diff --git a/.openpublishing.redirection.windows-security.json b/.openpublishing.redirection.windows-security.json index 8cbc4ef4cd..e573ac4d0a 100644 --- a/.openpublishing.redirection.windows-security.json +++ b/.openpublishing.redirection.windows-security.json @@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ }, { "source_path": "windows/security/information-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-device-encryption-overview-windows-10.md", - "redirect_url": "/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-device-encryption-overview-windows-10", + "redirect_url": "/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker#device-encryption", "redirect_document_id": false }, { @@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ }, { "source_path": "windows/security/information-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-recovery-guide-plan.md", - "redirect_url": "/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-recovery-guide-plan", + "redirect_url": "/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/recovery-overview", "redirect_document_id": false }, { @@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ }, { "source_path": "windows/security/information-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-use-bitlocker-recovery-password-viewer.md", - "redirect_url": "/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-use-bitlocker-recovery-password-viewer", + "redirect_url": "/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/manage-recovery-passwords#bitlocker-recovery-password-viewer", "redirect_document_id": false }, { @@ -7414,6 +7414,71 @@ "source_path": "windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/faq-pde.yml", "redirect_url": "/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/faq", "redirect_document_id": false + }, + { + "source_path": "windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md", + "redirect_url": "/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/configure#$bitlocker-policy-settings", + "redirect_document_id": false + }, + { + "source_path": "windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-deployment-comparison.md", + "redirect_url": "/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/configure#bitlocker-policy-settings", + "redirect_document_id": false + }, + { + "source_path": "windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-countermeasures.md", + "redirect_url": "/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/countermeasures", + "redirect_document_id": false + }, + { + "source_path": "windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-recovery-guide-plan.md", + "redirect_url": "/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/recovery-overview", + "redirect_document_id": false + }, + { + "source_path": "windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-use-bitlocker-recovery-password-viewer.md", + "redirect_url": "/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/recovery-process#bitlocker-recovery-password-viewer", + "redirect_document_id": false + }, + { + "source_path": "windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-how-to-enable-network-unlock.md", + "redirect_url": "/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/network-unlock", + "redirect_document_id": false + }, + { + "source_path": "windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-basic-deployment.md", + "redirect_url": "/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/configure", + "redirect_document_id": false + }, + { + "source_path": "windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-management-for-enterprises.md", + "redirect_url": "/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/configure", + "redirect_document_id": false + }, + { + "source_path": "windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/prepare-your-organization-for-bitlocker-planning-and-policies.md", + "redirect_url": "/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/plan", + "redirect_document_id": false + }, + { + "source_path": "windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-use-bitlocker-drive-encryption-tools-to-manage-bitlocker.md", + "redirect_url": "/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/operations-guide", + "redirect_document_id": false + }, + { + "source_path": "windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/protecting-cluster-shared-volumes-and-storage-area-networks-with-bitlocker.md", + "redirect_url": "/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/csv-san", + "redirect_document_id": false + }, + { + "source_path": "windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-how-to-deploy-on-windows-server.md", + "redirect_url": "/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/install-server", + "redirect_document_id": false + }, + { + "source_path": "windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-device-encryption-overview-windows-10.md", + "redirect_url": "/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker#device-encryption", + "redirect_document_id": false } ] -} +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/education/index.yml b/education/index.yml index a41a668122..a79c5f8617 100644 --- a/education/index.yml +++ b/education/index.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ metadata: title: Microsoft 365 Education Documentation description: Learn about product documentation and resources available for school IT administrators, teachers, students, and education app developers. ms.topic: hub-page - ms.date: 08/10/2022 + ms.date: 11/06/2023 productDirectory: title: For IT admins diff --git a/education/windows/autopilot-reset.md b/education/windows/autopilot-reset.md index 0c9591c71b..7b14deeb86 100644 --- a/education/windows/autopilot-reset.md +++ b/education/windows/autopilot-reset.md @@ -11,18 +11,18 @@ ms.collection: - education --- -# Reset devices with Autopilot Reset +# Reset devices with Autopilot Reset IT admins or technical teachers can use Autopilot Reset to quickly remove personal files, apps, and settings, and reset Windows 10 devices from the lock screen anytime and apply original settings and management enrollment (Microsoft Entra ID and device management) so the devices are ready to use. With Autopilot Reset, devices are returned to a fully configured or known IT-approved state. -To enable Autopilot Reset you must: +To enable Autopilot Reset, you must: 1. [Enable the policy for the feature](#enable-autopilot-reset) 2. [Trigger a reset for each device](#trigger-autopilot-reset) ## Enable Autopilot Reset -To use Autopilot Reset, [Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) must be enabled on the device](#winre). +To use Autopilot Reset, Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) must be enabled on the device. **DisableAutomaticReDeploymentCredentials** is a policy that enables or disables the visibility of the credentials for Autopilot Reset. It's a policy node in the [Policy CSP](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-credentialproviders), **CredentialProviders/DisableAutomaticReDeploymentCredentials**. By default, this policy is set to 1 (Disable). This setting ensures that Autopilot Reset isn't triggered by accident. @@ -32,13 +32,13 @@ You can set the policy using one of these methods: Check your MDM provider documentation on how to set this policy. If your MDM provider doesn't explicitly support this policy, you can manually set this policy if your MDM provider allows specific OMA-URIs to be manually set. - For example, in Intune, create a new configuration policy and add an OMA-URI. + For example, in Intune, create a new configuration policy and add an OMA-URI. - OMA-URI: ./Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/CredentialProviders/DisableAutomaticReDeploymentCredentials - Data type: Integer - Value: 0 - Windows Configuration Designer - + You can [use Windows Configuration Designer](/windows/configuration/provisioning-packages/provisioning-create-package) to set the **Runtime settings > Policies > CredentialProviders > DisableAutomaticReDeploymentCredentials** setting and create a provisioning package. - Set up School PCs app @@ -56,59 +56,50 @@ You can set the policy using one of these methods: - When using [Set up School PCs](use-set-up-school-pcs-app.md), in the **Configure student PC settings** screen, select **Enable Windows 10 Autopilot Reset** among the list of settings for the student PC as shown in the following example: ![Configure student PC settings in Set up School PCs.](images/suspcs/suspc_configure_pc2.jpg) - + ## Trigger Autopilot Reset -Autopilot Reset is a two-step process: trigger it and then authenticate. Once you've done these two steps, you can let the process execute and once it's done, the device is again ready for use. -**To trigger Autopilot Reset** +Autopilot Reset is a two-step process: trigger it and then authenticate. Once you've done these two steps, you can let the process execute and once it's done, the device is again ready for use. +] +To trigger Autopilot Reset: -1. From the Windows device lock screen, enter the keystroke: **CTRL + Windows key + R**. +1. From the Windows device lock screen, enter the keystroke: CTRL + WIN + R. ![Enter CTRL+Windows key+R on the Windows lockscreen.](images/autopilot-reset-lockscreen.png) - This keystroke will open up a custom sign-in screen for Autopilot Reset. The screen serves two purposes: + This keystroke opens up a custom sign-in screen for Autopilot Reset. The screen serves two purposes: 1. Confirm/verify that the end user has the right to trigger Autopilot Reset - - 2. Notify the user in case a provisioning package, created using Windows Configuration Designer or Set up School PCs, will be used as part of the process. + 1. Notify the user in case a provisioning package, created using Windows Configuration Designer or Set up School PCs, will be used as part of the process. ![Custom login screen for Autopilot Reset.](images/autopilot-reset-customlogin.png) -2. Sign in with the admin account credentials. If you created a provisioning package, plug in the USB drive and trigger Autopilot Reset. +1. Sign in with the admin account credentials. If you created a provisioning package, plug in the USB drive and trigger Autopilot Reset. > [!IMPORTANT] > To reestablish Wi-Fi connectivity after reset, make sure the **Connect automatically** box is checked for the device's wireless network connection. - Once Autopilot Reset is triggered, the reset process starts. - + Once Autopilot Reset is triggered, the reset process starts. + After reset, the device: - - Sets the region, language, and keyboard. - - - Connects to Wi-Fi. - - - If you provided a provisioning package when Autopilot Reset is triggered, the system will apply this new provisioning package. Otherwise, the system will reapply the original provisioning package on the device. - + - Sets the region, language, and keyboard + - Connects to Wi-Fi + - If you provided a provisioning package when Autopilot Reset is triggered, the system applies this new provisioning package. Otherwise, the system reapplies the original provisioning package on the device - Is returned to a known good managed state, connected to Microsoft Entra ID and MDM. ![Notification that provisioning is complete.](images/autopilot-reset-provisioningcomplete.png) Once provisioning is complete, the device is again ready for use. - - ## Troubleshoot Autopilot Reset -Autopilot Reset will fail when the [Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)](/windows-hardware/manufacture/desktop/windows-recovery-environment--windows-re--technical-reference) isn't enabled on the device. You'll see `Error code: ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED (0x80070032)`. +Autopilot Reset fails when the [Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE)](/windows-hardware/manufacture/desktop/windows-recovery-environment--windows-re--technical-reference) isn't enabled on the device. The error code is: `ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED (0x80070032)`. To make sure WinRE is enabled, use the [REAgentC.exe tool](/windows-hardware/manufacture/desktop/reagentc-command-line-options) to run the following command: -```console -reagentc /enable +```cmd +reagentc.exe /enable ``` If Autopilot Reset fails after enabling WinRE, or if you're unable to enable WinRE, kindly contact [Microsoft Support](https://support.microsoft.com) for assistance. - -## Related articles - -[Set up Windows devices for education](set-up-windows-10.md) diff --git a/education/windows/index.yml b/education/windows/index.yml index a78beaa537..0c159bd537 100644 --- a/education/windows/index.yml +++ b/education/windows/index.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ metadata: author: paolomatarazzo ms.author: paoloma manager: aaroncz - ms.date: 08/07/2023 + ms.date: 10/30/2023 highlightedContent: items: diff --git a/store-for-business/microsoft-store-for-business-overview.md b/store-for-business/microsoft-store-for-business-overview.md index bb6d16110b..c0e3db882e 100644 --- a/store-for-business/microsoft-store-for-business-overview.md +++ b/store-for-business/microsoft-store-for-business-overview.md @@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ Customers in these markets can use Microsoft Store for Business and Education to - Aremenia - Azerbaijan - Belarus -- Bosnia +- Bosnia and Herzegovina - Brazil - Georgia - India diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp.md index 3d54daff21..ab201e6028 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the BitLocker CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 10/23/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -18,8 +18,6 @@ ms.topic: reference [!INCLUDE [ADMX-backed CSP tip](includes/mdm-admx-csp-note.md)] -[!INCLUDE [Windows Insider tip](includes/mdm-insider-csp-note.md)] - The BitLocker configuration service provider (CSP) is used by the enterprise to manage encryption of PCs and devices. This CSP was added in Windows 10, version 1703. Starting in Windows 10, version 1809, it's also supported in Windows 10 Pro. @@ -39,7 +37,6 @@ The following list shows the BitLocker configuration service provider nodes: - ./Device/Vendor/MSFT/BitLocker - [AllowStandardUserEncryption](#allowstandarduserencryption) - - [AllowSuspensionOfBitLockerProtection](#allowsuspensionofbitlockerprotection) - [AllowWarningForOtherDiskEncryption](#allowwarningforotherdiskencryption) - [ConfigureRecoveryPasswordRotation](#configurerecoverypasswordrotation) - [EncryptionMethodByDriveType](#encryptionmethodbydrivetype) @@ -148,64 +145,6 @@ To disable this policy, use the following SyncML: - -## AllowSuspensionOfBitLockerProtection - - -| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | -|:--|:--|:--| -| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows Insider Preview | - - - -```Device -./Device/Vendor/MSFT/BitLocker/AllowSuspensionOfBitLockerProtection -``` - - - - -This policy setting allows suspending protection for BitLocker Drive Encryption when enabled and prevents suspending protection when disabled. - -> [!WARNING] -> When policy is disabled, some scenarios will be blocked and prevent those scenarios from behaving normally. - -The expected values for this policy are: - -0 = Prevent BitLocker Drive Encryption protection from being suspended. - -1 = This is the default, when the policy isn't set. Allows suspending BitLocker Drive Encryption protection. - - - - - - - -**Description framework properties**: - -| Property name | Property value | -|:--|:--| -| Format | `int` | -| Access Type | Add, Delete, Get, Replace | -| Default Value | 1 | - - - -**Allowed values**: - -| Value | Description | -|:--|:--| -| 0 | Prevent BitLocker Drive Encryption protection from being suspended. | -| 1 (Default) | This is the default, when the policy isn't set. Allows suspending BitLocker Drive Encryption protection. | - - - - - - - - ## AllowWarningForOtherDiskEncryption diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-ddf-file.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-ddf-file.md index c6d82985f8..fb912358e4 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-ddf-file.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-ddf-file.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: View the XML file containing the device description framework (DDF) author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 06/02/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -772,52 +772,6 @@ Supported Values: String form of request ID. Example format of request ID is GUI - - AllowSuspensionOfBitLockerProtection - - - - - - - - 1 - This policy setting allows suspending protection for BitLocker Drive Encryption when enabled and prevents suspending protection when disabled. - Warning: When policy is disabled, some scenarios will be blocked and prevent those scenarios from behaving normally. - The format is integer. - The expected values for this policy are: - - 0 = Prevent BitLocker Drive Encryption protection from being suspended. - 1 = This is the default, when the policy is not set. Allows suspending BitLocker Drive Encryption protection. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 99.9.99999 - 9.9 - - - - 0 - Prevent BitLocker Drive Encryption protection from being suspended. - - - 1 - This is the default, when the policy is not set. Allows suspending BitLocker Drive Encryption protection. - - - - Status diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/declaredconfiguration-csp.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/declaredconfiguration-csp.md index ac422bfdcc..64297f2f14 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/declaredconfiguration-csp.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/declaredconfiguration-csp.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the DeclaredConfiguration CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 09/27/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ The Host internal node indicates that the target of the configuration request or -This internal node indicates that the configuration has discrete settings values and is self-contained with complete setting and value pairs that don't contain placeholders that the need to be resolved later with additional data. The request is ready to be processed as is. +This internal node indicates that the configuration has discrete settings values and is self-contained with complete setting and value pairs that don't contain placeholders that need to be resolved later with additional data. The request is ready to be processed as is. diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/declaredconfiguration-ddf-file.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/declaredconfiguration-ddf-file.md index 8f17e34ba0..a60936f654 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/declaredconfiguration-ddf-file.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/declaredconfiguration-ddf-file.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: View the XML file containing the device description framework (DDF) author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 09/27/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ The following XML file contains the device description framework (DDF) for the D - This internal node indicates that the configuration has discrete settings values and is self-contained with complete setting and value pairs that do not contain placeholders that the need to be resolved later with additional data. The request is ready to be processed as is. + This internal node indicates that the configuration has discrete settings values and is self-contained with complete setting and value pairs that do not contain placeholders that need to be resolved later with additional data. The request is ready to be processed as is. diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/defender-csp.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/defender-csp.md index fb4186237a..ee424411b4 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/defender-csp.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/defender-csp.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the Defender CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 08/29/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -71,10 +71,12 @@ The following list shows the Defender configuration service provider nodes: - [HideExclusionsFromLocalUsers](#configurationhideexclusionsfromlocalusers) - [IntelTDTEnabled](#configurationinteltdtenabled) - [MeteredConnectionUpdates](#configurationmeteredconnectionupdates) + - [NetworkProtectionReputationMode](#configurationnetworkprotectionreputationmode) - [OobeEnableRtpAndSigUpdate](#configurationoobeenablertpandsigupdate) - [PassiveRemediation](#configurationpassiveremediation) - [PerformanceModeStatus](#configurationperformancemodestatus) - [PlatformUpdatesChannel](#configurationplatformupdateschannel) + - [QuickScanIncludeExclusions](#configurationquickscanincludeexclusions) - [RandomizeScheduleTaskTimes](#configurationrandomizescheduletasktimes) - [ScanOnlyIfIdleEnabled](#configurationscanonlyifidleenabled) - [SchedulerRandomizationTime](#configurationschedulerrandomizationtime) @@ -348,7 +350,7 @@ Control whether network protection can improve performance by switching from rea | Value | Description | |:--|:--| | 1 | Allow switching to asynchronous inspection. | -| 0 (Default) | Don’t allow asynchronous inspection. | +| 0 (Default) | Don't allow asynchronous inspection. | @@ -464,7 +466,7 @@ Define the retention period in days of how much time the evidence data will be k | Property name | Property value | |:--|:--| -| Format | `chr` (string) | +| Format | `int` | | Access Type | Add, Delete, Get, Replace | | Allowed Values | Range: `[1-120]` | | Default Value | 60 | @@ -953,8 +955,8 @@ Control Device Control feature. | Value | Description | |:--|:--| -| 1 | . | -| 0 (Default) | . | +| 1 | Device Control is enabled. | +| 0 (Default) | Device Control is disabled. | @@ -2186,6 +2188,46 @@ Allow managed devices to update through metered connections. Default is 0 - not + +### Configuration/NetworkProtectionReputationMode + + +| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | +|:--|:--|:--| +| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows 10, version 1607 [10.0.14393] and later | + + + +```Device +./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Defender/Configuration/NetworkProtectionReputationMode +``` + + + + +This sets the reputation mode for Network Protection. + + + + + + + +**Description framework properties**: + +| Property name | Property value | +|:--|:--| +| Format | `int` | +| Access Type | Add, Delete, Get, Replace | +| Default Value | 0 | + + + + + + + + ### Configuration/OobeEnableRtpAndSigUpdate @@ -2325,8 +2367,8 @@ This setting allows IT admins to configure performance mode in either enabled or | Value | Description | |:--|:--| -| 0 (Default) | Performance mode is enabled (default). A service restart is required after changing this value. | -| 1 | Performance mode is disabled. A service restart is required after changing this value. | +| 0 (Default) | Performance mode is enabled (default). | +| 1 | Performance mode is disabled. | @@ -2388,6 +2430,55 @@ Enable this policy to specify when devices receive Microsoft Defender platform u + +### Configuration/QuickScanIncludeExclusions + + +| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | +|:--|:--|:--| +| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows 10, version 1607 [10.0.14393] and later | + + + +```Device +./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Defender/Configuration/QuickScanIncludeExclusions +``` + + + + +This setting allows you to scan excluded files and directories during quick scans. + + + + + + + +**Description framework properties**: + +| Property name | Property value | +|:--|:--| +| Format | `int` | +| Access Type | Add, Delete, Get, Replace | +| Default Value | 0 | + + + +**Allowed values**: + +| Value | Description | +|:--|:--| +| 0 (Default) | If you set this setting to 0 or don't configure it, exclusions aren't scanned during quick scans. | +| 1 | If you set this setting to 1, all files and directories that are excluded from real-time protection using contextual exclusions are scanned during a quick scan. Exclusions that contain wildcards aren't supported and aren't scanned. | + + + + + + + + ### Configuration/RandomizeScheduleTaskTimes diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/defender-ddf.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/defender-ddf.md index 22e2b101f9..60fd484a13 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/defender-ddf.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/defender-ddf.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: View the XML file containing the device description framework (DDF) author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 08/29/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -2098,11 +2098,50 @@ The following XML file contains the device description framework (DDF) for the D 0 - Performance mode is enabled (default). A service restart is required after changing this value. + Performance mode is enabled (default). 1 - Performance mode is disabled. A service restart is required after changing this value. + Performance mode is disabled. + + + + + + QuickScanIncludeExclusions + + + + + + + + 0 + This setting allows you to scan excluded files and directories during quick scans. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 10.0.14393 + 1.3 + + + + 0 + If you set this setting to 0 or do not configure it, exclusions are not scanned during quick scans. + + + 1 + If you set this setting to 1, all files and directories that are excluded from real-time protection using contextual exclusions are scanned during a quick scan. Exclusions that contain wildcards are not supported and are not scanned. @@ -2382,7 +2421,7 @@ The following XML file contains the device description framework (DDF) for the D 60 Define the retention period in days of how much time the evidence data will be kept on the client machine should any transfer to the remote locations would occur. - + @@ -2432,13 +2471,11 @@ The following XML file contains the device description framework (DDF) for the D 1 - - + Device Control is enabled 0 - - + Device Control is disabled @@ -2650,6 +2687,35 @@ The following XML file contains the device description framework (DDF) for the D + + NetworkProtectionReputationMode + + + + + + + + 0 + This sets the reputation mode for Network Protection. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 10.0.14393 + 1.3 + + + AllowSwitchToAsyncInspection diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/devicepreparation-csp.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/devicepreparation-csp.md index d8b4a5ca6e..1998989619 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/devicepreparation-csp.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/devicepreparation-csp.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the DevicePreparation CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 10/03/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -27,12 +27,11 @@ The following list shows the DevicePreparation configuration service provider no - ./Device/Vendor/MSFT/DevicePreparation - [BootstrapperAgent](#bootstrapperagent) - - [ClassID](#bootstrapperagentclassid) - [ExecutionContext](#bootstrapperagentexecutioncontext) - - [InstallationStatusUri](#bootstrapperagentinstallationstatusuri) - - [MdmAgentInstalled](#mdmagentinstalled) - [MDMProvider](#mdmprovider) + - [MdmAgentInstalled](#mdmprovidermdmagentinstalled) - [Progress](#mdmproviderprogress) + - [RebootRequired](#mdmproviderrebootrequired) - [PageEnabled](#pageenabled) - [PageSettings](#pagesettings) - [PageStatus](#pagestatus) @@ -55,7 +54,7 @@ The following list shows the DevicePreparation configuration service provider no -The subnodes configure settings for the Bootstrapper Agent. +Parent node for configuring agent that orchestrates provisioning and communicate status to Device Preparation page. @@ -77,45 +76,6 @@ The subnodes configure settings for the Bootstrapper Agent. - -### BootstrapperAgent/ClassID - - -| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | -|:--|:--|:--| -| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows Insider Preview | - - - -```Device -./Device/Vendor/MSFT/DevicePreparation/BootstrapperAgent/ClassID -``` - - - - -This node stores the class ID for the Bootstrapper Agent WinRT object. - - - - - - - -**Description framework properties**: - -| Property name | Property value | -|:--|:--| -| Format | `chr` (string) | -| Access Type | Get, Replace | - - - - - - - - ### BootstrapperAgent/ExecutionContext @@ -155,85 +115,6 @@ This node holds opaque data that will be passed to the Bootstrapper Agent as a p - -### BootstrapperAgent/InstallationStatusUri - - -| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | -|:--|:--|:--| -| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows Insider Preview | - - - -```Device -./Device/Vendor/MSFT/DevicePreparation/BootstrapperAgent/InstallationStatusUri -``` - - - - -This node holds a URI that can be queried for the status of the Bootstrapper Agent installation. - - - - - - - -**Description framework properties**: - -| Property name | Property value | -|:--|:--| -| Format | `chr` (string) | -| Access Type | Get, Replace | - - - - - - - - - -## MdmAgentInstalled - - -| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | -|:--|:--|:--| -| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows Insider Preview | - - - -```Device -./Device/Vendor/MSFT/DevicePreparation/MdmAgentInstalled -``` - - - - -This node indicates whether the MDM agent was installed or not. When set to true sets the AUTOPILOT_MDM_AGENT_REGISTERED WNF event. - - - - - - - -**Description framework properties**: - -| Property name | Property value | -|:--|:--| -| Format | `bool` | -| Access Type | Get, Replace | -| Default Value | false | - - - - - - - - ## MDMProvider @@ -251,7 +132,7 @@ This node indicates whether the MDM agent was installed or not. When set to true -The subnode configures the settings for the MDMProvider. +Parent node for configuring the MDM provider that interacts with the BootstrapperAgent. @@ -273,6 +154,46 @@ The subnode configures the settings for the MDMProvider. + +### MDMProvider/MdmAgentInstalled + + +| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | +|:--|:--|:--| +| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows Insider Preview | + + + +```Device +./Device/Vendor/MSFT/DevicePreparation/MDMProvider/MdmAgentInstalled +``` + + + + +This node indicates whether the MDM agent was installed or not. When set to true sets the AUTOPILOT_MDM_AGENT_REGISTERED WNF event. + + + + + + + +**Description framework properties**: + +| Property name | Property value | +|:--|:--| +| Format | `bool` | +| Access Type | Get, Replace | +| Default Value | False | + + + + + + + + ### MDMProvider/Progress @@ -290,7 +211,7 @@ The subnode configures the settings for the MDMProvider. -Node for reporting progress status as opaque data. +Node for reporting progress status as opaque data. Contract for data is between the server and EMM agent that reads the data. @@ -303,7 +224,7 @@ Node for reporting progress status as opaque data. | Property name | Property value | |:--|:--| | Format | `chr` (string) | -| Access Type | Get, Replace | +| Access Type | Add, Delete, Get, Replace | @@ -312,6 +233,46 @@ Node for reporting progress status as opaque data. + +### MDMProvider/RebootRequired + + +| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | +|:--|:--|:--| +| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows Insider Preview | + + + +```Device +./Device/Vendor/MSFT/DevicePreparation/MDMProvider/RebootRequired +``` + + + + +This node indicates whether an MDM policy was provisioned that requires a reboot. + + + + + + + +**Description framework properties**: + +| Property name | Property value | +|:--|:--| +| Format | `bool` | +| Access Type | Get | +| Default Value | False | + + + + + + + + ## PageEnabled @@ -329,7 +290,7 @@ Node for reporting progress status as opaque data. -This node determines whether to enable or show the Device Preparation page. +This node determines whether to show the Device Preparation page during OOBE. @@ -346,15 +307,6 @@ This node determines whether to enable or show the Device Preparation page. | Default Value | false | - -**Allowed values**: - -| Value | Description | -|:--|:--| -| false (Default) | The page isn't enabled. | -| true | The page is enabled. | - - @@ -378,7 +330,7 @@ This node determines whether to enable or show the Device Preparation page. -This node configures specific settings for the Device Preparation page. +This node configures the Device Preparation page settings. @@ -417,7 +369,7 @@ This node configures specific settings for the Device Preparation page. -This node provides status of the Device Preparation page. Values are an enum: 0 = Disabled; 1 = Enabled; 2 = InProgress; 3 = ExitedOnSuccess; 4 = ExitedOnFailure. +This node provides status of the Device Preparation page. @@ -441,8 +393,8 @@ This node provides status of the Device Preparation page. Values are an enum: 0 | 0 | Disabled. | | 1 | Enabled. | | 2 | InProgress. | -| 3 | Succeeded. | -| 4 | Failed. | +| 3 | ExitOnSuccess. | +| 4 | ExitOnFailure. | diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/devicepreparation-ddf-file.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/devicepreparation-ddf-file.md index 4f948ac7b5..ed2c59bec4 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/devicepreparation-ddf-file.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/devicepreparation-ddf-file.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: View the XML file containing the device description framework (DDF) author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 10/03/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ The following XML file contains the device description framework (DDF) for the D - Parent node for the CSP. + Parent node for configuring the Device Preparation page in OOBE settings and configuring @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ The following XML file contains the device description framework (DDF) for the D - + 99.9.99999 @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ The following XML file contains the device description framework (DDF) for the D false - This node determines whether to enable or show the Device Preparation page. + This node determines whether to show the Device Preparation page during OOBE. @@ -71,16 +71,6 @@ The following XML file contains the device description framework (DDF) for the D - - - false - The page is not enabled - - - true - The page is enabled - - @@ -90,7 +80,7 @@ The following XML file contains the device description framework (DDF) for the D - This node provides status of the Device Preparation page. Values are an enum: 0 = Disabled; 1 = Enabled; 2 = InProgress; 3 = ExitedOnSuccess; 4 = ExitedOnFailure. + This node provides status of the Device Preparation page. @@ -118,11 +108,11 @@ The following XML file contains the device description framework (DDF) for the D 3 - Succeeded + ExitOnSuccess 4 - Failed + ExitOnFailure @@ -134,7 +124,7 @@ The following XML file contains the device description framework (DDF) for the D - This node configures specific settings for the Device Preparation page. + This node configures the Device Preparation page settings. @@ -147,7 +137,8 @@ The following XML file contains the device description framework (DDF) for the D - + + {"AgentDownloadTimeoutSeconds": 900, "PageTimeoutSeconds": 3600, "ErrorMessage": "This is an error message.", "AllowSkipOnFailure": true, "AllowDiagnostics": true } @@ -157,7 +148,7 @@ The following XML file contains the device description framework (DDF) for the D - The subnodes configure settings for the Bootstrapper Agent. + Parent node for configuring agent that orchestrage provioning and communicate status to Device Preparation page. @@ -171,30 +162,6 @@ The following XML file contains the device description framework (DDF) for the D - - ClassID - - - - - - This node stores the class ID for the Bootstrapper Agent WinRT object. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ExecutionContext @@ -215,32 +182,6 @@ The following XML file contains the device description framework (DDF) for the D - - - - - - InstallationStatusUri - - - - - - This node holds a URI that can be queried for the status of the Bootstrapper Agent installation. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - @@ -250,7 +191,7 @@ The following XML file contains the device description framework (DDF) for the D - The subnode configures the settings for the MDMProvider. + Parent node for configuring the MDM provider that interacts with the BootstrapperAgent. @@ -268,10 +209,12 @@ The following XML file contains the device description framework (DDF) for the D Progress + + - Noode for reporting progress status as opaque data. + Node for reporting progress status as opaque data. Contract for data is between the server and EMM agent that reads the data. @@ -286,29 +229,51 @@ The following XML file contains the device description framework (DDF) for the D - - - MdmAgentInstalled - - - - - - false - This node indicates whether the MDM agent was installed or not. When set to true sets the AUTOPILOT_MDM_AGENT_REGISTERED WNF event. - - - - - - - - - - - - - + + MdmAgentInstalled + + + + + + False + This node indicates whether the mdm agent was installed or not. When set to true sets the AUTOPILOT_MDM_AGENT_REGISTERED WNF event. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + RebootRequired + + + + + False + This node indicates whether an MDM policy was provisioned that requires a reboot. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/diagnosticlog-csp.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/diagnosticlog-csp.md index ae23d729eb..baa3ca8990 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/diagnosticlog-csp.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/diagnosticlog-csp.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the DiagnosticLog CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 08/10/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ This node is to trigger snapping of the Device Management state data with "SNAP" -Root note for archive definition and collection. +Root node for archive definition and collection. diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/dmacc-csp.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/dmacc-csp.md index 5a4154759f..91624a95d6 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/dmacc-csp.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/dmacc-csp.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the DMAcc CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 08/10/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ Specifies the authentication type. If AAuthLevel is CLCRED, the supported types -Specifies the application identifier for the OMA DM account.. The only supported value is w7. +Specifies the application identifier for the OMA DM account. The only supported value is w7. diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/dmclient-csp.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/dmclient-csp.md index 30b1bd5f6a..e1447e368b 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/dmclient-csp.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/dmclient-csp.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the DMClient CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 10/24/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -4576,7 +4576,7 @@ This node, when doing a get, tells the server if the "First Syncs" are done and | Value | Description | |:--|:--| -| false | The user isn't finished provisioning. | +| false | The user hasn't finished provisioning. | | true | The user has finished provisioning. | diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/dmclient-ddf-file.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/dmclient-ddf-file.md index f47fafa391..8ab416c84b 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/dmclient-ddf-file.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/dmclient-ddf-file.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: View the XML file containing the device description framework (DDF) author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 09/27/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -341,11 +341,11 @@ The following XML file contains the device description framework (DDF) for the D false - The user is not finished provisioning + The user has not finished provisioning true - The user has finished provisoining. + The user has finished provisioning. @@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ The following XML file contains the device description framework (DDF) for the D 2 - Provisoining is in progress. + Provisioning is in progress. @@ -1264,7 +1264,7 @@ The following XML file contains the device description framework (DDF) for the D 2 - Reserved for future. AlwaysSendAadUserTokenCheckin: always send AAD user token during checkin as a separate header section(not as Bearer toekn). + Reserved for future. AlwaysSendAadUserTokenCheckin: always send AAD user token during checkin as a separate header section(not as Bearer token). 4 @@ -2020,7 +2020,7 @@ The following XML file contains the device description framework (DDF) for the D true - The device has finished provisoining. + The device has finished provisioning. @@ -2056,7 +2056,7 @@ The following XML file contains the device description framework (DDF) for the D 2 - Provisoining is in progress. + Provisioning is in progress. @@ -2679,7 +2679,7 @@ The following XML file contains the device description framework (DDF) for the D - Endpoint Discovery is the process where a specific URL (the "discovery endpoint") is accessed, which returns a directory of endpoints for using the system including enrollment. On Get, if the endpoint is not set, client will return an rmpty string with S_OK. + Endpoint Discovery is the process where a specific URL (the "discovery endpoint") is accessed, which returns a directory of endpoints for using the system including enrollment. On Get, if the endpoint is not set, client will return an empty string with S_OK. diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/firewall-csp.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/firewall-csp.md index 6bfcf539e2..9fb784e982 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/firewall-csp.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/firewall-csp.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the Firewall CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 10/03/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -2151,7 +2151,7 @@ When setting this field in a firewall rule, the protocol field must also be set, Specifies the list of authorized local users for the app container. -This is a string in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) format\. +This is a string in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) format. diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/passportforwork-csp.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/passportforwork-csp.md index 29e995b12d..14c84143e8 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/passportforwork-csp.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/passportforwork-csp.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the PassportForWork CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 10/03/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -253,8 +253,8 @@ Don't start Windows Hello provisioning after sign-in. | Value | Description | |:--|:--| -| false (Default) | Disabled. | -| true | Enabled. | +| false (Default) | Post Logon Provisioning Enabled. | +| true | Post Logon Provisioning Disabled. | diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/passportforwork-ddf.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/passportforwork-ddf.md index 6cfc4fabfc..fa9e278d82 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/passportforwork-ddf.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/passportforwork-ddf.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: View the XML file containing the device description framework (DDF) author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 10/03/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -883,11 +883,11 @@ If you disable or do not configure this policy setting, the PIN recovery secret false - Disabled + Post Logon Provisioning Enabled true - Enabled + Post Logon Provisioning Disabled diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/policies-in-policy-csp-admx-backed.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/policies-in-policy-csp-admx-backed.md index bc9ea26ab4..8ca51cb2f9 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/policies-in-policy-csp-admx-backed.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/policies-in-policy-csp-admx-backed.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn about the ADMX-backed policies in Policy CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 10/03/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -2145,6 +2145,7 @@ This article lists the ADMX-backed policies in Policy CSP. - [EnableAllowedSources](policy-csp-desktopappinstaller.md) - [EnableMSAppInstallerProtocol](policy-csp-desktopappinstaller.md) - [EnableWindowsPackageManagerCommandLineInterfaces](policy-csp-desktopappinstaller.md) +- [EnableWindowsPackageManagerConfiguration](policy-csp-desktopappinstaller.md) ## DeviceInstallation @@ -2475,11 +2476,12 @@ This article lists the ADMX-backed policies in Policy CSP. ## MSSecurityGuide - [ApplyUACRestrictionsToLocalAccountsOnNetworkLogon](policy-csp-mssecurityguide.md) -- [ConfigureSMBV1Server](policy-csp-mssecurityguide.md) - [ConfigureSMBV1ClientDriver](policy-csp-mssecurityguide.md) +- [ConfigureSMBV1Server](policy-csp-mssecurityguide.md) - [EnableStructuredExceptionHandlingOverwriteProtection](policy-csp-mssecurityguide.md) -- [WDigestAuthentication](policy-csp-mssecurityguide.md) +- [NetBTNodeTypeConfiguration](policy-csp-mssecurityguide.md) - [TurnOnWindowsDefenderProtectionAgainstPotentiallyUnwantedApplications](policy-csp-mssecurityguide.md) +- [WDigestAuthentication](policy-csp-mssecurityguide.md) ## MSSLegacy @@ -2530,6 +2532,8 @@ This article lists the ADMX-backed policies in Policy CSP. ## RemoteDesktopServices +- [LimitServerToClientClipboardRedirection](policy-csp-remotedesktopservices.md) +- [LimitClientToServerClipboardRedirection](policy-csp-remotedesktopservices.md) - [DoNotAllowPasswordSaving](policy-csp-remotedesktopservices.md) - [AllowUsersToConnectRemotely](policy-csp-remotedesktopservices.md) - [DoNotAllowDriveRedirection](policy-csp-remotedesktopservices.md) diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/policies-in-policy-csp-supported-by-group-policy.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/policies-in-policy-csp-supported-by-group-policy.md index a1d5758c14..aec0cd363b 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/policies-in-policy-csp-supported-by-group-policy.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/policies-in-policy-csp-supported-by-group-policy.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn about the policies in Policy CSP supported by Group Policy. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 10/03/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -691,8 +691,24 @@ This article lists the policies in Policy CSP that have a group policy mapping. ## SystemServices +- [ConfigureComputerBrowserServiceStartupMode](policy-csp-systemservices.md) - [ConfigureHomeGroupListenerServiceStartupMode](policy-csp-systemservices.md) - [ConfigureHomeGroupProviderServiceStartupMode](policy-csp-systemservices.md) +- [ConfigureIISAdminServiceStartupMode](policy-csp-systemservices.md) +- [ConfigureInfraredMonitorServiceStartupMode](policy-csp-systemservices.md) +- [ConfigureInternetConnectionSharingServiceStartupMode](policy-csp-systemservices.md) +- [ConfigureLxssManagerServiceStartupMode](policy-csp-systemservices.md) +- [ConfigureMicrosoftFTPServiceStartupMode](policy-csp-systemservices.md) +- [ConfigureRemoteProcedureCallLocatorServiceStartupMode](policy-csp-systemservices.md) +- [ConfigureRoutingAndRemoteAccessServiceStartupMode](policy-csp-systemservices.md) +- [ConfigureSimpleTCPIPServicesStartupMode](policy-csp-systemservices.md) +- [ConfigureSpecialAdministrationConsoleHelperServiceStartupMode](policy-csp-systemservices.md) +- [ConfigureSSDPDiscoveryServiceStartupMode](policy-csp-systemservices.md) +- [ConfigureUPnPDeviceHostServiceStartupMode](policy-csp-systemservices.md) +- [ConfigureWebManagementServiceStartupMode](policy-csp-systemservices.md) +- [ConfigureWindowsMediaPlayerNetworkSharingServiceStartupMode](policy-csp-systemservices.md) +- [ConfigureWindowsMobileHotspotServiceStartupMode](policy-csp-systemservices.md) +- [ConfigureWorldWideWebPublishingServiceStartupMode](policy-csp-systemservices.md) - [ConfigureXboxAccessoryManagementServiceStartupMode](policy-csp-systemservices.md) - [ConfigureXboxLiveAuthManagerServiceStartupMode](policy-csp-systemservices.md) - [ConfigureXboxLiveGameSaveServiceStartupMode](policy-csp-systemservices.md) @@ -829,6 +845,8 @@ This article lists the policies in Policy CSP that have a group policy mapping. - [LogOnAsService](policy-csp-userrights.md) - [IncreaseProcessWorkingSet](policy-csp-userrights.md) - [DenyLogOnAsService](policy-csp-userrights.md) +- [AdjustMemoryQuotasForProcess](policy-csp-userrights.md) +- [AllowLogOnThroughRemoteDesktop](policy-csp-userrights.md) ## VirtualizationBasedTechnology @@ -895,6 +913,8 @@ This article lists the policies in Policy CSP that have a group policy mapping. - [AllowVideoInput](policy-csp-windowssandbox.md) - [AllowPrinterRedirection](policy-csp-windowssandbox.md) - [AllowClipboardRedirection](policy-csp-windowssandbox.md) +- [AllowMappedFolders](policy-csp-windowssandbox.md) +- [AllowWriteToMappedFolders](policy-csp-windowssandbox.md) ## WirelessDisplay diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-eventlog.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-eventlog.md index 16a23bf7bf..e7ea263655 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-eventlog.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-eventlog.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the ADMX_EventLog Area in Policy CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 08/10/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -955,9 +955,9 @@ This policy setting controls Event Log behavior when the log file reaches its ma This policy setting turns on logging. -If you enable or don't configure this policy setting, then events can be written to this log. +- If you enable or don't configure this policy setting, then events can be written to this log. -If the policy setting is disabled, then no new events can be logged. Events can always be read from the log, regardless of this policy setting. +- If the policy setting is disabled, then no new events can be logged. Events can always be read from the log, regardless of this policy setting. diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-microsoftdefenderantivirus.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-microsoftdefenderantivirus.md index f462eeaba0..2ed270ebf6 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-microsoftdefenderantivirus.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-microsoftdefenderantivirus.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the ADMX_MicrosoftDefenderAntivirus Area in Policy author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 08/30/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -838,7 +838,7 @@ Microsoft Defender Antivirus automatically determines which applications should Enabled: -Specify additional allowed applications in the Options section.. +Specify additional allowed applications in the Options section. Disabled: @@ -1283,12 +1283,12 @@ This policy, if defined, will prevent antimalware from using the configured prox This policy setting defines the URL of a proxy .pac file that should be used when the client attempts to connect the network for security intelligence updates and MAPS reporting. If the proxy auto-config fails or if there is no proxy auto-config specified, the client will fall back to the alternative options (in order): 1. Proxy server (if specified) -2. Proxy .pac URL (if specified) +1. Proxy .pac URL (if specified) -3. None -4. Internet Explorer proxy settings. +1. None +1. Internet Explorer proxy settings. -5. Autodetect. +1. Autodetect. - If you enable this setting, the proxy setting will be set to use the specified proxy .pac according to the order specified above. @@ -1349,12 +1349,12 @@ This policy setting defines the URL of a proxy .pac file that should be used whe This policy setting allows you to configure the named proxy that should be used when the client attempts to connect to the network for security intelligence updates and MAPS reporting. If the named proxy fails or if there is no proxy specified, the client will fall back to the alternative options (in order): 1. Proxy server (if specified) -2. Proxy .pac URL (if specified) +1. Proxy .pac URL (if specified) -3. None -4. Internet Explorer proxy settings. +1. None +1. Internet Explorer proxy settings. -5. Autodetect. +1. Autodetect. - If you enable this setting, the proxy will be set to the specified URL according to the order specified above. The URL should be proceeded with either https:// or https://. diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-msi.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-msi.md index d4bedbcaf2..881922d5e8 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-msi.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-msi.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the ADMX_MSI Area in Policy CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 08/10/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -668,11 +668,13 @@ Also, see the "Enable user to patch elevated products" policy setting. This policy setting prohibits Windows Installer from generating and saving the files it needs to reverse an interrupted or unsuccessful installation. -If you enable this policy setting, Windows Installer is prevented from recording the original state of the system and sequence of changes it makes during installation. It also prevents Windows Installer from retaining files it intends to delete later. As a result, Windows Installer can't restore the computer to its original state if the installation doesn't complete. +- If you enable this policy setting, Windows Installer is prevented from recording the original state of the system and sequence of changes it makes during installation. It also prevents Windows Installer from retaining files it intends to delete later. As a result, Windows Installer can't restore the computer to its original state if the installation doesn't complete. This policy setting is designed to reduce the amount of temporary disk space required to install programs. Also, it prevents malicious users from interrupting an installation to gather data about the internal state of the computer or to search secure system files. However, because an incomplete installation can render the system or a program inoperable, don't use this policy setting unless it's essential. -This policy setting appears in the Computer Configuration and User Configuration folders. If the policy setting is enabled in either folder, it's considered be enabled, even if it's explicitly disabled in the other folder. +This policy setting appears in the Computer Configuration and User Configuration folders. + +- If the policy setting is enabled in either folder, it's considered be enabled, even if it's explicitly disabled in the other folder. @@ -729,11 +731,13 @@ This policy setting appears in the Computer Configuration and User Configuration This policy setting prohibits Windows Installer from generating and saving the files it needs to reverse an interrupted or unsuccessful installation. -If you enable this policy setting, Windows Installer is prevented from recording the original state of the system and sequence of changes it makes during installation. It also prevents Windows Installer from retaining files it intends to delete later. As a result, Windows Installer can't restore the computer to its original state if the installation doesn't complete. +- If you enable this policy setting, Windows Installer is prevented from recording the original state of the system and sequence of changes it makes during installation. It also prevents Windows Installer from retaining files it intends to delete later. As a result, Windows Installer can't restore the computer to its original state if the installation doesn't complete. This policy setting is designed to reduce the amount of temporary disk space required to install programs. Also, it prevents malicious users from interrupting an installation to gather data about the internal state of the computer or to search secure system files. However, because an incomplete installation can render the system or a program inoperable, don't use this policy setting unless it's essential. -This policy setting appears in the Computer Configuration and User Configuration folders. If the policy setting is enabled in either folder, it's considered be enabled, even if it's explicitly disabled in the other folder. +This policy setting appears in the Computer Configuration and User Configuration folders. + +- If the policy setting is enabled in either folder, it's considered be enabled, even if it's explicitly disabled in the other folder. diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-nca.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-nca.md index 35907c1d3b..62d426d98e 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-nca.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-nca.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the ADMX_nca Area in Policy CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 08/10/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -53,9 +53,9 @@ Important. At least one of the entries must be a PING: resource. -- A Uniform Resource Locator (URL) that NCA queries with a Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) request. The contents of the web page don't matter. The syntax is "HTTP:" followed by a URL. The host portion of the URL must resolve to an IPv6 address of a Web server or contain an IPv6 address. Examples: HTTP:https://myserver.corp.contoso.com/ or HTTP:https://2002:836b:1::1/. +- A Uniform Resource Locator (URL) that NCA queries with a Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) request. The contents of the web page don't matter. The syntax is "HTTP:" followed by a URL. The host portion of the URL must resolve to an IPv6 address of a Web server or contain an IPv6 address. Examples: HTTP:https://myserver.corp.contoso.com/ or HTTP:https://2002:836b:1::1/. -- A Universal Naming Convention (UNC) path to a file that NCA checks for existence. The contents of the file don't matter. The syntax is "FILE:" followed by a UNC path. The ComputerName portion of the UNC path must resolve to an IPv6 address or contain an IPv6 address. Examples: FILE:\\myserver\myshare\test.txt or FILE:\\2002:836b:1::1\myshare\test.txt. +- A Universal Naming Convention (UNC) path to a file that NCA checks for existence. The contents of the file don't matter. The syntax is "FILE:" followed by a UNC path. The ComputerName portion of the UNC path must resolve to an IPv6 address or contain an IPv6 address. Examples: FILE:\\myserver\myshare\test.txt or FILE:\\2002:836b:1::1\myshare\test.txt. You must configure this setting to have complete NCA functionality. diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-offlinefiles.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-offlinefiles.md index b0ed275af0..6fe146e767 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-offlinefiles.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-offlinefiles.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the ADMX_OfflineFiles Area in Policy CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 10/23/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -1939,7 +1939,7 @@ Reminder balloons appear when the user's connection to a network file is lost or This setting appears in the Computer Configuration and User Configuration folders. If both settings are configured, the setting in Computer Configuration takes precedence over the setting in User Configuration. > [!TIP] -> To set reminder balloon frequency without establishing a setting, in Windows Explorer, on the Tools menu, click Folder Options, and then click the Offline Files tab. This setting corresponds to the "Display reminder balloons every ... minutes" option. +> To set reminder balloon frequency without establishing a setting, in Windows Explorer, on the Tools menu, click Folder Options, and then click the Offline Files tab. This setting corresponds to the "Display reminder balloons every .. minutes" option. @@ -2002,7 +2002,7 @@ Reminder balloons appear when the user's connection to a network file is lost or This setting appears in the Computer Configuration and User Configuration folders. If both settings are configured, the setting in Computer Configuration takes precedence over the setting in User Configuration. > [!TIP] -> To set reminder balloon frequency without establishing a setting, in Windows Explorer, on the Tools menu, click Folder Options, and then click the Offline Files tab. This setting corresponds to the "Display reminder balloons every ... minutes" option. +> To set reminder balloon frequency without establishing a setting, in Windows Explorer, on the Tools menu, click Folder Options, and then click the Offline Files tab. This setting corresponds to the "Display reminder balloons every .. minutes" option. diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-securitycenter.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-securitycenter.md index 7195e4fc98..b485aeaea3 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-securitycenter.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-securitycenter.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the ADMX_Securitycenter Area in Policy CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 08/10/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -48,14 +48,6 @@ Note that Security Center can only be turned off for computers that are joined t - If you enable this policy setting, Security Center is turned on for all users. - If you disable this policy setting, Security Center is turned off for domain members. - -Windows XP SP2 ----------------------- -In Windows XP SP2, the essential security settings that are monitored by Security Center include firewall, antivirus, and Automatic Updates. Note that Security Center might not be available following a change to this policy setting until after the computer is restarted for Windows XP SP2 computers. - -Windows Vista ---------------------- -In Windows Vista, this policy setting monitors essential security settings to include firewall, antivirus, antispyware, Internet security settings, User Account Control, and Automatic Updates. Windows Vista computers don't require a reboot for this policy setting to take effect. diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-terminalserver.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-terminalserver.md index d804a847a8..d7950d1ff0 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-terminalserver.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-terminalserver.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the ADMX_TerminalServer Area in Policy CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 10/24/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -1362,13 +1362,13 @@ You can use this policy setting to set a limit on the color depth of any connect Note: -1. Setting the color depth to 24 bits is only supported on Windows Server 2003 and Windows XP Professional. +1. Setting the color depth to 24 bits is only supported on Windows Server 2003 and Windows XP Professional. -2. The value specified in this policy setting isn't applied to connections from client computers that are using at least Remote Desktop Protocol 8.0 (computers running at least Windows 8 or Windows Server 2012). The 32-bit color depth format is always used for these connections. +1. The value specified in this policy setting isn't applied to connections from client computers that are using at least Remote Desktop Protocol 8.0 (computers running at least Windows 8 or Windows Server 2012). The 32-bit color depth format is always used for these connections. -3. For connections from client computers that are using Remote Desktop Protocol 7.1 or earlier versions that are connecting to computers running at least Windows 8 or Windows Server 2012, the minimum of the following values is used as the color depth format: +1. For connections from client computers that are using Remote Desktop Protocol 7.1 or earlier versions that are connecting to computers running at least Windows 8 or Windows Server 2012, the minimum of the following values is used as the color depth format: -a. Value specified by this policy setting b. Maximum color depth supported by the client c. Value requested by the client. +a. Value specified by this policy setting b. Maximum color depth supported by the client c. Value requested by the client. If the client doesn't support at least 16 bits, the connection is terminated. @@ -2130,19 +2130,19 @@ To allow users to overwrite the "Set RD Gateway server address" policy setting a This policy setting allows you to specify whether the RD Session Host server should join a farm in RD Connection Broker. RD Connection Broker tracks user sessions and allows a user to reconnect to their existing session in a load-balanced RD Session Host server farm. To participate in RD Connection Broker, the Remote Desktop Session Host role service must be installed on the server. -If the policy setting is enabled, the RD Session Host server joins the farm that's specified in the RD Connection Broker farm name policy setting. The farm exists on the RD Connection Broker server that's specified in the Configure RD Connection Broker server name policy setting. +- If the policy setting is enabled, the RD Session Host server joins the farm that's specified in the RD Connection Broker farm name policy setting. The farm exists on the RD Connection Broker server that's specified in the Configure RD Connection Broker server name policy setting. -- If you disable this policy setting, the server doesn't join a farm in RD Connection Broker, and user session tracking isn't performed. If the policy setting is disabled, you can't use either the Remote Desktop Session Host Configuration tool or the Remote Desktop Services WMI Provider to join the server to RD Connection Broker. +- If you disable this policy setting, the server doesn't join a farm in RD Connection Broker, and user session tracking isn't performed. + +- If the policy setting is disabled, you can't use either the Remote Desktop Session Host Configuration tool or the Remote Desktop Services WMI Provider to join the server to RD Connection Broker. If the policy setting isn't configured, the policy setting isn't specified at the Group Policy level. Note: -1. +1. - If you enable this policy setting, you must also enable the Configure RD Connection Broker farm name and Configure RD Connection Broker server name policy settings. -- If you enable this policy setting, you must also enable the Configure RD Connection Broker farm name and Configure RD Connection Broker server name policy settings. - -2. For Windows Server 2008, this policy setting is supported on at least Windows Server 2008 Standard. +1. For Windows Server 2008, this policy setting is supported on at least Windows Server 2008 Standard. @@ -2330,7 +2330,7 @@ This policy setting allows you to specify the order in which an RD Session Host 1. Remote Desktop license servers that are published in Active Directory Domain Services. -2. Remote Desktop license servers that are installed on domain controllers in the same domain as the RD Session Host server. +1. Remote Desktop license servers that are installed on domain controllers in the same domain as the RD Session Host server. - If you disable or don't configure this policy setting, the RD Session Host server doesn't specify a license server at the Group Policy level. @@ -3074,13 +3074,13 @@ By default, when a new user signs in to a computer, the Start screen is shown an 1. No remote control allowed: Disallows an administrator to use remote control or view a remote user session. -2. Full Control with user's permission: Allows the administrator to interact with the session, with the user's consent. +1. Full Control with user's permission: Allows the administrator to interact with the session, with the user's consent. -3. Full Control without user's permission: Allows the administrator to interact with the session, without the user's consent. +1. Full Control without user's permission: Allows the administrator to interact with the session, without the user's consent. -4. View Session with user's permission: Allows the administrator to watch the session of a remote user with the user's consent. +1. View Session with user's permission: Allows the administrator to watch the session of a remote user with the user's consent. -5. View Session without user's permission: Allows the administrator to watch the session of a remote user without the user's consent. +1. View Session without user's permission: Allows the administrator to watch the session of a remote user without the user's consent. - If you disable this policy setting, administrators can interact with a user's Remote Desktop Services session, with the user's consent. @@ -3141,13 +3141,13 @@ By default, when a new user signs in to a computer, the Start screen is shown an 1. No remote control allowed: Disallows an administrator to use remote control or view a remote user session. -2. Full Control with user's permission: Allows the administrator to interact with the session, with the user's consent. +1. Full Control with user's permission: Allows the administrator to interact with the session, with the user's consent. -3. Full Control without user's permission: Allows the administrator to interact with the session, without the user's consent. +1. Full Control without user's permission: Allows the administrator to interact with the session, without the user's consent. -4. View Session with user's permission: Allows the administrator to watch the session of a remote user with the user's consent. +1. View Session with user's permission: Allows the administrator to watch the session of a remote user with the user's consent. -5. View Session without user's permission: Allows the administrator to watch the session of a remote user without the user's consent. +1. View Session without user's permission: Allows the administrator to watch the session of a remote user without the user's consent. - If you disable this policy setting, administrators can interact with a user's Remote Desktop Services session, with the user's consent. @@ -3275,7 +3275,7 @@ Note: 1. This policy setting isn't effective unless both the Join RD Connection Broker and the Configure RD Connection Broker server name policy settings are enabled and configured by using Group Policy. -2. For Windows Server 2008, this policy setting is supported on at least Windows Server 2008 Standard. +1. For Windows Server 2008, this policy setting is supported on at least Windows Server 2008 Standard. @@ -3404,9 +3404,9 @@ Note: 1. For Windows Server 2008, this policy setting is supported on at least Windows Server 2008 Standard. -2. This policy setting isn't effective unless the Join RD Connection Broker policy setting is enabled. +1. This policy setting isn't effective unless the Join RD Connection Broker policy setting is enabled. -3. To be an active member of an RD Session Host server farm, the computer account for each RD Session Host server in the farm must be a member of one of the following local groups on the RD Connection Broker server: Session Directory Computers, Session Broker Computers, or RDS Endpoint Servers. +1. To be an active member of an RD Session Host server farm, the computer account for each RD Session Host server in the farm must be a member of one of the following local groups on the RD Connection Broker server: Session Directory Computers, Session Broker Computers, or RDS Endpoint Servers. @@ -4075,9 +4075,9 @@ This policy setting allows the administrator to configure the RemoteFX experienc - If you enable this policy setting, the RemoteFX experience could be set to one of the following options: 1. Let the system choose the experience for the network condition -2. Optimize for server scalability. +1. Optimize for server scalability. -3. Optimize for minimum bandwidth usage. +1. Optimize for minimum bandwidth usage. - If you disable or don't configure this policy setting, the RemoteFX experience will change dynamically based on the network condition". @@ -5677,7 +5677,7 @@ Note: 1. The roaming user profiles enabled by the policy setting apply only to Remote Desktop Services connections. A user might also have a Windows roaming user profile configured. The Remote Desktop Services roaming user profile always takes precedence in a Remote Desktop Services session. -2. To configure a mandatory Remote Desktop Services roaming user profile for all users connecting remotely to the RD Session Host server, use this policy setting together with the "Use mandatory profiles on the RD Session Host server" policy setting located in Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Remote Desktop Services\RD Session Host\Profiles. The path set in the "Set path for Remote Desktop Services Roaming User Profile" policy setting should contain the mandatory profile. +1. To configure a mandatory Remote Desktop Services roaming user profile for all users connecting remotely to the RD Session Host server, use this policy setting together with the "Use mandatory profiles on the RD Session Host server" policy setting located in Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Remote Desktop Services\RD Session Host\Profiles. The path set in the "Set path for Remote Desktop Services Roaming User Profile" policy setting should contain the mandatory profile. diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-applicationdefaults.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-applicationdefaults.md index 7796c7da9d..f51f27e3ee 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-applicationdefaults.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-applicationdefaults.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the ApplicationDefaults Area in Policy CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 10/03/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ To create the SyncML, follow these steps: This policy setting determines whether Windows supports web-to-app linking with app URI handlers. -Enabling this policy setting enables web-to-app linking so that apps can be launched with a http(s) URI. +Enabling this policy setting enables web-to-app linking so that apps can be launched with an http(s) URI. Disabling this policy disables web-to-app linking and http(s) URIs will be opened in the default browser instead of launching the associated app. diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-browser.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-browser.md index 16d4f87720..c6cf0c0b0b 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-browser.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-browser.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the Browser Area in Policy CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 08/10/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -1044,7 +1044,7 @@ To verify AllowPasswordManager is set to 0 (not allowed): -This policy setting lets you decide whether to turn on Pop-up Blocker. By default, Pop-up Blocker is turned on.. +This policy setting lets you decide whether to turn on Pop-up Blocker. By default, Pop-up Blocker is turned on. - If you enable this setting, Pop-up Blocker is turned on, stopping pop-up windows from appearing. @@ -3530,7 +3530,7 @@ Don't enable both this setting and the Keep favorites in sync between Internet E |:--|:--| | Name | ConfiguredFavorites | | Friendly Name | Provision Favorites | -| Element Name | Specify the URL which points to the file that has all the data for provisioning favorites (in html format). You can export a set of favorites from Microsoft Edge and use that html file for provisioning user machines.

URL can be specified as.

1. HTTP location: https://localhost:8080/URLs.html
2. Local network: \\network\shares\URLs.html.

3. Local file: file:///c:\\Users\\``\\Documents\\URLs.html or C:\\Users\\``\\Documents\\URLs.html. | +| Element Name | ConfiguredFavoritesPrompt | | Location | Computer and User Configuration | | Path | Windows Components > Microsoft Edge | | Registry Key Name | Software\Policies\Microsoft\MicrosoftEdge\Favorites | diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-defender.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-defender.md index 36aeeec980..bca45399aa 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-defender.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-defender.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the Defender Area in Policy CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 10/23/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -1350,7 +1350,7 @@ Microsoft Defender Antivirus automatically determines which applications should Enabled: -Specify additional allowed applications in the Options section.. +Specify additional allowed applications in the Options section. Disabled: diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-deliveryoptimization.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-deliveryoptimization.md index c8b37170cf..5e4f2838af 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-deliveryoptimization.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-deliveryoptimization.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the DeliveryOptimization Area in Policy CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 08/10/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -1697,8 +1697,8 @@ This policy allows an IT Admin to define the following details: - -This policy allows you to set one or more keywords used to recognize VPN connections. + +This policy allows you to set one or more keywords used to recognize VPN connections. To add multiple keywords, separate them with commas. @@ -1721,8 +1721,12 @@ This policy allows you to set one or more keywords used to recognize VPN connect | Name | Value | |:--|:--| | Name | VpnKeywords | -| Path | DeliveryOptimization > AT > WindowsComponents > DeliveryOptimizationCat | -| Element Name | VpnKeywords | +| Friendly Name | VPN Keywords | +| Element Name | VPN Keywords. | +| Location | Computer Configuration | +| Path | Windows Components > Delivery Optimization | +| Registry Key Name | SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\DeliveryOptimization | +| ADMX File Name | DeliveryOptimization.admx | diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-desktopappinstaller.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-desktopappinstaller.md index 700a225113..e0c33829f6 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-desktopappinstaller.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-desktopappinstaller.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the DesktopAppInstaller Area in Policy CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 10/03/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -775,6 +775,56 @@ The settings are stored inside of a .json file on the user’s system. It may be + +## EnableWindowsPackageManagerConfiguration + + +| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | +|:--|:--|:--| +| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows Insider Preview | + + + +```Device +./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/DesktopAppInstaller/EnableWindowsPackageManagerConfiguration +``` + + + + + + + + + + + +**Description framework properties**: + +| Property name | Property value | +|:--|:--| +| Format | `chr` (string) | +| Access Type | Add, Delete, Get, Replace | + + + + +[!INCLUDE [ADMX-backed policy note](includes/mdm-admx-policy-note.md)] + +**ADMX mapping**: + +| Name | Value | +|:--|:--| +| Name | EnableWindowsPackageManagerConfiguration | +| ADMX File Name | DesktopAppInstaller.admx | + + + + + + + + ## SourceAutoUpdateInterval diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-deviceinstallation.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-deviceinstallation.md index dcf5e542ca..601453f34d 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-deviceinstallation.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-deviceinstallation.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the DeviceInstallation Area in Policy CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 08/10/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -365,26 +365,26 @@ Device instance IDs > Device IDs > Device setup class > Removable devices. Device instance IDs. 1. Prevent installation of devices using drivers that match these device instance IDs -2. Allow installation of devices using drivers that match these device instance IDs. +1. Allow installation of devices using drivers that match these device instance IDs. Device IDs. -3. Prevent installation of devices using drivers that match these device IDs -4. Allow installation of devices using drivers that match these device IDs. +1. Prevent installation of devices using drivers that match these device IDs +1. Allow installation of devices using drivers that match these device IDs. Device setup class. -5. Prevent installation of devices using drivers that match these device setup classes -6. Allow installation of devices using drivers that match these device setup classes. +1. Prevent installation of devices using drivers that match these device setup classes +1. Allow installation of devices using drivers that match these device setup classes. Removable devices. -7. Prevent installation of removable devices. +1. Prevent installation of removable devices. > [!NOTE] > This policy setting provides more granular control than the "Prevent installation of devices not described by other policy settings" policy setting. If these conflicting policy settings are enabled at the same time, the "Apply layered order of evaluation for Allow and Prevent device installation policies across all device match criteria" policy setting will be enabled and the other policy setting will be ignored. -If you disable or don't configure this policy setting, the default evaluation is used. By default, all "Prevent installation..". policy settings have precedence over any other policy setting that allows Windows to install a device. +If you disable or don't configure this policy setting, the default evaluation is used. By default, all "Prevent installation.". policy settings have precedence over any other policy setting that allows Windows to install a device. diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-localpoliciessecurityoptions.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-localpoliciessecurityoptions.md index f3317c93af..3edee263b1 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-localpoliciessecurityoptions.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-localpoliciessecurityoptions.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the LocalPoliciesSecurityOptions Area in Policy CS author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 10/03/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -4132,7 +4132,7 @@ User Account Control: Only elevate executable files that are signed and validate -User Account Control: Only elevate UIAccess applications that are installed in secure locations This policy setting controls whether applications that request to run with a User Interface Accessibility (UIAccess) integrity level must reside in a secure location in the file system. Secure locations are limited to the following: - ...\Program Files\, including subfolders - ...\Windows\system32\ - ...\Program Files (x86)\, including subfolders for 64-bit versions of Windows Note: Windows enforces a public key infrastructure (PKI) signature check on any interactive application that requests to run with a UIAccess integrity level regardless of the state of this security setting. The options are: - Enabled: (Default) If an application resides in a secure location in the file system, it runs only with UIAccess integrity. - Disabled: An application runs with UIAccess integrity even if it doesn't reside in a secure location in the file system. +User Account Control: Only elevate UIAccess applications that are installed in secure locations This policy setting controls whether applications that request to run with a User Interface Accessibility (UIAccess) integrity level must reside in a secure location in the file system. Secure locations are limited to the following: - ..\Program Files\, including subfolders - ..\Windows\system32\ - ..\Program Files (x86)\, including subfolders for 64-bit versions of Windows Note: Windows enforces a public key infrastructure (PKI) signature check on any interactive application that requests to run with a UIAccess integrity level regardless of the state of this security setting. The options are: - Enabled: (Default) If an application resides in a secure location in the file system, it runs only with UIAccess integrity. - Disabled: An application runs with UIAccess integrity even if it doesn't reside in a secure location in the file system. diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-mssecurityguide.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-mssecurityguide.md index eaf592f322..9d94c49836 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-mssecurityguide.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-mssecurityguide.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the MSSecurityGuide Area in Policy CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 08/10/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -222,6 +222,56 @@ ms.topic: reference + +## NetBTNodeTypeConfiguration + + +| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | +|:--|:--|:--| +| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows 10, version 1803 [10.0.17134] and later | + + + +```Device +./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/MSSecurityGuide/NetBTNodeTypeConfiguration +``` + + + + + + + + + + + +**Description framework properties**: + +| Property name | Property value | +|:--|:--| +| Format | `chr` (string) | +| Access Type | Add, Delete, Get, Replace | + + + + +[!INCLUDE [ADMX-backed policy note](includes/mdm-admx-policy-note.md)] + +**ADMX mapping**: + +| Name | Value | +|:--|:--| +| Name | Pol_SecGuide_0050_NetbtNodeTypeConfig | +| ADMX File Name | SecGuide.admx | + + + + + + + + ## TurnOnWindowsDefenderProtectionAgainstPotentiallyUnwantedApplications diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-remotedesktopservices.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-remotedesktopservices.md index dd8a3fc532..a2eceff277 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-remotedesktopservices.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-remotedesktopservices.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the RemoteDesktopServices Area in Policy CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 08/10/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ ms.topic: reference [!INCLUDE [ADMX-backed CSP tip](includes/mdm-admx-csp-note.md)] +[!INCLUDE [Windows Insider tip](includes/mdm-insider-csp-note.md)] + @@ -338,6 +340,114 @@ By default, Remote Desktop allows redirection of WebAuthn requests. + +## LimitClientToServerClipboardRedirection + + +| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | +|:--|:--|:--| +| ✅ Device
✅ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows Insider Preview | + + + +```User +./User/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/RemoteDesktopServices/LimitClientToServerClipboardRedirection +``` + +```Device +./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/RemoteDesktopServices/LimitClientToServerClipboardRedirection +``` + + + + + + + + + + + +**Description framework properties**: + +| Property name | Property value | +|:--|:--| +| Format | `chr` (string) | +| Access Type | Add, Delete, Get, Replace | + + + + +[!INCLUDE [ADMX-backed policy note](includes/mdm-admx-policy-note.md)] + +**ADMX mapping**: + +| Name | Value | +|:--|:--| +| Name | TS_CLIENT_CLIPBOARDRESTRICTION_CS | +| ADMX File Name | terminalserver.admx | + + + + + + + + + +## LimitServerToClientClipboardRedirection + + +| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | +|:--|:--|:--| +| ✅ Device
✅ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows Insider Preview | + + + +```User +./User/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/RemoteDesktopServices/LimitServerToClientClipboardRedirection +``` + +```Device +./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/RemoteDesktopServices/LimitServerToClientClipboardRedirection +``` + + + + + + + + + + + +**Description framework properties**: + +| Property name | Property value | +|:--|:--| +| Format | `chr` (string) | +| Access Type | Add, Delete, Get, Replace | + + + + +[!INCLUDE [ADMX-backed policy note](includes/mdm-admx-policy-note.md)] + +**ADMX mapping**: + +| Name | Value | +|:--|:--| +| Name | TS_CLIENT_CLIPBOARDRESTRICTION_SC | +| ADMX File Name | terminalserver.admx | + + + + + + + + ## PromptForPasswordUponConnection diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-system.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-system.md index 0d0a105c89..22ff8ce8ea 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-system.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-system.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the System Area in Policy CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 08/30/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ AllowCommercialDataPipeline configures a Microsoft Entra joined device so that M To enable this behavior: 1. Enable this policy setting -2. Join a Microsoft Entra account to the device. +1. Join a Microsoft Entra account to the device. Windows diagnostic data is collected when the Allow Telemetry policy setting is set to value 1 - Required or above. Configuring this setting doesn't change the Windows diagnostic data collection level set for the device. @@ -198,10 +198,10 @@ This policy setting, in combination with the Allow Telemetry and Configure the C To enable this behavior: 1. Enable this policy setting -2. Join a Microsoft Entra account to the device. +1. Join a Microsoft Entra account to the device. -3. Set Allow Telemetry to value 1 - Required, or higher -4. Set the Configure the Commercial ID setting for your Desktop Analytics workspace. +1. Set Allow Telemetry to value 1 - Required, or higher +1. Set the Configure the Commercial ID setting for your Desktop Analytics workspace. When these policies are configured, Windows diagnostic data collected from the device will be subject to Microsoft processor commitments. @@ -762,10 +762,10 @@ This policy setting, in combination with the Allow Telemetry and Configure the C To enable this behavior: 1. Enable this policy setting -2. Join a Microsoft Entra account to the device. +1. Join a Microsoft Entra account to the device. -3. Set Allow Telemetry to value 1 - Required, or higher -4. Set the Configure the Commercial ID setting for your Update Compliance workspace. +1. Set Allow Telemetry to value 1 - Required, or higher +1. Set the Configure the Commercial ID setting for your Update Compliance workspace. When these policies are configured, Windows diagnostic data collected from the device will be subject to Microsoft processor commitments. @@ -889,9 +889,9 @@ This policy setting configures a Microsoft Entra joined device so that Microsoft To enable this behavior: 1. Enable this policy setting -2. Join a Microsoft Entra account to the device. +1. Join a Microsoft Entra account to the device. -3. Set Allow Telemetry to value 1 - Required, or higher. +1. Set Allow Telemetry to value 1 - Required, or higher. When these policies are configured, Windows diagnostic data collected from the device will be subject to Microsoft processor commitments. @@ -1999,10 +1999,10 @@ This policy setting, in combination with the "Allow Diagnostic Data" policy sett To enable the behavior described above, complete the following steps: 1. Enable this policy setting -2. Set the "Allow Diagnostic Data" policy to "Send optional diagnostic data". +1. Set the "Allow Diagnostic Data" policy to "Send optional diagnostic data". -3. Enable the "Limit Dump Collection" policy -4. Enable the "Limit Diagnostic Log Collection" policy. +1. Enable the "Limit Dump Collection" policy +1. Enable the "Limit Diagnostic Log Collection" policy. When these policies are configured, Microsoft will collect only required diagnostic data and the events required by Desktop Analytics, which can be viewed at< https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2116020>. diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-systemservices.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-systemservices.md index 1ba198008c..b0e97a7454 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-systemservices.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-systemservices.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the SystemServices Area in Policy CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 08/10/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -20,6 +20,56 @@ ms.topic: reference + +## ConfigureComputerBrowserServiceStartupMode + + +| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | +|:--|:--|:--| +| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows 10, version 1803 [10.0.17134] and later | + + + +```Device +./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/SystemServices/ConfigureComputerBrowserServiceStartupMode +``` + + + + +This setting determines whether the service's start type is Automatic(2), Manual(3), Disabled(4). Default: Manual. + + + + + + + +**Description framework properties**: + +| Property name | Property value | +|:--|:--| +| Format | `int` | +| Access Type | Add, Delete, Get, Replace | +| Allowed Values | Range: `[2-4]` | +| Default Value | 3 | + + + +**Group policy mapping**: + +| Name | Value | +|:--|:--| +| Name | Computer Browser | +| Path | Windows Settings > Security Settings > System Services | + + + + + + + + ## ConfigureHomeGroupListenerServiceStartupMode @@ -120,6 +170,756 @@ This setting determines whether the service's start type is Automatic(2), Manual + +## ConfigureIISAdminServiceStartupMode + + +| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | +|:--|:--|:--| +| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows 10, version 1803 [10.0.17134] and later | + + + +```Device +./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/SystemServices/ConfigureIISAdminServiceStartupMode +``` + + + + +This setting determines whether the service's start type is Automatic(2), Manual(3), Disabled(4). Default: Manual. + + + + + + + +**Description framework properties**: + +| Property name | Property value | +|:--|:--| +| Format | `int` | +| Access Type | Add, Delete, Get, Replace | +| Allowed Values | Range: `[2-4]` | +| Default Value | 3 | + + + +**Group policy mapping**: + +| Name | Value | +|:--|:--| +| Name | IIS Admin Service | +| Path | Windows Settings > Security Settings > System Services | + + + + + + + + + +## ConfigureInfraredMonitorServiceStartupMode + + +| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | +|:--|:--|:--| +| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows 10, version 1803 [10.0.17134] and later | + + + +```Device +./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/SystemServices/ConfigureInfraredMonitorServiceStartupMode +``` + + + + +This setting determines whether the service's start type is Automatic(2), Manual(3), Disabled(4). Default: Manual. + + + + + + + +**Description framework properties**: + +| Property name | Property value | +|:--|:--| +| Format | `int` | +| Access Type | Add, Delete, Get, Replace | +| Allowed Values | Range: `[2-4]` | +| Default Value | 3 | + + + +**Group policy mapping**: + +| Name | Value | +|:--|:--| +| Name | Infrared Monitor Service | +| Path | Windows Settings > Security Settings > System Services | + + + + + + + + + +## ConfigureInternetConnectionSharingServiceStartupMode + + +| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | +|:--|:--|:--| +| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows 10, version 1803 [10.0.17134] and later | + + + +```Device +./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/SystemServices/ConfigureInternetConnectionSharingServiceStartupMode +``` + + + + +This setting determines whether the service's start type is Automatic(2), Manual(3), Disabled(4). Default: Manual. + + + + + + + +**Description framework properties**: + +| Property name | Property value | +|:--|:--| +| Format | `int` | +| Access Type | Add, Delete, Get, Replace | +| Allowed Values | Range: `[2-4]` | +| Default Value | 3 | + + + +**Group policy mapping**: + +| Name | Value | +|:--|:--| +| Name | Internet Connection Sharing (ICS) | +| Path | Windows Settings > Security Settings > System Services | + + + + + + + + + +## ConfigureLxssManagerServiceStartupMode + + +| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | +|:--|:--|:--| +| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows 10, version 1803 [10.0.17134] and later | + + + +```Device +./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/SystemServices/ConfigureLxssManagerServiceStartupMode +``` + + + + +This setting determines whether the service's start type is Automatic(2), Manual(3), Disabled(4). Default: Manual. + + + + + + + +**Description framework properties**: + +| Property name | Property value | +|:--|:--| +| Format | `int` | +| Access Type | Add, Delete, Get, Replace | +| Allowed Values | Range: `[2-4]` | +| Default Value | 3 | + + + +**Group policy mapping**: + +| Name | Value | +|:--|:--| +| Name | LxssManager | +| Path | Windows Settings > Security Settings > System Services | + + + + + + + + + +## ConfigureMicrosoftFTPServiceStartupMode + + +| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | +|:--|:--|:--| +| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows 10, version 1803 [10.0.17134] and later | + + + +```Device +./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/SystemServices/ConfigureMicrosoftFTPServiceStartupMode +``` + + + + +This setting determines whether the service's start type is Automatic(2), Manual(3), Disabled(4). Default: Manual. + + + + + + + +**Description framework properties**: + +| Property name | Property value | +|:--|:--| +| Format | `int` | +| Access Type | Add, Delete, Get, Replace | +| Allowed Values | Range: `[2-4]` | +| Default Value | 3 | + + + +**Group policy mapping**: + +| Name | Value | +|:--|:--| +| Name | Microsoft FTP Service | +| Path | Windows Settings > Security Settings > System Services | + + + + + + + + + +## ConfigureRemoteProcedureCallLocatorServiceStartupMode + + +| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | +|:--|:--|:--| +| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows 10, version 1803 [10.0.17134] and later | + + + +```Device +./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/SystemServices/ConfigureRemoteProcedureCallLocatorServiceStartupMode +``` + + + + +This setting determines whether the service's start type is Automatic(2), Manual(3), Disabled(4). Default: Manual. + + + + + + + +**Description framework properties**: + +| Property name | Property value | +|:--|:--| +| Format | `int` | +| Access Type | Add, Delete, Get, Replace | +| Allowed Values | Range: `[2-4]` | +| Default Value | 3 | + + + +**Group policy mapping**: + +| Name | Value | +|:--|:--| +| Name | Remote Procedure Call (RPC) Locator | +| Path | Windows Settings > Security Settings > System Services | + + + + + + + + + +## ConfigureRoutingAndRemoteAccessServiceStartupMode + + +| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | +|:--|:--|:--| +| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows 10, version 1803 [10.0.17134] and later | + + + +```Device +./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/SystemServices/ConfigureRoutingAndRemoteAccessServiceStartupMode +``` + + + + +This setting determines whether the service's start type is Automatic(2), Manual(3), Disabled(4). Default: Manual. + + + + + + + +**Description framework properties**: + +| Property name | Property value | +|:--|:--| +| Format | `int` | +| Access Type | Add, Delete, Get, Replace | +| Allowed Values | Range: `[2-4]` | +| Default Value | 3 | + + + +**Group policy mapping**: + +| Name | Value | +|:--|:--| +| Name | Routing and Remote Access | +| Path | Windows Settings > Security Settings > System Services | + + + + + + + + + +## ConfigureSimpleTCPIPServicesStartupMode + + +| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | +|:--|:--|:--| +| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows 10, version 1803 [10.0.17134] and later | + + + +```Device +./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/SystemServices/ConfigureSimpleTCPIPServicesStartupMode +``` + + + + +This setting determines whether the service's start type is Automatic(2), Manual(3), Disabled(4). Default: Manual. + + + + + + + +**Description framework properties**: + +| Property name | Property value | +|:--|:--| +| Format | `int` | +| Access Type | Add, Delete, Get, Replace | +| Allowed Values | Range: `[2-4]` | +| Default Value | 3 | + + + +**Group policy mapping**: + +| Name | Value | +|:--|:--| +| Name | Simple TCP/IP Services | +| Path | Windows Settings > Security Settings > System Services | + + + + + + + + + +## ConfigureSpecialAdministrationConsoleHelperServiceStartupMode + + +| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | +|:--|:--|:--| +| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows 10, version 1803 [10.0.17134] and later | + + + +```Device +./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/SystemServices/ConfigureSpecialAdministrationConsoleHelperServiceStartupMode +``` + + + + +This setting determines whether the service's start type is Automatic(2), Manual(3), Disabled(4). Default: Manual. + + + + + + + +**Description framework properties**: + +| Property name | Property value | +|:--|:--| +| Format | `int` | +| Access Type | Add, Delete, Get, Replace | +| Allowed Values | Range: `[2-4]` | +| Default Value | 3 | + + + +**Group policy mapping**: + +| Name | Value | +|:--|:--| +| Name | Special Administration Console Helper | +| Path | Windows Settings > Security Settings > System Services | + + + + + + + + + +## ConfigureSSDPDiscoveryServiceStartupMode + + +| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | +|:--|:--|:--| +| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows 10, version 1803 [10.0.17134] and later | + + + +```Device +./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/SystemServices/ConfigureSSDPDiscoveryServiceStartupMode +``` + + + + +This setting determines whether the service's start type is Automatic(2), Manual(3), Disabled(4). Default: Manual. + + + + + + + +**Description framework properties**: + +| Property name | Property value | +|:--|:--| +| Format | `int` | +| Access Type | Add, Delete, Get, Replace | +| Allowed Values | Range: `[2-4]` | +| Default Value | 3 | + + + +**Group policy mapping**: + +| Name | Value | +|:--|:--| +| Name | SSDP Discovery | +| Path | Windows Settings > Security Settings > System Services | + + + + + + + + + +## ConfigureUPnPDeviceHostServiceStartupMode + + +| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | +|:--|:--|:--| +| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows 10, version 1803 [10.0.17134] and later | + + + +```Device +./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/SystemServices/ConfigureUPnPDeviceHostServiceStartupMode +``` + + + + +This setting determines whether the service's start type is Automatic(2), Manual(3), Disabled(4). Default: Manual. + + + + + + + +**Description framework properties**: + +| Property name | Property value | +|:--|:--| +| Format | `int` | +| Access Type | Add, Delete, Get, Replace | +| Allowed Values | Range: `[2-4]` | +| Default Value | 3 | + + + +**Group policy mapping**: + +| Name | Value | +|:--|:--| +| Name | UPnP Device Host | +| Path | Windows Settings > Security Settings > System Services | + + + + + + + + + +## ConfigureWebManagementServiceStartupMode + + +| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | +|:--|:--|:--| +| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows 10, version 1803 [10.0.17134] and later | + + + +```Device +./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/SystemServices/ConfigureWebManagementServiceStartupMode +``` + + + + +This setting determines whether the service's start type is Automatic(2), Manual(3), Disabled(4). Default: Manual. + + + + + + + +**Description framework properties**: + +| Property name | Property value | +|:--|:--| +| Format | `int` | +| Access Type | Add, Delete, Get, Replace | +| Allowed Values | Range: `[2-4]` | +| Default Value | 3 | + + + +**Group policy mapping**: + +| Name | Value | +|:--|:--| +| Name | Web Management Service | +| Path | Windows Settings > Security Settings > System Services | + + + + + + + + + +## ConfigureWindowsMediaPlayerNetworkSharingServiceStartupMode + + +| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | +|:--|:--|:--| +| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows 10, version 1803 [10.0.17134] and later | + + + +```Device +./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/SystemServices/ConfigureWindowsMediaPlayerNetworkSharingServiceStartupMode +``` + + + + +This setting determines whether the service's start type is Automatic(2), Manual(3), Disabled(4). Default: Manual. + + + + + + + +**Description framework properties**: + +| Property name | Property value | +|:--|:--| +| Format | `int` | +| Access Type | Add, Delete, Get, Replace | +| Allowed Values | Range: `[2-4]` | +| Default Value | 3 | + + + +**Group policy mapping**: + +| Name | Value | +|:--|:--| +| Name | Windows Media Player Network Sharing Service | +| Path | Windows Settings > Security Settings > System Services | + + + + + + + + + +## ConfigureWindowsMobileHotspotServiceStartupMode + + +| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | +|:--|:--|:--| +| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows 10, version 1803 [10.0.17134] and later | + + + +```Device +./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/SystemServices/ConfigureWindowsMobileHotspotServiceStartupMode +``` + + + + +This setting determines whether the service's start type is Automatic(2), Manual(3), Disabled(4). Default: Manual. + + + + + + + +**Description framework properties**: + +| Property name | Property value | +|:--|:--| +| Format | `int` | +| Access Type | Add, Delete, Get, Replace | +| Allowed Values | Range: `[2-4]` | +| Default Value | 3 | + + + +**Group policy mapping**: + +| Name | Value | +|:--|:--| +| Name | Windows Mobile Hotspot Service | +| Path | Windows Settings > Security Settings > System Services | + + + + + + + + + +## ConfigureWorldWideWebPublishingServiceStartupMode + + +| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | +|:--|:--|:--| +| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows 10, version 1803 [10.0.17134] and later | + + + +```Device +./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/SystemServices/ConfigureWorldWideWebPublishingServiceStartupMode +``` + + + + +This setting determines whether the service's start type is Automatic(2), Manual(3), Disabled(4). Default: Manual. + + + + + + + +**Description framework properties**: + +| Property name | Property value | +|:--|:--| +| Format | `int` | +| Access Type | Add, Delete, Get, Replace | +| Allowed Values | Range: `[2-4]` | +| Default Value | 3 | + + + +**Group policy mapping**: + +| Name | Value | +|:--|:--| +| Name | World Wide Web Publishing Service | +| Path | Windows Settings > Security Settings > System Services | + + + + + + + + ## ConfigureXboxAccessoryManagementServiceStartupMode diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-troubleshooting.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-troubleshooting.md index 05a793d534..96e90c4433 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-troubleshooting.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-troubleshooting.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the Troubleshooting Area in Policy CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 08/10/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -61,15 +61,15 @@ After setting this policy, you can use the following instructions to check devic rem The following batch script triggers Recommended Troubleshooting schtasks /run /TN "\Microsoft\Windows\Diagnosis\RecommendedTroubleshootingScanner". -2. To create a new immediate task, navigate to the Group Policy Management Editor > Computer Configuration > Preferences and select Control Panel Settings. +1. To create a new immediate task, navigate to the Group Policy Management Editor > Computer Configuration > Preferences and select Control Panel Settings. -3. Under Control Panel settings, right-click on Scheduled Tasks and select New. Select Immediate Task (At least Windows 7). +1. Under Control Panel settings, right-click on Scheduled Tasks and select New. Select Immediate Task (At least Windows 7). -4. Provide name and description as appropriate, then under Security Options set the user account to System and select the Run with highest privileges checkbox. +1. Provide name and description as appropriate, then under Security Options set the user account to System and select the Run with highest privileges checkbox. -5. In the Actions tab, create a new action, select Start a Program as its type, then enter the file created in step 1. +1. In the Actions tab, create a new action, select Start a Program as its type, then enter the file created in step 1. -6. Configure the task to deploy to your domain. +1. Configure the task to deploy to your domain. diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-update.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-update.md index 9c9630b5ac..5232cbd5a3 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-update.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-update.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the Update Area in Policy CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 10/03/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -292,8 +292,16 @@ Allows the IT admin to manage whether Automatic Updates accepts updates signed b - + This policy enables devices to get optional updates (including gradual feature rollouts (CFRs) - learn more by visiting aka.ms/AllowOptionalContent) + +When the policy is configured. + +- If "Automatically receive optional updates (including CFRs)" is selected, the device will get the latest optional updates automatically in line with the configured quality update deferrals. This includes optional cumulative updates and gradual feature rollouts (CFRs). + +- If "Automatically receive optional updates" is selected, the device will only get optional cumulative updates automatically, in line with the quality update deferrals. + +- If "Users can select which optional updates to receive" is selected, users can select which optional updates to get by visiting Settings > Windows Update > Advanced options > Optional updates. Users can also enable the toggle "Get the latest updates as soon as they're available" to automatically receive optional updates and gradual feature rollouts. @@ -327,7 +335,12 @@ This policy enables devices to get optional updates (including gradual feature r | Name | Value | |:--|:--| | Name | AllowOptionalContent | -| Path | WindowsUpdate > AT > WindowsComponents > WindowsUpdateCat | +| Friendly Name | Enable optional updates | +| Location | Computer Configuration | +| Path | Windows Components > Windows Update > Manage updates offered from Windows Update | +| Registry Key Name | Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate | +| Registry Value Name | SetAllowOptionalContent | +| ADMX File Name | WindowsUpdate.admx | @@ -1958,7 +1971,7 @@ If any of the following two policies are enabled, this policy has no effect: 1. No auto-restart with logged-on users for scheduled automatic updates installations. -2. Always automatically restart at scheduled time. +1. Always automatically restart at scheduled time. Note that the default max active hours range is 18 hours from the active hours start time unless otherwise configured via the Specify active hours range for auto-restarts policy. @@ -2085,7 +2098,7 @@ If any of the following two policies are enabled, this policy has no effect: 1. No auto-restart with logged-on users for scheduled automatic updates installations. -2. Always automatically restart at scheduled time. +1. Always automatically restart at scheduled time. Note that the default max active hours range is 18 hours from the active hours start time unless otherwise configured via the Specify active hours range for auto-restarts policy. @@ -3599,7 +3612,7 @@ Enabling either of the following two policies will override the above policy: 1. No auto-restart with logged-on users for scheduled automatic updates installations. -2. Always automatically restart at scheduled time. +1. Always automatically restart at scheduled time. @@ -3664,7 +3677,7 @@ Enabling either of the following two policies will override the above policy: 1. No auto-restart with logged-on users for scheduled automatic updates installations. -2. Always automatically restart at scheduled time. +1. Always automatically restart at scheduled time. @@ -4083,9 +4096,9 @@ If you disable or don't configure this policy, the PC will restart following the Enabling any of the following policies will override the above policy: 1. No auto-restart with logged-on users for scheduled automatic updates installations -2. Always automatically restart at scheduled time. +1. Always automatically restart at scheduled time. -3. Specify deadline before auto-restart for update installation. +1. Specify deadline before auto-restart for update installation. @@ -4153,9 +4166,9 @@ If you disable or don't configure this policy, the PC will restart following the Enabling any of the following policies will override the above policy: 1. No auto-restart with logged-on users for scheduled automatic updates installations -2. Always automatically restart at scheduled time. +1. Always automatically restart at scheduled time. -3. Specify deadline before auto-restart for update installation. +1. Specify deadline before auto-restart for update installation. @@ -4223,9 +4236,9 @@ If you disable or don't configure this policy, the PC will restart following the Enabling any of the following policies will override the above policy: 1. No auto-restart with logged-on users for scheduled automatic updates installations -2. Always automatically restart at scheduled time. +1. Always automatically restart at scheduled time. -3. Specify deadline before auto-restart for update installation. +1. Specify deadline before auto-restart for update installation. @@ -4293,9 +4306,9 @@ If you disable or don't configure this policy, the PC will restart following the Enabling any of the following policies will override the above policy: 1. No auto-restart with logged-on users for scheduled automatic updates installations -2. Always automatically restart at scheduled time. +1. Always automatically restart at scheduled time. -3. Specify deadline before auto-restart for update installation. +1. Specify deadline before auto-restart for update installation. @@ -4363,9 +4376,9 @@ If you disable or don't configure this policy, the PC will restart following the Enabling any of the following policies will override the above policy: 1. No auto-restart with logged-on users for scheduled automatic updates installations -2. Always automatically restart at scheduled time. +1. Always automatically restart at scheduled time. -3. Specify deadline before auto-restart for update installation. +1. Specify deadline before auto-restart for update installation. @@ -4433,9 +4446,9 @@ If you disable or don't configure this policy, the PC will restart following the Enabling any of the following policies will override the above policy: 1. No auto-restart with logged-on users for scheduled automatic updates installations -2. Always automatically restart at scheduled time. +1. Always automatically restart at scheduled time. -3. Specify deadline before auto-restart for update installation. +1. Specify deadline before auto-restart for update installation. diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-userrights.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-userrights.md index e323789f73..39a023b122 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-userrights.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-userrights.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the UserRights Area in Policy CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 08/10/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -259,6 +259,55 @@ This user right allows a process to impersonate any user without authentication. + +## AdjustMemoryQuotasForProcess + + +| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | +|:--|:--|:--| +| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows Insider Preview | + + + +```Device +./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/UserRights/AdjustMemoryQuotasForProcess +``` + + + + +Adjust memory quotas for a process - This privilege determines who can change the maximum memory that can be consumed by a process. This privilege is useful for system tuning on a group or user basis. + + + + + + + +**Description framework properties**: + +| Property name | Property value | +|:--|:--| +| Format | `chr` (string) | +| Access Type | Add, Delete, Get, Replace | +| Allowed Values | List (Delimiter: `0xF000`) | + + + +**Group policy mapping**: + +| Name | Value | +|:--|:--| +| Name | Adjust memory quotas for a process | +| Path | Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment | + + + + + + + + ## AllowLocalLogOn @@ -311,6 +360,55 @@ This user right determines which users can log on to the computer. + +## AllowLogOnThroughRemoteDesktop + + +| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | +|:--|:--|:--| +| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows Insider Preview | + + + +```Device +./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/UserRights/AllowLogOnThroughRemoteDesktop +``` + + + + +Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services - This policy setting determines which users or groups can access the sign-in screen of a remote device through a Remote Desktop Services connection. + + + + + + + +**Description framework properties**: + +| Property name | Property value | +|:--|:--| +| Format | `chr` (string) | +| Access Type | Add, Delete, Get, Replace | +| Allowed Values | List (Delimiter: `0xF000`) | + + + +**Group policy mapping**: + +| Name | Value | +|:--|:--| +| Name | Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services | +| Path | Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment | + + + + + + + + ## BackupFilesAndDirectories diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-webthreatdefense.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-webthreatdefense.md index a5834287ac..e415fba8e2 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-webthreatdefense.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-webthreatdefense.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the WebThreatDefense Area in Policy CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 08/30/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -16,8 +16,6 @@ ms.topic: reference # Policy CSP - WebThreatDefense -[!INCLUDE [Windows Insider tip](includes/mdm-insider-csp-note.md)] - > [!NOTE] @@ -30,7 +28,7 @@ ms.topic: reference | Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | |:--|:--|:--| -| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows Insider Preview | +| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows 11, version 23H2 [10.0.22631] and later | diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-windowsai.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-windowsai.md index 5d7b09569f..bf5ad5e22a 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-windowsai.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-windowsai.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the WindowsAI Area in Policy CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 08/30/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -16,8 +16,6 @@ ms.topic: reference # Policy CSP - WindowsAI -[!INCLUDE [Windows Insider tip](includes/mdm-insider-csp-note.md)] - @@ -28,7 +26,7 @@ ms.topic: reference | Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | |:--|:--|:--| -| ❌ Device
✅ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows Insider Preview [10.0.25929.1000] | +| ❌ Device
✅ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows 11, version 22H2 [10.0.22621.2360] and later
✅ Windows 11, version 23H2 [10.0.22631] and later | diff --git a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-windowssandbox.md b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-windowssandbox.md index 49f808e7e0..be6709c49c 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-windowssandbox.md +++ b/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-windowssandbox.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn more about the WindowsSandbox Area in Policy CSP. author: vinaypamnani-msft manager: aaroncz ms.author: vinpa -ms.date: 08/10/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.localizationpriority: medium ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-manage @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ ms.topic: reference # Policy CSP - WindowsSandbox +[!INCLUDE [Windows Insider tip](includes/mdm-insider-csp-note.md)] + @@ -148,6 +150,56 @@ This policy setting enables or disables clipboard sharing with the sandbox. + +## AllowMappedFolders + + +| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | +|:--|:--|:--| +| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows Insider Preview | + + + +```Device +./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/WindowsSandbox/AllowMappedFolders +``` + + + + +Allow mapping folders into Windows Sandbox. + + + + + + + +**Description framework properties**: + +| Property name | Property value | +|:--|:--| +| Format | `int` | +| Access Type | Add, Delete, Get, Replace | +| Allowed Values | Range: `[0-1]` | +| Default Value | 1 | + + + +**Group policy mapping**: + +| Name | Value | +|:--|:--| +| Name | AllowMappedFolders | +| Path | WindowsSandbox > AT > WindowsComponents > WindowsSandboxCat | + + + + + + + + ## AllowNetworking @@ -406,6 +458,57 @@ Note that there may be security implications of exposing host video input to the + +## AllowWriteToMappedFolders + + +| Scope | Editions | Applicable OS | +|:--|:--|:--| +| ✅ Device
❌ User | ✅ Pro
✅ Enterprise
✅ Education
✅ Windows SE
✅ IoT Enterprise / IoT Enterprise LTSC | ✅ Windows Insider Preview | + + + +```Device +./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/WindowsSandbox/AllowWriteToMappedFolders +``` + + + + +Allow Sandbox to write to mapped folders. + + + + + + + +**Description framework properties**: + +| Property name | Property value | +|:--|:--| +| Format | `int` | +| Access Type | Add, Delete, Get, Replace | +| Allowed Values | Range: `[0-1]` | +| Default Value | 1 | +| Dependency [WindowsSandbox_AllowWriteToMappedFolders_DependencyGroup] | Dependency Type: `DependsOn`
Dependency URI: `Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/WindowsSandbox/AllowMappedFolders`
Dependency Allowed Value: `[1]`
Dependency Allowed Value Type: `Range`
| + + + +**Group policy mapping**: + +| Name | Value | +|:--|:--| +| Name | AllowWriteToMappedFolders | +| Path | WindowsSandbox > AT > WindowsComponents > WindowsSandboxCat | + + + + + + + + diff --git a/windows/configuration/set-up-shared-or-guest-pc.md b/windows/configuration/set-up-shared-or-guest-pc.md index c8ef487740..6d7f554aea 100644 --- a/windows/configuration/set-up-shared-or-guest-pc.md +++ b/windows/configuration/set-up-shared-or-guest-pc.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ --- title: Set up a shared or guest Windows device description: Description of how to configured Shared PC mode, which is a Windows feature that optimizes devices for shared use scenarios. -ms.date: 10/15/2022 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-configure ms.topic: reference diff --git a/windows/configuration/shared-pc-technical.md b/windows/configuration/shared-pc-technical.md index b0d626cff0..2c55e09d27 100644 --- a/windows/configuration/shared-pc-technical.md +++ b/windows/configuration/shared-pc-technical.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ --- title: Shared PC technical reference description: List of policies and settings applied by the Shared PC options. -ms.date: 10/15/2022 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-configure ms.topic: reference diff --git a/windows/deployment/update/waas-manage-updates-wufb.md b/windows/deployment/update/waas-manage-updates-wufb.md index 58343cf36e..070ded3d1e 100644 --- a/windows/deployment/update/waas-manage-updates-wufb.md +++ b/windows/deployment/update/waas-manage-updates-wufb.md @@ -13,66 +13,70 @@ ms.localizationpriority: medium appliesto: - ✅ Windows 11 - ✅ Windows 10 -ms.date: 12/31/2017 +ms.date: 11/07/2023 --- # What is Windows Update for Business? -> **Looking for consumer information?** See [Windows Update: FAQ](https://support.microsoft.com/help/12373/windows-update-faq) +> **Looking for consumer information?** See [Windows Update: FAQ](https://support.microsoft.com/help/12373/windows-update-faq) Windows Update for Business is a free service that is available for the following editions of Windows 10 and Windows 11: + - Pro, including Pro for Workstations - Education - Enterprise, including Enterprise LTSC, IoT Enterprise, and IoT Enterprise LTSC -Windows Update for Business enables IT administrators to keep the Windows client devices in their organization always up to date with the latest security defenses and Windows features by directly connecting these systems to Windows Update service. You can use Group Policy or Mobile Device Management (MDM) solutions such as Microsoft Intune to configure the Windows Update for Business settings that control how and when devices are updated. +Windows Update for Business enables IT administrators to keep their organization's Windows client devices always up to date with the latest security updates and Windows features by directly connecting these systems to the Windows Update service. You can use Group Policy or Mobile Device Management (MDM) solutions, such as Microsoft Intune, to configure the Windows Update for Business settings that control how and when devices are updated. Specifically, Windows Update for Business lets you control update offerings and experiences to allow for reliability and performance testing on a subset of devices before deploying updates across the organization. It also provides a positive update experience for people in your organization. ## What can I do with Windows Update for Business? -Windows Update for Business enables commercial customers to manage which Windows Updates are received when as well as the experience a device has when it receives them. +Windows Update for Business enables commercial customers to manage which Windows Updates are received along with the experience a device has when it receives them. -You can control Windows Update for Business policies by using either Mobile Device Management (MDM) tools such as Microsoft Intune or Group Policy management tools such as local group policy or the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC), as well as various other non-Microsoft management tools. MDMs use Configuration Service Provider (CSP) policies instead of Group Policy. Intune additionally uses Cloud Policies. Not all policies are available in all formats (CSP, Group Policy, or Cloud policy). +You can control Windows Update for Business policies by using either MDM tools or Group Policy management, such as local group policy or the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC), and various other non-Microsoft management tools. MDMs use Configuration Service Provider (CSP) policies instead of Group Policy. Intune additionally uses Cloud Policies. Not all policies are available in all formats (CSP, Group Policy, or Cloud Policy). +### Manage deployment of Windows Updates -### Manage deployment of Windows Updates -By using Windows Update for Business, you can control which types of Windows Updates are offered to devices in your ecosystem, when updates are applied, and deployment to devices in your organization in waves. +By using Windows Update for Business, you can: +- Control the types of Windows Updates are offered to devices in your organization +- Control when updates are applied to the devices +- Deploy updates to devices in your organization in waves -### Manage which updates are offered -Windows Update for Business enables an IT administrator to receive and manage a variety of different types of Windows Updates. +### Manage which updates are offered + +Windows Update for Business enables an IT administrator to receive and manage various types of Windows Updates. ## Types of updates managed by Windows Update for Business Windows Update for Business provides management policies for several types of updates to Windows 10 devices: -- **Feature updates:** Previously referred to as "upgrades," feature updates contain not only security and quality revisions, but also significant feature additions and changes. Feature updates are released as soon as they become available. Feature updates aren't available for LTSC devices. -- **Quality updates:** Quality updates are traditional operating system updates, typically released on the second Tuesday of each month (though they can be released at any time). These include security, critical, and driver updates. -- **Driver updates:** Updates for non-Microsoft drivers that are relevant to your devices. Driver updates are on by default, but you can use Windows Update for Business policies to turn them off if you prefer. +- **Feature updates:** Previously referred to as upgrades, feature updates contain not only security and quality revisions, but also significant feature additions and changes. Feature updates are released as soon as they become available. Feature updates aren't available for LTSC devices. +- **Quality updates:** Quality updates are traditional operating system updates. Typically quality updates are released on the second Tuesday of each month, though they can be released at any time. These include security, critical, and driver updates. +- **Driver updates:** Updates for non-Microsoft drivers that are relevant to your devices. Driver updates are on by default, but you can use Windows Update for Business policies to turn them off if you prefer. - **Microsoft product updates**: Updates for other Microsoft products, such as versions of Office that are installed by using Windows Installer (MSI). Versions of Office that are installed by using Click-to-Run can't be updated by using Windows Update for Business. Product updates are off by default. You can turn them on by using Windows Update for Business policies. - ## Offering -You can control when updates are applied, for example by deferring when an update is installed on a device or by pausing updates for a certain period. + +You can control when updates are applied. For example, you can defer when an update is installed on a device or by pausing updates for a certain period. ### Manage when updates are offered + You can defer or pause the installation of updates for a set period of time. #### Enroll in prerelease updates The branch readiness level enables administrators to specify which channel of feature updates they want to receive. Today there are branch readiness level options for both prerelease and released updates: -- Windows Insider Canary -- Windows Insider Dev -- Windows Insider Beta -- Windows Insider Preview -- General Availability Channel +- Windows Insider Canary channel +- Windows Insider Dev channel +- Windows Insider Beta channel +- Windows Insider Release Preview channel #### Defer an update -A Windows Update for Business administrator can defer the installation of both feature and quality updates from deploying to devices within a bounded range of time from when those updates are first made available on the Windows Update service. You can use this deferral to allow time to validate deployments as they're pushed to devices. Deferrals work by allowing you to specify the number of days after an update is released before it's offered to a device. That is, if you set a feature update deferral period of 365 days, the device won't install a feature update that has been released for less than 365 days. To defer feature updates, use the **Select when Preview Builds and feature updates are Received** policy. - +An administrator can defer the installation of both feature and quality updates from deploying to devices within a range of time based on when those updates are first made available on the Windows Update service. You can use this deferral to allow time to validate deployments as they're pushed to devices. Deferrals work by allowing you to specify the number of days after an update is released before it's offered to a device. That is, if you set a feature update deferral period of 365 days, the device won't install a feature update that has been released for less than 365 days. To defer feature updates, use the **Select when Preview Builds and feature updates are Received** policy. |Category |Maximum deferral period | |---------|---------| @@ -85,13 +89,12 @@ A Windows Update for Business administrator can defer the installation of both f #### Pause an update -If you discover a problem while deploying a feature or quality update, the IT administrator can pause the update for 35 days from a specified start date to prevent other devices from installing it until the issue is mitigated. -If you pause a feature update, quality updates are still offered to devices to ensure they stay secure. The pause period for both feature and quality updates is calculated from a start date that you set. +If you discover a problem while deploying a feature or quality update, you can pause the update for 35 days from a specified start date to prevent other devices from installing it until the issue is mitigated. If you pause a feature update, quality updates are still offered to devices to ensure they stay secure. The pause period for both feature and quality updates is calculated from a start date that you set. To pause feature updates, use the **Select when Preview Builds and feature updates are Received** policy and to pause quality updates use the **Select when Quality Updates are Received** policy. For more information, see [Pause feature updates](waas-configure-wufb.md#pause-feature-updates) and [Pause quality updates](waas-configure-wufb.md#pause-quality-updates). Built-in benefits: -When updating from Windows Update, you get the added benefits of built-in compatibility checks to prevent against a poor update experience for your device as well as a check to prevent repeated rollbacks. +When updating from Windows Update, you get the added benefits of built-in compatibility checks to prevent against a poor update experience for your device and a check to prevent repeated rollbacks. ### Recommendations @@ -104,28 +107,38 @@ For the best experience with Windows Update, follow these guidelines: ### Manage the end-user experience when receiving Windows Updates -Windows Update for Business provides controls to help meet your organization's security standards as well as provide a great end-user experience. We do this by enabling you to set automatic updates at times that work well for people in your organization and set deadlines for quality and feature updates. Because Windows Update includes built-in intelligence, it's better to use fewer controls to manage the user experience. +Windows Update for Business provides controls to help meet your organization's security standards and provide a great end-user experience. We do this by enabling you to set automatic updates at times that work well for people in your organization and set deadlines for quality and feature updates. Because Windows Update includes built-in intelligence, it's better to use fewer controls to manage the user experience. #### Recommended experience settings Features like the smart busy check (which ensure updates don't happen when a user is signed in) and active hours help provide the best experience for end users while keeping devices more secure and up to date. Follow these steps to take advantage of these features: 1. Automatically download, install, and restart (default if no restart policies are set up or enabled). -2. Use the default notifications. -3. Set update deadlines. +1. Use the default notifications. +1. Set update deadlines. -##### Setting deadlines +##### Setting deadlines -A compliance deadline policy (released in June 2019) enables you to set separate deadlines and grace periods for feature and quality updates. +A compliance deadline policy enables you to set separate deadlines and grace periods for feature and quality updates. This policy enables you to specify the number of days from an update's publication date that it must be installed on the device. The policy also includes a configurable grace period that specifies the number of days from when the update is installed on the device until the device is forced to restart. This approach is useful in a vacation scenario as it allows, for example, users who have been away to have a bit of time before being forced to restart their devices when they return from vacation. #### Update Baseline +> [!NOTE] +> The Update Baseline toolkit is available only for Group Policy. Update Baseline does not affect your offering policies, whether you're using deferrals or target version to manage which updates are offered to your devices when. Update Baseline is not currently supported for Windows 11. + The large number of different policies offered can be overwhelming. Update Baseline provides a clear list of recommended Windows update policy settings for IT administrators who want the best user experience while also meeting their update compliance goals. The Update Baseline for Windows 10 includes policy settings recommendations covering deadline configuration, restart behavior, power policies, and more. The Update Baseline toolkit makes it easy by providing a single command for IT Admins to apply the Update Baseline to devices. You can get the Update Baseline toolkit from the [Download Center](https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=101056). ->[!NOTE] ->The Update Baseline toolkit is available only for Group Policy. Update Baseline does not affect your offering policies, whether you’re using deferrals or target version to manage which updates are offered to your devices when. Update Baseline is not currently supported for Windows 11. +## Other Windows Update for Business services +The following services are part of the Windows Update for Business product family: + +- [Windows Update for Business reports](wufb-reports-overview.md) is a cloud-based solution that provides information about your Microsoft Entra joined devices' compliance with Windows updates. Windows Update for Business reports is offered through the Azure portal. Windows Update for Business reports helps you: + - Monitor security, quality, driver, and feature updates for Windows 11 and Windows 10 devices + - Report on devices with update compliance issues + - Analyze and display your data in multiple ways + +- The [Windows Update for Business deployment service](deployment-service-overview.md) is a cloud service designed to work with your existing Windows Update for Business policies and Windows Update for Business reports. The deployment service provides additional control over the approval, scheduling, and safeguarding of updates delivered from Windows Update to managed devices. diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-quality-update-overview.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-quality-update-overview.md index 34a3b93fab..6082093e6d 100644 --- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-quality-update-overview.md +++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-quality-update-overview.md @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ For the deployment rings that have passed quality updates deferral date, the OOB 2. Under the **Release Announcements** tab, you can view the knowledge base (KB) articles corresponding to deployed OOB and regular Windows quality updates. You can also view the schedules for OOB update releases in the Release Schedule tab. > [!NOTE] -> Announcements abd OOB update schedules will be **removed** from the Release announcements tab when the next quality update is released. Further, if quality updates are paused for a deployment ring, the OOB updates will also be paused. +> Announcements and OOB update schedules will be **removed** from the Release announcements tab when the next quality update is released. Further, if quality updates are paused for a deployment ring, the OOB updates will also be paused. ### Pause and resume a release diff --git a/windows/security/docfx.json b/windows/security/docfx.json index 040348819b..aa4f877c04 100644 --- a/windows/security/docfx.json +++ b/windows/security/docfx.json @@ -218,6 +218,8 @@ "identity-protection/hello-for-business/*.md": "erikdau", "identity-protection/credential-guard/*.md": "zwhittington", "identity-protection/access-control/*.md": "sulahiri", + "identity-protection/smart-cards/*.md": "ardenw", + "identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/*.md": "ardenw", "operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/*.md": "paoloma", "operating-system-security/network-security/vpn/*.md": "pesmith", "operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/*.md":"rhonnegowda", @@ -231,7 +233,7 @@ "threat-protection/auditing/*.md": "tier3", "operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/*.md": "tier1", "operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/*.md": "tier1", - "operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/*.md": [ "tier3", "must-keep" ] + "operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/*.md": [ "tier2", "must-keep" ] } }, "template": [], diff --git a/windows/security/hardware-security/kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt.md b/windows/security/hardware-security/kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt.md index f7fd8927c1..8ed52be240 100644 --- a/windows/security/hardware-security/kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt.md +++ b/windows/security/hardware-security/kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt.md @@ -54,27 +54,27 @@ You can use the Windows Security settings to check if Kernel DMA Protection is e 1. Open **Windows Security**. 1. Select **Device security > Core isolation details > Memory access protection** -:::image type="content" source="images/kernel-dma-protection-security-center.png" alt-text="Screenshot of Kernel DMA protection in Windows Security." lightbox="images/kernel-dma-protection-security-center.png" border="true"::: + :::image type="content" source="images/kernel-dma-protection-security-center.png" alt-text="Screenshot of Kernel DMA protection in Windows Security." lightbox="images/kernel-dma-protection-security-center.png" border="true"::: -Alternatively, you can use the System Information desktop app (`msinfo32.exe`). If the system supports Kernel DMA Protection, the **Kernel DMA Protection** value will be set to **ON**. + Alternatively, you can use the System Information desktop app (`msinfo32.exe`). If the system supports Kernel DMA Protection, the **Kernel DMA Protection** value will be set to **ON**. -:::image type="content" source="images/kernel-dma-protection.png" alt-text="Screenshot of Kernel DMA protection in System Information." lightbox="images/kernel-dma-protection.png" border="true"::: + :::image type="content" source="images/kernel-dma-protection.png" alt-text="Screenshot of Kernel DMA protection in System Information." lightbox="images/kernel-dma-protection.png" border="true"::: -If the current state of **Kernel DMA Protection** is **OFF** and **Hyper-V - Virtualization Enabled in Firmware** is **NO**: + If the current state of **Kernel DMA Protection** is **OFF** and **Hyper-V - Virtualization Enabled in Firmware** is **NO**: -- Reboot into UEFI settings -- Turn on Intel Virtualization Technology -- Turn on Intel Virtualization Technology for I/O (VT-d) -- Reboot system into Windows + - Reboot into UEFI settings + - Turn on Intel Virtualization Technology + - Turn on Intel Virtualization Technology for I/O (VT-d) + - Reboot system into Windows -> [!NOTE] -> If the **Hyper-V** Windows feature is enabled, all the Hyper-V-related features will be hidden, and **A hypervisor has been detected. Features required for Hyper-V will not be displayed** entity will be shown at the bottom of the list. It means that **Hyper-V - Virtualization Enabled in Firmware** is set to **YES**. -> -> Enabling Hyper-V virtualization in Firmware (IOMMU) is required to enable **Kernel DMA Protection**, even when the firmware has the flag of *ACPI Kernel DMA Protection Indicators* described in [Kernel DMA Protection (Memory Access Protection) for OEMs][LINK-3]. + > [!NOTE] + > If the **Hyper-V** Windows feature is enabled, all the Hyper-V-related features will be hidden, and **A hypervisor has been detected. Features required for Hyper-V will not be displayed** entity will be shown at the bottom of the list. It means that **Hyper-V - Virtualization Enabled in Firmware** is set to **YES**. + > + > Enabling Hyper-V virtualization in Firmware (IOMMU) is required to enable **Kernel DMA Protection**, even when the firmware has the flag of *ACPI Kernel DMA Protection Indicators* described in [Kernel DMA Protection (Memory Access Protection) for OEMs][LINK-3]. -If the state of **Kernel DMA Protection** remains Off, then the system doesn't support Kernel DMA Protection. + If the state of **Kernel DMA Protection** remains Off, then the system doesn't support Kernel DMA Protection. -For systems that don't support Kernel DMA Protection, refer to the [BitLocker countermeasures](../operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-countermeasures.md) or [Thunderbolt 3 and Security on Microsoft Windows Operating system][EXT-1] for other means of DMA protection. +For systems that don't support Kernel DMA Protection, refer to the [BitLocker countermeasures](../operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/countermeasures.md) or [Thunderbolt 3 and Security on Microsoft Windows Operating system][EXT-1] for other means of DMA protection. ## Frequently asked questions diff --git a/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/tpm-recommendations.md b/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/tpm-recommendations.md index afea335006..1190a55d46 100644 --- a/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/tpm-recommendations.md +++ b/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/tpm-recommendations.md @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ The following table defines which Windows features require TPM support. Windows Features | TPM Required | Supports TPM 1.2 | Supports TPM 2.0 | Details | -|-|-|-|- Measured Boot | Yes | Yes | Yes | Measured Boot requires TPM 1.2 or 2.0 and UEFI Secure Boot. TPM 2.0 is recommended since it supports newer cryptographic algorithms. TPM 1.2 only supports the SHA-1 algorithm which is being deprecated. - BitLocker | No | Yes | Yes | TPM 1.2 or 2.0 are supported but TPM 2.0 is recommended. [Automatic Device Encryption requires Modern Standby](../../operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-device-encryption-overview-windows-10.md#bitlocker-device-encryption) including TPM 2.0 support + BitLocker | No | Yes | Yes | TPM 1.2 or 2.0 are supported but TPM 2.0 is recommended. [Device Encryption requires Modern Standby](../../operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/index.md#device-encryption) including TPM 2.0 support Device Encryption | Yes | N/A | Yes | Device Encryption requires Modern Standby/Connected Standby certification, which requires TPM 2.0. Windows Defender Application Control (Device Guard) | No | Yes | Yes Windows Defender System Guard (DRTM) | Yes | No | Yes | TPM 2.0 and UEFI firmware is required. diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/access-control.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/access-control.md index 0cc106f7cb..3a7b6d25bd 100644 --- a/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/access-control.md +++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/access-control.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ --- -ms.date: 11/22/2022 -title: Access Control Overview -description: Description of the access controls in Windows, which is the process of authorizing users, groups, and computers to access objects on the network or computer. +ms.date: 11/07/2023 +title: Access Control overview +description: Learn about access control in Windows, which is the process of authorizing users, groups, and computers to access objects on the network or computer. ms.topic: overview appliesto: - ✅ Windows 11 @@ -11,33 +11,37 @@ appliesto: - ✅ Windows Server 2016 --- -# Access Control Overview +# Access control overview -This topic for the IT professional describes access control in Windows, which is the process of authorizing users, groups, and computers to access objects on the network or computer. Key concepts that make up access control are permissions, ownership of objects, inheritance of permissions, user rights, and object auditing. +This article describes access control in Windows, which is the process of authorizing users, groups, and computers to access objects on the network or computer. Key concepts that make up access control are: -## Feature description +- permissions +- ownership of objects +- inheritance of permissions +- user rights +- object auditing Computers that are running a supported version of Windows can control the use of system and network resources through the interrelated mechanisms of authentication and authorization. After a user is authenticated, the Windows operating system uses built-in authorization and access control technologies to implement the second phase of protecting resources: determining if an authenticated user has the correct permissions to access a resource. -Shared resources are available to users and groups other than the resource's owner, and they need to be protected from unauthorized use. In the access control model, users and groups (also referred to as security principals) are represented by unique security identifiers (SIDs). They are assigned rights and permissions that inform the operating system what each user and group can do. Each resource has an owner who grants permissions to security principals. During the access control check, these permissions are examined to determine which security principals can access the resource and how they can access it. +Shared resources are available to users and groups other than the resource's owner, and they need to be protected from unauthorized use. In the access control model, users and groups (also referred to as security principals) are represented by unique security identifiers (SIDs). They're assigned rights and permissions that inform the operating system what each user and group can do. Each resource has an owner who grants permissions to security principals. During the access control check, these permissions are examined to determine which security principals can access the resource and how they can access it. Security principals perform actions (which include Read, Write, Modify, or Full control) on objects. Objects include files, folders, printers, registry keys, and Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) objects. Shared resources use access control lists (ACLs) to assign permissions. This enables resource managers to enforce access control in the following ways: - Deny access to unauthorized users and groups - Set well-defined limits on the access that is provided to authorized users and groups -Object owners generally grant permissions to security groups rather than to individual users. Users and computers that are added to existing groups assume the permissions of that group. If an object (such as a folder) can hold other objects (such as subfolders and files), it is called a container. In a hierarchy of objects, the relationship between a container and its content is expressed by referring to the container as the parent. An object in the container is referred to as the child, and the child inherits the access control settings of the parent. Object owners often define permissions for container objects, rather than individual child objects, to ease access control management. +Object owners generally grant permissions to security groups rather than to individual users. Users and computers that are added to existing groups assume the permissions of that group. If an object (such as a folder) can hold other objects (such as subfolders and files), it's called a container. In a hierarchy of objects, the relationship between a container and its content is expressed by referring to the container as the parent. An object in the container is referred to as the child, and the child inherits the access control settings of the parent. Object owners often define permissions for container objects, rather than individual child objects, to ease access control management. This content set contains: -- [Dynamic Access Control Overview](/windows-server/identity/solution-guides/dynamic-access-control-overview) -- [Security identifiers](/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-security-identifiers) -- [Security Principals](/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-security-principals) +- [Dynamic Access Control Overview][SERV-1] +- [Security identifiers][SERV-2] +- [Security Principals][SERV-3] - [Local Accounts](local-accounts.md) - - [Active Directory Accounts](/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-default-user-accounts) - - [Microsoft Accounts](/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-microsoft-accounts) - - [Service Accounts](/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-service-accounts) - - [Active Directory Security Groups](/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-security-groups) + - [Active Directory Accounts][SERV-4] + - [Microsoft Accounts][SERV-5] + - [Service Accounts][SERV-6] + - [Active Directory Security Groups][SERV-7] [!INCLUDE [access-control-aclsacl](../../../../includes/licensing/access-control-aclsacl.md)] @@ -45,18 +49,18 @@ This content set contains: Administrators who use the supported version of Windows can refine the application and management of access control to objects and subjects to provide the following security: -- Protect a greater number and variety of network resources from misuse. -- Provision users to access resources in a manner that is consistent with organizational policies and the requirements of their jobs. -- Enable users to access resources from a variety of devices in numerous locations. -- Update users' ability to access resources on a regular basis as an organization's policies change or as users' jobs change. -- Account for a growing number of use scenarios (such as access from remote locations or from a rapidly expanding variety of devices, such as tablet computers and mobile phones). -- Identify and resolve access issues when legitimate users are unable to access resources that they need to perform their jobs. +- Protect a greater number and variety of network resources from misuse +- Provision users to access resources in a manner that is consistent with organizational policies and the requirements of their jobs +- Enable users to access resources from various devices in numerous locations +- Update users' ability to access resources regularly as an organization's policies change or as users' jobs change +- Account for a growing number of use scenarios (such as access from remote locations or from a rapidly expanding variety of devices, such as tablet computers and mobile phones) +- Identify and resolve access issues when legitimate users are unable to access resources that they need to perform their jobs ## Permissions Permissions define the type of access that is granted to a user or group for an object or object property. For example, the Finance group can be granted Read and Write permissions for a file named Payroll.dat. -By using the access control user interface, you can set NTFS permissions for objects such as files, Active Directory objects, registry objects, or system objects such as processes. Permissions can be granted to any user, group, or computer. It is a good practice to assign permissions to groups because it improves system performance when verifying access to an object. +By using the access control user interface, you can set NTFS permissions for objects such as files, Active Directory objects, registry objects, or system objects such as processes. Permissions can be granted to any user, group, or computer. It's a good practice to assign permissions to groups because it improves system performance when verifying access to an object. For any object, you can grant permissions to: @@ -73,26 +77,25 @@ The permissions attached to an object depend on the type of object. For example, When you set permissions, you specify the level of access for groups and users. For example, you can let one user read the contents of a file, let another user make changes to the file, and prevent all other users from accessing the file. You can set similar permissions on printers so that certain users can configure the printer and other users can only print. -When you need to change the permissions on a file, you can run Windows Explorer, right-click the file name, and click **Properties**. On the **Security** tab, you can change permissions on the file. For more information, see [Managing Permissions](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/cc770962(v=ws.11)). +When you need to change the permissions on a file, you can run Windows Explorer, right-click the file name, and select **Properties**. On the **Security** tab, you can change permissions on the file. For more information, see [Managing Permissions][PREV-1]. > [!NOTE] -> Another kind of permissions, called share permissions, is set on the Sharing tab of a folder's **Properties** page or by using the Shared Folder Wizard. For more information see [Share and NTFS Permissions on a File Server](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/cc754178(v=ws.11)). - +> Another kind of permissions, called share permissions, is set on the Sharing tab of a folder's **Properties** page or by using the Shared Folder Wizard. For more information, see [Share and NTFS Permissions on a File Server][PREV-2]. ### Ownership of objects -An owner is assigned to an object when that object is created. By default, the owner is the creator of the object. No matter what permissions are set on an object, the owner of the object can always change the permissions. For more information, see [Manage Object Ownership](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/cc732983(v=ws.11)). +An owner is assigned to an object when that object is created. By default, the owner is the creator of the object. No matter what permissions are set on an object, the owner of the object can always change the permissions. For more information, see [Manage Object Ownership][PREV-3]. ### Inheritance of permissions -Inheritance allows administrators to easily assign and manage permissions. This feature automatically causes objects within a container to inherit all the inheritable permissions of that container. For example, the files within a folder inherit the permissions of the folder. Only permissions marked to be inherited will be inherited. +Inheritance allows administrators to easily assign and manage permissions. This feature automatically causes objects within a container to inherit all the inheritable permissions of that container. For example, the files within a folder inherit the permissions of the folder. Only permissions marked to be inherited are inherited. ## User rights User rights grant specific privileges and sign-in rights to users and groups in your computing environment. Administrators can assign specific rights to group accounts or to individual user accounts. These rights authorize users to perform specific actions, such as signing in to a system interactively or backing up files and directories. -User rights are different from permissions because user rights apply to user accounts, and permissions are associated with objects. Although user rights can apply to individual user accounts, user rights are best administered on a group account basis. There is no support in the access control user interface to grant user rights. However, user rights assignment can be administered through **Local Security Settings**. +User rights are different from permissions because user rights apply to user accounts, and permissions are associated with objects. Although user rights can apply to individual user accounts, user rights are best administered on a group account basis. There's no support in the access control user interface to grant user rights. However, user rights assignment can be administered through **Local Security Settings**. -For more information about user rights, see [User Rights Assignment](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/user-rights-assignment). +For more information about user rights, see [User Rights Assignment](../../threat-protection/security-policy-settings/user-rights-assignment.md). ## Object auditing @@ -102,4 +105,18 @@ For more information about auditing, see [Security Auditing Overview](../../thre ## See also -- For more information about access control and authorization, see [Access Control and Authorization Overview](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-8.1-and-8/jj134043(v=ws.11)). +For more information about access control and authorization, see [Access Control and Authorization Overview][PREV-4]. + + + +[SERV-1]: /windows-server/identity/solution-guides/dynamic-access-control-overview +[SERV-2]: /windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-security-identifiers +[SERV-3]: /windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-security-principals +[SERV-4]: /windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-default-user-accounts +[SERV-5]: /windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-microsoft-accounts +[SERV-6]: /windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-service-accounts +[SERV-7]: /windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-security-groups +[PREV-1]: /previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/cc770962(v=ws.11) +[PREV-2]: /previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/cc754178(v=ws.11) +[PREV-3]: /previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/cc732983(v=ws.11) +[PREV-4]: /previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-8.1-and-8/jj134043(v=ws.11) diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts.md index 1b41b86816..ba0aa757cc 100644 --- a/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts.md +++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts.md @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ --- -ms.date: 08/03/2023 +ms.date: 11/07/2023 title: Local Accounts description: Learn how to secure and manage access to the resources on a standalone or member server for services or users. ms.topic: concept-article @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ For details about the HelpAssistant account attributes, see the following table. |Type|User| |Default container|`CN=Users, DC=`| |Default members|None| -|Default member of|Domain Guests

