Use the DisableSettingsImportNotify parameter to disable notification.| |`Set-UevConfiguration -CurrentComputerUser -EnableSettingsImportNotify`|Configures the UE-V service to notify the current user when settings synchronization is delayed.
Use the DisableSettingsImportNotify parameter to disable notification.| - |`Set-UevConfiguration -Computer -EnableSyncUnlistedWindows8Apps`|Configures the UE-V service to synchronize all Windows apps that are not explicitly disabled by the Windows app list for all users of the computer. For more information, see "Get-UevAppxPackage" in [Managing UE-V Settings Location Templates Using Windows PowerShell and WMI](uev-managing-settings-location-templates-using-windows-powershell-and-wmi.md).
Use the DisableSyncUnlistedWindows8Apps parameter to configure the UE-V service to synchronize only Windows apps that are explicitly enabled by the Windows App List.| - |`Set-UevConfiguration -CurrentComputerUser - EnableSyncUnlistedWindows8Apps`|Configures the UE-V service to synchronize all Windows apps that are not explicitly disabled by the Windows app list for the current user on the computer. For more information, see "Get-UevAppxPackage" in [Managing UE-V Settings Location Templates Using Windows PowerShell and WMI](uev-managing-settings-location-templates-using-windows-powershell-and-wmi.md).
Use the DisableSyncUnlistedWindows8Apps parameter to configure the UE-V service to synchronize only Windows apps that are explicitly enabled by the Windows App List.| + |`Set-UevConfiguration -Computer -EnableSyncUnlistedWindows8Apps`|Configures the UE-V service to synchronize all Windows apps that aren't explicitly disabled by the Windows app list for all users of the computer. For more information, see "Get-UevAppxPackage" in [Managing UE-V Settings Location Templates Using Windows PowerShell and WMI](uev-managing-settings-location-templates-using-windows-powershell-and-wmi.md).
Use the DisableSyncUnlistedWindows8Apps parameter to configure the UE-V service to synchronize only Windows apps that are explicitly enabled by the Windows App List.| + |`Set-UevConfiguration -CurrentComputerUser - EnableSyncUnlistedWindows8Apps`|Configures the UE-V service to synchronize all Windows apps that aren't explicitly disabled by the Windows app list for the current user on the computer. For more information, see "Get-UevAppxPackage" in [Managing UE-V Settings Location Templates Using Windows PowerShell and WMI](uev-managing-settings-location-templates-using-windows-powershell-and-wmi.md).
Use the DisableSyncUnlistedWindows8Apps parameter to configure the UE-V service to synchronize only Windows apps that are explicitly enabled by the Windows App List.| |`Set-UevConfiguration -Computer -DisableSync`|Disables UE-V for all the users on the computer.
Use the EnableSync parameter to enable or re-enable.| |`Set-UevConfiguration -CurrentComputerUser -DisableSync`|Disables UE-V for the current user on the computer.
Use the EnableSync parameter to enable or re-enable.| |`Set-UevConfiguration -Computer -EnableTrayIcon`|Enables the UE-V icon in the notification area for all users of the computer.
Use the DisableTrayIcon parameter to disable the icon.| @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ You can use Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) and Windows PowerShell to m |`$config = Get-WmiObject -Namespace root\Microsoft\UEV ComputerConfiguration`
`$config. `$config.Put()`|Updates a specific per-computer setting. To clear the setting, use $null as the setting value.|
|`$config = Get-WmiObject -Namespace root\Microsoft\UEV ComputerConfiguration` `$config. `$config.Put()`|Updates a specific per-user setting for all users of the computer. To clear the setting, use $null as the setting value.|
-When you are finished configuring the UE-V service with WMI and Windows PowerShell, the defined configuration is stored in the registry in the following locations.
+When you're finished configuring the UE-V service with WMI and Windows PowerShell, the defined configuration is stored in the registry in the following locations.
`\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\UEV\Agent\Configuration`
diff --git a/windows/configuration/ue-v/uev-migrating-settings-packages.md b/windows/configuration/ue-v/uev-migrating-settings-packages.md
index eaa34a41eb..2716fc1659 100644
--- a/windows/configuration/ue-v/uev-migrating-settings-packages.md
+++ b/windows/configuration/ue-v/uev-migrating-settings-packages.md
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ In the lifecycle of a User Experience Virtualization (UE-V) deployment, you migh
- Migration of a settings storage location share from a test server to a production server
-Simply copying the files and folders does not preserve the security settings and permissions. The following steps describe how to correctly copy the settings package along with their NTFS file system permissions to a new share.
+Simply copying the files and folders doesn't preserve the security settings and permissions. The following steps describe how to correctly copy the settings package along with their NTFS file system permissions to a new share.
**To preserve UE-V settings packages when you migrate to a new server**
diff --git a/windows/configuration/ue-v/uev-prepare-for-deployment.md b/windows/configuration/ue-v/uev-prepare-for-deployment.md
index 81cf471c17..f44d3f47be 100644
--- a/windows/configuration/ue-v/uev-prepare-for-deployment.md
+++ b/windows/configuration/ue-v/uev-prepare-for-deployment.md
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Whether you want to synchronize settings for only default Windows applications o
- [Enable the UE-V service](uev-deploy-required-features.md#enable-the-ue-v-service) on user computers
-If you want to use UE-V to synchronize user-defined settings for custom applications (third-party or line-of-business), you'll need to install and configure these optional additional UE-V features:
+If you want to use UE-V to synchronize user-defined settings for custom applications (third-party or line-of-business), you’ll need to install and configure these optional extra UE-V features:
[Deploy UE-V for custom applications](uev-deploy-uev-for-custom-applications.md)
@@ -90,13 +90,13 @@ When you enable the UE-V service on user devices, it registers a default group o
| Microsoft Office 2016 applications | Microsoft Access 2016 This group is the first set of devices to send data to Windows Autopatch and are used to generate a health signal across all customers. For example, we can generate a statistically significant signal saying that critical errors are trending up in a specific release for all customers but can't be confident that it's doing so in your environment. Since Windows Autopatch doesn't yet have sufficient data to inform a release decision, devices in this ring might experience outages if there are scenarios that weren't covered during testing in the Test ring.|
-| Fast | 9% | The Fast ring is the second group of production users to receive changes. The signals from the First ring are considered as a part of the release process to the Broad ring. The goal with this ring is to cross the 500-device threshold needed to generate statistically significant analysis at the tenant level. These extra devices allow Windows Autopatch to consider the effect of a release on the rest of your devices and evaluate if a targeted action for your tenant is needed. This group is the first set of devices to send data to Windows Autopatch and are used to generate a health signal across all end-users. For example, Windows Autopatch can generate a statistically significant signal saying that critical errors are trending up in a specific release for all end-users, but can't be confident that it's doing so in your organization. Since Windows Autopatch doesn't yet have sufficient data to inform a release decision, devices in this deployment ring might experience outages if there are scenarios that weren't covered during early testing in the Test ring.|
+| Fast | **9%** | The Fast ring is the second group of production users to receive changes. The signals from the First ring are considered as a part of the release process to the Broad ring. The goal with this deployment ring is to cross the **500**-device threshold needed to generate statistically significant analysis at the tenant level. These extra devices allow Windows Autopatch to consider the effect of a release on the rest of your devices and evaluate if a targeted action for your tenant is needed. If a device hasn't been properly removed, it could show a status of "ready." If you move such a device, it's possible that the move won't be complete. If you don't see the **Ring assigned by column** change to **Pending** in Step 5, check that the device is available by searching for it in Intune. For more information, see [Device details in Intune](/mem/intune/remote-actions/device-inventory).
+> You can only move devices to other deployment rings when they're in an active state in the **Ready** tab. If you don't see the **Ring assigned by column** change to **Pending** in Step 5, check to see whether the device exists in Microsoft Endpoint Manager-Intune or not by searching for it in its device blade. For more information, see [Device details in Intune](/mem/intune/remote-actions/device-inventory).
+
+## Automated deployment ring remediation functions
+
+Windows Autopatch monitors device membership in its deployment rings, except for the **Modern Workplace Devices-Windows Autopatch-Test** ring, to provide automated deployment ring remediation functions to mitigate the risk of not having its managed devices being part of one of its deployment rings. These automated functions help mitigate risk of potentially having devices in a vulnerable state, and exposed to security threats in case they're not receiving update deployments due to either:
+
+- Changes performed by the IT admin on objects created by the Windows Autopatch tenant enrollment process, or
+- An issue occurred which prevented devices from getting a deployment rings assigned during the [device registration process](../deploy/windows-autopatch-device-registration-overview.md).
+
+There are two automated deployment ring remediation functions:
+
+| Function | Description |
+| ----- | ----- |
+| **Check Device Deployment Ring Membership** | Every hour, Windows Autopatch checks to see if any of its managed devices aren't part of one of the deployment rings. If, for some reason, a device isn't part of a deployment ring, Windows Autopatch randomly assigns the device to one of its deployment rings (except for the **Modern Workplace Devices-Windows Autopatch-Test** ring). |
+| **Multi-deployment ring device remediator:**| Every hour, Windows Autopatch checks to see if any of its managed devices are part of multiple deployment rings (except for the **Modern Workplace Devices-Windows Autopatch-Test** ring). If, for some reason, a device is part of multiple deployment rings, Windows Autopatch randomly removes device of one or more deployment rings until the device is only part of one deployment ring.|
+
+> [!IMPORTANT]
+> Windows Autopatch automated deployment ring functions doesn't assign or remove devices to or from the **Modern Workplace Devices-Windows Autopatch-Test** ring.
diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-wqu-overview.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-wqu-overview.md
index e58e36cbfd..c7c96c2575 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-wqu-overview.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-wqu-overview.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Windows quality updates
description: This article explains how Windows quality updates are managed in Autopatch
-ms.date: 05/30/2022
+ms.date: 08/08/2022
ms.prod: w11
ms.technology: windows
ms.topic: conceptual
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ For a device to be eligible for Windows quality updates as a part of Windows Aut
Windows Autopatch deploys the [B release of Windows quality updates](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-it-pro-blog/windows-quality-updates-primer/ba-p/2569385) that are released on the second Tuesday of each month.
-To release updates to devices in a gradual manner, Windows Autopatch deploys a set of mobile device management (MDM) policies to each update ring to control the rollout. There are three primary policies that are used to control Windows quality updates:
+To release updates to devices in a gradual manner, Windows Autopatch deploys a set of mobile device management (MDM) policies to each update deployment ring to control the rollout. There are three primary policies that are used to control Windows quality updates:
| Policy | Description |
| ----- | ----- |
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ To release updates to devices in a gradual manner, Windows Autopatch deploys a s
> [!IMPORTANT]
> Deploying deferral, deadline, or grace period policies which conflict with Autopatch's policies will cause a device to be considered ineligible for management, it will still receive policies from Windows Autopatch that are not in conflict, but may not function as designed. These devices will be marked as ineligible in our device reporting and will not count towards our [service level objective](#service-level-objective).
-Windows Autopatch configures these policies differently across update rings to gradually release the update to devices in your estate. Devices in the Test ring receive changes first and devices in the Broad ring receive changes last. For more information, see [Update rings](../operate/windows-autopatch-update-management.md#update-rings).
+Windows Autopatch configures these policies differently across update rings to gradually release the update to devices in your estate. Devices in the Test ring receive changes first and devices in the Broad ring receive changes last. For more information, see [Windows Autopatch deployment rings](../operate/windows-autopatch-update-management.md#windows-autopatch-deployment-rings).
:::image type="content" source="../media/release-process-timeline.png" alt-text="Release process timeline":::
diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/overview/windows-autopatch-faq.yml b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/overview/windows-autopatch-faq.yml
index 29d2234dde..54b36ea6ce 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/overview/windows-autopatch-faq.yml
+++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/overview/windows-autopatch-faq.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ metadata:
description: Answers to frequently asked questions about Windows Autopatch.
ms.prod: w11
ms.topic: faq
- ms.date: 07/06/2022
+ ms.date: 08/08/2022
audience: itpro
ms.localizationpriority: medium
manager: dougeby
@@ -96,9 +96,9 @@ sections:
- question: Can you customize the scheduling of an update rollout to only install on certain days and times?
answer: |
No, you can't customize update scheduling. However, you can specify [active hours](../operate/windows-autopatch-wqu-end-user-exp.md#servicing-window) to prevent users from updating during business hours.
- - question: Does Autopatch support include and exclude groups, or dynamic groups to define ring membership?
+ - question: Does Autopatch support include and exclude groups, or dynamic groups to define deployment ring membership?
answer: |
- Windows autopatch doesn't support managing update ring membership using your Azure AD groups. For more information, see [Move devices between rings](../operate/windows-autopatch-update-management.md#moving-devices-between-rings).
+ Windows autopatch doesn't support managing update deployment ring membership using your Azure AD groups. For more information, see [Moving devices in between deployment rings](../operate/windows-autopatch-update-management.md#moving-devices-in-between-deployment-rings).
- question: Does Autopatch have two release cadences per update or are there two release cadences per-ring?
answer: |
The release cadences are defined based on the update type. For example, a [regular cadence](../operate/windows-autopatch-wqu-overview.md#windows-quality-update-releases) (for a Windows quality update would be a gradual rollout from the Test ring to the Broad ring over 14 days whereas an [expedited release](../operate/windows-autopatch-wqu-overview.md#expedited-releases) would roll out more rapidly.
diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/prepare/windows-autopatch-enroll-tenant.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/prepare/windows-autopatch-enroll-tenant.md
index 99940fe13f..7ff9f212c0 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/prepare/windows-autopatch-enroll-tenant.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/prepare/windows-autopatch-enroll-tenant.md
@@ -99,6 +99,9 @@ Within the Readiness assessment tool, you'll now see the **Enroll** button. By s
Once these actions are complete, you've now successfully enrolled your tenant.
+> [!NOTE]
+> For more information about changes made to your tenant, see [Changes made at tenant enrollment](../references/windows-autopatch-changes-to-tenant.md).
+
### Delete data collected from the Readiness assessment tool
You can choose to delete the data we collect directly within the Readiness assessment tool.
diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/prepare/windows-autopatch-prerequisites.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/prepare/windows-autopatch-prerequisites.md
index 2f4d13cfe0..abbe0e525e 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/prepare/windows-autopatch-prerequisites.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/prepare/windows-autopatch-prerequisites.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Prerequisites
description: This article details the prerequisites needed for Windows Autopatch
-ms.date: 06/30/2022
+ms.date: 08/04/2022
ms.prod: w11
ms.technology: windows
ms.topic: conceptual
@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ Windows Autopatch is included with Window 10/11 Enterprise E3 or higher. The fol
The following Windows OS 10 editions, 1809 builds and architecture are supported in Windows Autopatch:
-- x64 architecture
- Windows 10 (1809+)/11 Pro
- Windows 10 (1809+)/11 Enterprise
- Windows 10 (1809+)/11 Pro for Workstations
@@ -51,8 +50,9 @@ The following Windows OS 10 editions, 1809 builds and architecture are supported
Windows Autopatch fully supports co-management. The following co-management requirements apply:
- Use a currently supported [Configuration Manager version](/mem/configmgr/core/servers/manage/updates#supported-versions).
-- Ensure ConfigMgr is connected to the internet and [cloud-attach with Intune](/mem/configmgr/cloud-attach/overview).
-- Ensure ConfigMgr is co-managed. For more information, see [Paths to co-management](/mem/configmgr/comanage/quickstart-paths).
-- Set the [Windows Update workload](/mem/configmgr/comanage/workloads#windows-update-policies) to Pilot Intune or Intune.
-- Set the [Device configuration workload](/mem/configmgr/comanage/workloads#device-configuration) to Pilot Intune or Intune.
-- Set the [Office Click-to-Run apps workload](/mem/configmgr/comanage/workloads#office-click-to-run-apps) to Pilot Intune or Intune.
+- ConfigMgr must be [cloud-attached with Intune (Co-management)](/mem/configmgr/cloud-attach/overview) and must have the following Co-management workloads enabled:
+ - Set the [Windows Update workload](/mem/configmgr/comanage/workloads#windows-update-policies) to Pilot Intune or Intune.
+ - Set the [Device configuration workload](/mem/configmgr/comanage/workloads#device-configuration) to Pilot Intune or Intune.
+ - Set the [Office Click-to-Run apps workload](/mem/configmgr/comanage/workloads#office-click-to-run-apps) to Pilot Intune or Intune.
+
+For more information, see [paths to co-management](/mem/configmgr/comanage/quickstart-paths).
diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/references/windows-autopatch-changes-to-tenant.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/references/windows-autopatch-changes-to-tenant.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62a9d46a41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/references/windows-autopatch-changes-to-tenant.md
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+---
+title: Changes made at tenant enrollment
+description: This reference article details the changes made to your tenant when enrolling into Windows Autopatch
+ms.date: 08/08/2022
+ms.prod: w11
+ms.technology: windows
+ms.topic: reference
+ms.localizationpriority: medium
+author: tiaraquan
+ms.author: tiaraquan
+manager: dougeby
+msreviewer: hathind
+---
+
+# Changes made at tenant enrollment
+
+## Service principal
+
+Windows Autopatch will create a service principal in your tenant allowing the service to establish an identity and restrict access to what resources the service has access to within the tenant. For more information, see [Application and service principal objects in Azure Active Directory](/azure/active-directory/develop/app-objects-and-service-principals#service-principal-object). The service principal created by Windows Autopatch is:
+
+- Modern Workplace Customer APIs
+
+## Azure Active Directory groups
+
+Windows Autopatch will create Azure Active Directory groups that are required to operate the service. The following groups are used for targeting Windows Autopatch configurations to devices and management of the service by our service accounts.
+
+| Group name | Description |
+| ----- | ----- |
+| Modern Workplace-All | All Modern Workplace users |
+| Modern Workplace - Windows 11 Pre-Release Test Devices | Device group for Windows 11 Pre-Release testing. |
+| Modern Workplace Devices-All | All Modern Workplace devices |
+| Modern Workplace Devices-Windows Autopatch-Test | Immediate ring for device rollout |
+| Modern Workplace Devices-Windows Autopatch-First | First production ring for early adopters |
+| Modern Workplace Devices-Windows Autopatch-Fast | Fast ring for quick rollout and adoption |
+| Modern Workplace Devices-Windows Autopatch-Broad | Final ring for broad rollout into an organization |
+| Modern Workplace Devices Dynamic - Windows 10 | Microsoft Managed Desktop Devices with Windows 10 Group Rule: Group Rule: Assigned to: Assigned to: Assigned to: Assigned to: Assigned to: Assigned to: Assigned to: Assigned to: Assigned to: Assigned to: Assigned to: Assigned to: Assigned to: Assigned to: Assigned to: Assigned to: Assigned to: Assigned to: Assigned to: Assigned to: Guests|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Can be moved out, but we do not recommend it.|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?|No|
-
-
-
-## KRBTGT account
-
-
-The KRBTGT account is a local default account that acts as a service account for the Key Distribution Center (KDC) service. This account cannot be deleted, and the account name cannot be changed. The KRBTGT account cannot be enabled in Active Directory.
-
-KRBTGT is also the security principal name used by the KDC for a Windows Server domain, as specified by RFC 4120. The KRBTGT account is the entity for the KRBTGT security principal, and it is created automatically when a new domain is created.
-
-Windows Server Kerberos authentication is achieved by the use of a special Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) enciphered with a symmetric key. This key is derived from the password of the server or service to which access is requested. The TGT password of the KRBTGT account is known only by the Kerberos service. In order to request a session ticket, the TGT must be presented to the KDC. The TGT is issued to the Kerberos client from the KDC.
-
-### KRBTGT account maintenance considerations
-
-A strong password is assigned to the KRBTGT and trust accounts automatically. Like any privileged service accounts, organizations should change these passwords on a regular schedule. The password for the KDC account is used to derive a secret key for encrypting and decrypting the TGT requests that are issued. The password for a domain trust account is used to derive an inter-realm key for encrypting referral tickets.
-
-Resetting the password requires you either to be a member of the Domain Admins group, or to have been delegated with the appropriate authority. In addition, you must be a member of the local Administrators group, or you must have been delegated the appropriate authority.
-
-After you reset the KRBTGT password, ensure that event ID 9 in the (Kerberos) Key-Distribution-Center event source is written to the System event log.
-
-### Security considerations
-
-It is also a best practice to reset the KRBTGT account password to ensure that a newly restored domain controller does not replicate with a compromised domain controller. In this case, in a large forest recovery that is spread across multiple locations, you cannot guarantee that all domain controllers are shut down, and if they are shut down, they cannot be rebooted again before all of the appropriate recovery steps have been undertaken. After you reset the KRBTGT account, another domain controller cannot replicate this account password by using an old password.
-
-An organization suspecting domain compromise of the KRBTGT account should consider the use of professional incident response services. The impact to restore the ownership of the account is domain-wide and labor intensive an should be undertaken as part of a larger recovery effort.
-
-The KRBTGT password is the key from which all trust in Kerberos chains up to. Resetting the KRBTGT password is similar to renewing the root CA certificate with a new key and immediately not trusting the old key, resulting in almost all subsequent Kerberos operations will be affected.
-
-For all account types (users, computers, and services)
-
-- All the TGTs that are already issued and distributed will be invalid because the DCs will reject them. These tickets are encrypted with the KRBTGT so any DC can validate them. When the password changes, the tickets become invalid.
-
-- All currently authenticated sessions that logged on users have established (based on their service tickets) to a resource (such as a file share, SharePoint site, or Exchange server) are good until the service ticket is required to re-authenticate.
-
-- NTLM authenticated connections are not affected
-
-Because it is impossible to predict the specific errors that will occur for any given user in a production operating environment, you must assume all computers and users will be affected.
-
-> [!IMPORTANT]
-> Rebooting a computer is the only reliable way to recover functionality as this will cause both the computer account and user accounts to log back in again. Logging in again will request new TGTs that are valid with the new KRBTGT, correcting any KRBTGT related operational issues on that computer.
-
-For information about how to help mitigate the risks associated with a potentially compromised KRBTGT account, see [KRBTGT Account Password Reset Scripts now available for customers](https://blogs.microsoft.com/cybertrust/2015/02/11/krbtgt-account-password-reset-scripts-now-available-for-customers/).
-
-### Read-only domain controllers and the KRBTGT account
-
-Windows Server 2008 introduced the read-only domain controller (RODC). The RODC is advertised as the Key Distribution Center (KDC) for the branch office. The RODC uses a different KRBTGT account and password than the KDC on a writable domain controller when it signs or encrypts ticket-granting ticket (TGT) requests. After an account is successfully authenticated, the RODC determines if a user's credentials or a computer's credentials can be replicated from the writable domain controller to the RODC by using the Password Replication Policy.
-
-After the credentials are cached on the RODC, the RODC can accept that user's sign-in requests until the credentials change. When a TGT is signed with the KRBTGT account of the RODC, the RODC recognizes that it has a cached copy of the credentials. If another domain controller signs the TGT, the RODC forwards requests to a writable domain controller.
-
-### KRBTGT account attributes
-
-For details about the KRBTGT account attributes, see the following table.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-` Global groups from any domain in the same forest Other Universal groups from any domain in the same forest|Can be converted to Domain Local scope if the group is not a member of any other Universal groups Can be converted to Global scope if the group does not contain any other Universal groups|On any domain in the same forest or trusting forests|Other Universal groups in the same forest Domain Local groups in the same forest or trusting forests Local groups on computers in the same forest or trusting forests|
-|Global|Accounts from the same domain Other Global groups from the same domain|Can be converted to Universal scope if the group is not a member of any other global group|On any domain in the same forest, or trusting domains or forests|Universal groups from any domain in the same forest Other Global groups from the same domain Domain Local groups from any domain in the same forest, or from any trusting domain|
-|Domain Local|Accounts from any domain or any trusted domain Global groups from any domain or any trusted domain Universal groups from any domain in the same forest Other Domain Local groups from the same domain Accounts, Global groups, and Universal groups from other forests and from external domains|Can be converted to Universal scope if the group does not contain any other Domain Local groups|Within the same domain|Other Domain Local groups from the same domain Local groups on computers in the same domain, excluding built-in groups that have well-known SIDs|
-
-### Special identity groups
-
-Special identities are generally referred to as groups. Special identity groups do not have specific memberships that can be modified, but they can represent different users at different times, depending on the circumstances. Some of these groups include Creator Owner, Batch, and Authenticated User.
-
-For information about all the special identity groups, see [Special Identities](special-identities.md).
-
-## Default security groups
-
-
-Default groups, such as the Domain Admins group, are security groups that are created automatically when you create an Active Directory domain. You can use these predefined groups to help control access to shared resources and to delegate specific domain-wide administrative roles.
-
-Many default groups are automatically assigned a set of user rights that authorize members of the group to perform specific actions in a domain, such as logging on to a local system or backing up files and folders. For example, a member of the Backup Operators group has the right to perform backup operations for all domain controllers in the domain.
-
-When you add a user to a group, the user receives all the user rights that are assigned to the group and all the permissions that are assigned to the group for any shared resources.
-
-Default groups are located in the **Builtin** container and in the **Users** container in Active Directory Users and Computers. The **Builtin** container includes groups that are defined with the Domain Local scope. The **Users** includes contains groups that are defined with Global scope and groups that are defined with Domain Local scope. You can move groups that are located in these containers to other groups or organizational units (OU) within the domain, but you cannot move them to other domains.
-
-Some of the administrative groups that are listed in this topic and all members of these groups are protected by a background process that periodically checks for and applies a specific security descriptor. This descriptor is a data structure that contains security information associated with a protected object. This process ensures that any successful unauthorized attempt to modify the security descriptor on one of the administrative accounts or groups will be overwritten with the protected settings.
-
-The security descriptor is present on the **AdminSDHolder** object. This means that if you want to modify the permissions on one of the service administrator groups or on any of its member accounts, you must modify the security descriptor on the **AdminSDHolder** object so that it will be applied consistently. Be careful when you make these modifications because you are also changing the default settings that will be applied to all of your protected administrative accounts.
-
-### Active Directory default security groups by operating system version
-
-The following tables provide descriptions of the default groups that are located in the **Builtin** and **Users** containers in each operating system.
-
-|Default Security Group|Windows Server 2016|Windows Server 2012 R2|Windows Server 2012|Windows Server 2008 R2|
-|--- |--- |--- |--- |--- |
-|[Access Control Assistance Operators](#bkmk-acasstops)|Yes|Yes|Yes||
-|[Account Operators](#bkmk-accountoperators)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Administrators](#bkmk-admins)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Allowed RODC Password Replication Group](#bkmk-allowedrodcpwdrepl)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Backup Operators](#bkmk-backupoperators)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Certificate Service DCOM Access](#bkmk-certificateservicedcomaccess)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Cert Publishers](#bkmk-certpublishers)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Cloneable Domain Controllers](#bkmk-cloneabledomaincontrollers)|Yes|Yes|Yes||
-|[Cryptographic Operators](#bkmk-cryptographicoperators)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Denied RODC Password Replication Group](#bkmk-deniedrodcpwdrepl)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Device Owners](#bkmk-device-owners)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Distributed COM Users](#bkmk-distributedcomusers)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[DnsUpdateProxy](#bkmk-dnsupdateproxy)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[DnsAdmins](#bkmk-dnsadmins)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Domain Admins](#bkmk-domainadmins)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Domain Computers](#bkmk-domaincomputers)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Domain Controllers](#bkmk-domaincontrollers)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Domain Guests](#bkmk-domainguests)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Domain Users](#bkmk-domainusers)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Enterprise Admins](#bkmk-entadmins)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Enterprise Key Admins](#enterprise-key-admins)|Yes||||
-|[Enterprise Read-only Domain Controllers](#bkmk-entrodc)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Event Log Readers](#bkmk-eventlogreaders)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Group Policy Creator Owners](#bkmk-gpcreatorsowners)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Guests](#bkmk-guests)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Hyper-V Administrators](#bkmk-hypervadministrators)|Yes|Yes|Yes||
-|[IIS_IUSRS](#bkmk-iis-iusrs)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Incoming Forest Trust Builders](#bkmk-inforesttrustbldrs)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Key Admins](#key-admins)|Yes||||
-|[Network Configuration Operators](#bkmk-networkcfgoperators)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Performance Log Users](#bkmk-perflogusers)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Performance Monitor Users](#bkmk-perfmonitorusers)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Pre–Windows 2000 Compatible Access](#bkmk-pre-ws2kcompataccess)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Print Operators](#bkmk-printoperators)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Protected Users](#bkmk-protectedusers)|Yes|Yes|||
-|[RAS and IAS Servers](#bkmk-rasandias)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[RDS Endpoint Servers](#bkmk-rdsendpointservers)|Yes|Yes|Yes||
-|[RDS Management Servers](#bkmk-rdsmanagementservers)|Yes|Yes|Yes||
-|[RDS Remote Access Servers](#bkmk-rdsremoteaccessservers)|Yes|Yes|Yes||
-|[Read-only Domain Controllers](#bkmk-rodc)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Remote Desktop Users](#bkmk-remotedesktopusers)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Remote Management Users](#bkmk-remotemanagementusers)|Yes|Yes|Yes||
-|[Replicator](#bkmk-replicator)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Schema Admins](#bkmk-schemaadmins)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Server Operators](#bkmk-serveroperators)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Storage Replica Administrators](#storage-replica-administrators)|Yes||||
-|[System Managed Accounts Group](#system-managed-accounts-group)|Yes||||
-|[Terminal Server License Servers](#bkmk-terminalserverlic)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Users](#bkmk-users)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[Windows Authorization Access Group](#bkmk-winauthaccess)|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
-|[WinRMRemoteWMIUsers_](#bkmk-winrmremotewmiusers-)||Yes|Yes||
-
-### Access Control Assistance Operators
-
-Members of this group can remotely query authorization attributes and permissions for resources on the computer.
-
-The Access Control Assistance Operators group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-32-579|
-|Type|Builtin Local|
-|Default container|CN=BuiltIn, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Cannot be moved|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?||
-|Default User Rights|None|
-
-### Account Operators
-
-The Account Operators group grants limited account creation privileges to a user. Members of this group can create and modify most types of accounts, including those of users, local groups, and global groups, and members can log in locally to domain controllers.
-
-Members of the Account Operators group cannot manage the Administrator user account, the user accounts of administrators, or the [Administrators](#bkmk-admins), [Server Operators](#bkmk-serveroperators), [Account Operators](#bkmk-accountoperators), [Backup Operators](#bkmk-backupoperators), or [Print Operators](#bkmk-printoperators) groups. Members of this group cannot modify user rights.
-
-The Account Operators group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-> [!NOTE]
-> By default, this built-in group has no members, and it can create and manage users and groups in the domain, including its own membership and that of the Server Operators group. This group is considered a service administrator group because it can modify Server Operators, which in turn can modify domain controller settings. As a best practice, leave the membership of this group empty, and do not use it for any delegated administration. This group cannot be renamed, deleted, or moved.
-
-
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-32-548|
-|Type|Builtin Local|
-|Default container|CN=BuiltIn, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|Yes|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Cannot be moved|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?|No|
-|Default User Rights|[Allow log on locally](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/allow-log-on-locally): SeInteractiveLogonRight|
-
-
-
-### Administrators
-
-Members of the Administrators group have complete and unrestricted access to the computer, or if the computer is promoted to a domain controller, members have unrestricted access to the domain.
-
-The Administrators group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-> [!NOTE]
-> The Administrators group has built-in capabilities that give its members full control over the system. This group cannot be renamed, deleted, or moved. This built-in group controls access to all the domain controllers in its domain, and it can change the membership of all administrative groups.
-
-Membership can be modified by members of the following groups: the default service Administrators, Domain Admins in the domain, or Enterprise Admins. This group has the special privilege to take ownership of any object in the directory or any resource on a domain controller. This account is considered a service administrator group because its members have full access to the domain controllers in the domain.
-
-
-
-This security group includes the following changes since Windows Server 2008:
-
-- Default user rights changes: **Allow log on through Terminal Services** existed in Windows Server 2008, and it was replaced by [Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/allow-log-on-through-remote-desktop-services).
-
-- [Remove computer from docking station](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/remove-computer-from-docking-station) was removed in Windows Server 2012 R2.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-32-544|
-|Type|Builtin Local|
-|Default container|CN=BuiltIn, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|Administrator, Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|Yes|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Cannot be moved|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?|No|
-|Default User Rights|[Adjust memory quotas for a process](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/adjust-memory-quotas-for-a-process): SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege [Access this computer from the network](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/access-this-computer-from-the-network): SeNetworkLogonRight [Allow log on locally](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/allow-log-on-locally): SeInteractiveLogonRight [Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/allow-log-on-through-remote-desktop-services): SeRemoteInteractiveLogonRight [Back up files and directories](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/back-up-files-and-directories): SeBackupPrivilege [Bypass traverse checking](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/bypass-traverse-checking): SeChangeNotifyPrivilege [Change the system time](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/change-the-system-time): SeSystemTimePrivilege [Change the time zone](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/change-the-time-zone): SeTimeZonePrivilege [Create a pagefile](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/create-a-pagefile): SeCreatePagefilePrivilege [Create global objects](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/create-global-objects): SeCreateGlobalPrivilege [Create symbolic links](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/create-symbolic-links): SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege [Debug programs](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/debug-programs): SeDebugPrivilege [Enable computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/enable-computer-and-user-accounts-to-be-trusted-for-delegation): SeEnableDelegationPrivilege [Force shutdown from a remote system](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/force-shutdown-from-a-remote-system): SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege [Impersonate a client after authentication](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/impersonate-a-client-after-authentication): SeImpersonatePrivilege [Increase scheduling priority](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/increase-scheduling-priority): SeIncreaseBasePriorityPrivilege [Load and unload device drivers](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/load-and-unload-device-drivers): SeLoadDriverPrivilege [Log on as a batch job](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/log-on-as-a-batch-job): SeBatchLogonRight [Manage auditing and security log](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/manage-auditing-and-security-log): SeSecurityPrivilege [Modify firmware environment values](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/modify-firmware-environment-values): SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege [Perform volume maintenance tasks](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/perform-volume-maintenance-tasks): SeManageVolumePrivilege [Profile system performance](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/profile-system-performance): SeSystemProfilePrivilege [Profile single process](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/profile-single-process): SeProfileSingleProcessPrivilege [Remove computer from docking station](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/remove-computer-from-docking-station): SeUndockPrivilege [Restore files and directories](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/restore-files-and-directories): SeRestorePrivilege [Shut down the system](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/shut-down-the-system): SeShutdownPrivilege [Take ownership of files or other objects](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/take-ownership-of-files-or-other-objects): SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege|
-
-### Allowed RODC Password Replication Group
-
-The purpose of this security group is to manage a RODC password replication policy. This group has no members by default, and it results in the condition that new Read-only domain controllers do not cache user credentials. The [Denied RODC Password Replication Group](#bkmk-deniedrodcpwdrepl) group contains a variety of high-privilege accounts and security groups. The Denied RODC Password Replication group supersedes the Allowed RODC Password Replication group.
-
-The Allowed RODC Password Replication group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-21-<domain>-571|
-|Type|Domain local|
-|Default container|CN=Users DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Cannot be moved|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?||
-|Default User Rights|None|
-
-### Backup Operators
-
-Members of the Backup Operators group can back up and restore all files on a computer, regardless of the permissions that protect those files. Backup Operators also can log on to and shut down the computer. This group cannot be renamed, deleted, or moved. By default, this built-in group has no members, and it can perform backup and restore operations on domain controllers. Its membership can be modified by the following groups: default service Administrators, Domain Admins in the domain, or Enterprise Admins. It cannot modify the membership of any administrative groups. While members of this group cannot change server settings or modify the configuration of the directory, they do have the permissions needed to replace files (including operating system files) on domain controllers. Because of this, members of this group are considered service administrators.
-
-The Backup Operators group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-32-551|
-|Type|Builtin Local|
-|Default container|CN=BuiltIn, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|Yes|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Cannot be moved|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?|No|
-|Default User Rights|[Allow log on locally](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/allow-log-on-locally): SeInteractiveLogonRight [Back up files and directories](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/back-up-files-and-directories): SeBackupPrivilege [Log on as a batch job](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/log-on-as-a-batch-job): SeBatchLogonRight [Restore files and directories](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/restore-files-and-directories): SeRestorePrivilege [Shut down the system](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/shut-down-the-system): SeShutdownPrivilege|
-
-
-
-### Certificate Service DCOM Access
-
-Members of this group are allowed to connect to certification authorities in the enterprise.
-
-The Certificate Service DCOM Access group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-32-<domain>-574|
-|Type|Domain Local|
-|Default container|CN=Builtin, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Cannot be moved|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?||
-|Default User Rights|None|
-
-
-### Cert Publishers
-
-Members of the Cert Publishers group are authorized to publish certificates for User objects in Active Directory.
-
-The Cert Publishers group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-21-<domain>-517|
-|Type|Domain Local|
-|Default container|CN=Users, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|[Denied RODC Password Replication Group](#bkmk-deniedrodcpwdrepl)|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Cannot be moved|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?|No|
-|Default User Rights|None|
-
-### Cloneable Domain Controllers
-
-Members of the Cloneable Domain Controllers group that are domain controllers may be cloned. In Windows Server 2012 R2 and Windows Server 2012, you can deploy domain controllers by copying an existing virtual domain controller. In a virtual environment, you no longer have to repeatedly deploy a server image that is prepared by using sysprep.exe, promote the server to a domain controller, and then complete additional configuration requirements for deploying each domain controller (including adding the virtual domain controller to this security group).
-
-For more information, see [Introduction to Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) Virtualization (Level 100)](/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/introduction-to-active-directory-domain-services-ad-ds-virtualization-level-100).
-
-This security group was introduced in Windows Server 2012, and it has not changed in subsequent versions.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-21-<domain>-522|
-|Type|Global|
-|Default container|CN=Users, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Cannot be moved|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?||
-|Default User Rights|None|
-
-### Cryptographic Operators
-
-Members of this group are authorized to perform cryptographic operations. This security group was added in Windows Vista Service Pack 1 (SP1) to configure Windows Firewall for IPsec in Common Criteria mode.
-
-The Cryptographic Operators group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-This security group was introduced in Windows Vista Service Pack 1, and it has not changed in subsequent versions.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-32-569|
-|Type|Builtin Local|
-|Default container|CN=Builtin, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Cannot be moved|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?||
-|Default User Rights|None|
-
-
-
-### Denied RODC Password Replication Group
-
-Members of the Denied RODC Password Replication group cannot have their passwords replicated to any Read-only domain controller.
-
-The purpose of this security group is to manage a RODC password replication policy. This group contains a variety of high-privilege accounts and security groups. The Denied RODC Password Replication Group supersedes the [Allowed RODC Password Replication Group](#bkmk-allowedrodcpwdrepl).
-
-This security group includes the following changes since Windows Server 2008:
-
-- Windows Server 2012 changed the default members to include [Cert Publishers](#bkmk-certpublishers).
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-21-<domain>-572|
-|Type|Domain local|
-|Default container|CN=Users, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|[Cert Publishers](#bkmk-certpublishers) [Domain Admins](#bkmk-domainadmins) [Domain Controllers](#bkmk-domaincontrollers) [Enterprise Admins](#bkmk-entadmins) Group Policy Creator Owners [Read-only Domain Controllers](#bkmk-rodc) [Schema Admins](#bkmk-schemaadmins)|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?||
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?||
-|Default User Rights|None|
-
-
-### Device Owners
-This group is not currently used in Windows.
-
-Microsoft does not recommend changing the default configuration where this security group has zero members. Changing the default configuration could hinder future scenarios that rely on this group.
-
-The Device Owners group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-32-583|
-|Type|Builtin Local|
-|Default container|CN=BuiltIn, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Can be moved out but it is not recommended|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?|No|
-|Default User Rights|[Allow log on locally](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/allow-log-on-locally): SeInteractiveLogonRight [Access this computer from the network](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/access-this-computer-from-the-network): SeNetworkLogonRight [Bypass traverse checking](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/bypass-traverse-checking): SeChangeNotifyPrivilege [Change the time zone](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/change-the-time-zone): SeTimeZonePrivilege|
-
-### Distributed COM Users
-
-Members of the Distributed COM Users group are allowed to launch, activate, and use Distributed COM objects on the computer. Microsoft Component Object Model (COM) is a platform-independent, distributed, object-oriented system for creating binary software components that can interact. Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) allows applications to be distributed across locations that make the most sense to you and to the application. This group appears as a SID until the domain controller is made the primary domain controller and it holds the operations master role (also known as flexible single master operations or FSMO).
-
-The Distributed COM Users group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-32-562|
-|Type|Builtin Local|
-|Default container|CN=Builtin, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Cannot be moved|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?||
-|Default User Rights|None|
-
-### DnsUpdateProxy
-
-Members of the DnsUpdateProxy group are DNS clients. They are permitted to perform dynamic updates on behalf of other clients (such as DHCP servers). A DNS server can develop stale resource records when a DHCP server is configured to dynamically register host (A) and pointer (PTR) resource records on behalf of DHCP clients by using dynamic update. Adding clients to this security group mitigates this scenario.
-
-However, to protect against unsecured records or to permit members of the DnsUpdateProxy group to register records in zones that allow only secured dynamic updates, you must create a dedicated user account and configure DHCP servers to perform DNS dynamic updates by using the credentials of this account (user name, password, and domain). Multiple DHCP servers can use the credentials of one dedicated user account. This group exists only if the DNS server role is or was once installed on a domain controller in the domain.
-
-For information, see [DNS Record Ownership and the DnsUpdateProxy Group](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd334715(v=ws.10)).
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-21-<domain>-<variable RI>|
-|Type|Global|
-|Default container|CN=Users, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Yes|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?||
-|Default User Rights|None|
-
-### DnsAdmins
-
-Members of DNSAdmins group have access to network DNS information. The default permissions are as follows: Allow: Read, Write, Create All Child objects, Delete Child objects, Special Permissions. This group exists only if the DNS server role is or was once installed on a domain controller in the domain.
-
-For more information about security and DNS, see [DNSSEC in Windows Server 2012](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn593694(v=ws.11)).
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-21-<domain>-<variable RI>|
-|Type|Builtin Local|
-|Default container|CN=Users, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Yes|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?||
-|Default User Rights|None|
-
-### Domain Admins
-
-Members of the Domain Admins security group are authorized to administer the domain. By default, the Domain Admins group is a member of the Administrators group on all computers that have joined a domain, including the domain controllers. The Domain Admins group is the default owner of any object that is created in Active Directory for the domain by any member of the group. If members of the group create other objects, such as files, the default owner is the Administrators group.
-
-The Domain Admins group controls access to all domain controllers in a domain, and it can modify the membership of all administrative accounts in the domain. Membership can be modified by members of the service administrator groups in its domain (Administrators and Domain Admins), and by members of the Enterprise Admins group. This is considered a service administrator account because its members have full access to the domain controllers in a domain.
-
-The Domain Admins group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-21-<domain>-512|
-|Type|Global|
-|Default container|CN=Users, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|Administrator|
-|Default member of|[Administrators](#bkmk-admins) [Denied RODC Password ReplicationGroup](#bkmk-deniedrodcpwdrepl)|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|Yes|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Yes|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?|No|
-|Default User Rights|See [Administrators](#bkmk-admins) See [Denied RODC Password Replication Group](#bkmk-deniedrodcpwdrepl)|
-
-
-
-### Domain Computers
-
-This group can include all computers and servers that have joined the domain, excluding domain controllers. By default, any computer account that is created automatically becomes a member of this group.
-
-The Domain Computers group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-21-<domain>-515|
-|Type|Global|
-|Default container|CN=Users, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|All computers joined to the domain, excluding domain controllers|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Yes (but not required)|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?|Yes|
-|Default User Rights|None|
-
-### Domain Controllers
-
-The Domain Controllers group can include all domain controllers in the domain. New domain controllers are automatically added to this group.
-
-The Domain Controllers group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-21-<domain>-516|
-|Type|Global|
-|Default container|CN=Users, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|Computer accounts for all domain controllers of the domain|
-|Default member of|[Denied RODC Password Replication Group](#bkmk-deniedrodcpwdrepl)|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|Yes|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|No|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?|No|
-|Default User Rights|None|
-
-### Domain Guests
-
-The Domain Guests group includes the domain’s built-in Guest account. When members of this group sign in as local guests on a domain-joined computer, a domain profile is created on the local computer.
-
-The Domain Guests group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-21-<domain>-514|
-|Type|Global|
-|Default container|CN=Users, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|Guest|
-|Default member of|[Guests](#bkmk-guests)|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|Yes|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Can be moved out but it is not recommended|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?|No|
-|Default User Rights|See [Guests](#bkmk-guests)|
-
-### Domain Users
-
-The Domain Users group includes all user accounts in a domain. When you create a user account in a domain, it is automatically added to this group.
-
-By default, any user account that is created in the domain automatically becomes a member of this group. This group can be used to represent all users in the domain. For example, if you want all domain users to have access to a printer, you can assign permissions for the printer to this group (or add the Domain Users group to a local group on the print server that has permissions for the printer).
-
-The Domain Users group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-21-<domain>-513|
-|Type|Global|
-|Default container|CN=Users, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|Administrator
-krbtgt|
-|Default member of|[Users](#bkmk-users)|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Yes|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?|No|
-|Default User Rights|See [Users](#bkmk-users)|
-
-### Enterprise Admins
-
-The Enterprise Admins group exists only in the root domain of an Active Directory forest of domains. It is a Universal group if the domain is in native mode; it is a Global group if the domain is in mixed mode. Members of this group are authorized to make forest-wide changes in Active Directory, such as adding child domains.
-
-By default, the only member of the group is the Administrator account for the forest root domain. This group is automatically added to the Administrators group in every domain in the forest, and it provides complete access for configuring all domain controllers. Members in this group can modify the membership of all administrative groups. Membership can be modified only by the default service administrator groups in the root domain. This is considered a service administrator account.
-
-The Enterprise Admins group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-21-<root domain>-519|
-|Type|Universal (if Domain is in Native-Mode) else Global|
-|Default container|CN=Users, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|Administrator|
-|Default member of|[Administrators](#bkmk-admins)
-[Denied RODC Password Replication Group](#bkmk-deniedrodcpwdrepl)|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|Yes|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Yes|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?|No|
-|Default User Rights|See [Administrators](#bkmk-admins) See [Denied RODC Password Replication Group](#bkmk-deniedrodcpwdrepl)|
-
-### Enterprise Key Admins
-
-Members of this group can perform administrative actions on key objects within the forest.
-
-The Enterprise Key Admins group was introduced in Windows Server 2016.
-
-| Attribute | Value |
-|-----------|-------|
-| Well-Known SID/RID | S-1-5-21-<domain>-527 |
-| Type | Global |
-| Default container | CN=Users, DC=<domain>, DC= |
-| Default members | None |
-| Default member of | None |
-| Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER? | Yes |
-| Safe to move out of default container? | Yes |
-| Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins? | No |
-| Default User Rights | None |
-
-
-### Enterprise Read-Only Domain Controllers
-
-Members of this group are Read-Only Domain Controllers in the enterprise. Except for account passwords, a Read-only domain controller holds all the Active Directory objects and attributes that a writable domain controller holds. However, changes cannot be made to the database that is stored on the Read-only domain controller. Changes must be made on a writable domain controller and then replicated to the Read-only domain controller.
-
-Read-only domain controllers address some of the issues that are commonly found in branch offices. These locations might not have a domain controller. Or, they might have a writable domain controller, but not the physical security, network bandwidth, or local expertise to support it.
-
-For more information, see [What Is an RODC?](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/cc771030(v=ws.10)).
-
-The Enterprise Read-Only Domain Controllers group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-21-<root domain>-498|
-|Type|Universal|
-|Default container|CN=Users, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|Yes|
-|Safe to move out of default container?||
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?||
-|Default User Rights|None|
-
-### Event Log Readers
-
-Members of this group can read event logs from local computers. The group is created when the server is promoted to a domain controller.
-
-The Event Log Readers group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-32-573|
-|Type|Domain Local|
-|Default container|CN=Users, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Cannot be moved|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?||
-|Default User Rights|None|
-
-### Group Policy Creator Owners
-
-This group is authorized to create, edit, or delete Group Policy Objects in the domain. By default, the only member of the group is Administrator.
-
-For information about other features you can use with this security group, see [Group Policy Overview](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/hh831791(v=ws.11)).
-
-The Group Policy Creator Owners group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-21-<domain>-520|
-|Type|Global|
-|Default container|CN=Users, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|Administrator|
-|Default member of|[Denied RODC Password Replication Group](#bkmk-deniedrodcpwdrepl)|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|No|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?|No|
-|Default User Rights|See [Denied RODC Password Replication Group](#bkmk-deniedrodcpwdrepl)|
-
-### Guests
-
-Members of the Guests group have the same access as members of the Users group by default, except that the Guest account has further restrictions. By default, the only member is the Guest account. The Guests group allows occasional or one-time users to sign in with limited privileges to a computer’s built-in Guest account.
-
-When a member of the Guests group signs out, the entire profile is deleted. This includes everything that is stored in the **%userprofile%** directory, including the user's registry hive information, custom desktop icons, and other user-specific settings. This implies that a guest must use a temporary profile to sign in to the system. This security group interacts with the Group Policy setting **Do not logon users with temporary profiles** when it is enabled. This setting is located under the following path:
-
-Computer Configuration\\Administrative Templates\\System\\User Profiles
-
-> [!NOTE]
-> A Guest account is a default member of the Guests security group. People who do not have an actual account in the domain can use the Guest account. A user whose account is disabled (but not deleted) can also use the Guest account.
-
-The Guest account does not require a password. You can set rights and permissions for the Guest account as in any user account. By default, the Guest account is a member of the built-in Guests group and the Domain Guests global group, which allows a user to sign in to a domain. The Guest account is disabled by default, and we recommend that it stay disabled.
-
-The Guests group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-32-546|
-|Type|Builtin Local|
-|Default container|CN=BuiltIn, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|[Domain Guests](#bkmk-domainguests)|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Cannot be moved|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?|No|
-|Default User Rights|None|
-
-
-### Hyper-V Administrators
-
-Members of the Hyper-V Administrators group have complete and unrestricted access to all the features in Hyper-V. Adding members to this group helps reduce the number of members required in the Administrators group, and further separates access.
-
-> [!NOTE]
-> Prior to Windows Server 2012, access to features in Hyper-V was controlled in part by membership in the Administrators group.
-
-
-
-This security group was introduced in Windows Server 2012, and it has not changed in subsequent versions.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-32-578|
-|Type|Builtin Local|
-|Default container|CN=BuiltIn, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Cannot be moved|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?||
-|Default User Rights|None|
-
-### IIS\_IUSRS
-
-IIS\_IUSRS is a built-in group that is used by Internet Information Services beginning with IIS 7.0. A built-in account and group are guaranteed by the operating system to always have a unique SID. IIS 7.0 replaces the IUSR\_MachineName account and the IIS\_WPG group with the IIS\_IUSRS group to ensure that the actual names that are used by the new account and group will never be localized. For example, regardless of the language of the Windows operating system that you install, the IIS account name will always be IUSR, and the group name will be IIS\_IUSRS.
-
-For more information, see [Understanding Built-In User and Group Accounts in IIS 7](/iis/get-started/planning-for-security/understanding-built-in-user-and-group-accounts-in-iis).
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-32-568|
-|Type|Builtin Local|
-|Default container|CN=BuiltIn, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|IUSR|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?||
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?||
-|Default User Rights|None|
-
-### Incoming Forest Trust Builders
-
-Members of the Incoming Forest Trust Builders group can create incoming, one-way trusts to this forest. Active Directory provides security across multiple domains or forests through domain and forest trust relationships. Before authentication can occur across trusts, Windows must determine whether the domain being requested by a user, computer, or service has a trust relationship with the logon domain of the requesting account.
-
-To make this determination, the Windows security system computes a trust path between the domain controller for the server that receives the request and a domain controller in the domain of the requesting account. A secured channel extends to other Active Directory domains through interdomain trust relationships. This secured channel is used to obtain and verify security information, including security identifiers (SIDs) for users and groups.
-
-> [!NOTE]
-> This group appears as a SID until the domain controller is made the primary domain controller and it holds the operations master role (also known as flexible single master operations or FSMO).
-
-
-
-For more information, see [How Domain and Forest Trusts Work: Domain and Forest Trusts](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc773178(v=ws.10)).
-
-The Incoming Forest Trust Builders group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-> [!NOTE]
-> This group cannot be renamed, deleted, or moved.
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-32-557|
-|Type|Builtin Local|
-|Default container|CN=Builtin, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Cannot be moved|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?|No|
-|Default User Rights|None|
-
-### Key Admins
-
-Members of this group can perform administrative actions on key objects within the domain.
-
-The Key Admins group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-| Attribute | Value |
-|-----------|-------|
-| Well-Known SID/RID | S-1-5-21-<domain>-526 |
-| Type | Global |
-| Default container | CN=Users, DC=<domain>, DC= |
-| Default members | None |
-| Default member of | None |
-| Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER? | Yes |
-| Safe to move out of default container? | Yes |
-| Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins? | No |
-| Default User Rights | None |
-
-
-
-### Network Configuration Operators
-
-Members of the Network Configuration Operators group can have the following administrative privileges to manage configuration of networking features:
-
-- Modify the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) properties for a local area network (LAN) connection, which includes the IP address, the subnet mask, the default gateway, and the name servers.
-
-- Rename the LAN connections or remote access connections that are available to all the users.
-
-- Enable or disable a LAN connection.
-
-- Modify the properties of all of remote access connections of users.
-
-- Delete all the remote access connections of users.
-
-- Rename all the remote access connections of users.
-
-- Issue **ipconfig**, **ipconfig /release**, or **ipconfig /renew** commands.
-
-- Enter the PIN unblock key (PUK) for mobile broadband devices that support a SIM card.
-
-> [!NOTE]
-> This group appears as a SID until the domain controller is made the primary domain controller and it holds the operations master role (also known as flexible single master operations or FSMO).
-
-
-The Network Configuration Operators group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-> [!NOTE]
-> This group cannot be renamed, deleted, or moved.
-
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-32-556|
-|Type|Builtin Local|
-|Default container|CN=Builtin, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Cannot be moved|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?|Yes|
-|Default User Rights|None|
-
-### Performance Log Users
-
-Members of the Performance Log Users group can manage performance counters, logs, and alerts locally on the server and from remote clients without being a member of the Administrators group. Specifically, members of this security group:
-
-- Can use all the features that are available to the Performance Monitor Users group.
-
-- Can create and modify Data Collector Sets after the group is assigned the [Log on as a batch job](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/log-on-as-a-batch-job) user right.
-
- > [!WARNING]
- > If you are a member of the Performance Log Users group, you must configure Data Collector Sets that you create to run under your credentials.
-
- > [!NOTE]
- > In Windows Server 2016 or later, Data Collector Sets cannot be created by a member of the Performance Log Users group.
- > If a member of the Performance Log Users group tries to create Data Collector Sets, they cannot complete creation because access will be denied.
-
-- Cannot use the Windows Kernel Trace event provider in Data Collector Sets.
-
-For members of the Performance Log Users group to initiate data logging or modify Data Collector Sets, the group must first be assigned the [Log on as a batch job](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/log-on-as-a-batch-job) user right. To assign this user right, use the Local Security Policy snap-in in Microsoft Management Console.
-
-> [!NOTE]
-> This group appears as a SID until the domain controller is made the primary domain controller and it holds the operations master role (also known as flexible single master operations or FSMO).
-
-
-The Performance Log Users group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-> [!NOTE]
-> This account cannot be renamed, deleted, or moved.
-
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-32-559|
-|Type|Builtin Local|
-|Default container|CN=Builtin, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Cannot be moved|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?|Yes|
-|Default User Rights|[Log on as a batch job](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/log-on-as-a-batch-job): SeBatchLogonRight|
-
-
-
-### Performance Monitor Users
-
-Members of this group can monitor performance counters on domain controllers in the domain, locally and from remote clients, without being a member of the Administrators or Performance Log Users groups. The Windows Performance Monitor is a Microsoft Management Console (MMC) snap-in that provides tools for analyzing system performance. From a single console, you can monitor application and hardware performance, customize what data you want to collect in logs, define thresholds for alerts and automatic actions, generate reports, and view past performance data in a variety of ways.
-
-Specifically, members of this security group:
-
-- Can use all the features that are available to the Users group.
-
-- Can view real-time performance data in Performance Monitor.
-
- Can change the Performance Monitor display properties while viewing data.
-
-- Cannot create or modify Data Collector Sets.
-
- > [!WARNING]
- > You cannot configure a Data Collector Set to run as a member of the Performance Monitor Users group.
-
-
-
-> [!NOTE]
-> This group appears as a SID until the domain controller is made the primary domain controller and it holds the operations master role (also known as flexible single master operations or FSMO). This group cannot be renamed, deleted, or moved.
-
-
-
-The Performance Monitor Users group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-32-558|
-|Type|Builtin Local|
-|Default container|CN=Builtin, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Cannot be moved|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?|Yes|
-|Default User Rights|None|
-
-
-### Pre–Windows 2000 Compatible Access
-
-Members of the Pre–Windows 2000 Compatible Access group have Read access for all users and groups in the domain. This group is provided for backward compatibility for computers running Windows NT 4.0 and earlier. By default, the special identity group, Everyone, is a member of this group. Add users to this group only if they are running Windows NT 4.0 or earlier.
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> This group appears as a SID until the domain controller is made the primary domain controller and it holds the operations master role (also known as flexible single master operations or FSMO).
-
-
-The Pre–Windows 2000 Compatible Access group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-32-554|
-|Type|Builtin Local|
-|Default container|CN=Builtin, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|If you choose the Pre–Windows 2000 Compatible Permissions mode, Everyone and Anonymous are members, and if you choose the Windows 2000-only permissions mode, Authenticated Users are members.|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Cannot be moved|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?|No|
-|Default User Rights|[Access this computer from the network](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/access-this-computer-from-the-network): SeNetworkLogonRight [Bypass traverse checking](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/bypass-traverse-checking): SeChangeNotifyPrivilege|
-
-
-
-### Print Operators
-
-Members of this group can manage, create, share, and delete printers that are connected to domain controllers in the domain. They can also manage Active Directory printer objects in the domain. Members of this group can locally sign in to and shut down domain controllers in the domain.
-
-This group has no default members. Because members of this group can load and unload device drivers on all domain controllers in the domain, add users with caution. This group cannot be renamed, deleted, or moved.
-
-The Print Operators group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008. However, in Windows Server 2008 R2, functionality was added to manage print administration. For more information, see [Assign Delegated Print Administrator and Printer Permission Settings in Windows Server 2012](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/jj190062(v=ws.11)).
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-32-550|
-|Type|Builtin Local|
-|Default container|CN=Builtin, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|Yes|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Cannot be moved|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?|No|
-|Default User Rights|[Allow log on locally](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/allow-log-on-locally): SeInteractiveLogonRight [Load and unload device drivers](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/load-and-unload-device-drivers): SeLoadDriverPrivilege [Shut down the system](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/shut-down-the-system): SeShutdownPrivilege|
-
-### Protected Users
-
-Members of the Protected Users group are afforded additional protection against the compromise of credentials during authentication processes.
-
-This security group is designed as part of a strategy to effectively protect and manage credentials within the enterprise. Members of this group automatically have non-configurable protection applied to their accounts. Membership in the Protected Users group is meant to be restrictive and proactively secure by default. The only method to modify the protection for an account is to remove the account from the security group.
-
-This domain-related, global group triggers non-configurable protection on devices and host computers, starting with the Windows Server 2012 R2 and Windows 8.1 operating systems. It also triggers non-configurable protection on domain controllers in domains with a primary domain controller running Windows Server 2012 R2 or Windows Server 2016. This greatly reduces the memory footprint of credentials when users sign in to computers on the network from a non-compromised computer.
-
-Depending on the account’s domain functional level, members of the Protected Users group are further protected due to behavior changes in the authentication methods that are supported in Windows.
-
-- Members of the Protected Users group cannot authenticate by using the following Security Support Providers (SSPs): NTLM, Digest Authentication, or CredSSP. Passwords are not cached on a device running Windows 8.1 or Windows 10, so the device fails to authenticate to a domain when the account is a member of the Protected User group.
-
-- The Kerberos protocol will not use the weaker DES or RC4 encryption types in the preauthentication process. This means that the domain must be configured to support at least the AES cipher suite.
-
-- The user’s account cannot be delegated with Kerberos constrained or unconstrained delegation. This means that former connections to other systems may fail if the user is a member of the Protected Users group.
-
-- The default Kerberos ticket-granting tickets (TGTs) lifetime setting of four hours is configurable by using Authentication Policies and Silos, which can be accessed through the Active Directory Administrative Center. This means that when four hours has passed, the user must authenticate again.
-
-The Protected Users group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-This group was introduced in Windows Server 2012 R2. For more information about how this group works, see [Protected Users Security Group](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn466518(v=ws.11)).
-
-The following table specifies the properties of the Protected Users group.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-known SID/RID|S-1-5-21-<domain>-525|
-|Type|Global|
-|Default container|CN=Users, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Yes|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-service admins?|No|
-|Default user rights|None|
-
-### RAS and IAS Servers
-
-Computers that are members of the RAS and IAS Servers group, when properly configured, are allowed to use remote access services. By default, this group has no members. Computers that are running the Routing and Remote Access service are added to the group automatically, such as IAS servers and Network Policy Servers. Members of this group have access to certain properties of User objects, such as Read Account Restrictions, Read Logon Information, and Read Remote Access Information.
-
-The RAS and IAS Servers group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-21-<domain>-553|
-|Type|Builtin Local|
-|Default container|CN=Users, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Yes|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?|Yes|
-|Default User Rights|None|
-
-### RDS Endpoint Servers
-
-Servers that are members in the RDS Endpoint Servers group can run virtual machines and host sessions where user RemoteApp programs and personal virtual desktops run. This group needs to be populated on servers running RD Connection Broker. Session Host servers and RD Virtualization Host servers used in the deployment need to be in this group.
-
-For information about Remote Desktop Services, see [Host desktops and apps in Remote Desktop Services](/windows-server/remote/remote-desktop-services/welcome-to-rds).
-
-This security group was introduced in Windows Server 2012, and it has not changed in subsequent versions.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-32-576|
-|Type|Builtin Local|
-|Default container|CN=Builtin, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Cannot be moved|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?||
-|Default User Rights|None|
-
-
-### RDS Management Servers
-
-Servers that are members in the RDS Management Servers group can be used to perform routine administrative actions on servers running Remote Desktop Services. This group needs to be populated on all servers in a Remote Desktop Services deployment. The servers running the RDS Central Management service must be included in this group.
-
-This security group was introduced in Windows Server 2012, and it has not changed in subsequent versions.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-32-577|
-|Type|Builtin Local|
-|Default container|CN=Builtin, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Cannot be moved|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?||
-|Default User Rights|None|
-
-### RDS Remote Access Servers
-
-Servers in the RDS Remote Access Servers group provide users with access to RemoteApp programs and personal virtual desktops. In Internet facing deployments, these servers are typically deployed in an edge network. This group needs to be populated on servers running RD Connection Broker. RD Gateway servers and RD Web Access servers that are used in the deployment need to be in this group.
-
-For more information, see [Host desktops and apps in Remote Desktop Services](/windows-server/remote/remote-desktop-services/welcome-to-rds).
-
-This security group was introduced in Windows Server 2012, and it has not changed in subsequent versions.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-32-575|
-|Type|Builtin Local|
-|Default container|CN=Builtin, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Cannot be moved|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?||
-|Default User Rights|None|
-
-### Read-Only Domain Controllers
-
-This group is comprised of the Read-only domain controllers in the domain. A Read-only domain controller makes it possible for organizations to easily deploy a domain controller in scenarios where physical security cannot be guaranteed, such as branch office locations, or in scenarios where local storage of all domain passwords is considered a primary threat, such as in an extranet or in an application-facing role.
-
-Because administration of a Read-only domain controller can be delegated to a domain user or security group, an Read-only domain controller is well suited for a site that should not have a user who is a member of the Domain Admins group. A Read-only domain controller encompasses the following functionality:
-
-- Read-only AD DS database
-
-- Unidirectional replication
-
-- Credential caching
-
-- Administrator role separation
-
-- Read-only Domain Name System (DNS)
-
-For information about deploying a Read-only domain controller, see [Understanding Planning and Deployment for Read-Only Domain Controllers](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/cc754719(v=ws.10)).
-
-This security group was introduced in Windows Server 2008, and it has not changed in subsequent versions.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-21-<domain>-521|
-|Type|Global|
-|Default container|CN=Users, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|[Denied RODC Password Replication Group](#bkmk-deniedrodcpwdrepl)|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|Yes|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Yes|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?||
-|Default User Rights|See [Denied RODC Password Replication Group](#bkmk-deniedrodcpwdrepl)|
-
-### Remote Desktop Users
-
-The Remote Desktop Users group on an RD Session Host server is used to grant users and groups permissions to remotely connect to an RD Session Host server. This group cannot be renamed, deleted, or moved. It appears as a SID until the domain controller is made the primary domain controller and it holds the operations master role (also known as flexible single master operations or FSMO).
-
-The Remote Desktop Users group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-32-555|
-|Type|Builtin Local|
-|Default container|CN=Builtin, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Cannot be moved|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?|Yes|
-|Default User Rights|None|
-
-
-
-
-### Remote Management Users
-
-Members of the Remote Management Users group can access WMI resources over management protocols (such as WS-Management via the Windows Remote Management service). This applies only to WMI namespaces that grant access to the user.
-
-The Remote Management Users group is generally used to allow users to manage servers through the Server Manager console, whereas the [WinRMRemoteWMIUsers\_](#bkmk-winrmremotewmiusers-) group is allows remotely running Windows PowerShell commands.
-
-For more information, see [What's New in MI?](/previous-versions/windows/desktop/wmi_v2/what-s-new-in-mi) and [About WMI](/windows/win32/wmisdk/about-wmi).
-
-This security group was introduced in Windows Server 2012, and it has not changed in subsequent versions.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-32-580|
-|Type|Builtin Local|
-|Default container|CN=Builtin, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Cannot be moved|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?||
-|Default User Rights|None|
-
-### Replicator
-
-Computers that are members of the Replicator group support file replication in a domain. Windows Server operating systems use the File Replication service (FRS) to replicate system policies and logon scripts stored in the System Volume (SYSVOL). Each domain controller keeps a copy of SYSVOL for network clients to access. FRS can also replicate data for the Distributed File System (DFS), synchronizing the content of each member in a replica set as defined by DFS. FRS can copy and maintain shared files and folders on multiple servers simultaneously. When changes occur, content is synchronized immediately within sites and by a schedule between sites.
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> In Windows Server 2008 R2, FRS cannot be used for replicating DFS folders or custom (non-SYSVOL) data. A Windows Server 2008 R2 domain controller can still use FRS to replicate the contents of a SYSVOL shared resource in a domain that uses FRS for replicating the SYSVOL shared resource between domain controllers.
-
-However, Windows Server 2008 R2 servers cannot use FRS to replicate the contents of any replica set apart from the SYSVOL shared resource. The DFS Replication service is a replacement for FRS, and it can be used to replicate the contents of a SYSVOL shared resource, DFS folders, and other custom (non-SYSVOL) data. You should migrate all non-SYSVOL FRS replica sets to DFS Replication. For more information, see:
-
-- [File Replication Service (FRS) Is Deprecated in Windows Server 2008 R2 (Windows)](/windows/win32/win7appqual/file-replication-service--frs--is-deprecated-in-windows-server-2008-r2)
-- [DFS Namespaces and DFS Replication Overview](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/jj127250(v=ws.11))
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-32-552|
-|Type|Builtin Local|
-|Default container|CN=Builtin, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|Yes|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Cannot be moved|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?||
-|Default User Rights|None|
-
-### Schema Admins
-
-Members of the Schema Admins group can modify the Active Directory schema. This group exists only in the root domain of an Active Directory forest of domains. It is a Universal group if the domain is in native mode; it is a Global group if the domain is in mixed mode.
-
-The group is authorized to make schema changes in Active Directory. By default, the only member of the group is the Administrator account for the forest root domain. This group has full administrative access to the schema.
-
-The membership of this group can be modified by any of the service administrator groups in the root domain. This is considered a service administrator account because its members can modify the schema, which governs the structure and content of the entire directory.
-
-For more information, see [What Is the Active Directory Schema?: Active Directory](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc784826(v=ws.10)).
-
-The Schema Admins group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-21-<root domain>-518|
-|Type|Universal (if Domain is in Native-Mode) else Global|
-|Default container|CN=Users, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|Administrator|
-|Default member of|[Denied RODC Password Replication Group](#bkmk-deniedrodcpwdrepl)|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|Yes|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Yes|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?|No|
-|Default User Rights|See [Denied RODC Password Replication Group](#bkmk-deniedrodcpwdrepl)|
-
-### Server Operators
-
-Members in the Server Operators group can administer domain controllers. This group exists only on domain controllers. By default, the group has no members. Members of the Server Operators group can sign in to a server interactively, create and delete network shared resources, start and stop services, back up and restore files, format the hard disk drive of the computer, and shut down the computer. This group cannot be renamed, deleted, or moved.
-
-By default, this built-in group has no members, and it has access to server configuration options on domain controllers. Its membership is controlled by the service administrator groups Administrators and Domain Admins in the domain, and the Enterprise Admins group in the forest root domain. Members in this group cannot change any administrative group memberships. This is considered a service administrator account because its members have physical access to domain controllers, they can perform maintenance tasks (such as backup and restore), and they have the ability to change binaries that are installed on the domain controllers. Note the default user rights in the following table.
-
-The Server Operators group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-32-549|
-|Type|Builtin Local|
-|Default container|CN=Builtin, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|Yes|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Cannot be moved|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?|No|
-|Default User Rights|[Allow log on locally](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/allow-log-on-locally): SeInteractiveLogonRight [Back up files and directories](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/back-up-files-and-directories): SeBackupPrivilege [Change the system time](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/change-the-system-time): SeSystemTimePrivilege [Change the time zone](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/change-the-time-zone): SeTimeZonePrivilege [Force shutdown from a remote system](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/force-shutdown-from-a-remote-system): SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege [Restore files and directories](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/restore-files-and-directories): Restore files and directories SeRestorePrivilege [Shut down the system](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/shut-down-the-system): SeShutdownPrivilege|
-
-### Storage Replica Administrators
-
-Members of this group have complete and unrestricted access to all features of Storage Replica.
-
-The Storage Replica Administrators group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-| Attribute | Value |
-|-----------|-------|
-| Well-Known SID/RID | S-1-5-32-582 |
-| Type | Builtin Local |
-| Default container | CN=BuiltIn, DC=<domain>, DC= |
-| Default members | None |
-| Default member of | None |
-| Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER? | No |
-| Safe to move out of default container? | Yes |
-| Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins? | No |
-| Default User Rights | None |
-
-
-
-### System Managed Accounts Group
-
-Members of this group are managed by the system.
-
-The System Managed Accounts group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-
-| Attribute | Value |
-|-----------|-------|
-| Well-Known SID/RID | S-1-5-32-581 |
-| Type | Builtin Local |
-| Default container | CN=BuiltIn, DC=<domain>, DC= |
-| Default members | Users |
-| Default member of | None |
-| Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER? | No |
-| Safe to move out of default container? | Yes |
-| Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins? | No |
-| Default User Rights | None |
-
-
-
-### Terminal Server License Servers
-
-Members of the Terminal Server License Servers group can update user accounts in Active Directory with information about license issuance. This is used to track and report TS Per User CAL usage. A TS Per User CAL gives one user the right to access a Terminal Server from an unlimited number of client computers or devices. This group appears as a SID until the domain controller is made the primary domain controller and it holds the operations master role (also known as flexible single master operations or FSMO).
-
-For more information about this security group, see [Terminal Services License Server Security Group Configuration](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/cc775331(v=ws.10)).
-
-The Terminal Server License Servers group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-> [!NOTE]
-> This group cannot be renamed, deleted, or moved.
-
-
-
-This security group only applies to Windows Server 2003 and Windows Server 2008 because Terminal Services was replaced by Remote Desktop Services in Windows Server 2008 R2.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-32-561|
-|Type|Builtin Local|
-|Default container|CN=Builtin, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Cannot be moved|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?|Yes|
-|Default User Rights|None|
-
-### Users
-
-Members of the Users group are prevented from making accidental or intentional system-wide changes, and they can run most applications. After the initial installation of the operating system, the only member is the Authenticated Users group. When a computer joins a domain, the Domain Users group is added to the Users group on the computer.
-
-Users can perform tasks such as running applications, using local and network printers, shutting down the computer, and locking the computer. Users can install applications that only they are allowed to use if the installation program of the application supports per-user installation. This group cannot be renamed, deleted, or moved.
-
-The Users group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-This security group includes the following changes since Windows Server 2008:
-
-- In Windows Server 2008 R2, INTERACTIVE was added to the default members list.
-
-- In Windows Server 2012, the default **Member Of** list changed from Domain Users to none.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-32-545|
-|Type|Builtin Local|
-|Default container|CN=Builtin, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|Authenticated Users [Domain Users](#bkmk-domainusers) INTERACTIVE|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Cannot be moved|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?|No|
-|Default User Rights|None|
-
-### Windows Authorization Access Group
-
-Members of this group have access to the computed token GroupsGlobalAndUniversal attribute on User objects. Some applications have features that read the token-groups-global-and-universal (TGGAU) attribute on user account objects or on computer account objects in Active Directory Domain Services. Some Win32 functions make it easier to read the TGGAU attribute. Applications that read this attribute or that call an API (referred to as a function) that reads this attribute do not succeed if the calling security context does not have access to the attribute. This group appears as a SID until the domain controller is made the primary domain controller and it holds the operations master role (also known as flexible single master operations or FSMO).
-
-The Windows Authorization Access group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-> [!NOTE]
-> This group cannot be renamed, deleted, or moved.
-
-
-This security group has not changed since Windows Server 2008.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-32-560|
-|Type|Builtin Local|
-|Default container|CN=Builtin, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|Enterprise Domain Controllers|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Cannot be moved|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?|Yes|
-|Default user rights|None|
-
-### WinRMRemoteWMIUsers\_
-
-In Windows 8 and in Windows Server 2012, a **Share** tab was added to the Advanced Security Settings user interface. This tab displays the security properties of a remote file share. To view this information, you must have the following permissions and memberships, as appropriate for the version of Windows Server that the file server is running.
-
-The WinRMRemoteWMIUsers\_ group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
-
-- If the file share is hosted on a server that is running a supported version of the operating system:
-
- - You must be a member of the WinRMRemoteWMIUsers\_\_ group or the BUILTIN\\Administrators group.
-
- - You must have Read permissions to the file share.
-
-- If the file share is hosted on a server that is running a version of Windows Server that is earlier than Windows Server 2012:
-
- - You must be a member of the BUILTIN\\Administrators group.
-
- - You must have Read permissions to the file share.
-
-In Windows Server 2012, the Access Denied Assistance functionality adds the Authenticated Users group to the local WinRMRemoteWMIUsers\_\_ group. Therefore, when the Access Denied Assistance functionality is enabled, all authenticated users who have Read permissions to the file share can view the file share permissions.
-
-> [!NOTE]
-> The WinRMRemoteWMIUsers\_ group allows running Windows PowerShell commands remotely whereas the [Remote Management Users](#bkmk-remotemanagementusers) group is generally used to allow users to manage servers by using the Server Manager console.
-
-
-
-This security group was introduced in Windows Server 2012, and it has not changed in subsequent versions.
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-21-<domain>-<variable RI>|
-|Type|Domain local|
-|Default container|CN=Users, DC=<domain>, DC=|
-|Default members|None|
-|Default member of|None|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Yes|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?||
-|Default User Rights|None|
-
-
-## See also
-
-- [Security Principals](security-principals.md)
-
-- [Special Identities](special-identities.md)
-
-- [Access Control Overview](access-control.md)
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/dynamic-access-control.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/dynamic-access-control.md
deleted file mode 100644
index b19feb4975..0000000000
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/dynamic-access-control.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,140 +0,0 @@
----
-title: Dynamic Access Control Overview (Windows 10)
-description: Learn about Dynamic Access Control and its associated elements, which were introduced in Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8.
-ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
-ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
-ms.topic: article
-ms.localizationpriority: medium
-ms.date: 04/19/2017
-ms.reviewer:
----
-
-# Dynamic Access Control Overview
-
-**Applies to**
-- Windows Server 2016
-
-This overview topic for the IT professional describes Dynamic Access Control and its associated elements, which were introduced in Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8.
-
-Domain-based Dynamic Access Control enables administrators to apply access-control permissions and restrictions based on well-defined rules that can include the sensitivity of the resources, the job or role of the user, and the configuration of the device that is used to access these resources.
-
-For example, a user might have different permissions when they access a resource from their office computer versus when they are using a portable computer over a virtual private network. Or access may be allowed only if a device meets the security requirements that are defined by the network administrators. When Dynamic Access Control is used, a user’s permissions change dynamically without additional administrator intervention if the user’s job or role changes (resulting in changes to the user’s account attributes in AD DS). For more detailed examples of Dynamic Access Control in use, see the scenarios described in [Dynamic Access Control: Scenario Overview](/windows-server/identity/solution-guides/dynamic-access-control--scenario-overview).
-
-Dynamic Access Control is not supported in Windows operating systems prior to Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8. When Dynamic Access Control is configured in environments with supported and non-supported versions of Windows, only the supported versions will implement the changes.
-
-Features and concepts associated with Dynamic Access Control include:
-
-- [Central access rules](#bkmk-rules)
-
-- [Central access policies](#bkmk-policies)
-
-- [Claims](#bkmk-claims)
-
-- [Expressions](#bkmk-expressions2)
-
-- [Proposed permissions](#bkmk-permissions2)
-
-### Central access rules
-
-A central access rule is an expression of authorization rules that can include one or more conditions involving user groups, user claims, device claims, and resource properties. Multiple central access rules can be combined into a central access policy.
-
-If one or more central access rules have been defined for a domain, file share administrators can match specific rules to specific resources and business requirements.
-
-### Central access policies
-
-Central access policies are authorization policies that include conditional expressions. For example, let’s say an organization has a business requirement to restrict access to personally identifiable information (PII) in files to only the file owner and members of the human resources (HR) department who are allowed to view PII information. This represents an organization-wide policy that applies to PII files wherever they are located on file servers across the organization. To implement this policy, an organization needs to be able to:
-
-- Identify and mark the files that contain the PII.
-
-- Identify the group of HR members who are allowed to view the PII information.
-
-- Add the central access policy to a central access rule, and apply the central access rule to all files that contain the PII, wherever they are located amongst the file servers across the organization.
-
-Central access policies act as security umbrellas that an organization applies across its servers. These policies are in addition to (but do not replace) the local access policies or discretionary access control lists (DACLs) that are applied to files and folders.
-
-### Claims
-
-A claim is a unique piece of information about a user, device, or resource that has been published by a domain controller. The user’s title, the department classification of a file, or the health state of a computer are valid examples of a claim. An entity can involve more than one claim, and any combination of claims can be used to authorize access to resources. The following types of claims are available in the supported versions of Windows:
-
-- **User claims** Active Directory attributes that are associated with a specific user.
-
-- **Device claims** Active Directory attributes that are associated with a specific computer object.
-
-- **Resource attributes** Global resource properties that are marked for use in authorization decisions and published in Active Directory.
-
-Claims make it possible for administrators to make precise organization- or enterprise-wide statements about users, devices, and resources that can be incorporated in expressions, rules, and policies.
-
-### Expressions
-
-Conditional expressions are an enhancement to access control management that allow or deny access to resources only when certain conditions are met, for example, group membership, location, or the security state of the device. Expressions are managed through the Advanced Security Settings dialog box of the ACL Editor or the Central Access Rule Editor in the Active Directory Administrative Center (ADAC).
-
-Expressions help administrators manage access to sensitive resources with flexible conditions in increasingly complex business environments.
-
-### Proposed permissions
-
-Proposed permissions enable an administrator to more accurately model the impact of potential changes to access control settings without actually changing them.
-
-Predicting the effective access to a resource helps you plan and configure permissions for those resources before implementing those changes.
-
-## Additional changes
-
-
-Additional enhancements in the supported versions of Windows that support Dynamic Access Control include:
-
-### Support in the Kerberos authentication protocol to reliably provide user claims, device claims, and device groups.
-
-By default, devices running any of the supported versions of Windows are able to process Dynamic Access Control-related Kerberos tickets, which include data needed for compound authentication. Domain controllers are able to issue and respond to Kerberos tickets with compound authentication-related information. When a domain is configured to recognize Dynamic Access Control, devices receive claims from domain controllers during initial authentication, and they receive compound authentication tickets when submitting service ticket requests. Compound authentication results in an access token that includes the identity of the user and the device on the resources that recognize Dynamic Access Control.
-
-### Support for using the Key Distribution Center (KDC) Group Policy setting to enable Dynamic Access Control for a domain.
-
-Every domain controller needs to have the same Administrative Template policy setting, which is located at **Computer Configuration\\Policies\\Administrative Templates\\System\\KDC\\Support Dynamic Access Control and Kerberos armoring**.
-
-### Support in Active Directory to store user and device claims, resource properties, and central access policy objects.
-
-### Support for using Group Policy to deploy central access policy objects.
-
-The following Group Policy setting enables you to deploy central access policy objects to file servers in your organization: **Computer Configuration\\Policies\\ Windows Settings\\Security Settings\\File System\\Central Access Policy**.
-
-### Support for claims-based file authorization and auditing for file systems by using Group Policy and Global Object Access Auditing
-
-You must enable staged central access policy auditing to audit the effective access of central access policy by using proposed permissions. You configure this setting for the computer under **Advanced Audit Policy Configuration** in the **Security Settings** of a Group Policy Object (GPO). After you configure the security setting in the GPO, you can deploy the GPO to computers in your network.
-
-### Support for transforming or filtering claim policy objects that traverse Active Directory forest trusts
-
-You can filter or transform incoming and outgoing claims that traverse a forest trust. There are three basic scenarios for filtering and transforming claims:
-
-- **Value-based filtering** Filters can be based on the value of a claim. This allows the trusted forest to prevent claims with certain values from being sent to the trusting forest. Domain controllers in trusting forests can use value-based filtering to guard against an elevation-of-privilege attack by filtering the incoming claims with specific values from the trusted forest.
-
-- **Claim type-based filtering** Filters are based on the type of claim, rather than the value of the claim. You identify the claim type by the name of the claim. You use claim type-based filtering in the trusted forest, and it prevents Windows from sending claims that disclose information to the trusting forest.
-
-- **Claim type-based transformation** Manipulates a claim before sending it to the intended target. You use claim type-based transformation in the trusted forest to generalize a known claim that contains specific information. You can use transformations to generalize the claim-type, the claim value, or both.
-
-## Software requirements
-
-
-Because claims and compound authentication for Dynamic Access Control require Kerberos authentication extensions, any domain that supports Dynamic Access Control must have enough domain controllers running the supported versions of Windows to support authentication from Dynamic Access Control-aware Kerberos clients. By default, devices must use domain controllers in other sites. If no such domain controllers are available, authentication will fail. Therefore, you must support one of the following conditions:
-
-- Every domain that supports Dynamic Access Control must have enough domain controllers running the supported versions of Windows Server to support authentication from all devices running the supported versions of Windows or Windows Server.
-
-- Devices running the supported versions of Windows or that do not protect resources by using claims or compound identity, should disable Kerberos protocol support for Dynamic Access Control.
-
-For domains that support user claims, every domain controller running the supported versions of Windows server must be configured with the appropriate setting to support claims and compound authentication, and to provide Kerberos armoring. Configure settings in the KDC Administrative Template policy as follows:
-
-- **Always provide claims** Use this setting if all domain controllers are running the supported versions of Windows Server. In addition, set the domain functional level to Windows Server 2012 or higher.
-
-- **Supported** When you use this setting, monitor domain controllers to ensure that the number of domain controllers running the supported versions of Windows Server is sufficient for the number of client computers that need to access resources protected by Dynamic Access Control.
-
-If the user domain and file server domain are in different forests, all domain controllers in the file server’s forest root must be set at the Windows Server 2012 or higher functional level.
-
-If clients do not recognize Dynamic Access Control, there must be a two-way trust relationship between the two forests.
-
-If claims are transformed when they leave a forest, all domain controllers in the user’s forest root must be set at the Windows Server 2012 or higher functional level.
-
-A file server running a server operating system that supports Dyamic Access Control must have a Group Policy setting that specifies whether it needs to get user claims for user tokens that do not carry claims. This setting is set by default to **Automatic**, which results in this Group Policy setting to be turned **On** if there is a central policy that contains user or device claims for that file server. If the file server contains discretionary ACLs that include user claims, you need to set this Group Policy to **On** so that the server knows to request claims on behalf of users that do not provide claims when they access the server.
-
-## See also
-
-- [Access control overview](access-control.md)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts.md
index b6149dcddb..cf62379ed8 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts.md
@@ -2,25 +2,26 @@
title: Local Accounts (Windows 10)
description: Learn how to secure and manage access to the resources on a standalone or member server for services or users.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: sulahiri
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection:
- M365-identity-device-management
- highpri
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 06/17/2022
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Windows Server 2016
+- ✅ Windows Server 2019
+- ✅ Windows Server 2022
---
# Local Accounts
-**Applies to**
-- Windows 11
-- Windows 10
-- Windows Server 2019
-- Windows Server 2016
-
This reference article for IT professionals describes the default local user accounts for servers, including how to manage these built-in accounts on a member or standalone server.
## About local user accounts
@@ -116,13 +117,13 @@ In addition, the guest user in the Guest account shouldn't be able to view the e
The HelpAssistant account is a default local account that is enabled when a Remote Assistance session is run. This account is automatically disabled when no Remote Assistance requests are pending.
-HelpAssistant is the primary account that is used to establish a Remote Assistance session. The Remote Assistance session is used to connect to another computer running the Windows operating system, and it's initiated by invitation. For solicited remote assistance, a user sends an invitation from their computer, through e-mail or as a file, to a person who can provide assistance. After the users invitation for a Remote Assistance session is accepted, the default HelpAssistant account is automatically created to give the person who provides assistance limited access to the computer. The HelpAssistant account is managed by the Remote Desktop Help Session Manager service.
+HelpAssistant is the primary account that is used to establish a Remote Assistance session. The Remote Assistance session is used to connect to another computer running the Windows operating system, and it's initiated by invitation. For solicited remote assistance, a user sends an invitation from their computer, through e-mail or as a file, to a person who can provide assistance. After the user's invitation for a Remote Assistance session is accepted, the default HelpAssistant account is automatically created to give the person who provides assistance limited access to the computer. The HelpAssistant account is managed by the Remote Desktop Help Session Manager service.
**Security considerations**
The SIDs that pertain to the default HelpAssistant account include:
-- SID: S-1-5-<domain>-13, display name Terminal Server User. This group includes all users who sign in to a server with Remote Desktop Services enabled. Note: In Windows Server 2008, Remote Desktop Services are called Terminal Services.
+- SID: S-1-5-<domain>-13, display name Terminal Server User. This group includes all users who sign in to a server with Remote Desktop Services enabled. Note: In Windows Server 2008, Remote Desktop Services is called Terminal Services.
- SID: S-1-5-<domain>-14, display name Remote Interactive Logon. This group includes all users who connect to the computer by using a remote desktop connection. This group is a subset of the Interactive group. Access tokens that contain the Remote Interactive Logon SID also contain the Interactive SID.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/microsoft-accounts.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/microsoft-accounts.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 7d9575a8f4..0000000000
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/microsoft-accounts.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,186 +0,0 @@
----
-title: Microsoft Accounts (Windows 10)
-description: Microsoft Accounts
-ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
-ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
-ms.topic: article
-ms.localizationpriority: medium
-ms.date: 10/13/2017
-ms.reviewer:
----
-
-# Microsoft Accounts
-
-**Applies to**
-- Windows 10
-
-This topic for the IT professional explains how a Microsoft account works to enhance security and privacy for users, and how you can manage this consumer account type in your organization.
-
-Microsoft sites, services, and properties, as well as computers running Windows 10, can use a Microsoft account as a means of identifying a user. Microsoft account was previously called Windows Live ID. It has user-defined secrets, and consists of a unique email address and a password.
-
-When a user signs in with a Microsoft account, the device is connected to cloud services. Many of the user's settings, preferences, and apps can be shared across devices.
-
-## How a Microsoft account works
-
-The Microsoft account allows users to sign in to websites that support this service by using a single set of credentials. Users' credentials are validated by a Microsoft account authentication server that is associated with a website. The Microsoft Store is an example of this association. When new users sign in to websites that are enabled to use Microsoft accounts, they are redirected to the nearest authentication server, which asks for a user name and password. Windows uses the Schannel Security Support Provider to open a Transport Level Security/Secure Sockets Layer (TLS/SSL) connection for this function. Users then have the option to use Credential Manager to store their credentials.
-
-When users sign in to websites that are enabled to use a Microsoft account, a time-limited cookie is installed on their computers, which includes a triple DES encrypted ID tag. This encrypted ID tag has been agreed upon between the authentication server and the website. This ID tag is sent to the website, and the website plants another time-limited encrypted HTTP cookie on the user’s computer. When these cookies are valid, users are not required to supply a user name and password. If a user actively signs out of their Microsoft account, these cookies are removed.
-
-**Important**
-Local Windows account functionality has not been removed, and it is still an option to use in managed environments.
-
-### How Microsoft accounts are created
-
-To prevent fraud, the Microsoft system verifies the IP address when a user creates an account. A user who tries to create multiple Microsoft accounts with the same IP address is stopped.
-
-Microsoft accounts are not designed to be created in batches, such as for a group of domain users within your enterprise.
-
-There are two methods for creating a Microsoft account:
-
-- **Use an existing email address**.
-
- Users are able to use their valid email addresses to sign up for Microsoft accounts. The service turns the requesting user's email address into a Microsoft account. Users can also choose their personal passwords.
-
-- **Sign up for a Microsoft email address**.
-
- Users can sign up for an email account with Microsoft's webmail services. This account can be used to sign in to websites that are enabled to use Microsoft accounts.
-
-### How the Microsoft account information is safeguarded
-
-Credential information is encrypted twice. The first encryption is based on the account’s password. Credentials are encrypted again when they are sent across the Internet. The data that is stored is not available to other Microsoft or non-Microsoft services.
-
-- **Strong password is required**.
-
- Blank passwords are not allowed.
-
- For more information, see [How to help keep your Microsoft account safe and secure](https://support.microsoft.com/account-billing/how-to-help-keep-your-microsoft-account-safe-and-secure-628538c2-7006-33bb-5ef4-c917657362b9).
-
-- **Secondary proof of identity is required**.
-
- Before user profile information and settings can be accessed on a second supported Windows computer for the first time, trust must established for that device by providing secondary proof of identity. This can be accomplished by providing Windows with a code that is sent to a mobile phone number or by following the instructions that are sent to an alternate email address that a user specifies in the account settings.
-
-- **All user profile data is encrypted on the client before it is transmitted to the cloud**.
-
- User data does not roam over a wireless wide area network (WWAN) by default, thereby protecting profile data. All data and settings that leave a device are transmitted through the TLS/SSL protocol.
-
-**Microsoft account security information is added**.
-
-Users can add security information to their Microsoft accounts through the **Accounts** interface on computers running the supported versions of Windows. This feature allows the user to update the security information that they provided when they created their accounts. This security information includes an alternate email address or phone number so if their password is compromised or forgotten, a verification code can be sent to verify their identity. Users can potentially use their Microsoft accounts to store corporate data on a personal OneDrive or email app, so it is safe practice for the account owner to keep this security information up-to-date.
-
-## The Microsoft account in the enterprise
-
-
-Although the Microsoft account was designed to serve consumers, you might find situations where your domain users can benefit by using their personal Microsoft account in your enterprise. The following list describes some advantages.
-
-- **Download Microsoft Store apps**:
-
- If your enterprise chooses to distribute software through the Microsoft Store, your users can use their Microsoft accounts to download and use them on up to five devices running any version of Windows 10, Windows 8.1, Windows 8, or Windows RT.
-
-- **Single sign-on**:
-
- Your users can use Microsoft account credentials to sign in to devices running Windows 10, Windows 8.1, Windows 8 or Windows RT. When they do this, Windows works with your Microsoft Store app to provide authenticated experiences for them. Users can associate a Microsoft account with their sign-in credentials for Microsoft Store apps or websites, so that these credentials roam across any devices running these supported versions.
-
-- **Personalized settings synchronization**:
-
- Users can associate their most commonly used operating-system settings with a Microsoft account. These settings are available whenever a user signs in with that account on any device that is running a supported version of Windows and is connected to the cloud. After a user signs in, the device automatically attempts to get the user's settings from the cloud and apply them to the device.
-
-- **App synchronization**:
-
- Microsoft Store apps can store user-specific settings so that these settings are available to any device. As with operating system settings, these user-specific app settings are available whenever the user signs in with the same Microsoft account on any device that is running a supported version of Windows and is connected to the cloud. After the user signs in, that device automatically downloads the settings from the cloud and applies them when the app is installed.
-
-- **Integrated social media services**:
-
- Contact information and status for your users’ friends and associates automatically stay up-to-date from sites such as Hotmail, Outlook, Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn. Users can also access and share photos, documents, and other files from sites such as OneDrive, Facebook, and Flickr.
-
-### Managing the Microsoft account in the domain
-
-Depending on your IT and business models, introducing Microsoft accounts into your enterprise might add complexity or it might provide solutions. You should address the following considerations before you allow the use of these account types in your enterprise:
-
-- [Restrict the use of the Microsoft account](#bkmk-restrictuse)
-
-- [Configure connected accounts](#bkmk-cfgconnectedaccounts)
-
-- [Provision Microsoft accounts in the enterprise](#bkmk-provisionaccounts)
-
-- [Audit account activity](#bkmk-audit)
-
-- [Perform password resets](#bkmk-passwordresets)
-
-- [Restrict app installation and usage](#bkmk-restrictappinstallationandusage)
-
-### Restrict the use of the Microsoft account
-
-The following Group Policy settings help control the use of Microsoft accounts in the enterprise:
-
-- [Block all consumer Microsoft account user authentication](#block-all-consumer-microsoft-account-user-authentication)
-- [Accounts: Block Microsoft accounts](#accounts-block-microsoft-accounts)
-
-#### Block all consumer Microsoft account user authentication
-
-This setting controls whether users can provide Microsoft accounts for authentication for applications or services.
-
-If this setting is enabled, all applications and services on the device are prevented from using Microsoft accounts for authentication.
-This applies both to existing users of a device and new users who may be added.
-
-However, any application or service that has already authenticated a user will not be affected by enabling this setting until the authentication cache expires.
-It is recommended to enable this setting before any user signs in to a device to prevent cached tokens from being present.
-
-If this setting is disabled or not configured, applications and services can use Microsoft accounts for authentication.
-By default, this setting is **Disabled**.
-
-This setting does not affect whether users can sign in to devices by using Microsoft accounts, or the ability for users to provide Microsoft accounts via the browser for authentication with web-based applications.
-
-The path to this setting is:
-
-Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Microsoft account
-
-#### Accounts: Block Microsoft accounts
-
-This setting prevents using the **Settings** app to add a Microsoft account for single sign-on (SSO) authentication for Microsoft services and some background services, or using a Microsoft account for single sign-on to other applications or services.
-
-There are two options if this setting is enabled:
-
-- **Users can’t add Microsoft accounts** means that existing connected accounts can still sign in to the device (and appear on the Sign in screen). However, users cannot use the **Settings** app to add new connected accounts (or connect local accounts to Microsoft accounts).
-- **Users can’t add or log on with Microsoft accounts** means that users cannot add new connected accounts (or connect local accounts to Microsoft accounts) or use existing connected accounts through **Settings**.
-
-This setting does not affect adding a Microsoft account for application authentication. For example, if this setting is enabled, a user can still provide a Microsoft account for authentication with an application such as **Mail**, but the user cannot use the Microsoft account for single sign-on authentication for other applications or services (in other words, the user will be prompted to authenticate for other applications or services).
-
-By default, this setting is **Not defined**.
-
-The path to this setting is:
-
-Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\Security Options
-
-### Configure connected accounts
-
-Users can connect a Microsoft account to their domain account and synchronize the settings and preferences between them. This enables users to see the same desktop background, app settings, browser history and favorites, and other Microsoft account settings on their other devices.
-
-Users can disconnect a Microsoft account from their domain account at any time as follows: In **PC settings**, tap or click **Users**, tap or click **Disconnect**, and then tap or click **Finish**.
-
-**Note**
-Connecting Microsoft accounts with domain accounts can limit access to some high-privileged tasks in Windows. For example, Task Scheduler will evaluate the connected Microsoft account for access and fail. In these situations, the account owner should disconnect the account.
-
-### Provision Microsoft accounts in the enterprise
-
-Microsoft accounts are private user accounts. There are no methods provided by Microsoft to provision Microsoft accounts for an enterprise. Enterprises should use domain accounts.
-
-### Audit account activity
-
-Because Microsoft accounts are Internet-based, Windows does not have a mechanism to audit their use until the account is associated with a domain account. But this association does not restrict the user from disconnecting the account or disjoining from the domain. It is not possible to audit the activity of accounts that are not associated with your domain.
-
-### Perform password resets
-
-Only the owner of the Microsoft account can change the password. Passwords can be changed in the [Microsoft account sign-in portal](https://login.live.com).
-
-### Restrict app installation and usage
-
-Within your organization, you can set application control policies to regulate app installation and usage for Microsoft accounts. For more information, see [AppLocker](/windows/device-security/applocker/applocker-overview) and [Packaged Apps and Packaged App Installer Rules in AppLocker](/windows/device-security/applocker/packaged-apps-and-packaged-app-installer-rules-in-applocker).
-
-## See also
-
-- [Managing Privacy: Using a Microsoft Account to Logon and Resulting Internet Communication](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/jj884082(v=ws.11))
-
-- [Access Control Overview](access-control.md)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-identifiers.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-identifiers.md
deleted file mode 100644
index eebc241c56..0000000000
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-identifiers.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,331 +0,0 @@
----
-title: Security identifiers (Windows 10)
-description: Security identifiers
-ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
-ms.collection:
- - M365-identity-device-management
- - highpri
-ms.topic: article
-ms.localizationpriority: medium
-ms.date: 04/19/2017
----
-
-# Security identifiers
-
-**Applies to**
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-- Windows Server 2016
-- Windows Server 2019
-
-This topic for the IT professional describes security identifiers and how they work in regards to accounts and groups in the Windows operating system.
-
-## What are security identifiers?
-
-A security identifier (SID) is used to uniquely identify a security principal or security group. Security principals can represent any entity that can be authenticated by the operating system, such as a user account, a computer account, or a thread or process that runs in the security context of a user or computer account.
-
-Each account or group, or process running in the security context of the account, has a unique SID that is issued by an authority, such as a Windows domain controller. It is stored in a security database. The system generates the SID that identifies a particular account or group at the time the account or group is created. When a SID has been used as the unique identifier for a user or group, it can never be used again to identify another user or group.
-
-Each time a user signs in, the system creates an access token for that user. The access token contains the user's SID, user rights, and the SIDs for any groups the user belongs to. This token provides the security context for whatever actions the user performs on that computer.
-
-In addition to the uniquely created, domain-specific SIDs that are assigned to specific users and groups, there are well-known SIDs that identify generic groups and generic users. For example, the Everyone and World SIDs identify a group that includes all users. Well-known SIDs have values that remain constant across all operating systems.
-
-SIDs are a fundamental building block of the Windows security model. They work with specific components of the authorization and access control technologies in the security infrastructure of the Windows Server operating systems. This helps protect access to network resources and provides a more secure computing environment.
-
-The content in this topic applies to computers that are running the supported versions of the Windows operating system as designated in the **Applies To** list at the beginning of this topic.
-
-## How security identifiers work
-
-Users refer to accounts by using the account name, but the operating system internally refers to accounts and processes that run in the security context of the account by using their security identifiers (SIDs). For domain accounts, the SID of a security principal is created by concatenating the SID of the domain with a relative identifier (RID) for the account. SIDs are unique within their scope (domain or local), and they are never reused.
-
-The operating system generates a SID that identifies a particular account or group at the time the account or group is created. The SID for a local account or group is generated by the Local Security Authority (LSA) on the computer, and it is stored with other account information in a secure area of the registry. The SID for a domain account or group is generated by the domain security authority, and it is stored as an attribute of the User or Group object in Active Directory Domain Services.
-
-For every local account and group, the SID is unique for the computer where it was created. No two accounts or groups on the computer ever share the same SID. Likewise, for every domain account and group, the SID is unique within an enterprise. This means that the SID for an account or group that is created in one domain will never match the SID for an account or group created in any other domain in the enterprise.
-
-SIDs always remain unique. Security authorities never issue the same SID twice, and they never reuse SIDs for deleted accounts. For example, if a user with a user account in a Windows domain leaves her job, an administrator deletes her Active Directory account, including the SID that identifies the account. If she later returns to a different job at the same company, an administrator creates a new account, and the Windows Server operating system generates a new SID. The new SID does not match the old one; so none of the user's access from her old account is transferred to the new account. Her two accounts represent two completely different security principals.
-
-## Security identifier architecture
-
-A security identifier is a data structure in binary format that contains a variable number of values. The first values in the structure contain information about the SID structure. The remaining values are arranged in a hierarchy (similar to a telephone number), and they identify the SID-issuing authority (for example, “NT Authority”), the SID-issuing domain, and a particular security principal or group. The following image illustrates the structure of a SID.
-
-
-
-The individual values of a SID are described in the following table.
-
-| Comment | Description |
-| - | - |
-| Revision | Indicates the version of the SID structure that is used in a particular SID. |
-| Identifier authority | Identifies the highest level of authority that can issue SIDs for a particular type of security principal. For example, the identifier authority value in the SID for the Everyone group is 1 (World Authority). The identifier authority value in the SID for a specific Windows Server account or group is 5 (NT Authority). |
-| Subauthorities | >Holds the most important information in a SID, which is contained in a series of one or more subauthority values. All values up to, but not including, the last value in the series collectively identify a domain in an enterprise. This part of the series is called the domain identifier. The last value in the series, which is called the relative identifier (RID), identifies a particular account or group relative to a domain. |
-
-The components of a SID are easier to visualize when SIDs are converted from a binary to a string format by using standard notation:
-```
-S-R-X-Y1-Y2-Yn-1-Yn
-```
-
-In this notation, the components of a SID are represented as shown in the following table.
-
-| Comment | Description |
-| - | - |
-| S | Indicates that the string is a SID |
-| R | Indicates the revision level |
-| X | Indicates the identifier authority value |
-| Y | Represents a series of subauthority values, where *n* is the number of values |
-
-The SID's most important information is contained in the series of subauthority values. The first part of the series (-Y1-Y2-Y*n*-1) is the domain identifier. This element of the SID becomes significant in an enterprise with several domains, because the domain identifier differentiates SIDs that are issued by one domain from SIDs that are issued by all other domains in the enterprise. No two domains in an enterprise share the same domain identifier.
-
-The last item in the series of subauthority values (-Y*n*) is the relative identifier. It distinguishes one account or group from all other accounts and groups in the domain. No two accounts or groups in any domain share the same relative identifier.
-
-For example, the SID for the built-in Administrators group is represented in standardized SID notation as the following string:
-
-```
-S-1-5-32-544
-```
-
-This SID has four components:
-
-- A revision level (1)
-
-- An identifier authority value (5, NT Authority)
