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# Overview of threat mitigations in Windows 10
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<span id="_Toc471830291" class="anchor"></span>This topic provides an overview of software and firmware threats faced in the current security landscape, and the mitigations that Windows 10 offers in response to these threats.
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**Note** If you are familiar with the [Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET)](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/2458544) and want information about the many EMET mitigations built into Windows 10, and how to convert an EMET settings file into policies for Windows 10, see [Understanding Windows 10 in relation to the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit](#understanding-windows-10-in-relation-to-the-enhanced-mitigation-experience-toolkit), later in this topic.
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| **Section** | **Contents** |
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|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
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| [The security threat landscape](#_IntroductionThe_security_threat) | Describes the current nature of the security threat landscape, and outlines the basic ways that Windows 10 is designed to mitigate against software exploits and other similar threats. |
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| [Windows 10 mitigations that you can configure](#_Windows_10_mitigations) | Provides tables of configurable threat mitigations with links to more information. Product features such as Device Guard appear in [Table 1](#_Windows_10_Mmitigations), and memory protection options such as Data Execution Prevention appear in [Table 2](#_Table_2_). |
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| [Windows 10 mitigations that need no configuration](#windows-10-mitigations-that-need-no-configuration) | Provides descriptions of Windows 10 mitigations that require no configuration—they are built into the operating system. For example, heap protections and kernel pool protections are built into Windows 10. |
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| [Understanding Windows 10 in relation to the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit](#understanding-windows-10-in-relation-to-the-enhanced-mitigation-experience-toolkit) | For IT professionals who in the past have used the [Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET)](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/2458544), describes how the mitigations in EMET correspond to features built into Windows 10. It also describes how to convert an XML settings file created in EMET into mitigation policies for Windows 10. |
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## <span id="_IntroductionThe_security_threat" class="anchor"><span id="_Toc471832066" class="anchor"><span id="_Toc472941069" class="anchor"></span></span></span>The security threat landscape
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Today’s security threat landscape is one of aggressive and tenacious threats. In previous years, malicious attackers mostly focused on gaining community recognition through their attacks and the personal enjoyment of temporarily taking a system offline. Since then, attacker’s motives have shifted toward monetizing their attacks, which includes holding machines and data hostage until the owners pay the demanded ransom, and exploiting the valuable information the attackers discover for monetary gain. Unlike these examples, modern attacks increasingly focus on large-scale intellectual property theft; targeted system degradation that results in financial loss; and now even cyberterrorism that threatens the security of individuals, businesses, and national interests all over the world. These attackers are typically highly trained individuals and security experts, some of whom are in the employ of nation states that have large budgets, seemingly unlimited human resources, and unknown motives. Threats like these require a different approach and mitigations that can meet the challenge.
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In recognition of this landscape, Windows 10, version 1703 includes multiple security features that were created to make it difficult (and costly) to find and exploit software vulnerabilities. These features are designed to:
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- Eliminate entire classes of vulnerabilities
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- Break exploitation techniques
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- Contain damage and prevent persistence
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- Limit the window of opportunity to exploit
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The following sections provide more detail about security mitigations in Windows 10, version 1703.
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## <span id="_Windows_10_Mmitigations" class="anchor"><span id="_Windows_10_mitigations" class="anchor"><span id="_Toc471830292" class="anchor"><span id="_Toc471832067" class="anchor"><span id="_Toc472941070" class="anchor"><span id="_Toc471470562" class="anchor"></span></span></span></span></span></span>Windows 10 mitigations that you can configure
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Windows 10 mitigations that you can configure are listed in the following two tables. The first table focuses on features such as Device Guard, and the second table describes memory protection options such as Data Execution Prevention. Memory protection options provide specific mitigations against malware that attempts to manipulate memory to gain control of a system.
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**Table 1 Windows 10 mitigations that you can configure**
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<table>
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<thead>
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<tr class="header">
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<th><strong>Mitigation and corresponding threat</strong></th>
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<th><strong>Description and links</strong></th>
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</tr>
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</thead>
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<tbody>
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<tr class="odd">
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<td><strong>Device Guard</strong>,<br />
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which helps keep a device free of<br />
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malware or other untrusted apps<br />
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(can be enhanced by secure boot, described in the next row)</td>
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<td><p>Device Guard includes Code Integrity policies, a whitelist you create of trusted apps—the only apps allowed to run in your organization. Device Guard also includes Virtualization-Based Security (VBS), which has specific hardware requirements, and works with Code Integrity policies to help stop attacks even if they gain entrance to the kernel.</p>
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<p>Device Guard is included in Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows Server 2016.</p>
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<p><strong>More information</strong>: <a href="https://technet.microsoft.com/itpro/windows/keep-secure/introduction-to-device-guard-virtualization-based-security-and-code-integrity-policies">Introduction to Device Guard</a></p></td>
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</tr>
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<tr class="even">
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<td><strong>UEFI secure boot</strong>,<br />
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which mitigates against<br />
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bootkits and rootkits</td>
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<td><p>Universal Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Secure Boot helps protect the boot process and firmware from tampering, such as from a physically present attacker or from forms of malware that run early in the boot process or in kernel after startup.</p>
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<p><strong>More information</strong>: <a href="https://technet.microsoft.com/itpro/windows/keep-secure/bitlocker-countermeasures#uefi-and-secure-boot">UEFI and secure boot</a></p></td>
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</tr>
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<tr class="odd">
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<td><strong>Credential Guard</strong>,<br />
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which mitigates against<br />
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credential theft attacks, such as Pass-the-Hash or Pass-The-Ticket</td>
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<td><p>Credential Guard uses virtualization-based security to isolate secrets, such as NTLM password hashes and Kerberos Ticket Granting Tickets, so that only privileged system software can access them.</p>
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<p>Credential Guard is included in Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows Server 2016.</p>
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<p><strong>More information</strong>: <a href="https://technet.microsoft.com/itpro/windows/keep-secure/credential-guard">Protect derived domain credentials with Credential Guard</a></p></td>
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</tr>
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<tr class="even">
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<td><strong>Blocking of untrusted fonts</strong>, <strong><br />
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</strong>which mitigates against<br />
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elevation-of-privilege attacks from untrusted fonts</td>
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<td><p>The Block Untrusted Fonts setting allows you to prevent users from loading untrusted fonts onto your network. Blocking untrusted fonts helps prevent both remote (web-based or email-based) and local elevation-of-privilege attacks associated with the parsing of font files.</p>