Guests| +|Default member of|Domain Guests

Guests| |Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?|No| |Safe to move out of default container?|Can be moved out, but we don't recommend it.| |Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?|No| @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ The DSMA has a well-known RID of `503`. The security identifier (SID) of the DSM The DSMA is a member of the well-known group **System Managed Accounts Group**, which has a well-known SID of `S-1-5-32-581`. -The DSMA alias can be granted access to resources during offline staging even before the account itself has been created. The account and the group are created during first boot of the machine within the Security Accounts Manager (SAM). +The DSMA alias can be granted access to resources during offline staging even before the account itself is created. The account and the group are created during first boot of the machine within the Security Accounts Manager (SAM). #### How Windows uses the DefaultAccount @@ -133,10 +133,10 @@ Similarly, Phone auto logs in as a *DefApps* account, which is akin to the stand In the converged user model, the multi-user-aware apps and multi-user-aware brokers will need to run in a context different from that of the users. For this purpose, the system creates DSMA. -#### How the DefaultAccount gets created on domain controllers +#### How the DefaultAccount is created on domain controllers -If the domain was created with domain controllers running Windows Server 2016, the DefaultAccount will exist on all domain controllers in the domain. -If the domain was created with domain controllers running an earlier version of Windows Server, the DefaultAccount will be created after the PDC Emulator role is transferred to a domain controller that runs Windows Server 2016. The DefaultAccount will then be replicated to all other domain controllers in the domain. +If the domain was created with domain controllers running Windows Server 2016, the DefaultAccount exists on all domain controllers in the domain. +If the domain was created with domain controllers running an earlier version of Windows Server, the DefaultAccount is created after the PDC Emulator role is transferred to a domain controller that runs Windows Server 2016. The DefaultAccount is then replicated to all other domain controllers in the domain. #### Recommendations for managing the Default Account (DSMA) @@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ Each of these approaches is described in the following sections. User Account Control (UAC) is a security feature that informs you when a program makes a change that requires administrative permissions. UAC works by adjusting the permission level of your user account. By default, UAC is set to notify you when applications try to make changes to your computer, but you can change when UAC notifies you. -UAC makes it possible for an account with administrative rights to be treated as a standard user non-administrator account until full rights, also called elevation, is requested and approved. For example, UAC lets an administrator enter credentials during a non-administrator's user session to perform occasional administrative tasks without having to switch users, sign out, or use the *Run as* command. +UAC makes it possible for an account with administrative rights to be treated as a standard user nonadministrator account until full rights, also called elevation, is requested and approved. For example, UAC lets an administrator enter credentials during a nonadministrator's user session to perform occasional administrative tasks without having to switch users, sign out, or use the *Run as* command. In addition, UAC can require administrators to specifically approve applications that make system-wide changes before those applications are granted permission to run, even in the administrator's user session. diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/includes/create-passkey.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/includes/create-passkey.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f5ec391065 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/includes/create-passkey.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 11/07/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +:::row::: + :::column span="4"::: + + 1. Open a website or app that supports passkeys + + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: +:::row::: + :::column span="4"::: + + 2. Create a passkey from your account settings + + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: +:::row::: + :::column span="3"::: + 3. Select the option **Use another device** > **Next** + :::column-end::: + :::column span="1"::: + :::image type="content" source="../images/save-passkey.png" alt-text="Screenshot showing a dialog box prompting the user to pick a location to store the passkey." lightbox="../images/save-passkey.png" border="false"::: + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/includes/use-passkey.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/includes/use-passkey.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..39aa37f431 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/includes/use-passkey.md @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 11/07/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +:::row::: + :::column span="3"::: + 1. Open a website or app that supports passkeys + :::column-end::: + :::column span="1"::: + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: +:::row::: + :::column span="3"::: + 2. Select **Sign in with a passkey**, or a similar option + :::column-end::: + :::column span="1"::: + :::image type="content" source="../images/website.png" alt-text="Screenshot of a website offering the passkey sign in option." lightbox="../images/website.png" border="false"::: + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: +:::row::: + :::column span="3"::: + 3. Select the option **Use another device** > **Next** + :::column-end::: + :::column span="1"::: + :::image type="content" source="../images/use-passkey.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the passkey dialog prompting the user to pick where the passkey is stored." lightbox="../images/use-passkey.png" border="false"::: + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/index.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/index.md index 40d33d3ed3..9ca4657426 100644 --- a/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/index.md +++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/index.md @@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ description: Learn about passkeys and how to use them on Windows devices. ms.collection: - highpri - tier1 -ms.topic: article -ms.date: 09/27/2023 +ms.topic: overview +ms.date: 11/07/2023 appliesto: - ✅ Windows 11 - ✅ Windows 10 @@ -40,50 +40,23 @@ Passkeys have several advantages over passwords, including their ease of use and ### Create a passkey -Follow these steps to create a passkey from a Windows device: +By default, Windows offers to save the passkey locally on the **Windows device**, in which case the passkey is protected by Windows Hello (biometrics and PIN). You can also choose to save the passkey in one of the following locations: -:::row::: - :::column span="4"::: - - 1. Open a website or app that supports passkeys - - :::column-end::: -:::row-end::: -:::row::: - :::column span="4"::: - - 2. Create a passkey from your account settings - - :::column-end::: -:::row-end::: -:::row::: - :::column span="4"::: - 3. Choose where to save the passkey. By default, Windows offers to save the passkey locally if you're using Windows Hello or Windows Hello for Business. If you select the option **Use another device**, you can choose to save the passkey in one of the following locations: - :::column-end::: -:::row-end::: -:::row::: - :::column span="3"::: - -- **This Windows device**: the passkey is saved locally on your Windows device, and protected by Windows Hello (biometrics and PIN) - **iPhone, iPad or Android device**: the passkey is saved on a phone or tablet, protected by the device's biometrics, if offered by the device. This option requires you to scan a QR code with your phone or tablet, which must be in proximity of the Windows device - **Linked device**: the passkey is saved on a phone or tablet, protected by the device's biometrics, if offered by the device. This option requires the linked device to be in proximity of the Windows device, and it's only supported for Android devices - **Security key**: the passkey is saved to a FIDO2 security key, protected by the key's unlock mechanism (for example, biometrics or PIN) - :::column-end::: - :::column span="1"::: - :::image type="content" source="images/save-passkey.png" alt-text="Screenshot showing a dialog box prompting the user to pick a location to store the passkey." lightbox="images/save-passkey.png" border="false"::: - :::column-end::: -:::row-end::: -:::row::: - :::column span="4"::: - 4. Select **Next** - :::column-end::: -:::row-end::: - Pick one of the following options to learn how to save a passkey, based on where you want to store it. #### [:::image type="icon" source="images/laptop.svg" border="false"::: **Windows device**](#tab/windows) +[!INCLUDE [use-passkey](includes/create-passkey.md)] + +:::row::: + :::column span="4"::: + 4. Select **This Windows device** > **Next** + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: :::row::: :::column span="3"::: @@ -107,6 +80,13 @@ Pick one of the following options to learn how to save a passkey, based on where #### [:::image type="icon" source="images/qr-code.svg" border="false"::: **New phone or tablet**](#tab/mobile) +[!INCLUDE [use-passkey](includes/create-passkey.md)] + +:::row::: + :::column span="4"::: + 4. Select **iPhone, iPad or Android device** > **Next** + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: :::row::: :::column span="3"::: @@ -130,6 +110,13 @@ Pick one of the following options to learn how to save a passkey, based on where #### [:::image type="icon" source="images/phone.svg" border="false"::: **Linked phone or tablet**](#tab/linked) +[!INCLUDE [use-passkey](includes/create-passkey.md)] + +:::row::: + :::column span="4"::: + 4. Select your linked device name (e.g. **Pixel**) > **Next** + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: :::row::: :::column span="3"::: @@ -153,6 +140,13 @@ Pick one of the following options to learn how to save a passkey, based on where #### [:::image type="icon" source="images/usb.svg" border="false"::: **Security key**](#tab/key) +[!INCLUDE [use-passkey](includes/create-passkey.md)] + +:::row::: + :::column span="4"::: + 4. Select **Security key** > **Next** + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: :::row::: :::column span="3"::: @@ -178,48 +172,27 @@ Pick one of the following options to learn how to save a passkey, based on where ### Use a passkey -Follow these steps to use a passkey: +When you open a website or app that supports passkeys, if a passkey is stored locally, you're automatically prompted to use Windows Hello to sign in. You can also choose to use a passkey from one of the following locations: -:::row::: - :::column span="3"::: - 1. Open a website or app that supports passkeys - :::column-end::: - :::column span="1"::: - :::column-end::: -:::row-end::: -:::row::: - :::column span="3"::: - 2. Select **Sign in with a passkey**, or a similar option - :::column-end::: - :::column span="1"::: - :::image type="content" source="images/website.png" alt-text="Screenshot of a website offering the passkey sign in option." lightbox="images/website.png" border="false"::: - :::column-end::: -:::row-end::: -:::row::: - :::column span="3"::: - 3. If a passkey is stored locally and protected by Windows Hello, you're prompted to use Windows Hello to sign in. If you select the option **Use another device**, you can choose one of the following options: - :::column-end::: -:::row-end::: -:::row::: - :::column span="3"::: -- **This Windows device**: use this option to use a passkey that is stored locally on your Windows device, and protected by Windows Hello - **iPhone, iPad or Android device**: use this option if you want to sign in with a passkey stored on a phone or tablet. This option requires you to scan a QR code with your phone or tablet, which must be in proximity of the Windows device - **Linked device**: use this option if you want to sign in with a passkey stored on a device that is in proximity of the Windows device. This option is only supported for Android devices - **Security key**: use this option if you want to sign in with a passkey stored on a FIDO2 security key - :::column-end::: - :::column span="1"::: - :::image type="content" source="images/use-passkey.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the passkey dialog prompting the user to pick where the passkey is stored." lightbox="images/use-passkey.png" border="false"::: - :::column-end::: -:::row-end::: Pick one of the following options to learn how to use a passkey, based on where you saved it. #### [:::image type="icon" source="images/laptop.svg" border="false"::: **Windows device**](#tab/windows) +[!INCLUDE [use-passkey](includes/use-passkey.md)] + +:::row::: + :::column span="4"::: + 4. Select **This Windows device** > **Next** + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: :::row::: :::column span="3"::: - 4. Select a Windows Hello unlock option + 5. Select a Windows Hello unlock option :::column-end::: :::column span="1"::: @@ -229,7 +202,7 @@ Pick one of the following options to learn how to use a passkey, based on where :::row::: :::column span="3"::: - 5. Select **OK** to continue signing in + 6. Select **OK** to continue signing in :::column-end::: :::column span="1"::: @@ -238,10 +211,17 @@ Pick one of the following options to learn how to use a passkey, based on where #### [:::image type="icon" source="images/qr-code.svg" border="false"::: **Phone or tablet**](#tab/mobile) +[!INCLUDE [use-passkey](includes/use-passkey.md)] + +:::row::: + :::column span="4"::: + 4. Select **iPhone, iPad or Android device** > **Next** + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: :::row::: :::column span="3"::: - 4. Scan the QR code with your phone or tablet where you saved the passkey. Once the connection to the device is established, follow the instructions to use the passkey + 5. Scan the QR code with your phone or tablet where you saved the passkey. Once the connection to the device is established, follow the instructions to use the passkey :::column-end::: :::column span="1"::: @@ -251,17 +231,24 @@ Pick one of the following options to learn how to use a passkey, based on where :::row::: :::column span="4"::: - 5. You're signed in to the website or app + 6. You're signed in to the website or app :::column-end::: :::row-end::: #### [:::image type="icon" source="images/phone.svg" border="false"::: **Linked phone or tablet**](#tab/linked) +[!INCLUDE [use-passkey](includes/use-passkey.md)] + +:::row::: + :::column span="4"::: + 4. Select your linked device name (e.g. **Pixel**) > **Next** + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: :::row::: :::column span="3"::: - 4. Once the connection to the linked device is established, follow the instructions on the device to use the passkey + 5. Once the connection to the linked device is established, follow the instructions on the device to use the passkey :::column-end::: :::column span="1"::: @@ -271,7 +258,7 @@ Pick one of the following options to learn how to use a passkey, based on where :::row::: :::column span="3"::: - 5. You're signed in to the website or app + 6. You're signed in to the website or app :::column-end::: :::column span="1"::: @@ -280,10 +267,17 @@ Pick one of the following options to learn how to use a passkey, based on where #### [:::image type="icon" source="images/usb.svg" border="false"::: **Security key**](#tab/key) +[!INCLUDE [use-passkey](includes/use-passkey.md)] + +:::row::: + :::column span="4"::: + 4. Select **Security key** > **Next** + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: :::row::: :::column span="3"::: - 4. Unlock the security key using the key's unlock mechanism + 5. Unlock the security key using the key's unlock mechanism :::column-end::: :::column span="1"::: @@ -293,7 +287,7 @@ Pick one of the following options to learn how to use a passkey, based on where :::row::: :::column span="3"::: - 5. You're signed in to the website or app + 6. You're signed in to the website or app :::column-end::: :::column span="1"::: diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-and-remote-desktop-services.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-and-remote-desktop-services.md index 35ace33d60..61e9d781c0 100644 --- a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-and-remote-desktop-services.md +++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-and-remote-desktop-services.md @@ -1,21 +1,19 @@ --- -ms.date: 09/24/2021 -title: Smart Card and Remote Desktop Services +ms.date: 11/07/2023 +title: Smart Card and Remote Desktop Services description: This topic for the IT professional describes the behavior of Remote Desktop Services when you implement smart card sign-in. ms.topic: conceptual -ms.reviewer: ardenw --- # Smart Card and Remote Desktop Services This topic for the IT professional describes the behavior of Remote Desktop Services when you implement smart card sign-in. -Smart card redirection logic and **WinSCard** API are combined to support multiple redirected sessions into a single process. +Smart card redirection logic and *WinSCard API* are combined to support multiple redirected sessions into a single process. Smart card support is required to enable many Remote Desktop Services scenarios. These include: -- Using Fast User Switching or Remote Desktop Services. A user is not able to establish a redirected smart card-based remote desktop connection. That is, the connect attempt is not successful in Fast User Switching or from a Remote Desktop Services session. - -- Enabling Encrypting File System (EFS) to locate the user's smart card reader from the Local Security Authority (LSA) process in Fast User Switching or in a Remote Desktop Services session. If EFS is not able to locate the smart card reader or certificate, EFS cannot decrypt user files. +- Using Fast User Switching or Remote Desktop Services. A user isn't able to establish a redirected smart card-based remote desktop connection. That is, the connect attempt isn't successful in Fast User Switching or from a Remote Desktop Services session +- Enabling *Encrypting File System* (EFS) to locate the user's smart card reader from the *Local Security Authority* (LSA) process in Fast User Switching or in a Remote Desktop Services session. If EFS isn't able to locate the smart card reader or certificate, EFS can't decrypt user files ## Remote Desktop Services redirection @@ -23,31 +21,24 @@ In a Remote Desktop scenario, a user is using a remote server for running servic ![Smart card service redirects to smart card reader.](images/sc-image101.png) -**Remote Desktop redirection** +### Remote Desktop redirection Notes about the redirection model: -1. This scenario is a remote sign-in session on a computer with Remote Desktop Services. In the remote session (labeled as "Client session"), the user runs **net use /smartcard**. - -2. Arrows represent the flow of the PIN after the user types the PIN at the command prompt until it reaches the user's smart card in a smart card reader that is connected to the Remote Desktop Connection (RDC) client computer. - -3. The authentication is performed by the LSA in session 0. - -4. The CryptoAPI processing is performed in the LSA (Lsass.exe). This is possible because RDP redirector (rdpdr.sys) allows per-session, rather than per-process, context. - -5. The WinScard and SCRedir components, which were separate modules in operating systems earlier than Windows Vista, are now included in one module. The ScHelper library is a CryptoAPI wrapper that is specific to the Kerberos protocol. - -6. The redirection decision is made on a per smart card context basis, based on the session of the thread that performs the SCardEstablishContext call. - -7. Changes to WinSCard.dll implementation were made in Windows Vista to improve smart card redirection. +1. This scenario is a remote sign-in session on a computer with Remote Desktop Services. In the remote session (labeled as "Client session"), the user runs `net use /smartcard` +1. Arrows represent the flow of the PIN after the user types the PIN at the command prompt until it reaches the user's smart card in a smart card reader that is connected to the Remote Desktop Connection (RDC) client computer +1. The authentication is performed by the LSA in session 0 +1. The CryptoAPI processing is performed in the LSA (`lsass.exe`). This is possible because RDP redirector (`rdpdr.sys`) allows per-session, rather than per-process, context +1. The ScHelper library is a CryptoAPI wrapper that is specific to the Kerberos protocol +1. The redirection decision is made on a per smart card context basis, based on the session of the thread that performs the `SCardEstablishContext` call ## RD Session Host server single sign-in experience As a part of the Common Criteria compliance, the RDC client must be configurable to use Credential Manager to acquire and save the user's password or smart card PIN. Common Criteria compliance requires that applications not have direct access to the user's password or PIN. -Common Criteria compliance requires specifically that the password or PIN never leave the LSA unencrypted. A distributed scenario should allow the password or PIN to travel between one trusted LSA and another, and it cannot be unencrypted during transit. +Common Criteria compliance requires specifically that the password or PIN never leave the LSA unencrypted. A distributed scenario should allow the password or PIN to travel between one trusted LSA and another, and it can't be unencrypted during transit. -When smart card-enabled single sign-in (SSO) is used for Remote Desktop Services sessions, users still need to sign in for every new Remote Desktop Services session. However, the user is not prompted for a PIN more than once to establish a Remote Desktop Services session. For example, after the user double-clicks a Microsoft Word document icon that resides on a remote computer, the user is prompted to enter a PIN. This PIN is sent by using a secure channel that the credential SSP has established. The PIN is routed back to the RDC client over the secure channel and sent to Winlogon. The user does not receive any additional prompts for the PIN, unless the PIN is incorrect or there are smart card-related failures. +When smart card-enabled single sign-in (SSO) is used for Remote Desktop Services sessions, users still need to sign in for every new Remote Desktop Services session. However, the user isn't prompted for a PIN more than once to establish a Remote Desktop Services session. For example, after the user double-clicks a Microsoft Word document icon that resides on a remote computer, the user is prompted to enter a PIN. This PIN is sent by using a secure channel that the credential SSP has established. The PIN is routed back to the RDC client over the secure channel and sent to Winlogon. The user doesn't receive any additional prompts for the PIN, unless the PIN is incorrect or there are smart card-related failures. ### Remote Desktop Services and smart card sign-in @@ -55,15 +46,19 @@ Remote Desktop Services enables users to sign in with a smart card by entering a In addition, Group Policy settings that are specific to Remote Desktop Services need to be enabled for smart card-based sign-in. -To enable smart card sign-in to a Remote Desktop Session Host (RD Session Host) server, the Key Distribution Center (KDC) certificate must be present on the RDC client computer. If the computer is not in the same domain or workgroup, the following command can be used to deploy the certificate: +To enable smart card sign-in to a Remote Desktop Session Host (RD Session Host) server, the Key Distribution Center (KDC) certificate must be present on the RDC client computer. If the computer isn't in the same domain or workgroup, the following command can be used to deploy the certificate: -**certutil -dspublish NTAuthCA** "*DSCDPContainer*" +```cmd +certutil.exe -dspublish NTAuthCA "DSCDPContainer" +``` -The *DSCDPContainer* Common Name (CN) is usually the name of the certification authority. +The `DSCDPContainer` Common Name (CN) is usually the name of the certification authority. Example: -**certutil -dspublish NTAuthCA** <*CertFile*> **"CN=NTAuthCertificates,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=engineering,DC=contoso,DC=com"** +```cmd +certutil -dspublish NTAuthCA "CN=NTAuthCertificates,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=engineering,DC=contoso,DC=com" +``` For information about this option for the command-line tool, see [-dsPublish](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc732443(v=ws.11)#BKMK_dsPublish). @@ -71,25 +66,25 @@ For information about this option for the command-line tool, see [-dsPublish](/p To enable remote access to resources in an enterprise, the root certificate for the domain must be provisioned on the smart card. From a computer that is joined to a domain, run the following command at the command line: -**certutil -scroots update** +```cmd +certutil.exe -scroots update +``` For information about this option for the command-line tool, see [-SCRoots](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc732443(v=ws.11)#BKMK_SCRoots). For Remote Desktop Services across domains, the KDC certificate of the RD Session Host server must also be present in the client computer's NTAUTH store. To add the store, run the following command at the command line: -**certutil -addstore -enterprise NTAUTH** <*CertFile*> +```cmd +certutil -addstore -enterprise NTAUTH +``` -Where <*CertFile*> is the root certificate of the KDC certificate issuer. +Where *CertFile* is the root certificate of the KDC certificate issuer. For information about this option for the command-line tool, see [-addstore](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc732443(v=ws.11)#BKMK_addstore). > [!NOTE] > To sign in with a smart card from a computer that is not joined to a domain, the smart card must contain the root certification of the domain controller. A public key infrastructure (PKI) secure channel cannot be established without the root certification of the domain controller. -Sign-in to Remote Desktop Services across a domain works only if the UPN in the certificate uses the following form: <*ClientName*>@<*DomainDNSName*> +Sign-in to Remote Desktop Services across a domain works only if the UPN in the certificate uses the following form: `@`. -The UPN in the certificate must include a domain that can be resolved. Otherwise, the Kerberos protocol cannot determine which domain to contact. You can resolve this issue by enabling GPO X509 domain hints. For more information about this setting, see [Smart Card Group Policy and Registry Settings](smart-card-group-policy-and-registry-settings.md). - -## See also - -[How Smart Card Sign-in Works in Windows](smart-card-how-smart-card-sign-in-works-in-windows.md) \ No newline at end of file +The UPN in the certificate must include a domain that can be resolved. Otherwise, the Kerberos protocol can't determine which domain to contact. You can resolve this issue by enabling GPO X509 domain hints. For more information about this setting, see [Smart Card Group Policy and Registry Settings](smart-card-group-policy-and-registry-settings.md). diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-architecture.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-architecture.md index f66eedf547..933f9bc3d3 100644 --- a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-architecture.md +++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-architecture.md @@ -1,40 +1,34 @@ --- title: Smart Card Architecture description: This topic for the IT professional describes the system architecture that supports smart cards in the Windows operating system. -ms.reviewer: ardenw ms.topic: reference-architecture -ms.date: 09/24/2021 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 --- # Smart Card Architecture This topic for the IT professional describes the system architecture that supports smart cards in the Windows operating system, including credential provider architecture and the smart card subsystem architecture. -Authentication is a process for verifying the identity of an object or person. When you authenticate an object, such as a smart card, the goal is to verify that the object is genuine. When you authenticate a person, the goal is to verify that you are not dealing with an imposter. +Authentication is a process for verifying the identity of an object or person. When you authenticate an object, such as a smart card, the goal is to verify that the object is genuine. When you authenticate a person, the goal is to verify that you aren't dealing with an imposter. In a networking context, authentication is the act of proving identity to a network application or resource. Typically, identity is proven by a cryptographic operation that uses a key only the user knows (such as with public key cryptography), or a shared key. The server side of the authentication exchange compares the signed data with a known cryptographic key to validate the authentication attempt. Storing the cryptographic keys in a secure central location makes the authentication process scalable and maintainable. For smart cards, Windows supports a provider architecture that meets the secure authentication requirements and is extensible so that you can include custom credential providers. This topic includes information about: -- [Credential provider architecture](#credential-provider-architecture) - -- [Smart card subsystem architecture](#smart-card-subsystem-architecture) - - +- [Credential provider architecture](#credential-provider-architecture) +- [Smart card subsystem architecture](#smart-card-subsystem-architecture) ## Credential provider architecture -The following table lists the components that are included in the interactive sign-in architecture of the Windows Server and Windows operating systems. +The following table lists the components that are included in the interactive sign-in architecture: -| **Component** | **Description** | -|------------------------------------------------|-----| -| Winlogon | Provides an interactive sign-in infrastructure. | -| Logon UI | Provides interactive UI rendering. | -| Credential providers (password and smart card) | Describes credential information and serializing credentials. | -| Local Security Authority (LSA) | Processes sign-in credentials. | -| Authentication packages | Includes NTLM and the Kerberos protocol. Communicates with server authentication packages to authenticate users. | +| Component | Description | +|--|--| +| Winlogon | Provides an interactive sign-in infrastructure. | +| Logon UI | Provides interactive UI rendering. | +| Credential providers (password and smart card) | Describes credential information and serializing credentials. | +| Local Security Authority (LSA) | Processes sign-in credentials. | +| Authentication packages | Includes NTLM and the Kerberos protocol. Communicates with server authentication packages to authenticate users. | Interactive sign-in in Windows begins when the user presses CTRL+ALT+DEL. The CTRL+ALT+DEL key combination is called a secure attention sequence (SAS). To keep other programs and processes from using it, Winlogon registers this sequence during the boot process. @@ -42,8 +36,6 @@ After receiving the SAS, the UI then generates the sign-in tile from the informa ![Credential provider architecture.](images/sc-image201.gif) -**Figure 1**  **Credential provider architecture** - Typically, a user who signs in to a computer by using a local account or a domain account must enter a user name and password. These credentials are used to verify the user's identity. For smart card sign-in, a user's credentials are contained on the smart card's security chip. A smart card reader lets the computer interact with the security chip on the smart card. When users sign in with a smart card, they enter a personal identification number (PIN) instead of a user name and password. Credential providers are in-process COM objects that run on the local system and are used to collect credentials. The Logon UI provides interactive UI rendering, Winlogon provides interactive sign-in infrastructure, and credential providers work with both of these components to help gather and process credentials. @@ -52,21 +44,23 @@ Winlogon instructs the Logon UI to display credential provider tiles after it re Combined with supporting hardware, credential providers can extend the Windows operating system to enable users to sign in by using biometrics (for example, fingerprint, retinal, or voice recognition), password, PIN, smart card certificate, or any custom authentication package. Enterprises and IT professionals can develop and deploy custom authentication mechanisms for all domain users, and they may explicitly require users to use this custom sign-in mechanism. -> **Note**  Credential providers are not enforcement mechanisms. They are used to gather and serialize credentials. The LSA and authentication packages enforce security. +> [!NOTE] +> Credential providers are not enforcement mechanisms. They are used to gather and serialize credentials. The LSA and authentication packages enforce security. Credential providers can be designed to support single sign-in (SSO). In this process, they authenticate users to a secure network access point (by using RADIUS and other technologies) for signing in to the computer. Credential providers are also designed to support application-specific credential gathering, and they can be used for authentication to network resources, joining computers to a domain, or to provide administrator consent for User Account Control (UAC). Multiple credential providers can coexist on a computer. -Credential providers must be registered on a computer running Windows, and they are responsible for: +Credential providers must be registered on a computer running Windows, and they're responsible for: -- Describing the credential information that is required for authentication. +- Describing the credential information that is required for authentication +- Handling communication and logic with external authentication authorities +- Packaging credentials for interactive and network sign-in -- Handling communication and logic with external authentication authorities. - -- Packaging credentials for interactive and network sign-in. - -> **Note**  The Credential Provider API does not render the UI. It describes what needs to be rendered.
Only the password credential provider is available in safe mode.
The smart card credential provider is available in safe mode during networking. +> [!NOTE] +> The Credential Provider API does not render the UI. It describes what needs to be rendered.\ +> Only the password credential provider is available in safe mode.\ +> The smart card credential provider is available in safe mode during networking. ## Smart card subsystem architecture @@ -74,19 +68,16 @@ Vendors provide smart cards and smart card readers, and in many cases the vendor ### Base CSP and smart card minidriver architecture -Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the CryptoAPI, CSPs, the Smart Card Base Cryptographic Service Provider (Base CSP), and smart card minidrivers. +The following graphic shows the relationship between the CryptoAPI, CSPs, the Smart Card Base Cryptographic Service Provider (Base CSP), and smart card minidrivers. ![Base CSP and smart card minidriver architecture.](images/sc-image203.gif) -**Figure 2**  **Base CSP and smart card minidriver architecture** - ### Caching with Base CSP and smart card KSP -Smart card architecture uses caching mechanisms to assist in streamlining operations and to improve a user's access to a PIN. +Smart card architecture uses caching mechanisms to help streamlining operations and to improve a user's access to a PIN. -- [Data caching](#data-caching): The data cache provides for a single process to minimize smart card I/O operations. - -- [PIN caching](#pin-caching): The PIN cache helps the user from having to reenter a PIN each time the smart card is unauthenticated. +- [Data caching](#data-caching): The data cache provides for a single process to minimize smart card I/O operations +- [PIN caching](#pin-caching): The PIN cache helps the user from having to reenter a PIN each time the smart card is unauthenticated #### Data caching @@ -94,13 +85,10 @@ Each CSP implements the current smart card data cache separately. The Base CSP i The existing global cache works as follows: -1. The application requests a cryptographic operation. For example, a user certificate is to be read from the smart card. - -2. The CSP checks its cache for the item. - -3. If the item is not found in the cache, or if the item is cached but is not up-to-date, the item is read from the smart card. - -4. After any item has been read from the smart card, it is added to the cache. Any existing out-of-date copy of that item is replaced. +1. The application requests a cryptographic operation. For example, a user certificate is to be read from the smart card +1. The CSP checks its cache for the item +1. If the item isn't found in the cache, or if the item is cached but isn't up-to-date, the item is read from the smart card +1. After any item has been read from the smart card, it's added to the cache. Any existing out-of-date copy of that item is replaced Three types of objects or data are cached by the CSP: pins (for more information, see [PIN caching](#pin-caching)), certificates, and files. If any of the cached data changes, the corresponding object is read from the smart card in successive operations. For example, if a file is written to the smart card, the CSP cache becomes out-of-date for the files, and other processes read the smart card at least once to refresh their CSP cache. @@ -110,51 +98,35 @@ The global data cache is hosted in the Smart Cards for Windows service. Windows The PIN cache protects the user from entering a PIN every time the smart card is unauthenticated. After a smart card is authenticated, it will not differentiate among host-side applications—any application can access private data on the smart card. -To mitigate this, the smart card enters an exclusive state when an application authenticates to the smart card. However, this means that other applications cannot communicate with the smart card and will be blocked. Therefore, such exclusive connections are minimized. The issue is that a protocol (such as the Kerberos protocol) requires multiple signing operations. Therefore, the protocol requires exclusive access to the smart card over an extended period, or it requires multiple authentication operations. This is where the PIN cache is used to minimize exclusive use of the smart card without forcing the user to enter a PIN multiple times. +To mitigate this, the smart card enters an exclusive state when an application authenticates to the smart card. However, this means that other applications can't communicate with the smart card and will be blocked. Therefore, such exclusive connections are minimized. The issue is that a protocol (such as the Kerberos protocol) requires multiple signing operations. Therefore, the protocol requires exclusive access to the smart card over an extended period, or it requires multiple authentication operations. This is where the PIN cache is used to minimize exclusive use of the smart card without forcing the user to enter a PIN multiple times. The following example illustrates how this works. In this scenario, there are two applications: Outlook and Internet Explorer. The applications use smart cards for different purposes. -1. The user starts Outlook and tries to send a signed e-mail. The private key is on the smart card. - -2. Outlook prompts the user for the smart card PIN. The user enters the correct PIN. - -3. E-mail data is sent to the smart card for the signature operation. The Outlook client formats the response and sends the e-mail. - -4. The user opens Internet Explorer and tries to access a protected site that requires Transport Layer Security (TLS) authentication for the client. - -5. Internet Explorer prompts the user for the smart card PIN. The user enters the correct PIN. - -6. The TLS-related private key operation occurs on the smart card, and the user is authenticated and signed in. - -7. The user returns to Outlook to send another signed e-mail. This time, the user is not prompted for a PIN because the PIN is cached from the previous operation. Similarly, if the user uses Internet Explorer again for another operation, Internet Explorer will not prompt the user for a PIN. +1. The user starts Outlook and tries to send a signed e-mail. The private key is on the smart card +1. Outlook prompts the user for the smart card PIN. The user enters the correct PIN +1. E-mail data is sent to the smart card for the signature operation. The Outlook client formats the response and sends the e-mail +1. The user opens Internet Explorer and tries to access a protected site that requires Transport Layer Security (TLS) authentication for the client +1. Internet Explorer prompts the user for the smart card PIN. The user enters the correct PIN +1. The TLS-related private key operation occurs on the smart card, and the user is authenticated and signed in +1. The user returns to Outlook to send another signed e-mail. This time, the user isn't prompted for a PIN because the PIN is cached from the previous operation. Similarly, if the user uses Internet Explorer again for another operation, Internet Explorer won't prompt the user for a PIN The Base CSP internally maintains a per-process cache of the PIN. The PIN is encrypted and stored in memory. The functions that are used to secure the PIN are RtlEncryptMemory, RtlDecryptMemory, and RtlSecureZeroMemory, which will empty buffers that contained the PIN. ### Smart card selection -The following sections in this topic describe how Windows leverages the smart card architecture to select the correct smart card reader software, provider, and credentials for a successful smart card sign-in: +The following sections in this article describe how Windows uses the smart card architecture to select the correct smart card reader software, provider, and credentials for a successful smart card sign-in: -- [Container specification levels](#container-specification-levels) - -- [Container operations](#container-operations) - -- [Context flags](#context-flags) - -- [Create a new container in silent context](#create-a-new-container-in-silent-context) - -- [Smart card selection behavior](#smart-card-selection-behavior) - -- [Make a smart card reader match](#make-a-smart-card-reader-match) - -- [Make a smart card match](#make-a-smart-card-match) - -- [Open an existing default container (no reader specified)](#open-an-existing-default-container-no-reader-specified) - -- [Open an existing GUID-named container (no reader specified)](#open-an-existing-guid-named-container-no-reader-specified) - -- [Create a new container (no reader specified)](#create-a-new-container-no-reader-specified) - -- [Delete a container](#delete-a-container) +- [Container specification levels](#container-specification-levels) +- [Container operations](#container-operations) +- [Context flags](#context-flags) +- [Create a new container in silent context](#create-a-new-container-in-silent-context) +- [Smart card selection behavior](#smart-card-selection-behavior) +- [Make a smart card reader match](#make-a-smart-card-reader-match) +- [Make a smart card match](#make-a-smart-card-match) +- [Open an existing default container (no reader specified)](#open-an-existing-default-container-no-reader-specified) +- [Open an existing GUID-named container (no reader specified)](#open-an-existing-guid-named-container-no-reader-specified) +- [Create a new container (no reader specified)](#create-a-new-container-no-reader-specified) +- [Delete a container](#delete-a-container) #### Container specification levels @@ -162,13 +134,14 @@ In response to a CryptAcquireContext call in CryptoAPI, the Base CSP tries to ma Similarly, in response to a NCryptOpenKey call in CNG, the smart card KSP tries to match the container the same way, and it takes the same container format, as shown in the following table. -> **Note**  Before opening a key by using the smart card KSP, a call to NCryptOpenStorageProvider (MS\_SMART\_CARD\_KEY\_STORAGE\_PROVIDER) must be made. +> [!NOTE] +> Before opening a key by using the smart card KSP, a call to NCryptOpenStorageProvider (`MS_SMART_CARD_KEY_STORAGE_PROVIDER`) must be made. | **Type** | **Name** | **Format** | |----------|----------|------------| -| I | Reader Name and Container Name | \\\\.\\<Reader Name>\\<Container Name> | -| II | Reader Name and Container Name (NULL) | \\\\.\\<Reader Name> | -| III | Container Name Only | <Container Name> | +| I | Reader Name and Container Name | `\.` | +| II | Reader Name and Container Name (NULL) | `\.` | +| III | Container Name Only | `` | | IV | Default Container (NULL) Only | NULL | The Base CSP and smart card KSP cache smart card handle information about the calling process and about the smart cards the process has accessed. When searching for a smart card container, the Base CSP or smart card KSP first checks its cache for the process. If the cached handle is invalid or no match is found, the SCardUIDlg API is called to get the card handle. @@ -177,74 +150,63 @@ The Base CSP and smart card KSP cache smart card handle information about the ca The following three container operations can be requested by using CryptAcquireContext: -1. Create a new container. (The CNG equivalent of CryptAcquireContext with dwFlags set to CRYPT\_NEWKEYSET is NCryptCreatePersistedKey.) - -2. Open an existing container. (The CNG equivalent of CryptAcquireContext to open the container is NCryptOpenKey.) - -3. Delete a container. (The CNG equivalent of CryptAcquireContext with dwFlags set to CRYPT\_DELETEKEYSET is NCryptDeleteKey.) +1. Create a new container. (The CNG equivalent of CryptAcquireContext with dwFlags set to CRYPT_NEWKEYSET is NCryptCreatePersistedKey.) +1. Open an existing container. (The CNG equivalent of CryptAcquireContext to open the container is NCryptOpenKey.) +1. Delete a container. (The CNG equivalent of CryptAcquireContext with dwFlags set to CRYPT_DELETEKEYSET is NCryptDeleteKey.) The heuristics that are used to associate a cryptographic handle with a particular smart card and reader are based on the container operation requested and the level of container specification used. The following table shows the restrictions for the container creation operation. -| **Specification** | **Restriction** | -|------------------------------------|-----------| -| No silent context | Key container creation must always be able to show UI, such as the PIN prompt. | +| Specification | Restriction | +|--|--| +| No silent context | Key container creation must always be able to show UI, such as the PIN prompt. | | No overwriting existing containers | If the specified container already exists on the chosen smart card, choose another smart card or cancel the operation. | #### Context flags The following table shows the context flags used as restrictions for the container creation operation. -| **Flag** | **Description** | -|------------------------|------------------------------------------------------| -| CRYPT\_SILENT | No UI can be displayed during this operation. | -| CRYPT\_MACHINE\_KEYSET | No cached data should be used during this operation. | -| CRYPT\_VERIFYCONTEXT | Only public data can be accessed on the smart card. | +| Flag | Description | +|--|--| +| `CRYPT_SILENT` | No UI can be displayed during this operation. | +| `CRYPT_MACHINE_KEYSET` | No cached data should be used during this operation. | +| `CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT` | Only public data can be accessed on the smart card. | In addition to container operations and container specifications, you must consider other user options, such as the CryptAcquireContext flags, during smart card selection. -> **Important**  The CRYPT\_SILENT flag cannot be used to create a new container. +> [!IMPORTANT] +> The CRYPT_SILENT flag cannot be used to create a new container. #### Create a new container in silent context -Applications can call the Base CSP with CRYPT\_DEFAULT\_CONTAINER\_OPTIONAL, set the PIN in silent context, and then create a new container in silent context. This operation occurs as follows: +Applications can call the Base CSP with `CRYPT_DEFAULT_CONTAINER_OPTIONAL`, set the PIN in silent context, and then create a new container in silent context. This operation occurs as follows: -1. Call CryptAcquireContext by passing the smart card reader name in as a type II container specification level, and specifying the CRYPT\_DEFAULT\_CONTAINER\_OPTIONAL flag. - -2. Call CryptSetProvParam by specifying PP\_KEYEXCHANGE\_PIN or PP\_SIGNATURE\_PIN and a null-terminated ASCII PIN. - -3. Release the context acquired in Step 1. - -4. Call CryptAcquireContext with CRYPT\_NEWKEYSET, and specify the type I container specification level. - -5. Call CryptGenKey to create the key. +1. Call CryptAcquireContext by passing the smart card reader name in as a type II container specification level, and specifying the `CRYPT_DEFAULT_CONTAINER_OPTIONAL` flag +1. Call CryptSetProvParam by specifying `PP_KEYEXCHANGE_PIN` or `PP_SIGNATURE_PIN` and a null-terminated ASCII PIN. +1. Release the context acquired in Step 1 +1. Call CryptAcquireContext with `CRYPT_NEWKEYSET`, and specify the type I container specification level +1. Call CryptGenKey to create the key #### Smart card selection behavior -In some of the following scenarios, the user can be prompted to insert a smart card. If the user context is silent, this operation fails and no UI is displayed. Otherwise, in response to the UI, the user can insert a smart card or click **Cancel**. If the user cancels the operation, the operation fails. The flow chart in Figure 3 shows the selection steps performed by the Windows operating system. +In some of the following scenarios, the user can be prompted to insert a smart card. If the user context is silent, this operation fails and no UI is displayed. Otherwise, in response to the UI, the user can insert a smart card or select **Cancel**. If the user cancels the operation, the operation fails. The flow chart shows the selection steps performed by the Windows operating system. ![Smart card selection process.](images/sc-image205.png) -**Figure 3**  **Smart card selection behavior** - In general, smart card selection behavior is handled by the SCardUIDlgSelectCard API. The Base CSP interacts with this API by calling it directly. The Base CSP also sends callback functions that have the purpose of filtering and matching candidate smart cards. Callers of CryptAcquireContext provide smart card matching information. Internally, the Base CSP uses a combination of smart card serial numbers, reader names, and container names to find specific smart cards. -Each call to SCardUI \* may result in additional information read from a candidate smart card. The Base CSP smart card selection callbacks cache this information. +Each call to `SCardUI *` may result in additional information read from a candidate smart card. The Base CSP smart card selection callbacks cache this information. #### Make a smart card reader match For type I and type II container specification levels, the smart card selection process is less complex because only the smart card in the named reader can be considered a match. The process for matching a smart card with a smart card reader is: -1. Find the requested smart card reader. If it cannot be found, the process fails. (This requires a cache search by reader name.) - -2. If no smart card is in the reader, the user is prompted to insert a smart card. (This is only in non-silent mode; if the call is made in silent mode, it will fail.) - -3. For container specification level II only, the name of the default container on the chosen smart card is determined. - -4. To open an existing container or delete an existing container, find the specified container. If the specified container cannot be found on this smart card, the user is prompted to insert a smart card. - -5. If the system attempts to create a new container, if the specified container already exists on this smart card, the process fails. +1. Find the requested smart card reader. If it can't be found, the process fails (this requires a cache search by reader name) +1. If no smart card is in the reader, the user is prompted to insert a smart card. (this is only in nonsilent mode; if the call is made in silent mode, it fails) +1. For container specification level II only, the name of the default container on the chosen smart card is determined +1. To open an existing container or delete an existing container, find the specified container. If the specified container can't be found on this smart card, the user is prompted to insert a smart card +1. If the system attempts to create a new container, if the specified container already exists on this smart card, the process fails #### Make a smart card match @@ -252,80 +214,71 @@ For container specification levels III and IV, a broader method is used to match #### Open an existing default container (no reader specified) -> **Note**  This operation requires that you use the smart card with the Base CSP. +> [!NOTE] +> This operation requires that you use the smart card with the Base CSP. -1. For each smart card that has been accessed by the Base CSP and the handle and container information are cached, the Base CSP looks for a valid default container. An operation is attempted on the cached SCARDHANDLE to verify its validity. If the smart card handle is not valid, the Base CSP continues to search for a new smart card. - -2. If a matching smart card is not found in the Base CSP cache, the Base CSP calls to the smart card subsystem. SCardUIDlgSelectCard() is used with an appropriate callback filter to find a matching smart card with a valid default container. +1. For each smart card that has been accessed by the Base CSP and the handle and container information are cached, the Base CSP looks for a valid default container. An operation is attempted on the cached SCARDHANDLE to verify its validity. If the smart card handle isn't valid, the Base CSP continues to search for a new smart card +1. If a matching smart card isn't found in the Base CSP cache, the Base CSP calls to the smart card subsystem. SCardUIDlgSelectCard() is used with an appropriate callback filter to find a matching smart card with a valid default container #### Open an existing GUID-named container (no reader specified) -> **Note**  This operation requires that you use the smart card with the Base CSP. +> [!NOTE] +> This operation requires that you use the smart card with the Base CSP. -1. For each smart card that is already registered with the Base CSP, search for the requested container. Attempt an operation on the cached SCARDHANDLE to verify its validity. If the smart card handle is not valid, the smart card's serial number is passed to the SCardUI \* API to continue searching for this specific smart card (rather than only a general match for the container name). - -2. If a matching smart card is not found in the Base CSP cache, a call is made to the smart card subsystem. SCardUIDlgSelectCard() is used with an appropriate callback filter to find a matching smart card with the requested container. Or, if a smart card serial number resulted from the search in Step 1, the callback filter attempts to match the serial number, not the container name. +1. For each smart card that is already registered with the Base CSP, search for the requested container. Attempt an operation on the cached SCARDHANDLE to verify its validity. If the smart card handle isn't valid, the smart card's serial number is passed to the `SCardUI *` API to continue searching for this specific smart card (rather than only a general match for the container name) +1. If a matching smart card isn't found in the Base CSP cache, a call is made to the smart card subsystem. `SCardUIDlgSelectCard()` is used with an appropriate callback filter to find a matching smart card with the requested container. Or, if a smart card serial number resulted from the search in Step 1, the callback filter attempts to match the serial number, not the container name #### Create a new container (no reader specified) -> **Note**  This operation requires that you use the smart card with the Base CSP. +> [!NOTE] +> This operation requires that you use the smart card with the Base CSP. -If the PIN is not cached, no CRYPT\_SILENT is allowed for the container creation because the user must be prompted for a PIN, at a minimum. +If the PIN isn't cached, no CRYPT_SILENT is allowed for the container creation because the user must be prompted for a PIN, at a minimum. -For other operations, the caller may be able to acquire a "verify" context against the default container (CRYPT\_DEFAULT\_CONTAINER\_OPTIONAL) and then make a call with CryptSetProvParam to cache the user PIN for subsequent operations. +For other operations, the caller may be able to acquire a *verify* context against the default container `CRYPT_DEFAULT_CONTAINER_OPTIONAL` and then make a call with CryptSetProvParam to cache the user PIN for subsequent operations. -1. For each smart card already known by the CSP, refresh the stored SCARDHANDLE and make the following checks: - - 1. If the smart card has been removed, continue the search. - - 2. If the smart card is present, but it already has the named container, continue the search. - - 3. If the smart card is available, but a call to CardQueryFreeSpace indicates that the smart card has insufficient storage for an additional key container, continue the search. - - 4. Otherwise, use the first available smart card that meets the above criteria for the container creation. - -2. If a matching smart card is not found in the CSP cache, make a call to the smart card subsystem. The callback that is used to filter enumerated smart cards verifies that a candidate smart card does not already have the named container, and that CardQueryFreeSpace indicates the smart card has sufficient space for an additional container. If no suitable smart card is found, the user is prompted to insert a smart card. +1. For each smart card already known by the CSP, refresh the stored SCARDHANDLE and make the following checks: + 1. If the smart card has been removed, continue the search + 1. If the smart card is present, but it already has the named container, continue the search + 1. If the smart card is available, but a call to CardQueryFreeSpace indicates that the smart card has insufficient storage for an additional key container, continue the search + 1. Otherwise, use the first available smart card that meets the above criteria for the container creation +1. If a matching smart card isn't found in the CSP cache, make a call to the smart card subsystem. The callback that is used to filter enumerated smart cards verifies that a candidate smart card doesn't already have the named container, and that CardQueryFreeSpace indicates the smart card has sufficient space for an additional container. If no suitable smart card is found, the user is prompted to insert a smart card #### Delete a container -1. If the specified container name is NULL, the default container is deleted. Deleting the default container causes a new default container to be selected arbitrarily. For this reason, this operation is not recommended. - -2. For each smart card already known by the CSP, refresh the stored SCARDHANDLE and make the following checks: - - 1. If the smart card does not have the named container, continue the search. - - 2. If the smart card has the named container, but the smart card handle is no longer valid, store the serial number of the matching smart card and pass it to SCardUI \*. - -3. If a matching smart card is not found in the CSP cache, make a call to the smart card subsystem. The callback that is used to filter enumerated smart cards should verify that a candidate smart card has the named container. If a serial number was provided as a result of the previous cache search, the callback should filter enumerated smart cards on serial number rather than on container matches. If the context is non-silent and no suitable smart card is found, display UI that prompts the user to insert a smart card. +1. If the specified container name is NULL, the default container is deleted. Deleting the default container causes a new default container to be selected arbitrarily. For this reason, this operation isn't recommended +1. For each smart card already known by the CSP, refresh the stored SCARDHANDLE and make the following checks: + 1. If the smart card doesn't have the named container, continue the search + 1. If the smart card has the named container, but the smart card handle is no longer valid, store the serial number of the matching smart card and pass it to SCardUI +1. If a matching smart card isn't found in the CSP cache, make a call to the smart card subsystem. The callback that is used to filter enumerated smart cards should verify that a candidate smart card has the named container. If a serial number was provided as a result of the previous cache search, the callback should filter enumerated smart cards on serial number rather than on container matches. If the context is non-silent and no suitable smart card is found, display UI that prompts the user to insert a smart card ### Base CSP and KSP-based architecture in Windows -Figure 4 shows the Cryptography architecture that is used by the Windows operating system. +The following diagram shows the Cryptography architecture that is used by the Windows operating system. ![Cryptography architecture.](images/sc-image206.gif) -**Figure 4**  **Cryptography architecture** - ### Base CSP and smart card KSP properties in Windows -> **Note**  The API definitions are located in WinCrypt.h and WinSCard.h. +> [!NOTE] +> The API definitions are located in WinCrypt.h and WinSCard.h. -| **Property** | **Description** | -|-----------------------|------------------| -| PP\_USER\_CERTSTORE | - Used to return an HCERTSTORE that contains all user certificates on the smart card
- Read-only (used only by CryptGetProvParam)
- Caller responsible for closing the certificate store
- Certificate encoded using PKCS\_7\_ASN\_ENCODING or X509\_ASN\_ENCODING
- CSP should set KEY\_PROV\_INFO on certificates
- Certificate store should be assumed to be an in-memory store
- Certificates should have a valid CRYPT\_KEY\_PROV\_INFO as a property | -| PP\_ROOT\_CERTSTORE | - Read and Write (used by CryptGetProvParam and CryptSetProvParam)
- Used to write a collection of root certificates to the smart card or return HCERTSTORE, which contains root certificates from the smart card
- Used primarily for joining a domain by using a smart card
- Caller responsible for closing the certificate store | -| PP\_SMARTCARD\_READER | - Read-only (used only by CryptGetProvParam)
- Returns the smart card reader name as an ANSI string that is used to construct a fully qualified container name (that is, a smart card reader plus a container) | -| PP\_SMARTCARD\_GUID | - Return smart card GUID (also known as a serial number), which should be unique for each smart card
- Used by the certificate propagation service to track the source of a root certificate| -| PP\_UI\_PROMPT | - Used to set the search string for the SCardUIDlgSelectCard card insertion dialog box
- Persistent for the entire process when it is set
- Write-only (used only by CryptSetProvParam) | +| Property | Description | +|--|--| +| `PP_USER_CERTSTORE` | - Used to return an `HCERTSTORE` that contains all user certificates on the smart card
- Read-only (used only by `CryptGetProvParam`)
- Caller responsible for closing the certificate store
- Certificate encoded using `PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING` or `X509_ASN_ENCODING`
- CSP should set `KEY_PROV_INFO` on certificates
- Certificate store should be assumed to be an in-memory store
- Certificates should have a valid `CRYPT_KEY_PROV_INFO` as a property | +| `PP_ROOT_CERTSTORE` | - Read and Write (used by `CryptGetProvParam` and `CryptSetProvParam`)
- Used to write a collection of root certificates to the smart card or return `HCERTSTORE`, which contains root certificates from the smart card
- Used primarily for joining a domain by using a smart card
- Caller responsible for closing the certificate store | +| `PP_SMARTCARD_READER` | - Read-only (used only by `CryptGetProvParam`)
- Returns the smart card reader name as an ANSI string that is used to construct a fully qualified container name (that is, a smart card reader plus a container) | +| `PP_SMARTCARD_GUID` | - Return smart card GUID (also known as a serial number), which should be unique for each smart card
- Used by the certificate propagation service to track the source of a root certificate | +| `PP_UI_PROMPT` | - Used to set the search string for the `SCardUIDlgSelectCard` card insertion dialog box
- Persistent for the entire process when it's set
- Write-only (used only by `CryptSetProvParam`) | ### Implications for CSPs in Windows -Cryptographic Service Providers (CSPs), including custom smart card CSPs, continue to be supported but this approach is not recommended. Using the existing Base CSP and smart card KSP with the smart card minidriver model for smart cards provides significant benefits in terms of performance, and PIN and data caching. One minidriver can be configured to work under CryptoAPI and CNG layers. This provides benefits from enhanced cryptographic support, including elliptic curve cryptography and AES. +Cryptographic Service Providers (CSPs), including custom smart card CSPs, continue to be supported but this approach isn't recommended. Using the existing Base CSP and smart card KSP with the smart card minidriver model for smart cards provides significant benefits in terms of performance, and PIN and data caching. One minidriver can be configured to work under CryptoAPI and CNG layers. This provides benefits from enhanced cryptographic support, including elliptic curve cryptography and AES. If a smart card is registered by a CSP and a smart card minidriver, the one that was installed most recently will be used to communicate with the smart card. ### Write a smart card minidriver, CSP, or KSP -CSPs and KSPs are meant to be written only if specific functionality is not available in the current smart card minidriver architecture. For example, the smart card minidriver architecture supports hardware security modules, so a minidriver could be written for a hardware security module, and a CSP or KSP may not be required unless it is needed to support algorithms that are not implemented in the Base CSP or smart card KSP. +CSPs and KSPs are meant to be written only if specific functionality isn't available in the current smart card minidriver architecture. For example, the smart card minidriver architecture supports hardware security modules, so a minidriver could be written for a hardware security module, and a CSP or KSP may not be required unless it's needed to support algorithms that aren't implemented in the Base CSP or smart card KSP. -For more information about how to write a smart card minidriver, CSP, or KSP, see [Smart Card Minidrivers](/windows-hardware/drivers/smartcard/smart-card-minidrivers). \ No newline at end of file +For more information about how to write a smart card minidriver, CSP, or KSP, see [Smart Card Minidrivers](/windows-hardware/drivers/smartcard/smart-card-minidrivers). diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-certificate-propagation-service.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-certificate-propagation-service.md index 62737034ae..851e89b13a 100644 --- a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-certificate-propagation-service.md +++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-certificate-propagation-service.md @@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ --- title: Certificate Propagation Service description: This topic for the IT professional describes the certificate propagation service (CertPropSvc), which is used in smart card implementation. -ms.reviewer: ardenw ms.topic: concept-article ms.date: 08/24/2021 --- @@ -12,57 +11,45 @@ This topic for the IT professional describes the certificate propagation service The certificate propagation service activates when a signed-in user inserts a smart card in a reader that is attached to the computer. This action causes the certificate to be read from the smart card. The certificates are then added to the user's Personal store. Certificate propagation service actions are controlled by using Group Policy. For more information, see [Smart Card Group Policy and Registry Settings](smart-card-group-policy-and-registry-settings.md). -> **Note**  The certificate propagation service must be running for smart card Plug and Play to work. +> [!NOTE] +> The certificate propagation service must be running for smart card Plug and Play to work. The following figure shows the flow of the certificate propagation service. The action begins when a signed-in user inserts a smart card. -1. The arrow labeled **1** indicates that the Service Control Manager (SCM) notifies the certificate propagation service (CertPropSvc) when a user signs in, and CertPropSvc begins to monitor the smart cards in the user session. - -2. The arrow labeled **R** represents the possibility of a remote session and the use of smart card redirection. - -3. The arrow labeled **2** indicates the certification to the reader. - -4. The arrow labeled **3** indicates the access to the certificate store during the client session. - -**Certificate propagation service** +1. The arrow labeled **1** indicates that the Service Control Manager (SCM) notifies the certificate propagation service (CertPropSvc) when a user signs in, and CertPropSvc begins to monitor the smart cards in the user session +1. The arrow labeled **R** represents the possibility of a remote session and the use of smart card redirection +1. The arrow labeled **2** indicates the certification to the reader +1. The arrow labeled **3** indicates the access to the certificate store during the client session ![Certificate propagation service.](images/sc-image302.gif) -1. A signed-in user inserts a smart card. +1. A signed-in user inserts a smart card +1. CertPropSvc is notified that a smart card was inserted +1. CertPropSvc reads all certificates from all inserted smart cards. The certificates are written to the user's personal certificate store -2. CertPropSvc is notified that a smart card was inserted. - -3. CertPropSvc reads all certificates from all inserted smart cards. The certificates are written to the user's personal certificate store. - -> **Note**  The certificate propagation service is started as a Remote Desktop Services dependency. +> [!NOTE] +> The certificate propagation service is started as a Remote Desktop Services dependency. Properties of the certificate propagation service include: -- CERT\_STORE\_ADD\_REPLACE\_EXISTING\_INHERIT\_PROPERTIES adds certificates to a user's Personal store. - -- If the certificate has the CERT\_ENROLLMENT\_PROP\_ID property (as defined by wincrypt.h), it filters empty requests and places them in the current user's request store, but it does not propagate them to the user's Personal store. - -- The service does not propagate any computer certificates to a user's Personal store or propagate user certificates to a computer store. - -- The service propagates certificates according to Group Policy options that are set, which may include: - - - **Turn on certificate propagation from the smart card** specifies whether a user's certificate should be propagated. - - - **Turn on root certificate propagation from smart card** specifies whether root certificates should be propagated. - - - **Configure root certificate cleanup** specifies how root certificates are removed. +- `CERT_STORE_ADD_REPLACE_EXISTING_INHERIT_PROPERTIES` adds certificates to a user's Personal store +- If the certificate has the `CERT_ENROLLMENT_PROP_ID` property (as defined by `wincrypt.h`), it filters empty requests and places them in the current user's request store, but it doesn't propagate them to the user's Personal store +- The service doesn't propagate any computer certificates to a user's Personal store or propagate user certificates to a computer store +- The service propagates certificates according to Group Policy options that are set, which might include: + - **Turn on certificate propagation from the smart card** specifies whether a user's certificate should be propagated + - **Turn on root certificate propagation from smart card** specifies whether root certificates should be propagated + - **Configure root certificate cleanup** specifies how root certificates are removed ## Root certificate propagation service -Root certificate propagation is responsible for the following smart card deployment scenarios when public key infrastructure (PKI) trust has not yet been established: +Root certificate propagation is responsible for the following smart card deployment scenarios when public key infrastructure (PKI) trust hasn't yet been established: -- Joining the domain +- Joining the domain +- Accessing a network remotely -- Accessing a network remotely +In both cases, the computer isn't joined to a domain, and therefore, trust isn't being managed by Group Policy. However, the objective is to authenticate to a remote server, such as the domain controller. Root certificate propagation provides the ability to use the smart card to include the missing trust chain. -In both cases, the computer is not joined to a domain, and therefore, trust is not being managed by Group Policy. However, the objective is to authenticate to a remote server, such as the domain controller. Root certificate propagation provides the ability to use the smart card to include the missing trust chain. - -When the smart card is inserted, the certificate propagation service propagates any root certificates on the card to the trusted smart card root computer certificate stores. This process establishes a trust relationship with the enterprise resources. You may also use a subsequent cleanup action when the user's smart card is removed from the reader, or when the user signs out. This is configurable with Group Policy. For more information, see [Smart Card Group Policy and Registry Settings](smart-card-group-policy-and-registry-settings.md). +When the smart card is inserted, the certificate propagation service propagates any root certificates on the card to the trusted smart card root computer certificate stores. This process establishes a trust relationship with the enterprise resources. You might also use a subsequent cleanup action when the user's smart card is removed from the reader, or when the user signs out. This is configurable with Group Policy. For more information, see [Smart Card Group Policy and Registry Settings](smart-card-group-policy-and-registry-settings.md). For more information about root certificate requirements, see [Smart card root certificate requirements for use with domain sign-in](smart-card-certificate-requirements-and-enumeration.md#smart-card-root-certificate-requirements-for-use-with-domain-sign-in). diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-certificate-requirements-and-enumeration.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-certificate-requirements-and-enumeration.md index 9931e52d1f..4e345d6a7b 100644 --- a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-certificate-requirements-and-enumeration.md +++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-certificate-requirements-and-enumeration.md @@ -1,9 +1,8 @@ --- title: Certificate Requirements and Enumeration description: This topic for the IT professional and smart card developers describes how certificates are managed and used for smart card sign-in. -ms.reviewer: ardenw ms.topic: concept-article -ms.date: 09/24/2021 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 --- # Certificate Requirements and Enumeration @@ -12,157 +11,110 @@ This topic for the IT professional and smart card developers describes how certi When a smart card is inserted, the following steps are performed. -> **Note**  Unless otherwise mentioned, all operations are performed silently (CRYPT\_SILENT is passed to CryptAcquireContext). +> [!NOTE] +> Unless otherwise mentioned, all operations are performed silently (CRYPT_SILENT is passed to CryptAcquireContext). -1. The smart card resource manager database searches for the smart card's cryptographic service provider (CSP). +1. The smart card resource manager database searches for the smart card's cryptographic service provider (CSP). +1. A qualified container name is constructed by using the smart card reader name, and it's passed to the CSP. The format is `\\.\` +1. CryptAcquireContext is called to retrieve a context to the default container. If a failure occurs, the smart card is unusable for smart card sign-in. +1. The name of the container is retrieved by using the PP_CONTAINER parameter with CryptGetProvParam. +1. Using the context acquired in Step 3, the CSP is queried for the PP_USER_CERTSTORE parameter. For more information, see [Smart Card Architecture](smart-card-architecture.md). If the operation is successful, the name of a certificate store is returned, and the program flow skips to Step 8. +1. If the operation in Step 5 fails, the default container context from Step 3 is queried for the AT_KEYEXCHANGE key. +1. The certificate is then queried from the key context by using KP_CERTIFICATE. The certificate is added to an in-memory certificate store. +1. For each certificate in the certificate store from Step 5 or Step 7, the following checks are performed: -2. A qualified container name is constructed by using the smart card reader name, and it is passed to the CSP. The format is *\\\\.\\<Reader name>*\\ - -3. CryptAcquireContext is called to retrieve a context to the default container. If a failure occurs, the smart card will be unusable for smart card sign-in. - -4. The name of the container is retrieved by using the PP\_CONTAINER parameter with CryptGetProvParam. - -5. Using the context acquired in Step 3, the CSP is queried for the PP\_USER\_CERTSTORE parameter (added in Windows Vista). For more information, see [Smart Card Architecture](smart-card-architecture.md). If the operation is successful, the name of a certificate store is returned, and the program flow skips to Step 8. - -6. If the operation in Step 5 fails, the default container context from Step 3 is queried for the AT\_KEYEXCHANGE key. - -7. The certificate is then queried from the key context by using KP\_CERTIFICATE. The certificate is added to an in-memory certificate store. - -8. For each certificate in the certificate store from Step 5 or Step 7, the following checks are performed: - - 1. The certificate must be valid, based on the computer system clock (not expired or valid with a future date). - - 2. The certificate must not be in the AT\_SIGNATURE part of a container. - - 3. The certificate must have a valid user principal name (UPN). - - 4. The certificate must have the digital signature key usage. - - 5. The certificate must have the smart card logon EKU. + 1. The certificate must be valid, based on the computer system clock (not expired or valid with a future date). + 1. The certificate must not be in the AT_SIGNATURE part of a container. + 1. The certificate must have a valid user principal name (UPN). + 1. The certificate must have the digital signature key usage. + 1. The certificate must have the smart card logon EKU. Any certificate that meets these requirements is displayed to the user with the certificate's UPN (or e-mail address or subject, depending on the presence of the certificate extensions). - > **Note**  These requirements are the same as those in Windows Server 2003, but they are performed before the user enters the PIN. You can override many of them by using Group Policy settings. - -9. The process then chooses a certificate, and the PIN is entered. - -10. LogonUI.exe packages the information and sends it to Lsass.exe to process the sign-in attempt. - -11. If successful, LogonUI.exe closes. This causes the context acquired in Step 3 to be released. - -## About Certificate support for compatibility - -Although versions of Windows earlier than Windows Vista include support for smart cards, the types of certificates that smart cards can contain are limited. The limitations are: - -- Each certificate must have a user principal name (UPN) and the smart card sign-in object identifier (also known as OID) in the extended key usage (EKU) attribute field. There is a Group Policy setting, Allow ECC certificates to be used for logon and authentication, to make the EKU optional. - -- Each certificate must be stored in the AT\_KEYEXCHANGE portion of the default CryptoAPI container, and non-default CryptoAPI containers are not supported. - -The following table lists the certificate support in older Windows operating system versions. - -| **Operating system** | **Certificate support** | -|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| -| Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7 | Support for smart card sign-in with ECC-based certificates. ECC smart card sign-in is enabled through Group Policy.

ECDH\_P256
ECDH
Curve P-256 from FIPS 186-2

ECDSA\_P256
ECDSA
Curve P-256 from FIPS 186-2

ECDH\_P384
ECDH
Curve P-384 from FIPS 186-2

ECDH\_P521
ECDH
Curve P-521 from FIPS 186-2

ECDSA\_P256
ECDH
Curve P-256 from FIPS 186-2

ECDSA\_P384
ECDSA
Curve P-384 from FIPS 186-2

ECDSA\_P521
ECDSA
Curve P-384 from FIPS 186-2 | -| Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista | Valid certificates are enumerated and displayed from all smart cards and presented to the user.
Keys are no longer restricted to the default container, and certificates in different containers can be chosen.
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)-based certificates are not supported for smart card sign-in | +1. The process then chooses a certificate, and the PIN is entered. +1. LogonUI.exe packages the information and sends it to Lsass.exe to process the sign-in attempt. +1. If successful, LogonUI.exe closes. This causes the context acquired in Step 3 to be released. ## Smart card sign-in flow in Windows -Most issues during authentication occur because of session behavior changes. When changes occur, the Local Security Authority (LSA) does not reacquire the session context; it relies instead on the Cryptographic Service Provider to handle the session change. +Most issues during authentication occur because of session behavior changes. When changes occur, the Local Security Authority (LSA) doesn't reacquire the session context; it relies instead on the Cryptographic Service Provider to handle the session change. -Client certificates that do not contain a UPN in the **subjectAltName** (SAN) field of the certificate can be enabled for sign-in, which supports a wider variety of certificates and supports multiple sign-in certificates on the same card. +Client certificates that don't contain a UPN in the `subjectAltName`` (SAN) field of the certificate can be enabled for sign-in, which supports a wider variety of certificates and supports multiple sign-in certificates on the same card. Support for multiple certificates on the same card is enabled by default. New certificate types must be enabled through Group Policy. -If you enable the **Allow signature keys valid for Logon** credential provider policy, any certificates that are available on the smart card with a signature-only key are listed on the sign-in screen. This allows users to select their sign-in experience. If the policy is disabled or not configured, smart card signature-key-based certificates are not listed on the sign-in screen. +If you enable the **Allow signature keys valid for Logon** credential provider policy, any certificates that are available on the smart card with a signature-only key are listed on the sign-in screen. This allows users to select their sign-in experience. If the policy is disabled or not configured, smart card signature-key-based certificates aren't listed on the sign-in screen. The following diagram illustrates how smart card sign-in works in the supported versions of Windows. ![Smart card sign-in flow.](images/sc-image402.png) -**Smart card sign-in flow** +### Smart card sign-in flow Following are the steps that are performed during a smart card sign-in: 1. Winlogon requests the sign-in UI credential information. +1. Asynchronously, smart card resource manager starts, and the smart card credential provider does the following: + 1. Gets credential information (a list of known credentials, or if no credentials exist, the smart card reader information that Windows detected). + 1. Gets a list of smart card readers (by using the WinSCard API) and the list of smart cards inserted in each of them. + 1. Enumerates each card to verify that a sign-in certificate that is controlled by Group Policy is present. If the certificate is present, the smart card credential provider copies it into a temporary, secure cache on the computer or terminal. -2. Asynchronously, smart card resource manager starts, and the smart card credential provider does the following: + > [!NOTE] + > Smartcard cache entries are created for certificates with a subject name or with a subject key identifier. If the certificate has a subject name, it is stored with an index that is based on the subject name and certificate issuer. If another certificate with the same subject name and certificate issuer is used, it will replace the existing cached entry. A change in this behavior, allows for the condition when the certificate does not have a subject name, the cache is created with an index that is based on the subject key identifier and certificate issuer. If another certificate has the same the subject key identifier and certificate issuer, the cache entry is replaced. When certificates have neither a subject name nor subject key identifier, a cached entry is not created. - 1. Gets credential information (a list of known credentials, or if no credentials exist, the smart card reader information that Windows detected). + 1. Notifies the sign-in UI that it has new credentials. - 2. Gets a list of smart card readers (by using the WinSCard API) and the list of smart cards inserted in each of them. +1. The sign-in UI requests the new credentials from the smart card credential provider. As a response, the smart card credential provider provides each sign-in certificate to the sign-in UI, and corresponding sign-in tiles are displayed. The user selects a smart card-based sign-in certificate tile, and Windows displays a PIN dialog box. +1. The user enters the PIN, and then presses ENTER. The smart card credential provider encrypts the PIN. +1. The credential provider that resides in the LogonUI system collects the PIN. As part of packaging credentials in the smart card credential provider, the data is packaged in a KERB_CERTIFICATE_LOGON structure. The main contents of the KERB_CERTIFICATE_LOGON structure are the smart card PIN, CSP data (such as reader name and container name), user name, and domain name. User name is required if the sign-in domain isn't in the same forest because it enables a certificate to be mapped to multiple user accounts. +1. The credential provider wraps the data (such as the encrypted PIN, container name, reader name, and card key specification) and sends it back to LogonUI. +1. Winlogon presents the data from LogonUI to the LSA with the user information in LSALogonUser. +1. LSA calls the Kerberos authentication package (Kerberos SSP) to create a Kerberos authentication service request (KRB_AS_REQ), which containing a preauthenticator (as specified in RFC 4556: [Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT)](http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4556.txt)). - 3. Enumerates each card to verify that a sign-in certificate that is controlled by Group Policy is present. If the certificate is present, the smart card credential provider copies it into a temporary, secure cache on the computer or terminal. + If the authentication is performed by using a certificate that uses a digital signature, the preauthentication data consists of the user's public certificate and the certificate that is digitally signed with the corresponding private key.\ + If the authentication is performed by using a certificate that uses key encipherment, the preauthentication data consists of the user's public certificate and the certificate that is encrypted with the corresponding private key. - > **Note**  Smartcard cache entries are created for certificates with a subject name or with a subject key identifier. If the certificate has a subject name, it is stored with an index that is based on the subject name and certificate issuer. If another certificate with the same subject name and certificate issuer is used, it will replace the existing cached entry. A change in this behavior after Windows Vista, allows for the condition when the certificate does not have a subject name, the cache is created with an index that is based on the subject key identifier and certificate issuer. If another certificate has the same the subject key identifier and certificate issuer, the cache entry is replaced. When certificates have neither a subject name nor subject key identifier, a cached entry is not created. +1. To sign the request digitally (as per RFC 4556), a call is made to the corresponding CSP for a private key operation. Because the private key in this case is stored in a smart card, the smart card subsystem is called, and the necessary operation is completed. The result is sent back to the Kerberos security support provider (SSP). +1. The Kerberos SSP sends an authentication request for a ticket-granting-ticket (TGT) (per RFC 4556) to the Key Distribution Center (KDC) service that runs on a domain controller. +1. The KDC finds the user's account object in Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS), as detailed in [Client certificate requirements and mappings](#client-certificate-requirements-and-mappings), and uses the user's certificate to verify the signature. +1. The KDC validates the user's certificate (time, path, and revocation status) to ensure that the certificate is from a trusted source. The KDC uses CryptoAPI to build a certification path from the user's certificate to a root certification authority (CA) certificate that resides in the root store on the domain controller. The KDC then uses CryptoAPI to verify the digital signature on the signed authenticator that was included in the preauthentication data fields. The domain controller verifies the signature and uses the public key from the user's certificate to prove that the request originated from the owner of the private key that corresponds to the public key. The KDC also verifies that the issuer is trusted and appears in the NTAUTH certificate store. +1. The KDC service retrieves user account information from AD DS. The KDC constructs a TGT, which is based on the user account information that it retrieves from AD DS. The TGT's authorization data fields include the user's security identifier (SID), the SIDs for universal and global domain groups to which the user belongs, and (in a multidomain environment) the SIDs for any universal groups of which the user is a member. +1. The domain controller returns the TGT to the client as part of the KRB_AS_REP response. - 4. Notifies the sign-in UI that it has new credentials. - -3. The sign-in UI requests the new credentials from the smart card credential provider. As a response, the smart card credential provider provides each sign-in certificate to the sign-in UI, and corresponding sign-in tiles are displayed. The user selects a smart card-based sign-in certificate tile, and Windows displays a PIN dialog box. - -4. The user enters the PIN, and then presses ENTER. The smart card credential provider encrypts the PIN. - -5. The credential provider that resides in the LogonUI system collects the PIN. As part of packaging credentials in the smart card credential provider, the data is packaged in a KERB\_CERTIFICATE\_LOGON structure. The main contents of the KERB\_CERTIFICATE\_LOGON structure are the smart card PIN, CSP data (such as reader name and container name), user name, and domain name. User name is required if the sign-in domain is not in the same forest because it enables a certificate to be mapped to multiple user accounts. - -6. The credential provider wraps the data (such as the encrypted PIN, container name, reader name, and card key specification) and sends it back to LogonUI. - -7. Winlogon presents the data from LogonUI to the LSA with the user information in LSALogonUser. - -8. LSA calls the Kerberos authentication package (Kerberos SSP) to create a Kerberos authentication service request (KRB\_AS\_REQ), which containing a preauthenticator (as specified in RFC 4556: [Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT)](http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4556.txt)). - - If the authentication is performed by using a certificate that uses a digital signature, the preauthentication data consists of the user's public certificate and the certificate that is digitally signed with the corresponding private key.
If the authentication is performed by using a certificate that uses key encipherment, the preauthentication data consists of the user's public certificate and the certificate that is encrypted with the corresponding private key. - -9. To sign the request digitally (as per RFC 4556), a call is made to the corresponding CSP for a private key operation. Because the private key in this case is stored in a smart card, the smart card subsystem is called, and the necessary operation is completed. The result is sent back to the Kerberos security support provider (SSP). - -10. The Kerberos SSP sends an authentication request for a ticket-granting-ticket (TGT) (per RFC 4556) to the Key Distribution Center (KDC) service that runs on a domain controller. - -11. The KDC finds the user's account object in Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS), as detailed in [Client certificate requirements and mappings](#client-certificate-requirements-and-mappings), and uses the user's certificate to verify the signature. - -12. The KDC validates the user's certificate (time, path, and revocation status) to ensure that the certificate is from a trusted source. The KDC uses CryptoAPI to build a certification path from the user's certificate to a root certification authority (CA) certificate that resides in the root store on the domain controller. The KDC then uses CryptoAPI to verify the digital signature on the signed authenticator that was included in the preauthentication data fields. The domain controller verifies the signature and uses the public key from the user's certificate to prove that the request originated from the owner of the private key that corresponds to the public key. The KDC also verifies that the issuer is trusted and appears in the NTAUTH certificate store. - -13. The KDC service retrieves user account information from AD DS. The KDC constructs a TGT, which is based on the user account information that it retrieves from AD DS. The TGT's authorization data fields include the user's security identifier (SID), the SIDs for universal and global domain groups to which the user belongs, and (in a multidomain environment) the SIDs for any universal groups of which the user is a member. - -14. The domain controller returns the TGT to the client as part of the KRB\_AS\_REP response. - - > **Note**  The KRB\_AS\_REP packet consists of: - >- Privilege attribute certificate (PAC) - >- User's SID - >- SIDs of any groups of which the user is a member - >- A request for ticket-granting service (TGS) - >- Preauthentication data + > [!NOTE] + > The KRB_AS_REP packet consists of: + > - Privilege attribute certificate (PAC) + > - User's SID + > - SIDs of any groups of which the user is a member + > - A request for ticket-granting service (TGS) + > - Preauthentication data TGT is encrypted with the master key of the KDC, and the session key is encrypted with a temporary key. This temporary key is derived based on RFC 4556. Using CryptoAPI, the temporary key is decrypted. As part of the decryption process, if the private key is on a smart card, a call is made to the smart card subsystem by using the specified CSP to extract the certificate corresponding to the user's public key. (Programmatic calls for the certificate include CryptAcquireContext, CryptSetProvParam with the PIN, CryptgetUserKey, and CryptGetKeyParam.) After the temporary key is obtained, the Kerberos SSP decrypts the session key. -15. The client validates the reply from the KDC (time, path, and revocation status). It first verifies the KDC's signature by the construction of a certification path from the KDC's certificate to a trusted root CA, and then it uses the KDC's public key to verify the reply signature. +1. The client validates the reply from the KDC (time, path, and revocation status). It first verifies the KDC's signature by the construction of a certification path from the KDC's certificate to a trusted root CA, and then it uses the KDC's public key to verify the reply signature. +1. Now that a TGT has been obtained, the client obtains a service ticket, which is used to sign in to the local computer. +1. With success, LSA stores the tickets and returns a success message to LSALogonUser. After this success message is issued, user profile for the device is selected and set, Group Policy refresh is instantiated, and other actions are performed. +1. After the user profile is loaded, the Certification Propagation Service (CertPropSvc) detects this event, reads the certificates from the smart card (including the root certificates), and then populates them into the user's certificate store (MYSTORE) +1. CSP to smart card resource manager communication happens on the LRPC Channel. +1. On successful authentication, certificates are propagated to the user's store asynchronously by the Certificate Propagation Service (CertPropSvc). +1. When the card is removed, certificates in the temporary secure cache store are removed. The Certificates are no longer available for sign-in, but they remain in the user's certificate store. -16. Now that a TGT has been obtained, the client obtains a service ticket, which is used to sign in to the local computer. - -17. With success, LSA stores the tickets and returns a success message to LSALogonUser. After this success message is issued, user profile for the device is selected and set, Group Policy refresh is instantiated, and other actions are performed. - -18. After the user profile is loaded, the Certification Propagation Service (CertPropSvc) detects this event, reads the certificates from the smart card (including the root certificates), and then populates them into the user's certificate store (MYSTORE). - -19. CSP to smart card resource manager communication happens on the LRPC Channel. - -20. On successful authentication, certificates are propagated to the user's store asynchronously by the Certificate Propagation Service (CertPropSvc). - -21. When the card is removed, certificates in the temporary secure cache store are removed. The Certificates are no longer available for sign-in, but they remain in the user's certificate store. - -> **Note**  A SID is created for each user or group at the time a user account or a group account is created within the local security accounts database or within AD DS. The SID never changes, even if the user or group account is renamed. +> [!NOTE] +> A SID is created for each user or group at the time a user account or a group account is created within the local security accounts database or within AD DS. The SID never changes, even if the user or group account is renamed. For more information about the Kerberos protocol, see [Microsoft Kerberos](/windows/win32/secauthn/microsoft-kerberos). -By default, the KDC verifies that the client's certificate contains the smart card client authentication EKU szOID\_KP\_SMARTCARD\_LOGON. However, if enabled, the **Allow certificates with no extended key usage certificate attribute** Group Policy setting allows the KDC to not require the SC-LOGON EKU. SC-LOGON EKU is not required for account mappings that are based on the public key. +By default, the KDC verifies that the client's certificate contains the smart card client authentication EKU szOID_KP_SMARTCARD_LOGON. However, if enabled, the **Allow certificates with no extended key usage certificate attribute** Group Policy setting allows the KDC to not require the SC-LOGON EKU. SC-LOGON EKU isn't required for account mappings that are based on the public key. ## KDC certificate Active Directory Certificate Services provides three kinds of certificate templates: -- Domain controller +- Domain controller +- Domain controller authentication +- Kerberos authentication -- Domain controller authentication - -- Kerberos authentication - -Depending on the configuration of the domain controller, one of these types of certificates is sent as a part of the AS\_REP packet. +Depending on the configuration of the domain controller, one of these types of certificates is sent as a part of the AS_REP packet. ## Client certificate requirements and mappings @@ -170,144 +122,125 @@ Certificate requirements are listed by versions of the Windows operating system. ### Certificate requirements -The smart card certificate has specific format requirements when it is used with Windows XP and earlier operating systems. You can enable any certificate to be visible for the smart card credential provider. - - -| **Component** | **Requirements for Windows 8.1, Windows 8, Windows 7, Windows Vista, Windows 10, and Windows 11** | **Requirements for Windows XP** | -|--------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| -| CRL distribution point location | Not required | The location must be specified, online, and available, for example:
\[1\]CRL Distribution Point
Distribution Point Name:
Full Name:
URL=`` | -| Key usage | Digital signature | Digital signature | -| Basic constraints | Not required | \[Subject Type=End Entity, Path Length Constraint=None\] (Optional) | -| extended key usage (EKU) | The smart card sign-in object identifier is not required.

**Note**  If an EKU is present, it must contain the smart card sign-in EKU. Certificates with no EKU can be used for sign-in. | - Client Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2)
The client authentication object identifier is required only if a certificate is used for SSL authentication.

- Smart Card Sign-in (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2) | -| Subject alternative name | E-mail ID is not required for smart card sign-in. | Other Name: Principal Name=(UPN), for example:
UPN=user1@contoso.com
The UPN OtherName object identifier is 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.3.
The UPN OtherName value must be an ASN1-encoded UTF8 string. | -| Subject | Not required | Distinguished name of user. This field is a mandatory extension, but the population of this field is optional. | -| Key exchange (AT\_KEYEXCHANGE field) | Not required for smart card sign-in certificates if a Group Policy setting is enabled. (By default, Group Policy settings are not enabled.) | Not required | -| CRL | Not required | Not required | -| UPN | Not required | Not required | -| Notes | You can enable any certificate to be visible for the smart card credential provider. | There are two predefined types of private keys. These keys are Signature Only (AT\_SIGNATURE) and Key Exchange (AT\_KEYEXCHANGE). Smart card sign-in certificates must have a Key Exchange (AT\_KEYEXCHANGE) private key type. | +| Component | Requirements | +|--|--| +| CRL distribution point location | Not required | +| Key usage | Digital signature | +| Basic constraints | Not required | +| extended key usage (EKU) | The smart card sign-in object identifier isn't required.