-
-- A domain identifier (32, Builtin)
-
-- A relative identifier (544, Administrators)
-
-SIDs for built-in accounts and groups always have the same domain identifier value: 32. This value identifies the domain **Builtin**, which exists on every computer that is running a version of the Windows Server operating system. It is never necessary to distinguish one computer's built-in accounts and groups from another computer's built-in accounts and groups because they are local in scope. They are local to a single computer, or in the case of domain controllers for a network domain, they are local to several computers that are acting as one.
-
-Built-in accounts and groups need to be distinguished from one another within the scope of the **Builtin** domain. Therefore, the SID for each account and group has a unique relative identifier. A relative identifier value of 544 is unique to the built-in Administrators group. No other account or group in the **Builtin** domain has a SID with a final value of 544.
-
-In another example, consider the SID for the global group, Domain Admins. Every domain in an enterprise has a Domain Admins group, and the SID for each group is different. The following example represents the SID for the Domain Admins group in the Contoso, Ltd. domain (Contoso\\Domain Admins):
-
-```
-S-1-5-21-1004336348-1177238915-682003330-512
-```
-
-The SID for Contoso\\Domain Admins has:
-
-- A revision level (1)
-
-- An identifier authority (5, NT Authority)
-
-- A domain identifier (21-1004336348-1177238915-682003330, Contoso)
-
-- A relative identifier (512, Domain Admins)
-
-The SID for Contoso\\Domain Admins is distinguished from the SIDs for other Domain Admins groups in the same enterprise by its domain identifier: 21-1004336348-1177238915-682003330. No other domain in the enterprise uses this value as its domain identifier. The SID for Contoso\\Domain Admins is distinguished from the SIDs for other accounts and groups that are created in the Contoso domain by its relative identifier, 512. No other account or group in the domain has a SID with a final value of 512.
-
-## Relative identifier allocation
-
-When accounts and groups are stored in an account database that is managed by a local Security Accounts Manager (SAM), it is fairly easy for the system to generate a unique relative identifier for each account and in a group that it creates on a stand-alone computer. The SAM on a stand-alone computer can track the relative identifier values that it has used before and make sure that it never uses them again.
-
-In a network domain, however, generating unique relative identifiers is a more complex process. Windows Server network domains can have several domain controllers. Each domain controller stores Active Directory account information. This means that, in a network domain, there are as many copies of the account database as there are domain controllers. In addition to this, every copy of the account database is a master copy. New accounts and groups can be created on any domain controller. Changes that are made to Active Directory on one domain controller are replicated to all other domain controllers in the domain. The process of replicating changes in one master copy of the account database to all other master copies is called a multimaster operation.
-
-The process of generating unique relative identifiers is a single-master operation. One domain controller is assigned the role of relative identifier (RID) master, and it allocates a sequence of relative identifiers to each domain controller in the domain. When a new domain account or group is created in one domain controller's replica of Active Directory, it is assigned a SID. The relative identifier for the new SID is taken from the domain controller's allocation of relative identifiers. When its supply of relative identifiers begins to run low, the domain controller requests another block from the RID master.
-
-Each domain controller uses each value in a block of relative identifiers only once. The RID master allocates each block of relative identifier values only once. This process assures that every account and group created in the domain has a unique relative identifier.
-
-## Security identifiers and globally unique identifiers
-
-When a new domain user or group account is created, Active Directory stores the account's SID in the **ObjectSID** property of a User or Group object. It also assigns the new object a globally unique identifier (GUID), which is a 128-bit value that is unique not only in the enterprise, but also across the world. GUIDs are assigned to every object that is created by Active Directory, not only User and Group objects. Each object's GUID is stored in its **ObjectGUID** property.
-
-Active Directory uses GUIDs internally to identify objects. For example, the GUID is one of an object's properties that is published in the global catalog. Searching the global catalog for a User object GUID produces results if the user has an account somewhere in the enterprise. In fact, searching for any object by **ObjectGUID** might be the most reliable way of finding the object you want to locate. The values of other object properties can change, but the **ObjectGUID** property never changes. When an object is assigned a GUID, it keeps that value for life.
-
-If a user moves from one domain to another, the user gets a new SID. The SID for a group object does not change because groups stay in the domain where they were created. However, if people move, their accounts can move with them. If an employee moves from North America to Europe, but stays in the same company, an administrator for the enterprise can move the employee's User object from, for example, Contoso\\NoAm to Contoso\\Europe. If the administrator does this, the User object for the account needs a new SID. The domain identifier portion of a SID that is issued in NoAm is unique to NoAm; so the SID for the user's account in Europe has a different domain identifier. The relative identifier portion of a SID is unique relative to the domain; so if the domain changes, the relative identifier also changes.
-
-When a User object moves from one domain to another, a new SID must be generated for the user account and stored in the **ObjectSID** property. Before the new value is written to the property, the previous value is copied to another property of a User object, **SIDHistory**. This property can hold multiple values. Each time a User object moves to another domain, a new SID is generated and stored in the **ObjectSID** property, and another value is added to the list of old SIDs in **SIDHistory**. When a user signs in and is successfully authenticated, the domain authentication service queries Active Directory for all the SIDs that are associated with the user, including the user's current SID, the user's old SIDs, and the SIDs for the user's groups. All these SIDs are returned to the authentication client, and they are included in the user's access token. When the user tries to gain access to a resource, any one of the SIDs in the access token (including one of the SIDs in **SIDHistory**), can allow or deny the user access.
-
-If you allow or deny users' access to a resource based on their jobs, you should allow or deny access to a group, not to an individual. That way, when users change jobs or move to other departments, you can easily adjust their access by removing them from certain groups and adding them to others.
-
-However, if you allow or deny an individual user access to resources, you probably want that user's access to remain the same no matter how many times the user's account domain changes. The **SIDHistory** property makes this possible. When a user changes domains, there is no need to change the access control list (ACL) on any resource. If an ACL has the user's old SID, but not the new one, the old SID is still in the user's access token. It is listed among the SIDs for the user's groups, and the user is granted or denied access based on the old SID.
-
-## Well-known SIDs
-
-The values of certain SIDs are constant across all systems. They are created when the operating system or domain is installed. They are called well-known SIDs because they identify generic users or generic groups.
-
-There are universal well-known SIDs that are meaningful on all secure systems that use this security model, including operating systems other than Windows. In addition, there are well-known SIDs that are meaningful only on Windows operating systems.
-
-The following table lists the universal well-known SIDs.
-
-| Value | Universal Well-Known SID | Identifies |
-| - | - | - |
-| S-1-0-0 | Null SID | A group with no members. This is often used when a SID value is not known.|
-| S-1-1-0 | World | A group that includes all users. |
-| S-1-2-0 | Local | Users who log on to terminals that are locally (physically) connected to the system. |
-| S-1-2-1 | Console Logon | A group that includes users who are logged on to the physical console. |
-| S-1-3-0 | Creator Owner ID | A security identifier to be replaced by the security identifier of the user who created a new object. This SID is used in inheritable ACEs. |
-| S-1-3-1 | Creator Group ID | A security identifier to be replaced by the primary-group SID of the user who created a new object. Use this SID in inheritable ACEs. |
-| S-1-3-2 | Creator Owner Server | |
-| S-1-3-3 | Creator Group Server | |
-| S-1-3-4 | Owner Rights | A group that represents the current owner of the object. When an ACE that carries this SID is applied to an object, the system ignores the implicit READ_CONTROL and WRITE_DAC permissions for the object owner. |
-| S-1-4 | Non-unique Authority | A SID that represents an identifier authority. |
-| S-1-5 | NT Authority | A SID that represents an identifier authority. |
-| S-1-5-80-0 | All Services | A group that includes all service processes configured on the system. Membership is controlled by the operating system.|
-
-The following table lists the predefined identifier authority constants. The first four values are used with universal well-known SIDs, and the rest of the values are used with well-known SIDs in Windows operating systems designated in the **Applies To** list.
-
-| Identifier Authority | Value | SID String Prefix |
-| - | - | - |
-| SECURITY_NULL_SID_AUTHORITY | 0 | S-1-0 |
-| SECURITY_WORLD_SID_AUTHORITY | 1 | S-1-1 |
-| SECURITY_LOCAL_SID_AUTHORITY | 2 | S-1-2 |
-| SECURITY_CREATOR_SID_AUTHORITY | 3 | S-1-3 |
-| SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY | 5 | S-1-5 |
-| SECURITY_AUTHENTICATION_AUTHORITY | 18 | S-1-18 |
-
-The following RID values are used with universal well-known SIDs. The Identifier authority column shows the prefix of the identifier authority with which you can combine the RID to create a universal well-known SID.
-
-| Relative Identifier Authority | Value | Identifier Authority |
-| - | - | - |
-| SECURITY_NULL_RID | 0 | S-1-0 |
-| SECURITY_WORLD_RID | 0 | S-1-1 |
-| SECURITY_LOCAL_RID | 0 | S-1-2 |
-| SECURITY_CREATOR_OWNER_RID | 0 | S-1-3 |
-| SECURITY_CREATOR_GROUP_RID | 1 | S-1-3 |
-
-The SECURITY\_NT\_AUTHORITY (S-1-5) predefined identifier authority produces SIDs that are not universal and are meaningful only in installations of the Windows operating systems that are designated in the **Applies To** list at the beginning of this topic. The following table lists the well-known SIDs.
-
-| SID | Display Name | Description |
-| - | - | - |
-| S-1-5-1 | Dialup | A group that includes all users who are logged on to the system by means of a dial-up connection.|
-| S-1-5-113 | Local account| You can use this SID when restricting network logon to local accounts instead of "administrator" or equivalent. This SID can be effective in blocking network logon for local users and groups by account type regardless of what they are actually named.|
-| S-1-5-114| Local account and member of Administrators group | You can use this SID when restricting network logon to local accounts instead of "administrator" or equivalent. This SID can be effective in blocking network logon for local users and groups by account type regardless of what they are actually named. |
-| S-1-5-2 | Network | A group that includes all users who are logged on by means of a network connection. Access tokens for interactive users do not contain the Network SID.|
-| S-1-5-3 | Batch | A group that includes all users who have logged on by means of a batch queue facility, such as task scheduler jobs.|
-| S-1-5-4 | Interactive| A group that includes all users who log on interactively. A user can start an interactive logon session by logging on directly at the keyboard, by opening a Remote Desktop Services connection from a remote computer, or by using a remote shell such as Telnet. In each case, the user's access token contains the Interactive SID. If the user signs in by using a Remote Desktop Services connection, the user's access token also contains the Remote Interactive Logon SID.|
-| S-1-5-5- *X*-*Y* | Logon Session| The *X* and *Y* values for these SIDs uniquely identify a particular logon session.|
-| S-1-5-6 | Service| A group that includes all security principals that have signed in as a service.|
-| S-1-5-7 | Anonymous Logon| A user who has connected to the computer without supplying a user name and password. Important: Notes: Notes: Note that this list supports the wildcards detailed in the [Network isolation settings wildcards](#network-isolation-settings-wildcards) table.|
-|Domains categorized as both work and personal| At least Windows Server 2012, Windows 8, or Windows RT|A comma-separated list of domain names used as both work or personal resources. Included endpoints are rendered using Microsoft Edge and will be accessible from the Application Guard and regular Edge environment. Note that this list supports the wildcards detailed in the [Network isolation settings wildcards](#network-isolation-settings-wildcards) table.|
+|Enterprise resource domains hosted in the cloud| At least Windows Server 2012, Windows 8, or Windows RT|A pipe-separated (`|`) list of your domain cloud resources. Included endpoints are rendered using Microsoft Edge and won't be accessible from the Application Guard environment. This list supports the wildcards detailed in the [Network isolation settings wildcards](#network-isolation-settings-wildcards) table.|
+|Domains categorized as both work and personal| At least Windows Server 2012, Windows 8, or Windows RT|A comma-separated list of domain names used as both work or personal resources. Included endpoints are rendered using Microsoft Edge and will be accessible from the Application Guard and regular Edge environment. This list supports the wildcards detailed in the [Network isolation settings wildcards](#network-isolation-settings-wildcards) table.|
## Network isolation settings wildcards
@@ -54,18 +54,18 @@ These settings, located at `Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Wind
|Name|Supported versions|Description|Options|
|-----------|------------------|-----------|-------|
|Configure Microsoft Defender Application Guard clipboard settings|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1709 or higher Windows 10 Pro, 1803 or higher Windows 11|Determines whether Application Guard can use the clipboard functionality.|**Enabled.** Turns On the clipboard functionality and lets you choose whether to additionally: **Disabled or not configured.** Completely turns Off the clipboard functionality for Application Guard.|
-|Configure Microsoft Defender Application Guard print settings|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1709 or higher Windows 10 Pro, 1803 or higher Windows 11|Determines whether Application Guard can use the print functionality.|**Enabled.** Turns On the print functionality and lets you choose whether to additionally: Windows 10 Pro, 1803 or higher Windows 11|Determines whether Application Guard can use the print functionality.|**Enabled.** Turns On the print functionality and lets you choose whether to additionally: Windows 11|Determines whether to allow Internet access for apps not included on the **Allowed Apps** list.|**Enabled.** Prevents network traffic from both Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge to non-enterprise sites that can't render in the Application Guard container. **NOTE**: This action might also block assets cached by CDNs and references to analytics sites. Add them to the trusted enterprise resources to avoid broken pages. **Disabled or not configured.** Prevents Microsoft Edge to render network traffic to non-enterprise sites that can't render in Application Guard. |
|Allow Persistence|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1709 or higher Windows 11|Determines whether data persists across different sessions in Microsoft Defender Application Guard.|**Enabled.** Application Guard saves user-downloaded files and other items (such as, cookies, Favorites, and so on) for use in future Application Guard sessions. **Disabled or not configured.** All user data within Application Guard is reset between sessions. **NOTE**: If you later decide to stop supporting data persistence for your employees, you can use our Windows-provided utility to reset the container and to discard any personal data. **To reset the container:** Windows 11|Determines whether to turn on Application Guard for Microsoft Edge and Microsoft Office.|**Enabled.** Turns on Application Guard for Microsoft Edge and/or Microsoft Office, honoring the network isolation settings, rendering non-enterprise domains in the Application Guard container. Be aware that Application Guard won't actually be turned on unless the required prerequisites and network isolation settings are already set on the device. Available options: Windows 11|Determines whether to save downloaded files to the host operating system from the Microsoft Defender Application Guard container.|**Enabled.** Allows users to save downloaded files from the Microsoft Defender Application Guard container to the host operating system. This action creates a share between the host and container that also allows for uploads from the host to the Application Guard container. **Disabled or not configured.** Users are not able to save downloaded files from Application Guard to the host operating system.|
-|Allow hardware-accelerated rendering for Microsoft Defender Application Guard|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1803 or higher Windows 11|Determines whether Microsoft Defender Application Guard renders graphics using hardware or software acceleration.|**Enabled.** Microsoft Defender Application Guard uses Hyper-V to access supported, high-security rendering graphics hardware (GPUs). These GPUs improve rendering performance and battery life while using Microsoft Defender Application Guard, particularly for video playback and other graphics-intensive use cases. If this setting is enabled without connecting any high-security rendering graphics hardware, Microsoft Defender Application Guard will automatically revert to software-based (CPU) rendering. **Important:** Be aware that enabling this setting with potentially compromised graphics devices or drivers might pose a risk to the host device. Windows 11|Determines whether to allow camera and microphone access inside Microsoft Defender Application Guard.|**Enabled.** Applications inside Microsoft Defender Application Guard are able to access the camera and microphone on the user's device. **Important:** Be aware that enabling this policy with a potentially compromised container could bypass camera and microphone permissions and access the camera and microphone without the user's knowledge. **Disabled or not configured.** Applications inside Microsoft Defender Application Guard are unable to access the camera and microphone on the user's device.|
-|Allow Microsoft Defender Application Guard to use Root Certificate Authorities from a user's device|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1809 or higher Windows 11|Determines whether Root Certificates are shared with Microsoft Defender Application Guard.|**Enabled.** Certificates matching the specified thumbprint are transferred into the container. Use a comma to separate multiple certificates. **Disabled or not configured.** Certificates are not shared with Microsoft Defender Application Guard.|
+|Turn on Microsoft Defender Application Guard in Managed Mode|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1809 or higher Windows 11|Determines whether to turn on Application Guard for Microsoft Edge and Microsoft Office.|**Enabled.** Turns on Application Guard for Microsoft Edge and/or Microsoft Office, honoring the network isolation settings, rendering non-enterprise domains in the Application Guard container. Application Guard won't actually be turned on unless the required prerequisites and network isolation settings are already set on the device. Available options: Windows 11|Determines whether to save downloaded files to the host operating system from the Microsoft Defender Application Guard container.|**Enabled.** Allows users to save downloaded files from the Microsoft Defender Application Guard container to the host operating system. This action creates a share between the host and container that also allows for uploads from the host to the Application Guard container. **Disabled or not configured.** Users aren't able to save downloaded files from Application Guard to the host operating system.|
+|Allow hardware-accelerated rendering for Microsoft Defender Application Guard|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1803 or higher Windows 11|Determines whether Microsoft Defender Application Guard renders graphics using hardware or software acceleration.|**Enabled.** Microsoft Defender Application Guard uses Hyper-V to access supported, high-security rendering graphics hardware (GPUs). These GPUs improve rendering performance and battery life while using Microsoft Defender Application Guard, particularly for video playback and other graphics-intensive use cases. If this setting is enabled without connecting any high-security rendering graphics hardware, Microsoft Defender Application Guard will automatically revert to software-based (CPU) rendering. **Important:** Enabling this setting with potentially compromised graphics devices or drivers might pose a risk to the host device. Windows 11|Determines whether to allow camera and microphone access inside Microsoft Defender Application Guard.|**Enabled.** Applications inside Microsoft Defender Application Guard are able to access the camera and microphone on the user's device. **Important:** Enabling this policy with a potentially compromised container could bypass camera and microphone permissions and access the camera and microphone without the user's knowledge. **Disabled or not configured.** Applications inside Microsoft Defender Application Guard are unable to access the camera and microphone on the user's device.|
+|Allow Microsoft Defender Application Guard to use Root Certificate Authorities from a user's device|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1809 or higher Windows 11|Determines whether Root Certificates are shared with Microsoft Defender Application Guard.|**Enabled.** Certificates matching the specified thumbprint are transferred into the container. Use a comma to separate multiple certificates. **Disabled or not configured.** Certificates aren't shared with Microsoft Defender Application Guard.|
|Allow auditing events in Microsoft Defender Application Guard|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1809 or higher Windows 11|This policy setting allows you to decide whether auditing events can be collected from Microsoft Defender Application Guard.|**Enabled.** Application Guard inherits auditing policies from your device and logs system events from the Application Guard container to your host. **Disabled or not configured.** event logs aren't collected from your Application Guard container.|
## Application Guard support dialog settings
-These settings are located at `Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Security\Enterprise Customization`. If an error is encountered, you are presented with a dialog box. By default, this dialog box only contains the error information and a button for you to report it to Microsoft via the feedback hub. However, it is possible to provide additional information in the dialog box.
+These settings are located at `Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Security\Enterprise Customization`. If an error is encountered, you're presented with a dialog box. By default, this dialog box only contains the error information and a button for you to report it to Microsoft via the feedback hub. However, it's possible to provide additional information in the dialog box.
[Use Group Policy to enable and customize contact information](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-security-center/wdsc-customize-contact-information#use-group-policy-to-enable-and-customize-contact-information).
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/faq-md-app-guard.yml b/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/faq-md-app-guard.yml
index 4e72f94860..603c2014c5 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/faq-md-app-guard.yml
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/faq-md-app-guard.yml
@@ -41,16 +41,16 @@ sections:
answer: |
The manual or PAC server must be a hostname (not IP) that is neutral on the site-list. Additionally, if the PAC script returns a proxy, it must meet those same requirements.
- To make sure the FQDNs (Fully Qualified Domain Names) for the “PAC file” and the “proxy servers the PAC file redirects to” are added as Neutral Resources in the Network Isolation policies used by Application Guard, you can:
+ To ensure the FQDNs (Fully Qualified Domain Names) for the “PAC file” and the “proxy servers the PAC file redirects to” are added as Neutral Resources in the Network Isolation policies used by Application Guard, you can:
- - Verify this by going to edge://application-guard-internals/#utilities and entering the FQDN for the pac/proxy in the “check url trust” field and verifying that it says “Neutral”.
+ - Verify this addition by going to edge://application-guard-internals/#utilities and entering the FQDN for the pac/proxy in the “check url trust” field and verifying that it says “Neutral.”
- It must be an FQDN. A simple IP address won't work.
- Optionally, if possible, the IP addresses associated with the server hosting the above should be removed from the Enterprise IP Ranges in the Network Isolation policies used by Application Guard.
- question: |
How do I configure Microsoft Defender Application Guard to work with my network proxy (IP-Literal Addresses)?
answer: |
- Application Guard requires proxies to have a symbolic name, not just an IP address. IP-Literal proxy settings such as `192.168.1.4:81` can be annotated as `itproxy:81` or using a record such as `P19216810010` for a proxy with an IP address of `192.168.100.10`. This applies to Windows 10 Enterprise edition, version 1709 or higher. These would be for the proxy policies under Network Isolation in Group Policy or Intune.
+ Application Guard requires proxies to have a symbolic name, not just an IP address. IP-Literal proxy settings such as `192.168.1.4:81` can be annotated as `itproxy:81` or using a record such as `P19216810010` for a proxy with an IP address of `192.168.100.10`. This annotation applies to Windows 10 Enterprise edition, version 1709 or higher. These annotations would be for the proxy policies under Network Isolation in Group Policy or Intune.
- question: |
Which Input Method Editors (IME) in 19H1 aren't supported?
@@ -73,19 +73,19 @@ sections:
- question: |
I enabled the hardware acceleration policy on my Windows 10 Enterprise, version 1803 deployment. Why are my users still only getting CPU rendering?
answer: |
- This feature is currently experimental only and isn't functional without an additional registry key provided by Microsoft. If you would like to evaluate this feature on a deployment of Windows 10 Enterprise, version 1803, contact Microsoft and we’ll work with you to enable the feature.
+ This feature is currently experimental only and isn't functional without an extra registry key provided by Microsoft. If you would like to evaluate this feature on a deployment of Windows 10 Enterprise, version 1803, contact Microsoft and we’ll work with you to enable the feature.
- question: |
What is the WDAGUtilityAccount local account?
answer: |
- WDAGUtilityAccount is part of Application Guard, beginning with Windows 10, version 1709 (Fall Creators Update). It remains disabled by default, unless Application Guard is enabled on your device. WDAGUtilityAccount is used to sign in to the Application Guard container as a standard user with a random password. It is NOT a malicious account. It requires *Logon as a service* permissions to be able to function correctly. If this permission is denied, you might see the following error:
+ WDAGUtilityAccount is part of Application Guard, beginning with Windows 10, version 1709 (Fall Creators Update). It remains disabled by default, unless Application Guard is enabled on your device. WDAGUtilityAccount is used to sign in to the Application Guard container as a standard user with a random password. It's NOT a malicious account. It requires *Logon as a service* permissions to be able to function correctly. If this permission is denied, you might see the following error:
**Error: 0x80070569, Ext error: 0x00000001; RDP: Error: 0x00000000, Ext error: 0x00000000 Location: 0x00000000**
- question: |
How do I trust a subdomain in my site list?
answer: |
- To trust a subdomain, you must precede your domain with two dots (..). For example: `..contoso.com` ensures that `mail.contoso.com` or `news.contoso.com` are trusted. The first dot represents the strings for the subdomain name (mail or news), and the second dot recognizes the start of the domain name (`contoso.com`). This prevents sites such as `fakesitecontoso.com` from being trusted.
+ To trust a subdomain, you must precede your domain with two dots (..). For example: `..contoso.com` ensures that `mail.contoso.com` or `news.contoso.com` are trusted. The first dot represents the strings for the subdomain name (mail or news), and the second dot recognizes the start of the domain name (`contoso.com`). These two dots prevent sites such as `fakesitecontoso.com` from being trusted.
- question: |
Are there differences between using Application Guard on Windows Pro vs Windows Enterprise?
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ sections:
- question: |
Why am I getting the error message "ERR_NAME_NOT_RESOLVED" after not being able to reach the PAC file?
answer: |
- This is a known issue. To mitigate this you need to create two firewall rules. For information about creating a firewall rule by using Group Policy, see the following resources:
+ This issue is a known one. To mitigate this issue, you need to create two firewall rules. For information about creating a firewall rule by using Group Policy, see the following resources:
- [Create an inbound icmp rule](../windows-firewall/create-an-inbound-icmp-rule.md)
- [Open Group Policy management console for Microsoft Defender Firewall](../windows-firewall/open-the-group-policy-management-console-to-windows-firewall-with-advanced-security.md)
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ sections:
- Port 67
### Second rule (DHCP Client)
- This is the same as the first rule, but scoped to local port 68. In the Microsoft Defender Firewall user interface go through the following steps:
+ This rule is the same as the first rule, but scoped to local port 68. In the Microsoft Defender Firewall user interface go through the following steps:
1. Right-click on inbound rules, and then create a new rule.
@@ -171,17 +171,17 @@ sections:
- question: |
How can I disable portions of Internet Connection Service (ICS) without breaking Application Guard?
answer: |
- ICS is enabled by default in Windows, and ICS must be enabled for Application Guard to function correctly. We do not recommend disabling ICS, this will stop Application Guard from working; however, you can disable ICS in part by using a Group Policy and editing registry keys.
+ ICS is enabled by default in Windows, and ICS must be enabled in order for Application Guard to function correctly. We don't recommend disabling ICS; however, you can disable ICS in part by using a Group Policy and editing registry keys.
1. In the Group Policy setting, **Prohibit use of Internet Connection Sharing on your DNS domain network**, set it to **Disabled**.
2. Disable IpNat.sys from ICS load as follows: **AND** One of the following virtualization extensions for VBS: **OR** [Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager](/configmgr/) **OR** [Group Policy](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/cc753298(v=ws.11)) **OR** Your current, company-wide, non-Microsoft mobile device management (MDM) solution. For info about non-Mirosoft MDM solutions, see the documentation that came with your product. |
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/msft-security-dev-lifecycle.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/msft-security-dev-lifecycle.md
index 9be071fa44..e6403fafa5 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/msft-security-dev-lifecycle.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/msft-security-dev-lifecycle.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
title: Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle
-description: Download the Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle white paper which covers a security assurance process focused on software development.
+description: Download the Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle white paper that covers a security assurance process focused on software development.
ms.prod: m365-security
author: dansimp
ms.author: dansimp
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ The Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) is a security assurance process that is
[:::image type="content" source="images/simplified-sdl.png" alt-text="Simplified secure development lifecycle":::](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/securityengineering/sdl)
-Combining a holistic and practical approach, the SDL aims to reduce the number and severity of vulnerabilities in software. The SDL introduces security and privacy throughout all phases of the development process.
+With the help of the combination of a holistic and practical approach, the SDL aims to reduce the number and severity of vulnerabilities in software. The SDL introduces security and privacy throughout all phases of the development process.
The Microsoft SDL is based on three core concepts:
- Education
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md
index 681a9ae413..c19f67e476 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md
@@ -22,14 +22,14 @@ Windows 10 includes Group Policy-configurable “Process Mitigation Options” t
> [!IMPORTANT]
> We recommend trying these mitigations in a test lab before deploying to your organization, to determine if they interfere with your organization’s required apps.
-The Group Policy settings in this topic are related to three types of process mitigations. In Windows 10, all three types are on by default for 64-bit applications, but by using the Group Policy settings described in this topic, you can configure additional protections. The types of process mitigations are:
+The Group Policy settings in this topic are related to three types of process mitigations. In Windows 10, all three types are on by default for 64-bit applications, but by using the Group Policy settings described in this topic, you can configure more protections. The types of process mitigations are:
- **Data Execution Prevention (DEP)** is a system-level memory protection feature that enables the operating system to mark one or more pages of memory as non-executable, preventing code from being run from that region of memory, to help prevent exploitation of buffer overruns. DEP helps prevent code from being run from data pages such as the default heap, stacks, and memory pools. For more information, see [Data Execution Prevention](overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md#data-execution-prevention).
-- **Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP)** is designed to block exploits that use the Structured Exception Handler (SEH) overwrite technique. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps to protect apps regardless of whether they have been compiled with the latest improvements. For more information, see [Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection](overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md#structured-exception-handling-overwrite-protection).
+- **Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP)** is designed to block exploits that use the Structured Exception Handler (SEH) overwrite technique. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps to protect apps regardless of whether they've been compiled with the latest improvements. For more information, see [Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection](overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md#structured-exception-handling-overwrite-protection).
- **Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)** loads DLLs into random memory addresses at boot time to mitigate against malware that’s designed to attack specific memory locations, where specific DLLs are expected to be loaded. For more information, see [Address Space Layout Randomization](overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md#address-space-layout-randomization).
- To find additional ASLR protections in the table below, look for `IMAGES` or `ASLR`.
+ To find more ASLR protections in the table below, look for `IMAGES` or `ASLR`.
The following procedure describes how to use Group Policy to override individual **Process Mitigation Options** settings.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md
index b4ab4b2171..d9a47da3b6 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ This topic provides an overview of some of the software and firmware threats fac
|--------------|-------------------------|
| [The security threat landscape](#threat-landscape) | Describes the current nature of the security threat landscape, and outlines how Windows 10 is designed to mitigate software exploits and similar threats. |
| [Windows 10 mitigations that you can configure](#windows-10-mitigations-that-you-can-configure) | Provides tables of configurable threat mitigations with links to more information. Product features such as Device Guard appear in [Table 1](#windows-10-mitigations-that-you-can-configure), and memory protection options such as Data Execution Prevention appear in [Table 2](#table-2). |
-| [Mitigations that are built in to Windows 10](#mitigations-that-are-built-in-to-windows-10) | Provides descriptions of Windows 10 mitigations that require no configuration—they are built into the operating system. For example, heap protections and kernel pool protections are built into Windows 10. |
+| [Mitigations that are built in to Windows 10](#mitigations-that-are-built-in-to-windows-10) | Provides descriptions of Windows 10 mitigations that require no configuration—they're built into the operating system. For example, heap protections and kernel pool protections are built into Windows 10. |
| [Understanding Windows 10 in relation to the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit](#understanding-windows-10-in-relation-to-the-enhanced-mitigation-experience-toolkit) | Describes how mitigations in the [Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET)](https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=48240) correspond to features built into Windows 10 and how to convert EMET settings into mitigation policies for Windows 10. |
This topic focuses on pre-breach mitigations aimed at device protection and threat resistance. These protections work with other security defenses in Windows 10, as shown in the following illustration:
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ Windows 10 mitigations that you can configure are listed in the following two ta
| **Device Guard** UEFI Secure Boot ensures that the device boots only authorized code. Additionally, Boot Integrity (Platform Secure Boot) must be supported following the requirements in Hardware Compatibility Specification for Systems for Windows 10 under the subsection: “System.Fundamentals.Firmware.CS.UEFISecureBoot.ConnectedStandby”|
|Virtualization extensions, such as Intel VT-x, AMD-V, and SLAT must be enabled|Required to support virtualization-based security. Direct Memory Access (DMA) protection can be enabled to provide additional memory protection but requires processors to include DMA protection technologies.|
+|X64 processor|Required to support virtualization-based security that uses Windows Hypervisor. Hyper-V is supported only on x64 processor (and not on x86). Direct Memory Access (DMA) protection can be enabled to provide extra memory protection but requires processors to include DMA protection technologies.|
|IOMMU, such as Intel VT-d, AMD-Vi|Support for the IOMMU in Windows 10 enhances system resiliency against DMA attacks.|
-|Trusted Platform Module (TPM)|Required to support health attestation and necessary for additional key protections for virtualization-based security. TPM 2.0 is supported. Support for TPM 1.2 was added beginning in Windows 10, version 1607 (RS1)|
+|Trusted Platform Module (TPM)|Required to support health attestation and necessary for other key protections for virtualization-based security. TPM 2.0 is supported. Support for TPM 1.2 was added beginning in Windows 10, version 1607 (RS1)|
-This section presented information about several closely related controls in Windows 10. The multi-layer defenses and in-depth approach helps to eradicate low-level malware during boot sequence. Virtualization-based security is a fundamental operating system architecture change that adds a new security boundary. Device Guard and Credential Guard respectively help to block untrusted code and protect corporate domain credentials from theft and reuse. This section also briefly discussed the importance of managing devices and patching vulnerabilities. All these technologies can be used to harden and lock down devices while limiting the risk of attackers compromising them.
+This section presented information about several closely related controls in Windows 10. The multi-layer defenses and in-depth approach help to eradicate low-level malware during boot sequence. Virtualization-based security is a fundamental operating system architecture change that adds a new security boundary. Device Guard and Credential Guard respectively help to block untrusted code and protect corporate domain credentials from theft and reuse. This section also briefly discussed the importance of managing devices and patching vulnerabilities. All these technologies can be used to harden and lock down devices while limiting the risk of attackers compromising them.
## Detect an unhealthy Windows 10-based device
-As of today, many organizations only consider devices to be compliant with company policy after they’ve passed a variety of checks that show, for example, that the operating system is in the correct state, properly configured, and has security protection enabled. Unfortunately, with today’s systems, this form of reporting isn't entirely reliable because malware can spoof a software statement about system health. A rootkit, or a similar low-level exploit, can report a false healthy state to traditional compliance tools.
+As of today, many organizations only consider devices to be compliant with company policy after they’ve passed various checks that show, for example, that the operating system is in the correct state, properly configured, and has security protection enabled. Unfortunately, with today’s systems, this form of reporting isn't entirely reliable because malware can spoof a software statement about system health. A rootkit, or a similar low-level exploit, can report a false healthy state to traditional compliance tools.
The biggest challenge with rootkits is that they can be undetectable to the client. Because they start before antimalware, and they have system-level privileges, they can completely disguise themselves while continuing to access system resources. As a result, traditional computers infected with rootkits appear to be healthy, even with antimalware running.
-As previously discussed, the health attestation feature of Windows 10 uses the TPM hardware component to securely record a measurement of every boot-related component, including firmware, Windows 10 kernel, and even early boot drivers. Because, health attestation leverages the hardware-based security capabilities of TPM, the log of all boot measured components remains out of the reach of any malware.
+As previously discussed, the health attestation feature of Windows 10 uses the TPM hardware component to securely record a measurement of every boot-related component, including firmware, Windows 10 kernel, and even early boot drivers. Because health attestation uses the hardware-based security capabilities of TPM, the log of all boot measured components remains out of the reach of any malware.
-By attesting a trusted boot state, devices can prove that they are not running low-level malware that could spoof later compliance checks. TPM-based health attestation provides a reliable anchor of trust for assets that contain high-value data.
+After the devices attest a trusted boot state, they can prove that they aren't running low-level malware that could spoof later compliance checks. TPM-based health attestation provides a reliable anchor of trust for assets that contain high-value data.
### What is the concept of device health?
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ However, the use of traditional malware prevention technologies like antimalware
The definition of device compliance will vary based on an organization’s installed antimalware, device configuration settings, patch management baseline, and other security requirements. But health of the device is part of the overall device compliance policy.
-The health of the device isn't binary and depends on the organization’s security implementation. The Health Attestation Service provides information back to the MDM on which security features are enabled during the boot of the device by leveraging trustworthy hardware TPM.
+The health of the device isn't binary and depends on the organization’s security implementation. The Health Attestation Service provides information back to the MDM on which security features are enabled during the boot of the device by using trustworthy hardware TPM.
But health attestation only provides information, which is why an MDM solution is needed to take and enforce a decision.
@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ But health attestation only provides information, which is why an MDM solution i
In Windows 10, health attestation refers to a feature where Measured Boot data generated during the boot process is sent to a remote device health attestation service operated by Microsoft.
-This is the most secure approach available for Windows 10-based devices to detect when security defenses are down. During the boot process, the TCG log and PCRs values are sent to a remote Microsoft cloud service. Logs are then checked by the Health Attestation Service to determine what changes have occurred on the device.
+This approach is the most secure one available for Windows 10-based devices to detect when security defenses are down. During the boot process, the TCG log and PCRs' values are sent to a remote Microsoft cloud service. Logs are then checked by the Health Attestation Service to determine what changes have occurred on the device.
A relying party like an MDM can inspect the report generated by the remote health attestation service.
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ Windows 10 supports health attestation scenarios by allowing applications access
Remote device health attestation combined with an MDM provides a hardware-rooted method for reporting the current security status and detecting any changes, without having to trust the software running on the system.
-In the case where malicious code is running on the device, the use of a remote server is required. If a rootkit is present on the device, the antimalware is no longer reliable, and its behavior can be hijacked by a malicious code running early in the startup sequence. That's why it's important to use Secure Boot and Device Guard, to control which code is loaded during the boot sequence.
+In the case where malicious code is running on the device, the use of a remote server is required. If a rootkit is present on the device, the antimalware is no longer reliable, and its behavior can be hijacked by a malicious code running early in the startup sequence. This reason is what makes it important to use Secure Boot and Device Guard, to control which code is loaded during the boot sequence.
The antimalware software can search to determine whether the boot sequence contains any signs of malware, such as a rootkit. It can also send the TCG log and the PCRs to a remote health attestation server to provide a separation between the measurement component and the verification component.
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ Health attestation logs the measurements in various TPM Platform Configuration R
:::image type="content" alt-text="figure 6." source="images/hva-fig6-logs.png":::
-When starting a device equipped with TPM, a measurement of different components is performed. This includes firmware, UEFI drivers, CPU microcode, and also all the Windows 10 drivers whose type is Boot Start. The raw measurements are stored in the TPM PCR registers while the details of all events (executable path, authority certification, and so on) are available in the TCG log.
+When you start a device equipped with TPM, a measurement of different components is performed. These components include firmware, UEFI drivers, CPU microcode, and also all the Windows 10 drivers whose type is Boot Start. The raw measurements are stored in the TPM PCR registers while the details of all events (executable path, authority certification, and so on) are available in the TCG log.
:::image type="content" alt-text="figure 7." source="images/hva-fig7-measurement.png":::
@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ The health attestation process works as follows:
4. Windows kernel is measured.
5. Antivirus software is started as the first kernel mode driver.
6. Boot start drivers are measured.
-7. MDM server through the MDM agent issues a health check command by leveraging the Health Attestation CSP.
+7. MDM server through the MDM agent issues a health check command by using the Health Attestation CSP.
8. Boot measurements are validated by the Health Attestation Service
> [!NOTE]
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ In a simplified manner, the TPM is a passive component with limited resources. I
A TPM incorporates in a single component:
-- A RSA 2048-bit key generator
+- An RSA 2048-bit key generator
- A random number generator
- Nonvolatile memory for storing EK, SRK, and AIK keys
- A cryptographic engine to encrypt, decrypt, and sign
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ A TPM incorporates in a single component:
The TPM has an embedded unique cryptographic key called the endorsement key. The TPM endorsement key is a pair of asymmetric keys (RSA size 2048 bits).
-The endorsement key public key is generally used for sending securely sensitive parameters, such as when taking possession of the TPM that contains the defining hash of the owner password. The EK private key is used when creating secondary keys like AIKs.
+The endorsement key public key is used for sending securely sensitive parameters, such as when taking possession of the TPM that contains the defining hash of the owner password. The EK private key is used when creating secondary keys like AIKs.
The endorsement key acts as an identity card for the TPM. For more information, see [Understand the TPM endorsement key](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/cc770443(v=ws.11)).
@@ -467,16 +467,16 @@ Because the endorsement certificate is unique for each device and doesn't change
The AIK is an asymmetric (public/private) key pair that is used as a substitute for the EK as an identity for the TPM for privacy purposes. The private portion of an AIK is never revealed or used outside the TPM and can only be used inside the TPM for a limited set of operations. Furthermore, it can only be used for signing, and only for limited, TPM-defined operations.
-Windows 10 creates AIKs protected by the TPM, if available, that are 2048-bit RSA signing keys. Microsoft is hosting a cloud service called Microsoft Cloud CA to establish cryptographically that it is communicating with a real TPM and that the TPM possesses the presented AIK. After the Microsoft
+Windows 10 creates AIKs protected by the TPM, if available, that are 2048-bit RSA signing keys. Microsoft is hosting a cloud service called Microsoft Cloud CA to establish cryptographically that it's communicating with a real TPM and that the TPM possesses the presented AIK. After the Microsoft
Cloud CA service has established these facts, it will issue an AIK certificate to the Windows 10-based device.
-Many existing devices that will upgrade to Windows 10 won't have a TPM, or the TPM won't contain an endorsement certificate. **To accommodate those devices, Windows 10 allows the issuance of AIK certificates without the presence of an endorsement certificate.** Such AIK certificates are not issued by Microsoft Cloud CA. Note that this isn't as trustworthy as an endorsement certificate that is burned into the device during manufacturing, but it will provide compatibility for advanced scenarios like Windows Hello for Business without TPM.
+Many existing devices that will upgrade to Windows 10 won't have a TPM, or the TPM won't contain an endorsement certificate. **To accommodate those devices, Windows 10 allows the issuance of AIK certificates without the presence of an endorsement certificate.** Such AIK certificates aren't issued by Microsoft Cloud CA. These certificates aren't as trustworthy as an endorsement certificate that is burned into the device during manufacturing, but it will provide compatibility for advanced scenarios like Windows Hello for Business without TPM.
-In the issued AIK certificate, a special OID is added to attest that endorsement certificate was used during the attestation process. This information can be leveraged by a relying party to decide whether to reject devices that are attested using AIK certificates without an endorsement certificate or accept them. Another scenario can be to not allow access to high-value assets from devices that are attested by an AIK certificate that isn't backed by an endorsement certificate.
+In the issued AIK certificate, a special OID is added to attest that endorsement certificate was used during the attestation process. This information can be used by a relying party to decide whether to reject devices that are attested using AIK certificates without an endorsement certificate or accept them. Another scenario can be to not allow access to high-value assets from devices that are attested by an AIK certificate that isn't backed by an endorsement certificate.
### Storage root key
-The storage root key (SRK) is also an asymmetric key pair (RSA with a minimum of 2048 bits length). The SRK has a major role and is used to protect TPM keys, so that these keys cannot be used without the TPM. The SRK key is created when the ownership of the TPM is taken.
+The storage root key (SRK) is also an asymmetric key pair (RSA with a minimum of 2048-bits length). The SRK has a major role and is used to protect TPM keys, so that these keys can't be used without the TPM. The SRK key is created when the ownership of the TPM is taken.
### Platform Configuration Registers
@@ -484,19 +484,19 @@ The TPM contains a set of registers that are designed to provide a cryptographic
The measurement of the boot sequence is based on the PCR and TCG log. To establish a static root of trust, when the device is starting, the device must be able to measure the firmware code before execution. In this case, the Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM) is executed from the boot, calculates the hash of the firmware, then stores it by expanding the register PCR\[0\] and transfers execution to the firmware.
-PCRs are set to zero when the platform is booted, and it is the job of the firmware that boots the platform to measure components in the boot chain and to record the measurements in the PCRs. Typically, boot components take the hash of the next component that is to be run and record the measurements in the PCRs. The initial component that starts the measurement chain is implicitly trusted. This is the CRTM. Platform manufacturers are required to have a secure update process for the CRTM or not permit updates to it. The PCRs record a cumulative hash of the components that have been measured.
+PCRs are set to zero when the platform is booted, and it's the job of the firmware that boots the platform to measure components in the boot chain and to record the measurements in the PCRs. Typically, boot components take the hash of the next component that is to be run and record the measurements in the PCRs. The initial component that starts the measurement chain is implicitly trusted. This component is the CRTM. Platform manufacturers are required to have a secure update process for the CRTM or not permit updates to it. The PCRs record a cumulative hash of the components that have been measured.
-The value of a PCR on its own is hard to interpret (it is just a hash value), but platforms typically keep a log with details of what has been measured, and the PCRs merely ensure that the log hasn't been tampered with. The logs are referred as a TCG log. Each time a register PCR is extended, an entry is added to the TCG log. Thus, throughout the boot process, a trace of the executable code and configuration data is created in the TCG log.
+The value of a PCR on its own is hard to interpret (it's just a hash value), but platforms typically keep a log with details of what has been measured, and the PCRs merely ensure that the log hasn't been tampered with. The logs are referred as a TCG log. Each time a register PCR is extended, an entry is added to the TCG log. Thus, throughout the boot process, a trace of the executable code and configuration data is created in the TCG log.
### TPM provisioning
-For the TPM of a Windows 10-based device to be usable, it must first be provisioned. The process of provisioning differs somewhat based on TPM versions, but, when successful, it results in the TPM being usable and the owner authorization data (ownerAuth) for the TPM being stored locally on the registry.
+For the TPM of a Windows 10-based device to be usable, it must first be provisioned. The process of provisioning differs based on TPM versions, but, when successful, it results in the TPM being usable and the owner authorization data (ownerAuth) for the TPM being stored locally on the registry.
When the TPM is provisioned, Windows 10 will first attempt to determine the EK and locally stored **ownerAuth** values by looking in the registry at the following location: **HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\TPM\\WMI\\Endorsement**
During the provisioning process, the device may need to be restarted.
-Note that the **Get-TpmEndorsementKeyInfo PowerShell** cmdlet can be used with administrative privilege to get information about the endorsement key and certificates of the TPM.
+The **Get-TpmEndorsementKeyInfo PowerShell** cmdlet can be used with administrative privilege to get information about the endorsement key and certificates of the TPM.
If the TPM ownership isn't known but the EK exists, the client library will provision the TPM and will store the resulting **ownerAuth** value into the registry if the policy allows it will store the SRK public portion at the following location:
**HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\TPM\\WMI\\Admin\\SRKPub**
@@ -510,16 +510,16 @@ As part of the provisioning process, Windows 10 will create an AIK with the TPM.
Windows 10 contains a configuration service provider (CSP) specialized for interacting with the health attestation feature. A CSP is a component that plugs into the Windows MDM client and provides a published protocol for how MDM servers can configure settings and manage Windows-based devices. The management protocol is represented as a tree structure that can be specified as URIs with functions to perform on the URIs such as “get”, “set”, “delete”, and so on.
-The following is a list of functions performed by the Windows 10 Health Attestation CSP:
+The following list is that of the functions performed by the Windows 10 Health Attestation CSP:
- Collects data that is used to verify a device’s health status
- Forwards the data to the Health Attestation Service
- Provisions the Health Attestation Certificate that it receives from the Health Attestation Service
- Upon request, forwards the Health Attestation Certificate (received from the Health Attestation Service) and related runtime information to the MDM server for verification
-During a health attestation session, the Health Attestation CSP forwards the TCG logs and PCRs values that are measured during the boot, by using a secure communication channel to the Health Attestation Service.
+During a health attestation session, the Health Attestation CSP forwards the TCG logs and PCRs' values that are measured during the boot, by using a secure communication channel to the Health Attestation Service.
-When an MDM server validates that a device has attested to the Health Attestation Service, it will be given a set of statements and claims about how that device booted, with the assurance that the device did not reboot between the time that it attested its health and the time that the MDM server validated it.
+When an MDM server validates that a device has attested to the Health Attestation Service, it will be given a set of statements and claims about how that device booted, with the assurance that the device didn't reboot between the time that it attested its health and the time that the MDM server validated it.
### Windows Health Attestation Service
@@ -530,8 +530,8 @@ The role of Windows Health Attestation Service is essentially to evaluate a set
Checking that a TPM attestation and the associated log are valid takes several steps:
-1. First, the server must check that the reports are signed by **trustworthy AIKs**. This might be done by checking that the public part of the AIK is listed in a database of assets, or perhaps that a certificate has been checked.
-2. After the key has been checked, the signed attestation (a quote structure) should be checked to see whether it is a **valid signature over PCR values**.
+1. First, the server must check that the reports are signed by **trustworthy AIKs**. This verification might be done by checking that the public part of the AIK is listed in a database of assets, or perhaps that a certificate has been checked.
+2. After the key has been checked, the signed attestation (a quote structure) should be checked to see whether it's a **valid signature over PCR values**.
3. Next the logs should be checked to ensure that they match the PCR values reported.
4. Finally, the logs themselves should be examined by an MDM solution to see whether they represent **known or valid security configurations**. For example, a simple check might be to see whether the measured early OS components are known to be good, that the ELAM driver is as expected, and that the ELAM driver policy file is up to date. If all of these checks succeed, an attestation statement can be issued that later can be used to determine whether or not the client should be granted access to a resource.
@@ -554,15 +554,15 @@ The following table presents some key items that can be reported back to MDM dep
|--- |--- |
|Windows 10 for desktop editions| AppLocker permits customization of error messages to direct users to a Web page for help.|
|Policy maintenance|SRP policies are updated by using the Local Security Policy snap-in or the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC).|AppLocker policies are updated by using the Local Security Policy snap-in or the GPMC. AppLocker supports a small set of PowerShell cmdlets to aid in administration and maintenance.|
|Policy management infrastructure|To manage SRP policies, SRP uses Group Policy within a domain and the Local Security Policy snap-in for a local computer.|To manage AppLocker policies, AppLocker uses Group Policy within a domain and the Local Security Policy snap-in for a local computer.|
-|Block malicious scripts|Rules for blocking malicious scripts prevents all scripts associated with the Windows Script Host from running, except those that are digitally signed by your organization.|AppLocker rules can control the following file formats: .ps1, .bat, .cmd, .vbs, and .js. In addition, you can set exceptions to allow specific files to run.|
+|Block malicious scripts|Rules for blocking malicious scripts prevent all scripts associated with the Windows Script Host from running, except those scripts that are digitally signed by your organization.|AppLocker rules can control the following file formats: .ps1, .bat, .cmd, .vbs, and .js. In addition, you can set exceptions to allow specific files to run.|
|Manage software installation|SRP can prevent all Windows Installer packages from installing. It allows .msi files that are digitally signed by your organization to be installed.|The Windows Installer rule collection is a set of rules created for Windows Installer file types (.mst, .msi and .msp) to allow you to control the installation of files on client computers and servers.|
|Manage all software on the computer|All software is managed in one rule set. By default, the policy for managing all software on a device disallows all software on the user's device, except software that is installed in the Windows folder, Program Files folder, or subfolders.|Unlike SRP, each AppLocker rule collection functions as an allowed list of files. Only the files that are listed within the rule collection will be allowed to run. This configuration makes it easier for administrators to determine what will occur when an AppLocker rule is applied.|
-|Different policies for different users|Rules are applied uniformly to all users on a particular device.|On a device that is shared by multiple users, an administrator can specify the groups of users who can access the installed software. Using AppLocker, an administrator can specify the user to whom a specific rule should apply.|
+|Different policies for different users|Rules are applied uniformly to all users on a particular device.|On a device that is shared by multiple users, an administrator can specify the groups of users who can access the installed software. An administrator uses AppLocker to specify the user to whom a specific rule should apply.|
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/working-with-applocker-rules.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/working-with-applocker-rules.md
index 4379162473..4ad45cf9e0 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/working-with-applocker-rules.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/working-with-applocker-rules.md
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ This topic for IT professionals describes AppLocker rule types and how to work w
| [Create a rule that uses a path condition](create-a-rule-that-uses-a-path-condition.md) | This topic for IT professionals shows how to create an AppLocker rule with a path condition.|
| [Create a rule that uses a publisher condition](create-a-rule-that-uses-a-publisher-condition.md) | This topic for IT professionals shows how to create an AppLocker rule with a publisher condition.|
| [Create AppLocker default rules](create-applocker-default-rules.md) | This topic for IT professionals describes the steps to create a standard set of AppLocker rules that will allow Windows system files to run.|
-| [Add exceptions for an AppLocker rule](configure-exceptions-for-an-applocker-rule.md) | This topic for IT professionals describes the steps to specify which apps can or cannot run as exceptions to an AppLocker rule.|
+| [Add exceptions for an AppLocker rule](configure-exceptions-for-an-applocker-rule.md) | This topic for IT professionals describes the steps to specify which apps can or can't run as exceptions to an AppLocker rule.|
| [Create a rule for packaged apps](create-a-rule-for-packaged-apps.md) | This topic for IT professionals shows how to create an AppLocker rule for packaged apps with a publisher condition.|
| [Delete an AppLocker rule](delete-an-applocker-rule.md) | This topic for IT professionals describes the steps to delete an AppLocker rule.|
| [Edit AppLocker rules](edit-applocker-rules.md) | This topic for IT professionals describes the steps to edit a publisher rule, path rule, and file hash rule in AppLocker.|
@@ -49,11 +49,11 @@ The three AppLocker enforcement modes are described in the following table. The
| Enforcement mode | Description |
| - | - |
-| **Not configured** | This is the default setting which means that the rules defined here will be enforced unless a linked GPO with a higher precedence has a different value for this setting.|
+| **Not configured** | This is the default setting, which means that the rules defined here will be enforced unless a linked GPO with a higher precedence has a different value for this setting.|
| **Enforce rules** | Rules are enforced.|
-| **Audit only** | Rules are audited but not enforced. When a user runs an app that is affected by an AppLocker rule, the app is allowed to run and the info about the app is added to the AppLocker event log. The Audit-only enforcement mode helps you determine which apps will be affected by the policy before the policy is enforced. When the AppLocker policy for a rule collection is set to **Audit only**, rules for that rule collection are not enforced|
+| **Audit only** | Rules are audited but not enforced. When a user runs an app that is affected by an AppLocker rule, the app is allowed to run and the info about the app is added to the AppLocker event log. The Audit-only enforcement mode helps you determine which apps will be affected by the policy before the policy is enforced. When the AppLocker policy for a rule collection is set to **Audit only**, rules for that rule collection aren't enforced|
-When AppLocker policies from various GPOs are merged, the rules from all the GPOs are merged and the enforcement mode setting of the winning GPO is applied.
+When AppLocker policies from various GPOs are merged, the rules from all the GPOs are merged, and the enforcement mode setting of the winning GPO is applied.
## Rule collections
The AppLocker console is organized into rule collections, which are executable files, scripts, Windows Installer files, packaged apps and packaged app installers, and DLL files. These collections give you an easy way to differentiate the rules for different types of apps. The following table lists the file formats that are included in each rule collection.
@@ -70,9 +70,9 @@ The AppLocker console is organized into rule collections, which are executable f
When DLL rules are used, AppLocker must check each DLL that an application loads. Therefore, users may experience a reduction in performance if DLL rules are used.
-The DLL rule collection is not enabled by default. To learn how to enable the DLL rule collection, see [DLL rule collections](#bkmk-dllrulecollections).
+The DLL rule collection isn't enabled by default. To learn how to enable the DLL rule collection, see [DLL rule collections](#bkmk-dllrulecollections).
-EXE rules apply to portable executable (PE) files. AppLocker checks whether a file is a valid PE file, rather than just applying rules based on file extension, which attackers can easily change. Regardless of the file extension, the AppLocker EXE rule collection will work on a file as long as it is a valid PE file.
+EXE rules apply to portable executable (PE) files. AppLocker checks whether a file is a valid PE file, rather than just applying rules based on file extension, which attackers can easily change. Regardless of the file extension, the AppLocker EXE rule collection will work on a file as long as it's a valid PE file.
## Rule conditions
@@ -84,13 +84,13 @@ Rule conditions are criteria that help AppLocker identify the apps to which the
### Publisher
-This condition identifies an app based on its digital signature and extended attributes when available. The digital signature contains info about the company that created the app (the publisher). Executable files, dlls, Windows installers, packaged apps and packaged app installers also have extended attributes, which are obtained from the binary resource. In case of executable files, dlls and Windows installers, these attributes contain the name of the product that the file is a part of, the original name of the file as supplied by the publisher, and the version number of the file. In case of packaged apps and packaged app installers, these extended attributes contain the name and the version of the app package.
+This condition identifies an app based on its digital signature and extended attributes when available. The digital signature contains info about the company that created the app (the publisher). Executable files, dlls, Windows installers, packaged apps and packaged app installers also have extended attributes, which are obtained from the binary resource. If there's executable files, dlls and Windows installers, these attributes contain the name of the product that the file is a part of, the original name of the file as supplied by the publisher, and the version number of the file. If there are packaged apps and packaged app installers, these extended attributes contain the name and the version of the app package.
> **Note:** Rules created in the packaged apps and packaged app installers rule collection can only have publisher conditions since Windows does not support unsigned packaged apps and packaged app installers.
>
> **Note:** Use a publisher rule condition when possible because they can survive app updates as well as a change in the location of files.
-When you select a reference file for a publisher condition, the wizard creates a rule that specifies the publisher, product, file name, and version number. You can make the rule more generic by moving the slider up or by using a wildcard character (\*) in the product, file name, or version number fields.
+When you select a reference file for a publisher condition, the wizard creates a rule that specifies the publisher, product, file name, and version number. You can make the rule more generic by moving up the slider or by using a wildcard character (\*) in the product, file name, or version number fields.
>**Note:** To enter custom values for any of the fields of a publisher rule condition in the Create Rules Wizard, you must select the **Use custom values** check box. When this check box is selected, you cannot use the slider.
@@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ The following table describes how a publisher condition is applied.
| **All signed files** | All files that are signed by any publisher.|
| **Publisher only**| All files that are signed by the named publisher.|
| **Publisher and product name**| All files for the specified product that are signed by the named publisher.|
-| **Publisher and product name, and file name**| Any version of the named file or package for the named product that are signed by the publisher.|
-| **Publisher, product name, file name, and file version**| **Exactly**
Microsoft Lync 2016
Microsoft Excel 2016
Microsoft OneNote 2016
Microsoft Outlook 2016
Microsoft PowerPoint 2016
Microsoft Project 2016
Microsoft Publisher 2016
Microsoft SharePoint Designer 2013 (not updated for 2016)
Microsoft Visio 2016
Microsoft Word 2016
Microsoft Office Upload Manager
Microsoft Infopath has been removed (deprecated) from the Office 2016 suite |
| Microsoft Office 2013 applications
[Download a list of all settings synced](https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=46367) | Microsoft Word 2013
Microsoft Excel 2013
Microsoft Outlook 2013
Microsoft Access 2013
Microsoft Project 2013
Microsoft PowerPoint 2013
Microsoft Publisher 2013
Microsoft Visio 2013
Microsoft InfoPath 2013
Microsoft Lync 2013
Microsoft OneNote 2013
Microsoft SharePoint Designer 2013
Microsoft Office 2013 Upload Center
Microsoft OneDrive for Business 2013
| Microsoft Office 2010 applications
[Download a list of all settings synced](https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=46367) | Microsoft Word 2010
Microsoft Excel 2010
Microsoft Outlook 2010
Microsoft Access 2010
Microsoft Project 2010
Microsoft PowerPoint 2010
Microsoft Publisher 2010
Microsoft Visio 2010
Microsoft SharePoint Workspace 2010
Microsoft InfoPath 2010
Microsoft Lync 2010
Microsoft OneNote 2010
Microsoft SharePoint Designer 2010 |
-| Browser options: Internet Explorer 11 and 10 | Synchronize favorites, home page, tabs, and toolbars.
**Note**
UE-V does not roam settings for Internet Explorer cookies. |
+| Browser options: Internet Explorer 11 and 10 | Synchronize favorites, home page, tabs, and toolbars.
**Note**
UE-V doesn't roam settings for Internet Explorer cookies. |
| Windows accessories | Microsoft NotePad, WordPad |
> [!NOTE]
> - An Outlook profile must be created for any device on which a user wants to sync their Outlook signature. If the profile is not already created, the user can create one and then restart Outlook on that device to enable signature synchronization.
>
-> - UE-V does not synchronize settings between the Microsoft Calculator in Windows 10 and the Microsoft Calculator in previous operating systems.
+> - UE-V doesn't synchronize settings between the Microsoft Calculator in Windows 10 and the Microsoft Calculator in previous operating systems.
### Windows settings synchronized by default
@@ -106,10 +106,10 @@ UE-V includes settings location templates that capture settings values for these
|----------------------|-----------------|--------------|---------------|-------------------|
| Desktop background | Currently active desktop background or wallpaper | Log on, unlock, remote connect, Scheduled Task events | Log off, lock, remote disconnect, or scheduled task interval | Enabled |
| Ease of Access | Accessibility and input settings, Microsoft Magnifier, Narrator, and on-Screen Keyboard | Log on only | Log off or scheduled task interval | Enabled |
-| Desktop settings | Start menu and Taskbar settings, folder options, default desktop icons, additional clocks, and region and language settings | Log on only | Log off or scheduled task | Enabled |
+| Desktop settings | Start menu and Taskbar settings, folder options, default desktop icons, more clocks, and region and language settings | Log on only | Log off or scheduled task | Enabled |
> [!IMPORTANT]
-> UE-V roams taskbar settings between Windows 10 devices. However, UE-V does not synchronize taskbar settings between Windows 10 devices and devices running previous operating systems versions.
+> UE-V roams taskbar settings between Windows 10 devices. However, UE-V doesn't synchronize taskbar settings between Windows 10 devices and devices running previous operating systems versions.
| Settings group | Category | Capture | Apply |
|--------------------------|----------------|----------------|--------------|
@@ -142,11 +142,11 @@ Printer roaming in UE-V requires one of these scenarios:
- The printer driver can be imported from Windows Update.
> [!NOTE]
-> The UE-V printer roaming feature does not roam printer settings or preferences, such as printing double-sided.
+> The UE-V printer roaming feature doesn't roam printer settings or preferences, such as printing double-sided.
### Determine whether you need settings synchronized for other applications
-After you have reviewed the settings that are synchronized automatically in a UE-V deployment, you'll need to decide whether to synchronize settings for other applications as your decision will determine how you deploy UE-V throughout your enterprise.
+After you've reviewed the settings that are synchronized automatically in a UE-V deployment, you’ll need to decide whether to synchronize settings for other applications as your decision will determine how you deploy UE-V throughout your enterprise.
As an administrator, when you consider which desktop applications to include in your UE-V solution, consider which settings can be customized by users, and how and where the application stores its settings. Not all desktop applications have settings that can be customized or that are routinely customized by users. In addition, not all desktop applications settings can be synchronized safely across multiple devices or environments.
@@ -167,14 +167,14 @@ If you've decided that you need to synchronize settings for custom applications,
|  | Does this application contain settings that the user can customize? |
|  | Is it important for the user that these settings are synchronized? |
|  | Are these user settings already managed by an application management or settings policy solution? UE-V applies application settings at application startup and Windows settings at logon, unlock, or remote connect events. If you use UE-V with other settings sharing solutions, users might experience inconsistency across synchronized settings. |
-|  | Are the application settings specific to the computer? Application preferences and customizations that are associated with hardware or specific computer configurations do not consistently synchronize across sessions and can cause a poor application experience. |
-|  | Does the application store settings in the Program Files directory or in the file directory that is located in the **Users**\\ \[User name\] \\**AppData**\\**LocalLow** directory? Application data that is stored in either of these locations usually should not synchronize with the user, because this data is specific to the computer or because the data is too large to synchronize. |
-|  | Does the application store any settings in a file that contains other application data that should not synchronize? UE-V synchronizes files as a single unit. If settings are stored in files that include application data other than settings, then synchronizing this additional data can cause a poor application experience.|
+|  | Are the application settings specific to the computer? Application preferences and customizations that are associated with hardware or specific computer configurations don't consistently synchronize across sessions and can cause a poor application experience. |
+|  | Does the application store settings in the Program Files directory or in the file directory that is located in the **Users**\\ \[User name\] \\**AppData**\\**LocalLow** directory? Application data that is stored in either of these locations usually shouldn't synchronize with the user, because this data is specific to the computer or because the data is too large to synchronize. |
+|  | Does the application store any settings in a file that contains other application data that shouldn't synchronize? UE-V synchronizes files as a single unit. If settings are stored in files that include application data other than settings, then synchronizing this extra data can cause a poor application experience.|
|  | How large are the files that contain the settings? The performance of the settings synchronization can be affected by large files. Including large files can affect the performance of settings synchronization. |
## Other considerations when preparing a UE-V deployment
-You should also consider these things when you are preparing to deploy UE-V:
+You should also consider these things when you're preparing to deploy UE-V:
- [Managing credentials synchronization](#managing-credentials-synchronization-in-ue-v)
@@ -192,19 +192,19 @@ You should also consider these things when you are preparing to deploy UE-V:
### Managing credentials synchronization in UE-V
-Many enterprise applications, including Microsoft Outlook, Lync, and Skype for Business prompt users for their domain credentials when they log in. Users have the option of saving their credentials to disk to prevent having to enter them every time they open these applications. Enabling roaming credentials synchronization lets users save their credentials on one computer and avoid re-entering them on every computer they use in their environment. Users can synchronize some domain credentials with UE-V.
+Many enterprise applications, including Microsoft Outlook, Lync, and Skype for Business prompt users for their domain credentials when they log in. Users have the option of saving their credentials to disk to prevent having to enter them every time they open these applications. Enabling roaming credentials synchronization lets users save their credentials on one computer and avoid reentering them on every computer they use in their environment. Users can synchronize some domain credentials with UE-V.
> [!IMPORTANT]
> Credentials synchronization is disabled by default. You must explicitly enable credentials synchronization after you enable the UE-V service to implement this feature.
-UE-V can synchronize enterprise credentials, but does not roam credentials intended only for use on the local device.
+UE-V can synchronize enterprise credentials, but doesn't roam credentials intended only for use on the local device.
-Credentials are synchronous settings, meaning that they are applied to users' profiles the first time they log on to their devices after UE-V synchronizes.
+Credentials are synchronous settings, meaning that they're applied to users' profiles the first time they log on to their devices after UE-V synchronizes.
Credentials synchronization is managed by its own settings location template, which is disabled by default. You can enable or disable this template through the same methods used for other templates. The template identifier for this feature is RoamingCredentialSettings.
> [!IMPORTANT]
-> If you are using Active Directory Credential Roaming in your environment, we recommend that you do not enable the UE-V credential roaming template. Instead, use PowerShell or Group Policy to enable credentials synchronization. Note that credentials are encrypted during synchronization.
+> If you're using Active Directory Credential Roaming in your environment, we recommend that you do not enable the UE-V credential roaming template. Instead, use PowerShell or Group Policy to enable credentials synchronization. Note that credentials are encrypted during synchronization.
[PowerShell](uev-administering-uev-with-windows-powershell-and-wmi.md)**:** Enter this PowerShell cmdlet to enable credential synchronization:
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ Credential files saved by applications into the following locations are synchron
- %UserProfile%\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\
-Credentials saved to other locations are not synchronized by UE-V.
+Credentials saved to other locations aren't synchronized by UE-V.
### Windows applications settings synchronization
@@ -256,13 +256,13 @@ UE-V manages Windows application settings synchronization in three ways:
- **Windows applications list:** Synchronize a list of Windows applications
-- **Unlisted default sync behavior:** Determine the synchronization behavior of Windows applications that are not in the Windows applications list.
+- **Unlisted default sync behavior:** Determine the synchronization behavior of Windows applications that aren't in the Windows applications list.
For more information, see the [Windows Application List](uev-managing-settings-location-templates-using-windows-powershell-and-wmi.md#win8applist).
### Custom UE-V settings location templates
-If you are deploying UE-V to synchronize settings for custom applications, you'll use the UE-V template generator to create custom settings location templates for those desktop applications. After you create and test a custom settings location template in a test environment, you can deploy the settings location templates to user devices.
+If you're deploying UE-V to synchronize settings for custom applications, you’ll use the UE-V template generator to create custom settings location templates for those desktop applications. After you create and test a custom settings location template in a test environment, you can deploy the settings location templates to user devices.
Custom settings location templates must be deployed with an existing deployment infrastructure, such as an enterprise software distribution method, including Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager, with preferences, or by configuring a UE-V settings template catalog. Templates that are deployed with Configuration Manager or Group Policy must be registered using UE-V WMI or Windows PowerShell.
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ UE-V downloads new user settings information from a settings storage location an
- When the Sync Controller Application scheduled task is run
-If UE-V is installed on computer A and computer B, and the settings that you want for the application are on computer A, then computer A should open and close the application first. If the application is opened and closed on computer B first, then the application settings on computer A are configured to the application settings on computer B. Settings are synchronized between computers on per-application basis. Over time, settings become consistent between computers as they are opened and closed with preferred settings.
+If UE-V is installed on computer A and computer B, and the settings that you want for the application are on computer A, then computer A should open and close the application first. If the application is opened and closed on computer B first, then the application settings on computer A are configured to the application settings on computer B. Settings are synchronized between computers on per-application basis. Over time, settings become consistent between computers as they're opened and closed with preferred settings.
This scenario also applies to Windows settings. If the Windows settings on computer B should be the same as the Windows settings on computer A, then the user should log on and log off computer A first.
@@ -304,17 +304,17 @@ The UE-V settings storage location and settings template catalog support storing
- Format the storage volume with an NTFS file system.
-- The share can use Distributed File System (DFS) replication, but Distributed File System Replication (DFSR) is specifically not supported. Distributed File System Namespaces (DFSN) are supported. For detailed information, see:
+- The share can use Distributed File System (DFS) replication, but Distributed File System Replication (DFSR) is not supported. Distributed File System Namespaces (DFSN) are supported. For detailed information, see:
- [Deploying Roaming User Profiles](/windows-server/storage/folder-redirection/deploy-roaming-user-profiles)
- [Information about Microsoft support policy for a DFS-R and DFS-N deployment scenario](/troubleshoot/windows-server/networking/support-policy-for-dfsr-dfsn-deployment)
- In addition, because SYSVOL uses DFSR for replication, SYSVOL cannot be used for UE-V data file replication.
+ In addition, because SYSVOL uses DFSR for replication, SYSVOL can't be used for UE-V data file replication.
- Configure the share permissions and NTFS access control lists (ACLs) as specified in [Deploying the settings storage location for UE-V](uev-deploy-required-features.md).
-- Use file server clustering along with the UE-V service to provide access to copies of user state data in the event of communications failures.
+- Use file server clustering along with the UE-V service to provide access to copies of user state data if communications failures occur.
- You can store the settings storage path data (user data) and settings template catalog templates on clustered shares, on DFSN shares, or on both.
@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ Before you proceed, ensure that your environment meets these requirements for us
> [!NOTE]
> - Windows Server 2012 operating systems come with .NET Framework 4.5 installed. The Windows 10 operating system comes with .NET Framework 4.6 installed.
>
-> - The "Delete Roaming Cache" policy for mandatory profiles is not supported with UE-V and should not be used.
+> - The “Delete Roaming Cache” policy for mandatory profiles isn't supported with UE-V and shouldn't be used.
There are no special random access memory (RAM) requirements specific to UE-V.
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ Sync Provider is the default setting for users and synchronizes a local cache wi
A scheduled task manages this synchronization of settings every 30 minutes or through trigger events for certain applications. For more information, see [Changing the frequency of UE-V scheduled tasks](uev-changing-the-frequency-of-scheduled-tasks.md).
-The UE-V service synchronizes user settings for devices that are not always connected to the enterprise network (remote devices and laptops) and devices that are always connected to the network (devices that run Windows Server and host virtual desktop interface (VDI) sessions).
+The UE-V service synchronizes user settings for devices that aren't always connected to the enterprise network (remote devices and laptops) and devices that are always connected to the network (devices that run Windows Server and host virtual desktop interface (VDI) sessions).
**Synchronization for computers with always-available connections** When you use UE-V on devices that are always connected to the network, you must configure the UE-V service to synchronize settings by using the *SyncMethod=None* parameter, which treats the settings storage server as a standard network share. In this configuration, the UE-V service can be configured to notify if the import of the application settings is delayed.
diff --git a/windows/configuration/ue-v/uev-release-notes-1607.md b/windows/configuration/ue-v/uev-release-notes-1607.md
index 67badc0dbf..743b218e4a 100644
--- a/windows/configuration/ue-v/uev-release-notes-1607.md
+++ b/windows/configuration/ue-v/uev-release-notes-1607.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
title: User Experience Virtualization (UE-V) Release Notes
-description: Read the latest information required to successfully install and use User Experience Virtualization (UE-V) that is not included in the UE-V documentation.
+description: Read the latest information required to successfully install and use User Experience Virtualization (UE-V) that isn't included in the UE-V documentation.
author: aczechowski
ms.prod: w10
ms.date: 04/19/2017
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ ms.topic: article
**Applies to**
- Windows 10, version 1607
-This topic includes information required to successfully install and use UE-V that is not included in the User Experience Virtualization (UE-V) documentation. If there are differences between the information in this topic and other UE-V topics, the latest change should be considered authoritative.
+This topic includes information required to successfully install and use UE-V that isn't included in the User Experience Virtualization (UE-V) documentation. If there are differences between the information in this topic and other UE-V topics, the latest change should be considered authoritative.
### Company Settings Center removed in UE-V for Windows 10, version 1607
@@ -44,33 +44,33 @@ When a user generates a valid settings location template for the Skype desktop a
WORKAROUND: Remove or unregister the Skype template to allow Skype to work again.
-### Registry settings do not synchronize between App-V and native applications on the same device
+### Registry settings don't synchronize between App-V and native applications on the same device
-When a device has an application that is installed through both Application Virtualization (App-V) and locally with a Windows Installer (.msi) file, the registry-based settings do not synchronize between the technologies.
+When a device has an application that is installed through both Application Virtualization (App-V) and locally with a Windows Installer (.msi) file, the registry-based settings don't synchronize between the technologies.
WORKAROUND: To resolve this problem, run the application by selecting one of the two technologies, but not both.
### Unpredictable results when both Office 2010 and Office 2013 are installed on the same device
-When a user has both Office 2010 and Office 2013 installed, any common settings between the two versions of Office are roamed by UE-V. This could cause the Office 2010 package size to be large or result in unpredictable conflicts with 2013, particularly if Office 365 is used.
+When a user has both Office 2010 and Office 2013 installed, any common settings between the two versions of Office are roamed by UE-V. This roaming could cause the Office 2010 package size to be large or result in unpredictable conflicts with 2013, particularly if Office 365 is used.
WORKAROUND: Install only one version of Office or limit which settings are synchronized by UE-V.
### Uninstallation and reinstallation of Windows 8 applications reverts settings to initial state
-While using UE-V settings synchronization for a Windows 8 application, if the user uninstalls the application and then reinstalls the application, the application’s settings revert to their default values. This result happens because the uninstall removes the local (cached) copy of the application’s settings but does not remove the local UE-V settings package. When the application is reinstalled and launched, UE-V gathers the application settings that were reset to the application defaults and then uploads the default settings to the central storage location. Other computers running the application then download the default settings. This behavior is identical to the behavior of desktop applications.
+While UE-V settings synchronization is being used for a Windows 8 application, if the user uninstalls the application and then reinstalls the application, the application’s settings revert to their default values. This result happens because the uninstall removes the local (cached) copy of the application’s settings but doesn't remove the local UE-V settings package. When the application is reinstalled and launched, UE-V gathers the application settings that were reset to the application defaults and then uploads the default settings to the central storage location. Other computers running the application then download the default settings. This behavior is identical to the behavior of desktop applications.
WORKAROUND: None.
-### UE-V does not support roaming settings between 32-bit and 64-bit versions of Microsoft Office
+### UE-V doesn't support roaming settings between 32-bit and 64-bit versions of Microsoft Office
-We recommend that you install the 32-bit version of Microsoft Office for both 32-bit and 64-bit operating systems. To choose the Microsoft Office version that you need, click [here](
This default setting is the gold standard for computers. This option attempts to synchronize the setting and times out after a short delay to ensure that the application or operating system startup isn’t delayed for a long period of time.
This functionality is also tied to the Scheduled task – Sync Controller Application. The administrator controls the frequency of the Scheduled task. By default, computers synchronize their settings every 30 min after logging on. |
| External | This configuration method specifies that if UE-V settings are written to a local folder on the user computer, then any external sync engine (such as OneDrive for Business, Work Folders, Sharepoint, or Dropbox) can be used to apply these settings to the different computers that users access. |
-| None | This configuration setting is designed for the Virtual Desktop Infrastructure (VDI) and Streamed Application experience primarily. This setting should be used on computers running the Windows Server operating system in a datacenter, where the connection will always be available.
Any settings changes are saved directly to the server. If the network connection to the settings storage path is not available, then the settings changes are cached on the device and are synchronized the next time that the Sync Provider runs. If the settings storage path is not found and the user profile is removed from a pooled VDI environment on logoff, then these settings changes are lost, and the user must reapply the change when the computer can again reach the settings storage path.
Apps and OS will wait indefinitely for the location to be present. This could cause App load or OS logon time to dramatically increase if the location is not found. |
+| None | This configuration setting is designed for the Virtual Desktop Infrastructure (VDI) and Streamed Application experience primarily. This setting should be used on computers running the Windows Server operating system in a datacenter, where the connection will always be available.
Any settings changes are saved directly to the server. If the network connection to the settings storage path isn't available, then the settings changes are cached on the device and are synchronized the next time that the Sync Provider runs. If the settings storage path isn't found and the user profile is removed from a pooled VDI environment on sign out, then these settings changes are lost, and the user must reapply the change when the computer can again reach the settings storage path.
Apps and OS will wait indefinitely for the location to be present. This waiting period could cause App load or OS sign-in time to dramatically increase if the location isn't found. |
You can configure the sync method in these ways:
diff --git a/windows/configuration/ue-v/uev-synchronizing-microsoft-office-with-uev.md b/windows/configuration/ue-v/uev-synchronizing-microsoft-office-with-uev.md
index 051be1125c..56ff1970cc 100644
--- a/windows/configuration/ue-v/uev-synchronizing-microsoft-office-with-uev.md
+++ b/windows/configuration/ue-v/uev-synchronizing-microsoft-office-with-uev.md
@@ -17,11 +17,13 @@ ms.topic: article
Microsoft User Experience Virtualization (UE-V) supports the synchronization of Microsoft Office application settings. The combination of UE-V and App-V support for Office enables the same experience on virtualized instances of Office from any UE-V-enabled device or virtualized desktop.
+To synchronize Office applications settings, you can download Office templates from the [User Experience Virtualization (UE-V) Template Gallery](https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/site/search?f%5B0%5D.Type=RootCategory&f%5B0%5D.Value=UE-V&f%5B0%5D.Text=UE-V). This resource provides Microsoft-authored UE-V settings location templates and community-developed settings location templates.
+
## Microsoft Office support in UE-V
UE-V includes settings location templates for Microsoft Office 2016, 2013, and 2010. In previous versions of UE-V, settings location templates for Office 2013 and Office 2010 were distributed and registered when you installed the UE-V agent. Now that UE-V is a feature in Windows 10, version 1607, settings location templates are installed when you install or upgrade to the new operating system.
-These templates help synchronize users' Office experience between devices. Microsoft Office 2016 settings roamed by Office 365 experience are not included in these settings. For a list of Office 365-specific settings, see [Overview of user and roaming settings for Office](/previous-versions/office/office-2013-resource-kit/jj733593(v=office.15)).
+These templates help synchronize users’ Office experience between devices. Microsoft Office 2016 settings roamed by Office 365 experience aren't included in these settings. For a list of Office 365-specific settings, see [Overview of user and roaming settings for Office](/previous-versions/office/office-2013-resource-kit/jj733593(v=office.15)).
## Synchronized Office Settings
@@ -42,7 +44,6 @@ Review the following tables for details about Office support in UE-V:
## Deploying Office templates
-
You can deploy UE-V settings location template with the following methods:
- **Registering template with PowerShell**. If you use Windows PowerShell to manage computers, run the following Windows PowerShell command as Administrator to register this settings location template:
diff --git a/windows/configuration/ue-v/uev-using-uev-with-application-virtualization-applications.md b/windows/configuration/ue-v/uev-using-uev-with-application-virtualization-applications.md
index 59e4e1d213..0396b91e54 100644
--- a/windows/configuration/ue-v/uev-using-uev-with-application-virtualization-applications.md
+++ b/windows/configuration/ue-v/uev-using-uev-with-application-virtualization-applications.md
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ ms.topic: article
**Applies to**
- Windows 10, version 1607
-User Experience Virtualization (UE-V) supports Microsoft Application Virtualization (App-V) applications without any required modifications to either the App-V package or the UE-V template. However, an additional step is required because you cannot run the UE-V template generator directly on a virtualized App-V application. Instead, you must install the application locally, generate the template, and then apply the template to the virtualized application. UE-V supports App-V for Windows 10 packages and App-V 5.0 packages.
+User Experience Virtualization (UE-V) supports Microsoft Application Virtualization (App-V) applications without any required modifications to either the App-V package or the UE-V template. However, another step is required because you can't run the UE-V template generator directly on a virtualized App-V application. Instead, you must install the application locally, generate the template, and then apply the template to the virtualized application. UE-V supports App-V for Windows 10 packages and App-V 5.0 packages.
## UE-V settings synchronization for App-V applications
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ UE-V monitors when an application opens by the program name and, optionally, by
1. Run the UE-V template generator to collect the settings of the locally installed application whose settings you want to synchronize between computers. This process creates a settings location template. If you use a built-in template such as a Microsoft Office template, skip this step. For more information about using the UE-V template generator, see [Deploy UE-V for custom applications](uev-deploy-uev-for-custom-applications.md).
-2. Install the App-V application package if you have not already done so.
+2. Install the App-V application package if you haven't already done so.
3. Publish the template to the location of your settings template catalog or manually install the template by using the `Register-UEVTemplate` Windows PowerShell cmdlet.
diff --git a/windows/configuration/ue-v/uev-whats-new-in-uev-for-windows.md b/windows/configuration/ue-v/uev-whats-new-in-uev-for-windows.md
index dccc836fe6..a0b47df0de 100644
--- a/windows/configuration/ue-v/uev-whats-new-in-uev-for-windows.md
+++ b/windows/configuration/ue-v/uev-whats-new-in-uev-for-windows.md
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ For more information about how to configure an existing UE-V installation after
## New UE-V template generator is available from the Windows 10 ADK
-UE-V for Windows 10 includes a new template generator, available from a new location. If you are upgrading from an existing UE-V installation, you'll need to use the new generator to create settings location templates. The UE-V for Windows 10 template generator is now available in the [Windows 10 Assessment and Deployment Kit](/windows-hardware/get-started/adk-install) (Windows ADK).
+UE-V for Windows 10 includes a new template generator, available from a new location. If you're upgrading from an existing UE-V installation, you’ll need to use the new generator to create settings location templates. The UE-V for Windows 10 template generator is now available in the [Windows 10 Assessment and Deployment Kit](https://developer.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/hardware/windows-assessment-deployment-kit) (Windows ADK).
## Company Settings Center removed in UE-V for Windows 10, version 1607
@@ -47,7 +47,8 @@ With the release of Windows 10, version 1607, the Company Settings Center was re
Administrators can still define which user-customized application settings can synchronize (roam) with Group Policy or Windows PowerShell.
-**Note** With the removal of the Company Settings Center, the following group policies are no longer applicable:
+>[!Note]
+>With the removal of the Company Settings Center, the following group policies are no longer applicable:
- Contact IT Link Text
- Contact IT URL
@@ -57,7 +58,7 @@ Administrators can still define which user-customized application settings can s
With Windows 10, version 1607, users can synchronize Windows application settings and Windows operating system settings to Azure instead of to OneDrive. You can use the Windows 10 enterprise sync functionality together with UE-V for on-premises domain-joined devices only.
-In hybrid cloud environments, UE-V can roam Win32 applications on-premises while [Enterprise State Roaming](/azure/active-directory/devices/enterprise-state-roaming-enable) (ESR) can roam the rest, e.g., Windows and desktop settings, themes, colors, etc., to an Azure cloud installation.
+In hybrid cloud environments, UE-V can roam Win32 applications on-premises while [Enterprise State Roaming](/azure/active-directory/devices/enterprise-state-roaming-overview) (ESR) can roam the rest, for example, Windows and desktop settings, themes, colors, and so on, to an Azure cloud installation.
To configure UE-V to roam Windows desktop and application data only, change the following group policies:
@@ -76,13 +77,14 @@ Additionally, to enable Windows 10 and UE-V to work together, configure these po
## Settings Synchronization Behavior Changed in UE-V for Windows 10
-While earlier versions of UE-V roamed taskbar settings between Windows 10 devices, UE-V for Windows 10, version 1607 does not synchronize taskbar settings between devices running Windows 10 and devices running previous versions of Windows.
+While earlier versions of UE-V roamed taskbar settings between Windows 10 devices, UE-V for Windows 10, version 1607 doesn't synchronize taskbar settings between devices running Windows 10 and devices running previous versions of Windows.
In addition, UE-V for Windows has removed support for the Windows calculator application.
-The Windows modern apps settings (DontSyncWindows8AppSettings) group policy is enabled by default and therefore, modern apps will not roam unless this policy is changed to disabled.
+The Windows modern apps settings (DontSyncWindows8AppSettings) group policy is enabled by default and therefore, modern apps won't roam unless this policy is changed to disabled.
-Please note, UE-V will roam any AppX apps that use the WinRT settings roaming API, provided that they have been opted in to roam at the time of development by the developer so there is no definitive list.
+> [!NOTE]
+> UE-V will roam any AppX apps that use the WinRT settings roaming API, if they've been opted in to roam at the time of development by the developer so there is no definitive list.
## Support Added for Roaming Network Printers
@@ -96,21 +98,23 @@ Printer roaming in UE-V requires one of these scenarios:
- The printer driver can be imported from Windows Update.
-> **Note** The UE-V printer roaming feature does not roam printer settings or preferences, such as printing double-sided.
+> [!Note]
+> The UE-V printer roaming feature doesn't roam printer settings or preferences, such as printing double-sided.
## Office 2016 Settings Location Template
UE-V for Windows 10, version 1607 includes the Microsoft Office 2016 settings location template with improved Outlook signature support. We've added synchronization of default signature settings for new, reply, and forwarded emails. Users no longer have to choose the default signature settings.
-> **Note** An Outlook profile must be created on any device on which a user wants to synchronize their Outlook signature. If the profile is not already created, the user can create one and then restart Outlook on that device to enable signature synchronization.
+> [!Note]
+> An Outlook profile must be created on any device on which a user wants to synchronize their Outlook signature. If the profile is not already created, the user can create one and then restart Outlook on that device to enable signature synchronization.
-UE-V works with Office 365 to determine whether Office 2016 settings are roamed by Office 365. If settings are roamed by Office 365, they are not roamed by UE-V. See [Overview of user and roaming settings for Microsoft Office](/previous-versions/office/office-2013-resource-kit/jj733593(v=office.15)) for more information.
+UE-V works with Office 365 to determine whether Office 2016 settings are roamed by Office 365. If settings are roamed by Office 365, they aren't roamed by UE-V. For more information, see [Overview of user and roaming settings for Microsoft Office](/previous-versions/office/office-2013-resource-kit/jj733593(v=office.15)).
-To enable settings synchronization using UE-V, do one of the following:
+To enable settings synchronization using UE-V, do one of the following steps:
- Use Group Policy to disable Office 365 synchronization
-- Do not enable the Office 365 synchronization experience during Office 2013 installation
+- Don't enable the Office 365 synchronization experience during Office 2013 installation
UE-V includes Office 2016, Office 2013, and Office 2010 templates.
diff --git a/windows/configuration/ue-v/uev-working-with-custom-templates-and-the-uev-generator.md b/windows/configuration/ue-v/uev-working-with-custom-templates-and-the-uev-generator.md
index f53af25e62..f857c6ac20 100644
--- a/windows/configuration/ue-v/uev-working-with-custom-templates-and-the-uev-generator.md
+++ b/windows/configuration/ue-v/uev-working-with-custom-templates-and-the-uev-generator.md
@@ -16,9 +16,9 @@ ms.topic: article
**Applies to**
- Windows 10
-User Experience Virtualization (UE-V) uses XML files called ***settings location templates*** to monitor and synchronize application settings and Windows settings between user devices. By default, some settings location templates are included in UE-V. However, if you want to synchronize settings for desktop applications other than those included in the default templates, you can create your own custom settings location templates with the UE-V template generator. You can also edit or validate custom settings location templates with the UE-V template generator.
+User Experience Virtualization (UE-V) uses XML files called ***settings location templates*** to monitor and synchronize application settings and Windows settings between user devices. By default, some settings location templates are included in UE-V. However, if you want to synchronize settings for desktop applications other than those settings included in the default templates, you can create your own custom settings location templates with the UE-V template generator. You can also edit or validate custom settings location templates with the UE-V template generator.
-Use the UE-V template generator to monitor, discover, and capture the locations where Win32 applications store settings. The template generator does not create settings location templates for the following types of applications:
+Use the UE-V template generator to monitor, discover, and capture the locations where Win32 applications store settings. The template generator doesn't create settings location templates for the following types of applications:
- Virtualized applications
- Applications that are offered through Terminal Services
@@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ The UE-V template generator opens the application as part of the discovery proce
- **Application Settings Files** - Files that are stored under \\ **Users** \\ \[User name\] \\ **AppData** \\ **Roaming**
-The UE-V template generator excludes locations, which commonly store application software files, but do not synchronize well between user computers or environments. The UE-V template generator excludes these locations. Excluded locations are as follows:
+The UE-V template generator excludes locations, which commonly store application software files, but don't synchronize well between user computers or environments. The UE-V template generator excludes these locations. Excluded locations are as follows:
-- HKEY\_CURRENT\_USER registry keys and files to which the logged-on user cannot write values
+- HKEY\_CURRENT\_USER registry keys and files to which the logged-on user can't write values
- HKEY\_CURRENT\_USER registry keys and files that are associated with the core functionality of the Windows operating system
@@ -112,8 +112,7 @@ Use the UE-V template generator to edit settings location templates. When the re
## Validate settings location templates with the UE-V template generator
-
-It is possible to create or edit settings location templates in an XML editor without using the UE-V template generator. If you do, you can use the UE-V template generator to validate that the new or revised XML matches the schema that has been defined for the template.
+It's possible to create or edit settings location templates in an XML editor without using the UE-V template generator. If you do, you can use the UE-V template generator to validate that the new or revised XML matches the schema that has been defined for the template.
To validate a UE-V settings location template with the UE-V template generator:
@@ -131,6 +130,21 @@ To validate a UE-V settings location template with the UE-V template generator:
## Next steps
+## Share settings location templates with the Template Gallery
+
+The [User Experience Virtualization Template Gallery](https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/site/search?f%5B0%5D.Type=RootCategory&f%5B0%5D.Value=UE-V&f%5B0%5D.Text=UE-V) enables administrators to share their UE-V settings location templates. Upload your settings location templates to the gallery for other users to use, and download templates that other users have created.
+
+Before you share a settings location template on the UE-V template gallery, ensure it doesn't contain any personal or company information. You can use any XML viewer to open and view the contents of a settings location template file. The following template values should be reviewed before you share a template with anyone outside your company.
+
+- Template Author Name – Specify a general, non-identifying name for the template author name or exclude this data from the template.
+
+- Template Author Email – Specify a general, non-identifying template author email or exclude this data from the template.
+
+Before you deploy any settings location template that you've downloaded from the UE-V gallery, you should first test the template to ensure that the application settings synchronize settings correctly in a test environment.
+
+
+## Related topics
+
[Administering UE-V](uev-administering-uev.md)
[Use UE-V with custom applications](uev-deploy-uev-for-custom-applications.md)
diff --git a/windows/configuration/wcd/wcd-accounts.md b/windows/configuration/wcd/wcd-accounts.md
index 94e31def8a..0186f5e66f 100644
--- a/windows/configuration/wcd/wcd-accounts.md
+++ b/windows/configuration/wcd/wcd-accounts.md
@@ -43,8 +43,8 @@ Specifies the settings you can configure when joining a device to a domain, incl
| Account | String | Account to use to join computer to domain |
| AccountOU | Enter the full path for the organizational unit. For example: OU=testOU,DC=domain,DC=Domain,DC=com. | Name of organizational unit for the computer account |
| ComputerName | On desktop PCs, this setting specifies the DNS hostname of the computer (Computer Name) up to 63 characters. Use `%RAND:x%` to generate x number of random digits in the name, where x must be a number less than 63. For domain-joined computers, the unique name must use `%RAND:x%`. Use `%SERIAL%` to generate the name with the `computer's` serial number embedded. If the serial number exceeds the character limit, it will be truncated from the beginning of the sequence. The character restriction limit doesn't count the length of the macros, including `%RAND:x%` and `%SERIAL%`. This setting is supported only in Windows 10, version 1803 and later. To change this setting in Windows 10 version 1709 and earlier releases, use the **ComputerName** setting under **Accounts**. | Specifies the name of the Windows device (computer name on PCs) |
-| DomainName | String (cannot be empty) | Specify the name of the domain that the device will join |
-| Password | String (cannot be empty) | Corresponds to the password of the user account that's authorized to join the computer account to the domain. |
+| DomainName | String (can't be empty) | Specify the name of the domain that the device will join |
+| Password | String (can't be empty) | Corresponds to the password of the user account that's authorized to join the computer account to the domain. |
## Users
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ Use these settings to add local user accounts to the device.
| Setting | Value | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
-| UserName | String (cannot be empty) | Specify a name for the local user account |
-| HomeDir | String (cannot be empty) | Specify the path of the home directory for the user |
-| Password | String (cannot be empty) | Specify the password for the user account |
-| UserGroup | String (cannot be empty) | Specify the local user group for the user |
+| UserName | String (can't be empty) | Specify a name for the local user account |
+| HomeDir | String (can't be empty) | Specify the path of the home directory for the user |
+| Password | String (can't be empty) | Specify the password for the user account |
+| UserGroup | String (can't be empty) | Specify the local user group for the user |
diff --git a/windows/configuration/wcd/wcd-browser.md b/windows/configuration/wcd/wcd-browser.md
index 5ebc1cccde..df8f60051d 100644
--- a/windows/configuration/wcd/wcd-browser.md
+++ b/windows/configuration/wcd/wcd-browser.md
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Select between **Prevent Pre-launching** and **Allow Pre-launching**.
Use to add items to the Favorites Bar in Microsoft Edge.
-1. Enter a name for the item, and select **Add**. (The name you enter here is only used to distinguish the group of settings, and is not shown on the device when the settings are applied.)
+1. Enter a name for the item, and select **Add**. (The name you enter here's only used to distinguish the group of settings, and isn't shown on the device when the settings are applied.)
2. In **Available customizations**, select the item that you added, and then configure the following settings for that item:
Setting | Description
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ To add a new item under the browser's **Favorites** list:
1. In the **Name** field, enter a friendly name for the item, and then click **Add**.
-2. In the **Available customizations** pane, select the friendly name that you just created, and in the text field, enter the URL for the item.
+2. In the **Available customizations** pane, select the friendly name that you created, and in the text field, enter the URL for the item.
For example, to include the corporate Web site to the list of browser favorites, a company called Contoso can specify **Contoso** as the value for the name and "
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ Windows 10/11 Pro activation is required before Enterprise E3 or E5 can be enabl
### Step 3: Sign in using Azure AD account
-Once the device is joined to your Azure AD subscription, the user will sign in by using his or her Azure AD account, as illustrated in **Figure 8**. The Windows 10 Enterprise E3 or E5 license associated with the user will enable Windows 10 Enterprise edition capabilities on the device.
+Once the device is joined to your Azure AD subscription, the users will sign in by using their Azure AD account, as illustrated in **Figure 8**. The Windows 10 Enterprise E3 or E5 license associated with the user will enable Windows 10 Enterprise edition capabilities on the device.
@@ -208,14 +208,14 @@ Virtual machines (VMs) must be configured to enable Windows 10 Enterprise subscr
In some instances, users may experience problems with the Windows 10/11 Enterprise E3 or E5 subscription. The most common problems that users may experience are as follows:
-- The existing Windows 10 Pro, version 1703 or 1709 operating system is not activated. This problem does not apply to Windows 10, version 1803 or later.
+- The existing Windows 10 Pro, version 1703 or 1709 operating system isn't activated. This problem doesn't apply to Windows 10, version 1803 or later.
- The Windows 10/11 Enterprise E3 or E5 subscription has lapsed or has been removed.
Use the following figures to help you troubleshoot when users experience these common problems:
- [Figure 9](#win-10-activated-subscription-active) (see the section above) illustrates a device in a healthy state, where Windows 10 Pro is activated and the Windows 10 Enterprise subscription is active.
-- [Figure 10](#win-10-not-activated) (below) illustrates a device on which Windows 10 Pro is not activated, but the Windows 10 Enterprise subscription is active.
+- [Figure 10](#win-10-not-activated) (below) illustrates a device on which Windows 10 Pro isn't activated, but the Windows 10 Enterprise subscription is active.
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ Use the following figures to help you troubleshoot when users experience these c
Figure 11 - Windows 10 Enterprise subscription lapsed or removed in Settings
-- [Figure 12](#win-10-not-activated-subscription-not-active) (below) illustrates a device on which Windows 10 Pro license is not activated and the Windows 10 Enterprise subscription is lapsed or removed.
+- [Figure 12](#win-10-not-activated-subscription-not-active) (below) illustrates a device on which Windows 10 Pro license isn't activated and the Windows 10 Enterprise subscription is lapsed or removed.
@@ -252,5 +252,5 @@ If a device is running a version of Windows 10 Pro prior to version 1703 (for ex
### Delay in the activation of Enterprise License of Windows 10
-This is by design. Windows 10 and Windows 11 include a built-in cache that is used when determining upgrade eligibility, including responses that indicate that the device is not eligible for an upgrade. It can take up to four days after a qualifying purchase before the upgrade eligibility is enabled and the cache expires.
+This delay is by design. Windows 10 and Windows 11 include a built-in cache that is used when determining upgrade eligibility, including responses that indicate that the device isn't eligible for an upgrade. It can take up to four days after a qualifying purchase before the upgrade eligibility is enabled and the cache expires.
diff --git a/windows/deployment/deploy-m365.md b/windows/deployment/deploy-m365.md
index c32aeb19ba..778cc5f140 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/deploy-m365.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/deploy-m365.md
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ ms.custom: seo-marvel-apr2020
This topic provides a brief overview of Microsoft 365 and describes how to use a free 90-day trial account to review some of the benefits of Microsoft 365.
-[Microsoft 365](https://www.microsoft.com/microsoft-365) is a new offering from Microsoft that combines [Windows 10](https://www.microsoft.com/windows/features) with [Office 365](https://www.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/office-365), and [Enterprise Mobility and Security](https://www.microsoft.com/cloud-platform/enterprise-mobility-security) (EMS). See the [M365 Enterprise poster](#m365-enterprise-poster) for an overview.
+[Microsoft 365](https://www.microsoft.com/microsoft-365) is a new offering from Microsoft that combines [Windows 10](https://www.microsoft.com/windows/features) with [Office 365](https://www.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/office-365), and [Enterprise Mobility and Security](https://www.microsoft.com/cloud-platform/enterprise-mobility-security) (EMS). See the [Microsoft 365 Enterprise poster](#microsoft-365-enterprise-poster) for an overview.
For Windows 10 deployment, Microsoft 365 includes a fantastic deployment advisor that can walk you through the entire process of deploying Windows 10. The wizard supports multiple Windows 10 deployment methods, including:
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ For Windows 10 deployment, Microsoft 365 includes a fantastic deployment advisor
**If you already have a Microsoft services subscription account and access to the Microsoft 365 Admin Center**
From the [Microsoft 365 Admin Center](https://portal.office.com), go to Billing and then Purchase services.
-In the Enterprise Suites section of the service offerings, you will find Microsoft 365 E3 and Microsoft 365 E5 tiles.
+In the Enterprise Suites section of the service offerings, you'll find Microsoft 365 E3 and Microsoft 365 E5 tiles.
There are "Start Free Trial" options available for your selection by hovering your mouse over the tiles.
**If you do not already have a Microsoft services subscription**
@@ -45,11 +45,11 @@ You can check out the Microsoft 365 deployment advisor and other resources for f
>[!NOTE]
>If you have not run a setup guide before, you will see the **Prepare your environment** guide first. This is to make sure you have basics covered like domain verification and a method for adding users. At the end of the "Prepare your environment" guide, there will be a **Ready to continue** button that sends you to the original guide that was selected.
-1. [Explore Microsoft 365](https://www.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/business/).
+1. [Obtain a free Microsoft 365 trial](/microsoft-365/commerce/try-or-buy-microsoft-365).
2. Check out the [Microsoft 365 deployment advisor](https://aka.ms/microsoft365setupguide).
3. Also check out the [Windows Analytics deployment advisor](/mem/configmgr/desktop-analytics/overview). This advisor will walk you through deploying [Desktop Analytics](/mem/configmgr/desktop-analytics/overview).
-That's all there is to it!
+That's all there's to it!
Examples of these two deployment advisors are shown below.
@@ -62,9 +62,9 @@ Examples of these two deployment advisors are shown below.
## Windows Analytics deployment advisor example
-## M365 Enterprise poster
+## Microsoft 365 Enterprise poster
-[](https://aka.ms/m365eposter)
+[](https://aka.ms/m365eposter)
## Related Topics
diff --git a/windows/deployment/deploy-whats-new.md b/windows/deployment/deploy-whats-new.md
index 6f43fb16f4..55f1a653a6 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/deploy-whats-new.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/deploy-whats-new.md
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ The [Windows ADK for Windows 11](/windows-hardware/get-started/adk-install) is a
New capabilities are available for [Delivery Optimization](#delivery-optimization) and [Windows Update for Business](#windows-update-for-business).
VPN support is added to [Windows Autopilot](#windows-autopilot)
An in-place upgrade wizard is available in [Configuration Manager](#microsoft-endpoint-configuration-manager).
-The Windows 10 deployment and update [landing page](index.yml) has been redesigned, with additional content added and more content coming soon.
+The Windows 10 deployment and update [landing page](index.yml) has been redesigned, with more content added and more content coming soon.
## The Modern Desktop Deployment Center
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ Microsoft 365 is a new offering from Microsoft that combines
- Office 365
- Enterprise Mobility and Security (EMS).
-See [Deploy Windows 10 with Microsoft 365](deploy-m365.md) for an overview, which now includes a link to download a nifty [M365 Enterprise poster](deploy-m365.md#m365-enterprise-poster).
+See [Deploy Windows 10 with Microsoft 365](deploy-m365.md) for an overview, which now includes a link to download a nifty [Microsoft 365 Enterprise poster](deploy-m365.md#microsoft-365-enterprise-poster).
## Windows 10 servicing and support
@@ -65,12 +65,12 @@ Windows PowerShell cmdlets for Delivery Optimization have been improved:
- **Get-DeliveryOptimizationStatus** has added the **-PeerInfo** option for a real-time peak behind the scenes on peer-to-peer activity (for example the peer IP Address, bytes received / sent).
- **Get-DeliveryOptimizationLogAnalysis** is a new cmdlet that provides a summary of the activity in your DO log (# of downloads, downloads from peers, overall peer efficiency). Use the **-ListConnections** option to for in-depth look at peer-to-peer connections.
-- **Enable-DeliveryOptimizationVerboseLogs** is a new cmdlet that enables a greater level of logging detail to assist in troubleshooting.
+- **Enable-DeliveryOptimizationVerboseLogs** is a new cmdlet that enables a greater level of logging detail to help in troubleshooting.
-Additional improvements in [Delivery Optimization](./do/waas-delivery-optimization.md) include:
+Other improvements in [Delivery Optimization](./do/waas-delivery-optimization.md) include:
- Enterprise network [throttling is enhanced](/windows-insider/archive/new-for-business#new-download-throttling-options-for-delivery-optimization-build-18917) to optimize foreground vs. background throttling.
- Automatic cloud-based congestion detection is available for PCs with cloud service support.
-- Improved peer efficiency for enterprises and educational institutions with complex networks is enabled with [new policies](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-deliveryoptimization). This now supports Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise updates and Intune content, with Microsoft Endpoint Manager content coming soon!
+- Improved peer efficiency for enterprises and educational institutions with complex networks is enabled with [new policies](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-deliveryoptimization). These policies now support Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise updates and Intune content, with Microsoft Endpoint Manager content coming soon!
The following Delivery Optimization policies are removed in the Windows 10, version 2004 release:
@@ -85,17 +85,17 @@ The following Delivery Optimization policies are removed in the Windows 10, vers
[Windows Update for Business](./update/waas-manage-updates-wufb.md) enhancements in this release include:
- Intune console updates: target version is now available allowing you to specify which version of Windows 10 you want devices to move to. Additionally, this capability enables you to keep devices on their current version until they reach end of service. Check it out in Intune, also available as a Group Policy and Configuration Service Provider (CSP) policy.
-- Validation improvements: To ensure devices and end users stay productive and protected, Microsoft uses safeguard holds to block devices from updating when there are known issues that would impact that device. Also, to better enable IT administrators to validate on the latest release, we have created a new policy that enables admins to opt devices out of the built-in safeguard holds.
+- Validation improvements: To ensure devices and end users stay productive and protected, Microsoft uses safeguard holds to block devices from updating when there are known issues that would impact that device. Also, to better enable IT administrators to validate on the latest release, we've created a new policy that enables admins to opt devices out of the built-in safeguard holds.
-- [**Automatic Restart Sign-on (ARSO)**](/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/winlogon-automatic-restart-sign-on--arso-): Windows will automatically log on as the user and lock their device in order to complete the update, ensuring that when the user returns and unlocks the device, the update will be completed.
+- [**Automatic Restart Sign-on (ARSO)**](/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/winlogon-automatic-restart-sign-on--arso-): Windows will automatically sign in as the user and lock their device in order to complete the update, ensuring that when the user returns and unlocks the device, the update will be completed.
- [**Windows Update for Business**](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/Windows-IT-Pro-Blog/Windows-Update-for-Business-and-the-retirement-of-SAC-T/ba-p/339523): There will now be a single, common start date for phased deployments (no more SAC-T designation). In addition, there will be a new notification and reboot scheduling experience for end users, the ability to enforce update installation and reboot deadlines, and the ability to provide end user control over reboots for a specific time period.
-- **Update rollback improvements**: You can now automatically recover from startup failures by removing updates if the startup failure was introduced after the installation of recent driver or quality updates. When a device is unable to start up properly after the recent installation of Quality of driver updates, Windows will now automatically uninstall the updates to get the device back up and running normally.
-- **Pause updates**: We have extended the ability to pause updates for both feature and monthly updates. This extension ability is for all editions of Windows 10, including Home. You can pause both feature and monthly updates for up to 35 days (seven days at a time, up to five times). Once the 35-day pause period is reached, you will need to update your device before pausing again.
+- **Update rollback improvements**: You can now automatically recover from startup failures by removing updates if the startup failure was introduced after the installation of recent driver or quality updates. When a device is unable to start up properly after the recent installation of Quality of driver updates, Windows will now automatically uninstall the updates to get the device back up and run normally.
+- **Pause updates**: We've extended the ability to pause updates for both feature and monthly updates. This extension ability is for all editions of Windows 10, including Home. You can pause both feature and monthly updates for up to 35 days (seven days at a time, up to five times). Once the 35-day pause period is reached, you'll need to update your device before pausing again.
- **Improved update notifications**: When there's an update requiring you to restart your device, you'll see a colored dot on the Power button in the Start menu and on the Windows icon in your taskbar.
-- **Intelligent active hours**: To further enhance active hours, users will now have the option to let Windows Update intelligently adjust active hours based on their device-specific usage patterns. You must enable the intelligent active hours feature for the system to predict device-specific usage patterns.
+- **Intelligent active hours**: To further enhance active hours, users now can let Windows Update intelligently adjust active hours based on their device-specific usage patterns. You must enable the intelligent active hours feature for the system to predict device-specific usage patterns.
- **Improved update orchestration to improve system responsiveness**: This feature will improve system performance by intelligently coordinating Windows updates and Microsoft Store updates, so they occur when users are away from their devices to minimize disruptions.
-Microsoft previously announced that we are [extending support](https://www.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/blog/2018/09/06/helping-customers-shift-to-a-modern-desktop) for Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows 10 Education editions to 30 months from the version release date. This includes all past versions and future versions that are targeted for release in September (versions ending in 09, ex: 1809). Future releases that are targeted for release in March (versions ending in 03, ex: 1903) will continue to be supported for 18 months from their release date. All releases of Windows 10 Home, Windows 10 Pro, and Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise will continue to be supported for 18 months (there is no change for these editions). These support policies are summarized in the table below.
+Microsoft previously announced that we're [extending support](https://www.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/blog/2018/09/06/helping-customers-shift-to-a-modern-desktop) for Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows 10 Education editions to 30 months from the version release date. These editions include all past versions and future versions that are targeted for release in September (versions ending in 09, ex: 1809). Future releases that are targeted for release in March (versions ending in 03, ex: 1903) will continue to be supported for 18 months from their release date. All releases of Windows 10 Home, Windows 10 Pro, and Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise will continue to be supported for 18 months (there's no change for these editions). These support policies are summarized in the table below.

