deepblue/windows-itpro-docs
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/MicrosoftDocs/windows-itpro-docs.git synced 2025-06-20 12:53:38 +00:00
Code Issues Actions 3 Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Per comments from CHallum, put tbl rows and sections in different order

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
JanKeller1
2017-02-17 13:04:58 -08:00
parent 29391a8423
commit 075af0d222
1 changed files with 85 additions and 85 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

170
windows/keep-secure/overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md
View File

@ -42,16 +42,16 @@ Windows 10 mitigations that you can configure are listed in the following two ta
| Mitigation and corresponding threat | Description and links |
|---|---|
| **Device Guard**,<br>which helps keep a device free of<br>malware or other untrusted apps<br>(can be enhanced by Secure Boot, described in the next row) | Device Guard includes Code Integrity policies, a whitelist you create of trusted apps—the only apps allowed to run in your organization. Device Guard also includes a powerful system mitigation called hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI), which leverages virtualization-based security (VBS) to protect Windows’ kernel-mode code integrity validation process. HVCI has specific hardware requirements, and works with Code Integrity policies to help stop attacks even if they gain entrance to the kernel.<br>Device Guard is included in Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows Server 2016.<br><br>**More information**: [Introduction to Device Guard](introduction-to-device-guard-virtualization-based-security-and-code-integrity-policies.md) |
| **UEFI Secure Boot**,<br>which mitigates against<br>bootkits and rootkits | Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Secure Boot helps to protect the boot process and firmware from tampering, such as from a physically present attacker or from forms of malware that run early in the boot process or in kernel after startup.<br><br>**More information**: [UEFI and Secure Boot](bitlocker-countermeasures.md#uefi-and-secure-boot)</a> |
| **Early Launch Antimalware (ELAM)**,<br>which mitigates against<br>rootkits disguised as drivers | Early Launch Antimalware (ELAM) is designed to enable the antimalware solution to start before all non-Microsoft drivers and apps. If malware modifies a boot-related driver, ELAM will detect the change, and Windows will prevent the driver from starting, thus blocking driver-based rootkits.<br><br>**More information**: [Early Launch Antimalware](bitlocker-countermeasures.md#protection-during-startup) |
| **Device Health Attestation**,<br>which mitigates against<br>compromised devices that<br>might access an<br>organization’s assets | Device Health Attestation (DHA) provides a way to confirm that devices attempting to connect to an organization's network are in a healthy state, not compromised with malware. When DHA has been configured, a device’s actual boot data measurements can be checked against the expected "healthy" boot data. If the check indicates a device is unhealthy, the device can be prevented from accessing the network.<br><br>**More information**: [Control the health of Windows 10-based devices](protect-high-value-assets-by-controlling-the-health-of-windows-10-based-devices.md) and [Device Health Attestation](https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/security/device-health-attestation) |
| **Credential Guard**,<br>which mitigates against<br>credential theft attacks, such as Pass-the-Hash or Pass-The-Ticket | Credential Guard uses virtualization-based security to isolate secrets, such as NTLM password hashes and Kerberos Ticket Granting Tickets, so that only privileged system software can access them.<br>Credential Guard is included in Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows Server 2016.<br><br>**More information**: [Protect derived domain credentials with Credential Guard](credential-guard.md) |
| **Enterprise certificate pinning**,<br>which mitigates against<br>man-in-the-middle attacks that leverage PKI | With enterprise certificate pinning, you can “pin” (associate) an X.509 certificate and its public key to its legitimate Certification Authority, either root or leaf. This helps protect your enterprise’s intranet sites (not external Internet sites) by providing validation for digitally signed certificates (SSL certificates) used while browsing. This feature mitigates against man-in the-middle attacks that involve these certificates.<br><br>**More information**: ENTERPRISE_CERTIFICATE_PINNING_LINK |
| **Windows Defender SmartScreen**,<br>which mitigates against<br>malicious applications that<br>a user might download | Windows Defender SmartScreen can check the reputation of a downloaded application by using a service that Microsoft maintains. The first time a user runs an app that originates from the Internet (even if the user copied it from another PC), SmartScreen checks to see if the app lacks a reputation or is known to be malicious, and responds accordingly.<br><br>**More information**: [Windows Defender SmartScreen](#windows-defender-smartscreen), later in this topic |
| **Windows Defender Antivirus**, which mitigates against<br>multiple threats | Windows 10 includes Windows Defender Antivirus, a robust inbox antimalware solution. Windows Defender Antivirus has been significantly improved since it was introduced in Windows 8.<br><br>**More information**: [Windows Defender Antivirus](#windows-defender-antivirus), later in this topic |