**Note** If an EKU is present, it must contain the smart card sign-in EKU. Certificates with no EKU can be used for sign-in. | +| Subject alternative name | E-mail ID isn't required for smart card sign-in. | +| Subject | Not required | +| Key exchange (AT_KEYEXCHANGE field) | Not required for smart card sign-in certificates if a Group Policy setting is enabled. (By default, Group Policy settings aren't enabled.) | +| CRL | Not required | +| UPN | Not required | +| Notes | You can enable any certificate to be visible for the smart card credential provider. | ### Client certificate mappings -Certificate mapping is based on the UPN that is contained in the subjectAltName (SAN) field of the certificate. Client certificates that do not contain information in the SAN field are also supported. +Certificate mapping is based on the UPN that is contained in the subjectAltName (SAN) field of the certificate. Client certificates that don't contain information in the SAN field are also supported. -SSL/TLS can map certificates that do not have SAN, and the mapping is done by using the AltSecID attributes on client accounts. The X509 AltSecID, which is used by SSL/TLS client authentication is of the form "X509: <I>"*<Issuer Name>*"<S>"*<Subject Name>*. The *<Issuer Name>* and *<Subject Name>* are taken from the client certificate, with '\\r' and '\\n' replaced with ','. +SSL/TLS can map certificates that don't have SAN, and the mapping is done by using the AltSecID attributes on client accounts. The X509 AltSecID, which is used by SSL/TLS client authentication is of the form "X509: `` `` and `` are taken from the client certificate, with '\r' and '\n' replaced with ','. -**Certificate revocation list distribution points** +#### Certificate revocation list distribution points ![Certificate revocation list distribution points.](images/sc-image403.png) -**UPN in Subject Alternative Name field** +#### UPN in Subject Alternative Name field ![UPN in Subject Alternative Name field.](images/sc-image404.png) -**Subject and Issuer fields** +#### Subject and Issuer fields ![Subject and Issuer fields.](images/sc-image405.png) This account mapping is supported by the KDC in addition to six other mapping methods. The following figure demonstrates a flow of user account mapping logic that is used by the KDC. -**High-level flow of certificate processing for sign-in** +#### High-level flow of certificate processing for sign-in ![High-level flow of certificate processing for sign-in.](images/sc-image406.png) The certificate object is parsed to look for content to perform user account mapping. -- When a user name is provided with the certificate, the user name is used to locate the account object. This operation is the fastest, because string matching occurs. +- When a user name is provided with the certificate, the user name is used to locate the account object. This operation is the fastest, because string matching occurs +- When only the certificate object is provided, multiple operations are performed to locate the user name to map the user name to an account object +- When no domain information is available for authentication, the local domain is used by default. If any other domain is to be used for lookup, a domain name hint should be provided to perform the mapping and binding -- When only the certificate object is provided, a series of operations are performed to locate the user name to map the user name to an account object. - -- When no domain information is available for authentication, the local domain is used by default. If any other domain is to be used for lookup, a domain name hint should be provided to perform the mapping and binding. - -Mapping based on generic attributes is not possible because there is no generic API to retrieve attributes from a certificate. Currently, the first method that locates an account successfully stops the search. But a configuration error occurs if two methods map the same certificate to different user accounts when the client does not supply the client name through the mapping hints. +Mapping based on generic attributes isn't possible because there's no generic API to retrieve attributes from a certificate. Currently, the first method that locates an account successfully stops the search. But a configuration error occurs if two methods map the same certificate to different user accounts when the client doesn't supply the client name through the mapping hints. The following figure illustrates the process of mapping user accounts for sign-in in the directory by viewing various entries in the certificate. -**Certificate processing logic** +#### Certificate processing logic ![Certificate processing logic.](images/sc-image407.png) -NT\_AUTH policy is best described in the CERT\_CHAIN\_POLICY\_NT\_AUTH parameter section of the CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy function. For more information, see [CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy](/windows/win32/api/wincrypt/nf-wincrypt-certverifycertificatechainpolicy). +NT_AUTH policy is best described in the CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_NT_AUTH parameter section of the CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy function. For more information, see [CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy](/windows/win32/api/wincrypt/nf-wincrypt-certverifycertificatechainpolicy). ## Smart card sign-in for a single user with one certificate into multiple accounts A single user certificate can be mapped to multiple accounts. For example, a user might be able to sign in to a user account and also to sign in as a domain administrator. The mapping is done by using the constructed AltSecID based on attributes from client accounts. For information about how this mapping is evaluated, see [Client certificate requirements and mappings](#client-certificate-requirements-and-mappings). -> **Note**  Because each account has a different user name, we recommend that you enable the **Allow user name hint** Group Policy setting (**X509HintsNeeded** registry key) to provide the optional fields that allow users to enter their user names and domain information to sign in. +> [!NOTE] +> Because each account has a different user name, we recommend that you enable the **Allow user name hint** Group Policy setting (**X509HintsNeeded** registry key) to provide the optional fields that allow users to enter their user names and domain information to sign in. Based on the information that is available in the certificate, the sign-in conditions are: -1. If no UPN is present in the certificate: - - 1. Sign-in can occur in the local forest or in another forest if a single user with one certificate needs to sign in to different accounts. - - 2. A hint must be supplied if mapping is not unique (for example, if multiple users are mapped to the same certificate). - -2. If a UPN is present in the certificate: - - 1. The certificate cannot be mapped to multiple users in the same forest. - - 2. The certificate can be mapped to multiple users in different forests. For a user to sign in to other forests, an X509 hint must be supplied to the user. +1. If no UPN is present in the certificate: + 1. Sign-in can occur in the local forest or in another forest if a single user with one certificate needs to sign in to different accounts + 1. A hint must be supplied if mapping isn't unique (for example, if multiple users are mapped to the same certificate) +1. If a UPN is present in the certificate: + 1. The certificate can't be mapped to multiple users in the same forest + 1. The certificate can be mapped to multiple users in different forests. For a user to sign in to other forests, an X509 hint must be supplied to the user ## Smart card sign-in for multiple users into a single account -A group of users might sign in to a single account (for example, an administrator account). For that account, user certificates are mapped so that they are enabled for sign-in. +A group of users might sign in to a single account (for example, an administrator account). For that account, user certificates are mapped so that they're enabled for sign-in. -Several distinct certificates can be mapped to a single account. For this to work properly, the certificate cannot have UPNs. +Several distinct certificates can be mapped to a single account. For this to work properly, the certificate can't have UPNs. For example, if Certificate1 has CN=CNName1, Certificate2 has CN=User1, and Certificate3 has CN=User2, the AltSecID of these certificates can be mapped to a single account by using the Active Directory Users and Computers name mapping. ## Smart card sign-in across forests -For account mapping to work across forests, particularly in cases where there is not enough information available on the certificate, the user might enter a hint in the form of a user name, such as *domain\\user*, or a fully qualified UPN such as user@contoso.com. +For account mapping to work across forests, particularly in cases where there isn't enough information available on the certificate, the user might enter a hint in the form of a user name, such as *domain\user*, or a fully qualified UPN such as `user@contoso.com`. -> **Note**  For the hint field to appear during smart card sign-in, the **Allow user name hint** Group Policy setting (**X509HintsNeeded** registry key) must be enabled on the client. +> [!NOTE] +> For the hint field to appear during smart card sign-in, the **Allow user name hint** Group Policy setting (**X509HintsNeeded** registry key) must be enabled on the client. ## OCSP support for PKINIT Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP), which is defined in RFC 2560, enables applications to obtain timely information about the revocation status of a certificate. Because OCSP responses are small and well bound, constrained clients might want to use OCSP to check the validity of the certificates for Kerberos on the KDC, to avoid transmission of large CRLs, and to save bandwidth on constrained networks. For information about CRL registry keys, see [Smart Card Group Policy and Registry Settings](smart-card-group-policy-and-registry-settings.md). -The KDCs in Windows attempt to get OCSP responses and use them when available. This behavior cannot be disabled. CryptoAPI for OCSP caches OCSP responses and the status of the responses. The KDC supports only OCSP responses for the signer certificate. +The KDCs in Windows attempt to get OCSP responses and use them when available. This behavior can't be disabled. CryptoAPI for OCSP caches OCSP responses and the status of the responses. The KDC supports only OCSP responses for the signer certificate. -Windows client computers attempt to request the OCSP responses and use them in the reply when they are available. This behavior cannot be disabled. +Windows client computers attempt to request the OCSP responses and use them in the reply when they're available. This behavior can't be disabled. ## Smart card root certificate requirements for use with domain sign-in For sign-in to work in a smart card-based domain, the smart card certificate must meet the following conditions: -- The KDC root certificate on the smart card must have an HTTP CRL distribution point listed in its certificate. - -- The smart card sign-in certificate must have the HTTP CRL distribution point listed in its certificate. - -- The CRL distribution point must have a valid CRL published and a delta CRL, if applicable, even if the CRL distribution point is empty. - +- The KDC root certificate on the smart card must have an HTTP CRL distribution point listed in its certificate +- The smart card sign-in certificate must have the HTTP CRL distribution point listed in its certificate +- The CRL distribution point must have a valid CRL published and a delta CRL, if applicable, even if the CRL distribution point is empty - The smart card certificate must contain one of the following: + - A subject field that contains the DNS domain name in the distinguished name. If it doesn't, resolution to an appropriate domain fails, so Remote Desktop Services and the domain sign-in with the smart card fail + - A UPN where the domain name resolves to the actual domain. For example, if the domain name is `Engineering.Corp.Contoso`, the UPN is `username@engineering.corp.contoso.com`. If any part of the domain name is omitted, the Kerberos client can't find the appropriate domain - - A subject field that contains the DNS domain name in the distinguished name. If it does not, resolution to an appropriate domain fails, so Remote Desktop Services and the domain sign-in with the smart card fail. +To allow smart card sign-in to a domain in these versions, do the following: - - A UPN where the domain name resolves to the actual domain. For example, if the domain name is Engineering.Corp.Contoso, the UPN is username@engineering.corp.contoso.com. If any part of the domain name is omitted, the Kerberos client cannot find the appropriate domain. - -Although the HTTP CRL distribution points are on by default in Windows Server 2008, subsequent versions of the Windows Server operating system do not include HTTP CRL distribution points. To allow smart card sign-in to a domain in these versions, do the following: - -1. Enable HTTP CRL distribution points on the CA. - -2. Restart the CA. - -3. Reissue the KDC certificate. - -4. Issue or reissue the smart card sign-in certificate. - -5. Propagate the updated root certificate to the smart card that you want to use for the domain sign-in. +1. Enable HTTP CRL distribution points on the CA +1. Restart the CA +1. Reissue the KDC certificate +1. Issue or reissue the smart card sign-in certificate +1. Propagate the updated root certificate to the smart card that you want to use for the domain sign-in The workaround is to enable the **Allow user name hint** Group Policy setting (**X509HintsNeeded** registry key), which allows the user to supply a hint in the credentials user interface for domain sign-in. -If the client computer is not joined to the domain or if it is joined to a different domain, the client computer can resolve the server domain only by looking at the distinguished name on the certificate, not the UPN. For this scenario to work, the certificate requires a full subject, including DC=*<DomainControllerName>*, for domain name resolution. +If the client computer isn't joined to the domain or if it's joined to a different domain, the client computer can resolve the server domain only by looking at the distinguished name on the certificate, not the UPN. For this scenario to work, the certificate requires a full subject, including `DC=`, for domain name resolution. To deploy root certificates on a smart card for the currently joined domain, you can use the following command: -**certutil -scroots update** +```cmd +certutil.exe -scroots update +``` For more information about this option for the command-line tool, see [-SCRoots](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc732443(v=ws.11)#BKMK_SCRoots). - -## See also - -[How Smart Card Sign-in Works in Windows](smart-card-how-smart-card-sign-in-works-in-windows.md) diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-debugging-information.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-debugging-information.md index 8193759010..0ba2519568 100644 --- a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-debugging-information.md +++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-debugging-information.md @@ -1,12 +1,8 @@ --- title: Smart Card Troubleshooting description: Describes the tools and services that smart card developers can use to help identify certificate issues with the smart card deployment. -ms.reviewer: ardenw -ms.collection: - - highpri - - tier2 ms.topic: troubleshooting -ms.date: 09/24/2021 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 --- # Smart Card Troubleshooting @@ -15,17 +11,12 @@ This article explains tools and services that smart card developers can use to h Debugging and tracing smart card issues requires a variety of tools and approaches. The following sections provide guidance about tools and approaches you can use. -- [Certutil](#certutil) - -- [Debugging and tracing using Windows software trace preprocessor (WPP)](#debugging-and-tracing-using-wpp) - -- [Kerberos protocol, Key Distribution Center (KDC), and NTLM debugging and tracing](#kerberos-protocol-kdc-and-ntlm-debugging-and-tracing) - -- [Smart Card service](#smart-card-service) - -- [Smart card readers](#smart-card-readers) - -- [CryptoAPI 2.0 Diagnostics](#cryptoapi-20-diagnostics) +- [Certutil](#certutil) +- [Debugging and tracing using Windows software trace preprocessor (WPP)](#debugging-and-tracing-using-wpp) +- [Kerberos protocol, Key Distribution Center (KDC), and NTLM debugging and tracing](#kerberos-protocol-kdc-and-ntlm-debugging-and-tracing) +- [Smart Card service](#smart-card-service) +- [Smart card readers](#smart-card-readers) +- [CryptoAPI 2.0 Diagnostics](#cryptoapi-20-diagnostics) ## Certutil @@ -33,7 +24,7 @@ For a complete description of Certutil including examples that show how to use i ### List certificates available on the smart card -To list certificates that are available on the smart card, type `certutil -scinfo`. +To list certificates that are available on the smart card, type `certutil.exe -scinfo`. > [!NOTE] > Entering a PIN is not required for this operation. You can press ESC if you are prompted for a PIN. @@ -42,9 +33,9 @@ To list certificates that are available on the smart card, type `certutil -scinf Each certificate is enclosed in a container. When you delete a certificate on the smart card, you're deleting the container for the certificate. -To find the container value, type `certutil -scinfo`. +To find the container value, type `certutil.exe -scinfo`. -To delete a container, type **certutil -delkey -csp "Microsoft Base Smart Card Crypto Provider"** "<*ContainerValue*>". +To delete a container, type `certutil.exe -delkey -csp "Microsoft Base Smart Card Crypto Provider" ""`. ## Debugging and tracing using WPP @@ -54,144 +45,153 @@ WPP simplifies tracing the operation of the trace provider. It provides a mechan Using WPP, use one of the following commands to enable tracing: -- **tracelog.exe -kd -rt -start** <*FriendlyName*> **-guid \#**<*GUID*> **-f .\\**<*LogFileName*>**.etl -flags** <*flags*> **-ft 1** - -- **logman start** <*FriendlyName*> **-ets -p {**<*GUID*>**} -**<*Flags*> **-ft 1 -rt -o .\\**<*LogFileName*>**.etl -mode 0x00080000** +```cmd +tracelog.exe -kd -rt -start -guid -f ..etl -flags -ft 1 +logman.exe start -ets -p {} - -ft 1 -rt -o ..etl -mode 0x00080000 +``` You can use the parameters in the following table. -| Friendly name | GUID | Flags | -|-------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------| -| `scardsvr` | 13038e47-ffec-425d-bc69-5707708075fe | 0xffff | -| `winscard` | 3fce7c5f-fb3b-4bce-a9d8-55cc0ce1cf01 | 0xffff | -| `basecsp` | 133a980d-035d-4e2d-b250-94577ad8fced | 0x7 | -| `scksp` | 133a980d-035d-4e2d-b250-94577ad8fced | 0x7 | -| `msclmd` | fb36caf4-582b-4604-8841-9263574c4f2c | 0x7 | -| `credprov` | dba0e0e0-505a-4ab6-aa3f-22f6f743b480 | 0xffff | -| `certprop` | 30eae751-411f-414c-988b-a8bfa8913f49 | 0xffff | -| `scfilter` | eed7f3c9-62ba-400e-a001-658869df9a91 | 0xffff | -| `wudfusbccid` | a3c09ba3-2f62-4be5-a50f-8278a646ac9d | 0xffff | +| Friendly name | GUID | Flags | +|--|--|--| +| `scardsvr` | 13038e47-ffec-425d-bc69-5707708075fe | 0xffff | +| `winscard` | 3fce7c5f-fb3b-4bce-a9d8-55cc0ce1cf01 | 0xffff | +| `basecsp` | 133a980d-035d-4e2d-b250-94577ad8fced | 0x7 | +| `scksp` | 133a980d-035d-4e2d-b250-94577ad8fced | 0x7 | +| `msclmd` | fb36caf4-582b-4604-8841-9263574c4f2c | 0x7 | +| `credprov` | dba0e0e0-505a-4ab6-aa3f-22f6f743b480 | 0xffff | +| `certprop` | 30eae751-411f-414c-988b-a8bfa8913f49 | 0xffff | +| `scfilter` | eed7f3c9-62ba-400e-a001-658869df9a91 | 0xffff | +| `wudfusbccid` | a3c09ba3-2f62-4be5-a50f-8278a646ac9d | 0xffff | -Examples +### Examples To enable tracing for the SCardSvr service: -- **tracelog.exe -kd -rt -start scardsvr -guid \#13038e47-ffec-425d-bc69-5707708075fe -f .\\scardsvr.etl -flags 0xffff -ft 1** +```cmd +tracelog.exe -kd -rt -start scardsvr -guid \#13038e47-ffec-425d-bc69-5707708075fe -f .\scardsvr.etl -flags 0xffff -ft 1 +logman.exe start scardsvr -ets -p {13038e47-ffec-425d-bc69-5707708075fe} 0xffff -ft 1 -rt -o .\scardsvr.etl -mode 0x00080000 +``` -- **logman start scardsvr -ets -p {13038e47-ffec-425d-bc69-5707708075fe} 0xffff -ft 1 -rt -o .\\scardsvr.etl -mode 0x00080000** +To enable tracing for `scfilter.sys`: -To enable tracing for scfilter.sys: - - - **tracelog.exe -kd -rt -start scfilter -guid \#eed7f3c9-62ba-400e-a001-658869df9a91 -f .\\scfilter.etl -flags 0xffff -ft 1** +```cmd +tracelog.exe -kd -rt -start scfilter -guid \#eed7f3c9-62ba-400e-a001-658869df9a91 -f .\scfilter.etl -flags 0xffff -ft 1 +``` ### Stop the trace Using WPP, use one of the following commands to stop the tracing: -- **tracelog.exe -stop** <*FriendlyName*> +```cmd +tracelog.exe -stop <*FriendlyName*> +logman.exe -stop <*FriendlyName*> -ets +``` -- **logman -stop** <*FriendlyName*> **-ets** +For example, to stop a trace: -#### Examples - -To stop a trace: - -- **tracelog.exe -stop scardsvr** - -- **logman -stop scardsvr -ets** +```cmd +tracelog.exe -stop scardsvr +logman.exe -stop scardsvr -ets +``` ## Kerberos protocol, KDC, and NTLM debugging and tracing - - You can use these resources to troubleshoot these protocols and the KDC: -- [Kerberos and LDAP Troubleshooting Tips](/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb463167(v=technet.10)). +- [Kerberos and LDAP Troubleshooting Tips](/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb463167(v=technet.10)) +- [Windows Driver Kit (WDK) and Debugging Tools for Windows (WinDbg)](https://developer.microsoft.com/windows/hardware/windows-driver-kit). You can use the trace log tool in this SDK to debug Kerberos authentication failures. -- [Windows Driver Kit (WDK) and Debugging Tools for Windows (WinDbg)](https://developer.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/hardware/windows-driver-kit).  You can use the trace log tool in this SDK to debug Kerberos authentication failures. - -To begin tracing, you can use `Tracelog`. Different components use different control GUIDs as explained in these examples. For more information, see [`Tracelog`](/windows-hardware/drivers/devtest/tracelog). +To begin tracing, you can use `Tracelog`. Different components use different control GUIDs as explained in these examples. For more information, see [`Tracelog`](/windows-hardware/drivers/devtest/tracelog) ### NTLM To enable tracing for NTLM authentication, run the following command on the command line: - - **tracelog.exe -kd -rt -start ntlm -guid \#5BBB6C18-AA45-49b1-A15F-085F7ED0AA90 -f .\\ntlm.etl -flags 0x15003 -ft 1** +```cmd +tracelog.exe -kd -rt -start ntlm -guid \#5BBB6C18-AA45-49b1-A15F-085F7ED0AA90 -f .\ntlm.etl -flags 0x15003 -ft 1 +``` To stop tracing for NTLM authentication, run this command: - - **tracelog -stop ntlm** +```cmd +tracelog -stop ntlm +``` ### Kerberos authentication To enable tracing for Kerberos authentication, run this command: - - **tracelog.exe -kd -rt -start kerb -guid \#6B510852-3583-4e2d-AFFE-A67F9F223438 -f .\\kerb.etl -flags 0x43 -ft 1** +```cmd +tracelog.exe -kd -rt -start kerb -guid \#6B510852-3583-4e2d-AFFE-A67F9F223438 -f .\kerb.etl -flags 0x43 -ft 1 +``` To stop tracing for Kerberos authentication, run this command: - - **tracelog.exe -stop kerb** +```cmd +tracelog.exe -stop kerb +``` ### KDC To enable tracing for the KDC, run the following command on the command line: - - **tracelog.exe -kd -rt -start kdc -guid \#1BBA8B19-7F31-43c0-9643-6E911F79A06B -f .\\kdc.etl -flags 0x803 -ft 1** +```cmd +tracelog.exe -kd -rt -start kdc -guid \#1BBA8B19-7F31-43c0-9643-6E911F79A06B -f .\kdc.etl -flags 0x803 -ft 1 +``` To stop tracing for the KDC, run the following command on the command line: - - **tracelog.exe -stop kdc** +```cmd +tracelog.exe -stop kdc +``` -To stop tracing from a remote computer, run this command: logman.exe -s *<ComputerName>*. +To stop tracing from a remote computer, run this command: + +```cmd +logman.exe -s +``` > [!NOTE] -> The default location for logman.exe is %systemroot%system32\\. Use the **-s** option to supply a computer name. +> The default location for logman.exe is %systemroot%system32\. Use the **-s** option to supply a computer name. ### Configure tracing with the registry You can also configure tracing by editing the Kerberos registry values shown in the following table. -| Element | Registry Key Setting | -|-------------|----------------------------------------------------| -| NTLM | HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\MSV1\_0
Value name: NtLmInfoLevel
Value type: DWORD
Value data: c0015003 | -| Kerberos | HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Kerberos
Value name: LogToFile
Value type: DWORD
Value data: 00000001

HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Kerberos\\Parameters
Value name: KerbDebugLevel
Value type: DWORD
Value data: c0000043

HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Kerberos\\Parameters
Value name: LogToFile
Value type: DWORD
Value data: 00000001 | -| KDC | HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\Kdc
Value name: KdcDebugLevel
Value type: DWORD
Value data: c0000803 | +| Element | Registry Key Setting | +|--|--| +| NTLM | HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\MSV1_0
Value name: NtLmInfoLevel
Value type: DWORD
Value data: c0015003 | +| Kerberos | HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Kerberos
Value name: LogToFile
Value type: DWORD
Value data: 00000001

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Kerberos\Parameters
Value name: KerbDebugLevel
Value type: DWORD
Value data: c0000043

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Kerberos\Parameters
Value name: LogToFile
Value type: DWORD
Value data: 00000001 | +| KDC | HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Kdc
Value name: KdcDebugLevel
Value type: DWORD
Value data: c0000803 | -If you used `Tracelog`, look for the following log file in your current directory: kerb.etl/kdc.etl/ntlm.etl. +If you used `Tracelog`, look for the following log file in your current directory: `kerb.etl/kdc.etl/ntlm.etl`. If you used the registry key settings shown in the previous table, look for the trace log files in the following locations: -- NTLM: %systemroot%\\tracing\\msv1\_0 +- NTLM: `%systemroot%\tracing\msv1_0` +- Kerberos: `%systemroot%\tracing\kerberos` +- KDC: `%systemroot%\tracing\kdcsvc` -- Kerberos: %systemroot%\\tracing\\kerberos  - -- KDC: %systemroot%\\tracing\\kdcsvc  - -To decode event trace files, you can use `Tracefmt` (tracefmt.exe). `Tracefmt` is a command-line tool that formats and displays trace messages from an event trace log file (.etl) or a real-time trace session. `Tracefmt` can display the messages in the Command Prompt window or save them in a text file. It is located in the \\tools\\tracing subdirectory of the Windows Driver Kit (WDK). For more information, see [`Tracefmt`](/windows-hardware/drivers/devtest/tracefmt). +To decode event trace files, you can use `Tracefmt` (tracefmt.exe). `Tracefmt` is a command-line tool that formats and displays trace messages from an event trace log file (.etl) or a real-time trace session. `Tracefmt` can display the messages in the Command Prompt window or save them in a text file. It is located in the \tools\tracing subdirectory of the Windows Driver Kit (WDK). For more information, see [`Tracefmt`](/windows-hardware/drivers/devtest/tracefmt). ## Smart Card service The smart card resource manager service runs in the context of a local service. It's implemented as a shared service of the services host (svchost) process. -**To check if Smart Card service is running** +To check if Smart Card service is running: -1. Press CTRL+ALT+DEL, and then select **Start Task Manager**. +1. Press CTRL+ALT+DEL, and then select **Start Task Manager** +1. In the **Windows Task Manager** dialog box, select the **Services** tab +1. Select the **Name** column to sort the list alphabetically, and then type **s** +1. In the **Name** column, look for **SCardSvr**, and then look under the **Status** column to see if the service is running or stopped -2. In the **Windows Task Manager** dialog box, select the **Services** tab. +To restart Smart Card service: -3. Select the **Name** column to sort the list alphabetically, and then type **s**. - -4. In the **Name** column, look for **SCardSvr**, and then look under the **Status** column to see if the service is running or stopped. - -**To restart Smart Card service** - -1. Run as administrator at the command prompt. - -2. If the **User Account Control** dialog box appears, confirm that the action it displays is what you want, and then select **Yes**. - -3. At the command prompt, type `net stop SCardSvr`. - -4. At the command prompt, type `net start SCardSvr`. +1. Run as administrator at the command prompt +1. If the **User Account Control** dialog box appears, confirm that the action it displays is what you want, and then select **Yes** +1. At the command prompt, type `net stop SCardSvr` +1. At the command prompt, type `net start SCardSvr` You can use the following command at the command prompt to check whether the service is running: `sc queryex scardsvr`. @@ -215,15 +215,12 @@ C:\> As with any device connected to a computer, Device Manager can be used to view properties and begin the debug process. -**To check if smart card reader is working** +To check if smart card reader is working: -1. Navigate to **Computer**. - -2. Right-click **Computer**, and then select **Properties**. - -3. Under **Tasks**, select **Device Manager**. - -4. In Device Manager, expand **Smart card readers**, select the name of the smart card reader you want to check, and then select **Properties**. +1. Navigate to **Computer** +1. Right-click **Computer**, and then select **Properties** +1. Under **Tasks**, select **Device Manager** +1. In Device Manager, expand **Smart card readers**, select the name of the smart card reader you want to check, and then select **Properties** > [!NOTE] > If the smart card reader is not listed in Device Manager, in the **Action** menu, select **Scan for hardware changes**. diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-group-policy-and-registry-settings.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-group-policy-and-registry-settings.md index 81d22a9785..270eda4a77 100644 --- a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-group-policy-and-registry-settings.md +++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-group-policy-and-registry-settings.md @@ -1,9 +1,8 @@ --- title: Smart Card Group Policy and Registry Settings description: Discover the Group Policy, registry key, local security policy, and credential delegation policy settings that are available for configuring smart cards. -ms.reviewer: ardenw ms.topic: reference -ms.date: 11/02/2021 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 --- # Smart Card Group Policy and Registry Settings @@ -12,72 +11,51 @@ This article for IT professionals and smart card developers describes the Group The following sections and tables list the smart card-related Group Policy settings and registry keys that can be set on a per-computer basis. If you use domain Group Policy Objects (GPOs), you can edit and apply Group Policy settings to local or domain computers. -- [Primary Group Policy settings for smart cards](#primary-group-policy-settings-for-smart-cards) - - - [Allow certificates with no extended key usage certificate attribute](#allow-certificates-with-no-extended-key-usage-certificate-attribute) - - - [Allow ECC certificates to be used for logon and authentication](#allow-ecc-certificates-to-be-used-for-logon-and-authentication) - - - [Allow Integrated Unblock screen to be displayed at the time of logon](#allow-integrated-unblock-screen-to-be-displayed-at-the-time-of-logon) - - - [Allow signature keys valid for Logon](#allow-signature-keys-valid-for-logon) - - - [Allow time invalid certificates](#allow-time-invalid-certificates) - - - [Allow user name hint](#allow-user-name-hint) - - - [Configure root certificate clean up](#configure-root-certificate-clean-up) - - - [Display string when smart card is blocked](#display-string-when-smart-card-is-blocked) - - - [Filter duplicate logon certificates](#filter-duplicate-logon-certificates) - - - [Force the reading of all certificates from the smart card](#force-the-reading-of-all-certificates-from-the-smart-card) - - - [Notify user of successful smart card driver installation](#notify-user-of-successful-smart-card-driver-installation) - - - [Prevent plaintext PINs from being returned by Credential Manager](#prevent-plaintext-pins-from-being-returned-by-credential-manager) - - - [Reverse the subject name stored in a certificate when displaying](#reverse-the-subject-name-stored-in-a-certificate-when-displaying) - - - [Turn on certificate propagation from smart card](#turn-on-certificate-propagation-from-smart-card) - - - [Turn on root certificate propagation from smart card](#turn-on-root-certificate-propagation-from-smart-card) - - - [Turn on Smart Card Plug and Play service](#turn-on-smart-card-plug-and-play-service) - -- [Base CSP and Smart Card KSP registry keys](#base-csp-and-smart-card-ksp-registry-keys) - -- [CRL checking registry keys](#crl-checking-registry-keys) - -- [Additional smart card Group Policy settings and registry keys](#additional-smart-card-group-policy-settings-and-registry-keys) +- [Primary Group Policy settings for smart cards](#primary-group-policy-settings-for-smart-cards) + - [Allow certificates with no extended key usage certificate attribute](#allow-certificates-with-no-extended-key-usage-certificate-attribute) + - [Allow ECC certificates to be used for logon and authentication](#allow-ecc-certificates-to-be-used-for-logon-and-authentication) + - [Allow Integrated Unblock screen to be displayed at the time of logon](#allow-integrated-unblock-screen-to-be-displayed-at-the-time-of-logon) + - [Allow signature keys valid for Logon](#allow-signature-keys-valid-for-logon) + - [Allow time invalid certificates](#allow-time-invalid-certificates) + - [Allow user name hint](#allow-user-name-hint) + - [Configure root certificate clean up](#configure-root-certificate-clean-up) + - [Display string when smart card is blocked](#display-string-when-smart-card-is-blocked) + - [Filter duplicate logon certificates](#filter-duplicate-logon-certificates) + - [Force the reading of all certificates from the smart card](#force-the-reading-of-all-certificates-from-the-smart-card) + - [Notify user of successful smart card driver installation](#notify-user-of-successful-smart-card-driver-installation) + - [Prevent plaintext PINs from being returned by Credential Manager](#prevent-plaintext-pins-from-being-returned-by-credential-manager) + - [Reverse the subject name stored in a certificate when displaying](#reverse-the-subject-name-stored-in-a-certificate-when-displaying) + - [Turn on certificate propagation from smart card](#turn-on-certificate-propagation-from-smart-card) + - [Turn on root certificate propagation from smart card](#turn-on-root-certificate-propagation-from-smart-card) + - [Turn on Smart Card Plug and Play service](#turn-on-smart-card-plug-and-play-service) +- [Base CSP and Smart Card KSP registry keys](#base-csp-and-smart-card-ksp-registry-keys) +- [CRL checking registry keys](#crl-checking-registry-keys) +- [Additional smart card Group Policy settings and registry keys](#additional-smart-card-group-policy-settings-and-registry-keys) ## Primary Group Policy settings for smart cards -The following smart card Group Policy settings are in Computer Configuration\\Administrative Templates\\Windows Components\\Smart Card. +The following smart card Group Policy settings are in Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Smart Card. The registry keys are in the following locations: -- **HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\ScPnP\\EnableScPnP** - -- **HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\SmartCardCredentialProvider** - -- **HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CertProp** +- **HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\ScPnP\EnableScPnP** +- **HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\SmartCardCredentialProvider** +- **HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\CertProp** > [!NOTE] -> Smart card reader registry information is in **HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Calais\\Readers**.
-Smart card registry information is in **HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Calais\\SmartCards**. +> Smart card reader registry information is in **HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Cryptography\Calais\Readers**.\ +> Smart card registry information is in **HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Cryptography\Calais\SmartCards**. The following table lists the default values for these GPO settings. Variations are documented under the policy descriptions in this article. -| **Server type or GPO** | **Default value** | -|----------------------------------------------|-------------------| -| Default Domain Policy | Not configured | -| Default Domain Controller Policy | Not configured | -| Stand-Alone Server Default Settings | Not configured | -| Domain Controller Effective Default Settings | Disabled | -| Member Server Effective Default Settings | Disabled | -| Client Computer Effective Default Settings | Disabled | +| Server type or GPO | Default value | +|--|--| +| Default Domain Policy | Not configured | +| Default Domain Controller Policy | Not configured | +| Stand-Alone Server Default Settings | Not configured | +| Domain Controller Effective Default Settings | Disabled | +| Member Server Effective Default Settings | Disabled | +| Client Computer Effective Default Settings | Disabled | ### Allow certificates with no extended key usage certificate attribute @@ -85,70 +63,66 @@ You can use this policy setting to allow certificates without an extended key us > [!NOTE] > extended key usage certificate attribute is also known as extended key usage. -> +> > In versions of Windows before Windows Vista, smart card certificates that are used to sign in require an EKU extension with a smart card logon object identifier. This policy setting can be used to modify that restriction. When this policy setting is turned on, certificates with the following attributes can also be used to sign in with a smart card: -- Certificates with no EKU - -- Certificates with an All Purpose EKU - -- Certificates with a Client Authentication EKU +- Certificates with no EKU +- Certificates with an All Purpose EKU +- Certificates with a Client Authentication EKU When this policy setting isn't turned on, only certificates that contain the smart card logon object identifier can be used to sign in with a smart card. -| **Item** | **Description** | -|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| -| Registry key | AllowCertificatesWithNoEKU | -| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Disabled and not configured are equivalent | -| Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: None | -| Notes and resources | | +| Item | Description | +|--|--| +| Registry key | AllowCertificatesWithNoEKU | +| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Disabled and not configured are equivalent | +| Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: None | ### Allow ECC certificates to be used for logon and authentication -You can use this policy setting to control whether elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) certificates on a smart card can be used to sign in to a domain. +You can use this policy setting to control whether elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) certificates on a smart card can be used to sign in to a domain. -When this setting is turned on, ECC certificates on a smart card can be used to sign in to a domain. +When this setting is turned on, ECC certificates on a smart card can be used to sign in to a domain. When this setting isn't turned on, ECC certificates on a smart card can't be used to sign in to a domain. -| **Item** | **Description** | -|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------| -| Registry key | **EnumerateECCCerts** | -| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Disabled and not configured are equivalent | -| Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: None | -| Notes and resources | This policy setting only affects a user's ability to sign in to a domain. ECC certificates on a smart card that are used for other applications, such as document signing, aren't affected by this policy setting.
If you use an ECDSA key to sign in, you must also have an associated ECDH key to permit sign in when you're not connected to the network. | +| Item | Description | +|--|--| +| Registry key | `EnumerateECCCerts` | +| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Disabled and not configured are equivalent | +| Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: None | +| Notes and resources | This policy setting only affects a user's ability to sign in to a domain. ECC certificates on a smart card that are used for other applications, such as document signing, aren't affected by this policy setting.
If you use an ECDSA key to sign in, you must also have an associated ECDH key to permit sign in when you're not connected to the network. | ### Allow Integrated Unblock screen to be displayed at the time of logon You can use this policy setting to determine whether the integrated unblock feature is available in the sign-in user interface (UI). The feature was introduced as a standard feature in the Credential Security Support Provider in Windows Vista. -When this setting is turned on, the integrated unblock feature is available. +When this setting is turned on, the integrated unblock feature is available. When this setting isn't turned on, the feature is not available. -| **Item** | **Description** | -|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| -| Registry key | **AllowIntegratedUnblock** | -| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Disabled and not configured are equivalent | -| Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: None | -| Notes and resources | To use the integrated unblock feature, the smart card must support it. Check with the hardware manufacturer to verify that the smart card supports this feature.
You can create a custom message that the user sees when the smart card is blocked by configuring the policy setting [Display string when smart card is blocked](#display-string-when-smart-card-is-blocked). | +| Item | Description | +|--|--| +| Registry key | `AllowIntegratedUnblock` | +| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Disabled and not configured are equivalent | +| Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: None | +| Notes and resources | To use the integrated unblock feature, the smart card must support it. Check with the hardware manufacturer to verify that the smart card supports this feature.
You can create a custom message that the user sees when the smart card is blocked by configuring the policy setting [Display string when smart card is blocked](#display-string-when-smart-card-is-blocked). | ### Allow signature keys valid for Logon -You can use this policy setting to allow signature key–based certificates to be enumerated and available for sign-in. +You can use this policy setting to allow signature key-based certificates to be enumerated and available for sign-in. When this setting is turned on, any certificates that are available on the smart card with a signature-only key are listed on the sign-in screen. When this setting isn't turned on, certificates available on the smart card with a signature-only key aren't listed on the sign-in screen. -| **Item** | **Description** | -|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| -| Registry key | **AllowSignatureOnlyKeys**| -| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Disabled and not configured are equivalent | -| Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: None | -| Notes and resources | | +| Item | Description | +|--|--| +| Registry key | **AllowSignatureOnlyKeys** | +| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Disabled and not configured are equivalent | +| Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: None | ### Allow time invalid certificates @@ -161,85 +135,79 @@ When this setting is turned on, certificates are listed on the sign-in screen wh When this policy setting isn't turned on, certificates that are expired or not yet valid aren't listed on the sign-in screen. -| **Item** | **Description** | -|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| -| Registry key | **AllowTimeInvalidCertificates** | -| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Disabled and not configured are equivalent | -| Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: None | -| Notes and resources | | +| Item | Description | +|--|--| +| Registry key | `AllowTimeInvalidCertificates` | +| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Disabled and not configured are equivalent | +| Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: None | ### Allow user name hint -You can use this policy setting to determine whether an optional field appears during sign-in and provides a subsequent elevation process where users can enter their username or username and domain, which associates a certificate with the user. +You can use this policy setting to determine whether an optional field appears during sign-in and provides a subsequent elevation process where users can enter their username or username and domain, which associates a certificate with the user. -When this policy setting is turned on, users see an optional field where they can enter their username or username and domain. +When this policy setting is turned on, users see an optional field where they can enter their username or username and domain. When this policy setting isn't turned on, users don't see this optional field. -| **Item** | **Description** | -|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| -| Registry key | **X509HintsNeeded**| -| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Disabled and not configured are equivalent | -| Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: None | -| Notes and resources | | +| Item | Description | +|--|--| +| Registry key | `X509HintsNeeded` | +| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Disabled and not configured are equivalent | +| Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: None | ### Configure root certificate clean-up -You can use this policy setting to manage the cleanup behavior of root certificates. Certificates are verified by using a trust chain, and the trust anchor for the digital certificate is the Root Certification Authority (CA). A CA can issue multiple certificates with the root certificate as the top certificate of the tree structure. A private key is used to sign other certificates. This creates an inherited trustworthiness for all certificates immediately under the root certificate. +You can use this policy setting to manage the cleanup behavior of root certificates. Certificates are verified by using a trust chain, and the trust anchor for the digital certificate is the Root Certification Authority (CA). A CA can issue multiple certificates with the root certificate as the top certificate of the tree structure. A private key is used to sign other certificates. This creates an inherited trustworthiness for all certificates immediately under the root certificate. When this policy setting is turned on, you can set the following cleanup options: -- **No cleanup**. When the user signs out or removes the smart card, the root certificates used during their session persist on the computer. - -- **Clean up certificates on smart card removal**. When the smart card is removed, the root certificates are removed. - -- **Clean up certificates on log off**. When the user signs out of Windows, the root certificates are removed. +- **No cleanup**. When the user signs out or removes the smart card, the root certificates used during their session persist on the computer. +- **Clean up certificates on smart card removal**. When the smart card is removed, the root certificates are removed. +- **Clean up certificates on log off**. When the user signs out of Windows, the root certificates are removed. When this policy setting isn't turned on, root certificates are automatically removed when the user signs out of Windows. -| **Item** | **Description** | -|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| -| Registry key | **RootCertificateCleanupOption**| -| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Disabled and not configured are equivalent | -| Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: None | -| Notes and resources | | +| Item | Description | +|--|--| +| Registry key | `RootCertificateCleanupOption` | +| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Disabled and not configured are equivalent | +| Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: None | ### Display string when smart card is blocked You can use this policy setting to change the default message that a user sees if their smart card is blocked. -When this policy setting is turned on, you can create and manage the displayed message that the user sees when a smart card is blocked. +When this policy setting is turned on, you can create and manage the displayed message that the user sees when a smart card is blocked. When this policy setting isn't turned on (and the integrated unblock feature is also enabled), the user sees the system's default message when the smart card is blocked. -| **Item** | **Description** | -|--------------------------------------|-------------------------| -| Registry key | **IntegratedUnblockPromptString** | -| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Disabled and not configured are equivalent | +| Item | Description | +|--|--| +| Registry key | `IntegratedUnblockPromptString` | +| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Disabled and not configured are equivalent | | Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: This policy setting is only effective when the [Allow Integrated Unblock screen to be displayed at the time of logon](#allow-integrated-unblock-screen-to-be-displayed-at-the-time-of-logon) policy is enabled. | -| Notes and resources | | ### Filter duplicate logon certificates -You can use this policy setting to configure which valid sign-in certificates are displayed. +You can use this policy setting to configure which valid sign-in certificates are displayed. > [!NOTE] > During the certificate renewal period, a user's smart card can have multiple valid sign-in certificates issued from the same certificate template, which can cause confusion about which certificate to select. This behavior can occur when a certificate is renewed and the old certificate has not expired yet. -> +> > If two certificates are issued from the same template with the same major version and they are for the same user (this is determined by their UPN), they are determined to be the same. -When this policy setting is turned on, filtering occurs so that the user can select from only the most current valid certificates. +When this policy setting is turned on, filtering occurs so that the user can select from only the most current valid certificates. If this policy setting isn't turned on, all the certificates are displayed to the user. This policy setting is applied to the computer after the [Allow time invalid certificates](#allow-time-invalid-certificates) policy setting is applied. -| **Item** | **Description** | -|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| -| Registry key | **FilterDuplicateCerts**| -| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Disabled and not configured are equivalent | -| Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: None | -| Notes and resources | If there are two or more of the same certificates on a smart card and this policy setting is enabled, the certificate that is used to sign in to computers running Windows 2000, Windows XP, or Windows Server 2003 will be displayed. Otherwise, the certificate with the most distant expiration time will be displayed. | +| Item | Description | +|--|--| +| Registry key | `FilterDuplicateCerts` | +| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Disabled and not configured are equivalent | +| Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: None | +| Notes and resources | If there are two or more of the same certificates on a smart card and this policy setting is enabled, the certificate with the most distant expiration time is displayed. | ### Force the reading of all certificates from the smart card @@ -249,45 +217,45 @@ When this policy setting is turned on, Windows attempts to read all certificates When this policy isn't turned on, Windows attempts to read only the default certificate from smart cards that don't support retrieval of all certificates in a single call. Certificates other than the default aren't available for sign-in. -| **Item** | **Description** | -|--------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------| -| Registry key | **ForceReadingAllCertificates** | -| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Disabled and not configured are equivalent | -| Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: None

**Important**: Enabling this policy setting can adversely impact performance during the sign-in process in certain situations. | -| Notes and resources | Contact the smart card vendor to determine if your smart card and associated CSP support the required behavior. | +| Item | Description | +|--|--| +| Registry key | `ForceReadingAllCertificates` | +| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Disabled and not configured are equivalent | +| Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: None

**Important**: Enabling this policy setting can adversely impact performance during the sign-in process in certain situations. | +| Notes and resources | Contact the smart card vendor to determine if your smart card and associated CSP support the required behavior. | ### Notify user of successful smart card driver installation -You can use this policy setting to control whether the user sees a confirmation message when a smart card device driver is installed. +You can use this policy setting to control whether the user sees a confirmation message when a smart card device driver is installed. -When this policy setting is turned on, the user sees a confirmation message when a smart card device driver is installed. +When this policy setting is turned on, the user sees a confirmation message when a smart card device driver is installed. When this setting isn't turned on, the user doesn't see a smart card device driver installation message. -| **Item** | **Description** | -|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------| -| Registry key | **ScPnPNotification** | -| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Disabled and not configured are equivalent | -| Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: None | -| Notes and resources | This policy setting applies only to smart card drivers that have passed the Windows Hardware Quality Labs (WHQL) testing process. | +|--|--| +| -------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------ | +| Registry key | `ScPnPNotification` | +| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Disabled and not configured are equivalent | +| Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: None | +| Notes and resources | This policy setting applies only to smart card drivers that have passed the Windows Hardware Quality Labs (WHQL) testing process. | ### Prevent plaintext PINs from being returned by Credential Manager -You can use this policy setting to prevent Credential Manager from returning plaintext PINs. +You can use this policy setting to prevent Credential Manager from returning plaintext PINs. > [!NOTE] -> Credential Manager is controlled by the user on the local computer, and it stores credentials from supported browsers and Windows applications. Credentials are saved in special encrypted folders on the computer under the user's profile. +> Credential Manager is controlled by the user on the local computer, and it stores credentials from supported browsers and Windows applications. Credentials are saved in special encrypted folders on the computer under the user's profile. -When this policy setting is turned on, Credential Manager doesn't return a plaintext PIN. +When this policy setting is turned on, Credential Manager doesn't return a plaintext PIN. When this setting isn't turned on, Credential Manager can return plaintext PINs. -| **Item** | **Description** | -|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------| -| Registry key | **DisallowPlaintextPin**| -| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Disabled and not configured are equivalent | -| Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: None | -| Notes and resources | If this policy setting is enabled, some smart cards might not work in computers running Windows. Consult the smart card manufacturer to determine whether this policy setting should be enabled. | +| Item | Description | +|--|--| +| Registry key | `DisallowPlaintextPin` | +| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Disabled and not configured are equivalent | +| Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: None | +| Notes and resources | If this policy setting is enabled, some smart cards might not work in computers running Windows. Consult the smart card manufacturer to determine whether this policy setting should be enabled. | ### Reverse the subject name stored in a certificate when displaying @@ -300,13 +268,11 @@ When this policy setting is turned on, the subject name during sign-in appears r When this policy setting isn't turned on, the subject name appears the same as it's stored in the certificate. - -| **Item** | **Description** | -|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| -| Registry key | **ReverseSubject** | -| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Disabled and not configured are equivalent | -| Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: None | -| Notes and resources | | +| Item | Description | +|--|--| +| Registry key | `ReverseSubject` | +| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Disabled and not configured are equivalent | +| Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: None | ### Turn on certificate propagation from smart card @@ -318,128 +284,123 @@ When this policy setting is turned on, certificate propagation occurs when the u When this policy setting is turned off, certificate propagation doesn't occur, and the certificates aren't available to applications, like Outlook. -| **Item** | **Description** | -|--------------------------------------|----------------| -| Registry key | **CertPropEnabled**| -| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Enabled and not configured are equivalent | +| Item | Description | +|--|--| +| Registry key | `CertPropEnabled` | +| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Enabled and not configured are equivalent | | Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: This policy setting must be enabled to allow the [Turn on root certificate propagation from smart card](#turn-on-root-certificate-propagation-from-smart-card) setting to work when it is enabled. | -| Notes and resources | | ### Turn on root certificate propagation from smart card -You can use this policy setting to manage the root certificate propagation that occurs when a smart card is inserted. +You can use this policy setting to manage the root certificate propagation that occurs when a smart card is inserted. > [!NOTE] -> The certificate propagation service applies when a signed-in user inserts a smart card in a reader that is attached to the computer. This action causes the certificate to be read from the smart card. The certificates are then added to the user's Personal store. +> The certificate propagation service applies when a signed-in user inserts a smart card in a reader that is attached to the computer. This action causes the certificate to be read from the smart card. The certificates are then added to the user's Personal store. When this policy setting is turned on, root certificate propagation occurs when the user inserts the smart card. When this policy setting isn't turned on, root certificate propagation doesn't occur when the user inserts the smart card. -| **Item** | **Description** | -|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| -| Registry key | **EnableRootCertificate Propagation** | -| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Enabled and not configured are equivalent | +| Item | Description | +|--|--| +| Registry key | `EnableRootCertificate Propagation` | +| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Enabled and not configured are equivalent | | Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: For this policy setting to work, the [Turn on certificate propagation from smart card](#turn-on-certificate-propagation-from-smart-card) policy setting must also be enabled. | -| Notes and resources | | +| Notes and resources | | ### Turn on Smart Card Plug and Play service -You can use this policy setting to control whether Smart Card Plug and Play is enabled. +You can use this policy setting to control whether Smart Card Plug and Play is enabled. > [!NOTE] > Your users can use smart cards from vendors who have published their drivers through Windows Update without needing special middleware. These drivers will be downloaded in the same way as drivers for other devices in Windows. If an appropriate driver isn't available from Windows Update, a PIV-compliant mini driver that's included with any of the supported versions of Windows is used for these cards. -When this policy setting is turned on, the system attempts to install a smart card device driver the first time a smart card is inserted in a smart card reader. +When this policy setting is turned on, the system attempts to install a smart card device driver the first time a smart card is inserted in a smart card reader. When this policy setting isn't turned on, a device driver isn't installed when a smart card is inserted in a smart card reader. -| **Item** | **Description** | -|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------| -| Registry key | **EnableScPnP** | -| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Enabled and not configured are equivalent | -| Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: None | -| Notes and resources | This policy setting applies only to smart card drivers that have passed the Windows Hardware Quality Labs (WHQL) testing process. | +| Item | Description | +|--|--| +| Registry key | `EnableScPnP` | +| Default values | No changes per operating system versions
Enabled and not configured are equivalent | +| Policy management | Restart requirement: None
Sign off requirement: None
Policy conflicts: None | +| Notes and resources | This policy setting applies only to smart card drivers that have passed the Windows Hardware Quality Labs (WHQL) testing process. | ## Base CSP and Smart Card KSP registry keys The following registry keys can be configured for the base cryptography service provider (CSP) and the smart card key storage provider (KSP). The following tables list the keys. All keys use the DWORD type. -The registry keys for the Base CSP are in the registry in **HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Defaults\\Provider\\Microsoft Base Smart Card Crypto Provider**. +The registry keys for the Base CSP are in the registry in `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\Defaults\Provider\Microsoft Base Smart Card Crypto Provider`. -The registry keys for the smart card KSP are in **HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Control\\Cryptography\\Providers\\Microsoft Smart Card Key Storage Provider**. +The registry keys for the smart card KSP are in `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Cryptography\Providers\Microsoft Smart Card Key Storage Provider`. -**Registry keys for the base CSP and smart card KSP** +### Registry keys for the base CSP and smart card KSP -| **Registry Key** | **Description** | -|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------| -| **AllowPrivateExchangeKeyImport** | A non-zero value allows RSA exchange (for example, encryption) private keys to be imported for use in key archival scenarios.
Default value: 00000000 | -| **AllowPrivateSignatureKeyImport** | A non-zero value allows RSA signature private keys to be imported for use in key archival scenarios.
Default value: 00000000 | -| **DefaultPrivateKeyLenBits** | Defines the default length for private keys, if desired.
Default value: 00000400
Default key generation parameter: 1024-bit keys | -| **RequireOnCardPrivateKeyGen** | This key sets the flag that requires on-card private key generation (default). If this value is set, a key generated on a host can be imported into the smart card. This is used for smart cards that don't support on-card key generation or where key escrow is required.
Default value: 00000000 | -| **TransactionTimeoutMilliseconds** | Default timeout values allow you to specify whether transactions that take an excessive amount of time will fail.
Default value: 000005dc
The default timeout for holding transactions to the smart card is 1.5 seconds. | +| Registry Key | Description | +|--|--| +| **AllowPrivateExchangeKeyImport** | A non-zero value allows RSA exchange (for example, encryption) private keys to be imported for use in key archival scenarios.
Default value: 00000000 | +| **AllowPrivateSignatureKeyImport** | A non-zero value allows RSA signature private keys to be imported for use in key archival scenarios.
Default value: 00000000 | +| **DefaultPrivateKeyLenBits** | Defines the default length for private keys, if desired.
Default value: 00000400
Default key generation parameter: 1024-bit keys | +| **RequireOnCardPrivateKeyGen** | This key sets the flag that requires on-card private key generation (default). If this value is set, a key generated on a host can be imported into the smart card. This is used for smart cards that don't support on-card key generation or where key escrow is required.
Default value: 00000000 | +| **TransactionTimeoutMilliseconds** | Default timeout values allow you to specify whether transactions that take an excessive amount of time will fail.
Default value: 000005dc
The default timeout for holding transactions to the smart card is 1.5 seconds. | -**Additional registry keys for the smart card KSP** +Additional registry keys for the smart card KSP: -| **Registry Key** | **Description** | -|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------| -| **AllowPrivateECDHEKeyImport** | This value allows Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) private keys to be imported for use in key archival scenarios.
Default value: 00000000 | +| Registry Key | Description | +|--|--| +| **AllowPrivateECDHEKeyImport** | This value allows Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) private keys to be imported for use in key archival scenarios.
Default value: 00000000 | | **AllowPrivateECDSAKeyImport** | This value allows Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) private keys to be imported for use in key archival scenarios.
Default value: 00000000 | ## CRL checking registry keys The following table lists the keys and the corresponding values to turn off certificate revocation list (CRL) checking at the Key Distribution Center (KDC) or client. To manage CRL checking, you must configure settings for both the KDC and the client. -**CRL checking registry keys** - -| **Registry Key** | **Details** | -|------------|-----------------------------| -| **HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CCS\\Services\\Kdc\\UseCachedCRLOnlyAndIgnoreRevocationUnknownErrors**| Type = DWORD
Value = 1 | -| **HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CCS\\Control\\LSA\\Kerberos\\Parameters\\UseCachedCRLOnlyAndIgnoreRevocationUnknownErrors**| Type = DWORD
Value = 1 | +| Registry Key | Details | +|--|--| +| `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CCS\Services\Kdc\UseCachedCRLOnlyAndIgnoreRevocationUnknownErrors` | Type = DWORD
Value = 1 | +| `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CCS\Control\LSA\Kerberos\Parameters\UseCachedCRLOnlyAndIgnoreRevocationUnknownErrors` | Type = DWORD
Value = 1 | ## Additional smart card Group Policy settings and registry keys In a smart card deployment, additional Group Policy settings can be used to enhance ease-of-use or security. Two of these policy settings that can complement a smart card deployment are: -- Turning off delegation for computers +- Turning off delegation for computers +- Interactive logon: Do not require CTRL+ALT+DEL (not recommended) -- Interactive logon: Do not require CTRL+ALT+DEL (not recommended) +The following smart card-related Group Policy settings are in **Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\Security Options**. -The following smart card-related Group Policy settings are in Computer Configuration\\Windows Settings\\Security Settings\\Local Policies\\Security Options. +### Local security policy settings -**Local security policy settings** - -| Group Policy setting and registry key | Default | Description | -|------------------------------------------|------------|---------------| -| Interactive logon: Require smart card

**scforceoption** | Disabled | This security policy setting requires users to sign in to a computer by using a smart card.

**Enabled** Users can sign in to the computer only by using a smart card.
**Disabled** Users can sign in to the computer by using any method.

NOTE: the Windows LAPS-managed local account is exempted from this policy when Enabled. For more information see [Windows LAPS integration with smart card policy](/windows-server/identity/laps/laps-concepts#windows-laps-integration-with-smart-card-policy).
| -| Interactive logon: Smart card removal behavior

**scremoveoption** | This policy setting isn't defined, which means that the system treats it as **No Action**. | This setting determines what happens when the smart card for a signed-in user is removed from the smart card reader. The options are:
**No Action**
**Lock Workstation**: The workstation is locked when the smart card is removed, so users can leave the area, take their smart card with them, and still maintain a protected session.
**Force Logoff**: The user is automatically signed out when the smart card is removed.
**Disconnect if a Remote Desktop Services session**: Removal of the smart card disconnects the session without signing out the user. The user can reinsert the smart card and resume the session later, or at another computer that's equipped with a smart card reader, without having to sign in again. If the session is local, this policy setting functions identically to the **Lock Workstation** option.

**Note**: In earlier versions of Windows Server, Remote Desktop Services was called Terminal Services. | +| Group Policy setting and registry key | Default | Description | +|--|--|--| +| Interactive logon: Require smart card

**scforceoption** | Disabled | This security policy setting requires users to sign in to a computer by using a smart card.

**Enabled** Users can sign in to the computer only by using a smart card.
**Disabled** Users can sign in to the computer by using any method.

NOTE: the Windows LAPS-managed local account is exempted from this policy when Enabled. For more information see [Windows LAPS integration with smart card policy](/windows-server/identity/laps/laps-concepts#windows-laps-integration-with-smart-card-policy).
| +| Interactive logon: Smart card removal behavior

**scremoveoption** | This policy setting isn't defined, which means that the system treats it as **No Action**. | This setting determines what happens when the smart card for a signed-in user is removed from the smart card reader. The options are:
**No Action**
**Lock Workstation**: The workstation is locked when the smart card is removed, so users can leave the area, take their smart card with them, and still maintain a protected session.
**Force Logoff**: The user is automatically signed out when the smart card is removed.
**Disconnect if a Remote Desktop Services session**: Removal of the smart card disconnects the session without signing out the user. The user can reinsert the smart card and resume the session later, or at another computer that's equipped with a smart card reader, without having to sign in again. If the session is local, this policy setting functions identically to the **Lock Workstation** option. | From the Local Security Policy Editor (secpol.msc), you can edit and apply system policies to manage credential delegation for local or domain computers. -The following smart card-related Group Policy settings are in Computer Configuration\\Administrative Templates\\System\\Credentials Delegation. +The following smart card-related Group Policy settings are in **Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\System\Credentials Delegation**. -Registry keys are in **HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Control\\Lsa\\Credssp\\PolicyDefaults**. +Registry keys are in `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\Credssp\PolicyDefaults`. > [!NOTE] > In the following table, fresh credentials are those that you are prompted for when running an application. -**Credential delegation policy settings** +### Credential delegation policy settings +| Group Policy setting and registry key | Default | Description | +|--|--|--| +| Allow Delegating Fresh Credentials

**AllowFreshCredentials** | Not configured | This policy setting applies:
When server authentication was achieved through a trusted X509 certificate or Kerberos protocol.
To applications that use the CredSSP component (for example, Remote Desktop Services).

**Enabled**: You can specify the servers where the user's fresh credentials can be delegated.
**Not configured**: After proper mutual authentication, delegation of fresh credentials is permitted to Remote Desktop Services running on any computer.
**Disabled**: Delegation of fresh credentials to any computer isn't permitted.

**Note**: This policy setting can be set to one or more service principal names (SPNs). The SPN represents the target server where the user credentials can be delegated. A single wildcard character is permitted when specifying the SPN, for example:
Use \*TERMSRV/\*\* for Remote Desktop Session Host (RD Session Host) running on any computer.
Use *TERMSRV/host.humanresources.fabrikam.com* for RD Session Host running on the host.humanresources.fabrikam.com computer.
Use *TERMSRV/\*.humanresources.fabrikam.com* for RD Session Host running on all computers in .humanresources.fabrikam.com | +| Allow Delegating Fresh Credentials with NTLM-only Server Authentication

**AllowFreshCredentialsWhenNTLMOnly** | Not configured | This policy setting applies:
When server authentication was achieved by using NTLM.
To applications that use the CredSSP component (for example, Remote Desktop).

**Enabled**: You can specify the servers where the user's fresh credentials can be delegated.
**Not configured**: After proper mutual authentication, delegation of fresh credentials is permitted to RD Session Host running on any computer (TERMSRV/\*).
**Disabled**: Delegation of fresh credentials isn't permitted to any computer.

**Note**: This policy setting can be set to one or more SPNs. The SPN represents the target server where the user credentials can be delegated. A single wildcard character (\*) is permitted when specifying the SPN.
See the **Allow Delegating Fresh Credentials** policy setting description for examples. | +| Deny Delegating Fresh Credentials

**DenyFreshCredentials** | Not configured | This policy setting applies to applications that use the CredSSP component (for example, Remote Desktop).

**Enabled**: You can specify the servers where the user's fresh credentials can't be delegated.
**Disabled** or **Not configured**: A server is not specified.

**Note**: This policy setting can be set to one or more SPNs. The SPN represents the target server where the user credentials can't be delegated. A single wildcard character (\*) is permitted when specifying the SPN.
For examples, see the "Allow delegating fresh credentials" policy setting. | -| Group Policy setting and registry key | Default | Description | -|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| -| Allow Delegating Fresh Credentials

**AllowFreshCredentials** | Not configured | This policy setting applies:
When server authentication was achieved through a trusted X509 certificate or Kerberos protocol.
To applications that use the CredSSP component (for example, Remote Desktop Services).

**Enabled**: You can specify the servers where the user's fresh credentials can be delegated.
**Not configured**: After proper mutual authentication, delegation of fresh credentials is permitted to Remote Desktop Services running on any computer.
**Disabled**: Delegation of fresh credentials to any computer isn't permitted.

**Note**: This policy setting can be set to one or more service principal names (SPNs). The SPN represents the target server where the user credentials can be delegated. A single wildcard character is permitted when specifying the SPN, for example:
Use \*TERMSRV/\*\* for Remote Desktop Session Host (RD Session Host) running on any computer.
Use *TERMSRV/host.humanresources.fabrikam.com* for RD Session Host running on the host.humanresources.fabrikam.com computer.
Use *TERMSRV/\*.humanresources.fabrikam.com* for RD Session Host running on all computers in .humanresources.fabrikam.com | -| Allow Delegating Fresh Credentials with NTLM-only Server Authentication

**AllowFreshCredentialsWhenNTLMOnly** | Not configured | This policy setting applies:
When server authentication was achieved by using NTLM.
To applications that use the CredSSP component (for example, Remote Desktop).

**Enabled**: You can specify the servers where the user's fresh credentials can be delegated.
**Not configured**: After proper mutual authentication, delegation of fresh credentials is permitted to RD Session Host running on any computer (TERMSRV/\*).
**Disabled**: Delegation of fresh credentials isn't permitted to any computer.

**Note**: This policy setting can be set to one or more SPNs. The SPN represents the target server where the user credentials can be delegated. A single wildcard character (\*) is permitted when specifying the SPN.
See the **Allow Delegating Fresh Credentials** policy setting description for examples. | -| Deny Delegating Fresh Credentials

**DenyFreshCredentials** | Not configured | This policy setting applies to applications that use the CredSSP component (for example, Remote Desktop).

**Enabled**: You can specify the servers where the user's fresh credentials can't be delegated.
**Disabled** or **Not configured**: A server is not specified.

**Note**: This policy setting can be set to one or more SPNs. The SPN represents the target server where the user credentials can't be delegated. A single wildcard character (\*) is permitted when specifying the SPN.
For examples, see the "Allow delegating fresh credentials" policy setting. | +If you're using Remote Desktop Services with smart card logon, you can't delegate default and saved credentials. The registry keys in the following table, which are at `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\Credssp\PolicyDefaults`, and the corresponding Group Policy settings are ignored. -If you're using Remote Desktop Services with smart card logon, you can't delegate default and saved credentials. The registry keys in the following table, which are at **HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Control\\Lsa\\Credssp\\PolicyDefaults**, and the corresponding Group Policy settings are ignored. - -| **Registry key** | **Corresponding Group Policy setting** | -|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------| -| **AllowDefaultCredentials** | Allow Delegating Default Credentials | +| Registry Key| **Corresponding Group Policy setting** | +|--|--| +| **AllowDefaultCredentials** | Allow Delegating Default Credentials | | **AllowDefaultCredentialsWhenNTLMOnly** | Allow Delegating Default Credentials with NTLM-only Server Authentication | -| **AllowSavedCredentials** | Allow Delegating Saved Credentials | -| **AllowSavedCredentialsWhenNTLMOnly** | Allow Delegating Saved Credentials with NTLM-only Server Authentication | +| **AllowSavedCredentials** | Allow Delegating Saved Credentials | +| **AllowSavedCredentialsWhenNTLMOnly** | Allow Delegating Saved Credentials with NTLM-only Server Authentication | ## See also diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-how-smart-card-sign-in-works-in-windows.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-how-smart-card-sign-in-works-in-windows.md index 5ad7eb1205..2641967e6d 100644 --- a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-how-smart-card-sign-in-works-in-windows.md +++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-how-smart-card-sign-in-works-in-windows.md @@ -1,25 +1,19 @@ --- title: How Smart Card Sign-in Works in Windows description: This topic for IT professional provides links to resources about the implementation of smart card technologies in the Windows operating system. -ms.reviewer: ardenw ms.topic: overview -ms.date: 09/24/2021 +ms.date: 1/06/2023 --- # How Smart Card Sign-in Works in Windows This topic for IT professional provides links to resources about the implementation of smart card technologies in the Windows operating system. It includes the following resources about the architecture, certificate management, and services that are related to smart card use: -- [Smart Card Architecture](smart-card-architecture.md): Learn about enabling communications with smart cards and smart card readers, which can be different according to the vendor that supplies them. +- [Smart Card Architecture](smart-card-architecture.md): Learn about enabling communications with smart cards and smart card readers, which can be different according to the vendor that supplies them +- [Certificate Requirements and Enumeration](smart-card-certificate-requirements-and-enumeration.md): Learn about requirements for smart card certificates based on the operating system, and about the operations that are performed by the operating system when a smart card is inserted into the computer +- [Smart Card and Remote Desktop Services](smart-card-and-remote-desktop-services.md): Learn about using smart cards for remote desktop connections +- [Smart Cards for Windows Service](smart-card-smart-cards-for-windows-service.md): Learn about how the Smart Cards for Windows service is implemented +- [Certificate Propagation Service](smart-card-certificate-propagation-service.md): Learn about how the certificate propagation service works when a smart card is inserted into a computer +- [Smart Card Removal Policy Service](smart-card-removal-policy-service.md): Learn about using Group Policy to control what happens when a user removes a smart card -- [Certificate Requirements and Enumeration](smart-card-certificate-requirements-and-enumeration.md): Learn about requirements for smart card certificates based on the operating system, and about the operations that are performed by the operating system when a smart card is inserted into the computer. - -- [Smart Card and Remote Desktop Services](smart-card-and-remote-desktop-services.md): Learn about using smart cards for remote desktop connections. - -- [Smart Cards for Windows Service](smart-card-smart-cards-for-windows-service.md): Learn about how the Smart Cards for Windows service is implemented. - -- [Certificate Propagation Service](smart-card-certificate-propagation-service.md): Learn about how the certificate propagation service works when a smart card is inserted into a computer. - -- [Smart Card Removal Policy Service](smart-card-removal-policy-service.md): Learn about using Group Policy to control what happens when a user removes a smart card. - -[!INCLUDE [smart-cards-for-windows-service](../../../../includes/licensing/smart-cards-for-windows-service.md)] \ No newline at end of file +[!INCLUDE [smart-cards-for-windows-service](../../../../includes/licensing/smart-cards-for-windows-service.md)] diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-removal-policy-service.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-removal-policy-service.md index 4b9fd9a3fd..616ea96b49 100644 --- a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-removal-policy-service.md +++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-removal-policy-service.md @@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ --- title: Smart Card Removal Policy Service description: This topic for the IT professional describes the role of the removal policy service (ScPolicySvc) in smart card implementation. -ms.reviewer: ardenw ms.topic: concept-article ms.date: 09/24/2021 --- @@ -12,19 +11,14 @@ This topic for the IT professional describes the role of the removal policy serv The smart card removal policy service is applicable when a user has signed in with a smart card and then removes that smart card from the reader. The action that is performed when the smart card is removed is controlled by Group Policy settings. For more information, see [Smart Card Group Policy and Registry Settings](smart-card-group-policy-and-registry-settings.md). -**Smart card removal policy service** - ![Smart card removal policy service.](images/sc-image501.gif) The numbers in the previous figure represent the following actions: -1. Winlogon is not directly involved in monitoring for smart card removal events. The sequence of steps that are involved when a smart card is removed begins with the smart card credential provider in the sign-in UI process. When a user successfully signs in with a smart card, the smart card credential provider captures the reader name. This information is then stored in the registry with the session identifier where the sign-in was initiated. - -2. The smart card resource manager service notifies the smart card removal policy service that a sign-in has occurred. - -3. ScPolicySvc retrieves the smart card information that the smart card credential provider stored in the registry. This call is redirected if the user is in a remote session. If the smart card is removed, ScPolicySvc is notified. - -4. ScPolicySvc calls Remote Desktop Services to take the appropriate action if the request is to sign out the user or to disconnect the user's session, which might result in data loss. If the setting is configured to lock the computer when the smart card is removed, ScPolicySvc sends a message to Winlogon to lock the computer. +1. Winlogon isn't directly involved in monitoring for smart card removal events. The sequence of steps that are involved when a smart card is removed begins with the smart card credential provider in the sign-in UI process. When a user successfully signs in with a smart card, the smart card credential provider captures the reader name. This information is then stored in the registry with the session identifier where the sign-in was initiated. +1. The smart card resource manager service notifies the smart card removal policy service that a sign-in has occurred. +1. ScPolicySvc retrieves the smart card information that the smart card credential provider stored in the registry. This call is redirected if the user is in a remote session. If the smart card is removed, ScPolicySvc is notified. +1. ScPolicySvc calls Remote Desktop Services to take the appropriate action if the request is to sign out the user or to disconnect the user's session, which might result in data loss. If the setting is configured to lock the computer when the smart card is removed, ScPolicySvc sends a message to Winlogon to lock the computer. ## See also diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-smart-cards-for-windows-service.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-smart-cards-for-windows-service.md index 2604d84270..6d468b9bda 100644 --- a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-smart-cards-for-windows-service.md +++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-smart-cards-for-windows-service.md @@ -1,9 +1,8 @@ --- title: Smart Cards for Windows Service description: This topic for the IT professional and smart card developers describes how the Smart Cards for Windows service manages readers and application interactions. -ms.reviewer: ardenw ms.topic: concept-article -ms.date: 09/24/2021 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 --- # Smart Cards for Windows Service @@ -69,34 +68,31 @@ The Smart Cards for Windows service runs in the context of a local service, and ``` -> **Note**  For winscard.dll to be invoked as the proper class installer, the INF file for a smart card reader must specify the following for **Class** and **ClassGUID**:
-`Class=SmartCardReader`
`ClassGuid={50DD5230-BA8A-11D1-BF5D-0000F805F530}` +> [!NOTE] +> For winscard.dll to be invoked as the proper class installer, the INF file for a smart card reader must specify the following for **Class** and **ClassGUID**: +> +> `Class=SmartCardReader` +> `ClassGuid={50DD5230-BA8A-11D1-BF5D-0000F805F530}` By default, the service is configured for manual mode. Creators of smart card reader drivers must configure their INFs so that they start the service automatically and winscard.dll files call a predefined entry point to start the service during installation. The entry point is defined as part of the **SmartCardReader** class, and it is not called directly. If a device advertises itself as part of this class, the entry point is automatically invoked to start the service when the device is inserted. Using this method ensures that the service is enabled when it is needed, but it is also disabled for users who do not use smart cards. When the service is started, it performs several functions: -1. It registers itself for service notifications. +1. It registers itself for service notifications +1. It registers itself for Plug and Play (PnP) notifications related to device removal and additions +1. It initializes its data cache and a global event that signals that the service has started -2. It registers itself for Plug and Play (PnP) notifications related to device removal and additions. - -3. It initializes its data cache and a global event that signals that the service has started. - -> **Note**  For smart card implementations, consider sending all communications in Windows operating systems with smart card readers through the Smart Cards for Windows service. This provides an interface to track, select, and communicate with all drivers that declare themselves members of the smart card reader device group. +> [!NOTE] +> For smart card implementations, consider sending all communications in Windows operating systems with smart card readers through the Smart Cards for Windows service. This provides an interface to track, select, and communicate with all drivers that declare themselves members of the smart card reader device group. The Smart Cards for Windows service categorizes each smart card reader slot as a unique reader, and each slot is also managed separately, regardless of the device's physical characteristics. The Smart Cards for Windows service handles the following high-level actions: -- Device introduction - -- Reader initialization - -- Notifying clients of new readers - -- Serializing access to readers - -- Smart card access - -- Tunneling of reader-specific commands +- Device introduction +- Reader initialization +- Notifying clients of new readers +- Serializing access to readers +- Smart card access +- Tunneling of reader-specific commands ## See also diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-tools-and-settings.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-tools-and-settings.md index f18465fff3..737d2d83fc 100644 --- a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-tools-and-settings.md +++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-tools-and-settings.md @@ -1,9 +1,8 @@ --- title: Smart Card Tools and Settings description: This topic for the IT professional and smart card developer links to information about smart card debugging, settings, and events. -ms.reviewer: ardenw ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 09/24/2021 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 --- # Smart Card Tools and Settings @@ -12,11 +11,9 @@ This topic for the IT professional and smart card developer links to information This section of the Smart Card Technical Reference contains information about the following: -- [Smart Cards Debugging Information](smart-card-debugging-information.md): Learn about tools and services in supported versions of Windows to help identify certificate issues. - -- [Smart Card Group Policy and Registry Settings](smart-card-group-policy-and-registry-settings.md): Learn about smart card-related Group Policy settings and registry keys that can be set on a per-computer basis, including how to edit and apply Group Policy settings to local or domain computers. - -- [Smart Card Events](smart-card-events.md): Learn about events that can be used to manage smart cards in an organization, including how to monitor installation, use, and errors. +- [Smart Cards Debugging Information](smart-card-debugging-information.md): Learn about tools and services in supported versions of Windows to help identify certificate issues +- [Smart Card Group Policy and Registry Settings](smart-card-group-policy-and-registry-settings.md): Learn about smart card-related Group Policy settings and registry keys that can be set on a per-computer basis, including how to edit and apply Group Policy settings to local or domain computers +- [Smart Card Events](smart-card-events.md): Learn about events that can be used to manage smart cards in an organization, including how to monitor installation, use, and errors ## See also diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-windows-smart-card-technical-reference.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-windows-smart-card-technical-reference.md index a7e5247fcc..b832cf3024 100644 --- a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-windows-smart-card-technical-reference.md +++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-windows-smart-card-technical-reference.md @@ -1,9 +1,8 @@ --- title: Smart Card Technical Reference description: Learn about the Windows smart card infrastructure for physical smart cards, and how smart card-related components work in Windows. -ms.reviewer: ardenw -ms.topic: reference -ms.date: 09/24/2021 +ms.topic: overview +ms.date: 11/06/2023 --- # Smart Card Technical Reference @@ -14,9 +13,8 @@ The Smart Card Technical Reference describes the Windows smart card infrastructu This document explains how the Windows smart card infrastructure works. To understand this information, you should have basic knowledge of public key infrastructure (PKI) and smart card concepts. This document is intended for: -- Enterprise IT developers, managers, and staff who are planning to deploy or are using smart cards in their organization. - -- Smart card vendors who write smart card minidrivers or credential providers. +- Enterprise IT developers, managers, and staff who are planning to deploy or are using smart cards in their organization. +- Smart card vendors who write smart card minidrivers or credential providers. ## What are smart cards? @@ -24,40 +22,28 @@ Smart cards are tamper-resistant portable storage devices that can enhance the s Smart cards provide: -- Tamper-resistant storage for protecting private keys and other forms of personal information. - -- Isolation of security-critical computations that involve authentication, digital signatures, and key exchange from other parts of the computer. These computations are performed on the smart card. - -- Portability of credentials and other private information between computers at work, home, or on the road. +- Tamper-resistant storage for protecting private keys and other forms of personal information +- Isolation of security-critical computations that involve authentication, digital signatures, and key exchange from other parts of the computer. These computations are performed on the smart card +- Portability of credentials and other private information between computers at work, home, or on the road Smart cards can be used to sign in to domain accounts only, not local accounts. When you use a password to sign in interactively to a domain account, Windows uses the Kerberos version 5 (v5) protocol for authentication. If you use a smart card, the operating system uses Kerberos v5 authentication with X.509 v3 certificates. -**Virtual smart cards** were introduced in Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8 to alleviate the need for a physical smart card, the smart card reader, and the associated administration of that hardware. +Virtual smart cards were introduced to alleviate the need for a physical smart card, the smart card reader, and the associated administration of that hardware. [!INCLUDE [virtual-smart-card-deprecation-notice](../../includes/virtual-smart-card-deprecation-notice.md)] ## In this technical reference -This reference contains the following topics. +This reference contains the following topics: -- [How Smart Card Sign-in Works in Windows](smart-card-how-smart-card-sign-in-works-in-windows.md) - - - [Smart Card Architecture](smart-card-architecture.md) - - - [Certificate Requirements and Enumeration](smart-card-certificate-requirements-and-enumeration.md) - - - [Smart Card and Remote Desktop Services](smart-card-and-remote-desktop-services.md) - - - [Smart Cards for Windows Service](smart-card-smart-cards-for-windows-service.md) - - - [Certificate Propagation Service](smart-card-certificate-propagation-service.md) - - - [Smart Card Removal Policy Service](smart-card-removal-policy-service.md) - -- [Smart Card Tools and Settings](smart-card-tools-and-settings.md) - - - [Smart Cards Debugging Information](smart-card-debugging-information.md) - - - [Smart Card Group Policy and Registry Settings](smart-card-group-policy-and-registry-settings.md) - - - [Smart Card Events](smart-card-events.md) +- [How Smart Card Sign-in Works in Windows](smart-card-how-smart-card-sign-in-works-in-windows.md) + - [Smart Card Architecture](smart-card-architecture.md) + - [Certificate Requirements and Enumeration](smart-card-certificate-requirements-and-enumeration.md) + - [Smart Card and Remote Desktop Services](smart-card-and-remote-desktop-services.md) + - [Smart Cards for Windows Service](smart-card-smart-cards-for-windows-service.md) + - [Certificate Propagation Service](smart-card-certificate-propagation-service.md) + - [Smart Card Removal Policy Service](smart-card-removal-policy-service.md) +- [Smart Card Tools and Settings](smart-card-tools-and-settings.md) + - [Smart Cards Debugging Information](smart-card-debugging-information.md) + - [Smart Card Group Policy and Registry Settings](smart-card-group-policy-and-registry-settings.md) + - [Smart Card Events](smart-card-events.md) diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/toc.yml b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/toc.yml index 0d82f8c3a7..bca4cb0bbd 100644 --- a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/toc.yml +++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/toc.yml @@ -1,28 +1,27 @@ items: -- name: Smart Card Technical Reference +- name: Smart card technical reference href: smart-card-windows-smart-card-technical-reference.md +- name: How smart card sign-in works + href: smart-card-how-smart-card-sign-in-works-in-windows.md items: - - name: How Smart Card Sign-in Works in Windows - href: smart-card-how-smart-card-sign-in-works-in-windows.md - items: - - name: Smart Card Architecture - href: smart-card-architecture.md - - name: Certificate Requirements and Enumeration - href: smart-card-certificate-requirements-and-enumeration.md - - name: Smart Card and Remote Desktop Services - href: smart-card-and-remote-desktop-services.md - - name: Smart Cards for Windows Service - href: smart-card-smart-cards-for-windows-service.md - - name: Certificate Propagation Service - href: smart-card-certificate-propagation-service.md - - name: Smart Card Removal Policy Service - href: smart-card-removal-policy-service.md - - name: Smart Card Tools and Settings - href: smart-card-tools-and-settings.md - items: - - name: Smart Cards Debugging Information - href: smart-card-debugging-information.md - - name: Smart Card Group Policy and Registry Settings - href: smart-card-group-policy-and-registry-settings.md - - name: Smart Card Events - href: smart-card-events.md \ No newline at end of file + - name: Smart card architecture + href: smart-card-architecture.md + - name: Certificate requirements and enumeration + href: smart-card-certificate-requirements-and-enumeration.md + - name: Smart card and Remote Desktop Services + href: smart-card-and-remote-desktop-services.md + - name: Smart cards for Windows Service + href: smart-card-smart-cards-for-windows-service.md + - name: Certificate Propagation Service + href: smart-card-certificate-propagation-service.md + - name: Smart card Removal Policy Service + href: smart-card-removal-policy-service.md +- name: Smart Card tools and settings + href: smart-card-tools-and-settings.md + items: + - name: Smart cards debugging information + href: smart-card-debugging-information.md + - name: Smart card group policy and registry settings + href: smart-card-group-policy-and-registry-settings.md + - name: Smart card events + href: smart-card-events.md \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/images/virtual-smart-card-icon.svg b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/images/virtual-smart-card-icon.svg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..02fb8d7434 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/images/virtual-smart-card-icon.svg 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b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/images/vsc-virtual-smart-card-icon.png deleted file mode 100644 index 4614d7684b..0000000000 Binary files a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/images/vsc-virtual-smart-card-icon.png and /dev/null differ diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/toc.yml b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/toc.yml index 68842b6001..0eec1122c0 100644 --- a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/toc.yml +++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/toc.yml @@ -1,17 +1,15 @@ items: - name: Virtual Smart Card overview href: virtual-smart-card-overview.md - items: - - name: Understand and evaluate virtual smart cards - href: virtual-smart-card-understanding-and-evaluating.md - items: - - name: Get started with virtual smart cards - href: virtual-smart-card-get-started.md - - name: Use virtual smart cards - href: virtual-smart-card-use-virtual-smart-cards.md - - name: Deploy virtual smart cards - href: virtual-smart-card-deploy-virtual-smart-cards.md - - name: Evaluate virtual smart card security - href: virtual-smart-card-evaluate-security.md - - name: Tpmvscmgr - href: virtual-smart-card-tpmvscmgr.md \ No newline at end of file +- name: Understand and evaluate virtual smart cards + href: virtual-smart-card-understanding-and-evaluating.md +- name: Get started with virtual smart cards + href: virtual-smart-card-get-started.md +- name: Use virtual smart cards + href: virtual-smart-card-use-virtual-smart-cards.md +- name: Deploy virtual smart cards + href: virtual-smart-card-deploy-virtual-smart-cards.md +- name: Evaluate virtual smart card security + href: virtual-smart-card-evaluate-security.md +- name: Tpmvscmgr + href: virtual-smart-card-tpmvscmgr.md \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-deploy-virtual-smart-cards.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-deploy-virtual-smart-cards.md index b20f03522b..9b7ee29239 100644 --- a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-deploy-virtual-smart-cards.md +++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-deploy-virtual-smart-cards.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ title: Deploy Virtual Smart Cards description: Learn about what to consider when deploying a virtual smart card authentication solution ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 02/22/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 --- # Deploy Virtual Smart Cards @@ -19,11 +19,9 @@ A device manufacturer creates physical devices, and then an organization purchas This topic contains information about the following phases in a virtual smart card lifecycle: -- [Create and personalize virtual smart cards](#create-and-personalize-virtual-smart-cards) - -- [Provision virtual smart cards](#provision-virtual-smart-cards) - -- [Maintain virtual smart cards](#maintain-virtual-smart-cards) +- [Create and personalize virtual smart cards](#create-and-personalize-virtual-smart-cards) +- [Provision virtual smart cards](#provision-virtual-smart-cards) +- [Maintain virtual smart cards](#maintain-virtual-smart-cards) ## Create and personalize virtual smart cards @@ -54,9 +52,7 @@ A virtual smart card appears within the operating system as a physical smart car - **Non-exportability**: Because all private information on the virtual smart card is encrypted by using the TPM on the host computer, it can't be used on a different computer with a different TPM. Additionally, TPMs are designed to be tamper-resistant and non-exportable, so a malicious user can't reverse engineer an identical TPM or install the same TPM on a different computer. For more information, see [Evaluate Virtual Smart Card Security](virtual-smart-card-evaluate-security.md). - - **Isolated cryptography**: TPMs provide the same properties of isolated cryptography that is offered by physical smart cards, which is utilized by virtual smart cards. Unencrypted copies of private keys are loaded only within the TPM and never into memory that is accessible by the operating system. All cryptographic operations with these private keys occur inside the TPM. - - **Anti-hammering**: If a user enters a PIN incorrectly, the virtual smart card responds by using the anti-hammering logic of the TPM, which rejects further attempts for some time instead of blocking the card. This is also known as lockout. For more information, see [Blocked virtual smart card](#blocked-virtual-smart-card) and [Evaluate Virtual Smart Card Security](virtual-smart-card-evaluate-security.md). @@ -70,12 +66,9 @@ During virtual smart card personalization, the values for the administrator key, Because the administrator key is critical to the security of the card, it's important to consider the deployment environment and decide on the proper administrator key setting strategy. Options for these strategies include: -- **Uniform**: Administrator keys for all the virtual smart cards deployed in the organization are the same. Although using the same key makes the maintenance infrastructure easy (only one key needs to be stored), it's highly insecure. This strategy might be sufficient for small organizations, but if the administrator key is compromised, all virtual smart cards that use the key must be reissued. - -- **Random, not stored**: Administrator keys are assigned randomly for all virtual smart cards, and they aren't recorded. This is a valid option if the deployment administrators don't require the ability to reset PINs, and instead prefer to delete and reissue virtual smart cards. This is a viable strategy if the administrator prefers to set PUK values for the virtual smart cards and then use this value to reset PINs, if necessary. - -- **Random, stored**: you assign the administrator keys randomly, storing them in a central location. Each card's security is independent of the others. This is a secure strategy on a large scale, unless the administrator key database is compromised. - +- **Uniform**: Administrator keys for all the virtual smart cards deployed in the organization are the same. Although using the same key makes the maintenance infrastructure easy (only one key needs to be stored), it's highly insecure. This strategy might be sufficient for small organizations, but if the administrator key is compromised, all virtual smart cards that use the key must be reissued +- **Random, not stored**: Administrator keys are assigned randomly for all virtual smart cards, and they aren't recorded. This is a valid option if the deployment administrators don't require the ability to reset PINs, and instead prefer to delete and reissue virtual smart cards. This is a viable strategy if the administrator prefers to set PUK values for the virtual smart cards and then use this value to reset PINs, if necessary +- **Random, stored**: you assign the administrator keys randomly, storing them in a central location. Each card's security is independent of the others. This is a secure strategy on a large scale, unless the administrator key database is compromised - **Deterministic**: Administrator keys are the result of some function or known information. For example, the user ID could be used to randomly generate data that can be further processed through a symmetric encryption algorithm by using a secret. This administrator key can be similarly regenerated when needed, and it doesn't need to be stored. The security of this method relies on the security of the secret used. Although the PUK and the administrator key methodologies provide unlocking and resetting functionality, they do so in different ways. The PUK is a PIN that is entered on the computer to enable a user PIN reset. @@ -112,9 +105,8 @@ You can use APIs to build Microsoft Store apps that you can use to manage the fu When a device or computer isn't joined to a domain, the TPM ownerAuth is stored in the registry under HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE. This exposes some threats. Most of the threat vectors are protected by BitLocker, but threats that aren't protected include: -- A malicious user possesses a device that has an active local sign-in session before the device locks. The malicious user could attempt a brute-force attack on the virtual smart card PIN, and then access the corporate secrets. - -- A malicious user possesses a device that has an active virtual private network (VPN) session. The device is then compromised. +- A malicious user possesses a device that has an active local sign-in session before the device locks. The malicious user could attempt a brute-force attack on the virtual smart card PIN, and then access the corporate secrets +- A malicious user possesses a device that has an active virtual private network (VPN) session. The device is then compromised The proposed mitigation for the previous scenarios is to use Exchange ActiveSync (EAS) policies to reduce the automatic lockout time from five minutes to 30 seconds of inactivity. You can set policies for automatic lockout while provisioning virtual smart cards. If an organization wants more security, they can also configure a setting to remove the ownerAuth from the local device. @@ -165,7 +157,7 @@ Similar to physical smart cards, virtual smart cards require certificate enrollm #### Certificate issuance -Users can enroll for certificates from within a remote desktop session that is established to provision the card. This process can also be managed by the smart card management tool that the user runs through the remote desktop connection. This model works for deployments that require the user to sign a request for enrollment by using a physical smart card. The driver for the physical smart card doesn't need to be installed on the client computer if it's installed on the remote computer. This is made possible by smart card redirection functionality that was introduced in Windows Server 2003, which ensures that smart cards that are connected to the client computer are available for use during a remote session. +Users can enroll for certificates from within a remote desktop session that is established to provision the card. This process can also be managed by the smart card management tool that the user runs through the remote desktop connection. This model works for deployments that require the user to sign a request for enrollment by using a physical smart card. The driver for the physical smart card doesn't need to be installed on the client computer if it's installed on the remote computer. This is made possible by smart card redirection functionality, which ensures that smart cards that are connected to the client computer are available for use during a remote session. Alternatively, without establishing a remote desktop connection, users can enroll for certificates from the Certificate Management console (certmgr.msc) on a client computer. Users can also create a request and submit it to a server from within a custom certificate enrollment application (for example, a registration authority) that has controlled access to the certification authority (CA). This requires specific enterprise configuration and deployments for Certificate Enrollment Policies (CEP) and Certificate Enrollment Services (CES). @@ -189,11 +181,11 @@ This command creates a card with a randomized administrator key. The key is auto `tpmvscmgr.exe destroy /instance ` -where <instance ID> is the value that is printed on the screen when the user creates the card. Specifically, for the first card created, the instance ID is ROOT\\SMARTCARDREADER\\0000). +where `` is the value that is printed on the screen when the user creates the card. Specifically, for the first card created, the instance ID is `ROOT\SMARTCARDREADER\0000`. ### Certificate management for unmanaged cards -Depending on the security requirements that are unique to an organization, users can initially enroll for certificates from the certificate management console (certmgr.msc) or from within custom certificate enrollment applications. The latter method can create a request and submit it to a server that has access to the Certification Authority. This requires specific organizational configurations and deployments for certificate enrollment policies and certificate enrollment services. Windows has built-in tools, specifically Certreq.exe and Certutil.exe, which can be used by scripts to perform the enrollment from the command line. +Depending on the security requirements that are unique to an organization, users can initially enroll for certificates from the certificate management console (certmgr.msc) or from within custom certificate enrollment applications. The latter method can create a request and submit it to a server that has access to the Certification Authority. This requires specific organizational configurations and deployments for certificate enrollment policies and certificate enrollment services. Windows has built-in tools, specifically Certreq.exe and Certutil.exe, which can be used by scripts to perform the enrollment from the command line. #### Requesting the certificate by providing domain credentials only @@ -211,19 +203,15 @@ The user can import the certificate into the **MY** store (which is the user's c For deployments that require users to use a physical smart card to sign the certificate request, you can use the procedure: -1. Users initiate a request on a domain-joined computer. - -2. Users complete the request by using a physical smart card to sign the request. - -3. Users download the request to the virtual smart card on their client computer. +1. Users initiate a request on a domain-joined computer +1. Users complete the request by using a physical smart card to sign the request +1. Users download the request to the virtual smart card on their client computer #### Using one-time password for enrollment Another option to ensure that users are strongly authenticated before virtual smart card certificates are issued, is to send a user a one-time password through SMS, email, or phone. The user then types the one-time password during the certificate enrollment from an application or a script on a desktop that invokes built-in command-line tools. -#### Certificate lifecycle management - -Certificate renewal can be done from the same tools that are used for the initial certificate enrollment. Certificate enrollment policies and certificate enrollment services can also be used to perform automatic renewal. +**Certificate lifecycle management**: certificate renewal can be done from the same tools that are used for the initial certificate enrollment. Certificate enrollment policies and certificate enrollment services can also be used to perform automatic renewal. Certificate revocation requires careful planning. When information about the certificate to be revoked is reliably available, the specific certificate can be easily revoked. When information about the certificate to be revoked isn't easy to determine, all certificates issued to the user under the policy that was used to issue the certificate might need to be revoked. For example, if an employee reports a lost or compromised device, and information that associates the device with a certificate isn't available. @@ -235,11 +223,11 @@ Maintenance is a significant portion of the virtual smart card lifecycle and one When renewing with a previously used key, no extra steps are required because a strong certificate with this key was issued during the initial provisioning. However, when the user requests a new key pair, you must take the same steps that were used during provisioning to assure the strength of the credentials. Renewal with new keys should occur periodically to counter sophisticated long-term attempts by malicious users to infiltrate the system. When new keys are assigned, you must ensure that the new keys are being used by the expected individuals on the same virtual smart cards. -**Resetting PINs**: Resetting virtual smart card PINs is also a frequent necessity, because employees forget their PINs. There are two ways to accomplish this, depending on choices made earlier in the deployment: Use a PUK (if the PUK is set), or use a challenge-response approach with the administration key. Before resetting the PIN, the user's identity must be verified by using some means other than the card—most likely the verification method that you used during initial provisioning (for example, in-person proofing). This is necessary in user-error scenarios when users forget their PINs. However, you should never reset a PIN if it has been compromised because the level of vulnerability after the PIN is exposed is difficult to identify. The entire card should be reissued. +**Reset PINs**: Resetting virtual smart card PINs is also a frequent necessity, because employees forget their PINs. There are two ways to accomplish this, depending on choices made earlier in the deployment: Use a PUK (if the PUK is set), or use a challenge-response approach with the administration key. Before resetting the PIN, the user's identity must be verified by using some means other than the card—most likely the verification method that you used during initial provisioning (for example, in-person proofing). This is necessary in user-error scenarios when users forget their PINs. However, you should never reset a PIN if it has been compromised because the level of vulnerability after the PIN is exposed is difficult to identify. The entire card should be reissued. **Lockout reset**: A frequent precursor to resetting a PIN is the necessity of resetting the TPM lockout time because the TPM anti-hammering logic will be engaged with multiple PIN entry failures for a virtual smart card. This is currently device specific. -**Retiring cards**: The final aspect of virtual smart card management is retiring cards when they're no longer needed. When an employee leaves the company, it's desirable to revoke domain access. Revoking sign-in credentials from the certification authority (CA) accomplishes this goal. +**Retire cards**: The final aspect of virtual smart card management is retiring cards when they're no longer needed. When an employee leaves the company, it's desirable to revoke domain access. Revoking sign-in credentials from the certification authority (CA) accomplishes this goal. The card should be reissued if the same computer is used by other employees without reinstalling the operating system. Reusing the former card can allow the former employee to change the PIN after leaving the organization, and then hijack certificates that belong to the new user to obtain unauthorized domain access. However, if the employee takes the virtual smart card-enabled computer, it's only necessary to revoke the certificates that are stored on the virtual smart card. diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-evaluate-security.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-evaluate-security.md index d86c288331..55070ad4d8 100644 --- a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-evaluate-security.md +++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-evaluate-security.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ title: Evaluate Virtual Smart Card Security description: Learn about the security characteristics and considerations when deploying TPM virtual smart cards. ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 02/22/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 --- # Evaluate Virtual Smart Card Security @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ The Trusted Computing Group specifies that if the response to attacks involves s 1. Allow only a limited number of wrong PIN attempts before enabling a lockout that enforces a time delay before any further commands are accepted by the TPM. > [!NOTE] - > + > > If the user enters the wrong PIN five consecutive times for a virtual smart card (which works in conjunction with the TPM), the card is blocked. When the card is blocked, it must be unblocked by using the administrative key or the PUK. 1. Increase the time delay exponentially as the user enters the wrong PIN so that an excessive number of wrong PIN attempts quickly trigger long delays in accepting commands. @@ -49,4 +49,4 @@ For example, it will take 14 years to guess an eight character PIN for a TPM tha 1. Number of wrong PINs allowed before entering lockout (threshold): 9 1. Time the TPM is in lockout after the threshold is reached: 10 seconds -1. Timed delay doubles for each wrong PIN after the threshold is reached \ No newline at end of file +1. Timed delay doubles for each wrong PIN after the threshold is reached diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-get-started.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-get-started.md index e3348db8ba..711c4ed802 100644 --- a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-get-started.md +++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-get-started.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ title: Get Started with Virtual Smart Cards - Walkthrough Guide description: This topic for the IT professional describes how to set up a basic test environment for using TPM virtual smart cards. ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 02/22/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 --- # Get Started with Virtual Smart Cards: Walkthrough Guide @@ -11,123 +11,78 @@ ms.date: 02/22/2023 This topic for the IT professional describes how to set up a basic test environment for using TPM virtual smart cards. -Virtual smart cards are a technology from Microsoft that offer comparable security benefits in two-factor authentication to physical smart cards. They also offer more convenience for users and lower cost for organizations to deploy. By utilizing Trusted Platform Module (TPM) devices that provide the same cryptographic capabilities as physical smart cards, virtual smart cards accomplish the three key properties that are desired by smart cards: non-exportability, isolated cryptography, and anti-hammering. +Virtual smart cards are a technology from Microsoft that offers comparable security benefits in two-factor authentication to physical smart cards. They also offer more convenience for users and lower cost for organizations to deploy. By utilizing Trusted Platform Module (TPM) devices that provide the same cryptographic capabilities as physical smart cards, virtual smart cards accomplish the three key properties that are desired by smart cards: nonexportability, isolated cryptography, and anti-hammering. -This step-by-step walkthrough shows you how to set up a basic test environment for using TPM virtual smart cards. After you complete this walkthrough, you will have a functional virtual smart card installed on the Windows computer. - -**Time requirements** +This step-by-step walkthrough shows you how to set up a basic test environment for using TPM virtual smart cards. After you complete this walkthrough, you'll have a functional virtual smart card installed on the Windows computer. You should be able to complete this walkthrough in less than one hour, excluding installing software and setting up the test domain. -**Walkthrough steps** +## Walkthrough steps -- [Prerequisites](#prerequisites) +- [Prerequisites](#prerequisites) +- [Step 1: Create the certificate template](#step-1-create-the-certificate-template) +- [Step 2: Create the TPM virtual smart card](#step-2-create-the-tpm-virtual-smart-card) +- [Step 3: Enroll for the certificate on the TPM Virtual Smart Card](#step-3-enroll-for-the-certificate-on-the-tpm-virtual-smart-card) -- [Step 1: Create the certificate template](#step-1-create-the-certificate-template) - -- [Step 2: Create the TPM virtual smart card](#step-2-create-the-tpm-virtual-smart-card) - -- [Step 3: Enroll for the certificate on the TPM Virtual Smart Card](#step-3-enroll-for-the-certificate-on-the-tpm-virtual-smart-card) - -> **Important**  This basic configuration is for test purposes only. It is not intended for use in a production environment. +> [!IMPORTANT] +> This basic configuration is for test purposes only. It is not intended for use in a production environment. ## Prerequisites -You will need: +You'll need: -- A computer running Windows 10 with an installed and fully functional TPM (version 1.2 or version 2.0). - -- A test domain to which the computer listed above can be joined. - -- Access to a server in that domain with a fully installed and running certification authority (CA). +- A computer running Windows 10 with an installed and fully functional TPM (version 1.2 or version 2.0) +- A test domain to which the computer listed above can be joined +- Access to a server in that domain with a fully installed and running certification authority (CA) ## Step 1: Create the certificate template -On your domain server, you need to create a template for the certificate that you will request for the virtual smart card. +On your domain server, you need to create a template for the certificate that you request for the virtual smart card. ### To create the certificate template -1. On your server, open the Microsoft Management Console (MMC). One way to do this is to type **mmc.exe** from the **Start** menu, right-click **mmc.exe**, and click **Run as administrator**. +1. On your server, open the Microsoft Management Console (MMC). One way to do this is to type **mmc.exe** from the **Start** menu, right-click **mmc.exe**, and select **Run as administrator** +1. Select **File** > **Add/Remove Snap-in** +1. In the available snap-ins list, select **Certificate Templates**, and then select **Add** +1. Certificate Templates is now located under **Console Root** in the MMC. Double-click it to view all the available certificate templates +1. Right-click the **Smartcard Logon** template, and select **Duplicate Template** +1. On the **Compatibility** tab, under **Certification Authority**, review the selection, and change it if needed +1. On the **General** tab: + 1. Specify a name, such as **TPM Virtual Smart Card Logon** + 1. Set the validity period to the desired value +1. On the **Request Handling** tab: + 1. Set the **Purpose** to **Signature and smartcard logon** + 1. Select **Prompt the user during enrollment** +1. On the **Cryptography** tab: + 1. Set the minimum key size to 2048 + 1. Select **Requests must use one of the following providers**, and then select **Microsoft Base Smart Card Crypto Provider** +1. On the **Security** tab, add the security group that you want to give **Enroll** access to. For example, if you want to give access to all users, select the **Authenticated users** group, and then select **Enroll** permissions for them +1. Select **OK** to finalize your changes and create the new template. Your new template should now appear in the list of Certificate Templates +1. Select **File**, then select **Add/Remove Snap-in** to add the Certification Authority snap-in to your MMC console. When asked which computer you want to manage, select the computer on which the CA is located, probably **Local Computer** +1. In the left pane of the MMC, expand **Certification Authority (Local)**, and then expand your CA within the Certification Authority list +1. Right-click **Certificate Templates**, select **New**, and then select **Certificate Template to Issue** +1. From the list, select the new template that you created (**TPM Virtual Smart Card Logon**), and then select **OK** -2. Click **File**, and then click **Add/Remove Snap-in**. + > [!NOTE] + > It can take some time for your template to replicate to all servers and become available in this list. - ![Add or remove snap-in.](images/vsc-02-mmc-add-snap-in.png) - -3. In the available snap-ins list, click **Certificate Templates**, and then click **Add**. - - ![Add Certificate Templates snap-in.](images/vsc-03-add-certificate-templates-snap-in.png) - -4. Certificate Templates is now located under **Console Root** in the MMC. Double-click it to view all the available certificate templates. - -5. Right-click the **Smartcard Logon** template, and click **Duplicate Template**. - - ![Duplicating the Smartcard Logon template.](images/vsc-04-right-click-smartcard-logon-template.png) - -6. On the **Compatibility** tab, under **Certification Authority**, review the selection, and change it if needed. - - ![Compatibility tab, certification authority setting.](images/vsc-05-certificate-template-compatibility.png) - -7. On the **General** tab: - - 1. Specify a name, such as **TPM Virtual Smart Card Logon**. - - 2. Set the validity period to the desired value. - -8. On the **Request Handling** tab: - - 1. Set the **Purpose** to **Signature and smartcard logon**. - - 2. Click **Prompt the user during enrollment**. - -9. On the **Cryptography** tab: - - 1. Set the minimum key size to 2048. - - 2. Click **Requests must use one of the following providers**, and then select **Microsoft Base Smart Card Crypto Provider**. - -10. On the **Security** tab, add the security group that you want to give **Enroll** access to. For example, if you want to give access to all users, select the **Authenticated users** group, and then select **Enroll** permissions for them. - -11. Click **OK** to finalize your changes and create the new template. Your new template should now appear in the list of Certificate Templates. - -12. Select **File**, then click **Add/Remove Snap-in** to add the Certification Authority snap-in to your MMC console. When asked which computer you want to manage, select the computer on which the CA is located, probably **Local Computer**. - - ![Add Certification Authority snap-in.](images/vsc-06-add-certification-authority-snap-in.png) - -13. In the left pane of the MMC, expand **Certification Authority (Local)**, and then expand your CA within the Certification Authority list. - -14. Right-click **Certificate Templates**, click **New**, and then click **Certificate Template to Issue**. - - ![Right-click menu for Certificate Templates.](images/vsc-07-right-click-certificate-templates.png) - -15. From the list, select the new template that you just created (**TPM Virtual Smart Card Logon**), and then click **OK**. - - > **Note**  It can take some time for your template to replicate to all servers and become available in this list. - - ![Selecting a certificate template.](images/vsc-08-enable-certificate-template.png) - -16. After the template replicates, in the MMC, right-click in the Certification Authority list, click **All Tasks**, and then click **Stop Service**. Then, right-click the name of the CA again, click **All Tasks**, and then click **Start Service**. - - ![Stopping and starting the service.](images/vsc-09-stop-service-start-service.png) +1. After the template replicates, in the MMC, right-click in the Certification Authority list, select **All Tasks**, and then select **Stop Service**. Then, right-click the name of the CA again, select **All Tasks**, and then select **Start Service**. ## Step 2: Create the TPM virtual smart card -In this step, you will create the virtual smart card on the client computer by using the command-line tool, [Tpmvscmgr.exe](virtual-smart-card-tpmvscmgr.md). +In this step, you create the virtual smart card on the client computer by using the command-line tool, [Tpmvscmgr.exe](virtual-smart-card-tpmvscmgr.md). ### To create the TPM virtual smart card -1. On a domain-joined computer, open a Command Prompt window with Administrative credentials. +1. On a domain-joined computer, open a Command Prompt window with Administrative credentials. +1. At the command prompt, type the following, and then press ENTER: - ![Cmd prompt, Run as administrator.](images/vsc-10-cmd-run-as-administrator.png) + `tpmvscmgr.exe create /name TestVSC /pin default /adminkey random /generate` -2. At the command prompt, type the following, and then press ENTER: + This creates a virtual smart card with the name **TestVSC**, omit the unlock key, and generate the file system on the card. The PIN is set to the default, 12345678. To be prompted for a PIN, instead of **/pin default** you can type **/pin prompt**.\ + For more information about the Tpmvscmgr command-line tool, see [Use Virtual Smart Cards](virtual-smart-card-use-virtual-smart-cards.md) and [Tpmvscmgr](virtual-smart-card-tpmvscmgr.md). - `tpmvscmgr.exe create /name TestVSC /pin default /adminkey random /generate` - - This will create a virtual smart card with the name **TestVSC**, omit the unlock key, and generate the file system on the card. The PIN will be set to the default, 12345678. To be prompted for a PIN, instead of **/pin default** you can type **/pin prompt**. - - For more information about the Tpmvscmgr command-line tool, see [Use Virtual Smart Cards](virtual-smart-card-use-virtual-smart-cards.md) and [Tpmvscmgr](virtual-smart-card-tpmvscmgr.md). - -4. Wait several seconds for the process to finish. Upon completion, Tpmvscmgr.exe will provide you with the device instance ID for the TPM Virtual Smart Card. Store this ID for later reference because you will need it to manage or remove the virtual smart card. +1. Wait several seconds for the process to finish. Upon completion, Tpmvscmgr.exe provides you with the device instance ID for the TPM Virtual Smart Card. Store this ID for later reference because you need it to manage or remove the virtual smart card. ## Step 3: Enroll for the certificate on the TPM Virtual Smart Card @@ -135,28 +90,17 @@ The virtual smart card must be provisioned with a sign-in certificate for it to ### To enroll the certificate -1. Open the Certificates console by typing **certmgr.msc** on the **Start** menu. +1. Open the Certificates console by typing **certmgr.msc** on the **Start** menu +1. Right-click **Personal**, select **All Tasks**, and then select **Request New Certificate** +1. Follow the prompts and when offered a list of templates, select the **TPM Virtual Smart Card Logon** check box (or whatever you named the template in Step 1) +1. If prompted for a device, select the Microsoft virtual smart card that corresponds to the one you created in the previous section. It displays as **Identity Device (Microsoft Profile)** +1. Enter the PIN that was established when you created the TPM virtual smart card, and then select **OK** +1. Wait for the enrollment to finish, and then select **Finish** -2. Right-click **Personal**, click **All Tasks**, and then click **Request New Certificate**. - - ![Request New Certificate.](images/vsc-11-certificates-request-new-certificate.png) - -3. Follow the prompts and when offered a list of templates, select the **TPM Virtual Smart Card Logon** check box (or whatever you named the template in Step 1). - - ![Certificate enrollment, select certificate.](images/vsc-12-certificate-enrollment-select-certificate.png) - -4. If prompted for a device, select the Microsoft virtual smart card that corresponds to the one you created in the previous section. It displays as **Identity Device (Microsoft Profile)**. - -5. Enter the PIN that was established when you created the TPM virtual smart card, and then click **OK**. - -6. Wait for the enrollment to finish, and then click **Finish**. - -The virtual smart card can now be used as an alternative credential to sign in to your domain. To verify that your virtual smart card configuration and certificate enrollment were successful, sign out of your current session, and then sign in. When you sign in, you will see the icon for the new TPM virtual smart card on the Secure Desktop (sign in) screen or you will be automatically directed to the TPM smart card sign-in dialog box. Click the icon, enter your PIN (if necessary), and then click **OK**. You should be signed in to your domain account. +The virtual smart card can now be used as an alternative credential to sign in to your domain. To verify that your virtual smart card configuration and certificate enrollment were successful, sign out of your current session, and then sign in. When you sign in, you'll see the icon for the new TPM virtual smart card on the Secure Desktop (sign in) screen or you are automatically directed to the TPM smart card sign-in dialog box. Select the icon, enter your PIN (if necessary), and then select **OK**. You should be signed in to your domain account. ## See also -- [Understanding and Evaluating Virtual Smart Cards](virtual-smart-card-understanding-and-evaluating.md) - -- [Use Virtual Smart Cards](virtual-smart-card-use-virtual-smart-cards.md) - -- [Deploy Virtual Smart Cards](virtual-smart-card-deploy-virtual-smart-cards.md) +- [Understanding and Evaluating Virtual Smart Cards](virtual-smart-card-understanding-and-evaluating.md) +- [Use Virtual Smart Cards](virtual-smart-card-use-virtual-smart-cards.md) +- [Deploy Virtual Smart Cards](virtual-smart-card-deploy-virtual-smart-cards.md) diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-overview.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-overview.md index 1445f06ad2..ed3cbe24d1 100644 --- a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-overview.md +++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-overview.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ title: Virtual Smart Card Overview description: Learn about virtual smart card technology for Windows. ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 02/22/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 --- # Virtual Smart Card Overview @@ -23,27 +23,27 @@ Virtual smart cards are functionally similar to physical smart cards, appearing ### Authentication use cases -**Two-factor authentication‒based remote access** +#### Two-factor authentication‒based remote access After a user has a fully functional TPM virtual smart card, provisioned with a sign-in certificate, the certificate is used to gain authenticated access to corporate resources. When the proper certificate is provisioned to the virtual card, the user need only provide the PIN for the virtual smart card, as if it was a physical smart card, to sign in to the domain. In practice, this is as easy as entering a password to access the system. Technically, it's far more secure. Using the virtual smart card to access the system proves to the domain that the user who is requesting authentication has possession of the personal computer upon which the card has been provisioned and knows the virtual smart card PIN. Because this request couldn't have possibly originated from a system other than the system certified by the domain for this user's access, and the user couldn't have initiated the request without knowing the PIN, a strong two-factor authentication is established. -**Client authentication** +#### Client authentication Virtual smart cards can also be used for client authentication by using TLS/SSL or a similar technology. Similar to domain access with a virtual smart card, an authentication certificate can be provisioned for the virtual smart card, provided to a remote service, as requested in the client authentication process. This adheres to the principles of two-factor authentication because the certificate is only accessible from the computer that hosts the virtual smart card, and the user is required to enter the PIN for initial access to the card. -**Virtual smart card redirection for remote desktop connections** +#### Virtual smart card redirection for remote desktop connections The concept of two-factor authentication associated with virtual smart cards relies on the proximity of users to the devices that they use to access domain. When you connect to a device that is hosting virtual smart cards, you can't use the virtual smart cards located on the remote device during the remote session. However, you can access the virtual smart cards on the connecting device (which is under your physical control), which are loaded onto the remote device. You can use the virtual smart cards as if they were installed by using the remote devices' TPM, extending your privileges to the remote device, while maintaining the principles of two-factor authentication. ### Confidentiality use cases -**S/MIME email encryption** +#### S/MIME email encryption Physical smart cards are designed to hold private keys. You can use the private keys for email encryption and decryption. The same functionality exists in virtual smart cards. By using S/MIME with a user's public key to encrypt email, the sender of an email is assured that only the person with the corresponding private key can decrypt the email. This assurance is a result of the non-exportability of the private key. It never exists within reach of malicious software, and it remains protected by the TPM—even during decryption. -**BitLocker for data volumes** +#### BitLocker for data volumes BitLocker Drive Encryption technology makes use of symmetric-key encryption to protect the content of a user's hard drive. BitLocker ensures that if the physical ownership of a hard drive is compromised, an adversary won't be able to read data off the drive. The key used to encrypt the drive can be stored in a virtual smart card, which necessitates knowledge of the virtual smart card PIN to access the drive, and possession of the device that is hosting the TPM virtual smart card. If the drive is obtained without access to the TPM that hosts the virtual smart card, any brute force attack will be difficult. @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ You can use BitLocker to encrypt portable drives, storing keys in virtual smart ### Data integrity use case -**Signing data** +#### Signing data To verify authorship of data, a user can sign it by using a private key stored in the virtual smart card. Digital signatures confirm the integrity and origin of the data. diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-tpmvscmgr.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-tpmvscmgr.md index 5eca1fae1e..89752f473d 100644 --- a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-tpmvscmgr.md +++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-tpmvscmgr.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ title: Tpmvscmgr description: Learn about the Tpmvscmgr command-line tool, through which an administrator can create and delete TPM virtual smart cards on a computer. ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 02/22/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 --- # Tpmvscmgr @@ -84,4 +84,4 @@ The following command will create a TPM virtual smart card with the default valu ```console tpmvscmgr.exe create /name "VirtualSmartCardForCorpAccess" /PIN PROMPT /pinpolicy minlen 4 maxlen 8 /AdminKey DEFAULT /attestation AIK_AND_CERT /generate -``` \ No newline at end of file +``` diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-understanding-and-evaluating.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-understanding-and-evaluating.md index 77e78baaf2..afc26113cb 100644 --- a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-understanding-and-evaluating.md +++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-understanding-and-evaluating.md @@ -1,9 +1,8 @@ --- title: Understanding and Evaluating Virtual Smart Cards description: Learn how smart card technology can fit into your authentication design. -ms.prod: windows-client ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 02/22/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 --- # Understand and Evaluate Virtual Smart Cards @@ -12,17 +11,14 @@ ms.date: 02/22/2023 This article describes the virtual smart card technology and how it can fit into your authentication design. -Virtual smart card technology uses cryptographic keys that are stored on computers that have the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) installed. Virtual smart cards offer comparable security benefits to conventional smart cards by using two-factor authentication. The technology also offers more convenience for users and has a lower cost to deploy. By utilizing TPM devices that provide the same cryptographic capabilities as conventional smart cards, virtual smart cards accomplish the three key properties that are desired for smart cards: non-exportability, isolated cryptography, and anti-hammering. +Virtual smart card technology uses cryptographic keys that are stored on computers that have the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) installed. Virtual smart cards offer comparable security benefits to conventional smart cards by using two-factor authentication. The technology also offers more convenience for users and has a lower cost to deploy. By utilizing TPM devices that provide the same cryptographic capabilities as conventional smart cards, virtual smart cards accomplish the three key properties that are desired for smart cards: nonexportability, isolated cryptography, and anti-hammering. -Virtual smart cards are functionally similar to physical smart cards. They appear as always-inserted smart cards, and they can be used for authentication to external resources, protection of data by secure encryption, and integrity through reliable signing. Because TPM-enabled hardware is readily available and virtual smart cards can be easily deployed by using existing certificate enrollment methods, virtual smart cards can become a full replacement for other methods of strong authentication in a corporate setting of any scale. +Virtual smart cards are functionally similar to physical smart cards. They appear as always-inserted smart cards, and they can be used for authentication to external resources, protection of data by secure encryption, and integrity through reliable signing. Since TPM-enabled hardware is readily available and virtual smart cards can be deployed using existing certificate enrollment methods, virtual smart cards can become a replacement for other methods of strong authentication in a corporate setting of any scale. This topic contains the following sections: -- [Comparing virtual smart cards with physical smart cards](#comparing-virtual-smart-cards-with-physical-smart-cards): - Compares properties, functional aspects, security, and cost. - -- [Authentication design options](#authentication-design-options): - Describes how passwords, smart cards, and virtual smart cards can be used to reach authentication goals in your organization. +- [Comparing virtual smart cards with physical smart cards](#comparing-virtual-smart-cards-with-physical-smart-cards): compares properties, functional aspects, security, and cost. +- [Authentication design options](#authentication-design-options): describes how passwords, smart cards, and virtual smart cards can be used to reach authentication goals in your organization. ## Comparing virtual smart cards with physical smart cards @@ -34,71 +30,67 @@ All cryptographic operations occur in the secure, isolated environment of the TP Virtual smart cards maintain the three key properties of physical smart cards: -- **Non-exportability**: Because all private information on the virtual smart card is encrypted by using the TPM on the host computer, it can't be used on a different computer with a different TPM. Additionally, TPMs are designed to be tamper-resistant and non-exportable, so a malicious user can't reverse engineer an identical TPM or install the same TPM on a different computer. - For more information, see [Evaluate Virtual Smart Card Security](virtual-smart-card-evaluate-security.md). - -- **Isolated cryptography**: TPMs provide the same properties of isolated cryptography that are offered by physical smart cards, and this is utilized by virtual smart cards. Unencrypted copies of private keys are loaded only within the TPM and never into memory that is accessible by the operating system. All cryptographic operations with these private keys occur inside the TPM. - -- **Anti-hammering**: If a user enters a PIN incorrectly, the virtual smart card responds by using the anti-hammering logic of the TPM, which rejects further attempts for a period of time instead of blocking the card. This is also known as lockout. - For more information, see [Evaluate Virtual Smart Card Security](virtual-smart-card-evaluate-security.md). +- **Non-exportability**: Because all private information on the virtual smart card is encrypted by using the TPM on the host computer, it can't be used on a different computer with a different TPM. Additionally, TPMs are designed to be tamper-resistant and nonexportable, so a malicious user can't reverse engineer an identical TPM or install the same TPM on a different computer. For more information, see [Evaluate Virtual Smart Card Security](virtual-smart-card-evaluate-security.md) +- **Isolated cryptography**: TPMs provide the same properties of isolated cryptography that are offered by physical smart cards, and this is utilized by virtual smart cards. Unencrypted copies of private keys are loaded only within the TPM and never into memory that is accessible by the operating system. All cryptographic operations with these private keys occur inside the TPM +- **Anti-hammering**: If a user enters a PIN incorrectly, the virtual smart card responds by using the anti-hammering logic of the TPM, which rejects further attempts for a period of time instead of blocking the card. This is also known as lockout. For more information, see [Evaluate Virtual Smart Card Security](virtual-smart-card-evaluate-security.md) The following subsections compare the functionality, security, and cost of virtual smart cards and physical smart cards. -**Functionality** +### Functionality The virtual smart card system that was designed by Microsoft closely mimics the functionality of conventional smart cards. The most striking difference to the end user is that the virtual smart card is essentially a smart card that is always inserted into the computer. There's no method to export the user's virtual smart card for use on other computers, which adds to the security of virtual smart cards. If a user requires access to network resources on multiple computers, multiple virtual smart cards can be issued for that user. Additionally, a computer that is shared among multiple users can host multiple virtual smart cards for different users. -The basic user experience for a virtual smart card is as simple as using a password to access a network. Because the smart card is loaded by default, the user must simply enter the PIN that is tied to the card to gain access. Users are no longer required to carry cards and readers or to take physical action to use the card. +The basic user experience for a virtual smart card is as simple as using a password to access a network. Because the smart card is loaded by default, the user must enter the PIN that is tied to the card to gain access. Users are no longer required to carry cards and readers or to take physical action to use the card. -Additionally, although the anti-hammering functionality of the virtual smart card is equally secure to that of a physical smart card, virtual smart card users are never required to contact an administrator to unblock the card. Instead, they simply wait a period of time (depending on the TPM specifications) before they reattempt to enter the PIN. Alternatively, the administrator can reset the lockout by providing owner authentication data to the TPM on the host computer. +Additionally, although the anti-hammering functionality of the virtual smart card is equally secure to that of a physical smart card, virtual smart card users are never required to contact an administrator to unblock the card. Instead, they wait a period of time (depending on the TPM specifications) before they reattempt to enter the PIN. Alternatively, the administrator can reset the lockout by providing owner authentication data to the TPM on the host computer. -**Security** +### Security Physical smart cards and virtual smart cards offer comparable levels of security. They both implement two-factor authentication for using network resources. However, they differ in certain aspects, including physical security and the practicality of an attack. Due to their compact and portable design, conventional smart cards are most frequently kept close to their intended user. They offer little opportunity for acquisition by a potential adversary, so any sort of interaction with the card is difficult without committing some variety of theft. -TPM virtual smart cards, however, reside on a user's computer that may frequently be left unattended, which provides an opportunity for a malicious user to hammer the TPM. Although virtual smart cards are fully protected from hammering (as are physical smart cards), this accessibility makes the logistics of an attack somewhat simpler. Additionally, the anti-hammering behavior of a TPM smart card differs in that it only presents a time delay in response to repeated PIN failures, as opposed to fully blocking the user. +TPM virtual smart cards, however, reside on a user's computer that may frequently be left unattended, which provides an opportunity for a malicious user to hammer the TPM. Although virtual smart cards are fully protected from hammering (as are physical smart cards), this accessibility makes the logistics of an attack simpler. Additionally, the anti-hammering behavior of a TPM smart card differs in that it only presents a time delay in response to repeated PIN failures, as opposed to fully blocking the user. -However, there are several advantages provided by virtual smart cards to mitigate these slight security deficits. Most importantly, a virtual smart card is much less likely to be lost. Virtual smart cards are integrated into computers and devices that the user already owns for other purposes and has incentive to keep safe. If the computer or device that hosts the virtual smart card is lost or stolen, a user will more immediately notice its loss than the loss of a physical smart card. When a computer or device is identified as lost, the user can notify the administrator of the system, who can revoke the certificate that is associated with the virtual smart card on that device. This precludes any future unauthorized access on that computer or device if the PIN for the virtual smart card is compromised. +However, there are several advantages provided by virtual smart cards to mitigate these slight security deficits. Most importantly, a virtual smart card is much less likely to be lost. Virtual smart cards are integrated into computers and devices that the user already owns for other purposes and has incentive to keep safe. If the computer or device that hosts the virtual smart card is lost or stolen, a user notices its loss quicker than the loss of a physical smart card. When a computer or device is identified as lost, the user can notify the administrator of the system, who can revoke the certificate that is associated with the virtual smart card on that device. This precludes any future unauthorized access on that computer or device if the PIN for the virtual smart card is compromised. -**Cost** +### Cost -If a company wants to deploy physical smart cards, they need to purchase smart cards and smart card readers for all employees. Although relatively inexpensive options can be found, options that ensure the three key properties of smart card security (most notably, non-exportability) are more expensive. If employees have computers with a built-in TPM, virtual smart cards can be deployed with no additional material costs. These computers and devices are relatively common in the market. +If a company wants to deploy physical smart cards, they need to purchase smart cards and smart card readers for all employees. Although relatively inexpensive options can be found, options that ensure the three key properties of smart card security (most notably, nonexportability) are more expensive. If employees have computers with a built-in TPM, virtual smart cards can be deployed with no additional material costs. These computers and devices are relatively common in the market. The maintenance cost of virtual smart cards is less than that for physical smart cards, which are easily lost, stolen, or broken from normal wear. TPM virtual smart cards are only lost or broken if the host computer or device is lost or broken, which in most cases is much less frequently. -**Comparison summary** +### Comparison summary -| Physical Smart Cards | TPM virtual smart cards | -|---------------------|-------------------| -| Protects private keys by using the built-in cryptographic functionality of the card. | Protects private keys by using the cryptographic functionality of the TPM. | -| Stores private keys in isolated non-volatile memory on the card, which means that access to private keys is only from the card, and access is never allowed to the operating system. | Stores encrypted private keys on the hard drive. The encryption ensures that these keys can only be decrypted and used in the TPM, not in the accessible memory of the operating system. | -| Guarantees non-exportability through the card manufacturer, which includes isolating private information from operating system access. | Guarantees non-exportability through the TPM manufacturer, which includes the inability of an adversary to replicate or remove the TPM. | -| Performs and isolates cryptographic operations within the built-in capabilities of the card. | Performs and isolates cryptographic operations in the TPM of the user's computer or device. | -| Provides anti-hammering through the card. After a certain number of failed PIN entry attempts, the card blocks further access until administrative action is taken. | Provides anti-hammering through the TPM. Successive failed attempts increase the device lockout time (the time the user has to wait before trying again). This can be reset by an administrator. | -| Requires that users carry their smart card and smart card reader with them to access network resources. | Allows users to access their TPM-enabled computers or devices, and potentially access the network, without other equipment. | -| Enables credential portability by inserting the smart card into smart card readers that are attached to other computers. | Prevents exporting credentials from a given computer or device. However, virtual smart cards can be issued for the same user on multiple computers or devices by using additional certificates. | -| Enables multiple users to access network resources through the same computer by inserting their personal smart cards. | Enables multiple users to access network resources through the same computer or device by issuing a virtual smart card for each user on that computer or device. | -| Requires the user to carry the card, making it more difficult for an attacker to access the device and launch a hammering attempt. | Stores virtual smart card on the user's computer, which may be left unattended and allow a greater risk window for hammering attempts. | -| Provides a generally single-purpose device that is carried explicitly for the purpose of authentication. The smart card can be easily misplaced or forgotten. | Installs the virtual smart card on a device that has other purposes for the user, so the user has greater incentive to be responsible for the computer or device. | -| Alerts users that their card is lost or stolen only when they need to sign in and notice it's missing. | Installs the virtual smart card on a device that the user likely needs for other purposes, so users will notice its loss much more quickly. This reduces the associated risk window. | -| Requires companies to invest in smart cards and smart card readers for all employees. | Requires that companies ensure all employees have TPM-enabled computers, which are relatively common. | -| Enables using a smart card removal policy to affect system behavior when the smart card is removed. For example, the policy can dictate if the user's sign-in session is locked or terminated when the user removes the card. | Eliminates the necessity for a smart card removal policy because a TPM virtual smart card is always present and can't be removed from the computer. | +| Physical Smart Cards | TPM virtual smart cards | +|--|--| +| Protects private keys by using the built-in cryptographic functionality of the card. | Protects private keys by using the cryptographic functionality of the TPM. | +| Stores private keys in isolated non-volatile memory on the card, which means that access to private keys is only from the card, and access is never allowed to the operating system. | Stores encrypted private keys on the hard drive. The encryption ensures that these keys can only be decrypted and used in the TPM, not in the accessible memory of the operating system. | +| Guarantees nonexportability through the card manufacturer, which includes isolating private information from operating system access. | Guarantees nonexportability through the TPM manufacturer, which includes the inability of an adversary to replicate or remove the TPM. | +| Performs and isolates cryptographic operations within the built-in capabilities of the card. | Performs and isolates cryptographic operations in the TPM of the user's computer or device. | +| Provides anti-hammering through the card. After some failed PIN entry attempts, the card blocks further access until administrative action is taken. | Provides anti-hammering through the TPM. Successive failed attempts increase the device lockout time (the time the user has to wait before trying again). This can be reset by an administrator. | +| Requires that users carry their smart card and smart card reader with them to access network resources. | Allows users to access their TPM-enabled computers or devices, and potentially access the network, without other equipment. | +| Enables credential portability by inserting the smart card into smart card readers that are attached to other computers. | Prevents exporting credentials from a given computer or device. However, virtual smart cards can be issued for the same user on multiple computers or devices by using additional certificates. | +| Enables multiple users to access network resources through the same computer by inserting their personal smart cards. | Enables multiple users to access network resources through the same computer or device by issuing a virtual smart card for each user on that computer or device. | +| Requires the user to carry the card, making it more difficult for an attacker to access the device and launch a hammering attempt. | Stores virtual smart card on the user's computer, which might be left unattended and allow a greater risk window for hammering attempts. | +| Provides a generally single-purpose device that is carried explicitly for the purpose of authentication. The smart card can be easily misplaced or forgotten. | Installs the virtual smart card on a device that has other purposes for the user, so the user has greater incentive to be responsible for the computer or device. | +| Alerts users that their card is lost or stolen only when they need to sign in and notice it's missing. | Installs the virtual smart card on a device that the user likely needs for other purposes, so users will notice its loss much more quickly. This reduces the associated risk window. | +| Requires companies to invest in smart cards and smart card readers for all employees. | Requires that companies ensure all employees have TPM-enabled computers, which are relatively common. | +| Enables using a smart card removal policy to affect system behavior when the smart card is removed. For example, the policy can dictate if the user's sign-in session is locked or terminated when the user removes the card. | Eliminates the necessity for a smart card removal policy because a TPM virtual smart card is always present and can't be removed from the computer. | ## Authentication design options The following section presents several commonly used options and their respective strengths and weaknesses, which organizations can consider for authentication. -**Passwords** +### Passwords A password is a secret string of characters that is tied to the identification credentials for a user's account. This establishes the user's identity. Although passwords are the most commonly used form of authentication, they're also the weakest. In a system where passwords are used as the sole method of user authentication, only individuals who know their passwords are considered valid users. Password authentication places a great deal of responsibility on the user. Passwords must be sufficiently complex so they can't be easily guessed, but they must be simple enough to be committed to memory and not stored in a physical location. Even if this balance is successfully achieved, a wide variety of attacks exist (such as brute force attacks, eavesdropping, and social engineering tactics) where a malicious user can acquire a user's password and impersonate that person's identity. A user often won't realize that the password is compromised, which makes it's easy for a malicious user to maintain access to a system if a valid password has been obtained. -**One-time passwords** +### One-time passwords A one-time password (OTP) is similar to a traditional password, but it's more secure in that it can be used only once to authenticate a user. The method for determining each new password varies by implementation. Assuming a secure deployment of each new password, OTPs have several advantages over the classic password model of authentication. Most importantly, if a given OTP token is intercepted in transmission between the user and the system, the interceptor can't use it for any future transactions. Similarly, if a malicious user obtains a valid user's OTP, the interceptor will have limited access to the system (only one session). -**Smart cards** +### Smart cards Smart cards are physical authentication devices, which improve on the concept of a password by requiring that users actually have their smart card device with them to access the system, in addition to knowing the PIN that provides access to the smart card. Smart cards have three key properties that help maintain their security: @@ -112,8 +104,8 @@ Additional security is achieved by the singular nature of the card because only The additional security comes with added material and support costs. Traditional smart cards are expensive to purchase (cards and card readers must be supplied to employees), and users can misplace or lose them. -**Virtual smart cards** +### Virtual smart cards -Virtual smart cards emulate the functionality of traditional smart cards. Instead of requiring the purchase of additional hardware, virtual smart cards utilize technology that users already own and are more likely to always have with them. Theoretically, any device that can provide the three key properties of smart cards (non-exportability, isolated cryptography, and anti-hammering) can be commissioned as a virtual smart card. The virtual smart card platform is limited to the use of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip, which is on most modern devices. +Virtual smart cards emulate the functionality of traditional smart cards. Instead of requiring the purchase of additional hardware, virtual smart cards utilize technology that users already own and are more likely to always have with them. Theoretically, any device that can provide the three key properties of smart cards (nonexportability, isolated cryptography, and anti-hammering) can be commissioned as a virtual smart card. The virtual smart card platform is limited to the use of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip, which is on most modern devices. -Virtual smart cards that utilize a TPM provide the three main security principles of traditional smart cards: non-exportability, isolated cryptography, and anti-hammering. Virtual smart cards are less expensive to implement and more convenient for users. Since many corporate computers already have a built-in TPM, there's no cost associated with purchasing new hardware. The user's possession of a computer or device is equivalent to the possession of a smart card, and a user's identity can't be assumed from any other computer or device without administrative provisioning of further credentials. Thus, two-factor authentication is achieved because the user must have a computer that is set up with a virtual smart card and know the PIN to use the virtual smart card. +Virtual smart cards that utilize a TPM provide the three main security principles of traditional smart cards: nonexportability, isolated cryptography, and anti-hammering. Virtual smart cards are less expensive to implement and more convenient for users. Since many corporate computers already have a built-in TPM, there's no cost associated with purchasing new hardware. The user's possession of a computer or device is equivalent to the possession of a smart card, and a user's identity can't be assumed from any other computer or device without administrative provisioning of further credentials. Thus, two-factor authentication is achieved because the user must have a computer that is set up with a virtual smart card and know the PIN to use the virtual smart card. diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-use-virtual-smart-cards.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-use-virtual-smart-cards.md index ddb91270e5..3132441a32 100644 --- a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-use-virtual-smart-cards.md +++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-use-virtual-smart-cards.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ title: Use Virtual Smart Cards description: Learn about the requirements for virtual smart cards, how to use and manage them. ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 02/22/2023 +ms.date: 11/06/2023 --- # Use Virtual Smart Cards @@ -13,13 +13,12 @@ Learn about the requirements for virtual smart cards, how to use and manage them ## Requirements, restrictions, and limitations -| Area | Requirements and details | -|-------------|---------------------------| -| Supported operating systems | Windows Server 2016
Windows Server 2012 R2
Windows Server 2012
Windows 10
Windows 8.1
Windows 8 | -| Supported Trusted Platform Module (TPM) | Any TPM that adheres to the TPM main specifications for version 1.2 or version 2.0 (as set by the Trusted Computing Group) is supported for use as a virtual smart card. For more information, see the [TPM Main Specification](http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/resources/tpm_main_specification). | -| Supported virtual smart cards per computer | Ten smart cards can be connected to a computer or device at one time. This includes physical and virtual smart cards combined.