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<p><strong>More information</strong>: <a href="https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/block-untrusted-fonts-in-enterprise">Block untrusted fonts in an enterprise</a></p></td>
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</tr>
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<tr class="odd">
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<td><strong>OS key pinning</strong>,<br />
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which mitigates against<br />
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man-in-the-middle attacks that leverage PKI</td>
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<td><p>With OS key pinning, you can “pin” (associate) an X.509 certificate and its public key to its legitimate Certification Authority (root or leaf). This provides validation for digitally signed certificates (SSL certifcates) used while browsing, and mitigates against man-in the-middle attacks that involve these certificates.</p>
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<p><strong>More</strong> <strong>information</strong>: OS_KEY_PINNING_LINK.</p></td>
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</tr>
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<tr class="even">
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<td><strong>The SmartScreen Filter</strong>,<br />
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which mitigates against<br />
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malicious applications that a user might download</td>
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<td><p>The SmartScreen Filter can check the reputation of a downloaded application by using a service that Microsoft maintains. The first time a user runs an app that originates from the Internet (even if the user copied it from another PC), the SmartScreen filter checks to see if the app lacks a reputation or is known to be malicious, and responds accordingly.</p>
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<p><strong>More information</strong>: <a href="#_The_SmartScreen_Filter">The SmartScreen Filter</a>, later in this topic</p></td>
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</tr>
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<tr class="odd">
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<td><strong>Windows Defender</strong> (antimalware), which mitigates against multiple threats</td>
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<td><p>Windows 10 includes Windows Defender, a robust inbox antimalware solution. Windows Defender has been significantly improved since it was introduced in Windows 8.</p>
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<p><strong>More information</strong>: <a href="#windows-defender">Windows Defender</a>, later in this topic.</p></td>
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</tr>
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<tr class="even">
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<td><strong>Memory protections</strong> listed in <a href="#_Table_2_">Table 2</a>,<br />
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which mitigate against<br />
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malware that uses memory manipulation techniques such as buffer overruns</td>
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<td><p>This set of mitigations helps protect against memory-based attacks, where malware or other code manipulates memory to gain control of a system. For example, malware may use buffer overruns to inject malicious executable code into memory.</p>
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<p>A minority of trusted apps will not be able to run if some of these mitigations are set to their most restrictive settings. Testing can help you maximize protection while still allowing needed apps to run correctly.</p>
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<p><strong>More information</strong>: <a href="#_Table_2_">Table 2</a>, later in this topic</p></td>
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</tr>
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</tbody>
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</table>
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Configurable Windows 10 mitigations oriented specifically toward memory manipulation are listed in the following table. Detailed understanding of these threats and mitigations requires detailed understanding of how the operating system and applications handle memory—knowledge used by developers but not necessarily by IT professionals. However, from an IT professional’s perspective, the basic process for maximizing these types of mitigations is to work in a test lab to discover whether a given setting interferes with any needed applications. Then you can deploy settings that maximize protection while still allowing needed apps to run correctly.
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### <span id="_Table_2_" class="anchor"><span id="_Toc472941071" class="anchor"></span></span>Table 2 Configurable Windows 10 mitigations designed to protect against memory exploits
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<table>
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<thead>
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<tr class="header">
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<th><strong>Mitigation and corresponding threat</strong></th>
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<th><strong>Description</strong></th>
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</tr>
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</thead>
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<tbody>
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<tr class="odd">
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<td><strong>Data Execution Prevention (DEP),</strong> which mitigates against<br />
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exploitation of buffer overruns</td>
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<td><p><strong>Data Execution Prevention (DEP)</strong> is a system-level memory protection feature that has been available in Windows operating systems for over a decade. DEP enables the system to mark one or more pages of memory as non-executable, which prevents code from being run from that region of memory, to help prevent exploitation of buffer overruns.</p>
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<p>DEP helps prevent code from being run from data pages such as the default heap, stacks, and memory pools. Although some applications have compatibility problems with DEP, the vast majority of applications do not.</p>
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<p>For more information, see <a href="#_Data_Execution_Prevention">Data Execution Prevention</a>, later in this topic.</p>
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<p><strong>Group Policy settings for this mitigation</strong>: See <a href="https://technet.microsoft.com/itpro/windows/keep-secure/override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies">Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies</a>.</p></td>
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</tr>
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<tr class="even">
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<td><strong>SEHOP</strong>,<br />
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which mitigates against<br />
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overwrites of the Structured Exception Handler</td>
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<td><p><strong>Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP)</strong> is designed to block exploits that use the Structured Exception Handler (SEH) overwrite technique. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps protect applications regardless of whether they have been compiled with the latest improvements. Although some applications have compatibility problems with SEHOP, the vast majority of applications do not.</p>
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<p>For more information, see <a href="#_Structured_Exception_Handling">Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection</a>, later in this topic.</p>
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<p><strong>Group Policy setting for this mitigation</strong>: See <a href="https://technet.microsoft.com/itpro/windows/keep-secure/override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies">Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies</a>.</p></td>
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</tr>
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<td><strong>ASLR</strong>,<br />
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which mitigates against<br />
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malware attacks based on expected memory locations</td>
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<td><p>Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) loads DLLs into random memory addresses at boot time. This mitigates against malware designed to attack specific memory locations where specific DLLs are expected to be loaded.</p>
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<p>For more information, see <a href="#_Address_Space_Layout">Address Space Layout Randomization</a>, later in this topic.</p>
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<p><strong>Group Policy settings for this mitigation</strong>: See <a href="https://technet.microsoft.com/itpro/windows/keep-secure/override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies">Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies</a>.</p></td>
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</tr>
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</tbody>
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</table>
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### <span id="_Data_Execution_Prevention" class="anchor"><span id="_Toc472941072" class="anchor"></span></span>Data Execution Prevention
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Malware depends on its ability to put a malicious payload into memory with the hope that it will be executed later. Wouldn’t it be great if you could prevent malware from running if it wrote to an area that has been allocated solely for the storage of information?