| **Blocking of untrusted fonts**, <br>which mitigates against<br>elevation-of-privilege attacks from untrusted fonts | The Block Untrusted Fonts setting allows you to prevent users from loading untrusted fonts onto your network, which can mitigate against elevation-of-privilege attacks associated with the parsing of font files. However, as of Windows 10, version 1703, this mitigation is less important, because font parsing is isolated in an [AppContainer sandbox](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/mt595898(v=vs.85).aspx) (for a list describing this and other kernel pool protections, see [Kernel pool protections](#kernel-pool-protections), later in this topic).<br><br>**More information**: [Block untrusted fonts in an enterprise](block-untrusted-fonts-in-enterprise.md) |
| **Memory protections** listed in [Table 2](#table-2),<br>which mitigate against<br>malware that uses memory<br>manipulation techniques such as<br>buffer overruns | This set of mitigations helps to protect against memory-based attacks, where malware or other code manipulates memory to gain control of a system. For example, malware might use buffer overruns to inject malicious executable code into memory.<br>A minority of trusted apps will not be able to run if some of these mitigations are set to their most restrictive settings. Testing can help you maximize protection while still allowing needed apps to run correctly.<br><br>**More information**: [Table 2](#table-2), later in this topic |
| **Windows Defender SmartScreen**,<br>which helps prevent<br>malicious applications<br>from even being downloaded | Windows Defender SmartScreen can check the reputation of a downloaded application by using a service that Microsoft maintains. The first time a user runs an app that originates from the Internet (even if the user copied it from another PC), SmartScreen checks to see if the app lacks a reputation or is known to be malicious, and responds accordingly.<br><br>**More information**: [Windows Defender SmartScreen](#windows-defender-smartscreen), later in this topic |
| **Credential Guard**,<br>which helps keep attackers<br>from gaining access through<br>Pass-the-Hash or<br>Pass-the-Ticket attacks | Credential Guard uses virtualization-based security to isolate secrets, such as NTLM password hashes and Kerberos Ticket Granting Tickets, so that only privileged system software can access them.<br>Credential Guard is included in Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows Server 2016.<br><br>**More information**: [Protect derived domain credentials with Credential Guard](credential-guard.md) |
| **Enterprise certificate pinning**,<br>which helps keep users<br>from being deceived by<br>man-in-the-middle attacks<br>that leverage PKI | With enterprise certificate pinning, you can “pin” (associate) an X.509 certificate and its public key to its legitimate Certification Authority, either root or leaf. This helps protect your enterprise’s intranet sites (not external Internet sites) by providing validation for digitally signed certificates (SSL certificates) used while browsing. This feature mitigates man-in the-middle attacks that involve these certificates.<br><br>**More information**: ENTERPRISE_CERTIFICATE_PINNING_LINK |
| **Device Guard**,<br>which helps keep a device<br>from running malware or<br>other untrusted apps | Device Guard includes Code Integrity policies, a whitelist you create of trusted apps—the only apps allowed to run in your organization. Device Guard also includes a powerful system mitigation called hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI), which leverages virtualization-based security (VBS) to protect Windows’ kernel-mode code integrity validation process. HVCI has specific hardware requirements, and works with Code Integrity policies to help stop attacks even if they gain entrance to the kernel.<br>Device Guard is included in Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows Server 2016.<br><br>**More information**: [Introduction to Device Guard](introduction-to-device-guard-virtualization-based-security-and-code-integrity-policies.md) |
| **Windows Defender Antivirus**,<br>which helps keep devices<br>free of viruses and other<br>known software threats | Windows 10 includes Windows Defender Antivirus, a robust inbox antimalware solution. Windows Defender Antivirus has been significantly improved since it was introduced in Windows 8.<br><br>**More information**: [Windows Defender Antivirus](#windows-defender-antivirus), later in this topic |
| **Blocking of untrusted fonts**,<br>which helps prevent fonts<br>from being used in<br>elevation-of-privilege attacks | The Block Untrusted Fonts setting allows you to prevent users from loading untrusted fonts onto your network, which can mitigate elevation-of-privilege attacks associated with the parsing of font files. However, as of Windows 10, version 1703, this mitigation is less important, because font parsing is isolated in an [AppContainer sandbox](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/mt595898(v=vs.85).aspx) (for a list describing this and other kernel pool protections, see [Kernel pool protections](#kernel-pool-protections), later in this topic).<br><br>**More information**: [Block untrusted fonts in an enterprise](block-untrusted-fonts-in-enterprise.md) |