**Note**
You can create more than one virtual smart card; however, after creating more than four virtual smart cards, you may start to notice performance degradation. Because all smart cards appear as if they're always inserted, if more than one person shares a computer or device, each person can see all the virtual smart cards that are created on that computer or device. If the user knows the PIN values for all the virtual smart cards, the user will also be able to use them.
| -| Supported number of certificates on a virtual smart card | A single TPM virtual smart card can contain 30 distinct certificates with the corresponding private keys. Users can continue to renew certificates on the card until the total number of certificates on a card exceeds 90. The reason that the total number of certificates is different from the total number of private keys is that sometimes the renewal can be done with the same private key—in which case a new private key isn't generated. | -| PIN, PIN Unlock Key (PUK), and Administrative key requirements | The PIN and the PUK must be a minimum of eight characters that can include numerals, alphabetic characters, and special characters.
The Administrative key must be entered as 48 hexadecimal characters. It's a 3-key triple DES with ISO/IEC 9797 padding method 2 in CBC chaining mode. | +| Area | Requirements and details | +|--|--| +| Supported Trusted Platform Module (TPM) | Any TPM that adheres to the TPM main specifications for version 1.2 or version 2.0 (as set by the Trusted Computing Group) is supported for use as a virtual smart card. For more information, see the [TPM Main Specification](http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/resources/tpm_main_specification). | +| Supported virtual smart cards per computer | Ten smart cards can be connected to a computer or device at one time. This includes physical and virtual smart cards combined.

**Note**
You can create more than one virtual smart card; however, after creating more than four virtual smart cards, you may start to notice performance degradation. Because all smart cards appear as if they're always inserted, if more than one person shares a computer or device, each person can see all the virtual smart cards that are created on that computer or device. If the user knows the PIN values for all the virtual smart cards, the user will also be able to use them.
| +| Supported number of certificates on a virtual smart card | A single TPM virtual smart card can contain 30 distinct certificates with the corresponding private keys. Users can continue to renew certificates on the card until the total number of certificates on a card exceeds 90. The reason that the total number of certificates is different from the total number of private keys is that sometimes the renewal can be done with the same private key—in which case a new private key isn't generated. | +| PIN, PIN Unlock Key (PUK), and Administrative key requirements | The PIN and the PUK must be a minimum of eight characters that can include numerals, alphabetic characters, and special characters.
The Administrative key must be entered as 48 hexadecimal characters. It's a 3-key triple DES with ISO/IEC 9797 padding method 2 in CBC chaining mode. | ## Using Tpmvscmgr.exe @@ -29,63 +28,58 @@ To create and delete TPM virtual smart cards for end users, the Tpmvscmgr comman Virtual smart cards can also be created and deleted by using APIs. For more information, see the following classes and interfaces: -- [TpmVirtualSmartCardManager](/previous-versions/windows/desktop/legacy/hh707171(v=vs.85)) +- [TpmVirtualSmartCardManager](/previous-versions/windows/desktop/legacy/hh707171(v=vs.85)) +- [RemoteTpmVirtualSmartCardManager](/previous-versions/windows/desktop/legacy/hh707166(v=vs.85)) +- [ITpmVirtualSmartCardManager](/windows/win32/api/tpmvscmgr/nn-tpmvscmgr-itpmvirtualsmartcardmanager) +- [ITPMVirtualSmartCardManagerStatusCallBack](/windows/win32/api/tpmvscmgr/nn-tpmvscmgr-itpmvirtualsmartcardmanagerstatuscallback) -- [RemoteTpmVirtualSmartCardManager](/previous-versions/windows/desktop/legacy/hh707166(v=vs.85)) - -- [ITpmVirtualSmartCardManager](/windows/win32/api/tpmvscmgr/nn-tpmvscmgr-itpmvirtualsmartcardmanager) - -- [ITPMVirtualSmartCardManagerStatusCallBack](/windows/win32/api/tpmvscmgr/nn-tpmvscmgr-itpmvirtualsmartcardmanagerstatuscallback) - -You can use APIs that were introduced in the Windows.Device.SmartCards namespace in Windows Server 2012 R2 and Windows 8.1 to build Microsoft Store apps to manage the full lifecycle of virtual smart cards. For information about how to build an app to do this, see [Strong Authentication: Building Apps That Leverage Virtual Smart Cards in Enterprise, BYOD, and Consumer Environments | Build 2013 | Channel 9](https://channel9.msdn.com/events/build/2013/2-041). +You can use APIs in the `Windows.Device.SmartCards` namespace to build Microsoft Store apps to manage the full lifecycle of virtual smart cards. For information about how to build an app to do this, see [Strong Authentication: Building Apps That Leverage Virtual Smart Cards in Enterprise, BYOD, and Consumer Environments](https://channel9.msdn.com/events/build/2013/2-041). The following table describes the features that can be developed in a Microsoft Store app: -| Feature | Physical Smart Card | Virtual Smart Card | -|----------------------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------| -| Query and monitor smart card readers | Yes | Yes | -| List available smart cards in a reader, and retrieve the card name and card ID | Yes | Yes | -| Verify if the administrative key of a card is correct | Yes | Yes | -| Provision (or reformat) a card with a given card ID | Yes | Yes | -| Change the PIN by entering the old PIN and specifying a new PIN | Yes | Yes | -| Change the administrative key, reset the PIN, or unblock the smart card by using a challenge/response method | Yes | Yes | -| Create a virtual smart card | Not applicable | Yes | -| Delete a virtual smart card | Not applicable | Yes | -| Set PIN policies | No | Yes | +| Feature | Physical Smart Card | Virtual Smart Card | +|--|--|--| +| Query and monitor smart card readers | Yes | Yes | +| List available smart cards in a reader, and retrieve the card name and card ID | Yes | Yes | +| Verify if the administrative key of a card is correct | Yes | Yes | +| Provision (or reformat) a card with a given card ID | Yes | Yes | +| Change the PIN by entering the old PIN and specifying a new PIN | Yes | Yes | +| Change the administrative key, reset the PIN, or unblock the smart card by using a challenge/response method | Yes | Yes | +| Create a virtual smart card | Not applicable | Yes | +| Delete a virtual smart card | Not applicable | Yes | +| Set PIN policies | No | Yes | For more information about these Windows APIs, see: -- [Windows.Devices.SmartCards namespace (Windows)](/uwp/api/Windows.Devices.SmartCards) - -- [Windows.Security.Cryptography.Certificates namespace (Windows)](/uwp/api/Windows.Security.Cryptography.Certificates) +- [Windows.Devices.SmartCards namespace (Windows)](/uwp/api/Windows.Devices.SmartCards) +- [Windows.Security.Cryptography.Certificates namespace (Windows)](/uwp/api/Windows.Security.Cryptography.Certificates) ## Distinguishing TPM-based virtual smart cards from physical smart cards -To help users visually distinguish a Trusted Platform Module (TPM)-based virtual smart card from physical smart cards, the virtual smart card has a different icon. The following icon is displayed during sign-in, and on other screens that require the user to enter the PIN for a virtual smart card. +To help users visually distinguish a Trusted Platform Module (TPM)-based virtual smart card from physical smart cards, the virtual smart card has a different icon. The virtual smart card icon :::image type="icon" source="images/virtual-smart-card-icon.svg" border="false"::: is displayed during sign-in, and on other screens that require the user to enter the PIN for a virtual smart card. -![Icon for a virtual smart card.](images/vsc-virtual-smart-card-icon.png) - -A TPM-based virtual smart card is labeled **Security Device** in the user interface. +A TPM-based virtual smart card is labeled *Security Device* in the user interface. ## Changing the PIN The PIN for a virtual smart card can be changed by following these steps: -- Sign in with the old PIN or password. -- Press Ctrl+Alt+Del and choose **Change a password**. -- Select **Sign-in Options**. -- Select the virtual smart card icon. -- Enter and confirm the new PIN. + +- Sign in with the old PIN or password +- Press Ctrl+Alt+Del and select **Change a password** +- Select **Sign-in Options** +- Select the virtual smart card icon +- Enter and confirm the new PIN + ## Resolving issues ### TPM not provisioned -For a TPM-based virtual smart card to function properly, a provisioned TPM must be available on the computer. If the TPM is disabled in the BIOS, or it isn't provisioned with full ownership and the storage root key, the TPM virtual smart card creation will fail. +For a TPM-based virtual smart card to function properly, a provisioned TPM must be available on the computer: -If the TPM is initialized after creating a virtual smart card, the card will no longer function, and it will need to be re-created. - -If the TPM ownership was established on a Windows Vista installation, the TPM won't be ready to use virtual smart cards. The system administrator needs to clear and initialize the TPM for it to be suitable for creating TPM virtual smart cards. - -If the operating system is reinstalled, prior TPM virtual smart cards are no longer available and need to be re-created. If the operating system is upgraded, prior TPM virtual smart cards will be available to use in the upgraded operating system. +- If the TPM is disabled in the BIOS, or it isn't provisioned with full ownership and the storage root key, the TPM virtual smart card creation fails +- If the TPM is initialized after creating a virtual smart card, the card will no longer function, and it must be re-created +- If the operating system is reinstalled, prior TPM virtual smart cards are no longer available and need to be re-created +- If the operating system is upgraded, prior TPM virtual smart cards are available to use in the upgraded operating system ### TPM in lockout state diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bcd-settings-and-bitlocker.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bcd-settings-and-bitlocker.md index cf39c89999..22f80cb481 100644 --- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bcd-settings-and-bitlocker.md +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bcd-settings-and-bitlocker.md @@ -1,31 +1,27 @@ --- title: BCD settings and BitLocker -description: This article for IT professionals describes the BCD settings that are used by BitLocker. +description: Learn how BCD settings are used by BitLocker. ms.topic: reference -ms.date: 11/08/2022 +ms.date: 10/30/2023 --- # Boot Configuration Data settings and BitLocker -This article for IT professionals describes the Boot Configuration Data (BCD) settings that are used by BitLocker. +This article describes the Boot Configuration Data (BCD) settings that are used by BitLocker. -When protecting data at rest on an operating system volume, during the boot process BitLocker verifies that the security sensitive BCD settings haven't changed since BitLocker was last enabled, resumed, or recovered. +During the boot process, BitLocker verifies that the security sensitive BCD settings haven't changed since BitLocker was last enabled, resumed, or recovered. -## BitLocker and BCD Settings +If it's believed that there's a risk in excluding a particular BCD setting from the validation profile, you can include that BCD setting in the BCD validation coverage to suit the preferences for validation.\ +If the default BCD setting persistently triggers a recovery for benign changes, you can exclude that BCD setting from the validation coverage. -In Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2, BitLocker validated BCD settings with the winload, winresume, and memtest prefixes to a large degree. However, this high degree of validation caused BitLocker to go into recovery mode for benign setting changes, for example, when applying a language pack, BitLocker would enter recovery mode. - -In Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, and later operating systems, BitLocker narrows the set of BCD settings validated to reduce the chance of benign changes causing a BCD validation problem. If it's believed that there's a risk in excluding a particular BCD setting from the validation profile, include that BCD setting in the BCD validation coverage to suit the preferences for validation. If a default BCD setting is found to persistently trigger a recovery for benign changes, exclude that BCD setting from the validation coverage. - -### When secure boot is enabled - -Computers with UEFI firmware can use secure boot to provide enhanced boot security. When BitLocker is able to use secure boot for platform and BCD integrity validation, as defined by the **Allow Secure Boot for integrity validation** group policy setting, the **Use enhanced Boot Configuration Data validation profile** group policy is ignored. +> [!IMPORTANT] +> Devices with UEFI firmware can use secure boot to provide enhanced boot security. When BitLocker is able to use secure boot for platform and BCD integrity validation, as defined by the **[Allow Secure Boot for integrity validation](configure.md?tabs=os#allow-secure-boot-for-integrity-validation)** policy setting, the **[Use enhanced Boot Configuration Data validation profile](configure.md?tabs=os#use-enhanced-boot-configuration-data-validation-profile)** policy is ignored. One of the benefits of using secure boot is that it can correct BCD settings during boot without triggering recovery events. Secure boot enforces the same BCD settings as BitLocker. Secure boot BCD enforcement isn't configurable from within the operating system. -## Customizing BCD validation settings +## Customize BCD validation settings -To modify the BCD settings that are validated by BitLocker, the administrator will add or exclude BCD settings from the platform validation profile by enabling and configuring the **Use enhanced Boot Configuration Data validation profile** group policy setting. +To modify the BCD settings that are validated by BitLocker, the administrator will add or exclude BCD settings from the platform validation profile by enabling and configuring the **[Use enhanced Boot Configuration Data validation profile](configure.md?tabs=os#use-enhanced-boot-configuration-data-validation-profile)** policy setting. For the purposes of BitLocker validation, BCD settings are associated with a specific set of Microsoft boot applications. These BCD settings can also be applied to the other Microsoft boot applications that aren't part of the set to which the BCD settings are already applicable for. This setting can be done by attaching any of the following prefixes to the BCD settings that are being entered in the group policy settings dialog: @@ -34,15 +30,15 @@ For the purposes of BitLocker validation, BCD settings are associated with a spe - memtest - all of the above -All BCD settings are specified by combining the prefix value with either a hexadecimal (hex) value or a "friendly name." +All BCD settings are specified by combining the prefix value with either a hexadecimal (hex) value or a *friendly name*. The BCD setting hex value is reported when BitLocker enters recovery mode and is stored in the event log (event ID 523). The hex value uniquely identifies the BCD setting that caused the recovery event. You can quickly obtain the friendly name for the BCD settings on a computer by using the command `bcdedit.exe /enum all`. -Not all BCD settings have friendly names; for those settings without a friendly name, the hex value is the only way to configure an exclusion policy. +Not all BCD settings have friendly names. For those settings without a friendly name, the hex value is the only way to configure an exclusion policy. -When specifying BCD values in the **Use enhanced Boot Configuration Data validation profile** group policy setting, use the following syntax: +When specifying BCD values in the **[Use enhanced Boot Configuration Data validation profile](configure.md?tabs=os#use-enhanced-boot-configuration-data-validation-profile)** policy setting, use the following syntax: - Prefix the setting with the boot application prefix - Append a colon `:` @@ -54,11 +50,11 @@ For example, either "`winload:hypervisordebugport`" or "`winload:0x250000f4`" yi A setting that applies to all boot applications may be applied only to an individual application. However, the reverse isn't true. For example, one can specify either "`all:locale`" or "`winresume:locale`", but as the BCD setting "`win-pe`" doesn't apply to all boot applications, "`winload:winpe`" is valid, but "`all:winpe`" isn't valid. The setting that controls boot debugging ("`bootdebug`" or 0x16000010) will always be validated and will have no effect if it's included in the provided fields. > [!NOTE] -> Take care when configuring BCD entries in the Group Policy setting. The Local Group Policy Editor does not validate the correctness of the BCD entry. BitLocker will fail to be enabled if the Group Policy setting specified is invalid. +> Take care when configuring BCD entries in the policy setting. The Local Group Policy Editor doesn't validate the correctness of the BCD entry. BitLocker fails to be enabled if the policy setting specified is invalid. ### Default BCD validation profile -The following table contains the default BCD validation profile used by BitLocker in Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, and subsequent versions: +The following table contains the default BCD validation profile used by BitLocker: | Hex Value | Prefix | Friendly Name | | - | - | - | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-basic-deployment.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-basic-deployment.md deleted file mode 100644 index 16a611c770..0000000000 --- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-basic-deployment.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,455 +0,0 @@ ---- -title: BitLocker basic deployment -description: This article for the IT professional explains how BitLocker features can be used to protect your data through drive encryption. -ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 11/08/2022 ---- - -# BitLocker basic deployment - -This article for the IT professional explains how BitLocker features can be used to protect data through drive encryption. - -## Using BitLocker to encrypt volumes - -BitLocker provides full volume encryption (FVE) for operating system volumes, and fixed and removable data drives. To support fully encrypted operating system drives, BitLocker uses an unencrypted system partition for the files required to boot, decrypt, and load the operating system. This volume is automatically created during a new installation of both client and server operating systems. - -If the drive was prepared as a single contiguous space, BitLocker requires a new volume to hold the boot files. BdeHdCfg.exe can create these volumes. - -> [!NOTE] -> For more info about using this tool, see [Bdehdcfg](/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bdehdcfg) in the Command-Line Reference. - -BitLocker encryption can be enabled and managed using the following methods: - -- BitLocker control panel -- Windows Explorer -- `manage-bde.exe` command-line interface -- BitLocker Windows PowerShell cmdlets - -### Encrypting volumes using the BitLocker control panel - -Encrypting volumes with the BitLocker control panel (select **Start**, enter `Bitlocker`, select **Manage BitLocker**) is how many users will use BitLocker. The name of the BitLocker control panel is BitLocker Drive Encryption. The BitLocker control panel supports encrypting operating system, fixed data, and removable data volumes. The BitLocker control panel will organize available drives in the appropriate category based on how the device reports itself to Windows. Only formatted volumes with assigned drive letters will appear properly in the BitLocker control panel applet. - -To start encryption for a volume, select **Turn on BitLocker** for the appropriate drive to initialize the **BitLocker Drive Encryption Wizard**. **BitLocker Drive Encryption Wizard** options vary based on volume type (operating system volume or data volume). - -#### Operating system volume - -For the operating system volume the **BitLocker Drive Encryption Wizard** presents several screens that prompt for options while it performs several actions: - -1. When the **BitLocker Drive Encryption Wizard** first launches, it verifies the computer meets the BitLocker system requirements for encrypting an operating system volume. By default, the system requirements are: - - |Requirement|Description| - |--- |--- | - |Hardware configuration|The computer must meet the minimum requirements for the supported Windows versions.| - |Operating system|BitLocker is an optional feature that can be installed by Server Manager on Windows Server 2012 and later.| - |Hardware TPM|TPM version 1.2 or 2.0.

A TPM isn't required for BitLocker; however, only a computer with a TPM can provide the additional security of pre-startup system integrity verification and multifactor authentication.| - |UEFI firmware/BIOS configuration|
  • A Trusted Computing Group (TCG)-compliant BIOS or UEFI firmware.
  • The boot order must be set to start first from the hard disk, and not the USB or CD drives.
  • The firmware must be able to read from a USB flash drive during startup.
| - |File system| One FAT32 partition for the system drive and one NTFS partition for the operating system drive. This requirement is applicable for computers that boot natively with UEFI firmware.
For computers with legacy BIOS firmware, at least two NTFS disk partitions, one for the system drive and one for the operating system drive.
For either firmware, the system drive partition must be at least 350 megabytes (MB) and set as the active partition.| - |Hardware encrypted drive prerequisites (optional)|To use a hardware encrypted drive as the boot drive, the drive must be in the uninitialized state and in the security inactive state. In addition, the system must always boot with native UEFI version 2.3.1 or higher and the CSM (if any) disabled.| - - If the volume doesn't pass the initial configuration for BitLocker, the user is presented with an error dialog describing the appropriate actions to be taken. - -2. Upon passing the initial configuration, users may be prompted to enter a password for the volume, for example, if a TPM isn't available. If a TPM is available, the password screen will be skipped. - -3. After the initial configuration/password screens, a recovery key will be generated. The **BitLocker Drive Encryption Wizard** will prompt for a location to save the recovery key. A BitLocker recovery key is a special key that is created when BitLocker Drive Encryption is turned on for the first time on each drive that is encrypted. The recovery key can be used to gain access to the computer if: - - - The drive that Windows is installed on (the operating system drive) is encrypted using BitLocker Drive Encryption - - BitLocker detects a condition that prevents it from unlocking the drive when the computer is starting up - - A recovery key can also be used to gain access to the files and folders on a removable data drive (such as an external hard drive or USB flash drive) that is encrypted using BitLocker To Go, if for some reason the password is forgotten or the computer can't access the drive. - - The recovery key can be stored using the following methods: - - - **Save to your Microsoft Entra account** (if applicable) - - **Save to a USB flash drive** - - **Save to a file** - the file needs to be saved to a location that isn't on the computer itself such as a network folder or OneDrive - - **Print the recovery key** - - The recovery key can't be stored at the following locations: - - - The drive being encrypted - - The root directory of a non-removable/fixed drive - - An encrypted volume - - > [!TIP] - > Ideally, a computer's recovery key should be stored separate from the computer itself. - - > [!NOTE] - > After a recovery key is created, the BitLocker control panel can be used to make additional copies of the recovery key. - -4. The **BitLocker Drive Encryption Wizard** will then prompt how much of the drive to encrypt. The **BitLocker Drive Encryption Wizard** will have two options that determine how much of the drive is encrypted: - - - **Encrypt used disk space only** - Encrypts only disk space that contains data. - - **Encrypt entire drive** - Encrypts the entire volume including free space. Also known as full disk encryption. - - Each of the methods is recommended in the following scenarios: - - - **Encrypt used disk space only**: - - - The drive has never had data - - Formatted or erased drives that in the past have never had confidential data that was never encrypted - - - **Encrypt entire drive** (full disk encryption): - - - Drives that currently have data - - Drives that currently have an operating system - - Formatted or erased drives that in the past had confidential data that was never encrypted - - > [!IMPORTANT] - > Deleted files appear as free space to the file system, which isn't encrypted by **used disk space only**. Until they are wiped or overwritten, deleted files hold information that could be recovered with common data forensic tools. - -5. The **BitLocker Drive Encryption Wizard** will then prompt for an encryption mode: - - - **New encryption mode** - - **Compatible mode** - - Normally **New encryption mode** should be chosen, but if the drive will be potentially moved to another computer with an older Windows operating system, then select **Compatible mode**. - -6. After selecting an encryption mode, the **BitLocker Drive Encryption Wizard** will give the option of running a BitLocker system check via the option **Run BitLocker system check**. This system check will ensure that BitLocker can properly access the recovery and encryption keys before the volume encryption begins. it's recommended run this system check before starting the encryption process. If the system check isn't run and a problem is encountered when the operating system attempts to start, the user will need to provide the recovery key to start Windows. - -After completing the system check (if selected), the **BitLocker Drive Encryption Wizard** will begin encryption. A reboot may be initiated to start encryption. If a reboot was initiated, if there was no TPM and a password was specified, the password will need to be entered to boot into the operating system volume. - -Users can check encryption status by checking the system notification area or the BitLocker control panel. - -Until encryption is completed, the only available options for managing BitLocker involve manipulation of the password protecting the operating system volume, backing up the recovery key, and turning off BitLocker. - -#### Data volume - -Encrypting data volumes using the BitLocker control panel works in a similar fashion to encryption of the operating system volumes. Users select **Turn on BitLocker** within the BitLocker control panel to begin the **BitLocker Drive Encryption Wizard**. - -1. Upon launching the **BitLocker Drive Encryption Wizard**, unlike for operating system volumes, data volumes aren't required to pass any configuration tests for the **BitLocker Drive Encryption Wizard** to proceed - -2. A choice of authentication methods to unlock the drive appears. The available options are: - - - **Use a password to unlock the drive** - - **Use my smart card to unlock the drive** - - **Automatically unlock this drive on this computer** - Disabled by default but if enabled, this option will unlock the data volume without user input when the operating system volume is unlocked. - -3. The **BitLocker Drive Encryption Wizard** presents options for storage of the recovery key. These options are the same as for operating system volumes: - - - **Save to your Microsoft Entra account** (if applicable) - - **Save to a USB flash drive** - - **Save to a file** - the file needs to be saved to a location that isn't on the computer itself such as a network folder or OneDrive - - **Print the recovery key** - -4. After saving the recovery key, the **BitLocker Drive Encryption Wizard** will show available options for encryption. These options are the same as for operating system volumes: - - - **Encrypt used disk space only** - Encrypts only disk space that contains data. - - **Encrypt entire drive** - Encrypts the entire volume including free space. Also known as full disk encryption. - -5. The **BitLocker Drive Encryption Wizard** will then prompt for an encryption mode: - - - **New encryption mode** - - **Compatible mode** - - Normally **New encryption mode** should be chosen, but if the drive will be potentially moved to another computer with an older Windows operating system, then select **Compatible mode**. - -6. The **BitLocker Drive Encryption Wizard** will display a final confirmation screen before the encryption process begins. Selecting **Start encrypting** begins encryption. - -Encryption status displays in the notification area or within the BitLocker control panel. - -### OneDrive option - -There's an option for storing the BitLocker recovery key using OneDrive. This option requires that computers aren't members of a domain and that the user is using a Microsoft Account. Local accounts don't give the option to use OneDrive. Using the OneDrive option is the default recommended recovery key storage method for computers that aren't joined to a domain. - -Users can verify whether the recovery key was saved properly by checking OneDrive for the BitLocker folder. The BitLocker folder on OneDrive is created automatically during the save process. The folder will contain two files, a `readme.txt` and the recovery key. For users storing more than one recovery password on their OneDrive, they can identify the required recovery key by looking at the file name. The recovery key ID is appended to the end of the file name. - -### Using BitLocker within Windows Explorer - -Windows Explorer allows users to launch the **BitLocker Drive Encryption Wizard** by right-clicking a volume and selecting **Turn On BitLocker**. This option is available on client computers by default. On servers, the BitLocker feature and the Desktop-Experience feature must first be installed for this option to be available. After selecting **Turn on BitLocker**, the wizard works exactly as it does when launched using the BitLocker control panel. - -## Down-level compatibility - -The following table shows the compatibility matrix for systems that have been BitLocker enabled and then presented to a different version of Windows. - -Table 1: Cross compatibility for Windows 11, Windows 10, Windows 8.1, Windows 8, and Windows 7 encrypted volumes - -|Encryption Type|Windows 11, Windows 10, and Windows 8.1|Windows 8|Windows 7| -|---|---|---|---| -|Fully encrypted on Windows 8|Presents as fully encrypted|N/A|Presented as fully encrypted| -|Used Disk Space Only encrypted on Windows 8|Presents as encrypt on write|N/A|Presented as fully encrypted| -|Fully encrypted volume from Windows 7|Presents as fully encrypted|Presented as fully encrypted|N/A| -|Partially encrypted volume from Windows 7|Windows 11, Windows 10, and Windows 8.1 will complete encryption regardless of policy|Windows 8 will complete encryption regardless of policy|N/A| - -## Encrypting volumes using the `manage-bde.exe` command-line interface - -`Manage-bde.exe` is a command-line utility that can be used for scripting BitLocker operations. `Manage-bde.exe` offers additional options not displayed in the BitLocker control panel. For a complete list of the options, see [Manage-bde](/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/manage-bde). - -`Manage-bde.exe` offers a multitude of wider options for configuring BitLocker. Using the command syntax may require care. For example, using just the `manage-bde.exe -on` command on a data volume will fully encrypt the volume without any authenticating protectors. A volume encrypted in this manner still requires user interaction to turn on BitLocker protection, even though the command successfully completed. For the volume to be fully protected, an authentication method needs to also be added to the volume in addition to running the `manage-bde.exe`command. - -Command-line users need to determine the appropriate syntax for a given situation. The following section covers general encryption for operating system volumes and data volumes. - -### Operating system volume commands - -Listed below are examples of basic valid commands for operating system volumes. In general, using only the `manage-bde.exe -on ` command encrypts the operating system volume with a TPM-only protector and no recovery key. However, many environments require more secure protectors such as passwords or PIN and expect to be able to recover information with a recovery key. - -#### Determining volume status - -A good practice when using `manage-bde.exe` is to determine the volume status on the target system. Use the following command to determine volume status: - -`manage-bde.exe -status` - -This command returns the volumes on the target, current encryption status, and volume type (operating system or data) for each volume. Using this information, users can determine the best encryption method for their environment. - -#### Enabling BitLocker without a TPM - -Suppose BitLocker is desired on a computer without a TPM. In this scenario, a USB flash drive is needed as a startup key for the operating system volume. The startup key will then allow the computer to boot. To create the startup key using `manage-bde.exe`, the `-protectors` switch would be used specifying the `-startupkey` option. Assuming the USB flash drive is drive letter `E:`, then the following `manage-bde.exe` commands would be used t create the startup key and start the BitLocker encryption: - -```powershell -manage-bde.exe -protectors -add C: -startupkey E: -manage-bde.exe -on C: -``` - -If prompted, reboot the computer to complete the encryption process. - -#### Enabling BitLocker with a TPM only - -It's possible to encrypt the operating system volume without any defined protectors by using `manage-bde.exe`. Use this command: - -```cmd -manage-bde.exe -on C: -``` - -This command will encrypt the drive using the TPM as the protector. If users are unsure of the protector for a volume, they can use the `-protectors` option in `manage-bde.exe` to list this information by executing the following command: - -```cmd -manage-bde.exe -protectors -get -``` - -#### Provisioning BitLocker with two protectors - -Another example is a user on a non-TPM hardware who wishes to add a password and SID-based protector to the operating system volume. In this instance, the user adds the protectors first. Adding the protectors is done with the command: - -```cmd -manage-bde.exe -protectors -add C: -pw -sid -``` - -This command requires the user to enter and then confirm the password protectors before adding them to the volume. With the protectors enabled on the volume, the user just needs to turn on BitLocker. - -### Data volume commands - -Data volumes use the same syntax for encryption as operating system volumes but they don't require protectors for the operation to complete. Encrypting data volumes can be done using the base command: - -```cmd -manage-bde.exe -on -``` - -Or users can choose to add protectors to the volume. It is recommended to add at least one primary protector and a recovery protector to a data volume. - -#### Enabling BitLocker with a password - -A common protector for a data volume is the password protector. In the example below, a password protector is added to the volume and turn on BitLocker. - -```powershell -manage-bde.exe -protectors -add -pw C: -manage-bde.exe -on C: -``` - -## Encrypting volumes using the BitLocker Windows PowerShell cmdlets - -Windows PowerShell cmdlets provide an alternative way to work with BitLocker. Using Windows PowerShell's scripting capabilities, administrators can integrate BitLocker options into existing scripts with ease. The list below displays the available BitLocker cmdlets. - -|Name|Parameters| -|--- |--- | -|**Add-BitLockerKeyProtector**|
  • ADAccountOrGroup
  • ADAccountOrGroupProtector
  • Confirm
  • MountPoint
  • Password
  • PasswordProtector
  • Pin
  • RecoveryKeyPath
  • RecoveryKeyProtector
  • RecoveryPassword
  • RecoveryPasswordProtector
  • Service
  • StartupKeyPath
  • StartupKeyProtector
  • TpmAndPinAndStartupKeyProtector
  • TpmAndPinProtector
  • TpmAndStartupKeyProtector
  • TpmProtector
  • WhatIf| -|**Backup-BitLockerKeyProtector**|
  • Confirm
  • KeyProtectorId
  • MountPoint
  • WhatIf| -|**Disable-BitLocker**|
  • Confirm
  • MountPoint
  • WhatIf| -|**Disable-BitLockerAutoUnlock**|
  • Confirm
  • MountPoint
  • WhatIf| -|**Enable-BitLocker**|
  • AdAccountOrGroup
  • AdAccountOrGroupProtector
  • Confirm
  • EncryptionMethod
  • HardwareEncryption
  • Password
  • PasswordProtector
  • Pin
  • RecoveryKeyPath
  • RecoveryKeyProtector
  • RecoveryPassword
  • RecoveryPasswordProtector
  • Service
  • SkipHardwareTest
  • StartupKeyPath
  • StartupKeyProtector
  • TpmAndPinAndStartupKeyProtector
  • TpmAndPinProtector
  • TpmAndStartupKeyProtector
  • TpmProtector
  • UsedSpaceOnly
  • WhatIf| -|**Enable-BitLockerAutoUnlock**|
  • Confirm
  • MountPoint
  • WhatIf| -|**Get-BitLockerVolume**|
  • MountPoint| -|**Lock-BitLocker**|
  • Confirm
  • ForceDismount
  • MountPoint
  • WhatIf| -|**Remove-BitLockerKeyProtector**|
  • Confirm
  • KeyProtectorId
  • MountPoint
  • WhatIf| -|**Resume-BitLocker**|
  • Confirm
  • MountPoint
  • WhatIf| -|**Suspend-BitLocker**|
  • Confirm
  • MountPoint
  • RebootCount
  • WhatIf| -|**Unlock-BitLocker**|
  • AdAccountOrGroup
  • Confirm
  • MountPoint
  • Password
  • RecoveryKeyPath
  • RecoveryPassword
  • RecoveryPassword
  • WhatIf| - -Similar to `manage-bde.exe`, the Windows PowerShell cmdlets allow configuration beyond the options offered in the control panel. As with `manage-bde.exe`, users need to consider the specific needs of the volume they're encrypting prior to running Windows PowerShell cmdlets. - -A good initial step is to determine the current state of the volume(s) on the computer. You can do this using the `Get-BitLocker` volume PowerShell cmdlet. The output from this cmdlet displays information on the volume type, protectors, protection status, and other useful information. - -Occasionally, all protectors may not be shown when using **Get-BitLockerVolume** due to lack of space in the output display. If all of the protectors for a volume aren't seen, the Windows PowerShell pipe command (`|`) can be used to format a listing of the protectors. - -> [!NOTE] -> In the event that there are more than four protectors for a volume, the pipe command may run out of display space. For volumes with more than four protectors, use the method described in the section below to generate a listing of all protectors with protector ID. - -```powershell -Get-BitLockerVolume C: | fl -``` - -If the existing protectors need to be removed prior to provisioning BitLocker on the volume, the `Remove-BitLockerKeyProtector` cmdlet can be used. Accomplishing this action requires the GUID associated with the protector to be removed. -A simple script can pipe out the values of each **Get-BitLockerVolume** return to another variable as seen below: - -```powershell -$vol = Get-BitLockerVolume -$keyprotectors = $vol.KeyProtector -``` - -Using this script, the information in the **$keyprotectors** variable can be displayed to determine the GUID for each protector. This information can then be used to remove the key protector for a specific volume using the command: - -```powershell -Remove-BitLockerKeyProtector : -KeyProtectorID "{GUID}" -``` - -> [!NOTE] -> The BitLocker cmdlet requires the key protector GUID (enclosed in quotation marks) to execute. Ensure the entire GUID, with braces, is included in the command. - -### Operating system volume PowerShell cmdlets - -Using the BitLocker Windows PowerShell cmdlets is similar to working with the `manage-bde.exe` tool for encrypting operating system volumes. Windows PowerShell offers users flexibility. For example, users can add the desired protector as part command for encrypting the volume. Below are examples of common user scenarios and steps to accomplish them using the BitLocker cmdlets for Windows PowerShell. - -To enable BitLocker with just the TPM protector, use this command: - -```powershell -Enable-BitLocker C: -``` - -The example below adds one additional protector, the StartupKey protectors, and chooses to skip the BitLocker hardware test. In this example, encryption starts immediately without the need for a reboot. - -```powershell -Enable-BitLocker C: -StartupKeyProtector -StartupKeyPath -SkipHardwareTest -``` - -### Data volume PowerShell cmdlets - -Data volume encryption using Windows PowerShell is the same as for operating system volumes. You should add the desired protectors prior to encrypting the volume. The following example adds a password protector to the E: volume using the variable $pw as the password. The $pw variable is held as a SecureString value to store the user-defined password. Last, encryption begins. - -```powershell -$pw = Read-Host -AsSecureString - -Enable-BitLockerKeyProtector E: -PasswordProtector -Password $pw -``` - -### Using an SID-based protector in Windows PowerShell - -The **ADAccountOrGroup** protector is an Active Directory SID-based protector. This protector can be added to both operating system and data volumes, although it doesn't unlock operating system volumes in the pre-boot environment. The protector requires the SID for the domain account or group to link with the protector. BitLocker can protect a cluster-aware disk by adding an SID-based protector for the Cluster Name Object (CNO) that lets the disk properly failover and unlock to any member computer of the cluster. - -> [!WARNING] -> The SID-based protector requires the use of an additional protector such as TPM, PIN, recovery key, etc. when used on operating system volumes. - -To add an **ADAccountOrGroup** protector to a volume, either the domain SID is needed or the group name preceded by the domain and a backslash. In the example below, the **CONTOSO\\Administrator** account is added as a protector to the data volume G. - -```powershell -Enable-BitLocker G: -AdAccountOrGroupProtector -AdAccountOrGroup CONTOSO\Administrator -``` - -For users who wish to use the SID for the account or group, the first step is to determine the SID associated with the account. To get the specific SID for a user account in Windows PowerShell, use the following command: - -```powershell -Get-ADUser -filter {samaccountname -eq "administrator"} -``` - -> [!NOTE] -> Use of this command requires the RSAT-AD-PowerShell feature. - -> [!TIP] -> In addition to the Windows PowerShell command above, information about the locally logged on user and group membership can be found using: `WHOAMI /ALL`. This doesn't require the use of additional features. - -In the example below, the user wishes to add a domain SID-based protector to the previously encrypted operating system volume. The user knows the SID for the user account or group they wish to add and uses the following command: - -```powershell -Add-BitLockerKeyProtector C: -ADAccountOrGroupProtector -ADAccountOrGroup "" -``` - -> [!NOTE] -> Active Directory-based protectors are normally used to unlock Failover Cluster-enabled volumes. - -## Checking BitLocker status - -To check the BitLocker status of a particular volume, administrators can look at the status of the drive in the BitLocker control panel applet, Windows Explorer, `manage-bde.exe` command-line tool, or Windows PowerShell cmdlets. Each option offers different levels of detail and ease of use. We'll look at each of the available methods in the following section. - -### Checking BitLocker status with the control panel - -Checking BitLocker status with the control panel is the most common method used by most users. Once opened, the status for each volume is displayed next to the volume description and drive letter. Available status return values with the control panel include: - -| Status | Description | -| - | - | -| **On**|BitLocker is enabled for the volume | -| **Off**| BitLocker isn't enabled for the volume | -| **Suspended** | BitLocker is suspended and not actively protecting the volume | -| **Waiting for Activation**| BitLocker is enabled with a clear protector key and requires further action to be fully protected| - -If a drive is pre-provisioned with BitLocker, a status of "Waiting for Activation" displays with a yellow exclamation icon on the volume. This status means that there was only a clear protector used when encrypting the volume. In this case, the volume isn't in a protected state and needs to have a secure key added to the volume before the drive is fully protected. Administrators can use the control panel, `manage-bde.exe` tool, or WMI APIs to add an appropriate key protector. Once complete, the control panel will update to reflect the new status. - -Using the control panel, administrators can choose **Turn on BitLocker** to start the BitLocker Drive Encryption wizard and add a protector, like PIN for an operating system volume (or password if no TPM exists), or a password or smart card protector to a data volume. -The drive security window displays prior to changing the volume status. Selecting **Activate BitLocker** will complete the encryption process. - -Once BitLocker protector activation is completed, the completion notice is displayed. - -### Checking BitLocker status with `manage-bde.exe` - -Administrators who prefer a command-line interface can utilize `manage-bde.exe` to check volume status. Manage-bde is capable of returning more information about the volume than the graphical user interface tools in the control panel. For example, `manage-bde.exe` can display the BitLocker version in use, the encryption type, and the protectors associated with a volume. - -To check the status of a volume using `manage-bde.exe`, use the following command: - -```powershell -manage-bde.exe -status -``` - -> [!NOTE] -> If no volume letter is associated with the -status command, all volumes on the computer display their status. - -### Checking BitLocker status with Windows PowerShell - -Windows PowerShell commands offer another way to query BitLocker status for volumes. Like `manage-bde.exe`, Windows PowerShell includes the advantage of being able to check the status of a volume on a remote computer. - -Using the Get-BitLockerVolume cmdlet, each volume on the system displays its current BitLocker status. To get information that is more detailed on a specific volume, use the following command: - -```powershell -Get-BitLockerVolume -Verbose | fl -``` - -This command displays information about the encryption method, volume type, key protectors, and more. - -### Provisioning BitLocker during operating system deployment - -Administrators can enable BitLocker prior to operating system deployment from the Windows Pre-installation environment. Enabling BitLocker prior to the operating system deployment is done with a randomly generated clear key protector applied to the formatted volume and by encrypting the volume prior to running the Windows setup process. If the encryption uses the **Used Disk Space Only** option described later in this document, this step takes only a few seconds and incorporates well into regular deployment processes. - -### Decrypting BitLocker volumes - -Decrypting volumes removes BitLocker and any associated protectors from the volumes. Decryption should occur when protection is no longer required. BitLocker decryption shouldn't occur as a troubleshooting step. BitLocker can be removed from a volume using the BitLocker control panel applet, `manage-bde.exe`, or Windows PowerShell cmdlets. We'll discuss each method further below. - -### Decrypting volumes using the BitLocker control panel applet - -BitLocker decryption using the control panel is done using a wizard. The control panel can be called from Windows Explorer or by opening it directly. After opening the BitLocker control panel, users will select the **Turn off BitLocker** option to begin the process. -After selecting the **Turn off BitLocker** option, the user chooses to continue by clicking the confirmation dialog. With **Turn off BitLocker** confirmed, the drive decryption process begins and reports status to the control panel. - -The control panel doesn't report decryption progress but displays it in the notification area of the task bar. Selecting the notification area icon will open a modal dialog with progress. - -Once decryption is complete, the drive updates its status in the control panel and becomes available for encryption. - -### Decrypting volumes using the `manage-bde.exe` command-line interface - -Decrypting volumes using `manage-bde.exe` is straightforward. Decryption with `manage-bde.exe` offers the advantage of not requiring user confirmation to start the process. Manage-bde uses the -off command to start the decryption process. A sample command for decryption is: - -```powershell -manage-bde.exe -off C: -``` - -This command disables protectors while it decrypts the volume and removes all protectors when decryption is complete. If users wish to check the status of the decryption, they can use the following command: - -```powershell -manage-bde.exe -status C: -``` - -### Decrypting volumes using the BitLocker Windows PowerShell cmdlets - -Decryption with Windows PowerShell cmdlets is straightforward, similar to `manage-bde.exe`. Windows PowerShell offers the ability to decrypt multiple drives in one pass. In the example below, the user has three encrypted volumes, which they wish to decrypt. - -Using the Disable-BitLocker command, they can remove all protectors and encryption at the same time without the need for more commands. An example of this command is: - -```powershell -Disable-BitLocker -``` - -If a user didn't want to input each mount point individually, using the `-MountPoint` parameter in an array can sequence the same command into one line without requiring additional user input. An example command is: - -```powershell -Disable-BitLocker -MountPoint E:,F:,G: -``` - -## Related articles - -- [Prepare your organization for BitLocker: Planning and policies](prepare-your-organization-for-bitlocker-planning-and-policies.md) -- [BitLocker recovery guide](bitlocker-recovery-guide-plan.md) -- [BitLocker: How to enable Network Unlock](bitlocker-how-to-enable-network-unlock.md) -- [BitLocker overview](index.md) diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-countermeasures.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-countermeasures.md deleted file mode 100644 index 46118e83d3..0000000000 --- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-countermeasures.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,183 +0,0 @@ ---- -title: BitLocker Countermeasures -description: Windows uses technologies including TPM, Secure Boot, Trusted Boot, and Early Launch Anti-malware (ELAM) to protect against attacks on the BitLocker encryption key. -ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 11/08/2022 ---- - -# BitLocker Countermeasures - -Windows uses technologies including trusted platform module (TPM), secure boot, and measured boot to help protect BitLocker encryption keys against attacks. BitLocker is part of a strategic approach to securing data against offline attacks through encryption technology. Data on a lost or stolen computer is vulnerable. For example, there could be unauthorized access, either by running a software attack tool against the computer or by transferring the computer's hard disk to a different computer. - -BitLocker helps mitigate unauthorized data access on lost or stolen computers before the authorized operating system is started. This mitigation is done by: - -- **Encrypting volumes on a computer.** For example, BitLocker can be turned on for the operating system volume, a volume on a fixed drive. or removable data drive (such as a USB flash drive, SD card, etc.) Turning on BitLocker for the operating system volume encrypts all system files on the volume, including the paging files and hibernation files. The only exception is for the System partition, which includes the Windows Boot Manager and minimal boot collateral required for decryption of the operating system volume after the key is unsealed. - -- **Ensuring the integrity of early boot components and boot configuration data.** On devices that have a TPM version 1.2 or higher, BitLocker uses the enhanced security capabilities of the TPM to make data accessible only if the computer's BIOS firmware code and configuration, original boot sequence, boot components, and BCD configuration all appear unaltered and the encrypted disk is located in the original computer. On systems that use TPM PCR[7], BCD setting changes deemed safe are permitted to improve usability. - -The next sections provide more details about how Windows protects against various attacks on the BitLocker encryption keys in Windows 11, Windows 10, Windows 8.1, and Windows 8. - -For more information about how to enable the best overall security configuration for devices beginning with Windows 10 version 1803, see [Standards for a highly secure Windows device](/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-highly-secure). - -## Protection before startup - -Before Windows starts, security features implemented as part of the device hardware and firmware must be relied on, including TPM and secure boot. Fortunately, many modern computers feature a TPM and secure boot. - -### Trusted Platform Module - -A trusted platform module (TPM) is a microchip designed to provide basic security-related functions, primarily involving encryption keys. On some platforms, TPM can alternatively be implemented as a part of secure firmware. BitLocker binds encryption keys with the TPM to ensure that a computer hasn't been tampered with while the system was offline. For more info about TPM, see [Trusted Platform Module](/windows/device-security/tpm/trusted-platform-module-overview). - -### UEFI and secure boot - -Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) is a programmable boot environment that initializes devices and starts the operating system's bootloader. - -The UEFI specification defines a firmware execution authentication process called [Secure Boot](../../system-security/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process.md). Secure Boot blocks untrusted firmware and bootloaders (signed or unsigned) from being able to start on the system. - -By default, BitLocker provides integrity protection for Secure Boot by utilizing the TPM PCR[7] measurement. An unauthorized EFI firmware, EFI boot application, or bootloader can't run and acquire the BitLocker key. - -### BitLocker and reset attacks - -To defend against malicious reset attacks, BitLocker uses the TCG Reset Attack Mitigation, also known as MOR bit (Memory Overwrite Request), before extracting keys into memory. - ->[!NOTE] ->This does not protect against physical attacks where an attacker opens the case and attacks the hardware. - -## Security policies - -The next sections cover pre-boot authentication and DMA policies that can provide additional protection for BitLocker. - -### Pre-boot authentication - -Pre-boot authentication with BitLocker is a policy setting that requires the use of either user input, such as a PIN, a startup key, or both to authenticate prior to making the contents of the system drive accessible. The Group Policy setting is [Require additional authentication at startup](bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md) and the corresponding setting in the [BitLocker CSP](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp) is SystemDrivesRequireStartupAuthentication. - -BitLocker accesses and stores the encryption keys in memory only after pre-boot authentication is completed. If Windows can't access the encryption keys, the device can't read or edit the files on the system drive. The only option for bypassing pre-boot authentication is entering the recovery key. - -Pre-boot authentication is designed to prevent the encryption keys from being loaded to system memory without the trusted user supplying another authentication factor such as a PIN or startup key. This feature helps mitigate DMA and memory remanence attacks. - -On computers with a compatible TPM, operating system drives that are BitLocker-protected can be unlocked in four ways: - -- **TPM-only.** Using TPM-only validation doesn't require any interaction with the user to unlock and provide access to the drive. If the TPM validation succeeds, the user sign-in experience is the same as a standard sign-in. If the TPM is missing or changed or if BitLocker detects changes to the BIOS or UEFI code or configuration, critical operating system startup files, or the boot configuration, BitLocker enters recovery mode, and the user must enter a recovery password to regain access to the data. This option is more convenient for sign-in but less secure than the other options, which require an additional authentication factor. - -- **TPM with startup key.** In addition to the protection that the TPM-only provides, part of the encryption key is stored on a USB flash drive, referred to as a startup key. Data on the encrypted volume can't be accessed without the startup key. - -- **TPM with PIN.** In addition to the protection that the TPM provides, BitLocker requires that the user enters a PIN. Data on the encrypted volume can't be accessed without entering the PIN. TPMs also have [anti-hammering protection](/windows/security/hardware-protection/tpm/tpm-fundamentals#anti-hammering) that is designed to prevent brute force attacks that attempt to determine the PIN. - -- **TPM with startup key and PIN.** In addition to the core component protection that the TPM-only provides, part of the encryption key is stored on a USB flash drive, and a PIN is required to authenticate the user to the TPM. This configuration provides multifactor authentication so that if the USB key is lost or stolen, it can't be used for access to the drive, because the correct PIN is also required. - -In the following group policy example, TPM + PIN is required to unlock an operating system drive: - -![Pre-boot authentication setting in Group Policy.](images/pre-boot-authentication-group-policy.png) - -Pre-boot authentication with a PIN can mitigate an attack vector for devices that use a bootable eDrive because an exposed eDrive bus can allow an attacker to capture the BitLocker encryption key during startup. Pre-boot authentication with a PIN can also mitigate DMA port attacks during the window of time between when BitLocker unlocks the drive and Windows boots to the point that Windows can set any port-related policies that have been configured. - -On the other hand, Pre-boot authentication-prompts can be inconvenient to users. In addition, users who forget their PIN or lose their startup key are denied access to their data until they can contact their organization's support team to obtain a recovery key. Pre-boot authentication can also make it more difficult to update unattended desktops and remotely administered servers because a PIN needs to be entered when a computer reboots or resumes from hibernation. - -To address these issues, [BitLocker Network Unlock](bitlocker-how-to-enable-network-unlock.md) can be deployed. Network Unlock allows systems within the physical enterprise security perimeter that meet the hardware requirements and have BitLocker enabled with TPM+PIN to boot into Windows without user intervention. It requires direct ethernet connectivity to an enterprise Windows Deployment Services (WDS) server. - -### Protecting Thunderbolt and other DMA ports - -There are a few different options to protect DMA ports, such as Thunderbolt™3. Beginning with Windows 10 version 1803, new Intel-based devices have kernel protection against DMA attacks via Thunderbolt™ 3 ports enabled by default. This Kernel DMA Protection is available only for new systems beginning with Windows 10 version 1803, as it requires changes in the system firmware and/or BIOS. - -You can use the System Information desktop app `MSINFO32.exe` to check if a device has kernel DMA protection enabled: - -![Kernel DMA protection.](images/kernel-dma-protection.png) - -If kernel DMA protection isn't enabled, follow these steps to protect Thunderbolt™ 3 enabled ports: - -1. Require a password for BIOS changes - -2. Intel Thunderbolt Security must be set to User Authorization in BIOS settings. Refer to [Intel Thunderbolt™ 3 and Security on Microsoft Windows® 10 Operating System documentation](https://thunderbolttechnology.net/security/Thunderbolt%203%20and%20Security.pdf) - -3. Additional DMA security may be added by deploying policy (beginning with Windows 10 version 1607 or Windows 11): - - - MDM: [DataProtection/AllowDirectMemoryAccess](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-dataprotection#dataprotection-allowdirectmemoryaccess) policy - - - Group Policy: [Disable new DMA devices when this computer is locked](bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md#disable-new-dma-devices-when-this-computer-is-locked) (This setting isn't configured by default.) - -For Thunderbolt v1 and v2 (DisplayPort Connector), refer to the **Thunderbolt Mitigation** section in [Blocking the SBP-2 driver and Thunderbolt controllers to reduce 1394 DMA and Thunderbolt DMA threats to BitLocker](https://support.microsoft.com/help/2516445/blocking-the-sbp-2-driver-and-thunderbolt-controllers-to-reduce-1394-d). For SBP-2 and 1394 (also known as Firewire), refer to the **SBP-2 Mitigation** section in [Blocking the SBP-2 driver and Thunderbolt controllers to reduce 1394 DMA and Thunderbolt DMA threats to BitLocker](https://support.microsoft.com/help/2516445/blocking-the-sbp-2-driver-and-thunderbolt-controllers-to-reduce-1394-d). - -## Attack countermeasures - -This section covers countermeasures for specific types of attacks. - -### Bootkits and rootkits - -A physically present attacker might attempt to install a bootkit or rootkit-like piece of software into the boot chain in an attempt to steal the BitLocker keys. The TPM should observe this installation via PCR measurements, and the BitLocker key won't be released. - -> [!NOTE] -> BitLocker protects against this attack by default. - -A BIOS password is recommended for defense-in-depth in case a BIOS exposes settings that may weaken the BitLocker security promise. Intel Boot Guard and AMD Hardware Verified Boot support stronger implementations of Secure Boot that provide additional resilience against malware and physical attacks. Intel Boot Guard and AMD Hardware Verified Boot are part of platform boot verification [standards for a highly secure Windows device](/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-highly-secure). - -### Brute force attacks against a PIN - -Require TPM + PIN for anti-hammering protection. - -### DMA attacks - -See [Protecting Thunderbolt and other DMA ports](#protecting-thunderbolt-and-other-dma-ports) earlier in this article. - -### Paging file, crash dump, and Hyberfil.sys attacks - -These files are secured on an encrypted volume by default when BitLocker is enabled on OS drives. It also blocks automatic or manual attempts to move the paging file. - -### Memory remanence - -Enable secure boot and mandatorily prompt a password to change BIOS settings. For customers requiring protection against these advanced attacks, configure a TPM+PIN protector, disable Standby power management, and shut down or hibernate the device before it leaves the control of an authorized user. - -### Tricking BitLocker to pass the key to a rogue operating system - -An attacker might modify the boot manager configuration database (BCD) which is stored on a non-encrypted partition and add an entry point to a rogue operating system on a different partition. During the boot process, BitLocker code will make sure that the operating system that the encryption key obtained from the TPM is given to, is cryptographically verified to be the intended recipient. Because this strong cryptographic verification already exists, we don't recommend storing a hash of a disk partition table in Platform Configuration Register (PCR) 5. - -An attacker might also replace the entire operating system disk while preserving the platform hardware and firmware and could then extract a protected BitLocker key blob from the metadata of the victim OS partition. The attacker could then attempt to unseal that BitLocker key blob by calling the TPM API from an operating system under their control. This will not succeed because when Windows seals the BitLocker key to the TPM, it does it with a PCR 11 value of 0, and to successfully unseal the blob, PCR 11 in the TPM must have a value of 0. However, when the boot manager passes the control to any boot loader (legitimate or rogue) it always changes PCR 11 to a value of 1. Since the PCR 11 value is guaranteed to be different after exiting the boot manager, the attacker can't unlock the BitLocker key. - -## Attacker countermeasures - -The following sections cover mitigations for different types of attackers. - -### Attacker without much skill or with limited physical access - -Physical access may be limited by a form factor that doesn't expose buses and memory. For example, there are no external DMA-capable ports, no exposed screws to open the chassis, and memory is soldered to the mainboard. - -This attacker of opportunity doesn't use destructive methods or sophisticated forensics hardware/software. - -Mitigation: - -- Pre-boot authentication set to TPM only (the default) - -### Attacker with skill and lengthy physical access - -Targeted attack with plenty of time; this attacker will open the case, will solder, and will use sophisticated hardware or software. - -Mitigation: - -- Pre-boot authentication set to TPM with a PIN protector (with a sophisticated alphanumeric PIN [enhanced pin] to help the TPM anti-hammering mitigation). - - -And- - -- Disable Standby power management and shut down or hibernate the device before it leaves the control of an authorized user. This configuration can be set using the following Group Policy: - - - *Computer Configuration* > *Policies* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *File Explorer* > **Show hibernate in the power options menu** - - - *Computer Configuration* > *Policies* > *Administrative Templates* > *Power Management* > *Sleep Settings* > **Allow standby states (S1-S3) when sleeping (plugged in)** - - - *Computer Configuration* > *Policies* > *Administrative Templates* > *Power Management* > *Sleep Settings* > **Allow standby states (S1-S3) when sleeping (on battery)** - -> [!IMPORTANT] -> These settings are **not configured** by default. - -For some systems, bypassing TPM-only may require opening the case, and may require soldering, but could possibly be done for a reasonable cost. Bypassing a TPM with a PIN protector would cost much more, and require brute forcing the PIN. With a sophisticated enhanced PIN, it could be nearly impossible. The Group Policy setting for [enhanced PIN](bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md) is: - -- *Computer Configuration* > *Policies* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Operating System Drives* > **Allow enhanced PINs for startup** - -> [!IMPORTANT] -> This setting is **not configured** by default. - -For secure administrative workstations, Microsoft recommends a TPM with PIN protector and to disable Standby power management and shut down or hibernate the device. - -## Related articles - -- [Blocking the SBP-2 driver and Thunderbolt controllers to reduce 1394 DMA and Thunderbolt DMA threats to BitLocker](https://support.microsoft.com/help/2516445/blocking-the-sbp-2-driver-and-thunderbolt-controllers-to-reduce-1394-d) -- [BitLocker Group Policy settings](bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md) -- [BitLocker CSP](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp) -- [Winlogon automatic restart sign-on (ARSO)](/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/winlogon-automatic-restart-sign-on--arso-) diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-deployment-comparison.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-deployment-comparison.md deleted file mode 100644 index dd95d6dbc5..0000000000 --- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-deployment-comparison.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,49 +0,0 @@ ---- -title: BitLocker deployment comparison -description: This article shows the BitLocker deployment comparison chart. -ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 11/08/2022 ---- - -# BitLocker deployment comparison - -This article depicts the BitLocker deployment comparison chart. - -## BitLocker deployment comparison chart - -| Requirements | Microsoft Intune | Microsoft Configuration Manager | Microsoft BitLocker Administration and Monitoring (MBAM) | -|--|--|--|--| -| *Minimum client operating system version* | Windows 11 and Windows 10 | Windows 11, Windows 10, and Windows 8.1 | Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 10 IoT, and Windows 11 | -| *Supported Windows SKUs* | Enterprise, Pro, Education | Enterprise, Pro, Education | Enterprise | -| *Minimum Windows version* | 1909 | None | None | -| *Supported domain-joined status* | Microsoft Entra joined, Microsoft Entra hybrid joined | Active Directory-joined, Microsoft Entra hybrid joined | Active Directory-joined | -| *Permissions required to manage policies* | Endpoint security manager or custom | Full administrator or custom | Domain Admin or Delegated GPO access | -| *Cloud or on premises* | Cloud | On premises | On premises | -| Server components required? | | ✅ | ✅ | -| *Additional agent required?* | No (device enrollment only) | Configuration Manager client | MBAM client | -| *Administrative plane* | Microsoft Intune admin center | Configuration Manager console | Group Policy Management Console and MBAM sites | -| *Administrative portal installation required* | | ✅ | ✅ | -| *Compliance reporting capabilities* | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | -| *Force encryption* | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | -| *Encryption for storage cards (mobile)* | ✅ | ✅ | | -| *Allow recovery password* | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | -| *Manage startup authentication* | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | -| *Select cipher strength and algorithms for fixed drives* | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | -| *Select cipher strength and algorithms for removable drives* | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | -| *Select cipher strength and algorithms for operating environment drives* | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | -| *Standard recovery password storage location* | Microsoft Entra ID or Active Directory | Configuration Manager site database | MBAM database | -| *Store recovery password for operating system and fixed drives to Microsoft Entra ID or Active Directory* | Yes (Active Directory and Microsoft Entra ID) | Yes (Active Directory only) | Yes (Active Directory only) | -| *Customize preboot message and recovery link* | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | -| *Allow/deny key file creation* | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | -| *Deny Write permission to unprotected drives* | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | -| *Can be administered outside company network* | ✅ | ✅ | | -| *Support for organization unique IDs* | | ✅ | ✅ | -| *Self-service recovery* | Yes (through Microsoft Entra ID or Company Portal app) | ✅ | ✅ | -| *Recovery password rotation for fixed and operating environment drives* | Yes (Windows 10, version 1909 and later) | ✅ | ✅ | -| *Wait to complete encryption until recovery information is backed up to Microsoft Entra ID* | ✅ | | | -| *Wait to complete encryption until recovery information is backed up to Active Directory* | | ✅ | ✅ | -| *Allow or deny Data Recovery Agent* | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | -| *Unlock a volume using certificate with custom object identifier* | | ✅ | ✅ | -| *Prevent memory overwrite on restart* | | ✅ | ✅ | -| *Configure custom Trusted Platform Module Platform Configuration Register profiles* | | | ✅ | -| *Manage auto-unlock functionality* | | ✅ | ✅ | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-device-encryption-overview-windows-10.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-device-encryption-overview-windows-10.md deleted file mode 100644 index 7b8887a82c..0000000000 --- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-device-encryption-overview-windows-10.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,163 +0,0 @@ ---- -title: Overview of BitLocker Device Encryption in Windows -description: This article provides an overview of how BitLocker Device Encryption can help protect data on devices running Windows. -ms.collection: - - highpri - - tier1 -ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 11/08/2022 ---- - -# Overview of BitLocker device encryption - -This article explains how BitLocker Device Encryption can help protect data on devices running Windows. See [BitLocker](index.md) for a general overview and list of articles. - -When users travel, their organization's confidential data goes with them. Wherever confidential data is stored, it must be protected against unauthorized access. Windows has a long history of providing at-rest data-protection solutions that guard against nefarious attackers, beginning with the Encrypting File System in the Windows 2000 operating system. More recently, BitLocker has provided encryption for full drives and portable drives. Windows consistently improves data protection by improving existing options and providing new strategies. - -## Data Protection in Windows 11, Windows 10, and Windows 7 - -The below table lists specific data-protection concerns and how they're addressed in Windows 11, Windows 10, and Windows 7. - -| Windows 7 | Windows 11 and Windows 10 | -|---|---| -| When BitLocker is used with a PIN to protect startup, PCs such as kiosks can't be restarted remotely. | Modern Windows devices are increasingly protected with BitLocker Device Encryption out of the box and support SSO to seamlessly protect the BitLocker encryption keys from cold boot attacks.

    Network Unlock allows PCs to start automatically when connected to the internal network. | -| When BitLocker is enabled, the provisioning process can take several hours. | BitLocker pre-provisioning, encrypting hard drives, and Used Space Only encryption allow administrators to enable BitLocker quickly on new computers. | -| There's no support for using BitLocker with self-encrypting drives (SEDs). | BitLocker supports offloading encryption to encrypted hard drives. | -| Administrators have to use separate tools to manage encrypted hard drives. | BitLocker supports encrypted hard drives with onboard encryption hardware built in, which allows administrators to use the familiar BitLocker administrative tools to manage them. | -| Encrypting a new flash drive can take more than 20 minutes. | Used Space Only encryption in BitLocker To Go allows users to encrypt removable data drives in seconds. | -| BitLocker could require users to enter a recovery key when system configuration changes occur. | BitLocker requires the user to enter a recovery key only when disk corruption occurs or when the PIN or password is lost. | -| Users need to enter a PIN to start the PC, and then their password to sign in to Windows. | Modern Windows devices are increasingly protected with BitLocker Device Encryption out of the box and support SSO to help protect the BitLocker encryption keys from cold boot attacks. | - -## Prepare for drive and file encryption - -The best type of security measures is transparent to the user during implementation and use. Every time there's a possible delay or difficulty because of a security feature, there's a strong likelihood that users will try to bypass security. This situation is especially true for data protection, and that's a scenario that organizations need to avoid. Whether planning to encrypt entire volumes, removable devices, or individual files, Windows 11 and Windows 10 meet these needs by providing streamlined, usable solutions. In fact, several steps can be taken in advance to prepare for data encryption and make the deployment quick and smooth. - -### TPM pre-provisioning - -In Windows 7, preparing the TPM offered a few challenges: - -- Turning on the TPM required going into the BIOS or UEFI firmware of the device. Turning on the TPM at the device requires someone to either physically go into the BIOS or UEFI firmware settings of the device to turn on the TPM, or to install a driver in Windows to turn on the TPM from within Windows. -- When the TPM is enabled, it may require one or more restarts. - -This made preparing the TPM in Windows 7 problematic. If IT staff are provisioning new PCs, they can handle the required steps for preparing a TPM. However, if BitLocker needed to be enabled on devices that are already in users' hands, those users would probably struggle with the technical challenges. The user would then either call to IT for support or leave BitLocker disabled. - -Microsoft includes instrumentation in Windows 11 and Windows 10 that enable the operating system to fully manage the TPM. There's no need to go into the BIOS, and all scenarios that required a restart have been eliminated. - -## Deploy hard drive encryption - -BitLocker is capable of encrypting entire hard drives, including both system and data drives. BitLocker pre-provisioning can drastically reduce the time required to provision new PCs with BitLocker enabled. With Windows 11 and Windows 10, administrators can turn on BitLocker and the TPM from within the Windows Pre-installation Environment before they install Windows or as part of an automated deployment task sequence without any user interaction. Combined with Used Disk Space Only encryption and a mostly empty drive (because Windows isn't yet installed), it takes only a few seconds to enable BitLocker. - -With earlier versions of Windows, administrators had to enable BitLocker after Windows had been installed. Although this process could be automated, BitLocker would need to encrypt the entire drive, a process that could take anywhere from several hours to more than a day depending on drive size and performance, which delayed deployment. Microsoft has improved this process through multiple features in Windows 11 and Windows 10. - -## BitLocker Device Encryption - -Beginning in Windows 8.1, Windows automatically enables BitLocker Device Encryption on devices that support Modern Standby. With Windows 11 and Windows 10, Microsoft offers BitLocker Device Encryption support on a much broader range of devices, including those devices that are Modern Standby, and devices that run Home edition of Windows 10 or Windows 11. - -Microsoft expects that most devices in the future will pass the requirements for BitLocker Device Encryption that will make BitLocker Device Encryption pervasive across modern Windows devices. BitLocker Device Encryption further protects the system by transparently implementing device-wide data encryption. - -Unlike a standard BitLocker implementation, BitLocker Device Encryption is enabled automatically so that the device is always protected. The following list outlines how BitLocker Device Encryption is enabled automatically: - -- When a clean installation of Windows 11 or Windows 10 is completed and the out-of-box experience is finished, the computer is prepared for first use. As part of this preparation, BitLocker Device Encryption is initialized on the operating system drive and fixed data drives on the computer with a clear key that is the equivalent of standard BitLocker suspended state. In this state, the drive is shown with a warning icon in Windows Explorer. The yellow warning icon is removed after the TPM protector is created and the recovery key is backed up, as explained in the following bullet points. - -- If the device isn't domain joined, a Microsoft account that has been granted administrative privileges on the device is required. When the administrator uses a Microsoft account to sign in, the clear key is removed, a recovery key is uploaded to the online Microsoft account, and a TPM protector is created. Should a device require the recovery key, the user will be guided to use an alternate device and navigate to a recovery key access URL to retrieve the recovery key by using their Microsoft account credentials. - -- If the user uses a domain account to sign in, the clear key isn't removed until the user joins the device to a domain, and the recovery key is successfully backed up to Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS). The following Group Policy settings must be enabled for the recovery key to be backed up to AD DS: - - *Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Operating System Drives* > **Do not enable BitLocker until recovery information is stored in AD DS for operating system drives** - - With this configuration, the recovery password is created automatically when the computer joins the domain, and then the recovery key is backed up to AD DS, the TPM protector is created, and the clear key is removed. - -- Similar to signing in with a domain account, the clear key is removed when the user signs in to a Microsoft Entra account on the device. As described in the bullet point above, the recovery password is created automatically when the user authenticates to Microsoft Entra ID. Then, the recovery key is backed up to Microsoft Entra ID, the TPM protector is created, and the clear key is removed. - -Microsoft recommends automatically enabling BitLocker Device Encryption on any systems that support it. However, the automatic BitLocker Device Encryption process can be prevented by changing the following registry setting: - -- **Subkey**: `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\BitLocker` -- **Type**: `REG_DWORD` -- **Value**: `PreventDeviceEncryption` equal to `1` (True) - -Administrators can manage domain-joined devices that have BitLocker Device Encryption enabled through Microsoft BitLocker Administration and Monitoring (MBAM). In this case, BitLocker Device Encryption automatically makes additional BitLocker options available. No conversion or encryption is required, and MBAM can manage the full BitLocker policy set if any configuration changes are required. - -> [!NOTE] -> BitLocker Device Encryption uses the XTS-AES 128-bit encryption method. If a different encryption method and/or cipher strength is needed but the device is already encrypted, it must first be decrypted before the new encryption method and/or cipher strength can be applied. After the device has been decrypted, different BitLocker settings can be applied. - -## Used Disk Space Only encryption - -BitLocker in earlier Windows versions could take a long time to encrypt a drive because it encrypted every byte on the volume including areas that didn't have data. Encrypting every byte on the volume including areas that didn't have data is known as full disk encryption. Full disk encryption is still the most secure way to encrypt a drive, especially if a drive has previously contained confidential data that has since been moved or deleted. If a drive previously had confidential data that has been moved or deleted, traces of the confidential data could remain on portions of the drive marked as unused. - -To reduce encryption time, BitLocker in Windows 11 and Windows 10 let users choose to encrypt just the areas of the disk that contain data. Areas of the disk that don't contain data and are empty won't be encrypted. Any new data is encrypted as it's created. Depending on the amount of data on the drive, this option can reduce the initial encryption time by more than 99 percent. - -Exercise caution when encrypting only used space on an existing volume on which confidential data may have already been stored in an unencrypted state. When using used space encryption, sectors where previously unencrypted data are stored can be recovered through disk-recovery tools until they're overwritten by new encrypted data. In contrast, encrypting only used space on a brand-new volume can significantly decrease deployment time without the security risk because all new data will be encrypted as it's written to the disk. - -## Encrypted hard drive support - -SEDs have been available for years, but Microsoft couldn't support their use with some earlier versions of Windows because the drives lacked important key management features. Microsoft worked with storage vendors to improve the hardware capabilities, and now BitLocker supports the next generation of SEDs, which are called encrypted hard drives. - -Encrypted hard drives provide onboard cryptographic capabilities to encrypt data on drives. This feature improves both drive and system performance by offloading cryptographic calculations from the PC's processor to the drive itself. Data is rapidly encrypted by the drive by using dedicated, purpose-built hardware. If planning to use whole-drive encryption with Windows 11 or Windows 10, Microsoft recommends researching hard drive manufacturers and models to determine whether any of their encrypted hard drives meet the security and budget requirements. - -For more information about encrypted hard drives, see [Encrypted hard drive](../encrypted-hard-drive.md). - -## Preboot information protection - -An effective implementation of information protection, like most security controls, considers usability and security. Users typically prefer a simple security experience. In fact, the more transparent a security solution becomes, the more likely users are to conform to it. - -It's crucial that organizations protect information on their PCs regardless of the state of the computer or the intent of users. This protection shouldn't be cumbersome to users. One undesirable and previously commonplace situation is when the user is prompted for input during preboot, and then again during Windows sign-in. Challenging users for input more than once should be avoided. - -Windows 11 and Windows 10 can enable a true SSO experience from the preboot environment on modern devices and in some cases even on older devices when robust information protection configurations are in place. The TPM in isolation is able to securely protect the BitLocker encryption key while it is at rest, and it can securely unlock the operating system drive. When the key is in use and thus in memory, a combination of hardware and Windows capabilities can secure the key and prevent unauthorized access through cold-boot attacks. Although other countermeasures like PIN-based unlock are available, they aren't as user-friendly; depending on the devices' configuration they may not offer additional security when it comes to key protection. For more information, see [BitLocker Countermeasures](bitlocker-countermeasures.md). - -## Manage passwords and PINs - -When BitLocker is enabled on a system drive and the PC has a TPM, users can be required to type a PIN before BitLocker will unlock the drive. Such a PIN requirement can prevent an attacker who has physical access to a PC from even getting to the Windows sign-in, which makes it almost impossible for the attacker to access or modify user data and system files. - -Requiring a PIN at startup is a useful security feature because it acts as a second authentication factor. However, this configuration comes with some costs. One of the most significant costs is the need to change the PIN regularly. In enterprises that used BitLocker with Windows 7 and the Windows Vista operating system, users had to contact systems administrators to update their BitLocker PIN or password. This requirement not only increased management costs but made users less willing to change their BitLocker PIN or password regularly. - -Windows 11 and Windows 10 users can update their BitLocker PINs and passwords themselves, without administrator credentials. Not only will this feature reduce support costs, but it could improve security, too, because it encourages users to change their PINs and passwords more often. In addition, Modern Standby devices don't require a PIN for startup: They're designed to start infrequently and have other mitigations in place that further reduce the attack surface of the system. - -For more information about how startup security works and the countermeasures that Windows 11 and Windows 10 provide, see [Protect BitLocker from pre-boot attacks](bitlocker-countermeasures.md). - -## Configure Network Unlock - -Some organizations have location specific data security requirements. Location specific data security requirements are most common in environments where high-value data is stored on PCs. The network environment may provide crucial data protection and enforce mandatory authentication. Therefore, policy states that those PCs shouldn't leave the building or be disconnected from the corporate network. Safeguards like physical security locks and geofencing may help enforce this policy as reactive controls. Beyond these safeguards, a proactive security control that grants data access only when the PC is connected to the corporate network is necessary. - -Network Unlock enables BitLocker-protected PCs to start automatically when connected to a wired corporate network on which Windows Deployment Services runs. Anytime the PC isn't connected to the corporate network, a user must type a PIN to unlock the drive (if PIN-based unlock is enabled). -Network Unlock requires the following infrastructure: - -- Client PCs that have Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) firmware version 2.3.1 or later, which supports Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) - -- A server running at least Windows Server 2012 with the Windows deployment services (WDS) role - -- A server with the DHCP server role installed - -For more information about how to configure Network unlock feature, see [BitLocker: How to enable Network Unlock](bitlocker-how-to-enable-network-unlock.md). - -## Microsoft BitLocker administration and monitoring - -Part of the Microsoft Desktop Optimization Pack, Microsoft BitLocker Administration and Monitoring (MBAM) makes it easier to manage and support BitLocker and BitLocker To Go. MBAM 2.5 with Service Pack 1, the latest version, has the following key features: - -- Enables administrators to automate the process of encrypting volumes on client computers across the enterprise. - -- Enables security officers to quickly determine the compliance state of individual computers or even of the enterprise itself. - -- Provides centralized reporting and hardware management with Microsoft Configuration Manager. - -- Reduces the workload on the help desk to assist end users with BitLocker recovery requests. - -- Enables end users to recover encrypted devices independently by using the Self-Service Portal. - -- Enables security officers to easily audit access to recovery key information. - -- Empowers Windows Enterprise users to continue working anywhere with the assurance that their corporate data is protected. - -- Enforces the BitLocker encryption policy options that are set for the enterprise. - -- Integrates with existing management tools, such as Microsoft Configuration Manager. - -- Offers an IT-customizable recovery user experience. - -- Supports Windows 11 and Windows 10. - -> [!IMPORTANT] -> Enterprises could use MBAM to manage client computers with BitLocker that are domain-joined on-premises until mainstream support ended in July 2019, or they could receive extended support until April 2026. - -Going forward, the functionality of MBAM will be incorporated into Configuration Manager. For more information, see [Plan for BitLocker management](/mem/configmgr/protect/plan-design/bitlocker-management). - -Enterprises not using Configuration Manager can use the built-in features of Microsoft Entra ID and Microsoft Intune for administration and monitoring. For more information, see [Monitor device encryption with Intune](/mem/intune/protect/encryption-monitor). diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md deleted file mode 100644 index f6aa783b9e..0000000000 --- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1328 +0,0 @@ ---- -title: BitLocker Group Policy settings -description: This article for IT professionals describes the function, location, and effect of each Group Policy setting that is used to manage BitLocker Drive Encryption. -ms.collection: - - highpri - - tier1 -ms.topic: reference -ms.date: 11/08/2022 ---- - -# BitLocker group policy settings - -This article for IT professionals describes the function, location, and effect of each Group Policy setting that is used to manage BitLocker Drive Encryption. - -Group Policy administrative templates or local computer policy settings can be used to control what BitLocker drive encryption tasks and configurations can be performed by users, for example through the **BitLocker Drive Encryption** control panel. Which of these policies are configured and how they're configured depends on how BitLocker is implemented and what level of interaction is desired for end users. - -> [!NOTE] -> A separate set of Group Policy settings supports the use of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). For details about those settings, see [TPM Group Policy settings](../../../hardware-security/tpm/trusted-platform-module-services-group-policy-settings.md). - -BitLocker Group Policy settings can be accessed using the Local Group Policy Editor and the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) under **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption**. - -Most of the BitLocker Group Policy settings are applied when BitLocker is initially turned on for a drive. If a computer isn't compliant with existing Group Policy settings, BitLocker may not be turned on, or BitLocker configuration may be modified until the computer is in a compliant state. When a drive becomes out of compliance with Group Policy settings, only changes to the BitLocker configuration that will bring it into compliance are allowed. This scenario could occur, for example, if a previously encrypted drive was brought out of compliance by change in Group Policy settings. - -If multiple changes are necessary to bring the drive into compliance, BitLocker protection may need to be suspended, the necessary changes made, and then protection resumed. This situation could occur, for example, if a removable drive is initially configured for unlock with a password but then Group Policy settings are changed to disallow passwords and require smart cards. In this situation, BitLocker protection needs to be suspended by using the [Manage-bde](/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/manage-bde) command-line tool, delete the password unlock method, and add the smart card method. After this process is complete, BitLocker is compliant with the Group Policy setting, and BitLocker protection on the drive can be resumed. - -In other scenarios, to bring the drive into compliance with a change in Group Policy settings, BitLocker may need to be disabled and the drive decrypted followed by reenabling BitLocker and then re-encrypting the drive. An example of this scenario is when the BitLocker encryption method or cipher strength is changed. The [Manage-bde](/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/manage-bde) command-line can also be used in this scenario to help bring the device into compliance. - -## BitLocker group policy settings details - -> [!NOTE] -> For more details about Active Directory configuration related to BitLocker enablement, please see [Set up MDT for BitLocker](/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-mdt/set-up-mdt-for-bitlocker). - -The following sections provide a comprehensive list of BitLocker group policy settings that are organized by usage. BitLocker group policy settings include settings for specific drive types (operating system drives, fixed data drives, and removable data drives) and settings that are applied to all drives. - -The following policy settings can be used to determine how a BitLocker-protected drive can be unlocked. - -- [Allow devices with Secure Boot and protected DMA ports to opt out of preboot PIN](#allow-devices-with-secure-boot-and-protected-dma-ports-to-opt-out-of-preboot-pin) -- [Allow network unlock at startup](#allow-network-unlock-at-startup) -- [Require additional authentication at startup](#require-additional-authentication-at-startup) -- [Allow enhanced PINs for startup](#allow-enhanced-pins-for-startup) -- [Configure minimum PIN length for startup](#configure-minimum-pin-length-for-startup) -- [Disable new DMA devices when this computer is locked](#disable-new-dma-devices-when-this-computer-is-locked) -- [Disallow standard users from changing the PIN or password](#disallow-standard-users-from-changing-the-pin-or-password) -- [Configure use of passwords for operating system drives](#configure-use-of-passwords-for-operating-system-drives) -- [Require additional authentication at startup (Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista)](#require-additional-authentication-at-startup-windows-server-2008-and-windows-vista) -- [Configure use of smart cards on fixed data drives](#configure-use-of-smart-cards-on-fixed-data-drives) -- [Configure use of passwords on fixed data drives](#configure-use-of-passwords-on-fixed-data-drives) -- [Configure use of smart cards on removable data drives](#configure-use-of-smart-cards-on-removable-data-drives) -- [Configure use of passwords on removable data drives](#configure-use-of-passwords-on-removable-data-drives) -- [Validate smart card certificate usage rule compliance](#validate-smart-card-certificate-usage-rule-compliance) -- [Enable use of BitLocker authentication requiring preboot keyboard input on slates](#enable-use-of-bitlocker-authentication-requiring-preboot-keyboard-input-on-slates) - -The following policy settings are used to control how users can access drives and how they can use BitLocker on their computers. - -- [Deny write access to fixed drives not protected by BitLocker](#deny-write-access-to-fixed-drives-not-protected-by-bitlocker) -- [Deny write access to removable drives not protected by BitLocker](#deny-write-access-to-removable-drives-not-protected-by-bitlocker) -- [Control use of BitLocker on removable drives](#control-use-of-bitlocker-on-removable-drives) - -The following policy settings determine the encryption methods and encryption types that are used with BitLocker. - -- [Choose drive encryption method and cipher strength](#choose-drive-encryption-method-and-cipher-strength) -- [Configure use of hardware-based encryption for fixed data drives](#configure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-fixed-data-drives) -- [Configure use of hardware-based encryption for operating system drives](#configure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-operating-system-drives) -- [Configure use of hardware-based encryption for removable data drives](#configure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-removable-data-drives) -- [Enforce drive encryption type on fixed data drives](#enforce-drive-encryption-type-on-fixed-data-drives) -- [Enforce drive encryption type on operating system drives](#enforce-drive-encryption-type-on-operating-system-drives) -- [Enforce drive encryption type on removable data drives](#enforce-drive-encryption-type-on-removable-data-drives) - -The following policy settings define the recovery methods that can be used to restore access to a BitLocker-protected drive if an authentication method fails or is unable to be used. - -- [Choose how BitLocker-protected operating system drives can be recovered](#choose-how-bitlocker-protected-operating-system-drives-can-be-recovered) -- [Choose how users can recover BitLocker-protected drives (Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista)](#choose-how-users-can-recover-bitlocker-protected-drives-windows-server-2008-and-windows-vista) -- [Store BitLocker recovery information in Active Directory Domain Services (Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista)](#store-bitlocker-recovery-information-in-active-directory-domain-services-windows-server-2008-and-windows-vista) -- [Choose default folder for recovery password](#choose-default-folder-for-recovery-password) -- [Choose how BitLocker-protected fixed drives can be recovered](#choose-how-bitlocker-protected-fixed-drives-can-be-recovered) -- [Choose how BitLocker-protected removable drives can be recovered](#choose-how-bitlocker-protected-removable-drives-can-be-recovered) -- [Configure the pre-boot recovery message and URL](#configure-the-pre-boot-recovery-message-and-url) - -The following policies are used to support customized deployment scenarios in an organization. - -- [Allow Secure Boot for integrity validation](#allow-secure-boot-for-integrity-validation) -- [Provide the unique identifiers for your organization](#provide-the-unique-identifiers-for-your-organization) -- [Prevent memory overwrite on restart](#prevent-memory-overwrite-on-restart) -- [Configure TPM platform validation profile for BIOS-based firmware configurations](#configure-tpm-platform-validation-profile-for-bios-based-firmware-configurations) -- [Configure TPM platform validation profile (Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2)](#configure-tpm-platform-validation-profile-windows-vista-windows-server-2008-windows-7-windows-server-2008-r2) -- [Configure TPM platform validation profile for native UEFI firmware configurations](#configure-tpm-platform-validation-profile-for-native-uefi-firmware-configurations) -- [Reset platform validation data after BitLocker recovery](#reset-platform-validation-data-after-bitlocker-recovery) -- [Use enhanced Boot Configuration Data validation profile](#use-enhanced-boot-configuration-data-validation-profile) -- [Allow access to BitLocker-protected fixed data drives from earlier versions of Windows](#allow-access-to-bitlocker-protected-fixed-data-drives-from-earlier-versions-of-windows) -- [Allow access to BitLocker-protected removable data drives from earlier versions of Windows](#allow-access-to-bitlocker-protected-removable-data-drives-from-earlier-versions-of-windows) - -### Allow devices with secure boot and protected DMA ports to opt out of preboot PIN - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, TPM-only protection can be allowed for newer, more secure devices, such as devices that support Modern Standby or HSTI, while requiring PIN on older devices.| -|**Introduced**|Windows 10, version 1703| -|**Drive type**|Operating system drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Operating System Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|This setting overrides the **Require startup PIN with TPM** option of the [Require additional authentication at startup](#require-additional-authentication-at-startup) policy on compliant hardware.| -|**When enabled**|Users on Modern Standby and HSTI compliant devices will have the choice to turn on BitLocker without preboot authentication.| -|**When disabled or not configured**|The options of the [Require additional authentication at startup](#require-additional-authentication-at-startup) policy apply.| - -#### Reference: Allow devices with secure boot and protected DMA ports to opt out of preboot PIN - -The preboot authentication option **Require startup PIN with TPM** of the [Require additional authentication at startup](#require-additional-authentication-at-startup) policy is often enabled to help ensure security for older devices that don't support Modern Standby. But visually impaired users have no audible way to know when to enter a PIN. -This setting enables an exception to the PIN-required policy on secure hardware. - -### Allow network unlock at startup - -This policy controls a portion of the behavior of the Network Unlock feature in BitLocker. This policy is required to enable BitLocker Network Unlock on a network because it allows clients running BitLocker to create the necessary network key protector during encryption. - -This policy is used with the BitLocker Drive Encryption Network Unlock Certificate security policy (located in the **Public Key Policies** folder of Local Computer Policy) to allow systems that are connected to a trusted network to properly utilize the Network Unlock feature. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, it can be controlled whether a BitLocker-protected computer that is connected to a trusted local area network and joined to a domain can create and use network key protectors on TPM-enabled computers to automatically unlock the operating system drive when the computer is started.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8| -|**Drive type**|Operating system drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Operating System Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|None| -|**When enabled**|Clients configured with a BitLocker Network Unlock certificate can create and use Network Key Protectors.| -|**When disabled or not configured**|Clients can't create and use Network Key Protectors.| - -#### Reference: Allow network unlock at startup - -To use a network key protector to unlock the computer, the computer and the server that hosts BitLocker Drive Encryption Network Unlock must be provisioned with a Network Unlock certificate. The Network Unlock certificate is used to create a network key protector and to protect the information exchange with the server to unlock the computer. The Group Policy setting **Computer Configuration** > **Windows Settings** > **Security Settings** > **Public Key Policies** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption Network Unlock Certificate** can be used on the domain controller to distribute this certificate to computers in the organization. This unlock method uses the TPM on the computer, so computers that don't have a TPM can't create network key protectors to automatically unlock by using Network Unlock. - -> [!NOTE] -> For reliability and security, computers should also have a TPM startup PIN that can be used when the computer is disconnected from the wired network or can't connect to the domain controller at startup. - -For more information about Network Unlock feature, see [BitLocker: How to enable Network Unlock](bitlocker-how-to-enable-network-unlock.md). - -### Require additional authentication at startup - -This policy setting is used to control which unlock options are available for operating system drives. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, it can be configured whether BitLocker requires additional authentication each time the computer starts and whether BitLocker will be used with a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). This policy setting is applied when BitLocker is turned on.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7| -|**Drive type**|Operating system drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Operating System Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|If one authentication method is required, the other methods can't be allowed. Use of BitLocker with a TPM startup key or with a TPM startup key and a PIN must be disallowed if the **Deny write access to removable drives not protected by BitLocker** policy setting is enabled.| -|**When enabled**|Users can configure advanced startup options in the BitLocker Setup Wizard.| -|**When disabled or not configured**|Users can configure only basic options on computers with a TPM.