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Data Execution Prevention (DEP) does exactly that, by substantially reducing the range of memory that malicious code can use for its benefit. DEP uses the No eXecute bit on modern CPUs to mark blocks of memory as read-only so that those blocks can’t be used to execute malicious code that may be inserted within through a vulnerability exploit.
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Because of the importance of DEP, users cannot install Windows 10 on a computer that does not have DEP capability. Fortunately, most processors released since the mid-2000s support DEP.
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**To see which apps use DEP**
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1. Open Task Manager: Press Ctrl+Alt+Del and select **Task Manager**, or search the Start screen.
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2. Click **More Details** (if necessary), and then click the **Details** tab.
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3. Right-click any column heading, and then click **Select Columns**.
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4. In the **Select Columns** dialog box, select the last **Data Execution Prevention** check box.
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5. Click **OK**.
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You can now see which processes have DEP enabled. Figure 1 shows the processes running on a Windows 10 PC with a single process that does not support DEP.
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**Figure 1. Processes on which DEP has been enabled in Windows 10**
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You can use Control Panel to view or change DEP settings.
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#### To use Control Panel to view or change DEP settings on an individual PC
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1. Open Control Panel, System: click Start, type **Control Panel System**, and press ENTER.
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2. Click **Advanced system settings**, and then click the **Advanced** tab.
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3. In the **Performance** box, click **Settings**.
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4. In **Performance Options**, click the **Data Execution Prevention** tab.
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5. Select an option:
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- **Turn on DEP for essential Windows programs and services only**
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- **Turn on DEP for all programs and services except those I select**. If you choose this option, use the **Add** and **Remove** buttons to create the list of exceptions for which DEP will not be turned on.
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#### To use Group Policy to control DEP settings
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You can use the Group Policy setting called **Process Mitigation Options** to control DEP settings. Although some applications have compatibility problems with DEP, the vast majority of applications do not. To use the Group Policy setting, see [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](https://technet.microsoft.com/itpro/windows/keep-secure/override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies).
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### <span id="_Windows_heap_protections" class="anchor"><span id="_Structured_Exception_Handling" class="anchor"><span id="_Toc472941075" class="anchor"></span></span></span>Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection
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Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP) helps prevent attackers from being able to use malicious code to exploit the [Structured Exception Handler](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680657(v=vs.85).aspx) (SEH), which is integral to the system and allows (non-malicious) apps to handle exceptions appropriately. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps protect applications regardless of whether they have been compiled with the latest improvements.
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You can use the Group Policy setting called **Process Mitigation Options** to control the SEHOP setting. Although some applications have compatibility problems with SEHOP, the vast majority of applications do not. To use the Group Policy setting, see [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](https://technet.microsoft.com/itpro/windows/keep-secure/override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies).
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### <span id="_Address_Space_Layout" class="anchor"><span id="_Toc472941076" class="anchor"></span></span>Address Space Layout Randomization
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One of the most common techniques used to gain access to a system is to find a vulnerability in a privileged process that is already running, guess or find a location in memory where important system code and data have been placed, and then overwrite that information with a malicious payload. In the early days of operating systems, any malware that could write directly to the system memory could do such a thing; the malware would simply overwrite system memory in well-known and predictable locations.
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Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) makes that type of attack much more difficult because it randomizes how and where important data is stored in memory. With ASLR, it is more difficult for malware to find the specific location it needs to attack. Figure 2 illustrates how ASLR works by showing how the locations of different critical Windows components can change in memory between restarts.
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**Figure 2. ASLR at work**
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Although the ASLR implementation in Windows 7 was effective, it wasn’t applied holistically across the operating system, and the level of entropy (cryptographic randomization) wasn’t always at the highest possible level. To decrease the likelihood that sophisticated attacks such as heap spraying could succeed, starting with Windows 8, Microsoft applied ASLR holistically across the system and increased the level of entropy many times.
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The ASLR implementation in Windows 10 is greatly improved over Windows 7, especially with 64-bit system and application processes that can take advantage of a vastly increased memory space, which makes it even more difficult for malware to predict where Windows 10 stores vital data. When used on systems that have TPMs, ASLR memory randomization will be increasingly unique across devices, which makes it even more difficult for a successful exploit that works on one system to work reliably on another.