| **Memory protections** listed in [Table 2](#table-2),<br>which help prevent malware<br>from using memory manipulation<br>techniques such as buffer<br>overruns | This set of mitigations helps to protect against memory-based attacks, where malware or other code manipulates memory to gain control of a system. For example, malware might use buffer overruns to inject malicious executable code into memory.<br>A minority of trusted apps will not be able to run if some of these mitigations are set to their most restrictive settings. Testing can help you maximize protection while still allowing needed apps to run correctly.<br><br>**More information**: [Table 2](#table-2), later in this topic |
| **UEFI Secure Boot**,<br>which helps protect<br>the platform from<br>bootkits and rootkits | Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Secure Boot helps to protect the boot process and firmware from tampering, such as from a physically present attacker or from forms of malware that run early in the boot process or in kernel after startup.<br><br>**More information**: [UEFI and Secure Boot](bitlocker-countermeasures.md#uefi-and-secure-boot)</a> |
| **Early Launch Antimalware (ELAM)**,<br>which helps protect<br>the platform from<br>rootkits disguised as drivers | Early Launch Antimalware (ELAM) is designed to enable the antimalware solution to start before all non-Microsoft drivers and apps. If malware modifies a boot-related driver, ELAM will detect the change, and Windows will prevent the driver from starting, thus blocking driver-based rootkits.<br><br>**More information**: [Early Launch Antimalware](bitlocker-countermeasures.md#protection-during-startup) |
| **Device Health Attestation**,<br>which helps prevent<br>compromised devices from<br>accessing an organization’s<br>assets | Device Health Attestation (DHA) provides a way to confirm that devices attempting to connect to an organization's network are in a healthy state, not compromised with malware. When DHA has been configured, a device’s actual boot data measurements can be checked against the expected "healthy" boot data. If the check indicates a device is unhealthy, the device can be prevented from accessing the network.<br><br>**More information**: [Control the health of Windows 10-based devices](protect-high-value-assets-by-controlling-the-health-of-windows-10-based-devices.md) and [Device Health Attestation](https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/security/device-health-attestation) |
Configurable Windows 10 mitigations oriented specifically toward memory manipulation are listed in the following table. Detailed understanding of these threats and mitigations requires knowledge of how the operating system and applications handle memory—knowledge used by developers but not necessarily by IT professionals. However, from an IT professional’s perspective, the basic process for maximizing these types of mitigations is to work in a test lab to discover whether a given setting interferes with any needed applications. Then you can deploy settings that maximize protection while still allowing needed apps to run correctly.
@ -61,9 +61,53 @@ Also, as an IT professional, you can ask application developers and software ven
| Mitigation and corresponding threat | Description |
|---|---|
| **Data Execution Prevention (DEP),** which mitigates against<br>exploitation of buffer overruns | **Data Execution Prevention (DEP)** is a system-level memory protection feature that has been available in Windows operating systems for over a decade. DEP enables the operating system to mark one or more pages of memory as non-executable, which prevents code from being run from that region of memory, to help prevent exploitation of buffer overruns.<br>DEP helps prevent code from being run from data pages such as the default heap, stacks, and memory pools. Although some applications have compatibility problems with DEP, the vast majority of applications do not.<br>For more information, see [Data Execution Prevention](#data-execution-prevention), later in this topic.<br><br>**Group Policy settings**: DEP is on by default for 64-bit applications, but you can configure additional DEP protections by using the Group Policy settings described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). |
| **SEHOP**,<br>which mitigates against<br>overwrites of the Structured Exception Handler | **Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP)** is designed to block exploits that use the Structured Exception Handler (SEH) overwrite technique. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps to protect apps regardless of whether they have been compiled with the latest improvements. Although some applications have compatibility problems with SEHOP, the vast majority of applications do not.<br>For more information, see [Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection](#structured-exception-handling-overwrite-protection), later in this topic.<br><br>**Group Policy setting**: SEHOP is on by default for 64-bit applications, but you can configure additional SEHOP protections by using the Group Policy setting described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). |
| **ASLR**,<br>which mitigates against<br>malware attacks based on expected memory locations | **Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)** loads DLLs into random memory addresses at boot time. This mitigates against malware that's designed to attack specific memory locations, where specific DLLs are expected to be loaded.<br>For more information, see [Address Space Layout Randomization](#address-space-layout-randomization), later in this topic.<br><br>**Group Policy settings**: ASLR is on by default for 64-bit applications, but you can configure additional ASLR protections by using the Group Policy settings described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). |