    Only one of the additional authentication options can be required at startup; otherwise, a policy error occurs.| - -#### Reference: Require additional authentication at startup - -If BitLocker needs to be used on a computer without a TPM, select **Allow BitLocker without a compatible TPM**. In this mode, a password or USB drive is required for startup. The USB drive stores the startup key that is used to encrypt the drive. When the USB drive is inserted, the startup key is authenticated, and the operating system drive is accessible. If the USB drive is lost or unavailable, BitLocker recovery is required to access the drive. - -On a computer with a compatible TPM, additional authentication methods can be used at startup to improve protection for encrypted data. When the computer starts, it can use: - -- Only the TPM -- Insertion of a USB flash drive containing the startup key -- The entry of a 4-digit to 20-digit personal identification number (PIN) -- A combination of the PIN and the USB flash drive - -There are four options for TPM-enabled computers or devices: - -- Configure TPM startup - - Allow TPM - - Require TPM - - Do not allow TPM -- Configure TPM startup PIN - - - Allow startup PIN with TPM - - Require startup PIN with TPM - - Do not allow startup PIN with TPM - -- Configure TPM startup key - - Allow startup key with TPM - - Require startup key with TPM - - Do not allow startup key with TPM - -- Configure TPM startup key and PIN - - Allow TPM startup key with PIN - - Require startup key and PIN with TPM - - Do not allow TPM startup key with PIN - -### Allow enhanced PINs for startup - -This policy setting permits the use of enhanced PINs when an unlock method that includes a PIN is used. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, it can be configured whether enhanced startup PINs are used with BitLocker.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7| -|**Drive type**|Operating system drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Operating System Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|None| -|**When enabled**|All new BitLocker startup PINs that are set will be enhanced PINs. Existing drives that were protected by using standard startup PINs aren't affected.| -|**When disabled or not configured**|Enhanced PINs won't be used.| - -#### Reference: Allow enhanced PINs for startup - -Enhanced startup PINs permit the use of characters (including uppercase and lowercase letters, symbols, numbers, and spaces). This policy setting is applied when BitLocker is turned on. - -> [!IMPORTANT] -> Not all computers support enhanced PIN characters in the preboot environment. It's strongly recommended that users perform a system check during the BitLocker setup to verify that enhanced PIN characters can be used. - -### Configure minimum PIN length for startup - -This policy setting is used to set a minimum PIN length when an unlock method that includes a PIN is used. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, it can be configured a minimum length for a TPM startup PIN. This policy setting is applied when BitLocker is turned on. The startup PIN must have a minimum length of four digits, and it can have a maximum length of 20 digits. By default, the minimum PIN length is 6.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7| -|**Drive type**|Operating system drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Operating System Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|None| -|**When enabled**|The required minimum length of startup PINs set by users can be set between 4 and 20 digits.| -|**When disabled or not configured**|Users can configure a startup PIN of any length between 6 and 20 digits.| - -#### Reference: Configure minimum PIN length for startup - -This policy setting is applied when BitLocker is turned on. The startup PIN must have a minimum length of four digits and can have a maximum length of 20 digits. - -Originally, BitLocker allowed a length from 4 to 20 characters for a PIN. Windows Hello has its own PIN for sign-in, length of which can be 4 to 127 characters. Both BitLocker and Windows Hello use the TPM to prevent PIN brute-force attacks. - -The TPM can be configured to use Dictionary Attack Prevention parameters ([lockout threshold and lockout duration](../../../hardware-security/tpm/trusted-platform-module-services-group-policy-settings.md) to control how many failed authorizations attempts are allowed before the TPM is locked out, and how much time must elapse before another attempt can be made. - -The Dictionary Attack Prevention Parameters provide a way to balance security needs with usability. For example, when BitLocker is used with a TPM + PIN configuration, the number of PIN guesses is limited over time. A TPM 2.0 in this example could be configured to allow only 32 PIN guesses immediately, and then only one more guess every two hours. This number of attempts totals to a maximum of about 4415 guesses per year. If the PIN is four digits, all 9999 possible PIN combinations could be attempted in a little over two years. - -Increasing the PIN length requires a greater number of guesses for an attacker. In that case, the lockout duration between each guess can be shortened to allow legitimate users to retry a failed attempt sooner, while maintaining a similar level of protection. - -Beginning with Windows 10, version 1703, the minimum length for the BitLocker PIN was increased to six characters to better align with other Windows features that use TPM 2.0, including Windows Hello. To help organizations with the transition, beginning with Windows 10, version 1709 and Windows 10, version 1703 with the October 2017 [cumulative update](https://support.microsoft.com/help/4018124) installed, the BitLocker PIN length is six characters by default, but it can be reduced to four characters. If the minimum PIN length is reduced from the default of six characters, then the TPM 2.0 lockout period will be extended. - -### Disable new DMA devices when this computer is locked - -This policy setting allows blocking of direct memory access (DMA) for all hot pluggable PCI ports until a user signs in to Windows. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|This setting helps prevent attacks that use external PCI-based devices to access BitLocker keys.| -|**Introduced**|Windows 10, version 1703| -|**Drive type**|Operating system drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption*| -|**Conflicts**|None| -|**When enabled**|Every time the user locks the screen, DMA will be blocked on hot pluggable PCI ports until the user signs in again.| -|**When disabled or not configured**|DMA is available on hot pluggable PCI devices if the device is turned on, regardless of whether a user is signed in.| - -#### Reference: Disable new DMA devices when this computer is locked - -This policy setting is only enforced when BitLocker or device encryption is enabled. As explained in the [Microsoft Security Guidance blog](/archive/blogs/secguide/issue-with-bitlockerdma-setting-in-windows-10-fall-creators-update-v1709), in some cases when this setting is enabled, internal, PCI-based peripherals can fail, including wireless network drivers and input and audio peripherals. This problem is fixed in the [April 2018 quality update](https://support.microsoft.com/help/4093105). - -### Disallow standard users from changing the PIN or password - -This policy setting allows configuration of whether standard users are allowed to change the PIN or password that is used to protect the operating system drive. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, it can be configured whether standard users are allowed to change the PIN or password used to protect the operating system drive.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8| -|**Drive type**|Operating system drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Operating System Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|None| -|**When enabled**|Standard users aren't allowed to change BitLocker PINs or passwords.| -|**When disabled or not configured**|Standard users are permitted to change BitLocker PINs or passwords.| - -#### Reference: Disallow standard users from changing the PIN or password - -To change the PIN or password, the user must be able to provide the current PIN or password. This policy setting is applied when BitLocker is turned on. - -### Configure use of passwords for operating system drives - -This policy controls how non-TPM based systems utilize the password protector. Used with the **Password must meet complexity requirements** policy, this policy allows administrators to require password length and complexity for using the password protector. By default, passwords must be eight characters in length. Complexity configuration options determine how important domain connectivity is for the client. For the strongest password security, administrators should choose **Require password complexity** because it requires domain connectivity, and it requires that the BitLocker password meets the same password complexity requirements as domain sign-in passwords. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, the constraints for passwords that are used to unlock operating system drives that are protected with BitLocker can be specified.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8| -|**Drive type**|Operating system drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Operating System Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|Passwords can't be used if FIPS-compliance is enabled.
    **NOTE:** The **System cryptography: Use FIPS-compliant algorithms for encryption, hashing, and signing** policy setting, which is located at *Computer Configuration* > *Windows Settings* > *Security Settings* > *Local Policies* > *Security Options* specifies whether FIPS-compliance is enabled.
    | -|**When enabled**|Users can configure a password that meets the defined requirements. To enforce complexity requirements for the password, select **Require complexity**.| -|**When disabled or not configured**|The default length constraint of eight characters will apply to operating system drive passwords and no complexity checks will occur.| - -#### Reference: Configure use of passwords for operating system drives - -If non-TPM protectors are allowed on operating system drives, a password, enforcement of complexity requirements on the password, and configuration of a minimum length for the password can all be provisioned. For the complexity requirement setting to be effective, the group policy setting **Password must meet complexity requirements**, which is located at *Computer Configuration* > *Windows Settings* > *Security Settings* > *Account Policies* > *Password Policy*, must be also enabled. - -> [!NOTE] -> These settings are enforced when turning on BitLocker, not when unlocking a volume. BitLocker allows unlocking a drive with any of the protectors that are available on the drive. - -When set to **Require complexity**, a connection to a domain controller is necessary when BitLocker is enabled to validate the complexity the password. When set to **Allow complexity**, a connection to a domain controller is attempted to validate that the complexity adheres to the rules set by the policy. If no domain controllers are found, the password will be accepted regardless of actual password complexity, and the drive will be encrypted by using that password as a protector. When set to **Do not allow complexity**, there's no password complexity validation. - -Passwords must be at least eight characters. To configure a greater minimum length for the password, enter the desired number of characters in the **Minimum password length** box. - -When this policy setting is enabled, the option **Configure password complexity for operating system drives** can be set to: - -- Allow password complexity -- Deny password complexity -- Require password complexity - -### Require additional authentication at startup (Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista) - -This policy setting is used to control what unlock options are available for computers running Windows Server 2008 or Windows Vista. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, it can be controlled whether the BitLocker Setup Wizard on computers running Windows Vista or Windows Server 2008 can set up an additional authentication method that is required each time the computer starts.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista| -|**Drive type**|Operating system drives (Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista)| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Operating System Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|If an additional authentication method is chosen, other authentication methods can't be allowed.| -|**When enabled**|The BitLocker Setup Wizard displays the page that allows the user to configure advanced startup options for BitLocker. Setting options can be further configured for computers with or without a TPM.| -|**When disabled or not configured**|The BitLocker Setup Wizard displays basic steps that allow users to enable BitLocker on computers with a TPM. In this basic wizard, no additional startup key or startup PIN can be configured.| - -#### Reference: Require additional authentication at startup (Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista) - -On a computer with a compatible TPM, two authentication methods can be used at startup to provide added protection for encrypted data. When the computer starts, it can prompt users to insert a USB drive that contains a startup key. It can also prompt users to enter a startup PIN with a length between 6 and 20 digits. - -A USB drive that contains a startup key is needed on computers without a compatible TPM. Without a TPM, BitLocker-encrypted data is protected solely by the key material that is on this USB drive. - -There are two options for TPM-enabled computers or devices: - -- Configure TPM startup PIN - - Allow startup PIN with TPM - - Require startup PIN with TPM - - Do not allow startup PIN with TPM - -- Configure TPM startup key - - Allow startup key with TPM - - Require startup key with TPM - - Do not allow startup key with TPM - -These options are mutually exclusive. If a startup key is required, a startup PIN isn't allowed. If startup PIN is required, startup key isn't allowed. If these policies are in conflict, a policy error will occur. - -To hide the advanced page on a TPM-enabled computer or device, set these options to **Do not allow** for the startup key and for the startup PIN. - -### Configure use of smart cards on fixed data drives - -This policy setting is used to require, allow, or deny the use of smart cards with fixed data drives. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|This policy setting can be used to specify whether smart cards can be used to authenticate user access to the BitLocker-protected fixed data drives on a computer.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7| -|**Drive type**|Fixed data drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Fixed Data Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|To use smart cards with BitLocker, the object identifier setting in the **Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\BitLocker Drive Encryption\Validate smart card certificate usage rule compliance** policy setting may need to be modified to match the object identifier of the smart card certificates.| -|**When enabled**|Smart cards can be used to authenticate user access to the drive. Smart card authentication can be required by selecting the **Require use of smart cards on fixed data drives** check box.| -|**When disabled**|Users can't use smart cards to authenticate their access to BitLocker-protected fixed data drives.| -|**When not configured**|Smart cards can be used to authenticate user access to a BitLocker-protected drive.| - -#### Reference: Configure use of smart cards on fixed data drives - -> [!NOTE] -> These settings are enforced when turning on BitLocker, not when unlocking a drive. BitLocker allows unlocking a drive by using any of the protectors that are available on the drive. - -### Configure use of passwords on fixed data drives - -This policy setting is used to require, allow, or deny the use of passwords with fixed data drives. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, it can be specified whether a password is required to unlock BitLocker-protected fixed data drives.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7| -|**Drive type**|Fixed data drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Fixed Data Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|To use password complexity, the **Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Account Policies\Password Policy\Password must meet complexity requirements** policy setting must also be enabled.| -|**When enabled**|Users can configure a password that meets the defined requirements. To require the use of a password, select **Require password for fixed data drive**. To enforce complexity requirements on the password, select **Require complexity**.| -|**When disabled**|The user isn't allowed to use a password.| -|**When not configured**|Passwords are supported with the default settings, which don't include password complexity requirements and require only eight characters.| - -#### Reference: Configure use of passwords on fixed data drives - -When set to **Require complexity**, a connection to a domain controller is necessary to validate the complexity of the password when BitLocker is enabled. - -When set to **Allow complexity**, a connection to a domain controller is attempted to validate that the complexity adheres to the rules set by the policy. However, if no domain controllers are found, the password is accepted regardless of the actual password complexity, and the drive is encrypted by using that password as a protector. - -When set to **Do not allow complexity**, no password complexity validation is performed. - -Passwords must be at least eight characters. To configure a greater minimum length for the password, enter the desired number of characters in the **Minimum password length** box. - -> [!NOTE] -> These settings are enforced when turning on BitLocker, not when unlocking a drive. BitLocker allows unlocking a drive with any of the protectors that are available on the drive. - -For the complexity requirement setting to be effective, the Group Policy setting **Computer Configuration** > **Windows Settings** > **Security Settings** > **Account Policies** > **Password Policy** > **Password must meet complexity requirements** must also be enabled. This policy setting is configured on a per-computer basis. The policy setting also applies to both local user accounts and domain user accounts. Because the password filter that's used to validate password complexity is located on the domain controllers, local user accounts can't access the password filter because they're not authenticated for domain access. When this policy setting is enabled, if a local user account signs in, and a drive is attempted to be encrypted or a password changed on an existing BitLocker-protected drive, an **Access denied** error message is displayed. In this situation, the password key protector can't be added to the drive. - -Enabling this policy setting requires that a device is connected to a domain before adding a password key protector to a BitLocker-protected drive. Users who work remotely and have periods of time in which they can't connect to the domain should be made aware of this requirement so that they can schedule a time when they'll be connected to the domain to turn on BitLocker or to change a password on a BitLocker-protected data drive. - -> [!IMPORTANT] -> Passwords can't be used if FIPS compliance is enabled. The **System cryptography: Use FIPS-compliant algorithms for encryption, hashing, and signing** policy setting in *Computer Configuration* > *Windows Settings* > *Security Settings* > *Local Policies* > *Security Options* specifies whether FIPS compliance is enabled. - -### Configure use of smart cards on removable data drives - -This policy setting is used to require, allow, or deny the use of smart cards with removable data drives. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|This policy setting can be used to specify whether smart cards can be used to authenticate user access to BitLocker-protected removable data drives on a computer.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7| -|**Drive type**|Removable data drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Removable Data Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|To use smart cards with BitLocker, the object identifier setting in the **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Validate smart card certificate usage rule compliance** policy setting may also need to be modified to match the object identifier of the smart card certificates.| -|**When enabled**|Smart cards can be used to authenticate user access to the drive. Smart card authentication can be required by selecting the **Require use of smart cards on removable data drives** check box.| -|**When disabled or not configured**|Users aren't allowed to use smart cards to authenticate their access to BitLocker-protected removable data drives.| -|**When not configured**|Smart cards are available to authenticate user access to a BitLocker-protected removable data drive.| - -#### Reference: Configure use of smart cards on removable data drives - -> [!NOTE] -> These settings are enforced when turning on BitLocker, not when unlocking a drive. BitLocker allows unlocking a drive with any of the protectors that are available on the drive. - -### Configure use of passwords on removable data drives - -This policy setting is used to require, allow, or deny the use of passwords with removable data drives. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, it can be specified whether a password is required to unlock BitLocker-protected removable data drives.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7| -|**Drive type**|Removable data drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Removable Data Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|To use password complexity, the **Password must meet complexity requirements** policy setting, which is located at **Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Account Policies\Password Policy** must also be enabled.| -|**When enabled**|Users can configure a password that meets the defined requirements. To require the use of a password, select **Require password for removable data drive**. To enforce complexity requirements on the password, select **Require complexity**.| -|**When disabled**|The user isn't allowed to use a password.| -|**When not configured**|Passwords are supported with the default settings, which don't include password complexity requirements and require only eight characters.| - -#### Reference: Configure use of passwords on removable data drives - -If use of passwords is allowed, requiring a password to be used, enforcement of password complexity requirements, and password minimum length can all be configured. For the complexity requirement setting to be effective, the group policy setting **Password must meet complexity requirements**, which is located at *Computer Configuration* > *Windows Settings* > *Security Settings* > *Account Policies* > *Password Policy*, must also be enabled. - -> [!NOTE] -> These settings are enforced when turning on BitLocker, not when unlocking a drive. BitLocker allows unlocking a drive with any of the protectors that are available on the drive. - -Passwords must be at least eight characters. To configure a greater minimum length for the password, enter the wanted number of characters in the **Minimum password length** box. - -When set to **Require complexity**, a connection to a domain controller is necessary when BitLocker is enabled to validate the complexity of the password. - -When set to **Allow complexity**, a connection to a domain controller is attempted to validate that the complexity adheres to the rules set by the policy. However, if no domain controllers are found, the password is still be accepted regardless of actual password complexity and the drive is encrypted by using that password as a protector. - -When set to **Do not allow complexity**, no password complexity validation is done. - -> [!NOTE] -> Passwords can't be used if FIPS compliance is enabled. The **System cryptography: Use FIPS-compliant algorithms for encryption, hashing, and signing** policy setting in **Computer Configuration** > **Windows Settings** > **Security Settings** > **Local Policies** > **Security Options** specifies whether FIPS compliance is enabled. - -For information about this setting, see [System cryptography: Use FIPS-compliant algorithms for encryption, hashing, and signing](../../../threat-protection/security-policy-settings/system-cryptography-use-fips-compliant-algorithms-for-encryption-hashing-and-signing.md). - -### Validate smart card certificate usage rule compliance - -This policy setting is used to determine what certificate to use with BitLocker. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, an object identifier from a smart card certificate can be associated to a BitLocker-protected drive.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7| -|**Drive type**|Fixed and removable data drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption*| -|**Conflicts**|None| -|**When enabled**|The object identifier that is specified in the **Object identifier** setting must match the object identifier in the smart card certificate.| -|**When disabled or not configured**|The default object identifier is used.| - -#### Reference: Validate smart card certificate usage rule compliance - -This policy setting is applied when BitLocker is turned on. - -The object identifier is specified in the extended key usage (EKU) of a certificate. BitLocker can identify which certificates can be used to authenticate a user certificate to a BitLocker-protected drive by matching the object identifier in the certificate with the object identifier that is defined by this policy setting. - -The default object identifier is 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.67.1.1. - -> [!NOTE] -> BitLocker doesn't require that a certificate have an EKU attribute; however, if one is configured for the certificate, it must be set to an object identifier that matches the object identifier configured for BitLocker. - -### Enable use of BitLocker authentication requiring preboot keyboard input on slates - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, users can be allowed to enable authentication options that require user input from the preboot environment, even if the platform indicates a lack of preboot input capability.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8| -|**Drive type**|Operating system drive| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Operating System Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|None| -|**When enabled**|Devices must have an alternative means of preboot input (such as an attached USB keyboard).| -|**When disabled or not configured**|The Windows Recovery Environment must be enabled on tablets to support entering the BitLocker recovery password.| - -#### Reference: Enable use of BitLocker authentication requiring preboot keyboard input on slates - -The Windows touch keyboard (such as used by tablets) isn't available in the preboot environment where BitLocker requires additional information, such as a PIN or password. - -It's recommended that administrators enable this policy only for devices that are verified to have an alternative means of preboot input, such as attaching a USB keyboard. - -When the Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) isn't enabled and this policy isn't enabled, BitLocker can't be turned on a device that uses the Windows touch keyboard. - -If this policy setting isn't enabled, the following options in the **Require additional authentication at startup** policy might not be available: - -- Configure TPM startup PIN: Required and Allowed -- Configure TPM startup key and PIN: Required and Allowed -- Configure use of passwords for operating system drives - -### Deny write access to fixed drives not protected by BitLocker - -This policy setting is used to require encryption of fixed drives prior to granting Write access. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, it can be set whether BitLocker protection is required for fixed data drives to be writable on a computer.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7| -|**Drive type**|Fixed data drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Fixed Data Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|See the Reference section for a description of conflicts.| -|**When enabled**|All fixed data drives that aren't BitLocker-protected are mounted as Read-only. If the drive is protected by BitLocker, it's mounted with Read and Write access.| -|**When disabled or not configured**|All fixed data drives on the computer are mounted with Read and Write access.| - -#### Reference: Deny write access to fixed drives not protected by BitLocker - -This policy setting is applied when BitLocker is turned on. - -Conflict considerations include: - -1. When this policy setting is enabled, users receive **Access denied** error messages when they try to save data to unencrypted fixed data drives. See the Reference section for additional conflicts. - -2. If `BdeHdCfg.exe` is run on a computer when this policy setting is enabled, the following issues could be encountered: - - - If it was attempted to shrink a drive to create the system drive, the drive size is successfully reduced, and a raw partition is created. However, the raw partition isn't formatted. The following error message is displayed: **The new active drive cannot be formatted. You may need to manually prepare your drive for BitLocker.** - - - If it was attempted to use unallocated space to create the system drive, a raw partition will be created. However, the raw partition won't be formatted. The following error message is displayed: **The new active drive cannot be formatted. You may need to manually prepare your drive for BitLocker.** - - - If it was attempted to merge an existing drive into the system drive, the tool fails to copy the required boot file onto the target drive to create the system drive. The following error message is displayed: **BitLocker setup failed to copy boot files. You may need to manually prepare your drive for BitLocker.** - -3. If this policy setting is enforced, a hard drive can't be repartitioned because the drive is protected. If computers are being upgrading in an organization from a previous version of Windows, and those computers were configured with a single partition, the required BitLocker system partition should be created before applying this policy setting to the computers. - -### Deny write access to removable drives not protected by BitLocker - -This policy setting is used to require that removable drives are encrypted prior to granting Write access, and to control whether BitLocker-protected removable drives that were configured in another organization can be opened with Write access. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, it can be configured whether BitLocker protection is required for a computer to be able to write data to a removable data drive.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7| -|**Drive type**|Removable data drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Removable Data Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|See the Reference section for a description of conflicts.| -|**When enabled**|All removable data drives that aren't BitLocker-protected are mounted as Read-only. If the drive is protected by BitLocker, it's mounted with Read and Write access.| -|**When disabled or not configured**|All removable data drives on the computer are mounted with Read and Write access.| - -#### Reference: Deny write access to removable drives not protected by BitLocker - -If the **Deny write access to devices configured in another organization** option is selected, only drives with identification fields that match the computer's identification fields are given Write access. When a removable data drive is accessed, it's checked for a valid identification field and allowed identification fields. These fields are defined by the **Provide the unique identifiers for your organization** policy setting. - -> [!NOTE] -> This policy setting can be overridden with the policy settings under **User Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **System** > **Removable Storage Access**. If the **Removable Disks: Deny write access** policy setting is enabled, this policy setting will be ignored. - -Conflict considerations include: - -1. Use of BitLocker with the TPM plus a startup key or with the TPM plus a PIN and startup key must be disallowed if the **Deny write access to removable drives not protected by BitLocker** policy setting is enabled. - -2. Use of recovery keys must be disallowed if the **Deny write access to removable drives not protected by BitLocker** policy setting is enabled. - -3. The **Provide the unique identifiers for your organization** policy setting must be enabled if Write access needs to be denied to drives that were configured in another organization. - -### Control use of BitLocker on removable drives - -This policy setting is used to prevent users from turning BitLocker on or off on removable data drives. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, it can be controlled the use of BitLocker on removable data drives.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7| -|**Drive type**|Removable data drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Removable Data Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|None| -|**When enabled**|Property settings can be selected that control how users can configure BitLocker.| -|**When disabled**|Users can't use BitLocker on removable data drives.| -|**When not configured**|Users can use BitLocker on removable data drives.| - -#### Reference: Control use of BitLocker on removable drives - -This policy setting is applied when BitLocker is turned on. - -For information about suspending BitLocker protection, see [BitLocker Basic Deployment](bitlocker-basic-deployment.md). - -The options for choosing property settings that control how users can configure BitLocker are: - -- **Allow users to apply BitLocker protection on removable data drives** Enables the user to run the BitLocker Setup Wizard on a removable data drive. - -- **Allow users to suspend and decrypt BitLocker on removable data drives** Enables the user to remove BitLocker from the drive or to suspend the encryption while performing maintenance. - -### Choose drive encryption method and cipher strength - -This policy setting is used to control the encryption method and cipher strength. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, it can be controlled the encryption method and strength for drives.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8| -|**Drive type**|All drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption*| -|**Conflicts**|None| -|**When enabled**|An encryption algorithm and key cipher strength for BitLocker can be chosen to use to encrypt drives.| -|**When disabled or not configured**|Beginning with Windows 10, version 1511, BitLocker uses the default encryption method of XTS-AES 128-bit or the encryption method that is specified by the setup script. - -#### Reference: Choose drive encryption method and cipher strength - -The values of this policy determine the strength of the cipher that BitLocker uses for encryption. Enterprises may want to control the encryption level for increased security (AES-256 is stronger than AES-128). - -If this setting is enabled, it can be configured an encryption algorithm and key cipher strength for fixed data drives, operating system drives, and removable data drives individually. - -- For fixed and operating system drives, it's recommended to use the XTS-AES algorithm. - -- For removable drives, AES-CBC 128-bit or AES-CBC 256-bit should be used if the drive will be used in other devices that aren't running Windows 10, version 1511 or later. - -Changing the encryption method has no effect if the drive is already encrypted or if encryption is in progress. In these cases, this policy setting is ignored. - -> [!WARNING] -> This policy doesn't apply to encrypted drives. Encrypted drives utilize their own algorithm, which is set by the drive during partitioning. - -When this policy setting is disabled or not configured, BitLocker will use the default encryption method of XTS-AES 128-bit or the encryption method that is specified in the setup script. - -### Configure use of hardware-based encryption for fixed data drives - -This policy controls how BitLocker reacts to systems that are equipped with encrypted drives when they're used as fixed data volumes. Using hardware-based encryption can improve the performance of drive operations that involve frequent reading or writing of data to the drive. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|This policy setting allows management of BitLocker's use of hardware-based encryption on fixed data drives and to specify which encryption algorithms BitLocker can use with hardware-based encryption.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8| -|**Drive type**|Fixed data drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Fixed Data Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|None| -|**When enabled**|Additional options can be specified that control whether BitLocker software-based encryption is used instead of hardware-based encryption on computers that don't support hardware-based encryption. It can also be specified to restrict the encryption algorithms and cipher suites that are used with hardware-based encryption.| -|**When disabled**|BitLocker can't use hardware-based encryption with fixed data drives, and BitLocker software-based encryption is used by default when the drive in encrypted.| -|**When not configured**|BitLocker software-based encryption is used irrespective of hardware-based encryption ability.| - -#### Reference: Configure use of hardware-based encryption for fixed data drives - -> [!NOTE] -> The **Choose drive encryption method and cipher strength** policy setting doesn't apply to hardware-based encryption. - -The encryption algorithm that is used by hardware-based encryption is set when the drive is partitioned. By default, BitLocker uses the algorithm that is configured on the drive to encrypt the drive. The **Restrict encryption algorithms and cipher suites allowed for hardware-based encryption** option of this setting enables restriction of the encryption algorithms that BitLocker can use with hardware encryption. If the algorithm that is set for the drive isn't available, BitLocker disables the use of hardware-based encryption. Encryption algorithms are specified by object identifiers (OID), for example: - -- Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 128 in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode OID: 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.2 -- AES 256 in CBC mode OID: 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.42 - -### Configure use of hardware-based encryption for operating system drives - -This policy controls how BitLocker reacts when encrypted drives are used as operating system drives. Using hardware-based encryption can improve the performance of drive operations that involve frequent reading or writing of data to the drive. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|This policy setting allows management of BitLocker's use of hardware-based encryption on operating system drives and specifies which encryption algorithms it can use with hardware-based encryption.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8| -|**Drive type**|Operating system drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Operating System Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|None| -|**When enabled**|Additional options can be specified that control whether BitLocker software-based encryption is used instead of hardware-based encryption on computers that don't support hardware-based encryption. It can also be specified to restrict the encryption algorithms and cipher suites that are used with hardware-based encryption.| -|**When disabled**|BitLocker can't use hardware-based encryption with operating system drives, and BitLocker software-based encryption is used by default when the drive in encrypted.| -|**When not configured**|BitLocker software-based encryption is used irrespective of hardware-based encryption ability.| - -#### Reference: Configure use of hardware-based encryption for operating system drives - -If hardware-based encryption isn't available, BitLocker software-based encryption is used instead. - -> [!NOTE] -> The **Choose drive encryption method and cipher strength** policy setting doesn't apply to hardware-based encryption. - -The encryption algorithm that is used by hardware-based encryption is set when the drive is partitioned. By default, BitLocker uses the algorithm that is configured on the drive to encrypt the drive. The **Restrict encryption algorithms and cipher suites allowed for hardware-based encryption** option of this setting enables restriction of the encryption algorithms that BitLocker can use with hardware encryption. If the algorithm that is set for the drive isn't available, BitLocker disables the use of hardware-based encryption. Encryption algorithms are specified by object identifiers (OID), for example: - -- Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 128 in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode OID: 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.2 -- AES 256 in CBC mode OID: 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.42 - -### Configure use of hardware-based encryption for removable data drives - -This policy controls how BitLocker reacts to encrypted drives when they're used as removable data drives. Using hardware-based encryption can improve the performance of drive operations that involve frequent reading or writing of data to the drive. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|This policy setting allows management of BitLocker's use of hardware-based encryption on removable data drives and specifies which encryption algorithms it can use with hardware-based encryption.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8| -|**Drive type**|Removable data drive| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Removable Data Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|None| -|**When enabled**|Additional options can be specified that control whether BitLocker software-based encryption is used instead of hardware-based encryption on computers that don't support hardware-based encryption. It can also be specified to restrict the encryption algorithms and cipher suites that are used with hardware-based encryption.| -|**When disabled**|BitLocker can't use hardware-based encryption with removable data drives, and BitLocker software-based encryption is used by default when the drive in encrypted.| -|**When not configured**|BitLocker software-based encryption is used irrespective of hardware-based encryption ability.| - -#### Reference: Configure use of hardware-based encryption for removable data drives - -If hardware-based encryption isn't available, BitLocker software-based encryption is used instead. - -> [!NOTE] -> The **Choose drive encryption method and cipher strength** policy setting doesn't apply to hardware-based encryption. - -The encryption algorithm that is used by hardware-based encryption is set when the drive is partitioned. By default, BitLocker uses the algorithm that is configured on the drive to encrypt the drive. The **Restrict encryption algorithms and cipher suites allowed for hardware-based encryption** option of this setting enables restriction of the encryption algorithms that BitLocker can use with hardware encryption. If the algorithm that is set for the drive isn't available, BitLocker disables the use of hardware-based encryption. Encryption algorithms are specified by object identifiers (OID), for example: - -- Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 128 in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode OID: 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.2 -- AES 256 in CBC mode OID: 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.42 - -### Enforce drive encryption type on fixed data drives - -This policy controls whether fixed data drives utilize Used Space Only encryption or Full encryption. Setting this policy also causes the BitLocker Setup Wizard to skip the encryption options page so no encryption selection displays to the user. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, it can be configured the encryption type that is used by BitLocker.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8| -|**Drive type**|Fixed data drive| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Fixed Data Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|None| -|**When enabled**|This policy defines the encryption type that BitLocker uses to encrypt drives, and the encryption type option isn't presented in the BitLocker Setup Wizard.| -|**When disabled or not configured**|The BitLocker Setup Wizard asks the user to select the encryption type before turning on BitLocker.| - -#### Reference: Enforce drive encryption type on fixed data drives - -This policy setting is applied when BitLocker is turned on. Changing the encryption type has no effect if the drive is already encrypted or if encryption is in progress. Choose Full encryption to make it mandatory for the entire drive to be encrypted when BitLocker is turned on. Choose Used Space Only encryption to make it mandatory to encrypt only that portion of the drive that is used to store data when BitLocker is turned on. - -> [!NOTE] -> This policy is ignored when a volume is being shrunk or expanded and the BitLocker drive uses the current encryption method. For example, when a drive that is using Used Space Only encryption is expanded, the new free space isn't wiped as it would be for a drive that is using Full encryption. The user could wipe the free space on a Used Space Only drive by using the following command: `manage-bde.exe -w`. If the volume is shrunk, no action is taken for the new free space. - -For more information about the tool to manage BitLocker, see [Manage-bde](/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/manage-bde). - -### Enforce drive encryption type on operating system drives - -This policy controls whether operating system drives utilize Full encryption or Used Space Only encryption. Setting this policy also causes the BitLocker Setup Wizard to skip the encryption options page, so no encryption selection displays to the user. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, it can be configured the encryption type that is used by BitLocker.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8| -|**Drive type**|Operating system drive| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Operating System Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|None| -|**When enabled**|The encryption type that BitLocker uses to encrypt drives is defined by this policy, and the encryption type option isn't presented in the BitLocker Setup Wizard.| -|**When disabled or not configured**|The BitLocker Setup Wizard asks the user to select the encryption type before turning on BitLocker.| - -#### Reference: Enforce drive encryption type on operating system drives - -This policy setting is applied when BitLocker is turned on. Changing the encryption type has no effect if the drive is already encrypted or if encryption is in progress. Choose Full encryption to make it mandatory for the entire drive to be encrypted when BitLocker is turned on. Choose Used Space Only encryption to make it mandatory to encrypt only that portion of the drive that is used to store data when BitLocker is turned on. - -> [!NOTE] -> This policy is ignored when shrinking or expanding a volume, and the BitLocker driver uses the current encryption method. For example, when a drive that is using Used Space Only encryption is expanded, the new free space isn't wiped as it would be for a drive that uses Full encryption. The user could wipe the free space on a Used Space Only drive by using the following command: `manage-bde.exe -w`. If the volume is shrunk, no action is taken for the new free space. - -For more information about the tool to manage BitLocker, see [Manage-bde](/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/manage-bde). - -### Enforce drive encryption type on removable data drives - -This policy controls whether fixed data drives utilize Full encryption or Used Space Only encryption. Setting this policy also causes the BitLocker Setup Wizard to skip the encryption options page, so no encryption selection displays to the user. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, it can be configured the encryption type that is used by BitLocker.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8| -|**Drive type**|Removable data drive| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Removable Data Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|None| -|**When enabled**|The encryption type that BitLocker uses to encrypt drives is defined by this policy, and the encryption type option isn't presented in the BitLocker Setup Wizard.| -|**When disabled or not configured**|The BitLocker Setup Wizard asks the user to select the encryption type before turning on BitLocker.| - -#### Reference: Enforce drive encryption type on removable data drives - -This policy setting is applied when BitLocker is turned on. Changing the encryption type has no effect if the drive is already encrypted or if encryption is in progress. Choose Full encryption to make it mandatory for the entire drive to be encrypted when BitLocker is turned on. Choose Used Space Only encryption to make it mandatory to encrypt only that portion of the drive that is used to store data when BitLocker is turned on. - -> [!NOTE] -> This policy is ignored when shrinking or expanding a volume, and the BitLocker driver uses the current encryption method. For example, when a drive that is using Used Space Only encryption is expanded, the new free space isn't wiped as it would be for a drive that is using Full Encryption. The user could wipe the free space on a Used Space Only drive by using the following command: `manage-bde.exe -w`. If the volume is shrunk, no action is taken for the new free space. - -For more information about the tool to manage BitLocker, see [Manage-bde](/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/manage-bde). - -### Choose how BitLocker-protected operating system drives can be recovered - -This policy setting is used to configure recovery methods for operating system drives. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, it can be controlled how BitLocker-protected operating system drives are recovered in the absence of the required startup key information.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7| -|**Drive type**|Operating system drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Operating System Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|The use of recovery keys must be disallowed if the **Deny write access to removable drives not protected by BitLocker** policy setting is enabled.

    When using data recovery agents, the **Provide the unique identifiers for your organization** policy setting must be enabled.| -|**When enabled**|it can be controlled the methods that are available to users to recover data from BitLocker-protected operating system drives.| -|**When disabled or not configured**|The default recovery options are supported for BitLocker recovery. By default, a data recovery agent is allowed, the recovery options can be specified by the user (including the recovery password and recovery key), and recovery information isn't backed up to AD DS.| - -#### Reference: Choose how BitLocker-protected operating system drives can be recovered - -This policy setting is applied when BitLocker is turned on. - -The **Allow data recovery agent** check box is used to specify whether a data recovery agent can be used with BitLocker-protected operating system drives. Before a data recovery agent can be used, it must be added from **Public Key Policies**, which is located in the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) or in the Local Group Policy Editor. - -For more information about adding data recovery agents, see [BitLocker basic deployment](bitlocker-basic-deployment.md). - -In **Configure user storage of BitLocker recovery information**, select whether users are allowed, required, or not allowed to generate a 48-digit recovery password. - -Select **Omit recovery options from the BitLocker setup wizard** to prevent users from specifying recovery options when they enable BitLocker on a drive. This policy setting means that which recovery option to use when BitLocker is enabled can't be specified. Instead, BitLocker recovery options for the drive are determined by the policy setting. - -In **Save BitLocker recovery information to Active Directory Domain Services**, choose which BitLocker recovery information to store in Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) for operating system drives. If **Store recovery password and key packages** is selected, the BitLocker recovery password and the key package are stored in AD DS. Storing the key package supports the recovery of data from a drive that is physically corrupted. If **Store recovery password only** is selected, only the recovery password is stored in AD DS. - -Select the **Do not enable BitLocker until recovery information is stored in AD DS for operating system drives** check box if users need to be prevented from enabling BitLocker unless the computer is connected to the domain and the backup of BitLocker recovery information to AD DS succeeds. - -> [!NOTE] -> If the **Do not enable BitLocker until recovery information is stored in AD DS for operating system drives** check box is selected, a recovery password is automatically generated. - -### Choose how users can recover BitLocker-protected drives (Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista) - -This policy setting is used to configure recovery methods for BitLocker-protected drives on computers running Windows Server 2008 or Windows Vista. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, it can be controlled whether the BitLocker Setup Wizard can display and specify BitLocker recovery options.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista| -|**Drive type**|Operating system drives and fixed data drives on computers running Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption*| -|**Conflicts**|This policy setting provides an administrative method of recovering data that is encrypted by BitLocker to prevent data loss due to lack of key information. If the **Do not allow** option is chosen for both user recovery options, the **Store BitLocker recovery information in Active Directory Domain Services (Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista)** policy setting must be enabled to prevent a policy error.| -|**When enabled**|The options that the BitLocker Setup Wizard displays to users for recovering BitLocker encrypted data can be configured.| -|**When disabled or not configured**|The BitLocker Setup Wizard presents users with ways to store recovery options.| - -#### Reference: Choose how users can recover BitLocker-protected drives (Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista) - -This policy is only applicable to computers running Windows Server 2008 or Windows Vista. This policy setting is applied when BitLocker is turned on. - -Two recovery options can be used to unlock BitLocker-encrypted data in the absence of the required startup key information. Users can type a 48-digit numerical recovery password, or they can insert a USB drive that contains a 256-bit recovery key. - -- Saving the recovery password to a USB drive stores the 48-digit recovery password as a text file and the 256-bit recovery key as a hidden file. -- Saving the recovery password to a folder stores the 48-digit recovery password as a text file. -- Printing the recovery password sends the 48-digit recovery password to the default printer. - -For example, not allowing the 48-digit recovery password prevents users from printing or saving recovery information to a folder. - -> [!IMPORTANT] -> If TPM initialization is performed during the BitLocker setup, TPM owner information is saved or printed with the BitLocker recovery information. -> The 48-digit recovery password isn't available in FIPS-compliance mode. - -> [!IMPORTANT] -> To prevent data loss, there must be a way to recover BitLocker encryption keys. If both recovery options are not allowed, backup of BitLocker recovery information to AD DS must be enabled. Otherwise, a policy error occurs. - -### Store BitLocker recovery information in Active Directory Domain Services (Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista) - -This policy setting is used to configure the storage of BitLocker recovery information in AD DS. This policy setting provides an administrative method of recovering data that is encrypted by BitLocker to prevent data loss due to lack of key information. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|This policy setting allows management of the AD DS backup of BitLocker Drive Encryption recovery information.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista| -|**Drive type**|Operating system drives and fixed data drives on computers running Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista.| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption*| -|**Conflicts**|None| -|**When enabled**|BitLocker recovery information is automatically and silently backed up to AD DS when BitLocker is turned on for a computer.| -|**When disabled or not configured**|BitLocker recovery information isn't backed up to AD DS.| - -#### Reference: Store BitLocker recovery information in Active Directory Domain Services (Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista) - -This policy is only applicable to computers running Windows Server 2008 or Windows Vista. - -This policy setting is applied when BitLocker is turned on. - -BitLocker recovery information includes the recovery password and unique identifier data. A package that contains an encryption key for a BitLocker-protected drive can also be included. This key package is secured by one or more recovery passwords, and it can help perform specialized recovery when the disk is damaged or corrupted. - -If **Require BitLocker backup to AD DS** is selected, BitLocker can't be turned on unless the computer is connected to the domain, and the backup of BitLocker recovery information to AD DS succeeds. This option is selected by default to help ensure that BitLocker recovery is possible. - -A recovery password is a 48-digit number that unlocks access to a BitLocker-protected drive. A key package contains a drive's BitLocker encryption key, which is secured by one or more recovery passwords. Key packages may help perform specialized recovery when the disk is damaged or corrupted. - -If the **Require BitLocker backup to AD DS** option isn't selected, AD DS backup is attempted, but network or other backup failures don't prevent the BitLocker setup. The Backup process isn't automatically retried, and the recovery password might not be stored in AD DS during BitLocker setup. -TPM initialization might be needed during the BitLocker setup. Enable the **Turn on TPM backup to Active Directory Domain Services** policy setting in **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **System** > **Trusted Platform Module Services** to ensure that TPM information is also backed up. - -For more information about this setting, see [TPM Group Policy settings](/windows/device-security/tpm/trusted-platform-module-services-group-policy-settings). - -### Choose default folder for recovery password - -This policy setting is used to configure the default folder for recovery passwords. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, the default path that is displayed when the BitLocker Setup Wizard prompts the user to enter the location of a folder in which to save the recovery password can be specified.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Vista| -|**Drive type**|All drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption*| -|**Conflicts**|None| -|**When enabled**|The path that will be used as the default folder location when the user chooses the option to save the recovery password in a folder can be specified. A fully qualified path can be specified. The target computer's environment variables can also be included in the path. If the path isn't valid, the BitLocker Setup Wizard displays the computer's top-level folder view.| -|**When disabled or not configured**|The BitLocker Setup Wizard displays the computer's top-level folder view when the user chooses the option to save the recovery password in a folder.| - -#### Reference: Choose default folder for recovery password - -This policy setting is applied when BitLocker is turned on. - -> [!NOTE] -> This policy setting doesn't prevent the user from saving the recovery password in another folder. - -### Choose how BitLocker-protected fixed drives can be recovered - -This policy setting is used to configure recovery methods for fixed data drives. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, it can be controlled how BitLocker-protected fixed data drives are recovered in the absence of the required credentials.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7| -|**Drive type**|Fixed data drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Fixed Data Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|The use of recovery keys must be disallowed if the **Deny write access to removable drives not protected by BitLocker** policy setting is enabled.

    When using data recovery agents, the **Provide the unique identifiers for your organization** policy setting must be enabled.| -|**When enabled**|it can be controlled the methods that are available to users to recover data from BitLocker-protected fixed data drives.| -|**When disabled or not configured**|The default recovery options are supported for BitLocker recovery. By default, a data recovery agent is allowed, the recovery options can be specified by the user (including the recovery password and recovery key), and recovery information isn't backed up to AD DS.| - -#### Reference: Choose how BitLocker-protected fixed drives can be recovered - -This policy setting is applied when BitLocker is turned on. - -The **Allow data recovery agent** check box is used to specify whether a data recovery agent can be used with BitLocker-protected fixed data drives. Before a data recovery agent can be used, it must be added from **Public Key Policies**, which is located in the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) or in the Local Group Policy Editor. - -In **Configure user storage of BitLocker recovery information**, select whether users can be allowed, required, or not allowed to generate a 48-digit recovery password or a 256-bit recovery key. - -Select **Omit recovery options from the BitLocker setup wizard** to prevent users from specifying recovery options when they enable BitLocker on a drive. This policy setting means that which recovery option to use when BitLocker is enabled can't be specified. Instead, BitLocker recovery options for the drive are determined by the policy setting. - -In **Save BitLocker recovery information to Active Directory Domain Services**, choose which BitLocker recovery information to store in AD DS for fixed data drives. If **Backup recovery password and key package** is selected, the BitLocker recovery password and the key package are stored in AD DS. Storing the key package supports recovering data from a drive that has been physically corrupted. To recover this data, the `Repair-bde.exe` command-line tool can be used. If **Backup recovery password only** is selected, only the recovery password is stored in AD DS. - -For more information about the BitLocker repair tool, see [Repair-bde](/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/repair-bde). - -Select the **Do not enable BitLocker until recovery information is stored in AD DS for fixed data drives** check box if users should be prevented from enabling BitLocker unless the computer is connected to the domain and the backup of BitLocker recovery information to AD DS succeeds. - -> [!NOTE] -> If the **Do not enable BitLocker until recovery information is stored in AD DS for fixed data drives** check box is selected, a recovery password is automatically generated. - -### Choose how BitLocker-protected removable drives can be recovered - -This policy setting is used to configure recovery methods for removable data drives. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, it can be controlled how BitLocker-protected removable data drives are recovered in the absence of the required credentials.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7| -|**Drive type**|Removable data drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Removable Data Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|The use of recovery keys must be disallowed if the **Deny write access to removable drives not protected by BitLocker** policy setting is enabled.

    When using data recovery agents, the **Provide the unique identifiers for your organization** policy setting must be enabled.| -|**When enabled**|it can be controlled the methods that are available to users to recover data from BitLocker-protected removable data drives.| -|**When disabled or not configured**|The default recovery options are supported for BitLocker recovery. By default, a data recovery agent is allowed, the recovery options can be specified by the user (including the recovery password and recovery key), and recovery information isn't backed up to AD DS.| - -#### Reference: Choose how BitLocker-protected removable drives can be recovered - -This policy setting is applied when BitLocker is turned on. - -The **Allow data recovery agent** check box is used to specify whether a data recovery agent can be used with BitLocker-protected removable data drives. Before a data recovery agent can be used, it must be added from **Public Key Policies** , which is accessed using the GPMC or the Local Group Policy Editor. - -In **Configure user storage of BitLocker recovery information**, select whether users can be allowed, required, or not allowed to generate a 48-digit recovery password. - -Select **Omit recovery options from the BitLocker setup wizard** to prevent users from specifying recovery options when they enable BitLocker on a drive. This policy setting means that which recovery option to use when BitLocker is enabled can't be specified. Instead, BitLocker recovery options for the drive are determined by the policy setting. - -In **Save BitLocker recovery information to Active Directory Domain Services**, choose which BitLocker recovery information is to be stored in AD DS for removable data drives. If **Backup recovery password and key package** is selected, the BitLocker recovery password and the key package are stored in AD DS. If **Backup recovery password only** is selected, only the recovery password is stored in AD DS. - -Select the **Do not enable BitLocker until recovery information is stored in AD DS for removable data drives** check box if users should be prevented from enabling BitLocker unless the computer is connected to the domain and the backup of BitLocker recovery information to AD DS succeeds. - -> [!NOTE] -> If the **Do not enable BitLocker until recovery information is stored in AD DS for fixed data drives** check box is selected, a recovery password is automatically generated. - -### Configure the pre-boot recovery message and URL - -This policy setting is used to configure the entire recovery message and to replace the existing URL that is displayed on the pre-boot recovery screen when the operating system drive is locked. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, it can be configured the BitLocker recovery screen to display a customized message and URL.| -|**Introduced**|Windows| -|**Drive type**|Operating system drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Operating System Drives* > *Configure pre-boot recovery message and URL*| -|**Conflicts**|None| -|**When enabled**|The customized message and URL are displayed on the pre-boot recovery screen. If a custom recovery message and URL has been previously enabled and the message and URL need to be reverted back to the default message and URL, the policy setting must be enabled and the **Use default recovery message and URL** option selected.| -|**When disabled or not configured**|If the setting hasn't been previously enabled, then the default pre-boot recovery screen is displayed for BitLocker recovery. If the setting previously was enabled and is later disabled, then the last message in Boot Configuration Data (BCD) is displayed whether it was the default recovery message or the custom message.| - -#### Reference: Configure the pre-boot recovery message and URL - -Enabling the **Configure the pre-boot recovery message and URL** policy setting allows customization of the default recovery screen message and URL to assist customers in recovering their key. - -Once the setting is enabled, three options are available: - -- If the **Use default recovery message and URL** option is selected, the default BitLocker recovery message and URL will be displayed on the pre-boot recovery screen. -- If the **Use custom recovery message** option is selected, enter the custom message in the **Custom recovery message option** text box. The message that is entered in the **Custom recovery message option** text box is displayed on the pre-boot recovery screen. If a recovery URL is available, include it in the message. -- If the **Use custom recovery URL** option is selected, enter the custom message URL in the **Custom recovery URL option** text box. The URL that is entered in the **Custom recovery URL option** text box replaces the default URL in the default recovery message, which is displayed on the pre-boot recovery screen. - -> [!IMPORTANT] -> Not all characters and languages are supported in the pre-boot environment. It is strongly recommended to verify the correct appearance of the characters that are used for the custom message and URL on the pre-boot recovery screen. - -> [!IMPORTANT] -> Because BCDEdit commands can be altered manually before Group Policy settings have been set, the policy setting can't be returned to the default setting by selecting the **Not Configured** option after this policy setting has been configured. To return to the default pre-boot recovery screen leave the policy setting enabled and select the **Use default message** options from the **Choose an option for the pre-boot recovery message** drop-down list box. - -### Allow Secure Boot for integrity validation - -This policy controls how BitLocker-enabled system volumes are handled with the Secure Boot feature. Enabling this feature forces Secure Boot validation during the boot process and verifies Boot Configuration Data (BCD) settings according to the Secure Boot policy. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, it can be configured whether Secure Boot will be allowed as the platform integrity provider for BitLocker operating system drives.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8| -|**Drive type**|All drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Operating System Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|If **Allow Secure Boot for integrity validation** is enabled, make sure the Configure TPM platform validation profile for native UEFI firmware configurations Group Policy setting isn't enabled, or include PCR 7 to allow BitLocker to use Secure Boot for platform or BCD integrity validation.

    For more information about PCR 7, see [About the Platform Configuration Register (PCR)](#about-the-platform-configuration-register-pcr) in this article.| -|**When enabled or not configured**|BitLocker uses Secure Boot for platform integrity if the platform is capable of Secure Boot-based integrity validation.| -|**When disabled**|BitLocker uses legacy platform integrity validation, even on systems that are capable of Secure Boot-based integrity validation.| - -#### Reference: Allow Secure Boot for integrity validation - -Secure boot ensures that the computer's pre-boot environment loads only firmware that is digitally signed by authorized software publishers. Secure boot also started providing more flexibility for managing pre-boot configurations than BitLocker integrity checks prior to Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8. - -When this policy is enabled and the hardware is capable of using secure boot for BitLocker scenarios, the **Use enhanced Boot Configuration Data validation profile** group policy setting is ignored, and secure boot verifies BCD settings according to the secure boot policy setting, which is configured separately from BitLocker. - -> [!WARNING] -> Disabling this policy might result in BitLocker recovery when manufacturer-specific firmware is updated. If this policy is disabled, suspend BitLocker prior to applying firmware updates. - -### Provide the unique identifiers for your organization - -This policy setting is used to establish an identifier that is applied to all drives that are encrypted in an organization. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, unique organizational identifiers can be associated to a new drive that is enabled with BitLocker.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7| -|**Drive type**|All drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption*| -|**Conflicts**|Identification fields are required to manage certificate-based data recovery agents on BitLocker-protected drives. BitLocker manages and updates certificate-based data recovery agents only when the identification field is present on a drive and it's identical to the value that is configured on the computer.| -|**When enabled**|The identification field on the BitLocker-protected drive and any allowed identification field that is used by an organization can be configured.| -|**When disabled or not configured**|The identification field isn't required.| - -#### Reference: Provide the unique identifiers for your organization - -These identifiers are stored as the identification field and the allowed identification field. The identification field allows association of a unique organizational identifier to BitLocker-protected drives. This identifier is automatically added to new BitLocker-protected drives, and it can be updated on existing BitLocker-protected drives by using the [Manage-bde](/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/manage-bde) command-line tool. - -An identification field is required to manage certificate-based data recovery agents on BitLocker-protected drives and for potential updates to the BitLocker To Go Reader. BitLocker manages and updates data recovery agents only when the identification field on the drive matches the value that is configured in the identification field. In a similar manner, BitLocker updates the BitLocker To Go Reader only when the identification field's value on the drive matches the value that is configured for the identification field. - -For more information about the tool to manage BitLocker, see [Manage-bde](/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/manage-bde). - -The allowed identification field is used in combination with the **Deny write access to removable drives not protected by BitLocker** policy setting to help control the use of removable drives in an organization. It's a comma-separated list of identification fields from an internal organization or external organizations. - -The identification fields on existing drives can be configured by using the [Manage-bde](/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/manage-bde) command-line tool. - -When a BitLocker-protected drive is mounted on another BitLocker-enabled computer, the identification field and the allowed identification field are used to determine whether the drive is from an external organization. - -Multiple values separated by commas can be entered in the identification and allowed identification fields. The identification field can be any value upto 260 characters. - -### Prevent memory overwrite on restart - -This policy setting is used to control whether the computer's memory will be overwritten the next time the computer is restarted. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, it can be controlled computer restart performance at the risk of exposing BitLocker secrets.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Vista| -|**Drive type**|All drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption*| -|**Conflicts**|None| -|**When enabled**|The computer won't overwrite memory when it restarts. Preventing memory overwrite may improve restart performance, but it increases the risk of exposing BitLocker secrets.| -|**When disabled or not configured**|BitLocker secrets are removed from memory when the computer restarts.| - -#### Reference: Prevent memory overwrite on restart - -This policy setting is applied when BitLocker is turned on. BitLocker secrets include key material that is used to encrypt data. This policy setting applies only when BitLocker protection is enabled. - -### Configure TPM platform validation profile for BIOS-based firmware configurations - -This policy setting determines what values the TPM measures when it validates early boot components before it unlocks an operating system drive on a computer with a BIOS configuration or with UEFI firmware that has the Compatibility Support Module (CSM) enabled. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, it can be configured how the computer's TPM security hardware secures the BitLocker encryption key.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8| -|**Drive type**|Operating system drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Operating System Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|None| -|**When enabled**|The boot components that the TPM validates before unlocking access to the BitLocker-encrypted operating system drive can be configured. If any of these components change while BitLocker protection is in effect, then the TPM doesn't release the encryption key to unlock the drive. Instead, the computer displays the BitLocker Recovery console and requires that the recovery password or the recovery key is provided to unlock the drive.| -|**When disabled or not configured**|The TPM uses the default platform validation profile or the platform validation profile that is specified by the setup script.| - -#### Reference: Configure TPM platform validation profile for BIOS-based firmware configurations - -This policy setting doesn't apply if the computer doesn't have a compatible TPM or if BitLocker has already been turned on with TPM protection. - -> [!IMPORTANT] -> This Group Policy setting only applies to computers with BIOS configurations or to computers with UEFI firmware with the CSM enabled. Computers that use a native UEFI firmware configuration store different values in the Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). Use the **Configure TPM platform validation profile for native UEFI firmware configurations** Group Policy setting to configure the TPM PCR profile for computers that use native UEFI firmware. - -A platform validation profile consists of a set of PCR indices that range from 0 to 23. The default platform validation profile secures the encryption key against changes to the following PCRs: - -- Core Root of Trust of Measurement (CRTM), BIOS, and Platform Extensions (PCR 0) -- Option ROM Code (PCR 2) -- Master Boot Record (MBR) Code (PCR 4) -- NTFS Boot Sector (PCR 8) -- NTFS Boot Block (PCR 9) -- Boot Manager (PCR 10) -- BitLocker Access Control (PCR 11) - -> [!NOTE] -> Changing from the default platform validation profile affects the security and manageability of a computer. BitLocker's sensitivity to platform modifications (malicious or authorized) is increased or decreased depending on inclusion or exclusion (respectively) of the PCRs. - -The following list identifies all of the available PCRs: - -- PCR 0: Core root-of-trust for measurement, BIOS, and platform extensions -- PCR 1: Platform and motherboard configuration and data. -- PCR 2: Option ROM code -- PCR 3: Option ROM data and configuration -- PCR 4: Master Boot Record (MBR) code -- PCR 5: Master Boot Record (MBR) partition table -- PCR 6: State transition and wake events -- PCR 7: Computer manufacturer-specific -- PCR 8: NTFS boot sector -- PCR 9: NTFS boot block -- PCR 10: Boot manager -- PCR 11: BitLocker access control -- PCR 12-23: Reserved for future use - -### Configure TPM platform validation profile (Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2) - -This policy setting determines what values the TPM measures when it validates early boot components before unlocking a drive on a computer running Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, or Windows 7. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, it can be configured how the computer's TPM security hardware secures the BitLocker encryption key.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista| -|**Drive type**|Operating system drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Operating System Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|None| -|**When enabled**|The boot components that the TPM validates before unlocking access to the BitLocker-encrypted operating system drive can be configured. If any of these components change while BitLocker protection is in effect, the TPM doesn't release the encryption key to unlock the drive. Instead, the computer displays the BitLocker Recovery console and requires that the recovery password or the recovery key is provided to unlock the drive.| -|**When disabled or not configured**|The TPM uses the default platform validation profile or the platform validation profile that is specified by the setup script.| - -#### Reference: Configure TPM platform validation profile (Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2) - -This policy setting doesn't apply if the computer doesn't have a compatible TPM or if BitLocker is already turned on with TPM protection. - -A platform validation profile consists of a set of PCR indices that range from 0 to 23. The default platform validation profile secures the encryption key against changes to the following PCRs: - -- Core Root of Trust of Measurement (CRTM), BIOS, and Platform Extensions (PCR 0) -- Option ROM Code (PCR 2) -- Master Boot Record (MBR) Code (PCR 4) -- NTFS Boot Sector (PCR 8) -- NTFS Boot Block (PCR 9) -- Boot Manager (PCR 10) -- BitLocker Access Control (PCR 11) - -> [!NOTE] -> The default TPM validation profile PCR settings for computers that use an Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are the PCRs 0, 2, 4, and 11 only. - -The following list identifies all of the available PCRs: - -- PCR 0: Core root-of-trust for measurement, EFI boot and run-time services, EFI drivers embedded in system ROM, ACPI static tables, embedded SMM code, and BIOS code -- PCR 1: Platform and motherboard configuration and data. Hand-off tables and EFI variables that affect system configuration -- PCR 2: Option ROM code -- PCR 3: Option ROM data and configuration -- PCR 4: Master Boot Record (MBR) code or code from other boot devices -- PCR 5: Master Boot Record (MBR) partition table. Various EFI variables and the GPT table -- PCR 6: State transition and wake events -- PCR 7: Computer manufacturer-specific -- PCR 8: NTFS boot sector -- PCR 9: NTFS boot block -- PCR 10: Boot manager -- PCR 11: BitLocker access control -- PCR 12 - 23: Reserved for future use - -> [!WARNING] -> Changing from the default platform validation profile affects the security and manageability of a computer. BitLocker's sensitivity to platform modifications (malicious or authorized) is increased or decreased depending on inclusion or exclusion (respectively) of the PCRs. - -### Configure TPM platform validation profile for native UEFI firmware configurations - -This policy setting determines what values the TPM measures when it validates early boot components before unlocking an operating system drive on a computer with native UEFI firmware configurations. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, it can be configured how the computer's Trusted Platform Module (TPM) security hardware secures the BitLocker encryption key.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8| -|**Drive type**|Operating system drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Operating System Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|Setting this policy with PCR 7 omitted overrides the **Allow Secure Boot for integrity validation** Group Policy setting, and it prevents BitLocker from using Secure Boot for platform or Boot Configuration Data (BCD) integrity validation.

    If an environment uses TPM and Secure Boot for platform integrity checks, this policy is configured.