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You can use the Group Policy setting called **Process Mitigation Options** to control ASLR settings (“Force ASLR” and “Bottom-up ASLR”), as described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](https://technet.microsoft.com/itpro/windows/keep-secure/override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies).
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### <span id="_Windows_10_mitigations_1" class="anchor"><span id="_The_SmartScreen_Filter" class="anchor"><span id="_Toc472424357" class="anchor"><span id="_Toc472941077" class="anchor"></span></span></span></span>The SmartScreen Filter
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Starting with Windows Internet Explorer 8, the SmartScreen Filter has helped protect users from both malicious applications and nefarious websites by using the SmartScreen Filter’s application and URL reputation services. The SmartScreen Filter in Internet Explorer would check URLs and newly downloaded apps against an online reputation service that Microsoft maintained. If the app or URL were not known to be safe, SmartScreen Filter would warn the user or even prevent the app or URL from loading, depending on how systems administrators had configured Group Policy settings.
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For Windows 10, Microsoft further developed the SmartScreen Filter by integrating its app reputation abilities into the operating system itself, which allows the filter to protect users regardless of the web browser they are using or the path that the app uses to arrive on the device (for example, email, USB flash drive). The first time a user runs an app that originates from the Internet, even if the user copied it from another PC, the SmartScreen Filter checks the reputation of the application by using digital signatures and other factors against a service that Microsoft maintains. If the app lacks a reputation or is known to be malicious, the SmartScreen Filter warns the user or blocks execution entirely, depending on how the administrator has configured Group Policy (see Figure 3).
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**Figure 3. The SmartScreen Filter at work in Windows 10**
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By default, users have the option to bypass SmartScreen Filter protection so that it will not prevent a user from running a legitimate app. You can use Control Panel or Group Policy settings to disable the SmartScreen Filter or to completely prevent users from running apps that the SmartScreen Filter does not recognize. The Control Panel settings are shown in Figure 4.
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**Figure 4. The Windows SmartScreen configuration options in Control Panel**
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If you want to try the SmartScreen Filter, use Windows 7 to download this simulated (but not dangerous) malware . Save it to your computer, and then run it from Windows Explorer. As shown in Figure 5, Windows runs the app without much warning. In Windows 7, you might receive a warning message about the app not having a certificate, but you can easily bypass it.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Figure 5. Windows 7 allows the app to run**
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Now, repeat the test on a computer running Windows 10 by copying the file to a Windows 10 PC or by downloading the file again and saving it to your local computer. Run the file directly from File Explorer, and the SmartScreen Filter will warn you before it allows it to run. Microsoft’s data shows that for a vast majority of users, that extra warning is enough to save them from a malware infection.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Windows Defender
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Windows included Windows Defender, a robust inbox antimalware solution, starting with Windows 8. With Windows 10, Microsoft significantly improved Windows Defender. Windows Defender in Windows 10 uses a four-pronged approach to improve antimalware:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Rich local context** improves how malware is identified. Windows 10 informs Windows Defender not only about content like files and processes but also where the content came from, where it has been stored, and more. The information about source and history enables Windows Defender to apply different levels of scrutiny to different content.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Extensive global sensors** help keep Windows Defender current and aware of even the newest malware. This is accomplished in two ways: by collecting the rich local context data from end points and by centrally analyzing that data. The goal is to identify new, emerging malware and block it in the first critical hours of its lifetime to limit exposure to the broader PC ecosystem.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Tamper proofing** helps guard Windows Defender itself against malware attacks. For example, Windows Defender uses Protected Processes, which prevents untrusted processes from attempting to tamper with Windows Defender components, its registry keys, and so on. (For information about Protected Processes, see [Additional memory protections](#_Additional_memory_protections_1), earlier in this topic.)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Enterprise-level features** give IT pros the tools and configuration options necessary to make Windows Defender an enterprise-class antimalware solution.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
For more information, see [Windows Defender in Windows 10](https://technet.microsoft.com/itpro/windows/keep-secure/windows-defender-in-windows-10) and [Windows Defender Overview for Windows Server](https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/security/windows-defender/windows-defender-overview-windows-server).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Windows 10 mitigations that need no configuration
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Windows 10 provides many threat mitigations that are built into the operating system and need no configuration within the operating system. The table that follows describes some of these mitigations.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
One of the mitigations, Control Flow Guard (CFG), needs no configuration within the operating system, but does require that the application developer configure the mitigation into the application when it’s compiled. CFG is built into Microsoft Edge, IE11, and other features in Windows 10, and can be built into any application when it’s compiled.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Table 3 Windows 10 mitigations to protect against memory exploits – no configuration needed
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<table>
|
||||||
|
<thead>
|
||||||
|
<tr class="header">
|
||||||
|
<th><strong>Mitigation and corresponding threat</strong></th>