@@ -115,14 +115,14 @@ For more information, see [Windows 10 Enterprise E3 in CSP](windows-10-enterpris
With the release of Windows 10, version 2004 you can configure [Windows Autopilot user-driven](/windows/deployment/windows-autopilot/user-driven) Hybrid Azure Active Directory join with VPN support. This support is also backported to Windows 10, version 1909 and 1903.
-If you configure the language settings in the Autopilot profile and the device is connected to Ethernet, all scenarios will now skip the language, locale, and keyboard pages. In previous versions, this was only supported with self-deploying profiles.
+If you configure the language settings in the Autopilot profile and the device is connected to Ethernet, all scenarios will now skip the language, locale, and keyboard pages. In previous versions, these language settings were only supported with self-deploying profiles.
The following Windows Autopilot features are available in Windows 10, version 1903 and later:
-- [Windows Autopilot for white glove deployment](/windows/deployment/windows-autopilot/white-glove) is new in Windows 10, version 1903. "White glove" deployment enables partners or IT staff to pre-provision devices so they are fully configured and business ready for your users.
+- [Windows Autopilot for white glove deployment](/windows/deployment/windows-autopilot/white-glove) is new in Windows 10, version 1903. "White glove" deployment enables partners or IT staff to pre-provision devices so they're fully configured and business ready for your users.
- The Intune [enrollment status page](/intune/windows-enrollment-status) (ESP) now tracks Intune Management Extensions.
- [Cortana voiceover](/windows-hardware/customize/desktop/cortana-voice-support) and speech recognition during OOBE is disabled by default for all Windows 10 Pro Education, and Enterprise SKUs.
-- Windows Autopilot is self-updating during OOBE. Starting with the Windows 10, version 1903 Autopilot functional and critical updates will begin downloading automatically during OOBE.
+- Windows Autopilot is self-updating during OOBE. From Windows 10 onward, version 1903 Autopilot functional and critical updates will begin downloading automatically during OOBE.
- Windows Autopilot will set the [diagnostics data](/windows/privacy/windows-diagnostic-data) level to Full on Windows 10 version 1903 and later during OOBE.
### Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager
@@ -137,11 +137,11 @@ With Windows 10, version 1903, you can step-up from Windows 10 Pro Education to
### SetupDiag
-[SetupDiag](upgrade/setupdiag.md) is a command-line tool that can help diagnose why a Windows 10 update failed. SetupDiag works by searching Windows Setup log files. When searching log files, SetupDiag uses a set of rules to match known issues.
+[SetupDiag](upgrade/setupdiag.md) is a command-line tool that can help diagnose why a Windows 10 update failed. SetupDiag works by searching Windows Setup log files. When log files are being searched, SetupDiag uses a set of rules to match known issues.
In Windows 10, version 2004, SetupDiag is now automatically installed.
-During the upgrade process, Windows Setup will extract all its sources files to the **%SystemDrive%\$Windows.~bt\Sources** directory. With Windows 10, version 2004 and later, Windows Setup now also installs SetupDiag.exe to this directory. If there is an issue with the upgrade, SetupDiag is automatically run to determine the cause of the failure. If the upgrade process proceeds normally, this directory is moved under %SystemDrive%\Windows.Old for cleanup.
+During the upgrade process, Windows Setup will extract all its sources files to the **%SystemDrive%\$Windows.~bt\Sources** directory. With Windows 10, version 2004 and later, Windows Setup now also installs SetupDiag.exe to this directory. If there's an issue with the upgrade, SetupDiag is automatically run to determine the cause of the failure. If the upgrade process proceeds normally, this directory is moved under %SystemDrive%\Windows.Old for cleanup.
### Upgrade Readiness
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ For more information, see [MBR2GPT.EXE](mbr-to-gpt.md).
### Microsoft Deployment Toolkit (MDT)
-MDT version 8456 supports Windows 10, version 2004 and earlier operating systems, including Windows Server 2019. There is currently an issue that causes MDT to incorrectly detect that UEFI is present in Windows 10, version 2004. This issue is currently under investigation.
+MDT version 8456 supports Windows 10, version 2004 and earlier operating systems, including Windows Server 2019. There's currently an issue that causes MDT to incorrectly detect that UEFI is present in Windows 10, version 2004. This issue is currently under investigation.
For the latest information about MDT, see the [MDT release notes](/mem/configmgr/mdt/release-notes).
diff --git a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/add-a-windows-10-operating-system-image-using-configuration-manager.md b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/add-a-windows-10-operating-system-image-using-configuration-manager.md
index 1e4ef75b50..af75531621 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/add-a-windows-10-operating-system-image-using-configuration-manager.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/add-a-windows-10-operating-system-image-using-configuration-manager.md
@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ Operating system images are typically the production image used for deployment t
## Infrastructure
-For the purposes of this guide, we will use one server computer: CM01.
-- CM01 is a domain member server and Configuration Manager software distribution point. In this guide CM01 is a standalone primary site server.
+For the purposes of this guide, we'll use one server computer: CM01.
+- CM01 is a domain member server and Configuration Manager software distribution point. In this guide, CM01 is a standalone primary site server.
- CM01 is running Windows Server 2019. However, an earlier, supported version of Windows Server can also be used.
An existing Configuration Manager infrastructure that is integrated with MDT is used for the following procedures. For more information about the setup for this article, see [Prepare for Zero Touch Installation of Windows 10 with Configuration Manager](prepare-for-zero-touch-installation-of-windows-10-with-configuration-manager.md).
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ An existing Configuration Manager infrastructure that is integrated with MDT is
5. On the **General** page, assign the name Windows 10 Enterprise x64 RTM, click **Next** twice, and then click **Close**.
6. Distribute the operating system image to the CM01 distribution point by right-clicking the **Windows 10 Enterprise x64 RTM** operating system image and then clicking **Distribute Content**.
7. In the Distribute Content Wizard, add the CM01 distribution point, click **Next** and click **Close**.
-8. View the content status for the Windows 10 Enterprise x64 RTM package. Do not continue until the distribution is completed (it might take a few minutes). You also can review the D:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Configuration Manager\\Logs\\distmgr.log file and look for the **STATMSG: ID=2301** line.
+8. View the content status for the Windows 10 Enterprise x64 RTM package. Don't continue until the distribution is completed (it might take a few minutes). You also can review the D:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Configuration Manager\\Logs\\distmgr.log file and look for the **STATMSG: ID=2301** line.

diff --git a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/add-drivers-to-a-windows-10-deployment-with-windows-pe-using-configuration-manager.md b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/add-drivers-to-a-windows-10-deployment-with-windows-pe-using-configuration-manager.md
index 4dad48dc9d..1d57288f6f 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/add-drivers-to-a-windows-10-deployment-with-windows-pe-using-configuration-manager.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/add-drivers-to-a-windows-10-deployment-with-windows-pe-using-configuration-manager.md
@@ -17,10 +17,10 @@ ms.custom: seo-marvel-apr2020
- Windows 10
-In this topic, you will learn how to configure the Windows Preinstallation Environment (Windows PE) to include the network drivers required to connect to the deployment share and the storage drivers required to see the local storage on machines. Even though the Windows PE boot image and the Windows 10 operating system contain many out-of-the-box drivers, it is likely you will have to add new or updated drivers to support all your hardware. In this section, you import drivers for both Windows PE and the full Windows 10 operating system.
+In this topic, you'll learn how to configure the Windows Preinstallation Environment (Windows PE) to include the network drivers required to connect to the deployment share and the storage drivers required to see the local storage on machines. Even though the Windows PE boot image and the Windows 10 operating system contain many out-of-the-box drivers, it's likely you'll have to add new or updated drivers to support all your hardware. In this section, you import drivers for both Windows PE and the full Windows 10 operating system.
-For the purposes of this guide, we will use one server computer: CM01.
-- CM01 is a domain member server and Configuration Manager software distribution point. In this guide CM01 is a standalone primary site server. CM01 is running Windows Server 2019. However, an earlier, supported version of Windows Server can also be used.
+For the purposes of this guide, we'll use one server computer: CM01.
+- CM01 is a domain member server and Configuration Manager software distribution point. In this guide, CM01 is a standalone primary site server. CM01 is running Windows Server 2019. However, an earlier, supported version of Windows Server can also be used.
An existing Configuration Manager infrastructure that is integrated with MDT is used for the following procedures. For more information about the setup for this article, see [Prepare for Zero Touch Installation of Windows 10 with Configuration Manager](prepare-for-zero-touch-installation-of-windows-10-with-configuration-manager.md).
@@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ For the purposes of this guide, we will use one server computer: CM01.
This section will show you how to import some network and storage drivers for Windows PE.
>[!NOTE]
->Windows PE usually has a fairly comprehensive set of drivers out of the box, assuming that you are using a recent version of the Windows ADK. This is different than the full Windows OS which will often require drivers. You shouldn't add drivers to Windows PE unless you have an issue or are missing functionality, and in these cases you should only add the driver that you need. An example of a common driver that is added is the Intel I217 driver. Adding too many drivers can cause conflicts and lead to driver bloat in the Config Mgr database. This section shows you how to add drivers, but typically you can just skip this procedure.
+>Windows PE usually has a fairly comprehensive set of drivers out of the box, assuming that you are using a recent version of the Windows ADK. This is different than the full Windows OS which will often require drivers. You shouldn't add drivers to Windows PE unless you've an issue or are missing functionality, and in these cases you should only add the driver that you need. An example of a common driver that is added is the Intel I217 driver. Adding too many drivers can cause conflicts and lead to driver bloat in the Config Mgr database. This section shows you how to add drivers, but typically you can just skip this procedure.
-This section assumes you have downloaded some drivers to the **D:\\Sources\\OSD\\DriverSources\\WinPE x64** folder on CM01.
+This section assumes you've downloaded some drivers to the **D:\\Sources\\OSD\\DriverSources\\WinPE x64** folder on CM01.

@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ On **CM01**:
This section illustrates how to add drivers for Windows 10 using the HP EliteBook 8560w as an example. Use the HP Image Assistant from the [HP Client Management Solutions site](https://hp.com/go/clientmanagement).
-For the purposes of this section, we assume that you have downloaded the Windows 10 drivers for the HP EliteBook 8560w model and copied them to the **D:\Sources$\OSD\DriverSources\Windows 10 x64\Hewlett-Packard\HP EliteBook 8560w** folder on CM01.
+For the purposes of this section, we assume that you've downloaded the Windows 10 drivers for the HP EliteBook 8560w model and copied them to the **D:\Sources$\OSD\DriverSources\Windows 10 x64\Hewlett-Packard\HP EliteBook 8560w** folder on CM01.