| **Data Execution Prevention (DEP),** which helps prevent<br>exploitation of buffer overruns | **Data Execution Prevention (DEP)** is a system-level memory protection feature that has been available in Windows operating systems for over a decade. DEP enables the operating system to mark one or more pages of memory as non-executable, which prevents code from being run from that region of memory, to help prevent exploitation of buffer overruns.<br>DEP helps prevent code from being run from data pages such as the default heap, stacks, and memory pools. Although some applications have compatibility problems with DEP, the vast majority of applications do not.<br>For more information, see [Data Execution Prevention](#data-execution-prevention), later in this topic.<br><br>**Group Policy settings**: DEP is on by default for 64-bit applications, but you can configure additional DEP protections by using the Group Policy settings described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). |
| **SEHOP**,<br>which helps prevent<br>overwrites of the<br>Structured Exception Handler | **Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP)** is designed to block exploits that use the Structured Exception Handler (SEH) overwrite technique. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps to protect apps regardless of whether they have been compiled with the latest improvements. Although some applications have compatibility problems with SEHOP, the vast majority of applications do not.<br>For more information, see [Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection](#structured-exception-handling-overwrite-protection), later in this topic.<br><br>**Group Policy setting**: SEHOP is on by default for 64-bit applications, but you can configure additional SEHOP protections by using the Group Policy setting described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). |
| **ASLR**,<br>which mitigates malware<br>attacks based on<br>expected memory locations | **Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)** loads DLLs into random memory addresses at boot time. This mitigates malware that's designed to attack specific memory locations, where specific DLLs are expected to be loaded.<br>For more information, see [Address Space Layout Randomization](#address-space-layout-randomization), later in this topic.<br><br>**Group Policy settings**: ASLR is on by default for 64-bit applications, but you can configure additional ASLR protections by using the Group Policy settings described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). |
### Windows Defender SmartScreen
Starting with Windows Internet Explorer 8, the SmartScreen Filter has helped protect users from both malicious applications and nefarious websites by using the SmartScreen Filter’s application and URL reputation services. The SmartScreen Filter in Internet Explorer would check URLs and newly downloaded apps against an online reputation service that Microsoft maintained. If the app or URL were not known to be safe, SmartScreen Filter would warn the user or even prevent the app or URL from loading, depending on how systems administrators had configured Group Policy settings.
For Windows 10, Microsoft further developed SmartScreen, now called Windows Defender SmartScreen, by integrating its app reputation abilities into the operating system itself, which allows SmartScreen to check the reputation of files downloaded from the Internet and warn users when they’re about to run a high-risk downloaded file. The first time a user runs an app that originates from the Internet, SmartScreen checks the reputation of the application by using digital signatures and other factors against a service that Microsoft maintains. If the app lacks a reputation or is known to be malicious, SmartScreen warns the user or blocks execution entirely, depending on how the administrator has configured Group Policy (see Figure 4).
![SmartScreen Filter at work in Windows 10](images/security-fig7-smartscreenfilter.png)
**Figure 4.&nbsp;&nbsp;SmartScreen at work in Windows 10**
<!-- There are probably some deletions to make in the following paragraph, and the screenshot needs to be replaced. Wait and see -- other information will likely be coming in. -->
By default, users have the option to bypass SmartScreen protection so that it will not prevent a user from running a legitimate app. You can use Control Panel or Group Policy settings to disable SmartScreen or to completely prevent users from running apps that SmartScreen does not recognize. The Control Panel settings are shown in Figure 5.
![SmartScreen configuration options](images/security-fig8-smartscreenconfig.png)
**Figure 5.&nbsp;&nbsp;The Windows SmartScreen configuration options in Control Panel**
If you want to try SmartScreen, use Windows 7 to download this simulated (but not dangerous) malware [file:freevideo.exe](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkId=626943). Save it to your computer, and then run it from Windows Explorer. As shown in Figure 6, Windows 7 runs the app without much warning. In Windows 7, you might receive a warning message about the app not having a certificate, but you can easily bypass it.
![Windows 7 allows the app to run](images/security-fig9-windows7allow.png)
**Figure 6.&nbsp;&nbsp;Windows 7 allows the app to run**
Now, repeat the test on a computer running Windows 10 by copying the file to a Windows 10 PC or by downloading the file again and saving it to your local computer. Run the file directly from File Explorer, and SmartScreen will warn you before it allows it to run. Microsoft’s data shows that for a vast majority of users, that extra warning is enough to save them from a malware infection.