|
||||||
|
<th><strong>Description</strong></th>
|
||||||
|
</tr>
|
||||||
|
</thead>
|
||||||
|
<tbody>
|
||||||
|
<tr class="odd">
|
||||||
|
<td><strong>Heap protections</strong>,<br />
|
||||||
|
which mitigate against<br />
|
||||||
|
exploitation of the heap</td>
|
||||||
|
<td><p>Windows 10 includes protections for the heap, such as the use of internal data structures which help protect against corruption of memory used by the heap.</p>
|
||||||
|
<p><strong>More information</strong>: <a href="#_Windows_heap_protections_1">Windows heap protections</a>, later in this topic.</p></td>
|
||||||
|
</tr>
|
||||||
|
<tr class="even">
|
||||||
|
<td><strong>Kernel pool protections</strong>,<br />
|
||||||
|
which mitigate against<br />
|
||||||
|
exploitation of pool memory used by the kernel</td>
|
||||||
|
<td><p>Windows 10 includes protections for the pool of memory used by the kernel. For example, safe unlinking protects against pool overruns that are combined with unlinking operations to create an attack.</p>
|
||||||
|
<p><strong>More information</strong>: <a href="#_Kernel_pool_protections">Kernel pool protections</a>, later in this topic.</p></td>
|
||||||
|
</tr>
|
||||||
|
<tr class="odd">
|
||||||
|
<td><strong>Control Flow Guard</strong>,<br />
|
||||||
|
which mitigates against<br />
|
||||||
|
exploits based on flow between code locations in memory</td>
|
||||||
|
<td><p>Control Flow Guard (CFG) is a mitigation built into Microsoft Edge, IE11, and other features in Windows 10.</p>
|
||||||
|
<p>CFG is a mitigation that any developer can configure into an application when it’s compiled. For such an application, CFG can detect an attacker’s attempt to change the intended flow of code. If this occurs, CFG terminates the application. Administrators can request software vendors to deliver Windows applications compiled with CFG enabled.</p>
|
||||||
|
<p><strong>More information</strong>: <a href="#_Control_Flow_Guard_1">Control Flow Guard</a>, later in this topic.</p></td>
|
||||||
|
</tr>
|
||||||
|
<tr class="even">
|
||||||
|
<td><strong>Additional memory protections</strong>,<br />
|
||||||
|
such as protections against<br />
|
||||||
|
NULL page derefences</td>
|
||||||
|
<td><p>Windows 10 includes a variety of memory protections, such as reserving the lowest 64 KB of process memory for the system, which helps protect against the “NULL dereference” technique and other threats.</p>
|
||||||
|
<p>For more information, see <a href="#_Additional_memory_protections_1">Additional memory protections</a>, later in this topic</p></td>
|
||||||
|
</tr>
|
||||||
|
<tr class="odd">
|
||||||
|
<td><strong>Universal Windows apps protections</strong>,<br />
|
||||||
|
which mitigate against<br />
|
||||||
|
multiple threats</td>
|
||||||
|
<td><p>Universal Windows apps are carefully screened before being made available, and they run in an AppContainer sandbox with limited privileges and capabilities.</p>
|
||||||
|
<p><strong>More information</strong>: <a href="#_Microsoft_Edge_and">Universal Windows apps protections</a>, later in this topic.</p></td>
|
||||||
|
</tr>
|
||||||
|
<tr class="even">
|
||||||
|
<td><strong>Protections built into Microsoft Edge</strong> (the browser),<br />
|
||||||
|
which mitigate against<br />
|
||||||
|
multiple threats</td>
|
||||||
|
<td><p>Windows 10 includes an entirely new browser, Microsoft Edge, designed with multiple security improvements.</p>
|
||||||
|
<p><strong>More information</strong>: <a href="#_Microsoft_Edge_and_2">Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer 11</a>, later in this topic.</p></td>
|
||||||
|
</tr>
|
||||||
|
</tbody>
|
||||||
|
</table>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### <span id="_Windows_heap_protections_1" class="anchor"><span id="_Toc472941079" class="anchor"></span></span>Windows heap protections
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The *heap* is a location in memory that Windows uses to store dynamic application data. Windows 10 continues to improve on earlier Windows heap designs by further mitigating the risk of heap exploits that could be used as part of an attack.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Windows 10 has several important improvements to the security of the heap over Windows 7:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Heap metadata hardening** for internal data structures that the heap uses, to improve protections against memory corruption.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Heap allocation randomization**, that is, the use of randomized locations and sizes for heap memory allocations, which makes it more difficult for an attacker to predict the location of critical memory to overwrite. Specifically, Windows 10 adds a random offset to the address of a newly allocated heap, which makes the allocation much less predictable.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Heap guard pages** before and after blocks of memory, which work as tripwires. If an attacker attempts to write past a block of memory (a common technique known as a buffer overflow), the attacker will have to overwrite a guard page. Any attempt to modify a guard page is considered a memory corruption, and Windows 10 responds by instantly terminating the app.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### <span id="_Additional_memory_protections" class="anchor"><span id="_Control_Flow_Guard" class="anchor"><span id="_Kernel_pool_protections" class="anchor"><span id="_Toc472941080" class="anchor"></span></span></span></span>Kernel pool protections
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The operating system kernel in Windows sets aside two pools of memory, one that remains in physical memory (“nonpaged pool”) and one that can be paged in and out of physical memory (“paged pool”). There are many types of attacks that have been attempted against these pools, such as process quota pointer encoding; lookaside, delay free, and pool page cookies; and PoolIndex bounds checks. Windows 10 has multiple “pool hardening” protections, such as integrity checks, that help protect the kernel pool against such attacks.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