@@ -81,9 +81,9 @@ On **CM01**:
* Path: \\\\CM01\\Sources$\\OSD\\DriverPackages\\Windows 10 x64\\Hewlett-Packard\\HP EliteBook 8560w
>[!NOTE]
- >The package path does not yet exist, so you have to type it in. The wizard will create the new package using the path you specify.
+ >The package path does not yet exist, so you've to type it in. The wizard will create the new package using the path you specify.
-5. On the **Select drivers to include in the boot image** page, do not select anything, and click **Next** twice. After the package has been created, click **Close**.
+5. On the **Select drivers to include in the boot image** page, don't select anything, and click **Next** twice. After the package has been created, click **Close**.
>[!NOTE]
>If you want to monitor the driver import process more closely, you can open the SMSProv.log file during driver import.
diff --git a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/create-a-custom-windows-pe-boot-image-with-configuration-manager.md b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/create-a-custom-windows-pe-boot-image-with-configuration-manager.md
index e925ac8f45..fb7aae6b8e 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/create-a-custom-windows-pe-boot-image-with-configuration-manager.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/create-a-custom-windows-pe-boot-image-with-configuration-manager.md
@@ -20,16 +20,16 @@ ms.custom: seo-marvel-apr2020
In Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager, you can create custom Windows Preinstallation Environment (Windows PE) boot images that include extra components and features. This topic shows you how to create a custom Windows PE 5.0 boot image with the Microsoft Deployment Toolkit (MDT) wizard. You can also add the Microsoft Diagnostics and Recovery Toolset (DaRT) 10 to the boot image as part of the boot image creation process.
- The boot image that is created is based on the version of ADK that is installed.
-For the purposes of this guide, we will use one server computer: CM01.
-- CM01 is a domain member server and Configuration Manager software distribution point. In this guide CM01 is a standalone primary site server. CM01 is running Windows Server 2019. However, an earlier, supported version of Windows Server can also be used.
+For the purposes of this guide, we'll use one server computer: CM01.
+- CM01 is a domain member server and Configuration Manager software distribution point. In this guide, CM01 is a standalone primary site server. CM01 is running Windows Server 2019. However, an earlier, supported version of Windows Server can also be used.
An existing Configuration Manager infrastructure that is integrated with MDT is used for the following procedures. For more information about the setup for this article, see [Prepare for Zero Touch Installation of Windows 10 with Configuration Manager](prepare-for-zero-touch-installation-of-windows-10-with-configuration-manager.md).
## Add DaRT 10 files and prepare to brand the boot image
-The steps below outline the process for adding DaRT 10 installation files to the MDT installation directory. You also copy a custom background image to be used later. These steps are optional. If you do not wish to add DaRT, skip the steps below to copy DaRT tools and later skip adding the DaRT component to the boot image.
+The steps below outline the process for adding DaRT 10 installation files to the MDT installation directory. You also copy a custom background image to be used later. These steps are optional. If you don't wish to add DaRT, skip the steps below to copy DaRT tools and later skip adding the DaRT component to the boot image.
-We assume you have downloaded [Microsoft Desktop Optimization Pack (MDOP) 2015](https://my.visualstudio.com/Downloads?q=Desktop%20Optimization%20Pack%202015) and copied the x64 version of MSDaRT100.msi to the **C:\\Setup\\DaRT 10** folder on CM01. We also assume you have created a custom background image and saved it in **C:\\Setup\\Branding** on CM01. In this section, we use a custom background image named ContosoBackground.bmp.
+We assume you've downloaded [Microsoft Desktop Optimization Pack (MDOP) 2015](https://my.visualstudio.com/Downloads?q=Desktop%20Optimization%20Pack%202015) and copied the x64 version of MSDaRT100.msi to the **C:\\Setup\\DaRT 10** folder on CM01. We also assume you've created a custom background image and saved it in **C:\\Setup\\Branding** on CM01. In this section, we use a custom background image named ContosoBackground.bmp.
On **CM01**:
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ On **CM01**:
## Create a boot image for Configuration Manager using the MDT wizard
-By using the MDT wizard to create the boot image in Configuration Manager, you gain additional options for adding components and features to the boot image. In this section, you create a boot image for Configuration Manager using the MDT wizard.
+By using the MDT wizard to create the boot image in Configuration Manager, you gain more options for adding components and features to the boot image. In this section, you create a boot image for Configuration Manager using the MDT wizard.
On **CM01**:
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ On **CM01**:
6. On the **Customization** page, select the **Use a custom background bitmap file** check box, and in the **UNC path:** text box, browse to **\\\\CM01\\Sources$\\OSD\\Branding\\ContosoBackground.bmp** and then click **Next** twice. Wait a few minutes while the boot image is generated, and then click **Finish**.
7. Distribute the boot image to the CM01 distribution point by selecting the **Boot images** node, right-clicking the **Zero Touch WinPE x64** boot image, and selecting **Distribute Content**.
8. In the Distribute Content Wizard, add the CM01 distribution point, and complete the wizard.
-9. Using Configuration Manager Trace, review the D:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Configuration Manager\\Logs\\distmgr.log file. Do not continue until you can see that the boot image is distributed. Look for the line that reads **STATMSG: ID=2301**. You also can monitor Content Status in the Configuration Manager Console at **\Monitoring\Overview\Distribution Status\Content Status\Zero Touch WinPE x64**. See the following examples:
+9. Using Configuration Manager Trace, review the D:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Configuration Manager\\Logs\\distmgr.log file. Don't continue until you can see that the boot image is distributed. Look for the line that reads **STATMSG: ID=2301**. You also can monitor Content Status in the Configuration Manager Console at **\Monitoring\Overview\Distribution Status\Content Status\Zero Touch WinPE x64**. See the following examples:


diff --git a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/create-a-task-sequence-with-configuration-manager-and-mdt.md b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/create-a-task-sequence-with-configuration-manager-and-mdt.md
index 260b79eadd..f846694f35 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/create-a-task-sequence-with-configuration-manager-and-mdt.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/create-a-task-sequence-with-configuration-manager-and-mdt.md
@@ -16,10 +16,10 @@ ms.topic: article
- Windows 10
-In this article, you will learn how to create a Configuration Manager task sequence with Microsoft Deployment Toolkit (MDT) integration using the MDT wizard. Creating task sequences in Configuration Manager requires many more steps than creating task sequences for MDT Lite Touch installation. Luckily, the MDT wizard helps you through the process and also guides you through creating the needed packages.
+In this article, you'll learn how to create a Configuration Manager task sequence with Microsoft Deployment Toolkit (MDT) integration using the MDT wizard. Creating task sequences in Configuration Manager requires many more steps than creating task sequences for MDT Lite Touch installation. Luckily, the MDT wizard helps you through the process and also guides you through creating the needed packages.
-For the purposes of this guide, we will use one server computer: CM01.
-- CM01 is a domain member server and Configuration Manager software distribution point. In this guide CM01 is a standalone primary site server. CM01 is running Windows Server 2019. However, an earlier, supported version of Windows Server can also be used.
+For the purposes of this guide, we'll use one server computer: CM01.
+- CM01 is a domain member server and Configuration Manager software distribution point. In this guide, CM01 is a standalone primary site server. CM01 is running Windows Server 2019. However, an earlier, supported version of Windows Server can also be used.
An existing Configuration Manager infrastructure that is integrated with MDT is used for the following procedures. For more information about the setup for this article, see [Prepare for Zero Touch Installation of Windows 10 with Configuration Manager](prepare-for-zero-touch-installation-of-windows-10-with-configuration-manager.md). Note: Active Directory [permissions](prepare-for-zero-touch-installation-of-windows-10-with-configuration-manager.md#configure-active-directory-permissions) for the **CM_JD** account are required for the task sequence to work properly.
@@ -93,9 +93,9 @@ On **CM01**:
Add an application to the Configuration Manager task sequence
>[!NOTE]
- >In recent versions of Configuration Manager the Request State Store and Release State Store actions described below are present by default. These actions are used for common computer replace scenarios. There is also the additional condition on the options tab: USMTOfflineMigration not equals TRUE. If these actions are not present, try updating to the Config Mgr current branch release.
+ >In recent versions of Configuration Manager the Request State Store and Release State Store actions described below are present by default. These actions are used for common computer replace scenarios. There's also the additional condition on the options tab: USMTOfflineMigration not equals TRUE. If these actions are not present, try updating to the Config Mgr current branch release.
-9. In the **State Restore** group, after the **Set Status 5** action, verify there is a **User State \ Request State Store** action with the following settings:
+9. In the **State Restore** group, after the **Set Status 5** action, verify there's a **User State \ Request State Store** action with the following settings:
* Request state storage location to: Restore state from another computer
* If computer account fails to connect to state store, use the Network Access account: selected
* Options: Continue on error
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ On **CM01**:
* Task Sequence Variable
* USMTLOCAL not equals True
-10. In the **State Restore** group, after the **Restore User State** action, verify there is a **Release State Store** action with the following settings:
+10. In the **State Restore** group, after the **Restore User State** action, verify there's a **Release State Store** action with the following settings:
* Options: Continue on error
* Options / Condition:
* Task Sequence Variable
@@ -113,14 +113,14 @@ On **CM01**:
## Organize your packages (optional)
-If desired, you can create a folder structure for packages. This is purely for organizational purposes and is useful if you need to manage a large number of packages.
+If desired, you can create a folder structure for packages. This folder structure is purely for organizational purposes and is useful if you need to manage a large number of packages.
To create a folder for packages:
On **CM01**:
1. Using the Configuration Manager Console, in the Software Library workspace, expand **Application Management**, and then select **Packages**.
-2. Right-click **Packages**, point to **Folder**, click **Create Folder** and create the OSD folder. This will create the Root \ OSD folder structure.
+2. Right-click **Packages**, point to **Folder**, click **Create Folder** and create the OSD folder. This process will create the Root \ OSD folder structure.
3. Select the **MDT**, **User State Migration Tool for Windows**, and **Windows 10 x64 Settings** packages, right-click and select **Move**.
4. In the **Move Selected Items** dialog box, select the **OSD** folder, and click **OK**.
diff --git a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/create-an-application-to-deploy-with-windows-10-using-configuration-manager.md b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/create-an-application-to-deploy-with-windows-10-using-configuration-manager.md
index caae9de1b6..102b3ae2d6 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/create-an-application-to-deploy-with-windows-10-using-configuration-manager.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/create-an-application-to-deploy-with-windows-10-using-configuration-manager.md
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
---
title: Create an app to deploy with Windows 10 using Configuration Manager
-description: Microsoft Microsoft Endpoint Manager supports deploying applications as part of the Windows 10 deployment process.
+description: Microsoft Endpoint Manager supports deploying applications as part of the Windows 10 deployment process.
+ms.assetid: 2dfb2f39-1597-4999-b4ec-b063e8a8c90c
ms.reviewer:
manager: dougeby
ms.author: aaroncz
@@ -19,8 +20,8 @@ ms.topic: article
Microsoft Endpoint Manager supports deploying applications as part of the Windows 10 deployment process. In this section, you create an application in Microsoft Endpoint Manager that you later configure the task sequence to use.
-For the purposes of this guide, we will use one server computer: CM01.
-- CM01 is a domain member server and Configuration Manager software distribution point. In this guide CM01 is a standalone primary site server. CM01 is running Windows Server 2019. However, an earlier, supported version of Windows Server can also be used.
+For the purposes of this guide, we'll use one server computer: CM01.
+- CM01 is a domain member server and Configuration Manager software distribution point. In this guide, CM01 is a standalone primary site server. CM01 is running Windows Server 2019. However, an earlier, supported version of Windows Server can also be used.
>[!NOTE]
>The [reference image](add-a-windows-10-operating-system-image-using-configuration-manager.md) used in this lab already contains some applications, such as Microsoft Office 365 Pro Plus x64. The procedure demonstrated in this article enables you to add some additional custom applications beyond those included in the reference image.
@@ -29,9 +30,9 @@ For the purposes of this guide, we will use one server computer: CM01.
On **CM01**:
-1. Create the **D:\Setup** folder if it does not already exist.
+1. Create the **D:\Setup** folder if it doesn't already exist.
1. Download the Enterprise distribution version of [Adobe Acrobat Reader DC](https://get.adobe.com/reader/enterprise/) (ex: AcroRdrDC2000620034_en_US.exe) to **D:\\Setup\\Adobe** on CM01. The filename will differ depending on the version of Acrobat Reader.
-2. Extract the .exe file that you downloaded to an .msi. The source folder will differ depending on where you downloaded the file. See the following example:
+2. Extract the .exe file that you downloaded to a .msi. The source folder will differ depending on where you downloaded the file. See the following example:
```powershell
Set-Location C:\Users\administrator.CONTOSO\Downloads
@@ -64,7 +65,7 @@ On **CM01**:
Add the "OSD Install" suffix to the application name
-11. In the **Applications** node, select the Adobe Reader - OSD Install application, and click **Properties** on the ribbon bar (this is another place to view properties, you can also right-click and select properties).
+11. In the **Applications** node, select the Adobe Reader - OSD Install application, and click **Properties** on the ribbon bar (this path is another place to view properties, you can also right-click and select properties).
12. On the **General Information** tab, select the **Allow this application to be installed from the Install Application task sequence action without being deployed** check box, and click **OK**.
Next, see [Add drivers to a Windows 10 deployment with Windows PE using Configuration Manager](add-drivers-to-a-windows-10-deployment-with-windows-pe-using-configuration-manager.md).
diff --git a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/deploy-windows-10-using-pxe-and-configuration-manager.md b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/deploy-windows-10-using-pxe-and-configuration-manager.md
index 55d9928a01..253e63190e 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/deploy-windows-10-using-pxe-and-configuration-manager.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/deploy-windows-10-using-pxe-and-configuration-manager.md
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
---
title: Deploy Windows 10 using PXE and Configuration Manager (Windows 10)
-description: In this topic, you will learn how to deploy Windows 10 using Microsoft Endpoint Manager deployment packages and task sequences.
+description: In this topic, you'll learn how to deploy Windows 10 using Microsoft Endpoint Manager deployment packages and task sequences.
+ms.assetid: fb93f514-5b30-4f4b-99dc-58e6860009fa
manager: dougeby
ms.author: aaroncz
ms.prod: w10
@@ -16,9 +17,9 @@ ms.collection: highpri
- Windows 10
-In this topic, you will learn how to deploy Windows 10 using Microsoft Endpoint Manager deployment packages and task sequences. This topic will walk you through the process of deploying the Windows 10 Enterprise image to a Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) computer named PC0001. An existing Configuration Manager infrastructure that is integrated with MDT is used for the procedures in this topic.
+In this topic, you'll learn how to deploy Windows 10 using Microsoft Endpoint Manager deployment packages and task sequences. This topic will walk you through the process of deploying the Windows 10 Enterprise image to a Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) computer named PC0001. An existing Configuration Manager infrastructure that is integrated with MDT is used for the procedures in this topic.
-This topic assumes that you have completed the following prerequisite procedures:
+This topic assumes that you've completed the following prerequisite procedures:
- [Prepare for Zero Touch Installation of Windows 10 with Configuration Manager](prepare-for-zero-touch-installation-of-windows-10-with-configuration-manager.md)
- [Create a custom Windows PE boot image with Configuration Manager](create-a-custom-windows-pe-boot-image-with-configuration-manager.md)
- [Add a Windows 10 operating system image using Configuration Manager](add-a-windows-10-operating-system-image-using-configuration-manager.md)
@@ -27,10 +28,10 @@ This topic assumes that you have completed the following prerequisite procedures
- [Create a task sequence with Configuration Manager and MDT](create-a-task-sequence-with-configuration-manager-and-mdt.md)
- [Finalize the operating system configuration for Windows 10 deployment with Configuration Manager](finalize-the-os-configuration-for-windows-10-deployment-with-configuration-manager.md)
-For the purposes of this guide, we will use a minimum of two server computers (DC01 and CM01) and one client computer (PC0001).
+For the purposes of this guide, we'll use a minimum of two server computers (DC01 and CM01) and one client computer (PC0001).
- DC01 is a domain controller and DNS server for the contoso.com domain. DHCP services are also available and optionally installed on DC01 or another server. Note: DHCP services are required for the client (PC0001) to connect to the Windows Deployment Service (WDS).
-- CM01 is a domain member server and Configuration Manager software distribution point. In this guide CM01 is a standalone primary site server.
- - CM01 is also running WDS which will be required to start PC0001 via PXE. **Note**: Ensure that only CM01 is running WDS.
+- CM01 is a domain member server and Configuration Manager software distribution point. In this guide, CM01 is a standalone primary site server.
+ - CM01 is also running WDS that will be required to start PC0001 via PXE. **Note**: Ensure that only CM01 is running WDS.
- PC0001 is a client computer that is blank, or has an operating system that will be erased and replaced with Windows 10. The device must be configured to boot from the network.
>[!NOTE]
@@ -38,7 +39,7 @@ For the purposes of this guide, we will use a minimum of two server computers (D
All servers are running Windows Server 2019. However, an earlier, supported version of Windows Server can also be used.
-All server and client computers referenced in this guide are on the same subnet. This is not required, but each server and client computer must be able to connect to each other to share files, and to resolve all DNS names and Active Directory information for the contoso.com domain. Internet connectivity is also required to download OS and application updates.
+All server and client computers referenced in this guide are on the same subnet. This connection isn't required, but each server and client computer must be able to connect to each other to share files, and to resolve all DNS names and Active Directory information for the contoso.com domain. Internet connectivity is also required to download OS and application updates.
>[!NOTE]
>No WDS console configuration is required for PXE to work. Everything is done with the Configuration Manager console.
@@ -50,7 +51,7 @@ All server and client computers referenced in this guide are on the same subnet.
3. On the **Select a task sequence to run** page, select **Windows 10 Enterprise x64 RTM** and click **Next**.
4. On the **Edit Task Sequence Variables** page, double-click the **OSDComputerName** variable, and in the **Value** field, type **PC0001** and click **OK**. Then click **Next**.
5. The operating system deployment will take several minutes to complete.
-6. You can monitor the deployment on CM01 using the MDT Deployment Workbench. When you see the PC0001 entry, double-click **PC0001**, and then click **DaRT Remote Control** and review the **Remote Control** option. The task sequence will run and do the following:
+6. You can monitor the deployment on CM01 using the MDT Deployment Workbench. When you see the PC0001 entry, double-click **PC0001**, and then click **DaRT Remote Control** and review the **Remote Control** option. The task sequence will run and do the following steps:
* Install the Windows 10 operating system.
* Install the Configuration Manager client and the client hotfix.
@@ -64,7 +65,7 @@ All server and client computers referenced in this guide are on the same subnet.
Monitoring the deployment with MDT.
-7. When the deployment is finished you will have a domain-joined Windows 10 computer with the Adobe Reader application installed as well as the applications that were included in the reference image, such as Office 365 Pro Plus.
+7. When the deployment is finished you'll have a domain-joined Windows 10 computer with the Adobe Reader application installed as well as the applications that were included in the reference image, such as Office 365 Pro Plus.
Examples are provided below of various stages of deployment:
diff --git a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/finalize-the-os-configuration-for-windows-10-deployment-with-configuration-manager.md b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/finalize-the-os-configuration-for-windows-10-deployment-with-configuration-manager.md
index 15ccee4085..3984e65a9b 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/finalize-the-os-configuration-for-windows-10-deployment-with-configuration-manager.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/finalize-the-os-configuration-for-windows-10-deployment-with-configuration-manager.md
@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ ms.custom: seo-marvel-apr2020
This topic walks you through the steps to finalize the configuration of your Windows 10 operating deployment, which includes enabling optional MDT monitoring for Configuration Manager, logs folder settings, rules configuration, content distribution, and deployment of the previously created task sequence.
-For the purposes of this guide, we will use one server computer: CM01.
-- CM01 is a domain member server and Configuration Manager software distribution point. In this guide CM01 is a standalone primary site server. CM01 is running Windows Server 2019. However, an earlier, supported version of Windows Server can also be used.
+For the purposes of this guide, we'll use one server computer: CM01.
+- CM01 is a domain member server and Configuration Manager software distribution point. In this guide, CM01 is a standalone primary site server. CM01 is running Windows Server 2019. However, an earlier, supported version of Windows Server can also be used.
An existing Configuration Manager infrastructure that is integrated with MDT is used for the following procedures. For more information about the setup for this article, see [Prepare for Zero Touch Installation of Windows 10 with Configuration Manager](prepare-for-zero-touch-installation-of-windows-10-with-configuration-manager.md).
@@ -45,11 +45,11 @@ On **CM01**:
## Configure the Logs folder
-The D:\Logs folder was [created previously](prepare-for-zero-touch-installation-of-windows-10-with-configuration-manager.md?#review-the-sources-folder-structure) and SMB permissions were added. Next, we will add NTFS folder permissions for the Configuration Manager Network Access Account (CM_NAA), and enable server-side logging by modifying the CustomSettings.ini file used by the Configuration Manager task sequence.
+The D:\Logs folder was [created previously](prepare-for-zero-touch-installation-of-windows-10-with-configuration-manager.md?#review-the-sources-folder-structure) and SMB permissions were added. Next, we'll add NTFS folder permissions for the Configuration Manager Network Access Account (CM_NAA), and enable server-side logging by modifying the CustomSettings.ini file used by the Configuration Manager task sequence.
On **CM01**:
-1. To configure NTFS permissions using icacls.exe, type the following at an elevated Windows PowerShell prompt:
+1. To configure NTFS permissions using icacls.exe, type the following command at an elevated Windows PowerShell prompt:
```
icacls D:\Logs /grant '"CM_NAA":(OI)(CI)(M)'
@@ -82,17 +82,17 @@ On **CM01**:
3. In the Configuration Manager console, update the distribution point for the **Windows 10 x64 Settings** package by right-clicking the **Windows 10 x64 Settings** package and selecting **Update Distribution Points**. Click **OK** in the popup dialog box.
>[!NOTE]
- >Although you have not yet added a distribution point, you still need to select Update Distribution Points. This process also updates the Configuration Manager content library with changes.
+ >Although you haven't yet added a distribution point, you still need to select Update Distribution Points. This process also updates the Configuration Manager content library with changes.
## Distribute content to the CM01 distribution portal
-In Configuration Manager, you can distribute all packages needed by a task sequence in a single task. In this section, you distribute packages that have not yet been distributed to the CM01 distribution point.
+In Configuration Manager, you can distribute all packages needed by a task sequence in a single task. In this section, you distribute packages that haven't yet been distributed to the CM01 distribution point.
On **CM01**:
1. Using the Configuration Manager console, in the Software Library workspace, expand **Operating Systems** and select **Task Sequences**. Right-click the **Windows 10 Enterprise x64 RTM** task sequence, and select **Distribute Content**.
2. In the Distribute Content Wizard, click **Next** twice then on the **Specify the content destination** page add the Distribution Point: **CM01.CONTOSO.COM**, and then complete the wizard.
-3. Using the CMTrace tool, verify the distribution to the CM01 distribution point by reviewing the distmgr.log file, or use the Distribution Status / Content Status option in the Monitoring workspace. Do not continue until you see all the new packages being distributed successfully.
+3. Using the CMTrace tool, verify the distribution to the CM01 distribution point by reviewing the distmgr.log file, or use the Distribution Status / Content Status option in the Monitoring workspace. Don't continue until you see all the new packages being distributed successfully.

@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ On **CM01**:
## Create a deployment for the task sequence
-This sections provides steps to help you create a deployment for the task sequence.
+This section provides steps to help you create a deployment for the task sequence.
On **CM01**:
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ On **CM01**:
## Configure Configuration Manager to prompt for the computer name during deployment (optional)
-You can have Configuration Manager prompt you for a computer name or you can use rules to generate a computer name. For more details on how to do this, see [Configure MDT settings](../deploy-windows-mdt/configure-mdt-settings.md).
+You can have Configuration Manager prompt you for a computer name or you can use rules to generate a computer name. For more information on how to do this step, see [Configure MDT settings](../deploy-windows-mdt/configure-mdt-settings.md).
This section provides steps to help you configure the All Unknown Computers collection to have Configuration Manager prompt for computer names.
diff --git a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/prepare-for-zero-touch-installation-of-windows-10-with-configuration-manager.md b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/prepare-for-zero-touch-installation-of-windows-10-with-configuration-manager.md
index 840f69546c..02c1c8a43b 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/prepare-for-zero-touch-installation-of-windows-10-with-configuration-manager.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/prepare-for-zero-touch-installation-of-windows-10-with-configuration-manager.md
@@ -32,19 +32,19 @@ In this article, you'll use [components](#components-of-configuration-manager-op
- The Configuration Manager [reporting services](/mem/configmgr/core/servers/manage/configuring-reporting) point role has been added and configured.
- A file system folder structure and Configuration Manager console folder structure for packages has been created. Steps to verify or create this folder structure are [provided below](#review-the-sources-folder-structure).
- The [Windows ADK](/windows-hardware/get-started/adk-install) (including USMT) version 1903, Windows PE add-on, WSIM 1903 update, [MDT](https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=54259) version 8456, and DaRT 10 (part of [MDOP 2015](https://my.visualstudio.com/Downloads?q=Desktop%20Optimization%20Pack%202015)) are installed.
-- The [CMTrace tool](/mem/configmgr/core/support/cmtrace) (cmtrace.exe) is installed on the distribution point.
+- The [CMTrace tool](/configmgr/core/support/cmtrace) (cmtrace.exe) is installed on the distribution point.
- > [!NOTE]
- > CMTrace is automatically installed with the current branch of Configuration Manager.
+ > [!NOTE]
+ > CMTrace is automatically installed with the current branch of Configuration Manager at **Program Files\Microsoft Configuration Manager\tools\cmtrace.exe**.
For the purposes of this guide, we'll use three server computers: DC01, CM01 and HV01.
- DC01 is a domain controller and DNS server for the contoso.com domain. DHCP services are also available and optionally installed on DC01 or another server.
-- CM01 is a domain member server and Configuration Manager software distribution point. In this guide CM01 is a standalone primary site server.
+- CM01 is a domain member server and Configuration Manager software distribution point. In this guide, CM01 is a standalone primary site server.
- HV01 is a Hyper-V host computer that is used to build a Windows 10 reference image. This computer doesn't need to be a domain member.
All servers are running Windows Server 2019. However, an earlier, supported version of Windows Server can also be used.
-All server and client computers referenced in this guide are on the same subnet. This configuration isn't required, but each server and client computer must be able to connect to each other to share files, and to resolve all DNS names and Active Directory information for the contoso.com domain. Internet connectivity is also required to download OS and application updates.
+All server and client computers referenced in this guide are on the same subnet. This interrelation isn't required, but each server and client computer must be able to connect to each other to share files, and to resolve all DNS names and Active Directory information for the contoso.com domain. Internet connectivity is also required to download OS and application updates.
### Domain credentials
@@ -57,13 +57,13 @@ The following generic credentials are used in this guide. You should replace the
## Create the OU structure
>[!NOTE]
->If you have already [created the OU structure](../deploy-windows-mdt/prepare-for-windows-deployment-with-mdt.md#create-the-ou-structure) that was used in the OSD guide for MDT, the same structure is used here and you can skip this section.
+>If you've already [created the OU structure](../deploy-windows-mdt/prepare-for-windows-deployment-with-mdt.md#create-the-ou-structure) that was used in the OSD guide for MDT, the same structure is used here and you can skip this section.
On **DC01**:
To create the OU structure, you can use the Active Directory Users and Computers console (dsa.msc), or you can use Windows PowerShell. The procedure below uses Windows PowerShell.
-To use Windows PowerShell, copy the following commands into a text file and save it as **C:\Setup\Scripts\ou.ps1**. Be sure that you're viewing file extensions and that you save the file with the `.ps1` extension.
+To use Windows PowerShell, copy the following commands into a text file and save it as `C:\Setup\Scripts\ou.ps1` Ensure that you're viewing file extensions and that you save the file with the `.ps1` extension.
```powershell
$oulist = Import-csv -Path c:\oulist.txt
@@ -123,11 +123,11 @@ On **DC01**:
## Configure Active Directory permissions
-In order for the Configuration Manager Join Domain Account (CM\_JD) to join machines into the contoso.com domain you need to configure permissions in Active Directory. These steps assume you've downloaded the sample [Set-OUPermissions.ps1 script](https://github.com/DeploymentArtist/SWP1/tree/master/Scripts) and copied it to C:\\Setup\\Scripts on DC01.
+In order for the Configuration Manager Join Domain Account (CM\_JD) to join machines into the contoso.com domain, you need to configure permissions in Active Directory. These steps assume you've downloaded the sample [Set-OUPermissions.ps1 script](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkId=619362) and copied it to C:\\Setup\\Scripts on DC01.
On **DC01**:
-1. Sign in as contoso\administrator and enter the following at an elevated Windows PowerShell prompt:
+1. Sign in as contoso\administrator and enter the following commands at an elevated Windows PowerShell prompt:
```powershell
Set-ExecutionPolicy -ExecutionPolicy RemoteSigned -Force
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ On **DC01**:
.\Set-OUPermissions.ps1 -Account CM_JD -TargetOU "OU=Workstations,OU=Computers,OU=Contoso"
```
-2. The Set-OUPermissions.ps1 script allows the CM\_JD user account permissions to manage computer accounts in the Contoso / Computers / Workstations OU. The following is a list of the permissions being granted:
+2. The Set-OUPermissions.ps1 script allows the CM\_JD user account permissions to manage computer accounts in the Contoso / Computers / Workstations OU. The following list is that of permissions being granted:
* Scope: This object and all descendant objects
* Create Computer objects
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ To support the packages you create in this article, the following folder structu
You can run the following commands from an elevated Windows PowerShell prompt to create this folder structure:
->We will also create the D:\Logs folder here which will be used later to support server-side logging.
+>We'll also create the D:\Logs folder here which will be used later to support server-side logging.
```powershell
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path "D:\Sources"
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ New-SmbShare -Name Logs$ -Path D:\Logs -ChangeAccess EVERYONE
## Integrate Configuration Manager with MDT
-To extend the Configuration Manager console with MDT wizards and templates, install MDT with the default settings and run the **Configure ConfigManager Integration** desktop app. In these steps, we assume you have already [downloaded MDT](https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=54259) and installed it with default settings.
+To extend the Configuration Manager console with MDT wizards and templates, install MDT with the default settings and run the **Configure ConfigManager Integration** desktop app. In these steps, we assume you've already [downloaded MDT](https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=54259) and installed it with default settings.
On **CM01**:
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ On **CM01**:
Configure the CM01 distribution point for PXE.
>[!NOTE]
- >If you select **Enable a PXE responder without Windows Deployment Service**, then WDS will not be installed, or if it is already installed it will be suspended, and the **ConfigMgr PXE Responder Service** (SccmPxe) will be used instead of WDS. The ConfigMgr PXE Responder does not support multicast. For more information, see [Install and configure distribution points](/mem/configmgr/core/servers/deploy/configure/install-and-configure-distribution-points#bkmk_config-pxe).
+ >If you select **Enable a PXE responder without Windows Deployment Service**, then WDS won't be installed, or if it's already installed it will be suspended, and the **ConfigMgr PXE Responder Service** (SccmPxe) will be used instead of WDS. The ConfigMgr PXE Responder doesn't support multicast. For more information, see [Install and configure distribution points](/configmgr/core/servers/deploy/configure/install-and-configure-distribution-points#bkmk_config-pxe).
4. Using the CMTrace tool, review the C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Configuration Manager\\Logs\\distmgr.log file. Look for ConfigurePXE and CcmInstallPXE lines.
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ On **CM01**:
The distmgr.log displays a successful configuration of PXE on the distribution point.
-5. Verify that you have seven files in each of the folders **D:\\RemoteInstall\\SMSBoot\\x86** and **D:\\RemoteInstall\\SMSBoot\\x64**.
+5. Verify that you've seven files in each of the folders **D:\\RemoteInstall\\SMSBoot\\x86** and **D:\\RemoteInstall\\SMSBoot\\x64**.

@@ -284,18 +284,17 @@ Next, see [Create a custom Windows PE boot image with Configuration Manager](cre
## Components of Configuration Manager operating system deployment
-Operating system deployment with Configuration Manager is part of the normal software distribution infrastructure, but there are other components. For example, operating system deployment in Configuration Manager may use the State Migration Point role, which isn't used by normal application deployment in Configuration Manager. This section describes the Configuration Manager components involved with the deployment of an operating system, such as Windows 10.
+Operating system deployment with Configuration Manager is part of the normal software distribution infrastructure, but there are more components. For example, operating system deployment in Configuration Manager may use the State Migration Point role, which isn't used by normal application deployment in Configuration Manager. This section describes the Configuration Manager components involved with the deployment of an operating system, such as Windows 10.
- **State migration point (SMP).** The state migration point is used to store user state migration data during computer replace scenarios.
- **Distribution point (DP).** The distribution point is used to store all packages in Configuration Manager, including the operating system deployment-related packages.
- **Software update point (SUP).** The software update point, which is normally used to deploy updates to existing machines, also can be used to update an operating system as part of the deployment process. You also can use offline servicing to update the image directly on the Configuration Manager server.
- **Reporting services point.** The reporting services point can be used to monitor the operating system deployment process.
- **Boot images.** Boot images are the Windows Preinstallation Environment (Windows PE) images Configuration Manager uses to start the deployment.
-- **Operating system images.** The operating system image package contains only one file, the custom .wim image. This is typically the production deployment image.
+- **Operating system images.** The operating system image package contains only one file, the custom .wim image. This image is typically the production deployment image.
- **Operating system installers.** The operating system installers were originally added to create reference images using Configuration Manager. Instead, we recommend that you use MDT Lite Touch to create your reference images. For more information on how to create a reference image, see [Create a Windows 10 reference image](../deploy-windows-mdt/create-a-windows-10-reference-image.md).
- **Drivers.** Like MDT Lite Touch, Configuration Manager also provides a repository (catalog) of managed device drivers.
-- **Task sequences.** The task sequences in Configuration Manager look and feel much like the sequences in MDT Lite Touch, and they're used for the same purpose. However, in Configuration Manager the task sequence is delivered to the clients as a policy via the Management Point (MP). MDT provides extra task sequence templates to Configuration Manager.
-
+- **Task sequences.** The task sequences in Configuration Manager look and feel much like the sequences in MDT Lite Touch, and they're used for the same purpose. However, in Configuration Manager, the task sequence is delivered to the clients as a policy via the Management Point (MP). MDT provides more task sequence templates to Configuration Manager.
> [!NOTE]
> The Windows Assessment and Deployment Kit (ADK) for Windows 10 is also required to support management and deployment of Windows 10.
@@ -303,12 +302,17 @@ Operating system deployment with Configuration Manager is part of the normal sof
As noted above, MDT adds many enhancements to Configuration Manager. While these enhancements are called Zero Touch, that name doesn't reflect how deployment is conducted. The following sections provide a few samples of the 280 enhancements that MDT adds to Configuration Manager.
+>[!NOTE]
+>MDT installation requires the following:
+>- The Windows ADK for Windows 10 (installed in the previous procedure)
+>- Windows PowerShell ([version 5.1](https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=54616) is recommended; type **$host** to check)
+>- Microsoft .NET Framework
+
### MDT enables dynamic deployment
-When MDT is integrated with Configuration Manager, the task sequence takes other instructions from the MDT rules. In its most simple form, these settings are stored in a text file, the CustomSettings.ini file, but you can store the settings in Microsoft SQL Server databases, or have a script or web services provide the settings used.
+When MDT is integrated with Configuration Manager, the task sequence takes more instructions from the MDT rules. In its most simple form, these settings are stored in a text file, the CustomSettings.ini file, but you can store the settings in Microsoft SQL Server databases, or have Microsoft Visual Basic Scripting Edition (VBScripts) or web services provide the settings used.
The task sequence uses instructions that allow you to reduce the number of task sequences in Configuration Manager and instead store settings outside the task sequence. Here are a few examples:
-
- The following settings instruct the task sequence to install the HP Hotkeys package, but only if the hardware is an HP EliteBook 8570w. You don't have to add the package to the task sequence.
``` syntax
@@ -349,7 +353,7 @@ The folder that contains the rules, a few scripts from MDT, and a custom script
### MDT adds real-time monitoring
-With MDT integration, you can follow your deployments in real time, and if you have access to Microsoft Diagnostics and Recovery Toolkit (DaRT), you can even remote into Windows Preinstallation Environment (Windows PE) during deployment. The real-time monitoring data can be viewed from within the MDT Deployment Workbench, via a web browser, Windows PowerShell, the Event Viewer, or Microsoft Excel 2013. In fact, any script or app that can read an Open Data (OData) feed can read the information.
+With MDT integration, you can follow your deployments in real time, and if you've access to Microsoft Diagnostics and Recovery Toolkit (DaRT), you can even remote into Windows Preinstallation Environment (Windows PE) during deployment. The real-time monitoring data can be viewed from within the MDT Deployment Workbench, via a web browser, Windows PowerShell, the Event Viewer, or Microsoft Excel 2013. In fact, any script or app that can read an Open Data (OData) feed can read the information.

@@ -370,25 +374,18 @@ MDT Zero Touch simply extends Configuration Manager with many useful built-in op
You can create reference images for Configuration Manager in Configuration Manager, but in general we recommend creating them in MDT Lite Touch for the following reasons:
- You can use the same image for every type of operating system deployment - Microsoft Virtual Desktop Infrastructure (VDI), Microsoft System Center Virtual Machine Manager (VMM), MDT, Configuration Manager, Windows Deployment Services (WDS), and more.
-- Configuration Manager performs deployment in the LocalSystem context. This means that you can't configure the Administrator account with all of the settings that you would like to be included in the image. MDT runs in the context of the Local Administrator, which means you can configure the look and feel of the configuration and then use the CopyProfile functionality to copy these changes to the default user during deployment.
+- Configuration Manager performs deployment in the LocalSystem context, which means that you can't configure the Administrator account with all of the settings that you would like to be included in the image. MDT runs in the context of the Local Administrator, which means you can configure the look and feel of the configuration and then use the CopyProfile functionality to copy these changes to the default user during deployment.
- The Configuration Manager task sequence doesn't suppress user interface interaction.
- MDT Lite Touch supports a Suspend action that allows for reboots, which is useful when you need to perform a manual installation or check the reference image before it's automatically captured.
- MDT Lite Touch doesn't require any infrastructure and is easy to delegate.
## Related articles
-[Create a custom Windows PE boot image with Configuration Manager](create-a-custom-windows-pe-boot-image-with-configuration-manager.md)
-
-[Add a Windows 10 operating system image using Configuration Manager](add-a-windows-10-operating-system-image-using-configuration-manager.md)
-
-[Create an application to deploy with Windows 10 using Configuration Manager](create-an-application-to-deploy-with-windows-10-using-configuration-manager.md)
-
-[Add drivers to a Windows 10 deployment with Windows PE using Configuration Manager](add-drivers-to-a-windows-10-deployment-with-windows-pe-using-configuration-manager.md)
-
-[Create a task sequence with Configuration Manager and MDT](./create-a-task-sequence-with-configuration-manager-and-mdt.md)
-
-[Deploy Windows 10 using PXE and Configuration Manager](deploy-windows-10-using-pxe-and-configuration-manager.md)
-
-[Refresh a Windows 7 SP1 client with Windows 10 using Configuration Manager](refresh-a-windows-7-client-with-windows-10-using-configuration-manager.md)
-
+[Create a custom Windows PE boot image with Configuration Manager](create-a-custom-windows-pe-boot-image-with-configuration-manager.md)\
+[Add a Windows 10 operating system image using Configuration Manager](add-a-windows-10-operating-system-image-using-configuration-manager.md)\
+[Create an application to deploy with Windows 10 using Configuration Manager](create-an-application-to-deploy-with-windows-10-using-configuration-manager.md)\
+[Add drivers to a Windows 10 deployment with Windows PE using Configuration Manager](add-drivers-to-a-windows-10-deployment-with-windows-pe-using-configuration-manager.md)\
+[Create a task sequence with Configuration Manager and MDT](./create-a-task-sequence-with-configuration-manager-and-mdt.md)\
+[Deploy Windows 10 using PXE and Configuration Manager](deploy-windows-10-using-pxe-and-configuration-manager.md)\
+[Refresh a Windows 7 SP1 client with Windows 10 using Configuration Manager](refresh-a-windows-7-client-with-windows-10-using-configuration-manager.md)\
[Replace a Windows 7 SP1 client with Windows 10 using Configuration Manager](replace-a-windows-7-client-with-windows-10-using-configuration-manager.md)
diff --git a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/refresh-a-windows-7-client-with-windows-10-using-configuration-manager.md b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/refresh-a-windows-7-client-with-windows-10-using-configuration-manager.md
index 117dedd018..41822baf59 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/refresh-a-windows-7-client-with-windows-10-using-configuration-manager.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/refresh-a-windows-7-client-with-windows-10-using-configuration-manager.md
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ ms.custom: seo-marvel-apr2020
- Windows 10
-This topic will show you how to refresh a Windows 7 SP1 client with Windows 10 using Configuration Manager and Microsoft Deployment Toolkit (MDT). A computer refresh is not the same as an in-place upgrade. A computer refresh involves storing user data and settings from the old installation, wiping the hard drives, installing a new OS, and then restoring the user data at the end of the installation. Also see the MDT refesh procedure: [Refresh a Windows 7 computer with Windows 10](../deploy-windows-mdt/refresh-a-windows-7-computer-with-windows-10.md).
+This topic will show you how to refresh a Windows 7 SP1 client with Windows 10 using Configuration Manager and Microsoft Deployment Toolkit (MDT). A computer refresh isn't the same as an in-place upgrade. A computer refresh involves storing user data and settings from the old installation, wiping the hard drives, installing a new OS, and then restoring the user data at the end of the installation. Also see the MDT refresh procedure: [Refresh a Windows 7 computer with Windows 10](../deploy-windows-mdt/refresh-a-windows-7-computer-with-windows-10.md).
A computer refresh with Configuration Manager works the same as it does with MDT Lite Touch installation. Configuration Manager also uses the User State Migration Tool (USMT) from the Windows Assessment and Deployment Kit (Windows ADK) 10 in the background. A computer refresh with Configuration Manager has the following steps:
@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ A computer refresh with Configuration Manager works the same as it does with MDT
An existing Configuration Manager infrastructure that is integrated with MDT is used for the following procedures. For more information about the setup for this article, see [Prepare for Zero Touch Installation of Windows 10 with Configuration Manager](prepare-for-zero-touch-installation-of-windows-10-with-configuration-manager.md).
-For the purposes of this article, we will use one server computer (CM01) and one client computer (PC0003).
-- CM01 is a domain member server and Configuration Manager software distribution point. In this guide CM01 is a standalone primary site server.
+For the purposes of this article, we'll use one server computer (CM01) and one client computer (PC0003).
+- CM01 is a domain member server and Configuration Manager software distribution point. In this guide, CM01 is a standalone primary site server.
- PC0003 is a domain member client computer running Windows 7 SP1, or a later version of Windows, with the Configuration Manager client installed, that will be refreshed to Windows 10.
>[!NOTE]
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ For the purposes of this article, we will use one server computer (CM01) and one
All servers are running Windows Server 2019. However, an earlier, supported version of Windows Server can also be used.
-All server and client computers referenced in this guide are on the same subnet. This is not required, but each server and client computer must be able to connect to each other to share files, and to resolve all DNS names and Active Directory information for the contoso.com domain. Internet connectivity is also required to download OS and application updates.
+All server and client computers referenced in this guide are on the same subnet. This interrelation isn't required, but each server and client computer must be able to connect to each other to share files, and to resolve all DNS names and Active Directory information for the contoso.com domain. Internet connectivity is also required to download OS and application updates.
>[!IMPORTANT]
>This article assumes that you have [configured Active Directory permissions](prepare-for-zero-touch-installation-of-windows-10-with-configuration-manager.md#configure-active-directory-permissions) in the specified OU for the **CM_JD** account, and the client's Active Directory computer account is in the **Contoso > Computers > Workstations** OU. Use the Active Directory Users and Computers console to review the location of computer objects and move them if needed.
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ On **CM01**:
Use the default settings to complete the remaining wizard pages and click **Close**.
-2. Review the Install Windows 10 Enterprise x64 collection. Do not continue until you see the PC0003 machine in the collection.
+2. Review the Install Windows 10 Enterprise x64 collection. Don't continue until you see the PC0003 machine in the collection.
>[!NOTE]
>It may take a short while for the collection to refresh; you can view progress via the Colleval.log file. If you want to speed up the process, you can manually update membership on the Install Windows 10 Enterprise x64 collection by right-clicking the collection and selecting Update Membership.
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ Using the Configuration Manager console, in the Software Library workspace, expa
- Make available to the following: Configuration Manager clients, media and PXE
>[!NOTE]
- >It is not necessary to make the deployment available to media and Pre-Boot Execution Environment (PXE) for a computer refresh, but you will use the same deployment for bare-metal deployments later on and you will need it at that point.
+ >It's not necessary to make the deployment available to media and Pre-Boot Execution Environment (PXE) for a computer refresh, but you will use the same deployment for bare-metal deployments later on and you will need it at that point.
- Scheduling
- <default>
diff --git a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/replace-a-windows-7-client-with-windows-10-using-configuration-manager.md b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/replace-a-windows-7-client-with-windows-10-using-configuration-manager.md
index 242bcd70ee..4d0bcca63b 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/replace-a-windows-7-client-with-windows-10-using-configuration-manager.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/replace-a-windows-7-client-with-windows-10-using-configuration-manager.md
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
---
title: Replace a Windows 7 SP1 client with Windows 10 using Configuration Manager
-description: In this topic, you will learn how to replacing a Windows 7 SP1 computer using Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager.
+description: In this topic, you'll learn how to replace a Windows 7 SP1 computer using Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager.
+ms.assetid: 3c8a2d53-8f08-475f-923a-bca79ca8ac36
ms.reviewer:
manager: dougeby
ms.author: aaroncz
@@ -17,16 +18,16 @@ ms.custom: seo-marvel-apr2020
- Windows 10
-In this topic, you will learn how to replace a Windows 7 SP1 computer using Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager. This process is similar to refreshing a computer, but since you are replacing the device, you have to run the backup job separately from the deployment of Windows 10.
+In this topic, you'll learn how to replace a Windows 7 SP1 computer using Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager. This process is similar to refreshing a computer, but since you're replacing the device, you have to run the backup job separately from the deployment of Windows 10.
-In this topic, you will create a backup-only task sequence that you run on PC0004 (the device you are replacing), deploy the PC0006 computer running Windows 10, and then restore this backup of PC0004 onto PC006. This is similar to the MDT replace process: [Replace a Windows 7 computer with a Windows 10 computer](../deploy-windows-mdt/replace-a-windows-7-computer-with-a-windows-10-computer.md).
+In this topic, you'll create a backup-only task sequence that you run on PC0004 (the device you're replacing), deploy the PC0006 computer running Windows 10, and then restore this backup of PC0004 onto PC006. This process is similar to the MDT replace process: [Replace a Windows 7 computer with a Windows 10 computer](../deploy-windows-mdt/replace-a-windows-7-computer-with-a-windows-10-computer.md).
## Infrastructure
An existing Configuration Manager infrastructure that is integrated with MDT is used for the following procedures. For more information about the setup for this article, see [Prepare for Zero Touch Installation of Windows 10 with Configuration Manager](prepare-for-zero-touch-installation-of-windows-10-with-configuration-manager.md).
-For the purposes of this article, we will use one server computer (CM01) and two client computers (PC0004, PC0006).
-- CM01 is a domain member server and Configuration Manager software distribution point. In this guide CM01 is a standalone primary site server.
+For the purposes of this article, we'll use one server computer (CM01) and two client computers (PC0004, PC0006).
+- CM01 is a domain member server and Configuration Manager software distribution point. In this guide, CM01 is a standalone primary site server.
- Important: CM01 must include the **[State migration point](/configmgr/osd/get-started/manage-user-state#BKMK_StateMigrationPoint)** role for the replace task sequence used in this article to work.
- PC0004 is a domain member client computer running Windows 7 SP1, or a later version of Windows, with the Configuration Manager client installed, that will be replaced.
- PC0006 is a domain member client computer running Windows 10, with the Configuration Manager client installed, that will replace PC0004.
@@ -36,7 +37,7 @@ For the purposes of this article, we will use one server computer (CM01) and two
All servers are running Windows Server 2019. However, an earlier, supported version of Windows Server can also be used.
-All server and client computers referenced in this guide are on the same subnet. This is not required, but each server and client computer must be able to connect to each other to share files, and to resolve all DNS names and Active Directory information for the contoso.com domain. Internet connectivity is also required to download OS and application updates.
+All server and client computers referenced in this guide are on the same subnet. This interrelation isn't required, but each server and client computer must be able to connect to each other to share files, and to resolve all DNS names and Active Directory information for the contoso.com domain. Internet connectivity is also required to download OS and application updates.
>[!IMPORTANT]
>This article assumes that you have [configured Active Directory permissions](prepare-for-zero-touch-installation-of-windows-10-with-configuration-manager.md#configure-active-directory-permissions) in the specified OU for the **CM_JD** account, and the client's Active Directory computer account is in the **Contoso > Computers > Workstations** OU. Use the Active Directory Users and Computers console to review the location of computer objects and move them if needed.
@@ -70,15 +71,15 @@ The backup-only task sequence (named Replace Task Sequence).
## Associate the new device with the old computer
-This section walks you through the process of associating a new, blank device (PC0006), with an existing computer (PC0004), for the purpose of replacing PC0004 with PC0006. PC0006 can be either a physical or virtual machine.
+This section walks you through the process of associating a new, blank device (PC0006), with an existing computer (PC0004), for replacing PC0004 with PC0006. PC0006 can be either a physical or virtual machine.
On **HV01** (if PC0006 is a VM) or in the PC0006 BIOS:
-1. Make a note of the MAC address for PC0006. (If PC0006 is a virtual machine, you can see the MAC Address in the virtual machine settings.) In our example, the PC0006 MAC Address is 00:15:5D:0A:6A:96. Do not attempt to PXE boot PC0006 yet.
+1. Make a note of the MAC address for PC0006. (If PC0006 is a virtual machine, you can see the MAC Address in the virtual machine settings.) In our example, the PC0006 MAC Address is 00:15:5D:0A:6A:96. Don't attempt to PXE boot PC0006 yet.
On **CM01**:
-2. Using the Configuration Manager console, in the Assets and Compliance workspace, right-click **Devices**, and then click **Import Computer Information**.
+2. When you're using the Configuration Manager console, in the Assets and Compliance workspace, right-click **Devices**, and then click **Import Computer Information**.
3. On the **Select Source** page, select **Import single computer** and click **Next**.
4. On the **Single Computer** page, use the following settings and then click **Next**:
@@ -95,14 +96,14 @@ On **CM01**:
7. On the **Choose additional collections** page, click **Add** and then select the **Install Windows 10 Enterprise x64** collection. Now, select the checkbox next to the Install Windows 10 Enterprise x64 collection you just added, and then click **Next**.
8. On the **Summary** page, click **Next**, and then click **Close**.
9. Select the **User State Migration** node and review the computer association in the right hand pane.
-10. Right-click the **PC0004/PC0006** association and click **View Recovery Information**. Note that a recovery key has been assigned already, but a user state store location has not.
-11. Review the **Install Windows 10 Enterprise x64** collection. Do not continue until you see the **PC0006** computer in the collection. You might have to update membership and refresh the collection again.
+10. Right-click the **PC0004/PC0006** association and click **View Recovery Information**. A recovery key has been assigned already, but a user state store location hasn't.
+11. Review the **Install Windows 10 Enterprise x64** collection. Don't continue until you see the **PC0006** computer in the collection. You might have to update membership and refresh the collection again.
## Create a device collection and add the PC0004 computer
On **CM01**:
-1. Using the Configuration Manager console, in the Asset and Compliance workspace, right-click **Device Collections**, and then select **Create Device Collection**. Use the following settings:
+1. When you're using the Configuration Manager console, in the Asset and Compliance workspace, right-click **Device Collections**, and then select **Create Device Collection**. Use the following settings:
* General
* Name: USMT Backup (Replace)
@@ -117,7 +118,7 @@ On **CM01**:
Use default settings for the remaining wizard pages, then click **Close**.
-2. Review the **USMT Backup (Replace)** collection. Do not continue until you see the **PC0004** computer in the collection.
+2. Review the **USMT Backup (Replace)** collection. Don't continue until you see the **PC0004** computer in the collection.
## Create a new deployment
@@ -145,7 +146,7 @@ This section assumes that you have a computer named PC0004 with the Configuratio
On **PC0004**:
-1. If it is not already started, start the PC0004 computer and open the Configuration Manager control panel (control smscfgrc).
+1. If it's not already started, start the PC0004 computer and open the Configuration Manager control panel (control smscfgrc).
2. On the **Actions** tab, select **Machine Policy Retrieval & Evaluation Cycle**, click **Run Now**, and then click **OK** in the popup dialog box that appears.
>[!NOTE]
@@ -161,8 +162,8 @@ Capturing the user state
On **CM01**:
-6. Open the state migration point storage folder (ex: D:\Migdata) and verify that a sub-folder was created containing the USMT backup.
-7. Using the Configuration Manager console, in the Assets and Compliance workspace, select the **User State Migration** node, right-click the **PC0004/PC0006** association, and select **View Recovery Information**. Note that the object now also has a user state store location.
+6. Open the state migration point storage folder (ex: D:\Migdata) and verify that a subfolder was created containing the USMT backup.
+7. Using the Configuration Manager console, in the Assets and Compliance workspace, select the **User State Migration** node, right-click the **PC0004/PC0006** association, and select **View Recovery Information**. The object now also has a user state store location.
>[!NOTE]
>It may take a few minutes for the user state store location to be populated.
@@ -176,7 +177,7 @@ On **PC0006**:
* Password: pass@word1
* Select a task sequence to execute on this computer: Windows 10 Enterprise x64 RTM
-2. The setup now starts and does the following:
+2. The setup now starts and does the following steps:
* Installs the Windows 10 operating system
* Installs the Configuration Manager client
@@ -184,7 +185,7 @@ On **PC0006**:
* Installs the applications
* Restores the PC0004 backup
-When the process is complete, you will have a new Windows 10 computer in your domain with user data and settings restored. See the following examples:
+When the process is complete, you'll have a new Windows 10 computer in your domain with user data and settings restored. See the following examples:


diff --git a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/upgrade-to-windows-10-with-configuration-manager.md b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/upgrade-to-windows-10-with-configuration-manager.md
index dd7097e837..5d6a936a26 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/upgrade-to-windows-10-with-configuration-manager.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/upgrade-to-windows-10-with-configuration-manager.md
@@ -27,28 +27,28 @@ The simplest path to upgrade PCs currently running Windows 7, Windows 8, or Wi
An existing Configuration Manager infrastructure that is integrated with MDT is used for the following procedures. For more information about the setup for this article, see [Prepare for Zero Touch Installation of Windows 10 with Configuration Manager](prepare-for-zero-touch-installation-of-windows-10-with-configuration-manager.md).
-For the purposes of this article, we will use one server computer (CM01) and one client computers (PC0004).
-- CM01 is a domain member server and Configuration Manager software distribution point. In this guide CM01 is a standalone primary site server.
+For the purposes of this article, we'll use one server computer (CM01) and one client computer (PC0004).
+- CM01 is a domain member server and Configuration Manager software distribution point. In this guide, CM01 is a standalone primary site server.
- PC0004 is a domain member client computer running Windows 7 SP1, or a later version of Windows, with the Configuration Manager client installed, that will be upgraded to Windows 10.
All servers are running Windows Server 2019. However, an earlier, supported version of Windows Server can also be used.
-All server and client computers referenced in this guide are on the same subnet. This is not required, but each server and client computer must be able to connect to each other to share files, and to resolve all DNS names and Active Directory information for the contoso.com domain. Internet connectivity is also required to download OS and application updates.
+All server and client computers referenced in this guide are on the same subnet. This interrelation isn't required, but each server and client computer must be able to connect to each other to share files, and to resolve all DNS names and Active Directory information for the contoso.com domain. Internet connectivity is also required to download OS and application updates.
## Add an OS upgrade package
-Configuration Manager Current Branch includes a native in-place upgrade task. This task sequence differs from the MDT in-place upgrade task sequence in that it does not use a default OS image, but rather uses an [OS upgrade package](/configmgr/osd/get-started/manage-operating-system-upgrade-packages).
+Configuration Manager Current Branch includes a native in-place upgrade task. This task sequence differs from the MDT in-place upgrade task sequence in that it doesn't use a default OS image, but rather uses an [OS upgrade package](/configmgr/osd/get-started/manage-operating-system-upgrade-packages).
On **CM01**:
1. Using the Configuration Manager console, in the Software Library workspace, expand **Operating Systems**, right-click **Operating System Upgrade Packages**, and click **Add Operating System Upgrade Package**.
-2. On the **Data Source** page, under **Path**, click **Browse** and enter the UNC path to your media source. In this example, we have extracted the Windows 10 installation media to **\\\\cm01\\Sources$\\OSD\\UpgradePackages\\Windows 10**.
-3. If you have multiple image indexes in the installation media, select **Extract a specific image index from install.wim...** and choose the image index you want from the dropdown menu. In this example, we have chosen **Windows 10 Enterprise**.
+2. On the **Data Source** page, under **Path**, click **Browse** and enter the UNC path to your media source. In this example, we've extracted the Windows 10 installation media to **\\\\cm01\\Sources$\\OSD\\UpgradePackages\\Windows 10**.
+3. If you have multiple image indexes in the installation media, select **Extract a specific image index from install.wim...** and choose the image index you want from the dropdown menu. In this example, we've chosen **Windows 10 Enterprise**.
4. Next to **Architecture**, select **x64**, choose a language from the dropdown menu next to **Language**, and then click **Next**.
5. Next to **Name**, enter **Windows 10 x64 RTM** and then complete the wizard by clicking **Next** and **Close**.
6. Distribute the OS upgrade package to the CM01 distribution point by right-clicking the **Windows 10 x64 RTM** OS upgrade package and then clicking **Distribute Content**.
7. In the Distribute Content Wizard, add the CM01 distribution point, click **Next** and click **Close**.
-8. View the content status for the Windows 10 x64 RTM upgrade package. Do not continue until the distribution is completed (it might take a few minutes). You also can review the D:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Configuration Manager\\Logs\\distmgr.log file and look for the **STATMSG: ID=2301** line.
+8. View the content status for the Windows 10 x64 RTM upgrade package. Don't continue until the distribution is completed (it might take a few minutes). You also can review the D:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Configuration Manager\\Logs\\distmgr.log file and look for the **STATMSG: ID=2301** line.
## Create an in-place upgrade task sequence
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ After you create the upgrade task sequence, you can create a collection to test
On **CM01**:
-1. Using the Configuration Manager console, in the Asset and Compliance workspace, right-click **Device Collections**, and then select **Create Device Collection**. Use the following settings:
+1. When you're using the Configuration Manager console, in the Asset and Compliance workspace, right-click **Device Collections**, and then select **Create Device Collection**. Use the following settings:
- General
- Name: Windows 10 x64 in-place upgrade
- Limited Collection: All Systems
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ On **CM01**:
- Select Resources
- Select PC0004
-2. Review the Windows 10 x64 in-place upgrade collection. Do not continue until you see PC0004 in the collection.
+2. Review the Windows 10 x64 in-place upgrade collection. Don't continue until you see PC0004 in the collection.
## Deploy the Windows 10 upgrade
diff --git a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-mdt/build-a-distributed-environment-for-windows-10-deployment.md b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-mdt/build-a-distributed-environment-for-windows-10-deployment.md
index 3300697ddc..ccf4df0e57 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-mdt/build-a-distributed-environment-for-windows-10-deployment.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-mdt/build-a-distributed-environment-for-windows-10-deployment.md
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
---
title: Build a distributed environment for Windows 10 deployment (Windows 10)
-description: In this topic, you will learn how to replicate your Windows 10 deployment shares to facilitate the deployment of Windows 10 in remote or branch locations.
+description: In this topic, you'll learn how to replicate your Windows 10 deployment shares to facilitate the deployment of Windows 10 in remote or branch locations.
+ms.assetid: a6cd5657-6a16-4fff-bfb4-44760902d00c
ms.reviewer:
manager: dougeby
ms.author: aaroncz
@@ -17,9 +18,9 @@ ms.topic: article
Perform the steps in this article to build a distributed environment for Windows 10 deployment. A distributed environment for deployment is useful when you have a segmented network, for example one that is segmented geographically into two branch locations. If you work in a distributed environment, replicating the deployment shares is an important part of a deployment solution because images of 5 GB or more in size can present bandwidth issues when deployed over the wire. Replicating this content enables clients to do local deployments.
-Four computers are used in this topic: DC01, MDT01, MDT02, and PC0006. DC01 is a domain controller, MDT01 and MDT02 are domain member computers running Windows Server 2019, and PC0006 is a blank device where we will deploy Windows 10. The second deployment server (MDT02) will be configured for a remote site (Stockholm) by replicating the deployment share on MDT01 at the original site (New York). All devices are members of the domain contoso.com for the fictitious Contoso Corporation.
+Four computers are used in this topic: DC01, MDT01, MDT02, and PC0006. DC01 is a domain controller, MDT01 and MDT02 are domain member computers running Windows Server 2019, and PC0006 is a blank device where we'll deploy Windows 10. The second deployment server (MDT02) will be configured for a remote site (Stockholm) by replicating the deployment share on MDT01 at the original site (New York). All devices are members of the domain contoso.com for the fictitious Contoso Corporation.
-For the purposes of this article, we assume that MDT02 is prepared with the same network and storage capabilities that were specified for MDT01, except that MDT02 is located on a different subnet than MDT01. For more details on the infrastructure setup for this topic, please see [Prepare for deployment with MDT](prepare-for-windows-deployment-with-mdt.md).
+For the purposes of this article, we assume that MDT02 is prepared with the same network and storage capabilities that were specified for MDT01, except that MDT02 is located on a different subnet than MDT01. For more information on the infrastructure setup for this topic, see [Prepare for deployment with MDT](prepare-for-windows-deployment-with-mdt.md).

@@ -29,7 +30,7 @@ Computers used in this topic.
## Replicate deployment shares
-Replicating the content between MDT01 (New York) and MDT02 (Stockholm) can be done in a number of different ways. The most common content replication solutions with Microsoft Deployment Toolkit (MDT) use either the Linked Deployment Shares (LDS) feature or Distributed File System Replication (DFS-R). Some organizations have used a simple robocopy script for replication of the content.
+Replicating the content between MDT01 (New York) and MDT02 (Stockholm) can be done in different ways. The most common content replication solutions with Microsoft Deployment Toolkit (MDT) use either the Linked Deployment Shares (LDS) feature or Distributed File System Replication (DFS-R). Some organizations have used a simple robocopy script for replication of the content.
> [!NOTE]
> Robocopy has options that allow for synchronization between folders. It has a simple reporting function; it supports transmission retry; and, by default, it will only copy/remove files from the source that are newer than files on the target.
@@ -40,7 +41,7 @@ LDS is a built-in feature in MDT for replicating content. However, LDS works bes
### Why DFS-R is a better option
-DFS-R is not only very fast and reliable, but it also offers central monitoring, bandwidth control, and a great delta replication engine. DFS-R will work equally well whether you have 2 sites or 90. When using DFS-R for MDT, we recommend running your deployment servers on Windows Server 2008 R2 or higher. From that version on, you can configure the replication targets as read-only, which is exactly what you want for MDT. This way, you can have your master deployment share centralized and replicate out changes as they happen. DFS-R will quickly pick up changes at the central deployment share in MDT01 and replicate the delta changes to MDT02.
+DFS-R isn't only fast and reliable, but it also offers central monitoring, bandwidth control, and a great delta replication engine. DFS-R will work equally well whether you have 2 sites or 90. When using DFS-R for MDT, we recommend running your deployment servers on Windows Server 2008 R2 or higher. From that version on, you can configure the replication targets as read-only, which is exactly what you want for MDT. This way, you can have your master deployment share centralized and replicate out changes as they happen. DFS-R will quickly pick up changes at the central deployment share in MDT01 and replicate the delta changes to MDT02.
## Set up Distributed File System Replication (DFS-R) for replication
@@ -113,7 +114,7 @@ When you have multiple deployment servers sharing the same content, you need to
On **MDT01**:
-1. Using Notepad, navigate to the **D:\\MDTProduction\\Control** folder and modify the Boostrap.ini file as follows. Under [DefaultGateway] enter the IP addresses for the client's default gateway in New York and Stockholm, respectively (replace 10.10.10.1 and 10.10.20.1 with your default gateways). The default gateway setting is what tells the client which deployment share (i.e. server) to use.
+1. Using Notepad, navigate to the **D:\\MDTProduction\\Control** folder and modify the Boostrap.ini file as follows. Under [DefaultGateway] enter the IP addresses for the client's default gateway in New York and Stockholm, respectively (replace 10.10.10.1 and 10.10.20.1 with your default gateways). The default gateway setting is what tells the client which deployment share (that is, server) to use.
```ini
[Settings]
@@ -152,7 +153,7 @@ On **MDT01**:
## Replicate the content
- Once the MDT01 and MDT02 servers are prepared, you are ready to configure the actual replication.
+ Once the MDT01 and MDT02 servers are prepared, you're ready to configure the actual replication.
### Create the replication group
@@ -247,7 +248,7 @@ Now you should have a solution ready for deploying the Windows 10 client to the
1. Select a task sequence to execute on this computer: Windows 10 Enterprise x64 RTM Custom Image
2. Computer Name: PC0006
3. Applications: Select the Install - Adobe Reader
-4. Setup will now start and perform the following:
+4. Setup will now start and perform the following steps:
1. Install the Windows 10 Enterprise operating system.
2. Install applications.
3. Update the operating system using your local Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) server.
diff --git a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-mdt/configure-mdt-deployment-share-rules.md b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-mdt/configure-mdt-deployment-share-rules.md
index 078bb06ca8..fe96dcd42b 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-mdt/configure-mdt-deployment-share-rules.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-mdt/configure-mdt-deployment-share-rules.md
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ ms.topic: article
# Configure MDT deployment share rules
-In this topic, you will learn how to configure the MDT rules engine to reach out to other resources, including external scripts, databases, and web services, for additional information instead of storing settings directly in the rules engine. The rules engine in MDT is powerful: most of the settings used for operating system deployments are retrieved and assigned via the rules engine. In its simplest form, the rules engine is the CustomSettings.ini text file.
+In this topic, you'll learn how to configure the MDT rules engine to reach out to other resources, including external scripts, databases, and web services, for additional information instead of storing settings directly in the rules engine. The rules engine in MDT is powerful: most of the settings used for operating system deployments are retrieved and assigned via the rules engine. In its simplest form, the rules engine is the CustomSettings.ini text file.
## Assign settings
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Before adding the more advanced components like scripts, databases, and web serv
### Set computer name by MAC Address
-If you have a small test environment, or simply want to assign settings to a very limited number of machines, you can edit the rules to assign settings directly for a given MAC Address. If you have many machines, it makes sense to use the database instead.
+If you have a small test environment, or simply want to assign settings to a limited number of machines, you can edit the rules to assign settings directly for a given MAC Address. If you have many machines, it makes sense to use the database instead.
```
[Settings]
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ In the preceding sample, you still configure the rules to set the computer name
### Add laptops to a different organizational unit (OU) in Active Directory
-In the rules, you find built-in properties that use a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) query to determine whether the machine you are deploying is a laptop, desktop, or server. In this sample, we assume you want to add laptops to different OUs in Active Directory. Note that ByLaptopType is not a reserved word; rather, it is the name of the section to read.
+In the rules, you find built-in properties that use a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) query to determine whether the machine you're deploying is a laptop, desktop, or server. In this sample, we assume you want to add laptops to different OUs in Active Directory. Note that ByLaptopType isn't a reserved word; rather, it's the name of the section to read.
```
[Settings]
diff --git a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-mdt/configure-mdt-settings.md b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-mdt/configure-mdt-settings.md
index c4bbe93743..8c0ba8179d 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-mdt/configure-mdt-settings.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-mdt/configure-mdt-settings.md
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
---
title: Configure MDT settings (Windows 10)
-description: One of the most powerful features in Microsoft Deployment Toolkit (MDT) is its extension capabilities; there is virtually no limitation to what you can do in terms of customization.
+description: One of the most powerful features in Microsoft Deployment Toolkit (MDT) is its extension capabilities; there's virtually no limitation to what you can do in terms of customization.
+ms.assetid: d3e1280c-3d1b-4fad-8ac4-b65dc711f122
ms.reviewer:
manager: dougeby
ms.author: aaroncz
@@ -12,8 +13,8 @@ ms.topic: article
# Configure MDT settings
-One of the most powerful features in Microsoft Deployment Toolkit (MDT) is its extension capabilities; there is virtually no limitation to what you can do in terms of customization. In this topic, you learn about configuring customizations for your environment.
-For the purposes of this topic, we will use four machines: DC01, MDT01, HV01, and PC0001. DC01 is a domain controller, MDT01 is a Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard server, and PC0001 is a Windows 10 Enterprise x64 client used for the MDT simulation environment. OR01 has Microsoft System Center 2012 R2 Orchestrator installed. MDT01, OR01, and PC0001 are members of the domain contoso.com for the fictitious Contoso Corporation. For more details on the setup for this topic, please see [Deploy Windows 10 with the Microsoft Deployment Toolkit](./prepare-for-windows-deployment-with-mdt.md).
+One of the most powerful features in Microsoft Deployment Toolkit (MDT) is its extension capabilities; there's virtually no limitation to what you can do in terms of customization. In this topic, you learn about configuring customizations for your environment.
+For the purposes of this topic, we'll use four machines: DC01, MDT01, HV01, and PC0001. DC01 is a domain controller, MDT01 is a Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard server, and PC0001 is a Windows 10 Enterprise x64 client used for the MDT simulation environment. OR01 has Microsoft System Center 2012 R2 Orchestrator installed. MDT01, OR01, and PC0001 are members of the domain contoso.com for the fictitious Contoso Corporation. For more information on the setup for this topic, see [Deploy Windows 10 with the Microsoft Deployment Toolkit](./prepare-for-windows-deployment-with-mdt.md).

diff --git a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-mdt/create-a-windows-10-reference-image.md b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-mdt/create-a-windows-10-reference-image.md
index e9d1c48603..1f482f177d 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-mdt/create-a-windows-10-reference-image.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-mdt/create-a-windows-10-reference-image.md
@@ -15,12 +15,12 @@ ms.topic: article
**Applies to**
- Windows 10
-Creating a reference image is important because that image serves as the foundation for the devices in your organization. In this topic, you will learn how to create a Windows 10 reference image using the Microsoft Deployment Toolkit (MDT). You will create a deployment share, configure rules and settings, and import all the applications and operating system files required to build a Windows 10 reference image. After completing the steps outlined in this topic, you will have a Windows 10 reference image that can be used in your deployment solution.
+Creating a reference image is important because that image serves as the foundation for the devices in your organization. In this topic, you 'll learn how to create a Windows 10 reference image using the Microsoft Deployment Toolkit (MDT). You 'll create a deployment share, configure rules and settings, and import all the applications and operating system files required to build a Windows 10 reference image. After completing the steps outlined in this topic, you 'll have a Windows 10 reference image that can be used in your deployment solution.
>[!NOTE]
->See [Prepare for deployment with MDT](prepare-for-windows-deployment-with-mdt.md) for more information about the server, client, and network infrastructure used in this guide.
+>For more information about the server, client, and network infrastructure used in this guide, see [Prepare for deployment with MDT](prepare-for-windows-deployment-with-mdt.md).
-For the purposes of this topic, we will use three computers: DC01, MDT01, and HV01.
+For the purposes of this topic, we'll use three computers: DC01, MDT01, and HV01.
- DC01 is a domain controller for the contoso.com domain.
- MDT01 is a contoso.com domain member server.
- HV01 is a Hyper-V server that will be used to build the reference image.
@@ -31,22 +31,22 @@ For the purposes of this topic, we will use three computers: DC01, MDT01, and HV
## The reference image
-The reference image described in this guide is designed primarily for deployment to physical devices. However, the reference image is typically created on a virtual platform, before being automatically run through the System Preparation (Sysprep) tool process and captured to a Windows Imaging (WIM) file. The reasons for creating the reference image on a virtual platform are the following:
+The reference image described in this guide is designed primarily for deployment to physical devices. However, the reference image is typically created on a virtual platform, before being automatically run through the System Preparation (Sysprep) tool process and captured to a Windows Imaging (WIM) file. The reasons for creating the reference image on a virtual platform are:
- To reduce development time and can use snapshots to test different configurations quickly.
-- To rule out hardware issues. You simply get the best possible image, and if you have a problem, it's not likely to be hardware related.
-- To ensures that you won't have unwanted applications that could be installed as part of a driver install but not removed by the Sysprep process.
+- To rule out hardware issues. You get the best possible image, and if you've a problem, it's not likely to be hardware related.
+- To ensure that you won't have unwanted applications that could be installed as part of a driver install but not removed by the Sysprep process.
- The image is easy to move between lab, test, and production.
## Set up the MDT build lab deployment share
-With Windows 10, there is no hard requirement to create reference images. However, to reduce the time needed for deployment, you might want to create a reference image that contains a few base applications as well as all of the latest updates. This section will show you how to create and configure the MDT Build Lab deployment share to create a Windows 10 reference image. Because reference images will be deployed only to virtual machines during the creation process and have specific settings (rules), you should always create a separate deployment share specifically for this process.
+With Windows 10, there's no hard requirement to create reference images. However, to reduce the time needed for deployment, you might want to create a reference image that contains a few base applications and all of the latest updates. This section will show you how to create and configure the MDT Build Lab deployment share to create a Windows 10 reference image. Because reference images will be deployed only to virtual machines during the creation process and have specific settings (rules), you should always create a separate deployment share specifically for this process.
### Create the MDT build lab deployment share
On **MDT01**:
- Sign in as contoso\\administrator using a password of pass@word1 (credentials from the [prepare for deployment](prepare-for-windows-deployment-with-mdt.md) topic).
-- Start the MDT deployment workbench, and pin this to the taskbar for easy access.
+- Start the MDT deployment workbench, and pin this workbench to the taskbar for easy access.
- Using the Deployment Workbench, right-click **Deployment Shares** and select **New Deployment Share**.
- Use the following settings for the New Deployment Share Wizard:
- Deployment share path: **D:\\MDTBuildLab**
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ In order to read files in the deployment share and write the reference image bac
On **MDT01**:
-1. Ensure you are signed in as **contoso\\administrator**.
+1. Ensure you're signed in as **contoso\\administrator**.
2. Modify the NTFS permissions for the **D:\\MDTBuildLab** folder by running the following command in an elevated Windows PowerShell prompt:
``` powershell
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ This section will show you how to populate the MDT deployment share with the Win
### Add the Windows 10 installation files
-MDT supports adding both full source Windows 10 DVDs (ISOs) and custom images that you have created. In this case, you create a reference image, so you add the full source setup files from Microsoft.
+MDT supports adding both full source Windows 10 DVDs (ISOs) and custom images that you've created. In this case, you create a reference image, so you add the full source setup files from Microsoft.
>[!NOTE]
>Due to the Windows limits on path length, we are purposely keeping the operating system destination directory short, using the folder name W10EX64RTM rather than a more descriptive name like Windows 10 Enterprise x64 RTM.
@@ -129,9 +129,9 @@ The steps in this section use a strict naming standard for your MDT applications
Using a script naming standard is always recommended when using MDT as it helps maintain order and consistency.
-By storing configuration items as MDT applications, it is easy to move these objects between various solutions, or between test and production environments.
+By storing configuration items as MDT applications, it's easy to move these objects between various solutions, or between test and production environments.
-In example sections, you will add the following applications:
+In example sections, you 'll add the following applications:
- Install - Microsoft Office 365 Pro Plus - x64
- Install - Microsoft Visual C++ Redistributable 2019 - x86
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ Download links:
Download all three items in this list to the D:\\Downloads folder on MDT01.
-**Note**: For the purposes of this lab, we will leave the MSVC files in the D:\\Downloads folder and the Office365 files will be extracted to a child folder. If you prefer, you can place each application in its own separate child folder and then modify the $ApplicationSourcePath below as needed (instead of just D:\\Downloads).
+**Note**: For the purposes of this lab, we'll leave the MSVC files in the D:\\Downloads folder and the Office365 files will be extracted to a child folder. If you prefer, you can place each application in its own separate child folder and then modify the $ApplicationSourcePath below as needed (instead of just D:\\Downloads).
>[!NOTE]
>All the Microsoft Visual C++ downloads can be found on [The latest supported Visual C++ downloads](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkId=619523). Visual C++ 2015, 2017 and 2019 all share the same redistributable files.
@@ -157,7 +157,9 @@ Download all three items in this list to the D:\\Downloads folder on MDT01.
2. Using a text editor (such as Notepad), create an XML file in the D:\\Downloads\\Office365 directory with the installation settings for Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise that are appropriate for your organization. The file uses an XML format, so the file you create must have an extension of .xml but the file can have any filename.
For example, you can use the following configuration.xml file, which provides these configuration settings:
- - Install the 64-bit version of Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise in English directly from the Office Content Delivery Network (CDN) on the internet. Note: 64-bit is now the default and recommended edition.
+ - Install the 64-bit version of Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise in English directly from the Office Content Delivery Network (CDN) on the internet.
+ > [!NOTE]
+ > 64-bit is now the default and recommended edition.
- Use the General Availability Channel and get updates directly from the Office CDN on the internet.
- Perform a silent installation. You won’t see anything that shows the progress of the installation and you won’t see any error messages.
@@ -173,27 +175,27 @@ Download all three items in this list to the D:\\Downloads folder on MDT01.
```
- By using these settings, any time you build the reference image you’ll be installing the most up-to-date General Availability Channel version of Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise.
+ When you use these settings, any time you build the reference image you’ll be installing the most up-to-date General Availability Channel version of Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise.
>[!TIP]
>You can also use the web-based interface of the [Office Customization Tool](https://config.office.com/) to help you create your configuration.xml file.
- Also see [Configuration options for the Office Deployment Tool](/deployoffice/configuration-options-for-the-office-2016-deployment-tool) and [Overview of the Office Deployment Tool](/DeployOffice/overview-of-the-office-2016-deployment-tool) for more information.
+ For more information, see [Configuration options for the Office Deployment Tool](/deployoffice/configuration-options-for-the-office-2016-deployment-tool) and [Overview of the Office Deployment Tool](/DeployOffice/overview-of-the-office-2016-deployment-tool).
3. Ensure the configuration.xml file is in the D:\\Downloads\\Office365 folder. See the following example of the extracted files plus the configuration.xml file in the Downloads\\Office365 folder:

- Assuming you have named the file "configuration.xml" as shown above, we will use the command "**setup.exe /configure configuration.xml**" when we create the application in MDT. This will perform the installation of Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise using the configuration settings in the configuration.xml file. Do not perform this step yet.
+ Assuming you've named the file "configuration.xml" as shown above, we'll use the command "**setup.exe /configure configuration.xml**" when we create the application in MDT. This command execution will perform the installation of Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise using the configuration settings in the configuration.xml file. Don't perform this step yet.
>[!IMPORTANT]
- >After Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise is installed on the reference image, do NOT open any Office programs. if you open an Office program, you are prompted to sign-in, which activates the installation of Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise. Even if you don't sign in and you close the Sign in to set up Office dialog box, a temporary product key is installed. You don't want any kind of product key for Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise installed as part of your reference image.
+ >After Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise is installed on the reference image, do NOT open any Office programs. if you open an Office program, you're prompted to sign-in, which activates the installation of Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise. Even if you don't sign in and you close the Sign in to set up Office dialog box, a temporary product key is installed. You don't want any kind of product key for Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise installed as part of your reference image.
Additional information
-- Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise is usually updated on a monthly basis with security updates and other quality updates (bug fixes), and possibly new features (depending on which update channel you’re using). That means that once you’ve deployed your reference image, Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise will most likely need to download and install the latest updates that have been released since you created your reference image.
+- Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise is updated on a monthly basis with security updates and other quality updates (bug fixes), and possibly new features (depending on which update channel you’re using). That means that once you’ve deployed your reference image, Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise will most likely need to download and install the latest updates that have been released since you created your reference image.
-- **Note**: By using installing Office Deployment Tool as part of the reference image, Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise is installed immediately after the reference image is deployed to the user’s device, rather than including Office apps part of the reference image. This way the user will have the most up-to-date version of Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise right away and won’t have to download any new updates (which is most likely what would happen if Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise was installed as part of the reference image.)
- - When you are creating your reference image, instead of installing Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise directly from the Office CDN on the internet, you can install Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise from a location on your local network, such as a file share. To do that, you would use the Office Deployment Tool in /download mode to download the installation files to that file share. Then you could use the Office Deployment Tool in /configure mode to install Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise from that location on to your reference image. As part of that, you’ll need to point to that location in your configuration.xml file so that the Office Deployment Tool knows where to get the Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise files. If you decide to do this, the next time you create a new reference image, you’ll want to be sure to use the Office Deployment Tool to download the most up-to-date installation files for Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise to that location on your internal network. That way your new reference image will have a more up-to-date installation of Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise.
+- **Note**: With the installing Office Deployment Tool being used as part of the reference image, Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise is installed immediately after the reference image is deployed to the user’s device, rather than including Office apps part of the reference image. This way the user will have the most up-to-date version of Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise right away and won’t have to download any new updates (which is most likely what would happen if Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise was installed as part of the reference image.)
+ - When you're creating your reference image, instead of installing Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise directly from the Office CDN on the internet, you can install Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise from a location on your local network, such as a file share. To do that, you would use the Office Deployment Tool in /download mode to download the installation files to that file share. Then you could use the Office Deployment Tool in /configure mode to install Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise from that location on to your reference image. As part of that process, you’ll need to point to that location in your configuration.xml file so that the Office Deployment Tool knows where to get the Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise files. If you decide to do this step, the next time you create a new reference image, you’ll want to be sure to use the Office Deployment Tool to download the most up-to-date installation files for Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise to that location on your internal network. That way your new reference image will have a more up-to-date installation of Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise.
### Connect to the deployment share using Windows PowerShell
@@ -201,7 +203,7 @@ If you need to add many applications, you can take advantage of the PowerShell s
On **MDT01**:
-1. Ensure you are signed in as **contoso\\Administrator**.
+1. Ensure you're signed in as **contoso\\Administrator**.
2. Import the snap-in and create the PSDrive by running the following commands in an elevated PowerShell prompt:
``` powershell
@@ -213,11 +215,11 @@ On **MDT01**:
### Create the install: Microsoft Office 365 Pro Plus - x64
-In these steps we assume that you have downloaded the Office Deployment Tool. You might need to modify the path to the source folder to reflect your current environment. In this example, the source path is set to D:\\Downloads\\Office365.
+In these steps, we assume that you've downloaded the Office Deployment Tool. You might need to modify the path to the source folder to reflect your current environment. In this example, the source path is set to D:\\Downloads\\Office365.
On **MDT01**:
-1. Ensure you are signed on as **contoso\\Administrator**.
+1. Ensure you're signed on as **contoso\\Administrator**.
2. Create the application by running the following commands in an elevated PowerShell prompt:
``` powershell
@@ -227,7 +229,7 @@ On **MDT01**:
Import-MDTApplication -Path "DS001:\Applications\Microsoft" -Enable "True" -Name $ApplicationName -ShortName $ApplicationName -CommandLine $CommandLine -WorkingDirectory ".\Applications\$ApplicationName" -ApplicationSourcePath $ApplicationSourcePath -DestinationFolder $ApplicationName -Verbose
```
- Upon successful installation the following text is displayed:
+ Upon successful installation, the following text is displayed:
```
VERBOSE: Performing the operation "import" on target "Application".
VERBOSE: Beginning application import
@@ -246,11 +248,11 @@ On **MDT01**:
>[!NOTE]
>We have abbreviated "Microsoft Visual C++ Redistributable" in the $ApplicationName below as "MSVC" to avoid the path name exceeding the maxiumum allowed length of 248 characters.
-In these steps we assume that you have downloaded Microsoft Visual C++ Redistributable 2019 - x86. You might need to modify the path to the source folder to reflect your current environment. In this example, the source path is set to D:\\Downloads.
+In these steps, we assume that you've downloaded Microsoft Visual C++ Redistributable 2019 - x86. You might need to modify the path to the source folder to reflect your current environment. In this example, the source path is set to D:\\Downloads.
On **MDT01**:
-1. Ensure you are signed on as **contoso\\Administrator**.
+1. Ensure you're signed on as **contoso\\Administrator**.
2. Create the application by running the following commands in an elevated PowerShell prompt:
``` powershell
@@ -260,7 +262,7 @@ On **MDT01**:
Import-MDTApplication -Path "DS001:\Applications\Microsoft" -Enable "True" -Name $ApplicationName -ShortName $ApplicationName -CommandLine $CommandLine -WorkingDirectory ".\Applications\$ApplicationName" -ApplicationSourcePath $ApplicationSourcePath -DestinationFolder $ApplicationName -Verbose
```
- Upon successful installation the following text is displayed:
+ Upon successful installation, the following text is displayed:
```
VERBOSE: Performing the operation "import" on target "Application".
VERBOSE: Beginning application import
@@ -275,11 +277,11 @@ On **MDT01**:
### Create the install: Microsoft Visual C++ Redistributable 2019 - x64
-In these steps we assume that you have downloaded Microsoft Visual C++ Redistributable 2019 - x64. You might need to modify the path to the source folder to reflect your current environment. In this example, the source path is set to D:\\Downloads.
+In these steps, we assume that you've downloaded Microsoft Visual C++ Redistributable 2019 - x64. You might need to modify the path to the source folder to reflect your current environment. In this example, the source path is set to D:\\Downloads.
On **MDT01**:
-1. Ensure you are signed on as **contoso\\Administrator**.
+1. Ensure you're signed on as **contoso\\Administrator**.
2. Create the application by running the following commands in an elevated PowerShell prompt:
``` powershell
@@ -291,8 +293,8 @@ On **MDT01**:
## Create the reference image task sequence
-In order to build and capture your Windows 10 reference image for deployment using MDT, you will create a task sequence. The task sequence will reference the operating system and applications that you previously imported into the MDT Build Lab deployment share to build a Windows 10 reference image.
-After creating the task sequence, you configure it to enable patching against the Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) server. The Task Sequence Windows Update action supports getting updates directly from Microsoft Update, but you get more stable patching if you use a local WSUS server. WSUS also allows for an easy process of approving the patches that you are deploying.
+In order to build and capture your Windows 10 reference image for deployment using MDT, you 'll create a task sequence. The task sequence will reference the operating system and applications that you previously imported into the MDT Build Lab deployment share to build a Windows 10 reference image.
+After creating the task sequence, you configure it to enable patching against the Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) server. The Task Sequence Windows Update action supports getting updates directly from Microsoft Update, but you get more stable patching if you use a local WSUS server. WSUS also allows for an easy process of approving the patches that you're deploying.
### Drivers and the reference image
@@ -304,18 +306,18 @@ To create a Windows 10 reference image task sequence, the process is as follows
On **MDT01**:
-1. Using the Deployment Workbench, under **Deployment Shares > MDT Build Lab** right-click **Task Sequences**, and create a **New Folder** named **Windows 10**.
+1. When you're using the Deployment Workbench, under **Deployment Shares > MDT Build Lab** right-click **Task Sequences**, and create a **New Folder** named **Windows 10**.
2. Right-click the new **Windows 10** folder and select **New Task Sequence**. Use the following settings for the New Task Sequence Wizard:
1. Task sequence ID: REFW10X64-001
2. Task sequence name: Windows 10 Enterprise x64 RTM Default Image
3. Task sequence comments: Reference Build
4. Template: Standard Client Task Sequence
5. Select OS: Windows 10 Enterprise x64 RTM Default Image
- 6. Specify Product Key: Do not specify a product key at this time
+ 6. Specify Product Key: Don't specify a product key at this time
7. Full Name: Contoso
8. Organization: Contoso
9. Internet Explorer home page: http://www.contoso.com
- 10. Admin Password: Do not specify an Administrator Password at this time
+ 10. Admin Password: Don't specify an Administrator Password at this time
### Edit the Windows 10 task sequence
@@ -338,7 +340,7 @@ On **MDT01**:
3. Select the roles and features that should be installed: .NET Framework 3.5 (includes .NET 2.0 and 3.0)
>[!IMPORTANT]
- >This is probably the most important step when creating a reference image. Many applications need the .NET Framework, and we strongly recommend having it available in the image. The one thing that makes this different from other components is that .NET Framework 3.5.1 is not included in the WIM file. It is installed from the **Sources\\SxS** folder on the media, and that makes it more difficult to add after the image has been deployed.
+ >This is probably the most important step when creating a reference image. Many applications need the .NET Framework, and we strongly recommend having it available in the image. The one thing that makes this different from other components is that .NET Framework 3.5.1 is not included in the WIM file. It's installed from the **Sources\\SxS** folder on the media, and that makes it more difficult to add after the image has been deployed.

@@ -355,7 +357,7 @@ On **MDT01**:
### Optional configuration: Add a suspend action
-The goal when creating a reference image is of course to automate everything. But sometimes you have a special configuration or application setup that is too time-consuming to automate. If you need to do some manual configuration, you can add a little-known feature called Lite Touch Installation (LTI) Suspend. If you add the LTISuspend.wsf script as a custom action in the task sequence, it will suspend the task sequence until you click the Resume Task Sequence shortcut icon on the desktop. In addition to using the LTI Suspend feature for manual configuration or installation, you can also use it simply for verifying a reference image before you allow the task sequence to continue and use Sysprep and capture the virtual machine.
+The goal when creating a reference image is to automate everything. But sometimes you've a special configuration or application setup that is too time-consuming to automate. If you need to do some manual configuration, you can add a little-known feature called Lite Touch Installation (LTI) Suspend. If you add the LTISuspend.wsf script as a custom action in the task sequence, it will suspend the task sequence until you click the Resume Task Sequence shortcut icon on the desktop. In addition to using the LTI Suspend feature for manual configuration or installation, you can also use it simply for verifying a reference image before you allow the task sequence to continue and use Sysprep and capture the virtual machine.

@@ -367,20 +369,20 @@ The goal when creating a reference image is of course to automate everything. Bu
### Edit the Unattend.xml file for Windows 10 Enterprise
-When using MDT, you don't need to edit the Unattend.xml file very often because most configurations are taken care of by MDT. However if, for example, you want to configure Internet Explorer behavior, then you can edit the Unattend.xml for this. Editing the Unattend.xml for basic Internet Explorer settings is easy, but for more advanced settings, you will want to use the Internet Explorer Administration Kit (IEAK).
+When using MDT, you don't need to edit the Unattend.xml file often because most configurations are taken care of by MDT. However if, for example, you want to configure Internet Explorer behavior, then you can edit the Unattend.xml. Editing the Unattend.xml for basic Internet Explorer settings is easy, but for more advanced settings, you 'll want to use the Internet Explorer Administration Kit (IEAK).
>[!WARNING]
->Do not use **SkipMachineOOBE** or **SkipUserOOBE** in your Unattend.xml file. These settings are deprecated and can have unintended effects if used.
+>Don't use **SkipMachineOOBE** or **SkipUserOOBE** in your Unattend.xml file. These settings are deprecated and can have unintended effects if used.
>[!NOTE]
->You also can use the Unattend.xml to enable components in Windows 10, like the Telnet Client or Hyper-V client. Normally we prefer to do this via the **Install Roles and Features** action, or using Deployment Image Servicing and Management (DISM) command-line tools, because then we can add that as an application, being dynamic, having conditions, and so forth. Also, if you are adding packages via Unattend.xml, it is version specific, so Unattend.xml must match the exact version of the operating system you are servicing.
+>You also can use the Unattend.xml to enable components in Windows 10, like the Telnet Client or Hyper-V client. Normally we prefer to do this via the **Install Roles and Features** action, or using Deployment Image Servicing and Management (DISM) command-line tools, because then we can add that as an application, being dynamic, having conditions, and so forth. Also, if you're adding packages via Unattend.xml, it's version specific, so Unattend.xml must match the exact version of the operating system you're servicing.
Follow these steps to configure Internet Explorer settings in Unattend.xml for the Windows 10 Enterprise x64 RTM Default Image task sequence:
On **MDT01**:
-1. Using the Deployment Workbench, under **Deployment Shares > MDT Build Lab > Task Sequences** right-click the **Windows 10 Enterprise x64 RTM Default Image** task sequence and select **Properties**.
-2. In the **OS Info** tab, click **Edit Unattend.xml**. MDT now generates a catalog file. This will take a few minutes, and then Windows System Image Manager (Windows SIM) will start.
+1. When you're using the Deployment Workbench, under **Deployment Shares > MDT Build Lab > Task Sequences** right-click the **Windows 10 Enterprise x64 RTM Default Image** task sequence and select **Properties**.
+2. In the **OS Info** tab, click **Edit Unattend.xml**. MDT now generates a catalog file. This file generation process will take a few minutes, and then Windows System Image Manager (Windows SIM) will start.
> [!IMPORTANT]
> The ADK version 1903 has a [known issue](/windows-hardware/get-started/what-s-new-in-kits-and-tools#whats-new-in-the-windows-adk-for-windows-10-version-1903) generating a catalog file for Windows 10, version 1903 or 1909 X64 install.wim. You might see the error "Could not load file or assembly" in in the console output. To avoid this issue, [install the ADK, version 2004 or a later version](/windows-hardware/get-started/adk-install). A workaround is also available for the ADK version 1903:
@@ -393,7 +395,8 @@ On **MDT01**:
4. In the **amd64\_Microsoft-Windows-IE-InternetExplorer\_neutral properties** window (right-hand window), set the following values:
- DisableDevTools: true
5. Save the Unattend.xml file, and close Windows SIM.
- - Note: If errors are reported that certain display values are incorrect, you can ignore this or browse to **7oobeSystem\\amd64_Microsoft-Windows-Shell-Setup__neutral\\Display** and enter the following: ColorDepth 32, HorizontalResolution 1, RefreshRate 60, VerticalResolution 1.
+ > [!NOTE]
+ > If errors are reported that certain display values are incorrect, you can ignore this message or browse to **7oobeSystem\\amd64_Microsoft-Windows-Shell-Setup__neutral\\Display** and enter the following: ColorDepth 32, HorizontalResolution 1, RefreshRate 60, VerticalResolution 1.
6. On the Windows 10 Enterprise x64 RTM Default Image Properties, click **OK**.

@@ -413,7 +416,7 @@ To configure the rules for the MDT Build Lab deployment share:
On **MDT01**:
1. Using the Deployment Workbench, right-click the **MDT Build Lab** deployment share and select **Properties**.
-2. Select the **Rules** tab and replace the existing content with the following information (edit the settings as needed to match your deployment). For example, If you do not have a WSUS server in your environment, delete the **WSUSServer** line from the configuration:
+2. Select the **Rules** tab and replace the existing content with the following information (edit the settings as needed to match your deployment). For example, If you don't have a WSUS server in your environment, delete the **WSUSServer** line from the configuration:
```
[Settings]
@@ -469,7 +472,7 @@ On **MDT01**:
```
>[!NOTE]
- >For security reasons, you normally don't add the password to the Bootstrap.ini file; however, because this deployment share is for creating reference image builds only, and should not be published to the production network, it is acceptable to do so in this situation. Obviously if you are not using the same password (pass@word3) that is provided in this lab, you must enter your own custom password on the Rules tab and in Bootstrap.ini.
+ >For security reasons, you normally don't add the password to the Bootstrap.ini file; however, because this deployment share is for creating reference image builds only, and should not be published to the production network, it's acceptable to do so in this situation. Obviously if you're not using the same password (pass@word3) that is provided in this lab, you must enter your own custom password on the Rules tab and in Bootstrap.ini.
4. On the **Windows PE** tab, in the **Platform** drop-down list, select **x86**.
5. In the **Lite Touch Boot Image Settings** area, configure the following settings:
@@ -486,7 +489,7 @@ On **MDT01**:
### Update the deployment share
-After the deployment share has been configured, it needs to be updated. This is the process when the Windows PE boot images are created.
+After the deployment share has been configured, it needs to be updated. This update-process is the one when the Windows PE boot images are created.
1. In the Deployment Workbench, right-click the **MDT Build Lab** deployment share and select **Update Deployment Share**.
2. Use the default options for the Update Deployment Share Wizard.
@@ -496,9 +499,9 @@ After the deployment share has been configured, it needs to be updated. This is
### The rules explained
-Now that the MDT Build Lab deployment share (the share used to create the reference images) has been configured, it is time to explain the various settings used in the Bootstrap.ini and CustomSettings.ini files.
+Now that the MDT Build Lab deployment share (the share used to create the reference images) has been configured, it's time to explain the various settings used in the Bootstrap.ini and CustomSettings.ini files.
-The Bootstrap.ini and CustomSettings.ini files work together. The Bootstrap.ini file is always present on the boot image and is read first. The basic purpose for Bootstrap.ini is to provide just enough information for MDT to find the CustomSettings.ini.
+The Bootstrap.ini and CustomSettings.ini files work together. The Bootstrap.ini file is always present on the boot image and is read first. The basic purpose for Bootstrap.ini is to provide enough information for MDT to find the CustomSettings.ini.
The CustomSettings.ini file is normally stored on the server, in the Deployment share\\Control folder, but also can be stored on the media (when using offline media).
@@ -521,14 +524,14 @@ SkipBDDWelcome=YES
```
So, what are these settings?
-- **Priority.** This determines the order in which different sections are read. This Bootstrap.ini has only one section, named \[Default\].
-- **DeployRoot.** This is the location of the deployment share. Normally, this value is set by MDT, but you need to update the DeployRoot value if you move to another server or other share. If you don't specify a value, the Windows Deployment Wizard prompts you for a location.
-- **UserDomain, UserID, and UserPassword.** These values are used for automatic log on to the deployment share. Again, if they are not specified, the wizard prompts you.
+- **Priority.** This setting determines the order in which different sections are read. This Bootstrap.ini has only one section, named \[Default\].
+- **DeployRoot.** This location is of the deployment share. Normally, this value is set by MDT, but you need to update the DeployRoot value if you move to another server or other share. If you don't specify a value, the Windows Deployment Wizard prompts you for a location.
+- **UserDomain, UserID, and UserPassword.** These values are used for automatic sign in to the deployment share. Again, if they aren't specified, the wizard prompts you.
>[!WARNING]
>Caution is advised. These values are stored in clear text on the boot image. Use them only for the MDT Build Lab deployment share and not for the MDT Production deployment share that you learn to create in the next topic.
-- **SkipBDDWelcome.** Even if it is nice to be welcomed every time we start a deployment, we prefer to skip the initial welcome page of the Windows Deployment Wizard.
+- **SkipBDDWelcome.** Even if it's nice to be welcomed every time we start a deployment, we prefer to skip the initial welcome page of the Windows Deployment Wizard.
>[!NOTE]
>All properties beginning with "Skip" control only whether to display that pane in the Windows Deployment Wizard. Most of the panes also require you to actually set one or more values.
@@ -569,20 +572,20 @@ SkipRoles=YES
SkipCapture=NO
SkipFinalSummary=YES
```
-- **Priority.** Has the same function as in Bootstrap.ini. Priority determines the order in which different sections are read. This CustomSettings.ini has only one section, named \[Default\]. In general, if you have multiple sections that set the same value, the value from the first section (higher priority) wins. The rare exceptions are listed in the ZTIGather.xml file.
+- **Priority.** Has the same function as in Bootstrap.ini. Priority determines the order in which different sections are read. This CustomSettings.ini has only one section, named \[Default\]. In general, if you've multiple sections that set the same value, the value from the first section (higher priority) wins. The rare exceptions are listed in the ZTIGather.xml file.
- **\_SMSTSORGNAME.** The organization name displayed in the task sequence progress bar window during deployment.
-- **UserDataLocation.** Controls the settings for user state backup. You do not need to use when building and capturing a reference image.
+- **UserDataLocation.** Controls the settings for user state backup. You don't need to use when building and capturing a reference image.
- **DoCapture.** Configures the task sequence to run the System Preparation (Sysprep) tool and capture the image to a file when the operating system is installed.
-- **OSInstall.** Must be set to Y or YES (the code actually just looks for the Y character) for the setup to proceed.
+- **OSInstall.** Must be set to Y or YES (the code just looks for the Y character) for the setup to proceed.
- **AdminPassword.** Sets the local Administrator account password.
- **TimeZoneName.** Establishes the time zone to use. Don't confuse this value with TimeZone, which is only for legacy operating systems (Windows 7 and Windows Server 2003).
**Note**: The easiest way to find the current time zone name on a Windows 10 machine is to run tzutil /g in a command prompt. You can also run tzutil /l to get a listing of all available time zone names.
- **JoinWorkgroup.** Configures Windows to join a workgroup.
-- **HideShell.** Hides the Windows Shell during deployment. This is especially useful for Windows 10 deployments in which the deployment wizard will otherwise appear behind the tiles.
+- **HideShell.** Hides the Windows Shell during deployment. This hide-operation is especially useful for Windows 10 deployments in which the deployment wizard will otherwise appear behind the tiles.
- **FinishAction.** Instructs MDT what to do when the task sequence is complete.
-- **DoNotCreateExtraPartition.** Configures the task sequence not to create the extra partition for BitLocker. There is no need to do this for your reference image.
+- **DoNotCreateExtraPartition.** Configures the task sequence not to create the extra partition for BitLocker. There's no need to do this configuration for your reference image.
- **WSUSServer.** Specifies which Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) server (and port, if needed) to use during the deployment. Without this option MDT will use Microsoft Update directly, which will increase deployment time and limit your options of controlling which updates are applied.
- **SLSHARE.** Instructs MDT to copy the log files to a server share if something goes wrong during deployment, or when a deployment is successfully completed.
- **ApplyGPOPack.** Allows you to deploy local group policies created by Microsoft Security Compliance Manager (SCM).
@@ -602,9 +605,9 @@ SkipFinalSummary=YES
## Build the Windows 10 reference image
-As previously described, this section requires a Hyper-V host. See [Hyper-V requirements](prepare-for-windows-deployment-with-mdt.md#hyper-v-requirements) for more information.
+As previously described, this section requires a Hyper-V host. For more information, see [Hyper-V requirements](prepare-for-windows-deployment-with-mdt.md#hyper-v-requirements).
-Once you have created your task sequence, you are ready to create the Windows 10 reference image. This will be performed by launching the task sequence from a virtual machine which will then automatically perform the reference image creation and capture process.
+Once you've created your task sequence, you're ready to create the Windows 10 reference image. This image creation will be performed by launching the task sequence from a virtual machine that will then automatically perform the reference image creation and capture process.
The steps below outline the process used to boot a virtual machine using an ISO boot image created by MDT, and then run the reference image task sequence image to create and capture the Windows 10 reference image.
@@ -628,7 +631,7 @@ On **HV01**:
4. Start the REFW10X64-001 virtual machine and connect to it.
- **Note**: Up to this point we have not discussed IP addressing or DHCP. In the initial setup for this guide, DC01 was provisioned as a DHCP server to provide IP address leases to client computers. You might have a different DHCP server on your network that you wish to use. The REFW10X64-001 virtual machine requires an IP address lease that provides it with connectivity to MDT01 so that it can connect to the \\MDT01\MDTBuildLab$ share. In the current scenario this is accomplished with a DHCP scope that provides IP addresses in the 10.10.10.100 - 10.10.10.200 range, as part of a /24 subnet so that the client can connect to MDT01 at 10.10.10.11.
+ **Note**: Up to this point we haven't discussed IP addressing or DHCP. In the initial setup for this guide, DC01 was provisioned as a DHCP server to provide IP address leases to client computers. You might have a different DHCP server on your network that you wish to use. The REFW10X64-001 virtual machine requires an IP address lease that provides it with connectivity to MDT01 so that it can connect to the \\MDT01\MDTBuildLab$ share. In the current scenario, this connectivity is accomplished with a DHCP scope that provides IP addresses in the 10.10.10.100 - 10.10.10.200 range, as part of a /24 subnet so that the client can connect to MDT01 at 10.10.10.11.
After booting into Windows PE, complete the Windows Deployment Wizard with the following settings:
1. Select a task sequence to execute on this computer: Windows 10 Enterprise x64 RTM Default Image
@@ -640,7 +643,7 @@ On **HV01**:
The Windows Deployment Wizard for the Windows 10 reference image.
-5. The setup now starts and does the following:
+5. The setup now starts and does the following steps:
1. Installs the Windows 10 Enterprise operating system.
2. Installs the added applications, roles, and features.
3. Updates the operating system via your local Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) server.
@@ -649,7 +652,7 @@ On **HV01**:
6. Captures the installation to a Windows Imaging (WIM) file.
7. Turns off the virtual machine.
-After some time, you will have a Windows 10 Enterprise x64 image that is fully patched and has run through Sysprep, located in the D:\\MDTBuildLab\\Captures folder on your deployment server. The file name is REFW10X64-001.wim.
+After some time, you 'll have a Windows 10 Enterprise x64 image that is fully patched and has run through Sysprep, located in the D:\\MDTBuildLab\\Captures folder on your deployment server. The file name is REFW10X64-001.wim.