    For more information about PCR 7, see [About the Platform Configuration Register (PCR)](#about-the-platform-configuration-register-pcr) in this article.| -|**When enabled**|Before BitLocker is turned on, the boot components that the TPM validates before it unlocks access to the BitLocker-encrypted operating system drive can be configured. If any of these components change while BitLocker protection is in effect, the TPM doesn't release the encryption key to unlock the drive. Instead, the computer displays the BitLocker Recovery console and requires that the recovery password or the recovery key is provided to unlock the drive.| -|**When disabled or not configured**|BitLocker uses the default platform validation profile or the platform validation profile that is specified by the setup script.| - -#### Reference: Configure TPM platform validation profile for native UEFI firmware configurations - -This policy setting doesn't apply if the computer doesn't have a compatible TPM or if BitLocker is already turned on with TPM protection. - -> [!IMPORTANT] -> This group policy setting only applies to computers with a native UEFI firmware configuration. Computers with BIOS or UEFI firmware with a Compatibility Support Module (CSM) enabled store different values in the Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). Use the **Configure TPM platform validation profile for BIOS-based firmware configurations** Group Policy setting to configure the TPM PCR profile for computers with BIOS configurations or for computers with UEFI firmware with a CSM enabled. - -A platform validation profile consists of a set of PCR indices ranging from 0 to 23. The default platform validation profile secures the encryption key against changes to the core system firmware executable code (PCR 0), extended or pluggable executable code (PCR 2), boot manager (PCR 4), and the BitLocker access control (PCR 11). - -The following list identifies all of the available PCRs: - -- PCR 0: Core System Firmware executable code -- PCR 1: Core System Firmware data -- PCR 2: Extended or pluggable executable code -- PCR 3: Extended or pluggable firmware data -- PCR 4: Boot Manager -- PCR 5: GPT/Partition Table -- PCR 6: Resume from S4 and S5 Power State Events -- PCR 7: Secure Boot State - - For more information about this PCR, see [About the Platform Configuration Register (PCR)](#about-the-platform-configuration-register-pcr) in this article. - -- PCR 8: Initialized to 0 with no Extends (reserved for future use) -- PCR 9: Initialized to 0 with no Extends (reserved for future use) -- PCR 10: Initialized to 0 with no Extends (reserved for future use) -- PCR 11: BitLocker access control -- PCR 12: Data events and highly volatile events -- PCR 13: Boot Module Details -- PCR 14: Boot Authorities -- PCR 15 - 23: Reserved for future use - -> [!WARNING] -> Changing from the default platform validation profile affects the security and manageability of a computer. BitLocker's sensitivity to platform modifications (malicious or authorized) is increased or decreased depending on inclusion or exclusion (respectively) of the PCRs. - -### Reset platform validation data after BitLocker recovery - -This policy setting determines if platform validation data should refresh when Windows is started following a BitLocker recovery. A platform validation data profile consists of the values in a set of Platform Configuration Register (PCR) indices that range from 0 to 23. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, it can be controlled whether platform validation data is refreshed when Windows is started following a BitLocker recovery.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8| -|**Drive type**|Operating system drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Operating System Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|None| -|**When enabled**|Platform validation data is refreshed when Windows is started following a BitLocker recovery.| -|**When disabled**|Platform validation data isn't refreshed when Windows is started following a BitLocker recovery.| -|**When not configured**|Platform validation data is refreshed when Windows is started following a BitLocker recovery.| - -#### Reference: Reset platform validation data after BitLocker recovery - -For more information about the recovery process, see the [BitLocker recovery guide](bitlocker-recovery-guide-plan.md). - -### Use enhanced Boot Configuration Data validation profile - -This policy setting determines specific Boot Configuration Data (BCD) settings to verify during platform validation. A platform validation uses the data in the platform validation profile, which consists of a set of Platform Configuration Register (PCR) indices that range from 0 to 23. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, Boot Configuration Data (BCD) settings to verify during platform validation can be specified.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8| -|**Drive type**|Operating system drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Operating System Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|When BitLocker is using Secure Boot for platform and Boot Configuration Data integrity validation, the **Use enhanced Boot Configuration Data validation profile** Group Policy setting is ignored (as defined by the **Allow Secure Boot for integrity validation** Group Policy setting).| -|**When enabled**|Additional BCD settings can be added and specified BCD settings can be excluded. Also a customized BCD validation profile can be created by combining inclusion and exclusion lists. The customized BCD validation profile gives the ability to verify BCD settings.| -|**When disabled**|The computer reverts to a BCD profile validation similar to the default BCD profile that is used by Windows 7.| -|**When not configured**|The computer verifies the default BCD settings in Windows.| - -#### Reference: Use enhanced Boot Configuration Data validation profile - -> [!NOTE] -> The setting that controls boot debugging (0x16000010) is always validated, and it has no effect if it's included in the inclusion or the exclusion list. - -### Allow access to BitLocker-protected fixed data drives from earlier versions of Windows - -This policy setting is used to control whether access to drives is allowed by using the BitLocker To Go Reader, and whether BitLocker To Go Reader can be installed on the drive. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, it can be configured whether fixed data drives that are formatted with the FAT file system can be unlocked and viewed on computers running Windows Vista, Windows XP with Service Pack 3 (SP3), or Windows XP with Service Pack 2 (SP2).| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7| -|**Drive type**|Fixed data drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Fixed Data Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|None| -|**When enabled and When not configured**|Fixed data drives that are formatted with the FAT file system can be unlocked on computers running Windows Server 2008, Windows Vista, Windows XP with SP3, or Windows XP with SP2, and their content can be viewed. These operating systems have Read-only access to BitLocker-protected drives.| -|**When disabled**|Fixed data drives that are formatted with the FAT file system and are BitLocker-protected can't be unlocked on computers running Windows Vista, Windows XP with SP3, or Windows XP with SP2. BitLocker To Go Reader (bitlockertogo.exe) isn't installed.| - -#### Reference: Allow access to BitLocker-protected fixed data drives from earlier versions of Windows - -> [!NOTE] -> This policy setting doesn't apply to drives that are formatted with the NTFS file system. - -When this policy setting is enabled, select the **Do not install BitLocker To Go Reader on FAT formatted fixed drives** check box to help prevent users from running BitLocker To Go Reader from their fixed drives. If BitLocker To Go Reader (bitlockertogo.exe) is present on a drive that doesn't have an identification field specified, or if the drive has the same identification field as specified in the **Provide unique identifiers for your organization** policy setting, the user is prompted to update BitLocker, and BitLocker To Go Reader is deleted from the drive. In this situation, for the fixed drive to be unlocked on computers running Windows Vista, Windows XP with SP3, or Windows XP with SP2, BitLocker To Go Reader must be installed on the computer. If this check box isn't selected, then BitLocker To Go Reader will be installed on the fixed drive to enable users to unlock the drive on computers running Windows Vista, Windows XP with SP3, or Windows XP with SP2. - -### Allow access to BitLocker-protected removable data drives from earlier versions of Windows - -This policy setting controls access to removable data drives that are using the BitLocker To Go Reader and whether the BitLocker To Go Reader can be installed on the drive. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|With this policy setting, it can be configured whether removable data drives that are formatted with the FAT file system can be unlocked and viewed on computers running Windows Vista, Windows XP with SP3, or Windows XP with SP2.| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7| -|**Drive type**|Removable data drives| -|**Policy path**|*Computer Configuration* > *Administrative Templates* > *Windows Components* > *BitLocker Drive Encryption* > *Removable Data Drives*| -|**Conflicts**|None| -|**When enabled and When not configured**|Removable data drives that are formatted with the FAT file system can be unlocked on computers running Windows Vista, Windows XP with SP3, or Windows XP with SP2, and their content can be viewed. These operating systems have Read-only access to BitLocker-protected drives.| -|**When disabled**|Removable data drives that are formatted with the FAT file system that are BitLocker-protected can't be unlocked on computers running Windows Vista, Windows XP with SP3, or Windows XP with SP2. BitLocker To Go Reader (bitlockertogo.exe) isn't installed.| - -#### Reference: Allow access to BitLocker-protected removable data drives from earlier versions of Windows - -> [!NOTE] -> This policy setting doesn't apply to drives that are formatted with the NTFS file system. - -When this policy setting is enabled, select the **Do not install BitLocker To Go Reader on FAT formatted removable drives** check box to help prevent users from running BitLocker To Go Reader from their removable drives. If BitLocker To Go Reader (bitlockertogo.exe) is present on a drive that doesn't have an identification field specified, or if the drive has the same identification field as specified in the **Provide unique identifiers for your organization** policy setting, the user will be prompted to update BitLocker, and BitLocker To Go Reader is deleted from the drive. In this situation, for the removable drive to be unlocked on computers running Windows Vista, Windows XP with SP3, or Windows XP with SP2, BitLocker To Go Reader must be installed on the computer. If this check box isn't selected, then BitLocker To Go Reader will be installed on the removable drive to enable users to unlock the drive on computers running Windows Vista or Windows XP that don't have BitLocker To Go Reader installed. - -## FIPS setting - -The Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) setting for FIPS compliance can be configured. As an effect of FIPS compliance, users can't create or save a BitLocker password for recovery or as a key protector. The use of a recovery key is permitted. - -| Item | Info | -|:---|:---| -|**Policy description**|Notes| -|**Introduced**|Windows Server 2003 with SP1| -|**Drive type**|System-wide| -|**Policy path**|*Local Policies* > *Security Options* > *System cryptography*: **Use FIPS compliant algorithms for encryption, hashing, and signing**| -|**Conflicts**|Some applications, such as Terminal Services, don't support FIPS-140 on all operating systems.| -|**When enabled**|Users will be unable to save a recovery password to any location. This policy setting includes AD DS and network folders. Also, WMI or the BitLocker Drive Encryption Setup wizard can't be used to create a recovery password.| -|**When disabled or not configured**|No BitLocker encryption key is generated| - -### Reference: FIPS setting - -This policy must be enabled before any encryption key is generated for BitLocker. When this policy is enabled, BitLocker prevents creating or using recovery passwords, so recovery keys should be used instead. - -The optional recovery key can be saved to a USB drive. Because recovery passwords can't be saved to AD DS when FIPS is enabled, an error is caused if AD DS backup is required by Group Policy. - -The FIPS setting can be edited by using the Security Policy Editor (`Secpol.msc`) or by editing the Windows registry. Only administrators can perform these procedures. - -For more information about setting this policy, see [System cryptography: Use FIPS compliant algorithms for encryption, hashing, and signing](../../../threat-protection/security-policy-settings/system-cryptography-use-fips-compliant-algorithms-for-encryption-hashing-and-signing.md). - -## Power management group policy settings: Sleep and Hibernate - -PCs default power settings for a computer will cause the computer to enter Sleep mode frequently to conserve power when idle and to help extend the system's battery life. When a computer transitions to Sleep, open programs and documents are persisted in memory. When a computer resumes from Sleep, users aren't required to reauthenticate with a PIN or USB startup key to access encrypted data. Not needing to reauthenticate when resuming from Sleep might lead to conditions where data security is compromised. - -However, when a computer hibernates the drive is locked, and when it resumes from hibernation the drive is unlocked, which means that users will need to provide a PIN or a startup key if using multifactor authentication with BitLocker. Therefore, organizations that use BitLocker may want to use Hibernate instead of Sleep for improved security. This setting doesn't have an impact on TPM-only mode, because it provides a transparent user experience at startup and when resuming from the Hibernate states. - -To disable all available sleep states, disable the Group Policy settings located in **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **System** > **Power Management** : - -- **Allow Standby States (S1-S3) When Sleeping (Plugged In)** -- **Allow Standby States (S1-S3) When Sleeping (Battery)** - -## About the Platform Configuration Register (PCR) - -A platform validation profile consists of a set of PCR indices that range from 0 to 23. The scope of the values can be specific to the version of the operating system. - -Changing from the default platform validation profile affects the security and manageability of a computer. BitLocker's sensitivity to platform modifications (malicious or authorized) is increased or decreased depending on inclusion or exclusion (respectively) of the PCRs. - -### About PCR 7 - -PCR 7 measures the state of Secure Boot. With PCR 7, BitLocker can use Secure Boot for integrity validation. Secure Boot ensures that the computer's preboot environment loads only firmware that is digitally signed by authorized software publishers. PCR 7 measurements indicate whether Secure Boot is on and which keys are trusted on the platform. If Secure Boot is on and the firmware measures PCR 7 correctly per the UEFI specification, BitLocker can bind to this information rather than to PCRs 0, 2, and 4, which have the measurements of the exact firmware and Bootmgr images loaded. This process reduces the likelihood of BitLocker starting in recovery mode as a result of firmware and image updates, and it provides with greater flexibility to manage the preboot configuration. - -PCR 7 measurements must follow the guidance that is described in [Appendix A Trusted Execution Environment EFI Protocol](/windows-hardware/test/hlk/testref/trusted-execution-environment-efi-protocol). - -PCR 7 measurements are a mandatory logo requirement for systems that support Modern Standby (also known as Always On, Always Connected PCs), such as the Microsoft Surface RT. On such systems, if the TPM with PCR 7 measurement and secure boot are correctly configured, BitLocker binds to PCR 7 and PCR 11 by default. - -## Related articles - -- [Trusted Platform Module](/windows/device-security/tpm/trusted-platform-module-overview) -- [TPM Group Policy settings](/windows/device-security/tpm/trusted-platform-module-services-group-policy-settings) -- [BitLocker frequently asked questions (FAQ)](faq.yml) -- [BitLocker overview](index.md) -- [Prepare your organization for BitLocker: Planning and policies](prepare-your-organization-for-bitlocker-planning-and-policies.md) diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-how-to-deploy-on-windows-server.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-how-to-deploy-on-windows-server.md deleted file mode 100644 index 1c64084bcd..0000000000 --- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-how-to-deploy-on-windows-server.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,102 +0,0 @@ ---- -title: BitLocker How to deploy on Windows Server -description: This article for the IT professional explains how to deploy BitLocker and Windows Server -ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 11/08/2022 ---- - -# BitLocker: How to deploy on Windows Server - -This article explains how to deploy BitLocker on Windows Server. For all Windows Server editions, BitLocker can be installed using Server Manager or Windows PowerShell cmdlets. BitLocker requires administrator privileges on the server on which it's to be installed. - -## Installing BitLocker - -### To install BitLocker using server manager - -1. Open server manager by selecting the server manager icon or running `servermanager.exe`. -1. Select **Manage** from the **Server Manager Navigation** bar and select **Add Roles and Features** to start the **Add Roles and Features Wizard.** -1. With the **Add Roles and Features** wizard open, select **Next** at the **Before you begin** pane (if shown). -1. Select **Role-based or feature-based installation** on the **Installation type** pane of the **Add Roles and Features** wizard and select **Next** to continue. -1. Select the **Select a server from the server pool** option in the **Server Selection** pane and confirm the server on which the BitLocker feature is to be installed. -1. Select **Next** on the **Server Roles** pane of the **Add Roles and Features** wizard to proceed to the **Features** pane. - > [!NOTE] - > Server roles and features are installed by using the same wizard in Server Manager. -1. Select the check box next to **BitLocker Drive Encryption** within the **Features** pane of the **Add Roles and Features** wizard. The wizard shows the extra management features available for BitLocker. If the extra management features aren't needed and/or don't need to be installed, deselect the **Include management tools**. - > [!NOTE] - > The **Enhanced Storage** feature is a required feature for enabling BitLocker. This feature enables support for encrypted hard drives on capable systems. -1. Select **Add Features**. Once optional features selection is complete, select **Next** to proceed in the wizard. -1. Select **Install** on the **Confirmation** pane of the **Add Roles and Features** wizard to begin BitLocker feature installation. The BitLocker feature requires a restart for its installation to be complete. Selecting the **Restart the destination server automatically if required** option in the **Confirmation** pane forces a restart of the computer after installation is complete. -1. If the **Restart the destination server automatically if required** check box isn't selected, the **Results** pane of the **Add Roles and Features** wizard displays the success or failure of the BitLocker feature installation. If necessary, a notification of other action necessary to complete the feature installation, such as the restart of the computer, will be displayed in the results text. - -### To install BitLocker using Windows PowerShell - -Windows PowerShell offers administrators another option for BitLocker feature installation. Windows PowerShell installs features using the `servermanager` or `dism.exe` module. However, the `servermanager` and `dism.exe` modules don't always share feature name parity. Because of this mismatch of feature name parity, it's advisable to confirm the feature or role name prior to installation. - -> [!NOTE] -> The server must be restarted to complete the installation of BitLocker. - -### Using the servermanager module to install BitLocker - -The `servermanager` Windows PowerShell module can use either the `Install-WindowsFeature` or `Add-WindowsFeature` to install the BitLocker feature. The `Add-WindowsFeature` cmdlet is merely a stub to the `Install-WindowsFeature`. This example uses the `Install-WindowsFeature` cmdlet. The feature name for BitLocker in the `servermanager` module is `BitLocker`. - -By default, installation of features in Windows PowerShell doesn't include optional subfeatures or management tools as part of the installation process. What is installed as part of the installation process can be seen using the `-WhatIf` option in Windows PowerShell. - -```powershell -Install-WindowsFeature BitLocker -WhatIf -``` - -The results of this command show that only the BitLocker Drive Encryption feature is installed using this command. - -To see what would be installed with the BitLocker feature, including all available management tools and subfeatures, use the following command: - -```powershell -Install-WindowsFeature BitLocker -IncludeAllSubFeature -IncludeManagementTools -WhatIf | fl -``` - -The result of this command displays the following list of all the administration tools for BitLocker, which would be installed along with the feature, including tools for use with Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) and Active Directory Lightweight Directory Services (AD LDS). - -- BitLocker Drive Encryption -- BitLocker Drive Encryption Tools -- BitLocker Drive Encryption Administration Utilities -- BitLocker Recovery Password Viewer -- AD DS Snap-Ins and Command-Line Tools -- AD DS Tools -- AD DS and AD LDS Tools - -The command to complete a full installation of the BitLocker feature with all available subfeatures and then to reboot the server at completion is: - -```powershell -Install-WindowsFeature BitLocker -IncludeAllSubFeature -IncludeManagementTools -Restart -``` - -> [!IMPORTANT] -> Installing the BitLocker feature using Windows PowerShell does not install the Enhanced Storage feature. Administrators wishing to support Encrypted Hard Drives in their environment will need to install the Enhanced Storage feature separately. - -### Using the dism module to install BitLocker - -The `dism.exe` Windows PowerShell module uses the `Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature` cmdlet to install features. The BitLocker feature name for BitLocker is `BitLocker`. The `dism.exe` module doesn't support wildcards when searching for feature names. To list feature names for the `dism.exe` module, use the `Get-WindowsOptionalFeatures` cmdlet. The following command lists all of the optional features in an online (running) operating system. - -```powershell -Get-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online | ft -``` - -From this output, there are three BitLocker-related optional feature names: **BitLocker**, **BitLocker-Utilities** and **BitLocker-NetworkUnlock**. To install the BitLocker feature, the **BitLocker** and **BitLocker-Utilities** features are the only required items. - -To install BitLocker using the `dism.exe` module, use the following command: - -```powershell -Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName BitLocker -All -``` - -This command prompts the user for a reboot. The Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature cmdlet doesn't offer support for forcing a reboot of the computer. This command doesn't include installation of the management tools for BitLocker. For a complete installation of BitLocker and all available management tools, use the following command: - -```powershell -Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName BitLocker, BitLocker-Utilities -All -``` - -## Related articles - -- [BitLocker overview](index.md) -- [BitLocker frequently asked questions (FAQ)](faq.yml) -- [Prepare your organization for BitLocker: Planning and policies](prepare-your-organization-for-bitlocker-planning-and-policies.md) -- [BitLocker: How to enable Network Unlock](bitlocker-how-to-enable-network-unlock.md) diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-how-to-enable-network-unlock.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-how-to-enable-network-unlock.md deleted file mode 100644 index 11f7b07e86..0000000000 --- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-how-to-enable-network-unlock.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,453 +0,0 @@ ---- -title: BitLocker - How to enable Network Unlock -description: This article for the IT professional describes how BitLocker Network Unlock works and how to configure it. -ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 11/08/2022 ---- - -# BitLocker: How to enable Network Unlock - -This article describes how BitLocker Network Unlock works and how to configure it. - -Network Unlock is a BitLocker protector option for operating system volumes. Network Unlock enables easier management for BitLocker-enabled desktops and servers in a domain environment by providing automatic unlock of operating system volumes at system reboot when connected to a wired corporate network. This feature requires the client hardware to have a DHCP driver implemented in its UEFI firmware. Without Network Unlock, operating system volumes protected by TPM+PIN protectors require a PIN to be entered when a computer reboots or resumes from hibernation (for example, by Wake on LAN). Requiring a PIN after a reboot can make it difficult to enterprises to roll out software patches to unattended desktops and remotely administered servers. - -Network Unlock allows BitLocker-enabled systems that have a TPM+PIN and that meet the hardware requirements to boot into Windows without user intervention. Network Unlock works in a similar fashion to the TPM+StartupKey at boot. Rather than needing to read the StartupKey from USB media, however, the Network Unlock feature needs the key to be composed from a key stored in the TPM and an encrypted network key that is sent to the server, decrypted and returned to the client in a secure session. - -## Network Unlock core requirements - -Network Unlock must meet mandatory hardware and software requirements before the feature can automatically unlock domain-joined systems. These requirements include: - -- Currently supported Windows operating system -- Any supported operating system with UEFI DHCP drivers that can serve as Network Unlock clients -- Network Unlock clients with a TPM chip and at least one TPM protector -- A server running the Windows Deployment Services (WDS) role on any supported server operating system -- BitLocker Network Unlock optional feature installed on any supported server operating system -- A DHCP server, separate from the WDS server -- Properly configured public/private key pairing -- Network Unlock group policy settings configured -- Network stack enabled in the UEFI firmware of client devices - -> [!NOTE] -> To properly support DHCP within UEFI, the UEFI-based system should be in native mode and shouldn't have a compatibility support module (CSM) enabled. - -For Network Unlock to work reliably on computers, the first network adapter on the computer, usually the onboard adapter, must be configured to support DHCP. This first network adapter must be used for Network Unlock. This configuration is especially worth noting when the device has multiple adapters, and some adapters are configured without DHCP, such as for use with a lights-out management protocol. This configuration is necessary because Network Unlock stops enumerating adapters when it reaches one with a DHCP port failure for any reason. Thus, if the first enumerated adapter doesn't support DHCP, isn't plugged into the network, or fails to report availability of the DHCP port for any reason, then Network Unlock fails. - -The Network Unlock server component is installed on supported versions of Windows Server 2012 and later as a Windows feature that uses Server Manager or Windows PowerShell cmdlets. The feature name is BitLocker Network Unlock in Server Manager and BitLocker-NetworkUnlock in Windows PowerShell. This feature is a core requirement. - -Network Unlock requires Windows Deployment Services (WDS) in the environment where the feature will be utilized. Configuration of the WDS installation isn't required. However, the WDS service must be running on the server. - -The network key is stored on the system drive along with an AES 256 session key and encrypted with the 2048-bit RSA public key of the Unlock server certificate. The network key is decrypted with the help of a provider on a supported version of Windows Server running WDS, and returned encrypted with its corresponding session key. - -## Network Unlock sequence - -The unlock sequence starts on the client side when the Windows boot manager detects the existence of Network Unlock protector. It uses the DHCP driver in UEFI to obtain an IP address for IPv4 and then broadcasts a vendor-specific DHCP request that contains the network key and a session key for the reply, all encrypted by the server's Network Unlock certificate, as described above. The Network Unlock provider on the supported WDS server recognizes the vendor-specific request, decrypts it with the RSA private key, and returns the network key encrypted with the session key via its own vendor-specific DHCP reply. - -On the server side, the WDS server role has an optional plugin component, like a PXE provider, which is what handles the incoming Network Unlock requests. The provider can also be configured with subnet restrictions, which would require that the IP address provided by the client in the Network Unlock request belong to a permitted subnet to release the network key to the client. In instances where the Network Unlock provider is unavailable, BitLocker fails over to the next available protector to unlock the drive. In a typical configuration, the standard TPM+PIN unlock screen is presented to unlock the drive. - -The server side configuration to enable Network Unlock also requires provisioning a 2048-bit RSA public/private key pair in the form of an X.509 certificate, and distributing the public key certificate to the clients. This certificate must be managed and deployed through the Group Policy editor directly on a domain controller with at least a Domain Functional Level of Windows Server 2012. This certificate is the public key that encrypts the intermediate network key (which is one of the two secrets required to unlock the drive; the other secret is stored in the TPM). - -Manage and deploy this certificate through the Group Policy editor directly on a domain controller that has a domain functional level of at least Windows Server 2012. This certificate is the public key that encrypts the intermediate network key. The intermediate network key is one of the two secrets that are required to unlock the drive; the other secret is stored in the TPM. - -![Diagram showing the BitLocker Network Unlock sequence.](images/bitlockernetworkunlocksequence.png) - -The Network Unlock process follows these phases: - -1. The Windows boot manager detects a Network Unlock protector in the BitLocker configuration. - -2. The client computer uses its DHCP driver in the UEFI to get a valid IPv4 IP address. - -3. The client computer broadcasts a vendor-specific DHCP request that contains: - - 1. A network key (a 256-bit intermediate key) that is encrypted by using the 2048-bit RSA Public Key of the Network Unlock certificate from the WDS server. - - 2. An AES-256 session key for the reply. - -4. The Network Unlock provider on the WDS server recognizes the vendor-specific request. - -5. The provider decrypts the request by using the WDS server's BitLocker Network Unlock certificate RSA private key. - -6. The WDS provider returns the network key encrypted with the session key by using its own vendor-specific DHCP reply to the client computer. This key is an intermediate key. - -7. The returned intermediate key is combined with another local 256-bit intermediate key. This key can be decrypted only by the TPM. - -8. This combined key is used to create an AES-256 key that unlocks the volume. - -9. Windows continues the boot sequence. - -## Configure Network Unlock - -The following steps allow an administrator to configure Network Unlock in a domain where the Domain Functional Level is at least Windows Server 2012. - -### Install the WDS server role - -The BitLocker Network Unlock feature installs the WDS role if it isn't already installed. WDS can be installed separately before BitLocker Network Unlock is installed by using **Server Manager** or **Windows PowerShell**. To install the role using Server Manager, select the **Windows Deployment Services** role in **Server Manager**. - -To install the role by using Windows PowerShell, use the following command: - -```powershell -Install-WindowsFeature WDS-Deployment -``` - -The WDS server must be configured so that it can communicate with DHCP (and optionally AD DS) and the client computer. The WDS server can be configured using the WDS management tool, `wdsmgmt.msc`, which starts the Windows Deployment Services Configuration wizard. - -### Confirm the WDS service is running - -To confirm that the WDS service is running, use the Services Management Console or Windows PowerShell. To confirm that the service is running in Services Management Console, open the console using `services.msc` and check the status of the Windows Deployment Services service. - -To confirm that the service is running using Windows PowerShell, use the following command: - -```powershell -Get-Service WDSServer -``` - -### Install the Network Unlock feature - -To install the Network Unlock feature, use Server Manager or Windows PowerShell. To install the feature using Server Manager, select the **BitLocker Network Unlock** feature in the Server Manager console. - -To install the feature by using Windows PowerShell, use the following command: - -```powershell -Install-WindowsFeature BitLocker-NetworkUnlock -``` - -### Create the certificate template for Network Unlock - -A properly configured Active Directory Services Certification Authority can use this certificate template to create and issue Network Unlock certificates. - -1. Open the Certificates Template snap-in (`certtmpl.msc`). - -2. Locate the User template, right-click the template name and select **Duplicate Template**. - -3. On the **Compatibility** tab, change the **Certification Authority** and **Certificate recipient** fields to Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8, respectively. Ensure that the **Show resulting changes** dialog box is selected. - -4. Select the **General** tab of the template. The **Template display name** and **Template name** should clearly identify that the template will be used for Network Unlock. Clear the check box for the **Publish certificate in Active Directory** option. - -5. Select the **Request Handling** tab. Select **Encryption** from the **Purpose** drop-down menu. Ensure that the **Allow private key to be exported** option is selected. - -6. Select the **Cryptography** tab. Set the **Minimum key size** to 2048. Any Microsoft cryptographic provider that supports RSA can be used for this template, but for simplicity and forward compatibility, it is recommended to use **Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider**. - -7. Select the **Requests must use one of the following providers** option and clear all options except for the cryptography provider selected, such as **Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider**. - -8. Select the **Subject Name** tab. Select **Supply in the request**. Select **OK** if the certificate templates pop-up dialog appears. - -9. Select the **Issuance Requirements** tab. Select both **CA certificate manager approval** and **Valid existing certificate** options. - -10. Select the **Extensions** tab. Select **Application Policies** and choose **Edit…**. - -11. In the **Edit Application Policies Extension** options dialog box, select **Client Authentication**, **Encrypting File System**, **and Secure Email** and choose **Remove**. - -12. On the **Edit Application Policies Extension** dialog box, select **Add**. - -13. On the **Add Application Policy** dialog box, select **New**. In the **New Application Policy** dialog box, enter the following information in the space provided and then select **OK** to create the BitLocker Network Unlock application policy: - - - *Name:* **BitLocker Network Unlock** - - *Object Identifier:* **1.3.6.1.4.1.311.67.1.1** - -14. Select the newly created **BitLocker Network Unlock** application policy and select **OK**. - -15. With the **Extensions** tab still open, select the **Edit Key Usage Extension** dialog. Select the **Allow key exchange only with key encryption (key encipherment)** option. Select the **Make this extension critical** option. - -16. Select the **Security** tab. Confirm that the **Domain Admins** group has been granted **Enroll** permission. - -17. Select **OK** to complete configuration of the template. - -To add the Network Unlock template to the certificate authority, open the certificate authority snap-in (`certsrv.msc`). Right-click **Certificate Templates**, and then choose **New, Certificate Template to issue**. Select the previously created BitLocker Network Unlock certificate. - -After the Network Unlock template is added to the certificate authority, this certificate can be used to configure BitLocker Network Unlock. - -### Create the Network Unlock certificate - -Network Unlock can use imported certificates from an existing public key infrastructure (PKI). Or it can use a self-signed certificate. - -To enroll a certificate from an existing certificate authority: - -1. On the WDS server, open Certificate Manager by using `certmgr.msc`. - -2. Under **Certificates - Current User**, right-click **Personal**. - -3. Select **All Tasks** > **Request New Certificate**. - -4. When the Certificate Enrollment wizard opens, select **Next**. - -5. Select **Active Directory Enrollment Policy**. - -6. Choose the certificate template that was created for Network Unlock on the domain controller. Then select **Enroll**. - -7. When prompted for more information, select **Subject Name** and provide a friendly name value. The friendly name should include information for the domain or organizational unit for the certificate. For example: - - *BitLocker Network Unlock Certificate for Contoso domain* - -8. Create the certificate. Ensure the certificate appears in the **Personal** folder. - -9. Export the public key certificate for Network Unlock: - - 1. Create a `.cer` file by right-clicking the previously created certificate, selecting **All Tasks**, and then selecting **Export**. - - 2. Select **No, do not export the private key**. - - 3. Select **DER encoded binary X.509** and complete exporting the certificate to a file. - - 4. Give the file a name such as BitLocker-NetworkUnlock.cer. - -10. Export the public key with a private key for Network Unlock. - - 1. Create a `.pfx` file by right-clicking the previously created certificate, selecting **All Tasks**, and then selecting **Export**. - - 2. Select **Yes, export the private key**. - - 3. Complete the steps to create the `.pfx` file. - -To create a self-signed certificate, either use the `New-SelfSignedCertificate` cmdlet in Windows PowerShell or use `certreq.exe`. For example: - -**Windows PowerShell:** - -```powershell -New-SelfSignedCertificate -CertStoreLocation Cert:\LocalMachine\My -Subject "CN=BitLocker Network Unlock certificate" -Provider "Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider" -KeyUsage KeyEncipherment -KeyUsageProperty Decrypt,Sign -KeyLength 2048 -HashAlgorithm sha512 -TextExtension @("1.3.6.1.4.1.311.21.10={text}OID=1.3.6.1.4.1.311.67.1.1","2.5.29.37={text}1.3.6.1.4.1.311.67.1.1") -``` - -**certreq.exe:** - -1. Create a text file with an `.inf` extension, for example: - - ```cmd - notepad.exe BitLocker-NetworkUnlock.inf - ``` - -2. Add the following contents to the previously created file: - - ```ini - [NewRequest] - Subject="CN=BitLocker Network Unlock certificate" - ProviderType=0 - MachineKeySet=True - Exportable=true - RequestType=Cert - KeyUsage="CERT_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT_KEY_USAGE" - KeyUsageProperty="NCRYPT_ALLOW_DECRYPT_FLAG | NCRYPT_ALLOW_SIGNING_FLAG" - KeyLength=2048 - SMIME=FALSE - HashAlgorithm=sha512 - [Extensions] - 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.21.10 = "{text}" - _continue_ = "OID=1.3.6.1.4.1.311.67.1.1" - 2.5.29.37 = "{text}" - _continue_ = "1.3.6.1.4.1.311.67.1.1" - ``` - -3. Open an elevated command prompt and use the `certreq.exe` tool to create a new certificate. Use the following command, specifying the full path to the file that was created previously along with the file name: - - ```cmd - certreq.exe -new BitLocker-NetworkUnlock.inf BitLocker-NetworkUnlock.cer - ``` - -4. Verify that certificate was properly created by the previous command by confirming that the `.cer` file exists. - -5. Launch the **Certificates - Local Computer** console by running `certlm.msc`. - -6. Create a `.pfx` file by following the below steps the **Certificates - Local Computer** console: - - 1. Navigate to **Certificates - Local Computer** > **Personal** > **Certificates** - - 2. Right-click the previously imported certificate, select **All Tasks**, and then select **Export** - - 3. Follow through the wizard to create the `.pfx` file. - -### Deploy the private key and certificate to the WDS server - -After creating the certificate and key, deploy them to the infrastructure to properly unlock systems. To deploy the certificates: - -1. On the WDS server, launch the **Certificates - Local Computer** console by running `certlm.msc`. - -2. Right-click **BitLocker Drive Encryption Network Unlock** item under **Certificates (Local Computer)**, select **All Tasks**, and then select **Import**. - -3. In the **File to Import** dialog, choose the `.pfx` file created previously. - -4. Enter the password used to create the `.pfx` and complete the wizard. - -### Configure group policy settings for Network Unlock - -With certificate and key deployed to the WDS server for Network Unlock, the final step is to use group policy settings to deploy the public key certificate to the desired computers that will use the Network Unlock key to unlock. Group policy settings for BitLocker can be found under **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** using the Local Group Policy Editor or the Microsoft Management Console. - -The following steps describe how to enable the group policy setting that is a requirement for configuring Network Unlock. - -1. Open Group Policy Management Console (`gpmc.msc`). -2. Enable the policy **Require additional authentication at startup**, and then select **Require startup PIN with TPM** or **Allow startup PIN with TPM**. -3. Turn on BitLocker with TPM+PIN protectors on all domain-joined computers. - -The following steps describe how to deploy the required group policy setting: - -> [!NOTE] -> The group policy settings **Allow Network Unlock at startup** and **Add Network Unlock Certificate** were introduced in Windows Server 2012. - -1. Copy the `.cer` file that was created for Network Unlock to the domain controller. - -2. On the domain controller, open Group Policy Management Console (`gpmc.msc`). - -3. Create a new Group Policy Object or modify an existing object to enable the **Allow Network Unlock at startup** setting. - -4. Deploy the public certificate to clients: - - 1. Within group policy management console, navigate to the following location: - - **Computer Configuration** > **Policies** > **Windows Settings** > **Security Settings** > **Public Key Policies** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption Network Unlock Certificate**. - - 2. Right-click the folder and select **Add Network Unlock Certificate**. - - 3. Follow the wizard steps and import the `.cer` file that was copied earlier. - - > [!NOTE] - > Only one Network Unlock certificate can be available at a time. If a new certificate is needed, delete the current certificate before deploying a new one. The Network Unlock certificate is located under the **`HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\FVE_NKP`** registry key on the client computer. - -5. Reboot the clients after the Group Policy is deployed. - - > [!NOTE] - > The **Network (Certificate Based)** protector will be added only after a reboot, with the policy enabled and a valid certificate present in the FVE_NKP store. - -### Subnet policy configuration files on the WDS server (optional) - -By default, all clients with the correct Network Unlock certificate and valid Network Unlock protectors that have wired access to a Network Unlock-enabled WDS server via DHCP are unlocked by the server. A subnet policy configuration file on the WDS server can be created to limit which are the subnet(s) the Network Unlock clients can use to unlock. - -The configuration file, called bde-network-unlock.ini, must be located in the same directory as the Network Unlock provider DLL (`%windir%\System32\Nkpprov.dll`) and it applies to both IPv6 and IPv4 DHCP implementations. If the subnet configuration policy becomes corrupted, the provider fails and stops responding to requests. - -The subnet policy configuration file must use a **\[SUBNETS\]** section to identify the specific subnets. The named subnets may then be used to specify restrictions in certificate subsections. Subnets are defined as simple name-value pairs, in the common INI format, where each subnet has its own line, with the name on the left of the equal-sign, and the subnet identified on the right of the equal-sign as a Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) address or range. The key word **ENABLED** is disallowed for subnet names. - -```ini -[SUBNETS] -SUBNET1=10.185.250.0/24 ; a comment about this subrange could be here, after the semicolon -SUBNET2=10.185.252.200/28 -SUBNET3= 2001:4898:a:2::/64 ; an IPv6 subnet -SUBNET4=2001:4898:a:3::/64; in production, the admin would likely give more useful names, like BUILDING9-EXCEPT-RECEP. -``` - -Following the **\[SUBNETS\]** section, there can be sections for each Network Unlock certificate, identified by the certificate thumbprint formatted without any spaces, which define the subnets clients that can be unlocked from that certificate. - -> [!NOTE] -> When specifying the certificate thumbprint, do not include any spaces. If spaces are included in the thumbprint, the subnet configuration fails because the thumbprint will not be recognized as valid. - -Subnet restrictions are defined within each certificate section by denoting the allowed list of permitted subnets. If any subnets are listed in a certificate section, then only those subnets are permitted for that certificate. If no subnet is listed in a certificate section, then all subnets are permitted for that certificate. If a certificate doesn't have a section in the subnet policy configuration file, then no subnet restrictions are applied for unlocking with that certificate. For restrictions to apply to every certificate, there must be a certificate section for every Network Unlock certificate on the server, and an explicit allowed list set for each certificate section. - -Subnet lists are created by putting the name of a subnet from the **\[SUBNETS\]** section on its own line below the certificate section header. Then, the server will only unlock clients with this certificate on the subnet(s) specified as in the list. For troubleshooting, a subnet can be quickly excluded without deleting it from the section by commenting it out with a prepended semi-colon. - -```ini -[2158a767e1c14e88e27a4c0aee111d2de2eafe60] -;Comments could be added here to indicate when the cert was issued, which Group Policy should get it, and so on. -;This list shows this cert is allowed to unlock clients only on the SUBNET1 and SUBNET3 subnets. In this example, SUBNET2 is commented out. -SUBNET1 -;SUBNET2 -SUBNET3 -``` - -To disallow the use of a certificate altogether, add a `DISABLED` line to its subnet list. - -## Turn off Network Unlock - -To turn off the unlock server, the PXE provider can be unregistered from the WDS server or uninstalled altogether. However, to stop clients from creating Network Unlock protectors, the **Allow Network Unlock at startup** group policy setting should be disabled. When this policy setting is updated to **disabled** on client computers, any Network Unlock key protector on the computer is deleted. Alternatively, the BitLocker Network Unlock certificate policy can be deleted on the domain controller to accomplish the same task for an entire domain. - -> [!NOTE] -> Removing the FVE_NKP certificate store that contains the Network Unlock certificate and key on the WDS server will also effectively disable the server's ability to respond to unlock requests for that certificate. However, this is seen as an error condition and is not a supported or recommended method for turning off the Network Unlock server. - -## Update Network Unlock certificates - -To update the certificates used by Network Unlock, administrators need to import or generate the new certificate for the server, and then update the Network Unlock certificate group policy setting on the domain controller. - -> [!NOTE] -> Servers that don't receive the Group Policy Object (GPO) will require a PIN when they boot. In such cases, find out why the server didn't receive the GPO to update the certificate. - -## Troubleshoot Network Unlock - -Troubleshooting Network Unlock issues begins by verifying the environment. Many times, a small configuration issue can be the root cause of the failure. Items to verify include: - -- Verify that the client hardware is UEFI-based and is on firmware version 2.3.1 and that the UEFI firmware is in native mode without a Compatibility Support Module (CSM) for BIOS mode enabled. Verification can be done by checking that the firmware doesn't have an option enabled such as "Legacy mode" or "Compatibility mode" or that the firmware doesn't appear to be in a BIOS-like mode. - -- All required roles and services are installed and started. - -- Public and private certificates have been published and are in the proper certificate containers. The presence of the Network Unlock certificate can be verified in the Microsoft Management Console (MMC.exe) on the WDS server with the certificate snap-ins for the local computer enabled. The client certificate can be verified by checking the registry key **`HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\FVE_NKP`** on the client computer. - -- Group policy for Network Unlock is enabled and linked to the appropriate domains. - -- Verify whether group policy is reaching the clients properly. Verification of group policy can be done using the `GPRESULT.exe` or `RSOP.msc` utilities. - -- Verify whether the clients were rebooted after applying the policy. - -- Verify whether the **Network (Certificate Based)** protector is listed on the client. Verification of the protector can be done using either manage-bde or Windows PowerShell cmdlets. For example, the following command will list the key protectors currently configured on the C: drive of the local computer: - - ```powershell - manage-bde.exe -protectors -get C: - ``` - - > [!NOTE] - > Use the output of `manage-bde.exe` along with the WDS debug log to determine whether the proper certificate thumbprint is being used for Network Unlock. - -Gather the following files to troubleshoot BitLocker Network Unlock. - -- The Windows event logs. Specifically, get the BitLocker event logs and the Microsoft-Windows-Deployment-Services-Diagnostics-Debug log. - - Debug logging is turned off by default for the WDS server role. To retrieve WDS debug logs, the WDS debug logs first need to be enabled. Use either of the following two methods to turn on WDS debug logging. - - - Start an elevated command prompt, and then run the following command: - - ```cmd - wevtutil.exe sl Microsoft-Windows-Deployment-Services-Diagnostics/Debug /e:true - ``` - - - Open **Event Viewer** on the WDS server: - - 1. In the left pane, navigate to **Applications and Services Logs** > **Microsoft** > **Windows** > **Deployment-Services-Diagnostics** > **Debug**. - 2. In the right pane, select **Enable Log**. - -- The DHCP subnet configuration file (if one exists). - -- The output of the BitLocker status on the volume. Gather this output into a text file by using `manage-bde.exe -status`. Or in Windows PowerShell, use `Get-BitLockerVolume`. - -- The Network Monitor capture on the server that hosts the WDS role, filtered by client IP address. - - - -## Related articles - -- [BitLocker overview](index.md) -- [BitLocker frequently asked questions (FAQ)](faq.yml) -- [Prepare your organization for BitLocker: Planning and policies](prepare-your-organization-for-bitlocker-planning-and-policies.md) diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-management-for-enterprises.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-management-for-enterprises.md deleted file mode 100644 index e9c661179f..0000000000 --- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-management-for-enterprises.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,115 +0,0 @@ ---- -title: BitLocker management -description: Refer to relevant documentation, products, and services to learn about managing BitLocker and see recommendations for different computers. -ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 11/08/2022 ---- - -# BitLocker management - -The ideal solution for BitLocker management is to eliminate the need for IT administrators to set management policies using tools or other mechanisms by having Windows perform tasks that are more practical to automate. This vision leverages modern hardware developments. The growth of TPM 2.0, secure boot, and other hardware improvements, for example, have helped to alleviate the support burden on help desks and a decrease in support-call volumes, yielding improved user satisfaction. Windows continues to be the focus for new features and improvements for built-in encryption management, such as automatically enabling encryption on devices that support Modern Standby beginning with Windows 8.1. - -Though much Windows [BitLocker documentation](index.md) has been published, customers frequently ask for recommendations and pointers to specific, task-oriented documentation that is both easy to digest and focused on how to deploy and manage BitLocker. This article links to relevant documentation, products, and services to help answer this and other related frequently asked questions, and also provides BitLocker recommendations for different types of computers. - -[!INCLUDE [bitlocker](../../../../../includes/licensing/bitlocker-management.md)] - -## Managing domain-joined computers and moving to cloud - -Companies that image their own computers using Configuration Manager can use an existing task sequence to [pre-provision BitLocker](/configmgr/osd/understand/task-sequence-steps#BKMK_PreProvisionBitLocker) encryption while in Windows Preinstallation Environment (WinPE) and can then [enable protection](/configmgr/osd/understand/task-sequence-steps#BKMK_EnableBitLocker). These steps during an operating system deployment can help ensure that computers are encrypted from the start, even before users receive them. As part of the imaging process, a company could also decide to use Configuration Manager to pre-set any desired [BitLocker Group Policy](bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md). - -Enterprises can use [Microsoft BitLocker Administration and Monitoring (MBAM)](/microsoft-desktop-optimization-pack/mbam-v25/) to manage client computers with BitLocker that are domain-joined on-premises until [mainstream support ends in July 2019](/lifecycle/products/?alpha=Microsoft%20BitLocker%20Administration%20and%20Monitoring%202.5%20Service%20Pack%201%2F) or they can receive extended support until April 2026. Thus, over the next few years, a good strategy for enterprises will be to plan and move to cloud-based management for BitLocker. Refer to the [PowerShell examples](#powershell-examples) to see how to store recovery keys in Microsoft Entra ID. - -> [!IMPORTANT] -> Microsoft BitLocker Administration and Monitoring (MBAM) capabilities are offered through Configuration Manager BitLocker Management. See [Plan for BitLocker management](/mem/configmgr/protect/plan-design/bitlocker-management) in the Configuration Manager documentation for additional information. - - - -## Managing devices joined to Microsoft Entra ID - -Devices joined to Microsoft Entra ID are managed using Mobile Device Management (MDM) policy from an MDM solution such as Microsoft Intune. Prior to Windows 10, version 1809, only local administrators can enable BitLocker via Intune policy. Starting with Windows 10, version 1809, Intune can enable BitLocker for standard users. [BitLocker Device Encryption](bitlocker-device-encryption-overview-windows-10.md#bitlocker-device-encryption) status can be queried from managed machines via the [Policy Configuration Settings Provider (CSP)](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-configuration-service-provider/), which reports on whether BitLocker Device Encryption is enabled on the device. Compliance with BitLocker Device Encryption policy can be a requirement for [Conditional Access](https://www.microsoft.com/cloud-platform/conditional-access/) to services like Exchange Online and SharePoint Online. - -Starting with Windows 10 version 1703, the enablement of BitLocker can be triggered over MDM either by the [Policy CSP](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-configuration-service-provider/) or the [BitLocker CSP](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp/). The BitLocker CSP adds policy options that go beyond ensuring that encryption has occurred, and is available on computers that run Windows 11, Windows 10, and on Windows phones. - -For hardware that is compliant with Modern Standby and HSTI, when using either of these features, [BitLocker Device Encryption](bitlocker-device-encryption-overview-windows-10.md#bitlocker-device-encryption) is automatically turned on whenever the user joins a device to Microsoft Entra ID. Microsoft Entra ID provides a portal where recovery keys are also backed up, so users can retrieve their own recovery key for self-service, if necessary. For older devices that aren't yet encrypted, beginning with Windows 10 version 1703, admins can use the [BitLocker CSP](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp/) to trigger encryption and store the recovery key in Microsoft Entra ID. This process and feature is applicable to Azure Hybrid AD as well. - -## Managing workplace-joined PCs and phones - -For Windows PCs and Windows Phones that are enrolled using **Connect to work or school account**, BitLocker Device Encryption is managed over MDM, the same as devices joined to Microsoft Entra ID. - -## Managing servers - -Servers are often installed, configured, and deployed using PowerShell; therefore, the recommendation is to also use [PowerShell to enable BitLocker on a server](bitlocker-use-bitlocker-drive-encryption-tools-to-manage-bitlocker.md#bitlocker-cmdlets-for-windows-powershell), ideally as part of the initial setup. BitLocker is an Optional Component (OC) in Windows Server; therefore, follow the directions in [BitLocker: How to deploy on Windows Server 2012 and later](bitlocker-how-to-deploy-on-windows-server.md) to add the BitLocker OC. - -The Minimal Server Interface is a prerequisite for some of the BitLocker administration tools. On a [Server Core](/windows-server/get-started/getting-started-with-server-core/) installation, the necessary GUI components must be added first. The steps to add shell components to Server Core are described in [Using Features on Demand with Updated Systems and Patched Images](/archive/blogs/server_core/using-features-on-demand-with-updated-systems-and-patched-images) and [How to update local source media to add roles and features](/archive/blogs/joscon/how-to-update-local-source-media-to-add-roles-and-features). - -If a server is being installed manually, such as a stand-alone server, then choosing [Server with Desktop Experience](/windows-server/get-started/getting-started-with-server-with-desktop-experience/) is the easiest path because it avoids performing the steps to add a GUI to Server Core. - - Additionally, lights-out data centers can take advantage of the enhanced security of a second factor while avoiding the need for user intervention during reboots by optionally using a combination of BitLocker (TPM+PIN) and BitLocker Network Unlock. BitLocker Network Unlock brings together the best of hardware protection, location dependence, and automatic unlock, while in the trusted location. For the configuration steps, see [BitLocker: How to enable Network Unlock](bitlocker-how-to-enable-network-unlock.md). - For more information, see the BitLocker FAQs article and other useful links in [Related Articles](#related-articles). - -## PowerShell examples - -For Microsoft Entra joined computers, including virtual machines, the recovery password should be stored in Microsoft Entra ID. - -**Example**: *Use PowerShell to add a recovery password and back it up to Microsoft Entra ID before enabling BitLocker* - -```powershell -Add-BitLockerKeyProtector -MountPoint "C:" -RecoveryPasswordProtector - -$BLV = Get-BitLockerVolume -MountPoint "C:" - -BackupToAAD-BitLockerKeyProtector -MountPoint "C:" -KeyProtectorId $BLV.KeyProtector[0].KeyProtectorId -``` - -For domain-joined computers, including servers, the recovery password should be stored in Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS). - -**Example**: *Use PowerShell to add a recovery password and back it up to AD DS before enabling BitLocker* - -```powershell -Add-BitLockerKeyProtector -MountPoint "C:" -RecoveryPasswordProtector - -$BLV = Get-BitLockerVolume -MountPoint "C:" - -Backup-BitLockerKeyProtector -MountPoint "C:" -KeyProtectorId $BLV.KeyProtector[0].KeyProtectorId -``` - -PowerShell can then be used to enable BitLocker: - -**Example**: *Use PowerShell to enable BitLocker with a TPM protector* - -```powershell -Enable-BitLocker -MountPoint "D:" -EncryptionMethod XtsAes256 -UsedSpaceOnly -TpmProtector -``` - -**Example**: *Use PowerShell to enable BitLocker with a TPM+PIN protector, in this case with a PIN set to 123456* - -```powershell -$SecureString = ConvertTo-SecureString "123456" -AsPlainText -Force - -Enable-BitLocker -MountPoint "C:" -EncryptionMethod XtsAes256 -UsedSpaceOnly -Pin $SecureString -TPMandPinProtector -``` - -## Related Articles - -- [BitLocker: FAQs](faq.yml) -- [Microsoft BitLocker Administration and Management (MBAM)](/microsoft-desktop-optimization-pack/mbam-v25/) -- [Overview of BitLocker Device Encryption in Windows](bitlocker-device-encryption-overview-windows-10.md#bitlocker-device-encryption) -- [BitLocker Group Policy Reference](bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md) -- [Microsoft Intune](https://www.microsoft.com/cloud-platform/microsoft-intune/) -*(Overview)* -- [Configuration Settings Providers](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-configuration-service-provider) -*(Policy CSP: See [Security-RequireDeviceEncryption](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-security#security-policies))* -- [BitLocker CSP](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp/) - -### Windows Server setup tools - -- [Windows Server Installation Options](/windows-server/get-started-19/install-upgrade-migrate-19/) -- [How to update local source media to add roles and features](/archive/blogs/joscon/how-to-update-local-source-media-to-add-roles-and-features) -- [How to add or remove optional components on Server Core](/archive/blogs/server_core/using-features-on-demand-with-updated-systems-and-patched-images) *(Features on Demand)* -- [How to deploy BitLocker on Windows Server](bitlocker-how-to-deploy-on-windows-server.md) -- [How to enable Network Unlock](bitlocker-how-to-enable-network-unlock.md) -- [Shielded VMs and Guarded Fabric](https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/windowsserver/2016/05/10/a-closer-look-at-shielded-vms-in-windows-server-2016/) - -### PowerShell - -- [BitLocker cmdlets for Windows PowerShell](bitlocker-use-bitlocker-drive-encryption-tools-to-manage-bitlocker.md#bitlocker-cmdlets-for-windows-powershell) diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-recovery-guide-plan.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-recovery-guide-plan.md deleted file mode 100644 index a2bf3f755c..0000000000 --- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-recovery-guide-plan.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,979 +0,0 @@ ---- -title: BitLocker recovery guide -description: This article for IT professionals describes how to recover BitLocker keys from Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS). -ms.collection: - - highpri - - tier1 -ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 11/08/2022 ---- - -# BitLocker recovery guide - -This article describes how to recover BitLocker keys from AD DS. - -Organizations can use BitLocker recovery information saved in Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) to access BitLocker-protected data. It's recommended to create a recovery model for BitLocker while planning for BitLocker deployment. - -This article assumes that it's understood how to set up AD DS to back up BitLocker recovery information automatically, and what types of recovery information are saved to AD DS. - -This article doesn't detail how to configure AD DS to store the BitLocker recovery information. - -## What is BitLocker recovery? - -BitLocker recovery is the process by which access can be restored to a BitLocker-protected drive if the drive can't be unlocked normally. In a recovery scenario, the following options to restore access to the drive are available: - -- **The user can supply the recovery password.** If the organization allows users to print or store recovery passwords, the users can enter in the 48-digit recovery password that they printed or stored on a USB drive or with a Microsoft account online. Saving a recovery password with a Microsoft account online is only allowed when BitLocker is used on a PC that isn't a member of a domain. - -- **Data recovery agents can use their credentials to unlock the drive.** If the drive is an operating system drive, the drive must be mounted as a data drive on another computer for the data recovery agent to unlock it. - -- **A domain administrator can obtain the recovery password from AD DS and use it to unlock the drive.** Storing recovery passwords in AD DS is recommended to provide a way for IT professionals to be able to obtain recovery passwords for drives in an organization if needed. This method makes it mandatory to enable this recovery method in the BitLocker group policy setting **Choose how BitLocker-protected operating system drives can be recovered** located at **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Operating System Drives** in the Local Group Policy Editor. For more information, see [BitLocker Group Policy settings](bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md). - -### What causes BitLocker recovery? - -The following list provides examples of specific events that will cause BitLocker to enter recovery mode when attempting to start the operating system drive: - -- On PCs that use BitLocker Drive Encryption, or on devices such as tablets or phones that use [BitLocker Device Encryption](bitlocker-device-encryption-overview-windows-10.md) only, when an attack is detected, the device will immediately reboot and enter into BitLocker recovery mode. To take advantage of this functionality, administrators can set the **Interactive logon: Machine account lockout threshold** Group Policy setting located in **Computer Configuration** > **Windows Settings** > **Security Settings** > **Local Policies** > **Security Options** in the Local Group Policy Editor. Or they can use the **MaxFailedPasswordAttempts** policy of [Exchange ActiveSync](/Exchange/clients/exchange-activesync/exchange-activesync) (also configurable through [Microsoft Intune](/mem/intune)), to limit the number of failed password attempts before the device goes into Device Lockout. - -- On devices with TPM 1.2, changing the BIOS or firmware boot device order causes BitLocker recovery. However, devices with TPM 2.0 don't start BitLocker recovery in this case. TPM 2.0 doesn't consider a firmware change of boot device order as a security threat because the OS Boot Loader isn't compromised. - -- Having the CD or DVD drive before the hard drive in the BIOS boot order and then inserting or removing a CD or DVD. - -- Failing to boot from a network drive before booting from the hard drive. - -- Docking or undocking a portable computer. In some instances (depending on the computer manufacturer and the BIOS), the docking condition of the portable computer is part of the system measurement and must be consistent to validate the system status and unlock BitLocker. So if a portable computer is connected to its docking station when BitLocker is turned on, then it might also need to be connected to the docking station when it's unlocked. Conversely, if a portable computer isn't connected to its docking station when BitLocker is turned on, then it might need to be disconnected from the docking station when it's unlocked. - -- Changes to the NTFS partition table on the disk including creating, deleting, or resizing a primary partition. - -- Entering the personal identification number (PIN) incorrectly too many times so that the anti-hammering logic of the TPM is activated. Anti-hammering logic is software or hardware methods that increase the difficulty and cost of a brute force attack on a PIN by not accepting PIN entries until after a certain amount of time has passed. - -- Turning off the support for reading the USB device in the pre-boot environment from the BIOS or UEFI firmware if using USB-based keys instead of a TPM. - -- Turning off, disabling, deactivating, or clearing the TPM. - -- Upgrading critical early startup components, such as a BIOS or UEFI firmware upgrade, causing the related boot measurements to change. - -- Forgetting the PIN when PIN authentication has been enabled. - -- Updating option ROM firmware. - -- Upgrading TPM firmware. - -- Adding or removing hardware; for example, inserting a new card in the computer, including some PCMIA wireless cards. - -- Removing, inserting, or completely depleting the charge on a smart battery on a portable computer. - -- Changes to the master boot record on the disk. - -- Changes to the boot manager on the disk. - -- Hiding the TPM from the operating system. Some BIOS or UEFI settings can be used to prevent the enumeration of the TPM to the operating system. When implemented, this option can make the TPM hidden from the operating system. When the TPM is hidden, BIOS and UEFI secure startup are disabled, and the TPM doesn't respond to commands from any software. - -- Using a different keyboard that doesn't correctly enter the PIN or whose keyboard map doesn't match the keyboard map assumed by the pre-boot environment. This problem can prevent the entry of enhanced PINs. - -- Modifying the Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) used by the TPM validation profile. For example, including **PCR\[1\]** would result in BitLocker measuring most changes to BIOS settings, causing BitLocker to enter recovery mode even when non-boot critical BIOS settings change. - - > [!NOTE] - > Some computers have BIOS settings that skip measurements to certain PCRs, such as **PCR\[2\]**. Changing this setting in the BIOS would cause BitLocker to enter recovery mode because the PCR measurement will be different. - -- Moving the BitLocker-protected drive into a new computer. - -- Upgrading the motherboard to a new one with a new TPM. - -- Losing the USB flash drive containing the startup key when startup key authentication has been enabled. - -- Failing the TPM self-test. - -- Having a BIOS, UEFI firmware, or an option ROM component that isn't compliant with the relevant Trusted Computing Group standards for a client computer. For example, a non-compliant implementation may record volatile data (such as time) in the TPM measurements, causing different measurements on each startup and causing BitLocker to start in recovery mode. - -- Changing the usage authorization for the storage root key of the TPM to a non-zero value. - - > [!NOTE] - > The BitLocker TPM initialization process sets the usage authorization value to zero, so another user or process must explicitly have changed this value. - -- Disabling the code integrity check or enabling test signing on Windows Boot Manager (Bootmgr). - -- Pressing the F8 or F10 key during the boot process. - -- Adding or removing add-in cards (such as video or network cards), or upgrading firmware on add-in cards. - -- Using a BIOS hot key during the boot process to change the boot order to something other than the hard drive. - -> [!NOTE] -> Before beginning recovery, it is recommend to determine what caused recovery. This might help prevent the problem from occurring again in the future. For instance, if it is determined that an attacker has modified the computer by obtaining physical access, new security policies can be created for tracking who has physical presence. After the recovery password has been used to recover access to the PC, BitLocker reseals the encryption key to the current values of the measured components. - -For planned scenarios, such as a known hardware or firmware upgrades, initiating recovery can be avoided by temporarily suspending BitLocker protection. Because suspending BitLocker leaves the drive fully encrypted, the administrator can quickly resume BitLocker protection after the planned task has been completed. Using suspend and resume also reseals the encryption key without requiring the entry of the recovery key. - -> [!NOTE] -> If suspended BitLocker will automatically resume protection when the PC is rebooted, unless a reboot count is specified using the manage-bde command line tool. - -If software maintenance requires the computer to be restarted and two-factor authentication is being used, the BitLocker network unlock feature can be enabled to provide the secondary authentication factor when the computers don't have an on-premises user to provide the additional authentication method. - -Recovery has been described within the context of unplanned or undesired behavior. However, recovery can also be caused as an intended production scenario, for example in order to manage access control. When desktop or laptop computers are redeployed to other departments or employees in the enterprise, BitLocker can be forced into recovery before the computer is given to a new user. - -## Testing recovery - -Before a thorough BitLocker recovery process is created, it's recommended to test how the recovery process works for both end users (people who call the helpdesk for the recovery password) and administrators (people who help the end user get the recovery password). The `-forcerecovery` command of `manage-bde.exe` is an easy way to step through the recovery process before users encounter a recovery situation. - -**To force a recovery for the local computer:** - -1. Select the **Start** button and type in **cmd** - -2. Right select on **cmd.exe** or **Command Prompt** and then select **Run as administrator**. - -3. At the command prompt, enter the following command: - - ```cmd - manage-bde.exe -forcerecovery - ``` - -**To force recovery for a remote computer:** - -1. Select the **Start** button and type in **cmd** - -2. Right select on **cmd.exe** or **Command Prompt** and then select **Run as administrator**. - -3. At the command prompt, enter the following command: - - ```cmd - manage-bde.exe -ComputerName -forcerecovery - ``` - - > [!NOTE] - > Recovery triggered by `-forcerecovery` persists for multiple restarts until a TPM protector is added or protection is suspended by the user. When using Modern Standby devices (such as Surface devices), the `-forcerecovery` option is not recommended because BitLocker will have to be unlocked and disabled manually from the WinRE environment before the OS can boot up again. For more information, see [BitLocker Troubleshooting: Continuous reboot loop with BitLocker recovery on a slate device](https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/18671.bitlocker-troubleshooting-continuous-reboot-loop-with-bitlocker-recovery-on-a-slate-device.aspx). - -## Planning the recovery process - -When planning the BitLocker recovery process, first consult the organization's current best practices for recovering sensitive information. For example: How does the enterprise handle lost Windows passwords? How does the organization perform smart card PIN resets? These best practices and related resources (people and tools) can be used to help formulate a BitLocker recovery model. - -Organizations that rely on BitLocker Drive Encryption and BitLocker To Go to protect data on a large number of computers and removable drives running the Windows 11, Windows 10, Windows 8, or Windows 7 operating systems and Windows to Go should consider using the Microsoft BitLocker Administration and Monitoring (MBAM) Tool version 2.0, which is included in the Microsoft Desktop Optimization Pack (MDOP) for Microsoft Software Assurance. MBAM makes BitLocker implementations easier to deploy and manage and allows administrators to provision and monitor encryption for operating system and fixed drives. MBAM prompts the user before encrypting fixed drives. MBAM also manages recovery keys for fixed and removable drives, making recovery easier to manage. MBAM can be used as part of a Microsoft System Center deployment or as a stand-alone solution. For more info, see [Microsoft BitLocker Administration and Monitoring](/microsoft-desktop-optimization-pack/mbam-v25/). - -After a BitLocker recovery has been initiated, users can use a recovery password to unlock access to encrypted data. Consider both self-recovery and recovery password retrieval methods for the organization. - -When the recovery process is determined: - -- Become familiar with how a recovery password can be retrieved. See: - - - [Self-recovery](#self-recovery) - - [Recovery password retrieval](#recovery-password-retrieval) - -- Determine a series of steps for post-recovery, including analyzing why the recovery occurred and resetting the recovery password. See: - - - [Post-recovery analysis](#post-recovery-analysis) - -### Self-recovery - -In some cases, users might have the recovery password in a printout or a USB flash drive and can perform self-recovery. It's recommended that the organization creates a policy for self-recovery. If self-recovery includes using a password or recovery key stored on a USB flash drive, the users must be warned not to store the USB flash drive in the same place as the PC, especially during travel. For example, if both the PC and the recovery items are in the same bag it would be easy for access to be gained to the PC by an unauthorized user. Another policy to consider is having users contact the Helpdesk before or after performing self-recovery so that the root cause can be identified. - -### Recovery password retrieval - -If the user doesn't have a recovery password printed or on a USB flash drive, the user will need to be able to retrieve the recovery password from an online source. If the PC is a member of a domain, the recovery password can be backed up to AD DS. **However, back up of the recovery password to AD DS does not happen by default.** Backup of the recovery password to AD DS has to be configured via the appropriate group policy settings **before** BitLocker was enabled on the PC. BitLocker group policy settings can be found in the Local Group Policy Editor or the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) under **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption**. The following policy settings define the recovery methods that can be used to restore access to a BitLocker-protected drive if an authentication method fails or is unable to be used. - -- **Choose how BitLocker-protected operating system drives can be recovered** - -- **Choose how BitLocker-protected fixed drives can be recovered** - -- **Choose how BitLocker-protected removable drives can be recovered** - -In each of these policies, select **Save BitLocker recovery information to Active Directory Domain Services** and then choose which BitLocker recovery information to store in AD DS. Check the **Do not enable BitLocker until recovery information is stored in AD -DS** check box if it's desired to prevent users from enabling BitLocker unless the computer is connected to the domain and the backup of BitLocker recovery information for the drive to AD DS succeeds. - -> [!NOTE] -> If the PCs are part of a workgroup, users are advised to save their BitLocker recovery password with their Microsoft account online. Having an online copy of the BitLocker recovery password is recommended to help ensure access to data is not lost in the event of a recovery being required. - -The BitLocker Recovery Password Viewer for Active Directory Users and Computers tool allows domain administrators to view BitLocker recovery passwords for specific computer objects in Active Directory. - -The following list can be used as a template for creating a recovery process for recovery password retrieval. This sample process uses the BitLocker Recovery Password Viewer for Active Directory Users and Computers tool. - -- [Record the name of the user's computer](#record-the-name-of-the-users-computer) -- [Verify the user's identity](#verify-the-users-identity) -- [Locate the recovery password in AD DS](#locate-the-recovery-password-in-ad-ds) -- [Gather information to determine why recovery occurred](#gather-information-to-determine-why-recovery-occurred) -- [Give the user the recovery password](#give-the-user-the-recovery-password) - -### Record the name of the user's computer - -The name of the user's computer can be used to locate the recovery password in AD DS. If the user doesn't know the name of the computer, ask the user to read the first word of the **Drive Label** in the **BitLocker Drive Encryption Password Entry** user interface. This word is the computer name when BitLocker was enabled and is probably the current name of the computer. - -### Verify the user's identity - -The person who is asking for the recovery password should be verified as the authorized user of that computer. It should also be verified whether the computer for which the user provided the name belongs to the user. - -### Locate the recovery password in AD DS - -Locate the computer object with the matching name in AD DS. Because computer object names are listed in the AD DS global catalog, the object should be able to be located even if it's a multi-domain forest. - -### Multiple recovery passwords - -If multiple recovery passwords are stored under a computer object in AD DS, the name of the BitLocker recovery information object includes the date on which the password was created. - -To make sure the correct password is provided and/or to prevent providing the incorrect password, ask the user to read the eight character password ID that is displayed in the recovery console. - -Since the password ID is a unique value that is associated with each recovery password stored in AD DS, running a query using this ID finds the correct password to unlock the encrypted volume. - -### Gather information to determine why recovery occurred - -Before giving the user the recovery password, information should be gatherer that will help determine why the recovery was needed. This information can be used to analyze the root cause during the post-recovery analysis. For more information about post-recovery analysis, see [Post-recovery analysis](#post-recovery-analysis). - -### Give the user the recovery password - -Because the recovery password is 48 digits long, the user may need to record the password by writing it down or typing it on a different computer. If using MBAM or Configuration Manager BitLocker Management, the recovery password will be regenerated after it's recovered from the MBAM or Configuration Manager database to avoid the security risks associated with an uncontrolled password. - -> [!NOTE] -> Because the 48-digit recovery password is long and contains a combination of digits, the user might mishear or mistype the password. The boot-time recovery console uses built-in checksum numbers to detect input errors in each 6-digit block of the 48-digit recovery password, and offers the user the opportunity to correct such errors. - -### Post-recovery analysis - -When a volume is unlocked using a recovery password, an event is written to the event log, and the platform validation measurements are reset in the TPM to match the current configuration. Unlocking the volume means that the encryption key has been released and is ready for on-the-fly encryption when data is written to the volume, and on-the-fly decryption when data is read from the volume. After the volume is unlocked, BitLocker behaves the same way, regardless of how the access was granted. - -If it's noticed that a computer is having repeated recovery password unlocks, an administrator might want to perform post-recovery analysis to determine the root cause of the recovery, and refresh BitLocker platform validation so that the user no longer needs to enter a recovery password each time that the computer starts up. For more information, see: - -- [Determine the root cause of the recovery](#determine-the-root-cause-of-the-recovery) -- [Resolve the root cause](#resolve-the-root-cause) - -### Determine the root cause of the recovery - -If a user needed to recover the drive, it's important to determine the root cause that initiated the recovery as soon as possible. Properly analyzing the state of the computer and detecting tampering may reveal threats that have broader implications for enterprise security. - -While an administrator can remotely investigate the cause of recovery in some cases, the end user might need to bring the computer that contains the recovered drive on site to analyze the root cause further. - -Review and answer the following questions for the organization: - -1. Which BitLocker protection mode is in effect (TPM, TPM + PIN, TPM + startup key, startup key only)? Which PCR profile is in use on the PC? - -2. Did the user merely forget the PIN or lose the startup key? If a token was lost, where might the token be? - -3. If TPM mode was in effect, was recovery caused by a boot file change? - -4. If recovery was caused by a boot file change, is the boot file change due to an intended user action (for example, BIOS upgrade), or a malicious software? - -5. When was the user last able to start the computer successfully, and what might have happened to the computer since then? - -6. Might the user have encountered malicious software or left the computer unattended since the last successful startup? - -To help answer these questions, use the BitLocker command-line tool to view the current configuration and protection mode: - -```cmd -manage-bde.exe -status -``` - -Scan the event log to find events that help indicate why recovery was initiated (for example, if a boot file change occurred). Both of these capabilities can be performed remotely. - -### Resolve the root cause - -After it has been identified what caused recovery, BitLocker protection can be reset to avoid recovery on every startup. - -The details of this reset can vary according to the root cause of the recovery. If root cause can't be determined, or if a malicious software or a rootkit might have infected the computer, Helpdesk should apply best-practice virus policies to react appropriately. - -> [!NOTE] -> BitLocker validation profile reset can be performed by suspending and resuming BitLocker. - -- [Unknown PIN](#unknown-pin) -- [Lost startup key](#lost-startup-key) -- [Changes to boot files](#changes-to-boot-files) - -### Unknown PIN - -If a user has forgotten the PIN, the PIN must be reset while signed on to the computer in order to prevent BitLocker from initiating recovery each time the computer is restarted. - -#### To prevent continued recovery due to an unknown PIN - -1. Unlock the computer using the recovery password. - -2. Reset the PIN: - - 1. Select and hold the drive and then select **Change PIN** - - 2. In the BitLocker Drive Encryption dialog, select **Reset a forgotten PIN**. If the signed in account isn't an administrator account, administrative credentials must be provided at this time. - - 3. In the PIN reset dialog, provide and confirm the new PIN to be used and then select **Finish**. - -3. The new PIN can be used the next time the drive needs to be unlocked. - -### Lost startup key - -If the USB flash drive that contains the startup key has been lost, then drive must be unlocked by using the recovery key. A new startup can then be created. - -#### To prevent continued recovery due to a lost startup key - -1. Sign in as an administrator to the computer that has its startup key lost. - -2. Open Manage BitLocker. - -3. Select **Duplicate start up key**, insert the clean USB drive where the key will be written, and then select **Save**. - -### Changes to boot files - -This error occurs if the firmware is updated. As a best practice, BitLocker should be suspended before making changes to the firmware. Protection should then be resumed after the firmware update has completed. Suspending BitLocker prevents the computer from going into recovery mode. However, if changes were made when BitLocker protection was on, the recovery password can be used to unlock the drive and the platform validation profile will be updated so that recovery won't occur the next time. - -## Windows RE and BitLocker Device Encryption - -Windows Recovery Environment (RE) can be used to recover access to a drive protected by [BitLocker Device Encryption](bitlocker-device-encryption-overview-windows-10.md). If a PC is unable to boot after two failures, Startup Repair automatically starts. When Startup Repair is launched automatically due to boot failures, it executes only operating system and driver file repairs if the boot logs or any available crash dump points to a specific corrupted file. In Windows 8.1 and later versions, devices that include firmware to support specific TPM measurements for PCR\[7\] **the TPM** can validate that Windows RE is a trusted operating environment and unlock any BitLocker-protected drives if Windows RE hasn't been modified. If the Windows RE environment has been modified, for example, the TPM has been disabled, the drives stay locked until the BitLocker recovery key is provided. If Startup Repair isn't able to run automatically from the PC and instead, Windows RE is manually started from a repair disk, the BitLocker recovery key must be provided to unlock the BitLocker-protected drives. - -Windows RE will also ask for a BitLocker recovery key when a **Remove everything** reset from Windows RE is started on a device that uses **TPM + PIN** or **Password for OS drive** protectors. If BitLocker recovery is started on a keyboardless device with TPM-only protection, Windows RE, not the boot manager, will ask for the BitLocker recovery key. After the key is entered, Windows RE troubleshooting tools can be accessed, or Windows can be started normally. - -The BitLocker recovery screen that's shown by Windows RE has the accessibility tools like narrator and on-screen keyboard to help enter the BitLocker recovery key. If the BitLocker recovery key is requested by the Windows boot manager, those tools might not be available. - -To activate the narrator during BitLocker recovery in Windows RE, press **Windows** + **CTRL** + **Enter**. To activate the on-screen keyboard, tap on a text input control. - -:::image type="content" source="images/bl-narrator.png" alt-text="A screenshot of the BitLocker recovery screen showing Narrator activated."::: - -## BitLocker recovery screen - -During BitLocker recovery, Windows displays a custom recovery message and a few hints that identify where a key can be retrieved from. These improvements can help a user during BitLocker recovery. - -### Custom recovery message - -BitLocker Group Policy settings starting in Windows 10, version 1511, allows configuring a custom recovery message and URL on the BitLocker recovery screen. The custom recovery message and URL can include the address of the BitLocker self-service recovery portal, the IT internal website, or a phone number for support. - -This policy can be configured using GPO under **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Operating System Drives** > **Configure pre-boot recovery message and URL**. - -It can also be configured using mobile device management (MDM), including in Intune, using the [BitLocker CSP](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp): - -**`./Device/Vendor/MSFT/BitLocker/SystemDrivesRecoveryMessage`** - -![Custom URL.](images/bl-intune-custom-url.png) - -Example of a customized recovery screen: - -![Customized BitLocker Recovery Screen.](images/bl-password-hint1.png) - -### BitLocker recovery key hints - -BitLocker metadata has been enhanced starting in Windows 10, version 1903, to include information about when and where the BitLocker recovery key was backed up. This information isn't exposed through the UI or any public API. It's used solely by the BitLocker recovery screen in the form of hints to help a user locate a volume's recovery key. Hints are displayed on the recovery screen and refer to the location where the key has been saved. Hints are displayed on both the modern (blue) and legacy (black) recovery screen. The hints apply to both the boot manager recovery screen and the WinRE unlock screen. - -![Customized BitLocker recovery screen.](images/bl-password-hint2.png) - -> [!IMPORTANT] -> It is not recommend to print recovery keys or saving them to a file. Instead, use Active Directory backup or a cloud-based backup. Cloud-based backup includes Microsoft Entra ID and Microsoft account. - -There are rules governing which hint is shown during the recovery (in the order of processing): - -1. Always display custom recovery message if it has been configured (using GPO or MDM). - -2. Always display generic hint: `For more information, go to https://aka.ms/recoverykeyfaq.` - -3. If multiple recovery keys exist on the volume, prioritize the last-created (and successfully backed up) recovery key. - -4. Prioritize keys with successful backup over keys that have never been backed up. - -5. Prioritize backup hints in the following order for remote backup locations: **Microsoft Account > Microsoft Entra ID > Active Directory**. - -6. If a key has been printed and saved to file, display a combined hint, "Look for a printout or a text file with the key," instead of two separate hints. - -7. If multiple backups of the same type (remove vs. local) have been performed for the same recovery key, prioritize backup info with latest backed-up date. - -8. There's no specific hint for keys saved to an on-premises Active Directory. In this case, a custom message (if configured) or a generic message, "Contact your organization's help desk," is displayed. - -9. If two recovery keys are present on the disk, but only one has been successfully backed up, the system asks for a key that has been backed up, even if another key is newer. - -#### Example 1 (single recovery key with single backup) - -| Custom URL | Yes | -|----------------------|------------| -| Saved to Microsoft Account | Yes | -| Saved to Microsoft Entra ID | No | -| Saved to Active Directory | No | -| Printed | No | -| Saved to file | No | - -**Result:** The hints for the Microsoft account and custom URL are displayed. - -![Example 1 of Customized BitLocker recovery screen.](images/rp-example1.png) - -#### Example 2 (single recovery key with single backup) - -| Custom URL | Yes | -|----------------------|------------| -| Saved to Microsoft Account | No | -| Saved to Microsoft Entra ID | No | -| Saved to Active Directory | Yes | -| Printed | No | -| Saved to file | No | - -**Result:** Only the custom URL is displayed. - -![Example 2 of customized BitLocker recovery screen.](images/rp-example2.png) - -#### Example 3 (single recovery key with multiple backups) - -| Custom URL | No | -|----------------------|------------| -| Saved to Microsoft Account | Yes | -| Saved to Microsoft Entra ID | Yes | -| Saved to Active Directory | No | -| Printed | Yes | -| Saved to file | Yes | - -**Result:** Only the Microsoft Account hint is displayed. - -![Example 3 of customized BitLocker recovery screen.](images/rp-example3.png) - -#### Example 4 (multiple recovery passwords) - -| Custom URL | No | -|----------------------|-----------------| -| Saved to Microsoft Account | No | -| Saved to Microsoft Entra ID | No | -| Saved to Active Directory | No | -| Printed | No | -| Saved to file | Yes | -| Creation time | **1PM** | -| Key ID | A564F193 | - -
    -
    - -| Custom URL | No | -|----------------------|-----------------| -| Saved to Microsoft Account | No | -| Saved to Microsoft Entra ID | No | -| Saved to Active Directory | No | -| Printed | No | -| Saved to file | No | -| Creation time | **3PM** | -| Key ID | T4521ER5 | - -**Result:** Only the hint for a successfully backed up key is displayed, even if it isn't the most recent key. - -![Example 4 of customized BitLocker recovery screen.](images/rp-example4.png) - -#### Example 5 (multiple recovery passwords) - -| Custom URL | No | -|----------------------|-----------------| -| Saved to Microsoft Account | Yes | -| Saved to Microsoft Entra ID | Yes | -| Saved to Active Directory | No | -| Printed | No | -| Saved to file | No | -| Creation time | **1PM** | -| Key ID | 99631A34 | - -| Custom URL | No | -|----------------------|-----------------| -| Saved to Microsoft Account | No | -| Saved to Microsoft Entra ID | Yes | -| Saved to Active Directory | No | -| Printed | No | -| Saved to file | No | -| Creation time | **3PM** | -| Key ID | 9DF70931 | - -**Result:** The hint for the most recent key is displayed. - -![Example 5 of customized BitLocker recovery screen.](images/rp-example5.png) - -## Using additional recovery information - -Besides the 48-digit BitLocker recovery password, other types of recovery information are stored in Active Directory. This section describes how this additional information can be used. - -### BitLocker key package - -If the recovery methods discussed earlier in this document don't unlock the volume, the BitLocker Repair tool can be used to decrypt the volume at the block level. The tool uses the BitLocker key package to help recover encrypted data from severely damaged drives. The recovered data can then be used to salvage encrypted data, even after the correct recovery password has failed to unlock the damaged volume. It's recommended to still save the recovery password. A key package can't be used without the corresponding recovery password. - -> [!NOTE] -> The BitLocker Repair tool `repair-bde.exe` must be used to use the BitLocker key package. - -The BitLocker key package isn't saved by default. To save the package along with the recovery password in AD DS, the **Backup recovery password and key package** option must be selected in the group policy settings that control the recovery method. The key package can also be exported from a working volume. For more information on how to export key packages, see [Retrieving the BitLocker Key Package](#retrieving-the-bitlocker-key-package). - -## Resetting recovery passwords - -It's recommended to invalidate a recovery password after it has been provided and used. The recovery password can be invalidated when it has been provided and used or for any other valid reason. - -The recovery password and be invalidated and reset in two ways: - -- **Use `manage-bde.exe`**: `manage-bde.exe` can be used to remove the old recovery password and add a new recovery password. The procedure identifies the command and the syntax for this method. - -- **Run a script**: A script can be run to reset the password without decrypting the volume. The sample script in the procedure illustrates this functionality. The sample script creates a new recovery password and invalidates all other passwords. - -### Resetting a recovery password using `manage-bde.exe` - -1. Remove the previous recovery password. - - ```cmd - `manage-bde.exe` -protectors -delete C: -type RecoveryPassword - ``` - -2. Add the new recovery password. - - ```cmd - `manage-bde.exe` -protectors -add C: -RecoveryPassword - ``` - -3. Get the ID of the new recovery password. From the screen, copy the ID of the recovery password. - - ```cmd - `manage-bde.exe` -protectors -get C: -Type RecoveryPassword - ``` - -4. Back up the new recovery password to AD DS. - - ```cmd - `manage-bde.exe` -protectors -adbackup C: -id {EXAMPLE6-5507-4924-AA9E-AFB2EB003692} - ``` - - > [!WARNING] - > The braces `{}` must be included in the ID string. - -### Running the sample recovery password script to reset the recovery passwords - -1. Save the following sample script in a VBScript file. For example: - - `ResetPassword.vbs`. - -2. At the command prompt, enter the following command:: - - ```cmd - cscript.exe ResetPassword.vbs - ``` - - > [!IMPORTANT] - > This sample script is configured to work only for the C volume. If necessary, customize the script to match the volume where the password reset needs to be tested. - -> [!NOTE] -> To manage a remote computer, specify the remote computer name rather than the local computer name. - -The following sample VBScript can be used to reset the recovery passwords: - -
    -
    - Expand to view sample recovery password VBscript to reset the recovery passwords - -```vb -' Target drive letter -strDriveLetter = "c:" -' Target computer name -' Use "." to connect to the local computer -strComputerName = "." -' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -' Connect to the BitLocker WMI provider class -' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -strConnectionStr = "winmgmts:" _ - & "{impersonationLevel=impersonate,authenticationLevel=pktPrivacy}!\\" _ - & strComputerName _ - & "\root\cimv2\Security\MicrosoftVolumeEncryption" - - -On Error Resume Next 'handle permission errors -Set objWMIService = GetObject(strConnectionStr) -If Err.Number <> 0 Then - WScript.Echo "Failed to connect to the BitLocker interface (Error 0x" & Hex(Err.Number) & ")." - Wscript.Echo "Ensure that you are running with administrative privileges." - WScript.Quit -1 -End If -On Error GoTo 0 -strQuery = "Select * from Win32_EncryptableVolume where DriveLetter='" & strDriveLetter & "'" -Set colTargetVolumes = objWMIService.ExecQuery(strQuery) -If colTargetVolumes.Count = 0 Then - WScript.Echo "FAILURE: Unable to find BitLocker-capable drive " & strDriveLetter & " on computer " & strComputerName & "." - WScript.Quit -1 -End If -' there should only be one volume found -For Each objFoundVolume in colTargetVolumes - set objVolume = objFoundVolume -Next -' objVolume is now our found BitLocker-capable disk volume -' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -' Perform BitLocker WMI provider functionality -' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -' Add a new recovery password, keeping the ID around so it doesn't get deleted later -' ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -nRC = objVolume.ProtectKeyWithNumericalPassword("Recovery Password Refreshed By Script", , sNewKeyProtectorID) -If nRC <> 0 Then -WScript.Echo "FAILURE: ProtectKeyWithNumericalPassword failed with return code 0x" & Hex(nRC) -WScript.Quit -1 -End If -' Removes the other, "stale", recovery passwords -' ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -nKeyProtectorTypeIn = 3 ' type associated with "Numerical Password" protector -nRC = objVolume.GetKeyProtectors(nKeyProtectorTypeIn, aKeyProtectorIDs) -If nRC <> 0 Then -WScript.Echo "FAILURE: GetKeyProtectors failed with return code 0x" & Hex(nRC) -WScript.Quit -1 -End If -' Delete those key protectors other than the one we just added. -For Each sKeyProtectorID In aKeyProtectorIDs -If sKeyProtectorID <> sNewKeyProtectorID Then -nRC = objVolume.DeleteKeyProtector(sKeyProtectorID) -If nRC <> 0 Then -WScript.Echo "FAILURE: DeleteKeyProtector on ID " & sKeyProtectorID & " failed with return code 0x" & Hex(nRC) -WScript.Quit -1 -Else -' no output -'WScript.Echo "SUCCESS: Key protector with ID " & sKeyProtectorID & " deleted" -End If -End If -Next -WScript.Echo "A new recovery password has been added. Old passwords have been removed." -' - some advanced output (hidden) -'WScript.Echo "" -'WScript.Echo "Type ""manage-bde.exe -protectors -get " & strDriveLetter & " -type recoverypassword"" to view existing passwords." -``` - -
    - -## Retrieving the BitLocker key package - -Two methods can be used to retrieve the key package as described in [Using Additional Recovery Information](#using-additional-recovery-information): - -- **Export a previously saved key package from AD DS.** Read access is required to BitLocker recovery passwords that are stored in AD DS. - -- **Export a new key package from an unlocked, BitLocker-protected volume.** Local administrator access to the working volume is required before any damage occurred to the volume. - -### Running the sample key package retrieval script that exports all previously saved key packages from AD DS - -The following steps and sample script exports all previously saved key packages from AD DS. - -1. Save the following sample script in a VBScript file. For example: `GetBitLockerKeyPackageADDS.vbs`. - -2. At the command prompt, enter a command similar to the following sample script: - - ```cmd - cscript.exe GetBitLockerKeyPackageADDS.vbs -? - ``` - -The following sample script can be used to create a VBScript file to retrieve the BitLocker key package from AD DS: - -
    -
    - Expand to view sample key package retrieval VBscript that exports all previously saved key packages from AD DS - -```vb -' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -' Usage -' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Sub ShowUsage - Wscript.Echo "USAGE: GetBitLockerKeyPackageADDS [Path To Save Key Package] [Optional Computer Name]" - Wscript.Echo "If no computer name is specified, the local computer is assumed." - Wscript.Echo - Wscript.Echo "Example: GetBitLockerKeyPackageADDS E:\bitlocker-ad-key-package mycomputer" - WScript.Quit -End Sub -' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -' Parse Arguments -' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Set args = WScript.Arguments -Select Case args.Count - Case 1 - If args(0) = "/?" Or args(0) = "-?" Then - ShowUsage - Else - strFilePath = args(0) - ' Get the name of the local computer - Set objNetwork = CreateObject("WScript.Network") - strComputerName = objNetwork.ComputerName - End If - - Case 2 - If args(0) = "/?" Or args(0) = "-?" Then - ShowUsage - Else - strFilePath = args(0) - strComputerName = args(1) - End If - Case Else - ShowUsage -End Select -' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -' Get path to Active Directory computer object associated with the computer name -' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Function GetStrPathToComputer(strComputerName) - ' Uses the global catalog to find the computer in the forest - ' Search also includes deleted computers in the tombstone - Set objRootLDAP = GetObject("LDAP://rootDSE") - namingContext = objRootLDAP.Get("defaultNamingContext") ' e.g. string dc=fabrikam,dc=com - strBase = "" - - Set objConnection = CreateObject("ADODB.Connection") - Set objCommand = CreateObject("ADODB.Command") - objConnection.Provider = "ADsDSOOBject" - objConnection.Open "Active Directory Provider" - Set objCommand.ActiveConnection = objConnection - strFilter = "(&(objectCategory=Computer)(cn=" & strComputerName & "))" - strQuery = strBase & ";" & strFilter & ";distinguishedName;subtree" - objCommand.CommandText = strQuery - objCommand.Properties("Page Size") = 100 - objCommand.Properties("Timeout") = 100 - objCommand.Properties("Cache Results") = False - ' Enumerate all objects found. - Set objRecordSet = objCommand.Execute - If objRecordSet.EOF Then - WScript.echo "The computer name '" & strComputerName & "' cannot be found." - WScript.Quit 1 - End If - ' Found object matching name - Do Until objRecordSet.EOF - dnFound = objRecordSet.Fields("distinguishedName") - GetStrPathToComputer = "LDAP://" & dnFound - objRecordSet.MoveNext - Loop - ' Clean up. - Set objConnection = Nothing - Set objCommand = Nothing - Set objRecordSet = Nothing -End Function -' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -' Securely access the Active Directory computer object using Kerberos -' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Set objDSO = GetObject("LDAP:") -strPathToComputer = GetStrPathToComputer(strComputerName) -WScript.Echo "Accessing object: " + strPathToComputer -Const ADS_SECURE_AUTHENTICATION = 1 -Const ADS_USE_SEALING = 64 '0x40 -Const ADS_USE_SIGNING = 128 '0x80 -' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -' Get all BitLocker recovery information from the Active Directory computer object -' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -' Get all the recovery information child objects of the computer object -Set objFveInfos = objDSO.OpenDSObject(strPathToComputer, vbNullString, vbNullString, _ - ADS_SECURE_AUTHENTICATION + ADS_USE_SEALING + ADS_USE_SIGNING) -objFveInfos.Filter = Array("msFVE-RecoveryInformation") -' Iterate through each recovery information object and saves any existing key packages -nCount = 1 -strFilePathCurrent = strFilePath & nCount -For Each objFveInfo in objFveInfos - strName = objFveInfo.Get("name") - strRecoveryPassword = objFveInfo.Get("msFVE-RecoveryPassword") - strKeyPackage = objFveInfo.Get("msFVE-KeyPackage") - WScript.echo - WScript.echo "Recovery Object Name: " + strName - WScript.echo "Recovery Password: " + strRecoveryPassword - ' Validate file path - Set fso = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject") - If (fso.FileExists(strFilePathCurrent)) Then - WScript.Echo "The file " & strFilePathCurrent & " already exists. Please use a different path." -WScript.Quit -1 - End If - ' Save binary data to the file - SaveBinaryDataText strFilePathCurrent, strKeyPackage - - WScript.echo "Related key package successfully saved to " + strFilePathCurrent - ' Update next file path using base name - nCount = nCount + 1 - strFilePathCurrent = strFilePath & nCount -Next -'---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -' Utility functions to save binary data -'---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Function SaveBinaryDataText(FileName, ByteArray) - 'Create FileSystemObject object - Dim FS: Set FS = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject") - - 'Create text stream object - Dim TextStream - Set TextStream = FS.CreateTextFile(FileName) - - 'Convert binary data To text And write them To the file - TextStream.Write BinaryToString(ByteArray) -End Function -Function BinaryToString(Binary) - Dim I, S - For I = 1 To LenB(Binary) - S = S & Chr(AscB(MidB(Binary, I, 1))) - Next - BinaryToString = S -End Function -WScript.Quit -``` - -
    - -### Running the sample key package retrieval script that exports a new key package from an unlocked, encrypted volume - -The following steps and sample script exports a new key package from an unlocked, encrypted volume. - -1. Save the following sample script in a VBScript file. For example: `GetBitLockerKeyPackage.vbs` - -2. Open an administrator command prompt, and then enter a command similar to the following sample script: - - ```cmd - cscript.exe GetBitLockerKeyPackage.vbs -? - ``` - -
    -
    - Expand to view sample VBscript that exports a new key package from an unlocked, encrypted volume - -```vb -' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -' Usage -' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Sub ShowUsage - Wscript.Echo "USAGE: GetBitLockerKeyPackage [VolumeLetter/DriveLetter:] [Path To Save Key Package]" - Wscript.Echo - Wscript.Echo "Example: GetBitLockerKeyPackage C: E:\bitlocker-backup-key-package" - WScript.Quit -End Sub -' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -' Parse Arguments -' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Set args = WScript.Arguments -Select Case args.Count - Case 2 - If args(0) = "/?" Or args(0) = "-?" Then - ShowUsage - Else - strDriveLetter = args(0) - strFilePath = args(1) - End If - Case Else - ShowUsage -End Select -' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -' Other Inputs -' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -' Target computer name -' Use "." to connect to the local computer -strComputerName = "." -' Default key protector ID to use. Specify "" to let the script choose. -strDefaultKeyProtectorID = "" -' strDefaultKeyProtectorID = "{001298E0-870E-4BA0-A2FF-FC74758D5720}" ' sample -' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -' Connect to the BitLocker WMI provider class -' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -strConnectionStr = "winmgmts:" _ - & "{impersonationLevel=impersonate,authenticationLevel=pktPrivacy}!\\" _ - & strComputerName _ - & "\root\cimv2\Security\MicrosoftVolumeEncryption" - - -On Error Resume Next 'handle permission errors -Set objWMIService = GetObject(strConnectionStr) -If Err.Number <> 0 Then - WScript.Echo "Failed to connect to the BitLocker interface (Error 0x" & Hex(Err.Number) & ")." - Wscript.Echo "Ensure that you are running with administrative privileges." - WScript.Quit -1 -End If -On Error GoTo 0 -strQuery = "Select * from Win32_EncryptableVolume where DriveLetter='" & strDriveLetter & "'" -Set colTargetVolumes = objWMIService.ExecQuery(strQuery) -If colTargetVolumes.Count = 0 Then - WScript.Echo "FAILURE: Unable to find BitLocker-capable drive " & strDriveLetter & " on computer " & strComputerName & "." - WScript.Quit -1 -End If -' there should only be one volume found -For Each objFoundVolume in colTargetVolumes - set objVolume = objFoundVolume -Next -' objVolume is now our found BitLocker-capable disk volume -' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -' Perform BitLocker WMI provider functionality -' -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -' Collect all possible valid key protector ID's that can be used to get the package -' ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -nNumericalKeyProtectorType = 3 ' type associated with "Numerical Password" protector -nRC = objVolume.GetKeyProtectors(nNumericalKeyProtectorType, aNumericalKeyProtectorIDs) -If nRC <> 0 Then -WScript.Echo "FAILURE: GetKeyProtectors failed with return code 0x" & Hex(nRC) -WScript.Quit -1 -End If -nExternalKeyProtectorType = 2 ' type associated with "External Key" protector -nRC = objVolume.GetKeyProtectors(nExternalKeyProtectorType, aExternalKeyProtectorIDs) -If nRC <> 0 Then -WScript.Echo "FAILURE: GetKeyProtectors failed with return code 0x" & Hex(nRC) -WScript.Quit -1 -End If -' Get first key protector of the type "Numerical Password" or "External Key", if any -' ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -if strDefaultKeyProtectorID = "" Then -' Save first numerical password, if exists -If UBound(aNumericalKeyProtectorIDs) <> -1 Then -strDefaultKeyProtectorID = aNumericalKeyProtectorIDs(0) -End If -' No numerical passwords exist, save the first external key -If strDefaultKeyProtectorID = "" and UBound(aExternalKeyProtectorIDs) <> -1 Then -strDefaultKeyProtectorID = aExternalKeyProtectorIDs(0) -End If -' Fail case: no recovery key protectors exist. -If strDefaultKeyProtectorID = "" Then -WScript.Echo "FAILURE: Cannot create backup key package because no recovery passwords or recovery keys exist. Check that BitLocker protection is on for this drive." -WScript.Echo "For help adding recovery passwords or recovery keys, enter ""manage-bde.exe -protectors -add -?""." -WScript.Quit -1 -End If -End If -' Get some information about the chosen key protector ID -' ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -' is the type valid? -nRC = objVolume.GetKeyProtectorType(strDefaultKeyProtectorID, nDefaultKeyProtectorType) -If Hex(nRC) = "80070057" Then -WScript.Echo "The key protector ID " & strDefaultKeyProtectorID & " is not valid." -WScript.Echo "This ID value may have been provided by the script writer." -ElseIf nRC <> 0 Then -WScript.Echo "FAILURE: GetKeyProtectorType failed with return code 0x" & Hex(nRC) -WScript.Quit -1 -End If -' what's a string that can be used to describe it? -strDefaultKeyProtectorType = "" -Select Case nDefaultKeyProtectorType - Case nNumericalKeyProtectorType - strDefaultKeyProtectorType = "recovery password" - Case nExternalKeyProtectorType - strDefaultKeyProtectorType = "recovery key" - Case Else - WScript.Echo "The key protector ID " & strDefaultKeyProtectorID & " does not refer to a valid recovery password or recovery key." - WScript.Echo "This ID value may have been provided by the script writer." -End Select -' Save the backup key package using the chosen key protector ID -' ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -nRC = objVolume.GetKeyPackage(strDefaultKeyProtectorID, oKeyPackage) -If nRC <> 0 Then -WScript.Echo "FAILURE: GetKeyPackage failed with return code 0x" & Hex(nRC) -WScript.Quit -1 -End If -' Validate file path -Set fso = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject") -If (fso.FileExists(strFilePath)) Then -WScript.Echo "The file " & strFilePath & " already exists. Please use a different path." -WScript.Quit -1 -End If -Dim oKeyPackageByte, bKeyPackage -For Each oKeyPackageByte in oKeyPackage - 'WScript.echo "key package byte: " & oKeyPackageByte - bKeyPackage = bKeyPackage & ChrB(oKeyPackageByte) -Next -' Save binary data to the file -SaveBinaryDataText strFilePath, bKeyPackage -' Display helpful information -' ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -WScript.Echo "The backup key package has been saved to " & strFilePath & "." -WScript.Echo "IMPORTANT: To use this key package, the " & strDefaultKeyProtectorType & " must also be saved." -' Display the recovery password or a note about saving the recovery key file -If nDefaultKeyProtectorType = nNumericalKeyProtectorType Then -nRC = objVolume.GetKeyProtectorNumericalPassword(strDefaultKeyProtectorID, sNumericalPassword) -If nRC <> 0 Then -WScript.Echo "FAILURE: GetKeyProtectorNumericalPassword failed with return code 0x" & Hex(nRC) -WScript.Quit -1 -End If -WScript.Echo "Save this recovery password: " & sNumericalPassword -ElseIf nDefaultKeyProtectorType = nExternalKeyProtectorType Then -WScript.Echo "The saved key file is named " & strDefaultKeyProtectorID & ".BEK" -WScript.Echo "For help re-saving this external key file, enter ""manage-bde.exe -protectors -get -?""" -End If -'---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -' Utility functions to save binary data -'---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Function SaveBinaryDataText(FileName, ByteArray) - 'Create FileSystemObject object - Dim FS: Set FS = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject") - - 'Create text stream object - Dim TextStream - Set TextStream = FS.CreateTextFile(FileName) - - 'Convert binary data To text And write them To the file - TextStream.Write BinaryToString(ByteArray) -End Function -Function BinaryToString(Binary) - Dim I, S - For I = 1 To LenB(Binary) - S = S & Chr(AscB(MidB(Binary, I, 1))) - Next - BinaryToString = S -End Function -``` - -
    - -## Related articles - -- [BitLocker overview](index.md) diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-use-bitlocker-drive-encryption-tools-to-manage-bitlocker.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-use-bitlocker-drive-encryption-tools-to-manage-bitlocker.md deleted file mode 100644 index cde89fc313..0000000000 --- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-use-bitlocker-drive-encryption-tools-to-manage-bitlocker.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,228 +0,0 @@ ---- -title: How to use the BitLocker drive encryption tools to manage BitLocker -description: Learn how to use tools to manage BitLocker. -ms.collection: - - tier1 -ms.topic: how-to -ms.date: 07/25/2023 ---- - -# How to use the BitLocker drive encryption tools to manage BitLocker - -BitLocker drive encryption tools include the command-line tools *manage-bde.exe*, *repair-bde.exe*, and the cmdlets for Windows PowerShell. - -The tools can be used to perform any tasks that can be accomplished through the BitLocker control panel and are appropriate to use for automated deployments and other scripting scenarios. - -## Manage-bde - -Manage-bde is a command-line tool that can be used for scripting BitLocker operations. Manage-bde offers additional options not displayed in the BitLocker control panel. For a complete list of the `manage-bde.exe` options, see the [Manage-bde](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/ff829849(v=ws.11)) command-line reference. - -Manage-bde includes fewer default settings and requires greater customization for configuring BitLocker. For example, using just the `manage-bde.exe -on` command on a data volume will fully encrypt the volume without any authenticating protectors. A volume encrypted in this manner still requires user interaction to turn on BitLocker protection, even though the command successfully completed because an authentication method needs to be added to the volume for it to be fully protected. The following sections provide examples of common usage scenarios for manage-bde. - -### Using manage-bde with operating system volumes - -Listed below are examples of basic valid commands for operating system volumes. In general, using only the `manage-bde.exe -on ` command will encrypt the operating system volume with a TPM-only protector and no recovery key. However, many environments require more secure protectors such as passwords or PIN and expect information recovery with a recovery key. It's recommended to add at least one primary protector plus a recovery protector to an operating system volume. - -A good practice when using `manage-bde.exe` is to determine the volume status on the target system. Use the following command to determine volume status: - -```cmd -manage-bde.exe -status -``` - -This command returns the volumes on the target, current encryption status, encryption method, and volume type (operating system or data) for each volume: - -![Using manage-bde to check encryption status.](images/manage-bde-status.png) - -The following example illustrates enabling BitLocker on a computer without a TPM chip. Before beginning the encryption process, the startup key needed for BitLocker must be created and saved to a USB drive. When BitLocker is enabled for the operating system volume, BitLocker will need to access the USB flash drive to obtain the encryption key. In this example, the drive letter E represents the USB drive. Once the commands are run, it will prompt to reboot the computer to complete the encryption process. - -```cmd -manage-bde.exe -protectors -add C: -startupkey E: -manage-bde.exe -on C: -``` - -> [!NOTE] -> After the encryption is completed, the USB startup key must be inserted before the operating system can be started. - -An alternative to the startup key protector on non-TPM hardware is to use a password and an **ADaccountorgroup** protector to protect the operating system volume. In this scenario, the protectors are added first. To add the protectors, enter the following command: - -```cmd -manage-bde.exe -protectors -add C: -pw -sid -``` - -The above command will require the password protector to be entered and confirmed before adding them to the volume. With the protectors enabled on the volume, BitLocker can then be turned on. - -On computers with a TPM, it's possible to encrypt the operating system volume without defining any protectors using `manage-bde.exe`. To enable BitLocker on a computer with a TPM without defining any protectors, enter the following command: - -```cmd -manage-bde.exe -on C: -``` - -The above command encrypts the drive using the TPM as the default protector. If verify if a TPM protector is available, the list of protectors available for a volume can be listed by running the following command: - -```cmd - manage-bde.exe -protectors -get -``` - -### Using manage-bde with data volumes - -Data volumes use the same syntax for encryption as operating system volumes but they don't require protectors for the operation to complete. Encrypting data volumes can be done using the base command: - -`manage-bde.exe -on ` - -or additional protectors can be added to the volume first. It's recommended to add at least one primary protector plus a recovery protector to a data volume. - -A common protector for a data volume is the password protector. In the example below, a password protector is added to the volume and then BitLocker is turned on. - -```cmd -manage-bde.exe -protectors -add -pw C: -manage-bde.exe -on C: -``` - -## BitLocker Repair Tool - -Hard disk areas on which BitLocker stores critical information could be damaged, for example, when a hard disk fails or if Windows exits unexpectedly. - -The BitLocker Repair Tool (*repair-bde.exe*) is useful for disaster recovery scenarios, in which a BitLocker protected drive can't be unlocked normally or using the recovery console. - -The Repair Tool can reconstruct critical parts of the drive and salvage recoverable data, as long as a valid recovery password or recovery key is used to decrypt the data. If the BitLocker metadata data on the drive is corrupt, the backup key package in addition to the recovery password or recovery key must be supplied. The key package is backed up in Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) if the default settings for AD DS backup are used. With the key package and either the recovery password or recovery key, portions of a corrupted BitLocker-protected drive can be decrypted. Each key package works only for a drive that has the corresponding drive identifier. The BitLocker Recovery Password Viewer can be used to obtain this key package from AD DS. - -> [!TIP] -> If recovery information is not backed up to AD DS or if key packages need to be saved in an alternative way, use the following command to generate a key package for a volume: -> -> `manage-bde.exe -KeyPackage` - -The Repair Tool is intended for use when the operating system doesn't start or when the BitLocker Recovery Console can't be started. Use Repair-bde in the following conditions: - -- The drive is encrypted using BitLocker Drive Encryption -- Windows doesn't start, or the BitLocker recovery console can't start -- There isn't a backup copy of the data that is contained on the encrypted drive - -> [!NOTE] -> Damage to the drive may not be related to BitLocker. Therefore, it is recommended to try other tools to help diagnose and resolve the problem with the drive before using the BitLocker Repair Tool. The Windows Recovery Environment (Windows RE) provides additional options to repair computers. - -The following limitations exist for Repair-bde: - -- The Repair-bde command-line tool can't repair a drive that failed during the encryption or decryption process. - -- The Repair-bde command-line tool assumes that if the drive has any encryption, then the drive has been fully encrypted. - -For more information about using repair-bde, see [Repair-bde](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/ff829851(v=ws.11)). - -## BitLocker cmdlets for Windows PowerShell - -Windows PowerShell cmdlets provide a new way for administrators to use when working with BitLocker. Using Windows PowerShell's scripting capabilities, administrators can integrate BitLocker options into existing scripts with ease. The list below displays the available BitLocker cmdlets. - -|Name|Parameters| -|--- |--- | -|**Add-BitLockerKeyProtector**|
  • ADAccountOrGroup
  • ADAccountOrGroupProtector
  • Confirm
  • MountPoint
  • Password
  • PasswordProtector
  • Pin
  • RecoveryKeyPath
  • RecoveryKeyProtector
  • RecoveryPassword
  • RecoveryPasswordProtector
  • Service
  • StartupKeyPath
  • StartupKeyProtector
  • TpmAndPinAndStartupKeyProtector
  • TpmAndPinProtector
  • TpmAndStartupKeyProtector
  • TpmProtector
  • WhatIf| -|**Backup-BitLockerKeyProtector**|
  • Confirm
  • KeyProtectorId
  • MountPoint
  • WhatIf| -|**Disable-BitLocker**|
  • Confirm
  • MountPoint
  • WhatIf| -|**Disable-BitLockerAutoUnlock**|
  • Confirm
  • MountPoint
  • WhatIf| -|**Enable-BitLocker**|
  • AdAccountOrGroup
  • AdAccountOrGroupProtector
  • Confirm
  • EncryptionMethod
  • HardwareEncryption
  • Password
  • PasswordProtector
  • Pin
  • RecoveryKeyPath
  • RecoveryKeyProtector
  • RecoveryPassword
  • RecoveryPasswordProtector
  • Service
  • SkipHardwareTest
  • StartupKeyPath
  • StartupKeyProtector
  • TpmAndPinAndStartupKeyProtector
  • TpmAndPinProtector
  • TpmAndStartupKeyProtector
  • TpmProtector
  • UsedSpaceOnly
  • WhatIf| -|**Enable-BitLockerAutoUnlock**|
  • Confirm
  • MountPoint
  • WhatIf| -|**Get-BitLockerVolume**|
  • MountPoint| -|**Lock-BitLocker**|
  • Confirm
  • ForceDismount
  • MountPoint
  • WhatIf| -|**Remove-BitLockerKeyProtector**|
  • Confirm
  • KeyProtectorId
  • MountPoint
  • WhatIf| -|**Resume-BitLocker**|
  • Confirm
  • MountPoint
  • WhatIf| -|**Suspend-BitLocker**|
  • Confirm
  • MountPoint
  • RebootCount
  • WhatIf| -|**Unlock-BitLocker**|
  • AdAccountOrGroup
  • Confirm
  • MountPoint
  • Password
  • RecoveryKeyPath
  • RecoveryPassword
  • RecoveryPassword
  • WhatIf| - -Similar to manage-bde, the Windows PowerShell cmdlets allow configuration beyond the options offered in the control panel. As with manage-bde, users need to consider the specific needs of the volume they're encrypting prior to running Windows PowerShell cmdlets. - -A good initial step is to determine the current state of the volume(s) on the computer. Determining the current state of the volume(s) can be done using the `Get-BitLockerVolume` cmdlet. - -The `Get-BitLockerVolume` cmdlet output gives information on the volume type, protectors, protection status, and other details. - -> [!TIP] -> Occasionally, all protectors may not be shown when using `Get-BitLockerVolume` due to lack of space in the output display. If all of the protectors for a volume are not seen, use the Windows PowerShell pipe command (|) to format a full listing of the protectors: -> -> `Get-BitLockerVolume C: | fl` - -To remove the existing protectors prior to provisioning BitLocker on the volume, use the `Remove-BitLockerKeyProtector` cmdlet. Running this cmdlet requires the GUID associated with the protector to be removed. - -A simple script can pipe the values of each Get-BitLockerVolume return out to another variable as seen below: - -```powershell -$vol = Get-BitLockerVolume -$keyprotectors = $vol.KeyProtector -``` - -By using this script, the information in the $keyprotectors variable can be displayed to determine the GUID for each protector. - -By using this information, the key protector for a specific volume can be removed using the command: - -```powershell -Remove-BitLockerKeyProtector : -KeyProtectorID "{GUID}" -``` - -> [!NOTE] -> The BitLocker cmdlet requires the key protector GUID enclosed in quotation marks to execute. Ensure the entire GUID, with braces, is included in the command. - -### Using the BitLocker Windows PowerShell cmdlets with operating system volumes - -Using the BitLocker Windows PowerShell cmdlets is similar to working with the manage-bde tool for encrypting operating system volumes. Windows PowerShell offers users flexibility. For example, users can add the desired protector as part command for encrypting the volume. Below are examples of common user scenarios and steps to accomplish them in BitLocker Windows PowerShell. - -The following example shows how to enable BitLocker on an operating system drive using only the TPM protector: - -```powershell -Enable-BitLocker C: -``` - -In the example below, adds one additional protector, the StartupKey protector and chooses to skip the BitLocker hardware test. In this example, encryption starts immediately without the need for a reboot. - -```powershell -Enable-BitLocker C: -StartupKeyProtector -StartupKeyPath -SkipHardwareTest -``` - -### Using the BitLocker Windows PowerShell cmdlets with data volumes - -Data volume encryption using Windows PowerShell is the same as for operating system volumes. Add the desired protectors prior to encrypting the volume. The following example adds a password protector to the E: volume using the variable $pw as the password. The $pw variable is held as a -SecureString value to store the user-defined password. - -```powershell -$pw = Read-Host -AsSecureString - -Enable-BitLockerKeyProtector E: -PasswordProtector -Password $pw -``` - -### Using an AD Account or Group protector in Windows PowerShell - -The **ADAccountOrGroup** protector, introduced in Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012, is an Active Directory SID-based protector. This protector can be added to both operating system and data volumes, although it doesn't unlock operating system volumes in the pre-boot environment. The protector requires the SID for the domain account or group to link with the protector. BitLocker can protect a cluster-aware disk by adding a SID-based protector for the Cluster Name Object (CNO) that lets the disk properly fail over to and become unlocked by any member computer of the cluster. - -> [!WARNING] -> The **ADAccountOrGroup** protector requires the use of an additional protector for use (such as TPM, PIN, or recovery key) when used on operating system volumes - -To add an **ADAccountOrGroup** protector to a volume, use either the actual domain SID or the group name preceded by the domain and a backslash. In the example below, the CONTOSO\\Administrator account is added as a protector to the data volume G. - -```powershell -Enable-BitLocker G: -AdAccountOrGroupProtector -AdAccountOrGroup CONTOSO\Administrator -``` - -For users who wish to use the SID for the account or group, the first step is to determine the SID associated with the account. To get the specific SID for a user account in Windows PowerShell, use the following command: - -> [!NOTE] -> Use of this command requires the RSAT-AD-PowerShell feature. - -```powershell -get-aduser -filter {samaccountname -eq "administrator"} -``` - -> [!TIP] -> In addition to the PowerShell command above, information about the locally logged on user and group membership can be found using: WHOAMI /ALL. This doesn't require the use of additional features. - -The following example adds an **ADAccountOrGroup** protector to the previously encrypted operating system volume using the SID of the account: - -```powershell -Add-BitLockerKeyProtector C: -ADAccountOrGroupProtector -ADAccountOrGroup S-1-5-21-3651336348-8937238915-291003330-500 -``` - -> [!NOTE] -> Active Directory-based protectors are normally used to unlock Failover Cluster enabled volumes. - -## Related articles - -- [BitLocker overview](index.md) -- [BitLocker frequently asked questions (FAQ)](faq.yml) -- [Prepare your organization for BitLocker: Planning and policies](prepare-your-organization-for-bitlocker-planning-and-policies.md) -- [BitLocker: How to enable Network Unlock](bitlocker-how-to-enable-network-unlock.md) -- [BitLocker: How to deploy on Windows Server 2012](bitlocker-how-to-deploy-on-windows-server.md) diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-use-bitlocker-recovery-password-viewer.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-use-bitlocker-recovery-password-viewer.md deleted file mode 100644 index 322c07dbd6..0000000000 --- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-use-bitlocker-recovery-password-viewer.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,45 +0,0 @@ ---- -title: How to use BitLocker Recovery Password Viewer -description: Learn how to use the BitLocker Recovery Password Viewer tool. -ms.collection: - - tier1 -ms.topic: how-to -ms.date: 07/25/2023 ---- - -# How to use BitLocker Recovery Password Viewer - -BitLocker Recovery Password Viewer is an optional tool included with the *Remote Server Administration Tools (RSAT)*. With Recovery Password Viewer you can view the BitLocker recovery passwords that are stored in Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS). The tool is an extension for the *Active Directory Users and Computers Microsoft Management Console (MMC)* snap-in. - -With BitLocker Recovery Password Viewer you can: - -- Check the Active Directory computer object's properties to find the associated BitLocker recovery passwords -- Search Active Directory for BitLocker recovery password across all the domains in the Active Directory forest. Passwords can also be searched by password identifier (ID) - -## Requirements - -To complete the procedures in this scenario, the following requirements must be met: - -- Domain administrator credentials -- Devices must be joined to the domain -- On the domain-joined devices, BitLocker must be enabled - -The following procedures describe the most common tasks performed by using the BitLocker Recovery Password Viewer. - -## View the recovery passwords for a computer object - -1. In **Active Directory Users and Computers**, locate and then select the container in which the computer is located -1. Right-click the computer object and select **Properties** -1. In the **Properties** dialog box, select the **BitLocker Recovery** tab to view the BitLocker recovery passwords that are associated with the computer - -## Copy the recovery passwords for a computer object - -1. Follow the steps in the previous procedure to view the BitLocker recovery passwords -1. On the **BitLocker Recovery** tab of the **Properties** dialog box, right-click the BitLocker recovery password that needs to be copied, and then select **Copy Details** -1. Press CTRL+V to paste the copied text to a destination location, such as a text file or spreadsheet - -## Locate a recovery password by using a password ID - -1. In Active Directory Users and Computers, right-click the domain container and select **Find BitLocker Recovery Password** -1. In the **Find BitLocker Recovery Password** dialog box, type the first eight characters of the recovery password in the **Password ID (first 8 characters)** box, and select **Search** -1. Once the recovery password is located, you can use the previous procedure to copy it diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/configure.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/configure.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2440fda840 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/configure.md @@ -0,0 +1,196 @@ +--- +title: Configure BitLocker +description: Learn about the available options to configure BitLocker and how to configure them via Configuration Service Providers (CSP) or group policy (GPO). +ms.topic: how-to +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +--- + +# Configure BitLocker + +To configure BitLocker, you can use one of the following options: + +- Configuration Service Provider (CSP): this option is commonly used for devices managed by a Mobile Device Management (MDM) solution, like Microsoft Intune. The [BitLocker CSP][WIN-1] is used to configure BitLocker, and to report the status of different BitLocker functions to the MDM solution. With Microsoft Intune, you can use the BitLocker status in [compliance policies][INT-1], combining them with [Conditional Access][ENTRA-1]. Conditional Access can prevent or grant access to services like Exchange Online and SharePoint Online, based on the status of BitLocker. To learn more about the Intune options to configure and monitor BitLocker, check the following articles: + + - [Manage BitLocker policy for Windows devices with Intune][INT-2] + - [Monitor device encryption with Intune][INT-3] + - [Use compliance policies to set rules for devices you manage with Intune][INT-4] + +- Group policy (GPO): this option can be used for devices that are joined to an Active Directory domain and aren't managed by a device management solution. Group policy can also be used for devices that aren't joined to an Active Directory domain, using the local group policy editor +- Microsoft Configuration Manager: this option can be used for devices that are managed by Microsoft Configuration Manager using the BitLocker management agent. To learn more about options to configure BitLocker via Microsoft Configuration Manager, see [Deploy BitLocker management][MCM-1] + +> [!NOTE] +> Windows Server doesn't support the configuration of BitLocker using CSP or Microsoft Configuration Manager. Use GPO instead. + +While many of the BitLocker policy settings can be configured using both CSP and GPO, there are some settings that are only available using one of the options. To learn about the policy settings available for both CSP and GPO, review the section [BitLocker policy settings](#bitlocker-policy-settings). + +[!INCLUDE [bitlocker](../../../../../includes/licensing/bitlocker-management.md)] + +## BitLocker policy settings + +This section describes the policy settings to configure BitLocker via configuration service provider (CSP) and group policy (GPO). + +> [!IMPORTANT] +> Most of the BitLocker policy settings are enforced when BitLocker is initially turned on for a drive. Encryption isn't restarted if settings change. + +### Policy settings list + +The list of settings is sorted alphabetically and organized in four categories: + +- **Common settings**: settings applicable to all BitLocker-protected drives +- **Operating system drive**: settings applicable to the drive where Windows is installed +- **Fixed data drives**: settings applicable to any local drives, except the operating system drive +- **Removable data drives**: settings applicable to any removable drives + +Select one of the tabs to see the list of available settings: + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/locked-drive.svg"::: **Common settings**](#tab/common) + +The following table lists the BitLocker policies applicable to all drive types, indicating if they're applicable via configuration service provider (CSP) and/or group policy (GPO). Select the policy name for more details. + +|Policy name| CSP | GPO | +|-|-|-| +|[Allow standard user encryption](#allow-standard-user-encryption)|✅|❌| +|[Choose default folder for recovery password](#choose-default-folder-for-recovery-password)|❌|✅| +|[Choose drive encryption method and cipher strength](#choose-drive-encryption-method-and-cipher-strength)|✅|✅| +|[Configure recovery password rotation](#configure-recovery-password-rotation)|✅|❌| +|[Disable new DMA devices when this computer is locked](#disable-new-dma-devices-when-this-computer-is-locked)|❌|✅| +|[Prevent memory overwrite on restart](#prevent-memory-overwrite-on-restart)|❌|✅| +|[Provide the unique identifiers for your organization](#provide-the-unique-identifiers-for-your-organization)|✅|✅| +|[Require device encryption](#require-device-encryption)|✅|❌| +|[Validate smart card certificate usage rule compliance](#validate-smart-card-certificate-usage-rule-compliance)|❌|✅| + +[!INCLUDE [allow-standard-user-encryption](includes/allow-standard-user-encryption.md)] +[!INCLUDE [choose-default-folder-for-recovery-password](includes/choose-default-folder-for-recovery-password.md)] +[!INCLUDE [choose-drive-encryption-method-and-cipher-strength](includes/choose-drive-encryption-method-and-cipher-strength.md)] +[!INCLUDE [configure-recovery-password-rotation](includes/configure-recovery-password-rotation.md)] +[!INCLUDE [disable-new-dma-devices-when-this-computer-is-locked](includes/disable-new-dma-devices-when-this-computer-is-locked.md)] +[!INCLUDE [prevent-memory-overwrite-on-restart](includes/prevent-memory-overwrite-on-restart.md)] +[!INCLUDE [provide-the-unique-identifiers-for-your-organization](includes/provide-the-unique-identifiers-for-your-organization.md)] +[!INCLUDE [require-device-encryption](includes/require-device-encryption.md)] +[!INCLUDE [validate-smart-card-certificate-usage-rule-compliance](includes/validate-smart-card-certificate-usage-rule-compliance.md)] + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/os-drive.svg"::: **Operating system drive**](#tab/os) + +|Policy name| CSP | GPO | +|-|-|-| +|[Allow devices compliant with InstantGo or HSTI to opt out of pre-boot PIN](#allow-devices-compliant-with-instantgo-or-hsti-to-opt-out-of-preboot-pin)|✅|✅| +|[Allow enhanced PINs for startup](#allow-enhanced-pins-for-startup)|✅|✅| +|[Allow network unlock at startup](#allow-network-unlock-at-startup)|❌|✅| +|[Allow Secure Boot for integrity validation](#allow-secure-boot-for-integrity-validation)|❌|✅| +|[Allow Warning For Other Disk Encryption](#allow-warning-for-other-disk-encryption)|✅|❌| +|[Choose how BitLocker-protected operating system drives can be recovered](#choose-how-bitlocker-protected-operating-system-drives-can-be-recovered)|✅|✅| +|[Configure minimum PIN length for startup](#configure-minimum-pin-length-for-startup)|✅|✅| +|[Configure pre-boot recovery message and URL](#configure-preboot-recovery-message-and-url)|✅|✅| +|[Configure TPM platform validation profile for BIOS-based firmware configurations](#configure-tpm-platform-validation-profile-for-bios-based-firmware-configurations)|❌|✅| +|[Configure TPM platform validation profile for native UEFI firmware configurations](#configure-tpm-platform-validation-profile-for-native-uefi-firmware-configurations)|❌|✅| +|[Configure use of hardware-based encryption for operating system drives](#configure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-operating-system-drives)|❌|✅| +|[Configure use of passwords for operating system drives](#configure-use-of-passwords-for-operating-system-drives)|❌|✅| +|[Disallow standard users from changing the PIN or password](#disallow-standard-users-from-changing-the-pin-or-password)|✅|✅| +|[Enable use of BitLocker authentication requiring preboot keyboard input on slates](#enable-use-of-bitlocker-authentication-requiring-preboot-keyboard-input-on-slates)|✅|✅| +|[Enforce drive encryption type on operating system drives](#enforce-drive-encryption-type-on-operating-system-drives)|✅|✅| +|[Require additional authentication at startup](#require-additional-authentication-at-startup)|✅|✅| +|[Reset platform validation data after BitLocker recovery](#reset-platform-validation-data-after-bitlocker-recovery)|❌|✅| +|[Use enhanced Boot Configuration Data validation profile](#use-enhanced-boot-configuration-data-validation-profile)|❌|✅| + +[!INCLUDE [allow-devices-compliant-with-instantgo-or-hsti-to-opt-out-of-pre-boot-pin](includes/allow-devices-compliant-with-instantgo-or-hsti-to-opt-out-of-pre-boot-pin.md)] +[!INCLUDE [allow-enhanced-pins-for-startup](includes/allow-enhanced-pins-for-startup.md)] +[!INCLUDE [allow-network-unlock-at-startup](includes/allow-network-unlock-at-startup.md)] +[!INCLUDE [allow-secure-boot-for-integrity-validation](includes/allow-secure-boot-for-integrity-validation.md)] +[!INCLUDE [allow-warning-for-other-disk-encryption](includes/allow-warning-for-other-disk-encryption.md)] +[!INCLUDE [choose-how-bitlocker-protected-operating-system-drives-can-be-recovered](includes/choose-how-bitlocker-protected-operating-system-drives-can-be-recovered.md)] +[!INCLUDE [configure-minimum-pin-length-for-startup](includes/configure-minimum-pin-length-for-startup.md)] +[!INCLUDE [configure-pre-boot-recovery-message-and-url](includes/configure-pre-boot-recovery-message-and-url.md)] +[!INCLUDE [configure-tpm-platform-validation-profile-for-bios-based-firmware-configurations](includes/configure-tpm-platform-validation-profile-for-bios-based-firmware-configurations.md)] +[!INCLUDE [configure-tpm-platform-validation-profile-for-native-uefi-firmware-configurations](includes/configure-tpm-platform-validation-profile-for-native-uefi-firmware-configurations.md)] +[!INCLUDE [configure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-operating-system-drives](includes/configure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-operating-system-drives.md)] +[!INCLUDE [configure-use-of-passwords-for-operating-system-drives](includes/configure-use-of-passwords-for-operating-system-drives.md)] +[!INCLUDE [disallow-standard-users-from-changing-the-pin-or-password](includes/disallow-standard-users-from-changing-the-pin-or-password.md)] +[!INCLUDE [enable-use-of-bitlocker-authentication-requiring-preboot-keyboard-input-on-slates](includes/enable-use-of-bitlocker-authentication-requiring-preboot-keyboard-input-on-slates.md)] +[!INCLUDE [enforce-drive-encryption-type-on-operating-system-drives](includes/enforce-drive-encryption-type-on-operating-system-drives.md)] +[!INCLUDE [require-additional-authentication-at-startup](includes/require-additional-authentication-at-startup.md)] +[!INCLUDE [reset-platform-validation-data-after-bitlocker-recovery](includes/reset-platform-validation-data-after-bitlocker-recovery.md)] +[!INCLUDE [use-enhanced-boot-configuration-data-validation-profile](includes/use-enhanced-boot-configuration-data-validation-profile.md)] + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/unlocked-drive.svg"::: **Fixed data drives**](#tab/fixed) + +|Policy name| CSP | GPO | +|-|-|-| +|[Choose how BitLocker-protected fixed drives can be recovered](#choose-how-bitlocker-protected-fixed-drives-can-be-recovered)|✅|✅| +|[Configure use of hardware-based encryption for fixed data drives](#configure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-fixed-data-drives)|❌|✅| +|[Configure use of passwords for fixed data drives](#configure-use-of-passwords-for-fixed-data-drives)|❌|✅| +|[Configure use of smart cards on fixed data drives](#configure-use-of-smart-cards-on-fixed-data-drives)|❌|✅| +|[Deny write access to fixed drives not protected by BitLocker](#deny-write-access-to-fixed-drives-not-protected-by-bitlocker)|✅|✅| +|[Enforce drive encryption type on fixed data drives](#enforce-drive-encryption-type-on-fixed-data-drives)|✅|✅| + +[!INCLUDE [choose-how-bitlocker-protected-fixed-drives-can-be-recovered](includes/choose-how-bitlocker-protected-fixed-drives-can-be-recovered.md)] +[!INCLUDE [configure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-fixed-data-drives](includes/configure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-fixed-data-drives.md)] +[!INCLUDE [configure-use-of-passwords-for-fixed-data-drives](includes/configure-use-of-passwords-for-fixed-data-drives.md)] +[!INCLUDE [configure-use-of-smart-cards-on-fixed-data-drives](includes/configure-use-of-smart-cards-on-fixed-data-drives.md)] +[!INCLUDE [deny-write-access-to-fixed-drives-not-protected-by-bitlocker](includes/deny-write-access-to-fixed-drives-not-protected-by-bitlocker.md)] +[!INCLUDE [enforce-drive-encryption-type-on-fixed-data-drives](includes/enforce-drive-encryption-type-on-fixed-data-drives.md)] + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/unlocked-drive.svg"::: **Removable data drives**](#tab/removable) + +|Policy name| CSP | GPO | +|-|-|-| +|[Choose how BitLocker-protected removable drives can be recovered](#choose-how-bitlocker-protected-removable-drives-can-be-recovered)|❌|✅| +|[Configure use of hardware-based encryption for removable data drives](#configure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-removable-data-drives)|❌|✅| +|[Configure use of passwords for removable data drives](#configure-use-of-passwords-for-removable-data-drives)|❌|✅| +|[Configure use of smart cards on removable data drives](#configure-use-of-smart-cards-on-removable-data-drives)|❌|✅| +|[Control use of BitLocker on removable drives](#control-use-of-bitlocker-on-removable-drives)|✅|✅| +|[Deny write access to removable drives not protected by BitLocker](#deny-write-access-to-removable-drives-not-protected-by-bitlocker)|✅|✅| +|[Enforce drive encryption type on removable data drives](#enforce-drive-encryption-type-on-removable-data-drives)|✅|✅| +|[Removable Drives Excluded From Encryption](#removable-drives-excluded-from-encryption)|✅|❌| + +[!INCLUDE [choose-how-bitlocker-protected-removable-drives-can-be-recovered](includes/choose-how-bitlocker-protected-removable-drives-can-be-recovered.md)] +[!INCLUDE [configure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-removable-data-drives](includes/configure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-removable-data-drives.md)] +[!INCLUDE [configure-use-of-passwords-for-removable-data-drives](includes/configure-use-of-passwords-for-removable-data-drives.md)] +[!INCLUDE [configure-use-of-smart-cards-on-removable-data-drives](includes/configure-use-of-smart-cards-on-removable-data-drives.md)] +[!INCLUDE [control-use-of-bitlocker-on-removable-drives](includes/control-use-of-bitlocker-on-removable-drives.md)] +[!INCLUDE [deny-write-access-to-removable-drives-not-protected-by-bitlocker](includes/deny-write-access-to-removable-drives-not-protected-by-bitlocker.md)] +[!INCLUDE [enforce-drive-encryption-type-on-removable-data-drives](includes/enforce-drive-encryption-type-on-removable-data-drives.md)] +[!INCLUDE [removable-drives-excluded-from-encryption](includes/removable-drives-excluded-from-encryption.md)] + +--- + +## BitLocker and policy settings compliance + +If a device isn't compliant with the configured policy settings, BitLocker might not be turned on, or BitLocker configuration might be modified until the device is in a compliant state. When a drive becomes out of compliance with policy settings, only changes to the BitLocker configuration that will bring it into compliance are allowed. Such scenario could occur, for example, if a previously encrypted drive becomes noncompliant by a policy setting change. + +If multiple changes are necessary to bring the drive into compliance, BitLocker protection might need to be suspended, the necessary changes made, and then protection resumed. Such situation could occur, for example, if a removable drive is initially configured for unlock with a password, and then policy settings are changed to require smart cards. In this scenario, BitLocker protection needs to be suspended, delete the password unlock method, and add the smart card method. After this process is complete, BitLocker is compliant with the policy setting, and BitLocker protection on the drive can be resumed. + +In other scenarios, to bring the drive into compliance with a change in policy settings, BitLocker might need to be disabled and the drive decrypted followed by re-enabling BitLocker and then re-encrypting the drive. An example of this scenario is when the BitLocker encryption method or cipher strength is changed. + +To learn more how to manage BitLocker, review the [BitLocker operations guide](operations-guide.md). + +## Configure and manage servers + +Servers are often deployed, configured, and managed using PowerShell. The recommendation is to use group policy settings to configure BitLocker on servers, and to manage BitLocker using PowerShell. + +BitLocker is an optional component in Windows Server. Follow the directions in [Install BitLocker on Windows Server](install-server.md) to add the BitLocker optional component. + +The Minimal Server Interface is a prerequisite for some of the BitLocker administration tools. On a [Server Core][WIN-2] installation, the necessary GUI components must be added first. The steps to add shell components to Server Core are described in [Using Features on Demand with Updated Systems and Patched Images][ARC-1] and [How to update local source media to add roles and features][ARC-2]. If a server is installed manually, then choosing [Server with Desktop Experience][WIN-3] is the easiest path because it avoids performing the steps to add a GUI to Server Core. + + Lights-out data centers can take advantage of the enhanced security of a second factor while avoiding the need for user intervention during reboots by optionally using a combination of BitLocker (TPM+PIN) and BitLocker Network Unlock. BitLocker Network Unlock brings together the best of hardware protection, location dependence, and automatic unlock, while in the trusted location. For the configuration steps, see [Network Unlock](network-unlock.md). + +## Next steps + +> [!div class="nextstepaction"] +> Review the BitLocker operations guide to learn how to use different tools to manage and operate BitLocker. +> +> +> [BitLocker operations guide >](operations-guide.md) + + + +[ARC-1]: /archive/blogs/server_core/using-features-on-demand-with-updated-systems-and-patched-images +[ARC-2]: /archive/blogs/joscon/how-to-update-local-source-media-to-add-roles-and-features +[ENTRA-1]: /entra/identity/conditional-access/overview +[INT-1]: /mem/intune/protect/compliance-policy-create-windows#encryption +[INT-2]: /mem/intune/protect/encrypt-devices#rotate-bitlocker-recovery-keys +[INT-3]: /mem/intune/protect/encryption-monitor +[INT-4]: /mem/intune/protect/device-compliance-get-started +[MCM-1]: /mem/configmgr/protect/deploy-use/bitlocker/deploy-management-agent +[WIN-1]: /windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp +[WIN-2]: /windows-server/get-started/getting-started-with-server-core/ +[WIN-3]: /windows-server/get-started/getting-started-with-server-with-desktop-experience/ diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/countermeasures.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/countermeasures.