In addition to pool hardening, Windows 10 includes other pool protections:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Kernel DEP** and **Kernel ASLR**: Follow the same principles as [Data Execution Prevention](#_Data_Execution_Prevention) and [Address Space Layout Randomization](#_Address_Space_Layout), described earlier in this topic.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Font parsing in AppContainer:** Isolates font parsing in an [AppContainer sandbox](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/mt595898(v=vs.85).aspx).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Disabling of NT Virtual DOS Machine (NTVDM)**: The old NTVDM kernel module (for running 16-bit applications) is disabled by default, which neutralizes the associated vulnerabilities. (Enabling NTVDM decreases protection against Null dereference and other exploits.)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Supervisor Mode Execution Prevention (SMEP)**: Prevents the kernel (the “supervisor”) from executing code in user pages, a common technique used by attackers for local kernel elevation of privilege (EOP). This requires processor support found in Intel Ivy Bridge or later processors, or ARM with PXN support.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Safe unlinking:** Protects against pool overruns that are combined with unlinking operations to create an attack. Windows 10 includes global safe unlinking, which extends heap and kernel pool safe unlinking to all usage of LIST\_ENTRY and includes the “FastFail” mechanism to enable rapid and safe process termination.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### <span id="_Control_Flow_Guard_1" class="anchor"><span id="_Toc472941081" class="anchor"></span></span>Control Flow Guard
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
When applications are loaded into memory, they are allocated space based on the size of the code, requested memory, and other factors. When an application begins to execute code, it calls additional code located in other memory addresses. The relationships between the code locations are well known—they are written in the code itself—but previous to Windows 10, the flow between these locations was not enforced, which gave attackers the opportunity to change the flow to meet their needs.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
This kind of threat is mitigated in Windows 10 through the Control Flow Guard (CFG) feature. When a trusted application that was compiled to use CFG calls code, CFG verifies that the code location called is trusted for execution. If the location is not trusted, the application is immediately terminated as a potential security risk.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
An administrator cannot configure CFG; rather, an application developer can take advantage of CFG by configuring it when the application is compiled. Administrators should consider asking application developers and software vendors to deliver trustworthy Windows applications compiled with CFG enabled. Of course, browsers are a key entry point for attacks, so Microsoft Edge, IE, and other Windows features take full advantage of CFG.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### <span id="_Additional_memory_protections_1" class="anchor"><span id="_Toc472941082" class="anchor"></span></span>Additional memory protections
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
In addition to the protections listed in previous sections, Windows 10 includes other memory protections, including the following:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Memory reservations**: The lowest 64 KB of process memory is reserved for the system. Apps are not allowed to allocate that portion of the memory. This makes it more difficult for malware to use techniques such as “NULL dereference” to overwrite critical system data structures in memory.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Protected Processes**: Most security controls are designed to prevent the initial infection point. However, despite all the best preventative controls, malware may eventually find a way to infect the system. So, some protections are built to place limits on any malware that might be running. Protected Processes creates limits of this type.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
With Protected Processes, Windows 10 prevents untrusted processes from interacting or tampering with those that have been specially signed. Protected Processes defines levels of trust for processes. Less trusted processes are prevented from interacting with and therefore attacking more trusted processes. Windows 10 uses Protected Processes more broadly across the operating system, and for the first time, you can put antimalware solutions into the protected process space, which helps make the system and antimalware solutions less susceptible to tampering by malware that does manage to get on the system.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### <span id="_Microsoft_Edge_and" class="anchor"><span id="_Universal_Windows_apps" class="anchor"><span id="_Toc472424356" class="anchor"><span id="_Toc472941083" class="anchor"></span></span></span></span>Universal Windows apps protections
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
When users download Universal Windows apps or even Windows Classic applications (Win32) from the Windows Store, it’s highly unlikely that they will encounter malware, because all apps go through a careful screening process before being made available in the store. Apps that organizations build and distribute through sideloading processes will need to be reviewed internally to ensure that they meet organizational security requirements.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Regardless of how users acquire Universal Windows apps, they can use them with increased confidence. Unlike Windows Classic applications, which can run with elevated privileges and have potentially sweeping access to the system and data, Universal Windows apps run in an AppContainer sandbox with limited privileges and capabilities. For example, Universal Windows apps have no system-level access, have tightly controlled interactions with other apps, and have no access to data unless the user explicitly grants the application permission.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
In addition, all Universal Windows apps follow the security principle of least privilege. Apps receive only the minimum privileges they need to perform their legitimate tasks, so even if an attacker exploits an app, the damage the exploit can do is severely limited and should be contained within the sandbox. The Windows Store displays the exact capabilities the app requires (for example, access to the camera), along with the app’s age rating and publisher.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### <span id="_Microsoft_Edge_and_1" class="anchor"><span id="_Windows_Defender" class="anchor"><span id="_Microsoft_Edge_and_2" class="anchor"></span></span></span>Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer 11
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Browser security is a critical component of any security strategy, and for good reason: the browser is the user’s interface to the Internet, an environment with many malicious sites and content waiting to attack. Most users cannot perform at least part of their job without a browser, and many users are completely reliant on one. This reality has made the browser the number one pathway from which malicious hackers initiate their attacks.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