@@ -662,9 +665,9 @@ If you [enabled monitoring](#enable-monitoring), you can check the progress of t

-If there are problems with your task sequence, you can troubleshoot in Windows PE by pressing F8 to open a command prompt. There are several [MDT log files](/configmgr/mdt/troubleshooting-reference#mdt-logs) created that can be helpful determining the origin of an error, such as BDD.log. From the command line in Windows PE you can copy these logs from the client to your MDT server for viewing with CMTrace. For example: copy BDD.log \\\\mdt01\\logs$.
+If there are problems with your task sequence, you can troubleshoot in Windows PE by pressing F8 to open a command prompt. There are several [MDT log files](/configmgr/mdt/troubleshooting-reference#mdt-logs) created that can be helpful determining the origin of an error, such as BDD.log. From the command line in Windows PE, you can copy these logs from the client to your MDT server for viewing with CMTrace. For example: copy BDD.log \\\\mdt01\\logs$.
-After some time, you will have a Windows 10 Enterprise x64 image that is fully patched and has run through Sysprep, located in the D:\\MDTBuildLab\\Captures folder on your deployment server. The file name is REFW10X64-001.wim.
+After some time, you 'll have a Windows 10 Enterprise x64 image that is fully patched and has run through Sysprep, located in the D:\\MDTBuildLab\\Captures folder on your deployment server. The file name is REFW10X64-001.wim.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-mdt/deploy-a-windows-10-image-using-mdt.md b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-mdt/deploy-a-windows-10-image-using-mdt.md
index 25eddbf4ef..90deeb5238 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-mdt/deploy-a-windows-10-image-using-mdt.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-mdt/deploy-a-windows-10-image-using-mdt.md
@@ -15,16 +15,16 @@ ms.topic: article
**Applies to**
- Windows 10
-This topic will show you how to take your reference image for Windows 10 (that was just [created](create-a-windows-10-reference-image.md)), and deploy that image to your environment using the Microsoft Deployment Toolkit (MDT).
+This topic will show you how to take your reference image for Windows 10 (that was [created](create-a-windows-10-reference-image.md)), and deploy that image to your environment using the Microsoft Deployment Toolkit (MDT).
-We will prepare for this by creating an MDT deployment share that is used solely for image deployment. Separating the processes of creating reference images from the processes used to deploy them in production allows greater control of on both processes. We will configure Active Directory permissions, configure the deployment share, create a new task sequence, and add applications, drivers, and rules.
+We'll prepare for this deployment by creating an MDT deployment share that is used solely for image deployment. Separating the processes of creating reference images from the processes used to deploy them in production allows greater control of on both processes. We'll configure Active Directory permissions, configure the deployment share, create a new task sequence, and add applications, drivers, and rules.
-For the purposes of this topic, we will use four computers: DC01, MDT01, HV01 and PC0005.
+For the purposes of this topic, we'll use four computers: DC01, MDT01, HV01 and PC0005.
- DC01 is a domain controller
- MDT01 is a domain member server
- HV01 is a Hyper-V server
-- PC0005 is a blank device to which we will deploy Windows 10
+- PC0005 is a blank device to which we'll deploy Windows 10
MDT01 and PC0005 are members of the domain contoso.com for the fictitious Contoso Corporation. HV01 used to test deployment of PC0005 in a virtual environment.
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ MDT01 and PC0005 are members of the domain contoso.com for the fictitious Contos
## Step 1: Configure Active Directory permissions
-These steps will show you how to configure an Active Directory account with the permissions required to deploy a Windows 10 machine to the domain using MDT. These steps assume you have The account is used for Windows Preinstallation Environment (Windows PE) to connect to MDT01. In order for MDT to join machines into the contoso.com domain you need to create an account and configure permissions in Active Directory.
+These steps will show you how to configure an Active Directory account with the permissions required to deploy a Windows 10 machine to the domain using MDT. These steps assume you've The account is used for Windows Preinstallation Environment (Windows PE) to connect to MDT01. In order for MDT to join machines into the contoso.com domain you need to create an account and configure permissions in Active Directory.
On **DC01**:
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ On **DC01**:
.\Set-OUPermissions.ps1 -Account MDT_JD -TargetOU "OU=Workstations,OU=Computers,OU=Contoso"
```
- The following is a list of the permissions being granted:
+ The following list is of the permissions being granted:
- Scope: This object and all descendant objects
- Create Computer objects
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ On **DC01**:
## Step 2: Set up the MDT production deployment share
-Next, create a new MDT deployment share. You should not use the same deployment share that you used to create the reference image for a production deployment. Perform this procedure on the MDT01 server.
+Next, create a new MDT deployment share. You shouldn't use the same deployment share that you used to create the reference image for a production deployment. Perform this procedure on the MDT01 server.
### Create the MDT production deployment share
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ On **MDT01**:
The steps for creating the deployment share for production are the same as when you created the deployment share for creating the custom reference image:
-1. Ensure you are signed on as: contoso\administrator.
+1. Ensure you're signed on as: contoso\administrator.
2. In the Deployment Workbench console, right-click **Deployment Shares** and select **New Deployment Share**.
3. On the **Path** page, in the **Deployment share path** text box, type **D:\\MDTProduction** and click **Next**.
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ To read files in the deployment share, you need to assign NTFS and SMB permissio
On **MDT01**:
-1. Ensure you are signed in as **contoso\\administrator**.
+1. Ensure you're signed in as **contoso\\administrator**.
2. Modify the NTFS permissions for the **D:\\MDTProduction** folder by running the following command in an elevated Windows PowerShell prompt:
``` powershell
@@ -107,11 +107,11 @@ On **MDT01**:
## Step 3: Add a custom image
-The next step is to add a reference image into the deployment share with the setup files required to successfully deploy Windows 10. When adding a custom image, you still need to copy setup files (an option in the wizard) because Windows 10 stores additional components in the Sources\\SxS folder which is outside the image and may be required when installing components.
+The next step is to add a reference image into the deployment share with the setup files required to successfully deploy Windows 10. When adding a custom image, you still need to copy setup files (an option in the wizard) because Windows 10 stores other components in the Sources\\SxS folder that is outside the image and may be required when installing components.
### Add the Windows 10 Enterprise x64 RTM custom image
-In these steps, we assume that you have completed the steps in the [Create a Windows 10 reference image](create-a-windows-10-reference-image.md) topic, so you have a Windows 10 reference image at **D:\\MDTBuildLab\\Captures\REFW10X64-001.wim** on MDT01.
+In these steps, we assume that you've completed the steps in the [Create a Windows 10 reference image](create-a-windows-10-reference-image.md) topic, so you've a Windows 10 reference image at **D:\\MDTBuildLab\\Captures\REFW10X64-001.wim** on MDT01.
1. Using the Deployment Workbench, expand the **Deployment Shares** node, and then expand **MDT Production**; select the **Operating Systems** node, and create a folder named **Windows 10**.
2. Right-click the **Windows 10** folder and select **Import Operating System**.
@@ -139,8 +139,8 @@ When you configure your MDT Build Lab deployment share, you can also add applica
On **MDT01**:
-1. Download the Enterprise distribution version of [Adobe Acrobat Reader DC](https://get.adobe.com/reader/enterprise/) (AcroRdrDC2200120142_en_US.exe) to **D:\\setup\\adobe** on MDT01.
-2. Extract the .exe file that you downloaded to an .msi (ex: .\AcroRdrDC2200120142_en_US.exe -sfx_o"d:\setup\adobe\install\" -sfx_ne).
+1. Download the Enterprise distribution version of [Adobe Acrobat Reader DC](https://get.adobe.com/reader/enterprise/) (AcroRdrDC2100520060_en_US.exe) to **D:\\setup\\adobe** on MDT01.
+2. Extract the .exe file that you downloaded to a .msi (ex: .\AcroRdrDC2100520060_en_US.exe -sfx_o"d:\setup\adobe\install\" -sfx_ne).
3. In the Deployment Workbench, expand the **MDT Production** node and navigate to the **Applications** node.
4. Right-click the **Applications** node, and create a new folder named **Adobe**.
@@ -175,12 +175,12 @@ For boot images, you need to have storage and network drivers; for the operating
### Create the driver source structure in the file system
-The key to successful management of drivers for MDT, as well as for any other deployment solution, is to have a really good driver repository. From this repository, you import drivers into MDT for deployment, but you should always maintain the repository for future use.
+The key to successful management of drivers for MDT, and for any other deployment solution, is to have a good driver repository. From this repository, you import drivers into MDT for deployment, but you should always maintain the repository for future use.
On **MDT01**:
> [!IMPORTANT]
-> In the steps below, it is critical that the folder names used for various computer makes and models exactly match the results of **wmic computersystem get model,manufacturer** on the target system.
+> In the steps below, it's critical that the folder names used for various computer makes and models exactly match the results of **wmic computersystem get model,manufacturer** on the target system.
1. Using File Explorer, create the **D:\\drivers** folder.
2. In the **D:\\drivers** folder, create the following folder structure:
@@ -198,11 +198,11 @@ On **MDT01**:
- Surface Laptop
> [!NOTE]
-> Even if you are not going to use both x86 and x64 boot images, we still recommend that you add the support structure for future use.
+> Even if you're not going to use both x86 and x64 boot images, we still recommend that you add the support structure for future use.
### Create the logical driver structure in MDT
-When you import drivers to the MDT driver repository, MDT creates a single instance folder structure based on driver class names. However, you can, and should, mimic the driver structure of your driver source repository in the Deployment Workbench. This is done by creating logical folders in the Deployment Workbench.
+When you import drivers to the MDT driver repository, MDT creates a single instance folder structure based on driver class names. However, you can, and should, mimic the driver structure of your driver source repository in the Deployment Workbench. This mimic is done by creating logical folders in the Deployment Workbench.
1. On MDT01, using Deployment Workbench, select the **Out-of-Box Drivers** node.
2. In the **Out-Of-Box Drivers** node, create the following folder structure:
1. WinPE x86
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ On **MDT01**:
### Extract and import drivers for the x64 boot image
-Windows PE supports all the hardware models that we have, but here you learn to add boot image drivers to accommodate any new hardware that might require additional drivers. In this example, you add the latest Intel network drivers to the x64 boot image.
+Windows PE supports all the hardware models that we have, but here you learn to add boot image drivers to accommodate any new hardware that might require more drivers. In this example, you add the latest Intel network drivers to the x64 boot image.
On **MDT01**:
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ For the ThinkStation P500 model, you use the Lenovo ThinkVantage Update Retrieve
To get the updates, download the drivers from the Lenovo ThinkVantage Update Retriever using its export function. You can also download the drivers by searching PC Support on the [Lenovo website](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkId=619543).
-In this example, we assume you have downloaded and extracted the drivers using ThinkVantage Update Retriever to the **D:\\Drivers\\Lenovo\\ThinkStation P500 (30A6003TUS)** directory.
+In this example, we assume you've downloaded and extracted the drivers using ThinkVantage Update Retriever to the **D:\\Drivers\\Lenovo\\ThinkStation P500 (30A6003TUS)** directory.
On **MDT01**:
@@ -292,13 +292,13 @@ On **MDT01**:
**D:\\Drivers\\Windows 10 x64\\Lenovo\\ThinkStation P500 (30A6003TUS)**
- The folder you select and all sub-folders will be checked for drivers, expanding any .cab files that are present and searching for drivers.
+ The folder you select and all subfolders will be checked for drivers, expanding any .cab files that are present and searching for drivers.
### For the Latitude E7450
For the Dell Latitude E7450 model, you use the Dell Driver CAB file, which is accessible via the [Dell TechCenter website](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkId=619544).
-In these steps, we assume you have downloaded and extracted the CAB file for the Latitude E7450 model to the **D:\\Drivers\\Dell Inc.\\Latitude E7450** folder.
+In these steps, we assume you've downloaded and extracted the CAB file for the Latitude E7450 model to the **D:\\Drivers\\Dell Inc.\\Latitude E7450** folder.
On **MDT01**:
@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ On **MDT01**:
For the HP EliteBook 8560w, you use HP Image Assistant to get the drivers. The HP Image Assistant can be accessed on the [HP Support site](https://ftp.ext.hp.com/pub/caps-softpaq/cmit/HPIA.html).
-In these steps, we assume you have downloaded and extracted the drivers for the HP EliteBook 8650w model to the **D:\\Drivers\\Windows 10 x64\\Hewlett-Packard\\HP EliteBook 8560w** folder.
+In these steps, we assume you've downloaded and extracted the drivers for the HP EliteBook 8650w model to the **D:\\Drivers\\Windows 10 x64\\Hewlett-Packard\\HP EliteBook 8560w** folder.
On **MDT01**:
@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ On **MDT01**:
### For the Microsoft Surface Laptop
-For the Microsoft Surface Laptop model, you find the drivers on the Microsoft website. In these steps we assume you have downloaded and extracted the Surface Laptop drivers to the **D:\\Drivers\\Windows 10 x64\\Microsoft\\Surface Laptop** folder.
+For the Microsoft Surface Laptop model, you find the drivers on the Microsoft website. In these steps, we assume you've downloaded and extracted the Surface Laptop drivers to the **D:\\Drivers\\Windows 10 x64\\Microsoft\\Surface Laptop** folder.
On **MDT01**:
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ On **MDT01**:
## Step 6: Create the deployment task sequence
-This section will show you how to create the task sequence used to deploy your production Windows 10 reference image. You will then configure the task sequence to enable patching via a Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) server.
+This section will show you how to create the task sequence used to deploy your production Windows 10 reference image. You'll then configure the task sequence to enable patching via a Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) server.
### Create a task sequence for Windows 10 Enterprise
@@ -350,11 +350,11 @@ On **MDT01**:
- Task sequence comments: Production Image
- Template: Standard Client Task Sequence
- Select OS: Windows 10 Enterprise x64 RTM Custom Image
- - Specify Product Key: Do not specify a product key at this time
+ - Specify Product Key: Don't specify a product key at this time
- Full Name: Contoso
- Organization: Contoso
- Internet Explorer home page: `https://www.contoso.com`
- - Admin Password: Do not specify an Administrator Password at this time
+ - Admin Password: Don't specify an Administrator Password at this time
### Edit the Windows 10 task sequence
@@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ On **MDT01**:
- Install all drivers from the selection profile
> [!NOTE]
- > The configuration above indicates that MDT should only use drivers from the folder specified by the DriverGroup001 property, which is defined by the "Choose a selection profile: Nothing" setting, and that MDT should not use plug and play to determine which drivers to copy, which is defined by the "Install all drivers from the selection profile" setting.
+ > The configuration above indicates that MDT should only use drivers from the folder specified by the DriverGroup001 property, which is defined by the "Choose a selection profile: Nothing" setting, and that MDT shouldn't use plug and play to determine which drivers to copy, which is defined by the "Install all drivers from the selection profile" setting.
3. State Restore. Enable the **Windows Update (Pre-Application Installation)** action.
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ On **MDT01**:
## Step 7: Configure the MDT production deployment share
-In this section, you will learn how to configure the MDT Build Lab deployment share with the rules required to create a simple and dynamic deployment process. This includes configuring commonly used rules and an explanation of how these rules work.
+In this section, you'll learn how to configure the MDT Build Lab deployment share with the rules required to create a dynamic deployment process. This configuration includes commonly used rules and an explanation of how these rules work.
### Configure the rules
@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ On **MDT01**:
> [!NOTE]
>
- > Because you are going to use Pre-Boot Execution Environment (PXE) later to deploy the machines, you do not need the ISO file; however, we recommend creating ISO files because they are useful when troubleshooting deployments and for quick tests.
+ > Because you're going to use Pre-Boot Execution Environment (PXE) later to deploy the machines, you don't need the ISO file; however, we recommend creating ISO files because they're useful when troubleshooting deployments and for quick tests.
6. On the **Drivers and Patches** sub tab, select the **WinPE x86** selection profile and select the **Include all drivers from the selection profile** option.
@@ -488,13 +488,13 @@ On **MDT01**:
### The rules explained
-The rules for the MDT Production deployment share are somewhat different from those for the MDT Build Lab deployment share. The biggest differences are that you deploy the machines into a domain instead of a workgroup.
+The rules for the MDT Production deployment share are different from those rules for the MDT Build Lab deployment share. The biggest differences are that you deploy the machines into a domain instead of a workgroup.
-You can optionally remove the **UserID** and **UserPassword** entries from Bootstrap.ini so that users performing PXE boot are prompted to provide credentials with permission to connect to the deployment share. Setting **SkipBDDWelcome=NO** enables the welcome screen that displays options to run the deployment wizard, run DaRT tools (if installed), exit to a Windows PE command prompt, set the keyboard layout, or configure a static IP address. In this example we are skipping the welcome screen and providing credentials.
+You can optionally remove the **UserID** and **UserPassword** entries from Bootstrap.ini so that users performing PXE boot are prompted to provide credentials with permission to connect to the deployment share. Setting **SkipBDDWelcome=NO** enables the welcome screen that displays options to run the deployment wizard, run DaRT tools (if installed), exit to a Windows PE command prompt, set the keyboard layout, or configure a static IP address. In this example, we're skipping the welcome screen and providing credentials.
### The Bootstrap.ini file
-This is the MDT Production Bootstrap.ini:
+This file is the MDT Production Bootstrap.ini:
```
[Settings]
@@ -510,7 +510,7 @@ SkipBDDWelcome=YES
### The CustomSettings.ini file
-This is the CustomSettings.ini file with the new join domain information:
+This file is the CustomSettings.ini file with the new join domain information:
```
[Settings]
@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ Some properties to use in the MDT Production rules file are as follows:
- **DomainAdminPassword.** The password for the join domain account.
- **MachineObjectOU.** The organizational unit (OU) to which to add the computer account.
- **ScanStateArgs.** Arguments for the User State Migration Tool (USMT) ScanState command.
-- **USMTMigFiles(\*).** List of USMT templates (controlling what to backup and restore).
+- **USMTMigFiles(\*).** List of USMT templates (controlling what to back up and restore).
- **EventService.** Activates logging information to the MDT monitoring web service.
> [!NOTE]
@@ -568,11 +568,11 @@ Some properties to use in the MDT Production rules file are as follows:
### Optional deployment share configuration
-If your organization has a Microsoft Software Assurance agreement, you also can subscribe to the additional Microsoft Desktop Optimization Package (MDOP) license (at an additional cost). Included in MDOP is Microsoft Diagnostics and Recovery Toolkit (DaRT), which contains tools that can help you troubleshoot MDT deployments, as well as troubleshoot Windows itself.
+If your organization has a Microsoft Software Assurance agreement, you also can subscribe to another Microsoft Desktop Optimization Package (MDOP) license (at an extra cost). Included in MDOP is Microsoft Diagnostics and Recovery Toolkit (DaRT), which contains tools that can help you troubleshoot MDT deployments, and troubleshoot Windows itself.
### Add DaRT 10 to the boot images
-If you have licensing for MDOP and DaRT, you can add DaRT to the boot images using the steps in this section. If you do not have DaRT licensing, or don't want to use it, simply skip to the next section, [Update the Deployment Share](#update-the-deployment-share). To enable the remote connection feature in MDT, you need to do the following:
+If you've licensing for MDOP and DaRT, you can add DaRT to the boot images using the steps in this section. If you don't have DaRT licensing, or don't want to use it, skip to the next section, [Update the Deployment Share](#update-the-deployment-share). To enable the remote connection feature in MDT, you need to do the following steps:
> [!NOTE]
@@ -608,7 +608,7 @@ On **MDT01**:
### Update the deployment share
-Like the MDT Build Lab deployment share, the MDT Production deployment share needs to be updated after it has been configured. This is the process during which the Windows PE boot images are created.
+Like the MDT Build Lab deployment share, the MDT Production deployment share needs to be updated after it has been configured. This update-process is the one during which the Windows PE boot images are created.
1. Right-click the **MDT Production** deployment share and select **Update Deployment Share**.
@@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ On **MDT01**:
### Deploy the Windows 10 client
-At this point, you should have a solution ready for deploying the Windows 10 client. We recommend starting by trying a few deployments at a time until you are confident that your configuration works as expected. We find it useful to try some initial tests on virtual machines before testing on physical hardware. This helps rule out hardware issues when testing or troubleshooting. Here are the steps to deploy your Windows 10 image to a virtual machine:
+At this point, you should have a solution ready for deploying the Windows 10 client. We recommend starting by trying a few deployments at a time until you're confident that your configuration works as expected. We find it useful to try some initial tests on virtual machines before testing on physical hardware. These tests help rule out hardware issues when testing or troubleshooting. Here are the steps to deploy your Windows 10 image to a virtual machine:
On **HV01**:
@@ -665,7 +665,7 @@ On **HV01**:
- Computer Name: **PC0005**
- Applications: Select the **Install - Adobe Reader** checkbox.
-4. Setup now begins and does the following:
+4. Setup now begins and does the following steps:
- Installs the Windows 10 Enterprise operating system.
- Installs the added application.
@@ -681,7 +681,7 @@ Following OS installation, Microsoft Office 365 Pro Plus - x64 is installed auto
### Use the MDT monitoring feature
-Since you have enabled the monitoring on the MDT Production deployment share, you can follow your deployment of PC0005 via the monitoring node.
+Since you've enabled the monitoring on the MDT Production deployment share, you can follow your deployment of PC0005 via the monitoring node.
On **MDT01**:
@@ -705,12 +705,11 @@ The Event Viewer showing a successful deployment of PC0005.
## Multicast deployments
-Multicast deployment allows for image deployment with reduced network load during simultaneous deployments. Multicast is a useful operating system deployment feature in MDT deployments, however it is important to ensure that your network supports it and is designed for it. If you have a limited number of simultaneous deployments, you probably do not need to enable multicast.
+Multicast deployment allows for image deployment with reduced network load during simultaneous deployments. Multicast is a useful operating system deployment feature in MDT deployments, however it's important to ensure that your network supports it and is designed for it. If you've a limited number of simultaneous deployments, you probably don't need to enable multicast.
### Requirements
-Multicast requires that Windows Deployment Services (WDS) is running on Windows Server 2008 or later. In addition to the core MDT setup for multicast, the network needs to be configured to support multicast. In general, this means involving the organization networking team to make sure that
-Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) snooping is turned on and that the network is designed for multicast traffic. The multicast solution uses IGMPv3.
+Multicast requires that Windows Deployment Services (WDS) is running on Windows Server 2008 or later. In addition to the core MDT setup for multicast, the network needs to be configured to support multicast. In general, this configuration means involvement of the organization networking team to ensure that Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) snooping is turned on and that the network is designed for multicast traffic. The multicast solution uses IGMPv3.
### Set up MDT for multicast
@@ -729,9 +728,9 @@ On **MDT01**:
## Use offline media to deploy Windows 10
-In addition to network-based deployments, MDT supports the use of offline media-based deployments of Windows 10. You can very easily generate an offline version of your deployment share - either the full deployment share or a subset of it - through the use of selection profiles. The generated offline media can be burned to a DVD or copied to a USB stick for deployment.
+In addition to network-based deployments, MDT supports the use of offline media-based deployments of Windows 10. You can easily generate an offline version of your deployment share - either the full deployment share or a subset of it - by using selection profiles. The generated offline media can be burned to a DVD or copied to a USB stick for deployment.
-Offline media are useful not only when you do not have network connectivity to the deployment share, but also when you have limited connection to the deployment share and do not want to copy 5 GB of data over the wire. Offline media can still join the domain, but you save the transfer of operating system images, drivers, and applications over the wire.
+Offline media are useful not only when you don't have network connectivity to the deployment share, but also when you've limited connection to the deployment share and don't want to copy 5 GB of data over the wire. Offline media can still join the domain, but you save the transfer of operating system images, drivers, and applications over the wire.
### Create the offline media selection profile
@@ -762,7 +761,7 @@ In these steps, you generate offline media from the MDT Production deployment sh
1. On MDT01, using File Explorer, create the **D:\\MDTOfflineMedia** folder.
>[!NOTE]
- >When creating offline media, you need to create the target folder first. It is crucial that you do not create a subfolder inside the deployment share folder because it will break the offline media.
+ >When creating offline media, you need to create the target folder first. It's crucial that you don't create a subfolder inside the deployment share folder because it will break the offline media.
2. In the Deployment Workbench, under the **MDT Production / Advanced Configuration** node, right-click the **Media** node, and select **New Media**.
@@ -798,7 +797,7 @@ On **MDT01**:
### Generate the offline media
-You have now configured the offline media deployment share, however the share has not yet been populated with the files required for deployment. Now everything is ready you populate the deployment share content folder and generate the offline media ISO.
+You've now configured the offline media deployment share, however the share hasn't yet been populated with the files required for deployment. Now everything is ready you populate the deployment share content folder and generate the offline media ISO.
On **MDT01**:
@@ -808,7 +807,7 @@ On **MDT01**:
### Create a bootable USB stick
-The ISO that you got when updating the offline media item can be burned to a DVD and used directly (it will be bootable), but it is often more efficient to use USB sticks instead since they are faster and can hold more data. (A dual-layer DVD is limited to 8.5 GB.)
+The ISO that you got when updating the offline media item can be burned to a DVD and used directly (it will be bootable), but it's often more efficient to use USB sticks instead since they're faster and can hold more data. (A dual-layer DVD is limited to 8.5 GB.)
>[!TIP]
>In this example, the .wim file is 5.5 GB in size. However, bootable USB sticks are formatted with the FAT32 file system which limits file size to 4.0 GB. You can place the image on a different drive (ex: E:\Deploy\Operating Systems\W10EX64RTM\REFW10X64-001.swm) and then modify E:\Deploy\Control\OperatingSystems.xml to point to it. Alternatively to keep using the USB you must split the .wim file, which can be done using DISM:
Dism /Split-Image /ImageFile:D:\MDTOfflinemedia\Content\Deploy\Operating Systems\W10EX64RTM\REFW10X64-001.wim /SWMFile:E:\sources\install.swm /FileSize:3800.
Windows Setup automatically installs from this file, provided you name it install.swm. The file names for the next files include numbers, for example: install2.swm, install3.swm.
To enable split image in MDT, the Settings.xml file in your deployment share (ex: D:\MDTProduction\Control\Settings.xml) must have the **SkipWimSplit** value set to **False**. By default this value is set to True (`
|
| Conditional access policy | After unenrollment, you may safely remove the **Modern Workplace – Secure Workstation** conditional access policy. |
| Microsoft Endpoint Manager roles | After unenrollment, you may safely remove the Modern Workplace Intune Admin role. |
diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-update-management.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-update-management.md
index 04bdc38aae..983a41a940 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-update-management.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-update-management.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
-title: Update management
+title: Software update management
description: This article provides an overview of how updates are handled in Autopatch
-ms.date: 05/30/2022
+ms.date: 08/08/2022
ms.prod: w11
ms.technology: windows
ms.topic: overview
@@ -9,16 +9,16 @@ ms.localizationpriority: medium
author: tiaraquan
ms.author: tiaraquan
manager: dougeby
-msreviewer: hathind
+msreviewer: andredm7
---
-# Update management
+# Software update management
-Keeping your devices up to date is a balance of speed and stability. Windows Autopatch connects all devices to a modern cloud-based infrastructure to manage updates.
+Keeping your devices up to date is a balance of speed and stability. Windows Autopatch connects all devices to a modern cloud-based infrastructure to manage updates on your behalf.
-## Update types
+## Software update workloads
-| Update type | Description |
+| Software update workload | Description |
| ----- | ----- |
| Windows quality update | Windows Autopatch uses four update rings to manage Windows quality updates. For more detailed information, see [Windows quality updates](../operate/windows-autopatch-wqu-overview.md). |
| Windows feature update | Windows Autopatch uses four update rings to manage Windows feature updates. For more detailed information, see [Windows feature updates](windows-autopatch-fu-overview.md).
@@ -27,44 +27,73 @@ Keeping your devices up to date is a balance of speed and stability. Windows Aut
| Microsoft Edge | For more information, see [Microsoft Edge](../operate/windows-autopatch-edge.md). |
| Microsoft Teams | For more information, see [Microsoft Teams](../operate/windows-autopatch-teams.md). |
-## Update rings
+## Windows Autopatch deployment rings
+
+During the [tenant enrollment process](../prepare/windows-autopatch-enroll-tenant.md), Windows Autopatch creates four Azure AD assigned groups that are used to segment devices into its deployment rings:
+
+| Ring | Description |
+| ----- | ----- |
+| **Modern Workplace Devices-Windows Autopatch-Test** | Deployment ring for testing update deployments prior production rollout.|
+| **Modern Workplace Devices-Windows Autopatch-First** | First production deployment ring for early adopters.|
+| **Modern Workplace Devices-Windows Autopatch-Fast** | Fast deployment ring for quick rollout and adoption. |
+| **Modern Workplace Devices-Windows Autopatch-Broad** | Final deployment ring for broad rollout into the organization. |
+
+Each deployment ring has a different set of update deployment policies to control the updates rollout.
+
+> [!IMPORTANT]
+> Windows Autopatch device registration doesn't assign devices to its test deployment ring (**Modern Workplace Devices-Windows Autopatch-Test**). This is intended to prevent devices that are essential to a business from being affected or devices that are used by executives from receiving early software update deployments.
+
+Also, during the [device registration process](../deploy/windows-autopatch-device-registration-overview.md), Windows Autopatch assigns each device being registered to one of its deployment rings so that the service has the proper representation of the device diversity across the organization in each deployment ring. The deployment ring distribution is designed to release software update deployments to as few devices as possible to get the signals needed to make a quality evaluation of a given update deployment.
> [!NOTE]
-> Update rings only apply to Windows quality updates.
+> Windows Autopatch deployment rings only apply to Windows quality updates. Additionally, you can't create additional deployment rings or use your own for devices managed by the Windows Autopatch service.
-During enrollment, Windows Autopatch creates four Azure Active Directory groups that are used to segment devices into update rings:
+### Deployment ring calculation logic
-1. Modern Workplace Devices - Test
-2. Modern Workplace Devices - First
-3. Modern Workplace Devices - Fast
-4. Modern Workplace Devices - Broad
+The Windows Autopatch deployment ring calculation happens during the [device registration process](../deploy/windows-autopatch-device-registration-overview.md) and it works as follows:
-Each of the update rings has a different purpose and assigned a set of policies to control the rollout of updates in each management area.
+- If the Windows Autopatch tenant’s existing managed device size is **≤ 200**, the deployment ring assignment is First **(5%)**, Fast **(15%)**, remaining devices go to the Broad ring **(80%)**.
+- If the Windows Autopatch tenant’s existing managed device size is **>200**, the deployment ring assignment will be First **(1%)**, Fast **(9%)**, remaining devices go to the Broad ring **(90%)**.
-When a device is enrolled into the Windows Autopatch service, the device is assigned to an update ring so that we have the right distributions across your estate. The distribution of each ring is designed to release to as few devices as possible to get the signals needed to make a quality evaluation of a given release.
-> [!NOTE]
-> You can't create additional rings for managed devices and must use the four rings provided by Windows Autopatch.
-
-| Ring | Default device count | Description
+| Deployment ring | Default device balancing percentage | Description |
| ----- | ----- | ----- |
-| Test | zero | Windows Autopatch doesn't automatically add devices to this ring. You must manually add devices to the Test ring. The recommended number of devices in this ring, based upon your environment size, is as follows:
Devices in this group are intended for your IT Administrators and testers since changes are released here first. This release schedule provides your organization the opportunity to validate updates prior to reaching production users. |
-| First | 1% | The First ring is the first group of production users to receive a change.
Devices in this group are intended for your IT Administrators and testers since changes are released here first. This release schedule provides your organization the opportunity to validate updates prior to reaching production users. |
+| First | **1%** | The First ring is the first group of production users to receive a change.
Exclusions:
|
+| Modern Workplace Devices Dynamic - Windows 11 | Microsoft Managed Desktop Devices with Windows 11
Exclusions:
|
+| Modern Workplace Roles - Service Administrator | All users granted access to Modern Workplace Service Administrator Role |
+| Modern Workplace Roles - Service Reader | All users granted access to Modern Workplace Service Reader Role |
+| Modern Workplace Service - Intune Admin All | Group for Intune Admins
|
+| Modern Workplace Service - Intune Reader All | Group for Intune readers
|
+| Modern Workplace Service - Intune Reader MMD | Group for Intune readers of MMD devices and users
|
+| Modern Workplace Service Accounts | Group for Windows Autopatch service accounts |
+| Windows Autopatch Device Registration | Group for automatic device registration for Windows Autopatch |
+
+## Windows Autopatch enterprise applications
+
+Enterprise applications are applications (software) that a business uses to do its work.
+
+Windows Autopatch creates an enterprise application in your tenant. This enterprise application is a first party application used to run the Windows Autopatch service.
+
+| Enterprise application name | Usage | Permissions |
+| ----- | ------ | ----- |
+| Modern Workplace Management | This enterprise application is a limited first party enterprise application with elevated privileges. This account is used to manage the service, publish baseline configuration updates, and maintain overall service health. |
|
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> Enterprise application authentication is only available on tenants enrolled after July 9th, 2022. For tenants enrolled before this date, Enterprise Application authentication will be made available for enrollment soon.
+
+## Windows Autopatch cloud service accounts
+
+Windows Autopatch will create three cloud service accounts in your tenant. These accounts are used to run the service and all need to be excluded from any multi-factor authentication controls.
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> Effective Aug 15th, 2022, these accounts will no longer be added to newly enrolled tenants, and existing tenants will be provided an option to migrate to enterprise application-based authentication. These accounts will be removed with that transition.
+
+| Cloud service account name | Usage | Mitigating controls |
+| ----- | ----- | ------ |
+| MsAdmin@tenantDomain.onmicrosoft.com |
| Audited sign-ins |
+| MsAdminInt@tenantDomain.onmicrosoft.com |
|
+| MsTest@tenantDomain.onmicrosoft.com | This is a standard account used as a validation account for initial configuration and roll out of policy, application, and device compliance settings. | Audited sign-ins |
+
+## Device configuration policies
+
+- Modern Workplace - Set MDM to Win Over GPO
+- Modern Workplace - Telemetry Settings for Windows 10
+- Modern Workplace - Telemetry Settings for Windows 11
+- Modern Workplace-Window Update Detection Frequency
+- Modern Workplace - Data Collection
+
+| Policy name | Policy description | OMA | Value |
+| ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- |
+| Modern Workplace - Set MDM to Win Over GPO | Sets mobile device management (MDM) to win over GPO
| | |
+| Modern Workplace - Telemetry Settings for Windows 10 | Telemetry settings for Windows 10
|[./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/System/AllowTelemetry](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-system#system-allowtelemetry) | 2 |
+| Modern Workplace - Telemetry Settings for Windows 11 | Telemetry settings for Windows 11
|
|
| [./Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/Update/DetectionFrequency](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-update#update-detectionfrequency)| 4 |
+| Modern Workplace - Data Collection | Allows diagnostic data from this device to be processed by Microsoft Managed Desktop.
| | |
+
+## Update rings for Windows 10 and later
+
+- Modern Workplace Update Policy [Test]-[Windows Autopatch]
+- Modern Workplace Update Policy [First]-[Windows Autopatch]
+- Modern Workplace Update Policy [Fast]-[Windows Autopatch]
+- Modern Workplace Update Policy [Broad]-[Windows Autopatch]
+
+| Policy name | Policy description | OMA | Value |
+| ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- |
+| Modern Workplace Update Policy [Test]-[Windows Autopatch | Windows Update for Business Configuration for the Test Ring
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exclude from:
|
+| Modern Workplace DSS Policy [First] | DSS policy for First device group | Assigned to:
Exclude from:
|
+| Modern Workplace DSS Policy [Broad] | DSS policy for Broad device group | Assigned to:
Exclude from:
|
+| Modern Workplace DSS Policy [Windows 11] | Windows 11 DSS policy | Assigned to:
|
+
+## Microsoft Office update policies
+
+- Modern Workplace - Office ADMX Deployment
+- Modern Workplace - Office Configuration v5
+- Modern Workplace - Office Update Configuration [Test]
+- Modern Workplace - Office Update Configuration [First]
+- Modern Workplace - Office Update Configuration [Fast]
+- Modern Workplace - Office Update Configuration [Broad]
+
+| Policy name | Policy description | OMA | Value |
+| ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- |
+| Modern Workplace - Office ADMX Deployment | ADMX file for Office
| | |
+| Modern Workplace - Office Configuration v5 | Sets Office Update Channel to the Monthly Enterprise servicing branch.
| | |
+| Modern Workplace - Office Update Configuration [Test] | Sets the Office update deadline
|
|
|
|
|
|
Assigned to:
|
| | |
+| Modern Workplace - Edge Update Channel Stable | Deploys updates via the Edge Stable Channel
| `./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/MicrosoftEdgeUpdate~Policy~Cat_EdgeUpdate~Cat_Applications~Cat_MicrosoftEdge/Pol_TargetChannelMicrosoftEdge` | Enabled |
+| Modern Workplace - Edge Update Channel Beta | Deploys updates via the Edge Beta Channel
| `./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/MicrosoftEdgeUpdate~Policy~Cat_EdgeUpdate~Cat_Applications~Cat_MicrosoftEdge/Pol_TargetChannelMicrosoftEdge` | Enabled |
+
+## Conditional access policies
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> Effective Aug 15, 2022, the following policy will no longer be added to newly enrolled tenants, and existing tenants will be provided an option to migrate to enterprise application-based authentication. This policy will be removed with that transition.
+
+| Conditional access policy | Description |
+| ----- | ----- |
+| Modern Workplace - Secure Workstation | This policy is targeted to only the Windows Autopatch cloud service accounts. The policy blocks access to the tenant unless the user is accessing the tenant from a Microsoft authorized location. |
+
+## PowerShell scripts
+
+| Script | Description |
+| ----- | ----- |
+| Modern Workplace - Autopatch Client Setup | Installs necessary client components for the Windows Autopatch service |
diff --git a/windows/hub/docfx.json b/windows/hub/docfx.json
index 228d687717..461e6028a8 100644
--- a/windows/hub/docfx.json
+++ b/windows/hub/docfx.json
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
"ms.topic": "article",
"feedback_system": "GitHub",
"feedback_github_repo": "MicrosoftDocs/windows-itpro-docs",
- "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/help/4021566/windows-10-send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-feedback-hub-app",
+ "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/windows/send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-the-feedback-hub-app-f59187f8-8739-22d6-ba93-f66612949332",
"_op_documentIdPathDepotMapping": {
"./": {
"depot_name": "MSDN.windows-hub",
diff --git a/windows/known-issues/docfx.json b/windows/known-issues/docfx.json
index d331ee80d1..2119242b44 100644
--- a/windows/known-issues/docfx.json
+++ b/windows/known-issues/docfx.json
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
"breadcrumb_path": "/windows/windows-10/breadcrumb/toc.json",
"feedback_system": "GitHub",
"feedback_github_repo": "MicrosoftDocs/windows-itpro-docs",
- "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/help/4021566/windows-10-send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-feedback-hub-app",
+ "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/windows/send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-the-feedback-hub-app-f59187f8-8739-22d6-ba93-f66612949332",
"contributors_to_exclude": [
"rjagiewich",
"traya1",
diff --git a/windows/privacy/docfx.json b/windows/privacy/docfx.json
index 48c27d274d..a0c9217603 100644
--- a/windows/privacy/docfx.json
+++ b/windows/privacy/docfx.json
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
"ms.topic": "article",
"feedback_system": "GitHub",
"feedback_github_repo": "MicrosoftDocs/windows-itpro-docs",
- "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/help/4021566/windows-10-send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-feedback-hub-app",
+ "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/windows/send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-the-feedback-hub-app-f59187f8-8739-22d6-ba93-f66612949332",
"_op_documentIdPathDepotMapping": {
"./": {
"depot_name": "MSDN.privacy",
diff --git a/windows/security/TOC.yml b/windows/security/TOC.yml
index aa38fc4f08..be054e388b 100644
--- a/windows/security/TOC.yml
+++ b/windows/security/TOC.yml
@@ -323,24 +323,8 @@
- name: Access Control Overview
href: identity-protection/access-control/access-control.md
items:
- - name: Dynamic Access Control Overview
- href: identity-protection/access-control/dynamic-access-control.md
- - name: Security identifiers
- href: identity-protection/access-control/security-identifiers.md
- - name: Security Principals
- href: identity-protection/access-control/security-principals.md
- name: Local Accounts
href: identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts.md
- - name: Active Directory Accounts
- href: identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-accounts.md
- - name: Microsoft Accounts
- href: identity-protection/access-control/microsoft-accounts.md
- - name: Service Accounts
- href: identity-protection/access-control/service-accounts.md
- - name: Active Directory Security Groups
- href: identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-security-groups.md
- - name: Special Identities
- href: identity-protection/access-control/special-identities.md
- name: User Account Control
href: identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-overview.md
items:
diff --git a/windows/security/breadcrumb/toc.yml b/windows/security/breadcrumb/toc.yml
index 6c5b49c520..2531ffba73 100644
--- a/windows/security/breadcrumb/toc.yml
+++ b/windows/security/breadcrumb/toc.yml
@@ -8,5 +8,5 @@ items:
topicHref: /windows/resources/
items:
- name: Security
- tocHref: /windows/security/
- topicHref: /windows/security/
+ tocHref: /windows-server/security/credentials-protection-and-management/
+ topicHref: /windows/security/
diff --git a/windows/security/docfx.json b/windows/security/docfx.json
index 730a2a9252..84eb2da0af 100644
--- a/windows/security/docfx.json
+++ b/windows/security/docfx.json
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
"audience": "ITPro",
"feedback_system": "GitHub",
"feedback_github_repo": "MicrosoftDocs/windows-itpro-docs",
- "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/help/4021566/windows-10-send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-feedback-hub-app",
+ "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/windows/send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-the-feedback-hub-app-f59187f8-8739-22d6-ba93-f66612949332",
"_op_documentIdPathDepotMapping": {
"./": {
"depot_name": "MSDN.security",
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/access-control.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/access-control.md
index 2dfc4dc841..3463887878 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/access-control.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/access-control.md
@@ -2,23 +2,23 @@
title: Access Control Overview (Windows 10)
description: Access Control Overview
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: sulahiri
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection:
- M365-identity-device-management
- highpri
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 07/18/2017
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows Server 2016
---
# Access Control Overview
-**Applies to**
-- Windows 10
-- Windows Server 2016
-
This topic for the IT professional describes access control in Windows, which is the process of authorizing users, groups, and computers to access objects on the network or computer. Key concepts that make up access control are permissions, ownership of objects, inheritance of permissions, user rights, and object auditing.
## Feature description
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-accounts.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-accounts.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 404f1abb50..0000000000
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-accounts.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,621 +0,0 @@
----
-title: Active Directory Accounts (Windows 10)
-description: Active Directory Accounts
-ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
-ms.collection:
- - M365-identity-device-management
- - highpri
-ms.topic: article
-ms.localizationpriority: medium
-ms.date: 08/23/2019
----
-
-# Active Directory Accounts
-
-**Applies to**
-- Windows Server 2016
-
-Windows Server operating systems are installed with default local accounts. In addition, you can create user accounts to meet the requirements of your organization. This reference topic for the IT professional describes the Windows Server default local accounts that are stored locally on the domain controller and are used in Active Directory.
-
-This reference topic does not describe default local user accounts for a member or standalone server or for a Windows client. For more information, see [Local Accounts](local-accounts.md).
-
-## About this topic
-
-
-This topic describes the following:
-
-- [Default local accounts in Active Directory](#sec-ad-default-accounts)
-
- - [Administrator account](#sec-administrator)
-
- - [Guest account](#sec-guest)
-
- - [HelpAssistant account (installed with a Remote Assistance session)](#sec-helpassistant)
-
- - [KRBTGT account](#sec-krbtgt)
-
-- [Settings for default local accounts in Active Directory](#sec-account-settings)
-
-- [Manage default local accounts in Active Directory](#sec-manage-local-accounts)
-
-- [Restrict and protect sensitive domain accounts](#sec-restrict-protect-accounts)
-
- - [Separate administrator accounts from user accounts](#task1-separate-admin-accounts)
-
- - [Create dedicated workstation hosts without Internet and email access](#task2-admin-workstations)
-
- - [Restrict administrator logon access to servers and workstations](#task3-restrict-admin-logon)
-
- - [Disable the account delegation right for administrator accounts](#task4-disable-account-delegation)
-
-- [Secure and manage domain controllers](#sec-secure-manage-dcs)
-
-## Default local accounts in Active Directory
-
-
-Default local accounts are built-in accounts that are created automatically when a Windows Server domain controller is installed and the domain is created. These default local accounts have counterparts in Active Directory. These accounts also have domain-wide access and are completely separate from the default local user accounts for a member or standalone server.
-
-You can assign rights and permissions to default local accounts on a particular domain controller, and only on that domain controller. These accounts are local to the domain. After the default local accounts are installed, they are stored in the Users container in Active Directory Users and Computers. It is a best practice to keep the default local accounts in the User container and not attempt to move these accounts, for example, to a different organizational unit (OU).
-
-The default local accounts in the Users container include: Administrator, Guest, and KRBTGT. The HelpAssistant account is installed when a Remote Assistance session is established. The following sections describe the default local accounts and their use in Active Directory.
-
-Primarily, default local accounts do the following:
-
-- Let the domain represent, identify, and authenticate the identity of the user that is assigned to the account by using unique credentials (user name and password). It is a best practice to assign each user to a single account to ensure maximum security. Multiple users are not allowed to share one account. A user account lets a user sign in to computers, networks, and domains with a unique identifier that can be authenticated by the computer, network, or domain.
-
-- Authorize (grant or deny) access to resources. After a user’s credentials have been authenticated, the user is authorized to access the network and domain resources based on the user’s explicitly assigned rights on the resource.
-
-- Audit the actions that are carried out on a user account.
-
-In Active Directory, default local accounts are used by administrators to manage domain and member servers directly and from dedicated administrative workstations. Active Directory accounts provide access to network resources. Active Directory User accounts and Computer accounts can represent a physical entity, such as a computer or person, or act as dedicated service accounts for some applications.
-
-Each default local account is automatically assigned to a security group that is preconfigured with the appropriate rights and permissions to perform specific tasks. Active Directory security groups collect user accounts, computer accounts, and other groups into manageable units. For more information, see [Active Directory Security Groups](active-directory-security-groups.md).
-
-On an Active Directory domain controller, each default local account is referred to as a security principal. A security principal is a directory object that is used to secure and manage Active Directory services that provide access to domain controller resources. A security principal includes objects such as user accounts, computer accounts, security groups, or the threads or processes that run in the security context of a user or computer account. For more information, see [Security Principals](security-principals.md).
-
-A security principal is represented by a unique security identifier (SID).The SIDs that are related to each of the default local accounts in Active Directory are described in the sections below.
-
-Some of the default local accounts are protected by a background process that periodically checks and applies a specific security descriptor. A security descriptor is a data structure that contains security information that is associated with a protected object. This process ensures that any successful unauthorized attempt to modify the security descriptor on one of the default local accounts or groups is overwritten with the protected settings.
-
-This security descriptor is present on the AdminSDHolder object. If you want to modify the permissions on one of the service administrator groups or on any of its member accounts, you must modify the security descriptor on the AdminSDHolder object to ensure that it is applied consistently. Be careful when making these modifications, because you are also changing the default settings that are applied to all of your protected accounts.
-
-## Administrator account
-
-
-The Administrator account is a default account that is used in all versions of the Windows operating system on every computer and device. The Administrator account is used by the system administrator for tasks that require administrative credentials. This account cannot be deleted or locked out, but the account can be renamed or disabled.
-
-The Administrator account gives the user complete access (Full Control permissions) of the files, directories, services, and other resources that are on that local server. The Administrator account can be used to create local users, and assign user rights and access control permissions. Administrator can also be used to take control of local resources at any time simply by changing the user rights and permissions. Although files and directories can be protected from the Administrator account temporarily, the Administrator account can take control of these resources at any time by changing the access permissions.
-
-**Account group membership**
-
-The Administrator account has membership in the default security groups as described in the Administrator account attributes table later in this topic.
-
-The security groups ensure that you can control administrator rights without having to change each Administrator account. In most instances, you do not have to change the basic settings for this account. However, you might have to change its advanced settings, such as membership in particular groups.
-
-**Security considerations**
-
-After installation of the server operating system, your first task is to set up the Administrator account properties securely. This includes setting up an especially long, strong password, and securing the Remote control and Remote Desktop Services profile settings.
-
-The Administrator account can also be disabled when it is not required. Renaming or disabling the Administrator account makes it more difficult for malicious users to try to gain access to the account. However, even when the Administrator account is disabled, it can still be used to gain access to a domain controller by using safe mode.
-
-On a domain controller, the Administrator account becomes the Domain Admin account. The Domain Admin account is used to sign in to the domain controller and this account requires a strong password. The Domain Admin account gives you access to domain resources.
-
-> [!NOTE]
-> When the domain controller is initially installed, you can sign in and use Server Manager to set up a local Administrator account, with the rights and permissions you want to assign. For example, you can use a local Administrator account to manage the operating system when you first install it. By using this approach, you can set up the operating system without getting locked out. Generally, you do not need to use the account after installation. You can only create local user accounts on the domain controller, before Active Directory Domain Services is installed, and not afterwards.
-
-When Active Directory is installed on the first domain controller in the domain, the Administrator account is created for Active Directory. The Administrator account is the most powerful account in the domain. It is given domain-wide access and administrative rights to administer the computer and the domain, and it has the most extensive rights and permissions over the domain. The person who installs Active Directory Domain Services on the computer creates the password for this account during the installation.
-
-**Administrator account attributes**
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-`
Group Policy Creator Owners, and Schema Admins in Active Directory
Domain Users group|
-|Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|Yes|
-|Safe to move out of default container?|Yes|
-|Safe to delegate management of this group to non-service administrators?|No|
-
-## Guest account
-
-
-The Guest account is a default local account that has limited access to the computer and is disabled by default. By default, the Guest account password is left blank. A blank password allows the Guest account to be accessed without requiring the user to enter a password.
-
-The Guest account enables occasional or one-time users, who do not have an individual account on the computer, to sign in to the local server or domain with restricted rights and permissions. The Guest account can be enabled, and the password can be set up if needed, but only by a member of the Administrator group on the domain.
-
-**Account group membership**
-
-The Guest account has membership in the default security groups that are described in the following Guest account attributes table. By default, the Guest account is the only member of the default Guests group, which lets a user sign in to a server, and the Domain Guests global group, which lets a user sign in to a domain.
-
-A member of the Administrators group or Domain Admins group can set up a user with a Guest account on one or more computers.
-
-**Security considerations**
-
-Because the Guest account can provide anonymous access, it is a security risk. It also has a well-known SID. For this reason, it is a best practice to leave the Guest account disabled, unless its use is required and then only with restricted rights and permissions for a very limited period of time.
-
-When the Guest account is required, an Administrator on the domain controller is required to enable the Guest account. The Guest account can be enabled without requiring a password, or it can be enabled with a strong password. The Administrator also grants restricted rights and permissions for the Guest account. To help prevent unauthorized access:
-
-- Do not grant the Guest account the [Shut down the system](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/shut-down-the-system) user right. When a computer is shutting down or starting up, it is possible that a Guest user or anyone with local access, such as a malicious user, could gain unauthorized access to the computer.
-
-- Do not provide the Guest account with the ability to view the event logs. After the Guest account is enabled, it is a best practice to monitor this account frequently to ensure that other users cannot use services and other resources, such as resources that were unintentionally left available by a previous user.
-
-- Do not use the Guest account when the server has external network access or access to other computers.
-
-If you decide to enable the Guest account, be sure to restrict its use and to change the password regularly. As with the Administrator account, you might want to rename the account as an added security precaution.
-
-In addition, an administrator is responsible for managing the Guest account. The administrator monitors the Guest account, disables the Guest account when it is no longer in use, and changes or removes the password as needed.
-
-For details about the Guest account attributes, see the following table.
-
-**Guest account attributes**
-
-|Attribute|Value|
-|--- |--- |
-|Well-Known SID/RID|S-1-5-`
This option is required when using Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP) in Internet Authentication Services (IAS), and when using digest authentication in Internet Information Services (IIS).|
-|Account is disabled|Prevents the user from signing in with the selected account. As an administrator, you can use disabled accounts as templates for common user accounts.|
-|Smart card is required for interactive logon|Requires that a user has a smart card to sign on to the network interactively. The user must also have a smart card reader attached to their computer and a valid personal identification number (PIN) for the smart card.
When this attribute is applied on the account, the effect is as follows:
The Anonymous Logon identity is different from the identity that is used by Internet Information Services (IIS) for anonymous web access. IIS uses an actual account—by default, IUSR_ *ComputerName*, for anonymous access to resources on a website. Strictly speaking, such access is not anonymous because the security principal is known even though unidentified people are using the account. IUSR_ *ComputerName* (or whatever you name the account) has a password, and IIS logs on the account when the service starts. As a result, the IIS "anonymous" user is a member of Authenticated Users but Anonymous Logon is not.|
-| S-1-5-8| Proxy| Does not currently apply: this SID is not used.|
-| S-1-5-9 | Enterprise Domain Controllers| A group that includes all domain controllers in a forest of domains.|
-| S-1-5-10 | Self| A placeholder in an ACE for a user, group, or computer object in Active Directory. When you grant permissions to Self, you grant them to the security principal that is represented by the object. During an access check, the operating system replaces the SID for Self with the SID for the security principal that is represented by the object.|
-| S-1-5-11 | Authenticated Users| A group that includes all users and computers with identities that have been authenticated. Authenticated Users does not include Guest even if the Guest account has a password.
This group includes authenticated security principals from any trusted domain, not only the current domain.|
-| S-1-5-12 | Restricted Code| An identity that is used by a process that is running in a restricted security context. In Windows and Windows Server operating systems, a software restriction policy can assign one of three security levels to code: unrestricted, restricted, or disallowed. When code runs at the restricted security level, the Restricted SID is added to the user's access token.|
-| S-1-5-13 | Terminal Server User| A group that includes all users who sign in to a server with Remote Desktop Services enabled.|
-| S-1-5-14 | Remote Interactive Logon| A group that includes all users who log on to the computer by using a remote desktop connection. This group is a subset of the Interactive group. Access tokens that contain the Remote Interactive Logon SID also contain the Interactive SID.|
-| S-1-5-15| This Organization| A group that includes all users from the same organization. Only included with Active Directory accounts and only added by a domain controller.|
-| S-1-5-17 | IUSR| An account that is used by the default Internet Information Services (IIS) user.|
-| S-1-5-18 | System (or LocalSystem)| An identity that is used locally by the operating system and by services that are configured to sign in as LocalSystem.
System is a hidden member of Administrators. That is, any process running as System has the SID for the built-in Administrators group in its access token.
When a process that is running locally as System accesses network resources, it does so by using the computer's domain identity. Its access token on the remote computer includes the SID for the local computer's domain account plus SIDs for security groups that the computer is a member of, such as Domain Computers and Authenticated Users.|
-| S-1-5-19 | NT Authority (LocalService)| An identity that is used by services that are local to the computer, have no need for extensive local access, and do not need authenticated network access. Services that run as LocalService access local resources as ordinary users, and they access network resources as anonymous users. As a result, a service that runs as LocalService has significantly less authority than a service that runs as LocalSystem locally and on the network.|
-| S-1-5-20 | Network Service| An identity that is used by services that have no need for extensive local access but do need authenticated network access. Services running as NetworkService access local resources as ordinary users and access network resources by using the computer's identity. As a result, a service that runs as NetworkService has the same network access as a service that runs as LocalSystem, but it has significantly reduced local access.|
-| S-1-5-*domain*-500 | Administrator| A user account for the system administrator. Every computer has a local Administrator account and every domain has a domain Administrator account.
The Administrator account is the first account created during operating system installation. The account cannot be deleted, disabled, or locked out, but it can be renamed.
By default, the Administrator account is a member of the Administrators group, and it cannot be removed from that group.|
-| S-1-5-*domain*-501 | Guest| A user account for people who do not have individual accounts. Every computer has a local Guest account, and every domain has a domain Guest account.
By default, Guest is a member of the Everyone and the Guests groups. The domain Guest account is also a member of the Domain Guests and Domain Users groups.
Unlike Anonymous Logon, Guest is a real account, and it can be used to log on interactively. The Guest account does not require a password, but it can have one.|
-| S-1-5-*domain*-502| krbtgt| A user account that is used by the Key Distribution Center (KDC) service. The account exists only on domain controllers.|
-| S-1-5-*domain*-512| Domain Admins| A global group with members that are authorized to administer the domain. By default, the Domain Admins group is a member of the Administrators group on all computers that have joined the domain, including domain controllers.
Domain Admins is the default owner of any object that is created in the domain's Active Directory by any member of the group. If members of the group create other objects, such as files, the default owner is the Administrators group.|
-| S-1-5-*domain*-513| Domain Users| A global group that includes all users in a domain. When you create a new User object in Active Directory, the user is automatically added to this group.|
-| S-1-5-*domain*-514| Domain Guests| A global group, which by default, has only one member: the domain's built-in Guest account.|
-| S-1-5-*domain*-515 | Domain Computers| A global group that includes all computers that have joined the domain, excluding domain controllers.|
-| S-1-5-*domain*-516| Domain Controllers| A global group that includes all domain controllers in the domain. New domain controllers are added to this group automatically.|
-| S-1-5-*domain*-517 | Cert Publishers| A global group that includes all computers that host an enterprise certification authority.
Cert Publishers are authorized to publish certificates for User objects in Active Directory.|
-| S-1-5-*root domain*-518| Schema Admins| A group that exists only in the forest root domain. It is a universal group if the domain is in native mode, and it is a global group if the domain is in mixed mode. The Schema Admins group is authorized to make schema changes in Active Directory. By default, the only member of the group is the Administrator account for the forest root domain.|
-| S-1-5-*root domain*-519| Enterprise Admins| A group that exists only in the forest root domain. It is a universal group if the domain is in native mode, and it is a global group if the domain is in mixed mode.
The Enterprise Admins group is authorized to make changes to the forest infrastructure, such as adding child domains, configuring sites, authorizing DHCP servers, and installing enterprise certification authorities.
By default, the only member of Enterprise Admins is the Administrator account for the forest root domain. The group is a default member of every Domain Admins group in the forest. |
-| S-1-5-*domain*-520| Group Policy Creator Owners| A global group that is authorized to create new Group Policy Objects in Active Directory. By default, the only member of the group is Administrator.
Objects that are created by members of Group Policy Creator Owners are owned by the individual user who creates them. In this way, the Group Policy Creator Owners group is unlike other administrative groups (such as Administrators and Domain Admins). Objects that are created by members of these groups are owned by the group rather than by the individual.|
-| S-1-5-*domain*-553| RAS and IAS Servers| A local domain group. By default, this group has no members. Computers that are running the Routing and Remote Access service are added to the group automatically.
Members of this group have access to certain properties of User objects, such as Read Account Restrictions, Read Logon Information, and Read Remote Access Information.|
-| S-1-5-32-544 | Administrators| A built-in group. After the initial installation of the operating system, the only member of the group is the Administrator account. When a computer joins a domain, the Domain Admins group is added to the Administrators group. When a server becomes a domain controller, the Enterprise Admins group also is added to the Administrators group.|
-| S-1-5-32-545 | Users| A built-in group. After the initial installation of the operating system, the only member is the Authenticated Users group.|
-| S-1-5-32-546 | Guests| A built-in group. By default, the only member is the Guest account. The Guests group allows occasional or one-time users to log on with limited privileges to a computer's built-in Guest account.|
-| S-1-5-32-547 | Power Users| A built-in group. By default, the group has no members. Power users can create local users and groups; modify and delete accounts that they have created; and remove users from the Power Users, Users, and Guests groups. Power users also can install programs; create, manage, and delete local printers; and create and delete file shares. |
-| S-1-5-32-548| Account Operators| A built-in group that exists only on domain controllers. By default, the group has no members. By default, Account Operators have permission to create, modify, and delete accounts for users, groups, and computers in all containers and organizational units of Active Directory except the Builtin container and the Domain Controllers OU. Account Operators do not have permission to modify the Administrators and Domain Admins groups, nor do they have permission to modify the accounts for members of those groups.|
-| S-1-5-32-549| Server Operators| Description: A built-in group that exists only on domain controllers. By default, the group has no members. Server Operators can log on to a server interactively; create and delete network shares; start and stop services; back up and restore files; format the hard disk of the computer; and shut down the computer.|
-| S-1-5-32-550 | Print Operators| A built-in group that exists only on domain controllers. By default, the only member is the Domain Users group. Print Operators can manage printers and document queues.|
-| S-1-5-32-551 | Backup Operators| A built-in group. By default, the group has no members. Backup Operators can back up and restore all files on a computer, regardless of the permissions that protect those files. Backup Operators also can log on to the computer and shut it down.|
-| S-1-5-32-552 | Replicators | A built-in group that is used by the File Replication service on domain controllers. By default, the group has no members. Do not add users to this group.|
-|S-1-5-32-554|Builtin\Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access|An alias added by Windows 2000. A backward compatibility group that allows read access on all users and groups in the domain.|
-|S-1-5-32-555|Builtin\Remote Desktop Users|An alias. Members in this group are granted the right to log on remotely.|
-|S-1-5-32-556|Builtin\Network Configuration Operators|An alias. Members in this group can have some administrative privileges to manage configuration of networking features.|
-|S-1-5-32-557|Builtin\Incoming Forest Trust Builders|An alias. Members of this group can create incoming, one-way trusts to this forest.|
-|S-1-5-32-558|Builtin\Performance Monitor Users|An alias. Members of this group have remote access to monitor this computer.|
-|S-1-5-32-559|Builtin\Performance Log Users|An alias. Members of this group have remote access to schedule logging of performance counters on this computer.|
-|S-1-5-32-560|Builtin\Windows Authorization Access Group|An alias. Members of this group have access to the computed tokenGroupsGlobalAndUniversal attribute on User objects.|
-|S-1-5-32-561|Builtin\Terminal Server License Servers|An alias. A group for Terminal Server License Servers. When Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1 is installed, a new local group is created.|
-|S-1-5-32-562|Builtin\Distributed COM Users|An alias. A group for COM to provide computer-wide access controls that govern access to all call, activation, or launch requests on the computer.|
-|S-1-5-32-568|Builtin\IIS_IUSRS|An alias. A built-in group account for IIS users.|
-|S-1-5-32-569|Builtin\Cryptographic Operators|A built-in local group. Members are authorized to perform cryptographic operations.|
-|S-1-5-32-573|Builtin\Event Log Readers|A built-in local group. Members of this group can read event logs from local computer.|
-|S-1-5-32-574|Builtin\Certificate Service DCOM Access|A built-in local group. Members of this group are allowed to connect to Certification Authorities in the enterprise.|
-|S-1-5-32-575|Builtin\RDS Remote Access Servers|A built-in local group. Servers in this group enable users of RemoteApp programs and personal virtual desktops access to these resources. In Internet-facing deployments, these servers are typically deployed in an edge network. This group needs to be populated on servers running RD Connection Broker. RD Gateway servers and RD Web Access servers used in the deployment need to be in this group.|
-|S-1-5-32-576|Builtin\RDS Endpoint Servers|A built-in local group. Servers in this group run virtual machines and host sessions where users RemoteApp programs and personal virtual desktops run. This group needs to be populated on servers running RD Connection Broker. RD Session Host servers and RD Virtualization Host servers used in the deployment need to be in this group.|
-|S-1-5-32-577|Builtin\RDS Management Servers|A builtin local group. Servers in this group can perform routine administrative actions on servers running Remote Desktop Services. This group needs to be populated on all servers in a Remote Desktop Services deployment. The servers running the RDS Central Management service must be included in this group.|
-|S-1-5-32-578|Builtin\Hyper-V Administrators|A built-in local group. Members of this group have complete and unrestricted access to all features of Hyper-V.|
-|S-1-5-32-579|Builtin\Access Control Assistance Operators|A built-in local group. Members of this group can remotely query authorization attributes and permissions for resources on this computer.|
-|S-1-5-32-580|Builtin\Remote Management Users|A built-in local group. Members of this group can access WMI resources over management protocols (such as WS-Management via the Windows Remote Management service). This applies only to WMI namespaces that grant access to the user.|
-| S-1-5-64-10| NTLM Authentication| A SID that is used when the NTLM authentication package authenticated the client|
-| S-1-5-64-14 | SChannel Authentication| A SID that is used when the SChannel authentication package authenticated the client.|
-| S-1-5-64-21 | Digest Authentication| A SID that is used when the Digest authentication package authenticated the client.|
-| S-1-5-80 | NT Service | A SID that is used as an NT Service account prefix.|
-| S-1-5-80-0 | All Services| A group that includes all service processes that are configured on the system. Membership is controlled by the operating system. SID S-1-5-80-0 equals NT SERVICES\ALL SERVICES. This SID was introduced in Windows Server 2008 R2.|
-| S-1-5-83-0| NT VIRTUAL MACHINE\Virtual Machines| A built-in group. The group is created when the Hyper-V role is installed. Membership in the group is maintained by the Hyper-V Management Service (VMMS). This group requires the **Create Symbolic Links** right (SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege), and also the **Log on as a Service** right (SeServiceLogonRight). |
-
-The following RIDs are relative to each domain.
-
-| RID |Decimal value| Identifies |
-| - | - | - |
-| DOMAIN_USER_RID_ADMIN | 500 | The administrative user account in a domain. |
-| DOMAIN_USER_RID_GUEST| 501 | The guest-user account in a domain. Users who do not have an account can automatically sign in to this account.|
-| DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_USERS | 513 | A group that contains all user accounts in a domain. All users are automatically added to this group.|
-| DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_GUESTS | 514 | The group Guest account in a domain.|
-| DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_COMPUTERS | 515 | The Domain Computer group. All computers in the domain are members of this group.|
-| DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_CONTROLLERS | 516 | The Domain Controller group. All domain controllers in the domain are members of this group.|
-| DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_CERT_ADMINS | 517 | The certificate publishers' group. Computers running Active Directory Certificate Services are members of this group.|
-| DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_SCHEMA_ADMINS | 518 | The schema administrators' group. Members of this group can modify the Active Directory schema.|
-| DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_ENTERPRISE_ADMINS | 519 | The enterprise administrators' group. Members of this group have full access to all domains in the Active Directory forest. Enterprise administrators are responsible for forest-level operations such as adding or removing new domains.|
-| DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_POLICY_ADMINS| 520 | The policy administrators' group.|
-
-The following table provides examples of domain-relative RIDs that are used to form well-known SIDs for local groups.
-
-| RID | Decimal value | Identifies |
-| - | - | - |
-| DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS | 544 | Administrators of the domain.|
-| DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_USERS | 545 | All users in the domain.|
-| DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_GUESTS | 546 | Guests of the domain.|
-| DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_POWER_USERS | 547 | A user or a set of users who expect to treat a system as if it were their personal computer rather than as a workstation for multiple users.|
-| DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_BACKUP_OPS | 551 | A local group that is used to control the assignment of file backup-and-restore user rights.|
-| DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_REPLICATOR | 552 | A local group that is responsible for copying security databases from the primary domain controller to the backup domain controllers. These accounts are used only by the system.|
-| DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_RAS_SERVERS | 553 | A local group that represents remote access and servers running Internet Authentication Service (IAS). This group permits access to various attributes of User objects.|
-
-## Changes in security identifier's functionality
-
-The following table describes changes in SID implementation in the Windows operating systems that are designated in the list.
-
-| Change | Operating system version | Description and resources |
-| - | - | - |
-| Most of the operating system files are owned by the TrustedInstaller security identifier (SID)| Windows Server 2008, Windows Vista| The purpose of this change is to prevent a process that is running as an administrator or under the LocalSystem account from automatically replacing the operating system files. |
-| Restricted SID checks are implemented| Windows Server 2008, Windows Vista| When restricting SIDs are present, Windows performs two access checks. The first is the normal access check, and the second is the same access check against the restricting SIDs in the token. Both access checks must pass to allow the process to access the object. |
-
-## Capability SIDs
-
-Capability Security Identifiers (SIDs) are used to uniquely and immutably identify capabilities. Capabilities represent an unforgeable token of authority that grants access to resources (Examples: documents, camera, locations etc...) to Universal Windows Applications. An App that “has” a capability is granted access to the resource the capability is associated with, and one that “does not have” a capability is denied access to the resource.
-
-All Capability SIDs that the operating system is aware of are stored in the Windows Registry in the path `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SecurityManager\CapabilityClasses\AllCachedCapabilities'. Any Capability SID added to Windows by first or third-party applications will be added to this location.
-
-## Examples of registry keys taken from Windows 10, version 1909, 64-bit Enterprise edition
-
-You may see the following registry keys under AllCachedCapabilities:
-
-HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SecurityManager\CapabilityClasses\AllCachedCapabilities\capabilityClass_DevUnlock
-HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SecurityManager\CapabilityClasses\AllCachedCapabilities\capabilityClass_DevUnlock_Internal
-HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SecurityManager\CapabilityClasses\AllCachedCapabilities\capabilityClass_Enterprise
-HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SecurityManager\CapabilityClasses\AllCachedCapabilities\capabilityClass_General
-HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SecurityManager\CapabilityClasses\AllCachedCapabilities\capabilityClass_Restricted
-HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SecurityManager\CapabilityClasses\AllCachedCapabilities\capabilityClass_Windows
-
-All Capability SIDs are prefixed by S-1-15-3
-
-## Examples of registry keys taken from Windows 11, version 21H2, 64-bit Enterprise edition
-
-You may see the following registry keys under AllCachedCapabilities:
-
-HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SecurityManager\CapabilityClasses\AllCachedCapabilities\capabilityClass_DevUnlock
-HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SecurityManager\CapabilityClasses\AllCachedCapabilities\capabilityClass_DevUnlock_Internal
-HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SecurityManager\CapabilityClasses\AllCachedCapabilities\capabilityClass_Enterprise
-HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SecurityManager\CapabilityClasses\AllCachedCapabilities\capabilityClass_General
-HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SecurityManager\CapabilityClasses\AllCachedCapabilities\capabilityClass_Restricted
-HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SecurityManager\CapabilityClasses\AllCachedCapabilities\capabilityClass_Windows
-
-All Capability SIDs are prefixed by S-1-15-3
-
-## See also
-
-- [Access Control Overview](access-control.md)
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 3120899040..0000000000
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-principals.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,148 +0,0 @@
----
-title: Security Principals (Windows 10)
-description: Security Principals
-ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
-ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
-ms.topic: article
-ms.localizationpriority: medium
-ms.date: 04/19/2017
-ms.reviewer:
----
-
-# Security Principals
-
-**Applies to**
-- Windows 10
-- Windows Server 2016
-
-This reference topic for the IT professional describes security principals in regards to Windows accounts and security groups, in addition to security technologies that are related to security principals.
-
-## What are security principals?
-
-
-Security principals are any entity that can be authenticated by the operating system, such as a user account, a computer account, or a thread or process that runs in the security context of a user or computer account, or the security groups for these accounts. Security principals have long been a foundation for controlling access to securable resources on Windows computers. Each security principal is represented in the operating system by a unique security identifier (SID).
-
-The following content applies to the versions of Windows that are designated in the **Applies To** list at the beginning of this topic.
-
-## How security principals work
-
-
-Security principals that are created in an Active Directory domain are Active Directory objects, which can be used to manage access to domain resources. Each security principal is assigned a unique identifier, which it retains for its entire lifetime. Local user accounts and security groups are created on a local computer, and they can be used to manage access to resources on that computer. Local user accounts and security groups are managed by the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local computer.
-
-### Authorization and access control components
-
-The following diagram illustrates the Windows authorization and access control process. In this diagram, the subject (a process that is initiated by a user) attempts to access an object, such as a shared folder. The information in the user’s access token is compared to the access control entries (ACEs) in the object’s security descriptor, and the access decision is made. The SIDs of security principals are used in the user’s access token and in the ACEs in the object’s security descriptor.
-
-**Authorization and access control process**
-
-
-
-Security principals are closely related to the following components and technologies:
-
-- [Security identifiers](#bkmk-sids)
-
-- [Access tokens](#bkmk-accesstokens)
-
-- [Security descriptors and access control lists](#bkmk-sdandacls)
-
-- [Permissions](#bkmk-permissions)
-
-### Security identifiers
-
-Security identifiers (SIDs) provide a fundamental building block of the Windows security model. They work with specific components of the authorization and access control technologies in the security infrastructure of the Windows Server operating systems. This helps protect access to network resources and provides a more secure computing environment.
-
-A SID is a value of variable length that is used to uniquely identify a security principal that represents any entity that can be authenticated by the system. These entities include a user account, a computer account, or a thread or process that runs in the security context of a user or computer account. Each security principal is automatically assigned a SID when it is created. The SID is stored in a security database. When a SID is used as the unique identifier for a user or group, it can never be used to identify another user or group.
-
-Each time a user signs in, the system creates an access token for that user. The access token contains the user’s SID, user rights, and the SIDs for groups that the user belongs to. This token provides the security context for whatever actions the user performs on that computer.
-
-In addition to the uniquely created, domain-specific SIDs that are assigned to specific users and groups, there are well-known SIDs that identify generic groups and generic users. For example, the Everyone and the World SIDs identify groups that includes all users. Well-known SIDs have values that remain constant across all operating systems.
-
-### Access tokens
-
-An access token is a protected object that contains information about the identity and user rights that are associated with a user account.
-
-When a user signs in interactively or tries to make a network connection to a computer running Windows, the sign-in process authenticates the user’s credentials. If authentication is successful, the process returns a SID for the user and a list of SIDs for the user’s security groups. The Local Security Authority (LSA) on the computer uses this information to create an access token (in this case, the primary access token). This includes the SIDs that are returned by the sign-in process and a list of user rights that are assigned by the local security policy to the user and to the user’s security groups.
-
-After the LSA creates the primary access token, a copy of the access token is attached to every thread and process that executes on the user’s behalf. Whenever a thread or process interacts with a securable object or tries to perform a system task that requires user rights, the operating system checks the access token that is associated with the thread to determine the level of authorization.
-
-There are two kinds of access tokens, primary and impersonation. Every process has a primary token that describes the security context of the user account that is associated with the process. A primary access token is typically assigned to a process to represent the default security information for that process. Impersonation tokens, on the other hand, are usually used for client and server scenarios. Impersonation tokens enable a thread to run in a security context that differs from the security context of the process that owns the thread.
-
-### Security descriptors and access control lists
-
-A security descriptor is a data structure that is associated with each securable object. All objects in Active Directory and all securable objects on a local computer or on the network have security descriptors to help control access to the objects. Security descriptors include information about who owns an object, who can access it and in what way, and what types of access are audited. Security descriptors contain the access control list (ACL) of an object, which includes all of the security permissions that apply to that object. An object’s security descriptor can contain two types of ACLs:
-
-- A discretionary access control list (DACL), which identifies the users and groups who are allowed or denied access
-
-- A system access control list (SACL), which controls how access is audited
-
-You can use this access control model to individually secure objects and attributes such as files and folders, Active Directory objects, registry keys, printers, devices, ports, services, processes, and threads. Because of this individual control, you can adjust the security of objects to meet the needs of your organization, delegate authority over objects or attributes, and create custom objects or attributes that require unique security protections to be defined.
-
-### Permissions
-
-Permissions enable the owner of each securable object, such as a file, Active Directory object, or registry key, to control who can perform an operation or a set of operations on the object or object property. Permissions are expressed in the security architecture as access control entries (ACEs). Because access to an object is at the discretion of the object’s owner, the type of access control that is used in Windows is called discretionary access control.
-
-Permissions are different from user rights in that permissions are attached to objects, and user rights apply to user accounts. Administrators can assign user rights to groups or users. These rights authorize users to perform specific actions, such as signing in to a system interactively or backing up files and directories.
-
-On computers, user rights enable administrators to control who has the authority to perform operations that affect an entire computer, rather than a particular object. Administrators assign user rights to individual users or groups as part of the security settings for the computer. Although user rights can be managed centrally through Group Policy, they are applied locally. Users can (and usually do) have different user rights on different computers.
-
-For information about which user rights are available and how they can be implemented, see [User Rights Assignment](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/user-rights-assignment).
-
-### Security context in authentication
-
-A user account enables a user to sign in to computers, networks, and domains with an identity that can be authenticated by the computer, network, or domain.
-
-In Windows, any user, service, group, or computer that can initiate action is a security principal. Security principals have accounts, which can be local to a computer or domain-based. For example, domain-joined Windows client computers can participate in a network domain by communicating with a domain controller, even when no user is signed in.
-
-To initiate communications, the computer must have an active account in the domain. Before accepting communications from the computer, the Local Security Authority on the domain controller authenticates the computer’s identity and then defines the computer’s security context just as it would for a user’s security principal.
-
-This security context defines the identity and capabilities of a user or service on a particular computer, or of a user, service, group or computer on a network. For example, it defines the resources (such as a file share or printer) that can be accessed and the actions (such as Read, Write, or Modify) that can be performed by a user, service, or computer on that resource.
-
-The security context of a user or computer can vary from one computer to another, such as when a user authenticates to a server or a workstation other than the user’s primary workstation. It can also vary from one session to another, such as when an administrator modifies the user’s rights and permissions. In addition, the security context is usually different when a user or computer is operating on a stand-alone basis, in a mixed network domain, or as part of an Active Directory domain.
-
-## Accounts and security groups
-
-
-Accounts and security groups that are created in an Active Directory domain are stored in the Active Directory database and managed by using Active Directory tools. These security principals are directory objects, and they can be used to manage access to domain resources.
-
-Local user accounts and security groups are created on a local computer, and they can be used to manage access to resources on that computer. Local user accounts and security groups are stored in and managed by the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local computer.
-
-### User accounts
-
-A user account uniquely identifies a person who is using a computer system. The account signals the system to enforce the appropriate authorization to allow or deny that user access to resources. User accounts can be created in Active Directory and on local computers, and administrators use them to:
-
-- Represent, identify, and authenticate the identity of a user. A user account enables a user to sign in to computers, networks, and domains with a unique identifier that can be authenticated by the computer, network, or domain.
-
-- Authorize (grant or deny) access to resources. After a user has been authenticated, the user is authorized access to resources based on the permissions that are assigned to that user for the resource.
-
-- Audit the actions that are carried out on a user account.
-
-Windows and the Windows Server operating systems have built-in user accounts, or you can create user accounts to meet the requirements of your organization.
-
-### Security groups
-
-A security group is a collection of user accounts, computer accounts, and other groups of accounts that can be managed as a single unit from a security perspective. In Windows operating systems, there are several built-in security groups that are preconfigured with the appropriate rights and permissions for performing specific tasks. Additionally, you can (and, typically, will) create a security group for each unique combination of security requirements that applies to multiple users in your organization.
-
-Groups can be Active Directory-based or local to a particular computer:
-
-- Active Directory security groups are used to manage rights and permissions to domain resources.
-
-- Local groups exist in the SAM database on local computers (on all Windows-based computers) except domain controllers. You use local groups to manage rights and permissions only to resources on the local computer.
-
-By using security groups to manage access control, you can:
-
-- Simplify administration. You can assign a common set of rights, a common set of permissions, or both to many accounts at one time, rather than assigning them to each account individually. Also, when users transfer jobs or leave the organization, permissions are not tied to their user accounts, making permission reassignment or removal easier.
-
-- Implement a role-based access-control model. You can use this model to grant permissions by using groups with different scopes for appropriate purposes. Scopes that are available in Windows include local, global, domain local, and universal.
-
-- Minimize the size of access control lists (ACLs) and speed security checking. A security group has its own SID; therefore, the group SID can be used to specify permissions for a resource. In an environment with more than a few thousand users, if the SIDs of individual user accounts are used to specify access to a resource, the ACL of that resource can become unmanageably large, and the time that is needed for the system to check permissions to the resource can become unacceptable.
-
-For descriptions and settings information about the domain security groups that are defined in Active Directory, see [Active Directory Security Groups](active-directory-security-groups.md).
-
-For descriptions and settings information about the Special Identities group, see [Special Identities](special-identities.md).
-
-## See also
-
-- [Access Control Overview](access-control.md)
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/service-accounts.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/service-accounts.md
deleted file mode 100644
index cd6db0f4f7..0000000000
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/service-accounts.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
----
-title: Service Accounts (Windows 10)
-description: Service Accounts
-ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
-ms.collection:
- - M365-identity-device-management
- - highpri
-ms.topic: article
-ms.localizationpriority: medium
-ms.date: 11/19/2021
----
-
-# Service Accounts
-
-**Applies to**
-- Windows 10
-- Windows Server 2016
-
-This topic for the IT professional explains group and standalone managed service accounts, and the computer-specific virtual computer account, and it points to resources about these service accounts.
-
-## Overview
-
-A service account is a user account that is created explicitly to provide a security context for services running on Windows Server operating systems. The security context determines the service's ability to access local and network resources. The Windows operating systems rely on services to run various features. These services can be configured through the applications, the Services snap-in, or Task Manager, or by using Windows PowerShell.
-
-This topic contains information about the following types of service accounts:
-
-- [Standalone managed service accounts](#bkmk-standalonemanagedserviceaccounts)
-
-- [Group-managed service accounts](#bkmk-groupmanagedserviceaccounts)
-
-- [Virtual accounts](#bkmk-virtualserviceaccounts)
-
-### Standalone managed service accounts
-
-A managed service account is designed to isolate domain accounts in crucial applications, such as Internet Information Services (IIS), and eliminate the need for an administrator to manually administer the service principal name (SPN) and credentials for the accounts.
-
-To use managed service accounts, the server on which the application or service is installed must be running at least Windows Server 2008 R2. One managed service account can be used for services on a single computer. Managed service accounts cannot be shared between multiple computers, and they cannot be used in server clusters where a service is replicated on multiple cluster nodes. For this scenario, you must use a group-managed service account. For more information, see [Group-Managed Service Accounts Overview](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/hh831782(v=ws.11)).
-
-In addition to the enhanced security that is provided by having individual accounts for critical services, there are four important administrative benefits associated with managed service accounts:
-
-- You can create a class of domain accounts that can be used to manage and maintain services on local computers.
-
-- Unlike domain accounts in which administrators must manually reset passwords, the network passwords for these accounts are automatically reset.
-
-- You do not have to complete complex SPN management tasks to use managed service accounts.
-- You don't have to complete complex SPN management tasks to use managed service accounts.
-- Administrative tasks for managed service accounts can be delegated to non-administrators.
-
-### Software requirements
-
-Managed service accounts apply to the Windows operating systems that are designated in the **Applies To** list at the beginning of this topic.
-
-### Group-managed service accounts
-
-Group-managed service accounts are an extension of the standalone-managed service accounts, which were introduced in Windows Server 2008 R2. These accounts are managed domain accounts that provide automatic password management and simplified service principal name (SPN) management, including delegation of management to other administrators.
-
-The group-managed service account provides the same functionality as a standalone managed service account within the domain, but it extends that functionality over multiple servers. When connecting to a service that is hosted on a server farm, such as Network Load Balancing, the authentication protocols that support mutual authentication require all instances of the services to use the same principal. When group-managed service accounts are used as service principals, the Windows Server operating system manages the password for the account instead of relying on the administrator to manage the password.
-
-The Microsoft Key Distribution Service (kdssvc.dll) provides the mechanism to securely obtain the latest key or a specific key with a key identifier for an Active Directory account. This service was introduced in Windows Server 2012, and it does not run on previous versions of the Windows Server operating system. The Key Distribution Service shares a secret, which is used to create keys for the account. These keys are periodically changed. For a group-managed service account, the domain controller computes the password on the key that is provided by the Key Distribution Services, in addition to other attributes of the group-managed service account.
-
-### Practical applications
-
-Group-managed service accounts provide a single identity solution for services running on a server farm, or on systems that use Network Load Balancing. By providing a group-managed service account solution, services can be configured for the group-managed service account principal, and the password management is handled by the operating system.
-
-By using a group-managed service account, service administrators do not need to manage password synchronization between service instances. The group-managed service account supports hosts that are kept offline for an extended time period and the management of member hosts for all instances of a service. This provision means that you can deploy a server farm that supports a single identity to which existing client computers can authenticate without knowing the instance of the service to which they are connecting.
-
-Failover clusters do not support group-managed service accounts. However, services that run on top of the Cluster service can use a group-managed service account or a standalone managed service account if they are a Windows service, an App pool, a scheduled task, or if they natively support group-managed service account or standalone managed service accounts.
-
-### Software requirements
-
-Group-managed service accounts can only be configured and administered on computers running at least Windows Server 2012, but they can be deployed as a single service identity solution in domains that still have domain controllers running operating systems earlier than Windows Server 2012. There are no domain or forest functional level requirements.
-
-A 64-bit architecture is required to run the Windows PowerShell commands that are used to administer group-managed service accounts.
-
-A managed service account is dependent on encryption types supported by Kerberos. When a client computer authenticates to a server by using Kerberos protocol, the domain controller creates a Kerberos service ticket that is protected with encryption that the domain controller and the server support. The domain controller uses the account’s **msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes** attribute to determine what encryption the server supports, and if there is no attribute, it assumes that the client computer does not support stronger encryption types. The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) must always be configured for managed service accounts. If computers that host the managed service account are configured to not support RC4, authentication will always fail.
-
-**Note**
-Introduced in Windows Server 2008 R2, the Data Encryption Standard (DES) is disabled by default. For more information about supported encryption types, see [Changes in Kerberos Authentication](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd560670(v=ws.10)).
-
-Group-managed service accounts are not applicable in Windows operating systems prior to Windows Server 2012.
-
-### Virtual accounts
-
-Virtual accounts were introduced in Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7, and are managed local accounts that provide the following features to simplify service administration:
-
-- The virtual account is automatically managed.
-
-- The virtual account can access the network in a domain environment.
-
-- No password management is required. For example, if the default value is used for the service accounts during SQL Server setup on Windows Server 2008 R2, a virtual account that uses the instance name as the service name is established in the format NT SERVICE\\<SERVICENAME>.
-
-Services that run as virtual accounts access network resources by using the credentials of the computer account in the format <domain\_name>\\<computer\_name>$.
-
-For information about how to configure and use virtual service accounts, see [Service Accounts Step-by-Step Guide](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd548356(v=ws.10)).
-
-### Software requirements
-
-Virtual accounts apply to the Windows operating systems that are designated in the **Applies To** list at the beginning of this topic.
-
-## See also
-
-
-The following table provides links to other resources that are related to standalone managed service accounts, group-managed service accounts, and virtual accounts.
-
-| Content type | References |
-|---------------|-------------|
-| **Product evaluation** | [What's New for Managed Service Accounts](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/hh831451(v=ws.11))
[Getting Started with Group Managed Service Accounts](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/jj128431(v=ws.11)) |
-| **Deployment** | [Windows Server 2012: Group Managed Service Accounts - Ask Premier Field Engineering (PFE) Platforms - Site Home - TechNet Blogs](https://blogs.technet.com/b/askpfeplat/archive/2012/12/17/windows-server-2012-group-managed-service-accounts.aspx) |
-| **Related technologies** | [Security Principals](security-principals.md)
[What's new in Active Directory Domain Services](/windows-server/identity/whats-new-active-directory-domain-services) |
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/special-identities.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/special-identities.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 995d23b020..0000000000
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/special-identities.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,448 +0,0 @@
----
-title: Special Identities (Windows 10)
-description: Special Identities
-ms.prod: m365-security
-ms.technology: windows-sec
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
-ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
-ms.topic: article
-ms.localizationpriority: medium
-ms.date: 12/21/2021
-ms.reviewer:
----
-
-# Special Identities
-
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows Server 2016 or later
-
-This reference topic for the IT professional describes the special identity groups (which are sometimes referred to as security groups) that are used in Windows access control.
-
-Special identity groups are similar to Active Directory security groups as listed in the users and built-in containers. Special identity groups can provide an efficient way to assign access to resources in your network. By using special identity groups, you can:
-
-- Assign user rights to security groups in Active Directory.
-- Assign permissions to security groups for the purpose of accessing resources.
-
-Servers that are running the supported Windows Server operating systems designated in the **Applies To** list at the beginning of this topic include several special identity groups. These special identity groups do not have specific memberships that can be modified, but they can represent different users at different times, depending on the circumstances.
-
-Although the special identity groups can be assigned rights and permissions to resources, the memberships cannot be modified or viewed. Group scopes do not apply to special identity groups. Users are automatically assigned to these special identity groups whenever they sign in or access a particular resource.
-
-For information about security groups and group scope, see [Active Directory Security Groups](active-directory-security-groups.md).
-
-The special identity groups are described in the following tables:
-
-- [Anonymous Logon](#anonymous-logon)
-- [Attested Key Property](#attested-key-property)
-- [Authenticated Users](#authenticated-users)
-- [Authentication Authority Asserted Identity](#authentication-authority-asserted-identity)
-- [Batch](#batch)
-- [Console Logon](#console-logon)
-- [Creator Group](#creator-group)
-- [Creator Owner](#creator-owner)
-- [Dialup](#dialup)
-- [Digest Authentication](#digest-authentication)
-- [Enterprise Domain Controllers](#enterprise-domain-controllers)
-- [Everyone](#everyone)
-- [Fresh Public Key Identity](#fresh-public-key-identity)
-- [Interactive](#interactive)
-- [IUSR](#iusr)
-- [Key Trust](#key-trust)
-- [Local Service](#local-service)
-- [LocalSystem](#localsystem)
-- [MFA Key Property](#mfa-key-property)
-- [Network](#network)
-- [Network Service](#network-service)
-- [NTLM Authentication](#ntlm-authentication)
-- [Other Organization](#other-organization)
-- [Owner Rights](#owner-rights)
-- [Principal Self](#principal-self)
-- [Proxy](#proxy)
-- [Remote Interactive Logon](#remote-interactive-logon)
-- [Restricted](#restricted)
-- [SChannel Authentication](#schannel-authentication)
-- [Service](#service)
-- [Service Asserted Identity](#service-asserted-identity)
-- [Terminal Server User](#terminal-server-user)
-- [This Organization](#this-organization)
-- [Window Manager\\Window Manager Group](#window-managerwindow-manager-group)
-
-## Anonymous Logon
-
-Any user who accesses the system through an anonymous logon has the Anonymous Logon identity. This identity allows anonymous access to resources, such as a web page that is published on corporate servers. The Anonymous Logon group is not a member of the Everyone group by default.
-
-| Attribute | Value |
-| :--: | :--: |
-| Well-Known SID/RID | S-1-5-7 |
-|Object Class| Foreign Security Principal|
-|Default Location in Active Directory |cn=WellKnown Security Principals, cn=Configuration, dc=\
[Add workstations to domain](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/add-workstations-to-domain): SeMachineAccountPrivilege
[Bypass traverse checking](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/bypass-traverse-checking): SeChangeNotifyPrivilege|
-
-## Authentication Authority Asserted Identity
-
-A SID that means the client's identity is asserted by an authentication authority based on proof of possession of client credentials.
-
-| Attribute | Value |
-| :--: | :--: |
-| Well-Known SID/RID | S-1-18-1 |
-|Object Class| Foreign Security Principal|
-|Default Location in Active Directory |cn=WellKnown Security Principals, cn=Configuration, dc=\
[Allow log on locally](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/allow-log-on-locally): SeInteractiveLogonRight|
-
-## Everyone
-
-All interactive, network, dial-up, and authenticated users are members of the Everyone group. This special identity group gives wide access to system resources. Whenever a user logs on to the network, the user is automatically added to the Everyone group.
-
-On computers running Windows 2000 and earlier, the Everyone group included the Anonymous Logon group as a default member, but as of Windows Server 2003, the Everyone group contains only Authenticated Users and Guest; and it no longer includes Anonymous Logon by default (although this can be changed, using Registry Editor, by going to the **Computer\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa** key and setting the value of **everyoneincludesanonymous** DWORD to 1).
-
-Membership is controlled by the operating system.
-
-| Attribute | Value |
-| :--: | :--: |
-| Well-Known SID/RID | S-1-1-0 |
-|Object Class| Foreign Security Principal|
-|Default Location in Active Directory |cn=WellKnown Security Principals, cn=Configuration, dc=\
[Bypass traverse checking](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/bypass-traverse-checking): SeChangeNotifyPrivilege
[Change the system time](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/change-the-system-time): SeSystemtimePrivilege
[Change the time zone](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/change-the-time-zone): SeTimeZonePrivilege
[Create global objects](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/create-global-objects): SeCreateGlobalPrivilege
[Generate security audits](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/generate-security-audits): SeAuditPrivilege
[Impersonate a client after authentication](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/impersonate-a-client-after-authentication): SeImpersonatePrivilege
[Replace a process level token](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/replace-a-process-level-token): SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege
|
-
-## LocalSystem
-
-This is a service account that is used by the operating system. The LocalSystem account is a powerful account that has full access to the system and acts as the computer on the network. If a service logs on to the LocalSystem account on a domain controller, that service has access to the entire domain. Some services are configured by default to log on to the LocalSystem account. Do not change the default service setting. The name of the account is LocalSystem. This account does not have a password.
-
-| Attribute | Value |
-| :--: | :--: |
-| Well-Known SID/RID | S-1-5-18 |
-|Object Class| Foreign Security Principal|
-|Default Location in Active Directory |cn=WellKnown Security Principals, cn=Configuration, dc=\
[Bypass traverse checking](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/bypass-traverse-checking): SeChangeNotifyPrivilege
[Create global objects](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/create-global-objects): SeCreateGlobalPrivilege
[Generate security audits](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/generate-security-audits): SeAuditPrivilege
[Impersonate a client after authentication](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/impersonate-a-client-after-authentication): SeImpersonatePrivilege
[Replace a process level token](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/replace-a-process-level-token): SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege
|
-
-## NTLM Authentication
-
-| Attribute | Value |
-| :--: | :--: |
-| Well-Known SID/RID | S-1-5-64-10 |
-|Object Class| Foreign Security Principal|
-|Default Location in Active Directory |cn=WellKnown Security Principals, cn=Configuration, dc=\
[Impersonate a client after authentication](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/impersonate-a-client-after-authentication): SeImpersonatePrivilege
|
-
-## Service Asserted Identity
-
-A SID that means the client's identity is asserted by a service.
-
-| Attribute | Value |
-| :--: | :--: |
-| Well-Known SID/RID | S-1-18-2 |
-|Object Class| Foreign Security Principal|
-|Default Location in Active Directory |cn=WellKnown Security Principals, cn=Configuration, dc=\
[Increase a process working set](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/increase-a-process-working-set): SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege
|
-
-## See also
-
-- [Active Directory Security Groups](active-directory-security-groups.md)
-
-- [Security Principals](security-principals.md)
-
-- [Access Control Overview](access-control.md)
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/configure-s-mime.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/configure-s-mime.md
index 9184e9a43d..b1d3c58e26 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/configure-s-mime.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/configure-s-mime.md
@@ -1,15 +1,17 @@
---
title: Configure S/MIME for Windows
description: S/MIME lets users encrypt outgoing messages and attachments so that only intended recipients with a digital ID, also known as a certificate, can read them.
-ms.reviewer:
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 07/27/2017
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
@@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ S/MIME stands for Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions, and provides an
Users can send encrypted message to people in their organization and people outside their organization if they have their encryption certificates. However, users using Windows Mail app can only read encrypted messages if the message is received on their Exchange account and they have corresponding decryption keys.
-Encrypted messages can be read only by recipients who have a certificate. If you try to send an encrypted message to recipient(s) whose encryption certificate are not available, the app will prompt you to remove these recipients before sending the email.
+Encrypted messages can be read only by recipients who have a certificate. If you try to send an encrypted message to recipients whose encryption certificate is not available, the app will prompt you to remove these recipients before sending the email.
## About digital signatures
@@ -80,7 +82,7 @@ When you receive an encrypted message, the mail app will check whether there is
## Install certificates from a received message
-When you receive a signed email, the app provide feature to install corresponding encryption certificate on your device if the certificate is available. This certificate can then be used to send encrypted email to this person.
+When you receive a signed email, the app provides a feature to install corresponding encryption certificate on your device if the certificate is available. This certificate can then be used to send encrypted email to this person.
1. Open a signed email.
@@ -89,4 +91,4 @@ When you receive a signed email, the app provide feature to install correspondin
3. Tap **Install.**
:::image type="content" alt-text="message security information." source="images/installcert.png":::
-
\ No newline at end of file
+
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/additional-mitigations.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/additional-mitigations.md
index 5be4c34c1e..ae0b3c7b76 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/additional-mitigations.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/additional-mitigations.md
@@ -3,13 +3,13 @@ title: Additional mitigations
description: Advice and sample code for making your domain environment more secure and robust with Windows Defender Credential Guard.
ms.prod: m365-security
ms.localizationpriority: medium
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: erikdau
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
ms.date: 08/17/2017
-ms.reviewer:
---
# Additional mitigations
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Windows Defender Credential Guard can provide mitigation against attacks on deri
## Restricting domain users to specific domain-joined devices
-Credential theft attacks allow the attacker to steal secrets from one device and use them from another device. If a user can sign on to multiple devices then any device could be used to steal credentials. How do you ensure that users only sign on using devices that have Windows Defender Credential Guard enabled? By deploying authentication policies that restrict them to specific domain-joined devices that have been configured with Windows Defender Credential Guard. For the domain controller to know what device a user is signing on from, Kerberos armoring must be used.
+Credential theft attacks allow the attacker to steal secrets from one device and use them from another device. If a user can sign on to multiple devices then any device could be used to steal credentials. How do you ensure that users only sign on with devices that have Windows Defender Credential Guard enabled? By deploying authentication policies that restrict them to specific domain-joined devices that have been configured with Windows Defender Credential Guard. For the domain controller to know what device a user is signing on from, Kerberos armoring must be used.
### Kerberos armoring
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Kerberos armoring is part of RFC 6113. When a device supports Kerberos armoring,
### Protecting domain-joined device secrets
-Since domain-joined devices also use shared secrets for authentication, attackers can steal those secrets as well. By deploying device certificates with Windows Defender Credential Guard, the private key can be protected. Then authentication policies can require that users sign on devices that authenticate using those certificates. This prevents shared secrets stolen from the device to be used with stolen user credentials to sign on as the user.
+Since domain-joined devices also use shared secrets for authentication, attackers can steal those secrets as well. By deploying device certificates with Windows Defender Credential Guard, the private key can be protected. Then authentication policies can require that users sign on to devices that authenticate using those certificates. This prevents shared secrets stolen from the device to be used with stolen user credentials to sign on as the user.
Domain-joined device certificate authentication has the following requirements:
- Devices' accounts are in Windows Server 2012 domain functional level or higher.
@@ -96,13 +96,13 @@ Beginning with the Windows Server 2008 R2 domain functional level, domain contro
.\set-IssuancePolicyToGroupLink.ps1 –IssuancePolicyName:"
- single certificate
- p7b
- sst
These files can also be Base64 formatted. All **Site** elements included in the same **PinRule** element can match any of these certificates. | Yes (File, Directory, or Base64 must be present). |
| **Directory** | Path to a directory containing one or more of the above certificate files. Skips any files not containing any certificates. | Yes (File, Directory, or Base64 must be present). |
| **Base64** | Base64 encoded certificate(s). Where the certificate(s) can be encoded as:
- single certificate
- p7b
- sst
This allows the certificates to be included in the XML file without a file directory dependency.
Note:
You can use **certutil -encode** to convert a .cer file into base64. You can then use Notepad to copy and paste the base64 encoded certificate into the pin rule. | Yes (File, Directory, or Base64 must be present). |
-| **EndDate** | Enables you to configure an expiration date for when the certificate is no longer valid in the pin rule.
If you are in the process of switching to a new root or CA, you can set the **EndDate** to allow matching of this element’s certificates.
If the current time is past the **EndDate**, then, when creating the certificate trust list (CTL), the parser outputs a warning message and exclude the certificate(s) from the Pin Rule in the generated CTL.
For help with formatting Pin Rules, see [Representing a Date in XML](#representing-a-date-in-xml).| No.|
+| **EndDate** | Enables you to configure an expiration date for when the certificate is no longer valid in the pin rule.
If you are in the process of switching to a new root or CA, you can set the **EndDate** to allow matching of this element’s certificates.
If the current time is past the **EndDate**, then, when creating the certificate trust list (CTL), the parser outputs a warning message and excludes the certificate(s) from the Pin Rule in the generated CTL.
For help with formatting Pin Rules, see [Representing a Date in XML](#representing-a-date-in-xml).| No.|
#### Site element
@@ -107,7 +106,7 @@ The **Site** element can have the following attributes.
| Attribute | Description | Required |
|-----------|-------------|----------|
-| **Domain** | Contains the DNS name to be matched for this pin rule. When creating the certificate trust list, the parser normalizes the input name string value as follows:
- If the DNS name has a leading "*", it's removed.
- Non-ASCII DNS name is converted to ASCII Puny Code.
- Upper case ASCII characters are converted to lower case.
If the normalized name has a leading ".", then, wildcard left-hand label matching is enabled. For example, ".xyz.com" would match "abc.xyz.com". | Yes.|
+| **Domain** | Contains the DNS name to be matched for this pin rule. When creating the certificate trust list, the parser normalizes the input name string value as follows:
- If the DNS name has a leading "*", it's removed.
- Non-ASCII DNS name is converted to ASCII Puny Code.
- Upper case ASCII characters are converted to lower case.
If the normalized name has a leading ".", then wildcard left-hand label matching is enabled. For example, ".xyz.com" would match "abc.xyz.com". | Yes.|
| **AllSubdomains** | By default, wildcard left-hand label matching is restricted to a single left-hand label. This attribute can be set to "true" to enable wildcard matching of all of the left-hand labels.
For example, setting this attribute would also match "123.abc.xyz.com" for the ".xyz.com" domain value.| No.|
### Create a Pin Rules Certificate Trust List
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/WebAuthnAPIs.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/WebAuthnAPIs.md
index af4b0207cd..c84b17cee4 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/WebAuthnAPIs.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/WebAuthnAPIs.md
@@ -2,14 +2,14 @@
title: WebAuthn APIs
description: Learn how to use WebAuthn APIs to enable password-less authentication for your sites and apps.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 02/15/2019
-ms.reviewer:
---
# WebAuthn APIs for password-less authentication on Windows
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/feature-multifactor-unlock.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/feature-multifactor-unlock.md
index 46c5ce15d2..50dac1c934 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/feature-multifactor-unlock.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/feature-multifactor-unlock.md
@@ -2,22 +2,20 @@
title: Multi-factor Unlock
description: Learn how Windows 10 and Windows 11 offer multi-factor device unlock by extending Windows Hello with trusted signals.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 03/20/2018
-ms.reviewer:
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
+manager: aaroncz
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# Multi-factor Unlock
-**Applies to:**
-
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-
**Requirements:**
* Windows Hello for Business deployment (Cloud, Hybrid or On-premises)
* Azure AD, Hybrid Azure AD, or Domain Joined (Cloud, Hybrid, or On-Premises deployments)
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-aad-join-cloud-only-deploy.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-aad-join-cloud-only-deploy.md
index a22fdc4c4b..1c3acf11f8 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-aad-join-cloud-only-deploy.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-aad-join-cloud-only-deploy.md
@@ -2,14 +2,17 @@
title: Azure Active Directory join cloud only deployment
description: Use this deployment guide to successfully use Azure Active Directory to join a Windows 10 or Windows 11 device.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 06/23/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
+manager: aaroncz
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# Azure Active Directory join cloud only deployment
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-adequate-domain-controllers.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-adequate-domain-controllers.md
index 201f155223..edba592b4e 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-adequate-domain-controllers.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-adequate-domain-controllers.md
@@ -2,24 +2,23 @@
title: Having enough Domain Controllers for Windows Hello for Business deployments
description: Guide for planning to have an adequate number of Windows Server 2016 or later Domain Controllers for Windows Hello for Business deployments
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 08/20/2018
-ms.reviewer:
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
+manager: aaroncz
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Windows Server 2016 or later
+- ✅ Hybrid or On-Premises deployment
+- ✅ Key trust
---
# Planning an adequate number of Windows Server 2016 or later Domain Controllers for Windows Hello for Business deployments
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later, or Windows 11
-- Windows Server, versions 2016 or later
-- Hybrid or On-Premises deployment
-- Key trust
-
> [!NOTE]
>There was an issue with key trust authentication on Windows Server 2019. To fix it, refer to [KB4487044](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/4487044/windows-10-update-kb4487044).
@@ -90,7 +89,7 @@ Using the same methods described above, monitor the Kerberos authentication afte
```"Every n Windows Hello for Business clients results in x percentage of key-trust authentication."```
-Where _n_ equals the number of clients you switched to Windows Hello for Business and _x_ equals the increased percentage of authentication from the upgraded domain controller. Armed with this information, you can apply the observations of upgrading domain controllers and increasing Windows Hello for Business client count to appropriately phase your deployment.
+Where *n* equals the number of clients you switched to Windows Hello for Business and _x_ equals the increased percentage of authentication from the upgraded domain controller. Armed with this information, you can apply the observations of upgrading domain controllers and increasing Windows Hello for Business client count to appropriately phase your deployment.
Remember, increasing the number of clients changes the volume of authentication distributed across the Windows Server 2016 or newer domain controllers. If there is only one Windows Server 2016 or newer domain controller, there's no distribution and you are simply increasing the volume of authentication for which THAT domain controller is responsible.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-and-password-changes.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-and-password-changes.md
index 409d7ad594..0b82e155e7 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-and-password-changes.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-and-password-changes.md
@@ -1,23 +1,21 @@
---
title: Windows Hello and password changes (Windows)
description: When you change your password on a device, you may need to sign in with a password on other devices to reset Hello.
-ms.reviewer:
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 07/27/2017
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
+manager: aaroncz
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# Windows Hello and password changes
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-
When you set up Windows Hello, the PIN or biometric gesture that you use is specific to that device. You can set up Hello for the same account on multiple devices. If the PIN or biometric is configured as part of Windows Hello for Business, changing the account password will not impact sign-in or unlock with these gestures since it uses a key or certificate. However, if Windows Hello for Business is not deployed and the password for that account changes, you must provide the new password on each device to continue to use Hello.
## Example
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-biometrics-in-enterprise.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-biometrics-in-enterprise.md
index 1b7fc74348..ebbea60361 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-biometrics-in-enterprise.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-biometrics-in-enterprise.md
@@ -2,24 +2,23 @@
title: Windows Hello biometrics in the enterprise (Windows)
description: Windows Hello uses biometrics to authenticate users and guard against potential spoofing, through fingerprint matching and facial recognition.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
ms.collection:
- M365-identity-device-management
- highpri
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 01/12/2021
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
+manager: aaroncz
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# Windows Hello biometrics in the enterprise
-**Applies to:**
-
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-
Windows Hello is the biometric authentication feature that helps strengthen authentication and helps to guard against potential spoofing through fingerprint matching and facial recognition.
>[!NOTE]
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-cert-trust-adfs.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-cert-trust-adfs.md
index 7c1152e8bf..da1d9d6154 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-cert-trust-adfs.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-cert-trust-adfs.md
@@ -2,24 +2,22 @@
title: Prepare and Deploy Windows AD FS certificate trust (Windows Hello for Business)
description: Learn how to Prepare and Deploy Windows Server 2016 Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) for Windows Hello for Business, using certificate trust.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 01/14/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
+manager: aaroncz
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ On-premises deployments
+- ✅ Certificate trust
---
# Prepare and Deploy Windows Server 2016 Active Directory Federation Services - Certificate Trust
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- On-premises deployment
-- Certificate trust
-
Windows Hello for Business works exclusively with the Active Directory Federation Service role included with Windows Server 2016 and requires an additional server update. The on-premises certificate trust deployment uses Active Directory Federation Services roles for key registration, device registration, and as a certificate registration authority.
The following guidance describes deploying a new instance of Active Directory Federation Services 2016 using the Windows Information Database as the configuration database, which is ideal for environments with no more than 30 federation servers and no more than 100 relying party trusts.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-cert-trust-policy-settings.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-cert-trust-policy-settings.md
index eda6b35e15..36186166cf 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-cert-trust-policy-settings.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-cert-trust-policy-settings.md
@@ -2,25 +2,24 @@
title: Configure Windows Hello for Business Policy settings - certificate trust
description: Configure Windows Hello for Business Policy settings for Windows Hello for Business. Certificate-based deployments need three group policy settings.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
ms.collection:
- M365-identity-device-management
- highpri
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 08/20/2018
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
+manager: aaroncz
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ On-premises deployments
+- ✅ Certificate trust
---
# Configure Windows Hello for Business Policy settings - Certificate Trust
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- On-premises deployment
-- Certificate trust
-
You need at least a Windows 10, version 1703 workstation to run the Group Policy Management Console, which provides the latest Windows Hello for Business and PIN Complexity Group Policy settings. To run the Group Policy Management Console, you need to install the Remote Server Administration Tools for Windows. You can download these tools from the [Microsoft Download Center](https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=45520).
Install the Remote Server Administration Tools for Windows on a computer running Windows 10, version 1703 or later.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-cert-trust-validate-ad-prereq.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-cert-trust-validate-ad-prereq.md
index 281f5bf449..9d4ca3a2f5 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-cert-trust-validate-ad-prereq.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-cert-trust-validate-ad-prereq.md
@@ -2,24 +2,22 @@
title: Update Active Directory schema for cert-trust deployment (Windows Hello for Business)
description: How to Validate Active Directory prerequisites for Windows Hello for Business when deploying with the certificate trust model.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 08/19/2018
-ms.reviewer:
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
+manager: aaroncz
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ On-premises deployments
+- ✅ Certificate trust
---
# Validate Active Directory prerequisites for cert-trust deployment
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- On-premises deployment
-- Certificate trust
-
The key registration process for the on-premises deployment of Windows Hello for Business needs the Windows Server 2016 Active Directory or later schema. The key-trust model receives the schema extension when the first Windows Server 2016 or later domain controller is added to the forest. The certificate trust model requires manually updating the current schema to the Windows Server 2016 or later schema.
> [!NOTE]
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-cert-trust-validate-deploy-mfa.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-cert-trust-validate-deploy-mfa.md
index 865759bf10..5ec79ae891 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-cert-trust-validate-deploy-mfa.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-cert-trust-validate-deploy-mfa.md
@@ -2,24 +2,22 @@
title: Validate and Deploy MFA for Windows Hello for Business with certificate trust
description: How to Validate and Deploy Multi-factor Authentication (MFA) Services for Windows Hello for Business with certificate trust
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 08/19/2018
-ms.reviewer:
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
+manager: aaroncz
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ On-premises deployments
+- ✅ Certificate trust
---
# Validate and Deploy Multi-Factor Authentication feature
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- On-premises deployment
-- Certificate trust
-
Windows Hello for Business requires all users perform multi-factor authentication prior to creating and registering a Windows Hello for Business credential. On-premises deployments can use certificates, third-party authentication providers for AD FS, or a custom authentication provider for AD FS as an on-premises MFA option.
For information on available third-party authentication methods, see [Configure Additional Authentication Methods for AD FS](/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/operations/configure-additional-authentication-methods-for-ad-fs). For creating a custom authentication method, see [Build a Custom Authentication Method for AD FS in Windows Server](/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/development/ad-fs-build-custom-auth-method)
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-cert-trust-validate-pki.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-cert-trust-validate-pki.md
index d6356353aa..578db1bd4e 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-cert-trust-validate-pki.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-cert-trust-validate-pki.md
@@ -2,25 +2,22 @@
title: Validate Public Key Infrastructure - certificate trust model (Windows Hello for Business)
description: How to Validate Public Key Infrastructure for Windows Hello for Business, under a certificate trust model.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 08/19/2018
-ms.reviewer:
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
+manager: aaroncz
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ On-premises deployments
+- ✅ Certificate trust
---
# Validate and Configure Public Key Infrastructure - Certificate Trust Model
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- On-premises deployment
-- Certificate trust
-
-
Windows Hello for Business must have a public key infrastructure regardless of the deployment or trust model. All trust models depend on the domain controllers having a certificate. The certificate serves as a root of trust for clients to ensure they are not communicating with a rogue domain controller. The certificate trust model extends certificate issuance to client computers. During Windows Hello for Business provisioning, the user receives a sign-in certificate.
## Deploy an enterprise certificate authority
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-deployment-cert-trust.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-deployment-cert-trust.md
index 278560bbc5..21b67500a6 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-deployment-cert-trust.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-deployment-cert-trust.md
@@ -2,24 +2,22 @@
title: Windows Hello for Business Deployment Guide - On Premises Certificate Trust Deployment
description: A guide to on premises, certificate trust Windows Hello for Business deployment.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 08/19/2018
-ms.reviewer:
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
+manager: aaroncz
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ On-premises deployments
+- ✅ Certificate trust
---
# On Premises Certificate Trust Deployment
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- On-premises deployment
-- Certificate trust
-
Windows Hello for Business replaces username and password sign-in to Windows with authentication using an asymmetric key pair. This deployment guide provides the information you'll need to successfully deploy Windows Hello for Business in an existing environment.
Below, you can find all the information needed to deploy Windows Hello for Business in a Certificate Trust Model in your on-premises environment:
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-deployment-guide.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-deployment-guide.md
index afe7fdf157..0f2c45e2f0 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-deployment-guide.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-deployment-guide.md
@@ -2,9 +2,10 @@
title: Windows Hello for Business Deployment Overview
description: Use this deployment guide to successfully deploy Windows Hello for Business in an existing environment.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection:
- M365-identity-device-management
- highpri
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-deployment-issues.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-deployment-issues.md
index 47d8b38c53..43ff73fc92 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-deployment-issues.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-deployment-issues.md
@@ -3,14 +3,14 @@ title: Windows Hello for Business Deployment Known Issues
description: A Troubleshooting Guide for Known Windows Hello for Business Deployment Issues
params: siblings_only
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 05/03/2021
-ms.reviewer:
---
# Windows Hello for Business Known Deployment Issues
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-deployment-key-trust.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-deployment-key-trust.md
index 280f51120d..faab624132 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-deployment-key-trust.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-deployment-key-trust.md
@@ -2,24 +2,22 @@
title: Windows Hello for Business Deployment Guide - On Premises Key Deployment
description: A guide to on premises, key trust Windows Hello for Business deployment.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 08/20/2018
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ On-premises deployment
+- ✅ Key trust
---
# On Premises Key Trust Deployment
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- On-premises deployment
-- Key trust
-
Windows Hello for Business replaces username and password sign-in to Windows with strong user authentication based on asymmetric key pair. The following deployment guide provides the information needed to successfully deploy Windows Hello for Business in an existing environment.
Below, you can find all the information you need to deploy Windows Hello for Business in a key trust model in your on-premises environment:
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-deployment-rdp-certs.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-deployment-rdp-certs.md
index 5df469ff3e..d0cc1cad93 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-deployment-rdp-certs.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-deployment-rdp-certs.md
@@ -2,25 +2,23 @@
title: Deploying Certificates to Key Trust Users to Enable RDP
description: Learn how to deploy certificates to a Key Trust user to enable remote desktop with supplied credentials
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 02/22/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Hybrid deployment
+- ✅ Key trust
---
# Deploying Certificates to Key Trust Users to Enable RDP
-**Applies To**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- Hybrid deployment
-- Key trust
-
Windows Hello for Business supports using a certificate as the supplied credential when establishing a remote desktop connection to a server or other device. For certificate trust deployments, creation of this certificate occurs at container creation time.
This document discusses an approach for key trust deployments where authentication certificates can be deployed to an existing key trust user.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation.md
index 631d982e36..d995550c13 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation.md
@@ -2,24 +2,23 @@
title: Windows Hello errors during PIN creation (Windows)
description: When you set up Windows Hello in Windows 10/11, you may get an error during the Create a work PIN step.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection:
- M365-identity-device-management
- highpri
ms.topic: troubleshooting
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 05/05/2018
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# Windows Hello errors during PIN creation
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-
When you set up Windows Hello in Windows client, you may get an error during the **Create a PIN** step. This topic lists some of the error codes with recommendations for mitigating the problem. If you get an error code that is not listed here, contact Microsoft Support.
## Where is the error code?
@@ -70,6 +69,8 @@ If the error occurs again, check the error code against the following table to s
| 0x801C044D | Authorization token does not contain device ID. | Unjoin the device from Azure AD and rejoin. |
| | Unable to obtain user token. | Sign out and then sign in again. Check network and credentials. |
| 0x801C044E | Failed to receive user credentials input. | Sign out and then sign in again. |
+| 0xC00000BB | Your PIN or this option is temporarily unavailable.| The destination domain controller doesn't support the login method. Most often the KDC service doesn't have the proper certificate to support the login. Use a different login method.|
+
## Errors with unknown mitigation
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-event-300.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-event-300.md
index 3e481d0f4d..8fa58bce19 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-event-300.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-event-300.md
@@ -1,24 +1,22 @@
---
title: Event ID 300 - Windows Hello successfully created (Windows)
description: This event is created when a Windows Hello for Business is successfully created and registered with Azure Active Directory (Azure AD).
-ms.reviewer:
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 07/27/2017
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# Event ID 300 - Windows Hello successfully created
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-
This event is created when Windows Hello for Business is successfully created and registered with Azure Active Directory (Azure AD). Applications or services can trigger actions on this event. For example, a certificate provisioning service can listen to this event and trigger a certificate request.
## Event details
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-faq.yml b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-faq.yml
index 2f77d6ba0e..5900a1444c 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-faq.yml
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-faq.yml
@@ -8,20 +8,22 @@ metadata:
ms.sitesec: library
ms.pagetype: security, mobile
audience: ITPro
- author: GitPrakhar13
- ms.author: prsriva
- manager: dansimp
+ author: paolomatarazzo
+ ms.author: paoloma
+ manager: aaroncz
+ ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection:
- M365-identity-device-management
- highpri
ms.topic: faq
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 02/21/2022
+ appliesto:
+ - ✅ Windows 10
+ - ✅ Windows 11
title: Windows Hello for Business Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
summary: |
- Applies to: Windows 10
-
sections:
- name: Ignored
@@ -31,6 +33,7 @@ sections:
answer: |
Windows Hello for Business cloud trust is a new trust model that is currently in preview. This trust model will enable Windows Hello for Business deployment using the infrastructure introduced for supporting [security key sign-in on Hybrid Azure AD-joined devices and on-premises resource access on Azure AD Joined devices](/azure/active-directory/authentication/howto-authentication-passwordless-security-key-on-premises). Cloud trust is the preferred deployment model if you do not need to support certificate authentication scenarios. For more information, see [Hybrid Cloud Trust Deployment (Preview)](/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cloud-trust).
+
- question: What about virtual smart cards?
answer: |
Windows Hello for Business is the modern, two-factor credential for Windows 10. Microsoft will be deprecating virtual smart cards in the future, but no date is set at this time. Customers using Windows 10 and virtual smart cards should move to Windows Hello for Business. Microsoft will publish the date early to ensure customers have adequate lead time to move to Windows Hello for Business. Microsoft recommends that new Windows 10 deployments use Windows Hello for Business. Virtual smart cards remain supported for Windows 7 and Windows 8.
@@ -42,6 +45,7 @@ sections:
- question: Can I use Windows Hello for Business key trust and RDP?
answer: |
Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) doesn't currently support using key-based authentication and self-signed certificates as supplied credentials. However, you can deploy certificates in the key trust model to enable RDP. For more information, see [Deploying certificates to key trust users to enable RDP](hello-deployment-rdp-certs.md). In addition, Windows Hello for Business key trust can be also used with RDP with [Windows Defender Remote Credential Guard](../remote-credential-guard.md) without deploying certificates.
+
- question: Can I deploy Windows Hello for Business by using Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager?
answer: |
@@ -57,9 +61,8 @@ sections:
- question: How can a PIN be more secure than a password?
answer: |
- The Windows Hello for Business PIN isn't a symmetric key, whereas a password is a symmetric key. With passwords, there's a server that has some representation of the password. With Windows Hello for Business, the PIN is user-provided entropy used to load the private key in the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). The server doesn't have a copy of the PIN. For that matter, the Windows client doesn't have a copy of the current PIN either. The user must provide the entropy, the TPM-protected key, and the TPM that generated that key in order to successfully access the private key.
-
- The statement "PIN is stronger than Password" isn't directed at the strength of the entropy used by the PIN. It's about the difference between providing entropy versus continuing the use of a symmetric key (the password). The TPM has anti-hammering features that thwart brute-force PIN attacks (an attacker's continuous attempt to try all combination of PINs). Some organizations may worry about shoulder surfing. For those organizations, rather than increase the complexity of the PIN, implement the [Multi-factor Unlock](feature-multifactor-unlock.md) feature.
+ When using Windows Hello for Business, the PIN isn't a symmetric key, whereas the password is a symmetric key. With passwords, there's a server that has some representation of the password. With Windows Hello for Business, the PIN is user-provided entropy used to load the private key in the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). The server doesn't have a copy of the PIN. For that matter, the Windows client doesn't have a copy of the current PIN either. The user must provide the entropy, the TPM-protected key, and the TPM that generated that key in order to successfully access the private key.
+ The statement "PIN is stronger than Password" is not directed at the strength of the entropy used by the PIN. It's about the difference between providing entropy versus continuing the use of a symmetric key (the password). The TPM has anti-hammering features that thwart brute-force PIN attacks (an attacker's continuous attempt to try all combination of PINs). Some organizations may worry about shoulder surfing. For those organizations, rather than increase the complexity of the PIN, implement the [Multifactor Unlock](feature-multifactor-unlock.md) feature.
- question: How does Windows Hello for Business work with Azure AD registered devices?
answer: |
@@ -123,9 +126,9 @@ sections:
- question: What's the difference between non-destructive and destructive PIN reset?
answer: |
- Windows Hello for Business has two types of PIN reset: non-destructive and destructive. Organizations running Windows 10 Enterprise and Azure Active Directory can take advantage of the Microsoft PIN Reset service. Once on-boarded to a tenant and deployed to computers, users who have forgotten their PINs can authenticate to Azure, provide a second factor of authentication, and reset their PIN without reprovisioning a new Windows Hello for Business enrollment. This flow is a non-destructive PIN reset because the user doesn't delete the current credential and obtain a new one. For more information, see [PIN Reset](hello-feature-pin-reset.md).
+ Windows Hello for Business has two types of PIN reset: non-destructive and destructive. Organizations running Windows 10 version 1903 and later and Azure Active Directory can take advantage of the Microsoft PIN Reset service. Once on-boarded to a tenant and deployed to computers, users who have forgotten their PINs can authenticate to Azure, provide a second factor of authentication, and reset their PIN without reprovisioning a new Windows Hello for Business enrollment. This flow is a non-destructive PIN reset because the user doesn't delete the current credential and obtain a new one. For more information, see [PIN Reset](hello-feature-pin-reset.md).
- Organizations that have the on-premises deployment of Windows Hello for Business, or those not using Windows 10 Enterprise can use destructive PIN reset. With destructive PIN reset, users that have forgotten their PIN can authenticate by using their password and then performing a second factor of authentication to reprovision their Windows Hello for Business credential. Reprovisioning deletes the old credential and requests a new credential and certificate. On-premises deployments need network connectivity to their domain controllers, Active Directory Federation Services, and their issuing certificate authority to perform a destructive PIN reset. For hybrid deployments, destructive PIN reset is only supported with the certificate trust model and the latest updates to Active Directory Federation Services.
+ Organizations that have the on-premises deployment of Windows Hello for Business, or those not using Windows 10 version 1903 and later can use destructive PIN reset. With destructive PIN reset, users that have forgotten their PIN can authenticate by using their password and then performing a second factor of authentication to reprovision their Windows Hello for Business credential. Reprovisioning deletes the old credential and requests a new credential and certificate. On-premises deployments need network connectivity to their domain controllers, Active Directory Federation Services, and their issuing certificate authority to perform a destructive PIN reset. For hybrid Azure Active Directory joined devices, destructive PIN reset is only supported with the certificate trust model and the latest updates to Active Directory Federation Services.
- question: |
Which is better or more secure, key trust or certificate trust?
@@ -149,7 +152,31 @@ sections:
- question: Is Windows Hello for Business multi-factor authentication?
answer: |
Windows Hello for Business is two-factor authentication based on the observed authentication factors of: something you have, something you know, and something that's part of you. Windows Hello for Business incorporates two of these factors: something you have (the user's private key protected by the device's security module) and something you know (your PIN). With the proper hardware, you can enhance the user experience by introducing biometrics. By using biometrics, you can replace the "something you know" authentication factor with the "something that is part of you" factor, with the assurances that users can fall back to the "something you know factor".
-
+
+ - question: Where is Windows Hello biometrics data stored?
+ answer: |
+ When you enroll in Windows Hello, a representation of your face called an enrollment profile is created more information can be found on [Windows Hello face authentication](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/windows-hello-face-authentication). This enrollment profile biometrics data is device specific, is stored locally on the device, and does not leave the device or roam with the user. Some external fingerprint sensors store biometric data on the fingerprint module itself rather than on Windows device. Even in this case, the biometrics data is stored locally on those modules, is device specific, doesn’t roam, never leaves the module, and is never sent to Microsoft cloud or external server. For more details see [Windows Hello biometrics in the enterprise](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-biometrics-in-enterprise#where-is-windows-hello-data-stored).
+
+ - question: What is the format used to store Windows Hello biometrics data on the device?
+ answer: |
+ Windows Hello biometrics data is stored on the device as an encrypted template database. The data from the biometrics sensor (e.g., face camera or fingerprint reader) creates a data representation—or graph—that is then encrypted before it’s stored on the device. Each biometrics sensor on the device which is used by Windows Hello (face or fingerprint) will have its own biometric database file where template data is stored. Each biometrics database file is encrypted with unique, randomly generated key that is encrypted to the system using AES encryption producing an SHA256 hash.
+
+ - question: Who has access on Windows Hello biometrics data?
+ answer: |
+ Since Windows Hello biometrics data is stored in encrypted format, no user, or any process other than Windows Hello has access to it.
+
+ - question: When is Windows Hello biometrics database file created? How is a user enrolled into Windows Hello face or fingerprint authentication?
+ answer: |
+ Windows Hello biometrics template database file is created on the device only when a user is enrolled into Windows Hello biometrics-based authentication. Your workplace or IT administrator may have turned certain authentication functionality, however, it is always your choice if you want to use Windows Hello or an alternative method (e.g. pin). Users can check their current enrollment into Windows Hello biometrics by going to sign-in options on their device. Go to **Start** > **Settings** > **Accounts** > **Sign-in** options. Or just click on **Go to Sign-in options**. To enroll into Windows Hello, user can go to **Start** > **Settings** > **Accounts** > **Sign-in** options, select the Windows Hello method that they want to set up, and then select **Set up**. If you don't see Windows Hello in Sign-in options, then it may not be available for your device or blocked by admin via policy. Admins can by policy request users to enroll into Windows Hello during autopilot or during initial setup of the device. Admins can disallow users to enroll into biometrics via Windows hello for business policy configurations. However, when allowed via policy configurations, enrollment into Windows Hello biometrics is always optional for users.
+
+ - question: When is Windows Hello biometrics database file deleted? How can a user be unenrolled from Windows Hello face or fingerprint authentication?
+ answer: |
+ To remove Windows Hello and any associated biometric identification data from the device, user can go to **Start** > **Settings** > **Accounts** > **Sign-in options**. Select the Windows Hello biometrics authentication method you want to remove, and then select **Remove**. This will unenroll the user from Windows Hello biometrics auth and will also delete the associated biometrics template database file. For more details see [Windows sign-in options and account protection (microsoft.com)](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/windows-sign-in-options-and-account-protection-7b34d4cf-794f-f6bd-ddcc-e73cdf1a6fbf#bkmk_helloandprivacy).
+
+ - question: What about any diagnostic data coming out when WHFB is enabled?
+ answer: |
+ To help us keep things working properly, to help detect and prevent fraud, and to continue improving Windows Hello, we collect diagnostic data about how people use Windows Hello. For example, data about whether people sign in with their face, iris, fingerprint, or PIN; the number of times they use it; and whether it works or not is all valuable information that helps us build a better product. The data is pseudonymized, does not include biometric information, and is encrypted before it is transmitted to Microsoft. You can choose to stop sending diagnostic data to Microsoft at any time. [Learn more about diagnostic data in Windows](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/diagnostics-feedback-and-privacy-in-windows-28808a2b-a31b-dd73-dcd3-4559a5199319).
+
- question: What are the biometric requirements for Windows Hello for Business?
answer: |
Read [Windows Hello biometric requirements](/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/windows-hello-biometric-requirements) for more information.
@@ -206,7 +233,7 @@ sections:
answer: |
Wherever possible, Windows Hello for Business takes advantage of Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 2.0 hardware to generate and protect keys. However, Windows Hello and Windows Hello for Business don't require a TPM. Administrators can choose to allow key operations in software.
- Whenever possible, Microsoft strongly recommends the use of TPM hardware. The TPM protects against a variety of known and potential attacks, including PIN brute-force attacks. The TPM provides an additional layer of protection after an account lockout, too. When the TPM has locked the key material, the user will need to reset the PIN (which means they'll need to use MFA to re-authenticate to the IDP before the IDP allows them to re-register).
+ Whenever possible, Microsoft strongly recommends the use of TPM hardware. The TPM protects against various known and potential attacks, including PIN brute-force attacks. The TPM provides an additional layer of protection after an account lockout, too. When the TPM has locked the key material, the user will need to reset the PIN (which means they'll need to use MFA to reauthenticate to the IDP before the IDP allows them to re-register).
- question: Can Windows Hello for Business work in air-gapped environments?
answer: |
@@ -223,9 +250,9 @@ sections:
| Protocol | Description |
| :---: | :--- |
| [[MS-KPP]: Key Provisioning Protocol](/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-kpp/25ff7bd8-50e3-4769-af23-bcfd0b4d4567) | Specifies the Key Provisioning Protocol, which defines a mechanism for a client to register a set of cryptographic keys on a user and device pair. |
- | [[MS-OAPX]: OAuth 2.0 Protocol Extensions](/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-oapx/7612efd4-f4c8-43c3-aed6-f5c5ce359da2)| Specifies the OAuth 2.0 Protocol Extensions, which are used to extend the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework. These extensions enable authorization features such as resource specification, request identifiers, and login hints. |
+ | [[MS-OAPX]: OAuth 2.0 Protocol Extensions](/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-oapx/7612efd4-f4c8-43c3-aed6-f5c5ce359da2)| Specifies the OAuth 2.0 Protocol Extensions, which are used to extend the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework. These extensions enable authorization features such as resource specification, request identifiers, and log in hints. |
| [[MS-OAPXBC]: OAuth 2.0 Protocol Extensions for Broker Clients](/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-oapxbc/2f7d8875-0383-4058-956d-2fb216b44706) | Specifies the OAuth 2.0 Protocol Extensions for Broker Clients, extensions to RFC6749 (the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework) that allow a broker client to obtain access tokens on behalf of calling clients. |
- | [[MS-OIDCE]: OpenID Connect 1.0 Protocol Extensions](/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-oidce/718379cf-8bc1-487e-962d-208aeb8e70ee) | Specifies the OpenID Connect 1.0 Protocol Extensions. These extensions define additional claims to carry information about the user, including the user principal name, a locally unique identifier, a time for password expiration, and a URL for password change. These extensions also define additional provider meta-data that enables the discovery of the issuer of access tokens and gives additional information about provider capabilities. |
+ | [[MS-OIDCE]: OpenID Connect 1.0 Protocol Extensions](/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-oidce/718379cf-8bc1-487e-962d-208aeb8e70ee) | Specifies the OpenID Connect 1.0 Protocol Extensions. These extensions define other claims to carry information about the user, including the user principal name, a locally unique identifier, a time for password expiration, and a URL for password change. These extensions also define more provider meta-data that enables the discovery of the issuer of access tokens and gives additional information about provider capabilities. |
- question: Does Windows Hello for Business work with Mac and Linux clients?
answer: |
@@ -235,3 +262,4 @@ sections:
- question: Does Windows Hello for Business work with Azure Active Directory Domain Services (Azure AD DS) clients?
answer: |
No, Azure AD DS is a separately managed environment in Azure, and hybrid device registration with cloud Azure AD isn't available for it via Azure AD Connect. Hence, Windows Hello for Business doesn't work with Azure AD.
+
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-feature-conditional-access.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-feature-conditional-access.md
index 5dac00754e..2acbb4823a 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-feature-conditional-access.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-feature-conditional-access.md
@@ -2,14 +2,14 @@
title: Conditional Access
description: Ensure that only approved users can access your devices, applications, and services from anywhere by enabling single sign-on with Azure Active Directory.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 09/09/2019
-ms.reviewer:
---
# Conditional access
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-feature-dual-enrollment.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-feature-dual-enrollment.md
index 445df8f5a8..489d5513cf 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-feature-dual-enrollment.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-feature-dual-enrollment.md
@@ -2,14 +2,14 @@
title: Dual Enrollment
description: Learn how to configure Windows Hello for Business dual enrollment. Also, learn how to configure Active Directory to support Domain Administrator enrollment.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 09/09/2019
-ms.reviewer:
---
# Dual Enrollment
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-feature-dynamic-lock.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-feature-dynamic-lock.md
index bdd56753a1..4fbe94952d 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-feature-dynamic-lock.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-feature-dynamic-lock.md
@@ -2,22 +2,21 @@
title: Dynamic lock
description: Learn how to set Dynamic lock on Windows 10 and Windows 11 devices, by configuring group policies. This feature locks a device when a Bluetooth signal falls below a set value.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 07/12/2022
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# Dynamic lock
-**Requirements:**
-
-* Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-
Dynamic lock enables you to configure Windows devices to automatically lock when Bluetooth paired device signal falls below the maximum Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) value. This makes it more difficult for someone to gain access to your device if you step away from your PC and forget to lock it.
> [!IMPORTANT]
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-feature-pin-reset.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-feature-pin-reset.md
index 7633011c29..5b2df11202 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-feature-pin-reset.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-feature-pin-reset.md
@@ -1,61 +1,68 @@
---
title: Pin Reset
-description: Learn how Microsoft PIN reset services enables you to help users recover who have forgotten their PIN.
+description: Learn how Microsoft PIN reset services enable you to help users recover who have forgotten their PIN.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection:
- M365-identity-device-management
- highpri
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
-ms.date: 5/3/2021
+ms.date: 07/29/2022
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# PIN reset
-**Applies to:**
+Windows Hello for Business provides the capability for users to reset forgotten PINs using the *I forgot my PIN* link from the Sign-in options page in *Settings* or from the Windows lock screen. Users are required to authenticate and complete multi-factor authentication to reset their PIN.
-- Windows 10, version 1709 or later
-- Windows 11
+There are two forms of PIN reset:
-Windows Hello for Business provides the capability for users to reset forgotten PINs using the "I forgot my PIN link" from the Sign-in options page in Settings or from above the lock screen. User's are required to authenticate and complete multifactor authentication to reset their PIN.
+- **Destructive PIN reset**: with this option, the user's existing PIN and underlying credentials, including any keys or certificates added to their Windows Hello container, are deleted from the client and a new login key and PIN are provisioned. Destructive PIN reset is the default option, and doesn't require configuration.
+- **Non-destructive PIN reset**: with this option, the user's Windows Hello for Business container and keys are preserved, but the user's PIN that they use to authorize key usage is changed. For non-destructive PIN reset, you must deploy the **Microsoft PIN Reset Service** and configure your clients' policy to enable the **PIN Recovery** feature.
+## Using PIN reset
-There are two forms of PIN reset called destructive and non-destructive. Destructive PIN reset is the default and does not require configuration. During a destructive PIN reset, the user's existing PIN and underlying credentials, including any keys or certificates added to their Windows Hello container, will be deleted from the client and a new logon key and PIN are provisioned. For non-destructive PIN reset, you must deploy the Microsoft PIN reset service and client policy to enable the PIN recovery feature. During a non-destructive PIN reset, the user's Windows Hello for Business container and keys are preserved, but the user's PIN that they use to authorize key usage is changed.
-## Using PIN Reset
+There are two forms of PIN reset called destructive and non-destructive. Destructive PIN reset is the default and doesn't require configuration. During a destructive PIN reset, the user's existing PIN and underlying credentials, including any keys or certificates added to their Windows Hello container, will be deleted from the client and a new logon key and PIN are provisioned. For non-destructive PIN reset, you must deploy the Microsoft PIN reset service and client policy to enable the PIN recovery feature. During a non-destructive PIN reset, the user's Windows Hello for Business container and keys are preserved, but the user's PIN that they use to authorize key usage is changed.
**Requirements**
-- Reset from settings - Windows 10, version 1703
-- Reset above Lock - Windows 10, version 1709
+- Reset from settings - Windows 10, version 1703 or later, Windows 11
+- Reset above Lock - Windows 10, version 1709 or later, Windows 11
+
+Destructive and non-destructive PIN reset use the same steps for initiating a PIN reset. If users have forgotten their PINs, but have an alternate sign-in method, they can navigate to Sign-in options in *Settings* and initiate a PIN reset from the PIN options. If users do not have an alternate way to sign into their devices, PIN reset can also be initiated from the Windows lock screen in the PIN credential provider.
-Destructive and non-destructive PIN reset use the same entry points for initiating a PIN reset. If a user has forgotten their PIN, but has an alternate logon method, they can navigate to Sign-in options in Settings and initiate a PIN reset from the PIN options. If they do not have an alternate way to sign into their device, PIN reset can also be initiated from above the lock screen in the PIN credential provider.
>[!IMPORTANT]
>For hybrid Azure AD-joined devices, users must have corporate network connectivity to domain controllers to complete destructive PIN reset. If AD FS is being used for certificate trust or for on-premises only deployments, users must also have corporate network connectivity to federation services to reset their PIN.
### Reset PIN from Settings
-1. Sign-in to Windows 10, version 1703 or later using an alternate credential.
-2. Open **Settings**, click **Accounts**, click **Sign-in options**.
-3. Under **PIN**, click **I forgot my PIN** and follow the instructions.
+1. Sign-in to Windows 10 using an alternate credential.
+1. Open **Settings**, select **Accounts** > **Sign-in options**.
+1. Select **PIN (Windows Hello)** > **I forgot my PIN** and follow the instructions.
+
### Reset PIN above the Lock Screen
For Azure AD-joined devices:
1. If the PIN credential provider is not selected, expand the **Sign-in options** link, and select the PIN pad icon.
-1. Click **I forgot my PIN** from the PIN credential provider.
-1. Select an authentication option from the list of presented options. This list will be based on the different authentication methods enabled in your tenant (i.e., Password, PIN, Security key).
+1. Select **I forgot my PIN** from the PIN credential provider.
+1. Select an authentication option from the list of presented options. This list will be based on the different authentication methods enabled in your tenant (e.g., Password, PIN, Security key).
1. Follow the instructions provided by the provisioning process.
1. When finished, unlock your desktop using your newly created PIN.
+
For Hybrid Azure AD-joined devices:
1. If the PIN credential provider is not selected, expand the **Sign-in options** link, and select the PIN pad icon.
-1. Click **I forgot my PIN** from the PIN credential provider.
+1. Select **I forgot my PIN** from the PIN credential provider.
1. Enter your password and press enter.
1. Follow the instructions provided by the provisioning process.
1. When finished, unlock your desktop using your newly created PIN.
@@ -63,84 +70,129 @@ For Hybrid Azure AD-joined devices:
> [!NOTE]
> Key trust on hybrid Azure AD-joined devices does not support destructive PIN reset from above the Lock Screen. This is due to the sync delay between when a user provisions their Windows Hello for Business credential and being able to use it for sign-in. For this deployment model, you must deploy non-destructive PIN reset for above lock PIN reset to work.
-You may find that PIN reset from settings only works post login, and that the "lock screen" PIN reset function will not work if you have any matching limitation of SSPR password reset from the lock screen. For more information, see [Enable Azure Active Directory self-service password reset at the Windows sign-in screen - General ](/azure/active-directory/authentication/howto-sspr-windows#general-limitations).
+You may find that PIN reset from settings only works post login, and that the "lock screen" PIN reset function will not work if you have any matching limitation of self-service password reset from the lock screen. For more information, see [Enable Azure Active Directory self-service password reset at the Windows sign-in screen - General ](/azure/active-directory/authentication/howto-sspr-windows#general-limitations).
## Non-Destructive PIN reset
**Requirements:**
- Azure Active Directory
+- Windows 10, version 1709 to 1809, Enterprise Edition. There is no licensing requirement for this feature since version 1903.
- Hybrid Windows Hello for Business deployment
- Azure AD registered, Azure AD joined, and Hybrid Azure AD joined
-- Windows 10, version 1709 to 1809, **Enterprise Edition**. There is no licensing requirement for this feature since version 1903.
-When non-destructive PIN reset is enabled on a client, a 256-bit AES key is generated locally and added to a user's Windows Hello for Business container and keys as the PIN reset protector. This PIN reset protector is encrypted using a public key retrieved from the Microsoft PIN reset service and then stored on the client for later use during PIN reset. After a user initiates a PIN reset, completes authentication to Azure, and completes multifactor authentication, the encrypted PIN reset protector is sent to the Microsoft PIN reset service, decrypted, and returned to the client. The decrypted PIN reset protector is used to change the PIN used to authorize Windows Hello for Business keys and it is then cleared from memory.
-Using Group Policy, Microsoft Intune or a compatible MDM, you can configure Windows devices to securely use the Microsoft PIN reset service that enables users to reset their forgotten PIN through settings or above the lock screen without requiring re-enrollment.
+When non-destructive PIN reset is enabled on a client, a 256-bit AES key is generated locally and added to a user's Windows Hello for Business container and keys as the PIN reset protector. This PIN reset protector is encrypted using a public key retrieved from the Microsoft PIN reset service and then stored on the client for later use during PIN reset. After a user initiates a PIN reset, completes authentication and multi-factor authentication to Azure AD, the encrypted PIN reset protector is sent to the Microsoft PIN reset service, decrypted, and returned to the client. The decrypted PIN reset protector is used to change the PIN used to authorize Windows Hello for Business keys and it is then cleared from memory.
+
+Using Group Policy, Microsoft Intune or a compatible MDM solution, you can configure Windows devices to securely use the **Microsoft PIN Reset Service** which enables users to reset their forgotten PIN without requiring re-enrollment.
>[!IMPORTANT]
-> The Microsoft PIN Reset service only works with **Enterprise Edition** for Windows 10, version 1709 to 1809. The feature works with **Enterprise Edition** and **Pro** edition with Windows 10, version 1903 and newer.
+> The Microsoft PIN Reset service only works with **Enterprise Edition** for Windows 10, version 1709 to 1809 and later, and Windows 11. The feature works with **Enterprise Edition** and **Pro** edition with Windows 10, version 1903 and later, Windows 11.
> The Microsoft PIN Reset service is not currently available in Azure Government.
+### Summary
+
+|Category|Destructive PIN Reset|Non-Destructive PIN Reset|
+|--- |--- |--- |
+|**Functionality**|The user's existing PIN and underlying credentials, including any keys or certificates added to their Windows Hello container, will be deleted from the client and a new logon key and PIN are provisioned.|You must deploy the Microsoft PIN reset service and client policy to enable the PIN recovery feature. For more information on how to deploy the Microsoft PIN reset service and client policy, see [Connect Azure Active Directory with the PIN reset service](#connect-azure-active-directory-with-the-pin-reset-service). During a non-destructive PIN reset, the user's Windows Hello for Business container and keys are preserved, but the user's PIN that they use to authorize key usage is changed.|
+|**Windows editions and versions**|Reset from settings - Windows 10, version 1703 or later, Windows 11. Reset above Lock - Windows 10, version 1709 or later, Windows 11.|Windows 10, version 1709 to 1809, Enterprise Edition. There is no licensing requirement for this feature since version 1903. Enterprise Edition and Pro edition with Windows 10, version 1903 and newer Windows 11.|
+|**Azure Active Directory Joined**|Cert Trust, Key Trust, and Cloud Trust|Cert Trust, Key Trust, and Cloud Trust|
+|**Hybrid Azure Active Directory Joined**|Cert Trust and Cloud Trust for both settings and above the lock support destructive PIN reset. Key Trust doesn't support this from above the lock screen. This is due to the sync delay between when a user provisions their Windows Hello for Business credential and being able to use it for sign-in. It does support from the settings page and the users must have a corporate network connectivity to the DC. |Cert Trust, Key Trust, and Cloud Trust for both settings and above the lock support non-destructive PIN reset. No network connection is required for the DC.|
+|**On Premises**|If ADFS is being used for on premises deployments, users must have a corporate network connectivity to federation services. |The PIN reset service relies on Azure Active Directory identities, so it is only available for Hybrid Azure Active Directory Joined and Azure Active Directory Joined devices.|
+|**Additional Configuration required**|Supported by default and doesn't require configuration|Deploy the Microsoft PIN reset service and client policy to enable the PIN recovery feature On-board the Microsoft PIN reset service to respective Azure Active Directory tenant Configure Windows devices to use PIN reset using Group *Policy\MDM*.|
+|**MSA/Enterprise**|MSA and Enterprise|Enterprise only.|
+
### Onboarding the Microsoft PIN reset service to your Intune tenant
-Before you can remotely reset PINs, you must on-board the Microsoft PIN reset service to your Azure Active Directory tenant, and configure devices you manage.
+> The **Microsoft PIN Reset Service** is not currently available in Azure Government.
-### Connect Azure Active Directory with the PIN reset service
-1. Go to the [Microsoft PIN Reset Service Production website](https://login.windows.net/common/oauth2/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=b8456c59-1230-44c7-a4a2-99b085333e84&resource=https%3A%2F%2Fgraph.windows.net&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fcred.microsoft.com&state=e9191523-6c2f-4f1d-a4f9-c36f26f89df0&prompt=admin_consent), and sign in using the Global administrator account you use to manage your Azure Active Directory tenant.
+### Enable the Microsoft PIN Reset Service in your Azure AD tenant
-1. After you have logged in, choose **Accept** to give consent for the PIN reset service to access your account.
+Before you can remotely reset PINs, you must register two applications in your Azure Active Directory tenant:
+- PIN Reset Service
+- PIN Reset Client
+
+#### Connect Azure Active Directory with the PIN Reset Service
+
+1. Go to the [Microsoft PIN Reset Service Production website](https://login.windows.net/common/oauth2/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=b8456c59-1230-44c7-a4a2-99b085333e84&resource=https%3A%2F%2Fgraph.windows.net&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fcred.microsoft.com&state=e9191523-6c2f-4f1d-a4f9-c36f26f89df0&prompt=admin_consent), and sign in using a Global Administrator account you use to manage your Azure Active Directory tenant.
+1. After you have logged in, select **Accept** to give consent to the **PIN Reset Service** to access your organization.

-1. Go to the [Microsoft PIN Reset Client Production website](https://login.windows.net/common/oauth2/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=9115dd05-fad5-4f9c-acc7-305d08b1b04e&resource=https%3A%2F%2Fcred.microsoft.com%2F&redirect_uri=ms-appx-web%3A%2F%2FMicrosoft.AAD.BrokerPlugin%2F9115dd05-fad5-4f9c-acc7-305d08b1b04e&state=6765f8c5-f4a7-4029-b667-46a6776ad611&prompt=admin_consent), and sign in using the Global administrator account you use to manage your Azure Active Directory tenant.
-
-1. After you have logged in, choose **Accept** to give consent for the PIN reset client to access your account.
+#### Connect Azure Active Directory with the PIN Reset Client
+1. Go to the [Microsoft PIN Reset Client Production website](https://login.windows.net/common/oauth2/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=9115dd05-fad5-4f9c-acc7-305d08b1b04e&resource=https%3A%2F%2Fcred.microsoft.com%2F&redirect_uri=ms-appx-web%3A%2F%2FMicrosoft.AAD.BrokerPlugin%2F9115dd05-fad5-4f9c-acc7-305d08b1b04e&state=6765f8c5-f4a7-4029-b667-46a6776ad611&prompt=admin_consent), and sign in using a Global Administrator account you use to manage your Azure Active Directory tenant.
+1. After you have logged in, select **Accept** to give consent for the **PIN Reset Client** to access your organization.

- > [!NOTE]
- > After you have accepted the PIN reset service and client requests, you will land on a page that states "You do not have permission to view this directory or page." This behavior is expected. Be sure to confirm that the two PIN reset applications are listed for your tenant.
+#### Confirm that the two PIN Reset service principals are registered in your tenant
-1. In the [Azure portal](https://portal.azure.com), verify that the Microsoft PIN Reset Service and Microsoft PIN Reset Client are integrated from the **Enterprise applications** blade. Filter to application status "Enabled" and both Microsoft Pin Reset Service Production and Microsoft Pin Reset Client Production will show up in your tenant.
+1. Sign in to the [Microsoft Entra Manager admin center](https://entra.microsoft.com).
+1. Select **Azure Active Directory** > **Applications** > **Enterprise applications**.
+1. Search by application name "Microsoft PIN" and both **Microsoft Pin Reset Service Production** and **Microsoft Pin Reset Client Production** will show up in the list.
+ :::image type="content" alt-text="PIN reset service permissions page." source="images/pinreset/pin-reset-applications.png" lightbox="images/pinreset/pin-reset-applications-expanded.png":::
- :::image type="content" alt-text="PIN reset service permissions page." source="images/pinreset/pin-reset-applications.png" lightbox="images/pinreset/pin-reset-applications.png":::
+### Enable PIN Recovery on your devices
-### Configure Windows devices to use PIN reset using Group Policy
+Before you can remotely reset PINs, your devices must be configured to enable PIN Recovery. Follow the instructions below to configure your devices using either Microsoft Intune, Group Policy Objects (GPO), or Configuration Service Providers (CSP).
-You can configure Windows to use the Microsoft PIN Reset service using the computer configuration portion of a Group Policy object.
+#### [✅ **Intune**](#tab/intune)
+
+You can configure Windows devices to use the **Microsoft PIN Reset Service** using Microsoft Intune.
+
+1. Sign in to the [Microsoft Endpoint Manager admin center](https://endpoint.microsoft.com).
+1. Select **Devices** > **Configuration profiles** > **Create profile**.
+1. Enter the following properties:
+ - **Platform**: Select **Windows 10 and later**.
+ - **Profile type**: Select **Settings catalog**.
+1. Select **Create**.
+1. In **Basics**, enter the following properties:
+ - **Name**: Enter a descriptive name for the profile.
+ - **Description**: Enter a description for the profile. This setting is optional, but recommended.
+1. Select **Next**.
+1. In **Configuration settings**, select **Add settings**.
+1. In the settings picker, select **Windows Hello For Business** > **Enable Pin Recovery**.
+1. Configure **Enable Pin Recovery** to **true**.
+1. Select **Next**.
+1. In **Scope tags**, assign any applicable tags (optional).
+1. Select **Next**.
+1. In **Assignments**, select the security groups that will receive the policy.
+1. Select **Next**.
+1. In **Review + create**, review your settings and select **Create**.
+
+>[!NOTE]
+> You can also configure PIN recovery from the **Endpoint security** blade:
+> 1. Sign in to the [Microsoft Endpoint Manager admin center](https://endpoint.microsoft.com).
+> 1. Select **Endpoint security** > **Account protection** > **Create Policy**.
+
+#### [✅ **GPO**](#tab/gpo)
+
+You can configure Windows devices to use the **Microsoft PIN Reset Service** using a Group Policy Object (GPO).
1. Using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC), scope a domain-based Group Policy to computer accounts in Active Directory.
1. Edit the Group Policy object from Step 1.
1. Enable the **Use PIN Recovery** policy setting located under **Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Windows Hello for Business**.
-1. Close the Group Policy Management Editor to save the Group Policy object. Close the GPMC.