### Windows Defender Antivirus
Windows included Windows Defender Antivirus, a robust inbox antimalware solution, starting with Windows 8, when it was called Windows Defender. With Windows 10, Microsoft significantly improved Windows Defender Antivirus. Windows Defender Antivirus in Windows 10 uses a four-pronged approach to improve antimalware:
- **Rich local context** improves how malware is identified. Windows 10 informs Windows Defender Antivirus not only about content like files and processes but also where the content came from, where it has been stored, and more. The information about source and history enables Windows Defender Antivirus to apply different levels of scrutiny to different content.
- **Extensive global sensors** help keep Windows Defender Antivirus current and aware of even the newest malware. This is accomplished in two ways: by collecting the rich local context data from end points and by centrally analyzing that data. The goal is to identify new, emerging malware and block it in the first critical hours of its lifetime to limit exposure to the broader PC ecosystem.
- **Tamper proofing** helps guard Windows Defender Antivirus itself against malware attacks. For example, Windows Defender Antivirus uses Protected Processes, which prevents untrusted processes from attempting to tamper with Windows Defender Antivirus components, its registry keys, and so on. ([Protected Processes](#protected-processes) is described later in this topic.)
- **Enterprise-level features** give IT pros the tools and configuration options necessary to make Windows Defender Antivirus an enterprise-class antimalware solution.
<!-- Watch the link text for the following links - try to keep it in sync with the actual topic. -->
For more information, see [Windows Defender in Windows 10](windows-defender-in-windows-10.md) and [Windows Defender Overview for Windows Server](https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/security/windows-defender/windows-defender-overview-windows-server).
For information about Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection, a service that helps enterprises to detect, investigate, and respond to advanced and targeted attacks on their networks, see [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (ATP)](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/WindowsForBusiness/windows-atp) (resources) and [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (ATP)](https://technet.microsoft.com/itpro/windows/keep-secure/windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection) (documentation).
### Data Execution Prevention
@ -137,50 +181,6 @@ The ASLR implementation in Windows 10 is greatly improved over Windows 7, espe
You can use the Group Policy setting called **Process Mitigation Options** to control ASLR settings (“Force ASLR” and “Bottom-up ASLR”), as described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md).
### Windows Defender SmartScreen
Starting with Windows Internet Explorer 8, the SmartScreen Filter has helped protect users from both malicious applications and nefarious websites by using the SmartScreen Filter’s application and URL reputation services. The SmartScreen Filter in Internet Explorer would check URLs and newly downloaded apps against an online reputation service that Microsoft maintained. If the app or URL were not known to be safe, SmartScreen Filter would warn the user or even prevent the app or URL from loading, depending on how systems administrators had configured Group Policy settings.
For Windows 10, Microsoft further developed SmartScreen, now called Windows Defender SmartScreen, by integrating its app reputation abilities into the operating system itself, which allows SmartScreen to check the reputation of files downloaded from the Internet and warn users when they’re about to run a high-risk downloaded file. The first time a user runs an app that originates from the Internet, SmartScreen checks the reputation of the application by using digital signatures and other factors against a service that Microsoft maintains. If the app lacks a reputation or is known to be malicious, SmartScreen warns the user or blocks execution entirely, depending on how the administrator has configured Group Policy (see Figure 4).
![SmartScreen Filter at work in Windows 10](images/security-fig7-smartscreenfilter.png)
**Figure 4.&nbsp;&nbsp;SmartScreen at work in Windows 10**
<!-- There are probably some deletions to make in the following paragraph, and the screenshot needs to be replaced. Wait and see -- other information will likely be coming in. -->
By default, users have the option to bypass SmartScreen protection so that it will not prevent a user from running a legitimate app. You can use Control Panel or Group Policy settings to disable SmartScreen or to completely prevent users from running apps that SmartScreen does not recognize. The Control Panel settings are shown in Figure 5.
![SmartScreen configuration options](images/security-fig8-smartscreenconfig.png)
**Figure 5.&nbsp;&nbsp;The Windows SmartScreen configuration options in Control Panel**
If you want to try SmartScreen, use Windows 7 to download this simulated (but not dangerous) malware [file:freevideo.exe](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkId=626943). Save it to your computer, and then run it from Windows Explorer. As shown in Figure 6, Windows 7 runs the app without much warning. In Windows 7, you might receive a warning message about the app not having a certificate, but you can easily bypass it.
![Windows 7 allows the app to run](images/security-fig9-windows7allow.png)
**Figure 6.&nbsp;&nbsp;Windows 7 allows the app to run**
Now, repeat the test on a computer running Windows 10 by copying the file to a Windows 10 PC or by downloading the file again and saving it to your local computer. Run the file directly from File Explorer, and SmartScreen will warn you before it allows it to run. Microsoft’s data shows that for a vast majority of users, that extra warning is enough to save them from a malware infection.