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..62dbc91a63 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/countermeasures.md @@ -0,0 +1,152 @@ +--- +title: BitLocker countermeasures +description: Learn about technologies and features to protect against attacks on the BitLocker encryption key. +ms.topic: concept-article +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +--- + +# BitLocker countermeasures + +Windows uses hardware solutions and security features that protect BitLocker encryption keys against attacks. These technologies include *Trusted Platform Module (TPM)*, *Secure Boot*, and *Measured Boot*. + +## Protection before startup + +Before Windows starts, security features implemented as part of the device hardware and firmware must be relied on, including TPM and secure boot: + +- a *TPM* is a chip designed to provide basic security-related functions, primarily involving encryption keys. BitLocker binds encryption keys with the TPM to ensure that the device hasn't been tampered with while the system is offline. For more information about TPM, see [Trusted Platform Module][WIN-1] +- *Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI)* is a programmable boot environment that initializes devices and starts the operating system's bootloader. The UEFI specification defines a firmware execution authentication process called [Secure Boot](../../system-security/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process.md) +- *Secure Boot* blocks untrusted firmware and bootloaders (signed or unsigned) from being able to start on the system. By default, BitLocker provides integrity protection for Secure Boot by utilizing the TPM PCR[7] measurement. An unauthorized EFI firmware, EFI boot application, or bootloader can't run and acquire the BitLocker key + +### BitLocker and reset attacks + +To defend against malicious reset attacks, BitLocker uses the *TCG Reset Attack Mitigation*, also known as *MOR bit* (Memory Overwrite Request), before extracting keys into memory. + +## Security policies + +Preboot authentication and DMA policies provide extra protection for BitLocker. + +### Preboot authentication + +Preboot authentication with BitLocker can require the use of either user input, such as a PIN, a startup key, or both to authenticate prior to making the contents of the system drive accessible. + +BitLocker accesses and stores the encryption keys in memory only after preboot authentication is completed. If Windows can't access the encryption keys, the device can't read or edit the files on the system drive. The only option for bypassing preboot authentication is entering the *recovery key*. + +Preboot authentication is designed to prevent the encryption keys from being loaded to system memory without the trusted user supplying another authentication factor. This feature helps mitigate DMA and memory remanence attacks. + +On devices with a compatible TPM, operating system drives that are BitLocker-protected can be unlocked in four ways: + +- **TPM-only**: this option doesn't require any interaction with the user to unlock and provide access to the drive. If the TPM validation succeeds, the user sign-in experience is the same as a standard sign-in. If the TPM is missing or changed, or if BitLocker detects changes to the BIOS or UEFI configuration, critical operating system startup files, or the boot configuration, BitLocker enters recovery mode. The user must then enter a recovery password to regain access to the data. This option is more convenient for sign-in but less secure than the other options, which require an additional authentication factor +- **TPM with startup key**: in addition to the protection that the TPM-only provides, part of the encryption key is stored on a USB flash drive, referred to as a *startup key*. Data on the encrypted volume can't be accessed without the startup key +- **TPM with PIN**: in addition to the protection that the TPM provides, BitLocker requires that the user enters a PIN. Data on the encrypted volume can't be accessed without entering the PIN. TPMs also have [anti-hammering protection][WIN-2] that is designed to prevent brute force attacks that attempt to determine the PIN +- **TPM with startup key and PIN**: in addition to the protection that the TPM provides, part of the encryption key is stored on a USB flash drive, and a PIN is required to authenticate the user to the TPM. This configuration provides multifactor authentication so that if the USB key is lost or stolen, it can't be used for access to the drive, because the PIN is also required + +Preboot authentication with a PIN can mitigate an attack vector for devices that use a bootable eDrive because an exposed eDrive bus can allow an attacker to capture the BitLocker encryption key during startup. Preboot authentication with a PIN can also mitigate DMA port attacks during the window of time between when BitLocker unlocks the drive and Windows boots to the point that Windows can set any port-related policies that have been configured. + +On the other hand, Preboot authentication-prompts can be inconvenient to users. In addition, users who forget their PIN or lose their startup key are denied access to their data until they can contact their organization's support team to obtain a recovery key. Preboot authentication can also make it more difficult to update unattended or remotely administered devices because a PIN must be entered when a device reboots or resumes from hibernation. + +To address these issues, [BitLocker Network Unlock](network-unlock.md) can be deployed. Network Unlock allows systems that meet the hardware requirements and have BitLocker enabled with TPM+PIN to boot into Windows without user intervention. It requires direct ethernet connectivity to a Windows Deployment Services (WDS) server. + +To learn more, see the policy setting [Require additional authentication at startup](configure.md?tabs=os#require-additional-authentication-at-startup). + +### Protect DMA ports + +It's important to protect DMA ports, as external peripherals might gain unauthorized access to memory. Depending on the device capabilities, there are different options to protect DMA ports. To learn more, see the policy setting [Disable new DMA devices when this computer is locked](configure.md?tabs=common#disable-new-dma-devices-when-this-computer-is-locked). + +## Attack countermeasures + +This section covers countermeasures for specific types of attacks. + +### Bootkits and rootkits + +A physically present attacker might attempt to install a bootkit or rootkit-like piece of software into the boot chain in an attempt to steal the BitLocker keys. The TPM should observe this installation via PCR measurements, and the BitLocker key isn't released. + +> [!NOTE] +> BitLocker protects against this attack by default. + +A BIOS password is recommended for defense-in-depth in case a BIOS exposes settings that might weaken the BitLocker security promise. Intel Boot Guard and AMD Hardware Verified Boot support stronger implementations of Secure Boot that provide additional resilience against malware and physical attacks. Intel Boot Guard and AMD Hardware Verified Boot are part of platform boot verification [standards for a highly secure Windows device][WIN-3]. + +### Brute force attacks against a PIN + +Require TPM + PIN for anti-hammering protection. + +### DMA attacks + +See [Protect DMA ports](#protect-dma-ports) earlier in this article. + +### Paging file, crash dump, and Hyberfil.sys attacks + +These files are secured on an encrypted volume by default when BitLocker is enabled on OS drives. It also blocks automatic or manual attempts to move the paging file. + +### Memory remanence + +Enable secure boot and mandatorily use a password to change BIOS settings. For scenarios requiring protection against these advanced attacks, configure a `TPM+PIN` protector, disable *standby* power management, and shut down or hibernate the device before it leaves the control of an authorized user. + +The Windows default power settings cause devices to enter *sleep mode* when idle. When a device transitions to sleep, running programs and documents are persisted in memory. When a device resumes from sleep, users aren't required to reauthenticate with a PIN or USB startup key to access encrypted data. This scenario might lead to conditions where data security is compromised. + +When a device *hibernates*, the drive is locked. When the device resumes from hibernation, the drive is unlocked, which means that users must provide a PIN or a startup key if using multifactor authentication with BitLocker. + +Therefore, organizations that use BitLocker might want to use Hibernate instead of Sleep for improved security. + +> [!NOTE] +> This setting doesn't have an impact on TPM-only mode, because it provides a transparent user experience at startup and when resuming from the Hibernate states. + +### Tricking BitLocker to pass the key to a rogue operating system + +An attacker might modify the boot manager configuration database (BCD), which is stored on a nonencrypted partition and add an entry point to a rogue operating system on a different partition. During the boot process, BitLocker code makes sure that the operating system that the encryption key obtained from the TPM is given to, is cryptographically verified to be the intended recipient. Because this strong cryptographic verification already exists, we don't recommend storing a hash of a disk partition table in Platform Configuration Register (PCR) 5. + +An attacker might also replace the entire operating system disk while preserving the platform hardware and firmware and could then extract a protected BitLocker key blob from the metadata of the victim OS partition. The attacker could then attempt to unseal that BitLocker key blob by calling the TPM API from an operating system under their control. This can't succeed because when Windows seals the BitLocker key to the TPM, it does it with a PCR 11 value of 0. To successfully unseal the blob, PCR 11 in the TPM must have a value of 0. However, when the boot manager passes the control to any boot loader (legitimate or rogue) it always changes PCR 11 to a value of 1. Since the PCR 11 value is guaranteed to be different after exiting the boot manager, the attacker can't unlock the BitLocker key. + +## Attacker countermeasures + +The following sections cover mitigations for different types of attackers. + +### Attacker without much skill or with limited physical access + +Physical access might be limited in a form factor that doesn't expose buses and memory. For example, there are no external DMA-capable ports, no exposed screws to open the chassis, and memory is soldered to the mainboard. + +This attacker of opportunity doesn't use destructive methods or sophisticated forensics hardware/software. + +Mitigation: + +- Preboot authentication set to TPM only (the default) + +### Attacker with skill and lengthy physical access + +Targeted attack with plenty of time; the attacker opens the case, solder, and uses sophisticated hardware or software. + +Mitigation: + +- Preboot authentication set to TPM with a PIN protector (with a sophisticated alphanumeric PIN [enhanced pin] to help the TPM anti-hammering mitigation). + + -And- + +- Disable Standby power management and shut down or hibernate the device before it leaves the control of an authorized user. This configuration can be set using the following policy settings: + + - **Computer Configuration** > **Policies** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **File Explorer** > **Show hibernate in the power options menu** + - **Computer Configuration** > **Policies** > **Administrative Templates** > **Power Management** > **Sleep Settings** > + - **Allow standby states (S1-S3) when sleeping (plugged in)** + - **Allow standby states (S1-S3) when sleeping (on battery)** + +> [!IMPORTANT] +> These settings are **not configured** by default. + +For some systems, bypassing TPM-only might require opening the case and require soldering, but can be done for a reasonable cost. Bypassing a TPM with a PIN protector would cost more, and require brute forcing the PIN. With a sophisticated enhanced PIN, it could be nearly impossible. To learn more about the policy setting, see [Allow enhanced PINs for startup](configure.md?tabs=os#allow-enhanced-pins-for-startup). + +For secure administrative workstations, it's recommended to: + +- use a TPM with PIN protector +- disable standby power management +- shut down or hibernate the device before it leaves the control of an authorized user + +## Next steps + +> [!div class="nextstepaction"] +> Learn how to plan for a BitLocker deployment in your organization: +> +> [BitLocker planning guide >](planning-guide.md) + + + +[WIN-1]: /windows/device-security/tpm/trusted-platform-module-overview +[WIN-2]: /windows/security/hardware-protection/tpm/tpm-fundamentals#anti-hammering +[WIN-3]: /windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-highly-secure diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/protecting-cluster-shared-volumes-and-storage-area-networks-with-bitlocker.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/csv-san.md similarity index 84% rename from windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/protecting-cluster-shared-volumes-and-storage-area-networks-with-bitlocker.md rename to windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/csv-san.md index fd2168f6bb..6eac3ac628 100644 --- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/protecting-cluster-shared-volumes-and-storage-area-networks-with-bitlocker.md +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/csv-san.md @@ -1,33 +1,31 @@ --- -title: Protecting cluster shared volumes and storage area networks with BitLocker -description: This article for IT pros describes how to protect CSVs and SANs with BitLocker. -ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 11/08/2022 +title: Protect cluster shared volumes and storage area networks with BitLocker +description: Learn how to protect cluster shared volumes (CSV) and storage area networks (SAN) with BitLocker. +ms.topic: how-to +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +appliesto: +- ✅ Windows Server 2022 +- ✅ Windows Server 2019 +- ✅ Windows Server 2016 --- -# Protecting cluster shared volumes and storage area networks with BitLocker +# Protect cluster shared volumes and storage area networks with BitLocker -**Applies to:** +This article describes the procedure to protect cluster shared volumes (CSVs) and storage area networks (SANs) with BitLocker. -- Windows Server 2016 and above +BitLocker protects both physical disk resources and cluster shared volumes version 2.0 (CSV2.0). BitLocker on clustered volumes provides an extra layer of protection that can be used to protect sensitive, highly available data. The administrators use this extra layer of protection to increase the security to resources. Only certain user accounts provided access to unlock the BitLocker volume. -This article describes the procedure to protect cluster shared volumes (CSVs) and storage area networks (SANs) by using BitLocker. +## Configure BitLocker on cluster shared volumes -BitLocker protects both physical disk resources and cluster shared volumes version 2.0 (CSV2.0). BitLocker on clustered volumes provides an extra layer of protection that can be used by administrators wishing to protect sensitive, highly available data. The administrators use this extra layer of protection to increase the security to resources. Only certain user accounts provided access to unlock the BitLocker volume. - -## Configuring BitLocker on Cluster Shared Volumes - -### Using BitLocker with clustered volumes - -Volumes within a cluster are managed with the help of BitLocker based on how the cluster service "views" the volume to be protected. The volume can be a physical disk resource such as a logical unit number (LUN) on a SAN or network attached storage (NAS). +Volumes within a cluster are managed with the help of BitLocker based on how the cluster service *sees* the volume to be protected. The volume can be a physical disk resource such as a logical unit number (LUN) on a SAN, or network attached storage (NAS). > [!IMPORTANT] -> SANs used with BitLocker must have obtained Windows Hardware Certification. For more info, see [Windows Hardware Lab Kit](/windows-hardware/drivers/). +> SANs used with BitLocker must have obtained Windows Hardware Certification. For more information, check [Windows Hardware Lab Kit](/windows-hardware/drivers/). -Instead, the volume can be a cluster-shared volume. Windows Server 2012 expanded the CSV architecture, now known as CSV2.0, to enable support for BitLocker. The volumes that are designated for a cluster must do the following tasks: +The volumes that are designated for a cluster must do the following tasks: -- It must turn on BitLocker—only after this task is done, can the volumes be added to the storage pool. -- It must put the resource into maintenance mode before BitLocker operations are completed. +- turn on BitLocker: only after this task is done, the volumes can be added to the storage pool +- must put the resource into maintenance mode before BitLocker operations are completed. Windows PowerShell or the `manage-bde.exe` command-line tool is the preferred method to manage BitLocker on CSV2.0 volumes. This method is recommended over the BitLocker Control Panel item because CSV2.0 volumes are mount points. Mount points are an NTFS object that is used to provide an entry point to other volumes. Mount points don't require the use of a drive letter. Volumes that lack drive letters don't appear in the BitLocker Control Panel item. Additionally, the new Active Directory-based protector option required for cluster disk resource or CSV2.0 resources isn't available in the Control Panel item. @@ -60,7 +58,7 @@ An Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) protector can also be used for prote BitLocker encryption is available for disks before these disks are added to a cluster storage pool. > [!NOTE] -> The advantage of The Bitlocker encryption can even be made available for disks after they are added to a cluster storage pool. +> The advantage of The BitLocker encryption can even be made available for disks after they are added to a cluster storage pool. The advantage of encrypting volumes prior to adding them to a cluster is that the disk resource need not be suspended to complete the operation. To turn on BitLocker for a disk before adding it to a cluster: @@ -92,27 +90,19 @@ To turn on BitLocker for a disk before adding it to a cluster: When the cluster service owns a disk resource already, the disk resource needs to be set into maintenance mode before BitLocker can be enabled. To turn on the BitLocker for a clustered disk using Windows PowerShell, perform the following steps: 1. Install the BitLocker drive encryption feature if it isn't already installed. - 2. Check the status of the cluster disk using Windows PowerShell. - ```powershell Get-ClusterResource "Cluster Disk 1" ``` - 3. Put the physical disk resource into maintenance mode using Windows PowerShell. - ```powershell Get-ClusterResource "Cluster Disk 1" | Suspend-ClusterResource ``` - 4. Identify the name of the cluster with Windows PowerShell. - ```powershell Get-Cluster ``` - 5. Enable BitLocker a volume with an **ADAccountOrGroup** protector, using the cluster name. For example, use a command such as: - ```powershell Enable-BitLocker E: -ADAccountOrGroupProtector -ADAccountOrGroup CLUSTER$ ``` @@ -133,17 +123,14 @@ When the cluster service owns a disk resource already, the disk resource needs t **`Manage-bde.exe`** can also be used to enable BitLocker on clustered volumes. The steps needed to add a physical disk resource or CSV2.0 volume to an existing cluster are: 1. Verify that the BitLocker drive encryption feature is installed on the computer. - 2. Ensure new storage is formatted as NTFS. - -3. Encrypt the volume, add a recovery key and add the cluster administrator as a protector key using **`manage-bde.exe`** in a command prompt window. For example: +3. Encrypt the volume, add a recovery key and add the cluster administrator as a protector key using **`manage-bde.exe`** in a Command Prompt window. For example: ```cmd manage-bde.exe -on -used -RP -sid domain\CNO$ -sync ``` 1. BitLocker will check to see if the disk is already part of a cluster. If it is, administrators will encounter a hard block. Otherwise, the encryption continues. - 2. Using the -sync parameter is optional. However, using the -sync parameter has the advantage of ensuring the command waits until the encryption for the volume is completed. The volume is then released for use in the cluster storage pool. 4. Open the Failover Cluster Manager snap-in or cluster PowerShell cmdlets to enable the disk to be clustered. @@ -153,7 +140,6 @@ When the cluster service owns a disk resource already, the disk resource needs t 5. During the resource online operation, cluster checks whether the disk is BitLocker encrypted. 1. If the volume isn't BitLocker enabled, traditional cluster online operations occur. - 2. If the volume is BitLocker enabled, BitLocker checks if the volume is **locked**. If the volume is **locked**, BitLocker impersonates the CNO and unlocks the volume using the CNO protector. If these actions by BitLocker fail, an event is logged. The logged event will state that the volume couldn't be unlocked and the online operation has failed. 6. Once the disk is online in the storage pool, it can be added to a CSV by right-clicking the disk resource, and choosing "**Add to cluster shared volumes**". @@ -196,16 +182,10 @@ In the case where a physical disk resource experiences a failover event during c Some other considerations to take into account for BitLocker on clustered storage include: -- BitLocker volumes have to be initialized and begin encryption before they're available to add to a CSV2.0 volume. - -- If an administrator needs to decrypt a CSV volume, remove the volume from the cluster or put it into disk maintenance mode. The CSV can be added back to the cluster while waiting for decryption to complete. - -- If an administrator needs to start encrypting a CSV volume, remove the volume from the cluster or put it into maintenance mode. - -- If conversion is paused with encryption in progress and the CSV volume is offline from the cluster, the cluster thread (health check) automatically resumes conversion when the volume is online to the cluster. - -- If conversion is paused with encryption in progress and a physical disk resource volume is offline from the cluster, the BitLocker driver automatically resumes conversion when the volume is online to the cluster. - -- If conversion is paused with encryption in progress, while the CSV volume is in maintenance mode, the cluster thread (health check) automatically resumes conversion when moving the volume back from maintenance. - -- If conversion is paused with encryption in progress, while the disk resource volume is in maintenance mode, the BitLocker driver automatically resumes conversion when the volume is moved back from maintenance mode. +- BitLocker volumes have to be initialized and begin encryption before they're available to add to a CSV2.0 volume +- If an administrator needs to decrypt a CSV volume, remove the volume from the cluster or put it into disk maintenance mode. The CSV can be added back to the cluster while waiting for decryption to complete +- If an administrator needs to start encrypting a CSV volume, remove the volume from the cluster or put it into maintenance mode +- If conversion is paused with encryption in progress and the CSV volume is offline from the cluster, the cluster thread (health check) automatically resumes conversion when the volume is online to the cluster +- If conversion is paused with encryption in progress and a physical disk resource volume is offline from the cluster, the BitLocker driver automatically resumes conversion when the volume is online to the cluster +- If conversion is paused with encryption in progress, while the CSV volume is in maintenance mode, the cluster thread (health check) automatically resumes conversion when moving the volume back from maintenance +- If conversion is paused with encryption in progress, while the disk resource volume is in maintenance mode, the BitLocker driver automatically resumes conversion when the volume is moved back from maintenance mode diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/faq.yml b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/faq.yml index 7f560a14b9..3973bbbe52 100644 --- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/faq.yml +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/faq.yml @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ metadata: ms.collection: - tier1 ms.topic: faq - ms.date: 07/25/2023 + ms.date: 10/30/2023 title: BitLocker FAQ summary: Learn more about BitLocker by reviewing the frequently asked questions. @@ -14,55 +14,29 @@ sections: ### YamlMime:FAQ - name: Overview and requirements questions: - - question: How does BitLocker work? - answer: | - **How BitLocker works with operating system drives** - - BitLocker Can be used to mitigate unauthorized data access on lost or stolen computers by encrypting all user files and system files on the operating system drive, including the swap files and hibernation files, and checking the integrity of early boot components and boot configuration data. - - **How BitLocker works with fixed and removable data drives** - - BitLocker can be used to encrypt the entire contents of a data drive. Group Policy can be used to require BitLocker be enabled on a drive before the computer can write data to the drive. BitLocker can be configured with various unlock methods for data drives, and a data drive supports multiple unlock methods. - - question: Does BitLocker support multifactor authentication? answer: Yes, BitLocker supports multifactor authentication for operating system drives. If BitLocker is enabled on a computer that has a TPM version 1.2 or later, additional forms of authentication can be used with the TPM protection. - - question: What are the BitLocker hardware and software requirements? - answer: | - For requirements, see [System requirements](index.md#system-requirements). - - > [!NOTE] - > Dynamic disks aren't supported by BitLocker. Dynamic data volumes won't be displayed in the Control Panel. Although the operating system volume will always be displayed in the Control Panel, regardless of whether it's a Dynamic disk, if it's a dynamic disk it can't be protected by BitLocker. - - - question: Why are two partitions required? Why does the system drive have to be so large? + - question: Why are two partitions required? answer: Two partitions are required to run BitLocker because pre-startup authentication and system integrity verification must occur on a separate partition from the encrypted operating system drive. This configuration helps protect the operating system and the information in the encrypted drive. - - question: Which Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) does BitLocker support? - answer: | - BitLocker supports TPM version 1.2 or higher. BitLocker support for TPM 2.0 requires Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) for the device. - - > [!NOTE] - > TPM 2.0 isn't supported in Legacy and CSM Modes of the BIOS. Devices with TPM 2.0 must have their BIOS mode configured as Native UEFI only. The Legacy and Compatibility Support Module (CSM) options must be disabled. For added security, enable the Secure Boot feature. - > - > Installed Operating System on hardware in legacy mode will stop the OS from booting when the BIOS mode is changed to UEFI. Use the tool [MBR2GPT](/windows/deployment/mbr-to-gpt) before changing the BIOS mode that will prepare the OS and the disk to support UEFI. - - question: How can I tell if a computer has a TPM? - answer: Beginning with Windows 10, version 1803, the TPM status can be checked in **Windows Defender Security Center** > **Device Security** > **Security processor details**. In previous versions of Windows, open the TPM MMC console (tpm.msc) and look under the **Status** heading. [**Get-TPM**](/powershell/module/trustedplatformmodule/get-tpm?view=windowsserver2019-ps)** can also be run in PowerShell to get more details about the TPM on the current computer. + answer: The TPM status can be checked in **Windows Defender Security Center** > **Device Security** > **Security processor details**. - question: Can I use BitLocker on an operating system drive without a TPM? answer: | - Yes, BitLocker can be enabled on an operating system drive without a TPM version 1.2 or higher, if the BIOS or UEFI firmware has the ability to read from a USB flash drive in the boot environment. BitLocker won't unlock the protected drive until BitLocker's own volume master key is first released by either the computer's TPM or by a USB flash drive containing the BitLocker startup key for that computer. However, computers without TPMs won't be able to use the system integrity verification that BitLocker can also provide. + Yes, BitLocker can be enabled on an operating system drive without a TPM, if the BIOS or UEFI firmware has the ability to read from a USB flash drive in the boot environment. BitLocker won't unlock the protected drive until BitLocker's own volume master key is first released by either the computer's TPM or by a USB flash drive containing the BitLocker startup key for that computer. However, computers without TPMs won't be able to use the system integrity verification that BitLocker can also provide. To help determine whether a computer can read from a USB device during the boot process, use the BitLocker system check as part of the BitLocker setup process. This system check performs tests to confirm that the computer can properly read from the USB devices at the appropriate time and that the computer meets other BitLocker requirements. - question: How do I obtain BIOS support for the TPM on my computer? answer: | Contact the computer manufacturer to request a Trusted Computing Group (TCG)-compliant BIOS or UEFI boot firmware that meets the following requirements: - - It's compliant with the TCG standards for a client computer. - - It has a secure update mechanism to help prevent a malicious BIOS or boot firmware from being installed on the computer. + - It's compliant with the TCG standards for a client computer + - It has a secure update mechanism to help prevent a malicious BIOS or boot firmware from being installed on the computer - - question: What credentials are required to use BitLocker? - answer: To turn on, turn off, or change configurations of BitLocker on operating system and fixed data drives, membership in the local **Administrators** group is required. Standard users can turn on, turn off, or change configurations of BitLocker on removable data drives. + - question: What user rights are required to use BitLocker? + answer: To turn on, turn off, or change configurations of BitLocker on operating system and fixed data drives, membership to the local *Administrators* group is required. Standard users can turn on, turn off, or change configurations of BitLocker on removable data drives. - question: What is the recommended boot order for computers that are going to be BitLocker-protected? answer: The computer's startup options should be configured to have the hard disk drive first in the boot order, before any other drives such as CD/DVD drives or USB drives. If the hard disk isn't first and the computer typically boots from the hard disk, then a boot order change may be detected or assumed when removable media is found during boot. The boot order typically affects the system measurement that is verified by BitLocker and a change in boot order will cause a prompt for the BitLocker recovery key. For the same reason, if a laptop is used with a docking station, ensure that the hard disk drive is first in the boot order both when the laptop is docked and undocked. @@ -70,16 +44,16 @@ sections: - name: BitLocker and Windows upgrade questions: - question: | - Can I upgrade to Windows 10 with BitLocker enabled? + Can I upgrade Windows versions with BitLocker enabled? answer: | Yes. - question: | What is the difference between suspending and decrypting BitLocker? answer: | - **Decrypt** completely removes BitLocker protection and fully decrypts the drive. + *Decrypt* completely removes BitLocker protection and fully decrypts the drive. - **Suspend** keeps the data encrypted but encrypts the BitLocker volume master key with a clear key. The clear key is a cryptographic key stored unencrypted and unprotected on the disk drive. By storing this key unencrypted, the **Suspend** option allows for changes or upgrades to the computer without the time and cost of decrypting and re-encrypting the entire drive. After the changes are made and BitLocker is again enabled, BitLocker will reseal the encryption key to the new values of the measured components that changed as a part of the upgrade, the volume master key is changed, the protectors are updated to match and the clear key is erased. + *Suspend* keeps the data encrypted but encrypts the BitLocker volume master key with a clear key. The clear key is a cryptographic key stored unencrypted and unprotected on the disk drive. By storing this key unencrypted, the *Suspend* option allows for changes or upgrades to the computer without the time and cost of decrypting and re-encrypting the entire drive. After the changes are made and BitLocker is again enabled, BitLocker will reseal the encryption key to the new values of the measured components that changed as a part of the upgrade, the volume master key is changed, the protectors are updated to match and the clear key is erased. - question: | Do I have to suspend BitLocker protection to download and install system updates and upgrades? @@ -87,25 +61,22 @@ sections: No user action is required for BitLocker in order to apply updates from Microsoft, including [Windows quality updates and feature updates](/windows/deployment/update/waas-quick-start). Users need to suspend BitLocker for Non-Microsoft software updates, such as: - - Some TPM firmware updates if these updates clear the TPM outside of the Windows API. Not every TPM firmware update will clear the TPM. Users don't have to suspend BitLocker if the TPM firmware update uses Windows API to clear the TPM because in this case, BitLocker will be automatically suspended. It's recommended that users test their TPM firmware updates if they don't want to suspend BitLocker protection. - - Non-Microsoft application updates that modify the UEFI\BIOS configuration. - - Manual or third-party updates to secure boot databases (only if BitLocker uses Secure Boot for integrity validation). - - Updates to UEFI\BIOS firmware, installation of additional UEFI drivers, or UEFI applications without using the Windows update mechanism (only if BitLocker doesn't use Secure Boot for integrity validation during updates). - - BitLocker can be checked if it uses Secure Boot for integrity validation with the command line `manage-bde.exe -protectors -get C:`. If Secure Boot for integrity validation is being used, it will be report **Uses Secure Boot for integrity validation**. + - Some TPM firmware updates if these updates clear the TPM outside of the Windows API. Not every TPM firmware update will clear the TPM. Users don't have to suspend BitLocker if the TPM firmware update uses Windows API to clear the TPM because in this case, BitLocker will be automatically suspended. It's recommended that users test their TPM firmware updates if they don't want to suspend BitLocker protection + - Non-Microsoft application updates that modify the UEFI\BIOS configuration + - Manual or third-party updates to secure boot databases (only if BitLocker uses Secure Boot for integrity validation) + - Updates to UEFI\BIOS firmware, installation of additional UEFI drivers, or UEFI applications without using the Windows update mechanism (only if BitLocker doesn't use Secure Boot for integrity validation during updates) + - BitLocker can be checked if it uses Secure Boot for integrity validation with the command line `manage-bde.exe -protectors -get C:`. If Secure Boot for integrity validation is being used, it reports **Uses Secure Boot for integrity validation** > [!NOTE] - > If BitLocker has been suspended, BitLocker protection can be resumed after the upgrade or update has been installed. Upon resuming protection, BitLocker will reseal the encryption key to the new values of the measured components that changed as a part of the upgrade or update. If these types of upgrades or updates are applied without suspending BitLocker, the computer will enter recovery mode when restarting and will require a recovery key or password to access the computer. + > If BitLocker is suspended, you can resume BitLocker protection after the upgrade or update is installed. Upon resuming protection, BitLocker will reseal the encryption key to the new values of the measured components that changed as a part of the upgrade or update. If these types of upgrades or updates are applied without suspending BitLocker, the computer will enter recovery mode when restarting and will require a recovery key or password to access the computer. - name: Deployment and administration questions: - question: Can BitLocker deployment be automated in an enterprise environment? answer: | - Yes, the deployment and configuration of both BitLocker and the TPM can be automated using either WMI or Windows PowerShell scripts. Which method is chosen to implement the automation depends on the environment. `Manage-bde.exe` can also be used to locally or remotely configure BitLocker. For more info about writing scripts that use the BitLocker WMI providers, see [BitLocker Drive Encryption Provider](/windows/win32/secprov/bitlocker-drive-encryption-provider). For more info about using Windows PowerShell cmdlets with BitLocker Drive Encryption, see [BitLocker Cmdlets in Windows PowerShell](/powershell/module/bitlocker/index?view=win10-ps). + Yes, the deployment and configuration BitLocker can be automated using either Windows PowerShell or with the `manage-bde.exe` command. For more information about common BitLocker management commands, check the [BitLocker operations guide](operations-guide.md). - - question: Can BitLocker encrypt more than just the operating system drive? - answer: Yes. - - question: Is there a noticeable performance impact when BitLocker is enabled on a computer? answer: Typically, there's a small performance overhead, often in single-digit percentages, which is relative to the throughput of the storage operations on which it needs to operate. @@ -121,39 +92,41 @@ sections: - question: Does BitLocker encrypt and decrypt the entire drive all at once when reading and writing data? answer: No, BitLocker doesn't encrypt and decrypt the entire drive when reading and writing data. The encrypted sectors in the BitLocker-protected drive are decrypted only as they're requested from system read operations. Blocks that are written to the drive are encrypted before the system writes them to the physical disk. No unencrypted data is ever stored on a BitLocker-protected drive. - - question: How can I prevent users on a network from storing data on an unencrypted drive? + - question: How can I prevent users from storing data on an unencrypted drive? answer: | - Group Policy settings can be configured to require that data drives be BitLocker-protected before a BitLocker-protected computer can write data to them. For more info, see [BitLocker Group Policy settings](bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md). + Policy settings can be configured to require that data drives be BitLocker-protected before a BitLocker-protected computer can write data to them. For more info, see [BitLocker policy settings](configure.md). When these policy settings are enabled, the BitLocker-protected operating system will mount any data drives that aren't protected by BitLocker as read-only. - - question: What is Used Disk Space Only encryption? + - question: | + What is Used Disk Space Only encryption? answer: | - BitLocker in Windows 10 lets users choose to encrypt just their data. Although it's not the most secure way to encrypt a drive, this option can reduce encryption time by more than 99 percent, depending on how much data that needs to be encrypted. For more information, see [Used Disk Space Only encryption](bitlocker-device-encryption-overview-windows-10.md#used-disk-space-only-encryption). + BitLocker lets users choose to encrypt just their data. Although it's not the most secure way to encrypt a drive, this option can reduce encryption time by more than 99 percent, depending on how much data that needs to be encrypted. For more information, see [Used Disk Space Only encryption](planning-guide.md#used-disk-space-only-encryption). - - question: What system changes would cause the integrity check on my operating system drive to fail? + - question: | + What system changes would cause the integrity check on the OS drive to fail? answer: | The following types of system changes can cause an integrity check failure and prevent the TPM from releasing the BitLocker key to decrypt the protected operating system drive: - - Moving the BitLocker-protected drive into a new computer. - - Installing a new motherboard with a new TPM. - - Turning off, disabling, or clearing the TPM. - - Changing any boot configuration settings. - - Changing the BIOS, UEFI firmware, master boot record, boot sector, boot manager, option ROM, or other early boot components or boot configuration data. + - Moving the BitLocker-protected drive into a new computer + - Installing a new motherboard with a new TPM + - Turning off, disabling, or clearing the TPM + - Changing any boot configuration settings + - Changing the BIOS, UEFI firmware, master boot record, boot sector, boot manager, option ROM, or other early boot components or boot configuration data - question: What causes BitLocker to start into recovery mode when attempting to start the operating system drive? answer: | Because BitLocker is designed to protect computers from numerous attacks, there are numerous reasons why BitLocker could start in recovery mode. For example: - - Changing the BIOS boot order to boot another drive in advance of the hard drive. - - Adding or removing hardware, such as inserting a new card in the computer. - - Removing, inserting, or completely depleting the charge on a smart battery on a portable computer. + - Changing the BIOS boot order to boot another drive in advance of the hard drive + - Adding or removing hardware, such as inserting a new card in the computer + - Removing, inserting, or completely depleting the charge on a smart battery on a portable computer In BitLocker, recovery consists of decrypting a copy of the volume master key using either a recovery key stored on a USB flash drive or a cryptographic key derived from a recovery password. The TPM isn't involved in any recovery scenarios, so recovery is still possible if the TPM fails boot component validation, malfunctions, or is removed. - question: What can prevent BitLocker from binding to PCR 7? - answer: BitLocker can be prevented from binding to PCR 7 if a non-Windows OS booted prior to Windows, or if Secure Boot isn't available to the device, either because it has been disabled or the hardware doesn't support it. + answer: BitLocker can be prevented from binding to PCR 7 if a non-Windows OS booted prior to Windows, or if Secure Boot isn't available to the device, either because it's disabled or the hardware doesn't support it. - question: Can I swap hard disks on the same computer if BitLocker is enabled on the operating system drive? answer: Yes, multiple hard disks can be swapped on the same computer if BitLocker is enabled, but only if the hard disks were BitLocker-protected on the same computer. The BitLocker keys are unique to the TPM and the operating system drive. If a backup operating system or data drive needs to be prepared in case of a disk failure, make sure that they were matched with the correct TPM. Different hard drives can also be configured for different operating systems and then enable BitLocker on each one with different authentication methods (such as one with TPM-only and one with TPM+PIN) without any conflicts. @@ -161,57 +134,79 @@ sections: - question: Can I access my BitLocker-protected drive if I insert the hard disk into a different computer? answer: Yes, if the drive is a data drive, it can be unlocked from the **BitLocker Drive Encryption** Control Panel item by using a password or smart card. If the data drive was configured for automatic unlock only, it will need to be unlocked by using the recovery key. The encrypted hard disk can be unlocked by a data recovery agent (if one was configured) or it can be unlocked by using the recovery key. - - question: Why is **Turn BitLocker on** not available when I right-click a drive? + - question: Why isn't the "Turn BitLocker on" option available when I right-click a drive? answer: Some drives can't be encrypted with BitLocker. Reasons a drive can't be encrypted include insufficient disk size, an incompatible file system, if the drive is a dynamic disk, or a drive is designated as the system partition. By default, the system drive (or system partition) is hidden from display. However, if it isn't created as a hidden drive when the operating system was installed due to a custom installation process, that drive might be displayed but can't be encrypted. - question: What type of disk configurations are supported by BitLocker? answer: Any number of internal, fixed data drives can be protected with BitLocker. On some versions ATA and SATA-based, direct-attached storage devices are also supported. - name: Key Management - questions: + questions: - question: How can I authenticate or unlock my removable data drive? answer: | - Removable data drives can be unlocked using a password or a smart card. An SID protector can also be configured to unlock a drive by using user domain credentials. After encryption has started, the drive can also be automatically unlocked on a specific computer for a specific user account. System administrators can configure which options are available for users including password complexity and minimum length requirements. To unlock by using a SID protector, use `manage-bde.exe`: + Removable data drives can be unlocked using a password or a smart card. A SID protector can also be configured to unlock a drive by using user domain credentials. After encryption has started, the drive can also be automatically unlocked on a specific computer for a specific user account. System administrators can configure which options are available for users including password complexity and minimum length requirements. To unlock by using a SID protector, use `manage-bde.exe`: ```cmd - Manage-bde.exe -protectors -add e: -sid domain\username + Manage-bde.exe -protectors -add e: -sid domain\username ``` - - question: What is the difference between a recovery password, recovery key, PIN, enhanced PIN, and startup key? + - question: What is the difference between a TPM owner password, recovery password, recovery key, PIN, enhanced PIN, and startup key? answer: | - For tables that list and describe elements such as a recovery password, recovery key, and PIN, see [BitLocker key protectors](prepare-your-organization-for-bitlocker-planning-and-policies.md#bitlocker-key-protectors) and [BitLocker authentication methods](prepare-your-organization-for-bitlocker-planning-and-policies.md#bitlocker-authentication-methods). + There are multiple keys that can be generated and used by BitLocker. Some keys are required and some are optional protectors you can choose to use depending on the level of security you require. + + **TPM owner password** + + Prior to enabling BitLocker on a computer with a TPM version 1.2, you must initialize the TPM. The initialization process generates a TPM owner password, which is a password set on the TPM. You must be able to supply the TPM owner password to change the state of the TPM, such as when enabling or disabling the TPM or resetting the TPM lockout. + + **Recovery password and recovery key** + + When you set up BitLocker, you must choose how access to BitLocker-protected drives can be recovered in the event that the specified unlock method cannot be used (such as if the TPM cannot validate the boot components, the personal identification number (PIN) is forgotten, or the password is forgotten). In these situations, you must be able to supply either the recovery key or the recovery password to unlock the encrypted data on the drive. When you supply the recovery information, you can use either of the following formats: + + - A recovery password consisting of 48 digits divided into eight groups. During recovery, you need to type this password into the BitLocker recovery console by using the function keys on your keyboard + - A key file on a USB flash drive that is read directly by the BitLocker recovery console. During recovery, you need to insert this USB device + + **PIN and enhanced PIN** + For a higher level of security with the TPM, you can configure BitLocker with a personal identification number (PIN). The PIN is a user-created value that must be entered each time the computer starts or resumes from hibernation. The PIN can consist of 4 to 20 digits as specified by the *Configure minimum PIN length for startup* policy setting and is stored internally as a 256-bit hash of the entered Unicode characters. This value is never displayed to the user. The PIN is used to provide another factor of authentication in conjunction with TPM authentication.\ + For an even higher level of security with the TPM, you can configure BitLocker to use enhanced PINs. Enhanced PINs are PINs that use the full keyboard character set in addition to the numeric set to allow for more possible PIN combinations and are between 4 and 20 characters in length. To use enhanced PINs, you must enable the *Allow enhanced PINs for startup* policy setting before adding the PIN to the drive. By enabling this policy, all PINs created can utilize full keyboard characters. + + **Startup key** + + Configuring a startup key is another method to enable a higher level of security with the TPM. The startup key is a key stored on a USB flash drive, and the USB flash drive must be inserted every time the computer starts. The startup key is used to provide another factor of authentication in conjunction with TPM authentication. To use a USB flash drive as a startup key, the USB flash drive must be formatted by using the NTFS, FAT, or FAT32 file system. + + >[!IMPORTANT] + > You must have a startup key to use BitLocker on a non-TPM computer. + - question: How can the recovery password and recovery key be stored? answer: | The recovery password and recovery key for an operating system drive or a fixed data drive can be saved to a folder, saved to one or more USB devices, saved to a Microsoft Account, or printed. For removable data drives, the recovery password and recovery key can be saved to a folder, saved to a Microsoft Account, or printed. By default, a recovery key for a removable drive can't be stored on a removable drive. - A domain administrator can also configure Group Policy to automatically generate recovery passwords and store them in Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) for any BitLocker-protected drive. + A domain administrator can also configure policy settings to automatically generate recovery passwords and store them in Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) or Microsoft Entra ID for any BitLocker-protected drive. - question: Is it possible to add an additional method of authentication without decrypting the drive if I only have the TPM authentication method enabled? answer: | - The `Manage-bde.exe` command-line tool can be used to replace TPM-only authentication mode with a multifactor authentication mode. For example, if BitLocker is enabled with TPM authentication only and PIN authentication needs to be added, use the following commands from an elevated command prompt, replacing *4-20 digit numeric PIN* with the desired numeric PIN: + The `Manage-bde.exe` command-line tool can be used to replace TPM-only authentication mode with a multifactor authentication mode. For example, if BitLocker is enabled with TPM authentication only and PIN authentication needs to be added, use the following commands from an elevated Command Prompt, replacing *4-20 digit numeric PIN* with the desired numeric PIN: ```cmd manage-bde.exe -protectors -delete %systemdrive% -type tpm - + manage-bde.exe -protectors -add %systemdrive% -tpmandpin <4-20 digit numeric PIN> ``` - - + - question: When should an additional method of authentication be considered? answer: | New hardware that meets [Windows Hardware Compatibility Program](/windows-hardware/design/compatibility/) requirements make a PIN less critical as a mitigation, and having a TPM-only protector is likely sufficient when combined with policies like device lockout. For example, Surface Pro and Surface Book don't have external DMA ports to attack. - For older hardware, where a PIN may be needed, it's recommended to enable [enhanced PINs](bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md#allow-enhanced-pins-for-startup) that allow non-numeric characters such as letters and punctuation marks, and to set the PIN length based on the risk tolerance and the hardware anti-hammering capabilities available to the TPMs on the computers. + For older hardware, where a PIN may be needed, it's recommended to enable [enhanced PINs](configure.md) that allow non-numeric characters such as letters and punctuation marks, and to set the PIN length based on the risk tolerance and the hardware anti-hammering capabilities available to the TPMs on the computers. - question: If I lose my recovery information, will the BitLocker-protected data be unrecoverable? answer: | BitLocker is designed to make the encrypted drive unrecoverable without the required authentication. When in recovery mode, the user needs the recovery password or recovery key to unlock the encrypted drive. > [!IMPORTANT] - > Store the recovery information in AD DS, along with in a Microsoft Account, or another safe location. - + > Store the recovery information in Microsoft Entra ID, AD DS, Microsoft Account, or another safe location. + - question: Can the USB flash drive that is used as the startup key also be used to store the recovery key? answer: While using a USB flash drive as both the startup key and for storage of the recovery key is technically possible, it isn't a best practice to use one USB flash drive to store both keys. If the USB flash drive that contains the startup key is lost or stolen, the recovery key will also be lost. In addition, inserting this key would cause the computer to automatically boot from the recovery key even if TPM-measured files have changed, which circumvents the TPM's system integrity check. @@ -247,7 +242,7 @@ sections: It's possible that a personal identification number (PIN) can be discovered by an attacker performing a brute force attack. A brute force attack occurs when an attacker uses an automated tool to try different PIN combinations until the correct one is discovered. For BitLocker-protected computers, this type of attack, also known as a dictionary attack, requires that the attacker has physical access to the computer. The TPM has the built-in ability to detect and react to these types of attacks. Because different manufacturers' TPMs may support different PIN and attack mitigations, contact the TPM's manufacturer to determine how the computer's TPM mitigates PIN brute force attacks. - After the TPM's manufacturer has been determined, contact the manufacturer to gather the TPM's vendor-specific information. Most manufacturers use the PIN authentication failure count to exponentially increase lockout time to the PIN interface. However, each manufacturer has different policies regarding when and how the failure counter is decreased or reset. + After the TPM's manufacturer is determined, contact the manufacturer to gather the TPM's vendor-specific information. Most manufacturers use the PIN authentication failure count to exponentially increase lockout time to the PIN interface. However, each manufacturer has different policies regarding when and how the failure counter is decreased or reset. - question: How can I determine the manufacturer of my TPM? answer: The TPM manufacturer can be determined in **Windows Defender Security Center** > **Device Security** > **Security processor details**. @@ -260,11 +255,15 @@ sections: - What is the algorithm for determining the duration of a lockout based on the number of failed attempts and any other relevant parameters? - What actions can cause the failure count and lockout duration to be decreased or reset? - - question: Can PIN length and complexity be managed with Group Policy? + - question: Can PIN length and complexity be managed with policy settings? answer: | - Yes and No. The minimum personal identification number (PIN) length can be configured by using the **Configure minimum PIN length for startup** Group Policy setting and allow the use of alphanumeric PINs by enabling the **Allow enhanced PINs for startup** Group Policy setting. However, PIN complexity can't be required via Group Policy. + The minimum personal identification number (PIN) length can be configured by using the **Configure minimum PIN length for startup** Group Policy setting and allow the use of alphanumeric PINs by enabling the **Allow enhanced PINs for startup** policy setting. PIN complexity can't be required via policy settings. - For more info, see [BitLocker Group Policy settings](bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md). + For more info, see [BitLocker policy settings](configure.md). + + - question: How are the PIN and TPM used to derive the volume master key? + answer: | + BitLocker hashes the user-specified personal identification number (PIN) by using SHA-256, and the first 160 bits of the hash are used as authorization data sent to the TPM to seal the volume master key. The volume master key is now protected by both the TPM and the PIN. To unseal the volume master key, you are required to enter the PIN each time the computer restarts or resumes from hibernation. - name: BitLocker To Go questions: @@ -288,34 +287,23 @@ sections: answer: | Stored information | Description -------------------|------------ - Hash of the TPM owner password | Beginning with Windows 10, the password hash isn't stored in AD DS by default. The password hash can be stored only if the TPM is owned and the ownership was taken by using components of Windows 8.1 or earlier, such as the BitLocker Setup Wizard or the TPM snap-in. BitLocker recovery password | The recovery password allows unlocking of and access to the drive after a recovery incident. Domain administrators can view the BitLocker recovery password by using the BitLocker Recovery Password Viewer. For more information about this tool, see [BitLocker: Use BitLocker Recovery Password Viewer](bitlocker-use-bitlocker-recovery-password-viewer.md). BitLocker key package | The key package helps to repair damage to the hard disk that would otherwise prevent standard recovery. Using the key package for recovery requires the BitLocker Repair Tool, `Repair-bde`. - question: | - What if BitLocker is enabled on a computer before the computer has joined the domain? + What if BitLocker is enabled on a computer before the computer joins the domain? answer: | - If BitLocker is enabled on a drive before Group Policy has been applied to enforce a backup, the recovery information won't be automatically backed up to AD DS when the computer joins the domain or when Group Policy is subsequently applied. However, the Group Policy settings **Choose how BitLocker-protected operating system drives can be recovered**, **Choose how BitLocker-protected fixed drives can be recovered**, and **Choose how BitLocker-protected removable drives can be recovered** can be chosen to require the computer to be connected to a domain before BitLocker can be enabled to help ensure that recovery information for BitLocker-protected drives in the organization is backed up to AD DS. + If BitLocker is enabled on a drive before policy settings are applied to enforce a backup, the recovery information won't be automatically backed up to AD DS when the computer joins the domain or when the policy settings are subsequently applied. However, the policy settings **Choose how BitLocker-protected operating system drives can be recovered**, **Choose how BitLocker-protected fixed drives can be recovered**, and **Choose how BitLocker-protected removable drives can be recovered** can be chosen to require the computer to be connected to a domain before BitLocker can be enabled to help ensure that recovery information for BitLocker-protected drives in the organization is backed up to AD DS. - For more info, see [BitLocker Group Policy settings](bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md). - - The BitLocker Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) interface does allow administrators to write a script to back up or synchronize an online client's existing recovery information. However, BitLocker doesn't automatically manage this process. The `manage-bde.exe` command-line tool can also be used to manually back up recovery information to AD DS. For example, to back up all of the recovery information for the `$env:SystemDrive` to AD DS, the following command script can be used from an elevated command prompt: - - ```powershell - $BitLocker = Get-BitLockerVolume -MountPoint $env:SystemDrive - $RecoveryProtector = $BitLocker.KeyProtector | Where-Object { $_.KeyProtectorType -eq 'RecoveryPassword' } - - Backup-BitLockerKeyProtector -MountPoint $env:SystemDrive -KeyProtectorId $RecoveryProtector.KeyProtectorID - BackupToAAD-BitLockerKeyProtector -MountPoint $env:SystemDrive -KeyProtectorId $RecoveryProtector.KeyProtectorID - ``` + For more information how to back up the recovery password to AD DS or Microsoft Entra ID, review the [BitLocker operations guide](operations-guide.md). > [!IMPORTANT] - > Joining a computer to the domain should be the first step for new computers within an organization. After computers are joined to a domain, storing the BitLocker recovery key to AD DS is automatic (when enabled in Group Policy). + > Joining a computer to the domain should be the first step for new computers within an organization. After computers are joined to a domain, storing the BitLocker recovery key to AD DS is automatic (when enabled with policy settings). - question: | - Is there an event log entry recorded on the client computer to indicate the success or failure of the Active Directory backup? + Is there an event log entry recorded on the client computer to indicate the success or failure of the Microsoft Entra ID or Active Directory backup? answer: | - Yes, an event log entry that indicates the success or failure of an Active Directory backup is recorded on the client computer. However, even if an event log entry says "Success," the information could have been subsequently removed from AD DS, or BitLocker could have been reconfigured in such a way that the Active Directory information can no longer unlock the drive (such as by removing the recovery password key protector). In addition, it's also possible that the log entry could be spoofed. + Yes, an event log entry that indicates the success or failure of a backup is recorded on the client computer. However, even if an event log entry says "Success," the information could have been subsequently removed from AD DS, or BitLocker could have been reconfigured in such a way that the Active Directory information can no longer unlock the drive (such as by removing the recovery password key protector). In addition, it's also possible that the log entry could be spoofed. Ultimately, determining whether a legitimate backup exists in AD DS requires querying AD DS with domain administrator credentials by using the BitLocker password viewer tool. @@ -329,28 +317,28 @@ sections: answer: | If the backup initially fails, such as when a domain controller is unreachable at the time when the BitLocker setup wizard is run, BitLocker doesn't try again to back up the recovery information to AD DS. - When an administrator selects the **Require BitLocker backup to AD DS** check box of the **Store BitLocker recovery information in Active Directory Domain Service (Windows 2008 and Windows Vista)** policy setting, or the equivalent **Do not enable BitLocker until recovery information is stored in AD DS for (operating system | fixed data | removable data) drives** check box in any of the **Choose how BitLocker-protected operating system drives can be recovered**, **Choose how BitLocker-protected fixed data drives can be recovered**, and **Choose how BitLocker-protected removable data drives can be recovered** policy settings, users can't enable BitLocker unless the computer is connected to the domain and the backup of BitLocker recovery information to AD DS succeeds. With these settings configured if the backup fails, BitLocker can't be enabled, ensuring that administrators will be able to recover BitLocker-protected drives in the organization. + When an administrator selects the **Do not enable BitLocker until recovery information is stored in AD DS for (operating system | fixed data | removable data) drives** check box in any of the **Choose how BitLocker-protected operating system drives can be recovered**, **Choose how BitLocker-protected fixed data drives can be recovered**, and **Choose how BitLocker-protected removable data drives can be recovered** policy settings, users can't enable BitLocker unless the computer is connected to the domain and the backup of BitLocker recovery information to AD DS succeeds. With these settings configured if the backup fails, BitLocker can't be enabled, ensuring that administrators will be able to recover BitLocker-protected drives in the organization. - For more info, see [BitLocker Group Policy settings](bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md). + For more info, see [BitLocker policy settings](configure.md). - When an administrator clears these check boxes, the administrator is allowing a drive to be BitLocker-protected without having the recovery information successfully backed up to AD DS; however, BitLocker won't automatically retry the backup if it fails. Instead, administrators can create a backup script, as described earlier in [What if BitLocker is enabled on a computer before the computer has joined the domain?](#what-if-bitlocker-is-enabled-on-a-computer-before-the-computer-has-joined-the-domain-) to capture the information after connectivity is restored. + When an administrator clears these check boxes, the administrator is allowing a drive to be BitLocker-protected without having the recovery information successfully backed up to AD DS; however, BitLocker won't automatically retry the backup if it fails. Instead, administrators can create a backup script, as described earlier in [What if BitLocker is enabled on a computer before the computer joins the domain?](#what-if-bitlocker-is-enabled-on-a-computer-before-the-computer-joins-the-domain-) to capture the information after connectivity is restored. - name: Security questions: - question: | What form of encryption does BitLocker use? Is it configurable? answer: | - BitLocker uses Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) as its encryption algorithm with configurable key lengths of 128 bits or 256 bits. The default encryption setting is AES-128, but the options are configurable by using Group Policy. + BitLocker uses Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) as its encryption algorithm with configurable key lengths of 128 bits or 256 bits. The default encryption setting is AES-128, but the options are configurable by using policy settings. - question: | What is the best practice for using BitLocker on an operating system drive? answer: | - The recommended practice for BitLocker configuration on an operating system drive is to implement BitLocker on a computer with a TPM version 1.2 or higher, and a Trusted Computing Group (TCG)-compliant BIOS or UEFI firmware implementation, along with a PIN. By requiring a PIN that was set by the user in addition to the TPM validation, a malicious user that has physical access to the computer can't start the computer. + The recommended practice for BitLocker configuration on an operating system drive is to implement BitLocker on a computer with a TPM version 1.2 or higher. - question: | What are the implications of using the sleep or hibernate power management options? answer: | - BitLocker on operating system drives in its basic configuration (with a TPM but without other startup authentication) provides extra security for the hibernate mode. However, BitLocker provides greater security when it's configured to use another startup authentication factor (TPM+PIN, TPM+USB, or TPM+PIN+USB) with the hibernate mode. This method is more secure because returning from hibernation requires authentication. In sleep mode, the computer is vulnerable to direct memory access attacks, since unprotected data remains in RAM. Therefore, for improved security, it's recommended to disable sleep mode and to use TPM+PIN for the authentication method. Startup authentication can be configured by using [Group Policy](./bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md) or Mobile Device Management with the [BitLocker CSP](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp). + BitLocker on operating system drives in its basic configuration provides extra security for the hibernate mode. In sleep mode, the computer is vulnerable to direct memory access attacks, since unprotected data remains in RAM. Therefore, for improved security, it's recommended to disable sleep mode. Startup authentication can be configured by using a [policy setting](configure.md). - question: | What are the advantages of a TPM? @@ -363,9 +351,9 @@ sections: - name: Network Unlock questions: - question: | - BitLocker Network Unlock FAQ + What is BitLocker Network Unlock? answer: | - BitLocker Network Unlock enables easier management for BitLocker-enabled desktops and servers that use the TPM+PIN protection method in a domain environment. When a computer that is connected to a wired corporate network is rebooted, Network Unlock allows the PIN entry prompt to be bypassed. It automatically unlocks BitLocker-protected operating system volumes by using a trusted key that is provided by the Windows Deployment Services server as its secondary authentication method. + BitLocker Network Unlock enables easier management for BitLocker-enabled clients and servers that use the TPM+PIN protection method in a domain environment. When a computer that is connected to a wired corporate network is rebooted, Network Unlock allows the PIN entry prompt to be bypassed. It automatically unlocks BitLocker-protected operating system volumes by using a trusted key that is provided by the Windows Deployment Services server as its secondary authentication method. To use Network Unlock, a PIN must be configured for the computer. When the computer isn't connected to the network, a PIN will need to be provided to unlock it. @@ -373,7 +361,7 @@ sections: Network Unlock uses two protectors - the TPM protector and the protector provided by the network or by the PIN. Automatic unlock uses a single protector - the one stored in the TPM. If the computer is joined to a network without the key protector, it will prompt to enter a PIN. If the PIN isn't available, the recovery key will need to be used to unlock the computer if it can't be connected to the network. - For more info, see [BitLocker: How to enable Network Unlock](bitlocker-how-to-enable-network-unlock.md). + For more info, see [BitLocker: How to enable Network Unlock](network-unlock.md). - name: Use BitLocker with other programs questions: @@ -412,13 +400,13 @@ sections: answer: | The system check is designed to ensure the computer's BIOS or UEFI firmware is compatible with BitLocker and that the TPM is working correctly. The system check can fail for several reasons: - - The computer's BIOS or UEFI firmware can't read USB flash drives. - - The computer's BIOS, uEFI firmware, or boot menu doesn't have reading USB flash drives enabled. - - There are multiple USB flash drives inserted into the computer. - - The PIN wasn't entered correctly. - - The computer's BIOS or UEFI firmware only supports using the function keys (F1-F10) to enter numerals in the pre-boot environment. - - The startup key was removed before the computer finished rebooting. - - The TPM has malfunctioned and fails to unseal the keys. + - The computer's BIOS or UEFI firmware can't read USB flash drives + - The computer's BIOS, uEFI firmware, or boot menu doesn't have reading USB flash drives enabled + - There are multiple USB flash drives inserted into the computer + - The PIN wasn't entered correctly + - The computer's BIOS or UEFI firmware only supports using the function keys (F1-F10) to enter numerals in the pre-boot environment + - The startup key was removed before the computer finished rebooting + - The TPM has malfunctioned and fails to unseal the keys - question: | What can I do if the recovery key on my USB flash drive can't be read? @@ -466,11 +454,11 @@ sections: answer: | BitLocker should work like any specific physical machine within its hardware limitations as long as the environment (physical or virtual) meets Windows Operating System requirements to run. - With TPM: Yes, it's supported. - - Without TPM: Yes, it's supported (with password protector). + - Without TPM: Yes, it's supported (with password protector). - BitLocker is also supported on data volume VHDs, such as those used by clusters, if running Windows 10, Windows 8.1, Windows 8, Windows Server 2016, Windows Server 2012 R2, or Windows Server 2012. + BitLocker is also supported on data volume VHDs, such as those used by clusters. - question: | Can I use BitLocker with virtual machines (VMs)? answer: | - Yes. Password protectors and virtual TPMs can be used with BitLocker to protect virtual machines. VMs can be domain joined, Microsoft Entra joined, or workplace-joined (via **Settings** > **Accounts** > **Access work or school** > **Connect**) to receive policy. Encryption can be enabled either while creating the VM or by using other existing management tools such as the BitLocker CSP, or even by using a startup script or sign-in script delivered by Group Policy. Windows Server 2016 also supports [Shielded VMs and guarded fabric](/windows-server/virtualization/guarded-fabric-shielded-vm/guarded-fabric-and-shielded-vms-top-node) to protect VMs from malicious administrators. + Yes, BitLocker can be used with virtual machines (VMs) if the environment meets BitLocker's hardware and software requirements. diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/images/bitlockernetworkunlocksequence.png b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/images/bitlockernetworkunlocksequence.png deleted file mode 100644 index fe459be8e0..0000000000 Binary files a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/images/bitlockernetworkunlocksequence.png and /dev/null differ diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/images/bl-intune-custom-url.png b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/images/bl-intune-custom-url.png 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a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/images/unlocked-drive.svg b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/images/unlocked-drive.svg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..94f06bf78b --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/images/unlocked-drive.svg @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/allow-devices-compliant-with-instantgo-or-hsti-to-opt-out-of-pre-boot-pin.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/allow-devices-compliant-with-instantgo-or-hsti-to-opt-out-of-pre-boot-pin.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..522ed7d429 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/allow-devices-compliant-with-instantgo-or-hsti-to-opt-out-of-pre-boot-pin.md @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + + +### Allow devices compliant with InstantGo or HSTI to opt out of preboot PIN + +This policy setting allows users on devices that are compliant with InstantGo or Microsoft Hardware Security Test Interface (HSTI) to not have a PIN for preboot authentication. + +The policy overrides the *Require startup PIN with TPM* and *Require startup key and PIN with TPM* options of the [*Require additional authentication at startup*](#require-additional-authentication-at-startup) policy on compliant hardware. + +- If you enable this policy setting, users on InstantGo and HSTI compliant devices can turn on BitLocker without preboot authentication +- If the policy is disabled or not configured, the options of [*Require additional authentication at startup*](#require-additional-authentication-at-startup) policy apply + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | `./Device/Vendor/MSFT/BitLocker/`[SystemDrivesEnablePreBootPinExceptionOnDECapableDevice](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp#systemdrivesenableprebootpinexceptionondecapabledevice) | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Operating System Drives** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/allow-enhanced-pins-for-startup.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/allow-enhanced-pins-for-startup.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..458c6d1e88 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/allow-enhanced-pins-for-startup.md @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Allow enhanced PINs for startup + +This setting permits the use of enhanced PINs when an unlock method that includes a PIN is used. + +Enhanced startup PINs permit the use of characters (including uppercase and lowercase letters, symbols, numbers, and spaces). + +> [!IMPORTANT] +> Not all computers support enhanced PIN characters in the preboot environment. It's strongly recommended that users perform a system check during the BitLocker setup to verify that enhanced PIN characters can be used. + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | `./Device/Vendor/MSFT/BitLocker/`[SystemDrivesEnhancedPIN](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp#systemdrivesenhancedpin) | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Operating System Drives** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/allow-network-unlock-at-startup.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/allow-network-unlock-at-startup.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..87d69aff1e --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/allow-network-unlock-at-startup.md @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Allow network unlock at startup + +This policy setting controls whether a BitLocker-protected device that is connected to a trusted wired Local Area Network (LAN) can create and use Network Key Protectors on TPM-enabled computers to automatically unlock the operating system drive when the computer is started. + +If you enable this policy, devices configured with a *BitLocker Network Unlock certificate* can create and use Network Key Protectors. To use a Network Key Protector to unlock the computer, both the computer and the BitLocker Drive Encryption Network Unlock server must be provisioned with a Network Unlock certificate. The Network Unlock certificate is used to create Network Key Protectors, and protects the information exchanged with the server to unlock the computer. + +The Group Policy setting **Computer Configuration** > **Windows Settings** > **Security Settings** > **Public Key Policies** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption Network Unlock Certificate** can be used on the domain controller to distribute this certificate to computers in the organization. This unlock method uses the TPM on the computer, so computers that don't have a TPM can't create Network Key Protectors to automatically unlock with Network Unlock. + +If you disable or don't configure this policy setting, BitLocker clients won't be able to create and use Network Key Protectors. + +> [!NOTE] +> For reliability and security, computers should also have a TPM startup PIN that can be used when the computer is disconnected from the wired network or the server at startup. + +For more information about Network Unlock feature, see [BitLocker: How to enable Network Unlock](../network-unlock.md) + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | Not available | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Operating System Drives** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/allow-secure-boot-for-integrity-validation.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/allow-secure-boot-for-integrity-validation.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..853270403b --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/allow-secure-boot-for-integrity-validation.md @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Allow Secure Boot for integrity validation + +This policy setting allows you to configure whether Secure Boot is allowed as the platform integrity provider for BitLocker operating system drives. + +Secure Boot ensures that the device's preboot environment only loads firmware that is digitally signed by authorized software publishers. + +- If you enable or don't configure this policy setting, BitLocker uses Secure Boot for platform integrity if the platform is capable of Secure Boot-based integrity validation +- If you disable this policy setting, BitLocker uses legacy platform integrity validation, even on systems capable of Secure Boot-based integrity validation + +When this policy is enabled and the hardware is capable of using Secure Boot for BitLocker scenarios, the *[Use enhanced Boot Configuration Data validation profile](../configure.md?tabs=os#use-enhanced-boot-configuration-data-validation-profile)* policy setting is ignored and Secure Boot verifies BCD settings according to the Secure Boot policy setting, which is configured separately from BitLocker. + +> [!NOTE] +> If the policy setting *[Configure TPM platform validation profile for native UEFI firmware configurations](../configure.md?tabs=os#configure-tpm-platform-validation-profile-for-native-uefi-firmware-configurations)* is enabled and has PCR 7 omitted, BitLocker is prevented from using Secure Boot for platform or Boot Configuration Data (BCD) integrity validation. + +> [!WARNING] +> Disabling this policy might result in BitLocker recovery when manufacturer-specific firmware is updated. If this policy is disabled, suspend BitLocker prior to applying firmware updates. + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | Not available | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Operating System Drives** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/allow-standard-user-encryption.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/allow-standard-user-encryption.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4ee204fa87 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/allow-standard-user-encryption.md @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Allow standard user encryption + +With this policy you can enforce the [*Require device encryption*](../configure.md?tabs=os#require-device-encryption) policy for scenarios where the policy is applied while the current logged-on user doesn't have administrative rights. + +> [!IMPORTANT] +> The [Allow warning for other disk encryption](../configure.md?tabs=os#allow-warning-for-other-disk-encryption) policy must be disabled to allow standard user encryption. + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | `./Device/Vendor/MSFT/BitLocker/`[AllowStandardUserEncryption](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp#allowstandarduserencryption)| +| **GPO** | Not available | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/allow-warning-for-other-disk-encryption.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/allow-warning-for-other-disk-encryption.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4463d21b87 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/allow-warning-for-other-disk-encryption.md @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Allow warning for other disk encryption + +With this policy you can disable all notification for encryption, warning prompt for other disk encryption, and turn on encryption silently. + +> [!IMPORTANT] +> This policy applies to Microsoft Entra joined devices only. + +This policy takes effect only if [Require device encryption](../configure.md?tabs=os#require-device-encryption) policy is enabled. + +> [!WARNING] +> When you enable BitLocker on a device with third party encryption, it may render the device unusable and will require reinstallation of Windows. + +The expected values for this policy are: + +- Enabled (default): warning prompt and encryption notification is allowed +- Disabled: warning prompt and encryption notification are suppressed. Windows will attempt to silently enable BitLocker + +> [!NOTE] +> When you disable the warning prompt, the OS drive's recovery key will back up to the user's Microsoft Entra ID account. When you allow the warning prompt, the user who receives the prompt can select where to back up the OS drive's recovery key. +> +> The endpoint for a fixed data drive's backup is chosen in the following order: +> +> 1. The user's Windows Server Active Directory Domain Services account +> 2. The user's Microsoft Entra ID account +> 3. The user's personal OneDrive (MDM/MAM only) +> +> Encryption will wait until one of these three locations backs up successfully. + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | `./Device/Vendor/MSFT/BitLocker/`[AllowWarningForOtherDiskEncryption](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp#allowwarningforotherdiskencryption) | +| **GPO** | Not available | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/choose-default-folder-for-recovery-password.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/choose-default-folder-for-recovery-password.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5a19c8397b --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/choose-default-folder-for-recovery-password.md @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Choose default folder for recovery password + +Specify the default path that is displayed when the *BitLocker Drive Encryption setup wizard* prompts the user to enter the location of a folder in which to save the recovery password. You can specify either a fully qualified path or include the target computer's environment variables in the path: + +- If the path isn't valid, the BitLocker setup wizard displays the computer's top-level folder view +- If you disable or don't configure this policy setting, the BitLocker setup wizard displays the computer's top-level folder view when the user chooses the option to save the recovery password in a folder + +> [!NOTE] +> This policy setting does not prevent the user from saving the recovery password in another folder. + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | Not available | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/choose-drive-encryption-method-and-cipher-strength.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/choose-drive-encryption-method-and-cipher-strength.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fdda90d046 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/choose-drive-encryption-method-and-cipher-strength.md @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Choose drive encryption method and cipher strength + +With this policy, you can configure an encryption algorithm and key cipher strength for fixed data drives, operating system drives, and removable data drives individually. + +Recommended settings: `XTS-AES` algorithm for all drives. The choice of key size, 128 bit or 256 bit depends on the performance of the device. For more performant hard drives and CPU, choose 256-bit key, for less performant ones use 128. + +> [!IMPORTANT] +> Key size might be required by regulators or industry. + +If you disable or don't configure this policy setting, BitLocker uses the default encryption method of `XTS-AES 128-bit`. + +> [!NOTE] +> This policy doesn't apply to encrypted drives. Encrypted drives utilize their own algorithm, which is set by the drive during partitioning. + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | `./Device/Vendor/MSFT/BitLocker/`[EncryptionMethodByDriveType](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp#encryptionmethodbydrivetype)| +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/choose-how-bitlocker-protected-fixed-drives-can-be-recovered.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/choose-how-bitlocker-protected-fixed-drives-can-be-recovered.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7b7748c000 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/choose-how-bitlocker-protected-fixed-drives-can-be-recovered.md @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Choose how BitLocker-protected fixed drives can be recovered + +This policy setting allows you to control how BitLocker-protected fixed data drives are recovered in the absence of the required startup key information. If you enable this policy setting, you can control the methods available to users to recover data from BitLocker-protected fixed data drives. Here are the available options: + +- **Allow certificate-based data recovery agent**: specify whether a data recovery agent can be used with BitLocker-protected fixed data drives. Before a data recovery agent can be used, it must be added from the Public Key Policies item in either the Group Policy Management Console or the Local Group Policy Editor +- **Configure user storage of BitLocker recovery information**: select whether users are allowed, required, or not allowed to generate a 48-digit recovery password or a 256-bit recovery key +- **Omit recovery options from the BitLocker setup wizard**: prevent users from specifying recovery options when they turn on BitLocker for a drive. This means that users won't be able to specify which recovery option to use when they turn on BitLocker. BitLocker recovery options for the drive are determined by the policy setting +- **Save BitLocker recovery information to Active Directory Domain Services**: choose which BitLocker recovery information to store in AD DS for fixed data drives. If you select **Backup recovery password and key package**, both the BitLocker recovery password and key package are stored in AD DS. Storing the key package supports recovering data from a drive that has been physically corrupted. If you select **Backup recovery password only**, only the recovery password is stored in AD DS +- **Do not enable BitLocker until recovery information is stored in AD DS for fixed data drives**: prevents users from enabling BitLocker unless the device is connected to the domain and the backup of BitLocker recovery information to AD DS succeeds. When using this option, a recovery password is automatically generated. + +> [!IMPORTANT] +> The use of recovery keys must be disallowed if the **Deny write access to fixed drives not protected by BitLocker** policy setting is enabled. + +If this policy setting is disabled or not configured, the default recovery options are supported for BitLocker recovery. By default a DRA is allowed, the recovery options can be specified by the user including the recovery password and recovery key, and recovery information is not backed up to AD DS. + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | `./Device/Vendor/MSFT/BitLocker/`[FixedDrivesRecoveryOptions](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp#fixeddrivesrecoveryoptions) | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Fixed Data Drives** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/choose-how-bitlocker-protected-operating-system-drives-can-be-recovered.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/choose-how-bitlocker-protected-operating-system-drives-can-be-recovered.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8cfee0617e --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/choose-how-bitlocker-protected-operating-system-drives-can-be-recovered.md @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Choose how BitLocker-protected operating system drives can be recovered + +This policy setting allows you to control how BitLocker-protected operating system drives are recovered in the absence of the required startup key information. If you enable this policy setting, you can control the methods available to users to recover data from BitLocker-protected operating system drives. Here are the available options: + +- **Allow certificate-based data recovery agent**: specify whether a data recovery agent can be used with BitLocker-protected OS drives. Before a data recovery agent can be used, it must be added from the Public Key Policies item in either the Group Policy Management Console or the Local Group Policy Editor +- **Configure user storage of BitLocker recovery information**: select whether users are allowed, required, or not allowed to generate a 48-digit recovery password or a 256-bit recovery key +- **Omit recovery options from the BitLocker setup wizard**: prevent users from specifying recovery options when they turn on BitLocker for a drive. This means that users won't be able to specify which recovery option to use when they turn on BitLocker. BitLocker recovery options for the drive are determined by the policy setting +- **Save BitLocker recovery information to Active Directory Domain Services**: choose which BitLocker recovery information to store in AD DS for operating system drives. If you select **Backup recovery password and key package**, both the BitLocker recovery password and key package are stored in AD DS. Storing the key package supports recovering data from a drive that has been physically corrupted. If you select **Backup recovery password only**, only the recovery password is stored in AD DS +- **Do not enable BitLocker until recovery information is stored in AD DS for operating system drives**: prevents users from enabling BitLocker unless the device is connected to the domain and the backup of BitLocker recovery information to AD DS succeeds. When using this option, a recovery password is automatically generated. + +If this policy setting is disabled or not configured, the default recovery options are supported for BitLocker recovery. By default a DRA is allowed, the recovery options can be specified by the user including the recovery password and recovery key, and recovery information is not backed up to AD DS. + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | `./Device/Vendor/MSFT/BitLocker/`[SystemDrivesRecoveryOptions](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp#systemdrivesrecoveryoptions)| +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Operating System Drives** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/choose-how-bitlocker-protected-removable-drives-can-be-recovered.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/choose-how-bitlocker-protected-removable-drives-can-be-recovered.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d9973fdef2 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/choose-how-bitlocker-protected-removable-drives-can-be-recovered.md @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Choose how BitLocker-protected removable drives can be recovered + +This policy setting allows you to control how BitLocker-protected removable data drives are recovered in the absence of the required startup key information. If you enable this policy setting, you can control the methods available to users to recover data from BitLocker-protected removable data drives. Here are the available options: + +- **Allow certificate-based data recovery agent**: specify whether a data recovery agent can be used with BitLocker-protected removable data drives. Before a data recovery agent can be used, it must be added from the Public Key Policies item in either the Group Policy Management Console or the Local Group Policy Editor +- **Configure user storage of BitLocker recovery information**: select whether users are allowed, required, or not allowed to generate a 48-digit recovery password or a 256-bit recovery key +- **Omit recovery options from the BitLocker setup wizard**: prevent users from specifying recovery options when they turn on BitLocker for a drive. This means that users won't be able to specify which recovery option to use when they turn on BitLocker. BitLocker recovery options for the drive are determined by the policy setting +- **Save BitLocker recovery information to Active Directory Domain Services**: choose which BitLocker recovery information to store in AD DS for removable data drives. If you select **Backup recovery password and key package**, both the BitLocker recovery password and key package are stored in AD DS. Storing the key package supports recovering data from a drive that has been physically corrupted. If you select **Backup recovery password only**, only the recovery password is stored in AD DS +- **Do not enable BitLocker until recovery information is stored in AD DS for removable data drives**: prevents users from enabling BitLocker unless the device is connected to the domain and the backup of BitLocker recovery information to AD DS succeeds. When using this option, a recovery password is automatically generated. + +> [!IMPORTANT] +> The use of recovery keys must be disallowed if the **Deny write access to removable drives not protected by BitLocker** policy setting is enabled. + +If this policy setting is disabled or not configured, the default recovery options are supported for BitLocker recovery. By default a DRA is allowed, the recovery options can be specified by the user including the recovery password and recovery key, and recovery information is not backed up to AD DS. + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | Not available | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Removable Data Drives** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-minimum-pin-length-for-startup.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-minimum-pin-length-for-startup.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cddc5432db --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-minimum-pin-length-for-startup.md @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Configure minimum PIN length for startup + +This policy configures a minimum length for a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) startup PIN. The startup PIN must have a minimum length of 4 digits and can have a maximum length of 20 digits. + +If you enable this policy setting, you can require a minimum number of digits to be used when setting the startup PIN.\ +If you disable or do not configure this policy setting, users can configure a startup PIN of any length between 6 and 20 digits. + +The TPM can be configured to use Dictionary Attack Prevention parameters ([lockout threshold and lockout duration](../../../../hardware-security/tpm/trusted-platform-module-services-group-policy-settings.md) to control how many failed authorizations attempts are allowed before the TPM is locked out, and how much time must elapse before another attempt can be made. + +The Dictionary Attack Prevention Parameters provide a way to balance security needs with usability. For example, when BitLocker is used with a TPM + PIN configuration, the number of PIN guesses is limited over time. A TPM 2.0 in this example could be configured to allow only 32 PIN guesses immediately, and then only one more guess every two hours. This number of attempts totals to a maximum of about 4415 guesses per year. If the PIN is four digits, all 9999 possible PIN combinations could be attempted in a little over two years. + +> [!TIP] +> Increasing the PIN length requires a greater number of guesses for an attacker. In that case, the lockout duration between each guess can be shortened to allow legitimate users to retry a failed attempt sooner, while maintaining a similar level of protection. + +> [!NOTE] +> If minimum PIN length is set below 6 digits, Windows will attempt to update the TPM 2.0 lockout period to be greater than the default when a PIN is changed. If successful, Windows will only reset the TPM lockout period back to default if the TPM is reset. + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | `./Device/Vendor/MSFT/BitLocker/`[SystemDrivesMinimumPINLength](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp#systemdrivesminimumpinlength) | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Operating System Drives** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-pre-boot-recovery-message-and-url.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-pre-boot-recovery-message-and-url.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..62dffacee5 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-pre-boot-recovery-message-and-url.md @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Configure preboot recovery message and URL + +This policy setting is used to configure the recovery message and to replace the existing URL that is displayed on the preboot recovery screen when the OS drive is locked. + +- If you select the **Use default recovery message and URL** option, the default BitLocker recovery message and URL are displayed in the preboot key recovery screen. If you have previously configured a custom recovery message or URL and want to revert to the default message, you must keep the policy enabled and select the **Use default recovery message and URL** option +- If you select the **Use custom recovery message** option, the message you add to the **Custom recovery message option** text box is displayed in the preboot key recovery screen. If a recovery URL is available, include it in the message +- If you select the **Use custom recovery URL** option, the URL you add to the **Custom recovery URL option** text box replaces the default URL in the default recovery message, which is displayed in the preboot key recovery screen + +> [!NOTE] +> Not all characters and languages are supported in pre-boot. It is strongly recommended that you test that the characters you use for the custom message or URL appear correctly on the pre-boot recovery screen. + +For more information about the BitLocker preboot recovery screen, see [Preboot recovery screen](/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/preboot-recovery-screen). + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | `./Device/Vendor/MSFT/BitLocker/`[SystemDrivesRecoveryMessage](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp#systemdrivesrecoverymessage) | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Operating System Drives** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-recovery-password-rotation.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-recovery-password-rotation.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d2d790df4b --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-recovery-password-rotation.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Configure recovery password rotation + +With this policy you can configure a numeric recovery password rotation upon use for OS and fixed drives on Microsoft Entra joined and Microsoft Entra hybrid joined devices. + +Possible values are: + +- `0`: numeric recovery password rotation is turned off +- `1`: numeric recovery password rotation upon use is *on* for Microsoft Entra joined devices. This is also the default value +- `2`: numeric recovery password rotation upon use is *on* for both Microsoft Entra joined devices and Microsoft Entra hybrid joined devices + +> [!NOTE] +> The Policy is effective only when Micropsoft Entra ID or Active Directory backup for recovery password is configured to *required* +> +> - For OS drive: enable *Do not enable BitLocker until recovery information is stored to AD DS for operating system drives* +> - For fixed drives: enable "*Do not enable BitLocker until recovery information is stored to AD DS for fixed data drives* + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | `./Device/Vendor/MSFT/BitLocker/`[ConfigureRecoveryPasswordRotation](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp#configurerecoverypasswordrotation)| +| **GPO** | Not available | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-tpm-platform-validation-profile-for-bios-based-firmware-configurations.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-tpm-platform-validation-profile-for-bios-based-firmware-configurations.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..26f07df41c --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-tpm-platform-validation-profile-for-bios-based-firmware-configurations.md @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Configure TPM platform validation profile for BIOS-based firmware configurations + +This policy setting determines what values the TPM measures when it validates early boot components before it unlocks an operating system drive on a computer with a BIOS configuration or with UEFI firmware that has the Compatibility Support Module (CSM) enabled. + +- When enabled, the boot components that the TPM validates before unlocking access to the BitLocker-encrypted operating system drive can be configured. If any of these components change while BitLocker protection is in effect, then the TPM doesn't release the encryption key to unlock the drive. Instead, the computer displays the BitLocker Recovery console and requires that the recovery password or the recovery key is provided to unlock the drive. +- When disabled or not configured, the TPM uses the default platform validation profile or the platform validation profile that is specified by the setup script. + +This policy setting doesn't apply if the computer doesn't have a compatible TPM or if BitLocker has already been turned on with TPM protection. + +> [!IMPORTANT] +> This Group Policy setting only applies to computers with BIOS configurations or to computers with UEFI firmware with the CSM enabled. Computers that use a native UEFI firmware configuration store different values in the Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). Use the **Configure TPM platform validation profile for native UEFI firmware configurations** policy setting to configure the TPM PCR profile for computers that use native UEFI firmware. + +A platform validation profile consists of a set of PCR indices that range from 0 to 23. Each PCR index represents a specific measurement that the TPM validates during early boot. The default platform validation profile secures the encryption key against changes to the following PCRs: + +|PCR|Description| +|-|-| +|PCR 0|Core root-of-trust for measurement, BIOS, and platform extensions| +|PCR 2|Option ROM code| +|PCR 4|Master Boot Record (MBR) code| +|PCR 8|NTFS boot sector| +|PCR 9|NTFS boot block| +|PCR 10|Boot manager| +|PCR 11|BitLocker access control| + +> [!NOTE] +> Changing from the default platform validation profile affects the security and manageability of a computer. BitLocker's sensitivity to platform modifications (malicious or authorized) is increased or decreased depending on inclusion or exclusion (respectively) of the PCRs. + +The following list identifies all of the available PCRs: + +|PCR|Description| +|-|-| +| PCR 0 | Core root-of-trust for measurement, BIOS, and platform extensions| +| PCR 1 | Platform and motherboard configuration and data.| +| PCR 2 | Option ROM code| +| PCR 3 | Option ROM data and configuration| +| PCR 4 | Master Boot Record (MBR) code| +| PCR 5 | Master Boot Record (MBR) partition table| +| PCR 6 | State transition and wake events| +| PCR 7 | Computer manufacturer-specific| +| PCR 8 | NTFS boot sector| +| PCR 9 | NTFS boot block| +| PCR 10 | Boot manager| +| PCR 11 | BitLocker access control| +| PCR 12-23 | Reserved for future use | + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | Not available | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Operating System Drives** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-tpm-platform-validation-profile-for-native-uefi-firmware-configurations.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-tpm-platform-validation-profile-for-native-uefi-firmware-configurations.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cb43d10a8c --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-tpm-platform-validation-profile-for-native-uefi-firmware-configurations.md @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Configure TPM platform validation profile for native UEFI firmware configurations + +This policy setting determines what values the TPM measures when it validates early boot components, before unlocking the OS drive on native-UEFI firmware device. + +- If you enable this policy setting before turning on BitLocker, you can configure the boot components that the TPM validates before unlocking access to the BitLocker-encrypted OS drive. If any of these components change while BitLocker protection is in effect, the TPM doesn't release the encryption key to unlock the drive. The device displays the BitLocker Recovery console and requires that either the recovery password or recovery key be provided to unlock the drive +- If you disable or do not configure this policy setting, BitLocker uses the default platform validation profile for the available hardware, or the platform validation profile specified by the setup script + +> [!IMPORTANT] +> This policy setting only applies to devices with a native UEFI firmware configuration. Computers with BIOS or UEFI firmware with a Compatibility Support Module (CSM) enabled store different values in the Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). Use the **[Configure TPM platform validation profile for BIOS-based firmware configurations](../configure.md?tabs=os#configure-tpm-platform-validation-profile-for-bios-based-firmware-configurations)** policy setting to configure the TPM PCR profile for devices with BIOS configurations, or for devices with UEFI firmware with a CSM enabled. + +A platform validation profile consists of a set of PCR indices ranging from 0 to 23. The default platform validation profile secures the encryption key against changes to the following PCRs: + +|PCR|Description| +|-|-| +| PCR 0 | Core System Firmware executable code| +| PCR 2 | Extended or pluggable executable code| +| PCR 4 | Boot Manager| +| PCR 11 | BitLocker access control| + +> [!NOTE] +> When Secure Boot State (PCR7) support is available, the default platform validation profile secures the encryption key using Secure Boot State (PCR 7) and the BitLocker access control (PCR 11). + +The following list identifies all of the available PCRs: + +|PCR|Description| +|-|-| +| PCR 0 | Core System Firmware executable code| +| PCR 1 | Core System Firmware data| +| PCR 2 | Extended or pluggable executable code| +| PCR 3 | Extended or pluggable firmware data| +| PCR 4 | Boot Manager| +| PCR 5 | GPT/Partition Table| +| PCR 6 | Resume from S4 and S5 Power State Events| +| PCR 7 | Secure Boot State| +| PCR 8 | Initialized to 0 with no Extends (reserved for future use)| +| PCR 9 | Initialized to 0 with no Extends (reserved for future use)| +| PCR 10 | Initialized to 0 with no Extends (reserved for future use)| +| PCR 11 | BitLocker access control| +| PCR 12 | Data events and highly volatile events| +| PCR 13 | Boot Module Details| +| PCR 14 | Boot Authorities| +| PCR 15 - 23 | Reserved for future use + +> [!WARNING] +> Changing from the default platform validation profile affects the security and manageability of a device. BitLocker's sensitivity to platform modifications (malicious or authorized) is increased or decreased depending on inclusion or exclusion (respectively) of the PCRs. +> +> Setting this policy with PCR 7 omitted, overrides the *[Allow Secure Boot for integrity validation](../configure.md?tabs=os#allow-secure-boot-for-integrity-validation)* policy, preventing BitLocker from using Secure Boot for platform or Boot Configuration Data (BCD) integrity validation. +> +> Setting this policy may result in BitLocker recovery when firmware is updated. If you set this policy to include PCR 0, suspend BitLocker prior to applying firmware updates. It is recommended to not configure this policy, to allow Windows to select the PCR profile for the best combination of security and usability based on the available hardware on each device. + +PCR 7 measures the state of Secure Boot. With PCR 7, BitLocker can use Secure Boot for integrity validation. Secure Boot ensures that the computer's preboot environment loads only firmware that is digitally signed by authorized software publishers. PCR 7 measurements indicate whether Secure Boot is on, and which keys are trusted on the platform. If Secure Boot is on and the firmware measures PCR 7 correctly per the UEFI specification, BitLocker can bind to this information rather than to PCRs 0, 2, and 4, which have the measurements of the exact firmware and Bootmgr images loaded. This process reduces the likelihood of BitLocker starting in recovery mode as a result of firmware and image updates, and it provides with greater flexibility to manage the preboot configuration. + +PCR 7 measurements must follow the guidance that is described in [Appendix A Trusted Execution Environment EFI Protocol](/windows-hardware/test/hlk/testref/trusted-execution-environment-efi-protocol). + +PCR 7 measurements are a mandatory logo requirement for systems that support Modern Standby (also known as Always On, Always Connected PCs). On such systems, if the TPM with PCR 7 measurement and secure boot are correctly configured, BitLocker binds to PCR 7 and PCR 11 by default. + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | Not available | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Operating System Drives** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-fixed-data-drives.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-fixed-data-drives.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6c6a082d01 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-fixed-data-drives.md @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Configure use of hardware-based encryption for fixed data drives + +This policy setting allows you to manage BitLocker's use of hardware-based encryption on fixed data drives and specify which encryption algorithms it can use with hardware-based encryption. Using hardware-based encryption can improve performance of drive operations that involve frequent reading or writing of data to the drive. + +If you enable this policy setting, you can specify options that control whether BitLocker software-based encryption is used instead of hardware-based encryption on devices that don't support hardware-based encryption. You can also specify if you want to restrict the encryption algorithms and cipher suites used with hardware-based encryption. + +If you disable this policy setting, BitLocker can't use hardware-based encryption with fixed data drives, and BitLocker software-based encryption will be used by default when the drive is encrypted. + +If you do not configure this policy setting, BitLocker will use software-based encryption, irrespective of hardware-based encryption availability. + +> [!NOTE] +> The **Choose drive encryption method and cipher strength** policy setting doesn't apply to hardware-based encryption. The encryption algorithm used by hardware-based encryption is set when the drive is partitioned. By default, BitLocker uses the algorithm configured on the drive to encrypt the drive. +> +> The **Restrict encryption algorithms and cipher suites allowed for hardware-based encryption** option enables you to restrict the encryption algorithms that BitLocker can use with hardware encryption. If the algorithm set for the drive isn't available, BitLocker disables the use of hardware-based encryption. Encryption algorithms are specified by object identifiers (OID). For example: +> - AES 128 in CBC mode OID: `2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.2` +> - AES 256 in CBC mode OID: `2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.42` + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | Not available | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Fixed Data Drives** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-operating-system-drives.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-operating-system-drives.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..81b9dd760c --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-operating-system-drives.md @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Configure use of hardware-based encryption for operating system drives + +This policy setting allows you to manage BitLocker's use of hardware-based encryption on operating system drives and specify which encryption algorithms it can use with hardware-based encryption. Using hardware-based encryption can improve performance of drive operations that involve frequent reading or writing of data to the drive. + +If you enable this policy setting, you can specify options that control whether BitLocker software-based encryption is used instead of hardware-based encryption on devices that don't support hardware-based encryption. You can also specify if you want to restrict the encryption algorithms and cipher suites used with hardware-based encryption. + +If you disable this policy setting, BitLocker can't use hardware-based encryption with operating system drives, and BitLocker software-based encryption will be used by default when the drive is encrypted. + +If you do not configure this policy setting, BitLocker will use software-based encryption, irrespective of hardware-based encryption availability. + +> [!NOTE] +> The **Choose drive encryption method and cipher strength** policy setting doesn't apply to hardware-based encryption. The encryption algorithm used by hardware-based encryption is set when the drive is partitioned. By default, BitLocker uses the algorithm configured on the drive to encrypt the drive. +> +> The **Restrict encryption algorithms and cipher suites allowed for hardware-based encryption** option enables you to restrict the encryption algorithms that BitLocker can use with hardware encryption. If the algorithm set for the drive isn't available, BitLocker disables the use of hardware-based encryption. Encryption algorithms are specified by object identifiers (OID). For example: +> - AES 128 in CBC mode OID: `2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.2` +> - AES 256 in CBC mode OID: `2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.42` + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | Not available | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Operating System Drives** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-removable-data-drives.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-removable-data-drives.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..21ebc8d5b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-removable-data-drives.md @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Configure use of hardware-based encryption for removable data drives + +This policy setting allows you to manage BitLocker's use of hardware-based encryption on removable data drives and specify which encryption algorithms it can use with hardware-based encryption. Using hardware-based encryption can improve performance of drive operations that involve frequent reading or writing of data to the drive. + +If you enable this policy setting, you can specify options that control whether BitLocker software-based encryption is used instead of hardware-based encryption on devices that don't support hardware-based encryption. You can also specify if you want to restrict the encryption algorithms and cipher suites used with hardware-based encryption. + +If you disable this policy setting, BitLocker can't use hardware-based encryption with removable data drives, and BitLocker software-based encryption will be used by default when the drive is encrypted. + +If you do not configure this policy setting, BitLocker will use software-based encryption, irrespective of hardware-based encryption availability. + +> [!NOTE] +> The **Choose drive encryption method and cipher strength** policy setting doesn't apply to hardware-based encryption. The encryption algorithm used by hardware-based encryption is set when the drive is partitioned. By default, BitLocker uses the algorithm configured on the drive to encrypt the drive. +> +> The **Restrict encryption algorithms and cipher suites allowed for hardware-based encryption** option enables you to restrict the encryption algorithms that BitLocker can use with hardware encryption. If the algorithm set for the drive isn't available, BitLocker disables the use of hardware-based encryption. Encryption algorithms are specified by object identifiers (OID). For example: +> - AES 128 in CBC mode OID: `2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.2` +> - AES 256 in CBC mode OID: `2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.42` + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | Not available | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Removable Data Drives** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-use-of-passwords-for-fixed-data-drives.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-use-of-passwords-for-fixed-data-drives.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..db3025e06b --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-use-of-passwords-for-fixed-data-drives.md @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Configure use of passwords for fixed data drives + +This policy setting specifies whether a password is required to unlock BitLocker-protected fixed data drives. If you choose to allow the use of a password, you can require that a password be used, enforce complexity requirements, and configure a minimum length. + +> [!IMPORTANT] +> For the complexity requirement setting to be effective, the group policy setting **Password must meet complexity requirements** located in **Computer Configuration** > **Windows Settings** > **Security Settings** > **Account Policies** > **Password Policy**, must be also enabled. + +If you enable this policy setting, users can configure a password that meets the requirements you define. To enforce complexity requirements on the password, select **Require complexity**: + +- When set to **Require complexity**, a connection to a domain controller is necessary when BitLocker is enabled to validate the complexity the password +- When set to **Allow complexity**, a connection to a domain controller is attempted to validate that the complexity adheres to the rules set by the policy. If no domain controllers are found, the password is accepted regardless of actual password complexity and the drive will be encrypted using that password as a protector +- When set to **Do not allow complexity**, password complexity isn't validated + +Passwords must be at least eight characters. To configure a greater minimum length for the password, specify the desired number of characters under **Minimum password length** + +If you disable or don't configure this policy setting, the default length constraint of eight characters applies to operating system drive passwords, and no complexity checks occur. + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | Not available | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Fixed Data Drives** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-use-of-passwords-for-operating-system-drives.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-use-of-passwords-for-operating-system-drives.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5ec07cf5b7 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-use-of-passwords-for-operating-system-drives.md @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Configure use of passwords for operating system drives + +This policy setting specifies the constraints for passwords used to unlock BitLocker-protected operating system drives. If non-TPM protectors are allowed on operating system drives, you can provision a password, enforce complexity requirements, and configure a minimum length. + +> [!IMPORTANT] +> For the complexity requirement setting to be effective, the group policy setting **Password must meet complexity requirements** located in **Computer Configuration** > **Windows Settings** > **Security Settings** > **Account Policies** > **Password Policy**, must be also enabled. + +If you enable this policy setting, users can configure a password that meets the requirements you define. To enforce complexity requirements on the password, select **Require complexity**: + +- When set to **Require complexity**, a connection to a domain controller is necessary when BitLocker is enabled to validate the complexity the password +- When set to **Allow complexity**, a connection to a domain controller is attempted to validate that the complexity adheres to the rules set by the policy. If no domain controllers are found, the password is accepted regardless of actual password complexity and the drive will be encrypted using that password as a protector +- When set to **Do not allow complexity**, password complexity isn't validated + +Passwords must be at least eight characters. To configure a greater minimum length for the password, specify the desired number of characters under **Minimum password length** + +If you disable or don't configure this policy setting, the default length constraint of eight characters applies to operating system drive passwords, and no complexity checks occur. + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | Not available | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Operating System Drives** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-use-of-passwords-for-removable-data-drives.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-use-of-passwords-for-removable-data-drives.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..336f1e1f59 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-use-of-passwords-for-removable-data-drives.md @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Configure use of passwords for removable data drives + +This policy setting specifies whether a password is required to unlock BitLocker-protected removable data drives. If you choose to allow the use of a password, you can require that a password be used, enforce complexity requirements, and configure a minimum length. + +> [!IMPORTANT] +> For the complexity requirement setting to be effective, the group policy setting **Password must meet complexity requirements** located in **Computer Configuration** > **Windows Settings** > **Security Settings** > **Account Policies** > **Password Policy**, must be also enabled. + +If you enable this policy setting, users can configure a password that meets the requirements you define. To enforce complexity requirements on the password, select **Require complexity**: + +- When set to **Require complexity**, a connection to a domain controller is necessary when BitLocker is enabled to validate the complexity the password +- When set to **Allow complexity**, a connection to a domain controller is attempted to validate that the complexity adheres to the rules set by the policy. If no domain controllers are found, the password is accepted regardless of actual password complexity and the drive will be encrypted using that password as a protector +- When set to **Do not allow complexity**, password complexity isn't validated + +Passwords must be at least 8 characters. To configure a greater minimum length for the password, specify the desired number of characters under **Minimum password length** + +If you disable or don't configure this policy setting, the default length constraint of eight characters applies to operating system drive passwords, and no complexity checks occur. + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | Not available | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Removable Data Drives** | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-use-of-smart-cards-on-fixed-data-drives.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-use-of-smart-cards-on-fixed-data-drives.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..272d4f036f --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-use-of-smart-cards-on-fixed-data-drives.md @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Configure use of smart cards on fixed data drives + +This policy setting allows you to specify whether smart cards can be used to authenticate user access to the BitLocker-protected fixed data drives. + +- If you enable this policy setting, smart cards can be used to authenticate user access to the drive + - You can require a smart card authentication by selecting the **Require use of smart cards on fixed data drives** option +- If you disable this policy setting, users can't use smart cards to authenticate their access to BitLocker-protected fixed data drives +- If you don't configure this policy setting, smart cards can be used to authenticate user access to a BitLocker-protected drive + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | Not available | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Fixed Data Drives** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-use-of-smart-cards-on-removable-data-drives.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-use-of-smart-cards-on-removable-data-drives.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..420074ca92 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/configure-use-of-smart-cards-on-removable-data-drives.md @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Configure use of smart cards on removable data drives + +This policy setting allows you to specify whether smart cards can be used to authenticate user access to the BitLocker-protected removable data drives. + +- If you enable this policy setting, smart cards can be used to authenticate user access to the drive + - You can require a smart card authentication by selecting the **Require use of smart cards on removable data drives** option +- If you disable this policy setting, users can't use smart cards to authenticate their access to BitLocker-protected removable data drives +- If you don't configure this policy setting, smart cards can be used to authenticate user access to a BitLocker-protected drive + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | Not available | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Removable Data Drives** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/control-use-of-bitlocker-on-removable-drives.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/control-use-of-bitlocker-on-removable-drives.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6900ca9c2d --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/control-use-of-bitlocker-on-removable-drives.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Control use of BitLocker on removable drives + +This policy setting controls the use of BitLocker on removable data drives. + +When this policy setting is enabled, you can select property settings that control how users can configure BitLocker: + +- Choose **Allow users to apply BitLocker protection on removable data drives** to permit the user to run the BitLocker setup wizard on a removable data drive +- Choose **Allow users to suspend and decrypt BitLocker on removable data drives** to permit the user to remove BitLocker encryption from the drive or suspend the encryption while maintenance is performed + +If you disable this policy setting, users can't use BitLocker on removable disk drives. + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | `./Device/Vendor/MSFT/BitLocker/`[RemovableDrivesConfigureBDE](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp#removabledrivesconfigurebde) | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Removable Data Drives** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/deny-write-access-to-fixed-drives-not-protected-by-bitlocker.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/deny-write-access-to-fixed-drives-not-protected-by-bitlocker.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3589ed946a --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/deny-write-access-to-fixed-drives-not-protected-by-bitlocker.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Deny write access to fixed drives not protected by BitLocker + +This policy setting is used to require encryption of fixed drives prior to granting *write* access. + +If you enable this policy setting, all fixed data drives that are not BitLocker-protected will be mounted as read-only. If the drive is protected by BitLocker, it will be mounted with read and write access. + +If you disable or don't configure this policy setting, all fixed data drives on the computer will be mounted with read and write access. + +> [!NOTE] +> When this policy setting is enabled, users receive **Access denied** error messages when they try to save data to unencrypted fixed data drives. +> +> +> If the *BitLocker Drive Preparation Tool* `BdeHdCfg.exe` is executed on a computer when this policy setting is enabled, the following issues could be encountered: +> +> - If you attempt to shrink a drive to create the system drive, the drive size is successfully reduced, and a raw partition is created. However, the raw partition isn't formatted. The following error message is displayed: **The new active drive cannot be formatted. You may need to manually prepare your drive for BitLocker.** +> - If you attempt to use unallocated space to create the system drive, a raw partition is created. However, the raw partition isn't be formatted. The following error message is displayed: **The new active drive cannot be formatted. You may need to manually prepare your drive for BitLocker.** +> - If you attempt to merge an existing drive into the system drive, the tool fails to copy the required boot file onto the target drive to create the system drive. The following error message is displayed: **BitLocker setup failed to copy boot files. You may need to manually prepare your drive for BitLocker.** + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | `./Device/Vendor/MSFT/BitLocker/`[FixedDrivesRequireEncryption](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp#fixeddrivesrequireencryption) | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Fixed Data Drives** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/deny-write-access-to-removable-drives-not-protected-by-bitlocker.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/deny-write-access-to-removable-drives-not-protected-by-bitlocker.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..510a31f0d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/deny-write-access-to-removable-drives-not-protected-by-bitlocker.md @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Deny write access to removable drives not protected by BitLocker + +This policy setting configures whether BitLocker protection is required for a device to be able to write data to a removable data drive. + +If you enable this policy setting: + +- all removable data drives that are not BitLocker-protected are mounted as read-only +- if the drive is protected by BitLocker, it's mounted with read and write access +- if the **Deny write access to devices configured in another organization** option is selected, only drives with identification fields matching the computer's identification fields are given write access + - When a removable data drive is accessed, it's checked for valid identification field and allowed identification fields. These fields are defined by the (*Provide the unique identifiers for your organization*)[] policy setting + +If you disable or do not configure this policy setting, all removable data drives on the computer are mounted with read and write access. + +> [!NOTE] +> This policy setting is ignored if the policy settings *Removable Disks: Deny write access* is enabled. + +> [!IMPORTANT] +> If you enable this policy: +> +> - Use of BitLocker with the *TPM startup key* or *TPM key and PIN* must be disallowed +> - Use of recovery keys must be disallowed + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | `./Device/Vendor/MSFT/BitLocker/`[RemovableDrivesRequireEncryption](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp#removabledrivesrequireencryption) | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Removable Data Drives** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/disable-new-dma-devices-when-this-computer-is-locked.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/disable-new-dma-devices-when-this-computer-is-locked.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cb3456daea --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/disable-new-dma-devices-when-this-computer-is-locked.md @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Disable new DMA devices when this computer is locked + +When enabled, this policy setting blocks direct memory access (DMA) for all hot pluggable PCI ports until a user signs into Windows. + +Once a user signs in, Windows enumerates the PCI devices connected to the host Thunderbolt PCI ports. Every time the user locks the device, DMA is blocked on hot plug Thunderbolt PCI ports with no children devices, until the user signs in again. + +Devices that were already enumerated when the device was unlocked will continue to function until unplugged, or the system is rebooted or hibernated. + +This policy setting is only enforced when BitLocker or device encryption is enabled. + +> [!IMPORTANT] +> This policy is not compatible with *Kernel DMA Protection*. It's recommended to disable this policy if the system supports Kernel DMA Protection, as Kernel DMA Protection provides higher security for the system. For more information about Kernel DMA Protection, see [Kernel DMA Protection](../../../../hardware-security/kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt.md). + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | Not available | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/disallow-standard-users-from-changing-the-pin-or-password.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/disallow-standard-users-from-changing-the-pin-or-password.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5d5089cdfc --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/disallow-standard-users-from-changing-the-pin-or-password.md @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Disallow standard users from changing the PIN or password + +This policy allows configuration of whether standard users are allowed to change the PIN or password that is used to protect the operating system drive, if they can provide the existing PIN first. + +If you enable this policy, standard users can't change BitLocker PINs or passwords. +If you disable or don't configure this policy, standard users can change BitLocker PINs and passwords. + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | `./Device/Vendor/MSFT/BitLocker/`[SystemDrivesDisallowStandardUsersCanChangePIN](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp#systemdrivesdisallowstandarduserscanchangepin) | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Operating System Drives** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/enable-use-of-bitlocker-authentication-requiring-preboot-keyboard-input-on-slates.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/enable-use-of-bitlocker-authentication-requiring-preboot-keyboard-input-on-slates.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..af984e4535 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/enable-use-of-bitlocker-authentication-requiring-preboot-keyboard-input-on-slates.md @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Enable use of BitLocker authentication requiring preboot keyboard input on slates + +This policy setting allows users to turn on authentication options that require user input from the preboot environment, even if the platform lacks preboot input capability. The Windows touch keyboard (such as that used by tablets) isn't available in the preboot environment where BitLocker requires additional information such as a PIN or Password. + +- If you enable this policy setting, devices must have an alternative means of preboot input (such as an attached USB keyboard). +- If this policy isn't enabled, the Windows Recovery Environment must be enabled on tablets to support the entry of the BitLocker recovery password. + +It's recommended that administrators enable this policy only for devices that are verified to have an alternative means of preboot input, such as attaching a USB keyboard. + +When the Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) isn't enabled and this policy isn't enabled, BitLocker can't be turned on a device that uses a touch keyboard. + +If this policy setting isn't enabled, the following options in the **Require additional authentication at startup** policy might not be available: + +- Configure TPM startup PIN: Required and Allowed +- Configure TPM startup key and PIN: Required and Allowed +- Configure use of passwords for operating system drives + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | `./Device/Vendor/MSFT/BitLocker/`[SystemDrivesEnablePrebootInputProtectorsOnSlates](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp#systemdrivesenableprebootinputprotectorsonslates) | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Operating System Drives** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/enforce-drive-encryption-type-on-fixed-data-drives.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/enforce-drive-encryption-type-on-fixed-data-drives.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ebbb59b261 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/enforce-drive-encryption-type-on-fixed-data-drives.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Enforce drive encryption type on fixed data drives + +This policy setting controls the use of BitLocker on fixed data drives. + +If you enable this policy setting the encryption type that BitLocker uses to encrypt drives is defined by this policy, and the encryption type option won't be presented in the BitLocker setup wizard: + +- Choose **full encryption** to require that the entire drive be encrypted when BitLocker is turned on +- Choose **used space only encryption** to require that only the portion of the drive used to store data is encrypted when BitLocker is turned on + +If you disable or don't configure this policy setting, the BitLocker setup wizard asks the user to select the encryption type before turning on BitLocker. + +> [!NOTE] +> Changing the encryption type has no effect if the drive is already encrypted or if encryption is in progress. +> +> This policy is ignored when shrinking or expanding a volume, and the BitLocker driver uses the current encryption method. For example, when a drive that is using *Used Space Only encryption* is expanded, the new free space isn't wiped like a drive that uses *Full encryption*. The user could wipe the free space on a *Used Space Only* drive by using the following command: `manage-bde.exe -w`. If the volume is shrunk, no action is taken for the new free space. + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | `./Device/Vendor/MSFT/BitLocker/`[FixedDrivesEncryptionType](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp#fixeddrivesencryptiontype) | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Fixed Data Drives** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/enforce-drive-encryption-type-on-operating-system-drives.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/enforce-drive-encryption-type-on-operating-system-drives.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d5c449d091 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/enforce-drive-encryption-type-on-operating-system-drives.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Enforce drive encryption type on operating system drives + +This policy setting allows you to configure the encryption type used by BitLocker Drive Encryption. + +When you enable this policy setting, the *encryption type* option isn't offered in the BitLocker setup wizard: + +- Choose **full encryption** to require that the entire drive be encrypted when BitLocker is turned on +- Choose **used space only encryption** to require that only the portion of the drive used to store data is encrypted when BitLocker is turned on + +If you disable or don't configure this policy setting, the BitLocker setup wizard asks the user to select the encryption type before turning on BitLocker. + +> [!NOTE] +> Changing the encryption type has no effect if the drive is already encrypted or if encryption is in progress. +> +> This policy is ignored when shrinking or expanding a volume, and the BitLocker driver uses the current encryption method. For example, when a drive that is using *Used Space Only encryption* is expanded, the new free space isn't wiped like a drive that uses *Full encryption*. The user could wipe the free space on a *Used Space Only* drive by using the following command: `manage-bde.exe -w`. If the volume is shrunk, no action is taken for the new free space. + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | `./Device/Vendor/MSFT/BitLocker/`[SystemDrivesEncryptionType](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp#systemdrivesencryptiontype) | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Operating System Drives** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/enforce-drive-encryption-type-on-removable-data-drives.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/enforce-drive-encryption-type-on-removable-data-drives.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..abf2f0dca0 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/enforce-drive-encryption-type-on-removable-data-drives.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Enforce drive encryption type on removable data drives + +This policy setting controls the use of BitLocker on removable data drives. + +When you enable this policy setting, the *encryption type* option isn't offered in the BitLocker setup wizard: + +- Choose **full encryption** to require that the entire drive be encrypted when BitLocker is turned on +- Choose **used space only encryption** to require that only the portion of the drive used to store data is encrypted when BitLocker is turned on + +If you disable or don't configure this policy setting, the BitLocker setup wizard asks the user to select the encryption type before turning on BitLocker. + +> [!NOTE] +> Changing the encryption type has no effect if the drive is already encrypted or if encryption is in progress. +> +> This policy is ignored when shrinking or expanding a volume, and the BitLocker driver uses the current encryption method. For example, when a drive that is using *Used Space Only encryption* is expanded, the new free space isn't wiped like a drive that uses *Full encryption*. The user could wipe the free space on a *Used Space Only* drive by using the following command: `manage-bde.exe -w`. If the volume is shrunk, no action is taken for the new free space. + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | `./Device/Vendor/MSFT/BitLocker/`[RemovableDrivesEncryptionType](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp#removabledrivesencryptiontype) | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Removable Data Drives** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/prevent-memory-overwrite-on-restart.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/prevent-memory-overwrite-on-restart.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0437a528d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/prevent-memory-overwrite-on-restart.md @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Prevent memory overwrite on restart + +This policy setting is used to control whether the computer's memory is overwritten when the device restarts. BitLocker secrets include key material used to encrypt data. + +- If you enable this policy setting, memory isn't overwritten when the computer restarts. Preventing memory overwrite may improve restart performance but increases the risk of exposing BitLocker secrets. +- If you disable or do not configure this policy setting, BitLocker secrets are removed from memory when the computer restarts. + +> [!NOTE] +> This policy setting applies only when BitLocker protection is enabled. + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | Not available | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/provide-the-unique-identifiers-for-your-organization.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/provide-the-unique-identifiers-for-your-organization.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5612741246 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/provide-the-unique-identifiers-for-your-organization.md @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Provide the unique identifiers for your organization + +This policy setting allows you to associate unique organizational identifiers to a drive that is encrypted with BitLocker. The identifiers are stored as the *identification field* and *allowed identification field*: + +- The identification field allows you to associate a unique organizational identifier to BitLocker-protected drives. This identifier is automatically added to new BitLocker-protected drives and can be updated on existing BitLocker-protected drives using the *BitLocker Drive Encryption: Configuration Tool* (`manage-bde.exe`) +- The allowed identification field is used in combination with the *[Deny write access to removable drives not protected by BitLocker](../configure.md?tabs=removable#deny-write-access-to-removable-drives-not-protected-by-bitlocker)* policy setting to help control the use of removable drives in your organization. It's a comma separated list of identification fields from your organization or other external organizations. You can configure the identification fields on existing drives by using `manage-bde.exe`. + +If you enable this policy setting, you can configure the identification field on the BitLocker-protected drive and any allowed identification field used by your organization. When a BitLocker-protected drive is mounted on another BitLocker-enabled device, the identification field and allowed identification field are used to determine whether the drive is from a different organization. + +If you disable or don't configure this policy setting, the identification field is not required. + +> [!IMPORTANT] +> Identification fields are required for management of certificate-based data recovery agents on BitLocker-protected drives. BitLocker only manages and updates certificate-based data recovery agents when the identification field is present on a drive and is identical to the value configured on the device. The identification field can be any value of 260 characters or fewer. + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | `./Device/Vendor/MSFT/BitLocker/`[IdentificationField](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp#identificationfield) | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/removable-drives-excluded-from-encryption.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/removable-drives-excluded-from-encryption.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..133e810d41 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/removable-drives-excluded-from-encryption.md @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Removable drives excluded from encryption + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | `./Device/Vendor/MSFT/BitLocker/`[RemovableDrivesExcludedFromEncryption](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp#removabledrivesexcludedfromencryption) | +| **GPO** | Not available | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/require-additional-authentication-at-startup.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/require-additional-authentication-at-startup.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..825a951cf0 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/require-additional-authentication-at-startup.md @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Require additional authentication at startup + +This policy setting configures whether BitLocker requires extra authentication each time the device starts. + +If you enable this policy, users can configure advanced startup options in the BitLocker setup wizard.\ +If you disable or don't configure this policy setting, users can configure only basic options on computers with a TPM. + +> [!NOTE] +> Only one of the additional authentication options can be required at startup, otherwise a policy error occurs. + +If you want to use BitLocker on a device without a TPM, select the option **Allow BitLocker without a compatible TPM**. In this mode, either a password or a USB drive is required for startup.\ +When using a startup key, the key information used to encrypt the drive is stored on the USB drive, creating a USB key. When the USB key is inserted, the access to the drive is authenticated and the drive is accessible. If the USB key is lost or unavailable, or if you have forgotten the password, then you must use one of the BitLocker recovery options to access the drive. + +On a computer with a compatible TPM, four types of authentication methods can be used at startup to provide added protection for encrypted data. When the computer starts, it can use: + +- TPM only +- a USB flash drive containing a startup key +- a PIN (6-digit to 20-digit) +- PIN + USB flash drive + +> [!NOTE] +> If you want to require the use of a startup PIN and a USB flash drive, you must configure BitLocker settings using the command-line tool [manage-bde](/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/manage-bde) instead of the BitLocker Drive Encryption setup wizard. + +There are four options for TPM-enabled devices: + +- Configure TPM startup + - Allow TPM + - Require TPM + - Don't allow TPM + +- Configure TPM startup PIN + - Allow startup PIN with TPM + - Require startup PIN with TPM + - Don't allow startup PIN with TPM + +- Configure TPM startup key + - Allow startup key with TPM + - Require startup key with TPM + - Don't allow startup key with TPM + +- Configure TPM startup key and PIN + - Allow TPM startup key with PIN + - Require startup key and PIN with TPM + - Don't allow TPM startup key with PIN + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | `./Device/Vendor/MSFT/BitLocker/`[SystemDrivesRequireStartupAuthentication](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp#systemdrivesrequirestartupauthentication) | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Operating System Drives** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/require-device-encryption.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/require-device-encryption.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c80d17f8b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/require-device-encryption.md @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Require device encryption + +This policy setting determines whether BitLocker is required: + +- If enabled, encryption is triggered on all drives silently or non-silently based on [Allow warning for other disk encryption](../configure.md?tabs=os#allow-warning-for-other-disk-encryption) policy +- If disabled, BitLocker isn't turned off for the system drive, but it stops prompting the user to turn BitLocker on. + +> [!NOTE] +> Typically, BitLocker follows the [Choose drive encryption method and cipher strength](../configure.md?tabs=os#choose-drive-encryption-method-and-cipher-strength) policy configuration. However, this policy setting will be ignored for self-encrypting fixed drives and self-encrypting OS drives. + +Encryptable fixed data volumes are treated similarly to OS volumes, but they must meet other criteria to be encryptable: + +- It must not be a dynamic volume +- It must not be a recovery partition +- It must not be a hidden volume +- It must not be a system partition +- It must not be backed by virtual storage +- It must not have a reference in the BCD store + +> [!NOTE] +> Only full disk encryption is supported when using this policy for silent encryption. For non-silent encryption, encryption type will depend on the [*Enforce drive encryption type on operating system drives*](../configure.md?tabs=fixed#enforce-drive-encryption-type-on-operating-system-drives) and [*Enforce drive encryption type on fixed data drives*](../configure.md?tabs=fixed#enforce-drive-encryption-type-on-fixed-data-drives) policies configured on the device. + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | `./Device/Vendor/MSFT/BitLocker/`[RequireDeviceEncryption](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp#requiredeviceencryption) | +| **GPO** | Not available | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/reset-platform-validation-data-after-bitlocker-recovery.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/reset-platform-validation-data-after-bitlocker-recovery.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d34fafac10 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/reset-platform-validation-data-after-bitlocker-recovery.md @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Reset platform validation data after BitLocker recovery + +This policy setting determines if platform validation data should refresh when Windows is started following a BitLocker recovery. A platform validation data profile consists of the values in a set of Platform Configuration Register (PCR) indices that range from 0 to 23. + +If you enable this policy setting, platform validation data is refreshed when Windows is started following BitLocker recovery. This is the default behavior.\ +If you disable this policy setting, platform validation data won't be refreshed when Windows is started following BitLocker recovery. + +For more information about the recovery process, see the [BitLocker recovery overview](../recovery-overview.md). + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | Not available | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Operating System Drives** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/use-enhanced-boot-configuration-data-validation-profile.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/use-enhanced-boot-configuration-data-validation-profile.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e80cb22d19 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/use-enhanced-boot-configuration-data-validation-profile.md @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Use enhanced Boot Configuration Data validation profile + +This policy setting determines specific Boot Configuration Data (BCD) settings to verify during platform validation. A platform validation uses the data in the platform validation profile, which consists of a set of Platform Configuration Register (PCR) indices that range from 0 to 23. + +If you don't configure this policy setting, the device will verify the default Windows BCD settings. + +> [!NOTE] +> When BitLocker is using Secure Boot for platform and BCD integrity validation, as defined by the *[Allow Secure Boot for integrity validation](../configure.md?tabs=os#allow-secure-boot-for-integrity-validation)* policy setting, this policy setting is ignored. The setting that controls boot debugging `0x16000010` is always validated, and it has no effect if it's included in the inclusion or exclusion list. + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | Not available | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > **Operating System Drives** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/validate-smart-card-certificate-usage-rule-compliance.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/validate-smart-card-certificate-usage-rule-compliance.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d74b1ca073 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/validate-smart-card-certificate-usage-rule-compliance.md @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +--- +author: paolomatarazzo +ms.author: paoloma +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +ms.topic: include +--- + +### Validate smart card certificate usage rule compliance + +This policy setting is used to determine which certificate to use with BitLocker by associating an object identifier (OID) from a smart card certificate to a BitLocker-protected drive. The object identifier is specified in the enhanced key usage (EKU) of a certificate. + +BitLocker can identify which certificates may be used to authenticate a user certificate to a BitLocker-protected drive by matching the object identifier in the certificate with the object identifier that is defined by this policy setting. Default OID is `1.3.6.1.4.1.311.67.1.1`. + +If you enable this policy setting, the object identifier specified in the **Object identifier** field must match the object identifier in the smart card certificate. If you disable or don't configure this policy setting, the default OID is used. + +> [!NOTE] +> BitLocker doesn't require that a certificate have an EKU attribute; however, if one is configured for the certificate, it must be set to an object identifier that matches the object identifier configured for BitLocker. + +| | Path | +|--|--| +| **CSP** | Not available | +| **GPO** | **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** | diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/index.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/index.md index 3faff60393..c831cf49df 100644 --- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/index.md +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/index.md @@ -1,51 +1,151 @@ --- title: BitLocker overview -description: Learn about BitLocker requirements, practical applications, and deprecated features. +description: Learn about BitLocker practical applications and requirements. ms.collection: - highpri - tier1 ms.topic: overview -ms.date: 08/03/2023 +ms.date: 10/30/2023 --- # BitLocker overview -Bitlocker is a Windows disk encryption feature, designed to protect data by providing encryption for entire volumes.\ -BitLocker addresses the threats of data theft or exposure from lost, stolen, or inappropriately decommissioned devices. - -BitLocker provides maximum protection when used with a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). A TPM is a hardware component installed in many devices and it works with BitLocker to help protect user data and to ensure that a computer hasn't been tampered with while the system is offline. - -On devices that don't have a TPM, BitLocker can still be used to encrypt the Windows operating system drive. However, this implementation requires the user to insert a USB startup key to start the device or resume from hibernation. An operating system volume password can be used to protect the operating system volume on a computer without TPM. Both options don't provide the pre-startup system integrity verification offered by BitLocker with a TPM. - -In addition to the TPM, BitLocker offers the option to lock the normal startup process until the user supplies a personal identification number (PIN) or inserts a removable device (such as a USB flash drive) that contains a startup key. These additional security measures provide multifactor authentication and assurance that the computer won't start or resume from hibernation until the correct PIN or startup key is presented. +BitLocker is a Windows security feature that provides encryption for entire volumes, addressing the threats of data theft or exposure from lost, stolen, or inappropriately decommissioned devices. ## Practical applications -Data on a lost or stolen device is vulnerable to unauthorized access, either by running a software-attack tool against it or by transferring the computer's hard drive to a different computer. BitLocker helps mitigate unauthorized data access by enhancing file and system protections. BitLocker also helps render data inaccessible when BitLocker-protected devices are decommissioned or recycled. +Data on a lost or stolen device is vulnerable to unauthorized access, either by running a software-attack tool against it, or by transferring the device's hard drive to a different device. BitLocker helps mitigate unauthorized data access by enhancing file and system protections, rendering data inaccessible when BitLocker-protected devices are decommissioned or recycled. + +## BitLocker and TPM + +BitLocker provides maximum protection when used with a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), which is a common hardware component installed on Windows devices. The TPM works with BitLocker to ensure that a device hasn't been tampered with while the system is offline. + +In *addition* to the TPM, BitLocker can lock the normal startup process until the user supplies a personal identification number (PIN) or inserts a removable device that contains a *startup key*. These security measures provide multifactor authentication and assurance that the device can't start or resume from hibernation until the correct PIN or startup key is presented. + +On devices that don't have a TPM, BitLocker can still be used to encrypt the operating system drive. This implementation requires the user to either: + +- use a startup key, which is a file stored on a removable drive that is used to start the device, or when resuming from hibernation +- use a password. This option isn't secure since it's subject to brute force attacks as there isn't a password lockout logic. As such, the password option is discouraged and disabled by default + +Both options don't provide the preboot system integrity verification offered by BitLocker with a TPM. + +:::row::: + :::column span="1"::: + *BitLocker preboot screen with startup key:* + :::column-end::: + :::column span="1"::: + *BitLocker preboot screen with PIN:* + :::column-end::: + :::column span="1"::: + *BitLocker preboot screen with password:* + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: +:::row::: + :::column span="1"::: + :::image type="content" source="images/preboot-startup-key.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the BitLocker preboot screen prompting to enter a startup key." lightbox="images/preboot-startup-key.png" border="false"::: + :::column-end::: + :::column span="1"::: + :::image type="content" source="images/preboot-pin.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the BitLocker preboot screen prompting to enter a PIN." lightbox="images/preboot-pin.png" border="false"::: + :::column-end::: + :::column span="1"::: + :::image type="content" source="images/preboot-password.