+1. Close the Group Policy Management Editor to save the Group Policy object.
-#### Create a PIN Reset Device configuration profile using Microsoft Intune
+#### [✅ **CSP**](#tab/csp)
-1. Sign-in to [Endpoint Manager admin center](https://endpoint.microsoft.com/) using a Global administrator account.
-1. Click **Endpoint Security** > **Account Protection** > **Properties**.
-1. Set **Enable PIN recovery** to **Yes**.
+You can configure Windows devices to use the **Microsoft PIN Reset Service** using the [PassportForWork CSP](/windows/client-management/mdm/passportforwork-csp).
-> [!NOTE]
-> You can also set up PIN recovery using configuration profiles.
->
-> 1. Sign in to Endpoint Manager.
-> 1. Click **Devices** > **Configuration Profiles** > Create a new profile or edit an existing profile using the Identity Protection profile type.
-> 1. Set **Enable PIN recovery** to **Yes**.
+- OMA-URI: `./Vendor/MSFT/Policy/PassportForWork/`*TenantId*`/Policies/EnablePinRecovery`
+- Data type: **Boolean**
+- Value: **True**
-#### Assign the PIN Reset Device configuration profile using Microsoft Intune
+>[!NOTE]
+> You must replace `TenantId` with the identifier of your Azure Active Directory tenant.
-1. Sign in to the [Azure portal](https://portal.azure.com) using a Global administrator account.
-1. Navigate to the Microsoft Intune blade. Choose **Device configuration** > **Profiles**. From the list of device configuration profiles, choose the profile that contains the PIN reset configuration.
-1. In the device configuration profile, select **Assignments**.
-1. Use the **Include** and/or **Exclude** tabs to target the device configuration profile to select groups.
+---
-### Confirm that PIN recovery policy is enforced on the client
+#### Confirm that PIN Recovery policy is enforced on the devices
-The PIN reset configuration for a user can be viewed by running [**dsregcmd /status**](/azure/active-directory/devices/troubleshoot-device-dsregcmd) from the command line. This state can be found under the output in the user state section as the **CanReset** line item. If **CanReset** reports as DestructiveOnly, then only destructive PIN reset is enabled. If **CanReset** reports DestructiveAndNonDestructive, then non-destructive PIN reset is enabled.
+The _PIN reset_ configuration can be viewed by running [**dsregcmd /status**](/azure/active-directory/devices/troubleshoot-device-dsregcmd) from the command line. This state can be found under the output in the user state section as the **CanReset** line item. If **CanReset** reports as DestructiveOnly, then only destructive PIN reset is enabled. If **CanReset** reports DestructiveAndNonDestructive, then non-destructive PIN reset is enabled.
-#### Sample User state Output for Destructive PIN Reset
+**Sample User state Output for Destructive PIN Reset**
```console
+----------------------------------------------------------------------+
@@ -159,7 +211,7 @@ The PIN reset configuration for a user can be viewed by running [**dsregcmd /sta
+----------------------------------------------------------------------+
```
-#### Sample User state Output for Non-Destructive PIN Reset
+**Sample User state Output for Non-Destructive PIN Reset**
```console
+----------------------------------------------------------------------+
@@ -198,7 +250,7 @@ The [ConfigureWebSignInAllowedUrls](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-au
1. In the **Name** field type **Web Sign In Allowed URLs** and optionally provide a description for the configuration. Click Next.
-1. On the Configuration settings page, click **Add** to add a custom OMA-URI setting. Provide the following information for the custom settings
+1. On the Configuration settings page, click **Add** to add a custom OMA-URI setting. Provide the following information for the custom settings:
- **Name:** Web Sign In Allowed URLs
- **Description:** (Optional) List of domains that are allowed during PIN reset flows.
@@ -208,14 +260,45 @@ The [ConfigureWebSignInAllowedUrls](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-au
:::image type="content" alt-text="Custom Configuration for ConfigureWebSignInAllowedUrls policy." source="images/pinreset/allowlist.png" lightbox="images/pinreset/allowlist.png":::
-1. Click the Save button to save the custom configuration.
+1. Click the **Save** button to save the custom configuration.
1. On the Assignments page, use the Included groups and Excluded groups sections to define the groups of users or devices that should receive this policy. Once you have completed configuring groups click the Next button.
-1. On the Applicability rules page, click Next.
+1. On the Applicability rules page, click **Next**.
1. Review the configuration that is shown on the Review + create page to make sure that it is accurate. Click create to save the profile and apply it to the configured groups.
+### Configure Web Sign-in Allowed URLs for Third Party Identity Providers on Azure AD Joined Devices
+
+The [ConfigureWebSignInAllowedUrls](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-authentication#authentication-configurewebsigninallowedurls) policy allows you to specify a list of domains that can be reached during PIN reset flows on Azure AD-joined devices. If you have a federated environment and authentication is handled using AD FS or a third-party identity provider, this policy should be set to ensure that authentication pages from that identity provider can be used during Azure AD joined PIN reset.
+
+
+#### Configure Web Sign-in Allowed URLs using Microsoft Intune
+
+1. Sign in to the [Microsoft Endpoint Manager admin center](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2109431).
+1. Select **Devices** > **Configuration profiles** > **Create profile**.
+1. Enter the following properties:
+ - **Platform**: Select **Windows 10 and later**.
+ - **Profile type**: Select **Templates**.
+ - In the list of templates that is loaded, select **Custom** > **Create**.
+1. In **Basics**, enter the following properties:
+ - **Name**: Enter a descriptive name for the profile.
+ - **Description**: Enter a description for the profile. This setting is optional, but recommended.
+1. Select **Next**.
+1. In **Configuration settings**, select **Add** and enter the following settings:
+ - Name: **Web Sign In Allowed URLs**
+ - Description: **(Optional) List of domains that are allowed during PIN reset flows**
+ - OMA-URI: `./Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/Authentication/ConfigureWebSignInAllowedUrls`
+ - Data type: **String**
+ - Value: Provide a semicolon delimited list of domains needed for authentication during the PIN reset scenario. An example value would be **signin.contoso.com;portal.contoso.com** (without quotation marks).
+ :::image type="content" alt-text="Custom Configuration for ConfigureWebSignInAllowedUrls policy." source="images/pinreset/allowlist.png" lightbox="images/pinreset/allowlist-expanded.png":::
+1. Select **Save** > **Next**.
+1. In **Assignments**, select the security groups that will receive the policy.
+1. Select **Next**.
+1. In **Applicability Rules**, select **Next**.
+1. In **Review + create**, review your settings and select **Create**.
+
+
> [!NOTE]
> For Azure Government, there is a known issue with PIN reset on Azure AD Joined devices failing. When the user attempts to launch PIN reset, the PIN reset UI shows an error page that says, "We can't open that page right now." The ConfigureWebSignInAllowedUrls policy can be used to work around this issue. If you are experiencing this problem and you are using Azure US Government cloud, set **login.microsoftonline.us** as the value for the ConfigureWebSignInAllowedUrls policy.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-feature-remote-desktop.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-feature-remote-desktop.md
index b622e6277f..9073c4ef60 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-feature-remote-desktop.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-feature-remote-desktop.md
@@ -2,14 +2,14 @@
title: Remote Desktop
description: Learn how Windows Hello for Business supports using biometrics with remote desktop
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 02/24/2021
-ms.reviewer:
---
# Remote Desktop
@@ -18,10 +18,10 @@ ms.reviewer:
- Windows 10
- Windows 11
-- Cloud only, Hybrid, and On-premises only Windows Hello for Business deployments
+- Hybrid and On-premises Windows Hello for Business deployments
- Azure AD joined, Hybrid Azure AD joined, and Enterprise joined devices
-Windows Hello for Business supports using a certificate deployed to a Windows Hello for Business container as a supplied credential to establish a remote desktop connection to a server or another device. This functionality is not supported for key trust deployments. This feature takes advantage of the redirected smart card capabilities of the remote desktop protocol. Windows Hello for Business key trust can be used with [Windows Defender Remote Credential Guard](../remote-credential-guard.md) to establish a remote desktop protocol connection.
+Windows Hello for Business supports using a certificate deployed to a Windows Hello for Business container as a supplied credential to establish a remote desktop connection to a server or another device. This feature takes advantage of the redirected smart card capabilities of the remote desktop protocol. Windows Hello for Business key trust can be used with [Windows Defender Remote Credential Guard](../remote-credential-guard.md) to establish a remote desktop protocol connection.
Microsoft continues to investigate supporting using keys trust for supplied credentials in a future release.
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Microsoft continues to investigate supporting using keys trust for supplied cred
**Requirements**
-- Cloud only, Hybrid, and On-premises only Windows Hello for Business deployments
+- Hybrid and On-premises Windows Hello for Business deployments
- Azure AD joined, Hybrid Azure AD joined, and Enterprise joined devices
- Biometric enrollments
- Windows 10, version 1809 or later
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-how-it-works-authentication.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-how-it-works-authentication.md
index 76b94b5ddb..909df0b77b 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-how-it-works-authentication.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-how-it-works-authentication.md
@@ -2,22 +2,20 @@
title: How Windows Hello for Business works - Authentication
description: Learn about the authentication flow for Windows Hello for Business.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 02/15/2022
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# Windows Hello for Business and Authentication
-**Applies to:**
-
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-
Windows Hello for Business authentication is passwordless, two-factor authentication. Authenticating with Windows Hello for Business provides a convenient sign-in experience that authenticates the user to both Azure Active Directory and Active Directory resources.
Azure Active Directory-joined devices authenticate to Azure during sign-in and can optionally authenticate to Active Directory. Hybrid Azure Active Directory-joined devices authenticate to Active Directory during sign-in, and authenticate to Azure Active Directory in the background.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-how-it-works-provisioning.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-how-it-works-provisioning.md
index c81ed991e1..7d93ef16b8 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-how-it-works-provisioning.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-how-it-works-provisioning.md
@@ -2,22 +2,20 @@
title: How Windows Hello for Business works - Provisioning
description: Explore the provisioning flows for Windows Hello for Business, from within a variety of environments.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 2/15/2022
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# Windows Hello for Business Provisioning
-**Applies to:**
-
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-
Windows Hello for Business provisioning enables a user to enroll a new, strong, two-factor credential that they can use for passwordless authentication. Provisioning experience vary based on:
- How the device is joined to Azure Active Directory
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-how-it-works-technology.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-how-it-works-technology.md
index 1813f3e403..ff24499d85 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-how-it-works-technology.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-how-it-works-technology.md
@@ -2,23 +2,21 @@
title: How Windows Hello for Business works - technology and terms
description: Explore technology and terms associated with Windows Hello for Business. Learn how Windows Hello for Business works.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 10/08/2018
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# Technology and terms
-**Applies to:**
-
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-
## Attestation identity keys
Because the endorsement certificate is unique for each device and doesn't change, the usage of it may present privacy concerns because it's theoretically possible to track a specific device. To avoid this privacy problem, Windows issues a derived attestation anchor based on the endorsement certificate. This intermediate key, which can be attested to an endorsement key, is the Attestation Identity Key (AIK) and the corresponding certificate is called the AIK certificate. This AIK certificate is issued by a Microsoft cloud service.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-how-it-works.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-how-it-works.md
index 768b3a0e02..cb5b134268 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-how-it-works.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-how-it-works.md
@@ -2,22 +2,20 @@
title: How Windows Hello for Business works
description: Learn how Windows Hello for Business works, and how it can help your users authenticate to services.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 05/05/2018
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# How Windows Hello for Business works in Windows Devices
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-
Windows Hello for Business is a modern, two-factor credential that is the more secure alternative to passwords. Whether you are cloud or on-premises, Windows Hello for Business has a deployment option for you. For cloud deployments, you can use Windows Hello for Business with Azure Active Directory-joined, Hybrid Azure Active Directory-joined, or Azure AD registered devices. Windows Hello for Business also works for domain joined devices.
Watch this quick video where Pieter Wigleven gives a simple explanation of how Windows Hello for Business works and some of its supporting features.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-aadj-sso-base.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-aadj-sso-base.md
index 51f303b2ba..c936ab0e6a 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-aadj-sso-base.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-aadj-sso-base.md
@@ -2,26 +2,24 @@
title: Configure Azure AD-joined devices for On-premises Single-Sign On using Windows Hello for Business
description: Before adding Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) joined devices to your existing hybrid deployment, you need to verify the existing deployment can support them.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection:
- M365-identity-device-management
- highpri
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 01/14/2021
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Azure Active Directory-join
+- ✅ Hybrid Deployment
+- ✅ Key trust
---
# Configure Azure AD-joined devices for On-premises Single-Sign On using Windows Hello for Business
-
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-- Azure Active Directory-joined
-- Hybrid Deployment
-- Key trust model
-
## Prerequisites
Before adding Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) joined devices to your existing hybrid deployment, you need to verify the existing deployment can support Azure AD-joined devices. Unlike hybrid Azure AD-joined devices, Azure AD-joined devices do not have a relationship with your Active Directory domain. This factor changes the way in which users authenticate to Active Directory. Validate the following configurations to ensure they support Azure AD-joined devices.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-aadj-sso-cert.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-aadj-sso-cert.md
index 53931e113c..875fe62728 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-aadj-sso-cert.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-aadj-sso-cert.md
@@ -2,26 +2,24 @@
title: Using Certificates for AADJ On-premises Single-sign On single sign-on
description: If you want to use certificates for on-premises single-sign on for Azure Active Directory-joined devices, then follow these additional steps.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 08/19/2018
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Azure AD-join
+- ✅ Hybrid Deployment
+- ✅ Certificate trust
---
# Using Certificates for AADJ On-premises Single-sign On
-**Applies to:**
-
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-- Azure Active Directory-joined
-- Hybrid Deployment
-- Certificate trust
-
If you plan to use certificates for on-premises single-sign on, then follow these **additional** steps to configure the environment to enroll Windows Hello for Business certificates for Azure AD-joined devices.
> [!IMPORTANT]
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-aadj-sso.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-aadj-sso.md
index 1acba0f5b3..0842bb52e6 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-aadj-sso.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-aadj-sso.md
@@ -2,24 +2,20 @@
title: Azure AD Join Single Sign-on Deployment
description: Learn how to provide single sign-on to your on-premises resources for Azure Active Directory-joined devices, using Windows Hello for Business.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 08/19/2018
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# Azure AD Join Single Sign-on Deployment
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-- Azure Active Directory-joined
-- Hybrid deployment
-
Windows Hello for Business combined with Azure Active Directory-joined devices makes it easy for users to securely access cloud-based resources using a strong, two-factor credential. Some resources may remain on-premises as enterprises transition resources to the cloud and Azure AD-joined devices may need to access these resources. With additional configurations to your current hybrid deployment, you can provide single sign-on to your on-premises resources for Azure Active Directory-joined devices using Windows Hello for Business, using a key or a certificate.
## Key vs. Certificate
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-new-install.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-new-install.md
index 546fe98a8e..1dbae77cc3 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-new-install.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-new-install.md
@@ -2,24 +2,22 @@
title: Hybrid Azure AD joined Windows Hello for Business Trust New Installation (Windows Hello for Business)
description: Learn about new installations for Windows Hello for Business certificate trust and the various technologies hybrid certificate trust deployments rely on.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 4/30/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Hybrid deployment
+- ✅ Certificate trust
---
# Hybrid Azure AD joined Windows Hello for Business Certificate Trust New Installation
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- Hybrid deployment
-- Certificate trust
-
Windows Hello for Business involves configuring distributed technologies that may or may not exist in your current infrastructure. Hybrid certificate trust deployments of Windows Hello for Business rely on these technologies
- [Active Directory](#active-directory)
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-trust-devreg.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-trust-devreg.md
index 2d15af954c..b35fa21dac 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-trust-devreg.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-trust-devreg.md
@@ -2,24 +2,22 @@
title: Configure Device Registration for Hybrid Azure AD joined Windows Hello for Business
description: Azure Device Registration for Hybrid Certificate Trust Deployment (Windows Hello for Business)
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 4/30/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Hybrid deployment
+- ✅ Certificate trust
---
# Configure Device Registration for Hybrid Azure AD joined Windows Hello for Business
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- Hybrid deployment
-- Certificate trust
-
Your environment is federated and you're ready to configure device registration for your hybrid environment. Hybrid Windows Hello for Business deployment needs device registration and device write-back to enable proper device authentication.
> [!IMPORTANT]
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-trust-prereqs.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-trust-prereqs.md
index edba57fd05..b6d189d7c1 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-trust-prereqs.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-trust-prereqs.md
@@ -2,24 +2,22 @@
title: Hybrid Azure AD joined Windows Hello for Business Prerequisites
description: Learn these prerequisites for hybrid Windows Hello for Business deployments using certificate trust.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 4/30/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Hybrid deployment
+- ✅ Certificate trust
---
# Hybrid Azure AD joined Windows Hello for Business Prerequisites
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- Hybrid deployment
-- Certificate trust
-
Hybrid environments are distributed systems that enable organizations to use on-premises and Azure-based identities and resources. Windows Hello for Business uses the existing distributed system as a foundation on which organizations can provide two-factor authentication that provides a single sign-in like experience to modern resources.
The distributed systems on which these technologies were built involved several pieces of on-premises and cloud infrastructure. High-level pieces of the infrastructure include:
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-trust.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-trust.md
index f9c3cf3feb..72086e9d13 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-trust.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-trust.md
@@ -2,24 +2,22 @@
title: Hybrid Certificate Trust Deployment (Windows Hello for Business)
description: Learn the information you need to successfully deploy Windows Hello for Business in a hybrid certificate trust scenario.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 09/08/2017
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Hybrid deployment
+- ✅ Certificate trust
---
# Hybrid Azure AD joined Certificate Trust Deployment
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- Hybrid deployment
-- Certificate trust
-
Windows Hello for Business replaces username and password sign-in to Windows with strong user authentication based on asymmetric key pair. The following deployment guide provides the information needed to successfully deploy Windows Hello for Business in a hybrid certificate trust scenario.
It is recommended that you review the Windows Hello for Business planning guide prior to using the deployment guide. The planning guide helps you make decisions by explaining the available options with each aspect of the deployment and explains the potential outcomes based on each of these decisions. You can review the [planning guide](/windows/access-protection/hello-for-business/hello-planning-guide) and download the [planning worksheet](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=852514).
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-provision.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-provision.md
index f6e69dad32..6721675b09 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-provision.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-provision.md
@@ -2,24 +2,22 @@
title: Hybrid Azure AD joined Windows Hello for Business Certificate Trust Provisioning (Windows Hello for Business)
description: In this article, learn about provisioning for hybrid certificate trust deployments of Windows Hello for Business.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 4/30/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Hybrid deployment
+- ✅ Certificate trust
---
# Hybrid Azure AD joined Windows Hello for Business Certificate Trust Provisioning
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- Hybrid deployment
-- Certificate trust
-
## Provisioning
The Windows Hello for Business provisioning begins immediately after the user has signed in, after the user profile is loaded, but before the user receives their desktop. Windows only launches the provisioning experience if all the prerequisite checks pass. You can determine the status of the prerequisite checks by viewing the **User Device Registration** in the **Event Viewer** under **Applications and Services Logs\Microsoft\Windows**.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-settings-ad.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-settings-ad.md
index f8b0c788c1..230a694361 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-settings-ad.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-settings-ad.md
@@ -2,24 +2,22 @@
title: Configure Hybrid Azure AD joined Windows Hello for Business - Active Directory (AD)
description: Discussing the configuration of Active Directory (AD) in a Hybrid deployment of Windows Hello for Business
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 4/30/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Hybrid deployment
+- ✅ Certificate trust
---
# Configure Hybrid Azure AD joined Windows Hello for Business: Active Directory
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- Hybrid deployment
-- Certificate trust
-
The key synchronization process for the hybrid deployment of Windows Hello for Business needs the Windows Server 2016 Active Directory schema.
### Creating Security Groups
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-settings-adfs.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-settings-adfs.md
index ed13229f6a..03989ad22c 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-settings-adfs.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-settings-adfs.md
@@ -2,24 +2,22 @@
title: Configuring Hybrid Azure AD joined Windows Hello for Business - Active Directory Federation Services (ADFS)
description: Discussing the configuration of Active Directory Federation Services (ADFS) in a Hybrid deployment of Windows Hello for Business
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 4/30/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Hybrid deployment
+- ✅ Certificate trust
---
# Configure Hybrid Azure AD joined Windows Hello for Business: Active Directory Federation Services
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- Hybrid deployment
-- Certificate trust
-
## Federation Services
The Windows Server 2016 Active Directory Federation Server Certificate Registration Authority (AD FS RA) enrolls for an enrollment agent certificate. Once the registration authority verifies the certificate request, it signs the certificate request using its enrollment agent certificate and sends it to the certificate authority.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-settings-dir-sync.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-settings-dir-sync.md
index 3dea044165..7e29ef7f6a 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-settings-dir-sync.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-settings-dir-sync.md
@@ -2,25 +2,23 @@
title: Configure Hybrid Azure AD joined Windows Hello for Business Directory Synch
description: Discussing Directory Synchronization in a Hybrid deployment of Windows Hello for Business
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 4/30/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Hybrid deployment
+- ✅ Certificate trust
---
# Configure Hybrid Azure AD joined Windows Hello for Business- Directory Synchronization
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- Hybrid deployment
-- Certificate Trust
-
## Directory Synchronization
In hybrid deployments, users register the public portion of their Windows Hello for Business credential with Azure. Azure AD Connect synchronizes the Windows Hello for Business public key to Active Directory.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-settings-pki.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-settings-pki.md
index 0a7da03055..e604fc736f 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-settings-pki.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-settings-pki.md
@@ -2,25 +2,23 @@
title: Configuring Hybrid Azure AD joined Windows Hello for Business - Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
description: Discussing the configuration of the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) in a Hybrid deployment of Windows Hello for Business
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 4/30/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Hybrid deployment
+- ✅ Certificate trust
---
# Configure Hybrid Azure AD joined Windows Hello for Business - Public Key Infrastructure
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- Hybrid Deployment
-- Certificate Trust
-
Windows Hello for Business deployments rely on certificates. Hybrid deployments use publicly-issued server authentication certificates to validate the name of the server to which they are connecting and to encrypt the data that flows between them and the client computer.
All deployments use enterprise issued certificates for domain controllers as a root of trust. Hybrid certificate trust deployments issue users with a sign-in certificate that enables them to authenticate using Windows Hello for Business credentials to non-Windows Server 2016 domain controllers. Additionally, hybrid certificate trust deployments issue certificates to registration authorities to provide defense-in-depth security when issuing user authentication certificates.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-settings-policy.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-settings-policy.md
index bba12adf27..2708e9a22c 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-settings-policy.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-settings-policy.md
@@ -2,23 +2,22 @@
title: Configuring Hybrid Azure AD joined Windows Hello for Business - Group Policy
description: Discussing the configuration of Group Policy in a Hybrid deployment of Windows Hello for Business
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 4/30/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Hybrid deployment
+- ✅ Certificate trust
---
# Configure Hybrid Azure AD joined Windows Hello for Business - Group Policy
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- Hybrid deployment
-- Certificate trust
## Policy Configuration
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-settings.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-settings.md
index ec22d31a65..c0ba9ce415 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-settings.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-settings.md
@@ -2,24 +2,22 @@
title: Configure Hybrid Windows Hello for Business Settings (Windows Hello for Business)
description: Learn how to configure Windows Hello for Business settings in hybrid certificate trust deployment.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 4/30/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Hybrid deployment
+- ✅ Certificate trust
---
# Configure Hybrid Azure AD joined Windows Hello for Business
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- Hybrid deployment
-- Certificate trust
-
Your environment is federated and you are ready to configure your hybrid environment for Windows Hello for business using the certificate trust model.
> [!IMPORTANT]
> If your environment is not federated, review the [New Installation baseline](hello-hybrid-cert-new-install.md) section of this deployment document to learn how to federate your environment for your Windows Hello for Business deployment.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cloud-trust.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cloud-trust.md
index 1f4f7f1f17..e8589d8b29 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cloud-trust.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cloud-trust.md
@@ -2,22 +2,20 @@
title: Hybrid Cloud Trust Deployment (Windows Hello for Business)
description: Learn the information you need to successfully deploy Windows Hello for Business in a hybrid cloud trust scenario.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 2/15/2022
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10 21H2 and later
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# Hybrid Cloud Trust Deployment (Preview)
-Applies to
-
-- Windows 10, version 21H2
-- Windows 11 and later
-
Windows Hello for Business replaces username and password Windows sign-in with strong authentication using an asymmetric key pair. The following deployment guide provides the information needed to successfully deploy Windows Hello for Business in a hybrid cloud trust scenario.
## Introduction to Cloud Trust
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-new-install.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-new-install.md
index 66a720d026..98599d9132 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-new-install.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-new-install.md
@@ -2,25 +2,22 @@
title: Windows Hello for Business Hybrid Azure AD joined Key Trust New Installation
description: Learn how to configure a hybrid key trust deployment of Windows Hello for Business for systems with no previous installations.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 4/30/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Hybrid deployment
+- ✅ Key trust
---
# Windows Hello for Business Hybrid Azure AD joined Key Trust New Installation
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- Hybrid deployment
-- Key trust
-
-
Windows Hello for Business involves configuring distributed technologies that may or may not exist in your current infrastructure. Hybrid key trust deployments of Windows Hello for Business rely on these technologies
- [Active Directory](#active-directory)
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-trust-devreg.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-trust-devreg.md
index 4d064c210c..49cd5d3b42 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-trust-devreg.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-trust-devreg.md
@@ -2,25 +2,22 @@
title: Configure Device Registration for Hybrid Azure AD joined key trust Windows Hello for Business
description: Azure Device Registration for Hybrid Certificate Key Deployment (Windows Hello for Business)
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 05/04/2022
-ms.reviewer: prsriva
-
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Hybrid deployment
+- ✅ Key trust
---
# Configure Device Registration for Hybrid Azure AD joined key trust Windows Hello for Business
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- Hybrid deployment
-- Key trust
-
You're ready to configure device registration for your hybrid environment. Hybrid Windows Hello for Business deployment needs device registration to enable proper device authentication.
> [!NOTE]
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-trust-dirsync.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-trust-dirsync.md
index 299e93c00c..d3e68887fd 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-trust-dirsync.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-trust-dirsync.md
@@ -2,24 +2,22 @@
title: Configure Directory Synchronization for Hybrid Azure AD joined key trust Windows Hello for Business
description: Azure Directory Synchronization for Hybrid Certificate Key Deployment (Windows Hello for Business)
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 4/30/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Hybrid deployment
+- ✅ Key trust
---
# Configure Directory Synchronization for Hybrid Azure AD joined key trust Windows Hello for Business
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- Hybrid deployment
-- Key trust
-
You are ready to configure directory synchronization for your hybrid environment. Hybrid Windows Hello for Business deployment needs both a cloud and an on-premises identity to authenticate and access resources in the cloud or on-premises.
## Deploy Azure AD Connect
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-trust-prereqs.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-trust-prereqs.md
index 0850fae7f7..b732396e36 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-trust-prereqs.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-trust-prereqs.md
@@ -2,24 +2,21 @@
title: Hybrid Azure AD joined Key trust Windows Hello for Business Prerequisites (Windows Hello for Business)
description: Learn about the prerequisites for hybrid Windows Hello for Business deployments using key trust and what the next steps are in the deployment process.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: mapalko
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 4/30/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Hybrid deployment
+- ✅ Key trust
---
# Hybrid Azure AD joined Key trust Windows Hello for Business Prerequisites
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- Hybrid deployment
-- Key trust
-
Hybrid environments are distributed systems that enable organizations to use on-premises and Azure-based identities and resources. Windows Hello for Business uses the existing distributed system as a foundation on which organizations can provide two-factor authentication that provides a single sign-in like experience to modern resources.
The distributed systems on which these technologies were built involved several pieces of on-premises and cloud infrastructure. High-level pieces of the infrastructure include:
@@ -35,7 +32,7 @@ The distributed systems on which these technologies were built involved several
Hybrid Windows Hello for Business needs two directories: on-premises Active Directory and a cloud Azure Active Directory. The minimum required domain functional and forest functional levels for Windows Hello for Business deployment is Windows Server 2008 R2.
-A hybrid Windows Hello for Business deployment needs an Azure Active Directory subscription. The hybrid key trust deployment, does not need a premium Azure Active Directory subscription.
+A hybrid Windows Hello for Business deployment needs an Azure Active Directory subscription. The hybrid key trust deployment does not need a premium Azure Active Directory subscription.
You can deploy Windows Hello for Business in any environment with Windows Server 2008 R2 or later domain controllers.
If using the key trust deployment model, you MUST ensure that you have adequate (1 or more, depending on your authentication load) Windows Server 2016 or later Domain Controllers in each Active Directory site where users will be authenticating for Windows Hello for Business.
@@ -90,7 +87,7 @@ The minimum required Enterprise certificate authority that can be used with Wind
The two directories used in hybrid deployments must be synchronized. You need Azure Active Directory Connect to synchronize user accounts in the on-premises Active Directory with Azure Active Directory.
-Organizations using older directory synchronization technology, such as DirSync or Azure AD sync need to upgrade to Azure AD Connect.
+Organizations using older directory synchronization technology, such as DirSync or Azure AD sync, need to upgrade to Azure AD Connect.
### Section Review
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-trust.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-trust.md
index 833968247b..7a7e3f3eed 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-trust.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-trust.md
@@ -2,24 +2,22 @@
title: Hybrid Key Trust Deployment (Windows Hello for Business)
description: Review this deployment guide to successfully deploy Windows Hello for Business in a hybrid key trust scenario.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 08/20/2018
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Hybrid deployment
+- ✅ Key trust
---
# Hybrid Azure AD joined Key Trust Deployment
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- Hybrid deployment
-- Key trust
-
Windows Hello for Business replaces username and password sign-in to Windows with strong user authentication based on asymmetric key pair. The following deployment guide provides the information needed to successfully deploy Windows Hello for Business in a hybrid key trust scenario.
It is recommended that you review the Windows Hello for Business planning guide prior to using the deployment guide. The planning guide helps you make decisions by explaining the available options with each aspect of the deployment and explains the potential outcomes based on each of these decisions. You can review the [planning guide](/windows/access-protection/hello-for-business/hello-planning-guide) and download the [planning worksheet](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=852514).
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-whfb-provision.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-whfb-provision.md
index 925d6d12e8..4b009fe228 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-whfb-provision.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-whfb-provision.md
@@ -2,24 +2,21 @@
title: Hybrid Azure AD joined Windows Hello for Business key trust Provisioning (Windows Hello for Business)
description: Learn about provisioning for hybrid key trust deployments of Windows Hello for Business and learn where to find the hybrid key trust deployment guide.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 4/30/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Hybrid deployment
+- ✅ Key trust
---
# Hybrid Azure AD joined Windows Hello for Business Key Trust Provisioning
-
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- Hybrid deployment
-- Key trust
-
## Provisioning
The Windows Hello for Business provisioning begins immediately after the user has signed in, after the user profile is loaded, but before the user receives their desktop. Windows only launches the provisioning experience if all the prerequisite checks pass. You can determine the status of the prerequisite checks by viewing the **User Device Registration** in the **Event Viewer** under **Applications and Services Logs\Microsoft\Windows**.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-whfb-settings-ad.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-whfb-settings-ad.md
index bbdde28351..49124b1ddf 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-whfb-settings-ad.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-whfb-settings-ad.md
@@ -2,23 +2,22 @@
title: Configuring Hybrid Azure AD joined key trust Windows Hello for Business - Active Directory (AD)
description: Configuring Hybrid key trust Windows Hello for Business - Active Directory (AD)
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 4/30/2021
-ms.reviewer:
---
# Configuring Hybrid Azure AD joined key trust Windows Hello for Business: Active Directory
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Hybrid deployment
+- ✅ Key trust
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- Hybrid deployment
-- Key trust
Configure the appropriate security groups to efficiently deploy Windows Hello for Business to users.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-whfb-settings-dir-sync.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-whfb-settings-dir-sync.md
index 0ed4142f70..1092173f9c 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-whfb-settings-dir-sync.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-whfb-settings-dir-sync.md
@@ -2,24 +2,22 @@
title: Hybrid Azure AD joined Windows Hello for Business - Directory Synchronization
description: How to configure Hybrid key trust Windows Hello for Business - Directory Synchronization
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 4/30/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Hybrid deployment
+- ✅ Key trust
---
# Configure Hybrid Azure AD joined Windows Hello for Business: Directory Synchronization
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- Hybrid deployment
-- Key trust
-
## Directory Synchronization
In hybrid deployments, users register the public portion of their Windows Hello for Business credential with Azure. Azure AD Connect synchronizes the Windows Hello for Business public key to Active Directory.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-whfb-settings-pki.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-whfb-settings-pki.md
index 5f2d0ed289..8a9e8ee322 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-whfb-settings-pki.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-whfb-settings-pki.md
@@ -2,25 +2,22 @@
title: Configure Hybrid Azure AD joined key trust Windows Hello for Business
description: Configuring Hybrid key trust Windows Hello for Business - Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 04/30/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Hybrid deployment
+- ✅ Key trust
---
-
# Configure Hybrid Azure AD joined Windows Hello for Business: Public Key Infrastructure
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- Hybrid Deployment
-- Key trust
-
Windows Hello for Business deployments rely on certificates. Hybrid deployments use publicly issued server authentication certificates to validate the name of the server to which they are connecting and to encrypt the data that flows them and the client computer.
All deployments use enterprise issued certificates for domain controllers as a root of trust.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-whfb-settings-policy.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-whfb-settings-policy.md
index 26b31e209b..4522c3b93d 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-whfb-settings-policy.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-whfb-settings-policy.md
@@ -2,24 +2,22 @@
title: Configure Hybrid Azure AD joined Windows Hello for Business - Group Policy
description: Configuring Hybrid key trust Windows Hello for Business - Group Policy
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 4/30/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Hybrid deployment
+- ✅ Key trust
---
# Configure Hybrid Azure AD joined Windows Hello for Business: Group Policy
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- Hybrid deployment
-- Key trust
-
## Policy Configuration
You need at least a Windows 10, version 1703 workstation to run the Group Policy Management Console, which provides the latest Windows Hello for Business and PIN Complexity Group Policy settings. To run the Group Policy Management Console, you need to install the Remote Server Administration Tools for Windows. You can download these tools from the [Microsoft Download Center](https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=45520).
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-whfb-settings.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-whfb-settings.md
index 29c29de56f..ea0439b451 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-whfb-settings.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-key-whfb-settings.md
@@ -2,24 +2,22 @@
title: Configure Hybrid Azure AD joined Windows Hello for Business key trust Settings
description: Begin the process of configuring your hybrid key trust environment for Windows Hello for Business. Start with your Active Directory configuration.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 4/30/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Hybrid deployment
+- ✅ Key trust
---
# Configure Hybrid Azure AD joined Windows Hello for Business key trust settings
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- Hybrid deployment
-- Key trust
-
You are ready to configure your hybrid Azure AD joined key trust environment for Windows Hello for Business.
> [!IMPORTANT]
@@ -36,10 +34,6 @@ For the most efficient deployment, configure these technologies in order beginni
> [!div class="step-by-step"]
> [Configure Active Directory >](hello-hybrid-key-whfb-settings-ad.md)
-
-
-
-
## Follow the Windows Hello for Business hybrid key trust deployment guide
1. [Overview](hello-hybrid-key-trust.md)
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-identity-verification.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-identity-verification.md
index 185768fe63..7a9e8e62b1 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-identity-verification.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-identity-verification.md
@@ -2,9 +2,10 @@
title: Windows Hello for Business Deployment Prerequisite Overview
description: Overview of all the different infrastructure requirements for Windows Hello for Business deployment models
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection:
- M365-identity-device-management
- highpri
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-key-trust-adfs.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-key-trust-adfs.md
index d2c141ca3a..8761b3eaf6 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-key-trust-adfs.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-key-trust-adfs.md
@@ -2,24 +2,22 @@
title: Prepare & Deploy Windows Active Directory Federation Services with key trust (Windows Hello for Business)
description: How to Prepare and Deploy Windows Server 2016 Active Directory Federation Services for Windows Hello for Business using key trust.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 08/19/2018
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ On-premises deployment
+- ✅ Key trust
---
# Prepare and Deploy Windows Server 2016 Active Directory Federation Services with Key Trust
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- On-premises deployment
-- Key trust
-
Windows Hello for Business works exclusively with the Active Directory Federation Service role included with Windows Server 2016 and requires an additional server update. The on-premises key trust deployment uses Active Directory Federation Services roles for key registration and device registration.
The following guidance describes deploying a new instance of Active Directory Federation Services 2016 using the Windows Information Database as the configuration database, which is ideal for environments with no more than 30 federation servers and no more than 100 relying party trusts.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-key-trust-policy-settings.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-key-trust-policy-settings.md
index 5baf31a055..b954e4d073 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-key-trust-policy-settings.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-key-trust-policy-settings.md
@@ -2,25 +2,22 @@
title: Configure Windows Hello for Business Policy settings - key trust
description: Configure Windows Hello for Business Policy settings for Windows Hello for Business
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 08/19/2018
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ On-premises deployment
+- ✅ Key trust
---
# Configure Windows Hello for Business Policy settings - Key Trust
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- On-premises deployment
-- Key trust
-
-
You need at least a Windows 10, version 1703 workstation to run the Group Policy Management Console, which provides the latest Windows Hello for Business and PIN Complexity Group Policy settings. To run the Group Policy Management Console, you need to install the Remote Server Administration Tools for Windows. You can download these tools from [Microsoft Download Center](https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=45520).
Install the Remote Server Administration Tools for Windows on a computer running Windows 10, version 1703 or later.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-key-trust-validate-ad-prereq.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-key-trust-validate-ad-prereq.md
index c8227d9536..64195a8b82 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-key-trust-validate-ad-prereq.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-key-trust-validate-ad-prereq.md
@@ -2,24 +2,22 @@
title: Key registration for on-premises deployment of Windows Hello for Business
description: How to Validate Active Directory prerequisites for Windows Hello for Business when deploying with the key trust model.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 08/19/2018
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ On-premises deployment
+- ✅ Key trust
---
# Validate Active Directory prerequisites - Key Trust
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- On-premises deployment
-- Key trust
-
Key trust deployments need an adequate number of 2016 or later domain controllers to ensure successful user authentication with Windows Hello for Business. To learn more about domain controller planning for key trust deployments, read the [Windows Hello for Business planning guide](hello-planning-guide.md), the [Planning an adequate number of Windows Server 2016 or later Domain Controllers for Windows Hello for Business deployments](hello-adequate-domain-controllers.md) section.
> [!NOTE]
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-key-trust-validate-deploy-mfa.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-key-trust-validate-deploy-mfa.md
index 968ae0d5b0..81e0df5016 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-key-trust-validate-deploy-mfa.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-key-trust-validate-deploy-mfa.md
@@ -2,27 +2,25 @@
title: Validate and Deploy MFA for Windows Hello for Business with key trust
description: How to Validate and Deploy Multifactor Authentication (MFA) Services for Windows Hello for Business with key trust
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 08/19/2018
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ On-premises deployment
+- ✅ Key trust
---
# Validate and Deploy Multifactor Authentication (MFA)
> [!IMPORTANT]
> As of July 1, 2019, Microsoft will no longer offer MFA Server for new deployments. New customers who would like to require multifactor authentication from their users should use cloud-based Azure AD Multi-Factor Authentication. Existing customers who have activated MFA Server prior to July 1 will be able to download the latest version, future updates and generate activation credentials as usual.
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- On-premises deployment
-- Key trust
-
Windows Hello for Business requires all users perform multi-factor authentication prior to creating and registering a Windows Hello for Business credential. On-premises deployments can use certificates, third-party authentication providers for AD FS, or a custom authentication provider for AD FS as an on-premises MFA option.
For information on available third-party authentication methods see [Configure Additional Authentication Methods for AD FS](/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/operations/configure-additional-authentication-methods-for-ad-fs). For creating a custom authentication method see [Build a Custom Authentication Method for AD FS in Windows Server](/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/development/ad-fs-build-custom-auth-method)
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-key-trust-validate-pki.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-key-trust-validate-pki.md
index 809720fdba..d12ad32ade 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-key-trust-validate-pki.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-key-trust-validate-pki.md
@@ -2,25 +2,22 @@
title: Validate Public Key Infrastructure - key trust model (Windows Hello for Business)
description: How to Validate Public Key Infrastructure for Windows Hello for Business, under a key trust model.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 08/19/2018
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ On-premises deployment
+- ✅ Key trust
---
-
# Validate and Configure Public Key Infrastructure - Key Trust
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10, version 1703 or later
-- Windows 11
-- On-premises deployment
-- Key trust
-
Windows Hello for Business must have a public key infrastructure regardless of the deployment or trust model. All trust models depend on the domain controllers having a certificate. The certificate serves as a root of trust for clients to ensure they are not communicating with a rogue domain controller.
## Deploy an enterprise certificate authority
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-manage-in-organization.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-manage-in-organization.md
index deba83abae..7127970af5 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-manage-in-organization.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-manage-in-organization.md
@@ -2,24 +2,23 @@
title: Manage Windows Hello in your organization (Windows)
description: You can create a Group Policy or mobile device management (MDM) policy that will implement Windows Hello for Business on devices running Windows 10.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection:
- M365-identity-device-management
- highpri
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 2/15/2022
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# Manage Windows Hello for Business in your organization
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-
You can create a Group Policy or mobile device management (MDM) policy that will implement Windows Hello on devices running Windows 10.
>[!IMPORTANT]
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-overview.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-overview.md
index 37a81d4995..6a355853aa 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-overview.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-overview.md
@@ -1,25 +1,22 @@
---
title: Windows Hello for Business Overview (Windows)
-ms.reviewer: An overview of Windows Hello for Business
description: Learn how Windows Hello for Business replaces passwords with strong two-factor authentication on PCs and mobile devices in Windows 10 and Windows 11.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection:
- M365-identity-device-management
- highpri
ms.topic: conceptual
localizationpriority: medium
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
-
# Windows Hello for Business Overview
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-
In Windows 10, Windows Hello for Business replaces passwords with strong two-factor authentication on devices. This authentication consists of a new type of user credential that is tied to a device and uses a biometric or PIN.
>[!NOTE]
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-planning-guide.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-planning-guide.md
index 3212485067..c1dc768999 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-planning-guide.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-planning-guide.md
@@ -2,23 +2,22 @@
title: Planning a Windows Hello for Business Deployment
description: Learn about the role of each component within Windows Hello for Business and how certain deployment decisions affect other aspects of your infrastructure.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection:
- M365-identity-device-management
- highpri
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: conceptual
ms.date: 09/16/2020
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# Planning a Windows Hello for Business Deployment
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-
Congratulations! You are taking the first step forward in helping move your organizations away from password to a two-factor, convenience authentication for Windows — Windows Hello for Business. This planning guide helps you understand the different topologies, architectures, and components that encompass a Windows Hello for Business infrastructure.
This guide explains the role of each component within Windows Hello for Business and how certain deployment decisions affect other aspects of the infrastructure. Armed with your planning worksheet, you'll use that information to select the correct deployment guide for your needs.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-prepare-people-to-use.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-prepare-people-to-use.md
index 6b57daee9c..89efd738ea 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-prepare-people-to-use.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-prepare-people-to-use.md
@@ -1,24 +1,21 @@
---
title: Prepare people to use Windows Hello (Windows)
description: When you set a policy to require Windows Hello for Business in the workplace, you will want to prepare people in your organization.
-ms.reviewer:
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 08/19/2018
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
-
# Prepare people to use Windows Hello
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-
When you set a policy to require Windows Hello for Business in the workplace, you will want to prepare people in your organization by explaining how to use Hello.
After enrollment in Hello, users should use their gesture (such as a PIN or fingerprint) for access to corporate resources. Their gesture is only valid on the enrolled device.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-videos.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-videos.md
index 05c92d9ba2..cf437e3bee 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-videos.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-videos.md
@@ -2,22 +2,19 @@
title: Windows Hello for Business Videos
description: View several informative videos describing features and experiences in Windows Hello for Business in Windows 10 and Windows 11.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 07/26/2022
-ms.reviewer: paoloma
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# Windows Hello for Business Videos
-
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-
## Overview of Windows Hello for Business and Features
Watch Pieter Wigleven explain Windows Hello for Business, Multi-factor Unlock, and Dynamic Lock
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-why-pin-is-better-than-password.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-why-pin-is-better-than-password.md
index ef30d59ed1..887d2893eb 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-why-pin-is-better-than-password.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-why-pin-is-better-than-password.md
@@ -2,24 +2,22 @@
title: Why a PIN is better than an online password (Windows)
description: Windows Hello in Windows 10 enables users to sign in to their device using a PIN. How is a PIN different from (and better than) an online password .
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection:
- M365-identity-device-management
- highpri
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 10/23/2017
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
-
# Why a PIN is better than an online password
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-
Windows Hello in Windows 10 enables users to sign in to their device using a PIN. How is a PIN different from (and better than) a local password?
On the surface, a PIN looks much like a password. A PIN can be a set of numbers, but enterprise policy might allow complex PINs that include special characters and letters, both upper-case and lower-case. Something like **t758A!** could be an account password or a complex Hello PIN. It isn't the structure of a PIN (length, complexity) that makes it better than an online password, it's how it works. First we need to distinguish between two types of passwords: `local` passwords are validated against the machine's password store, whereas `online` passwords are validated against a server. This article mostly covers the benefits a PIN has over an online password, and also why it can be considered even better than a local password.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/allowlist-expanded.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/allowlist-expanded.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..df2fc5634a
Binary files /dev/null and b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/allowlist-expanded.png differ
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/allowlist.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/allowlist.png
index 5b1df9448e..35eee9bc5e 100644
Binary files a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/allowlist.png and b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/allowlist.png differ
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset-applications-expanded.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset-applications-expanded.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b3db1cd442
Binary files /dev/null and b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset-applications-expanded.png differ
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset-applications.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset-applications.png
index 3001e771d8..e276132f9e 100644
Binary files a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset-applications.png and b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset-applications.png differ
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset-client-home-screen.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset-client-home-screen.png
deleted file mode 100644
index fce622e7f7..0000000000
Binary files a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset-client-home-screen.png and /dev/null differ
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset-client-prompt.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset-client-prompt.png
index 9e5e339b30..2bfb558bbf 100644
Binary files a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset-client-prompt.png and b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset-client-prompt.png differ
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset-option.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset-option.png
deleted file mode 100644
index 7415de9616..0000000000
Binary files a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset-option.png and /dev/null differ
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset-service-application.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset-service-application.png
deleted file mode 100644
index 970e9f8109..0000000000
Binary files a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset-service-application.png and /dev/null differ
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset-service-home-screen.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset-service-home-screen.png
deleted file mode 100644
index 9903a59bf5..0000000000
Binary files a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset-service-home-screen.png and /dev/null differ
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset-service-prompt.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset-service-prompt.png
index e4a92204ee..39f21df392 100644
Binary files a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset-service-prompt.png and b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset-service-prompt.png differ
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/index.yml b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/index.yml
index 62c038bd6b..bdd841ab2c 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/index.yml
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/index.yml
@@ -8,9 +8,10 @@ metadata:
description: Learn how to manage and deploy Windows Hello for Business.
ms.prod: m365-security
ms.topic: landing-page
- author: GitPrakhar13
- manager: dansimp
- ms.author: prsriva
+ author: paolomatarazzo
+ ms.author: paoloma
+ manager: aaroncz
+ ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.date: 01/22/2021
ms.collection:
- M365-identity-device-management
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/microsoft-compatible-security-key.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/microsoft-compatible-security-key.md
index 75645f288d..2d0f9aed02 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/microsoft-compatible-security-key.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/microsoft-compatible-security-key.md
@@ -2,14 +2,14 @@
title: Microsoft-compatible security key
description: Learn how a Microsoft-compatible security key for Windows is different (and better) than any other FIDO2 security key.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 11/14/2018
-ms.reviewer:
---
# What is a Microsoft-compatible security key?
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/passwordless-strategy.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/passwordless-strategy.md
index 74765dffac..be9b81f965 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/passwordless-strategy.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/passwordless-strategy.md
@@ -2,14 +2,17 @@
title: Password-less strategy
description: Learn about the password-less strategy and how Windows Hello for Business implements this strategy in Windows 10 and Windows 11.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
-ms.reviewer:
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: conceptual
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 05/24/2022
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# Password-less strategy
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/reset-security-key.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/reset-security-key.md
index e2f9b9e978..3818cf29e6 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/reset-security-key.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/reset-security-key.md
@@ -2,14 +2,14 @@
title: Reset-security-key
description: Windows 10 and Windows 11 enables users to sign in to their device using a security key. How to reset a security key
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: GitPrakhar13
-ms.author: prsriva
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: prsriva
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 11/14/2018
-ms.reviewer:
---
# How to reset a Microsoft-compatible security key?
> [!Warning]
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/retired/hello-how-it-works.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/retired/hello-how-it-works.md
index 29e42655ab..aaca362314 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/retired/hello-how-it-works.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/retired/hello-how-it-works.md
@@ -2,21 +2,18 @@
title: How Windows Hello for Business works (Windows)
description: Learn about registration, authentication, key material, and infrastructure for Windows Hello for Business.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: mapalko
ms.localizationpriority: high
-ms.author: mapalko
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
ms.date: 10/16/2017
-ms.reviewer:
-manager: dansimp
+manager: aaroncz
ms.topic: article
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# How Windows Hello for Business works in Windows devices
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-
Windows Hello for Business requires a registered device. When the device is set up, its user can use the device to authenticate to services. This topic explains how device registration works, what happens when a user requests authentication, how key material is stored and processed, and which servers and infrastructure components are involved in different parts of this process.
## Register a new user or device
@@ -58,14 +55,14 @@ Containers can contain several types of key material:
- An authentication key, which is always an asymmetric public–private key pair. This key pair is generated during registration. It must be unlocked each time it’s accessed, by using either the user’s PIN or a previously generated biometric gesture. The authentication key exists until the user resets the PIN, at which time a new key will be generated. When the new key is generated, all the key material that the old key previously protected must be decrypted and re-encrypted using the new key.
- Virtual smart card keys are generated when a virtual smart card is generated and stored securely in the container. They’re available whenever the user’s container is unlocked.
-- The IDP key. These keys can be either symmetric or asymmetric, depending on which IDP you use. A single container may contain zero or more IDP keys, with some restrictions (for example, the enterprise container can contain zero or one IDP keys). IDP keys are stored in the container. For certificate-based Windows Hello for Work, when the container is unlocked, applications that require access to the IDP key or key pair can request access. IDP keys are used to sign or encrypt authentication requests or tokens sent from this device to the IDP. IDP keys are typically long-lived but could have a shorter lifetime than the authentication key. Microsoft accounts, Active Directory accounts, and Azure AD accounts all require the use of asymmetric key pairs. The device generates public and private keys, registers the public key with the IDP (which stores it for later verification), and securely stores the private key. For enterprises, the IDP keys can be generated in two ways:
+- The IDP key. These keys can be either symmetric or asymmetric, depending on which IDP you use. A single container may contain zero or more IDP keys, with some restrictions (for example, the enterprise container can contain zero or one IDP key). IDP keys are stored in the container. For certificate-based Windows Hello for Work, when the container is unlocked, applications that require access to the IDP key or key pair can request access. IDP keys are used to sign or encrypt authentication requests or tokens sent from this device to the IDP. IDP keys are typically long-lived but could have a shorter lifetime than the authentication key. Microsoft accounts, Active Directory accounts, and Azure AD accounts all require the use of asymmetric key pairs. The device generates public and private keys, registers the public key with the IDP (which stores it for later verification), and securely stores the private key. For enterprises, the IDP keys can be generated in two ways:
- The IDP key pair can be associated with an enterprise Certificate Authority (CA) through the Windows Network Device Enrollment Service (NDES), described more fully in [Network Device Enrollment Service Guidance](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/hh831498(v=ws.11)). In this case, Windows Hello requests a new certificate with the same key as the certificate from the existing PKI. This option lets organizations that have an existing PKI continue to use it where appropriate. Given that many applications, such as popular virtual private network systems, require the use of certificates, when you deploy Windows Hello in this mode, it allows a faster transition away from user passwords while still preserving certificate-based functionality. This option also allows the enterprise to store additional certificates in the protected container.
- The IDP can generate the IDP key pair directly, which allows quick, lower-overhead deployment of Windows Hello in environments that don’t have or need a PKI.
## How keys are protected
-Any time key material is generated, it must be protected against attack. The most robust way to do this is through specialized hardware. There’s a long history of using hardware security modules (HSMs) to generate, store, and process keys for security-critical applications. Smart cards are a special type of HSM, as are devices that are compliant with the Trusted Computing Group TPM standard. Wherever possible, the Windows Hello for Work implementation takes advantage of onboard TPM hardware to generate and protect keys. However, Windows Hello and Windows Hello for Work do not require an onboard TPM. Administrators can choose to allow key operations in software, in which case any user who has (or can escalate to) administrative rights on the device can use the IDP keys to sign requests. As an alternative, in some scenarios, devices that don’t have a TPM can be remotely authenticated by using a device that does have a TPM, in which case all the sensitive operations are performed with the TPM and no key material is exposed.
+Anytime key material is generated, it must be protected against attack. The most robust way to do this is through specialized hardware. There’s a long history of using hardware security modules (HSMs) to generate, store, and process keys for security-critical applications. Smart cards are a special type of HSM, as are devices that are compliant with the Trusted Computing Group TPM standard. Wherever possible, the Windows Hello for Work implementation takes advantage of onboard TPM hardware to generate and protect keys. However, Windows Hello and Windows Hello for Work do not require an onboard TPM. Administrators can choose to allow key operations in software, in which case any user who has (or can escalate to) administrative rights on the device can use the IDP keys to sign requests. As an alternative, in some scenarios, devices that don’t have a TPM can be remotely authenticated by using a device that does have a TPM, in which case all the sensitive operations are performed with the TPM and no key material is exposed.
Whenever possible, Microsoft recommends the use of TPM hardware. The TPM protects against a variety of known and potential attacks, including PIN brute-force attacks. The TPM provides an additional layer of protection after an account lockout, too. When the TPM has locked the key material, the user will have to reset the PIN (which means he or she will have to use MFA to reauthenticate to the IDP before the IDP allows him or her to re-register). Resetting the PIN means that all keys and certificates encrypted with the old key material will be removed.
@@ -74,7 +71,7 @@ Whenever possible, Microsoft recommends the use of TPM hardware. The TPM protect
When a user wants to access protected key material, the authentication process begins with the user entering a PIN or biometric gesture to unlock the device, a process sometimes called releasing the key. Think of it like using a physical key to unlock a door: before you can unlock the door, you need to remove the key from your pocket or purse. The user's PIN unlocks the protector key for the container on the device. When that container is unlocked, applications (and thus the user) can use whatever IDP keys reside inside the container.
-These keys are used to sign requests that are sent to the IDP, requesting access to specified resources. It’s important to understand that although the keys are unlocked, applications cannot use them at will. Applications can use specific APIs to request operations that require key material for particular actions (for example, decrypt an email message or sign in to a website). Access through these APIs doesn’t require explicit validation through a user gesture, and the key material isn’t exposed to the requesting application. Rather, the application asks for authentication, encryption, or decryption, and the Windows Hello layer handles the actual work and returns the results. Where appropriate, an application can request a forced authentication even on an unlocked device. Windows prompts the user to reenter the PIN or perform an authentication gesture, which adds an extra level of protection for sensitive data or actions. For example, you can configure the Microsoft Store to require reauthentication any time a user purchases an application, even though the same account and PIN or gesture were already used to unlock the device.
+These keys are used to sign requests that are sent to the IDP, requesting access to specified resources. It’s important to understand that although the keys are unlocked, applications cannot use them at will. Applications can use specific APIs to request operations that require key material for particular actions (for example, decrypt an email message or sign in to a website). Access through these APIs doesn’t require explicit validation through a user gesture, and the key material isn’t exposed to the requesting application. Rather, the application asks for authentication, encryption, or decryption, and the Windows Hello layer handles the actual work and returns the results. Where appropriate, an application can request a forced authentication even on an unlocked device. Windows prompts the user to reenter the PIN or perform an authentication gesture, which adds an extra level of protection for sensitive data or actions. For example, you can configure the Microsoft Store to require reauthentication anytime a user purchases an application, even though the same account and PIN or gesture were already used to unlock the device.
For example, the authentication process for Azure Active Directory works like this:
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/index.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/index.md
index 330cc0041d..ee523e79f7 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/index.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/index.md
@@ -2,18 +2,21 @@
title: Identity and access management (Windows 10)
description: Learn more about identity and access protection technologies in Windows.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 02/05/2018
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# Identity and access management
-Learn more about identity and access management technologies in Windows 10.
+Learn more about identity and access management technologies in Windows 10 and Windows 11.
| Section | Description |
|-|-|
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/password-support-policy.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/password-support-policy.md
index 5cc29b63a0..a48a887b72 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/password-support-policy.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/password-support-policy.md
@@ -1,16 +1,15 @@
---
title: Technical support policy for lost or forgotten passwords
description: Outlines the ways in which Microsoft can help you reset a lost or forgotten password, and provides links to instructions for doing so.
-ms.reviewer: kaushika
-manager: kaushika
ms.custom:
- CI ID 110060
- CSSTroubleshoot
-ms.author: v-tappelgate
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: Teresa-Motiv
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
ms.date: 11/20/2019
---
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/remote-credential-guard.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/remote-credential-guard.md
index a477d48218..4d160b97b2 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/remote-credential-guard.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/remote-credential-guard.md
@@ -2,22 +2,21 @@
title: Protect Remote Desktop credentials with Windows Defender Remote Credential Guard (Windows 10)
description: Windows Defender Remote Credential Guard helps to secure your Remote Desktop credentials by never sending them to the target device.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection:
- M365-identity-device-management
- highpri
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 01/12/2018
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows Server 2016
---
# Protect Remote Desktop credentials with Windows Defender Remote Credential Guard
-**Applies to**
-- Windows 10
-- Windows Server 2016
-
Introduced in Windows 10, version 1607, Windows Defender Remote Credential Guard helps you protect your credentials over a Remote Desktop connection by redirecting Kerberos requests back to the device that's requesting the connection. It also provides single sign-on experiences for Remote Desktop sessions.
Administrator credentials are highly privileged and must be protected. By using Windows Defender Remote Credential Guard to connect during Remote Desktop sessions, if the target device is compromised, your credentials are not exposed because both credential and credential derivatives are never passed over the network to the target device.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-and-remote-desktop-services.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-and-remote-desktop-services.md
index 101b50087d..613d27bf02 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-and-remote-desktop-services.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-and-remote-desktop-services.md
@@ -2,20 +2,23 @@
title: Smart Card and Remote Desktop Services (Windows)
description: This topic for the IT professional describes the behavior of Remote Desktop Services when you implement smart card sign-in.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: ardenw
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 09/24/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Windows Server 2016
+- ✅ Windows Server 2019
+- ✅ Windows Server 2022
---
-
# Smart Card and Remote Desktop Services
-Applies To: Windows 10, Windows 11, Windows Server 2016 and above
-
This topic for the IT professional describes the behavior of Remote Desktop Services when you implement smart card sign-in.
The content in this topic applies to the versions of Windows that are designated in the **Applies To** list at the beginning of this topic. In these versions, smart card redirection logic and **WinSCard** API are combined to support multiple redirected sessions into a single process.
@@ -60,7 +63,7 @@ When smart card-enabled single sign-in (SSO) is used for Remote Desktop Services
### Remote Desktop Services and smart card sign-in
-Remote Desktop Services enable users to sign in with a smart card by entering a PIN on the RDC client computer and sending it to the RD Session Host server in a manner similar to authentication that is based on user name and password.
+Remote Desktop Services enables users to sign in with a smart card by entering a PIN on the RDC client computer and sending it to the RD Session Host server in a manner similar to authentication that is based on user name and password.
In addition, Group Policy settings that are specific to Remote Desktop Services need to be enabled for smart card-based sign-in.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-architecture.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-architecture.md
index ddc63b2e02..3fa8e4255e 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-architecture.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-architecture.md
@@ -2,20 +2,24 @@
title: Smart Card Architecture (Windows)
description: This topic for the IT professional describes the system architecture that supports smart cards in the Windows operating system.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: ardenw
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 09/24/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Windows Server 2016
+- ✅ Windows Server 2019
+- ✅ Windows Server 2022
---
# Smart Card Architecture
-Applies To: Windows 10, Windows 11, Windows Server 2016 and above
-
This topic for the IT professional describes the system architecture that supports smart cards in the Windows operating system, including credential provider architecture and the smart card subsystem architecture.
Authentication is a process for verifying the identity of an object or person. When you authenticate an object, such as a smart card, the goal is to verify that the object is genuine. When you authenticate a person, the goal is to verify that you are not dealing with an imposter.
@@ -118,7 +122,7 @@ The global data cache is hosted in the Smart Cards for Windows service. Windows
The PIN cache protects the user from entering a PIN every time the smart card is unauthenticated. After a smart card is authenticated, it will not differentiate among host-side applications—any application can access private data on the smart card.
-To mitigate this, the smart card enters an exclusive state when an application authenticates to the smart card. However, this means that other applications cannot communicate with the smart card and will be blocked. Therefore, such exclusive connections are minimized. The issue is that a protocol (such as the Kerberos protocol) requires multiple signing operations. Therefore, the protocol requires exclusive access to the smart card over an extended period, or it require multiple authentication operations. This is where the PIN cache is used to minimize exclusive use of the smart card without forcing the user to enter a PIN multiple times.
+To mitigate this, the smart card enters an exclusive state when an application authenticates to the smart card. However, this means that other applications cannot communicate with the smart card and will be blocked. Therefore, such exclusive connections are minimized. The issue is that a protocol (such as the Kerberos protocol) requires multiple signing operations. Therefore, the protocol requires exclusive access to the smart card over an extended period, or it requires multiple authentication operations. This is where the PIN cache is used to minimize exclusive use of the smart card without forcing the user to enter a PIN multiple times.
The following example illustrates how this works. In this scenario, there are two applications: Outlook and Internet Explorer. The applications use smart cards for different purposes.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-certificate-propagation-service.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-certificate-propagation-service.md
index ad0699cf6a..ef2c516483 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-certificate-propagation-service.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-certificate-propagation-service.md
@@ -2,20 +2,24 @@
title: Certificate Propagation Service (Windows)
description: This topic for the IT professional describes the certificate propagation service (CertPropSvc), which is used in smart card implementation.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: ardenw
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 08/24/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Windows Server 2016
+- ✅ Windows Server 2019
+- ✅ Windows Server 2022
---
# Certificate Propagation Service
-Applies To: Windows 10, Windows 11, Windows Server 2016 and above
-
This topic for the IT professional describes the certificate propagation service (CertPropSvc), which is used in smart card implementation.
The certificate propagation service activates when a signed-in user inserts a smart card in a reader that is attached to the computer. This action causes the certificate to be read from the smart card. The certificates are then added to the user's Personal store. Certificate propagation service actions are controlled by using Group Policy. For more information, see [Smart Card Group Policy and Registry Settings](smart-card-group-policy-and-registry-settings.md).
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-certificate-requirements-and-enumeration.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-certificate-requirements-and-enumeration.md
index 701f3dccd8..df7c9505b6 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-certificate-requirements-and-enumeration.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-certificate-requirements-and-enumeration.md
@@ -2,20 +2,24 @@
title: Certificate Requirements and Enumeration (Windows)
description: This topic for the IT professional and smart card developers describes how certificates are managed and used for smart card sign-in.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: ardenw
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 09/24/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Windows Server 2016
+- ✅ Windows Server 2019
+- ✅ Windows Server 2022
---
# Certificate Requirements and Enumeration
-Applies To: Windows 10, Windows 11, Windows Server 2016 and above
-
This topic for the IT professional and smart card developers describes how certificates are managed and used for smart card sign-in.
When a smart card is inserted, the following steps are performed.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-debugging-information.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-debugging-information.md
index 50881d1ef8..7f0143c568 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-debugging-information.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-debugging-information.md
@@ -2,21 +2,26 @@
title: Smart Card Troubleshooting (Windows)
description: Describes the tools and services that smart card developers can use to help identify certificate issues with the smart card deployment.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: ardenw
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection:
- M365-identity-device-management
- highpri
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 09/24/2021
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Windows Server 2016
+- ✅ Windows Server 2019
+- ✅ Windows Server 2022
---
# Smart Card Troubleshooting
-Applies To: Windows 10, Windows 11, Windows Server 2016 and above
-
This article explains tools and services that smart card developers can use to help identify certificate issues with the smart card deployment.
Debugging and tracing smart card issues requires a variety of tools and approaches. The following sections provide guidance about tools and approaches you can use.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-events.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-events.md
index 9585fdfb5e..a750b165ca 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-events.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-events.md
@@ -2,51 +2,47 @@
title: Smart Card Events (Windows)
description: This topic for the IT professional and smart card developer describes events that are related to smart card deployment and development.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: ardenw
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 09/24/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Windows Server 2016
+- ✅ Windows Server 2019
+- ✅ Windows Server 2022
---
# Smart Card Events
-Applies To: Windows 10, Windows 11, Windows Server 2016 and above
-
This topic for the IT professional and smart card developer describes events that are related to smart card deployment and development.
A number of events can be used to monitor smart card activities on a computer, including installation, use, and errors. The following sections describe the events and information that can be used to manage smart cards in an organization.
-- [Smart card reader name](#smart-card-reader-name)
-
-- [Smart card warning events](#smart-card-warning-events)
-
-- [Smart card error events](#smart-card-error-events)
-
-- [Smart card Plug and Play events](#smart-card-plug-and-play-events)
-
+- [Smart card reader name](#smart-card-reader-name)
+- [Smart card warning events](#smart-card-warning-events)
+- [Smart card error events](#smart-card-error-events)
+- [Smart card Plug and Play events](#smart-card-plug-and-play-events)
## Smart card reader name
-The Smart Card resource manager does not use the device name from Device Manager to describe a smart card reader. Instead, the name is constructed from three device attributes that are queried directly from the smart card reader driver.
+The Smart Card resource manager doesn't use the device name from Device Manager to describe a smart card reader. Instead, the name is constructed from three device attributes that are queried directly from the smart card reader driver.
The following three attributes are used to construct the smart card reader name:
-- Vendor name
-
-- Interface device type
-
-- Device unit
+- Vendor name
+- Interface device type
+- Device unit
The smart card reader device name is constructed in the form <*VendorName*> <*Type*> <*DeviceUnit*>. For example 'Contoso Smart Card Reader 0' is constructed from the following information:
-- Vendor name: Contoso
-
-- Interface device type: Smart Card Reader
-
-- Device unit: 0
+- Vendor name: Contoso
+- Interface device type: Smart Card Reader
+- Device unit: 0
## Smart card warning events
@@ -54,8 +50,8 @@ The smart card reader device name is constructed in the form <*VendorName*>
| **Event ID** | **Warning Message** | **Description** |
|--------------|---------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
-| 620 | Smart Card Resource Manager was unable to cancel IOCTL %3 for reader '%2': %1. The reader may no longer be responding. If this error persists, your smart card or reader may not be functioning correctly. %n%nCommand Header: %4 | This occurs if the resource manager attempts to cancel a command to the smart card reader when the smart card service is shutting down or after a smart card is removed from the smart card reader and the command could not to be canceled. This can leave the smart card reader in an unusable state until it is removed from the computer or the computer is restarted.
%1 = Windows error code
%2 = Smart card reader name
%3 = IOCTL being canceled
%4 = First 4 bytes of the command that was sent to the smart card |
-| 619 | Smart Card Reader '%2' has not responded to IOCTL %3 in %1 seconds. If this error persists, your smart card or reader may not be functioning correctly. %n%nCommand Header: %4 | This occurs when a reader has not responded to an IOCTL after an unusually long period of time. Currently, this error is sent after a reader does not respond for 150 seconds. This can leave the smart card reader in an unusable state until it is removed from the computer or the computer is restarted.
%1 = Number of seconds the IOCTL has been waiting
%2 = Smart card reader name
%3 = IOCTL sent
%4 = First 4 bytes of the command that was sent to the smart card |
+| 620 | Smart Card Resource Manager was unable to cancel IOCTL %3 for reader '%2': %1. The reader may no longer be responding. If this error persists, your smart card or reader may not be functioning correctly. %n%nCommand Header: %4 | This occurs if the resource manager attempts to cancel a command to the smart card reader when the smart card service is shutting down or after a smart card is removed from the smart card reader and the command could not be canceled. This can leave the smart card reader in an unusable state until it's removed from the computer or the computer is restarted.
%1 = Windows error code
%2 = Smart card reader name
%3 = IOCTL being canceled
%4 = First 4 bytes of the command that was sent to the smart card |
+| 619 | Smart Card Reader '%2' hasn't responded to IOCTL %3 in %1 seconds. If this error persists, your smart card or reader may not be functioning correctly. %n%nCommand Header: %4 | This occurs when a reader hasn't responded to an IOCTL after an unusually long period of time. Currently, this error is sent after a reader doesn't respond for 150 seconds. This can leave the smart card reader in an unusable state until it's removed from the computer or the computer is restarted.
%1 = Number of seconds the IOCTL has been waiting
%2 = Smart card reader name
%3 = IOCTL sent
%4 = First 4 bytes of the command that was sent to the smart card |
## Smart card error events
@@ -67,7 +63,7 @@ The smart card reader device name is constructed in the form <*VendorName*>
| 205 | Reader object has duplicate name: %1 | There are two smart card readers that have the same name. Remove the smart card reader that is causing this error message.
%1 = Name of the smart card reader that is duplicated |
| 206 | Failed to create global reader change event. | This is an internal, unrecoverable error that indicates a failure in the smart card service. The most common cause is limited computer resources. Restarting the computer may resolve the issue. |
| 401 | Reader shutdown exception from eject smart card command | A smart card reader could not eject a smart card while the smart card reader was shutting down. |
-| 406 | Reader object cannot Identify Device | A smart card reader did not properly respond to a request for information about the device, which is required for constructing the smart card reader name. The smart card reader will not be recognized by the service until it is removed from the computer and reinserted or until the computer is restarted. |
+| 406 | Reader object cannot Identify Device | A smart card reader did not properly respond to a request for information about the device, which is required for constructing the smart card reader name. The smart card reader will not be recognized by the service until it's removed from the computer and reinserted or until the computer is restarted. |
| 502 | Initialization of Service Status Critical Section failed | This is an internal, unrecoverable error that indicates a failure in the smart card service. The most common cause is limited computer resources. Restarting the computer may resolve the issue. |
| 504 | Resource Manager cannot create shutdown event flag: %1 | This is an internal, unrecoverable error that indicates a failure in the smart card service. The most common cause is limited computer resources. Restarting the computer may resolve the issue.
%1 = Windows error code |
| 506 | Smart Card Resource Manager failed to register service: %1 | This is an internal, unrecoverable error that indicates a failure in the smart card service. The most common cause is limited computer resources. Restarting the computer may resolve the issue.
%1 = Windows error code |
@@ -95,10 +91,10 @@ The smart card reader device name is constructed in the form <*VendorName*>
| 609 | Reader monitor failed to create overlapped event: %1 | This is an internal, unrecoverable error that indicates a failure in the smart card service. The most common cause is limited computer resources. Restarting the computer may resolve the issue.
%1 = Windows error code |
| 610 | Smart Card Reader '%2' rejected IOCTL %3: %1 If this error persists, your smart card or reader may not be functioning correctly.%n%nCommand Header: %4 | The reader cannot successfully transmit the indicated IOCTL to the smart card. This can indicate hardware failure, but this error can also occur if a smart card or smart card reader is removed from the system while an operation is in progress.
%1 = Windows error code
%2 = Name of the smart card reader
%3 = IOCTL that was sent
%4 = First 4 bytes of the command sent to the smart card
These events are caused by legacy functionality in the smart card stack. It can be ignored if there is no noticeable failure in the smart card usage scenarios. You might also see this error if your eSIM is recognized as a smartcard controller.|
| 611 | Smart Card Reader initialization failed | This is an internal, unrecoverable error that indicates a failure in the smart card service. The most common cause is limited computer resources. Restarting the computer may resolve this issue. |
-| 612 | Reader insertion monitor error retry threshold reached: %1 | This occurs when a smart card reader fails several times to respond properly to the IOCTL, which indicates whether a smart card is present in the reader. The smart card reader is marked as defective, and it is not recognized by the service until it is removed from the computer and reinserted or until the computer is restarted.
%1 = Windows error code |
-| 615 | Reader removal monitor error retry threshold reached: %1 | This occurs when a smart card reader fails several times to respond properly to the IOCTL, which indicates whether a smart card is present in the reader. The smart card reader is marked as defective, and it is not recognized by the service until it is removed from the computer and reinserted or until the computer is restarted.
%1 = Windows error code |
-| 616 | Reader monitor '%2' received uncaught error code: %1 | This occurs when a smart card reader fails several times to respond properly to the IOCTL, which indicates whether a smart card is present in the reader. The smart card reader is marked as defective, and it is not recognized by the service until it is removed from the computer and reinserted or until the computer is restarted.
%1 = Windows error code
%2 = Reader name |
-| 617 | Reader monitor '%1' exception -- exiting thread | An unknown error occurred while monitoring a smart card reader for smart card insertions and removals. The smart card reader is marked as defective, and it is not recognized by the service until it is removed from the computer and reinserted or until the computer is restarted.
%1 = Smart card reader name |
+| 612 | Reader insertion monitor error retry threshold reached: %1 | This occurs when a smart card reader fails several times to respond properly to the IOCTL, which indicates whether a smart card is present in the reader. The smart card reader is marked as defective, and it is not recognized by the service until it's removed from the computer and reinserted or until the computer is restarted.
%1 = Windows error code |
+| 615 | Reader removal monitor error retry threshold reached: %1 | This occurs when a smart card reader fails several times to respond properly to the IOCTL, which indicates whether a smart card is present in the reader. The smart card reader is marked as defective, and it is not recognized by the service until it's removed from the computer and reinserted or until the computer is restarted.
%1 = Windows error code |
+| 616 | Reader monitor '%2' received uncaught error code: %1 | This occurs when a smart card reader fails several times to respond properly to the IOCTL, which indicates whether a smart card is present in the reader. The smart card reader is marked as defective, and it is not recognized by the service until it's removed from the computer and reinserted or until the computer is restarted.
%1 = Windows error code
%2 = Reader name |
+| 617 | Reader monitor '%1' exception -- exiting thread | An unknown error occurred while monitoring a smart card reader for smart card insertions and removals. The smart card reader is marked as defective, and it is not recognized by the service until it's removed from the computer and reinserted or until the computer is restarted.
%1 = Smart card reader name |
| 618 | Smart Card Resource Manager encountered an unrecoverable internal error. | This is an internal, unrecoverable error that indicates a failure in the smart card service. The most common cause is limited computer resources. Restarting the computer may resolve the issue. |
| 621 | Server Control failed to access start event: %1 | This is an internal, unrecoverable error that indicates a failure in the smart card service. The most common cause is limited computer resources. Restarting the computer may resolve the issue.
%1 = Windows error code
These events are caused by legacy functionality in the smart card stack. It can be ignored if there is no noticeable failure in the smart card usage scenarios. |
| 622 | Server Control failed to access stop event: %1 | This is an internal, unrecoverable error that indicates a failure in the smart card service. The most common cause is limited computer resources. Restarting the computer may resolve the issue.
%1 = Windows error code |
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-group-policy-and-registry-settings.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-group-policy-and-registry-settings.md
index 897140b630..2b1c30addd 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-group-policy-and-registry-settings.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-group-policy-and-registry-settings.md
@@ -2,20 +2,24 @@
title: Smart Card Group Policy and Registry Settings (Windows)
description: Discover the Group Policy, registry key, local security policy, and credential delegation policy settings that are available for configuring smart cards.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: ardenw
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 11/02/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Windows Server 2016
+- ✅ Windows Server 2019
+- ✅ Windows Server 2022
---
# Smart Card Group Policy and Registry Settings
-Applies to: Windows 10, Windows 11, Windows Server 2016 and above
-
This article for IT professionals and smart card developers describes the Group Policy settings, registry key settings, local security policy settings, and credential delegation policy settings that are available for configuring smart cards.
The following sections and tables list the smart card-related Group Policy settings and registry keys that can be set on a per-computer basis. If you use domain Group Policy Objects (GPOs), you can edit and apply Group Policy settings to local or domain computers.
@@ -89,7 +93,7 @@ The following table lists the default values for these GPO settings. Variations
### Allow certificates with no extended key usage certificate attribute
-You can use this policy setting to allow certificates without an enhanced key usage (EKU) set to be used for sign in.
+You can use this policy setting to allow certificates without an enhanced key usage (EKU) set to be used for sign-in.
> [!NOTE]
> Enhanced key usage certificate attribute is also known as extended key usage.
@@ -145,9 +149,9 @@ When this setting isn't turned on, the feature is not available.
### Allow signature keys valid for Logon
-You can use this policy setting to allow signature key–based certificates to be enumerated and available for sign in.
+You can use this policy setting to allow signature key–based certificates to be enumerated and available for sign-in.
-When this setting is turned on, any certificates that are available on the smart card with a signature-only key are listed on the sign-in screen.
+When this setting is turned on, any certificates that are available on the smart card with a signature-only key are listed on the sign-in screen.
When this setting isn't turned on, certificates available on the smart card with a signature-only key aren't listed on the sign-in screen.
@@ -160,7 +164,7 @@ When this setting isn't turned on, certificates available on the smart card with
### Allow time invalid certificates
-You can use this policy setting to permit certificates that are expired or not yet valid to be displayed for sign in.
+You can use this policy setting to permit certificates that are expired or not yet valid to be displayed for sign-in.
> [!NOTE]
> Before Windows Vista, certificates were required to contain a valid time and to not expire. For a certificate to be used, it must be accepted by the domain controller. This policy setting only controls which certificates are displayed on the client computer.
@@ -178,7 +182,7 @@ When this policy setting isn't turned on, certificates that are expired or not y
### Allow user name hint
-You can use this policy setting to determine whether an optional field appears during sign in and provides a subsequent elevation process where users can enter their username or username and domain, which associates a certificate with the user.
+You can use this policy setting to determine whether an optional field appears during sign-in and provides a subsequent elevation process where users can enter their username or username and domain, which associates a certificate with the user.
When this policy setting is turned on, users see an optional field where they can enter their username or username and domain.
@@ -191,7 +195,7 @@ When this policy setting isn't turned on, users don't see this optional field.
| Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: None |
| Notes and resources | |
-### Configure root certificate clean up
+### Configure root certificate clean-up
You can use this policy setting to manage the cleanup behavior of root certificates. Certificates are verified by using a trust chain, and the trust anchor for the digital certificate is the Root Certification Authority (CA). A CA can issue multiple certificates with the root certificate as the top certificate of the tree structure. A private key is used to sign other certificates. This creates an inherited trustworthiness for all certificates immediately under the root certificate.
@@ -251,17 +255,17 @@ This policy setting is applied to the computer after the [Allow time invalid cer
### Force the reading of all certificates from the smart card
-You can use this policy setting to manage how Windows reads all certificates from the smart card for sign in. During sign in, Windows reads only the default certificate from the smart card unless it supports retrieval of all certificates in a single call. This policy setting forces Windows to read all the certificates from the smart card.
+You can use this policy setting to manage how Windows reads all certificates from the smart card for sign-in. During sign-in, Windows reads only the default certificate from the smart card unless it supports retrieval of all certificates in a single call. This policy setting forces Windows to read all the certificates from the smart card.
-When this policy setting is turned on, Windows attempts to read all certificates from the smart card, regardless of the CSP feature set.
+When this policy setting is turned on, Windows attempts to read all certificates from the smart card, regardless of the CSP feature set.
-When this policy isn't turned on, Windows attempts to read only the default certificate from smart cards that don't support retrieval of all certificates in a single call. Certificates other than the default aren't available for sign in.
+When this policy isn't turned on, Windows attempts to read only the default certificate from smart cards that don't support retrieval of all certificates in a single call. Certificates other than the default aren't available for sign-in.
| **Item** | **Description** |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Registry key | **ForceReadingAllCertificates** |
| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Disabled and not configured are equivalent |
-| Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: None
**Important**: Enabling this policy setting can adversely impact performance during the sign in process in certain situations. |
+| Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: None
**Important**: Enabling this policy setting can adversely impact performance during the sign-in process in certain situations. |
| Notes and resources | Contact the smart card vendor to determine if your smart card and associated CSP support the required behavior. |
### Notify user of successful smart card driver installation
@@ -299,12 +303,12 @@ When this setting isn't turned on, Credential Manager can return plaintext PINs.
### Reverse the subject name stored in a certificate when displaying
-You can use this policy setting to control the way the subject name appears during sign in.
+You can use this policy setting to control the way the subject name appears during sign-in.
> [!NOTE]
> To help users distinguish one certificate from another, the user principal name (UPN) and the common name are displayed by default. For example, when this setting is enabled, if the certificate subject is CN=User1, OU=Users, DN=example, DN=com and the UPN is user1@example.com, "User1" is displayed with "user1@example.com." If the UPN is not present, the entire subject name is displayed. This setting controls the appearance of that subject name, and it might need to be adjusted for your organization.
-When this policy setting is turned on, the subject name during sign in appears reversed from the way that it's stored in the certificate.
+When this policy setting is turned on, the subject name during sign-in appears reversed from the way that it's stored in the certificate.
When this policy setting isn’t turned on, the subject name appears the same as it’s stored in the certificate.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-how-smart-card-sign-in-works-in-windows.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-how-smart-card-sign-in-works-in-windows.md
index 9fb023c25f..4019c75ad2 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-how-smart-card-sign-in-works-in-windows.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-how-smart-card-sign-in-works-in-windows.md
@@ -2,21 +2,26 @@
title: How Smart Card Sign-in Works in Windows
description: This topic for IT professional provides links to resources about the implementation of smart card technologies in the Windows operating system.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: ardenw
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection:
- M365-identity-device-management
- highpri
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 09/24/2021
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Windows Server 2016
+- ✅ Windows Server 2019
+- ✅ Windows Server 2022
---
# How Smart Card Sign-in Works in Windows
-Applies To: Windows 10, Windows 11, Windows Server 2016 and above
-
This topic for IT professional provides links to resources about the implementation of smart card technologies in the Windows operating system. It includes the following resources about the architecture, certificate management, and services that are related to smart card use:
- [Smart Card Architecture](smart-card-architecture.md): Learn about enabling communications with smart cards and smart card readers, which can be different according to the vendor that supplies them.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-removal-policy-service.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-removal-policy-service.md
index 5757f75aa1..79ce85481a 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-removal-policy-service.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-removal-policy-service.md
@@ -2,20 +2,24 @@
title: Smart Card Removal Policy Service (Windows)
description: This topic for the IT professional describes the role of the removal policy service (ScPolicySvc) in smart card implementation.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: ardenw
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 09/24/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Windows Server 2016
+- ✅ Windows Server 2019
+- ✅ Windows Server 2022
---
# Smart Card Removal Policy Service
-Applies To: Windows 10, Windows 11, Windows Server 2016
-
This topic for the IT professional describes the role of the removal policy service (ScPolicySvc) in smart card implementation.
The smart card removal policy service is applicable when a user has signed in with a smart card and then removes that smart card from the reader. The action that is performed when the smart card is removed is controlled by Group Policy settings. For more information, see [Smart Card Group Policy and Registry Settings](smart-card-group-policy-and-registry-settings.md).
@@ -26,7 +30,7 @@ The smart card removal policy service is applicable when a user has signed in wi
The numbers in the previous figure represent the following actions:
-1. Winlogon is not directly involved in monitoring for smart card removal events. The sequence of steps that are involved when a smart card is removed begins with the smart card credential provider in the sign-in UI process. When a user successfully signs in with a smart card, the smart card credential provider captures the reader name. This information is then stored in the registry with the session identifier where the sign in was initiated.
+1. Winlogon is not directly involved in monitoring for smart card removal events. The sequence of steps that are involved when a smart card is removed begins with the smart card credential provider in the sign-in UI process. When a user successfully signs in with a smart card, the smart card credential provider captures the reader name. This information is then stored in the registry with the session identifier where the sign-in was initiated.
2. The smart card resource manager service notifies the smart card removal policy service that a sign-in has occurred.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-smart-cards-for-windows-service.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-smart-cards-for-windows-service.md
index 0345ccac67..4acfbe37c2 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-smart-cards-for-windows-service.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-smart-cards-for-windows-service.md
@@ -2,20 +2,24 @@
title: Smart Cards for Windows Service (Windows)
description: This topic for the IT professional and smart card developers describes how the Smart Cards for Windows service manages readers and application interactions.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: ardenw
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 09/24/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Windows Server 2016
+- ✅ Windows Server 2019
+- ✅ Windows Server 2022
---
# Smart Cards for Windows Service
-Applies To: Windows 10, Windows 11, Windows Server 2016 and above
-
This topic for the IT professional and smart card developers describes how the Smart Cards for Windows service (formerly called Smart Card Resource Manager) manages readers and application interactions.
The Smart Cards for Windows service provides the basic infrastructure for all other smart card components as it manages smart card readers and application interactions on the computer. It is fully compliant with the specifications set by the PC/SC Workgroup. For information about these specifications, see the [PC/SC Workgroup Specifications website](https://pcscworkgroup.com/).
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-tools-and-settings.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-tools-and-settings.md
index a7c1c2bfa4..faab6d1c50 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-tools-and-settings.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-tools-and-settings.md
@@ -2,20 +2,24 @@
title: Smart Card Tools and Settings (Windows)
description: This topic for the IT professional and smart card developer links to information about smart card debugging, settings, and events.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: ardenw
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 09/24/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Windows Server 2016
+- ✅ Windows Server 2019
+- ✅ Windows Server 2022
---
# Smart Card Tools and Settings
-Applies To: Windows 10, Windows 11, Windows Server 2016 and above
-
This topic for the IT professional and smart card developer links to information about smart card debugging, settings, and events.
This section of the Smart Card Technical Reference contains information about the following:
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-windows-smart-card-technical-reference.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-windows-smart-card-technical-reference.md
index 7f577b80dd..7899c14e50 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-windows-smart-card-technical-reference.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-windows-smart-card-technical-reference.md
@@ -2,20 +2,24 @@
title: Smart Card Technical Reference (Windows)
description: Learn about the Windows smart card infrastructure for physical smart cards, and how smart card-related components work in Windows.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: ardenw
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 09/24/2021
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Windows Server 2016
+- ✅ Windows Server 2019
+- ✅ Windows Server 2022
---
# Smart Card Technical Reference
-Applies To: Windows 10, Windows 11, Windows Server 2016 and above
-
The Smart Card Technical Reference describes the Windows smart card infrastructure for physical smart cards and how smart card-related components work in Windows. This document also contains information about tools that information technology (IT) developers and administrators can use to troubleshoot, debug, and deploy smart card-based strong authentication in the enterprise.
## Audience
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works.md
index ded2f140d2..42aca41a0a 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works.md
@@ -1,26 +1,27 @@
---
title: How User Account Control works (Windows)
description: User Account Control (UAC) is a fundamental component of Microsoft's overall security vision. UAC helps mitigate the impact of malware.
-ms.reviewer:
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: sulahiri
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection:
- M365-identity-device-management
- highpri
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 09/23/2021
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Windows Server 2016
+- ✅ Windows Server 2019
+- ✅ Windows Server 2022
---
# How User Account Control works
-**Applies to**
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-- Windows Server 2016 and above
-
User Account Control (UAC) is a fundamental component of Microsoft's overall security vision. UAC helps mitigate the impact of malware.
## UAC process and interactions
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-group-policy-and-registry-key-settings.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-group-policy-and-registry-key-settings.md
index eb97277ed7..e54d14dafe 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-group-policy-and-registry-key-settings.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-group-policy-and-registry-key-settings.md
@@ -2,25 +2,25 @@
title: User Account Control Group Policy and registry key settings (Windows)
description: Here's a list of UAC Group Policy and registry key settings that your organization can use to manage UAC.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: sulahiri
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection:
- M365-identity-device-management
- highpri
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 04/19/2017
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Windows Server 2016
+- ✅ Windows Server 2019
+- ✅ Windows Server 2022
---
# User Account Control Group Policy and registry key settings
-
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-- Windows Server 2016 and above
-
## Group Policy settings
There are 10 Group Policy settings that can be configured for User Account Control (UAC). The table lists the default for each of the policy settings, and the following sections explain the different UAC policy settings and provide recommendations. These policy settings are located in **Security Settings\\Local Policies\\Security Options** in the Local Security Policy snap-in. For more information about each of the Group Policy settings, see the Group Policy description. For information about the registry key settings, see [Registry key settings](#registry-key-settings).
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-overview.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-overview.md
index 2e12c5d66e..e9b562bbe0 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-overview.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-overview.md
@@ -1,26 +1,27 @@
---
title: User Account Control (Windows)
description: User Account Control (UAC) helps prevent malware from damaging a PC and helps organizations deploy a better-managed desktop.
-ms.reviewer:
ms.prod: m365-security
ms.localizationpriority: medium
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: sulahiri
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection:
- M365-identity-device-management
- highpri
ms.topic: article
ms.date: 09/24/2011
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Windows Server 2016
+- ✅ Windows Server 2019
+- ✅ Windows Server 2022
---
# User Account Control
-**Applies to**
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-- Windows Server 2016 and above
-
User Account Control (UAC) helps prevent malware from damaging a PC and helps organizations deploy a better-managed desktop. With UAC, apps and tasks always run in the security context of a non-administrator account, unless an administrator specifically authorizes administrator-level access to the system. UAC can block the automatic installation of unauthorized apps and prevent inadvertent changes to system settings.
UAC allows all users to log on to their computers using a standard user account. Processes launched using a standard user token may perform tasks using access rights granted to a standard user. For instance, Windows Explorer automatically inherits standard user level permissions. Additionally, any apps that are started using Windows Explorer (for example, by double-clicking a shortcut) also run with the standard set of user permissions. Many apps, including those that are included with the operating system itself, are designed to work properly in this way.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-security-policy-settings.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-security-policy-settings.md
index d5a71d6a7b..cacda816c0 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-security-policy-settings.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-security-policy-settings.md
@@ -1,27 +1,27 @@
---
title: User Account Control security policy settings (Windows)
description: You can use security policies to configure how User Account Control works in your organization.
-ms.reviewer:
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: sulahiri
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection:
- M365-identity-device-management
- highpri
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 09/24/2021
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Windows Server 2016
+- ✅ Windows Server 2019
+- ✅ Windows Server 2022
---
# User Account Control security policy settings
-**Applies to**
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-- Windows Server 2016 and above
-
-
You can use security policies to configure how User Account Control works in your organization. They can be configured locally by using the Local Security Policy snap-in (secpol.msc) or configured for the domain, OU, or specific groups by Group Policy.
## User Account Control: Admin Approval Mode for the Built-in Administrator account
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-deploy-virtual-smart-cards.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-deploy-virtual-smart-cards.md
index a6b311b8f1..763ba1f346 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-deploy-virtual-smart-cards.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-deploy-virtual-smart-cards.md
@@ -2,14 +2,16 @@
title: Deploy Virtual Smart Cards (Windows 10)
description: This topic for the IT professional discusses the factors to consider when you deploy a virtual smart card authentication solution.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 04/19/2017
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows Server 2016
---
# Deploy Virtual Smart Cards
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-evaluate-security.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-evaluate-security.md
index cb90ff6746..703582c5a0 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-evaluate-security.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-evaluate-security.md
@@ -2,20 +2,20 @@
title: Evaluate Virtual Smart Card Security (Windows 10)
description: This topic for the IT professional describes security characteristics and considerations when deploying TPM virtual smart cards.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 04/19/2017
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows Server 2016
---
# Evaluate Virtual Smart Card Security
-Applies To: Windows 10, Windows Server 2016
-
This topic for the IT professional describes security characteristics and considerations when deploying TPM virtual smart cards.
## Virtual smart card non-exportability details
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-get-started.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-get-started.md
index a1371cb4aa..92cdfe8cdc 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-get-started.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-get-started.md
@@ -2,20 +2,20 @@
title: Get Started with Virtual Smart Cards - Walkthrough Guide (Windows 10)
description: This topic for the IT professional describes how to set up a basic test environment for using TPM virtual smart cards.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 04/19/2017
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows Server 2016
---
# Get Started with Virtual Smart Cards: Walkthrough Guide
-Applies To: Windows 10, Windows Server 2016
-
This topic for the IT professional describes how to set up a basic test environment for using TPM virtual smart cards.
Virtual smart cards are a technology from Microsoft, which offer comparable security benefits in two-factor authentication to physical smart cards. They also offer more convenience for users and lower cost for organizations to deploy. By utilizing Trusted Platform Module (TPM) devices that provide the same cryptographic capabilities as physical smart cards, virtual smart cards accomplish the three key properties that are desired by smart cards: non-exportability, isolated cryptography, and anti-hammering.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-overview.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-overview.md
index f81458d9ea..7d92df7bd0 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-overview.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-overview.md
@@ -2,20 +2,20 @@
title: Virtual Smart Card Overview (Windows 10)
description: Learn more about the virtual smart card technology that was developed by Microsoft. Find links to additional topics about virtual smart cards.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: conceptual
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 10/13/2017
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows Server 2016
---
# Virtual Smart Card Overview
-Applies To: Windows 10, Windows Server 2016
-
This topic for IT professional provides an overview of the virtual smart card technology that was developed by Microsoft and includes [links to additional topics](#see-also) to help you evaluate, plan, provision, and administer virtual smart cards.
**Did you mean…**
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-tpmvscmgr.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-tpmvscmgr.md
index e6674037f9..37b59cb998 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-tpmvscmgr.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-tpmvscmgr.md
@@ -2,20 +2,20 @@
title: Tpmvscmgr (Windows 10)
description: This topic for the IT professional describes the Tpmvscmgr command-line tool, through which an administrator can create and delete TPM virtual smart cards on a computer.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 04/19/2017
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows Server 2016
---
# Tpmvscmgr
-Applies To: Windows 10, Windows Server 2016
-
The Tpmvscmgr command-line tool allows users with Administrative credentials to create and delete TPM virtual smart cards on a computer. For examples of how this command can be used, see [Examples](#examples).
## Syntax
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-understanding-and-evaluating.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-understanding-and-evaluating.md
index 49bd1fbfff..077d990d63 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-understanding-and-evaluating.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-understanding-and-evaluating.md
@@ -2,20 +2,20 @@
title: Understanding and Evaluating Virtual Smart Cards (Windows 10)
description: Learn how smart card technology can fit into your authentication design. Find links to additional topics about virtual smart cards.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 04/19/2017
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows Server 2016
---
# Understanding and Evaluating Virtual Smart Cards
-Applies To: Windows 10, Windows Server 2016
-
This topic for the IT professional describes the virtual smart card technology that was developed by Microsoft; suggests how it can fit into your authentication design; and provides links to additional resources that you can use to design, deploy, and troubleshoot virtual smart cards.
Virtual smart card technology uses cryptographic keys that are stored on computers that have the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) installed. Virtual smart cards offer comparable security benefits to conventional smart cards by using two-factor authentication. The technology also offers more convenience for users and has a lower cost to deploy. By utilizing TPM devices that provide the same cryptographic capabilities as conventional smart cards, virtual smart cards accomplish the three key properties that are desired for smart cards: non-exportability, isolated cryptography, and anti-hammering.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-use-virtual-smart-cards.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-use-virtual-smart-cards.md
index 3d09432ada..6cb4ac6fc7 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-use-virtual-smart-cards.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-use-virtual-smart-cards.md
@@ -2,20 +2,20 @@
title: Use Virtual Smart Cards (Windows 10)
description: This topic for the IT professional describes requirements for virtual smart cards and provides information about how to use and manage them.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 10/13/2017
-ms.reviewer:
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows Server 2016
---
# Use Virtual Smart Cards
-Applies To: Windows 10, Windows Server 2016
-
This topic for the IT professional describes requirements for virtual smart cards, how to use virtual smart cards, and tools that are available to help you create and manage them.
## Requirements, restrictions, and limitations
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/how-to-configure-diffie-hellman-protocol-over-ikev2-vpn-connections.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/how-to-configure-diffie-hellman-protocol-over-ikev2-vpn-connections.md
index 647e58e84b..0e77c5aca8 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/how-to-configure-diffie-hellman-protocol-over-ikev2-vpn-connections.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/how-to-configure-diffie-hellman-protocol-over-ikev2-vpn-connections.md
@@ -2,12 +2,15 @@
title: How to configure Diffie Hellman protocol over IKEv2 VPN connections (Windows 10 and Windows 11)
description: Learn how to update the Diffie Hellman configuration of VPN servers and clients by running VPN cmdlets to secure connections.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 09/23/2021
-ms.reviewer:
-manager: dansimp
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: pesmith
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# How to configure Diffie Hellman protocol over IKEv2 VPN connections
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/how-to-use-single-sign-on-sso-over-vpn-and-wi-fi-connections.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/how-to-use-single-sign-on-sso-over-vpn-and-wi-fi-connections.md
index 317751d40d..58e9851817 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/how-to-use-single-sign-on-sso-over-vpn-and-wi-fi-connections.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/how-to-use-single-sign-on-sso-over-vpn-and-wi-fi-connections.md
@@ -2,11 +2,14 @@
title: How to use Single Sign-On (SSO) over VPN and Wi-Fi connections (Windows 10 and Windows 11)
description: Explains requirements to enable Single Sign-On (SSO) to on-premises domain resources over WiFi or VPN connections.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
ms.date: 03/22/2022
-ms.reviewer:
-manager: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: pesmith
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# How to use Single Sign-On (SSO) over VPN and Wi-Fi connections
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-authentication.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-authentication.md
index 65de4f3780..3434542f7b 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-authentication.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-authentication.md
@@ -2,20 +2,19 @@
title: VPN authentication options (Windows 10 and Windows 11)
description: Learn about the EAP authentication methods that Windows supports in VPNs to provide secure authentication using username/password and certificate-based methods.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 09/23/2021
-ms.reviewer:
-manager: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: pesmith
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# VPN authentication options
-**Applies to**
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-
In addition to older and less-secure password-based authentication methods (which should be avoided), the built-in VPN solution uses Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) to provide secure authentication using both user name and password, and certificate-based methods. You can only configure EAP-based authentication if you select a built-in VPN type (IKEv2, L2TP, PPTP or Automatic).
Windows supports a number of EAP authentication methods.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-auto-trigger-profile.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-auto-trigger-profile.md
index 8b3e2dbebd..2cef6b0692 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-auto-trigger-profile.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-auto-trigger-profile.md
@@ -2,20 +2,19 @@
title: VPN auto-triggered profile options (Windows 10 and Windows 11)
description: Learn about the types of auto-trigger rules for VPNs in Windows, which start a VPN when it is needed to access a resource.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 09/23/2021
-ms.reviewer:
-manager: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: pesmith
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# VPN auto-triggered profile options
-**Applies to**
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-
In Windows 10 and Windows 11, a number of features have been added to auto-trigger VPN so users won’t have to manually connect when VPN is needed to access necessary resources. There are three different types of auto-trigger rules:
- App trigger
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-conditional-access.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-conditional-access.md
index 0912af9374..e33c303053 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-conditional-access.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-conditional-access.md
@@ -2,22 +2,23 @@
title: VPN and conditional access (Windows 10 and Windows 11)
description: Learn how to integrate the VPN client with the Conditional Access Platform, so you can create access rules for Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) connected apps.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
-ms.reviewer:
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: pesmith
+manager: aaroncz
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 09/23/2021
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# VPN and conditional access
->Applies to: Windows 10 and Windows 11
-
The VPN client is now able to integrate with the cloud-based Conditional Access Platform to provide a device compliance option for remote clients. Conditional Access is a policy-based evaluation engine that lets you create access rules for any Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) connected application.
>[!NOTE]
->Conditional Access is an Azure AD Premium feature.
+>Conditional Access is an Azure AD Premium feature.
Conditional Access Platform components used for Device Compliance include the following cloud-based services:
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-connection-type.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-connection-type.md
index 75b93889b6..96e77511ad 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-connection-type.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-connection-type.md
@@ -2,20 +2,19 @@
title: VPN connection types (Windows 10 and Windows 11)
description: Learn about Windows VPN platform clients and the VPN connection-type features that can be configured.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 08/23/2021
-ms.reviewer:
-manager: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: pesmith
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# VPN connection types
-**Applies to**
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-
Virtual private networks (VPNs) are point-to-point connections across a private or public network, such as the Internet. A VPN client uses special TCP/IP or UDP-based protocols, called *tunneling protocols*, to make a virtual call to a virtual port on a VPN server. In a typical VPN deployment, a client initiates a virtual point-to-point connection to a remote access server over the Internet. The remote access server answers the call, authenticates the caller, and transfers data between the VPN client and the organization’s private network.
There are many options for VPN clients. In Windows 10 and Windows 11, the built-in plug-in and the Universal Windows Platform (UWP) VPN plug-in platform are built on top of the Windows VPN platform. This guide focuses on the Windows VPN platform clients and the features that can be configured.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-guide.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-guide.md
index 58fa8e9068..c235596b5c 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-guide.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-guide.md
@@ -2,22 +2,19 @@
title: Windows VPN technical guide (Windows 10 and Windows 11)
description: Learn about decisions to make for Windows 10 or Windows 11 clients in your enterprise VPN solution and how to configure your deployment.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 02/21/2022
-ms.reviewer:
-manager: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: pesmith
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# Windows VPN technical guide
-
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-
This guide will walk you through the decisions you will make for Windows 10 or Windows 11 clients in your enterprise VPN solution and how to configure your deployment. This guide references the [VPNv2 Configuration Service Provider (CSP)](/windows/client-management/mdm/vpnv2-csp) and provides mobile device management (MDM) configuration instructions using Microsoft Intune and the VPN Profile template for Windows 10 and Windows 11.
To create a Windows 10 VPN device configuration profile see: [Windows 10 and Windows Holographic device settings to add VPN connections using Intune](/mem/intune/configuration/vpn-settings-windows-10).
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-name-resolution.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-name-resolution.md
index fe3269e28b..d91442912d 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-name-resolution.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-name-resolution.md
@@ -2,20 +2,19 @@
title: VPN name resolution (Windows 10 and Windows 11)
description: Learn how the name resolution setting in the VPN profile configures how name resolution works when a VPN client connects to a VPN server.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 09/23/2021
-ms.reviewer:
-manager: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: pesmith
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# VPN name resolution
-**Applies to**
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-
When the VPN client connects to the VPN server, the VPN client receives the client IP address. The client may also receive the IP address of the Domain Name System (DNS) server and the IP address of the Windows Internet Name Service (WINS) server.
The name resolution setting in the VPN profile configures how name resolution should work on the system when VPN is connected. The networking stack first looks at the Name Resolution Policy table (NRPT) for any matches and tries a resolution in the case of a match. If no match is found, the DNS suffix on the most preferred interface based on the interface metric is appended to the name (in the case of a short name) and a DNS query is sent out on the preferred interface. If the query times out, the DNS suffix search list is used in order and DNS queries are sent on all interfaces.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-office-365-optimization.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-office-365-optimization.md
index 2022a4e863..c54c8c05a4 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-office-365-optimization.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-office-365-optimization.md
@@ -3,14 +3,16 @@ title: Optimizing Office 365 traffic for remote workers with the native Windows
description: tbd
ms.prod: m365-security
ms.topic: article
-author: kelleyvice-msft
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 09/23/2021
-ms.reviewer:
-manager: dansimp
-ms.author: jajo
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: pesmith
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
-
# Optimizing Office 365 traffic for remote workers with the native Windows 10 and Windows 11 VPN client
This article describes how to configure the recommendations in the article [Optimize Office 365 connectivity for remote users using VPN split tunneling](/office365/enterprise/office-365-vpn-split-tunnel) for the *native Windows 10 and Windows 11 VPN client*. This guidance enables VPN administrators to optimize Office 365 usage while still ensuring that all other traffic goes over the VPN connection and through existing security gateways and tooling.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-profile-options.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-profile-options.md
index b0cd4195ee..c6a1f32a1b 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-profile-options.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-profile-options.md
@@ -1,22 +1,20 @@
---
title: VPN profile options (Windows 10 and Windows 11)
description: Windows adds Virtual Private Network (VPN) profile options to help manage how users connect. VPNs give users secure remote access to the company network.
-ms.reviewer:
-manager: dansimp
+manager: aaroncz
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: pesmith
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 05/17/2018
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# VPN profile options
-**Applies to**
-
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-
Most of the VPN settings in Windows 10 and Windows 11 can be configured in VPN profiles using Microsoft Intune or Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager. All VPN settings in Windows 10 and Windows 11 can be configured using the **ProfileXML** node in the [VPNv2 configuration service provider (CSP)](/windows/client-management/mdm/vpnv2-csp).
>[!NOTE]
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-routing.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-routing.md
index 291f5adaf9..2fdcf08d5b 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-routing.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-routing.md
@@ -2,20 +2,18 @@
title: VPN routing decisions (Windows 10 and Windows 10)
description: Learn about approaches that either send all data through a VPN or only selected data. The one you choose impacts capacity planning and security expectations.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 09/23/2021
-ms.reviewer:
-manager: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: pesmith
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
-
# VPN routing decisions
-**Applies to**
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-
Network routes are required for the stack to understand which interface to use for outbound traffic. One of the most important decision points for VPN configuration is whether you want to send all the data through VPN (*force tunnel*) or only some data through the VPN (*split tunnel*). This decision impacts the configuration and the capacity planning, as well as security expectations from the connection.
## Split tunnel configuration
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-security-features.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-security-features.md
index 34d9f772e4..31e2845099 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-security-features.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-security-features.md
@@ -2,21 +2,19 @@
title: VPN security features
description: Learn about security features for VPN, including LockDown VPN, Windows Information Protection integration with VPN, and traffic filters.
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 07/21/2022
-ms.reviewer:
-manager: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.reviewer: pesmith
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# VPN security features
-**Applies to**
-- Windows 10
-- Windows 11
-
-
## Hyper-V based containers and VPN
Windows supports different kinds of Hyper-V based containers. This support includes, but isn't limited to, Microsoft Defender Application Guard and Windows Sandbox. When you use 3rd party VPN solutions, these Hyper-V based containers may not be able to seamlessly connect to the internet. Additional configurational changes might be needed to resolve connectivity issues.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/windows-credential-theft-mitigation-guide-abstract.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/windows-credential-theft-mitigation-guide-abstract.md
index abe5fd0462..ced8857c84 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/windows-credential-theft-mitigation-guide-abstract.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/windows-credential-theft-mitigation-guide-abstract.md
@@ -1,22 +1,21 @@
---
title: Windows Credential Theft Mitigation Guide Abstract
description: Provides a summary of the Windows credential theft mitigation guide.
-ms.reviewer:
ms.prod: m365-security
-author: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
ms.collection: M365-identity-device-management
ms.topic: article
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 04/19/2017
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows 11
---
# Windows Credential Theft Mitigation Guide Abstract
-**Applies to**
-- Windows 10
-
This topic provides a summary of the Windows credential theft mitigation guide, which can be downloaded from the [Microsoft Download Center](https://download.microsoft.com/download/C/1/4/C14579CA-E564-4743-8B51-61C0882662AC/Windows%2010%20credential%20theft%20mitigation%20guide.docx).
This guide explains how credential theft attacks occur and the strategies and countermeasures you can implement to mitigate them, following these security stages:
diff --git a/windows/security/includes/improve-request-performance.md b/windows/security/includes/improve-request-performance.md
index 89b07558ea..24aaa25d9f 100644
--- a/windows/security/includes/improve-request-performance.md
+++ b/windows/security/includes/improve-request-performance.md
@@ -3,12 +3,12 @@ title: Improve request performance
description: Improve request performance
search.product: eADQiWindows 10XVcnh
ms.prod: m365-security
-ms.author: macapara
-author: mjcaparas
ms.localizationpriority: medium
-manager: dansimp
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
ms.topic: article
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
---
>[!TIP]
diff --git a/windows/security/includes/machineactionsnote.md b/windows/security/includes/machineactionsnote.md
index 5d784c2abe..31e3d1ac98 100644
--- a/windows/security/includes/machineactionsnote.md
+++ b/windows/security/includes/machineactionsnote.md
@@ -3,9 +3,9 @@ title: Perform a Machine Action via the Microsoft Defender for Endpoint API
description: This page focuses on performing a machine action via the Microsoft Defender for Endpoint API.
ms.date: 08/28/2017
ms.reviewer:
-manager: dansimp
-ms.author: macapara
-author: mjcaparas
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
ms.prod: m365-security
---
diff --git a/windows/security/includes/microsoft-defender-api-usgov.md b/windows/security/includes/microsoft-defender-api-usgov.md
index 288e5a9769..74cfd90cbb 100644
--- a/windows/security/includes/microsoft-defender-api-usgov.md
+++ b/windows/security/includes/microsoft-defender-api-usgov.md
@@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ title: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint API URIs for US Government
description: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint API URIs for US Government
search.product: eADQiWindows 10XVcnh
ms.prod: m365-security
-ms.author: macapara
-author: mjcaparas
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
ms.localizationpriority: medium
-manager: dansimp
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
ms.topic: article
---
diff --git a/windows/security/includes/microsoft-defender.md b/windows/security/includes/microsoft-defender.md
index f3a6cb666b..2bca659e04 100644
--- a/windows/security/includes/microsoft-defender.md
+++ b/windows/security/includes/microsoft-defender.md
@@ -4,8 +4,9 @@ description: A note in regard to important Microsoft 365 Defender guidance.
ms.date:
ms.reviewer:
manager: dansimp
-ms.author: dansimp
-author: dansimp
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
ms.prod: m365-security
ms.topic: include
---
diff --git a/windows/security/includes/prerelease.md b/windows/security/includes/prerelease.md
index bced58da9f..58b056c484 100644
--- a/windows/security/includes/prerelease.md
+++ b/windows/security/includes/prerelease.md
@@ -3,9 +3,9 @@ title: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Pre-release Disclaimer
description: Disclaimer for pre-release version of Microsoft Defender for Endpoint.
ms.date: 08/28/2017
ms.reviewer:
-manager: dansimp
-ms.author: macapara
-author: mjcaparas
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+manager: aaroncz
ms.prod: m365-security
---
diff --git a/windows/security/index.yml b/windows/security/index.yml
index 1c56c04c1c..2fedb0e205 100644
--- a/windows/security/index.yml
+++ b/windows/security/index.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ metadata:
ms.author: dansimp #Required; microsoft alias of author; optional team alias.
ms.date: 09/20/2021
localization_priority: Priority
-
+
# linkListType: architecture | concept | deploy | download | get-started | how-to-guide | learn | overview | quickstart | reference | tutorial | video | whats-new
landingContent:
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4913.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4913.md
index 9c173860f4..dc79e60f50 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4913.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4913.md
@@ -77,13 +77,13 @@ This event always generates, regardless of the object’s [SACL](/windows/win32/
**Subject:**
-- **Security ID** \[Type = SID\]**:** SID of account that changed the Central Access Policy on the object. Event Viewer automatically tries to resolve SIDs and show the account name. If the SID cannot be resolved, you will see the source data in the event.
+- **Security ID** \[Type = SID\]**:** SID of account that changed the Central Access Policy on the object. Event Viewer automatically tries to resolve SIDs and show the account name. If the SID can't be resolved, you'll see the source data in the event.
> **Note** A **security identifier (SID)** is a unique value of variable length used to identify a trustee (security principal). Each account has a unique SID that is issued by an authority, such as an Active Directory domain controller, and stored in a security database. Each time a user logs on, the system retrieves the SID for that user from the database and places it in the access token for that user. The system uses the SID in the access token to identify the user in all subsequent interactions with Windows security. When a SID has been used as the unique identifier for a user or group, it cannot ever be used again to identify another user or group. For more information about SIDs, see [Security identifiers](/windows/access-protection/access-control/security-identifiers).
- **Account Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** the name of the account that changed the Central Access Policy on the object.
-- **Account Domain** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** subject’s domain or computer name. Formats vary, and include the following:
+- **Account Domain** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** subject’s domain or computer name. Formats vary, and include the following ones:
- Domain NETBIOS name example: CONTOSO
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ This event always generates, regardless of the object’s [SACL](/windows/win32/
- **Original Security Descriptor** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** the Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) value for the old Central Policy ID (for the policy that was formerly applied to the object).
- SDDL contains Central Access Policy SID, here is an example: S:ARAI(SP;ID;;;;S-1-17-1442530252-1178042555-1247349694-2318402534), Central Access Policy SID here is “**S-1-17-1442530252-1178042555-1247349694-2318402534**”. To resolve this SID to the real Central Access Policy name you need to do the following:
+ SDDL contains Central Access Policy SID, here's an example: S:ARAI(SP;ID;;;;S-1-17-1442530252-1178042555-1247349694-2318402534), Central Access Policy SID here is “**S-1-17-1442530252-1178042555-1247349694-2318402534**”. To resolve this SID to the real Central Access Policy name, you need to do the following steps:
1. Find Central Access Policy Active Directory object in: “CN=Central Access Policies,CN=Claims Configuration,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=XXX,DC=XX” Active Directory container.
@@ -166,11 +166,11 @@ This event always generates, regardless of the object’s [SACL](/windows/win32/
|-------|--------------------------------------|-------|---------------------------------|
| "AO" | Account operators | "PA" | Group Policy administrators |
| "RU" | Alias to allow previous Windows 2000 | "IU" | Interactively logged-on user |
-| "AN" | Anonymous logon | "LA" | Local administrator |
+| "AN" | Anonymous sign in | "LA" | Local administrator |
| "AU" | Authenticated users | "LG" | Local guest |
| "BA" | Built-in administrators | "LS" | Local service account |
| "BG" | Built-in guests | "SY" | Local system |
-| "BO" | Backup operators | "NU" | Network logon user |
+| "BO" | Backup operators | "NU" | Network sign-in user |
| "BU" | Built-in users | "NO" | Network configuration operators |
| "CA" | Certificate server administrators | "NS" | Network service account |
| "CG" | Creator group | "PO" | Printer operators |
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ This event always generates, regardless of the object’s [SACL](/windows/win32/
| "DU" | Domain users | "RC" | Restricted code |
| "EA" | Enterprise administrators | "SA" | Schema administrators |
| "ED" | Enterprise domain controllers | "SO" | Server operators |
-| "WD" | Everyone | "SU" | Service logon user |
+| "WD" | Everyone | "SU" | Service sign-in user |
- *G*: = Primary Group.
- *D*: = DACL Entries.
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ Example: D:(A;;FA;;;WD)
"P” - SDDL\_PROTECTED, Inheritance from containers that are higher in the folder hierarchy are blocked.
-"AI" - SDDL\_AUTO\_INHERITED, Inheritance is allowed, assuming that "P" Is not also set.
+"AI" - SDDL\_AUTO\_INHERITED, Inheritance is allowed, assuming that "P" isn't also set.
"AR" - SDDL\_AUTO\_INHERIT\_REQ, Child objects inherit permissions from this object.
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ Example: D:(A;;FA;;;WD)
"CI" - CONTAINER INHERIT: Child objects that are containers, such as directories, inherit the ACE as an explicit ACE.
-"OI" - OBJECT INHERIT: Child objects that are not containers inherit the ACE as an explicit ACE.
+"OI" - OBJECT INHERIT: Child objects that aren't containers inherit the ACE as an explicit ACE.
"NP" - NO PROPAGATE: only immediate children inherit this ace.
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ Example: D:(A;;FA;;;WD)
"SA" - SUCCESSFUL ACCESS AUDIT
"FA" - FAILED ACCESS AUDIT
-- rights: A hexadecimal string which denotes the access mask or reserved value, for example: FA (File All Access), FX (File Execute), FW (File Write), etc.
+- rights: A hexadecimal string that denotes the access mask or reserved value, for example: FA (File All Access), FX (File Execute), FW (File Write), etc.
| Value | Description | Value | Description |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ Example: D:(A;;FA;;;WD)
- object\_guid: N/A
- inherit\_object\_guid: N/A
-- account\_sid: SID of specific security principal, or reserved value, for example: AN (Anonymous), WD (Everyone), SY (LOCAL\_SYSTEM), etc. See the table above for more details.
+- account\_sid: SID of specific security principal, or reserved value, for example: AN (Anonymous), WD (Everyone), SY (LOCAL\_SYSTEM), etc. For more information, see the table above.
For more information about SDDL syntax, see these articles:
-- **Status Code** \[Type = UInt32\]**:** if there are no issues or errors, the status code will be 0. If an error happened, you will receive Failure event and Status Code will not be equal to “**0**”. You can check error code meaning here:
-- **Rule Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of the rule which was listed when the Windows Firewall started. You can see the name of Windows Firewall rule using Windows Firewall with Advanced Security management console (**wf.msc**), check “Name” column:
+- **Rule Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of the rule that was listed when the Windows Firewall started. You can see the name of Windows Firewall rule using Windows Firewall with Advanced Security management console (**wf.msc**), check “Name” column:
@@ -89,5 +89,5 @@ For 4945(S): A rule was listed when the Windows Firewall started.
- Typically this event has an informational purpose.
-- Unfortunately this event shows rules only for **Public** profile, but you still can compare this list with your organization's Windows Firewall baseline for Public profile rules on different computers, and trigger an alert if the configuration is not the same.
+- Unfortunately this event shows rules only for **Public** profile, but you still can compare this list with your organization's Windows Firewall baseline for Public profile rules on different computers, and trigger an alert if the configuration isn't the same.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4946.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4946.md
index 505cec18fb..5a3a44929a 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4946.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4946.md
@@ -71,11 +71,11 @@ This event doesn't generate when new rule was added via Group Policy.
- All
-- Domain,Public
+- Domain, Public
-- Domain,Private
+- Domain, Private
-- Private,Public
+- Private, Public
- Public
@@ -87,11 +87,11 @@ This event doesn't generate when new rule was added via Group Policy.
- **Rule ID** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the unique new firewall rule identifier.
- To see the unique ID of the rule you need to navigate to “**HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\FirewallRules”** registry key and you will see the list of Windows Firewall rule IDs (Name column) with parameters:
+ To see the unique ID of the rule, you need to navigate to “**HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\FirewallRules”** registry key and you'll see the list of Windows Firewall rule IDs (Name column) with parameters:
-- **Rule Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of the rule which was added. You can see the name of Windows Firewall rule using Windows Firewall with Advanced Security management console (**wf.msc**), check “Name” column:
+- **Rule Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of the rule that was added. You can see the name of Windows Firewall rule using Windows Firewall with Advanced Security management console (**wf.msc**), check “Name” column:
@@ -99,5 +99,5 @@ This event doesn't generate when new rule was added via Group Policy.
For 4946(S): A change has been made to Windows Firewall exception list. A rule was added.
-- This event can be helpful in case you want to monitor all creations of new Firewall rules which were done locally.
+- This event can be helpful in case you want to monitor all creations of new Firewall rules that were done locally.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4948.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4948.md
index 65c71e3cd4..ecc34d3112 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4948.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4948.md
@@ -71,11 +71,11 @@ This event doesn't generate when the rule was deleted via Group Policy.
- All
-- Domain,Public
+- Domain, Public
-- Domain,Private
+- Domain, Private
-- Private,Public
+- Private, Public
- Public
@@ -87,11 +87,11 @@ This event doesn't generate when the rule was deleted via Group Policy.
- **Rule ID** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the unique identifier for deleted firewall rule.
- To see the unique ID of the rule you need to navigate to “**HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\FirewallRules”** registry key and you will see the list of Windows Firewall rule IDs (Name column) with parameters:
+ To see the unique ID of the rule, you need to navigate to “**HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\FirewallRules”** registry key and you'll see the list of Windows Firewall rule IDs (Name column) with parameters:
-- **Rule Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of the rule which was deleted. You can see the name of Windows Firewall rule using Windows Firewall with Advanced Security management console (**wf.msc**), check “Name” column:
+- **Rule Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of the rule that was deleted. You can see the name of Windows Firewall rule using Windows Firewall with Advanced Security management console (**wf.msc**), check “Name” column:
@@ -99,5 +99,5 @@ This event doesn't generate when the rule was deleted via Group Policy.
For 4948(S): A change has been made to Windows Firewall exception list. A rule was deleted.
-- This event can be helpful in case you want to monitor all deletions of Firewall rules which were done locally.
+- This event can be helpful in case you want to monitor all deletions of Firewall rules that were done locally.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4950.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4950.md
index 69db4a04e2..8c7148eb98 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4950.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4950.md
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ This event doesn't generate when Windows Firewall setting was changed via Group
**New Setting:**
-- **Type** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of the setting which was modified. You can use “**netsh advfirewall**” command to see or set Windows Firewall settings, for example, to see settings for current\\active Windows Firewall profile you need to execute “**netsh advfirewall show currentprofile**” command:
+- **Type** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of the setting that was modified. You can use “**netsh advfirewall**” command to see or set Windows Firewall settings, for example, to see settings for current\\active Windows Firewall profile you need to execute “**netsh advfirewall show currentprofile**” command:
@@ -89,5 +89,5 @@ For 4950(S): A Windows Firewall setting has changed.
- If you have a standard or baseline for Windows Firewall settings defined, monitor this event and check whether the settings reported by the event are still the same as were defined in your standard or baseline.
-- This event can be helpful in case you want to monitor all changes in Windows Firewall settings which were done locally.
+- This event can be helpful in case you want to monitor all changes in Windows Firewall settings that were done locally.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4951.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4951.md
index 060b9c4b83..6f7ede1970 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4951.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4951.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
-title: 4951(F) A rule has been ignored because its major version number was not recognized by Windows Firewall. (Windows 10)
-description: Describes security event 4951(F) A rule has been ignored because its major version number was not recognized by Windows Firewall.
+title: 4951(F) A rule has been ignored because its major version number wasn't recognized by Windows Firewall. (Windows 10)
+description: Describes security event 4951(F) A rule has been ignored because its major version number wasn't recognized by Windows Firewall.
ms.pagetype: security
ms.prod: m365-security
ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ ms.author: dansimp
ms.technology: windows-sec
---
-# 4951(F): A rule has been ignored because its major version number was not recognized by Windows Firewall.
+# 4951(F): A rule has been ignored because its major version number wasn't recognized by Windows Firewall.
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec
When you create or edit a Windows Firewall rule, the settings that you can include depend upon the version of Windows you use when creating the rule. As new settings are added to later versions of Windows or to service packs for existing versions of Windows, the version number of the rules processing engine is updated, and that version number is stamped into rules that are created by using that version of Windows. For example, Windows Vista produces firewall rules that are stamped with version "v2.0". Future versions of Windows might use "v2.1", or "v3.0" to indicate, respectively, minor or major changes and additions.
-If you create a firewall rule on a newer version of Windows that references firewall settings that are not available on earlier versions of Windows, and then try to deploy that rule to computers running the earlier version of Windows, the firewall engine produces this error to indicate that it cannot process the rule.
+If you create a firewall rule on a newer version of Windows that references firewall settings that aren't available on earlier versions of Windows, and then try to deploy that rule to computers running the earlier version of Windows, the firewall engine produces this error to indicate that it can't process the rule.
The only solution is to remove the incompatible rule, and then deploy a compatible rule.
@@ -73,11 +73,11 @@ The only solution is to remove the incompatible rule, and then deploy a compatib
- All
-- Domain,Public
+- Domain, Public
-- Domain,Private
+- Domain, Private
-- Private,Public
+- Private, Public
- Public
@@ -89,17 +89,17 @@ The only solution is to remove the incompatible rule, and then deploy a compatib
- **ID** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the unique identifier for ignored firewall rule.
- To see the unique ID of the rule you need to navigate to “**HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\FirewallRules”** registry key and you will see the list of Windows Firewall rule IDs (Name column) with parameters:
+ To see the unique ID of the rule, you need to navigate to “**HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\FirewallRules”** registry key and you'll see the list of Windows Firewall rule IDs (Name column) with parameters:
-- **Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of the rule which was ignored. You can see the name of Windows Firewall rule using Windows Firewall with Advanced Security management console (**wf.msc**), check “Name” column:
+- **Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of the rule that was ignored. You can see the name of Windows Firewall rule using Windows Firewall with Advanced Security management console (**wf.msc**), check “Name” column:
## Security Monitoring Recommendations
-For 4951(F): A rule has been ignored because its major version number was not recognized by Windows Firewall.
+For 4951(F): A rule has been ignored because its major version number wasn't recognized by Windows Firewall.
- This event can be a sign of software issues, Windows Firewall registry errors or corruption, or Group Policy setting misconfigurations. We recommend monitoring this event and investigating the reason for the condition. Typically this event indicates configuration issues, not security issues.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4953.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4953.md
index 2d31faae0c..c327d3a349 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4953.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4953.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
-title: 4953(F) Windows Firewall ignored a rule because it could not be parsed. (Windows 10)
-description: Describes security event 4953(F) Windows Firewall ignored a rule because it could not be parsed.
+title: 4953(F) Windows Firewall ignored a rule because it couldn't be parsed. (Windows 10)
+description: Describes security event 4953(F) Windows Firewall ignored a rule because it couldn't be parsed.
ms.pagetype: security
ms.prod: m365-security
ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ ms.author: dansimp
ms.technology: windows-sec
---
-# 4953(F): Windows Firewall ignored a rule because it could not be parsed.
+# 4953(F): Windows Firewall ignored a rule because it couldn't be parsed.
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec
***Event Description:***
-This event generates if Windows Firewall was not able to parse Windows Firewall rule for some reason.
+This event generates if Windows Firewall wasn't able to parse Windows Firewall rule for some reason.
It can happen if Windows Firewall rule registry entry was corrupted.
@@ -72,11 +72,11 @@ It can happen if Windows Firewall rule registry entry was corrupted.
- All
-- Domain,Public
+- Domain, Public
-- Domain,Private
+- Domain, Private
-- Private,Public
+- Private, Public
- Public
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ It can happen if Windows Firewall rule registry entry was corrupted.
- **ID** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the unique identifier for ignored firewall rule.
- To see the unique ID of the rule, navigate to the “**HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\FirewallRules”** registry key and you will see the list of Windows Firewall rule IDs (Name column) with parameters:
+ To see the unique ID of the rule, navigate to the “**HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\FirewallRules”** registry key and you'll see the list of Windows Firewall rule IDs (Name column) with parameters:
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ It can happen if Windows Firewall rule registry entry was corrupted.
## Security Monitoring Recommendations
-For 4953(F): Windows Firewall ignored a rule because it could not be parsed.
+For 4953(F): Windows Firewall ignored a rule because it couldn't be parsed.
- This event can be a sign of software issues, Windows Firewall registry errors or corruption, or Group Policy setting misconfigurations. We recommend monitoring this event and investigating the reason for the condition. Typically this event indicates configuration issues, not security issues.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4957.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4957.md
index b83701e32b..5abad05870 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4957.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4957.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
title: 4957(F) Windows Firewall did not apply the following rule. (Windows 10)
-description: Describes security event 4957(F) Windows Firewall did not apply the following rule.
+description: Describes security event 4957(F) Windows Firewall didn't apply the following rule.
ms.pagetype: security
ms.prod: m365-security
ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec
***Event Description:***
-This event generates when Windows Firewall starts or apply new rule, and the rule cannot be applied for some reason.
+This event generates when Windows Firewall starts or apply new rule, and the rule can't be applied for some reason.
> **Note** For recommendations, see [Security Monitoring Recommendations](#security-monitoring-recommendations) for this event.
@@ -69,17 +69,17 @@ This event generates when Windows Firewall starts or apply new rule, and the rul
- **ID** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the unique identifier for not applied firewall rule.
- To see the unique ID of the rule you need to navigate to “**HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\FirewallRules”** registry key and you will see the list of Windows Firewall rule IDs (Name column) with parameters:
+ To see the unique ID of the rule, you need to navigate to “**HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\FirewallRules”** registry key and you'll see the list of Windows Firewall rule IDs (Name column) with parameters:
-- **Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of the rule which was not applied. You can see the name of Windows Firewall rule using Windows Firewall with Advanced Security management console (**wf.msc**), check “Name” column:
+- **Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of the rule that wasn't applied. You can see the name of Windows Firewall rule using Windows Firewall with Advanced Security management console (**wf.msc**), check “Name” column:
**Error Information:**
-- **Reason** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the reason why the rule was not applied.
+- **Reason** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the reason why the rule wasn't applied.
## Security Monitoring Recommendations
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4958.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4958.md
index 3fc2c85a83..4bd2da3a99 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4958.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4958.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
title: 4958(F) Windows Firewall did not apply the following rule because the rule referred to items not configured on this computer. (Windows 10)
-description: Describes security event 4958(F) Windows Firewall did not apply the following rule because the rule referred to items not configured on this computer.
+description: Describes security event 4958(F) Windows Firewall didn't apply the following rule because the rule referred to items not configured on this computer.
ms.pagetype: security
ms.prod: m365-security
ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
@@ -17,15 +17,15 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec
# 4958(F): Windows Firewall did not apply the following rule because the rule referred to items not configured on this computer.
-Windows Firewall with Advanced Security processed a rule that contains parameters that cannot be resolved on the local computer. The rule is therefore not enforceable on the computer and so is excluded from the runtime state of the firewall. This is not necessarily an error. Examine the rule for applicability on the computers to which it was applied.
+Windows Firewall with Advanced Security processed a rule that contains parameters that can't be resolved on the local computer. The rule is therefore not enforceable on the computer and so is excluded from the runtime state of the firewall. This exclusion isn't necessarily an error. Examine the rule for applicability on the computers to which it was applied.
-There is no example of this event in this document.
+There's no example of this event in this document.
***Subcategory:*** [Audit MPSSVC Rule-Level Policy Change](audit-mpssvc-rule-level-policy-change.md)
***Event Schema:***
-*Windows Firewall did not apply the following rule because the rule referred to items not configured on this computer:
+*Windows Firewall didn't apply the following rule because the rule referred to items not configured on this computer:
Rule Information:
%tID:%t%1
%tName:%t%2
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5030.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5030.md
index 9216275f2d..86502afb98 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5030.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5030.md
@@ -19,9 +19,9 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec
Windows logs this event if the Windows Firewall service fails to start, or if it unexpectedly terminates. The error message indicates the cause of the service failure by including an error code in the text of the message.
-This event doesn't generate during Windows Firewall service failures if Windows Firewall policy is incorrect\\corrupted or one of the service dependencies was not started.
+This event doesn't generate during Windows Firewall service failures if Windows Firewall policy is incorrect\\corrupted or one of the service dependencies wasn't started.
-There is no example of this event in this document.
+There's no example of this event in this document.
***Subcategory:*** [Audit Other System Events](audit-other-system-events.md)
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5031.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5031.md
index b54933cde7..0e6d81e9ac 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5031.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5031.md
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec
This event generates when an application was blocked from accepting incoming connections on the network by [Windows Filtering Platform](/windows/win32/fwp/windows-filtering-platform-start-page).
-If you don’t have any firewall rules (Allow or Deny) in Windows Firewall for specific applications, you will get this event from [Windows Filtering Platform](/windows/win32/fwp/windows-filtering-platform-start-page) layer, because by default this layer is denying any incoming connections.
+If you don’t have any firewall rules (Allow or Deny) in Windows Firewall for specific applications, you'll get this event from [Windows Filtering Platform](/windows/win32/fwp/windows-filtering-platform-start-page) layer, because by default this layer is denying any incoming connections.
> **Note** For recommendations, see [Security Monitoring Recommendations](#security-monitoring-recommendations) for this event.
@@ -82,8 +82,8 @@ For 5031(F): The Windows Firewall Service blocked an application from accepting
- You can use this event to detect applications for which no Windows Firewall rules were created.
-- If you have a pre-defined application which should be used to perform the operation that was reported by this event, monitor events with “**Application**” not equal to your defined application.
+- If you have a pre-defined application that should be used to perform the operation that was reported by this event, monitor events with “**Application**” not equal to your defined application.
-- You can monitor to see if “**Application**” is not in a standard folder (for example, not in **System32** or **Program Files**) or is in a restricted folder (for example, **Temporary Internet Files**).
+- You can monitor to see if “**Application**” isn't in a standard folder (for example, not in **System32** or **Program Files**) or is in a restricted folder (for example, **Temporary Internet Files**).
- If you have a pre-defined list of restricted substrings or words in application names (for example, “**mimikatz**” or “**cain.exe**”), check for these substrings in “**Application**.”
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5038.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5038.md
index dbb32f1459..60b2f51b2d 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5038.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5038.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
title: 5038(F) Code integrity determined that the image hash of a file is not valid. (Windows 10)
-description: Describes security event 5038(F) Code integrity determined that the image hash of a file is not valid.
+description: Describes security event 5038(F) Code integrity determined that the image hash of a file isn't valid.
ms.pagetype: security
ms.prod: m365-security
ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
@@ -19,11 +19,11 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec
The file could be corrupt due to unauthorized modification or the invalid hash could indicate a potential disk device error.
-This event generates by [Code Integrity](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd348642(v=ws.10)) feature, if signature of a file is not valid.
+This event generates by [Code Integrity](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd348642(v=ws.10)) feature, if signature of a file isn't valid.
-Code Integrity is a feature that improves the security of the operating system by validating the integrity of a driver or system file each time it is loaded into memory. Code Integrity detects whether an unsigned driver or system file is being loaded into the kernel, or whether a system file has been modified by malicious software that is being run by a user account with administrative permissions. On x64-based versions of the operating system, kernel-mode drivers must be digitally signed.
+Code Integrity is a feature that improves the security of the operating system by validating the integrity of a driver or system file each time it's loaded into memory. Code Integrity detects whether an unsigned driver or system file is being loaded into the kernel, or whether a system file has been modified by malicious software that is being run by a user account with administrative permissions. On x64-based versions of the operating system, kernel-mode drivers must be digitally signed.
-There is no example of this event in this document.
+There's no example of this event in this document.
***Subcategory:*** [Audit System Integrity](audit-system-integrity.md)
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5039.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5039.md
index 7194197d62..aec25c2291 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5039.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5039.md
@@ -19,9 +19,9 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec
This event should be generated when registry key was virtualized using [LUAFV](https://blogs.msdn.com/b/alexcarp/archive/2009/06/25/the-deal-with-luafv-sys.aspx).
-This event occurs very rarely during standard LUAFV registry key virtualization.
+This event occurs rarely during standard LUAFV registry key virtualization.
-There is no example of this event in this document.
+There's no example of this event in this document.
***Subcategory:*** [Audit Registry](audit-registry.md)
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ There is no example of this event in this document.
## Security Monitoring Recommendations
-- There is no recommendation for this event in this document.
+- There's no recommendation for this event in this document.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5051.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5051.md
index 67f25e7071..530cebdbe3 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5051.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5051.md
@@ -19,9 +19,9 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec
This event should be generated when file was virtualized using [LUAFV](https://blogs.msdn.com/b/alexcarp/archive/2009/06/25/the-deal-with-luafv-sys.aspx).
-This event occurs very rarely during standard LUAFV file virtualization.
+This event occurs rarely during standard LUAFV file virtualization.
-There is no example of this event in this document.
+There's no example of this event in this document.
***Subcategory:*** [Audit File System](audit-file-system.md)
@@ -59,5 +59,5 @@ There is no example of this event in this document.
## Security Monitoring Recommendations
-- There is no recommendation for this event in this document.
+- There's no recommendation for this event in this document.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5056.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5056.md
index a0be07f3bf..b8d749b9fe 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5056.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5056.md
@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ For more information about Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) visit these pages
-
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5060.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5060.md
index e20a614013..b8f9fb0ef7 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5060.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5060.md
@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ For more information about CNG, visit these pages:
-
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5063.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5063.md
index 5038c7efce..ca597eccaf 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5063.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5063.md
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec
# 5063(S, F): A cryptographic provider operation was attempted.
-This event generates in BCryptUnregisterProvider() and BCryptRegisterProvider() functions. These are Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) functions.
+This event generates in BCryptUnregisterProvider() and BCryptRegisterProvider() functions. These functions are Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) functions.
This event generates when cryptographic provider was registered or unregistered.
@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ For more information about Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) visit these pages
-
For example, if you want to exclude Microsoft Word processes, you’d use `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\Winword.exe`.
-2. Add any additional processes that need to be excluded here, and then turn the Blocking untrusted fonts feature on, using the steps in [Turn on and use the Blocking Untrusted Fonts feature](#turn-on-and-use-the-blocking-untrusted-fonts-feature), earlier in this article.
+2. Add other processes that need to be excluded here, and then turn on the Blocking untrusted fonts feature, using the steps in [Turn on and use the Blocking Untrusted Fonts feature](#turn-on-and-use-the-blocking-untrusted-fonts-feature), earlier in this article.
## Related content
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/device-guard/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/device-guard/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md
index 5d9db2a678..90770727f0 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/device-guard/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/device-guard/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md
@@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec
This topic covers different ways to enable Hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI) on Windows 10 and Windows 11.
Some applications, including device drivers, may be incompatible with HVCI.
-This can cause devices or software to malfunction and in rare cases may result in a blue screen. Such issues may occur after HVCI has been turned on or during the enablement process itself.
-If this happens, see [Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting) for remediation steps.
+This incompatibility can cause devices or software to malfunction and in rare cases may result in a blue screen. Such issues may occur after HVCI has been turned on or during the enablement process itself.
+If these issues occur, see [Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting) for remediation steps.
> [!NOTE]
> Because it makes use of *Mode Based Execution Control*, HVCI works better with Intel Kaby Lake or AMD Zen 2 CPUs and newer. Processors without MBEC will rely on an emulation of this feature, called *Restricted User Mode*, which has a bigger impact on performance.
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ Enabling in Intune requires using the Code Integrity node in the [AppLocker CSP]
3. Double-click **Turn on Virtualization Based Security**.
-4. Click **Enabled** and under **Virtualization Based Protection of Code Integrity**, select **Enabled with UEFI lock** to ensure HVCI cannot be disabled remotely or select **Enabled without UEFI lock**.
+4. Click **Enabled** and under **Virtualization Based Protection of Code Integrity**, select **Enabled with UEFI lock** to ensure HVCI can't be disabled remotely or select **Enabled without UEFI lock**.