### Windows Defender Antivirus
Windows included Windows Defender Antivirus, a robust inbox antimalware solution, starting with Windows 8, when it was called Windows Defender. With Windows 10, Microsoft significantly improved Windows Defender Antivirus. Windows Defender Antivirus in Windows 10 uses a four-pronged approach to improve antimalware:
- **Rich local context** improves how malware is identified. Windows 10 informs Windows Defender Antivirus not only about content like files and processes but also where the content came from, where it has been stored, and more. The information about source and history enables Windows Defender Antivirus to apply different levels of scrutiny to different content.
- **Extensive global sensors** help keep Windows Defender Antivirus current and aware of even the newest malware. This is accomplished in two ways: by collecting the rich local context data from end points and by centrally analyzing that data. The goal is to identify new, emerging malware and block it in the first critical hours of its lifetime to limit exposure to the broader PC ecosystem.
- **Tamper proofing** helps guard Windows Defender Antivirus itself against malware attacks. For example, Windows Defender Antivirus uses Protected Processes, which prevents untrusted processes from attempting to tamper with Windows Defender Antivirus components, its registry keys, and so on. ([Protected Processes](#protected-processes) is described later in this topic.)
- **Enterprise-level features** give IT pros the tools and configuration options necessary to make Windows Defender Antivirus an enterprise-class antimalware solution.
<!-- Watch the link text for the following links - try to keep it in sync with the actual topic. -->
For more information, see [Windows Defender in Windows 10](windows-defender-in-windows-10.md) and [Windows Defender Overview for Windows Server](https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/security/windows-defender/windows-defender-overview-windows-server).
For information about Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection, a service that helps enterprises to detect, investigate, and respond to advanced and targeted attacks on their networks, see [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (ATP)](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/WindowsForBusiness/windows-atp) (resources) and [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (ATP)](https://technet.microsoft.com/itpro/windows/keep-secure/windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection) (documentation).
## Windows 10 mitigations that need no configuration
Windows 10 provides many threat mitigations that are built into the operating system and need no configuration within the operating system. The table that follows describes some of these mitigations.
@ -191,13 +191,34 @@ One of the mitigations, Control Flow Guard (CFG), needs no configuration within
| Mitigation and corresponding threat | Description |
|---|---|
| **Heap protections**,<br>which mitigate against<br>exploitation of the heap | Windows 10 includes protections for the heap, such as the use of internal data structures which help protect against corruption of memory used by the heap.<br><br>**More information**: [Windows heap protections](#windows-heap-protections), later in this topic. |
| **Kernel pool protections**,<br>which mitigate against<br>exploitation of pool memory used by the kernel | Windows 10 includes protections for the pool of memory used by the kernel. For example, safe unlinking protects against pool overruns that are combined with unlinking operations to create an attack.<br><br>**More information**: [Kernel pool protections](#kernel-pool-protections), later in this topic. |
| **Control Flow Guard**,<br>which mitigates against<br>exploits based on flow between code locations in memory | Control Flow Guard (CFG) is a mitigation that requires no configuration within the operating system, but instead can be built into software when it’s compiled. It is built into Microsoft Edge, IE11, and other features in Windows 10. CFG can be built into applications written in C or C++, or applications compiled using Visual Studio 2015.<br>For such an application, CFG can detect an attacker’s attempt to change the intended flow of code. If this occurs, CFG terminates the application. Administrators can request software vendors to deliver Windows applications compiled with CFG enabled.<br><br>**More information**: [Control Flow Guard](#control-flow-guard), later in this topic. |
| **Protected Processes**,<br>to mitigate against<br>one process tampering<br>with another process | With the Protected Processes feature, Windows 10 prevents untrusted processes from interacting or tampering with those that have been specially signed.<br><br>**More information**: [Protected Processes](#protected-processes), later in this topic. |
| **SMB hardening for SYSVOL and NETLOGON shares**,<br>which mitigates against<br>man-in-the-middle attacks | Client connections to the Active Directory Domain Services default SYSVOL and NETLOGON shares on domain controllers now require SMB signing and mutual authentication (such as Kerberos).<br><br>**More information**: [SMB hardening improvements for SYSVOL and NETLOGON shares](#smb-hardening-improvements-for-sysvol-and-netlogon-shares), later in this topic. |
| **Universal Windows apps protections**,<br>which mitigate against<br>multiple threats | Universal Windows apps are carefully screened before being made available, and they run in an AppContainer sandbox with limited privileges and capabilities.<br><br>**More information**: [Universal Windows apps protections](#universal-windows-apps-protections), later in this topic. |