All browsers enable some amount of extensibility to do things beyond the original scope of the browser. Two common examples of this are Flash and Java extensions that enable their respective applications to run inside a browser. Keeping Windows 10 secure for web browsing and applications, especially for these two content types, is a priority.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Windows 10 includes an entirely new browser, Microsoft Edge. Microsoft Edge is more secure in multiple ways, especially:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Smaller attack surface; no support for non-Microsoft binary extensions**. Multiple browser components with vulnerable attack surfaces have been removed from Microsoft Edge. Components that have been removed include legacy document modes and script engines, Browser Helper Objects (BHOs), ActiveX controls, and Java. However, Microsoft Edge supports Flash content and PDF viewing by default through built-in extensions.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Runs 64-bit processes.** A 64-bit PC running an older version of Windows often runs in 32-bit compatibility mode to support older and less secure extensions. When Microsoft Edge runs on a 64-bit PC, it runs only 64-bit processes, which are much more secure against exploits.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Includes Memory Garbage Collection (MemGC)**. This helps protect against use-after-free (UAF) issues.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Designed as a Universal Windows app.** Microsoft Edge is inherently compartmentalized and runs in an AppContainer that sandboxes the browser from the system, data, and other apps. IE11 on Windows 10 can also take advantage of the same AppContainer technology through Enhanced Protect Mode. However, because IE11 can run ActiveX and BHOs, the browser and sandbox are susceptible to a much broader range of attacks than Microsoft Edge.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Simplifies security configuration tasks.** Because Microsoft Edge uses a simplified application structure and a single sandbox configuration, there are fewer required security settings. In addition, Microsoft Edge default settings align with security best practices, which makes it more secure by default.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
In addition to Microsoft Edge, Microsoft includes IE11 in Windows 10, primarily for backwards-compatibility with websites and with binary extensions that do not work with Microsoft Edge. It should not be configured as the primary browser but rather as an optional or automatic switchover. We recommend using Microsoft Edge as the primary web browser because it provides compatibility with the modern web and the best possible security.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
For sites that require IE11 compatibility, including those that require binary extensions and plug ins, enable Enterprise mode and use the Enterprise Mode Site List to define which sites have the dependency. With this configuration, when users use Microsoft Edge and it identifies a site that requires IE11, they will automatically be switched to IE11.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Functions that software vendors can use to build mitigations into apps
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Some of the protections available in Windows 10 are provided through functions that can be called from apps or other software. Such software is less likely to provide openings for exploits. If you are working with a software vendor, you can request that they include these security-oriented functions in the application. The following table lists some types of mitigations and the corresponding security-oriented functions that can be used in apps.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Note** Control Flow Guard (CFG) is also an important mitigation that a developer can include in software when it is compiled. For more information, see [Control Flow Guard](#_Control_Flow_Guard_1), earlier in this topic.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Table 4 Functions available to developers for building mitigations into apps
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
| Mitigation | Function |
|
||||||
|
|-------------|-----------|
|
||||||
|
| LoadLib image loading restrictions | [UpdateProcThreadAttribute function](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms686880(v=vs.85).aspx)<br>\[PROCESS\_CREATION\_MITIGATION\_POLICY\_IMAGE\_LOAD\_NO\_REMOTE\_ALWAYS\_ON\] |
|
||||||
|
| MemProt dynamic code restriction | [UpdateProcThreadAttribute function](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms686880(v=vs.85).aspx)<br>\[PROCESS\_CREATION\_MITIGATION\_POLICY\_PROHIBIT\_DYNAMIC\_CODE\_ALWAYS\_ON\] |
|
||||||
|
| Child Process Restriction to restrict the ability to create child processes | [UpdateProcThreadAttribute function](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms686880(v=vs.85).aspx)<br>\[PROC\_THREAD\_ATTRIBUTE\_CHILD\_PROCESS\_POLICY\] |
|
||||||
|
| Code Integrity Restriction to restrict image loading | [SetProcessMitigationPolicy function](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/hh769088(v=vs.85).aspx)<br>\[ProcessSignaturePolicy\] |
|
||||||
|
| Win32k System Call Disable Restriction to restrict ability to use NTUser and GDI | [SetProcessMitigationPolicy function](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/hh769088(v=vs.85).aspx)<br>\[ProcessSystemCallDisablePolicy\] |
|
||||||
|
| High Entropy ASLR for up to 1TB of variance in memory allocations | [UpdateProcThreadAttribute function](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms686880(v=vs.85).aspx)<br>\[PROCESS\_CREATION\_MITIGATION\_POLICY\_HIGH\_ENTROPY\_ASLR\_ALWAYS\_ON\] |
|
||||||
|
| Strict handle checks to raise immediate exception upon bad handle reference | [UpdateProcThreadAttribute function](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms686880(v=vs.85).aspx)<br>\[PROCESS\_CREATION\_MITIGATION\_POLICY\_STRICT\_HANDLE\_CHECKS\_ALWAYS\_ON\] |
|
||||||
|
| Extension point disable to block the use of certain third-party extension points | [UpdateProcThreadAttribute function](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms686880(v=vs.85).aspx)<br>\[PROCESS\_CREATION\_MITIGATION\_POLICY\_EXTENSION\_POINT\_DISABLE\_ALWAYS\_ON\] |
|
||||||
|
| Heap terminate on corruption to protect the system against a corrupted heap | [UpdateProcThreadAttribute function](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms686880(v=vs.85).aspx)<br>\[PROCESS\_CREATION\_MITIGATION\_POLICY\_HEAP\_TERMINATE\_ALWAYS\_ON\] |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Understanding Windows 10 in relation to the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