@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ To apply the new policy on a domain-joined computer, either restart or run `gpup
### Use registry keys to enable virtualization-based protection of code integrity
-Set the following registry keys to enable HVCI. This provides exactly the same set of configuration options provided by Group Policy.
+Set the following registry keys to enable HVCI. These keys provide exactly the same set of configuration options provided by Group Policy.
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ Get-CimInstance –ClassName Win32_DeviceGuard –Namespace root\Microsoft\Windo
> [!NOTE]
> Mode Based Execution Control property will only be listed as available starting with Windows 10 version 1803 and Windows 11 version 21H2.
-The output of this command provides details of the available hardware-based security features as well as those features that are currently enabled.
+The output of this command provides details of the available hardware-based security features and those features that are currently enabled.
#### AvailableSecurityProperties
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ This field indicates whether the Windows Defender Credential Guard or HVCI servi
Value | Description
-|-
-**0.** | No services configured.
+**0.** | No services are configured.
**1.** | If present, Windows Defender Credential Guard is configured.
**2.** | If present, HVCI is configured.
**3.** | If present, System Guard Secure Launch is configured.
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ This field indicates whether VBS is enabled and running.
Value | Description
-|-
-**0.** | VBS is not enabled.
+**0.** | VBS isn't enabled.
**1.** | VBS is enabled but not running.
**2.** | VBS is enabled and running.
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ Another method to determine the available and enabled Windows Defender Device Gu
A. If a device driver fails to load or crashes at runtime, you may be able to update the driver using **Device Manager**.
-B. If you experience software or device malfunction after using the above procedure to turn on HVCI, but you are able to log in to Windows, you can turn off HVCI by renaming or deleting the SIPolicy.p7b file from `
plus **extended page tables** | These hardware features are required for VBS:
One of the following virtualization extensions:
• VT-x (Intel) or
• AMD-V
And:
• Extended page tables, also called Second Level Address Translation (SLAT). | VBS provides isolation of the secure kernel from the normal operating system. Vulnerabilities and zero-days in the normal operating system cannot be exploited because of this isolation. |
-| Firmware: **UEFI firmware version 2.3.1.c or higher with UEFI Secure Boot** | See the System.Fundamentals.Firmware.UEFISecureBoot requirement in the [Windows Hardware Compatibility Specifications for Windows 10, version 1809 and Windows Server 2019 - Systems download](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2027110). You can find previous versions of the Windows Hardware Compatibility Program Specifications and Policies [here](/windows-hardware/design/compatibility/whcp-specifications-policies). | UEFI Secure Boot helps ensure that the device boots only authorized code. This can prevent boot kits and root kits from installing and persisting across reboots. |
+| Hardware: **CPU virtualization extensions**,
plus **extended page tables** | These hardware features are required for VBS:
One of the following virtualization extensions:
• VT-x (Intel) or
• AMD-V
And:
• Extended page tables, also called Second Level Address Translation (SLAT). | VBS provides isolation of the secure kernel from the normal operating system. Vulnerabilities and zero-days in the normal operating system can't be exploited because of this isolation. |
+| Firmware: **UEFI firmware version 2.3.1.c or higher with UEFI Secure Boot** | See the System.Fundamentals.Firmware.UEFISecureBoot requirement in the [Windows Hardware Compatibility Specifications for Windows 10, version 1809 and Windows Server 2019 - Systems download](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2027110). You can find previous versions of the Windows Hardware Compatibility Program Specifications and Policies [here](/windows-hardware/design/compatibility/whcp-specifications-policies). | UEFI Secure Boot helps ensure that the device boots only authorized code. This guarantee can prevent boot kits and root kits from installing and persisting across reboots. |
| Firmware: **Secure firmware update process** | UEFI firmware must support secure firmware update found under the System.Fundamentals.Firmware.UEFISecureBoot requirement in the [Windows Hardware Compatibility Specifications for Windows 10, version 1809 and Windows Server 2019 - Systems download](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2027110). You can find previous versions of the Windows Hardware Compatibility Program Specifications and Policies [here](/windows-hardware/design/compatibility/whcp-specifications-policies). | UEFI firmware just like software can have security vulnerabilities that, when found, need to be patched through firmware updates. Patching helps prevent root kits from getting installed. |
-| Software: **HVCI compatible drivers** | See the Filter.Driver.DeviceGuard.DriverCompatibility requirement in the [Windows Hardware Compatibility Specifications for Windows 10, version 1809 and Windows Server 2019 - Filter driver download](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2027110). You can find previous versions of the Windows Hardware Compatibility Program Specifications and Policies [here](/windows-hardware/design/compatibility/whcp-specifications-policies). | [HVCI Compatible](https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/windows_hardware_certification/2015/05/22/driver-compatibility-with-device-guard-in-windows-10/) drivers help ensure that VBS can maintain appropriate memory permissions. This increases resistance to bypassing vulnerable kernel drivers and helps ensure that malware cannot run in kernel. Only code verified through code integrity can run in kernel mode. |
+| Software: **HVCI compatible drivers** | See the Filter.Driver.DeviceGuard.DriverCompatibility requirement in the [Windows Hardware Compatibility Specifications for Windows 10, version 1809 and Windows Server 2019 - Filter driver download](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2027110). You can find previous versions of the Windows Hardware Compatibility Program Specifications and Policies [here](/windows-hardware/design/compatibility/whcp-specifications-policies). | [HVCI Compatible](https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/windows_hardware_certification/2015/05/22/driver-compatibility-with-device-guard-in-windows-10/) drivers help ensure that VBS can maintain appropriate memory permissions. This increases resistance to bypassing vulnerable kernel drivers and helps ensure that malware can't run in kernel. Only code verified through code integrity can run in kernel mode. |
| Software: Qualified **Windows operating system** | Windows 10 Enterprise, Windows 10 Pro, Windows 10 Education, Windows Server 2016, or Windows 10 IoT Enterprise
| Support for VBS and for management features. |
> **Important** The following tables list additional qualifications for improved security. You can use WDAC and HVCI with hardware, firmware, and software that support baseline protections, even if they do not support protections for improved security. However, we strongly recommend meeting these additional qualifications to significantly strengthen the level of security that WDAC and HVCI can provide.
-## Additional qualifications for improved security
+## Other qualifications for improved security
-The following tables describe additional hardware and firmware qualifications, and the improved security that is available when these qualifications are met.
+The following tables describe other hardware and firmware qualifications, and the improved security that is available when these qualifications are met.
-### Additional security qualifications starting with Windows 10, version 1507, and Windows Server 2016, Technical Preview 4
+### More security qualifications starting with Windows 10, version 1507, and Windows Server 2016, Technical Preview 4
| Protections for Improved Security | Description | Security benefits |
|---------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|------|
-| Firmware: **Securing Boot Configuration and Management** | • BIOS password or stronger authentication must be supported.
Windows Server 2016 running as a domain controller does not support Windows Defender Credential Guard. Only virtualization-based protection of code integrity is supported in this configuration.
• In the BIOS configuration, BIOS authentication must be set.
• There must be support for protected BIOS option to configure list of permitted boot devices (for example, “Boot only from internal hard drive”) and boot device order, overriding BOOTORDER modification made by operating system.
• In the BIOS configuration, BIOS options related to security and boot options (list of permitted boot devices, boot order) must be secured to prevent other operating systems from starting and to prevent changes to the BIOS settings. | • BIOS password or stronger authentication helps ensure that only authenticated Platform BIOS administrators can change BIOS settings. This helps protect against a physically present user with BIOS access.
• Boot order when locked provides protection against the computer being booted into WinRE or another operating system on bootable media. |
+| Firmware: **Securing Boot Configuration and Management** | • BIOS password or stronger authentication must be supported.
• In the BIOS configuration, BIOS authentication must be set.
• There must be support for protected BIOS option to configure list of permitted boot devices (for example, “Boot only from internal hard drive”) and boot device order, overriding BOOTORDER modification made by operating system.
• In the BIOS configuration, BIOS options related to security and boot options (list of permitted boot devices, boot order) must be secured to prevent other operating systems from starting and to prevent changes to the BIOS settings. | • BIOS password or stronger authentication helps ensure that only authenticated Platform BIOS administrators can change BIOS settings. This guarantee helps protect against a physically present user with BIOS access.
• Boot order when locked provides protection against the computer being booted into WinRE or another operating system on bootable media. |
-### Additional security qualifications starting with Windows 10, version 1607, and Windows Server 2016
+### More security qualifications starting with Windows 10, version 1607, and Windows Server 2016
| Protections for Improved Security | Description | Security benefits |
|---------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|-----|
-| Firmware: **Hardware Rooted Trust Platform Secure Boot** | • Boot Integrity (Platform Secure Boot) must be supported. See the System.Fundamentals.Firmware.CS.UEFISecureBoot.ConnectedStandby requirement in the [Windows Hardware Compatibility Specifications for Windows 10, version 1809 and Windows Server 2019 - Systems download](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2027110). You can find previous versions of the Windows Hardware Compatibility Program Specifications and Policies [here](/windows-hardware/design/compatibility/whcp-specifications-policies).
• The Hardware Security Test Interface (HSTI) 1.1.a must be implemented. See [Hardware Security Testability Specification](/windows-hardware/test/hlk/testref/hardware-security-testability-specification). | • Boot Integrity (Platform Secure Boot) from Power-On provides protections against physically present attackers, and defense-in-depth against malware.
• HSTI 1.1.a provides additional security assurance for correctly secured silicon and platform. |
+| Firmware: **Hardware Rooted Trust Platform Secure Boot** | • Boot Integrity (Platform Secure Boot) must be supported. See the System.Fundamentals.Firmware.CS.UEFISecureBoot.ConnectedStandby requirement in the [Windows Hardware Compatibility Specifications for Windows 10, version 1809 and Windows Server 2019 - Systems download](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2027110). You can find previous versions of the Windows Hardware Compatibility Program Specifications and Policies [here](/windows-hardware/design/compatibility/whcp-specifications-policies).
• The Hardware Security Test Interface (HSTI) 1.1.a must be implemented. See [Hardware Security Testability Specification](/windows-hardware/test/hlk/testref/hardware-security-testability-specification). | • Boot Integrity (Platform Secure Boot) from Power-On provides protections against physically present attackers, and defense-in-depth against malware.
• HSTI 1.1.a provides extra security assurance for correctly secured silicon and platform. |
| Firmware: **Firmware Update through Windows Update** | Firmware must support field updates through Windows Update and UEFI encapsulation update. | Helps ensure that firmware updates are fast, secure, and reliable. |
-| Firmware: **Securing Boot Configuration and Management** | • Required BIOS capabilities: Ability of OEM to add ISV, OEM, or Enterprise Certificate in Secure Boot DB at manufacturing time.
• Required configurations: Microsoft UEFI CA must be removed from Secure Boot DB. Support for 3rd-party UEFI modules is permitted but should leverage ISV-provided certificates or OEM certificate for the specific UEFI software.| • Enterprises can choose to allow proprietary EFI drivers/applications to run.
• Removing Microsoft UEFI CA from Secure Boot DB provides full control to enterprises over software that runs before the operating system boots. |
+| Firmware: **Securing Boot Configuration and Management** | • Required BIOS capabilities: Ability of OEM to add ISV, OEM, or Enterprise Certificate in Secure Boot DB at manufacturing time.
• Required configurations: Microsoft UEFI CA must be removed from Secure Boot DB. Support for 3rd-party UEFI modules is permitted but should use ISV-provided certificates or OEM certificate for the specific UEFI software.| • Enterprises can choose to allow proprietary EFI drivers/applications to run.
• Removing Microsoft UEFI CA from Secure Boot DB provides full control to enterprises over software that runs before the operating system boots. |
-### Additional security qualifications starting with Windows 10, version 1703
+### More security qualifications starting with Windows 10, version 1703
| Protections for Improved Security | Description | Security benefits |
|---------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|------|
-| Firmware: **VBS enablement of NX protection for UEFI runtime services** | • VBS will enable No-Execute (NX) protection on UEFI runtime service code and data memory regions. UEFI runtime service code must support read-only page protections, and UEFI runtime service data must not be executable.
• UEFI runtime service must meet these requirements:
• Implement UEFI 2.6 EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE. All UEFI runtime service memory (code and data) must be described by this table.
• PE sections need to be page-aligned in memory (not required for in non-volitile storage).
• The Memory Attributes Table needs to correctly mark code and data as RO/NX for configuration by the OS:
• All entries must include attributes EFI_MEMORY_RO, EFI_MEMORY_XP, or both
• No entries may be left with neither of the above attributes, indicating memory that is both executable and writable. Memory must be either readable and executable or writeable and non-executable.
• This only applies to UEFI runtime service memory, and not UEFI boot service memory.
• This protection is applied by VBS on OS page tables.
Please also note the following:
• Do not use sections that are both writeable and executable
• Do not attempt to directly modify executable system memory
• Do not use dynamic code | • Vulnerabilities in UEFI runtime, if any, will be blocked from compromising VBS (such as in functions like UpdateCapsule and SetVariable)
• Reduces the attack surface to VBS from system firmware. |
-| Firmware: **Firmware support for SMM protection** | The [Windows SMM Security Mitigations Table (WSMT) specification](https://download.microsoft.com/download/1/8/A/18A21244-EB67-4538-BAA2-1A54E0E490B6/WSMT.docx) contains details of an Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI) table that was created for use with Windows operating systems that support Windows virtualization-based security (VBS) features.| • Protects against potential vulnerabilities in UEFI runtime services, if any, will be blocked from compromising VBS (such as in functions like UpdateCapsule and SetVariable)
• Reduces the attack surface to VBS from system firmware.
• Blocks additional security attacks against SMM. |
+| Firmware: **VBS enablement of NX protection for UEFI runtime services** | • VBS will enable No-Execute (NX) protection on UEFI runtime service code and data memory regions. UEFI runtime service code must support read-only page protections, and UEFI runtime service data must not be executable.
• UEFI runtime service must meet these requirements:
• Implement UEFI 2.6 EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE. All UEFI runtime service memory (code and data) must be described by this table.
• PE sections need to be page-aligned in memory (not required for in non-volitile storage).
• The Memory Attributes Table needs to correctly mark code and data as RO/NX for configuration by the OS:
• All entries must include attributes EFI_MEMORY_RO, EFI_MEMORY_XP, or both
• No entries may be left with neither of the above attributes, indicating memory that is both executable and writable. Memory must be either readable and executable or writeable and non-executable.
• This only applies to UEFI runtime service memory, and not UEFI boot service memory.
• This protection is applied by VBS on OS page tables.
Also note the following guidelines:
• Don't use sections that are both writeable and executable
• Don't attempt to directly modify executable system memory
• Don't use dynamic code | • Vulnerabilities in UEFI runtime, if any, will be blocked from compromising VBS (such as in functions like UpdateCapsule and SetVariable)
• Reduces the attack surface to VBS from system firmware. |
+| Firmware: **Firmware support for SMM protection** | The [Windows SMM Security Mitigations Table (WSMT) specification](https://download.microsoft.com/download/1/8/A/18A21244-EB67-4538-BAA2-1A54E0E490B6/WSMT.docx) contains details of an Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI) table that was created for use with Windows operating systems that support Windows virtualization-based security (VBS) features.| • Protects against potential vulnerabilities in UEFI runtime services, if any, will be blocked from compromising VBS (such as in functions like UpdateCapsule and SetVariable)
• Reduces the attack surface to VBS from system firmware.
• Blocks other security attacks against SMM. |
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/mbsa-removal-and-guidance.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/mbsa-removal-and-guidance.md
index c8fafe64a7..b38ebe2069 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/mbsa-removal-and-guidance.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/mbsa-removal-and-guidance.md
@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec
# What is Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer and its uses?
-Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer (MBSA) is used to verify patch compliance. MBSA also performed several other security checks for Windows, IIS, and SQL Server. Unfortunately, the logic behind these additional checks had not been actively maintained since Windows XP and Windows Server 2003. Changes in the products since then rendered many of these security checks obsolete and some of their recommendations counterproductive.
+Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer (MBSA) is used to verify patch compliance. MBSA also performed several other security checks for Windows, IIS, and SQL Server. Unfortunately, the logic behind these extra checks hadn't been actively maintained since Windows XP and Windows Server 2003. Changes in the products since then rendered many of these security checks obsolete and some of their recommendations counterproductive.
-MBSA was largely used in situations where neither Microsoft Update nor a local WSUS or Configuration Manager server was available, or as a compliance tool to ensure that all security updates were deployed to a managed environment. While MBSA version 2.3 introduced support for Windows Server 2012 R2 and Windows 8.1, it has since been deprecated and no longer developed. MBSA 2.3 is not updated to fully support Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016.
+MBSA was largely used in situations where Microsoft Update a local WSUS or Configuration Manager server wasn't available, or as a compliance tool to ensure that all security updates were deployed to a managed environment. While MBSA version 2.3 introduced support for Windows Server 2012 R2 and Windows 8.1, it has since been deprecated and no longer developed. MBSA 2.3 isn't updated to fully support Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016.
> [!NOTE]
> In accordance with our [SHA-1 deprecation initiative](https://aka.ms/sha1deprecation), the Wsusscn2.cab file is no longer dual-signed using both SHA-1 and the SHA-2 suite of hash algorithms (specifically SHA-256). This file is now signed using only SHA-256. Administrators who verify digital signatures on this file should now expect only single SHA-256 signatures. Starting with the August 2020 Wsusscn2.cab file, MBSA will return the following error "The catalog file is damaged or an invalid catalog." when attempting to scan using the offline scan file.
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ For example:
[](https://www.powershellgallery.com/packages/Scan-UpdatesOffline/1.0)
The preceding scripts use the [WSUS offline scan file](https://support.microsoft.com/help/927745/detailed-information-for-developers-who-use-the-windows-update-offline) (wsusscn2.cab) to perform a scan and get the same information on missing updates as MBSA supplied. MBSA also relied on the wsusscn2.cab to determine which updates were missing from a given system without connecting to any online service or server. The wsusscn2.cab file is still available and there are currently no plans to remove or replace it.
-The wsusscn2.cab file contains the metadata of only security updates, update rollups and service packs available from Microsoft Update; it does not contain any information on non-security updates, tools or drivers.
+The wsusscn2.cab file contains the metadata of only security updates, update rollups and service packs available from Microsoft Update; it doesn't contain any information on non-security updates, tools or drivers.
## More Information
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/configure-md-app-guard.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/configure-md-app-guard.md
index 99819da4d5..6e85b47920 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/configure-md-app-guard.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/configure-md-app-guard.md
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ ms.author: deniseb
ms.date: 03/10/2022
ms.reviewer:
manager: dansimp
-ms.custom: asr
+ms.custom: sasr
ms.technology: windows-sec
---
@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ These settings, located at `Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Netw
|Policy name|Supported versions|Description|
|-----------|------------------|-----------|
|Private network ranges for apps | At least Windows Server 2012, Windows 8, or Windows RT| A comma-separated list of IP address ranges that are in your corporate network. Included endpoints or endpoints that are included within a specified IP address range, are rendered using Microsoft Edge and won't be accessible from the Application Guard environment.|
-|Enterprise resource domains hosted in the cloud| At least Windows Server 2012, Windows 8, or Windows RT|A pipe-separated (`|`) list of your domain cloud resources. Included endpoints are rendered using Microsoft Edge and won't be accessible from the Application Guard environment.
- Disable the clipboard functionality completely when Virtualization Security is enabled.
- Enable copying of certain content from Application Guard into Microsoft Edge.
- Enable copying of certain content from Microsoft Edge into Application Guard. **Important:** Allowing copied content to go from Microsoft Edge into Application Guard can cause potential security risks and isn't recommended.
- Enable Application Guard to print into the XPS format.
- Enable Application Guard to print into the PDF format.
- Enable Application Guard to print to locally attached printers.
- Enable Application Guard to print from previously connected network printers. Employees can't search for additional printers.
**Disabled or not configured.** Completely turns Off the print functionality for Application Guard.|
+|Configure Microsoft Defender Application Guard print settings|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1709 or higher
- Enable Application Guard to print into the XPS format.
- Enable Application Guard to print into the PDF format.
- Enable Application Guard to print to locally attached printers.
- Enable Application Guard to print from previously connected network printers. Employees can't search for other printers.
**Disabled or not configured.** Completely turns Off the print functionality for Application Guard.|
|Prevent enterprise websites from loading non-enterprise content in Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1709 or higher
Windows 10 Pro, 1803 or higher
1. Open a command-line program and navigate to `Windows/System32`.
2. Type `wdagtool.exe cleanup`. The container environment is reset, retaining only the employee-generated data.
3. Type `wdagtool.exe cleanup RESET_PERSISTENCE_LAYER`. The container environment is reset, including discarding all employee-generated data.|
-|Turn on Microsoft Defender Application Guard in Managed Mode|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1809 or higher
- Enable Microsoft Defender Application Guard only for Microsoft Edge
- Enable Microsoft Defender Application Guard only for Microsoft Office
- Enable Microsoft Defender Application Guard for both Microsoft Edge and Microsoft Office
**Disabled.** Turns off Application Guard, allowing all apps to run in Microsoft Edge and Microsoft Office.|
-|Allow files to download to host operating system|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1803 or higher
Windows 10 Pro, 1803 or higher
**Disabled or not configured.** Microsoft Defender Application Guard uses software-based (CPU) rendering and won’t load any third-party graphics drivers or interact with any connected graphics hardware.|
-|Allow camera and microphone access in Microsoft Defender Application Guard|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Pro, 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Pro, 1809 or higher
- Enable Microsoft Defender Application Guard only for Microsoft Edge
- Enable Microsoft Defender Application Guard only for Microsoft Office
- Enable Microsoft Defender Application Guard for both Microsoft Edge and Microsoft Office
**Disabled.** Turns off Application Guard, allowing all apps to run in Microsoft Edge and Microsoft Office.|
+|Allow files to download to host operating system|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1803 or higher
Windows 10 Pro, 1803 or higher
**Disabled or not configured.** Microsoft Defender Application Guard uses software-based (CPU) rendering and won’t load any third-party graphics drivers or interact with any connected graphics hardware.|
+|Allow camera and microphone access in Microsoft Defender Application Guard|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Pro, 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Pro, 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Pro, 1809 or higher
`System\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\DisableIpNat = 1`
- 3. Configure ICS (SharedAccess) to enabled as follows:
+ 3. Configure ICS (SharedAccess) to be enabled as follows:
`HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Start = 3`
- 4. (This is optional) Disable IPNAT as follows:
+ 4. (This step is optional) Disable IPNAT as follows:
`HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\IPNat\Start = 4`
5. Reboot the device.
@@ -210,9 +210,9 @@ sections:
- `{71a27cdd-812a-11d0-bec7-08002be2092f}`
- question: |
- I'm encountering TCP fragmentation issues, and cannot enable my VPN connection. How do I fix this?
+ I'm encountering TCP fragmentation issues, and can't enable my VPN connection. How do I fix this issue?
answer: |
- WinNAT drops ICMP/UDP messages with packets greater than MTU when using Default Switch or Docker NAT network. Support for this has been added in [KB4571744](https://www.catalog.update.microsoft.com/Search.aspx?q=4571744). To fix the issue, install the update and enable the fix by following these steps:
+ WinNAT drops ICMP/UDP messages with packets greater than MTU when using Default Switch or Docker NAT network. Support for this solution has been added in [KB4571744](https://www.catalog.update.microsoft.com/Search.aspx?q=4571744). To fix the issue, install the update and enable the fix by following these steps:
1. Ensure that the FragmentAware DWORD is set to 1 in this registry setting: `\Registry\Machine\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Winnat`.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/reqs-md-app-guard.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/reqs-md-app-guard.md
index d91da6e81c..ddf7e13d0d 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/reqs-md-app-guard.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/reqs-md-app-guard.md
@@ -33,11 +33,11 @@ Your environment must have the following hardware to run Microsoft Defender Appl
| Hardware | Description |
|--------|-----------|
-| 64-bit CPU|A 64-bit computer with minimum 4 cores (logical processors) is required for hypervisor and virtualization-based security (VBS). For more info about Hyper-V, see [Hyper-V on Windows Server 2016](/windows-server/virtualization/hyper-v/hyper-v-on-windows-server) or [Introduction to Hyper-V on Windows 10](/virtualization/hyper-v-on-windows/about/). For more info about hypervisor, see [Hypervisor Specifications](/virtualization/hyper-v-on-windows/reference/tlfs).|
+| 64-bit CPU|A 64-bit computer with minimum four cores (logical processors) is required for hypervisor and virtualization-based security (VBS). For more info about Hyper-V, see [Hyper-V on Windows Server 2016](/windows-server/virtualization/hyper-v/hyper-v-on-windows-server) or [Introduction to Hyper-V on Windows 10](/virtualization/hyper-v-on-windows/about/). For more info about hypervisor, see [Hypervisor Specifications](/virtualization/hyper-v-on-windows/reference/tlfs).|
| CPU virtualization extensions|Extended page tables, also called _Second Level Address Translation (SLAT)_
VT-x (Intel)
**OR**
AMD-V |
-| Hardware memory | Microsoft requires a minimum of 8GB RAM |
-| Hard disk | 5 GB free space, solid state disk (SSD) recommended |
-| Input/Output Memory Management Unit (IOMMU) support| Not required, but strongly recommended |
+| Hardware memory | Microsoft requires a minimum of 8-GB RAM |
+| Hard disk | 5-GB free space, solid state disk (SSD) recommended |
+| Input/Output Memory Management Unit (IOMMU) support| Not required, but recommended |
## Software requirements
@@ -45,6 +45,6 @@ Your environment must have the following hardware to run Microsoft Defender Appl
| Software | Description |
|--------|-----------|
-| Operating system | Windows 10 Enterprise edition, version 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Professional edition, version 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Professional for Workstations edition, version 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Professional Education edition, version 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Education edition, version 1809 or higher
Professional editions are only supported for non-managed devices; Intune or any other 3rd party mobile device management (MDM) solutions are not supported with MDAG for Professional editions.
Windows 11 |
+| Operating system | Windows 10 Enterprise edition, version 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Professional edition, version 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Professional for Workstations edition, version 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Professional Education edition, version 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Education edition, version 1809 or higher
Professional editions are only supported for non-managed devices; Intune or any other third-party mobile device management (MDM) solutions aren't supported with MDAG for Professional editions.
Windows 11 |
| Browser | Microsoft Edge |
| Management system
(only for managed devices)| [Microsoft Intune](/intune/)
helps keep a device
from running malware or
other untrusted apps | Device Guard includes a Code Integrity policy that you create; an allowlist of trusted apps—the only apps allowed to run in your organization. Device Guard also includes a powerful system mitigation called hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI), which uses virtualization-based security (VBS) to protect Windows' kernel-mode code integrity validation process. HVCI has specific hardware requirements, and works with Code Integrity policies to help stop attacks even if they gain access to the kernel.
Device Guard is included in Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows Server 2016.
**More information**: [Introduction to Device Guard](/windows/device-security/device-guard/introduction-to-device-guard-virtualization-based-security-and-code-integrity-policies) |
| **Microsoft Defender Antivirus**,
which helps keep devices
free of viruses and other
malware | Windows 10 includes Microsoft Defender Antivirus, a robust inbox anti-malware solution. Microsoft Defender Antivirus has been improved significantly since it was introduced in Windows 8.
**More information**: [Microsoft Defender Antivirus](#microsoft-defender-antivirus), later in this topic |
| **Blocking of untrusted fonts**
helps prevent fonts
from being used in
elevation-of-privilege attacks | Block Untrusted Fonts is a setting that allows you to prevent users from loading fonts that are "untrusted" onto your network, which can mitigate elevation-of-privilege attacks associated with the parsing of font files. However, as of Windows 10, version 1703, this mitigation is less important, because font parsing is isolated in an [AppContainer sandbox](/windows/win32/secauthz/appcontainer-isolation) (for a list describing this and other kernel pool protections, see [Kernel pool protections](#kernel-pool-protections), later in this topic).
**More information**: [Block untrusted fonts in an enterprise](/windows/threat-protection/block-untrusted-fonts-in-enterprise) |
-| **Memory protections**
help prevent malware
from using memory manipulation
techniques such as buffer
overruns | These mitigations, listed in [Table 2](#table-2), help to protect against memory-based attacks, where malware or other code manipulates memory to gain control of a system (for example, malware that attempts to use buffer overruns to inject malicious executable code into memory. Note:
A subset of apps will not be able to run if some of these mitigations are set to their most restrictive settings. Testing can help you maximize protection while still allowing these apps to run.
**More information**: [Table 2](#table-2), later in this topic |
+| **Memory protections**
help prevent malware
from using memory manipulation
techniques such as buffer
overruns | These mitigations, listed in [Table 2](#table-2), help to protect against memory-based attacks, where malware or other code manipulates memory to gain control of a system (for example, malware that attempts to use buffer overruns to inject malicious executable code into memory. Note:
A subset of apps won't be able to run if some of these mitigations are set to their most restrictive settings. Testing can help you maximize protection while still allowing these apps to run.
**More information**: [Table 2](#table-2), later in this topic |
| **UEFI Secure Boot**
helps protect
the platform from
boot kits and rootkits | Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Secure Boot is a security standard for firmware built in to PCs by manufacturers beginning with Windows 8. It helps to protect the boot process and firmware against tampering, such as from a physically present attacker or from forms of malware that run early in the boot process or in kernel after startup.
**More information**: [UEFI and Secure Boot](/windows/device-security/bitlocker/bitlocker-countermeasures#uefi-and-secure-boot) |
| **Early Launch Antimalware (ELAM)**
helps protect
the platform from
rootkits disguised as drivers | Early Launch Antimalware (ELAM) is designed to enable the anti-malware solution to start before all non-Microsoft drivers and apps. If malware modifies a boot-related driver, ELAM will detect the change, and Windows will prevent the driver from starting, thus blocking driver-based rootkits.
**More information**: [Early Launch Antimalware](/windows/device-security/bitlocker/bitlocker-countermeasures#protection-during-startup) |
| **Device Health Attestation**
helps prevent
compromised devices from
accessing an organization's
assets | Device Health Attestation (DHA) provides a way to confirm that devices attempting to connect to an organization's network are in a healthy state, not compromised with malware. When DHA has been configured, a device's actual boot data measurements can be checked against the expected "healthy" boot data. If the check indicates a device is unhealthy, the device can be prevented from accessing the network.
**More information**: [Control the health of Windows 10-based devices](/windows/device-security/protect-high-value-assets-by-controlling-the-health-of-windows-10-based-devices) and [Device Health Attestation](/windows-server/security/device-health-attestation) |
@@ -73,8 +73,8 @@ As an IT professional, you can ask application developers and software vendors t
| Mitigation and corresponding threat | Description |
|---|---|
-| **Data Execution Prevention (DEP)**
helps prevent
exploitation of buffer overruns | **Data Execution Prevention (DEP)** is a system-level memory protection feature available in Windows operating systems. DEP enables the operating system to mark one or more pages of memory as non-executable, which prevents code from being run from that region of memory, to help prevent exploitation of buffer overruns.
DEP helps prevent code from being run from data pages such as the default heap, stacks, and memory pools. Although some applications have compatibility problems with DEP, most applications do not.
**More information**: [Data Execution Prevention](#data-execution-prevention), later in this topic.
**Group Policy settings**: DEP is on by default for 64-bit applications, but you can configure more DEP protections by using the Group Policy settings described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). |
-| **SEHOP**
helps prevent
overwrites of the
Structured Exception Handler | **Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP)** is designed to help block exploits that use the Structured Exception Handler (SEH) overwrite technique. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps to protect apps regardless of whether they have been compiled with the latest improvements. A few applications have compatibility problems with SEHOP, so be sure to test for your environment.
**More information**: [Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection](#structured-exception-handling-overwrite-protection), later in this topic.
**Group Policy setting**: SEHOP is on by default for 64-bit applications, but you can configure more SEHOP protections by using the Group Policy setting described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). |
+| **Data Execution Prevention (DEP)**
helps prevent
exploitation of buffer overruns | **Data Execution Prevention (DEP)** is a system-level memory protection feature available in Windows operating systems. DEP enables the operating system to mark one or more pages of memory as non-executable, which prevents code from being run from that region of memory, to help prevent exploitation of buffer overruns.
DEP helps prevent code from being run from data pages such as the default heap, stacks, and memory pools. Although some applications have compatibility problems with DEP, most applications don't.
**More information**: [Data Execution Prevention](#data-execution-prevention), later in this topic.
**Group Policy settings**: DEP is on by default for 64-bit applications, but you can configure more DEP protections by using the Group Policy settings described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). |
+| **SEHOP**
helps prevent
overwrites of the
Structured Exception Handler | **Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP)** is designed to help block exploits that use the Structured Exception Handler (SEH) overwrite technique. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps to protect apps regardless of whether they've been compiled with the latest improvements. A few applications have compatibility problems with SEHOP, so be sure to test for your environment.
**More information**: [Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection](#structured-exception-handling-overwrite-protection), later in this topic.
**Group Policy setting**: SEHOP is on by default for 64-bit applications, but you can configure more SEHOP protections by using the Group Policy setting described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). |
| **ASLR**
helps mitigate malware
attacks based on
expected memory locations | **Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)** loads DLLs into random memory addresses at boot time. This loading - of specific DLLs -helps mitigate malware that's designed to attack specific memory locations.
**More information**: [Address Space Layout Randomization](#address-space-layout-randomization), later in this topic.
**Group Policy settings**: ASLR is on by default for 64-bit applications, but you can configure more ASLR protections by using the Group Policy settings described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). |
### Windows Defender SmartScreen
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ You can use Control Panel to view or change DEP settings.
- **Turn on DEP for essential Windows programs and services only**
- - **Turn on DEP for all programs and services except those I select**. If you choose this option, use the **Add** and **Remove** buttons to create the list of exceptions for which DEP will not be turned on.
+ - **Turn on DEP for all programs and services except those I select**. If you choose this option, use the **Add** and **Remove** buttons to create the list of exceptions for which DEP won't be turned on.
#### To use Group Policy to control DEP settings
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ You can use the Group Policy setting called **Process Mitigation Options** to co
### Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection
-Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP) helps prevent attackers from being able to use malicious code to exploit the [Structured Exception Handling](/windows/win32/debug/structured-exception-handling) (SEH), which is integral to the system and allows (non-malicious) apps to handle exceptions appropriately. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps to protect applications regardless of whether they have been compiled with the latest improvements.
+Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP) helps prevent attackers from being able to use malicious code to exploit the [Structured Exception Handling](/windows/win32/debug/structured-exception-handling) (SEH), which is integral to the system and allows (non-malicious) apps to handle exceptions appropriately. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps to protect applications regardless of whether they've been compiled with the latest improvements.
You can use the Group Policy setting called **Process Mitigation Options** to control the SEHOP setting. A few applications have compatibility problems with SEHOP, so be sure to test for your environment. To use the Group Policy setting, see [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md).
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ You can use the Group Policy setting called **Process Mitigation Options** to co
One of the most common techniques used to gain access to a system is to find a vulnerability in a privileged process that is already running, guess or find a location in memory where important system code and data have been placed, and then overwrite that information with a malicious payload. Any malware that could write directly to the system memory could overwrite it in well-known and predictable locations.
-Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) makes that type of attack much more difficult because it randomizes how and where important data is stored in memory. With ASLR, it is more difficult for malware to find the specific location it needs to attack. Figure 3 illustrates how ASLR works by showing how the locations of different critical Windows components can change in memory between restarts.
+Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) makes that type of attack much more difficult because it randomizes how and where important data is stored in memory. With ASLR, it's more difficult for malware to find the specific location it needs to attack. Figure 3 illustrates how ASLR works by showing how the locations of different critical Windows components can change in memory between restarts.
:::image type="content" alt-text="ASLR at work." source="images/security-fig4-aslr.png" lightbox="images/security-fig4-aslr.png":::
@@ -175,9 +175,9 @@ You can use the Group Policy setting called **Process Mitigation Options** to co
## Mitigations that are built in to Windows 10
-Windows 10 provides many threat mitigations to protect against exploits that are built into the operating system and need no configuration within the operating system. The table that follows describes some of these mitigations.
+Windows 10 provides many threat mitigations to protect against exploits that are built into the operating system and need no configuration within the operating system. The subsequent table describes some of these mitigations.
-Control Flow Guard (CFG) is a mitigation that does not need configuration within the operating system, but does require an application developer to configure the mitigation into the application when it's compiled. CFG is built into Microsoft Edge, IE11, and other areas in Windows 10, and can be built into many other applications when they are compiled.
+Control Flow Guard (CFG) is a mitigation that doesn't need configuration within the operating system, but does require an application developer to configure the mitigation into the application when it's compiled. CFG is built into Microsoft Edge, IE11, and other areas in Windows 10, and can be built into many other applications when they're compiled.
### Table 3 Windows 10 mitigations to protect against memory exploits – no configuration needed
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ Control Flow Guard (CFG) is a mitigation that does not need configuration within
| **Universal Windows apps protections**
screen downloadable
apps and run them in
an AppContainer sandbox | Universal Windows apps are carefully screened before being made available, and they run in an AppContainer sandbox with limited privileges and capabilities.
**More information**: [Universal Windows apps protections](#universal-windows-apps-protections), later in this topic. |
| **Heap protections**
help prevent
exploitation of the heap | Windows 10 includes protections for the heap, such as the use of internal data structures that help protect against corruption of memory used by the heap.
**More information**: [Windows heap protections](#windows-heap-protections), later in this topic. |
| **Kernel pool protections**
help prevent
exploitation of pool memory
used by the kernel | Windows 10 includes protections for the pool of memory used by the kernel. For example, safe unlinking protects against pool overruns that are combined with unlinking operations that can be used to create an attack.
**More information**: [Kernel pool protections](#kernel-pool-protections), later in this topic. |
-| **Control Flow Guard**
helps mitigate exploits
based on
flow between code locations
in memory | Control Flow Guard (CFG) is a mitigation that requires no configuration within the operating system, but instead is built into software when it's compiled. It is built into Microsoft Edge, IE11, and other areas in Windows 10. CFG can be built into applications written in C or C++, or applications compiled using Visual Studio 2015.
For such an application, CFG can detect an attacker's attempt to change the intended flow of code. If this attempt occurs, CFG terminates the application. You can request software vendors to deliver Windows applications compiled with CFG enabled.
**More information**: [Control Flow Guard](#control-flow-guard), later in this topic. |
+| **Control Flow Guard**
helps mitigate exploits
based on
flow between code locations
in memory | Control Flow Guard (CFG) is a mitigation that requires no configuration within the operating system, but instead is built into software when it's compiled. It's built into Microsoft Edge, IE11, and other areas in Windows 10. CFG can be built into applications written in C or C++, or applications compiled using Visual Studio 2015.
For such an application, CFG can detect an attacker's attempt to change the intended flow of code. If this attempt occurs, CFG terminates the application. You can request software vendors to deliver Windows applications compiled with CFG enabled.
**More information**: [Control Flow Guard](#control-flow-guard), later in this topic. |
| **Protections built into Microsoft Edge** (the browser)
helps mitigate multiple
threats | Windows 10 includes an entirely new browser, Microsoft Edge, designed with multiple security improvements.
**More information**: [Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer 11](#microsoft-edge-and-internet-explorer11), later in this topic. |
### SMB hardening improvements for SYSVOL and NETLOGON shares
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ With Protected Processes, Windows 10 prevents untrusted processes from interacti
### Universal Windows apps protections
-When users download Universal Windows apps from the Microsoft Store, it's unlikely that they will encounter malware because all apps go through a careful screening process before being made available in the store. Apps that organizations build and distribute through sideloading processes will need to be reviewed internally to ensure that they meet organizational security requirements.
+When users download Universal Windows apps from the Microsoft Store, it's unlikely that they'll encounter malware because all apps go through a careful screening process before being made available in the store. Apps that organizations build and distribute through sideloading processes will need to be reviewed internally to ensure that they meet organizational security requirements.
Regardless of how users acquire Universal Windows apps, they can use them with increased confidence. Universal Windows apps run in an AppContainer sandbox with limited privileges and capabilities. For example, Universal Windows apps have no system-level access, have tightly controlled interactions with other apps, and have no access to data unless the user explicitly grants the application permission.
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ Windows 10 has several important improvements to the security of the heap:
### Kernel pool protections
-The operating system kernel in Windows sets aside two pools of memory, one which remains in physical memory ("nonpaged pool") and one that can be paged in and out of physical memory ("paged pool"). There are many mitigations that have been added over time, such as process quota pointer encoding; lookaside, delay free, and pool page cookies; and PoolIndex bounds checks. Windows 10 adds multiple "pool hardening" protections, such as integrity checks, that help protect the kernel pool against more advanced attacks.
+The operating system kernel in Windows sets aside two pools of memory, one that remains in physical memory ("nonpaged pool") and one that can be paged in and out of physical memory ("paged pool"). There are many mitigations that have been added over time, such as process quota pointer encoding; lookaside, delay free, and pool page cookies; and PoolIndex bounds checks. Windows 10 adds multiple "pool hardening" protections, such as integrity checks, that help protect the kernel pool against more advanced attacks.
In addition to pool hardening, Windows 10 includes other kernel hardening features:
@@ -240,23 +240,23 @@ In addition to pool hardening, Windows 10 includes other kernel hardening featur
- **Safe unlinking:** Helps protect against pool overruns that are combined with unlinking operations to create an attack. Windows 10 includes global safe unlinking, which extends heap and kernel pool safe unlinking to all usage of LIST\_ENTRY and includes the "FastFail" mechanism to enable rapid and safe process termination.
-- **Memory reservations**: The lowest 64 KB of process memory is reserved for the system. Apps are not allowed to allocate that portion of the memory. This allocation for the system makes it more difficult for malware to use techniques such as "NULL dereference" to overwrite critical system data structures in memory.
+- **Memory reservations**: The lowest 64 KB of process memory is reserved for the system. Apps aren't allowed to allocate that portion of the memory. This allocation for the system makes it more difficult for malware to use techniques such as "NULL dereference" to overwrite critical system data structures in memory.
### Control Flow Guard
-When applications are loaded into memory, they are allocated space based on the size of the code, requested memory, and other factors. When an application begins to execute code, it calls the other code located in other memory addresses. The relationships between the code locations are well known—they are written in the code itself—but previous to Windows 10, the flow between these locations was not enforced, which gave attackers the opportunity to change the flow to meet their needs.
+When applications are loaded into memory, they're allocated space based on the size of the code, requested memory, and other factors. When an application begins to execute code, it calls the other code located in other memory addresses. The relationships between the code locations are well known—they're written in the code itself—but previous to Windows 10, the flow between these locations wasn't enforced, which gave attackers the opportunity to change the flow to meet their needs.
-This kind of threat is mitigated in Windows 10 through the Control Flow Guard (CFG) feature. When a trusted application that was compiled to use CFG calls code, CFG verifies that the code location called is trusted for execution. If the location is not trusted, the application is immediately terminated as a potential security risk.
+This kind of threat is mitigated in Windows 10 through the Control Flow Guard (CFG) feature. When a trusted application that was compiled to use CFG calls code, CFG verifies that the code location called is trusted for execution. If the location isn't trusted, the application is immediately terminated as a potential security risk.
-An administrator cannot configure CFG; rather, an application developer can take advantage of CFG by configuring it when the application is compiled. Consider asking application developers and software vendors to deliver trustworthy Windows applications compiled with CFG enabled. For example, it can be enabled for applications written in C or C++, or applications compiled using Visual Studio 2015. For information about enabling CFG for a Visual Studio 2015 project, see [Control Flow Guard](/windows/win32/secbp/control-flow-guard).
+An administrator can't configure CFG; rather, an application developer can take advantage of CFG by configuring it when the application is compiled. Consider asking application developers and software vendors to deliver trustworthy Windows applications compiled with CFG enabled. For example, it can be enabled for applications written in C or C++, or applications compiled using Visual Studio 2015. For information about enabling CFG for a Visual Studio 2015 project, see [Control Flow Guard](/windows/win32/secbp/control-flow-guard).
Browsers are a key entry point for attacks, so Microsoft Edge, IE, and other Windows features take full advantage of CFG.
### Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer 11
-Browser security is a critical component of any security strategy, and for good reason: the browser is the user's interface to the Internet, an environment with many malicious sites and content waiting to attack. Most users cannot perform at least part of their job without a browser, and many users are reliant on one. This reality has made the browser the common pathway from which malicious hackers initiate their attacks.
+Browser security is a critical component of any security strategy, and for good reason: the browser is the user's interface to the Internet, an environment with many malicious sites and content waiting to attack. Most users can't perform at least part of their job without a browser, and many users are reliant on one. This reality has made the browser the common pathway from which malicious hackers initiate their attacks.
-All browsers enable some amount of extensibility to do things beyond the original scope of the browser. Two common examples are Flash and Java extensions that enable their respective applications to run inside a browser. Keeping Windows 10 secure for web browsing and applications, especially for these two content types, is a priority.
+All browsers enable some amount of extensibility to do things beyond the original scope of the browser. Two common examples are Flash and Java extensions that enable their respective applications to run inside a browser. The security of Windows 10 for the purposes of web browsing and applications, especially for these two content types, is a priority.
Windows 10 includes an entirely new browser, Microsoft Edge. Microsoft Edge is more secure in multiple ways, especially:
@@ -270,13 +270,13 @@ Windows 10 includes an entirely new browser, Microsoft Edge. Microsoft Edge is m
- **Simplifies security configuration tasks.** Because Microsoft Edge uses a simplified application structure and a single sandbox configuration, there are fewer required security settings. In addition, Microsoft Edge default settings align with security best practices, making it more secure by default.
-In addition to Microsoft Edge, Microsoft includes IE11 in Windows 10, primarily for backwards-compatibility with websites and with binary extensions that do not work with Microsoft Edge. You cannot configure it as the primary browser but rather as an optional or automatic switchover. We recommend using Microsoft Edge as the primary web browser because it provides compatibility with the modern web and the best possible security.
+In addition to Microsoft Edge, Microsoft includes IE11 in Windows 10, primarily for backwards-compatibility with websites and with binary extensions that don't work with Microsoft Edge. You can't configure it as the primary browser but rather as an optional or automatic switchover. We recommend using Microsoft Edge as the primary web browser because it provides compatibility with the modern web and the best possible security.
For sites that require IE11 compatibility, including those sites that require binary extensions and plug-ins, enable Enterprise mode and use the Enterprise Mode Site List to define which sites have the dependency. With this configuration, when Microsoft Edge identifies a site that requires IE11, users will automatically be switched to IE11.
### Functions that software vendors can use to build mitigations into apps
-Some of the protections available in Windows 10 are provided through functions that can be called from apps or other software. Such software is less likely to provide openings for exploits. If you are working with a software vendor, you can request that they include these security-oriented functions in the application. The following table lists some types of mitigations and the corresponding security-oriented functions that can be used in apps.
+Some of the protections available in Windows 10 are provided through functions that can be called from apps or other software. Such software is less likely to provide openings for exploits. If you're working with a software vendor, you can request that they include these security-oriented functions in the application. The following table lists some types of mitigations and the corresponding security-oriented functions that can be used in apps.
> [!NOTE]
> Control Flow Guard (CFG) is also an important mitigation that a developer can include in software when it is compiled. For more information, see [Control Flow Guard](#control-flow-guard), earlier in this topic.
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ Some of the protections available in Windows 10 are provided through functions t
## Understanding Windows 10 in relation to the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit
-You might already be familiar with the [Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET)](https://support.microsoft.com/topic/emet-mitigations-guidelines-b529d543-2a81-7b5a-d529-84b30e1ecee0), which has since 2009 offered various exploit mitigations, and an interface for configuring those mitigations. You can use this section to understand how EMET mitigations relate to those mitigations in Windows 10. Many of EMET's mitigations have been built into Windows 10, some with extra improvements. However, some EMET mitigations carry high-performance cost, or appear to be relatively ineffective against modern threats, and therefore have not been brought into Windows 10.
+You might already be familiar with the [Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET)](https://support.microsoft.com/topic/emet-mitigations-guidelines-b529d543-2a81-7b5a-d529-84b30e1ecee0), which has since 2009 offered various exploit mitigations, and an interface for configuring those mitigations. You can use this section to understand how EMET mitigations relate to those mitigations in Windows 10. Many of EMET's mitigations have been built into Windows 10, some with extra improvements. However, some EMET mitigations carry high-performance cost, or appear to be relatively ineffective against modern threats, and therefore haven't been brought into Windows 10.
Because many of EMET's mitigations and security mechanisms already exist in Windows 10 and have been improved, particularly the ones assessed to have high effectiveness at mitigating known bypasses, version 5.5*x* has been announced as the final major version release for EMET (see [Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit](https://web.archive.org/web/20170928073955/https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/security/jj653751)).
@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ The following table lists EMET features in relation to Windows 10 features.
|
If an entry is not analyzed, it may be that it was not defined in the analysis database or that the user who is running the analysis may not have sufficient permission to perform analysis on a specific object or area.|
-|Exclamation point |This item is defined in the analysis database, but does not exist on the actual system. For example, there may be a restricted group that is defined in the analysis database but does not actually exist on the analyzed system.|
-|No highlight |The item is not defined in the analysis database or on the system.|
+|Question mark |The entry isn't defined in the analysis database and, therefore, wasn't analyzed.
If an entry isn't analyzed, it may be that it wasn't defined in the analysis database or that the user who is running the analysis may not have sufficient permission to perform analysis on a specific object or area.|
+|Exclamation point |This item is defined in the analysis database, but doesn't exist on the actual system. For example, there may be a restricted group that is defined in the analysis database but doesn't actually exist on the analyzed system.|
+|No highlight |The item isn't defined in the analysis database or on the system.|
If you choose to accept the current settings, the corresponding value in the base configuration is modified to match them. If you change the system setting to match the base configuration, the change will be reflected when you configure the system with Security Configuration and Analysis.
-To avoid continued flagging of settings that you have investigated and determined to be reasonable, you can modify the base configuration. The changes are made to a copy of the template.
+To avoid continued flagging of settings that you've investigated and determined to be reasonable, you can modify the base configuration. The changes are made to a copy of the template.
### Resolving security discrepancies
You can resolve discrepancies between analysis database and system settings by:
- Accepting or changing some or all of the values that are flagged or not included in the configuration, if you determine that the local system security levels are valid due to the context (or role) of that computer. These attribute values are then updated in the database and applied to the system when you click **Configure Computer Now**.
-- Configuring the system to the analysis database values, if you determine the system is not in compliance with valid security levels.
+- Configuring the system to the analysis database values, if you determine the system isn't in compliance with valid security levels.
- Importing a more appropriate template for the role of that computer into the database as the new base configuration and applying it to the system.
Changes to the analysis database are made to the stored template in the database, not to the security template file. The security template file will only be modified if you either return to Security Templates and edit that template or export the stored configuration to the same template file.
You should use **Configure Computer Now** only to modify security areas *not* affected by Group Policy settings, such as security on local files and folders, registry keys, and system services. Otherwise, when the Group Policy settings are applied, it will take precedence over local settings—such as account policies.
-In general, do not use **Configure Computer Now** when you are analyzing security for domain-based clients, since you will have to configure each client individually. In this case, you should return to Security Templates, modify the template, and reapply it to the appropriate Group Policy Object.
+In general, don't use **Configure Computer Now** when you're analyzing security for domain-based clients, since you'll have to configure each client individually. In this case, you should return to Security Templates, modify the template, and reapply it to the appropriate Group Policy Object.
### Automating security configuration tasks
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/allow-log-on-through-remote-desktop-services.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/allow-log-on-through-remote-desktop-services.md
index 1ad9f2883f..595d9b29e8 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/allow-log-on-through-remote-desktop-services.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/allow-log-on-through-remote-desktop-services.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
title: Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services (Windows 10)
-description: Best practices, location, values, policy management, and security considerations for the security policy setting, Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services.
+description: Best practices, location, values, policy management, and security considerations for the security policy setting. Allow a sign-in through Remote Desktop Services.
ms.assetid: 6267c376-8199-4f2b-ae56-9c5424e76798
ms.reviewer:
ms.author: dansimp
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security
## Reference
-This policy setting determines which users or groups can access the logon screen of a remote device through a Remote Desktop Services connection. It is possible for a user to establish a Remote Desktop Services connection to a particular server but not be able to log on to the console of that same server.
+This policy setting determines which users or groups can access the sign-in screen of a remote device through a Remote Desktop Services connection. It's possible for a user to establish a Remote Desktop Services connection to a particular server but not be able to sign in to the console of that same server.
Constant: SeRemoteInteractiveLogonRight
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ Constant: SeRemoteInteractiveLogonRight
### Best practices
-- To control who can open a Remote Desktop Services connection and log on to the device, add users to or remove users from the Remote Desktop Users group.
+- To control who can open a Remote Desktop Services connection and sign in to the device, add users to or remove users from the Remote Desktop Users group.
### Location
@@ -66,13 +66,13 @@ This section describes different features and tools available to help you manage
### Group Policy
-To use Remote Desktop Services to successfully log on to a remote device, the user or group must be a member of the Remote Desktop Users or Administrators group and be granted the **Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services** right. It is possible for a user to establish an Remote Desktop Services session to a particular server, but not be able to log on to the console of that same server.
+To use Remote Desktop Services to successfully sign in to a remote device, the user or group must be a member of the Remote Desktop Users or Administrators group and be granted the **Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services** right. It's possible for a user to establish a Remote Desktop Services session to a particular server, but not be able to sign in to the console of that same server.
To exclude users or groups, you can assign the **Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services** user right to those users or groups. However, be careful when you use this method because you could create conflicts for legitimate users or groups that have been allowed access through the **Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services** user right.
For more information, see [Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services](deny-log-on-through-remote-desktop-services.md).
-A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to be effective.
+A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to be effective.
Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on.
@@ -89,11 +89,11 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
### Vulnerability
-Any account with the **Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services** user right can log on to the remote console of the device. If you do not restrict this user right to legitimate users who must log on to the console of the computer, unauthorized users could download and run malicious software to elevate their privileges.
+Any account with the **Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services** user right can sign in to the remote console of the device. If you don't restrict this user right to legitimate users who must sign in to the console of the computer, unauthorized users could download and run malicious software to elevate their privileges.
### Countermeasure
-For domain controllers, assign the **Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services** user right only to the Administrators group. For other server roles and devices, add the Remote Desktop Users group. For servers that have the Remote Desktop (RD) Session Host role service enabled and do not run in Application Server mode, ensure that only authorized IT personnel who must manage the computers remotely belong to these groups.
+For domain controllers, assign the **Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services** user right only to the Administrators group. For other server roles and devices, add the Remote Desktop Users group. For servers that have the Remote Desktop (RD) Session Host role service enabled and don't run in Application Server mode, ensure that only authorized IT personnel who must manage the computers remotely belong to these groups.
> **Caution:** For RD Session Host servers that run in Application Server mode, ensure that only users who require access to the server have accounts that belong to the Remote Desktop Users group because this built-in group has this logon right by default.
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ Alternatively, you can assign the **Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services*
### Potential impact
-Removal of the **Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services** user right from other groups (or membership changes in these default groups) could limit the abilities of users who perform specific administrative roles in your environment. You should confirm that delegated activities are not adversely affected.
+Removal of the **Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services** user right from other groups (or membership changes in these default groups) could limit the abilities of users who perform specific administrative roles in your environment. You should confirm that delegated activities aren't adversely affected.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-audit-the-use-of-backup-and-restore-privilege.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-audit-the-use-of-backup-and-restore-privilege.md
index 39535992d7..6b5311ba25 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-audit-the-use-of-backup-and-restore-privilege.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-audit-the-use-of-backup-and-restore-privilege.md
@@ -62,11 +62,11 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
### Auditing
-Enabling this policy setting in conjunction with the **Audit privilege use** policy setting records any instance of user rights that are being exercised in the security log. If **Audit privilege use** is enabled but **Audit: Audit the use of Backup and Restore privilege** is disabled, when users back up or restore user rights, those events will not be audited.
+Enabling this policy setting in conjunction with the **Audit privilege use** policy setting records any instance of user rights that are being exercised in the security log. If **Audit privilege use** is enabled but **Audit: Audit the use of Backup and Restore privilege** is disabled, when users back up or restore user rights, those events won't be audited.
Enabling this policy setting when the **Audit privilege use** policy setting is also enabled generates an audit event for every file that is backed up or restored. This setup can help you to track down an administrator who is accidentally or maliciously restoring data in an unauthorized manner.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-force-audit-policy-subcategory-settings-to-override.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-force-audit-policy-subcategory-settings-to-override.md
index cc93c278b5..d4f0fd8113 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-force-audit-policy-subcategory-settings-to-override.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-force-audit-policy-subcategory-settings-to-override.md
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ There are over 40 auditing subcategories that provide precise details about acti
### Best practices
-- Leave the setting enabled. This provides the ability to audit events at the category level without revising a policy.
+- Leave the setting enabled. This "enabled" state helps audit events at the category level without revising a policy.
### Location
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
### Group Policy
@@ -71,9 +71,9 @@ All auditing capabilities are integrated in Group Policy. You can configure, dep
### Auditing
-To manage an audit policy by using subcategories without requiring a change to Group Policy, the SCENoApplyLegacyAuditPolicy registry value , prevents the application of category-level audit policy from Group Policy and from the Local Security Policy administrative tool.
+To manage an audit policy by using subcategories without requiring a change to Group Policy, the SCENoApplyLegacyAuditPolicy registry value prevents the application of category-level audit policy from Group Policy and from the Local Security Policy administrative tool.
-If the category level audit policy that is set here is not consistent with the events that are currently being generated, the cause might be that this registry key is set.
+If the category level audit policy that is set here isn't consistent with the events that are currently being generated, the cause might be that this registry key is set.
### Command-line tools
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-shut-down-system-immediately-if-unable-to-log-security-audits.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-shut-down-system-immediately-if-unable-to-log-security-audits.md
index 7cc7a09a81..867e169424 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-shut-down-system-immediately-if-unable-to-log-security-audits.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-shut-down-system-immediately-if-unable-to-log-security-audits.md
@@ -27,13 +27,13 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, management practices, and securi
## Reference
-The **Audit: Shut down system immediately if unable to log security audits** policy setting determines whether the system shuts down if it is unable to log security events. This policy setting is a requirement for Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC)-C2 and Common Criteria certification to prevent auditable events from occurring if the audit system is unable to log those events. Microsoft has chosen to meet this requirement by halting the system and displaying a Stop message in the case of a failure of the auditing system. Enabling this policy setting stops the system if a security audit cannot be logged for any reason. Typically, an event fails to be logged when the security audit log is full and the value of **Retention method for security log** is **Do not overwrite events (clear log manually)** or **Overwrite events by days**.
+The **Audit: Shut down system immediately if unable to log security audits** policy setting determines whether the system shuts down if it's unable to log security events. This policy setting is a requirement for Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC)-C2 and Common Criteria certification to prevent auditable events from occurring if the audit system is unable to log those events. Microsoft has chosen to meet this requirement by halting the system and displaying a Stop message if there's a failure of the auditing system. Enabling this policy setting stops the system if a security audit can't be logged for any reason. Typically, an event fails to be logged when the security audit log is full and the value of **Retention method for security log** is **Do not overwrite events (clear log manually)** or **Overwrite events by days**.
-With **Audit: Shut down system immediately if unable to log security audits** set to **Enabled**, if the security log is full and an existing entry cannot be overwritten, the following Stop message appears:
+With **Audit: Shut down system immediately if unable to log security audits** set to **Enabled**, if the security log is full and an existing entry can't be overwritten, the following Stop message appears:
**STOP: C0000244 {Audit Failed}**: An attempt to generate a security audit failed.
-To recover, you must log on, archive the log (optional), clear the log, and reset this option as desired.
+To recover, you must sign in, archive the log (optional), clear the log, and reset this option as desired.
If the computer is unable to record events to the security log, critical evidence or important troubleshooting information might not be available for review after a security incident.
@@ -67,11 +67,11 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default values for this polic
## Policy management
This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage this policy.
-The administrative burden of enabling this policy setting can be very high, especially if you also set the **Retention method for security log** to **Do not overwrite events (clear log manually)**. This setting turns a repudiation threat (a backup operator could deny that they backed up or restored data) into a denial-of-service threat, because a server can be forced to shut down if it is overwhelmed with logon events and other security events that are written to the security log. Additionally, because the shutdown is not graceful, it is possible that irreparable damage to the operating system, applications, or data could result. Although the NTFS file system will guarantee that the file system's integrity will be maintained during a sudden system shutdown, it cannot guarantee that every data file for every application will still be in a usable form when the system is restarted.
+The administrative burden of enabling this policy setting can be high, especially if you also set the **Retention method for security log** to **Do not overwrite events (clear log manually)**. This setting turns a repudiation threat (a backup operator could deny that they backed up or restored data) into a denial-of-service threat, because a server can be forced to shut down if it's overwhelmed with sign-in events and other security events that are written to the security log. Additionally, because the shutdown isn't graceful, it's possible that irreparable damage to the operating system, applications, or data could result. Although the NTFS file system will guarantee that the file system's integrity will be maintained during a sudden system shutdown, it can't guarantee that every data file for every application will still be in a usable form when the system is restarted.
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
### Group Policy
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ Enable the **Audit: Shut down system immediately if unable to log security audit
### Potential impact
-If you enable this policy setting, the administrative burden can be significant, especially if you also configure the **Retention method for the Security log** to **Do not overwrite events** (clear log manually). This configuration causes a repudiation threat (a backup operator could deny that they backed up or restored data) to become a denial of service (DoS) vulnerability because a server could be forced to shut down if it is overwhelmed with logon events and other security events that are written to the security event log. Also, because the shutdown is abrupt, it is possible that irreparable damage to the operating system, applications, or data could result. Although the NTFS file system maintains its integrity when this type of computer shutdown occurs, there is no guarantee that every data file for every application will still be in a usable form when the device restarts.
+If you enable this policy setting, the administrative burden can be significant, especially if you also configure the **Retention method for the Security log** to **Do not overwrite events** (clear log manually). This configuration causes a repudiation threat (a backup operator could deny that they backed up or restored data) to become a denial of service (DoS) vulnerability because a server could be forced to shut down if it's overwhelmed with sign-in events and other security events that are written to the security event log. Also, because the shutdown is abrupt, it's possible that irreparable damage to the operating system, applications, or data could result. Although the NTFS file system maintains its integrity when this type of computer shutdown occurs, there's no guarantee that every data file for every application will still be in a usable form when the device restarts.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/bypass-traverse-checking.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/bypass-traverse-checking.md
index 239a32f7b1..f41f877de5 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/bypass-traverse-checking.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/bypass-traverse-checking.md
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security
## Reference
-This policy setting determines which users (or a process that acts on behalf of the user’s account) have permission to navigate an object path in the NTFS file system or in the registry without being checked for the Traverse Folder special access permission. This user right does not allow the user to list the contents of a folder. It only allows the user to traverse folders to access permitted files or subfolders.
+This policy setting determines which users (or a process that acts on behalf of the user’s account) have permission to navigate an object path in the NTFS file system or in the registry without being checked for the Traverse Folder special access permission. This user right doesn't allow the user to list the contents of a folder. It only allows the user to traverse folders to access permitted files or subfolders.
Constant: SeChangeNotifyPrivilege
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Constant: SeChangeNotifyPrivilege
### Best practices
-1. Use access–based enumeration when you want to prevent users from seeing any folder or file to which they do not have access.
+1. Use access–based enumeration when you want to prevent users from seeing any folder or file to which they don't have access.
2. Use the default settings of this policy in most cases. If you change the settings, verify your intent through testing.
### Location
@@ -62,9 +62,9 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Defaul
## Policy management
-Permissions to files and folders are controlled though the appropriate configuration of file system access control lists (ACLs).The ability to traverse the folder does not provide any Read or Write permissions to the user.
+Permissions to files and folders are controlled through the appropriate configuration of file system access control lists (ACLs). The ability to traverse the folder doesn't provide any Read or Write permissions to the user.
-A restart of the computer is not required for this policy setting to be effective.
+A restart of the computer isn't required for this policy setting to be effective.
Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on.
@@ -85,11 +85,11 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
### Vulnerability
-The default configuration for the **Bypass traverse checking** setting is to allow all users to bypass traverse checking. Permissions to files and folders are controlled though the appropriate configuration of file system access control lists (ACLs) because the ability to traverse the folder does not provide any Read or Write permissions to the user. The only scenario in which the default configuration could lead to a mishap would be if the administrator who configures permissions does not understand how this policy setting works. For example, the administrator might expect that users who are unable to access a folder are unable to access the contents of any child folders. Such a situation is unlikely, and, therefore, this vulnerability presents little risk.
+The default configuration for the **Bypass traverse checking** setting is to allow all users to bypass traverse checking. Permissions to files and folders are controlled through the appropriate configuration of file system access control lists (ACLs) because the ability to traverse the folder doesn't provide any Read or Write permissions to the user. The only scenario in which the default configuration could lead to a mishap would be if the administrator who configures permissions doesn't understand how this policy setting works. For example, the administrator might expect that users who are unable to access a folder are unable to access the contents of any child folders. Such a situation is unlikely, and, therefore, this vulnerability presents little risk.
### Countermeasure
-Organizations that are extremely concerned about security may want to remove the Everyone group, and perhaps the Users group, from the list of groups that have the **Bypass traverse checking** user right. Taking explicit control over traversal assignments can be an effective way to limit access to sensitive information. Access–based enumeration can also be used. If you use access–based enumeration, users cannot see any folder or file to which they do not have access. For more info about this feature, see [Access-based Enumeration](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc784710(v=ws.10)).
+Organizations that are concerned about security may want to remove the Everyone group, and perhaps the Users group, from the list of groups that have the **Bypass traverse checking** user right. Taking explicit control over traversal assignments can be an effective way to limit access to sensitive information. Access–based enumeration can also be used. If you use access–based enumeration, users can't see any folder or file to which they don't have access. For more info about this feature, see [Access-based Enumeration](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc784710(v=ws.10)).
### Potential impact
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/change-the-system-time.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/change-the-system-time.md
index c3d5940ecc..bd9df622f1 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/change-the-system-time.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/change-the-system-time.md
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security
## Reference
-This policy setting determines which users can adjust the time on the device's internal clock. This right allows the computer user to change the date and time associated with records in the event logs, database transactions, and the file system. This right is also required by the process that performs time synchronization. This setting does not impact the user’s ability to change the time zone or other display characteristics of the system time. For info about assigning the right to change the time zone, see [Change the time zone](change-the-time-zone.md).
+This policy setting determines which users can adjust the time on the device's internal clock. This right allows the computer user to change the date and time associated with records in the event logs, database transactions, and the file system. This right is also required by the process that performs time synchronization. This setting doesn't impact the user’s ability to change the time zone or other display characteristics of the system time. For info about assigning the right to change the time zone, see [Change the time zone](change-the-time-zone.md).
Constant: SeSystemtimePrivilege
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Defaul
This section describes features, tools and guidance to help you manage this policy.
-A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to be effective.
+A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to be effective.
Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on.
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ Users who can change the time on a computer could cause several problems. For ex
- Time stamps on event log entries could be made inaccurate
- Time stamps on files and folders that are created or modified could be incorrect
- Computers that belong to a domain might not be able to authenticate themselves
-- Users who try to log on to the domain from devices with inaccurate time might not be able to authenticate.
+- Users who try to sign in to the domain from devices with inaccurate time might not be able to authenticate.
Also, because the Kerberos authentication protocol requires that the requester and authenticator have their clocks synchronized within an administrator-defined skew period, an attacker who changes a device's time may cause that computer to be unable to obtain or grant Kerberos protocol tickets.
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ The risk from these types of events is mitigated on most domain controllers, mem
- All PDC emulator operations masters follow the hierarchy of domains in the selection of their inbound time partner.
- The PDC emulator operations master at the root of the domain is authoritative for the organization. Therefore, we recommend that you configure this computer to synchronize with a reliable external time server.
-This vulnerability becomes much more serious if an attacker is able to change the system time and then stop the Windows Time Service or reconfigure it to synchronize with a time server that is not accurate.
+This vulnerability becomes much more serious if an attacker is able to change the system time and then stop the Windows Time Service or reconfigure it to synchronize with a time server that isn't accurate.
### Countermeasure
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ Restrict the **Change the system time** user right to users with a legitimate ne
### Potential impact
-There should be no impact because time synchronization for most organizations should be fully automated for all computers that belong to the domain. Computers that do not belong to the domain should be configured to synchronize with an external source, such as a web service.
+There should be no impact because time synchronization for most organizations should be fully automated for all computers that belong to the domain. Computers that don't belong to the domain should be configured to synchronize with an external source, such as a web service.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-a-pagefile.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-a-pagefile.md
index c5a8a0a8e1..a5669229ef 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-a-pagefile.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-a-pagefile.md
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security
## Reference
-Windows designates a section of the hard drive as virtual memory known as the page file, or more specifically, as pagefile.sys. It is used to supplement the computer’s Random Access Memory (RAM) to improve performance for frequently used programs and data. Although the file is hidden from browsing, you can manage it using the system settings.
+Windows designates a section of the hard drive as virtual memory known as the page file, or more specifically, as pagefile.sys. It's used to supplement the computer’s Random Access Memory (RAM) to improve performance for frequently used programs and data. Although the file is hidden from browsing, you can manage it using the system settings.
This policy setting determines which users can create and change the size of a page file. It determines whether users can specify a page file size for a particular drive in the **Performance Options** box located on the **Advanced** tab of the **System Properties** dialog box or through using internal application interfaces (APIs).
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values for the
## Policy management
-A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to be effective.
+A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to be effective.
Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on.
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
### Vulnerability
-Users who can change the page file size could make it extremely small or move the file to a highly fragmented storage volume, which could cause reduced device performance.
+Users who can change the page file size could make it small or move the file to a highly fragmented storage volume, which could cause reduced device performance.
### Countermeasure
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-a-token-object.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-a-token-object.md
index b506e0c131..718a99a7bd 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-a-token-object.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-a-token-object.md
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security
This policy setting determines which accounts a process can use to create a token, and which accounts it can then use to gain access to local resources when the process uses NtCreateToken() or other token-creation APIs.
-When a user logs on to the local device or connects to a remote device through a network, Windows builds the user’s access token. Then the system examines the token to determine the level of the user's privileges. When you revoke a privilege, the change is immediately recorded, but the change is not reflected in the user's access token until the next time the user logs on or connects.
+When a user signs in to the local device or connects to a remote device through a network, Windows builds the user’s access token. Then the system examines the token to determine the level of the user's privileges. When you revoke a privilege, the change is immediately recorded, but the change isn't reflected in the user's access token until the next time the user logs on or connects.
Constant: SeCreateTokenPrivilege
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Constant: SeCreateTokenPrivilege
### Best practices
-- This user right is used internally by the operating system. Unless it is necessary, do not assign this user right to a user, group, or process other than Local System.
+- This user right is used internally by the operating system. Unless it's necessary, don't assign this user right to a user, group, or process other than Local System.
### Location
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Computer Configuration\\Windows Settings\\Security Settings\\Local Policies\\Use
### Default values
-This user right is used internally by the operating system. By default, it is not assigned to any user groups.
+This user right is used internally by the operating system. By default, it isn't assigned to any user groups.
The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Default values are also listed on the policy’s property page.
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Defaul
## Policy management
-A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to be effective.
+A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to be effective.
Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on.
@@ -86,11 +86,11 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
>**Caution:** A user account that is given this user right has complete control over the system, and it can lead to the system being compromised. We highly recommend that you do not assign this right to any user accounts.
-Windows examines a user's access token to determine the level of the user's privileges. Access tokens are built when users log on to the local device or connect to a remote device over a network. When you revoke a privilege, the change is immediately recorded, but the change is not reflected in the user's access token until the next time the user logs on or connects. Users with the ability to create or modify tokens can change the level of access for any account on a computer if they are currently logged on. They could escalate their privileges or create a DoS condition.
+Windows examines a user's access token to determine the level of the user's privileges. Access tokens are built when users sign in to the local device or connect to a remote device over a network. When you revoke a privilege, the change is immediately recorded, but the change isn't reflected in the user's access token until the next time the user logs on or connects. Users with the ability to create or modify tokens can change the level of access for any account on a computer if they're currently logged on. They could escalate their privileges or create a DoS condition.
### Countermeasure
-Do not assign the **Create a token object** user right to any users. Processes that require this user right should use the Local System account, which already includes it, instead of a separate user account that has this user right assigned.
+Don't assign the **Create a token object** user right to any users. Processes that require this user right should use the Local System account, which already includes it, instead of a separate user account that has this user right assigned.
### Potential impact
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-global-objects.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-global-objects.md
index fd0acee762..b4f0048aa0 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-global-objects.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-global-objects.md
@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security
## Reference
-This policy setting determines which users can create global objects that are available to all sessions. Users can still create objects that are specific to their own session if they do not have this user right.
+This policy setting determines which users can create global objects that are available to all sessions. Users can still create objects that are specific to their own session if they don't have this user right.
-A global object is an object that is created to be used by any number of processes or threads, even those not started within the user’s session. Remote Desktop Services uses global objects in its processes to facilitate connections and access.
+A global object is an object that can be used by any number of processes or threads, even those processes or threads not started within the user’s session. Remote Desktop Services uses global objects in its processes to facilitate connections and access.
Constant: SeCreateGlobalPrivilege
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Constant: SeCreateGlobalPrivilege
### Best practices
-- Do not assign any user accounts this right.
+- Don't assign any user accounts this right.
### Location
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Defaul
## Policy management
-A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to take effect.
+A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to take effect.
Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on.
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ By default, members of the **Administrators** group, the System account, and ser
### Countermeasure
-When non-administrators need to access a server using Remote Desktop, add the users to the **Remote Desktop Users** group rather than assining them this user right.
+When non-administrators need to access a server using Remote Desktop, add the users to the **Remote Desktop Users** group rather than assigning them this user right.
### Potential impact
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-symbolic-links.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-symbolic-links.md
index d5d9820efd..3302b6c613 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-symbolic-links.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-symbolic-links.md
@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security
## Reference
-This user right determines if users can create a symbolic link from the device they are logged on to.
+This user right determines if users can create a symbolic link from the device they're logged on to.
-A symbolic link is a file-system object that points to another file-system object. The object that's pointed to is called the target. Symbolic links are transparent to users. The links appear as normal files or directories, and they can be acted upon by the user or application in exactly the same manner. Symbolic links are designed to aid in migration and application compatibility with UNIX operating systems. Microsoft has implemented symbolic links to function just like UNIX links.
+A symbolic link is a file-system object that points to another file-system object that is called the target. Symbolic links are transparent to users. The links appear as normal files or directories, and they can be acted upon by the user or application in exactly the same manner. Symbolic links are designed to aid in migration and application compatibility with UNIX operating systems. Microsoft has implemented symbolic links to function just like UNIX links.
>**Warning:** This privilege should only be given to trusted users. Symbolic links can expose security vulnerabilities in applications that aren't designed to handle them.
Constant: SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ Constant: SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege
### Best practices
-- Only trusted users should get this user right. Symbolic links can expose security vulnerabilities in applications that are not designed to handle them.
+- Only trusted users should get this user right. Symbolic links can expose security vulnerabilities in applications that aren't designed to handle them.
### Location
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Defaul
This section describes different features and tools available to help you manage this policy.
-A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to be effective.
+A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to be effective.
Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on.
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ Users who have the **Create symbolic links** user right could inadvertently or m
### Countermeasure
-Do not assign the **Create symbolic links** user right to standard users. Restrict this right to trusted administrators. You can use the **fsutil** command to establish a symbolic link file system setting that controls the kind of symbolic links that can be created on a computer.
+Don't assign the **Create symbolic links** user right to standard users. Restrict this right to trusted administrators. You can use the **fsutil** command to establish a symbolic link file system setting that controls the kind of symbolic links that can be created on a computer.
### Potential impact
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/dcom-machine-access-restrictions-in-security-descriptor-definition-language-sddl-syntax.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/dcom-machine-access-restrictions-in-security-descriptor-definition-language-sddl-syntax.md
index cfed5fd439..22eda320a1 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/dcom-machine-access-restrictions-in-security-descriptor-definition-language-sddl-syntax.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/dcom-machine-access-restrictions-in-security-descriptor-definition-language-sddl-syntax.md
@@ -27,13 +27,13 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for
## Reference
-This policy setting allows you to define additional computer-wide controls that govern access to all Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM)–based applications on a device. These controls restrict call, activation, or launch requests on the device. A simple way to think about these access controls is as an additional access check that is performed against a device-wide access control list (ACL) on each call, activation, or launch of any COM-based server. If the access check fails, the call, activation, or launch request is denied. (This check is in addition to any access check that is run against the server-specific ACLs.) In effect, it provides a minimum authorization standard that must be passed to access any COM-based server. This policy setting controls access permissions to cover call rights.
+This policy setting allows you to define other computer-wide controls that govern access to all Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM)–based applications on a device. These controls restrict call, activation, or launch requests on the device. A simple way to think about these access controls is as an extra access check that is performed against a device-wide access control list (ACL) on each call, activation, or launch of any COM-based server. If the access check fails, the call, activation, or launch request is denied. (This check is in addition to any access check that is run against the server-specific ACLs.) In effect, it provides a minimum authorization standard that must be passed to access any COM-based server. This policy setting controls access permissions to cover call rights.
These device-wide ACLs provide a way to override weak security settings that are specified by an application through the CoInitializeSecurity function or application-specific security settings. They provide a minimum security standard that must be passed, regardless of the settings of the specific server.
These ACLs also provide a centralized location for an administrator to set a general authorization policy that applies to all COM-based servers on the device.
-This policy setting allows you to specify an ACL in two different ways. You can type the security descriptor in SDDL, or you can grant or deny Local Access and Remote Access permissions to users and groups. We recommend that you use the built-in user interface to specify the ACL contents that you want to apply with this setting. The default ACL settings vary, depending on the version of Windows you are running.
+This policy setting allows you to specify an ACL in two different ways. You can type the security descriptor in SDDL, or you can grant or deny Local Access and Remote Access permissions to users and groups. We recommend that you use the built-in user interface to specify the ACL contents that you want to apply with this setting. The default ACL settings vary, depending on the version of Windows you're running.
### Possible values
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ This policy setting allows you to specify an ACL in two different ways. You can
- Blank
- This represents how the local security policy deletes the policy enforcement key. This value deletes the policy and then sets it as Not defined. The Blank value is set by using the ACL editor to empty the list, and then pressing OK.
+ This value represents how the local security policy deletes the policy enforcement key. This value deletes the policy and then sets it as Not defined. The Blank value is set by using the ACL editor to empty the list, and then pressing OK.
### Location
@@ -67,14 +67,14 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default values for this polic
This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage this policy.
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
### Group Policy
-The registry settings that are created as a result of enabling the **DCOM: Machine Access Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) syntax** policy setting take precedence over the previous registry settings when this policy setting was configured. The Remote Procedure Call (RPC) service checks the new registry keys in the Policies section for the computer restrictions, and these registry entries take precedence over the existing registry keys under OLE. This means that previously existing registry settings are no longer effective, and if you make changes to the existing settings, device access permissions for users are not changed. Use care in configuring the list of users and groups.
+The registry settings that are created as a result of enabling the **DCOM: Machine Access Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) syntax** policy setting take precedence over the previous registry settings when this policy setting was configured. The Remote Procedure Call (RPC) service checks the new registry keys in the Policies section for the computer restrictions, and these registry entries take precedence over the existing registry keys under OLE. This precedence means that previously existing registry settings are no longer effective, and if you make changes to the existing settings, device access permissions for users aren't changed. Use care in configuring the list of users and groups.
-If the administrator is denied permission to access DCOM applications due to the changes made to DCOM in the Windows operating system, the administrator can use the **DCOM: Machine Access Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) syntax** policy setting to manage DCOM access to the computer. The administrator can use this setting to specify which users and groups can access the DCOM application on the computer locally and remotely. This will restore control of the DCOM application to the administrator and users. To do this, open the **DCOM: Machine Access Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) syntax** setting, and click
-**Edit Security**. Specify the users or groups you want to include and the computer access permissions for those users or groups. This defines the setting and sets the appropriate SDDL value.
+If the administrator is denied permission to access DCOM applications due to the changes made to DCOM in the Windows operating system, the administrator can use the **DCOM: Machine Access Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) syntax** policy setting to manage DCOM access to the computer. The administrator can use this setting to specify which users and groups can access the DCOM application on the computer locally and remotely. This setting will restore control of the DCOM application to the administrator and users. To define this setting, open the **DCOM: Machine Access Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) syntax** setting, and click
+**Edit Security**. Specify the users or groups you want to include and the computer access permissions for those users or groups. This information defines the setting and sets the appropriate SDDL value.
## Security considerations
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
### Vulnerability
-Many COM applications include some security-specific code (for example, to call CoInitializeSecurity), but they use weak settings that allow unauthenticated access to the process. Administrators cannot override these settings to force stronger security in earlier versions of Windows without modifying the application. An attacker could attempt to exploit weak security in an individual application by attacking it through COM calls.
+Many COM applications include some security-specific code (for example, to call CoInitializeSecurity), but they use weak settings that allow unauthenticated access to the process. Administrators can't override these settings to force stronger security in earlier versions of Windows without modifying the application. An attacker could attempt to exploit weak security in an individual application by attacking it through COM calls.
Also, the COM infrastructure includes the Remote Procedure Call Services (RPCSS), a system service that runs during and after computer startup. This service manages activation of COM objects and the running object table and provides helper services to DCOM remoting. It exposes RPC interfaces that can be called remotely. Because some COM-based servers allow unauthenticated remote access, these interfaces can be called by anyone, including unauthenticated users. As a result, RPCSS can be attacked by malicious users who use remote, unauthenticated computers.
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ To protect individual COM-based applications or services, set the **DCOM: Machin
### Potential impact
-Windows implements default COM ACLs when they are installed. Modifying these ACLs from the default may cause some applications or components that communicate by using DCOM to fail. If you implement a COM-based server and you override the default security settings, confirm that the application-specific call permissions that ACL assigns are the correct permissions for appropriate users. If it does not, you must change your application-specific permission ACL to provide appropriate users with activation rights so that applications and Windows components that use DCOM do not fail.
+Windows implements default COM ACLs when they're installed. Modifying these ACLs from the default may cause some applications or components that communicate by using DCOM to fail. If you implement a COM-based server and you override the default security settings, confirm that the application-specific call permissions that ACL assigns are the correct permissions for appropriate users. If it doesn't, you must change your application-specific permission ACL to provide appropriate users with activation rights so that applications and Windows components that use DCOM don't fail.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/dcom-machine-launch-restrictions-in-security-descriptor-definition-language-sddl-syntax.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/dcom-machine-launch-restrictions-in-security-descriptor-definition-language-sddl-syntax.md
index 7142b1773f..e5bb3b3aec 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/dcom-machine-launch-restrictions-in-security-descriptor-definition-language-sddl-syntax.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/dcom-machine-launch-restrictions-in-security-descriptor-definition-language-sddl-syntax.md
@@ -27,17 +27,17 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for
## Reference
-This policy setting is similar to the [DCOM: Machine Access Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) syntax](dcom-machine-access-restrictions-in-security-descriptor-definition-language-sddl-syntax.md) setting in that it allows you to define additional computer-wide controls that govern access to all DCOM–based applications on a device. However, the ACLs that are specified in this policy setting control local and remote COM launch requests (not access requests) on the device. A simple way to think about this access control is as an additional access check that is performed against a device-wide ACL on each launch of any COM-based server. If the access check fails, the call, activation, or launch request is denied. (This check is in addition to any access check that is run against the server-specific ACLs.) In effect, it provides a minimum authorization standard that must be passed to launch any COM-based server. The DCOM: Machine Access Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) syntax policy setting differs in that it provides a minimum access check that is applied to attempts to access an already launched COM-based server.
+This policy setting is similar to the [DCOM: Machine Access Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) syntax](dcom-machine-access-restrictions-in-security-descriptor-definition-language-sddl-syntax.md) setting in that it allows you to define more computer-wide controls that govern access to all DCOM–based applications on a device. However, the ACLs that are specified in this policy setting control local and remote COM launch requests (not access requests) on the device. A simple way to think about this access control is as an extra access check that is performed against a device-wide ACL on each launch of any COM-based server. If the access check fails, the call, activation, or launch request is denied. (This check is in addition to any access check that is run against the server-specific ACLs.) In effect, it provides a minimum authorization standard that must be passed to launch any COM-based server. The DCOM: Machine Access Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) syntax policy setting differs in that it provides a minimum access check that is applied to attempts to access an already launched COM-based server.
These device-wide ACLs provide a way to override weak security settings that are specified by an application through CoInitializeSecurity or application-specific security settings. They provide a minimum security standard that must be passed, regardless of the settings of the specific COM-based server. These ACLs provide a centralized location for an administrator to set a general authorization policy that applies to all COM-based servers.
The **DCOM: Machine Launch Restrictions in the Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) syntax** setting allows you to specify an ACL in two ways. You can type the security descriptor in SDDL, or you can grant or deny Local
-Access and Remote Access permissions to users and groups. We recommend that you use the built-in user interface to specify the ACL contents that you want to apply with this setting. The default ACL settings vary, depending on the version of Windows you are running.
+Access and Remote Access permissions to users and groups. We recommend that you use the built-in user interface to specify the ACL contents that you want to apply with this setting. The default ACL settings vary, depending on the version of Windows you're running.
### Possible values
- Blank
- This represents how the local security policy deletes the policy enforcement key. This value deletes the policy and then sets it to Not defined. The Blank value is set by using the ACL editor to empty the list, and then pressing OK.
+ This value represents how the local security policy deletes the policy enforcement key. This value deletes the policy and then sets it to Not defined. The Blank value is set by using the ACL editor to empty the list, and then pressing OK.
- *User-defined input* of the SDDL representation of the groups and privileges
@@ -66,15 +66,15 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
### Group Policy
The registry settings that are created as a result of this policy take precedence over the previous registry settings in this area. The Remote Procedure Call (RPC) service (RpcSs) checks the new registry keys in the Policies section for the computer restrictions; these entries take precedence over the existing registry keys under OLE.
-If you are denied access to activate and launch DCOM applications due to the changes made to DCOM in the Windows operating system, this policy setting can be used to control the DCOM activation and launch to the device.
+If you're denied access to activate and launch DCOM applications due to the changes made to DCOM in the Windows operating system, this policy setting can be used to control the DCOM activation and launch to the device.
-You can specify which users and groups can launch and activate DCOM applications on the device locally and remotely by using the **DCOM: Machine Launch Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) syntax** policy setting. This restores control of the DCOM application to the administrator and specified users. To do this, open the **DCOM: Machine Launch Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) syntax** setting, and click **Edit Security**. Specify the groups that you want to include and the device launch permissions for those groups. This defines the setting and sets the appropriate SDDL value.
+You can specify which users and groups can launch and activate DCOM applications on the device locally and remotely by using the **DCOM: Machine Launch Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) syntax** policy setting. This setting restores control of the DCOM application to the administrator and specified users. To define this setting, open the **DCOM: Machine Launch Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) syntax** setting, and click **Edit Security**. Specify the groups that you want to include and the device launch permissions for those groups. This information defines the setting and sets the appropriate SDDL value.
## Security considerations
@@ -82,9 +82,9 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
### Vulnerability
-Many COM applications include some security-specific code (for example, to call CoInitializeSecurity), but they use weak settings that allow unauthenticated access to the process. You cannot override these settings to force stronger security in earlier versions of Windows without modifying the application. An attacker could attempt to exploit weak security in an individual application by attacking it through COM calls.
+Many COM applications include some security-specific code (for example, to call CoInitializeSecurity), but they use weak settings that allow unauthenticated access to the process. You can't override these settings to force stronger security in earlier versions of Windows without modifying the application. An attacker could attempt to exploit weak security in an individual application by attacking it through COM calls.
-Also, the COM infrastructure includes the Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCSS), a system service that runs during computer startup and always runs after that. This service manages activation of COM objects and the running object table and provides helper services to DCOM remoting. It exposes RPC interfaces that can be called remotely. Because some COM-based servers allow unauthenticated remote component activation, these interfaces can be called by anyone, including unauthenticated users. As a result, RPCSS can be attacked by malicious users using remote, unauthenticated computers.
+Also, the COM infrastructure includes the Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCSS), a system service that runs during computer startup and always runs after the startup. This service manages activation of COM objects and the running object table and provides helper services to DCOM remoting. It exposes RPC interfaces that can be called remotely. Because some COM-based servers allow unauthenticated remote component activation, these interfaces can be called by anyone, including unauthenticated users. As a result, RPCSS can be attacked by malicious users using remote, unauthenticated computers.
### Countermeasure
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ To protect individual COM-based applications or services, set this policy settin
### Potential impact
-Windows implements default COM ACLs when they are installed. Modifying these ACLs from the default may cause some applications or components that communicate by using DCOM to fail. If you implement a COM-based server and you override the default security settings, confirm that the application-specific launch permissions ACL assigns include activation permissions to appropriate users. If it does not, you must change your application-specific launch permission ACL to provide appropriate users with activation rights so that applications and Windows components that use DCOM do not fail.
+Windows implements default COM ACLs when they're installed. Modifying these ACLs from the default may cause some applications or components that communicate by using DCOM to fail. If you implement a COM-based server and you override the default security settings, confirm that the application-specific launch permissions ACL assigns include activation permissions to appropriate users. If it doesn't, you must change your application-specific launch permission ACL to provide appropriate users with activation rights so that applications and Windows components that use DCOM don't fail.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-access-to-this-computer-from-the-network.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-access-to-this-computer-from-the-network.md
index 269c9d78ab..4b02ab14cd 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-access-to-this-computer-from-the-network.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-access-to-this-computer-from-the-network.md
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Defaul
This section describes features and tools available to help you manage this policy.
-A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to be effective.
+A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to be effective.
This policy setting supersedes the **Access this computer from the network** policy setting if a user account is subject to both policies.
@@ -87,25 +87,25 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
### Vulnerability
-Users who can log on to the device over the network can enumerate lists of account names, group names, and shared resources. Users with permission to access shared folders and files can connect over the network and possibly view or modify data.
+Users who can sign in to the device over the network can enumerate lists of account names, group names, and shared resources. Users with permission to access shared folders and files can connect over the network and possibly view or modify data.
### Countermeasure
Assign the **Deny access to this computer from the network** user right to the following accounts:
-- Anonymous logon
+- Anonymous sign in
- Built-in local Administrator account
- Local Guest account
- All service accounts
-An important exception to this list is any service accounts that are used to start services that must connect to the device over the network. For example, let’s say you have configured a shared folder for web servers to access, and you present content within that folder through a website. You may need to allow the account that runs IIS to log on to the server with the shared folder from the network. This user right is particularly effective when you must configure servers and workstations on which sensitive information is handled because of regulatory compliance concerns.
+An important exception to this list is any service accounts that are used to start services that must connect to the device over the network. For example, let’s say you've configured a shared folder for web servers to access, and you present content within that folder through a website. You may need to allow the account that runs IIS to sign in to the server with the shared folder from the network. This user right is effective when you must configure servers and workstations on which sensitive information is handled because of regulatory compliance concerns.
> [!NOTE]
> If the service account is configured in the logon properties of a Windows service, it requires network logon rights to the domain controllers to start properly.
### Potential impact
-If you configure the **Deny access to this computer from the network** user right for other accounts, you could limit the abilities of users who are assigned to specific administrative roles in your environment. You should verify that delegated tasks are not negatively affected.
+If you configure the **Deny access to this computer from the network** user right for other accounts, you could limit the abilities of users who are assigned to specific administrative roles in your environment. You should verify that delegated tasks aren't negatively affected.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-as-a-batch-job.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-as-a-batch-job.md
index 3065d91365..a1f85a8494 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-as-a-batch-job.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-as-a-batch-job.md
@@ -27,8 +27,7 @@ This article describes the recommended practices, location, values, policy manag
## Reference
-This policy setting determines which accounts are prevented from logging on by using a batch-queue tool to schedule and start jobs automatically in the future. The ability to log on by using a batch-queue tool is needed for any account that is used to start scheduled jobs by means of the Task
-Scheduler.
+This policy setting determines which accounts are prevented from logging on by using a batch-queue tool to schedule and start jobs automatically in the future. The ability to sign in by using a batch-queue tool is needed for any account that is used to start scheduled jobs with the Task Scheduler.
Constant: SeDenyBatchLogonRight
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-as-a-service.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-as-a-service.md
index 3b48755935..6085f264bd 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-as-a-service.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-as-a-service.md
@@ -89,12 +89,12 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
### Vulnerability
-Accounts that can log on to a service application could be used to configure and start new unauthorized services, such as a keylogger or other malware. The benefit of the specified countermeasure is somewhat reduced by the fact that only users with administrative rights can install and configure
+Accounts that can sign in to a service application could be used to configure and start new unauthorized services, such as a keylogger or other malware. The benefit of the specified countermeasure is reduced by the fact that only users with administrative rights can install and configure
services, and an attacker who already has that level of access could configure the service to run by using the System account.
### Countermeasure
-We recommend that you don't assign the **Deny log on as a service** user right to any accounts. This configuration is the default. Organizations that have strong concerns about security might assign this user right to groups and accounts when they're certain that they'll never need to log on to a service application.
+We recommend that you don't assign the **Deny log on as a service** user right to any accounts. This configuration is the default. Organizations that have strong concerns about security might assign this user right to groups and accounts when they're certain that they'll never need to sign in to a service application.
### Potential impact
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-locally.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-locally.md
index e3663ffda4..7363da3bbc 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-locally.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-locally.md
@@ -62,11 +62,11 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values for the
This section describes features, tools, and guidance to help you manage this policy.
-A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to be effective.
+A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to be effective.
Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on.
-If you apply this policy setting to the Everyone group, no one will be able to log on locally.
+If you apply this policy setting to the Everyone group, no one will be able to sign in locally.
### Group Policy
@@ -87,15 +87,15 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
### Vulnerability
-Any account with the ability to log on locally could be used to log on at the console of the device. If this user right is not restricted to legitimate users who must log on to the console of the device, unauthorized users might download and run malicious software that elevates their user rights.
+Any account with the ability to sign in locally could be used to sign in at the console of the device. If this user right isn't restricted to legitimate users who must sign in to the console of the device, unauthorized users might download and run malicious software that elevates their user rights.
### Countermeasure
-Assign the **Deny log on locally** user right to the local Guest account. If you have installed optional components such as ASP.NET, you may want to assign this user right to additional accounts that are required by those components.
+Assign the **Deny log on locally** user right to the local Guest account. If you have installed optional components such as ASP.NET, you may want to assign this user right to other accounts that are required by those components.
### Potential impact
-If you assign the **Deny log on locally** user right to additional accounts, you could limit the abilities of users who are assigned to specific roles in your environment. However, this user right should explicitly be assigned to the ASPNET account on device that are configured with the Web Server role. You should confirm that delegated activities are not adversely affected.
+If you assign the **Deny log on locally** user right to other accounts, you could limit the abilities of users who are assigned to specific roles in your environment. However, this user right should explicitly be assigned to the ASPNET account on devices that are configured with the Web Server role. You should confirm that delegated activities aren't adversely affected.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-through-remote-desktop-services.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-through-remote-desktop-services.md
index ea9ba0f63a..288922a996 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-through-remote-desktop-services.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-through-remote-desktop-services.md
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security
## Reference
-This policy setting determines which users are prevented from logging on to the device through a Remote Desktop connection through Remote Desktop Services. It is possible for a user to establish a Remote Desktop connection to a particular server, but not be able to log on to the console of that server.
+This policy setting determines which users are prevented from logging on to the device through a Remote Desktop connection through Remote Desktop Services. It's possible for a user to establish a Remote Desktop connection to a particular server, but not be able to sign in to the console of that server.
Constant: SeDenyRemoteInteractiveLogonRight
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ Constant: SeDenyRemoteInteractiveLogonRight
### Best practices
-- To control who can open a Remote Desktop connection and log on to the device, add the user account to or remove user accounts from the Remote Desktop Users group.
+- To control who can open a Remote Desktop connection and sign in to the device, add the user account to or remove user accounts from the Remote Desktop Users group.
### Location
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values for the
This section describes features, tools, and guidance to help you manage this policy.
-A restart of the computer is not required for this policy setting to be effective.
+A restart of the computer isn't required for this policy setting to be effective.
Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on.
@@ -86,15 +86,15 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
### Vulnerability
-Any account with the right to log on through Remote Desktop Services could be used to log on to the remote console of the device. If this user right is not restricted to legitimate users who need to log on to the console of the computer, malicious users might download and run software that elevates their user rights.
+Any account with the right to sign in through Remote Desktop Services could be used to sign in to the remote console of the device. If this user right isn't restricted to legitimate users who need to sign in to the console of the computer, malicious users might download and run software that elevates their user rights.
### Countermeasure
-Assign the **Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services** user right to the built-in local guest account and all service accounts. If you have installed optional components, such as ASP.NET, you may want to assign this user right to additional accounts that are required by those components.
+Assign the **Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services** user right to the built-in local guest account and all service accounts. If you have installed optional components, such as ASP.NET, you may want to assign this user right to other accounts that are required by those components.
### Potential impact
-If you assign the **Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services** user right to other groups, you could limit the abilities of users who are assigned to specific administrative roles in your environment. Accounts that have this user right cannot connect to the device through Remote Desktop Services or Remote Assistance. You should confirm that delegated tasks are not negatively affected.
+If you assign the **Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services** user right to other groups, you could limit the abilities of users who are assigned to specific administrative roles in your environment. Accounts that have this user right can't connect to the device through Remote Desktop Services or Remote Assistance. You should confirm that delegated tasks aren't negatively affected.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-allow-undock-without-having-to-log-on.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-allow-undock-without-having-to-log-on.md
index 6f6a4ddb5f..c0aaf647df 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-allow-undock-without-having-to-log-on.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-allow-undock-without-having-to-log-on.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
title: Devices Allow undock without having to log on (Windows 10)
-description: Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for the Devices Allow undock without having to log on security policy setting.
+description: Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for the Devices Allow undock without having to sign in security policy setting.
ms.assetid: 1d403f5d-ad41-4bb4-9f4a-0779c1c14b8c
ms.reviewer:
ms.author: dansimp
@@ -27,11 +27,11 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for
## Reference
-This policy setting enables or disables the ability of a user to remove a portable device from a docking station without logging on. If you enable this policy setting, users can press a docked portable device's physical eject button to safely undock the device. If you disable this policy setting, the user must log on to receive permission to undock the device. Only users who have the **Remove Computer from Docking Station** privilege can obtain this permission.
+This policy setting enables or disables the ability of a user to remove a portable device from a docking station without logging on. If you enable this policy setting, users can press a docked portable device's physical eject button to safely undock the device. If you disable this policy setting, the user must sign in to receive permission to undock the device. Only users who have the **Remove Computer from Docking Station** privilege can obtain this permission.
>**Note:** Disabling this policy setting only reduces theft risk for portable devices that cannot be mechanically undocked. Devices that can be mechanically undocked can be physically removed by the user whether or not they use the Windows undocking functionality.
-Enabling this policy setting means that anyone with physical access to a device that has been placed in its docking station can remove the computer and possibly tamper with it. For devices that do not have docking stations, this policy setting has no impact. However, for users with a mobile computer that is normally docked while they are in the office, this policy setting will help lower the risk of equipment theft or a malicious user gaining physical access to these devices
+Enabling this policy setting means that anyone with physical access to a device that has been placed in its docking station can remove the computer and possibly tamper with it. For devices that don't have docking stations, this policy setting has no impact. However, for users with a mobile computer that is normally docked while they are in the office, this policy setting will help lower the risk of equipment theft or a malicious user gaining physical access to these devices
### Possible values
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ Enabling this policy setting means that anyone with physical access to a device
### Best practices
-It is advisable to disable the **Devices: Allow undock without having to log on** policy setting. Users who have docked their devices will have to log on to the local console before they can undock their systems.
+It's advisable to disable the **Devices: Allow undock without having to log on** policy setting. Users who have docked their devices will have to sign in to the local console before they can undock their systems.
### Location
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
## Security considerations
@@ -79,9 +79,10 @@ If this policy setting is enabled, anyone with physical access to portable compu
### Countermeasure
Disable the **Devices: Allow undock without having to log on** setting.
+
### Potential impact
-Users who have docked their device must log on to the local console before they can undock their computers. For devices that do not have docking stations, this policy setting has no impact.
+Users who have docked their device must sign in to the local console before they can undock their computers. For devices that don't have docking stations, this policy setting has no impact.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-allowed-to-format-and-eject-removable-media.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-allowed-to-format-and-eject-removable-media.md
index fccacdc413..3acbde1af2 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-allowed-to-format-and-eject-removable-media.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-allowed-to-format-and-eject-removable-media.md
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Users can move removable disks to a different device where they have administrat
### Best practices
-- It is advisable to set **Allowed to format and eject removable media** to **Administrators**. Only administrators will be able to eject NTFS-formatted removable media.
+- It's advisable to set **Allowed to format and eject removable media** to **Administrators**. Only administrators will be able to eject NTFS-formatted removable media.
### Location
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
## Security considerations
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-prevent-users-from-installing-printer-drivers.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-prevent-users-from-installing-printer-drivers.md
index 5b2bfdf5aa..baf3de195a 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-prevent-users-from-installing-printer-drivers.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-prevent-users-from-installing-printer-drivers.md
@@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for
For a device to print to a network printer, the driver for that network printer must be installed locally. The **Devices: Prevent users from installing printer drivers** policy setting determines who can install a printer driver as part of adding a network printer. When you set the value to **Enabled**, only Administrators and Power Users can install a printer driver as part of adding a network printer. Setting the value to **Disabled** allows any user to install a printer driver as part of adding a network printer. This setting prevents unprivileged users from downloading and installing an untrusted printer driver.
-This setting has no impact if you have configured a trusted path for downloading drivers. When using trusted paths, the print subsystem attempts to use the trusted path to download the driver. If the trusted path download succeeds, the driver is installed on behalf of any user. If the trusted path download fails, the driver is not installed and the network printer is not added.
+This setting has no impact if you've configured a trusted path for downloading drivers. If trusted paths are being used, the print subsystem attempts to use the trusted path to download the driver. If the trusted path download succeeds, the driver is installed on behalf of any user. If the trusted path download fails, the driver isn't installed and the network printer isn't added.
-Although it might be appropriate in some organizations to allow users to install printer drivers on their own workstations, this is not suitable for servers. Installing a printer driver on a server can cause the system to become less stable. Only administrators should have this user right on servers. A malicious user might deliberately try to damage the system by installing inappropriate printer drivers.
+Although it might be appropriate in some organizations to allow users to install printer drivers on their own workstations, this idea isn't suitable for servers. Installing a printer driver on a server can cause the system to become less stable. Only administrators should have this user right on servers. A malicious user might deliberately try to damage the system by installing inappropriate printer drivers.
### Possible values
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ Although it might be appropriate in some organizations to allow users to install
### Best practices
-- It is advisable to set **Devices: Prevent users from installing printer drivers** to Enabled. Only users in the Administrative, Power User, or Server Operator groups will be able to install printers on servers. If this policy setting is enabled, but the driver for a network printer already exists on the local computer, users can still add the network printer. This policy setting does not affect a user's ability to add a local printer.
+- It's advisable to set **Devices: Prevent users from installing printer drivers** to Enabled. Only users in the Administrative, Power User, or Server Operator groups will be able to install printers on servers. If this policy setting is enabled, but the driver for a network printer already exists on the local computer, users can still add the network printer. This policy setting doesn't affect a user's ability to add a local printer.
> [!NOTE]
> After applying the [July 6, 2021 updates](https://support.microsoft.com/topic/kb5005010-restricting-installation-of-new-printer-drivers-after-applying-the-july-6-2021-updates-31b91c02-05bc-4ada-a7ea-183b129578a7), non-administrators, including delegated admin groups like printer operators, cannot install signed and unsigned printer drivers to a print server. By default, only administrators can install both signed and unsigned printer drivers to a print server.
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
## Security considerations
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-restrict-cd-rom-access-to-locally-logged-on-user-only.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-restrict-cd-rom-access-to-locally-logged-on-user-only.md
index 1bc52f9b73..18e750e462 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-restrict-cd-rom-access-to-locally-logged-on-user-only.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-restrict-cd-rom-access-to-locally-logged-on-user-only.md
@@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for
This policy setting determines whether a CD is accessible to local and remote users simultaneously. If you enable this policy setting, only the interactively logged-on user is allowed to access removable CDs. If this policy setting is enabled and no one is logged on interactively, the CD can be accessed over the network.
-The security benefit of enabling this policy setting is small because it only prevents network users from accessing the drive when someone is logged on to the local console of the system at the same time. Additionally, CD drives are not automatically made available as network shared drives; you must deliberately choose to share the drive. This is important when administrators are installing software or copying data from a CD-ROM, and they do not want network users to be able to execute the applications or view the data.
+The security benefit of enabling this policy setting is small because it only prevents network users from accessing the drive when someone is logged on to the local console of the system at the same time. Additionally, CD drives aren't automatically made available as network shared drives; you must deliberately choose to share the drive. This setting to share is important when administrators are installing software or copying data from a CD-ROM, and they don't want network users to be able to execute the applications or view the data.
-If this policy setting is enabled, users who connect to the server over the network will not be able to use any CD drives that are installed on the server when anyone is logged on to the local console of the server. Enabling this policy setting is not suitable for a system that serves as a CD jukebox for network users.
+If this policy setting is enabled, users who connect to the server over the network won't be able to use any CD drives that are installed on the server when anyone is logged on to the local console of the server. Enabling this policy setting isn't suitable for a system that serves as a CD jukebox for network users.
### Possible values
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
## Security considerations
@@ -75,14 +75,14 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
### Vulnerability
-A remote user could potentially access a mounted CD that contains sensitive information. This risk is small because CD drives are not automatically made available as shared drives; you must deliberately choose to share the drive. However, you can deny network users the ability to view data or run
+A remote user could potentially access a mounted CD that contains sensitive information. This risk is small because CD drives aren't automatically made available as shared drives; you must deliberately choose to share the drive. However, you can deny network users the ability to view data or run
applications from removable media on the server.
### Countermeasure
Enable the **Devices: Restrict CD-ROM drive access to locally logged-on user only** setting.
### Potential impact
-Users who connect to the server over the network cannot use any CD drives that are installed on the server when anyone is logged on to the local console of the server. System tools that require access to the CD drive will fail. For example, the Volume Shadow Copy service attempts to access all CD and floppy disk drives that are present on the computer when it initializes, and if the service cannot access one of these drives, it fails. This condition causes the Windows Backup tool to fail if volume shadow copies were specified for the backup job. Any non-Microsoft backup products that use volume shadow copies also fail. This policy setting would not be suitable for a computer that serves as a CD jukebox for network users.
+Users who connect to the server over the network can't use any CD drives that are installed on the server when anyone is logged on to the local console of the server. System tools that require access to the CD drive will fail. For example, the Volume Shadow Copy service attempts to access all CD and floppy disk drives that are present on the computer when it initializes, and if the service can't access one of these drives, it fails. This condition causes the Windows Backup tool to fail if volume shadow copies were specified for the backup job. Any non-Microsoft backup products that use volume shadow copies also fail. This policy setting wouldn't be suitable for a computer that serves as a CD jukebox for network users.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-restrict-floppy-access-to-locally-logged-on-user-only.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-restrict-floppy-access-to-locally-logged-on-user-only.md
index 2591b45b42..cd1c68ffef 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-restrict-floppy-access-to-locally-logged-on-user-only.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-restrict-floppy-access-to-locally-logged-on-user-only.md
@@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for
This policy setting determines whether removable floppy disks are accessible to local and remote users simultaneously. Enabling this policy setting allows only the interactively logged-on user to access removable floppy disks. If this policy setting is enabled and no one is logged on interactively, the floppy disk can be accessed over the network.
-The security benefit of enabling this policy setting is small because it only prevents network users from accessing the floppy disk drive when someone is logged on to the local console of the system at the same time. Additionally, floppy disk drives are not automatically made available as network shared drives; you must deliberately choose to share the drive. This becomes important when you are installing software or copying data from a floppy disk and they do not want network users to be able to execute the applications or view the data.
+The security benefit of enabling this policy setting is small because it only prevents network users from accessing the floppy disk drive when someone is logged on to the local console of the system at the same time. Additionally, floppy disk drives aren't automatically made available as network shared drives; you must deliberately choose to share the drive. This setting to share becomes important when you're installing software or copying data from a floppy disk and they don't want network users to be able to execute the applications or view the data.
-If this policy setting is enabled, users who connect to the server over the network will not be able to use any floppy disk drives that are installed on the server when anyone is logged on to the local console of the server.
+If this policy setting is enabled, users who connect to the server over the network won't be able to use any floppy disk drives that are installed on the server when anyone is logged on to the local console of the server.
### Possible values
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
## Security considerations
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
### Vulnerability
-A remote user could potentially access a mounted floppy disk that contains sensitive information. This risk is small because floppy disk drives are not automatically shared; administrators must deliberately choose to share the drive. However, you can deny network users the ability to view data or run applications from removable media on the server.
+A remote user could potentially access a mounted floppy disk that contains sensitive information. This risk is small because floppy disk drives aren't automatically shared; administrators must deliberately choose to share the drive. However, you can deny network users the ability to view data or run applications from removable media on the server.
### Countermeasure
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ Enable the **Devices: Restrict floppy access to locally logged-on user only** se
### Potential impact
-Users who connect to the server over the network cannot use any floppy disk drives that are installed on the device when anyone is logged on to the local console of the server. System tools that require access to floppy disk drives fail. For example, the Volume Shadow Copy service attempts to access all CD-ROM and floppy disk drives that are present on the computer when it initializes, and if the service cannot access one of these drives, it fails. This condition causes the Windows Backup tool to fail if volume shadow copies were specified for the backup job. Any non-Microsoft backup products that use volume shadow copies also fail.
+Users who connect to the server over the network can't use any floppy disk drives that are installed on the device when anyone is logged on to the local console of the server. System tools that require access to floppy disk drives fail. For example, the Volume Shadow Copy service attempts to access all CD-ROM and floppy disk drives that are present on the computer when it initializes, and if the service can't access one of these drives, it fails. This condition causes the Windows Backup tool to fail if volume shadow copies were specified for the backup job. Any non-Microsoft backup products that use volume shadow copies also fail.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-controller-allow-server-operators-to-schedule-tasks.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-controller-allow-server-operators-to-schedule-tasks.md
index 4d00465fda..e3159ed429 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-controller-allow-server-operators-to-schedule-tasks.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-controller-allow-server-operators-to-schedule-tasks.md
@@ -31,9 +31,9 @@ This policy setting determines whether server operators can use the **at** comma
>**Note:** This security option setting affects only the scheduler tool for the **at** command. It does not affect the Task Scheduler tool.
-Enabling this policy setting means jobs that are created by server operators through the **at** command will be executed in the context of the account that is running that service—by default, that is the Local System account. This means that server operators can perform tasks that the Local System account is able to do, but server operators would normally not be able to do, such as add their account to the local Administrators group.
+Enabling this policy setting means jobs that are created by server operators through the **at** command will be executed in the context of the account that is running that service—by default, that is, the Local System account. This synchronization with the local account means that server operators can perform tasks that the Local System account is able to do, but server operators would normally not be able to do, such as add their account to the local Administrators group.
-The impact of enabling this policy setting should be small for most organizations. Users, including those in the Server Operators group, will still be able to create jobs by using the Task Scheduler Wizard, but those jobs will run in the context of the account that the user authenticates with when setting up the job.
+The impact of enabling this policy setting should be small for most organizations. Users, including those users in the Server Operators group, will still be able to create jobs by using the Task Scheduler Wizard, but those jobs will run in the context of the account that the user authenticates with when setting up the job.
### Possible values
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
### Command-line tools
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ Disable the **Domain controller: Allow server operators to schedule tasks** sett
### Potential impact
-The impact should be small for most organizations. Users (including those in the Server Operators group) can still create jobs by means of the Task Scheduler snap-in. However, those jobs run in the context of the account that the user authenticates with when setting up the job.
+The impact should be small for most organizations. Users (including those users in the Server Operators group) can still create jobs through the Task Scheduler snap-in. However, those jobs run in the context of the account that the user authenticates with when setting up the job.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-controller-ldap-server-signing-requirements.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-controller-ldap-server-signing-requirements.md
index 3c4bd32092..d9e51b120c 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-controller-ldap-server-signing-requirements.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-controller-ldap-server-signing-requirements.md
@@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ This article describes the best practices, location, values, and security consid
This policy setting determines whether the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) server requires LDAP clients to negotiate data signing.
-Unsigned network traffic is susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks, where an intruder captures packets between the server and the client device and modifies them before forwarding them to the client device. In the case of an LDAP server, a malicious user can cause a client device to make decisions based on false records from the LDAP directory. You can lower this risk in a corporate network by implementing strong physical security measures to protect the network infrastructure. Furthermore, implementing Internet Protocol security (IPsec) Authentication Header mode, which provides mutual authentication and packet integrity for IP traffic, can make all types of man-in-the-middle attacks difficult.
+Unsigned network traffic is susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks, where an intruder captures packets between the server and the client device and modifies them before forwarding them to the client device. In the example of an LDAP server, a malicious user can cause a client device to make decisions based on false records from the LDAP directory. You can lower this risk in a corporate network by implementing strong physical security measures to protect the network infrastructure. Furthermore, implementing Internet Protocol security (IPsec) Authentication Header mode, which provides mutual authentication and packet integrity for IP traffic, can make all types of man-in-the-middle attacks difficult.
-This setting does not have any impact on LDAP simple bind through SSL (LDAP TCP/636).
+This setting doesn't have any impact on LDAP simple bind through SSL (LDAP TCP/636).
If signing is required, then LDAP simple binds not using SSL are rejected (LDAP TCP/389).
@@ -39,13 +39,13 @@ If signing is required, then LDAP simple binds not using SSL are rejected (LDAP
### Possible values
-- None. Data signatures are not required to bind with the server. If the client computer requests data signing, the server supports it.
+- None. Data signatures aren't required to bind with the server. If the client computer requests data signing, the server supports it.
- Require signature. The LDAP data-signing option must be negotiated unless Transport Layer Security/Secure Sockets Layer (TLS/SSL) is in use.
- Not defined.
### Best practices
-- We recommend that you set **Domain controller: LDAP server signing requirements** to **Require signature**. Clients that do not support LDAP signing will be unable to execute LDAP queries against the domain controllers.
+- We recommend that you set **Domain controller: LDAP server signing requirements** to **Require signature**. Clients that don't support LDAP signing will be unable to execute LDAP queries against the domain controllers.
### Location
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
## Security considerations
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
### Vulnerability
-Unsigned network traffic is susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks. In such attacks, an intruder captures packets between the server and the client device, modifies them, and then forwards them to the client device. Where LDAP servers are concerned, an attacker could cause a client device to make decisions that are based on false records from the LDAP directory. To lower the risk of such an intrusion in an organization's network, you can implement strong physical security measures to protect the network infrastructure. You could also implement Internet Protocol security (IPsec) Authentication Header mode, which performs mutual authentication and packet integrity for IP traffic to make all types of man-in-the-middle attacks difficult.
+Unsigned network traffic is susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks. In such attacks, an intruder captures packets between the server and the client device, modifies them, and then forwards them to the client device. Regarding LDAP servers, an attacker could cause a client device to make decisions that are based on false records from the LDAP directory. To lower the risk of such an intrusion in an organization's network, you can implement strong physical security measures to protect the network infrastructure. You could also implement Internet Protocol security (IPsec) Authentication Header mode, which performs mutual authentication and packet integrity for IP traffic to make all types of man-in-the-middle attacks difficult.
### Countermeasure
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ Configure the **Domain controller: LDAP server signing requirements** setting to
### Potential impact
-Client devices that do not support LDAP signing cannot run LDAP queries against the domain controllers.
+Client devices that don't support LDAP signing can't run LDAP queries against the domain controllers.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-controller-refuse-machine-account-password-changes.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-controller-refuse-machine-account-password-changes.md
index d0b2f91db5..4b6f851944 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-controller-refuse-machine-account-password-changes.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-controller-refuse-machine-account-password-changes.md
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ This policy setting enables or disables blocking a domain controller from accept
### Possible values
-- **Enabled** When enabled, this setting does not allow a domain controller to accept any changes to a machine account's password.
+- **Enabled** When enabled, this setting doesn't allow a domain controller to accept any changes to a machine account's password.
- **Disabled** When disabled, this setting allows a domain controller to accept any changes to a machine account's password.
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ This policy setting enables or disables blocking a domain controller from accept
### Best practices
-- Enabling this policy setting on all domain controllers in a domain prevents domain members from changing their machine account passwords. This, in turn, leaves those passwords susceptible to attack. Make sure that this conforms to your overall security policy for the domain.
+- Enabling this policy setting on all domain controllers in a domain prevents domain members from changing their machine account passwords. This prevention, in turn, leaves those passwords susceptible to attack. Ensure that this setting conforms to your overall security policy for the domain.
### Location
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
## Security considerations
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
### Vulnerability
-If you enable this policy setting on all domain controllers in a domain, domain members cannot change their machine account passwords, and those passwords are more susceptible to attack.
+If you enable this policy setting on all domain controllers in a domain, domain members can't change their machine account passwords, and those passwords are more susceptible to attack.
### Countermeasure
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ Disable the **Domain controller: Refuse machine account password changes** setti
### Potential impact
-None. This is the default configuration.
+None. This non-impact state is the default configuration.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-digitally-encrypt-or-sign-secure-channel-data-always.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-digitally-encrypt-or-sign-secure-channel-data-always.md
index c48680bf77..f5fe43b200 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-digitally-encrypt-or-sign-secure-channel-data-always.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-digitally-encrypt-or-sign-secure-channel-data-always.md
@@ -27,30 +27,29 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for
## Reference
-This setting determines whether all secure channel traffic that is initiated by the domain member meets minimum security requirements. Specifically, it determines whether all secure channel traffic that is initiated by the domain member must be signed or encrypted. Logon information that is
-transmitted over the secure channel is always encrypted regardless of whether the encryption of all other secure channel traffic is negotiated.
+This setting determines whether all secure channel traffic that is initiated by the domain member meets minimum security requirements. Specifically, it determines whether all secure channel traffic that is initiated by the domain member must be signed or encrypted. Sign-in information that is transmitted over the secure channel is always encrypted regardless of whether the encryption of all other secure channel traffic is negotiated.
-The following policy settings determine whether a secure channel can be established with a domain controller that is not capable of signing or encrypting secure channel traffic:
+The following policy settings determine whether a secure channel can be established with a domain controller that isn't capable of signing or encrypting secure channel traffic:
- Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)
- [Domain member: Digitally encrypt secure channel data (when possible)](domain-member-digitally-encrypt-secure-channel-data-when-possible.md)
- [Domain member: Digitally sign secure channel data (when possible)](domain-member-digitally-sign-secure-channel-data-when-possible.md)
-Setting **Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)** to **Enabled** prevents establishing a secure channel with any domain controller that cannot sign or encrypt all secure channel data.
+Setting **Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)** to **Enabled** prevents establishing a secure channel with any domain controller that can't sign or encrypt all secure channel data.
-To protect authentication traffic from man-in-the-middle, replay, and other types of network attacks, Windows-based computers create a communication channel through NetLogon called secure channels. These channels authenticate machine accounts. They also authenticate user accounts when a remote user connects to a network resource and the user account exists in a trusted domain. This is called pass-through authentication, and it allows a device running Windows that has joined a domain to have access to the user account database in its domain and in any trusted domains.
+To protect authentication traffic from man-in-the-middle, replay, and other types of network attacks, Windows-based computers create a communication channel through NetLogon called secure channels. These channels authenticate machine accounts. They also authenticate user accounts when a remote user connects to a network resource and the user account exists in a trusted domain. This authentication is called pass-through authentication, and it allows a device running Windows that has joined a domain to have access to the user account database in its domain and in any trusted domains.
To enable the **Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)** policy setting on a member workstation or server, all domain controllers in the domain that the member belongs to must be capable of signing or encrypting all secure-channel data.
Enabling the **Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)** policy setting automatically enables the [Domain member: Digitally sign secure channel data (when possible)](domain-member-digitally-sign-secure-channel-data-when-possible.md) policy setting.
-When a device joins a domain, a machine account is created. After joining the domain, the device uses the password for that account to create a secure channel with the domain controller for its domain every time it restarts. This secure channel is used to perform operations such as NTLM pass-through authentication and LSA SID/name Lookup. Requests that are sent on the secure channel are authenticated—and sensitive information such as passwords are encrypted—but the integrity of the channel is not checked, and not all information is encrypted. If a system is set to always encrypt or sign secure channel data, a secure channel cannot be established with a domain controller that is not capable of signing or encrypting all secure channel traffic. If the computer is configured to encrypt or sign secure channel data when possible, a secure channel can be established, but the level of encryption and signing is negotiated.
+When a device joins a domain, a machine account is created. After being connected to the domain, the device uses the password for that account to create a secure channel with the domain controller for its domain every time it restarts. This secure channel is used to perform operations such as NTLM pass-through authentication and LSA SID/name Lookup. Requests that are sent on the secure channel are authenticated—and sensitive information such as passwords are encrypted—but the integrity of the channel isn't checked, and not all information is encrypted. If a system is set to always encrypt or sign secure channel data, a secure channel can't be established with a domain controller that isn't capable of signing or encrypting all secure channel traffic. If the computer is configured to encrypt or sign secure channel data when possible, a secure channel can be established, but the level of encryption and signing is negotiated.
### Possible values
- Enabled
- The policy [Domain member: Digitally sign secure channel data (when possible)](domain-member-digitally-sign-secure-channel-data-when-possible.md) is assumed to be enabled regardless of its current setting. This ensures that the domain member attempts to negotiate at least signing of the secure
+ The policy [Domain member: Digitally sign secure channel data (when possible)](domain-member-digitally-sign-secure-channel-data-when-possible.md) is assumed to be enabled regardless of its current setting. This enablement ensures that the domain member attempts to negotiate at least signing of the secure
channel traffic.
- Disabled
@@ -92,7 +91,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
### Group Policy
@@ -104,8 +103,8 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
### Vulnerability
-When a device joins a domain, a machine account is created. After it joins the domain, the device uses the password for that account to create a secure channel with the domain controller for its domain every time it restarts. Requests that are sent on the secure channel are authenticated—and
-sensitive information such as passwords are encrypted—but the channel is not integrity-checked, and not all information is encrypted. If a device is configured to always encrypt or sign secure channel data but the domain controller cannot sign or encrypt any portion of the secure channel data, the computer and domain controller cannot establish a secure channel. If the device is configured to encrypt or sign secure channel data, when possible, a secure channel can be established, but the level of encryption and signing is negotiated.
+When a device joins a domain, a machine account is created. After the device is joined with the domain, it uses the password for that account to create a secure channel with the domain controller for its domain every time it restarts. Requests that are sent on the secure channel are authenticated—and
+sensitive information such as passwords are encrypted—but the channel isn't integrity-checked, and not all information is encrypted. If a device is configured to always encrypt or sign secure channel data but the domain controller can't sign or encrypt any portion of the secure channel data, the computer and domain controller can't establish a secure channel. If the device is configured to encrypt or sign secure channel data, when possible, a secure channel can be established, but the level of encryption and signing is negotiated.
### Countermeasure
@@ -117,7 +116,7 @@ Select one of the following settings as appropriate for your environment to conf
### Potential impact
-Digital encryption and signing of the secure channel is a good idea because the secure channel protects domain credentials as they are sent to the domain controller.
+Digital encryption and signing of the secure channel is a good idea because the secure channel protects domain credentials as they're sent to the domain controller.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-digitally-encrypt-secure-channel-data-when-possible.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-digitally-encrypt-secure-channel-data-when-possible.md
index f07984917f..920aba71a4 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-digitally-encrypt-secure-channel-data-when-possible.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-digitally-encrypt-secure-channel-data-when-possible.md
@@ -27,31 +27,31 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for
## Reference
-This setting determines whether all secure channel traffic that is initiated by the domain member meets minimum security requirements. Specifically, it determines whether all secure channel traffic that is initiated by the domain member must be encrypted. Logon information that is transmitted over
+This setting determines whether all secure channel traffic that is initiated by the domain member meets minimum security requirements. Specifically, it determines whether all secure channel traffic that is initiated by the domain member must be encrypted. Sign-in information that is transmitted over
the secure channel is always encrypted regardless of whether the encryption of all other secure channel traffic is negotiated.
-In addition to this policy setting, the following policy settings determine whether a secure channel can be established with a domain controller that is not capable of signing or encrypting secure channel traffic:
+In addition to this policy setting, the following policy settings determine whether a secure channel can be established with a domain controller that isn't capable of signing or encrypting secure channel traffic:
- [Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)](domain-member-digitally-encrypt-or-sign-secure-channel-data-always.md)
- [Domain member: Digitally sign secure channel data (when possible)](domain-member-digitally-sign-secure-channel-data-when-possible.md)
-Setting **Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)** to **Enabled** prevents establishing a secure channel with any domain controller that cannot sign or encrypt all secure channel data.
+Setting **Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)** to **Enabled** prevents establishing a secure channel with any domain controller that can't sign or encrypt all secure channel data.
-To protect authentication traffic from man-in-the-middle, replay, and other types of network attacks, Windows-based computers create a communication channel through NetLogon called secure channels. These channels authenticate machine accounts. They also authenticate user accounts when a remote user connects to a network resource and the user account exists in a trusted domain. This is called pass-through authentication, and it allows a computer running the Windows operating system that has joined a domain to have access to the user account database in its domain and in any trusted domains.
+To protect authentication traffic from man-in-the-middle, replay, and other types of network attacks, Windows-based computers create a communication channel through NetLogon called secure channels. These channels authenticate machine accounts. They also authenticate user accounts when a remote user connects to a network resource and the user account exists in a trusted domain. This authentication is called pass-through authentication, and it allows a computer running the Windows operating system that has joined a domain to have access to the user account database in its domain and in any trusted domains.
Enabling the [Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)](domain-member-digitally-encrypt-or-sign-secure-channel-data-always.md) policy setting automatically enables the **Domain member: Digitally sign secure channel data (when possible)** policy setting.
-When a device joins a domain, a machine account is created. After joining the domain, the device uses the password for that account to create a secure channel with the domain controller for its domain every time it restarts. This secure channel is used to perform operations such as NTLM pass through authentication and LSA SID/name Lookup. Requests that are sent on the secure channel are authenticated—and sensitive information such as passwords are encrypted—but the integrity of the channel is not checked, and not all information is encrypted. If a system is set to always encrypt or sign secure channel data, a secure channel cannot be established with a domain controller that is not capable of signing or encrypting all secure channel traffic. If the computer is configured to encrypt or sign secure channel data when possible, a secure channel can be established, but the level of encryption and signing is negotiated.
+When a device joins a domain, a machine account is created. After the device is joined with the domain, it uses the password for that account to create a secure channel with the domain controller for its domain every time it restarts. This secure channel is used to perform operations such as NTLM pass through authentication and LSA SID/name Lookup. Requests that are sent on the secure channel are authenticated—and sensitive information such as passwords are encrypted—but the integrity of the channel isn't checked, and not all information is encrypted. If a system is set to always encrypt or sign secure channel data, a secure channel can't be established with a domain controller that isn't capable of signing or encrypting all secure channel traffic. If the computer is configured to encrypt or sign secure channel data when possible, a secure channel can be established, but the level of encryption and signing is negotiated.
### Possible values
- Enabled
- The domain member will request encryption of all secure channel traffic. If the domain controller supports encryption of all secure channel traffic, then all secure channel traffic will be encrypted. Otherwise, only logon information that is transmitted over the secure channel will be encrypted.
+ The domain member will request encryption of all secure channel traffic. If the domain controller supports encryption of all secure channel traffic, then all secure channel traffic will be encrypted. Otherwise, only sign-in information that is transmitted over the secure channel will be encrypted.
- Disabled
- The domain member will not attempt to negotiate secure channel encryption.
+ The domain member won't attempt to negotiate secure channel encryption.
>**Note:** If the security policy setting [Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)](domain-member-digitally-encrypt-or-sign-secure-channel-data-always.md) is enabled, this setting will be overwritten.
@@ -86,11 +86,11 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
### Group Policy
-Distribution of this policy through Group Policy does not override the Local Security Policy setting.
+Distribution of this policy through Group Policy doesn't override the Local Security Policy setting.
## Security considerations
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
### Vulnerability
-When a device joins a domain, a machine account is created. After it joins the domain, the device uses the password for that account to create a secure channel with the domain controller for its domain every time it restarts. Requests that are sent on the secure channel are authenticated—and sensitive information such as passwords are encrypted—but the channel is not integrity-checked, and not all information is encrypted. If a device is configured to always encrypt or sign secure channel data but the domain controller cannot sign or encrypt any portion of the secure channel data, the computer and domain controller cannot establish a secure channel. If the computer is configured to encrypt or sign secure channel data when possible, a secure channel can be established, but the level of encryption and signing is negotiated.
+When a device joins a domain, a machine account is created. After it joins the domain, the device uses the password for that account to create a secure channel with the domain controller for its domain every time it restarts. Requests that are sent on the secure channel are authenticated—and sensitive information such as passwords are encrypted—but the channel isn't integrity-checked, and not all information is encrypted. If a device is configured to always encrypt or sign secure channel data but the domain controller can't sign or encrypt any portion of the secure channel data, the computer and domain controller can't establish a secure channel. If the computer is configured to encrypt or sign secure channel data when possible, a secure channel can be established, but the level of encryption and signing is negotiated.
### Countermeasure
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ Select one of the following settings as appropriate for your environment to conf
### Potential impact
-Digital signing of the secure channel is a good idea because it protects domain credentials as they are sent to the domain controller.
+Digital signing of the secure channel is a good idea because it protects domain credentials as they're sent to the domain controller.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-digitally-sign-secure-channel-data-when-possible.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-digitally-sign-secure-channel-data-when-possible.md
index b75a8767d9..2083e899a8 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-digitally-sign-secure-channel-data-when-possible.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-digitally-sign-secure-channel-data-when-possible.md
@@ -27,30 +27,30 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for
## Reference
-This setting determines whether all secure channel traffic that is initiated by the domain member meets minimum security requirements. Specifically, it determines whether all secure channel traffic that is initiated by the domain member must be signed. Logon information that is transmitted over the
+This setting determines whether all secure channel traffic that is initiated by the domain member meets minimum security requirements. Specifically, it determines whether all secure channel traffic that is initiated by the domain member must be signed. Sign-in information that is transmitted over the
secure channel is always encrypted regardless of whether the encryption of all other secure channel traffic is negotiated.
-The following policy settings determine whether a secure channel can be established with a domain controller that is not capable of signing or encrypting secure channel traffic:
+The following policy settings determine whether a secure channel can be established with a domain controller that isn't capable of signing or encrypting secure channel traffic:
- [Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)](domain-member-digitally-encrypt-or-sign-secure-channel-data-always.md)
- [Domain member: Digitally encrypt secure channel data (when possible)](domain-member-digitally-encrypt-secure-channel-data-when-possible.md)
- Domain member: Digitally sign secure channel data (when possible)
-Setting [Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)](domain-member-digitally-encrypt-or-sign-secure-channel-data-always.md) to **Enabled** prevents establishing a secure channel with any domain controller that cannot sign or encrypt all secure channel data.
+Setting [Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)](domain-member-digitally-encrypt-or-sign-secure-channel-data-always.md) to **Enabled** prevents establishing a secure channel with any domain controller that can't sign or encrypt all secure channel data.
-To protect authentication traffic from man-in-the-middle, replay, and other types of network attacks, Windows-based computers create a communication channel through NetLogon called secure channels. These channels authenticate computer accounts. They also authenticate user accounts when a remote user connects to a network resource and the user account exists in a trusted domain. This is called pass-through authentication, and it allows a computer running the Windows operating system that has joined a domain to have access to the user account database in its domain and in any trusted domains.
+To protect authentication traffic from man-in-the-middle, replay, and other types of network attacks, Windows-based computers create a communication channel through NetLogon called secure channels. These channels authenticate computer accounts. They also authenticate user accounts when a remote user connects to a network resource and the user account exists in a trusted domain. This authentication is called pass-through authentication, and it allows a computer running the Windows operating system that has joined a domain to have access to the user account database in its domain and in any trusted domains.
Enabling the [Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)](domain-member-digitally-encrypt-or-sign-secure-channel-data-always.md) policy setting automatically enables the **Domain member: Digitally sign secure channel data (when possible)** policy setting.
-When a device joins a domain, a machine account is created. After joining the domain, the device uses the password for that account to create a secure channel with the domain controller for its domain every time it restarts. This secure channel is used to perform operations such as NTLM pass through authentication and LSA SID/name Lookup. Requests that are sent on the secure channel are authenticated—and sensitive information such as passwords are encrypted—but the integrity of the channel is not checked, and not all information is encrypted. If a system is set to always encrypt or sign secure channel data, a secure channel cannot be established with a domain controller that is not capable of signing or encrypting all secure channel traffic. If the computer is configured to encrypt or sign secure channel data when possible, a secure channel can be established, but the level of encryption and signing is negotiated.
+When a device joins a domain, a machine account is created. After the device is joined with the domain, it uses the password for that account to create a secure channel with the domain controller for its domain every time it restarts. This secure channel is used to perform operations such as NTLM pass through authentication and LSA SID/name Lookup. Requests that are sent on the secure channel are authenticated—and sensitive information such as passwords are encrypted—but the integrity of the channel isn't checked, and not all information is encrypted. If a system is set to always encrypt or sign secure channel data, a secure channel can't be established with a domain controller that isn't capable of signing or encrypting all secure channel traffic. If the computer is configured to encrypt or sign secure channel data when possible, a secure channel can be established, but the level of encryption and signing is negotiated.
### Possible values
- Enabled
- The domain member will request signing of all secure channel traffic. If the domain controller supports signing of all secure channel traffic, then all secure channel traffic will be signed which ensures that it cannot be tampered with in transit.
+ The domain member will request to sign all secure channel traffic. If the domain controller supports signing of all secure channel traffic, then all secure channel traffic will be signed which ensures that it can't be tampered with in transit.
- Disabled
- Signing will not be negotiated unless the policy [Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)](domain-member-digitally-encrypt-or-sign-secure-channel-data-always.md) is enabled.
+ Signing won't be negotiated unless the policy [Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)](domain-member-digitally-encrypt-or-sign-secure-channel-data-always.md) is enabled.
- Not defined
@@ -84,11 +84,11 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
### Group Policy
-Distribution of this policy through Group Policy does not override the Local Security Policy setting.
+Distribution of this policy through Group Policy doesn't override the Local Security Policy setting.
## Security considerations
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
### Vulnerability
-When a device joins a domain, a machine account is created. After it joins the domain, the device uses the password for that account to create a secure channel with the domain controller for its domain every time it restarts. Requests that are sent on the secure channel are authenticated—and sensitive information such as passwords are encrypted—but the channel is not integrity-checked, and not all information is encrypted. If a device is configured to always encrypt or sign secure channel data but the domain controller cannot sign or encrypt any portion of the secure channel data, the computer and domain controller cannot establish a secure channel. If the computer is configured to encrypt or sign secure channel data when possible, a secure channel can be established, but the level of encryption and signing is negotiated.
+When a device joins a domain, a machine account is created. After it joins the domain, the device uses the password for that account to create a secure channel with the domain controller for its domain every time it restarts. Requests that are sent on the secure channel are authenticated—and sensitive information such as passwords are encrypted—but the channel isn't integrity-checked, and not all information is encrypted. If a device is configured to always encrypt or sign secure channel data but the domain controller can't sign or encrypt any portion of the secure channel data, the computer and domain controller can't establish a secure channel. If the computer is configured to encrypt or sign secure channel data when possible, a secure channel can be established, but the level of encryption and signing is negotiated.
### Countermeasure
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ Because these policies are closely related and useful depending on your environm
### Potential impact
-Digital signing of the secure channel is a good idea because the secure channel protects domain credentials as they are sent to the domain controller.
+Digital signing of the secure channel is a good idea because the secure channel protects domain credentials as they're sent to the domain controller.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-disable-machine-account-password-changes.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-disable-machine-account-password-changes.md
index 8c85b1ecee..6127a9b87f 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-disable-machine-account-password-changes.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-disable-machine-account-password-changes.md
@@ -39,12 +39,12 @@ Verify that the **Domain member: Disable machine account password changes** opti
### Best practices
-1. Do not enable this policy setting. Machine account passwords are used to establish secure channel communications between members and domain controllers and between the domain controllers within the domain. After it is established, the secure channel transmits sensitive information that is necessary for making authentication and authorization decisions.
-2. Do not use this policy setting to try to support dual-boot scenarios that use the same machine account. If you want to configure dual-boot installations that are joined to the same domain, give the two installations different computer names. This policy setting was added to the Windows operating system to help organizations that stockpile pre-built computers that are put into production months later. Those devices do not have to be rejoined to the domain.
-3. You may want to consider using this policy setting in specific environments, such as the following:
+1. Don't enable this policy setting. Machine account passwords are used to establish secure channel communications between members and domain controllers and between the domain controllers within the domain. After it's established, the secure channel transmits sensitive information that is necessary for making authentication and authorization decisions.
+2. Don't use this policy setting to try to support dual-boot scenarios that use the same machine account. If you want to configure dual-boot installations that are joined to the same domain, give the two installations different computer names. This policy setting was added to the Windows operating system to help organizations that stockpile pre-built computers that are put into production months later. Those devices don't have to be rejoined to the domain.
+3. You may want to consider using this policy setting in specific environments, such as the following ones:
- Non-persistent Virtual Desktop Infrastructure implementations. In such implementations, each session starts from a read-only base image.
- - Embedded devices that do not have write access to the OS volume.
+ - Embedded devices that don't have write access to the OS volume.
In either case, a password change that was made during normal operations would be lost as soon as the session ends. We strongly recommend that you plan password changes for maintenance windows. Add the password changes to the updates and modifications that Windows performs during maintenance windows. To trigger a password update on a specific OS volume, run the following command:
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
## Security considerations
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
### Vulnerability
By default, devices running Windows Server that belong to a domain automatically change their passwords for their accounts every certain number of days, typically 30. If you disable this policy setting, devices that run Windows Server retain the same passwords as their machine accounts. Devices
-that cannot automatically change their account password are at risk from an attacker who could determine the password for the machine's domain account.
+that can't automatically change their account password are at risk from an attacker who could determine the password for the machine's domain account.
### Countermeasure
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ Verify that the **Domain member: Disable machine account password changes** sett
### Potential impact
-None. This is the default configuration.
+None. This non-impact state is the default configuration.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-maximum-machine-account-password-age.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-maximum-machine-account-password-age.md
index 7a5f2b3e94..7eb431cb17 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-maximum-machine-account-password-age.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-maximum-machine-account-password-age.md
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ For more information, see [Machine Account Password Process](https://techcommuni
### Best practices
-We recommend that you set **Domain member: Maximum machine account password age** to about 30 days. Setting the value to fewer days can increase replication and affect domain controllers. For example, in Windows NT domains, machine passwords were changed every 7 days. The additional replication churn would affect domain controllers in large organizations that have many computers or slow links between sites.
+We recommend that you set **Domain member: Maximum machine account password age** to about 30 days. Setting the value to fewer days can increase replication and affect domain controllers. For example, in Windows NT domains, machine passwords were changed every 7 days. The extra replication churn would affect domain controllers in large organizations that have many computers or slow links between sites.
### Location
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
## Security considerations
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
### Vulnerability
-By default, the domain members submit a password change every 30 days. If you increase this interval significantly so that the computers no longer submit a password change, an attacker has more time to undertake a brute-force attack to guess the password of one or more computer accounts.
+By default, the domain members submit a password change every 30 days. If you increase this interval so that the computers no longer submit a password change, an attacker has more time to undertake a brute-force attack to guess the password of one or more computer accounts.
### Countermeasure
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ Configure the **Domain member: Maximum machine account password age** setting to
### Potential impact
-None. This is the default configuration.
+None. This non-impact state is the default configuration.
## Related topics
- [Security Options](security-options.md)
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-require-strong-windows-2000-or-later-session-key.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-require-strong-windows-2000-or-later-session-key.md
index 24cdd01bd2..1d7f2049d2 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-require-strong-windows-2000-or-later-session-key.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-require-strong-windows-2000-or-later-session-key.md
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for