| **Protections built into Microsoft Edge** (the browser),<br>which mitigate against<br>multiple threats | Windows 10 includes an entirely new browser, Microsoft Edge, designed with multiple security improvements.<br><br>**More information**: [Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer 11](#microsoft-edge-and-internet-explorer-11), later in this topic. |
| **SMB hardening for SYSVOL and NETLOGON shares**,<br>which mitigates<br>man-in-the-middle attacks | Client connections to the Active Directory Domain Services default SYSVOL and NETLOGON shares on domain controllers now require SMB signing and mutual authentication (such as Kerberos).<br><br>**More information**: [SMB hardening improvements for SYSVOL and NETLOGON shares](#smb-hardening-improvements-for-sysvol-and-netlogon-shares), later in this topic. |
| **Protected Processes**,<br>which help prevent one process<br>from tampering with another<br>process | With the Protected Processes feature, Windows 10 prevents untrusted processes from interacting or tampering with those that have been specially signed.<br><br>**More information**: [Protected Processes](#protected-processes), later in this topic. |
| **Universal Windows apps protections**,<br>which screen downloadable<br>apps and run them in<br>an AppContainer sandbox | Universal Windows apps are carefully screened before being made available, and they run in an AppContainer sandbox with limited privileges and capabilities.<br><br>**More information**: [Universal Windows apps protections](#universal-windows-apps-protections), later in this topic. |
| **Heap protections**,<br>which help prevent<br>exploitation of the heap | Windows 10 includes protections for the heap, such as the use of internal data structures which help protect against corruption of memory used by the heap.<br><br>**More information**: [Windows heap protections](#windows-heap-protections), later in this topic. |
| **Kernel pool protections**,<br>which help prevent<br>exploitation of pool memory<br>used by the kernel | Windows 10 includes protections for the pool of memory used by the kernel. For example, safe unlinking protects against pool overruns that are combined with unlinking operations to create an attack.<br><br>**More information**: [Kernel pool protections](#kernel-pool-protections), later in this topic. |
| **Control Flow Guard**,<br>which mitigates exploits<br>that are based on<br>flow between code locations<br>in memory | Control Flow Guard (CFG) is a mitigation that requires no configuration within the operating system, but instead can be built into software when it’s compiled. It is built into Microsoft Edge, IE11, and other features in Windows 10. CFG can be built into applications written in C or C++, or applications compiled using Visual Studio 2015.<br>For such an application, CFG can detect an attacker’s attempt to change the intended flow of code. If this occurs, CFG terminates the application. Administrators can request software vendors to deliver Windows applications compiled with CFG enabled.<br><br>**More information**: [Control Flow Guard](#control-flow-guard), later in this topic. |
| **Protections built into Microsoft Edge** (the browser),<br>which mitigate multiple<br>threats | Windows 10 includes an entirely new browser, Microsoft Edge, designed with multiple security improvements.<br><br>**More information**: [Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer 11](#microsoft-edge-and-internet-explorer-11), later in this topic. |
### SMB hardening improvements for SYSVOL and NETLOGON shares
In Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016, client connections to the Active Directory Domain Services default SYSVOL and NETLOGON shares on domain controllers require Server Message Block (SMB) signing and mutual authentication (such as Kerberos). This reduces the likelihood of man-in-the-middle attacks. If SMB signing and mutual authentication are unavailable, a computer running Windows 10 or Windows Server 2016 won’t process domain-based Group Policy and scripts.
> [!NOTE]
> The registry values for these settings aren’t present by default, but the hardening rules still apply until overridden by Group Policy or other registry values. For more information on these security improvements, (also referred to as UNC hardening), see [Microsoft Knowledge Base article 3000483](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/3000483/ms15-011-vulnerability-in-group-policy-could-allow-remote-code-execution-february-10,-2015) and [MS15-011 & MS15-014: Hardening Group Policy](https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2015/02/10/ms15-011-ms15-014-hardening-group-policy/).
### Protected Processes
Most security controls are designed to prevent the initial infection point. However, despite all the best preventative controls, malware might eventually find a way to infect the system. So, some protections are built to place limits on any malware that might be running. Protected Processes creates limits of this type.
With Protected Processes, Windows 10 prevents untrusted processes from interacting or tampering with those that have been specially signed. Protected Processes defines levels of trust for processes. Less trusted processes are prevented from interacting with and therefore attacking more trusted processes. Windows 10 uses Protected Processes more broadly across the operating system, and as in Windows 8.1, implements them in a way that can be used by 3rd party anti-malware vendors, as described in [Protecting Anti-Malware Services](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/dn313124(v=vs.85).aspx). This helps make the system and antimalware solutions less susceptible to tampering by malware that does manage to get on the system.