You might already be familiar with the [Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET)](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/2458544), which has since 2009 offered a variety of exploit mitigations, and an interface for configuring those mitigations. If you are familiar with EMET, you can use this section to understand how those mitigations map to Windows 10. Many of EMET’s mitigations have been built into Windows 10, some with additional improvements. However, some EMET mitigations carry high performance cost, are not considered durable, or appear to be relatively ineffective against modern threats, and therefore have not been brought into Windows 10.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EMET has benefited many enterprise IT admins and other security enthusiasts and early adopters, yet has also fallen behind the pace of security innovation in Windows. For this reason and because many of EMET’s mitigations and security mechanisms already exist in Windows 10 and have been improved, particularly those assessed to have high effectiveness at mitigating known bypasses, version 5.5*x* has been announced as the final major version release for EMET (see [Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit](https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/jj653751)).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The following table lists EMET features in relation to Windows 10 features.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Table 5 EMET features in relation to Windows 10 features
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<table>
|
||||||
|
<thead>
|
||||||
|
<tr class="header">
|
||||||
|
<th><strong>Specific EMET features</strong></th>
|
||||||
|
<th><strong>How these EMET features map<br />
|
||||||
|
to Windows 10 features</strong></th>
|
||||||
|
</tr>
|
||||||
|
</thead>
|
||||||
|
<tbody>
|
||||||
|
<tr class="odd">
|
||||||
|
<td><ul>
|
||||||
|
<li><p>DEP</p></li>
|
||||||
|
<li><p>SEHOP</p></li>
|
||||||
|
<li><p>ASLR (Force ASLR, Bottom-up ASLR)</p></li>
|
||||||
|
</ul></td>
|
||||||
|
<td><p>Included in Windows 10 as configurable features. See <a href="#_Table_2_">Table 2</a>, earlier in this topic.</p>
|
||||||
|
<p>Also see the section that follows for steps you can take to convert your EMET settings for these features into policies that you can apply to Windows 10.</p></td>
|
||||||
|
</tr>
|
||||||
|
<tr class="even">
|
||||||
|
<td><ul>
|
||||||
|
<li><p>Load Library Check (LoadLib)</p></li>
|
||||||
|
<li><p>Memory Protection Check (MemProt)</p></li>
|
||||||
|
</ul></td>
|
||||||
|
<td>Supported in Windows 10, for all applications that are written to use these functions. See <a href="#functions-that-software-vendors-can-use-to-build-mitigations-into-apps">Table 4</a>, earlier in this topic.</td>
|
||||||
|
</tr>
|
||||||
|
<tr class="odd">
|
||||||
|
<td><ul>
|
||||||
|
<li><p>Null Page</p></li>
|
||||||
|
</ul></td>
|
||||||
|
<td>No action needed; mitigations for this threat are built into Windows 10, as described in <a href="#_Additional_memory_protections_1">Additional memory protections</a>, earlier in this topic.</td>
|
||||||
|
</tr>
|
||||||
|
<tr class="even">
|
||||||
|
<td><ul>
|
||||||
|
<li><p>Heap Spray</p></li>
|
||||||
|
<li><p>EAF</p></li>
|
||||||
|
<li><p>EAF+</p></li>
|
||||||
|
<li><p>Caller Check</p></li>
|
||||||
|
<li><p>Simulate Execution Flow</p></li>
|
||||||
|
<li><p>Stack Pivot</p></li>
|
||||||
|
<li><p>Deep Hooks (an ROP “Advanced Mitigation”)</p></li>
|
||||||
|
<li><p>Anti Detours (an ROP “Advanced Mitigation”)</p></li>
|
||||||
|
<li><p>Banned Functions (an ROP “Advanced Mitigation”)</p></li>
|
||||||
|
</ul></td>
|
||||||
|
<td>Mitigated in Windows 10 with applications compiled with Control Flow Guard, as described in <a href="#_Control_Flow_Guard_1">Control Flow Guard</a>, earlier in this topic.</td>
|
||||||
|
</tr>
|
||||||
|
</tbody>
|
||||||
|
</table>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Converting an EMET XML settings file into Windows 10 mitigation policies
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
One of EMET’s strengths is that it allows you to import and export configuration settings for EMET mitigations as an XML settings file, thus enabling a straightforward deployment workflow. To aid with security configuration and deployment of Windows 10 devices, an EMET Policy Converter is included in Windows 10, version 1703. With the converter, you can use an EMET XML settings file to generate mitigation policies for Windows 10.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The Converter feature is currently available as a Windows PowerShell cmdlet, **Set-ProcessMitigations -c** (instead of **-c**, you can also type **-Convert**). This cmdlet, and the Process Mitigation Management Tool collection of cmdlets, provides the following capabilities:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Converting EMET settings to Windows 10 settings**: You can run **Set-ProcessMitigations -Convert** and provide an EMET XML settings file as input, which will generate an output file of Windows 10 mitigation settings.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Auditing and modifying the converted settings (the output file)**: After you create the output file, you can apply and manually audit the mitigation settings by running cmdlets, through which you can Apply, Enumerate, Enable, Disable, and Save settings (see the Process Mitigation Management Tool documentation).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Converting Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) settings to a Code Integrity policy file**: If the input file contains any settings for EMET’s Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) mitigation, the converter will also create a Code Integrity policy file. In this case, you can complete the merging, auditing, and deployment process for the Code Integrity policy, as described in [Deploy Device Guard: deploy code integrity policies](https://technet.microsoft.com/itpro/windows/keep-secure/deploy-device-guard-deploy-code-integrity-policies). This will enable protections on Windows 10 equivalent to EMET’s ASR protections.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Converting Certificate Trust settings to OS Key Pinning rules**: If you have an EMET “Certificate Trust” XML file (pinning rules file), you can also use **Set-ProcessMitigations -Convert** to convert the pinning rules file into an OS Key Pinning rules file. Then you can finish enabling that file as described in the OS Key Pinning documentation.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#### <span id="_Toc471830298" class="anchor"><span id="_Toc471832073" class="anchor"><span id="_Toc472941089" class="anchor"></span></span></span>EMET-related products
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Microsoft Consulting Services (MCS) and Microsoft Support/Premier Field Engineering (PFE) offer enterprise deliveries for EMET, support for EMET, and EMET-related reporting and auditing products such as the EMET Enterprise Reporting Service (ERS). For any enterprise customers who use such products today or who are interested in similar capabilities, we recommend evaluating [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection](https://technet.microsoft.com/itpro/windows/keep-secure/windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection) (ATP).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Related topics
|
||||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user