## Reference
-The **Domain member: Require strong (Windows 2000 or later) session key** policy setting determines whether a secure channel can be established with a domain controller that is not capable of encrypting secure channel traffic with a strong, 128-bit session key. Enabling this policy setting prevents establishing a secure channel with any domain controller that cannot encrypt secure channel data with a strong key. Disabling this policy setting allows 64-bit session keys.
+The **Domain member: Require strong (Windows 2000 or later) session key** policy setting determines whether a secure channel can be established with a domain controller that isn't capable of encrypting secure channel traffic with a strong, 128-bit session key. Enabling this policy setting prevents establishing a secure channel with any domain controller that can't encrypt secure channel data with a strong key. Disabling this policy setting allows 64-bit session keys.
Whenever possible, you should take advantage of these stronger session keys to help protect secure channel communications from eavesdropping and session-hijacking network attacks. Eavesdropping is a form of hacking in which network data is read or altered in transit. The data can be modified to hide or change the name of the sender, or it can be redirected.
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Whenever possible, you should take advantage of these stronger session keys to h
- Enabled
- When enabled on a member workstation or server, all domain controllers in the domain that the member belongs to must be capable of encrypting secure channel data with a strong, 128-bit key. This means that all such domain controllers must be running at least Windows 2000 Server.
+ When enabled on a member workstation or server, all domain controllers in the domain that the member belongs to must be capable of encrypting secure channel data with a strong, 128-bit key. This capability means that all such domain controllers must be running at least Windows 2000 Server.
- Disabled
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ Whenever possible, you should take advantage of these stronger session keys to h
### Best practices
-- It is advisable to set **Domain member: Require strong (Windows 2000 or later) session key** to Enabled. Enabling this policy setting ensures that all outgoing secure channel traffic will require a strong encryption key. Disabling this policy setting requires that key strength be negotiated. Only enable this option if the domain controllers in all trusted domains support strong keys. By default, this value is disabled.
+- It's advisable to set **Domain member: Require strong (Windows 2000 or later) session key** to Enabled. Enabling this policy setting ensures that all outgoing secure channel traffic will require a strong encryption key. Disabling this policy setting requires that key strength be negotiated. Only enable this option if the domain controllers in all trusted domains support strong keys. By default, this value is disabled.
### Location
@@ -73,13 +73,13 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
### Group Policy
Misuse of this policy setting is a common error that can cause data loss or problems with data access or security.
-You will you be able to join devices that do not support this policy setting to domains where the domain controllers have this policy setting enabled.
+You'll you be able to join devices that don't support this policy setting to domains where the domain controllers have this policy setting enabled.
## Security considerations
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ If you enable this policy setting, all outgoing secure channel traffic requires
### Potential impact
-Devices that do not support this policy setting cannot join domains in which the domain controllers have this policy setting enabled.
+Devices that don't support this policy setting can't join domains in which the domain controllers have this policy setting enabled.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/enable-computer-and-user-accounts-to-be-trusted-for-delegation.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/enable-computer-and-user-accounts-to-be-trusted-for-delegation.md
index d60d7b9568..464033d694 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/enable-computer-and-user-accounts-to-be-trusted-for-delegation.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/enable-computer-and-user-accounts-to-be-trusted-for-delegation.md
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security
## Reference
This policy setting determines which users can set the **Trusted for Delegation** setting on a user or computer object.
-Security account delegation provides the ability to connect to multiple servers, and each server change retains the authentication credentials of the original client. Delegation of authentication is a capability that client and server applications use when they have multiple tiers. It allows a public-facing service to use client credentials to authenticate to an application or database service. For this configuration to be possible, the client and the server must run under accounts that are trusted for delegation.
+Security account delegation enables connection to multiple servers, and each server change retains the authentication credentials of the original client. Delegation of authentication is a capability that client and server applications use when they have multiple tiers. It allows a public-facing service to use client credentials to authenticate to an application or database service. For this configuration to be possible, the client and the server must run under accounts that are trusted for delegation.
Only administrators who have the **Enable computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation** credential can set up delegation. Domain admins and Enterprise admins have this credential. The procedure to allow a user to be trusted for delegation depends on the functionality level of the domain.
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Constant: SeEnableDelegationPrivilege
### Best practices
-- There is no reason to assign this user right to anyone on member servers and workstations that belong to a domain because it has no meaning in those contexts. It is only relevant on domain controllers and stand-alone devices.
+- There's no reason to assign this user right to anyone on member servers and workstations that belong to a domain because it has no meaning in those contexts. It's only relevant on domain controllers and stand-alone devices.
### Location
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ This section describes features, tools and guidance to help you manage this poli
Modifying this setting might affect compatibility with clients, services, and applications.
-A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to be effective.
+A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to be effective.
Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on.
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ after a security incident.
### Countermeasure
-The **Enable computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation** user right should be assigned only if there is a clear need for its functionality. When you assign this right, you should investigate the use of constrained delegation to control what the delegated accounts can do. On domain controllers, this right is assigned to the Administrators group by default.
+The **Enable computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation** user right should be assigned only if there's a clear need for its functionality. When you assign this right, you should investigate the use of constrained delegation to control what the delegated accounts can do. On domain controllers, this right is assigned to the Administrators group by default.
>**Note:** There is no reason to assign this user right to anyone on member servers and workstations that belong to a domain because it has no meaning in those contexts. It is only relevant on domain controllers and stand-alone computers.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/enforce-password-history.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/enforce-password-history.md
index e32f558d6c..97d3791815 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/enforce-password-history.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/enforce-password-history.md
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security
The **Enforce password history** policy setting determines the number of unique new passwords that must be associated with a user account before an old password can be reused.
Password reuse is an important concern in any organization. Many users want to reuse the same password for their account over a long period of time. The longer the same password is used for a particular account, the greater the chance that an attacker will be able to determine the password through brute force attacks. If users are required to change their password, but they can reuse an old password, the effectiveness of a good password policy is greatly reduced.
-Specifying a low number for **Enforce password history** allows users to continually use the same small number of passwords repeatedly. If you do not also set [Minimum password age](minimum-password-age.md), users can change their password as many times in a row as necessary to reuse their original password.
+Specifying a low number for **Enforce password history** allows users to continually use the same small number of passwords repeatedly. If you don't also set [Minimum password age](minimum-password-age.md), users can change their password as many times in a row as necessary to reuse their original password.
### Possible values
@@ -39,9 +39,9 @@ Specifying a low number for **Enforce password history** allows users to continu
### Best practices
-- Set **Enforce password history** to 24. This will help mitigate vulnerabilities that are caused by password reuse.
+- Set **Enforce password history** to 24. This setting will help mitigate vulnerabilities that are caused by password reuse.
- Set [Maximum password age](maximum-password-age.md) to expire passwords between 60 and 90 days. Try to expire the passwords between major business cycles to prevent work loss.
-- Configure [Minimum password age](minimum-password-age.md) so that you do not allow passwords to be changed immediately.
+- Configure [Minimum password age](minimum-password-age.md) so that you don't allow passwords to be changed immediately.
### Location
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ This section describes features, tools, and guidance to help you manage this pol
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
## Security considerations
@@ -74,9 +74,9 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
### Vulnerability
-The longer a user uses the same password, the greater the chance that an attacker can determine the password through brute force attacks. Also, any accounts that may have been compromised remain exploitable for as long as the password is left unchanged. If password changes are required but password reuse is not prevented, or if users continually reuse a small number of passwords, the effectiveness of a good password policy is greatly reduced.
+The longer a user uses the same password, the greater the chance that an attacker can determine the password through brute force attacks. Also, any accounts that may have been compromised remain exploitable for as long as the password is left unchanged. If password changes are required but password reuse isn't prevented, or if users continually reuse a few passwords, the effectiveness of a good password policy is greatly reduced.
-If you specify a low number for this policy setting, users can use the same small number of passwords repeatedly. If you do not also configure the [Minimum password age](minimum-password-age.md) policy setting, users might repeatedly change their passwords until they can reuse their original password.
+If you specify a low number for this policy setting, users can use the same small number of passwords repeatedly. If you don't also configure the [Minimum password age](minimum-password-age.md) policy setting, users might repeatedly change their passwords until they can reuse their original password.
>**Note:** After an account has been compromised, a simple password reset might not be enough to restrict a malicious user because the malicious user might have modified the user's environment so that the password is changed back to a known value automatically at a certain time. If an account has been compromised, it is best to delete the account and assign the user a new account after all affected systems have been restored to normal operations and verified that they are no longer compromised.
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ For this policy setting to be effective, you should also configure effective val
### Potential impact
-The major impact of configuring the **Enforce password history** setting to 24 is that users must create a new password every time they are required to change their old one. If users are required to change their passwords to new unique values, there is an increased risk of users who write their passwords somewhere so that they do not forget them. Another risk is that users may create passwords that change incrementally (for example, password01, password02, and so on) to facilitate memorization, but this makes them easier for an attacker to guess. Also, an excessively low value for the [Maximum password age](maximum-password-age.md) policy setting is likely to increase administrative overhead because users who forget their passwords might ask the Help Desk to reset them frequently.
+The major impact of configuring the **Enforce password history** setting to 24 is that users must create a new password every time they're required to change their old one. If users are required to change their passwords to new unique values, there's an increased risk of users who write their passwords somewhere so that they don't forget them. Another risk is that users may create passwords that change incrementally (for example, password01, password02, and so on) to facilitate memorization, but these passwords make it easier for an attacker to guess. Also, an excessively low value for the [Maximum password age](maximum-password-age.md) policy setting is likely to increase administrative overhead because users who forget their passwords might ask the Help Desk to reset them frequently.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/enforce-user-logon-restrictions.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/enforce-user-logon-restrictions.md
index c1b6e0c09e..5198399434 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/enforce-user-logon-restrictions.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/enforce-user-logon-restrictions.md
@@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ The possible values for this Group Policy setting are:
### Best practices
-- If this policy setting is disabled, users might be granted session tickets for services that they do not have the right to use.
+- If this policy setting is disabled, users might be granted session tickets for services that they don't have the right to use.
- We recommend to set **Enforce user logon restrictions** to Enabled.
+ We recommend setting **Enforce user logon restrictions** to Enabled.
### Location
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Defaul
This section describes features, tools, and guidance to help you manage this policy.
-A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to be effective.
+A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to be effective.
### Group Policy
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ Enable the **Enforce user logon restrictions** setting.
### Potential impact
-None. This is the default configuration.
+None. This non-impact state is the default configuration.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/increase-a-process-working-set.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/increase-a-process-working-set.md
index f6eda6e23e..c9c6d11852 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/increase-a-process-working-set.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/increase-a-process-working-set.md
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security
## Reference
-This policy setting determines which users can increase or decrease the size of the working set of a process. The working set of a process is the set of memory pages currently visible to the process in physical RAM. These pages are resident, and they are available for an application to use without triggering a page fault. The minimum and maximum working set sizes affect the virtual memory paging behavior of a process.
+This policy setting determines which users can increase or decrease the size of the working set of a process. The working set of a process is the set of memory pages currently visible to the process in physical RAM. These pages are resident, and they're available for an application to use without triggering a page fault. The minimum and maximum working set sizes affect the virtual memory paging behavior of a process.
Constant: SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Defaul
This section describes features, tools, and guidance to help you manage this policy.
-A restart of the computer is not required for this policy setting to be effective.
+A restart of the computer isn't required for this policy setting to be effective.
Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-display-user-information-when-the-session-is-locked.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-display-user-information-when-the-session-is-locked.md
index 7c5ca6c4a7..a54c5e93d9 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-display-user-information-when-the-session-is-locked.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-display-user-information-when-the-session-is-locked.md
@@ -44,9 +44,9 @@ This setting has these possible values:
- **User display name, domain and user names**
- For a local logon, the user's full name is displayed.
+ For a local sign in, the user's full name is displayed.
If the user signed in using a Microsoft account, the user's email address is displayed.
- For a domain logon, the domain\username is displayed.
+ For a domain sign in, the domain\username is displayed.
This setting has the same effect as turning on the **Privacy** setting.
- **User display name only**
@@ -57,30 +57,30 @@ This setting has these possible values:
- **Do not display user information**
No names are displayed.
- Beginning with Windows 10 version 1607, this option is not supported.
+ Beginning with Windows 10 version 1607, this option isn't supported.
If this option is chosen, the full name of the user who locked the session is displayed instead.
This change makes this setting consistent with the functionality of the new **Privacy** setting.
To display no user information, enable the Group Policy setting **Interactive logon: Don't display last signed-in**.
- **Domain and user names only**
- For a domain logon only, the domain\username is displayed.
+ For a domain sign in only, the domain\username is displayed.
The **Privacy** setting is automatically on and grayed out.
- **Blank**
Default setting.
This setting translates to “Not defined,” but it will display the user's full name in the same manner as the option **User display name only**.
- When an option is set, you cannot reset this policy to blank, or not defined.
+ When an option is set, you can't reset this policy to blank, or not defined.
### Hotfix for Windows 10 version 1607
-Clients that run Windows 10 version 1607 will not show details on the sign-in screen even if the **User display name, domain and user names** option is chosen because the **Privacy** setting is off.
+Clients that run Windows 10 version 1607 won't show details on the sign-in screen even if the **User display name, domain and user names** option is chosen because the **Privacy** setting is off.
If the **Privacy** setting is turned on, details will show.
-The **Privacy** setting cannot be changed for clients in bulk.
+The **Privacy** setting can't be changed for clients in bulk.
Instead, apply [KB 4013429](https://www.catalog.update.microsoft.com/Search.aspx?q=KB4013429) to clients that run Windows 10 version 1607 so they behave similarly to previous versions of Windows.
-Clients that run later versions of Windows 10 do not require a hotfix.
+Clients that run later versions of Windows 10 don't require a hotfix.
There are related Group Policy settings:
@@ -93,19 +93,19 @@ There are related Group Policy settings:
For all versions of Windows 10, only the user display name is shown by default.
If **Block user from showing account details on sign-in** is enabled, then only the user display name is shown regardless of any other Group Policy settings.
-Users will not be able to show details.
+Users won't be able to show details.
-If **Block user from showing account details on sign-in** is not enabled, then you can set **Interactive logon: Display user information when the session is locked** to **User display name, domain and user names** or **Domain and user names only** to show additional details such as domain\username.
+If **Block user from showing account details on sign-in** isn't enabled, then you can set **Interactive logon: Display user information when the session is locked** to **User display name, domain and user names** or **Domain and user names only** to show other details such as domain\username.
In this case, clients that run Windows 10 version 1607 need [KB 4013429](https://www.catalog.update.microsoft.com/Search.aspx?q=KB4013429) applied.
-Users will not be able to hide additional details.
+Users won't be able to hide other details.
-If **Block user from showing account details on sign-in** is not enabled and **Don’t display last signed-in** is enabled, the username will not be shown.
+If **Block user from showing account details on sign-in** isn't enabled and **Don’t display last signed-in** is enabled, the username won't be shown.
### Best practices
-Your implementation of this policy depends on your security requirements for displayed logon information. If you run computers that store sensitive data, with monitors displayed in unsecured locations, or if you have computers with sensitive data that are remotely accessed, revealing logged on user’s full names or domain account names might contradict your overall security policy.
+Your implementation of this policy depends on your security requirements for displayed sign-in information. If you run computers that store sensitive data, with monitors displayed in unsecured locations, or if you have computers with sensitive data that are remotely accessed, revealing logged on user’s full names or domain account names might contradict your overall security policy.
-Depending on your security policy, you might also want to enable the [Interactive logon: Do not display last user name](interactive-logon-do-not-display-last-user-name.md) policy.
+Depending on your security policy, you might also want to enable the [Interactive logon: Don't display last user name](interactive-logon-do-not-display-last-user-name.md) policy.
### Location
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
### Policy conflict considerations
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ None
### Group Policy
-This policy setting can be configured by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to be distributed through Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If this policy is not contained in a distributed GPO, this policy can be configured on the local computer by using the Local Security Policy snap-in.
+This policy setting can be configured by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to be distributed through Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If this policy isn't contained in a distributed GPO, this policy can be configured on the local computer by using the Local Security Policy snap-in.
## Security considerations
@@ -148,9 +148,9 @@ When a computer displays the Secure Desktop in an unsecured area, certain user i
### Countermeasure
-Enabling this policy setting allows the operating system to hide certain user information from being displayed on the Secure Desktop (after the device has been booted or when the session has been locked by using CTRL+ALT+DEL). However, user information is displayed if the **Switch user** feature is used so that the logon tiles are displayed for each logged on user.
+Enabling this policy setting allows the operating system to hide certain user information from being displayed on the Secure Desktop (after the device has been booted or when the session has been locked by using CTRL+ALT+DEL). However, user information is displayed if the **Switch user** feature is used so that the sign-in tiles are displayed for each signed-in user.
-You might also want to enable the [Interactive logon: Do not display last signed-in](interactive-logon-do-not-display-last-user-name.md) policy, which will prevent the Windows operating system from displaying the logon name and logon tile of the last user to log on.
+You might also want to enable the [Interactive logon: Don't display last signed-in](interactive-logon-do-not-display-last-user-name.md) policy, which will prevent the Windows operating system from displaying the sign-in name and sign-in tile of the last user to sign in.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-do-not-display-last-user-name.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-do-not-display-last-user-name.md
index 9994a60f7e..47bac4e4cc 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-do-not-display-last-user-name.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-do-not-display-last-user-name.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
title: Interactive logon Don't display last signed-in (Windows 10)
-description: Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for the Interactive logon Do not display last user name security policy setting.
+description: Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for the Interactive logon Don't display last user name security policy setting.
ms.prod: m365-security
ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
ms.sitesec: library
@@ -26,11 +26,11 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for
## Reference
-This security policy setting determines whether the name of the last user to log on to the device is displayed on the Secure Desktop.
+This security policy setting determines whether the name of the last user to sign in to the device is displayed on the Secure Desktop.
-If this policy is enabled, the full name of the last user to successfully log on is not displayed on the Secure Desktop, nor is the user’s logon tile displayed. Additionally, if the **Switch user** feature is used, the full name and logon tile are not displayed. The logon screen requests a qualified domain account name (or local user name) and password.
+If this policy is enabled, the full name of the last user to successfully sign in isn't displayed on the Secure Desktop, nor is the user’s sign-in tile displayed. Additionally, if the **Switch user** feature is used, the full name and sign-in tile aren't displayed. The sign-in screen requests a qualified domain account name (or local user name) and password.
-If this policy is disabled, the full name of the last user to log on is displayed, and the user’s logon tile is displayed. This behavior is the same when the **Switch user** feature is used.
+If this policy is disabled, the full name of the last user to sign in is displayed, and the user’s sign-in tile is displayed. This behavior is the same when the **Switch user** feature is used.
### Possible values
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ If this policy is disabled, the full name of the last user to log on is displaye
### Best practices
-Your implementation of this policy depends on your security requirements for displayed logon information. If you have devices that store sensitive data, with monitors displayed in unsecured locations, or if you have devices with sensitive data that are remotely accessed, revealing logged on user’s full names or domain account names might contradict your overall security policy.
+Your implementation of this policy depends on your security requirements for displayed sign-in information. If you have devices that store sensitive data, with monitors displayed in unsecured locations, or if you have devices with sensitive data that are remotely accessed, revealing logged on user’s full names or domain account names might contradict your overall security policy.
### Location
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
### Policy conflict considerations
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ None.
### Group Policy
-This policy setting can be configured by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to be distributed through Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If this policy is not contained in a distributed GPO, this policy can be configured on the local computer by using the Local Security Policy snap-in.
+This policy setting can be configured by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to be distributed through Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If this policy isn't contained in a distributed GPO, this policy can be configured on the local computer by using the Local Security Policy snap-in.
## Security considerations
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
### Vulnerability
-An attacker with access to the console (for example, someone with physical access or someone who can connect to the device through Remote Desktop Session Host) could view the name of the last user who logged on. The attacker could then try to guess the password, use a dictionary, or use a brute-force attack to try to log on.
+An attacker with access to the console (for example, someone with physical access or someone who can connect to the device through Remote Desktop Session Host) could view the name of the last user who logged on. The attacker could then try to guess the password, use a dictionary, or use a brute-force attack to try to sign in.
### Countermeasure
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ Enable the **Interactive logon: Do not display last user name** setting.
### Potential impact
-Users must always type their user names and passwords when they log on locally or to the domain. The logon tiles of all logged on users are not displayed.
+Users must always type their user names and passwords when they sign in locally or to the domain. The sign-in tiles of all logged on users aren't displayed.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-do-not-require-ctrl-alt-del.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-do-not-require-ctrl-alt-del.md
index 028bd47b3f..0284f2bb14 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-do-not-require-ctrl-alt-del.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-do-not-require-ctrl-alt-del.md
@@ -26,15 +26,15 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for
## Reference
-This security setting determines whether pressing CTRL+ALT+DEL is required before a user can log on.
+This security setting determines whether pressing CTRL+ALT+DEL is required before a user can sign in.
-If this policy setting is enabled on a device, a user is not required to press CTRL+ALT+DEL to log on.
+If this policy setting is enabled on a device, a user isn't required to press CTRL+ALT+DEL to sign in.
-If this policy is disabled, any user is required to press CTRL+ALT+DEL before logging on to the Windows operating system (unless they are using a smart card for logon).
+If this policy is disabled, any user is required to press CTRL+ALT+DEL before logging on to the Windows operating system (unless they're using a smart card for signing in).
-Microsoft developed this feature to make it easier for users with certain types of physical impairments to log on to device running the Windows operating system; however, not having to press the CTRL+ALT+DELETE key combination leaves users susceptible to attacks that attempt to intercept their passwords. Requiring CTRL+ALT+DELETE before users log on ensures that users are communicating by means of a trusted path when entering their passwords.
+Microsoft developed this feature to make it easier for users with certain types of physical impairments to sign in to a device running the Windows operating system; however, not having to press the CTRL+ALT+DELETE key combination leaves users susceptible to attacks that attempt to intercept their passwords. Requiring CTRL+ALT+DELETE before users sign in ensures that users are communicating through a trusted path when entering their passwords.
-A malicious user might install malware that looks like the standard logon dialog box for the Windows operating system, and capture a user's password. The attacker can then log on to the compromised account with whatever level of user rights that user has.
+A malicious user might install malware that looks like the standard sign-in dialog box for the Windows operating system, and capture a user's password. The attacker can then sign in to the compromised account with whatever level of user rights that user has.
> [!NOTE]
> When the policy is defined, registry value **DisableCAD** located in **HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System** is created. To revert the changes made by this policy, it is not enough to set its value to **Not defined**, this registry value needs to be removed as well.
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
### Policy conflict considerations
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ Beginning with Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista, the CTRL+ALT+DELETE key
### Group Policy
-This policy setting can be configured by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to be distributed through Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If this policy is not contained in a distributed GPO, this policy can be configured on the local computer by using the Local Security Policy snap-in.
+This policy setting can be configured by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to be distributed through Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If this policy isn't contained in a distributed GPO, this policy can be configured on the local computer by using the Local Security Policy snap-in.
## Security considerations
@@ -88,9 +88,9 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
### Vulnerability
-This setting makes it easier for users with certain types of physical impairments to log on to devices that run the Windows operating system. However, if users are not required to press CTRL+ALT+DEL, they are susceptible to attacks that attempt to intercept their passwords. If CTRL+ALT+DEL is required before logon, user passwords are communicated by means of a trusted path.
+This setting makes it easier for users with certain types of physical impairments to sign in to devices that run the Windows operating system. However, if users aren't required to press CTRL+ALT+DEL, they're susceptible to attacks that attempt to intercept their passwords. If CTRL+ALT+DEL is required before signing in, user passwords are communicated through a trusted path.
-If this setting is enabled, an attacker could install malware that looks like the standard logon dialog box in the Windows operating system, and capture the user's password. The attacker would then be able to log on to the compromised account with whatever level of privilege that user has.
+If this setting is enabled, an attacker could install malware that looks like the standard sign-in dialog box in the Windows operating system, and capture the user's password. The attacker would then be able to sign in to the compromised account with whatever level of privilege that user has.
### Countermeasure
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ Disable the **Interactive logon: Do not require CTRL+ALT+DEL** setting.
### Potential impact
-Unless they use a smart card to log on, users must simultaneously press the three keys before the logon dialog box is displayed.
+Unless they use a smart card to sign in, users must simultaneously press the three keys before the sign-in dialog box is displayed.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-dont-display-username-at-sign-in.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-dont-display-username-at-sign-in.md
index e0431252ef..2fd2510de4 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-dont-display-username-at-sign-in.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-dont-display-username-at-sign-in.md
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for
A new policy setting has been introduced in Windows 10 starting with Windows 10 version 1703. This security policy setting determines whether the username is displayed during sign in. This setting only affects the **Other user** tile.
-If the policy is enabled and a user signs in as **Other user**, the full name of the user is not displayed during sign-in. In the same context, if users type their email address and password at the sign in screen and press **Enter**, the displayed text “Other user” remains unchanged, and is no longer replaced by the user’s first and last name, as in previous versions of Windows 10. Additionally,if users enter their domain user name and password and click **Submit**, their full name is not shown until the Start screen displays.
+If the policy is enabled and a user signs in as **Other user**, the full name of the user isn't displayed during sign-in. In the same context, if users type their email address and password at the sign-in screen and press **Enter**, the displayed text “Other user” remains unchanged, and is no longer replaced by the user’s first and last name, as in previous versions of Windows 10. Additionally,if users enter their domain user name and password and click **Submit**, their full name isn't shown until the Start screen displays.
If the policy is disabled and a user signs in as **Other user**, the “Other user” text is replaced by the user’s first and last name during sign-in.
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
### Policy conflict considerations
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ None.
### Group Policy
-This policy setting can be configured by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to be distributed through Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If this policy is not contained in a distributed GPO, this policy can be configured on the local computer by using the Local Security Policy snap-in.
+This policy setting can be configured by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to be distributed through Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If this policy isn't contained in a distributed GPO, this policy can be configured on the local computer by using the Local Security Policy snap-in.
## Security considerations
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
### Vulnerability
-An attacker with access to the console (for example, someone with physical access or someone who can connect to the device through Remote Desktop Session Host) could view the name of the last user who logged on. The attacker could then try to guess the password, use a dictionary, or use a brute-force attack to try to log on.
+An attacker with access to the console (for example, someone with physical access or someone who can connect to the device through Remote Desktop Session Host) could view the name of the last user who logged on. The attacker could then try to guess the password, use a dictionary, or use a brute-force attack to try to sign in.
### Countermeasure
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ Enable the **Interactive logon: Don't display user name at sign-in** setting.
### Potential impact
-Users must always type their usernames and passwords when they log on locally or to the domain. The logon tiles of all logged on users are not displayed.
+Users must always type their usernames and passwords when they log on locally or to the domain. The sign in tiles of all logged on users aren't displayed.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-machine-account-lockout-threshold.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-machine-account-lockout-threshold.md
index e9a1fea0ae..148956b0f3 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-machine-account-lockout-threshold.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-machine-account-lockout-threshold.md
@@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, management, and security conside
Beginning with Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8, the **Interactive logon: Machine account threshold** security policy setting enforces the lockout policy on those computers that have BitLocker enabled to protect operating system volumes.
-The security setting allows you to set a threshold for the number of failed logon attempts that causes the device to be locked by using BitLocker. This means, if the specified maximum number of failed logon attempts is exceeded, the device will invalidate the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) protector and any other protector except the 48-digit recovery password, and then reboot. During Device Lockout mode, the computer or device only boots into the touch-enabled Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) until an authorized user enters the recovery password to restore full access.
+The security setting allows you to set a threshold for the number of failed sign-in attempts that causes the device to be locked by using BitLocker. This threshold means, if the specified maximum number of failed sign-in attempts is exceeded, the device will invalidate the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) protector and any other protector except the 48-digit recovery password, and then reboot. During Device Lockout mode, the computer or device only boots into the touch-enabled Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) until an authorized user enters the recovery password to restore full access.
-Failed password attempts on workstations or member servers that have been locked by using either Ctrl+Alt+Delete or password-protected screen savers count as failed logon attempts.
+Failed password attempts on workstations or member servers that have been locked by using either Ctrl+Alt+Delete or password-protected screen savers count as failed sign-in attempts.
### Possible values
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ You can set the **invalid logon attempts** value between 1 and 999. Values from
### Best practices
-Use this policy setting in conjunction with your other failed account logon attempts policy. For example, if the [Account lockout threshold](account-lockout-threshold.md) policy setting is set at 4, then setting **Interactive logon: Machine account lockout threshold** at 6 allows the user to restore access to resources without having to restore access to the device resulting from a BitLocker lock out.
+Use this policy setting in conjunction with your other failed account sign-in attempts policy. For example, if the [Account lockout threshold](account-lockout-threshold.md) policy setting is set at 4, then setting **Interactive logon: Machine account lockout threshold** at 6 allows the user to restore access to resources without having to restore access to the device resulting from a BitLocker lock out.
### Location
@@ -64,13 +64,13 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage
### Restart requirement
-A restart is required for changes to this policy to become effective when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+A restart is required for changes to this policy to become effective when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
### Group Policy
Because this policy setting was introduced in Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8, it can only be set locally on those devices that contain this policy setting, but it can be set and distributed through Group Policy to any computer running the Windows operating system that supports Group Policy and is BitLocker-enabled.
-When setting this policy, consider the [Account lockout threshold](account-lockout-threshold.md) policy setting, which determines the number of failed logon attempts that will cause a user account to be locked out.
+When setting this policy, consider the [Account lockout threshold](account-lockout-threshold.md) policy setting, which determines the number of failed sign-in attempts that will cause a user account to be locked out.
## Security considerations
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ This policy setting helps protect a BitLocker-encrypted device from attackers at
### Countermeasure
-Use this policy setting in conjunction with your other failed account logon attempts policy. For example, if the [Account lockout threshold](account-lockout-threshold.md) policy setting is set at 4, then setting **Interactive logon: Machine account lockout threshold** at 6 allows the user to restore access to resources without having to restore access to the device resulting from a BitLocker lock out.
+Use this policy setting in conjunction with your other failed account sign-in attempts policy. For example, if the [Account lockout threshold](account-lockout-threshold.md) policy setting is set at 4, then setting **Interactive logon: Machine account lockout threshold** at 6 allows the user to restore access to resources without having to restore access to the device resulting from a BitLocker lock out.
### Potential impact
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-machine-inactivity-limit.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-machine-inactivity-limit.md
index 737bfddba3..01524c765c 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-machine-inactivity-limit.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-machine-inactivity-limit.md
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage
### Restart requirement
-Restart is required for changes to this policy to become effective when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+Restart is required for changes to this policy to become effective when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
### Group Policy
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-message-text-for-users-attempting-to-log-on.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-message-text-for-users-attempting-to-log-on.md
index 8fdc5659f9..09e60e2f2b 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-message-text-for-users-attempting-to-log-on.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-message-text-for-users-attempting-to-log-on.md
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
title: Interactive Logon Message text (Windows 10)
description: Learn about best practices, security considerations and more for the security policy setting, Interactive logon Message text for users attempting to log on.
ms.assetid: fcfe8a6d-ca65-4403-b9e6-2fa017a31c2e
-ms.reviewer:
+ms.reviewer:
ms.author: dansimp
ms.prod: m365-security
ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
@@ -30,10 +30,11 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, management, and security conside
The **Interactive logon: Message text for users attempting to log on** and [Interactive logon: Message title for users attempting to log on](interactive-logon-message-title-for-users-attempting-to-log-on.md) policy settings are closely related.
-- **Interactive logon: Message text for users attempting to log on** specifies a text message to be displayed to users when they log on.
-- **Interactive logon: Message title for users attempting to log on** specifies a title to appear in the title bar of the window that contains the text message.
+**Interactive logon: Message text for users attempting to log on** specifies a text message to be displayed to users when they sign in.
-This text is often used for legal reasons, for example, to warn users about the ramifications of misusing company information or to warn them that their actions may be audited. When these policy settings are configured, users will see a dialog box before they can log on to the server console.
+**Interactive logon: Message title for users attempting to log on** specifies a title to appear in the title bar of the window that contains the text message. This text is often used for legal reasons, for example, to warn users about the ramifications of misusing company information or to warn them that their actions may be audited.
+
+When these policy settings are configured, users will see a dialog box before they can sign in to the server console.
### Possible values
@@ -44,15 +45,12 @@ The possible values for this setting are:
### Best practices
-It is advisable to set **Interactive logon: Message text for users attempting to log on** to a value similar to one of the following:
+- It's advisable to set **Interactive logon: Message text for users attempting to log on** to a value similar to one of the following:
-```text
-1. IT IS AN OFFENSE TO CONTINUE WITHOUT PROPER AUTHORIZATION.
-2. This system is restricted to authorized users. Individuals who attempt unauthorized access will be prosecuted. If you are unauthorized, terminate access now. Click OK to indicate your acceptance of this information.
-```
-
-> [!NOTE]
-> Any warning that you display in the title or text should be approved by representatives from your organization's legal and human resources departments.
+ 1. IT IS AN OFFENSE TO CONTINUE WITHOUT PROPER AUTHORIZATION.
+ 2. This system is restricted to authorized users. Individuals who attempt unauthorized access will be prosecuted. If you're unauthorized, terminate access now. Click OK to indicate your acceptance of this information.
+ > [!IMPORTANT]
+ > Any warning that you display in the title or text should be approved by representatives from your organization's legal and human resources departments.
### Location
@@ -77,22 +75,22 @@ This section describes different requirements to help you manage this policy.
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
## Security considerations
This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configuration, how to implement the countermeasure, and the possible negative consequences of countermeasure implementation.
-There are two policy settings that relate to logon displays:
+There are two policy settings that relate to sign-in displays:
- **Interactive logon: Message text for users attempting to log on**
- [Interactive logon: Message title for users attempting to log on](interactive-logon-message-title-for-users-attempting-to-log-on.md)
-The first policy setting specifies a text message that displays to users when they log on, and the second policy setting specifies a title for the title bar of the text message window. Many organizations use this text for legal purposes; for example, to warn users about the ramifications of misuse of company information, or to warn them that their actions may be audited.
+The first policy setting specifies a text message that displays to users when they sign in, and the second policy setting specifies a title for the title bar of the text message window. Many organizations use this text for legal purposes; for example, to warn users about the ramifications of misuse of company information, or to warn them that their actions may be audited.
### Vulnerability
-Users often do not understand the importance of security practices. However, the display of a warning message before logon may help prevent an attack by warning malicious or uninformed users about the consequences of their misconduct before it happens. It may also help reinforce corporate policies by notifying employees of appropriate policies during the logon process.
+Users often don't understand the importance of security practices. However, the display of a warning message before signing in may help prevent an attack by warning malicious or uninformed users about the consequences of their misconduct before it happens. It may also help reinforce corporate policies by notifying employees of appropriate policies during the sign-in process.
### Countermeasure
@@ -100,7 +98,7 @@ Configure the **Interactive logon: Message text for users attempting to log on**
### Potential impact
-Users see a message in a dialog box before they can log on to the server console.
+Users see a message in a dialog box before they can sign in to the server console.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-message-title-for-users-attempting-to-log-on.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-message-title-for-users-attempting-to-log-on.md
index e69e4bd287..b16fd3bff2 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-message-title-for-users-attempting-to-log-on.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-message-title-for-users-attempting-to-log-on.md
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
title: Interactive logon Message title for users attempting to log on (Windows 10)
description: Best practices, security considerations, and more for the security policy setting, Interactive logon Message title for users attempting to log on.
ms.assetid: f2596470-4cc0-4ef1-849c-bef9dc3533c6
-ms.reviewer:
+ms.reviewer:
ms.author: dansimp
ms.prod: m365-security
ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
@@ -30,7 +30,9 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management and security c
This security setting allows you to specify a title that appears in the title bar of the window that contains the **Interactive logon: Message title for users attempting to log on**. This text is often used for legal reasons—for example, to warn users about the ramifications of misusing company information, or to warn them that their actions might be audited.
-The **Interactive logon: Message title for users attempting to log on** and [Interactive logon: Message text for users attempting to log on](interactive-logon-message-text-for-users-attempting-to-log-on.md) policy settings are closely related. When these policy settings are configured, users will see a dialog box before they can log on to the server console.
+The **Interactive logon: Message title for users attempting to log on** and [Interactive logon: Message text for users attempting to log on](interactive-logon-message-text-for-users-attempting-to-log-on.md) policy settings are closely related. **Interactive logon: Message title for users attempting to log on** specifies a message title to be displayed to users when they log on. This text is often used for legal reasons, for example, to warn users about the ramifications of misusing company information or to warn them that their actions may be audited.
+
+When these policy settings are configured, users will see a dialog box before they can sign in the server console.
### Possible values
@@ -72,22 +74,22 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
## Security considerations
This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configuration, how to implement the countermeasure, and the possible negative consequences of countermeasure implementation.
-There are two policy settings that relate to logon displays:
+There are two policy settings that relate to sign-in displays:
- [Interactive logon: Message text for users attempting to log on](interactive-logon-message-text-for-users-attempting-to-log-on.md)
- **Interactive logon: Message title for users attempting to log on**
-The first policy setting specifies a text message that displays to users when they log on, and the second policy setting specifies a title for the title bar of the text message window. Many organizations use this text for legal purposes; for example, to warn users about the ramifications of misuse of company information, or to warn them that their actions may be audited.
+The first policy setting specifies a text message that displays to users when they sign in, and the second policy setting specifies a title for the title bar of the text message window. Many organizations use this text for legal purposes; for example, to warn users about the ramifications of misuse of company information, or to warn them that their actions may be audited.
### Vulnerability
-Users often do not understand the importance of security practices. However, the display of a warning message with an appropriate title before logon may help prevent an attack by warning malicious or uninformed users about the consequences of their misconduct before it happens. It may also help reinforce corporate policies by notifying employees of appropriate policies during the logon process.
+Users often don't understand the importance of security practices. However, the display of a warning message with an appropriate title before signing in may help prevent an attack by warning malicious or uninformed users about the consequences of their misconduct before it happens. It may also help reinforce corporate policies by notifying employees of appropriate policies during the sign-in process.
### Countermeasure
@@ -98,7 +100,7 @@ Configure the [Interactive logon: Message text for users attempting to log on](i
### Potential impact
-Users see a message in a dialog box before they can log on to the server console.
+Users see a message in a dialog box before they can sign in to the server console.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-number-of-previous-logons-to-cache-in-case-domain-controller-is-not-available.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-number-of-previous-logons-to-cache-in-case-domain-controller-is-not-available.md
index 90773e0b18..966a3f3c4e 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-number-of-previous-logons-to-cache-in-case-domain-controller-is-not-available.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-number-of-previous-logons-to-cache-in-case-domain-controller-is-not-available.md
@@ -27,19 +27,19 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security
## Reference
-The **Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain controller is not available**) policy setting determines whether a user can log on to a Windows domain by using cached account information. Logon information for domain accounts can be cached locally so that, if a domain controller cannot be contacted on subsequent logons, a user can still log on. This policy setting determines the number of unique users whose logon information is cached locally.
+The **Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain controller is not available**) policy setting determines whether a user can sign in to a Windows domain by using cached account information. Sign-in information for domain accounts can be cached locally so that, if a domain controller can't be contacted on subsequent logons, a user can still sign in. This policy setting determines the number of unique users whose sign-in information is cached locally.
-If a domain controller is unavailable and a user's logon information is cached, the user is prompted with the following message:
+If a domain controller is unavailable and a user's sign-in information is cached, the user is prompted with the following message:
-A domain controller for your domain could not be contacted. You have been logged on using cached account information. Changes to your profile since you last logged on might not be available.
+A domain controller for your domain couldn't be contacted. You've been logged on using cached account information. Changes to your profile since you last logged on might not be available.
-If a domain controller is unavailable and a user's logon information is not cached, the user is prompted with this message:
+If a domain controller is unavailable and a user's sign-in information isn't cached, the user is prompted with this message:
-The system cannot log you on now because the domain *DOMAIN NAME* is not available.
+The system can't log you on now because the domain *DOMAIN NAME* isn't available.
-The value of this policy setting indicates the number of users whose logon information the server caches locally. If the value is 10, the server caches logon information for 10 users. When an 11th user logs on to the device, the server overwrites the oldest cached logon session.
+The value of this policy setting indicates the number of users whose sign-in information the server caches locally. If the value is 10, the server caches sign-in information for 10 users. When an 11th user signs in to the device, the server overwrites the oldest cached sign-in session.
-Users who access the server console will have their logon credentials cached on that server. A malicious user who is able to access the file system of the server can locate this cached information and use a brute-force attack to determine user passwords. Windows mitigates this type of attack by
+Users who access the server console will have their sign-in credentials cached on that server. A malicious user who is able to access the file system of the server can locate this cached information and use a brute-force attack to determine user passwords. Windows mitigates this type of attack by
encrypting the information and keeping the cached credentials in the system's registries, which are spread across numerous physical locations.
> [!NOTE]
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ encrypting the information and keeping the cached credentials in the system's re
### Best practices
-The [Windows security baselines](../windows-security-baselines.md) do not recommend configuring this setting.
+The [Windows security baselines](../windows-security-baselines.md) don't recommend configuring this setting.
### Location
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
### Policy conflict considerations
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ None
### Group Policy
-This policy setting can be configured by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to be distributed through Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If this policy is not contained in a distributed GPO, this policy can be configured on the local computer by using the Local Security Policy snap-in.
+This policy setting can be configured by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to be distributed through Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If this policy isn't contained in a distributed GPO, this policy can be configured on the local computer by using the Local Security Policy snap-in.
## Security considerations
@@ -93,20 +93,20 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
### Vulnerability
-The number that is assigned to this policy setting indicates the number of users whose logon information is cache locally by the servers. If the number is set to 10, the server caches logon information for 10 users. When an 11th user logs on to the device, the server overwrites the oldest cached logon session.
+The number that is assigned to this policy setting indicates the number of users whose sign-in information is cached locally by the servers. If the number is set to 10, the server caches sign-in information for 10 users. When an 11th user signs in to the device, the server overwrites the oldest cached sign-in session.
-Users who access the server console have their logon credentials cached on that server. An attacker who is able to access the file system of the server could locate this cached information and use a brute force attack to attempt to determine user passwords.
+Users who access the server console have their sign-in credentials cached on that server. An attacker who is able to access the file system of the server could locate this cached information and use a brute force attack to attempt to determine user passwords.
To mitigate this type of attack, Windows encrypts the information and obscures its physical location.
### Countermeasure
-Configure the **Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain controller is not available)** setting to 0, which disables the local caching of logon information. Additional countermeasures include enforcement of strong password policies and physically secure locations for the computers.
+Configure the **Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain controller is not available)** setting to 0, which disables the local caching of sign-in information. Other countermeasures include enforcement of strong password policies and physically secure locations for the computers.
### Potential impact
-Users cannot log on to any devices if there is no domain controller available to authenticate them. Organizations can configure this value to 2 for end-user computers, especially for mobile users. A configuration value of 2 means that the user's logon information is still in the cache, even if a
-member of the IT department has recently logged on to the device to perform system maintenance. This method allows users to log on to their computers when they are not connected to the organization's network.
+Users can't sign in to any devices if there's no domain controller available to authenticate them. Organizations can configure this value to 2 for end-user computers, especially for mobile users. A configuration value of 2 means that the user's sign-in information is still in the cache, even if a
+member of the IT department has recently logged on to the device to perform system maintenance. This method allows users to sign in to their computers when they aren't connected to the organization's network.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-require-domain-controller-authentication-to-unlock-workstation.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-require-domain-controller-authentication-to-unlock-workstation.md
index 88948dcc4f..be5146c636 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-require-domain-controller-authentication-to-unlock-workstation.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-require-domain-controller-authentication-to-unlock-workstation.md
@@ -27,13 +27,13 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security
## Reference
-Unlocking a locked device requires logon information. For domain accounts, the **Interactive logon: Require Domain Controller authentication to unlock workstation** policy setting determines whether it is necessary to contact a domain controller to unlock a device. Enabling this policy setting requires a domain controller to authenticate the domain account that is being used to unlock the device. Disabling this policy setting allows a user to unlock the device without the computer verifying the logon information with a domain controller. However, if [Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain controller is not available)](interactive-logon-number-of-previous-logons-to-cache-in-case-domain-controller-is-not-available.md) is set to a value greater than zero, the user's cached credentials will be used to unlock the system.
+Unlocking a locked device requires sign-in information. For domain accounts, the **Interactive logon: Require Domain Controller authentication to unlock workstation** policy setting determines whether it's necessary to contact a domain controller to unlock a device. Enabling this policy setting requires a domain controller to authenticate the domain account that is being used to unlock the device. Disabling this policy setting allows a user to unlock the device without the computer verifying the sign-in information with a domain controller. However, if [Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain controller is not available)](interactive-logon-number-of-previous-logons-to-cache-in-case-domain-controller-is-not-available.md) is set to a value greater than zero, the user's cached credentials will be used to unlock the system.
The device caches (locally in memory) the credentials of any users who have been authenticated. The device uses these cached credentials to authenticate anyone who attempts to unlock the console.
-When cached credentials are used, any changes that have recently been made to the account (such as user rights assignments, account lockout, or the account being disabled) are not considered or applied after this authentication process. This means not only that user rights are not updated, but more importantly that disabled accounts are still able to unlock the console of the system.
+When cached credentials are used, any changes that have recently been made to the account (such as user rights assignments, account lockout, or the account being disabled) aren't considered or applied after this authentication process. This result means not only that user rights aren't updated, but more importantly that disabled accounts are still able to unlock the console of the system.
-It is advisable to set **Interactive logon: Require Domain Controller authentication to unlock workstation** to Enabled and set [Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain controller is not available)](interactive-logon-number-of-previous-logons-to-cache-in-case-domain-controller-is-not-available.md) to 0. When the console of a device is locked by a user or automatically by a screen saver time-out, the console can only be unlocked if the user is able to re-authenticate to the domain controller. If no domain controller is available, users cannot unlock their devices.
+It's advisable to set **Interactive logon: Require Domain Controller authentication to unlock workstation** to Enabled and set [Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain controller is not available)](interactive-logon-number-of-previous-logons-to-cache-in-case-domain-controller-is-not-available.md) to 0. When the console of a device is locked by a user or automatically by a screen saver time-out, the console can only be unlocked if the user is able to reauthenticate to the domain controller. If no domain controller is available, users can't unlock their devices.
### Possible values
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ It is advisable to set **Interactive logon: Require Domain Controller authentica
### Best practices
-- Set **Interactive logon: Require Domain Controller authentication to unlock workstation** to Enabled and set [Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain controller is not available)](interactive-logon-number-of-previous-logons-to-cache-in-case-domain-controller-is-not-available.md) to 0. When the console of a device is locked by a user or automatically by a screen saver time-out, the console can only be unlocked if the user is able to re-authenticate to the domain controller. If no domain controller is available, users cannot unlock their devices.
+- Set **Interactive logon: Require Domain Controller authentication to unlock workstation** to Enabled and set [Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain controller is not available)](interactive-logon-number-of-previous-logons-to-cache-in-case-domain-controller-is-not-available.md) to 0. When the console of a device is locked by a user or automatically by a screen saver time-out, the console can only be unlocked if the user is able to reauthenticate to the domain controller. If no domain controller is available, users can't unlock their devices.
### Location
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
### Policy conflict considerations
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ None
### Group Policy
-This policy setting can be configured by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to be distributed through Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If this policy is not contained in a distributed GPO, this policy can be configured on the local computer by using the Local Security Policy snap-in.
+This policy setting can be configured by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to be distributed through Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If this policy isn't contained in a distributed GPO, this policy can be configured on the local computer by using the Local Security Policy snap-in.
## Security considerations
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
### Vulnerability
-By default, the device caches locally in memory the credentials of any users who are authenticated. The device uses these cached credentials to authenticate anyone who attempts to unlock the console. When cached credentials are used, any changes that have recently been made to the account—such as user rights assignments, account lockout, or the account being disabled—are not considered or applied after the account is authenticated. User privileges are not updated, and disabled accounts are still able to unlock the console of the device
+By default, the device caches locally in memory the credentials of any users who are authenticated. The device uses these cached credentials to authenticate anyone who attempts to unlock the console. When cached credentials are used, any changes that have recently been made to the account—such as user rights assignments, account lockout, or the account being disabled—aren't considered or applied after the account is authenticated. User privileges aren't updated, and disabled accounts are still able to unlock the console of the device
### Countermeasure
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ Configure the **Interactive logon: Require Domain Controller authentication to u
### Potential impact
-When the console on a device is locked by a user or automatically by a screen-saver timeout, the console can be unlocked only if the user can re-authenticate to the domain controller. If no domain controller is available, users cannot unlock their workstations. If you configure the [Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain controller is not available)](interactive-logon-number-of-previous-logons-to-cache-in-case-domain-controller-is-not-available.md) setting to 0, users whose domain controllers are unavailable (such as mobile or remote users) cannot log on.
+When the console on a device is locked by a user or automatically by a screen-saver timeout, the console can be unlocked only if the user can reauthenticate to the domain controller. If no domain controller is available, users can't unlock their workstations. If you configure the [Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain controller is not available)](interactive-logon-number-of-previous-logons-to-cache-in-case-domain-controller-is-not-available.md) setting to 0, users whose domain controllers are unavailable (such as mobile or remote users) can't sign in.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/kerberos-policy.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/kerberos-policy.md
index 50e612ee9a..959ced7fdc 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/kerberos-policy.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/kerberos-policy.md
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec
Describes the Kerberos Policy settings and provides links to policy setting descriptions.
-The Kerberos version 5 authentication protocol provides the default mechanism for authentication services and the authorization data necessary for a user to access a resource and perform a task on that resource. By reducing the lifetime of Kerberos tickets, you reduce the risk of a legitimate user's credentials being stolen and successfully used by an attacker. However, this also increases the authorization overhead. In most environments, these settings should not need to be changed.
+The Kerberos version 5 authentication protocol provides the default mechanism for authentication services and the authorization data necessary for a user to access a resource and perform a task on that resource. By reducing the lifetime of Kerberos tickets, you reduce the risk of a legitimate user's credentials being stolen and successfully used by an attacker. However, this ticket lifetime reduction also increases the authorization overhead. In most environments, these settings shouldn't need to be changed.
These policy settings are located in **\\Computer Configuration\\Windows Settings\\Security Settings\\Account Policies\\Kerberos Policy**.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/load-and-unload-device-drivers.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/load-and-unload-device-drivers.md
index a0534994d0..9a7f5f87d4 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/load-and-unload-device-drivers.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/load-and-unload-device-drivers.md
@@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security
## Reference
-This policy setting determines which users can dynamically load and unload device drivers. This user right is not required if a signed driver for the new hardware already exists in the driver.cab file on the device. Device drivers run as highly privileged code.
+This policy setting determines which users can dynamically load and unload device drivers. This user right isn't required if a signed driver for the new hardware already exists in the driver.cab file on the device. Device drivers run as highly privileged code.
Windows supports the Plug and Play specifications that define how a computer can detect and configure newly added hardware, and then automatically install the device driver. Prior to Plug and Play, users needed to manually configure devices before attaching them to the device. This model allows a user to plug in the hardware, then Windows searches for an appropriate device driver package and automatically configures it to work without interfering with other devices.
-Because device driver software runs as if it is a part of the operating system with unrestricted access to the entire computer, it is critical that only known and authorized device drivers be permitted.
+Because device driver software runs as if it's a part of the operating system with unrestricted access to the entire computer, it's critical that only known and authorized device drivers be permitted.
Constant: SeLoadDriverPrivilege
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Constant: SeLoadDriverPrivilege
### Best practices
-- Because of the potential security risk, do not assign this user right to any user, group, or process that you do not want to take over the system.
+- Because of the potential security risk, don't assign this user right to any user, group, or process that you don't want to take over the system.
### Location
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Defaul
This section describes features, tools, and guidance to help you manage this policy.
-A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to be effective.
+A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to be effective.
Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on.
@@ -94,11 +94,11 @@ Device drivers run as highly privileged code. A user who has the **Load and unlo
### Countermeasure
-Do not assign the **Load and unload device drivers** user right to any user or group other than Administrators on member servers. On domain controllers, do not assign this user right to any user or group other than Domain Admins.
+Don't assign the **Load and unload device drivers** user right to any user or group other than Administrators on member servers. On domain controllers, don't assign this user right to any user or group other than Domain Admins.
### Potential impact
-If you remove the **Load and unload device drivers** user right from the Print Operators group or other accounts, you could limit the abilities of users who are assigned to specific administrative roles in your environment. You should ensure that delegated tasks are not negatively affected.
+If you remove the **Load and unload device drivers** user right from the Print Operators group or other accounts, you could limit the abilities of users who are assigned to specific administrative roles in your environment. You should ensure that delegated tasks aren't negatively affected.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/lock-pages-in-memory.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/lock-pages-in-memory.md
index 17b2d7d0e6..5aae309524 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/lock-pages-in-memory.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/lock-pages-in-memory.md
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ This policy setting determines which accounts can use a process to keep data in
Normally, an application running on Windows can negotiate for more physical memory, and in response to the request, the application begins to move the data from RAM (such as the data cache) to a disk. When the pageable memory is moved to a disk, more RAM is free for the operating system to use.
-Enabling this policy setting for a specific account (a user account or a process account for an application) prevents paging of the data. Thereby, the amount of memory that Windows can reclaim under pressure is limited. This could lead to performance degradation.
+Enabling this policy setting for a specific account (a user account or a process account for an application) prevents paging of the data. Thereby, the amount of memory that Windows can reclaim under pressure is limited. This limitation could lead to performance degradation.
>**Note:** By configuring this policy setting, the performance of the Windows operating system will differ depending on if applications are running on 32-bit or 64-bit systems, and if they are virtualized images. Performance will also differ between earlier and later versions of the Windows operating system.
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values for the
This section describes features, tools, and guidance to help you manage this policy.
-A restart of the computer is not required for this policy setting to be effective.
+A restart of the computer isn't required for this policy setting to be effective.
Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on.
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ Users with the **Lock pages in memory** user right could assign physical memory
### Countermeasure
-Do not assign the **Lock pages in memory** user right to any accounts.
+Don't assign the **Lock pages in memory** user right to any accounts.
### Potential impact
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/log-on-as-a-batch-job.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/log-on-as-a-batch-job.md
index db982227ad..39c6bc3b10 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/log-on-as-a-batch-job.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/log-on-as-a-batch-job.md
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ This article describes the recommended practices, location, values, policy manag
## Reference
-This policy setting determines which accounts can log on by using a batch-queue tool such as the Task Scheduler service. When you use the Add Scheduled Task Wizard to schedule a task to run under a particular user name and password, that user is automatically assigned the **Log on as a batch job** user right. When the scheduled time arrives, the Task Scheduler service logs on the user as a batch job instead of as an interactive user, and the task runs in the user's security context.
+This policy setting determines which accounts can sign in by using a batch-queue tool such as the Task Scheduler service. When you use the Add Scheduled Task Wizard to schedule a task to run under a particular user name and password, that user is automatically assigned the **Log on as a batch job** user right. When the scheduled time arrives, the Task Scheduler service logs on the user as a batch job instead of as an interactive user, and the task runs in the user's security context.
Constant: SeBatchLogonRight
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ For IIS servers, configure this policy locally instead of through domain–based
### Potential impact
-If you configure the **Log on as a batch job** setting by using domain-based Group Policy settings, the computer can't assign the user right to accounts that are used for scheduled jobs in the Task Scheduler. If you install optional components such as ASP.NET or IIS, you might need to assign this user right to additional accounts that those components require. For example, IIS requires assignment of this user right to the IIS\_WPG group and the IUSR\_*<ComputerName>*, ASPNET, and IWAM\_*<ComputerName>* accounts. If this user right isn't assigned to this group and these accounts, IIS can't run some COM objects that are necessary for proper functionality.
+If you configure the **Log on as a batch job** setting by using domain-based Group Policy settings, the computer can't assign the user right to accounts that are used for scheduled jobs in the Task Scheduler. If you install optional components such as ASP.NET or IIS, you might need to assign this user right to other accounts that those components require. For example, IIS requires assignment of this user right to the IIS\_WPG group and the IUSR\_*<ComputerName>*, ASPNET, and IWAM\_*<ComputerName>* accounts. If this user right isn't assigned to this group and these accounts, IIS can't run some COM objects that are necessary for proper functionality.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/manage-auditing-and-security-log.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/manage-auditing-and-security-log.md
index 5da39ee708..4566dfbf15 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/manage-auditing-and-security-log.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/manage-auditing-and-security-log.md
@@ -27,8 +27,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security
## Reference
-This policy setting determines which users can specify object access audit options for individual resources such as files, Active Directory objects, and registry keys. These objects specify their system access control lists (SACL). A user who is assigned this user right can also view and clear the
-Security log in Event Viewer. For more info about the Object Access audit policy, see [Audit object access](../auditing/basic-audit-object-access.md).
+This policy setting determines which users can specify object access audit options for individual resources such as files, Active Directory objects, and registry keys. These objects specify their system access control lists (SACL). A user who is assigned this user right can also view and clear the Security log in Event Viewer. For more information about the Object Access audit policy, see [Audit object access](../auditing/basic-audit-object-access.md).
Constant: SeSecurityPrivilege
@@ -40,7 +39,7 @@ Constant: SeSecurityPrivilege
### Best practices
1. Before removing this right from a group, investigate whether applications are dependent on this right.
-2. Generally, assigning this user right to groups other than Administrators is not necessary.
+2. Generally, assigning this user right to groups other than Administrators isn't necessary.
### Location
@@ -65,11 +64,11 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values for the
This section describes features, tools, and guidance to help you manage this policy.
-A restart of the computer is not required for this policy setting to be effective.
+A restart of the computer isn't required for this policy setting to be effective.
Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on.
-Audits for object access are not performed unless you enable them by using the Local Group Policy Editor, the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC), or the Auditpol command-line tool.
+Audits for object access aren't performed unless you enable them by using the Local Group Policy Editor, the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC), or the Auditpol command-line tool.
For more information about the Object Access audit policy, see [Audit object access](../auditing/basic-audit-object-access.md).
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-lifetime-for-service-ticket.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-lifetime-for-service-ticket.md
index e3ed6c49c4..3dbb0c258d 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-lifetime-for-service-ticket.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-lifetime-for-service-ticket.md
@@ -31,16 +31,16 @@ The **Maximum lifetime for service ticket** policy setting determines the maximu
The possible values for this Group Policy setting are:
-- A user-defined number of minutes from 10 through 99,999, or 0 (in which case service tickets do not expire).
+- A user-defined number of minutes from 10 through 99,999, or 0 (in which case service tickets don't expire).
- Not defined.
-If a client presents an expired session ticket when it requests a connection to a server, the server returns an error message. The client must request a new session ticket from the Kerberos V5 KDC. After a connection is authenticated, however, it no longer matters whether the session ticket remains valid. Session tickets are used only to authenticate new connections with servers. Ongoing operations are not interrupted if the session ticket that authenticated the connection expires during the connection.
+If a client presents an expired session ticket when it requests a connection to a server, the server returns an error message. The client must request a new session ticket from the Kerberos V5 KDC. After a connection is authenticated, however, it no longer matters whether the session ticket remains valid. Session tickets are used only to authenticate new connections with servers. Ongoing operations aren't interrupted if the session ticket that authenticated the connection expires during the connection.
-If the value for this policy setting is too high, users might be able to access network resources outside of their logon hours. In addition, users whose accounts have been disabled might be able to continue accessing network services by using valid service tickets that were issued before their account was disabled. If the value is set to 0, service tickets never expire.
+If the value for this policy setting is too high, users might be able to access network resources outside of their sign-in hours. In addition, users whose accounts have been disabled might be able to continue accessing network services by using valid service tickets that were issued before their account was disabled. If the value is set to 0, service tickets never expire.
### Best practices
-- It is advisable to set **Maximum lifetime for service ticket** to **600** minutes.
+- It's advisable to set **Maximum lifetime for service ticket** to **600** minutes.
### Location
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Defaul
This section describes features, tools, and guidance to help you manage this policy.
-A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to be effective.
+A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to be effective.
This policy setting is configured on the domain controller.
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
### Vulnerability
-If you configure the value for the **Maximum lifetime for service ticket** setting too high, users might be able to access network resources outside of their logon hours. Also, users whose accounts were disabled might continue to have access to network services with valid service tickets that were issued before their accounts were disabled.
+If you configure the value for the **Maximum lifetime for service ticket** setting too high, users might be able to access network resources outside of their sign-in hours. Also, users whose accounts were disabled might continue to have access to network services with valid service tickets that were issued before their accounts were disabled.
### Countermeasure
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ Configure the **Maximum lifetime for service ticket** setting to 600 minutes.
### Potential impact
-None. This is the default configuration.
+None. This non-impact state is the default configuration.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-lifetime-for-user-ticket-renewal.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-lifetime-for-user-ticket-renewal.md
index 0b5fddd3cd..4807321a05 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-lifetime-for-user-ticket-renewal.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-lifetime-for-user-ticket-renewal.md
@@ -36,9 +36,9 @@ The possible values for this Group Policy setting are:
### Best practices
-- If the value for this policy setting is too high, users may be able to renew very old user ticket-granting tickets. If the value is 0, ticket-granting tickets never expire.
+- If the value for this policy setting is too high, users may be able to renew old user ticket-granting tickets. If the value is 0, ticket-granting tickets never expire.
- It is advisable to set **Maximum lifetime for user ticket renewal** to **7** days.
+ It's advisable to set **Maximum lifetime for user ticket renewal** to **7** days.
### Location
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Defaul
This section describes features, tools, and guidance to help you manage this policy.
-A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to be effective.
+A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to be effective.
This policy setting is configured on the domain controller.
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
### Vulnerability
-If the value for the **Maximum lifetime for user ticket renewal** setting is too high, users might be able to renew very old user tickets.
+If the value for the **Maximum lifetime for user ticket renewal** setting is too high, users might be able to renew old user tickets.
### Countermeasure
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-lifetime-for-user-ticket.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-lifetime-for-user-ticket.md
index b189dda660..53e36fa838 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-lifetime-for-user-ticket.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-lifetime-for-user-ticket.md
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ The possible values for this Group Policy setting are:
- A user-defined number of hours from 0 through 99,999
- Not defined
-If the value for this policy setting is too high, users might be able to access network resources outside of their logon hours, or users whose accounts have been disabled might be able to continue to access network services by using valid service tickets that were issued before their account was disabled. If the value is set to 0, ticket-granting tickets never expire.
+If the value for this policy setting is too high, users might be able to access network resources outside of their sign-in hours, or users whose accounts have been disabled might be able to continue to access network services by using valid service tickets that were issued before their account was disabled. If the value is set to 0, ticket-granting tickets never expire.
### Best practices
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Defaul
This section describes features, tools, and guidance to help you manage this policy.
-A restart of the computer is not required for this policy setting to be effective.
+A restart of the computer isn't required for this policy setting to be effective.
This policy setting is configured on the domain controller.
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
### Vulnerability
-If you configure the value for the **Maximum lifetime for user ticket** setting too high, users might be able to access network resources outside of their logon hours. Also, users whose accounts were disabled might continue to have access to network services with valid user tickets that were issued before their accounts were disabled. If you configure this value too low, ticket requests to the KDC may affect the performance of your KDC and present an opportunity for a DoS attack.
+If you configure the value for the **Maximum lifetime for user ticket** setting too high, users might be able to access network resources outside of their sign-in hours. Also, users whose accounts were disabled might continue to have access to network services with valid user tickets that were issued before their accounts were disabled. If you configure this value too low, ticket requests to the KDC may affect the performance of your KDC and present an opportunity for a DoS attack.
### Countermeasure
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ Configure the **Maximum lifetime for user ticket** setting with a value between
### Potential impact
-Reducing this setting from the default value reduces the likelihood that the ticket-granting ticket will be used to access resources that the user does not have rights to. However, it requires more frequent requests to the KDC for ticket-granting tickets on behalf of users. Most KDCs can support a value of four hours without too much additional burden.
+Reducing this setting from the default value reduces the likelihood that the ticket-granting ticket will be used to access resources that the user doesn't have rights to. However, it requires more frequent requests to the KDC for ticket-granting tickets on behalf of users. Most KDCs can support a value of 4 hours without any extra burden.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-password-age.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-password-age.md
index 546b7de4f2..e63f28edde 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-password-age.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-password-age.md
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security
## Reference
-The **Maximum password age** policy setting determines the period of time (in days) that a password can be used before the system requires the user to change it. You can set passwords to expire after a number of days between 1 and 999, or you can specify that passwords never expire by setting the number of days to 0. If **Maximum password age** is between 1 and 999 days, the minimum password age must be less than the maximum password age. If **Maximum password age** is set to 0, [Minimum password age](minimum-password-age.md) can be any value between 0 and 998 days.
+The **Maximum password age** policy setting determines the period of time (in days) that a password can be used before the system requires the user to change it. You can set passwords to expire after a certain number of days between 1 and 999, or you can specify that passwords never expire by setting the number of days to 0. If **Maximum password age** is between 1 and 999 days, the minimum password age must be less than the maximum password age. If **Maximum password age** is set to 0, [Minimum password age](minimum-password-age.md) can be any value between 0 and 998 days.
>**Note:** Setting **Maximum password age** to -1 is equivalent to 0, which means it never expires. Setting it to any other negative number is equivalent to setting it to **Not Defined**.
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ This section describes features, tools, and guidance to help you manage this pol
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
## Security considerations
@@ -78,13 +78,13 @@ The longer a password exists, the higher the likelihood that it will be compromi
### Considerations
-Mandated password changes are a long-standing security practice, but current research strongly indicates that password expiration has a negative effect. See [Microsoft Password Guidance](https://www.microsoft.com/research/publication/password-guidance/) for further information.
+Mandated password changes are a long-standing security practice, but current research strongly indicates that password expiration has a negative effect. For more information, see [Microsoft Password Guidance](https://www.microsoft.com/research/publication/password-guidance/).
-Configure the **Maximum password age** policy setting to a value that is suitable for your organization's business requirements. For example, many organisations have compliance or insurance mandates requiring a short lifespan on passwords. Where such a requirement exists, the **Maximum password age** policy setting can be used to meet business requirements.
+Configure the **Maximum password age** policy setting to a value that is suitable for your organization's business requirements. For example, many organizations have compliance or insurance mandates requiring a short lifespan on passwords. Where such a requirement exists, the **Maximum password age** policy setting can be used to meet business requirements.
### Potential impact
-If the **Maximum password age** policy setting is too low, users are required to change their passwords very often. Such a configuration can reduce security in the organization because users might keep their passwords in an unsecured location or lose them. If the value for this policy setting is too high, the level of security within an organization is reduced because it allows potential attackers more time in which to discover user passwords or to use compromised accounts.
+If the **Maximum password age** policy setting is too low, users are required to change their passwords often. Such a configuration can reduce security in the organization because users might keep their passwords in an unsecured location or lose them. If the value for this policy setting is too high, the level of security within an organization is reduced because it allows potential attackers more time in which to discover user passwords or to use compromised accounts.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-tolerance-for-computer-clock-synchronization.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-tolerance-for-computer-clock-synchronization.md
index fe607f246f..e010602641 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-tolerance-for-computer-clock-synchronization.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-tolerance-for-computer-clock-synchronization.md
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security
This security setting determines the maximum time difference (in minutes) that Kerberos V5 tolerates between the time on the client clock and the time on the domain controller that provides Kerberos authentication.
To prevent "replay attacks," the Kerberos v5 protocol uses time stamps as part of its protocol definition. For time stamps to work properly, the clocks of the client and the domain controller need to be in sync as much as possible. In other words, both devices must be set to the same time and date.
-Because the clocks of two computers are often out of sync, you can use this policy setting to establish the maximum acceptable difference to the Kerberos protocol between a client clock and domain controller clock. If the difference between a client computer clock and the domain controller clock is less than the maximum time difference that is specified in this policy, any time stamp that is used in a session between the two devices is considered to be authentic.
+Because the clocks of two computers are often out of sync, you can use this policy setting to establish the maximum acceptable difference to the Kerberos protocol between a client clock and domain controller clock. If the difference between a client computer clock and the domain controller clock is less than the maximum time difference that is specified in this policy, any timestamp that's used in a session between the two devices is considered to be authentic.
The possible values for this Group Policy setting are:
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ The possible values for this Group Policy setting are:
### Best practices
-- It is advisable to set **Maximum tolerance for computer clock synchronization** to a value of 5 minutes.
+- It's advisable to set **Maximum tolerance for computer clock synchronization** to a value of 5 minutes.
### Location
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Defaul
This section describes features, tools, and guidance to help you manage this policy.
-A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to be effective.
+A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to be effective.
This policy setting is configured on the domain controller.
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
### Vulnerability
-To prevent "replay attacks" (which are attacks in which an authentication credential is resubmitted by a malicious user or program to gain access to a protected resource), the Kerberos protocol uses time stamps as part of its definition. For time stamps to work properly, the clocks of the client computer and the domain controller need to be closely synchronized. Because the clocks of two computers are often not synchronized, administrators can use this policy to establish the maximum acceptable difference to the Kerberos protocol between a client computer clock and a domain controller clock. If the difference between the client computer clock and the domain controller clock is less than the maximum time difference specified in this setting, any time stamp that is used in a session between the two computers is considered to be authentic.
+To prevent "replay attacks" (which are attacks in which an authentication credential is resubmitted by a malicious user or program to gain access to a protected resource), the Kerberos protocol uses time stamps as part of its definition. For time stamps to work properly, the clocks of the client computer and the domain controller need to be closely synchronized. Because the clocks of two computers are often not synchronized, administrators can use this policy to establish the maximum acceptable difference to the Kerberos protocol between a client computer clock and a domain controller clock. If the difference between the client computer clock and the domain controller clock is less than the maximum time difference specified in this setting, any timestamp that's used in a session between the two computers is considered to be authentic.
### Countermeasure
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ Configure the **Maximum tolerance for computer clock synchronization** setting t
### Potential impact
-None. This is the default configuration.
+None. This non-impact state is the default configuration.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-client-send-unencrypted-password-to-third-party-smb-servers.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-client-send-unencrypted-password-to-third-party-smb-servers.md
index 0cc87e361e..c17a0e599f 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-client-send-unencrypted-password-to-third-party-smb-servers.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-client-send-unencrypted-password-to-third-party-smb-servers.md
@@ -28,23 +28,23 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management and security c
## Reference
-The Server Message Block (SMB) protocol provides the basis for file and print sharing and many other networking operations, such as remote Windows administration. This policy setting allows or prevents the SMB redirector to send plaintext passwords to a non-Microsoft server service that does not support password encryption during authentication.
+The Server Message Block (SMB) protocol provides the basis for file and print sharing and many other networking operations, such as remote Windows administration. This policy setting allows or prevents the SMB redirector to send plaintext passwords to a non-Microsoft server service that doesn't support password encryption during authentication.
### Possible values
- Enabled
- The Server Message Block (SMB) redirector is allowed to send plaintext passwords to a non-Microsoft server service that does not support password encryption during authentication.
+ The Server Message Block (SMB) redirector is allowed to send plaintext passwords to a non-Microsoft server service that doesn't support password encryption during authentication.
- Disabled
- The Server Message Block (SMB) redirector only sends encrypted passwords to non-Microsoft SMB server services. If those server services do not support password encryption, the authentication request will fail.
+ The Server Message Block (SMB) redirector only sends encrypted passwords to non-Microsoft SMB server services. If those server services don't support password encryption, the authentication request will fail.
- Not defined
### Best practices
-- It is advisable to set **Microsoft network client: Send unencrypted password to connect to third-party SMB servers** to Disabled.
+- It's advisable to set **Microsoft network client: Send unencrypted password to connect to third-party SMB servers** to Disabled.
### Location
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
## Security considerations
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ Disable the **Microsoft network client: Send unencrypted password to connect to
### Potential impact
-Some older applications may not be able to communicate with the servers in your organization by means of the SMB protocol.
+Some older applications may not be able to communicate with the servers in your organization through the SMB protocol.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-server-amount-of-idle-time-required-before-suspending-session.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-server-amount-of-idle-time-required-before-suspending-session.md
index abe6db2b33..5a14605d54 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-server-amount-of-idle-time-required-before-suspending-session.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-server-amount-of-idle-time-required-before-suspending-session.md
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ The **Microsoft network server: Amount of idle time required before suspending s
### Best practices
-- It is advisable to set this policy to 15 minutes. There will be little impact because SMB sessions will be reestablished automatically if the client resumes activity.
+- It's advisable to set this policy to 15 minutes. There will be little impact because SMB sessions will be reestablished automatically if the client resumes activity.
### Location
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
## Security considerations
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ The default behavior on a server mitigates this threat by design.
### Potential impact
-There is little impact because SMB sessions are reestablished automatically if the client computer resumes activity.
+There's little impact because SMB sessions are reestablished automatically if the client computer resumes activity.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-server-attempt-s4u2self-to-obtain-claim-information.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-server-attempt-s4u2self-to-obtain-claim-information.md
index 1ef73b3a59..f4ddaa9d5a 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-server-attempt-s4u2self-to-obtain-claim-information.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-server-attempt-s4u2self-to-obtain-claim-information.md
@@ -30,9 +30,9 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, management, and security conside
This security setting supports client devices running a version of Windows prior to Windows 8 that are trying to access a file share that requires user claims. This setting determines whether the local file server will attempt to use Kerberos Service-for-User-to-Self (S4U2Self) functionality to obtain a network client principal’s claims from the client’s account domain. This setting should only be enabled if the file server is using user claims to control access to files, and if the file server will support client principals whose accounts might be in a domain that has client computers
and domain controllers running a version of Windows prior to Windows 8 or Windows Server 2012.
-When enabled, this security setting causes the Windows file server to examine the access token of an authenticated network client principal and determines if claim information is present. If claims are not present, the file server will then use the Kerberos S4U2Self feature to attempt to contact a Windows Server 2012 domain controller in the client’s account domain and obtain a claims-enabled access token for the client principal. A claims-enabled token might be needed to access files or folders that have claim-based access control policy applied.
+When enabled, this security setting causes the Windows file server to examine the access token of an authenticated network client principal and determines if claim information is present. If claims aren't present, the file server will then use the Kerberos S4U2Self feature to attempt to contact a Windows Server 2012 domain controller in the client’s account domain and obtain a claims-enabled access token for the client principal. A claims-enabled token might be needed to access files or folders that have claim-based access control policy applied.
-If this setting is disabled, the Windows file server will not attempt to obtain a claim-enabled access token for the client principal.
+If this setting is disabled, the Windows file server won't attempt to obtain a claim-enabled access token for the client principal.
### Possible values
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
### Group Policy
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
### Vulnerability
-None. Enabling this policy setting allows you take advantage of features in Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8 and later for specific scenarios to use claims-enabled tokens to access files or folders that have claim-based access control policy applied on Windows operating systems prior to Windows Server 2012
+None. Enabling this policy setting allows you to take advantage of features in Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8 and later for specific scenarios to use claims-enabled tokens to access files or folders that have claim-based access control policy applied on Windows operating systems prior to Windows Server 2012
and Windows 8.
### Countermeasure
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-server-digitally-sign-communications-always.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-server-digitally-sign-communications-always.md
index afb7ddfe20..080f186f03 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-server-digitally-sign-communications-always.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-server-digitally-sign-communications-always.md
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Implementation of digital signatures in high-security networks helps prevent the
Beginning with SMBv2 clients and servers, signing can be either required or not required. If this policy setting is enabled, SMBv2 clients will digitally sign all packets. Another policy setting determines whether signing is required for SMBv3 and SMBv2 server communications: [Microsoft network client: Digitally sign communications (always)](microsoft-network-client-digitally-sign-communications-always.md).
-There is a negotiation done between the SMB client and the SMB server to decide whether signing will effectively be used. The following table has the effective behavior for SMBv3 and SMBv2.
+There's a negotiation done between the SMB client and the SMB server to decide whether signing will effectively be used. The following table has the effective behavior for SMBv3 and SMBv2.
| | Server – Required | Server – Not Required |
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ There is a negotiation done between the SMB client and the SMB server to decide
1 Default for domain controller SMB traffic
2 Default for all other SMB traffic
-Performance of SMB signing is improved in SMBv2. For more details, see [Potential impact](#potential-impact).
+Performance of SMB signing is improved in SMBv2. For more information, see [Potential impact](#potential-impact).
### Possible values
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage
### Restart requirement
-None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
+None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy.
## Security considerations
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
Session hijacking uses tools that allow attackers who have access to the same network as the client device or server to interrupt, end, or steal a session in progress. Attackers can potentially intercept and modify unsigned Server Message Block (SMB) packets and then modify the traffic and forward it so that the server might perform objectionable actions. Alternatively, the attacker could pose as the server or client device after legitimate authentication and gain unauthorized access to data.
-SMB is the resource-sharing protocol that is supported by many Windows operating systems. It is the basis of many modern features like Storage Spaces Direct, Storage Replica, and SMB Direct, as well as many legacy protocols and tools. If either side fails the authentication process, data transmission does not take place.
+SMB is the resource-sharing protocol that is supported by many Windows operating systems. It's the basis of many modern features like Storage Spaces Direct, Storage Replica, and SMB Direct, as well as many legacy protocols and tools. If either side fails the authentication process, data transmission doesn't take place.
### Countermeasure
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ Enable **Microsoft network server: Digitally sign communications (always)**.
### Potential impact
-Storage speeds impact performance. A faster drive on the source and destination allows more throughput, which causes more CPU usage of signing. If you are using a 1 Gb Ethernet network or slower storage speed with a modern CPU, there is limited degradation in performance. If you are using a faster network (such as 10 Gb), the performance impact of signing may be greater.
+Storage speeds impact performance. A faster drive on the source and destination allows more throughput, which causes more CPU usage of signing. If you're using a 1-GB Ethernet network or slower storage speed with a modern CPU, there's limited degradation in performance. If you're using a faster network (such as 10 Gb), the performance impact of signing may be greater.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/document-group-policy-structure-and-applocker-rule-enforcement.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/document-group-policy-structure-and-applocker-rule-enforcement.md
index f21a48c714..24d9b339a4 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/document-group-policy-structure-and-applocker-rule-enforcement.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/document-group-policy-structure-and-applocker-rule-enforcement.md
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ To complete this AppLocker planning document, you should first complete the foll
3. [Select the types of rules to create](select-types-of-rules-to-create.md)
4. [Determine the Group Policy structure and rule enforcement](determine-group-policy-structure-and-rule-enforcement.md)
-After you determine how to structure your Group Policy Objects (GPOs) so that you can apply AppLocker policies, you should record your findings. You can use the following table to determine how many GPOs to create (or edit) and which objects they are linked to. If you decided to create custom rules to allow system files to run, note the high-level rule configuration in the **Use default rule or define new rule condition** column.
+After you determine how to structure your Group Policy Objects (GPOs) so that you can apply AppLocker policies, you should record your findings. You can use the following table to determine how many GPOs to create (or edit) and which objects they're linked to. If you decided to create custom rules to allow system files to run, note the high-level rule configuration in the **Use default rule or define new rule condition** column.
The following table includes the sample data that was collected when you determined your enforcement settings and the GPO structure for your AppLocker policies.
@@ -49,13 +49,13 @@ The following table includes the sample data that was collected when you determi
|Bank Tellers|Teller-East and Teller-West|Yes|Teller Software|C:\Program Files\Woodgrove\Teller.exe|File is signed; create a publisher condition|Allow|Tellers-AppLockerTellerRules|
||||Windows files|C:\Windows|Create a path exception to the default rule to exclude \Windows\Temp|Allow||
|Human Resources|HR-All|Yes|Check Payout|C:\Program Files\Woodgrove\HR\Checkcut.exe|File is signed; create a publisher condition|Allow|HR-AppLockerHRRules|
-||||Time Sheet Organizer|C:\Program Files\Woodgrove\HR\Timesheet.exe|File is not signed; create a file hash condition|Allow||
+||||Time Sheet Organizer|C:\Program Files\Woodgrove\HR\Timesheet.exe|File isn't signed; create a file hash condition|Allow||
||||Internet Explorer 7|C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer
For a comparison of Classic Windows applications and Universal Windows apps, see [Comparing Classic Windows applications and Universal Windows apps for AppLocker policy design decisions](#bkmk-compareclassicmetro) in this topic.|
| Control apps by business group and user | AppLocker policies can be applied through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to computer objects within an organizational unit (OU). Individual AppLocker rules can be applied to individual users or to groups of users.|
-| Control apps by computer, not user | AppLocker is a computer-based policy implementation. If your domain or site organizational structure is not based on a logical user structure, such as an OU, you might want to set up that structure before you begin your AppLocker planning. Otherwise, you will have to identify users, their computers, and their app access requirements.|
-|Understand app usage, but there is no need to control any apps yet | AppLocker policies can be set to audit app usage to help you track which apps are used in your organization. You can then use the AppLocker event log to create AppLocker policies.|
+| Control apps by computer, not user | AppLocker is a computer-based policy implementation. If your domain or site organizational structure isn't based on a logical user structure, such as an OU, you might want to set up that structure before you begin your AppLocker planning. Otherwise, you'll have to identify users, their computers, and their app access requirements.|
+|Understand app usage, but there's no need to control any apps yet | AppLocker policies can be set to audit app usage to help you track which apps are used in your organization. You can then use the AppLocker event log to create AppLocker policies.|
> [!IMPORTANT]
> The following list contains files or types of files that cannot be managed by AppLocker:
-- AppLocker does not protect against running 16-bit DOS binaries in an NT Virtual DOS Machine (NTVDM). This technology allows running legacy DOS and 16-bit Windows programs on computers that are using Intel 80386 or higher when there is already another operating system running and controlling the hardware. The result is that 16-bit binaries can still run on Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7 when AppLocker is configured to otherwise block binaries and libraries. If it is a requirement to prevent 16-bit applications from running, you must configure the Deny rule in the Executable rule collection for NTVDM.exe.
+- AppLocker doesn't protect against running 16-bit DOS binaries in an NT Virtual DOS Machine (NTVDM). This technology allows running legacy DOS and 16-bit Windows programs on computers that are using Intel 80386 or higher when there's already another operating system running and controlling the hardware. The result is that 16-bit binaries can still run on Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7 when AppLocker is configured to otherwise block binaries and libraries. If it's a requirement to prevent 16-bit applications from running, you must configure the Deny rule in the Executable rule collection for NTVDM.exe.
-- You cannot use AppLocker to prevent code from running outside the Win32 subsystem. In particular, this applies to the (POSIX) subsystem in Windows NT. If it is a requirement to prevent applications from running in the POSIX subsystem, you must disable the subsystem.
+- You can't use AppLocker to prevent code from running outside the Win32 subsystem. In particular, this rule applies to the (POSIX) subsystem in Windows NT. If it's a requirement to prevent applications from running in the POSIX subsystem, you must disable the subsystem.
-- AppLocker can only control VBScript, JScript, .bat files, .cmd files and Windows PowerShell scripts. It does not control all interpreted code that runs within a host process, for example Perl scripts and macros. Interpreted code is a form of executable code that runs within a host process. For example, Windows batch files (\*.bat) run within the context of the Windows Command Host (cmd.exe). To use AppLocker to control interpreted code, the host process must call AppLocker before it runs the interpreted code, and then enforce the decision that is returned by AppLocker. Not all host processes call into AppLocker. Therefore, AppLocker cannot control every kind of interpreted code, for example Microsoft Office macros.
+- AppLocker can only control VBScript, JScript, .bat files, .cmd files and Windows PowerShell scripts. It doesn't control all interpreted code that runs within a host process, for example Perl scripts and macros. Interpreted code is a form of executable code that runs within a host process. For example, Windows batch files (\*.bat) run within the context of the Windows Command Host (cmd.exe). To use AppLocker to control interpreted code, the host process must call AppLocker before it runs the interpreted code, and then enforce the decision that is returned by AppLocker. Not all host processes call into AppLocker. Therefore, AppLocker can't control every kind of interpreted code, for example Microsoft Office macros.
> [!IMPORTANT]
> You should configure the appropriate security settings of these host processes if you must allow them to run. For example, configure the security settings in Microsoft Office to ensure that only signed and trusted macros are loaded.
-- AppLocker rules allow or prevent an app from launching. AppLocker does not control the behavior of apps after they are launched. Applications could contain flags that are passed to functions that signal AppLocker to circumvent the rules and allow another .exe or .dll file to be loaded. In practice, an app that is allowed by AppLocker could use these flags to bypass AppLocker rules and launch child processes. You must follow a process that best suits your needs to thoroughly vet each app before allowing them to run using AppLocker rules.
+- AppLocker rules allow or prevent an app from launching. AppLocker doesn't control the behavior of apps after they're launched. Applications could contain flags that are passed to functions that signal AppLocker to circumvent the rules and allow another .exe or .dll file to be loaded. In practice, an app that is allowed by AppLocker could use these flags to bypass AppLocker rules and launch child processes. You must follow a process that best suits your needs to thoroughly vet each app before allowing them to run using AppLocker rules.
For more info, see [Security considerations for AppLocker](security-considerations-for-applocker.md).
@@ -77,8 +77,8 @@ You might need to control a limited number of apps because they access sensitive
AppLocker policies for Universal Windows apps can only be applied to apps that are installed on computers running Windows operating systems that support Microsoft Store apps. However, Classic Windows applications can be controlled in Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7, in addition to those computers that support Universal Windows apps. The rules for Classic Windows applications and Universal Windows apps can be enforced together. The differences you should consider for Universal Windows apps are:
-- All Universal Windows apps can be installed by a standard user, whereas a number of Classic Windows applications require administrative credentials to install. So in an environment where most of the users are standard users, you might not need numerous exe rules, but you might want more explicit policies for packaged apps.
-- Classic Windows applications can be written to change the system state if they run with administrative credentials. Most Universal Windows apps cannot change the system state because they run with limited permissions. When you design your AppLocker policies, it is important to understand whether an app that you are allowing can make system-wide changes.
+- All Universal Windows apps can be installed by a standard user, whereas many Classic Windows applications require administrative credentials to install. So in an environment where most of the users are standard users, you might not need numerous exe rules, but you might want more explicit policies for packaged apps.
+- Classic Windows applications can be written to change the system state if they run with administrative credentials. Most Universal Windows apps can't change the system state because they run with limited permissions. When you design your AppLocker policies, it's important to understand whether an app that you're allowing can make system-wide changes.
- Universal Windows apps can be acquired through the Store, or they can be side-loaded by using Windows PowerShell cmdlets. If you use Windows PowerShell cmdlets, a special Enterprise license is required to acquire Universal Windows apps. Classic Windows applications can be acquired through traditional means, such as through software vendors or retail distribution.
AppLocker controls Universal Windows apps and Classic Windows applications by using different rule collections. You have the choice to control Universal Windows apps, Classic Windows applications, or both.
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ Most organizations have evolved app control policies and methods over time. With
| Possible answers | Design considerations |
| - | - |
-| Security polices (locally set or through Group Policy) | Using AppLocker requires increased effort in planning to create correct policies, but this results in a simpler distribution method.|
+| Security policies (locally set or through Group Policy) | Using AppLocker requires increased effort in planning to create correct policies, but this policy creation results in a simpler distribution method.|
| Non-Microsoft app control software | Using AppLocker requires a complete app control policy evaluation and implementation.|
| Managed usage by group or OU | Using AppLocker requires a complete app control policy evaluation and implementation.|
| Authorization Manager or other role-based access technologies | Using AppLocker requires a complete app control policy evaluation and implementation.|
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ If your organization supports multiple Windows operating systems, app control po
|Possible answers|Design considerations|
|--- |--- |
-|Your organization's computers are running a combination of the following operating systems:
**Note:** If you are using the Basic User security level as assigned in SRP, those privileges are not supported on computers running that support AppLocker.
AppLocker policies as applied through a GPO take precedence over SRP policies in the same or linked GPO. SRP policies can be created and maintained the same way.|
+|Your organization's computers are running a combination of the following operating systems:
**Note:** If you're using the Basic User security level as assigned in SRP, those privileges aren't supported on computers running that support AppLocker.
AppLocker policies as applied through a GPO take precedence over SRP policies in the same or linked GPO. SRP policies can be created and maintained the same way.|
|Your organization's computers are running only the following operating systems:
If your GPO structure is not currently configured so that you can apply different policies to specific groups, you can alternatively apply AppLocker rules in a GPO to specific user groups.|
+| Yes | For each group, you need to create a list that includes their application control requirements. Although this consideration may increase the planning time, it will most likely result in a more effective deployment.
If your GPO structure isn't currently configured so that you can apply different policies to specific groups, you can alternatively apply AppLocker rules in a GPO to specific user groups.|
| No | AppLocker policies can be applied globally to applications that are installed on PCs running the supported versions of Windows as listed in [Requirements to use AppLocker](requirements-to-use-applocker.md). Depending on the number of apps you need to control, managing all the rules and exceptions might be challenging.|
### Does your IT department have resources to analyze application usage, and to design and manage the policies?
@@ -121,12 +121,12 @@ The time and resources that are available to you to perform the research and ana
| Possible answers | Design considerations |
| - | - |
-| Yes | Invest the time to analyze your organization's application control requirements, and plan a complete deployment that uses rules that are as simply constructed as possible.|
-| No | Consider a focused and phased deployment for specific groups by using a small number of rules. As you apply controls to applications in a specific group, learn from that deployment to plan your next deployment. |
+| Yes | Invest the time to analyze your organization's application control requirements, and plan a complete deployment that uses rules that are as constructed as possible.|
+| No | Consider a focused and phased deployment for specific groups by using a few rules. As you apply controls to applications in a specific group, learn from that deployment to plan your next deployment. |
### Does your organization have Help Desk support?
-Preventing your users from accessing known, deployed, or personal applications will initially cause an increase in end-user support. It will be necessary to address the various support issues in your organization so security policies are followed and business workflow is not hampered.
+Preventing your users from accessing known, deployed, or personal applications will initially cause an increase in end-user support. It will be necessary to address the various support issues in your organization so security policies are followed and business workflow isn't hampered.
| Possible answers | Design considerations |
| - | - |
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ Any successful application control policy implementation is based on your knowle
| Possible answers | Design considerations |
| - | - |
| Yes | You should determine the application control priorities for a business group and then attempt to design the simplest scheme for their application control policies. |
-| No | You will have to perform an audit and requirements gathering project to discover the application usage. AppLocker provides the means to deploy policies in **Audit only** mode, and tools to view the event logs.|
+| No | You'll have to perform an audit and requirements gathering project to discover the application usage. AppLocker provides the means to deploy policies in **Audit only** mode, and tools to view the event logs.|
### How do you deploy or sanction applications (upgraded or new) in your organization?
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ Although SRP and AppLocker have the same goal, AppLocker is a major revision of
| Possible answers | Design considerations |
| - | - |
-| Yes | You cannot use AppLocker to manage SRP settings, but you can use SRP to manage application control policies on computers running on any of the supported operating systems listed in [Requirements to use AppLocker](requirements-to-use-applocker.md). In addition, if AppLocker and SRP settings are configured in the same GPO, only the AppLocker settings will be enforced on computers running those supported operating systems.
**Note:** If you are using the Basic User security level as assigned in SRP, those permissions are not supported on computers running the supported operating systems.|
+| Yes | You can't use AppLocker to manage SRP settings, but you can use SRP to manage application control policies on computers running on any of the supported operating systems listed in [Requirements to use AppLocker](requirements-to-use-applocker.md). In addition, if AppLocker and SRP settings are configured in the same GPO, only the AppLocker settings will be enforced on computers running those supported operating systems.
**Note:** If you're using the Basic User security level as assigned in SRP, those permissions aren't supported on computers running the supported operating systems.|
| No | Policies that are configured for AppLocker can only be applied to computers running the supported operating systems, but SRP is also available on those operating systems. |
### What are your organization's priorities when implementing application control policies?
@@ -168,19 +168,19 @@ Some organizations will benefit from application control policies as shown by an
| Possible answers | Design considerations |
| - | - |
-| Productivity: The organization assures that tools work and required applications can be installed. | To meet innovation and productivity goals, some groups require the ability to install and run a variety of software from different sources, including software that they developed. Therefore, if innovation and productivity is a high priority, managing application control policies through an allowed list might be time consuming and an impediment to progress. |
-| Management: The organization is aware of and controls the apps it supports. | In some business groups, application usage can be managed from a central point of control. AppLocker policies can be built into a GPO for that purpose. This shifts the burden of app access to the IT department, but it also has the benefit of controlling the number of apps that can be run and controlling the versions of those apps|
+| Productivity: The organization assures that tools work and required applications can be installed. | To meet innovation and productivity goals, some groups require the ability to install and run various softwares from different sources, including software that they developed. Therefore, if innovation and productivity are a high priority, managing application control policies through an allowed list might be time consuming and an impediment to progress. |
+| Management: The organization is aware of and controls the applications it supports. | In some business groups, application usage can be managed from a central point of control. AppLocker policies can be built into a GPO for that purpose. This GPO shifts the burden of application access to the IT department, but it also has the benefit of controlling the number of applications that can be run and controlling the versions of those applications|
| Security: The organization must protect data in part by ensuring that only approved apps are used. | AppLocker can help protect data by allowing a defined set of users access to apps that access the data. If security is the top priority, the application control policies will be the most restrictive.|
### How are apps currently accessed in your organization?
-AppLocker is very effective for organizations that have application restriction requirements if they have environments with a simple topography and application control policy goals that are straightforward. For example, AppLocker can benefit an environment where non-employees have access to computers that are connected to the organizational network, such as a school or library. Large organizations also benefit from AppLocker policy deployment when the goal is to achieve a detailed level of control on the desktop computers with a relatively small number of applications to manage, or when the applications are manageable with a small number of rules.
+AppLocker is effective for organizations that have application restriction requirements if they have environments with a simple topography and application control policy goals that are straightforward. For example, AppLocker can benefit an environment where non-employees have access to computers that are connected to the organizational network, such as a school or library. Large organizations also benefit from AppLocker policy deployment when the goal is to achieve a detailed level of control on the desktop computers with a relatively small number of applications to manage, or when the applications are manageable with a few rules.
| Possible answers | Design considerations |
| - | - |
| Users run without administrative rights. | Apps are installed by using an installation deployment technology.|
-| AppLocker can help reduce the total cost of ownership for business groups that typically use a finite set of apps, such as human resources and finance departments. At the same time, these departments access highly sensitive information, much of which contains confidential and proprietary information. By using AppLocker to create rules for specific apps that are allowed to run, you can help limit unauthorized applications from accessing this information.
**Note:** AppLocker can also be effective in helping create standardized desktops in organizations where users run as administrators. However, it is important to note that users with administrative credentials can add new rules to the local AppLocker policy.| Users must be able to install applications as needed.
-| Users currently have administrator access, and it would be difficult to change this.|Enforcing AppLocker rules is not suited for business groups that must be able to install apps as needed and without approval from the IT department. If one or more OUs in your organization has this requirement, you can choose not to enforce application rules in those OUs by using AppLocker or to implement the **Audit only** enforcement setting through AppLocker.|
+| AppLocker can help reduce the total cost of ownership for business groups that typically use a finite set of apps, such as human resources and finance departments. At the same time, these departments access highly sensitive information, much of which contains confidential and proprietary information. By using AppLocker to create rules for specific apps that are allowed to run, you can help limit unauthorized applications from accessing this information.
**Note:** AppLocker can also be effective in helping create standardized desktops in organizations where users run as administrators. However, it's important to note that users with administrative credentials can add new rules to the local AppLocker policy.| Users must be able to install applications as needed.
+| Users currently have administrator access, and it would be difficult to change this privilege.|Enforcing AppLocker rules isn't suited for business groups that must be able to install apps as needed and without approval from the IT department. If one or more OUs in your organization has this requirement, you can choose not to enforce application rules in those OUs by using AppLocker or to implement the **Audit only** enforcement setting through AppLocker.|
### Is the structure in Active Directory Domain Services based on the organization's hierarchy?
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-applocker-rule-behavior.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-applocker-rule-behavior.md
index 92bd84efc4..5afe6be646 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-applocker-rule-behavior.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-applocker-rule-behavior.md
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ If no AppLocker rules for a specific rule collection exist, all files with that
A rule can be configured to use either an allow or deny action:
- **Allow**. You can specify which files are allowed to run in your environment and for which users or groups of users. You can also configure exceptions to identify files that are excluded from the rule.
-- **Deny**. You can specify which files are not allowed to run in your environment and for which users or groups of users. You can also configure exceptions to identify files that are excluded from the rule.
+- **Deny**. You can specify which files aren't allowed to run in your environment and for which users or groups of users. You can also configure exceptions to identify files that are excluded from the rule.
>**Important:** You can use a combination of allow actions and deny actions. However, we recommend using allow actions with exceptions because deny actions override allow actions in all cases. Deny actions can also be circumvented. For example, if you configure a deny action for a file or folder path, the user can still run the file from any other path.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-applocker-rule-exceptions.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-applocker-rule-exceptions.md
index 295497d103..d4eab6bcf6 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-applocker-rule-exceptions.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-applocker-rule-exceptions.md
@@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ This topic describes the result of applying AppLocker rule exceptions to rule co
You can apply AppLocker rules to individual users or a group of users. If you apply a rule to a group of users, all users in that group are affected by that rule. If you need to allow a subset of a user group to use an app, you can create a special rule for that subset.
-For example, the rule "Allow Everyone to run Windows except Registry Editor" allows Everyone to run Windows binaries, but does not allow anyone to run Registry Editor (by adding %WINDIR%\regedit.exe as a Path Exception of the rule).
+For example, the rule "Allow Everyone to run Windows except Registry Editor" allows Everyone to run Windows binaries, but doesn't allow anyone to run Registry Editor (by adding %WINDIR%\regedit.exe as a Path Exception for the rule).
The effect of this rule would prevent users such as Helpdesk personnel from running the Registry Editor, a program that is necessary for their support tasks.
-To resolve this problem, create a second rule that applies to the Helpdesk user group: "Allow Helpdesk to run Registry Editor" and add %WINDIR%\regedit.exe as an allowed path. If you create a deny rule that does not allow any users to run Registry Editor, the deny rule will override the second rule that allows the Helpdesk user group to run Registry Editor.
+To resolve this problem, create a second rule that applies to the Helpdesk user group: "Allow Helpdesk to run Registry Editor" and add %WINDIR%\regedit.exe as an allowed path. If you create a deny rule that doesn't allow any users to run Registry Editor, the deny rule will override the second rule that allows the Helpdesk user group to run Registry Editor.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-the-file-hash-rule-condition-in-applocker.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-the-file-hash-rule-condition-in-applocker.md
index 2a8b980f8f..9e63783239 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-the-file-hash-rule-condition-in-applocker.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-the-file-hash-rule-condition-in-applocker.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
title: Understanding the file hash rule condition in AppLocker (Windows)
-description: This topic explains the AppLocker file hash rule condition, the advantages and disadvantages, and how it is applied.
+description: This topic explains the AppLocker file hash rule condition, the advantages and disadvantages, and how it's applied.
ms.assetid: 4c6d9af4-2b1a-40f4-8758-1a6f9f147756
ms.reviewer:
ms.author: macapara
@@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec
>[!NOTE]
>Some capabilities of Windows Defender Application Control are only available on specific Windows versions. Learn more about the [Windows Defender Application Control feature availability](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/feature-availability).
-This topic explains the AppLocker file hash rule condition, the advantages and disadvantages, and how it is applied.
+This topic explains the AppLocker file hash rule condition, the advantages and disadvantages, and how it's applied.
-File hash rules use a system-computed cryptographic hash of the identified file. For files that are not digitally signed, file hash rules are more secure than path rules. The following table describes the advantages and disadvantages of the file hash condition.
+File hash rules use a system-computed cryptographic hash of the identified file. For files that aren't digitally signed, file hash rules are more secure than path rules. The following table describes the advantages and disadvantages of the file hash condition.
| File hash condition advantages | File hash condition disadvantages |
| - | - |
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-the-path-rule-condition-in-applocker.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-the-path-rule-condition-in-applocker.md
index 4aa28b9f43..e47540ebc1 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-the-path-rule-condition-in-applocker.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-the-path-rule-condition-in-applocker.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
title: Understanding the path rule condition in AppLocker (Windows)
-description: This topic explains the AppLocker path rule condition, the advantages and disadvantages, and how it is applied.
+description: This topic explains the AppLocker path rule condition, the advantages and disadvantages, and how it's applied.
ms.assetid: 3fa54ded-4466-4f72-bea4-2612031cad43
ms.reviewer:
ms.author: macapara
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec
>[!NOTE]
>Some capabilities of Windows Defender Application Control are only available on specific Windows versions. Learn more about the [Windows Defender Application Control feature availability](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/feature-availability).
-This topic explains the AppLocker path rule condition, the advantages and disadvantages, and how it is applied.
+This topic explains the AppLocker path rule condition, the advantages and disadvantages, and how it's applied.
The path condition identifies an application by its location in the file system of the computer or on the network.
@@ -39,11 +39,11 @@ When creating a rule that uses a deny action, path conditions are less secure th
|--- |--- |
|
AppLocker permits customization of error messages to direct users to a Web page for help.|
|Policy maintenance|SRP policies must be updated by using the Local Security Policy snap-in (if the policies are created locally) or the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC).|AppLocker policies can be updated by using the Local Security Policy snap-in (if the policies are created locally), or the GPMC, or the Windows PowerShell AppLocker cmdlets.|
|Policy application|SRP policies are distributed through Group Policy.|AppLocker policies are distributed through Group Policy.|
-|Enforcement mode|SRP works in the “deny list mode” where administrators can create rules for files that they do not want to allow in this Enterprise whereas the rest of the file is allowed to run by default.
SRP can also be configured in the “allowlist mode” so that by default all files are blocked and administrators need to create allow rules for files that they want to allow.|AppLocker by default works in the “allowlist mode” where only those files are allowed to run for which there is a matching allow rule.|
-|File types that can be controlled|SRP can control the following file types:
SRP cannot control each file type separately. All SRP rules are in a single rule collection.|AppLocker can control the following file types:
AppLocker maintains a separate rule collection for each of the five file types.|
+|Enforcement mode|SRP works in the “blocklist mode” where administrators can create rules for files that they don't want to allow in this Enterprise whereas the rest of the file is allowed to run by default.
SRP can also be configured in the “allowlist mode” so that by default all files are blocked and administrators need to create allow rules for files that they want to allow.|AppLocker by default works in the “allowlist mode” where only those files are allowed to run for which there's a matching allow rule.|
+|File types that can be controlled|SRP can control the following file types:
SRP can't control each file type separately. All SRP rules are in a single rule collection.|AppLocker can control the following file types:
AppLocker maintains a separate rule collection for each of the five file types.|
|Designated file types|SRP supports an extensible list of file types that are considered executable. Administrators can add extensions for files that should be considered executable.|AppLocker currently supports the following file extensions:
Beginning with Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2, you can only select the file to hash, not provide the hash value.|AppLocker computes the hash value itself. Internally, it uses the SHA2 Authenticode hash for Portable Executables (exe and dll) and Windows Installers and an SHA2 flat file hash for the rest.|
-|Support for different security levels|With SRP, you can specify the permissions with which an app can run. So, you can configure a rule such that Notepad always runs with restricted permissions and never with administrative privileges.
SRP on Windows Vista and earlier supported multiple security levels. On Windows 7, that list was restricted to just two levels: Disallowed and Unrestricted (Basic User translates to Disallowed).|AppLocker does not support security levels.|
+|Editing the hash value|In Windows XP, you could use SRP to provide custom hash values.
Beginning with Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2, you can only select the file to hash, and not provide the hash value.|AppLocker computes the hash value itself. Internally, it uses the SHA2 Authenticode hash for Portable Executables (exe and dll) and Windows Installers and an SHA2 flat file hash for the rest.|
+|Support for different security levels|With SRP, you can specify the permissions with which an app can run. So, you can configure a rule such that Notepad always runs with restricted permissions and never with administrative privileges.
SRP on Windows Vista and earlier supported multiple security levels. On Windows 7, that list was restricted to just two levels: Disallowed and Unrestricted (Basic User translates to Disallowed).|AppLocker doesn't support security levels.|
|Manage Packaged apps and Packaged app installers.|Not supported|.appx is a valid file type which AppLocker can manage.|
|Targeting a rule to a user or a group of users|SRP rules apply to all users on a particular computer.|AppLocker rules can be targeted to a specific user or a group of users.|
-|Support for rule exceptions|SRP does not support rule exceptions.|AppLocker rules can have exceptions, which allow you to create rules such as “Allow everything from Windows except for regedit.exe”.|
-|Support for audit mode|SRP does not support audit mode. The only way to test SRP policies is to set up a test environment and run a few experiments.|AppLocker supports audit mode, which allows you to test the effect of their policy in the real production environment without impacting the user experience. Once you are satisfied with the results, you can start enforcing the policy.|
-|Support for exporting and importing policies|SRP does not support policy import/export.|AppLocker supports the importing and exporting of policies. This allows you to create AppLocker policy on a sample device, test it out and then export that policy and import it back into the desired GPO.|
+|Support for rule exceptions|SRP doesn't support rule exceptions.|AppLocker rules can have exceptions, which allow you to create rules such as “Allow everything from Windows except for regedit.exe”.|
+|Support for audit mode|SRP doesn't support audit mode. The only way to test SRP policies is to set up a test environment and run a few experiments.|AppLocker supports audit mode, which allows you to test the effect of their policy in the real production environment without impacting the user experience. Once you're satisfied with the results, you can start enforcing the policy.|
+|Support for exporting and importing policies|SRP doesn't support policy import/export.|AppLocker supports the importing and exporting of policies. This support by AppLocker allows you to create AppLocker policy on a sample device, test it out and then export that policy and import it back into the desired GPO.|
|Rule enforcement|Internally, SRP rules enforcement happens in the user-mode, which is less secure.|Internally, AppLocker rules for .exe and .dll files are enforced in the kernel-mode, which is more secure than enforcing them in the user-mode.|
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/use-the-applocker-windows-powershell-cmdlets.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/use-the-applocker-windows-powershell-cmdlets.md
index 636ea5f18b..2751109b02 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/use-the-applocker-windows-powershell-cmdlets.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/use-the-applocker-windows-powershell-cmdlets.md
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Local Security policy snap-in, you must be a member of the local **Administrator
The [Get-AppLockerFileInformation](/powershell/module/applocker/get-applockerfileinformation) cmdlet retrieves the AppLocker file information from a list of files or from an event log. File information that is retrieved can include publisher information, file hash information, and file path information.
-File information from an event log may not contain all of these fields. Files that are not signed do not have any publisher information.
+File information from an event log may not contain all of these fields. Files that aren't signed don't have any publisher information.
### Set AppLocker policy
@@ -62,6 +62,6 @@ list of file information.
The [Test-AppLockerPolicy](/powershell/module/applocker/test-applockerpolicy) cmdlet uses the specified AppLocker policy to test whether a specified list of files are allowed to run or not on the local device for a specific user.
-## Additional resources
+## Other resources
- For steps to perform other AppLocker policy tasks, see [Administer AppLocker](administer-applocker.md).
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/using-event-viewer-with-applocker.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/using-event-viewer-with-applocker.md
index 0274a768dd..59111cd93d 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/using-event-viewer-with-applocker.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/using-event-viewer-with-applocker.md
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ The AppLocker log contains information about applications that are affected by A
- The rule name
- The security identifier (SID) for the user or group identified in the rule
-Review the entries in the Event Viewer to determine if any applications are not included in the rules that you automatically generated. For instance, some line-of-business apps are installed to non-standard locations, such as the root of the active drive (for example: %SystemDrive%).
+Review the entries in the Event Viewer to determine if any applications aren't included in the rules that you automatically generated. For instance, some line-of-business apps are installed to non-standard locations, such as the root of the active drive (for example: %SystemDrive%).
For info about what to look for in the AppLocker event logs, see [Monitor app usage with AppLocker](monitor-application-usage-with-applocker.md).
@@ -52,14 +52,14 @@ The following table contains information about the events that you can use to de
| Event ID | Level | Event message | Description |
| - | - | - | - |
-| 8000 | Error| Application Identity Policy conversion failed. Status *<%1> *| Indicates that the policy was not applied correctly to the computer. The status message is provided for troubleshooting purposes.|
+| 8000 | Error| Application Identity Policy conversion failed. Status *<%1> *| Indicates that the policy wasn't applied correctly to the computer. The status message is provided for troubleshooting purposes.|
| 8001 | Information| The AppLocker policy was applied successfully to this computer.| Indicates that the AppLocker policy was successfully applied to the computer.|
| 8002 | Information| *<File name> * was allowed to run.| Specifies that the .exe or .dll file is allowed by an AppLocker rule.|
-| 8003 | Warning| *<File name> * was allowed to run but would have been prevented from running if the AppLocker policy were enforced.| Applied only when the **Audit only** enforcement mode is enabled. Specifies that the .exe or .dll file would be blocked if the **Enforce rules** enforcement mode were enabled. |
-| 8004 | Error| *<File name> * was not allowed to run.| Access to *<file name>* is restricted by the administrator. Applied only when the **Enforce rules** enforcement mode is set either directly or indirectly through Group Policy inheritance. The .exe or .dll file cannot run.|
+| 8003 | Warning| *<File name> * was allowed to run but would have been prevented from running if the AppLocker policy was enforced.| Applied only when the **Audit only** enforcement mode is enabled. Specifies that the .exe or .dll file would be blocked if the **Enforce rules** enforcement mode were enabled. |
+| 8004 | Error| *<File name> * was not allowed to run.| Access to *<file name>* is restricted by the administrator. Applied only when the **Enforce rules** enforcement mode is set either directly or indirectly through Group Policy inheritance. The .exe or .dll file can't run.|
| 8005| Information| *<File name> * was allowed to run.| Specifies that the script or .msi file is allowed by an AppLocker rule.|
-| 8006 | Warning| *<File name> * was allowed to run but would have been prevented from running if the AppLocker policy were enforced.| Applied only when the **Audit only** enforcement mode is enabled. Specifies that the script or .msi file would be blocked if the **Enforce rules** enforcement mode were enabled. |
-| 8007 | Error| *<File name> * was not allowed to run.| Access to *<file name>* is restricted by the administrator. Applied only when the **Enforce rules** enforcement mode is set either directly or indirectly through Group Policy inheritance. The script or .msi file cannot run.|
+| 8006 | Warning| *<File name> * was allowed to run but would have been prevented from running if the AppLocker policy was enforced.| Applied only when the **Audit only** enforcement mode is enabled. Specifies that the script or .msi file would be blocked if the **Enforce rules** enforcement mode were enabled. |
+| 8007 | Error| *<File name> * was not allowed to run.| Access to *<file name>* is restricted by the administrator. Applied only when the **Enforce rules** enforcement mode is set either directly or indirectly through Group Policy inheritance. The script or .msi file can't run.|
| 8008| Error| AppLocker disabled on the SKU.| Added in Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8.|
| 8020| Information| Packaged app allowed.| Added in Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8.|
| 8021| Information| Packaged app audited.| Added in Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8.|
@@ -68,12 +68,12 @@ The following table contains information about the events that you can use to de
| 8024 | Information| Packaged app installation audited.| Added in Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8.|
| 8025 | Warning| Packaged app installation disabled.| Added in Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8.|
| 8027 | Warning| No Packaged app rule configured.| Added in Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8.|
-| 8028 | Warning | * was allowed to run but would have been prevented if the Config CI policy were enforced.| Added in Windows Server 2016 and Windows 10.|
+| 8028 | Warning | * was allowed to run but would have been prevented if the Config CI policy was enforced.| Added in Windows Server 2016 and Windows 10.|
| 8029 | Error | * was prevented from running due to Config CI policy.| Added in Windows Server 2016 and Windows 10.|
| 8030 | Information | ManagedInstaller check SUCCEEDED during Appid verification of * | Added in Windows Server 2016 and Windows 10.|
| 8031 | Information | SmartlockerFilter detected file * being written by process * | Added in Windows Server 2016 and Windows 10.|
| 8032 | Error | ManagedInstaller check FAILED during Appid verification of * | Added in Windows Server 2016 and Windows 10.|
-| 8033 | Warning | ManagedInstaller check FAILED during Appid verification of * . Allowed to run due to Audit Applocker Policy. | Added in Windows Server 2016 and Windows 10.|
+| 8033 | Warning | ManagedInstaller check FAILED during Appid verification of * . Allowed to run due to Audit AppLocker Policy. | Added in Windows Server 2016 and Windows 10.|
| 8034 | Information | ManagedInstaller Script check FAILED during Appid verification of * | Added in Windows Server 2016 and Windows 10.|
| 8035 | Error | ManagedInstaller Script check SUCCEEDED during Appid verification of * | Added in Windows Server 2016 and Windows 10.|
| 8036 | Error | * was prevented from running due to Config CI policy | Added in Windows Server 2016 and Windows 10.|
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/using-software-restriction-policies-and-applocker-policies.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/using-software-restriction-policies-and-applocker-policies.md
index 47f5faeacd..96c1644d3a 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/using-software-restriction-policies-and-applocker-policies.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/using-software-restriction-policies-and-applocker-policies.md
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ You might want to deploy application control policies in Windows operating syste
## Use SRP and AppLocker in the same domain
-SRP and AppLocker use Group Policy for domain management. However, when policies are generated by SRP and AppLocker exist in the same domain, and they are applied through Group Policy, AppLocker policies take precedence over policies generated by SRP on computers that are running an operating system that supports AppLocker. For info about how inheritance in Group Policy applies to AppLocker policies and policies generated by SRP, see [Understand AppLocker rules and enforcement setting inheritance in Group Policy](understand-applocker-rules-and-enforcement-setting-inheritance-in-group-policy.md).
+SRP and AppLocker use Group Policy for domain management. However, when policies are generated by SRP and AppLocker exist in the same domain, and they're applied through Group Policy, AppLocker policies take precedence over policies generated by SRP on computers that are running an operating system that supports AppLocker. For info about how inheritance in Group Policy applies to AppLocker policies and policies generated by SRP, see [Understand AppLocker rules and enforcement setting inheritance in Group Policy](understand-applocker-rules-and-enforcement-setting-inheritance-in-group-policy.md).
>**Important:** As a best practice, use separate Group Policy Objects to implement your SRP and AppLocker policies. To reduce troubleshooting issues, do not combine them in the same GPO.
@@ -45,15 +45,15 @@ The following scenario provides an example of how each type of policy would affe
| Operating system | Tellers GPO with AppLocker policy | Tellers GPO with SRP | Tellers GPO with AppLocker policy and SRP |
| - | - | - | - |
-| Windows 10, Windows 8.1, Windows 8,and Windows 7 | AppLocker policies in the GPO are applied, and they supersede any local AppLocker policies.| Local AppLocker policies supersede policies generated by SRP that are applied through the GPO. | AppLocker policies in the GPO are applied, and they supersede the policies generated by SRP in the GPO and local AppLocker policies or policies generated by SRP.|
-| Windows Vista| AppLocker policies are not applied.| Policies generated by SRP in the GPO are applied, and they supersede local policies generated by SRP.AppLocker policies are not applied.| Policies generated by SRP in the GPO are applied, and they supersede local policies generated by SRP. AppLocker policies not applied.|
-| Windows XP| AppLocker policies are not applied.| Policies generated by SRP in the GPO are applied, and they supersede local policies generated by SRP. AppLocker policies are not applied.| Policies generated by SRP in the GPO are applied, and they supersede local policies generated by SRP. AppLocker policies not applied.|
+| Windows 10, Windows 8.1, Windows 8, and Windows 7 | AppLocker policies in the GPO are applied, and they supersede any local AppLocker policies.| Local AppLocker policies supersede policies generated by SRP that are applied through the GPO. | AppLocker policies in the GPO are applied, and they supersede the policies generated by SRP in the GPO and local AppLocker policies or policies generated by SRP.|
+| Windows Vista| AppLocker policies aren't applied.| Policies generated by SRP in the GPO are applied, and they supersede local policies generated by SRP.AppLocker policies aren't applied.| Policies generated by SRP in the GPO are applied, and they supersede local policies generated by SRP. AppLocker policies not applied.|
+| Windows XP| AppLocker policies aren't applied.| Policies generated by SRP in the GPO are applied, and they supersede local policies generated by SRP. AppLocker policies aren't applied.| Policies generated by SRP in the GPO are applied, and they supersede local policies generated by SRP. AppLocker policies not applied.|
>**Note:** For info about supported versions and editions of the Windows operating system, see [Requirements to use AppLocker](requirements-to-use-applocker.md).
## Test and validate SRPs and AppLocker policies that are deployed in the same environment
-Because SRPs and AppLocker policies function differently, they should not be implemented in the same GPO. This makes testing the result of the policy straightforward, which is critical to successfully controlling application usage in the organization. Configuring a testing and policy distribution system can help you understand the result of a policy. The effects of policies generated by SRP and AppLocker policies need to be tested separately and by using different tools.
+Because SRPs and AppLocker policies function differently, they shouldn't be implemented in the same GPO. This rule, when implemented, makes testing the result of the policy straightforward, which is critical to successfully controlling application usage in the organization. Configuring a testing and policy distribution system can help you understand the result of a policy. The effects of policies generated by SRP and AppLocker policies need to be tested separately and by using different tools.
### Step 1: Test the effect of SRPs
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/what-is-applocker.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/what-is-applocker.md
index 1196a83dee..dc46fa241d 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/what-is-applocker.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/what-is-applocker.md
@@ -76,10 +76,10 @@ The following table compares the application control functions of Software Restr
|User support|SRP allows users to install applications as an administrator.|AppLocker policies are maintained through Group Policy, and only the administrator of the device can update an AppLocker policy.
The specified version of the named file or package for the named product that are signed by the publisher.|
+| **Publisher and product name, and file name**| Any version of the named file or package for the named product that is signed by the publisher.|
+| **Publisher, product name, file name, and file version**| **Exactly**
The specified version of the named file or package for the named product that is signed by the publisher.|
| **Publisher, product name, file name, and file version**| **And above**
The specified version of the named file or package and any new releases for the product that are signed by the publisher.|
| **Publisher, product name, file name, and file version**| **And below**
The specified version of the named file or package and any earlier versions for the product that are signed by the publisher.|
| **Custom**| You can edit the **Publisher**, **Product name**, **File name**, **Version** **Package name**, and **Package version** fields to create a custom rule.|
@@ -184,13 +184,13 @@ A rule can be configured to use allow or deny actions:
## Rule exceptions
-You can apply AppLocker rules to individual users or to a group of users. If you apply a rule to a group of users, all users in that group are affected by that rule. If you need to allow a subset of a user group to use an app, you can create a special rule for that subset. For example, the rule "Allow everyone to run Windows except Registry Editor" allows everyone in the organization to run the Windows operating system, but it does not allow anyone to run Registry Editor.
+You can apply AppLocker rules to individual users or to a group of users. If you apply a rule to a group of users, all users in that group are affected by that rule. If you need to allow a subset of a user group to use an app, you can create a special rule for that subset. For example, the rule "Allow everyone to run Windows except Registry Editor" allows everyone in the organization to run the Windows operating system, but it doesn't allow anyone to run Registry Editor.
-The effect of this rule would prevent users such as Help Desk personnel from running a program that is necessary for their support tasks. To resolve this problem, create a second rule that applies to the Help Desk user group: "Allow Help Desk to run Registry Editor." If you create a deny rule that does not allow any users to run Registry Editor, the deny rule will override the second rule that allows the Help Desk user group to run Registry Editor.
+The effect of this rule would prevent users such as Help Desk personnel from running a program that is necessary for their support tasks. To resolve this problem, create a second rule that applies to the Help Desk user group: "Allow Help Desk to run Registry Editor." If you create a deny rule that doesn't allow any users to run Registry Editor, the deny rule will override the second rule that allows the Help Desk user group to run Registry Editor.
## DLL rule collection
-Because the DLL rule collection is not enabled by default, you must perform the following procedure before you can create and enforce DLL rules.
+Because the DLL rule collection isn't enabled by default, you must perform the following procedure before you can create and enforce DLL rules.
Membership in the local **Administrators** group, or equivalent, is the minimum required to complete this procedure.
@@ -208,21 +208,21 @@ Membership in the local **Administrators** group, or equivalent, is the minimum
You can create rules by using two AppLocker wizards:
1. The Create Rules Wizard enables you to create one rule at a time.
-2. The Automatically Generate Rules Wizard allows you to create multiple rules at one time. You can either select a folder and let the wizard create rules for the relevant files within that folder or in case of packaged apps let the wizard create rules for all packaged apps installed on the computer. You can also specify the user or group to which to apply the rules. This wizard automatically generates allow rules only.
+2. The Automatically Generate Rules Wizard allows you to create multiple rules at one time. You can either select a folder and let the wizard create rules for the relevant files within that folder or if there are packaged apps let the wizard create rules for all packaged apps installed on the computer. You can also specify the user or group to which to apply the rules. This wizard automatically generates allow rules only.
-## Additional considerations
+## Other considerations
-- By default, AppLocker rules do not allow users to open or run any files that are not specifically allowed. Administrators should maintain an up-to-date list of allowed applications.
-- There are two types of AppLocker conditions that do not persist following an update of an app:
+- By default, AppLocker rules don't allow users to open or run any files that aren't allowed. Administrators should maintain an up-to-date list of allowed applications.
+- There are two types of AppLocker conditions that don't persist following an update of an app:
- **A file hash condition** File hash rule conditions can be used with any app because a cryptographic hash value of the app is generated at the time the rule is created. However, the hash value is specific to that exact version of the app. If there are several versions of the application in use within the organization, you need to create file hash conditions for each version in use and for any new versions that are released.
- - **A publisher condition with a specific product version set** If you create a publisher rule condition that uses the **Exactly** version option, the rule cannot persist if a new version of the app is installed. A new publisher condition must be created, or the version must be edited in the rule to be made less specific.
+ - **A publisher condition with a specific product version set** If you create a publisher rule condition that uses the **Exactly** version option, the rule can't persist if a new version of the app is installed. A new publisher condition must be created, or the version must be edited in the rule to be made less specific.
-- If an app is not digitally signed, you cannot use a publisher rule condition for that app.
-- AppLocker rules cannot be used to manage computers running a Windows operating system earlier than Windows Server 2008 R2 or Windows 7. Software Restriction Policies must be used instead. If AppLocker rules are defined in a Group Policy Object (GPO), only those rules are applied. To ensure interoperability between Software Restriction Policies rules and AppLocker rules, define Software Restriction Policies rules and AppLocker rules in different GPOs.
+- If an app isn't digitally signed, you can't use a publisher rule condition for that app.
+- AppLocker rules can't be used to manage computers running a Windows operating system earlier than Windows Server 2008 R2 or Windows 7. Software Restriction Policies must be used instead. If AppLocker rules are defined in a Group Policy Object (GPO), only those rules are applied. To ensure interoperability between Software Restriction Policies rules and AppLocker rules, define Software Restriction Policies rules and AppLocker rules in different GPOs.
- The packaged apps and packaged apps installer rule collection is available on devices running at least Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8.
-- When the rules for the executable rule collection are enforced and the packaged apps and packaged app installers rule collection does not contain any rules, no packaged apps and packaged app installers are allowed to run. In order to allow any packaged apps and packaged app installers, you must create rules for the packaged apps and packaged app installers rule collection.
-- When an AppLocker rule collection is set to **Audit only**, the rules are not enforced. When a user runs an application that is included in the rule, the app is opened and runs normally, and information about that app is added to the AppLocker event log.
+- When the rules for the executable rule collection are enforced and the packaged apps and packaged app installers rule collection doesn't contain any rules, no packaged apps and packaged app installers are allowed to run. In order to allow any packaged apps and packaged app installers, you must create rules for the packaged apps and packaged app installers rule collection.
+- When an AppLocker rule collection is set to **Audit only**, the rules aren't enforced. When a user runs an application that is included in the rule, the app is opened and runs normally, and information about that app is added to the AppLocker event log.
- A custom configured URL can be included in the message that is displayed when an app is blocked.
-- Expect an increase in the number of Help Desk calls initially because of blocked apps until users understand that they cannot run apps that are not allowed.
+- Expect an increase in the number of Help Desk calls initially because of blocked apps until users understand that they can't run apps that aren't allowed.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/configure-authorized-apps-deployed-with-a-managed-installer.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/configure-authorized-apps-deployed-with-a-managed-installer.md
index 839aa3a791..3bb07036ab 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/configure-authorized-apps-deployed-with-a-managed-installer.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/configure-authorized-apps-deployed-with-a-managed-installer.md
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Windows 10 (version 1703) introduced a new option for Windows Defender Applicati
## How does a managed installer work?
-Managed installer uses a special rule collection in **AppLocker** to designate binaries that are trusted by your organization as an authorized source for application installation. When one of these trusted binaries runs, Windows monitors the binary's process (and processes it launches) and watches for files being written to disk. As files are written, they are tagged as originating from a managed installer.
+Managed installer uses a special rule collection in **AppLocker** to designate binaries that are trusted by your organization as an authorized source for application installation. When one of these trusted binaries runs, Windows monitors the binary's process (and processes it launches) and watches for files being written to disk. As files are written, they're tagged as originating from a managed installer.
You can then configure WDAC to trust files that are installed by a managed installer by adding the "Enabled:Managed Installer" option to your WDAC policy. When that option is set, WDAC will check for managed installer origin information when determining whether or not to allow a binary to run. As long as there are no deny rules for the binary, WDAC will allow it to run based purely on its managed installer origin.
@@ -45,14 +45,12 @@ Users with administrator privileges, or malware running as an administrator user
If a managed installer process runs in the context of a user with standard privileges, then it's possible that standard users or malware running as standard user may be able to circumvent the intent of Windows Defender Application Control.
-Some application installers may automatically run the application at the end of the installation process. If this happens when the installer is run by a managed installer, then the managed installer's heuristic tracking and authorization will extend to all files that are created during the first run of the application. This could result in unintentional authorization of an executable. To avoid that, ensure that the method of application deployment that is used as a managed installer limits running applications as part of installation.
+Some application installers may automatically run the application at the end of the installation process. If the application runs automatically, and the installer was run by a managed installer, then the managed installer's heuristic tracking and authorization will extend to all files that are created during the first run of the application. This extension could result in unintentional authorization of an executable. To avoid that, ensure that the method of application deployment that is used as a managed installer limits running applications as part of installation.
## Known limitations with managed installer
- Application control, based on managed installer, doesn't support applications that self-update. If an application that was deployed by a managed installer later updates itself, the updated application files won't include the origin information from the managed installer, and they might not be able to run. When you rely on managed installers, you must deploy and install all application updates by using a managed installer, or include rules to authorize the app in the WDAC policy. In some cases, it may be possible to also designate an application binary that performs self-updates as a managed installer. Proper review for functionality and security should be performed for the application before using this method.
-- [Packaged apps (MSIX)](/windows/msix/) deployed through a managed installer aren't tracked by the managed installer heuristic and will need to be separately authorized in your WDAC policy. See [Manage packaged apps with WDAC](manage-packaged-apps-with-windows-defender-application-control.md).
-
- Some applications or installers may extract, download, or generate binaries and immediately attempt to run them. Files run by such a process may not be allowed by the managed installer heuristic. In some cases, it may be possible to also designate an application binary that performs such an operation as a managed installer. Proper review for functionality and security should be performed for the application before using this method.
- The managed installer heuristic doesn't authorize kernel drivers. The WDAC policy must have rules that allow the necessary drivers to run.
@@ -66,11 +64,11 @@ To turn on managed installer tracking, you must:
### Create and deploy an AppLocker policy that defines your managed installer rules and enables services enforcement for executables and DLLs
-Currently, neither the AppLocker policy creation UI in GPO Editor nor the PowerShell cmdlets allow for directly specifying rules for the Managed Installer rule collection. However, you can use an XML or text editor to convert an EXE rule collection policy into a ManagedInstaller rule collection.
+Currently, both the AppLocker policy creation UI in GPO Editor and the PowerShell cmdlets allow for directly specifying rules for the Managed Installer rule collection. However, you can use an XML or text editor to convert an EXE rule collection policy into a ManagedInstaller rule collection.
> [!NOTE]
> Only EXE file types can be designated as managed installers.
-1. Use [New-AppLockerPolicy](/powershell/module/applocker/new-applockerpolicy?view=win10-ps&preserve-view=true) to make an EXE rule for the file you are designating as a managed installer. This example creates a rule for Microsoft's Intune Management Extension using the Publisher rule type, but any AppLocker rule type can be used. You may need to reformat the output for readability.
+1. Use [New-AppLockerPolicy](/powershell/module/applocker/new-applockerpolicy?view=win10-ps&preserve-view=true) to make an EXE rule for the file you're designating as a managed installer. This example creates a rule for Microsoft's Intune Management Extension using the Publisher rule type, but any AppLocker rule type can be used. You may need to reformat the output for readability.
```powershell
Get-ChildItem ${env:ProgramFiles(x86)}'\Microsoft Intune Management Extension\Microsoft.Management.Services.IntuneWindowsAgent.exe' | Get-AppLockerFileInformation | New-AppLockerPolicy -RuleType Publisher -User Everyone -Xml > AppLocker_MI_PS_ISE.xml
@@ -125,7 +123,7 @@ Currently, neither the AppLocker policy creation UI in GPO Editor nor the PowerS
```
-4. Verify your AppLocker policy. The following example shows a complete AppLocker policy that sets Configuration Manager and Microsoft Endpoint Manager Intune as managed installers. Only those AppLocker rule collections that have actual rules defined are included in the final XML. This ensures the policy will merge successfully on devices which may already have an AppLocker policy in place.
+4. Verify your AppLocker policy. The following example shows a complete AppLocker policy that sets Configuration Manager and Microsoft Endpoint Manager Intune as managed installers. Only those AppLocker rule collections that have actual rules defined are included in the final XML. This condition-based inclusion ensures the policy will merge successfully on devices that may already have an AppLocker policy in place.
```xml
Each installed software application should be validated as trustworthy before you create a policy.
We recommend that you review the reference computer for software that can load arbitrary DLLs and run code or scripts that could render the PC more vulnerable. Examples include software aimed at development or scripting such as msbuild.exe (part of Visual Studio and the .NET Framework) which can be removed if you don't want to run scripts. You can remove or disable such software on the reference computer.
+
+Alice identifies the following key factors to arrive at the "circle-of-trust" for Lamna's critical infrastructure servers:
+
+- All devices are running Windows Server 2019 or above;
+- All apps are centrally managed and deployed;
+- No interactive users.
+
+Based on the above, Alice defines the pseudo-rules for the policy:
+
+1. **“Windows works”** rules that authorize:
+ - Windows
+ - WHQL (third-party kernel drivers)
+ - Windows Store signed apps
+
+2. Rules for **scanned files** that authorize all pre-existing app binaries found on the device
+
+To create the WDAC policy, Alice runs each of the following commands in an elevated Windows PowerShell session, in order:
+
+1. Initialize variables.
```powershell
$PolicyPath=$env:userprofile+"\Desktop\"
$PolicyName="FixedWorkloadPolicy_Audit"
- $WDACPolicy=$PolicyPath+$PolicyName+".xml"
- $WDACPolicyBin=$PolicyPath+$PolicyName+".bin"
+ $LamnaServerPolicy=$PolicyPath+$PolicyName+".xml"
+ $DefaultWindowsPolicy=$env:windir+"\schemas\CodeIntegrity\ExamplePolicies\DefaultWindows_Audit.xml"
+ ```
2. Use [New-CIPolicy](/powershell/module/configci/new-cipolicy) to create a new WDAC policy by scanning the system for installed applications:
```powershell
- New-CIPolicy -Level PcaCertificate -FilePath $WDACPolicy –UserPEs 3> CIPolicyLog.txt
+ New-CIPolicy -FilePath $LamnaServerPolicy -Level SignedVersion -Fallback FilePublisher,FileName,Hash -ScanPath c:\ -UserPEs -MultiplePolicyFormat -OmitPaths c:\Windows,'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\',c:\windows.old\,c:\users\ 3> CIPolicyLog.txt
```
> [!Note]
- >
- > - When you specify the **-UserPEs** parameter (to include user mode executables in the scan), rule option **0 Enabled:UMCI** is automatically added to the WDAC policy. In contrast, if you do not specify **-UserPEs**, the policy will be empty of user mode executables and will only have rules for kernel mode binaries like drivers, in other words, the allow list will not include applications. If you create such a policy and later add rule option **0 Enabled:UMCI**, all attempts to start applications will cause a response from Windows Defender Application Control. In audit mode, the response is logging an event, and in enforced mode, the response is blocking the application.
- > - You can add the **-MultiplePolicyFormat** parameter when creating policies which will be deployed to computers which are running Windows build 1903+. For more information about multiple policies, see [Deploy multiple Windows Defender Application Control policies](deploy-multiple-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md).
+ >
> - You can add the **-Fallback** parameter to catch any applications not discovered using the primary file rule level specified by the **-Level** parameter. For more information about file rule level options, see [Windows Defender Application Control file rule levels](select-types-of-rules-to-create.md).
- >
> - To specify that the WDAC policy scan only a specific drive, include the **-ScanPath** parameter followed by a path. Without this parameter, the tool will scan the C-drive by default.
- >
+ > - When you specify the **-UserPEs** parameter (to include user mode executables in the scan), rule option **0 Enabled:UMCI** is automatically added to the WDAC policy. If you do not specify **-UserPEs**, the policy will be empty of user mode executables and will only have rules for kernel mode binaries like drivers. In other words, the allow list will not include applications. If you create such a policy and later add rule option **0 Enabled:UMCI**, all attempts to start applications will cause a response from Windows Defender Application Control. In audit mode, the response is logging an event, and in enforced mode, the response is blocking the application.
+ > - To create a policy for Windows 10 1903 and above, including support for supplemental policies, use **-MultiplePolicyFormat**.
+ > - To specify a list of paths to exclude from the scan, use the **-OmitPaths** option and supply a comma-delimited list of paths.
> - The preceding example includes `3> CIPolicylog.txt`, which redirects warning messages to a text file, **CIPolicylog.txt**.
-3. Use [ConvertFrom-CIPolicy](/powershell/module/configci/convertfrom-cipolicy) to convert the WDAC policy to a binary format:
+3. Merge the new policy with the WindowsDefault_Audit policy to ensure all Windows binaries and kernel drivers will load.
+
+ ```powershell
+ Merge-CIPolicy -OutputFilePath $LamnaServerPolicy -PolicyPaths $LamnaServerPolicy,$DefaultWindowsPolicy
+ ```
+
+4. Give the new policy a descriptive name, and initial version number:
+
+ ```powershell
+ Set-CIPolicyIdInfo -FilePath $LamnaServerPolicy -PolicyName $PolicyName
+ Set-CIPolicyVersion -FilePath $LamnaServerPolicy -Version "1.0.0.0"
+ ```
+
+5. Modify the merged policy to set policy rules:
+
+ ```powershell
+ Set-RuleOption -FilePath $LamnaServerPolicy -Option 3 # Audit Mode
+ Set-RuleOption -FilePath $LamnaServerPolicy -Option 6 # Unsigned Policy
+ Set-RuleOption -FilePath $LamnaServerPolicy -Option 9 # Advanced Boot Menu
+ Set-RuleOption -FilePath $LamnaServerPolicy -Option 12 # Enforce Store Apps
+ Set-RuleOption -FilePath $LamnaServerPolicy -Option 16 # No Reboot
+ Set-RuleOption -FilePath $LamnaServerPolicy -Option 17 # Allow Supplemental
+ Set-RuleOption -FilePath $LamnaServerPolicy -Option 19 # Dynamic Code Security
+ ```
+
+6. If appropriate, add more signer or file rules to further customize the policy for your organization.
+
+7. Use [ConvertFrom-CIPolicy](/powershell/module/configci/convertfrom-cipolicy) to convert the WDAC policy to a binary format:
```powershell
- ConvertFrom-CIPolicy $WDACPolicy $WDACPolicyBin
+ [xml]$LamnaServerPolicyXML = Get-Content $LamnaServerPolicy
+ $PolicyId = $LamnaServerPolicyXML.SiPolicy.PolicyId
+ $LamnaServerPolicyBin = $PolicyPath+$PolicyId+".cip"
+ ConvertFrom-CIPolicy $LamnaServerPolicy $LamnaServerPolicyBin
```
-After you complete these steps, the WDAC binary file ($WDACPolicyBin) and original .xml file ($WDACPolicy) will be available on your desktop. You can use the binary file as a WDAC policy or sign it for more security.
+8. Upload the base policy XML and the associated binary to a source control solution such as [GitHub](https://github.com/) or a document management solution such as [Office 365 SharePoint](https://products.office.com/sharepoint/collaboration).
-> [!NOTE]
-> We recommend that you keep the original .xml file of the policy for use when you need to merge the WDAC policy with another policy or update its rule options. Alternatively, you would have to create a new policy from a new scan for servicing. For more information about how to merge WDAC policies, see [Merge Windows Defender Application Control policies](merge-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md).
+Alice now has an initial policy for Lamna's critical infrastructure servers that is ready to deploy in audit mode.
-We recommend that every WDAC policy be run in audit mode before being enforced. Doing so allows administrators to discover any issues with the policy without receiving error messages. For information about how to audit a WDAC policy, see [Audit Windows Defender Application Control policies](audit-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md).
+## Create a custom base policy to minimize user impact on in-use client devices
+Alice previously created a policy for the organization's fully managed devices. Alice has included the fully managed device policy as part of Lamna's device build process so all new devices now begin with WDAC enabled. She's preparing to deploy the policy to systems that are already in use, but is worried about causing disruption to users' productivity. To minimize that risk, Alice decides to take a different approach for those systems. She'll continue to deploy the fully managed device policy in audit mode to those devices, but for enforcement mode she'll merge the fully managed device policy rules with a policy created by scanning the device for all previously installed software. In this way, each device is treated as its own "golden" system.
+Alice identifies the following key factors to arrive at the "circle-of-trust" for Lamna's fully managed in-use devices:
+
+- Everything described for Lamna's [Fully Managed Devices](create-wdac-policy-for-fully-managed-devices.md);
+- Users have installed apps that they need to continue to run.
+
+Based on the above, Alice defines the pseudo-rules for the policy:
+
+1. Everything included in the Fully Managed Devices policy
+2. Rules for **scanned files** that authorize all pre-existing app binaries found on the device
+
+For Lamna's existing, in-use devices, Alice deploys a script along with the Fully Managed Devices policy XML (not the converted WDAC policy binary). The script then generates a custom policy locally on the client as described in the previous section, but instead of merging with the DefaultWindows policy, the script merges with Lamna's Fully Managed Devices policy. Alice also modifies the steps above to match the requirements of this different use case.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/create-wdac-policy-for-fully-managed-devices.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/create-wdac-policy-for-fully-managed-devices.md
index 7cd08be428..2d13639669 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/create-wdac-policy-for-fully-managed-devices.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/create-wdac-policy-for-fully-managed-devices.md
@@ -82,8 +82,9 @@ Alice follows these steps to complete this task:
2. On the client device, run the following commands in an elevated Windows PowerShell session to initialize variables:
```powershell
+ $PolicyPath=$env:userprofile+"\Desktop\"
$PolicyName= "Lamna_FullyManagedClients_Audit"
- $LamnaPolicy=$env:userprofile+"\Desktop\"+$PolicyName+".xml"
+ $LamnaPolicy=$PolicyPath+$PolicyName+".xml"
$MEMCMPolicy=$env:windir+"\CCM\DeviceGuard\MergedPolicy_Audit_ISG.xml"
```
@@ -121,7 +122,9 @@ Alice follows these steps to complete this task:
> In the sample commands below, replace the string "{InsertPolicyID}" with the actual PolicyID GUID (including braces **{ }**) found in your policy XML file.
```powershell
- $WDACPolicyBin=$env:userprofile+"\Desktop\"+$PolicyName+"_{InsertPolicyID}.bin"
+ [xml]$LamnaPolicyXML = Get-Content $LamnaPolicy
+ $PolicyId = $LamnaPolicyXML.SiPolicy.PolicyId
+ $LamnaPolicyBin = $PolicyPath+$PolicyId+".cip"
ConvertFrom-CIPolicy $LamnaPolicy $WDACPolicyBin
```
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/select-types-of-rules-to-create.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/select-types-of-rules-to-create.md
index 474a39e5dd..e1f7559c0d 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/select-types-of-rules-to-create.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/select-types-of-rules-to-create.md
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ Each file rule level has its benefit and disadvantage. Use Table 2 to select the
|----------- | ----------- |
| **Hash** | Specifies individual [Authenticode/PE image hash values](#more-information-about-hashes) for each discovered binary. This level is the most specific level, and requires more effort to maintain the current product versions’ hash values. Each time a binary is updated, the hash value changes, therefore requiring a policy update. |
| **FileName** | Specifies the original filename for each binary. Although the hash values for an application are modified when updated, the file names are typically not. This level offers less specific security than the hash level, but it doesn't typically require a policy update when any binary is modified. |
-| **FilePath** | Beginning with Windows 10 version 1903, this level allows binaries to run from specific file path locations. More information about FilePath level rules can be found below. |
+| **FilePath** | Beginning with Windows 10 version 1903, this level allows binaries to run from specific file path locations. FilePath rules only apply to user mode binaries and can't be used to allow kernel mode drivers. More information about FilePath level rules can be found below. |
| **SignedVersion** | This level combines the publisher rule with a version number. It allows anything to run from the specified publisher with a version at or above the specified version number. |
| **Publisher** | This level combines the PcaCertificate level (typically one certificate below the root) and the common name (CN) of the leaf certificate. You can use this rule level to trust a certificate issued by a particular CA and issued to a specific company you trust (such as Intel, for device drivers). |
| **FilePublisher** | This level combines the “FileName” attribute of the signed file, plus “Publisher” (PCA certificate with CN of leaf), plus a minimum version number. This option trusts specific files from the specified publisher, with a version at or above the specified version number. |
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/use-signed-policies-to-protect-windows-defender-application-control-against-tampering.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/use-signed-policies-to-protect-windows-defender-application-control-against-tampering.md
index 3200f16f8f..07f86d0c75 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/use-signed-policies-to-protect-windows-defender-application-control-against-tampering.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/use-signed-policies-to-protect-windows-defender-application-control-against-tampering.md
@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ ms.localizationpriority: medium
audience: ITPro
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
author: jsuther1974
-ms.reviewer: isbrahm
+ms.reviewer: jogeurte
ms.author: dansimp
manager: dansimp
-ms.date: 06/27/2022
+ms.date: 08/15/2022
ms.technology: windows-sec
---
@@ -31,26 +31,29 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec
Signed Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) policies give organizations the highest level of malware protection available in Windows—must be signed with [PKCS #7](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5652). In addition to their enforced policy rules, signed policies can't be modified or deleted by a user or administrator on the computer. These policies are designed to prevent administrative tampering and kernel mode exploit access. With this idea of the policies in mind, it's much more difficult to remove signed WDAC policies. SecureBoot must be enabled in order to restrict users from updating or removing signed WDAC policies.
-Before you sign with PKCS #7 and deploy a signed WDAC policy, we recommend that you [audit the policy](audit-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md) to discover any blocked applications that should be allowed to run.
+> [!WARNING]
+> Boot failure (blue screen) may occur if your signing certificate does not follow these rules:
+>
+> - All policies, including base and supplemental, must be signed according to the [PKCS 7 Standard](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5652).
+> - Use RSA SHA-256 only. ECDSA isn't supported.
+> - Don't use UTF-8 encoding for certificate fields, like 'subject common name' and 'issuer common name'. These strings must be encoded as PRINTABLE_STRING, IA5STRING or BMPSTRING.
+> - Keys must be less than or equal to 4K key size
+>
+
+Before you sign with PKCS #7 and deploy a signed WDAC policy, we recommend that you [audit the policy](audit-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md) to discover any blocked applications that should be allowed to run.
Signing WDAC policies by using an on-premises CA-generated certificate or a purchased code signing certificate is straightforward.
-If you don't currently have a code signing certificate exported in .pfx format (containing private keys, extensions, and root certificates), see [Optional: Create a code signing certificate for Windows Defender Application Control](create-code-signing-cert-for-windows-defender-application-control.md) to create one with your on-premises CA.
+If you don't currently have a code signing certificate exported in .pfx format (containing private keys, extensions, and root certificates), see [Optional: Create a code signing certificate for Windows Defender Application Control](create-code-signing-cert-for-windows-defender-application-control.md) to create one with your on-premises CA.
Before PKCS #7-signing WDAC policies for the first time, ensure you enable rule options 9 (“Advanced Boot Options Menu”) and 10 (“Boot Audit on Failure”) to leave troubleshooting options available to administrators. To ensure that a rule option is enabled, you can run a command such as `Set-RuleOption -FilePath