### Universal Windows apps protections
When users download Universal Windows apps or even Windows Classic applications (Win32) from the Windows Store, it’s highly unlikely that they will encounter malware, because all apps go through a careful screening process before being made available in the store. Apps that organizations build and distribute through sideloading processes will need to be reviewed internally to ensure that they meet organizational security requirements.
Regardless of how users acquire Universal Windows apps, they can use them with increased confidence. Unlike Windows Classic applications, which can run with elevated privileges and have potentially sweeping access to the system and data, Universal Windows apps run in an AppContainer sandbox with limited privileges and capabilities. For example, Universal Windows apps have no system-level access, have tightly controlled interactions with other apps, and have no access to data unless the user explicitly grants the application permission.
In addition, all Universal Windows apps follow the security principle of least privilege. Apps receive only the minimum privileges they need to perform their legitimate tasks, so even if an attacker exploits an app, the damage the exploit can do is severely limited and should be contained within the sandbox. The Windows Store displays the exact capabilities the app requires (for example, access to the camera), along with the app’s age rating and publisher.
### Windows heap protections
@ -239,27 +260,6 @@ An administrator cannot configure CFG; rather, an application developer can take
Of course, browsers are a key entry point for attacks, so Microsoft Edge, IE, and other Windows features take full advantage of CFG.
### Protected Processes
Most security controls are designed to prevent the initial infection point. However, despite all the best preventative controls, malware might eventually find a way to infect the system. So, some protections are built to place limits on any malware that might be running. Protected Processes creates limits of this type.
With Protected Processes, Windows 10 prevents untrusted processes from interacting or tampering with those that have been specially signed. Protected Processes defines levels of trust for processes. Less trusted processes are prevented from interacting with and therefore attacking more trusted processes. Windows 10 uses Protected Processes more broadly across the operating system, and as in Windows 8.1, implements them in a way that can be used by 3rd party anti-malware vendors, as described in [Protecting Anti-Malware Services](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/dn313124(v=vs.85).aspx). This helps make the system and antimalware solutions less susceptible to tampering by malware that does manage to get on the system.
### SMB hardening improvements for SYSVOL and NETLOGON shares
In Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016, client connections to the Active Directory Domain Services default SYSVOL and NETLOGON shares on domain controllers require Server Message Block (SMB) signing and mutual authentication (such as Kerberos). This reduces the likelihood of man-in-the-middle attacks. If SMB signing and mutual authentication are unavailable, a computer running Windows 10 or Windows Server 2016 won’t process domain-based Group Policy and scripts.
> [!NOTE]
> The registry values for these settings aren’t present by default, but the hardening rules still apply until overridden by Group Policy or other registry values. For more information on these security improvements, (also referred to as UNC hardening), see [Microsoft Knowledge Base article 3000483](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/3000483/ms15-011-vulnerability-in-group-policy-could-allow-remote-code-execution-february-10,-2015) and [MS15-011 & MS15-014: Hardening Group Policy](https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2015/02/10/ms15-011-ms15-014-hardening-group-policy/).
### Universal Windows apps protections
When users download Universal Windows apps or even Windows Classic applications (Win32) from the Windows Store, it’s highly unlikely that they will encounter malware, because all apps go through a careful screening process before being made available in the store. Apps that organizations build and distribute through sideloading processes will need to be reviewed internally to ensure that they meet organizational security requirements.
Regardless of how users acquire Universal Windows apps, they can use them with increased confidence. Unlike Windows Classic applications, which can run with elevated privileges and have potentially sweeping access to the system and data, Universal Windows apps run in an AppContainer sandbox with limited privileges and capabilities. For example, Universal Windows apps have no system-level access, have tightly controlled interactions with other apps, and have no access to data unless the user explicitly grants the application permission.
In addition, all Universal Windows apps follow the security principle of least privilege. Apps receive only the minimum privileges they need to perform their legitimate tasks, so even if an attacker exploits an app, the damage the exploit can do is severely limited and should be contained within the sandbox. The Windows Store displays the exact capabilities the app requires (for example, access to the camera), along with the app’s age rating and publisher.
### Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer 11
Browser security is a critical component of any security strategy, and for good reason: the browser is the user’s interface to the Internet, an environment with many malicious sites and content waiting to attack. Most users cannot perform at least part of their job without a browser, and many users are completely reliant on one. This reality has made the browser the number one pathway from which malicious hackers initiate their attacks.