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the BitLocker preboot screen prompting to enter a password." lightbox="images/preboot-password.png" border="false"::: + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: ## System requirements -BitLocker has the following hardware requirements: +BitLocker has the following requirements: -- For BitLocker to use the system integrity check provided by a TPM, the computer must have TPM 1.2 or later versions. If a computer doesn't have a TPM, saving a startup key on a removable drive, such as a USB flash drive, becomes mandatory when enabling BitLocker -- A device with a TPM must also have a Trusted Computing Group (TCG)-compliant BIOS or UEFI firmware. The BIOS or UEFI firmware establishes a chain of trust for the pre-operating system startup, and it must include support for TCG-specified Static Root of Trust Measurement. A computer without a TPM doesn't require TCG-compliant firmware -- The system BIOS or UEFI firmware (for TPM and non-TPM computers) must support the USB mass storage device class, including reading small files on a USB flash drive in the pre-operating system environment +- For BitLocker to use the system integrity check provided by a TPM, the device must have TPM 1.2 or later versions. If a device doesn't have a TPM, saving a startup key on a removable drive is mandatory when enabling BitLocker +- A device with a TPM must also have a *Trusted Computing Group* (TCG)-compliant BIOS or UEFI firmware. The BIOS or UEFI firmware establishes a chain of trust for the preboot startup, and it must include support for *TCG-specified Static Root of Trust Measurement*. A computer without a TPM doesn't require TCG-compliant firmware +- The system BIOS or UEFI firmware (for TPM and non-TPM devices) must support the USB mass storage device class, and reading files on a USB drive in the preboot environment > [!NOTE] - > TPM 2.0 is not supported in Legacy and Compatibility Support Module (CSM) modes of the BIOS. Devices with TPM 2.0 must have their BIOS mode configured as native UEFI only. The Legacy and CSM options must be disabled. For added security, enable the secure boot feature. + > TPM 2.0 is not supported in *Legacy* and *Compatibility Support Module (CSM)* modes of the BIOS. Devices with TPM 2.0 must have their BIOS mode configured as native UEFI only. The Legacy and CSM options must be disabled. For added security, enable the *secure boot* feature. > - > Installed Operating System on hardware in Legacy mode stops the OS from booting when the BIOS mode is changed to UEFI. Use the tool [MBR2GPT](/windows/deployment/mbr-to-gpt) before changing the BIOS mode, which prepares the OS and the disk to support UEFI. + > Installed operating system on hardware in Legacy mode stops the OS from booting when the BIOS mode is changed to UEFI. Use the tool [`mbr2gpt.exe`][WIN-1] before changing the BIOS mode, which prepares the OS and the disk to support UEFI. - The hard disk must be partitioned with at least two drives: - - The operating system drive (or boot drive) contains the operating system and its support files. It must be formatted with the NTFS file system - - The system drive contains the files that are needed to load Windows after the firmware has prepared the system hardware. BitLocker isn't enabled on this drive. For BitLocker to work, the system drive must not be encrypted, must differ from the operating system drive, and must be formatted with the FAT32 file system on computers that use UEFI-based firmware or with the NTFS file system on computers that use BIOS firmware. It's recommended that the system drive be approximately 350 MB in size. After BitLocker is turned on, it should have approximately 250 MB of free space + - The *operating system drive* (or boot drive) contains the OS and its support files. It must be formatted with the NTFS file system + - The *system drive* contains files required to boot, decrypt, and load the operating system. BitLocker isn't enabled on this drive. For BitLocker to work, the system drive: + - must not be encrypted + - must differ from the operating system drive + - must be formatted with the FAT32 file system on computers that use UEFI-based firmware, or with the NTFS file system on computers that use BIOS firmware + - it's recommended that to be approximately 350 MB in size. After BitLocker is turned on, it should have approximately 250 MB of free space -> [!IMPORTANT] -> When installed on a new device, Windows automatically creates the partitions that are required for BitLocker. -> -> An encrypted partition can't be marked as active. + > [!IMPORTANT] + > When installed on a new device, Windows automatically creates the partitions that are required for BitLocker. + > + > If the drive was prepared as a single contiguous space, BitLocker requires a new volume to hold the boot files. `BdeHdCfg.exe` can create the volume. For more information about using the tool, see [Bdehdcfg][WIN-2] in the Command-Line Reference. > [!NOTE] -> When installing the BitLocker optional component on a server, the Enhanced Storage feature also needs to be installed. The Enhanced Storage feature is used to support hardware encrypted drives. +> When installing the BitLocker optional component on a server, the *Enhanced Storage* feature must be installed. The feature is used to support hardware encrypted drives. [!INCLUDE [bitlocker](../../../../../includes/licensing/bitlocker-enablement.md)] + +> [!NOTE] +> Licensing requirements for BitLocker enablement are different from the licensing requirements for BitLocker *management*. To learn more, review the how-to guide: [configure BitLocker](configure.md). + +## Device encryption + +*Device encryption* is a Windows feature that provides a simple way for some devices to enable BitLocker encryption automatically. Device encryption is available on all Windows versions, and it requires a device to meet either [Modern Standby][WIN-3] or HSTI security requirements. Device encryption can't have externally accessible ports that allow DMA access. + +> [!IMPORTANT] +> Device encryption encrypts only the OS drive and fixed drives, it doesn't encrypt external/USB drives. + +Unlike a standard BitLocker implementation, device encryption is enabled automatically so that the device is always protected. When a clean installation of Windows is completed and the out-of-box experience is finished, the device is prepared for first use. As part of this preparation, device encryption is initialized on the OS drive and fixed data drives on the computer with a clear key that is the equivalent of standard BitLocker suspended state. In this state, the drive is shown with a warning icon in Windows Explorer. The yellow warning icon is removed after the TPM protector is created and the recovery key is backed up. + +- If the device is Microsoft Entra joined or Active Directory domain joined, the clear key is removed once the recovery key is successfully backed up to Microsoft Entra ID or Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS). The following policy settings must be enabled for the recovery key to be backed up: [Choose how BitLocker-protected operating system drives can be recovered](configure.md?tabs=os#choose-how-bitlocker-protected-operating-system-drives-can-be-recovered) + - For Microsoft Entra joined devices: the recovery password is created automatically when the user authenticates to Microsoft Entra ID, then the recovery key is backed up to Microsoft Entra ID, the TPM protector is created, and the clear key is removed + - For AD DS joined devices: the recovery password is created automatically when the computer joins the domain. The recovery key is then backed up to AD DS, the TPM protector is created, and the clear key is removed +- If the device isn't Microsoft Entra joined or Active Directory domain joined, a Microsoft account with administrative privileges on the device is required. When the administrator uses a Microsoft account to sign in, the clear key is removed, a recovery key is uploaded to the online Microsoft account, and a TPM protector is created. Should a device require the recovery key, the user is guided to use an alternate device and navigate to a recovery key access URL to retrieve the recovery key by using their Microsoft account credentials +- If a device uses only local accounts, then it remains unprotected even though the data is encrypted + +> [!IMPORTANT] +> Device encryption uses the `XTS-AES 128-bit` encryption method, by default. In case you configure a policy setting to use a different encryption method, you can use the Enrollment Status Page to avoid the device to begin encryption with the default method. BitLocker has a logic that doesn't start encrypting until the end of OOBE, after the Enrollment Status Page device configuration phase is complete. This logic gives a device enough time to receive the BitLocker policy settings before starting encryption. +> +> If a different encryption method and/or cipher strength is needed but the device is already encrypted, it must first be decrypted before the new encryption method and/or cipher strength can be applied. After the device is decrypted, you can apply different BitLocker settings. + +If a device doesn't initially qualify for device encryption, but then a change is made that causes the device to qualify (for example, by turning on *Secure Boot*), device encryption enables BitLocker automatically as soon as it detects it. + +You can check whether a device meets requirements for device encryption in the System Information app (`msinfo32.exe`). If the device meets the requirements, System Information shows a line that reads: + +|Item|Value| +|-|-| +|Device Encryption Support | Meets prerequisites| + +### Difference between BitLocker and device encryption + +- Device encryption turns on BitLocker automatically on device encryption-qualifying devices, with the recovery key automatically backed up to Microsoft Entra ID, AD DS, or the user's Microsoft account +- Device encryption adds a device encryption setting in the Settings app, which can be used to turn device encryption on or off + - The Settings UI doesn't show device encryption enabled until encryption is complete + +:::image type="content" source="images/settings-device-encryption.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the Settings app showing the device encryption panel." border="False"::: + +> [!NOTE] +> If device encryption is turned off, it will no longer automatically enable itself in the future. The user must enable it manually in Settings + +### Disable device encryption + +It's recommended to keep device encryption on for any systems that support it. However, you can prevent the automatic device encryption process by changing the following registry setting: + +| Path|Name|Type|Value| +|-|-|-|-| +| `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\BitLocker`| `PreventDeviceEncryption`|REG_DWORD|0x1| + +For more information about device encryption, see [BitLocker device encryption hardware requirements][WIN-4]. + +## Next steps + +> [!div class="nextstepaction"] +> Learn about technologies and features to protect against attacks on the BitLocker encryption key: +> +> +> [BitLocker countermeasures >](countermeasures.md) + + + +[WIN-1]: /windows/deployment/mbr-to-gpt +[WIN-2]: /windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bdehdcfg +[WIN-3]: /windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/modern-standby +[WIN-4]: /windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-bitlocker#bitlocker-automatic-device-encryption \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/install-server.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/install-server.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c79ab3d0aa --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/install-server.md @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +--- +title: Install BitLocker on Windows Server +description: Learn how to install BitLocker on Windows Server. +ms.topic: how-to +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +appliesto: +- ✅ Windows Server 2022 +- ✅ Windows Server 2019 +- ✅ Windows Server 2016 +--- + +# Install BitLocker on Windows Server + +For all Windows Server editions, BitLocker isn't installed by default, but it can be installed using Server Manager or Windows PowerShell cmdlets. This article explains how to install BitLocker on Windows Server. + +> [!NOTE] +> To install BitLocker you must have administrator privileges. + +## Install BitLocker with Server Manager + +1. Open Server Manager by selecting the icon or running `servermanager.exe` +1. Select **Manage** from the **Server Manager Navigation** bar and select **Add Roles and Features** +1. Select **Next** at the **Before you begin** pane (if shown) +1. Under **Installation type**, select **Role-based or feature-based installation** and select **Next** +1. Under **Server Selection**, select the **Select a server from the server pool** pane and confirm the server on which you want to install the BitLocker feature and **Next** +1. Under **Server Roles** select **Next** +1. Under **Features**, select the box next to **BitLocker Drive Encryption**. The wizard shows the extra management features available for BitLocker. If you don't need the extra management features, deselect **Include management tools** + > [!NOTE] + > The **Enhanced Storage** feature is a required feature for enabling BitLocker. This feature enables support for encrypted hard drives on capable systems. +1. Select **Next** and under **Confirmation** select **Install** + +The BitLocker feature requires a restart to complete its installation. Selecting the **Restart the destination server automatically if required** option in the **Confirmation** pane forces a restart of the server after installation is complete + +## Install BitLocker with Windows PowerShell + +Windows PowerShell offers administrators another option for BitLocker feature installation. Windows PowerShell installs features using the `servermanager` or `dism.exe` module. However, the `servermanager` and `dism.exe` modules don't always share feature name parity. Because of this mismatch of feature name parity, it's advisable to confirm the feature or role name prior to installation. + +> [!NOTE] +> The server must be restarted to complete the installation of BitLocker. + +### Use the servermanager module to install BitLocker + +The `servermanager` Windows PowerShell module can use either the `Install-WindowsFeature` or `Add-WindowsFeature` to install the BitLocker feature. The `Add-WindowsFeature` cmdlet is a stub to the `Install-WindowsFeature`. This example uses the `Install-WindowsFeature` cmdlet. The feature name for BitLocker in the `servermanager` module is `BitLocker`. + +By default, installation of features in Windows PowerShell doesn't include optional subfeatures or management tools as part of the installation process. What is installed as part of the installation process can be seen using the `-WhatIf` option in Windows PowerShell. + +```powershell +Install-WindowsFeature BitLocker -WhatIf +``` + +The results of this command show that only the BitLocker Drive Encryption feature is installed using this command. + +To see what would be installed with the BitLocker feature, including all available management tools and subfeatures, use the following command: + +```powershell +Install-WindowsFeature BitLocker -IncludeAllSubFeature -IncludeManagementTools -WhatIf | fl +``` + +The command to complete a full installation of the BitLocker feature with all available subfeatures and then to reboot the server at completion is: + +```powershell +Install-WindowsFeature BitLocker -IncludeAllSubFeature -IncludeManagementTools -Restart +``` + +> [!IMPORTANT] +> Installing the BitLocker feature using Windows PowerShell does not install the Enhanced Storage feature. Administrators wishing to support Encrypted Hard Drives in their environment will need to install the Enhanced Storage feature separately. + +### Use the dism module to install BitLocker + +The `dism.exe` Windows PowerShell module uses the `Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature` cmdlet to install features. The BitLocker feature name for BitLocker is `BitLocker`. The `dism.exe` module doesn't support wildcards when searching for feature names. To list feature names for the `dism.exe` module, use the `Get-WindowsOptionalFeatures` cmdlet. The following command lists all of the optional features in an online (running) operating system. + +```powershell +Get-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online | ft +``` + +From this output, there are three BitLocker-related optional feature names: **BitLocker**, **BitLocker-Utilities** and **BitLocker-NetworkUnlock**. To install the BitLocker feature, the **BitLocker** and **BitLocker-Utilities** features are the only required items. + +To install BitLocker using the `dism.exe` module, use the following command: + +```powershell +Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName BitLocker -All +``` + +The command doesn't include installation of the management tools for BitLocker, but you can do a complete installation of BitLocker and all available management tools with the following command: + +```powershell +Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName BitLocker, BitLocker-Utilities -All +``` + +> [!NOTE] +> When using `Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature`, the administrator is prompted to reboot the server, as the cmdlet doesn't have support for forcing a reboot. + +After the server reboots, you can use BitLocker. diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/network-unlock.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/network-unlock.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f81e6c585f --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/network-unlock.md @@ -0,0 +1,335 @@ +--- +title: Network Unlock +description: Learn how BitLocker Network Unlock works and how to configure it. +ms.topic: how-to +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +--- + +# Network Unlock + +Network Unlock is a BitLocker *key protector* for operating system volumes. Network Unlock enables easier management for BitLocker-enabled desktops and servers in a domain environment by providing automatic unlock of operating system volumes at system reboot when connected to a wired corporate network. Network Unlock requires the client hardware to have a DHCP driver implemented in its UEFI firmware. Without Network Unlock, operating system volumes protected by `TPM+PIN` protectors require a PIN to be entered when a device reboots or resumes from hibernation (for example, by Wake on LAN). Requiring a PIN after a reboot can make it difficult to enterprises to roll out software patches to unattended desktops and remotely administered servers. + +Network Unlock allows BitLocker-enabled systems that have a `TPM+PIN` and that meet the hardware requirements to boot into Windows without user intervention. Network Unlock works in a similar fashion to the `TPM+StartupKey` at boot. Rather than needing to read the StartupKey from USB media, however, the Network Unlock feature needs the key to be composed from a key stored in the TPM and an encrypted network key that is sent to the server, decrypted and returned to the client in a secure session. + +## System requirements + +Network Unlock must meet mandatory hardware and software requirements before the feature can automatically unlock domain-joined systems. These requirements include: + +- Any supported operating system with UEFI DHCP drivers that can serve as Network Unlock clients +- Network Unlock clients with a TPM chip and at least one TPM protector +- A server running the Windows Deployment Services (WDS) role on any supported server operating system +- BitLocker Network Unlock optional feature installed on any supported server operating system +- A DHCP server, separate from the WDS server +- Properly configured public/private key pairing +- Network Unlock group policy settings configured +- Network stack enabled in the UEFI firmware of client devices + +> [!IMPORTANT] +> To support DHCP within UEFI, the UEFI-based system should be in native mode and shouldn't have a compatibility support module (CSM) enabled. + +For Network Unlock to work reliably, the first network adapter on the device, usually the onboard adapter, must be configured to support DHCP. This first network adapter must be used for Network Unlock. This configuration is especially worth noting when the device has multiple adapters, and some adapters are configured without DHCP, such as for use with a lights-out management protocol. This configuration is necessary because Network Unlock stops enumerating adapters when it reaches one with a DHCP port failure for any reason. Thus, if the first enumerated adapter doesn't support DHCP, isn't plugged into the network, or fails to report availability of the DHCP port for any reason, then Network Unlock fails. + +The Network Unlock server component is installed on supported versions of Windows Server as a Windows feature that uses Server Manager or Windows PowerShell cmdlets. The feature name is `BitLocker Network Unlock` in Server Manager and `BitLocker-NetworkUnlock` in PowerShell. + +Network Unlock requires Windows Deployment Services (WDS) in the environment where the feature will be utilized. Configuration of the WDS installation isn't required. However, the WDS service must be running on the server. + +The network key is stored on the system drive along with an AES 256 session key and encrypted with the 2048-bit RSA public key of the Unlock server certificate. The network key is decrypted with the help of a provider on a supported version of Windows Server running WDS, and returned encrypted with its corresponding session key. + +## Network Unlock sequence + +The unlock sequence starts on the client side when the Windows boot manager detects the existence of Network Unlock protector. It uses the DHCP driver in UEFI to obtain an IP address for IPv4 and then broadcasts a vendor-specific DHCP request that contains the network key and a session key for the reply, all encrypted by the server's Network Unlock certificate. The Network Unlock provider on the supported WDS server recognizes the vendor-specific request, decrypts it with the RSA private key, and returns the network key encrypted with the session key via its own vendor-specific DHCP reply. + +On the server side, the WDS server role has an optional plugin component, like a PXE provider, which is what handles the incoming Network Unlock requests. The provider can also be configured with subnet restrictions, which would require that the IP address provided by the client in the Network Unlock request belong to a permitted subnet to release the network key to the client. In instances where the Network Unlock provider is unavailable, BitLocker fails over to the next available protector to unlock the drive. In a typical configuration, the standard `TPM+PIN` unlock screen is presented to unlock the drive. + +The server side configuration to enable Network Unlock also requires provisioning a 2048-bit RSA public/private key pair in the form of an X.509 certificate, and distributing the public key certificate to the clients. This certificate is the *public key* that encrypts the intermediate network key (which is one of the two secrets required to unlock the drive; the other secret is stored in the TPM), and it must be managed and deployed via Group Policy. + +The Network Unlock process follows these phases: + +:::row::: + :::column span="3"::: + 1. The Windows boot manager detects a Network Unlock protector in the BitLocker configuration + 2. The client computer uses its DHCP driver in the UEFI to get a valid IPv4 IP address + 3. The client computer broadcasts a vendor-specific DHCP request that contains a network key (a 256-bit intermediate key) and an AES-256 session key for the reply. The network key is encrypted by using the 2048-bit RSA Public Key of the Network Unlock certificate from the WDS server + 4. The Network Unlock provider on the WDS server recognizes the vendor-specific request + 5. The provider decrypts the request by using the WDS server's BitLocker Network Unlock certificate RSA private key + 6. The WDS provider returns the network key encrypted with the session key by using its own vendor-specific DHCP reply to the client computer. This key is an intermediate key + 7. The returned intermediate key is combined with another local 256-bit intermediate key. This key can be decrypted only by the TPM + 8. This combined key is used to create an AES-256 key that unlocks the volume + 9. Windows continues the boot sequence + :::column-end::: + :::column span="1"::: + :::image type="content" source="images/network-unlock-diagram.png" alt-text="Diagram of the Network Unlock sequence." lightbox="images/network-unlock-diagram.png" border="false"::: + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: + +## Configure Network Unlock + +The following steps allow an administrator to configure Network Unlock in an Active Directory domain. + +### Install the WDS server role + +The BitLocker Network Unlock feature installs the WDS role if it isn't already installed. WDS can be installed separately, before BitLocker Network Unlock is installed, by using **Server Manager** or **PowerShell**. To install the role using Server Manager, select the **Windows Deployment Services** role in **Server Manager**. + +To install the role by using PowerShell, use the following command: + +```powershell +Install-WindowsFeature WDS-Deployment +``` + +The WDS server must be configured so that it can communicate with DHCP (and optionally AD DS) and the client computer. The WDS server can be configured using the WDS management tool, `wdsmgmt.msc`, which starts the Windows Deployment Services Configuration wizard. + +### Confirm the WDS service is running + +To confirm that the WDS service is running, use the Services Management Console or PowerShell. To confirm that the service is running in Services Management Console, open the console using `services.msc` and check the status of the **Windows Deployment Services** service. + +To confirm that the service is running using PowerShell, use the following command: + +```powershell +Get-Service WDSServer +``` + +### Install the Network Unlock feature + +To install the Network Unlock feature, use Server Manager or PowerShell. To install the feature using Server Manager, select the **BitLocker Network Unlock** feature in the Server Manager console. + +To install the feature by using PowerShell, use the following command: + +```powershell +Install-WindowsFeature BitLocker-NetworkUnlock +``` + +### Create the certificate template for Network Unlock + +A properly configured Active Directory Certification Authority can use this certificate template to create and issue Network Unlock certificates. + +1. Open the Certificates Template snap-in (`certtmpl.msc`) +1. Locate the User template, right-click the template name and select **Duplicate Template** +1. On the **Compatibility** tab, change the **Certification Authority** and **Certificate recipient** fields to Windows Server 2016 and Windows 10, respectively. Ensure that the **Show resulting changes** dialog box is selected +1. Select the **General** tab of the template. The **Template display name** and **Template name** should identify that the template will be used for Network Unlock. Clear the check box for the **Publish certificate in Active Directory** option +1. Select the **Request Handling** tab. Select **Encryption** from the **Purpose** drop-down menu. Ensure that the **Allow private key to be exported** option is selected +1. Select the **Cryptography** tab. Set the **Minimum key size** to 2048. Any Microsoft cryptographic provider that supports RSA can be used for this template, but for simplicity and forward compatibility, it is recommended to use **Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider** +1. Select the **Requests must use one of the following providers** option and clear all options except for the cryptography provider selected, such as **Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider** +1. Select the **Subject Name** tab. Select **Supply in the request**. Select **OK** if the certificate templates pop-up dialog appears +1. Select the **Issuance Requirements** tab. Select both **CA certificate manager approval** and **Valid existing certificate** options +1. Select the **Extensions** tab. Select **Application Policies** and choose **Edit…** +1. In the **Edit Application Policies Extension** options dialog box, select **Client Authentication**, **Encrypting File System**, **and Secure Email** and choose **Remove** +1. On the **Edit Application Policies Extension** dialog box, select **Add** +1. On the **Add Application Policy** dialog box, select **New**. In the **New Application Policy** dialog box, enter the following information in the space provided and then select **OK** to create the BitLocker Network Unlock application policy: + + - *Name:* **BitLocker Network Unlock** + - *Object Identifier:* **1.3.6.1.4.1.311.67.1.1** + +1. Select the newly created **BitLocker Network Unlock** application policy and select **OK** +1. With the **Extensions** tab still open, select the **Edit Key Usage Extension** dialog. Select the **Allow key exchange only with key encryption (key encipherment)** option. Select the **Make this extension critical** option +1. Select the **Security** tab. Confirm that the **Domain Admins** group has been granted **Enroll** permission +1. Select **OK** to complete configuration of the template + +To add the Network Unlock template to the certificate authority, open the certificate authority snap-in (`certsrv.msc`). Right-click **Certificate Templates**, and then choose **New, Certificate Template to issue**. Select the previously created BitLocker Network Unlock certificate. + +After the Network Unlock template is added to the certificate authority, this certificate can be used to configure BitLocker Network Unlock. + +### Create the Network Unlock certificate + +Network Unlock can use imported certificates from an existing public key infrastructure (PKI). Or it can use a self-signed certificate. + +To enroll a certificate from an existing certificate authority: + +1. On the WDS server, open Certificate Manager by using `certmgr.msc` +1. Under **Certificates - Current User**, right-click **Personal** +1. Select **All Tasks** > **Request New Certificate** +1. When the Certificate Enrollment wizard opens, select **Next** +1. Select **Active Directory Enrollment Policy** +1. Choose the certificate template that was created for Network Unlock on the domain controller. Then select **Enroll** +1. When prompted for more information, select **Subject Name** and provide a friendly name value. The friendly name should include information for the domain or organizational unit for the certificate For example: *BitLocker Network Unlock Certificate for Contoso domain* +1. Create the certificate. Ensure the certificate appears in the **Personal** folder +1. Export the public key certificate for Network Unlock: + 1. Create a `.cer` file by right-clicking the previously created certificate, selecting **All Tasks**, and then selecting **Export** + 2. Select **No, do not export the private key** + 3. Select **DER encoded binary X.509** and complete exporting the certificate to a file + 4. Give the file a name such as **BitLocker-NetworkUnlock.cer** +1. Export the public key with a private key for Network Unlock + 1. Create a `.pfx` file by right-clicking the previously created certificate, selecting **All Tasks**, and then selecting **Export** + 1. Select **Yes, export the private key** + 1. Complete the steps to create the `.pfx` file + +To create a self-signed certificate, either use the `New-SelfSignedCertificate` cmdlet in Windows PowerShell or use `certreq.exe`. For example: + +#### PowerShell + +```powershell +New-SelfSignedCertificate -CertStoreLocation Cert:\LocalMachine\My -Subject "CN=BitLocker Network Unlock certificate" -Provider "Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider" -KeyUsage KeyEncipherment -KeyUsageProperty Decrypt,Sign -KeyLength 2048 -HashAlgorithm sha512 -TextExtension @("1.3.6.1.4.1.311.21.10={text}OID=1.3.6.1.4.1.311.67.1.1","2.5.29.37={text}1.3.6.1.4.1.311.67.1.1") +``` + +#### certreq.exe + +1. Create a text file with an `.inf` extension, for example: + + ```cmd + notepad.exe BitLocker-NetworkUnlock.inf + ``` + +1. Add the following contents to the previously created file: + + ```ini + [NewRequest] + Subject="CN=BitLocker Network Unlock certificate" + ProviderType=0 + MachineKeySet=True + Exportable=true + RequestType=Cert + KeyUsage="CERT_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT_KEY_USAGE" + KeyUsageProperty="NCRYPT_ALLOW_DECRYPT_FLAG | NCRYPT_ALLOW_SIGNING_FLAG" + KeyLength=2048 + SMIME=FALSE + HashAlgorithm=sha512 + [Extensions] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.21.10 = "{text}" + _continue_ = "OID=1.3.6.1.4.1.311.67.1.1" + 2.5.29.37 = "{text}" + _continue_ = "1.3.6.1.4.1.311.67.1.1" + ``` + +1. Open an elevated Command Prompt and use the `certreq.exe` tool to create a new certificate. Use the following command, specifying the full path to the file that was created previously along with the file name: + + ```cmd + certreq.exe -new BitLocker-NetworkUnlock.inf BitLocker-NetworkUnlock.cer + ``` + +1. Verify that certificate was properly created by the previous command by confirming that the `.cer` file exists +1. Launch the **Certificates - Local Computer** console by running `certlm.msc` +1. Create a `.pfx` file by following the below steps the **Certificates - Local Computer** console: + + 1. Navigate to **Certificates - Local Computer** > **Personal** > **Certificates** + 1. Right-click the previously imported certificate, select **All Tasks**, and then select **Export** + 1. Follow through the wizard to create the `.pfx` file + +### Deploy the private key and certificate to the WDS server + +After creating the certificate and key, deploy them to the infrastructure to properly unlock systems. To deploy the certificates: + +1. On the WDS server, launch the **Certificates - Local Computer** console by running `certlm.msc` +1. Right-click **BitLocker Drive Encryption Network Unlock** item under **Certificates (Local Computer)**, select **All Tasks**, and then select **Import** +1. In the **File to Import** dialog, choose the `.pfx` file created previously +1. Enter the password used to create the `.pfx` and complete the wizard + +### Configure group policy settings for Network Unlock + +With certificate and key deployed to the WDS server for Network Unlock, the final step is to use group policy settings to deploy the public key certificate to the desired computers that will use the Network Unlock key to unlock. Group policy settings for BitLocker can be found under **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** using the Local Group Policy Editor or the Microsoft Management Console. + +The following steps describe how to enable the group policy setting that is a requirement for configuring Network Unlock. + +1. Open Group Policy Management Console (`gpmc.msc`) +1. Enable the policy **Require additional authentication at startup**, and then select **Require startup PIN with TPM** or **Allow startup PIN with TPM** +1. Turn on BitLocker with TPM+PIN protectors on all domain-joined computers + +The following steps describe how to deploy the required group policy setting: + +1. Copy the `.cer` file that was created for Network Unlock to the domain controller +1. On the domain controller, open Group Policy Management Console (`gpmc.msc`) +1. Create a new Group Policy Object or modify an existing object to enable the **Allow Network Unlock at startup** setting +1. Deploy the public certificate to clients: + + 1. Within group policy management console, navigate to the following location: + + **Computer Configuration** > **Policies** > **Windows Settings** > **Security Settings** > **Public Key Policies** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption Network Unlock Certificate**. + + 1. Right-click the folder and select **Add Network Unlock Certificate** + 1. Follow the wizard steps and import the `.cer` file that was copied earlier + + > [!NOTE] + > Only one Network Unlock certificate can be available at a time. If a new certificate is needed, delete the current certificate before deploying a new one. The Network Unlock certificate is located under the **`HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\FVE_NKP`** registry key on the client computer. + +1. Reboot the clients after the Group Policy is deployed + + > [!NOTE] + > The **Network (Certificate Based)** protector will be added only after a reboot, with the policy enabled and a valid certificate present in the FVE_NKP store. + +### Subnet policy configuration files on the WDS server (optional) + +By default, all clients with the correct Network Unlock certificate and valid Network Unlock protectors that have wired access to a Network Unlock-enabled WDS server via DHCP are unlocked by the server. A subnet policy configuration file on the WDS server can be created to limit which are the subnet(s) the Network Unlock clients can use to unlock. + +The configuration file, called `bde-network-unlock.ini`, must be located in the same directory as the Network Unlock provider DLL (`%windir%\System32\Nkpprov.dll`) and it applies to both IPv6 and IPv4 DHCP implementations. If the subnet configuration policy becomes corrupted, the provider fails and stops responding to requests. + +The subnet policy configuration file must use a `[SUBNETS]` section to identify the specific subnets. The named subnets may then be used to specify restrictions in certificate subsections. Subnets are defined as simple name-value pairs, in the common INI format, where each subnet has its own line, with the name on the left of the equal-sign, and the subnet identified on the right of the equal-sign as a Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) address or range. The key word `ENABLED` is disallowed for subnet names. + +```ini +[SUBNETS] +SUBNET1=10.185.250.0/24 ; a comment about this subrange could be here, after the semicolon +SUBNET2=10.185.252.200/28 +SUBNET3= 2001:4898:a:2::/64 ; an IPv6 subnet +SUBNET4=2001:4898:a:3::/64; in production, the admin would likely give more useful names, like BUILDING9-EXCEPT-RECEP. +``` + +Following the `[SUBNETS]` section, there can be sections for each Network Unlock certificate, identified by the certificate thumbprint formatted without any spaces, which define the subnets clients that can be unlocked from that certificate. + +> [!NOTE] +> When specifying the certificate thumbprint, do not include any spaces. If spaces are included in the thumbprint, the subnet configuration fails because the thumbprint will not be recognized as valid. + +Subnet restrictions are defined within each certificate section by denoting the allowed list of permitted subnets. If any subnets are listed in a certificate section, then only those subnets are permitted for that certificate. If no subnet is listed in a certificate section, then all subnets are permitted for that certificate. If a certificate doesn't have a section in the subnet policy configuration file, then no subnet restrictions are applied for unlocking with that certificate. For restrictions to apply to every certificate, there must be a certificate section for every Network Unlock certificate on the server, and an explicit allowed list set for each certificate section. + +Subnet lists are created by putting the name of a subnet from the `[SUBNETS]` section on its own line below the certificate section header. Then, the server will only unlock clients with this certificate on the subnet(s) specified as in the list. For troubleshooting, a subnet can be quickly excluded without deleting it from the section by commenting it out with a prepended semi-colon. + +```ini +[2158a767e1c14e88e27a4c0aee111d2de2eafe60] +;Comments could be added here to indicate when the cert was issued, which Group Policy should get it, and so on. +;This list shows this cert is allowed to unlock clients only on the SUBNET1 and SUBNET3 subnets. In this example, SUBNET2 is commented out. +SUBNET1 +;SUBNET2 +SUBNET3 +``` + +To disallow the use of a certificate altogether, add a `DISABLED` line to its subnet list. + +## Turn off Network Unlock + +To turn off the unlock server, the PXE provider can be unregistered from the WDS server or uninstalled altogether. However, to stop clients from creating Network Unlock protectors, the **Allow Network Unlock at startup** group policy setting should be disabled. When this policy setting is updated to **disabled** on client computers, any Network Unlock key protector on the computer is deleted. Alternatively, the BitLocker Network Unlock certificate policy can be deleted on the domain controller to accomplish the same task for an entire domain. + +> [!NOTE] +> Removing the FVE_NKP certificate store that contains the Network Unlock certificate and key on the WDS server will also effectively disable the server's ability to respond to unlock requests for that certificate. However, this is seen as an error condition and is not a supported or recommended method for turning off the Network Unlock server. + +## Update Network Unlock certificates + +To update the certificates used by Network Unlock, administrators need to import or generate the new certificate for the server, and then update the Network Unlock certificate group policy setting on the domain controller. + +> [!NOTE] +> Servers that don't receive the group policy setting require a PIN when they boot. In such cases, find out why the servers don't receive the GPO to update the certificate. + +## Troubleshoot Network Unlock + +Troubleshooting Network Unlock issues begins by verifying the environment. Many times, a small configuration issue can be the root cause of the failure. Items to verify include: + +- Verify that the client hardware is UEFI-based and is on firmware version 2.3.1 and that the UEFI firmware is in native mode without a Compatibility Support Module (CSM) for BIOS mode enabled. Verification can be done by checking that the firmware doesn't have an option enabled such as "Legacy mode" or "Compatibility mode" or that the firmware doesn't appear to be in a BIOS-like mode +- All required roles and services are installed and started +- Public and private certificates have been published and are in the proper certificate containers. The presence of the Network Unlock certificate can be verified in the Microsoft Management Console (MMC.exe) on the WDS server with the certificate snap-ins for the local computer enabled. The client certificate can be verified by checking the registry key **`HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\FVE_NKP`** on the client computer +- Group policy for Network Unlock is enabled and linked to the appropriate domains +- Verify whether group policy is reaching the clients properly. Verification of group policy can be done using the `GPRESULT.exe` or `RSOP.msc` utilities +- Verify whether the clients were rebooted after applying the policy +- Verify whether the **Network (Certificate Based)** protector is listed on the client. Verification of the protector can be done using either manage-bde or Windows PowerShell cmdlets. For example, the following command will list the key protectors currently configured on the C: drive of the local computer: + + ```powershell + manage-bde.exe -protectors -get C: + ``` + + > [!NOTE] + > Use the output of `manage-bde.exe` along with the WDS debug log to determine whether the proper certificate thumbprint is being used for Network Unlock. + +Gather the following files to troubleshoot BitLocker Network Unlock. + +- The Windows event logs. Specifically, get the BitLocker event logs and the `Microsoft-Windows-Deployment-Services-Diagnostics-Debug` log + + Debug logging is turned off by default for the WDS server role. To retrieve WDS debug logs, the WDS debug logs first need to be enabled. Use either of the following two methods to turn on WDS debug logging. + + - Start an elevated Command Prompt, and then run the following command: + + ```cmd + wevtutil.exe sl Microsoft-Windows-Deployment-Services-Diagnostics/Debug /e:true + ``` + + - Open **Event Viewer** on the WDS server: + + 1. In the left pane, navigate to **Applications and Services Logs** > **Microsoft** > **Windows** > **Deployment-Services-Diagnostics** > **Debug** + 2. In the right pane, select **Enable Log** + +- The DHCP subnet configuration file (if one exists) +- The output of the BitLocker status on the volume. Gather this output into a text file by using `manage-bde.exe -status`. Or in Windows PowerShell, use `Get-BitLockerVolume` +- The Network Monitor capture on the server that hosts the WDS role, filtered by client IP address diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/operations-guide.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/operations-guide.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bdbd2a6e80 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/operations-guide.md @@ -0,0 +1,618 @@ +--- +title: BitLocker operations guide +description: Learn how to use different tools to manage and operate BitLocker. +ms.collection: + - tier1 +ms.topic: how-to +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +--- + +# BitLocker operations guide + +There are different tools and options to manage and operate BitLocker: + +- the BitLocker PowerShell module +- the BitLocker drive encryption tools +- Control Panel + +The BitLocker drive encryption tools and BitLocker PowerShell module can be used to perform any tasks that can be accomplished through the BitLocker Control Panel. They're appropriate to use for automated deployments and other scripting scenarios.\ +The BitLocker Control Panel applet allows users to perform basic tasks such as turning on BitLocker on a drive and specifying unlock methods and authentication methods. The BitLocker Control Panel applet is appropriate to use for basic BitLocker tasks. + +This article describes the BitLocker management tools and how to use them, providing practical examples. + +## BitLocker PowerShell module + +The BitLocker PowerShell module enables administrators to integrate BitLocker options into existing scripts with ease. For a list of cmdlets included in module, their description and syntax, check the [BitLocker PowerShell reference article][PS-1]. + +## BitLocker drive encryption tools + +The BitLocker drive encryption tools include the two command-line tools: + +- *Configuration Tool* (`manage-bde.exe`) can be used for scripting BitLocker operations, offering options that aren't present in the BitLocker Control Panel applet. For a complete list of the `manage-bde.exe` options, see the [Manage-bde reference][PREV-1] +- *Repair Tool* (`repair-bde.exe`) is useful for disaster recovery scenarios, in which a BitLocker protected drive can't be unlocked normally or using the recovery console + +## BitLocker Control Panel applet + +Encrypting volumes with the BitLocker Control Panel (select **Start**, enter `BitLocker`, select **Manage BitLocker**) is how many users will use BitLocker. The name of the BitLocker Control Panel applet is *BitLocker Drive Encryption*. The applet supports encrypting operating system, fixed data, and removable data volumes. The BitLocker Control Panel organizes available drives in the appropriate category based on how the device reports itself to Windows. Only formatted volumes with assigned drive letters appear properly in the BitLocker Control Panel applet. + +### Use BitLocker within Windows Explorer + +Windows Explorer allows users to launch the **BitLocker Drive Encryption Wizard** by right-clicking a volume and selecting **Turn On BitLocker**. This option is available on client computers by default. On servers, the BitLocker feature and the Desktop-Experience feature must first be installed for this option to be available. After selecting **Turn on BitLocker**, the wizard works exactly as it does when launched using the BitLocker Control Panel. + +## Check the BitLocker status + +To check the BitLocker status of a particular volume, administrators can look at the status of the drive in the BitLocker Control Panel applet, Windows Explorer, `manage-bde.exe` command-line tool, or Windows PowerShell cmdlets. Each option offers different levels of detail and ease of use. + +Follow the instructions below verify the status of BitLocker, selecting the tool of your choice. + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/powershell.svg"::: **PowerShell**](#tab/powershell) + +To determine the current state of a volume you can use the `Get-BitLockerVolume` cmdlet, which provides information on the volume type, protectors, protection status, and other details. For example: + +```powershell +PS C:\> Get-BitLockerVolume C: | fl + +ComputerName : DESKTOP +MountPoint : C: +EncryptionMethod : XtsAes128 +AutoUnlockEnabled : +AutoUnlockKeyStored : False +MetadataVersion : 2 +VolumeStatus : FullyEncrypted +ProtectionStatus : On +LockStatus : Unlocked +EncryptionPercentage : 100 +WipePercentage : 0 +VolumeType : OperatingSystem +CapacityGB : 1000 +KeyProtector : {Tpm, RecoveryPassword} +``` + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/cmd.svg"::: **Command Prompt**](#tab/cmd) + +With `manage-bde.exe` you can determine the volume status on the target system, for example: + +```cmd +manage-bde.exe -status +``` + +This command returns the volumes on the target, current encryption status, encryption method, and volume type (operating system or data) for each volume. + +```cmd +C:\>manage-bde -status + +Volume C: [Local Disk] +[OS Volume] + + Size: 1000 GB + BitLocker Version: 2.0 + Conversion Status: Used Space Only Encrypted + Percentage Encrypted: 100.0% + Encryption Method: XTS-AES 128 + Protection Status: Protection On + Lock Status: Unlocked + Identification Field: Unknown + Key Protectors: + TPM + Numerical Password +``` + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/controlpanel.svg"::: **Control Panel**](#tab/controlpanel) + +Checking BitLocker status with the Control Panel is a common method used by most users. Once opened, the status for each volume is displayed next to the volume description and drive letter. Available status return values with applet include: + +| Status | Description | +| - | - | +| **On**|BitLocker is enabled for the volume | +| **Off**| BitLocker isn't enabled for the volume | +| **Suspended** | BitLocker is suspended and not actively protecting the volume | +| **Waiting for Activation**| BitLocker is enabled with a clear protector key and requires further action to be fully protected| + +If a drive is pre-provisioned with BitLocker, a status of **Waiting for Activation** displays with a yellow exclamation icon on the volume. This status means that there was only a clear protector used when encrypting the volume. In this case, the volume isn't in a protected state and needs to have a secure key added to the volume before the drive is fully protected. Administrators can use the Control Panel, PowerShell or `manage-bde.exe` to add an appropriate key protector. Once complete, the Control Panel updates to reflect the new status. + +--- + +## Enable BitLocker + +### OS drive with TPM protector + +The following example shows how to enable BitLocker on an operating system drive using only the TPM protector and no recovery key: + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/powershell.svg"::: **PowerShell**](#tab/powershell) + +```powershell +Enable-BitLocker C: -TpmProtector +``` +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/cmd.svg"::: **Command Prompt**](#tab/cmd) + +```cmd +manage-bde.exe -on C: +``` + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/controlpanel.svg"::: **Control Panel**](#tab/controlpanel) + +From the **BitLocker Drive Encryption** Control Panel applet: + +1. Expand the OS drive and select the option **Turn on BitLocker** +1. When prompted, select the option **Let BitLocker automatically unlock my drive** +1. Back up the *recovery key* using one of the following methods: + + - **Save to your Microsoft Entra ID account** or **Microsoft Account** (if applicable) + - **Save to a USB flash drive** + - **Save to a file** - the file needs to be saved to a location that isn't on the device itself such as a network folder + - **Print the recovery key** + +1. Select **Next** +1. Choose one of the options to **encrypt used disk space only** or **encrypt entire drive** and select **Next** + + - **Encrypt used disk space only** - Encrypts only disk space that contains data + - **Encrypt entire drive** - Encrypts the entire volume including free space. Also known as full disk encryption + + Each of the methods is recommended in the following scenarios: + + - **Encrypt used disk space only**: + + - The drive has never had data + - Formatted or erased drives that in the past have never had confidential data that was never encrypted + + - **Encrypt entire drive** (full disk encryption): + + - Drives that currently have data + - Drives that currently have an operating system + - Formatted or erased drives that in the past had confidential data that was never encrypted + + > [!IMPORTANT] + > Deleted files appear as free space to the file system, which isn't encrypted by **used disk space only**. Until they are wiped or overwritten, deleted files hold information that could be recovered with common data forensic tools. + +1. Select an encryption mode and select **Next** + + - **New encryption mode** + - **Compatible mode** + + > [!NOTE] + > Normally **New encryption mode** should be chosen, but if the drive will be potentially moved to another device with an older Windows operating system, select **Compatible mode** +1. Select **Continue** > **Restart now** +1. After reboot, the OS performs a BitLocker system check and start encryption + +Users can check encryption status using the BitLocker Control Panel applet. + +> [!NOTE] +> After a recovery key is created, the BitLocker Control Panel can be used to make additional copies of the recovery key. + +--- + +### OS drive with TPM protector and startup key + +The following example shows how to enable BitLocker on an operating system drive using the TPM and *startup key* protectors. + +Assuming the OS drive letter is `C:` and the USB flash drive is drive letter `E:`, here's the command: + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/powershell.svg"::: **PowerShell**](#tab/powershell) + +If you choose to skip the BitLocker hardware test, encryption starts immediately without the need for a reboot. + +```powershell +Enable-BitLocker C: -StartupKeyProtector -StartupKeyPath E: -SkipHardwareTest +``` + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/cmd.svg"::: **Command Prompt**](#tab/cmd) + +```cmd +manage-bde.exe -protectors -add C: -TPMAndStartupKey E: +manage-bde.exe -on C: +``` + +If prompted, reboot the computer to complete the encryption process. + +> [!NOTE] +> After the encryption is completed, the USB startup key must be inserted before the operating system can be started. + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/controlpanel.svg"::: **Control Panel**](#tab/controlpanel) + +The Control Panel applet doesn't allow enabling BitLocker and adding a startup key protector at the same time. To add a startup key protector, follow these steps: + +- From the **BitLocker Drive Encryption** Control Panel applet, under the OS drive, select the option **Change how drive is unlocked at startup** +- When prompted, select the option **Insert a USB flash drive** +- Selecting the USB drive where you want to store the startup key, and select **Save** + +--- + +After reboot, the BitLocker preboot screen displays and the USB startup key must be inserted before the operating system can be started: + +:::image type="content" source="images/preboot-startup-key.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the BitLocker preboot screen asking for a USB drive containing the startup key."::: + +### Data volumes + +Data volumes use a similar process for encryption as operating system volumes, but they don't require protectors for the operation to complete. + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/powershell.svg"::: **PowerShell**](#tab/powershell) + +Add the desired protectors prior to encrypting the volume. The following example adds a password protector to the `E:` volume using the variable `$pw` as the password. The `$pw` variable is held as a SecureString value to store the user-defined password: + +```powershell +$pw = Read-Host -AsSecureString + +Enable-BitLockerKeyProtector E: -PasswordProtector -Password $pw +``` + +> [!NOTE] +> The BitLocker cmdlet requires the key protector GUID enclosed in quotation marks to execute. Ensure the entire GUID, with braces, is included in the command. + +**Example**: Use PowerShell to enable BitLocker with a TPM protector + +```powershell +Enable-BitLocker D: -EncryptionMethod XtsAes256 -UsedSpaceOnly -TpmProtector +``` + +**Example**: Use PowerShell to enable BitLocker with a TPM+PIN protector, in this case with a PIN set to *123456*: + +```powershell +$SecureString = ConvertTo-SecureString "123456" -AsPlainText -Force +Enable-BitLocker C: -EncryptionMethod XtsAes256 -UsedSpaceOnly -Pin $SecureString -TPMandPinProtector +``` + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/cmd.svg"::: **Command Prompt**](#tab/cmd) + +Encrypting data volumes can be done using the base command: + +```cmd +manage-bde.exe -on +``` + +or additional protectors can be added to the volume first. It's recommended to add at least one primary protector plus a recovery protector to a data volume. + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/controlpanel.svg"::: **Control Panel**](#tab/controlpanel) + +Encrypting data volumes using the BitLocker Control Panel works in a similar fashion to encryption of the operating system volumes. Users select **Turn on BitLocker** within the BitLocker Control Panel to begin the **BitLocker Drive Encryption Wizard**. + +--- + +## Manage BitLocker protectors + +The management of BitLocker protectors consists in adding, removing, and backing up protectors. + +Managed BitLocker protectors by using the following instructions, selecting the option that best suits your needs. + +### List protectors + +The list of protectors available for a volume (`C:` in the example) can be listed by running the following command: + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/powershell.svg"::: **PowerShell**](#tab/powershell) + +```PowerShell +(Get-BitLockerVolume -mountpoint C).KeyProtector +``` + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/cmd.svg"::: **Command Prompt**](#tab/cmd) + +```cmd + manage-bde.exe -protectors -get C: +``` + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/controlpanel.svg"::: **Control Panel**](#tab/controlpanel) + +This information isn't available in the Control Panel. + +--- + +### Add protectors + +#### Add a recovery password protector + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/powershell.svg"::: **PowerShell**](#tab/powershell) + + +```PowerShell +Add-BitLockerKeyProtector -MountPoint C -RecoveryPasswordProtector +``` + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/cmd.svg"::: **Command Prompt**](#tab/cmd) + +```cmd +manage-bde.exe -protectors -add -recoverypassword C: +``` + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/controlpanel.svg"::: **Control Panel**](#tab/controlpanel) + +From the **BitLocker Drive Encryption** Control Panel applet, select the volume where you want to add a protector and select the option **Back up your recovery key**. + +--- + +#### Add a password protector + +A common protector for a *data volume* is the *password protector*. In the next example, a password protector is added to a volume. + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/powershell.svg"::: **PowerShell**](#tab/powershell) + +```PowerShell +Add-BitLockerKeyProtector -MountPoint D -PasswordProtector +``` + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/cmd.svg"::: **Command Prompt**](#tab/cmd) + +```cmd +manage-bde.exe -protectors -add -pw D: +``` + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/controlpanel.svg"::: **Control Panel**](#tab/controlpanel) + +From the **BitLocker Drive Encryption** Control Panel applet, expand the drive where you want to add a password protector and select the option **Add password**. When prompted, enter and confirm a password to unlock the drive. Select **Finish** to complete the process. + +--- + +#### Add an Active Directory protector + +The Active Directory protector is a SID-based protector that can be added to both operating system and data volumes, although it doesn't unlock operating system volumes in the preboot environment. The protector requires the SID for the domain account or group to link with the protector. BitLocker can protect a cluster-aware disk by adding an SID-based protector for the Cluster Name Object (CNO) that lets the disk properly failover and unlock to any member computer of the cluster. + +> [!IMPORTANT] +> The SID-based protector requires the use of an additional protector such as TPM, PIN, recovery key, etc. when used on operating system volumes. + +> [!NOTE] +> This option is not available for Microsoft Entra joined devices. + +In this example, a domain SID-based protector is added to a previously encrypted volume. The user knows the SID for the user account or group they wish to add and uses the following command: + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/powershell.svg"::: **PowerShell**](#tab/powershell) + +```powershell +Add-BitLockerKeyProtector C: -ADAccountOrGroupProtector -ADAccountOrGroup "" +``` + +To add the protector to a volume, either the domain SID or the group name preceded by the domain and a backslash are needed. In the following example, the **CONTOSO\\Administrator** account is added as a protector to the data volume G. + +```powershell +Enable-BitLocker G: -AdAccountOrGroupProtector -AdAccountOrGroup CONTOSO\Administrator +``` + +To use the SID for the account or group, the first step is to determine the SID associated with the security principal. To get the specific SID for a user account in Windows PowerShell, use the following command: + +```powershell +Get-ADUser -filter {samaccountname -eq "administrator"} +``` + +> [!NOTE] +> Use of this command requires the RSAT-AD-PowerShell feature. + +> [!TIP] +> Information about the locally logged on user and group membership can be found using: `whoami.exe /all`. + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/cmd.svg"::: **Command Prompt**](#tab/cmd) + +```cmd +manage-bde.exe -protectors -add -sid +``` + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/controlpanel.svg"::: **Control Panel**](#tab/controlpanel) + +This option isn't available in the Control Panel. + +--- + +### Remove protectors + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/powershell.svg"::: **PowerShell**](#tab/powershell) + +To remove existing protectors on a volume, use the `Remove-BitLockerKeyProtector` cmdlet. A GUID associated with the protector to be removed must be provided. + +The following commands return the list of key protectors and GUIDS: + +```PowerShell +$vol = Get-BitLockerVolume C +$keyprotectors = $vol.KeyProtector +$keyprotectors +``` + +By using this information, the key protector for a specific volume can be removed using the command: + +```powershell +Remove-BitLockerKeyProtector -KeyProtectorID "{GUID}" +``` + +> [!NOTE] +> The BitLocker cmdlet requires the key protector GUID enclosed in quotation marks to execute. Ensure the entire GUID, with braces, is included in the command. + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/cmd.svg"::: **Command Prompt**](#tab/cmd) + +The following commands return the list of key protectors: + +```cmd +manage-bde.exe -status C: +``` + +The following command removes keys protector of a certain type: + +```cmd +manage-bde.exe -protectors -delete C: -type TPMandPIN +``` + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/controlpanel.svg"::: **Control Panel**](#tab/controlpanel) + +From the **BitLocker Drive Encryption** Control Panel applet, expand the drive where you want to remove a protector and select the option to remove it, if available. + +--- + +> [!NOTE] +> You must have at least one unlock method for any BitLocker-encrypted drives. + +## Suspend and resume + +Some configuration changes may require to suspend BitLocker and then resume it after the change is applied. + +Suspend and resume BitLocker by using the following instructions, selecting the option that best suits your needs. + +### Suspend BitLocker + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/powershell.svg"::: **PowerShell**](#tab/powershell) + +```powershell +Suspend-BitLocker -MountPoint D +``` + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/cmd.svg"::: **Command Prompt**](#tab/cmd) + +```cmd +manage-bde.exe -protectors -disable d: +``` + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/controlpanel.svg"::: **Control Panel**](#tab/controlpanel) + +You can only suspend BitLocker protection for the OS drive when using the Control Panel. + +From the **BitLocker Drive Encryption** Control Panel applet, select the OS drive and select the option **Suspend protection**. + +--- + +### Resume BitLocker + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/powershell.svg"::: **PowerShell**](#tab/powershell) + +```powershell +Resume-BitLocker -MountPoint D +``` + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/cmd.svg"::: **Command Prompt**](#tab/cmd) + +```cmd +manage-bde.exe -protectors -enable d: +``` + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/controlpanel.svg"::: **Control Panel**](#tab/controlpanel) + +From the **BitLocker Drive Encryption** Control Panel applet, select the OS drive and select the option **Resume protection**. + +--- + +## Reset and backup a recovery password + +It's recommended to invalidate a recovery password after its use. In this example the recovery password protector is removed from the OS drive, a new protector added, and backed up to Microsoft Entra ID or Active Directory. + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/powershell.svg"::: **PowerShell**](#tab/powershell) + +Remove all recovery passwords from the OS volume: + +```PowerShell +(Get-BitLockerVolume -MountPoint $env:SystemDrive).KeyProtector | ` + where-object {$_.KeyProtectorType -eq 'RecoveryPassword'} | ` + Remove-BitLockerKeyProtector -MountPoint $env:SystemDrive +``` + +Add a BitLocker recovery password protector for the OS volume: + +```PowerShell +Add-BitLockerKeyProtector -MountPoint $env:SystemDrive -RecoveryPasswordProtector +``` + +Obtain the ID of the new recovery password: + +```PowerShell +(Get-BitLockerVolume -mountpoint $env:SystemDrive).KeyProtector | where-object {$_.KeyProtectorType -eq 'RecoveryPassword'} | ft KeyProtectorId,RecoveryPassword +``` + +> [!NOTE] +>This next steps are not required if the policy setting [Choose how BitLocker-protected operating system drives can be recovered](configure.md?tabs=os#choose-how-bitlocker-protected-operating-system-drives-can-be-recovered) is configured to **Require BitLocker backup to AD DS**. + +Copy the ID of the recovery password from the output. + +Using the GUID from the previous step, replace the `{ID}` in the following command and use the following command to back up the recovery password to Microsoft Entra ID: + +```PowerShell +BackuptoAAD-BitLockerKeyProtector -MountPoint $env:SystemDrive -KeyProtectorId "{ID}" +``` + +Or use the following command to back up the recovery password to Active Directory: + +```PowerShell +Backup-BitLockerKeyProtector -MountPoint $env:SystemDrive -KeyProtectorId "{ID}" +``` + +> [!NOTE] +> The braces `{}` must be included in the ID string. + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/cmd.svg"::: **Command Prompt**](#tab/cmd) + +Remove all recovery passwords from the OS volume: + +```cmd +manage-bde.exe -protectors -delete C: -type RecoveryPassword +``` + +Add a BitLocker recovery password protector for the OS volume: + +```cmd +manage-bde.exe -protectors -add C: -RecoveryPassword +``` + +Obtain the ID of the new recovery password: + +```cmd +manage-bde.exe -protectors -get C: -Type RecoveryPassword +``` + +> [!NOTE] +>This following steps are not required if the policy setting [Choose how BitLocker-protected operating system drives can be recovered](configure.md?tabs=os#choose-how-bitlocker-protected-operating-system-drives-can-be-recovered) is configured to **Require BitLocker backup to AD DS**. + +Using the GUID from the previous step, replace the `{ID}` in the following command and use the following command to back up the recovery password to Microsoft Entra ID: + +```cmd +manage-bde.exe -protectors -aadbackup C: -id {ID} +``` + +Or use the following command to back up the recovery password to Active Directory: + +```cmd +manage-bde.exe -protectors -adbackup C: -id {ID} +``` + +> [!NOTE] +> The braces `{}` must be included in the ID string. + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/controlpanel.svg"::: **Control Panel**](#tab/controlpanel) + +This process can't be accomplished using the Control Panel. Use one of the other options instead. + +--- + +## Disable BitLocker + +Disabling BitLocker decrypts and removes any associated protectors from the volumes. Decryption should occur when protection is no longer required, and not as a troubleshooting step. + +Disable BitLocker by using the following instructions, selecting the option that best suits your needs. + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/powershell.svg"::: **PowerShell**](#tab/powershell) + +Windows PowerShell offers the ability to decrypt multiple drives in one pass. In the following example, the user has three encrypted volumes, which they wish to decrypt. + +Using the Disable-BitLocker command, they can remove all protectors and encryption at the same time without the need for more commands. An example of this command is: + +```powershell +Disable-BitLocker +``` + +To avoid specifying each mount point individually, use the `-MountPoint` parameter in an array to sequence the same command into one line, without requiring additional user input. Example: + +```powershell +Disable-BitLocker -MountPoint C,D +``` + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/cmd.svg"::: **Command Prompt**](#tab/cmd) + +Decryption with `manage-bde.exe` offers the advantage of not requiring user confirmation to start the process. Manage-bde uses the -off command to start the decryption process. A sample command for decryption is: + +```cmd +manage-bde.exe -off C: +``` + +This command disables protectors while it decrypts the volume and removes all protectors when decryption is complete. + +#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/controlpanel.svg"::: **Control Panel**](#tab/controlpanel) + +BitLocker decryption using the Control Panel is done using a wizard. After opening the BitLocker Control Panel applet, select the **Turn off BitLocker** option to begin the process. To proceed, select the confirmation dialog. With **Turn off BitLocker** confirmed, the drive decryption process begins. + +Once decryption is complete, the drive updates its status in the Control Panel and becomes available for encryption. + +--- + + + +[PREV-1]: /previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/ff829849(v=ws.11) +[PS-1]: /powershell/module/bitlocker diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/planning-guide.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/planning-guide.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5fb64c8c85 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/planning-guide.md @@ -0,0 +1,216 @@ +--- +title: BitLocker planning guide +description: Learn how to plan for a BitLocker deployment in your organization. +ms.topic: concept-article +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +--- + +# BitLocker planning guide + +A BitLocker deployment strategy includes defining the appropriate policies and configuration requirements based on your organization's security requirements. This article helps collecting the information to assist with a BitLocker deployment. + +## Audit the environment + +To plan a BitLocker deployment, understand the current environment. Perform an informal audit to define the current policies, procedures, and hardware environment. Review the existing disk encryption software and the organization's security policies. If the organization isn't using disk encryption software, then these policies might not exist. If disk encryption software is in use, then the policies might need to change to use certain BitLocker features. + +To help document the organization's current disk encryption security policies, answer the following questions: + +| :ballot_box_with_check: | **Question** | +|--|--| +| :black_square_button: | *Are there policies to determine which devices must use BitLocker and which don't?* | +| :black_square_button: | *What policies exist to control recovery password and recovery key storage?* | +| :black_square_button: | *What are the policies for validating the identity of users who need to perform BitLocker recovery?* | +| :black_square_button: | *What policies exist to control who in the organization has access to recovery data?* | +| :black_square_button: | *What policies exist to control the decommission or retirement of devices?* | +| :black_square_button: | *What encryption algorithm strength is in place?* | + +## Encryption keys and authentication + +A trusted platform module (TPM) is a hardware component installed in many Windows devices by the manufacturers. It works with BitLocker to help protect user data and to make sure a device hasn't been tampered with while the system was offline. + +BitLocker can lock the normal startup process until the user supplies a personal identification number (PIN), or inserts a removable USB device that contains a startup key. These extra security measures provide multifactor authentication. They also make sure that the computer doesn't start or resume from hibernation until the correct PIN or startup key is presented. + +On devices that don't have a TPM, BitLocker can still be used to encrypt the Windows operating system volume. However, this implementation doesn't provide the pre-startup system integrity verification offered by BitLocker working with a TPM. + +An effective implementation of information protection, like most security controls, considers usability and security. Users typically prefer a simple security experience. In fact, the more transparent a security solution becomes, the more likely users are to conform to it. + +It's crucial that organizations protect information on their devices regardless of the state of the device or the intent of users. This protection shouldn't be cumbersome to users. One undesirable and previously commonplace situation is when the user is prompted for input during preboot, and then again during Windows sign-in. Challenging users for input more than once should be avoided. + +The TPM is able to securely protect the BitLocker encryption key while it is at rest, and it can securely unlock the operating system drive. When the key is in use, and thus in memory, a combination of hardware and Windows capabilities can secure the key and prevent unauthorized access through cold-boot attacks. Although other countermeasures like PIN-based unlock are available, they aren't as user-friendly; depending on the devices' configuration they may not offer more security when it comes to key protection. For more information, see [BitLocker countermeasures](countermeasures.md). + +### BitLocker key protectors + +To protect the BitLocker encryption key, BitLocker can use different types of *protectors*. When enabling BitLocker, each protector receives a copy of the *Volume Master Key*, which is then encrypted by using its own mechanism. + +| Key protector | Description | +|--|--| +| **Auto-unlock** | Used to automatically unlock volumes that don't host an operating system. BitLocker uses encrypted information stored in the registry and volume metadata to unlock any data volumes that use automatic unlocking. | +| **Password** and **Password for OS drive**| To unlock a drive, the user must supply a password. When used for OS drives, the user is prompted for a password in the preboot screen. This method doesn't offer any lockout logic, therefore it doesn't protect against brute force attacks. | +| **Startup key** | An encryption key that can be stored on removable media, with a file name format of `.bek`. The user is prompted for the USB flash drive that has the recovery key and/or startup key, and then reboot the device. | +| **Smart card certificate** | Used to unlock volumes that don't host an operating system. To unlock a drive, the user must use a smart card. | +| **TPM** | A hardware device used to help establish a secure root-of-trust, validating early boot components. The TPM protector can only be used with the OS drive. | +| **TPM + PIN** | A user-entered numeric or alphanumeric key protector that can only be used with OS volumes and in addition to the TPM.The TPM validates early boot components. The user must enter the correct PIN before the start-up process can continue, and before the drive can be unlocked. The TPM enters lockout if the incorrect PIN is entered repeatedly, to protect the PIN from brute force attacks. The number of repeated attempts that trigger a lockout is variable. | +| **TPM + Startup key** | The TPM successfully validates early boot components. The user must insert a USB drive containing the startup key before the OS can boot. | +| **TPM + Startup key + PIN** | The TPM successfully validates early boot components. The user must enter the correct PIN and insert a USB drive containing the startup key before the OS can boot. | +| **Recovery password** | A 48-digit number used to unlock a volume when it is in *recovery mode*. Numbers can often be typed on a regular keyboard. If the numbers on the normal keyboard aren't responding, the function keys (F1-F10) can be used to input the numbers. | +| **TPM + Network Key** | The TPM successfully validates early boot components, and a valid encrypted network key has been provided from a WDS server. This authentication method provides automatic unlock of OS volumes while maintaining multifactor authentication. This key protector can only be used with OS volumes. | +| **Recovery key** | An encryption key stored on removable media that can be used for recovering data encrypted on a BitLocker volume. The file name has a format of `.bek`. | +| **Data Recovery Agent** | Data recovery agents (DRAs) are accounts that are able to decrypt BitLocker-protected drives by using their certificates. Recovery of a BitLocker-protected drive can be accomplished by a data recovery agent that is configured with the proper certificate. | +| **Active Directory user or group** | A protector that is based on an Active Directory user or group security identified (SID). Data drives are automatically unlocked when such users attempt to access them. | + +#### Support for devices without TPM + +Determine whether computers that don't have a TPM 1.2 or higher versions in the environment will be supported. If you decide to support devices without TPM, a user must use a USB startup key or a password to boot the system. The startup key requires extra support processes similar to multifactor authentication. + +#### What areas of the organization need a baseline level of data protection? + +The TPM-only authentication method provides the most transparent user experience for organizations that need a baseline level of data protection to meet security policies. It has the lowest total cost of ownership. TPM-only might also be more appropriate for devices that are unattended or that must reboot unattended. + +However, TPM-only authentication method doesn't offer a high level of data protection. This authentication method protects against attacks that modify early boot components. But, the level of protection can be affected by potential weaknesses in hardware or in the early boot components. BitLocker's multifactor authentication methods significantly increase the overall level of data protection. + +> [!TIP] +> An advantage of TPM-only authentication is that a device can boot Windows without any user interaction. In case of lost or stolen device, there may be an advantage of this configuration: if the device is connected to the Internet, it can be remotely wiped with a device management solution like Microsoft Intune. + +#### What areas of the organization need a more secure level of data protection? + +If there are devices with highly sensitive data, then deploy BitLocker with multifactor authentication on those systems. Requiring the user to input a PIN significantly increases the level of protection for the system. BitLocker Network Unlock can also be used to allow these devices to automatically unlock when connected to a trusted wired network that can provide the Network Unlock key. + +#### What multifactor authentication method does the organization prefer? + +The protection differences provided by multifactor authentication methods can't be easily quantified. Consider each authentication method's impact on Helpdesk support, user education, user productivity, and any automated systems management processes. + +## Manage passwords and PINs + +When BitLocker is enabled on a system drive and the device has a TPM, users can be required to enter a PIN before BitLocker unlocks the drive. Such a PIN requirement can prevent an attacker who has physical access to a device from even getting to the Windows sign-in, which makes it almost impossible for the attacker to access or modify user data and system files. + +Requiring a PIN at startup is a useful security feature because it acts as a second authentication factor. However, this configuration comes with some costs, especially if you require to change the PIN regularly. + +In addition, Modern Standby devices don't require a PIN for startup: they're designed to start infrequently and have other mitigations in place that further reduce the attack surface of the system. + +For more information about how startup security works and the countermeasures that Windows provides, see [Preboot authentication](countermeasures.md#preboot-authentication). + +## TPM hardware configurations + +In the deployment plan, identify what TPM-based hardware platforms are supported. Document the hardware models from an OEM(s) used by the organization so that their configurations can be tested and supported. TPM hardware requires special consideration during all aspects of planning and deployment. + +### TPM 1.2 states and initialization + +For TPM 1.2, there are multiple possible states. Windows automatically initializes the TPM, which brings it to an enabled, activated, and owned state. This state is the state that BitLocker requires before it can use the TPM. + +### Endorsement keys + +For a TPM to be usable by BitLocker, it must contain an endorsement key, which is an RSA key pair. The private half of the key pair is held inside the TPM and is never revealed or accessible outside the TPM. If the TPM doesn't have an endorsement key, BitLocker forces the TPM to generate one automatically as part of BitLocker setup. + +An endorsement key can be created at various points in the TPM's lifecycle, but needs to be created only once for the lifetime of the TPM. If an endorsement key doesn't exist for the TPM, it must be created before you can take TPM ownership. + +For more information about the TPM and the TCG, see the Trusted Computing Group: [Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Specifications][FWD-1]. + +## Non-TPM hardware configurations + +Devices without a TPM can still be protected with drive encryption using a startup key. + +Use the following questions to identify issues that might affect the deployment in a non-TPM configuration: + +- Is there a budget for USB flash drives for each of these devices? +- Do existing non-TPM devices support USB drives at boot time? + +Test the individual hardware platforms with the BitLocker system check option while enabling BitLocker. The system check makes sure that BitLocker can read the recovery information from a USB device and encryption keys correctly before it encrypts the volume. + +## Disk configuration considerations + +To function correctly, BitLocker requires a specific disk configuration. BitLocker requires two partitions that meet the following requirements: + +- The operating system partition contains the operating system and its support files; it must be formatted with the NTFS file system +- The system partition (or boot partition) includes the files needed to load Windows after the BIOS or UEFI firmware has prepared the system hardware. BitLocker isn't enabled on this partition. For BitLocker to work, the system partition must not be encrypted, and must be on a different partition than the operating system. On UEFI platforms, the system partition must be formatted with the FAT 32-file system. On BIOS platforms, the system partition must be formatted with the NTFS file system. It should be at least 350 MB in size. + +Windows setup automatically configures the disk drives of computers to support BitLocker encryption. + +Windows Recovery Environment (Windows RE) is an extensible recovery platform that is based on Windows Pre-installation Environment (Windows PE). When the computer fails to start, Windows automatically transitions into this environment, and the Startup Repair tool in Windows RE automates the diagnosis and repair of an unbootable Windows installation. Windows RE also contains the drivers and tools that are needed to unlock a volume protected by BitLocker by providing a recovery key or recovery password. To use Windows RE with BitLocker, the Windows RE boot image must be on a volume that isn't protected by BitLocker. + +Windows RE can also be used from boot media other than the local hard disk. If Windows RE isn't installed on the local hard disk of BitLocker-enabled computers, then different methods can be used to boot Windows RE. For example, Windows Deployment Services (WDS) or USB flash drive can be used for recovery. + +## BitLocker provisioning + +Administrators can enable BitLocker before to operating system deployment from the *Windows Pre-installation Environment* (WinPE). This step is done with a randomly generated clear key protector applied to the formatted volume. It encrypts the volume before running the Windows setup process. If the encryption uses the **Used Disk Space Only** option, then this step takes only a few seconds, and can be incorporated into existing deployment processes. Preprovisioning requires a TPM. + +To check the BitLocker status of a particular volume, administrators can look at the drive status in the BitLocker Control Panel applet or Windows Explorer. The **Waiting For Activation** status means that the drive was preprovisioned for BitLocker, and there's only a clear protector used to encrypt the volume. In this case, the volume isn't protected, and needs to have a secure key added to the volume before the drive is considered fully protected. Administrators can use the Control Panel options, PowerShell cmdlets, the `manage-bde.exe` tool, or WMI APIs to add an appropriate key protector. The volume status then is updated. + +When using the Control Panel options, administrators can choose to **Turn on BitLocker** and follow the steps in the wizard to add a protector, such as a PIN for an operating system volume (or a password if no TPM exists), or a password or smart card protector to a data volume. Then the drive security window is presented before changing the volume status. + +## *Used Disk Space Only* encryption + +The BitLocker Setup wizard provides administrators the ability to choose the *Used Disk Space Only* or *Full* encryption method when enabling BitLocker for a volume. Administrators can use BitLocker policy settings to enforce either Used Disk Space Only or Full disk encryption. + +Launching the BitLocker Setup wizard prompts for the authentication method to be used (password and smart card are available for data volumes). Once the method is chosen and the recovery key is saved, the wizard asks to choose the drive encryption type. Select **Used Disk Space Only** or **Full** drive encryption. + +With Used Disk Space Only, just the portion of the drive that contains data are encrypted. Unused space remains unencrypted. This behavior causes the encryption process to be faster, especially for new devices and data drives. When BitLocker is enabled with this method, as data is added to the drive, the portion of the drive used is encrypted. So, there's never unencrypted data stored on the drive. + +With Full drive encryption, the entire drive is encrypted, whether data is stored on it or not. This option is useful for drives that have been repurposed, and might contain data remnants from their previous use. + +> [!CAUTION] +> Exercise caution when encrypting only used space on an existing volume on which confidential data might have already been stored in an unencrypted state. When using used space encryption, sectors where previously unencrypted data are stored can be recovered through disk-recovery tools until they're overwritten by new encrypted data. In contrast, encrypting only used space on a brand-new volume can significantly decrease deployment time without the security risk because all new data will be encrypted as it's written to the disk. + +## Encrypted hard drive support + +Encrypted hard drives provide onboard cryptographic capabilities to encrypt data on drives. This feature improves both drive and system performance by offloading cryptographic calculations from the device's processor to the drive itself. Data is rapidly encrypted by the drive by using dedicated, purpose-built hardware. If planning to use whole-drive encryption with Windows, Microsoft recommends researching hard drive manufacturers and models to determine whether any of their encrypted hard drives meet the security and budget requirements. + +For more information about encrypted hard drives, see [Encrypted hard drives](../encrypted-hard-drive.md). + +## Microsoft Entra ID and Active Directory Domain Services considerations + +BitLocker integrates with Microsoft Entra ID and Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) to provide centralized key management. By default, no recovery information is backed up to Microsoft Entra ID or AD DS. Administrators can configure [policy setting](configure.md?tabs=os#choose-how-bitlocker-protected-operating-system-drives-can-be-recovered) for each drive type to enable backup of BitLocker recovery information. + +The following recovery data is saved for each computer object: + +- *Recovery password*: a 48-digit recovery password used to recover a BitLocker-protected volume. Users must enter this password to unlock a volume when BitLocker enters recovery mode +- *Key package*: with the key package and the recovery password, portions of a BitLocker-protected volume can be decrypted if the disk is severely damaged. Each key package works only with the volume it was created on, which is identified by the corresponding volume ID + +## FIPS support for recovery password protector + +Devices configured to operate in FIPS mode can create FIPS-compliant recovery password protectors, which use the *FIPS-140 NIST SP800-132* algorithm. + +> [!NOTE] +> The United States Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) defines security and interoperability requirements for computer systems that are used by the U.S. Federal Government. The FIPS-140 standard defines approved cryptographic algorithms. The FIPS-140 standard also sets forth requirements for key generation and for key management. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) uses the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) to determine whether a particular implementation of a cryptographic algorithm is compliant with the FIPS-140 standard. An implementation of a cryptographic algorithm is considered FIPS-140-compliant only if it has been submitted for and has passed NIST validation. An algorithm that has not been submitted cannot be considered FIPS-compliant even if the implementation produces identical data as a validated implementation of the same algorithm. + +- FIPS-compliant recovery password protectors can be exported and stored in AD DS +- The BitLocker policy settings for recovery passwords work the same for all Windows versions that support BitLocker, whether in FIPS mode or not + +## Network Unlock + +Some organizations have location-specific data security requirements, especially in environments with high-value data. The network environment might provide crucial data protection and enforce mandatory authentication. Therefore, policy states that those devices shouldn't leave the building or be disconnected from the corporate network. Safeguards like physical security locks and geofencing might help enforce this policy as reactive controls. Beyond these safeguards, a proactive security control that grants data access only when the device is connected to the corporate network is necessary. + +*Network Unlock* enables BitLocker-protected devices to start automatically when connected to a wired corporate network on which Windows Deployment Services runs. Anytime the device isn't connected to the corporate network, a user must enter a PIN to unlock the drive (if PIN-based unlock is enabled). Network Unlock requires the following infrastructure: + +- Client devices that have Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) firmware version 2.3.1 or later, which supports Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) +- A Windows Server running the Windows deployment services (WDS) role +- A DHCP server + +For more information about how to configure Network unlock feature, see [Network Unlock](network-unlock.md). + +## BitLocker recovery + +Organizations should carefully plan a BitLocker recovery strategy as part of the overall BitLocker implementation plan. There are different options when implementing a BitLocker recovery model, which are described in [BitLocker recovery overview](recovery-overview.md). + +## Monitor BitLocker + +Organizations can use Microsoft Intune or Configuration Manager to monitor device encryption across multiple devices. For more information, see [Monitor device encryption with Intune][INT-1] and [View BitLocker reports in Configuration Manager][MCM-1]. + +## Next steps + +> [!div class="nextstepaction"] +> Learn how to plan a BitLocker recovery strategy for your organization: +> +> +> [BitLocker recovery overview >](recovery-overview.md) + +> [!div class="nextstepaction"] +> Learn about the available options to configure BitLocker and how to configure them via Configuration Service Providers (CSP) or group policy (GPO): +> +> +> [Configure BitLocker >](configure.md) + + + +[FWD-1]: https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?linkid=69584 +[INT-1]: /mem/intune/protect/encryption-monitor +[MCM-1]: /mem/configmgr/protect/deploy-use/bitlocker/view-reports diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/preboot-recovery-screen.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/preboot-recovery-screen.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e694a95993 --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/preboot-recovery-screen.md @@ -0,0 +1,192 @@ +--- +title: BitLocker preboot recovery screen +description: Learn about the information displayed in the BitLocker preboot recovery screen, depending on configured policy settings and recovery keys status. +ms.collection: + - highpri + - tier1 +ms.topic: concept-article +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +--- + +# BitLocker preboot recovery screen + +During BitLocker recovery, the *preboot recovery screen* can display a custom recovery message, a custom recovery URL, and a few hints to help users finding where a key can be retrieved from. + +This article describes the information displayed in the preboot recovery screen depending on configured policy settings and recovery keys status. + +## Default preboot recovery screen + +:::row::: + :::column span="2"::: + By default, the BitLocker recovery screen displays a generic message and the url **https://aka.ms/recoverykeyfaq**. + :::column-end::: + :::column span="2"::: + :::image type="content" source="images/preboot-recovery.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the default BitLocker recovery screen." lightbox="images/preboot-recovery.png" border="false"::: + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: + +## Custom recovery message + +With BitLocker policy settings, you can configure a custom recovery message and URL on the BitLocker preboot recovery screen. The custom recovery message and URL can include the address of the BitLocker self-service recovery portal, the IT internal website, or a phone number for support. + +:::row::: + :::column span="2"::: + BitLocker policy settings configured with a custom recovery message. + :::column-end::: + :::column span="2"::: + :::image type="content" source="images/preboot-recovery-custom-message.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the BitLocker recovery screen showing a custom message." lightbox="images/preboot-recovery-custom-message.png" border="false"::: + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: +:::row::: + :::column span="2"::: + BitLocker policy settings configured with a custom recovery URL. + :::column-end::: + :::column span="2"::: + :::image type="content" source="images/preboot-recovery-custom-url.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the BitLocker recovery screen showing a custom URL." lightbox="images/preboot-recovery-custom-url.png" border="false"::: + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: + +For more information how to configure a custom recovery message with policy settings, see [Configure preboot recovery message and URL](configure.md?tabs=os#configure-preboot-recovery-message-and-url). + +## Recovery key hints + +BitLocker metadata includes information about when and where a BitLocker recovery key was saved. This information isn't exposed through the UI or any public API. It's used solely by the BitLocker recovery screen in the form of hints to help a user locate a volume's recovery key. Hints are displayed on the recovery screen and refer to the location where the key was saved. The hints apply to both the boot manager recovery screen and the WinRE unlock screen. + +There are rules governing which hint is shown during the recovery (in the order of processing): + +1. Always display custom recovery message, if configured via policy settings +1. Always display generic hint: **For more information, go to https://aka.ms/recoverykeyfaq** +1. If multiple recovery keys exist on the volume, prioritize the last-created (and successfully backed up) recovery key +1. Prioritize keys with successful backup over keys that have never been backed up +1. Prioritize backup hints in the following order for remote backup locations: + - Microsoft account + - Microsoft Entra ID + - Active Directory +1. If a key has been printed and saved to file, display a combined hint **Look for a printout or a text file with the key**, instead of two separate hints +1. If multiple backups of the same type (remove vs. local) were done for the same recovery key, prioritize backup info with latest backup date +1. There's no specific hint for keys saved to an on-premises Active Directory. In this case, a custom message (if configured) or a generic message, **Contact your organization's help desk**, is displayed +1. If two recovery keys are present and only one backed up, the system asks for the backed up key, even if the other key is newer + +:::row::: + :::column span="4"::: + #### Example: single recovery password saved to file and single backup + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: +:::row::: + :::column span="2"::: + In this scenario, the recovery password is saved to a file + + > [!IMPORTANT] + > It's not recommend to print recovery keys or saving them to a file. Instead, use Microsoft account, Microsoft Entra ID or Active Directory backup. + +:::column-end::: + :::column span="2"::: + :::image type="content" source="images/preboot-recovery-hint.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the BitLocker recovery screen showing a hint where the BitLocker recovery key was saved." lightbox="images/preboot-recovery-hint.png" border="false"::: + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: +:::row::: + :::column span="4"::: + #### Example: single recovery password for Microsoft account and single backup + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: +:::row::: + :::column span="2"::: + In this scenario, a custom URL is configured. The recovery password is: + - saved to Microsoft account + - not printed + - not saved to a file + + **Result:** the hints for the custom URL and the Microsoft account (**https://aka.ms/myrecoverykey**) are displayed. + :::column-end::: + :::column span="2"::: + :::image type="content" source="images/preboot-recovery-custom-url-single-backup.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the BitLocker recovery screen showing a custom URL and the hint where the BitLocker recovery key was saved." lightbox="images/preboot-recovery-custom-url-single-backup.png" border="false"::: + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: +:::row::: + :::column span="4"::: + #### Example: single recovery password in AD DS and single backup + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: +:::row::: + :::column span="2"::: + In this scenario, a custom URL is configured. The recovery password is: + - saved to Active Directory + - not printed + - not saved to a file + + **Result:** only the custom URL is displayed. + :::column-end::: + :::column span="2"::: + :::image type="content" source="images/preboot-recovery-custom-url.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the BitLocker recovery screen showing only the custom URL." lightbox="images/preboot-recovery-custom-url.png" border="false"::: + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: +:::row::: + :::column span="4"::: + #### Example: single recovery password with multiple backups + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: +:::row::: + :::column span="2"::: + In this scenario, the recovery password is: + - saved to Microsoft account + - saved to Microsoft Entra ID + - printed + - saved to file + + **Result:** only the Microsoft account hint (**https://aka.ms/myrecoverykey**) is displayed. + :::column-end::: + :::column span="2"::: + :::image type="content" source="images/preboot-recovery-multiple-backups.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the BitLocker recovery screen showing only the Microsoft account hint." lightbox="images/preboot-recovery-multiple-backups.png" border="false"::: + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: +:::row::: + :::column span="4"::: + #### Example: multiple recovery passwords with sinlge backup + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: +:::row::: + :::column span="2"::: + In this scenario, there are two recovery passwords. + + The recovery password #1 is: + - saved to file + - creation time: **1PM** + - key ID: **4290B6C0-B17A-497A-8552-272CC30E80D4** + + The recovery password #2 is: + - not backed up + - creation time: **3PM** + - key ID: **045219EC-A53B-41AE-B310-08EC883AAEDD** + + **Result:** only the hint for the successfully backed up key is displayed, even if it isn't the most recent key. + :::column-end::: + :::column span="2"::: + :::image type="content" source="images/preboot-recovery-hint.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the BitLocker recovery screen showing the key ID of the recovery password that was successfully backed up." lightbox="images/preboot-recovery-hint.png" border="false"::: + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: +:::row::: + :::column span="4"::: + #### Example: multiple recovery passwords with multiple backups + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: +:::row::: + :::column span="2"::: + In this scenario, there are two recovery passwords. + + The recovery password #1 is: + - Saved to Microsoft account + - Saved to Microsoft Entra ID + - creation time: **1PM** + - key ID: **4290B6C0-B17A-497A-8552-272CC30E80D4** + + The recovery password #2 is: + - Saved to Microsoft Entra ID + - creation time: **3PM** + - key ID: **045219EC-A53B-41AE-B310-08EC883AAEDD** + + **Result:** the Microsoft Entra ID hint (**https://aka.ms/aadrecoverykey**), which is the most recent key saved, is displayed. + :::column-end::: + :::column span="2"::: + :::image type="content" source="images/preboot-recovery-multiple-passwords-multiple-backups.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the BitLocker recovery screen showing the key ID of the most recent key." lightbox="images/preboot-recovery-multiple-passwords-multiple-backups.png" border="false"::: + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/prepare-your-organization-for-bitlocker-planning-and-policies.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/prepare-your-organization-for-bitlocker-planning-and-policies.md deleted file mode 100644 index ebce5dd70e..0000000000 --- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/prepare-your-organization-for-bitlocker-planning-and-policies.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,191 +0,0 @@ ---- -title: Prepare the organization for BitLocker Planning and policies -description: This article for the IT professional explains how can to plan for a BitLocker deployment. -ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 11/08/2022 ---- - -# Prepare an organization for BitLocker: Planning and policies - -This article for the IT professional explains how to plan BitLocker deployment. - -When BitLocker deployment strategy is defined, define the appropriate policies and configuration requirements based on the business requirements of the organization. The following sections will help with collecting information. Use this information to help with the decision-making process about deploying and managing BitLocker systems. - -## Audit the environment - -To plan a BitLocker deployment, understand the current environment. Perform an informal audit to define the current policies, procedures, and hardware environment. Review the existing disk encryption software corporate security policies. If the organization isn't using disk encryption software, then none of these policies will exist. If disk encryption software is being used, then the organization's policies might need to be changed to use the BitLocker features. - -To help document the organization's current disk encryption security policies, answer the following questions: - -1. Are there policies to determine which computers will use BitLocker and which computers won't use BitLocker? - -2. What policies exist to control recovery password and recovery key storage? - -3. What are the policies for validating the identity of users who need to perform BitLocker recovery? - -4. What policies exist to control who in the organization has access to recovery data? - -5. What policies exist to control computer decommissioning or retirement? - -## Encryption keys and authentication - -BitLocker helps prevent unauthorized access to data on lost or stolen computers by: - -- Encrypting the entire Windows operating system volume on the hard disk. -- Verifying the boot process integrity. - -The trusted platform module (TPM) is a hardware component installed in many newer computers by the computer manufacturers. It works with BitLocker to help protect user data. And, help make sure a computer hasn't been tampered with while the system was offline. - -Also, BitLocker can lock the normal startup process until the user supplies a personal identification number (PIN) or inserts a removable USB device that contains a startup key. These extra security measures provide multifactor authentication. They also make sure that the computer won't start or resume from hibernation until the correct PIN or startup key is presented. - -On computers that don't have a TPM version 1.2 or higher, BitLocker can still be used to encrypt the Windows operating system volume. However, this implementation requires the user to insert a USB startup key to start the computer or resume from hibernation. It doesn't provide the pre-startup system integrity verification offered by BitLocker working with a TPM. - -### BitLocker key protectors - -| Key protector | Description | -| - | - | -| *TPM* | A hardware device used to help establish a secure root-of-trust. BitLocker only supports TPM 1.2 or higher versions.| -| *PIN* | A user-entered numeric key protector that can only be used in addition to the TPM.| -| *Enhanced PIN* | A user-entered alphanumeric key protector that can only be used in addition to the TPM.| -| *Startup key* | An encryption key that can be stored on most removable media. This key protector can be used alone on non-TPM computers, or with a TPM for added security.| -| *Recovery password* | A 48-digit number used to unlock a volume when it is in recovery mode. Numbers can often be typed on a regular keyboard. If the numbers on the normal keyboard aren't responding, the function keys (F1-F10) can be used to input the numbers.| -| *Recovery key*| An encryption key stored on removable media that can be used for recovering data encrypted on a BitLocker volume.| - -### BitLocker authentication methods - -| Authentication method | Requires user interaction | Description | -| - | - | - | -| *TPM only*| No| TPM validates early boot components.| -| *TPM + PIN* | Yes| TPM validates early boot components. The user must enter the correct PIN before the start-up process can continue, and before the drive can be unlocked. The TPM enters lockout if the incorrect PIN is entered repeatedly, to protect the PIN from brute force attacks. The number of repeated attempts that will trigger a lockout is variable.| -| *TPM + Network key* | No | The TPM successfully validates early boot components, and a valid encrypted network key has been provided from the WDS server. This authentication method provides automatic unlock of operating system volumes at system reboot while still maintaining multifactor authentication. | -| *TPM + startup key* | Yes| The TPM successfully validates early boot components, and a USB flash drive containing the startup key has been inserted.| -| *Startup key only* | Yes| The user is prompted for the USB flash drive that has the recovery key and/or startup key, and then reboot the computer.| - -#### Will computers without TPM 1.2 or higher versions be supported? - -Determine whether computers that don't have a TPM 1.2 or higher versions in the environment will be supported. If it's decided to support computers with TPM 1.2 or higher versions, a user must use a USB startup key to boot the system. This startup key requires extra support processes similar to multifactor authentication. - -#### What areas of the organization need a baseline level of data protection? - -The TPM-only authentication method provides the most transparent user experience for organizations that need a baseline level of data protection to meet security policies. It has the lowest total cost of ownership. TPM-only might also be more appropriate for computers that are unattended or that must reboot unattended. - -However, TPM-only authentication method offers the lowest level of data protection. This authentication method protects against attacks that modify early boot components. But, the level of protection can be affected by potential weaknesses in hardware or in the early boot components. BitLocker's multifactor authentication methods significantly increase the overall level of data protection. - -#### What areas of the organization need a more secure level of data protection? - -If there are user computers with highly sensitive data, then deploy BitLocker with multifactor authentication on those systems. Requiring the user to input a PIN significantly increases the level of protection for the system. BitLocker Network Unlock can also be used to allow these computers to automatically unlock when connected to a trusted wired network that can provide the Network Unlock key. - -#### What multifactor authentication method does the organization prefer? - -The protection differences provided by multifactor authentication methods can't be easily quantified. Consider each authentication method's impact on Helpdesk support, user education, user productivity, and any automated systems management processes. - -## TPM hardware configurations - -In the deployment plan, identify what TPM-based hardware platforms will be supported. Document the hardware models from an OEM(s) being used by the organization so that their configurations can be tested and supported. TPM hardware requires special consideration during all aspects of planning and deployment. - -### TPM 1.2 states and initialization - -For TPM 1.2, there are multiple possible states. Windows automatically initializes the TPM, which brings it to an enabled, activated, and owned state. This state is the state that BitLocker requires before it can use the TPM. - -### Endorsement keys - -For a TPM to be usable by BitLocker, it must contain an endorsement key, which is an RSA key pair. The private half of the key pair is held inside the TPM and is never revealed or accessible outside the TPM. If the TPM doesn't have an endorsement key, BitLocker will force the TPM to generate one automatically as part of BitLocker setup. - -An endorsement key can be created at various points in the TPM's lifecycle, but needs to be created only once for the lifetime of the TPM. If an endorsement key doesn't exist for the TPM, it must be created before TPM ownership can be taken. - -For more information about the TPM and the TCG, see the Trusted Computing Group: Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Specifications (). - -## Non-TPM hardware configurations - -Devices that don't include a TPM can still be protected by drive encryption. Windows To Go workspaces can be BitLocker protected using a startup password and PCs without a TPM can use a startup key. - -Use the following questions to identify issues that might affect the deployment in a non-TPM configuration: - -- Are password complexity rules in place? -- Is there a budget for USB flash drives for each of these computers? -- Do existing non-TPM devices support USB devices at boot time? - -Test the individual hardware platforms with the BitLocker system check option while enabling BitLocker. The system check makes sure that BitLocker can read the recovery information from a USB device and encryption keys correctly before it encrypts the volume. CD and DVD drives can't act as a block storage device and can't be used to store the BitLocker recovery material. - -## Disk configuration considerations - -To function correctly, BitLocker requires a specific disk configuration. BitLocker requires two partitions that meet the following requirements: - -- The operating system partition contains the operating system and its support files; it must be formatted with the NTFS file system -- The system partition (or boot partition) includes the files needed to load Windows after the BIOS or UEFI firmware has prepared the system hardware. BitLocker isn't enabled on this partition. For BitLocker to work, the system partition must not be encrypted, and must be on a different partition than the operating system. On UEFI platforms, the system partition must be formatted with the FAT 32-file system. On BIOS platforms, the system partition must be formatted with the NTFS file system. It should be at least 350 MB in size. - -Windows setup automatically configures the disk drives of computers to support BitLocker encryption. - -Windows Recovery Environment (Windows RE) is an extensible recovery platform that is based on Windows Pre-installation Environment (Windows PE). When the computer fails to start, Windows automatically transitions into this environment, and the Startup Repair tool in Windows RE automates the diagnosis and repair of an unbootable Windows installation. Windows RE also contains the drivers and tools that are needed to unlock a volume protected by BitLocker by providing a recovery key or recovery password. To use Windows RE with BitLocker, the Windows RE boot image must be on a volume that isn't protected by BitLocker. - -Windows RE can also be used from boot media other than the local hard disk. If Windows RE isn't installed on the local hard disk of BitLocker-enabled computers, then different methods can be used to boot Windows RE. For example, Windows Deployment Services (WDS), CD-ROM, or USB flash drive can be used for recovery. - -## BitLocker provisioning - -In Windows Vista and Windows 7, BitLocker was provisioned after the installation for system and data volumes. It used the `manage-bde` command line interface or the Control Panel user interface. With newer operating systems, BitLocker can be provisioned before the operating system is installed. Preprovisioning requires the computer have a TPM. - -To check the BitLocker status of a particular volume, administrators can look at the drive status in the BitLocker control panel applet or Windows Explorer. The "Waiting For Activation" status with a yellow exclamation icon means that the drive was preprovisioned for BitLocker. This status means that there was only a clear protector used when encrypting the volume. In this case, the volume isn't protected, and needs to have a secure key added to the volume before the drive is considered fully protected. Administrators can use the control panel options, the **manage-bde** tool, or WMI APIs to add an appropriate key protector. The volume status will be updated. - -When using the control panel options, administrators can choose to **Turn on BitLocker** and follow the steps in the wizard to add a protector, such as a PIN for an operating system volume (or a password if no TPM exists), or a password or smart card protector to a data volume. Then the drive security window is presented before changing the volume status. - -Administrators can enable BitLocker before to operating system deployment from the Windows Pre-installation Environment (WinPE). This step is done with a randomly generated clear key protector applied to the formatted volume. It encrypts the volume before running the Windows setup process. If the encryption uses the Used Disk Space Only option, then this step takes only a few seconds. And, it incorporates into the regular deployment processes. - -## Used Disk Space Only encryption - -The BitLocker Setup wizard provides administrators the ability to choose the Used Disk Space Only or Full encryption method when enabling BitLocker for a volume. Administrators can use the new BitLocker group policy setting to enforce either Used Disk Space Only or Full disk encryption. - -Launching the BitLocker Setup wizard prompts for the authentication method to be used (password and smart card are available for data volumes). Once the method is chosen and the recovery key is saved, the wizard asks to choose the drive encryption type. Select Used Disk Space Only or Full drive encryption. - -With Used Disk Space Only, just the portion of the drive that contains data will be encrypted. Unused space will remain unencrypted. This behavior causes the encryption process to be much faster, especially for new PCs and data drives. When BitLocker is enabled with this method, as data is added to the drive, the portion of the drive used is encrypted. So, there's never unencrypted data stored on the drive. - -With Full drive encryption, the entire drive is encrypted, whether data is stored on it or not. This option is useful for drives that have been repurposed, and may contain data remnants from their previous use. - -## Active Directory Domain Services considerations - -BitLocker integrates with Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) to provide centralized key management. By default, no recovery information is backed up to Active Directory. Administrators can configure the following group policy setting for each drive type to enable backup of BitLocker recovery information: - -**Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** > ***drive type*** > **Choose how BitLocker-protected drives can be recovered**. - -By default, only Domain Admins have access to BitLocker recovery information, but [access can be delegated to others](/archive/blogs/craigf/delegating-access-in-ad-to-bitlocker-recovery-information). - -The following recovery data is saved for each computer object: - -- **Recovery password** - - A 48-digit recovery password used to recover a BitLocker-protected volume. Users enter this password to unlock a volume when BitLocker enters recovery mode. - -- **Key package data** - - With this key package and the recovery password, portions of a BitLocker-protected volume can be decrypted if the disk is severely damaged. Each key package works only with the volume it was created on, which is identified by the corresponding volume ID. - -## FIPS support for recovery password protector - -Functionality introduced in Windows Server 2012 R2 and Windows 8.1 allows BitLocker to be fully functional in FIPS mode. - -> [!NOTE] -> The United States Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) defines security and interoperability requirements for computer systems that are used by the U.S. Federal Government. The FIPS-140 standard defines approved cryptographic algorithms. The FIPS-140 standard also sets forth requirements for key generation and for key management. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) uses the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) to determine whether a particular implementation of a cryptographic algorithm is compliant with the FIPS-140 standard. An implementation of a cryptographic algorithm is considered FIPS-140-compliant only if it has been submitted for and has passed NIST validation. An algorithm that has not been submitted cannot be considered FIPS-compliant even if the implementation produces identical data as a validated implementation of the same algorithm. - -Before these supported versions of Windows, when Windows was in FIPS mode, BitLocker prevented the creation or use of recovery passwords and instead forced the user to use recovery keys. For more information about these issues, see the support article [The recovery password for Windows BitLocker isn't available when FIPS compliant policy is set in Windows](/troubleshoot/windows-client/windows-security/bitlocker-recovery-password-not-fips-compliant). - -However, on computers running these supported systems with BitLocker enabled: - -- FIPS-compliant recovery password protectors can be created when Windows is in FIPS mode. These protectors use the FIPS-140 NIST SP800-132 algorithm. - -- Recovery passwords created in FIPS mode on Windows 8.1 can be distinguished from recovery passwords created on other systems. - -- Recovery unlock using the FIPS-compliant, algorithm-based recovery password protector works in all cases that currently work for recovery passwords. - -- When FIPS-compliant recovery passwords unlock volumes, the volume is unlocked to allow read/write access even while in FIPS mode. - -- FIPS-compliant recovery password protectors can be exported and stored in AD a while in FIPS mode. - -The BitLocker Group Policy settings for recovery passwords work the same for all Windows versions that support BitLocker, whether in FIPS mode or not. - -On Windows Server 2012 R2 and Windows 8.1 and older, recovery passwords generated on a system in FIPS mode can't be used. Recovery passwords created on Windows Server 2012 R2 and Windows 8.1 are incompatible with BitLocker on operating systems older than Windows Server 2012 R2 and Windows 8.1. So, recovery keys should be used instead. - -## Related articles - -- [BitLocker frequently asked questions (FAQ)](faq.yml) -- [BitLocker](index.md) -- [BitLocker Group Policy settings](bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md) -- [BitLocker basic deployment](bitlocker-basic-deployment.md) diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/recovery-overview.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/recovery-overview.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d258db515e --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/recovery-overview.md @@ -0,0 +1,199 @@ +--- +title: BitLocker recovery overview +description: Learn about BitLocker recovery scenarios, recovery options, and how to determine root cause of failed automatic unlocks. +ms.collection: + - highpri + - tier1 +ms.topic: how-to +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +--- + +# BitLocker recovery overview + +BitLocker recovery is the process by which access to a BitLocker-protected drive can be restored if the drive doesn't unlock using its default unlock mechanism. + +This article describes scenarios that trigger BitLocker recovery, how to configure devices to save recovery information, and the options to restore access to a locked drive. + +## BitLocker recovery scenarios + +The following list provides examples of common events that cause a device to enter BitLocker recovery mode when starting Windows: + +- Entering the wrong PIN too many times +- Turning off the support for reading the USB device in the preboot environment from the BIOS or UEFI firmware if using USB-based keys instead of a TPM +- Having the CD or DVD drive before the hard drive in the BIOS boot order (common with virtual machines) +- Docking or undocking a portable computer +- Changes to the NTFS partition table on the disk +- Changes to the boot manager +- Turning off, disabling, deactivating, or clearing the TPM +- TPM self-test failure +- Upgrading the motherboard to a new one with a new TPM +- Upgrading critical early startup components, such as a BIOS or UEFI firmware upgrade +- Hiding the TPM from the operating system +- Modifying the Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) used by the TPM validation profile +- Moving a BitLocker-protected drive into a new computer +- On devices with TPM 1.2, changing the BIOS or firmware boot device order + +As part of the [BitLocker recovery process](recovery-process.md), it's recommended to determine what caused a device to enter in recovery mode. Root cause analysis might help to prevent the problem from occurring again in the future. For instance, if you determine that an attacker modified a device by obtaining physical access, you can implement new security policies for tracking who has physical presence. + +For planned scenarios, such as a known hardware or firmware upgrades, initiating recovery can be avoided by temporarily suspending BitLocker protection. Suspending BitLocker leaves the drive fully encrypted, and the administrator can quickly resume BitLocker protection after the planned task is completed. Using *suspend* and *resume* also reseals the encryption key without requiring the entry of the recovery key. + +> [!NOTE] +> If suspended, BitLocker automatically resumes protection when the device is rebooted, unless a reboot count is specified using PowerShell or the `manage-bde.exe` command line tool. For more information about suspending BitLocker, review the [BitLocker operations guide](operations-guide.md#suspend-and-resume). + +> [!TIP] +> Recovery is described within the context of unplanned or undesired behavior. However, recovery can also be caused as an intended production scenario, for example in order to manage access control. When devices are redeployed to other departments or employees in the organization, BitLocker can be forced into recovery before the device is delivered to a new user. + +## BitLocker recovery options + +In a recovery scenario, the following options to restore access to the drive might be available, depending on the policy settings applied to the devices: + +:::row::: + :::column span="2"::: + - **Recovery password**: a 48-digit number used to unlock a volume when it is in recovery mode. The recovery password might be saved as a text file, printed or stored in Microsoft Entra ID or Active Directory. The user can supply a recovery password, if available + :::column-end::: + :::column span="2"::: + :::image type="content" source="images/preboot-recovery.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the default BitLocker recovery screen asking enter the recovery password." lightbox="images/preboot-recovery.png" border="false"::: + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: +:::row::: + :::column span="2"::: + - **Recovery key**: an encryption key stored on removable media that can be used for recovering data encrypted on a BitLocker volume. The file name has a format of `.bek`. For the OS drive, the recovery key can be used to gain access to the device if BitLocker detects a condition that prevents it from unlocking the drive when the device is starting up. A recovery key can also be used to gain access to fixed data drives and removable drives that are encrypted with BitLocker, if for some reason the password is forgotten or the device can't access the drive + :::column-end::: + :::column span="2"::: + :::image type="content" source="images/preboot-recovery-key.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the BitLocker recovery screen asking to plug a USB drive with the recovery key." lightbox="images/preboot-recovery-key.png" border="false"::: + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: +:::row::: + :::column span="4"::: + - **Key package**: decryption key that can be used with the BitLocker Repair tool to reconstruct critical parts of a drive and salvage recoverable data. With the key package and either the *recovery password* or *recovery key*, portions of a corrupted BitLocker-protected drive can be decrypted. Each key package works only for a drive that has the corresponding drive identifier. A key package isn't generated automatically, and can be saved on a file or in Active Directory Domain Services. A key package can't be stored in Microsoft Entra ID + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: +:::row::: + :::column span="4"::: + - **Data Recovery Agent certificate**: a Data Recovery Agent (DRA) is a type of certificate that is associated with an Active Directory security principal and that can be used to access any BitLocker encrypted drives configured with the matching public key. DRAs can use their credentials to unlock the drive. If the drive is an OS drive, the drive must be mounted as a data drive on another device for the DRA to unlock it + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: + +> [!TIP] +> Both the *Recovery password* and *Recovery key* can be supplied by users in the Control Panel applet (for data and removable drives), or in the preboot recovery screen. It's recommended to configure policy settings to customize the preboot recovery screen, for example by adding a custom message, URL, and help desk contact information. For more information, review the article [BitLocker preboot recovery screen](preboot-recovery-screen.md). + +When planning the BitLocker recovery process, first consult the organization's current best practices for recovering sensitive information. For example: + +| :ballot_box_with_check: | Question | +|--|--| +| :black_square_button: | *How does the organization handle lost or forgotten passwords?* | +| :black_square_button: | *How does the organization perform smart card PIN resets?* | +| :black_square_button: | *Are users allowed to save or retrieve recovery information for the devices that they own?* | +| :black_square_button: | *How much do you want users to be involved in the BitLocker configuration process? Do you want users to interact with the process, be silent, or both?* | +| :black_square_button: | *Where do you want to store the BitLocker recovery keys?* | +| :black_square_button: | *Do you want to enable recovery password rotation?* | + +Answering the questions helps to determine the best BitLocker recovery process for the organization, and to configure BitLocker policy settings accordingly. For example, if the organization has a process for resetting passwords, a similar process can be used for BitLocker recovery. If users aren't allowed to save or retrieve recovery information, the organization can use a data recovery agents (DRAs), or automatically back up recovery information. + +The following policy settings define the recovery methods that can be used to restore access to a BitLocker-protected drive: + +- [Choose how BitLocker-protected operating system drives can be recovered](configure.md?tabs=os#choose-how-bitlocker-protected-operating-system-drives-can-be-recovered) +- [Choose how BitLocker-protected fixed drives can be recovered](configure.md?tabs=fixed#choose-how-bitlocker-protected-fixed-drives-can-be-recovered) +- [Choose how BitLocker-protected removable drives can be recovered](configure.md?tabs=removable#choose-how-bitlocker-protected-removable-drives-can-be-recovered) + +> [!TIP] +> In each of these policies, select **Save BitLocker recovery information to Active Directory Domain Services** and then choose which BitLocker recovery information to store in AD DS. Use the option **Do not enable BitLocker until recovery information is stored in AD DS** to prevent users from enabling BitLocker unless the backup of BitLocker recovery information for the drive to Microsoft Entra ID or AD DS succeeds. + +### BitLocker recovery password + +To recover BitLocker, a user can use a recovery password, if available. The BitLocker recovery password is unique to the device it was created on, and can be saved in different ways. Depending on the configured policy settings, the recovery password can be: + +- Saved in Microsoft Entra ID, for Microsoft Entra joined +- Saved in AD DS, for devices that are joined to Active Directory +- Saved on text file +- Printed + +Having access to the recovery password allows the holder to unlock a BitLocker-protected volume and access all of its data. Therefore, it's important for your organization to establish procedures to control access to recovery passwords and ensure that they're stored securely, separate from the devices they protect. + +> [!NOTE] +> There's an option for storing the BitLocker recovery key in a user's Microsoft account. The option is available for devices that aren't members of a domain and that the user is using a Microsoft account. Storing the recovery password in a Microsoft account is the default recommended recovery key storage method for devices that aren't Microsoft Entra joined or Active Directory joined. + +Backup of the recovery password should be configured before BitLocker is enabled, but can also be done after encryption, as described in the [BitLocker operations guide](operations-guide.md#reset-and-backup-a-recovery-password).\ +The preferred backup methodology in an organization is to automatically store BitLocker recovery information in a central location. Depending on the organization's requirements, the recovery information can be stored in Microsoft Entra ID, AD DS, or file shares. + +The recommendation is to use the following BitLocker backup methods: + +- For Microsoft Entra joined devices, store the recovery key in Microsoft Entra ID +- For Active Directory joined devices, store the recovery key in AD DS + +> [!NOTE] +> There's no automatic way to store the recovery key for removable storage devices in Microsoft Entra ID or AD DS. However, you can use PowerShell or the `manage.bde.exe` command to do so. For more information and examples, review the [BitLocker operations guide](operations-guide.md?tabs=powershell#reset-and-backup-a-recovery-password). + +### Data Recovery Agents + +DRAs can be used to recover OS drives, fixed data drives, and removable data drives. However, when used to recover OS drives, the operating system drive must be mounted on another device as a *data drive* for the DRA to be able to unlock the drive. Data recovery agents are added to the drive when it's encrypted, and can be updated after encryption occurs. + +The benefit of using a DRA over password or key recovery is that the DRA acts as a *master key* for BitLocker. With a DRA you can recover any volume protected by the policy, without having to find a specific password or key for each individual volume. + +To configure DRAs for devices that are joined to an Active Directory domain, the following steps are required: + +1. Obtain a DRA certificate. The following key usage and enhanced key usage attributes are inspected by BitLocker before using the certificate. + 1. If a key usage attribute is present, it must be either: + - `CERT_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT_KEY_USAGE` + - `CERT_KEY_AGREEMENT_KEY_USAGE` + - `CERT_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT_KEY_USAGE` + 1. If an enhanced key usage (EKU) attribute is present, it must be either: + - As specified in the policy setting, or the default `1.3.6.1.4.1.311.67.1.1` + - Any EKU object identifier supported by your certification authority (CA) +1. Add the DRA via group policy using the path: **Computer configuration** > **Policies** > **Windows Settings** > **Security Settings** > **Public Key Policies** > **BitLocker Drive Encryption** +1. Configure the [Provide the unique identifiers for your organization](configure.md?tabs=common#provide-the-unique-identifiers-for-your-organization) policy setting to associate a unique identifier to a new drive that is enabled with BitLocker. An identification field is a string that is used to uniquely identify a business unit or organization. Identification fields are required for management of data recovery agents on BitLocker-protected drives. BitLocker only manages and updates DRAs when an identification field is present on a drive, and is identical to the value configured on the device +1. Configure the following policy settings to allow recovery using a DRA for each drive type: + - [Choose how BitLocker-protected operating system drives can be recovered](configure.md?tabs=os#choose-how-bitlocker-protected-operating-system-drives-can-be-recovered) + - [Choose how BitLocker-protected fixed drives can be recovered](configure.md?tabs=fixed#choose-how-bitlocker-protected-fixed-drives-can-be-recovered) + - [Choose how BitLocker-protected removable drives can be recovered](configure.md?tabs=removable#choose-how-bitlocker-protected-removable-drives-can-be-recovered) + +## BitLocker recovery information stored in Microsoft Entra ID + +The BitLocker recovery information for Microsoft Entra joined devices can be stored in Microsoft Entra ID. The advantage of storing the BitLocker recovery passwords in Microsoft Entra ID, is that users can easily retrieve the passwords for the devices assigned to them from the web, without involving the help desk. + +Access to recovery passwords can also be delegated to the help desk, to facilitate support scenarios. + +The BitLocker recovery password information stored in Microsoft Entra ID is a `bitlockerRecoveryKey` resource type. The resource can be retrieved from the Microsoft Entra admin center, the Microsoft Intune admin center (for devices enrolled in Microsoft Intune), using PowerShell, or using Microsoft Graph. For more information, see [bitlockerRecoveryKey resource type](/graph/api/resources/bitlockerrecoverykey). + +## BitLocker recovery information stored in AD DS + +The BitLocker recovery information for a device joined to an Active Directory domain can be stored in AD DS. The information is stored in a child object of the computer object itself. Each BitLocker recovery object includes the recovery password and other recovery information. More than one BitLocker recovery object can exist under each computer object, because there can be more than one recovery password associated with a BitLocker-enabled volume. + +The name of the BitLocker recovery object incorporates a globally unique identifier (GUID) and date and time information, for a fixed length of 63 characters. The syntax is ``. + +> [!NOTE] +> Active Directory maintains history of all recovery passwords for a computer object. Old recovery keys are not removed automatically from AD DS, unless the computer object is deleted. + +The common name (cn) for the BitLocker recovery object is `ms-FVE-RecoveryInformation`. Each `ms-FVE-RecoveryInformation` object has the following attributes: + +|Attribute Name | Description| +|-|-| +|`ms-FVE-RecoveryPassword`| The 48-digit recovery password used to recover a BitLocker-encrypted disk volume.| +|`ms-FVE-RecoveryGuid`| GUID associated with a BitLocker recovery password. In BitLocker's recovery mode, the GUID is displayed to the user, so that the correct recovery password can be located to unlock the volume. The GUID is also included in the name of the recovery object.| +|`ms-FVE-VolumeGuid`| GUID associated with a BitLocker-supported disk volume. While the password (stored in `ms-FVE-RecoveryGuid`) is unique for each recovery password, the volume identifier is unique for each BitLocker-encrypted volume.| +|`ms-FVE-KeyPackage`| Volume's BitLocker encryption key secured by the corresponding recovery password. With this key package and the recovery password (stored in `ms-FVE-RecoveryPassword`), portions of a BitLocker-protected volume can be decrypted if the disk is corrupted. Each key package works only for a volume that has the corresponding volume identifier (stored in `ms-FVE-VolumeGuid`). The BitLocker Repair Tool can be used to make use of the key package.| + +To learn more about the BitLocker attributes stored in AD DS, review the following articles: + +- [ms-FVE-KeyPackage attribute](/windows/win32/adschema/a-msfve-keypackage) +- [ms-FVE-RecoveryPassword attribute](/windows/win32/adschema/a-msfve-recoverypassword) + +The BitLocker key package isn't saved by default. To save the package along with the recovery password in AD DS, the **Backup recovery password and key package** policy setting must be selected in the policy that controls the recovery method. The key package can also be exported from a working volume. + +If recovery information isn't backed up to AD DS, or if you want to save a key package in an alternative location, use the following command to generate a key package for a volume: + + ``` cmd +manage-bde.exe -KeyPackage C: -id -path +``` + +A file with a file name format of `BitLocker Key Package {}.KPG` is created in the specified path. + +> [!NOTE] +> To export a new key package from an unlocked, BitLocker-protected volume, local administrator access to the working volume is required before any damage occurrs to the volume. + +## Next steps + +> [!div class="nextstepaction"] +> Learn how to obtain BitLocker recovery information for Microsoft Entra joined, Microsoft Entra hybrid joined, and Active Directory joined devices, and how to restore access to a locked drive: +> +> [BitLocker recovery process >](recovery-process.md) diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/recovery-process.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/recovery-process.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..76c314a7cb --- /dev/null +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/recovery-process.md @@ -0,0 +1,302 @@ +--- +title: BitLocker recovery process +description: Learn how to obtain BitLocker recovery information for Microsoft Entra joined, Microsoft Entra hybrid joined, and Active Directory joined devices, and how to restore access to a locked drive. +ms.collection: + - highpri + - tier1 +ms.topic: how-to +ms.date: 10/30/2023 +--- + +# BitLocker recovery process + +If a device or drive fails to unlock using the configured BitLocker mechanism, users may be able to self-recover it. If self-recovery isn't an option, or the user is unsure how to proceed, the helpdesk should have procedures in place to retrieve recovery information quickly and securely. + +This article outlines the process of obtaining BitLocker recovery information for Microsoft Entra joined, Microsoft Entra hybrid joined, and Active Directory joined devices. It's assumed that the reader is already familiar with configuring devices to automatically back up BitLocker recovery information, and the available BitLocker recovery options. For more information, see the [BitLocker recovery overview](recovery-overview.md) article. + +## Self-recovery + +The BitLocker recovery password and recovery key for an operating system drive or a fixed data drive can be saved to one or more USB devices, printed, saved to Microsoft Entra ID or AD DS. + +> [!TIP] +> Saving BitLocker recovery keys to Microsoft Entra ID or AD DS is a recommended approach. That way, a BitLocker administrator or helpdesk can assist users in attaining their keys. + +If self-recovery includes using a password or recovery key stored on a USB flash drive, the users must be warned not to store the USB flash drive in the same place as the device, especially during travel. For example, if both the device and the recovery items are in the same bag, it would be easy for an unauthorized user to access the device. Another policy to consider is having users contact the helpdesk before or after performing self-recovery so that the root cause can be identified. + +A recovery key can't be stored in any of the following locations: + +- The drive being encrypted +- The root directory of a nonremovable drive +- An encrypted volume + +### Self-recovery in Microsoft Entra ID + +If BitLocker recovery keys are stored in Microsoft Entra ID, users can access them using the following URL: https://myaccount.microsoft.com. From the **Devices** tab, users can select a Windows device that they own, and select the option **View BitLocker Keys**. + +> [!NOTE] +> By default, users can retrieve their BitLocker reecovery keys from Microsoft Entra ID. This behavior can be modified with the option **Restrict users from recovering the BitLocker key(s) for their owned devices**. For more information, see [Restrict member users' default permissions][ENTRA-1]. + +### Self-recovery with USB flash drive + +If users saved the recovery password on a USB drive, they can plug the drive into a locked device and follow the instructions. If the key was saved as a text file on the flash drive, users must use a different device to read the text file. + +## Helpdesk recovery + +If a user doesn't have a self-service recovery option, the helpdesk should be able to assist the user with one of the following options: + +- If the device is Microsoft Entra joined or Microsoft Entra hybrid joined, BitLocker recovery information can be retrieved from Microsoft Entra ID +- If the device is domain joined, recovery information can be retrieved from Active Directory +- If the device is configured to use a DRA, the encrypted drive can be mounted on another device as a *data drive* for the DRA to be able to unlock the drive + +> [!WARNING] +> The backup of the BitLocker recovery password to Microsoft Entra ID or AD DS may not happen automatically. Devices should be configured with policy settings to enable automatic backup, as described the [BitLocker recovery overview](recovery-overview.md) article. + +The following list can be used as a template for creating a recovery process for recovery password retrieval by the helpdesk. + +| :ballot_box_with_check: | Recovery process step | Details | +|--|--|--| +| :black_square_button: | Verify the user's identity |The person who is asking for the recovery password should be verified as the authorized user of that device. It should also be verified whether the device for which the user provided the name belongs to the user.| +| :black_square_button: | Record the device name |The name of the user's device can be used to locate the recovery password in Microsoft Entra ID or AD DS. | +| :black_square_button: | Record the recovery key ID |The recovery key ID can be used to locate the recovery password in Microsoft Entra ID or AD DS. The recovery key ID is displayed in the preboot recovery screen. | +| :black_square_button: | Locate the recovery password |Locate the BitLocker recovery password using the device name or the recovery key ID from Microsoft Entra ID or AD DS.| +| :black_square_button: | Root cause analysis |Before giving the user the recovery password, information should be gatherer to determine why the recovery is needed. The information can be used to perform root cause analysis.| +| :black_square_button: | Provide the user the recovery password | Since the 48-digit recovery password is long and contains a combination of digits, the user might mishear or mistype the password. The boot-time recovery console uses built-in checksum numbers to detect input errors in each 6-digit block of the 48-digit recovery password, and offers the user the opportunity to correct such errors. | +| :black_square_button: | Rotate the recovery password | If automatic password rotation is configured, Microsoft Entra joined and Microsoft Entra hybrid joined devices generate a new recovery password and store it in Microsoft Entra ID. An administrator can also trigger password rotation on-demand, using Microsoft Intune or Microsoft Configuration Manager. | + +### Helpdesk recovery in Microsoft Entra ID + +There are a few Microsoft Entra ID roles that allow a delegated administrator to read BitLocker recovery passwords from the devices in the tenant. While it's common for organizations to use the existing Microsoft Entra ID *[Cloud Device Administrator][ENTRA-2]* or *[Helpdesk Administrator][ENTRA-3]* built-in roles, you can also [create a custom role][ENTRA-5], delegating access to BitLocker keys using the `microsoft.directory/bitlockerKeys/key/read` permission. Roles can be delegated to access BitLocker recovery passwords for devices in specific Administrative Units. + +The [Microsoft Entra admin center][ENTRA] allows administrators to retrieve BitLocker recovery passwords. To learn more about the process, see [View or copy BitLocker keys][ENTRA-4]. Another option to access BitLocker recovery passwords is to use the Microsoft Graph API, which might be useful for integrated or scripted solutions. For more information about this option, see [Get bitlockerRecoveryKey][GRAPH-1]. + +In the following example, we use Microsoft Graph PowerShell cmdlet [`Get-MgInformationProtectionBitlockerRecoveryKey`][PS-1] to build a PowerShell function that retrieves recovery passwords from Microsoft Entra ID: + +``` PowerShell +function Get-EntraBitLockerKeys{ + [CmdletBinding()] + param ( + [Parameter(Mandatory = $true, HelpMessage = "Device name to retrieve the BitLocker keys from Microsoft Entra ID")] + [string]$DeviceName + ) + $DeviceID = (Get-MGDevice -filter "displayName eq '$DeviceName'").DeviceId + if ($DeviceID){ + $KeyIds = (Get-MgInformationProtectionBitlockerRecoveryKey -Filter "deviceId eq '$DeviceId'").Id + if ($keyIds) { + Write-Host -ForegroundColor Yellow "Device name: $devicename" + foreach ($keyId in $keyIds) { + $recoveryKey = (Get-MgInformationProtectionBitlockerRecoveryKey -BitlockerRecoveryKeyId $keyId -Select "key").key + Write-Host -ForegroundColor White " Key id: $keyid" + Write-Host -ForegroundColor Cyan " BitLocker recovery key: $recoveryKey" + } + } else { + Write-Host -ForegroundColor Red "No BitLocker recovery keys found for device $DeviceName" + } + } else { + Write-Host -ForegroundColor Red "Device $DeviceName not found" + } +} + +Install-Module Microsoft.Graph.Identity.SignIns -Scope CurrentUser -Force +Import-Module Microsoft.Graph.Identity.SignIns +Connect-MgGraph -Scopes 'BitlockerKey.Read.All' -NoWelcome +``` + +After the function is loaded, it can be used to retrieve BitLocker recovery passwords for a specific device. Example: + +``` PowerShell +PS C:\> Get-EntraBitLockerKeys -DeviceName DESKTOP-53O32QI +Device name: DESKTOP-53O32QI + Key id: 4290b6c0-b17a-497a-8552-272cc30e80d4 + BitLocker recovery key: 496298-461032-321464-595518-463221-173943-033616-139579 + Key id: 045219ec-a53b-41ae-b310-08ec883aaedd + BitLocker recovery key: 158422-038236-492536-574783-256300-205084-114356-069773 +``` + +> [!NOTE] +> For devices that are managed by Microsoft Intune, BitLocker recovery passwords can be retrieved from the device properties in the Microsoft Intune admin center. For more information, see [View details for recovery keys][INT-1]. + +### Helpdesk recovery in Active Directory Domain Services + +To export a recovery password from AD DS, you must have *read access* to objects stored in AD DS. By default, only *Domain Administrators* have access to BitLocker recovery information, but [access can be delegated][ARC-1] to specific security principals. + +To facilitate the retrieval of BitLocker recovery passwords from AD DS, you can use the *BitLocker Recovery Password Viewer* tool. The tool is included with the *Remote Server Administration Tools (RSAT)*, and it's an extension for the *Active Directory Users and Computers Microsoft Management Console (MMC)* snap-in. + +With BitLocker Recovery Password Viewer you can: + +- Check the Active Directory computer object's properties to retrieve the associated BitLocker recovery passwords +- Search Active Directory for BitLocker recovery password across all the domains in the Active Directory forest + +The following procedures describe the most common tasks performed by using the BitLocker Recovery Password Viewer. + +##### View the recovery passwords for a computer object + +1. Open **Active Directory Users and Computers** MMC snap-in, and select the container or OU in which the computer objects is located +1. Right-click the computer object and select **Properties** +1. In the **Properties** dialog box, select the **BitLocker Recovery** tab to view the BitLocker recovery passwords that are associated with the computer + +##### Locate a recovery password by using a password ID + +1. In **Active Directory Users and Computers**, right-click the domain container and select **Find BitLocker Recovery Password** +1. In the **Find BitLocker Recovery Password** dialog box, type the first eight characters of the recovery password in the **Password ID (first 8 characters)** box, and select **Search** + +### Data Recovery Agents + +If devices are configured with a DRA, the Helpdesk can use the DRA to unlock the drive. Once the BitLocker drive is attached to a device that has the private key of the DRA certificate, the drive can be unlocked by using the `manage-bde.exe` command. + +For example, to list the DRA configured for a BitLocker-protected drive, use the following command: + +```cmd +C:\>manage-bde.exe -protectors -get D: + +Volume D: [Local Disk] +All Key Protectors + + Data Recovery Agent (Certificate Based): + ID: {3A8F7DEA-878F-4663-B149-EE2EC9ADE40B} + Certificate Thumbprint: + f46563b1d4791d5bd827f32265341ff9068b0c42 +``` + +If the private key of the certificate with a thumbprint of `f46563b1d4791d5bd827f32265341ff9068b0c42` is available in the local certificate store, an administrator can use the following command to unlock the drive with the DRA protector: + +```cmd +manage-bde -unlock D: -Certificate -ct f46563b1d4791d5bd827f32265341ff9068b0c42 +``` + +## Post-recovery tasks + +When a volume is unlocked using a recovery password: + +- an event is written to the Event Log +- the platform validation measurements are reset in the TPM to match the current configuration +- the encryption key is released and is ready for on-the-fly encryption/decryption when data is written/read to and from the volume + +After the volume is unlocked, BitLocker behaves the same way, regardless of how the access was granted. + +If a device experiences multiple recovery password events, an administrator should perform post-recovery analysis to determine the root cause of the recovery. Then, refresh the BitLocker platform validation to prevent entering a recovery password each time that the device starts up. + +### Determine the root cause of the recovery + +If a user needed to recover the drive, it's important to determine the root cause that initiated the recovery as soon as possible. Properly analyzing the state of the computer and detecting tampering might reveal threats that have broader implications for enterprise security. + +While an administrator can remotely investigate the cause of recovery in some cases, the user might need to bring the device that contains the recovered drive on site to analyze the root cause further. Here are some questions that can be used to help determine the root cause of the recovery: + +| :ballot_box_with_check: | Question | +|--|--| +| :black_square_button: | *Which BitLocker protection mode is configured (TPM, TPM + PIN, TPM + startup key, startup key only)?*| +| :black_square_button: | *If TPM mode is configured, was recovery caused by a boot file change?* | +| :black_square_button: | *Which PCR profile is in use on the device?*| +| :black_square_button: | *Did the user merely forget the PIN or lose the startup key?* | +| :black_square_button: | *If recovery was caused by a boot file change, is the boot file change due to an intended user action (for example, BIOS upgrade), or a malicious software?* | +| :black_square_button: | *When was the user last able to start the device successfully, and what might have happened to the device since then?* | +| :black_square_button: | *Might the user have encountered malicious software or left the device unattended since the last successful startup?* | + +To help answer these questions, you can use the `manage-bde.exe -status` command to view the current configuration and protection mode. Scan the event log to find events that help indicate why recovery was initiated (for example, if a boot file change occurred). + +### Resolve the root cause + +After you identify the cause of the recovery, BitLocker protection can be reset to avoid recovery on every startup. + +The details of the reset can vary according to the root cause of the recovery. If root cause can't be determined, or if a malicious software or a rootkit infects the device, the helpdesk should apply best-practice virus policies to react appropriately. + +> [!NOTE] +> BitLocker validation profile reset can be performed by suspending and resuming BitLocker. + +:::row::: + :::column span="1"::: + **Root cause** + :::column-end::: + :::column span="3"::: + **Steps** + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: +:::row::: + :::column span="1"::: + Unknown PIN + :::column-end::: + :::column span="3"::: + If a user has forgotten the PIN, the PIN must be reset while signed on to the computer in order to prevent BitLocker from initiating recovery each time the computer is restarted. + +To prevent continued recovery due to an unknown PIN: + +1. Unlock the device using the recovery password +1. From the BitLocker Control Panel applet, expand the drive and then select **Change PIN** +1. In the BitLocker Drive Encryption dialog, select **Reset a forgotten PIN**. If the signed in account isn't an administrator account, you must provide administrative credentials +1. In the PIN reset dialog, provide and confirm the new PIN to be used and then select **Finish** +1. The new PIN can be used the next time the drive needs to be unlocked + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: +:::row::: + :::column span="1"::: + Lost startup key + :::column-end::: + :::column span="3"::: + If the USB flash drive that contains the startup key is lost, you can unlock the drive using the recovery key. A new startup can then be created using PowerShell, the Command Prompt, or the BitLocker Control Panel applet. + + For examples how to add BitLocker protectors, review the [BitLocker operations guide](operations-guide.md#add-protectors) + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: +:::row::: + :::column span="1"::: + Changes to boot files + :::column-end::: + :::column span="3"::: + This error occurs if the firmware is updated. BitLocker should be suspended before making changes to the firmware. Protection should then be resumed after the firmware update is complete. Suspending BitLocker prevents the device from going into recovery mode. However, if changes happen when BitLocker protection is on, the recovery password can be used to unlock the drive and the platform validation profile is updated so that recovery doesn't occur the next time. + + For examples how to suspend and resume BitLocker protectors, review the [BitLocker operations guide](operations-guide.md#suspend-and-resume) + :::column-end::: +:::row-end::: + +## Rotate passwords + +Administrators can configure a policy setting to enable automatic recovery password rotation for Microsoft Entra joined and Microsoft Entra hybrid joined devices.\ +When automatic recovery password rotation is enabled, devices automatically rotate the recovery password after the password is used to unlock the drive. This behavior helps to prevent the same recovery password from being used multiple times, which can be a security risk. + +For more information, see [configure recovery password rotation](configure.md?tabs=common#configure-recovery-password-rotation). + +Another option is to initiate the rotation of recovery passwords for individual devices remotely using Microsoft Intune or Microsoft Configuration Manager. + +To learn more how to rotate BitLocker recovery passwords using Microsoft Intune or Microsoft Configuration Manager, see: + +- [Microsoft Intune documentation][INT-1] +- [Microsoft Configuration Manager documentation][MCM-1] + +## BitLocker Repair tool + +If the recovery methods discussed earlier in this document don't unlock the volume, the *BitLocker Repair tool* (`repair-bde.exe`) can be used to decrypt the volume at the block level. The tool uses the *BitLocker key package* to help recover encrypted data from severely damaged drives. + +The recovered data can then be used to salvage encrypted data, even if the correct recovery password fails to unlock the damaged volume. It's recommended to still save the recovery password, as a key package can't be used without the corresponding recovery password. + +Use the Repair tool in the following conditions: + +- The drive is encrypted using BitLocker +- Windows doesn't start, or the BitLocker recovery screen doesn't start +- There isn't a backup copy of the data that is contained on the encrypted drive + +> [!NOTE] +> Damage to the drive may not be related to BitLocker. Therefore, it's recommended to try other tools to help diagnose and resolve the problem with the drive before using the BitLocker Repair Tool. The Windows Recovery Environment (Windows RE) provides more options to repair Windows. + +The following limitations exist for Repair-bde: + +- it can't repair a drive that failed *during* the encryption or decryption process +- it assumes that if the drive has any encryption, then the drive is fully encrypted + +For a complete list of the `repair-bde.exe` options, see the [Repair-bde reference][PREV-1]. + +> [!NOTE] +> To export a key package from AD DS, you must have *read* access to the BitLocker recovery passwords and key packages that are stored in AD DS. By default, only Domain Admins have access to BitLocker recovery information, but [access can be delegated to others][ARC-1]. + + + +[ARC-1]: /archive/blogs/craigf/delegating-access-in-ad-to-bitlocker-recovery-information +[ENTRA-1]: /entra/fundamentals/users-default-permissions#restrict-member-users-default-permissions +[ENTRA-2]: /entra/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference#cloud-device-administrator +[ENTRA-3]: /entra/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference#helpdesk-administrator +[ENTRA-4]: /entra/identity/devices/manage-device-identities#view-or-copy-bitlocker-keys +[ENTRA-5]: /entra/identity/role-based-access-control/custom-create +[ENTRA]: https://entra.microsoft.com +[GRAPH-1]: /graph/api/bitlockerrecoverykey-get +[INT-1]: /mem/intune/protect/encrypt-devices#view-details-for-recovery-keys +[MCM-1]: /mem/configmgr/protect/deploy-use/bitlocker/recovery-service#rotate-keys +[PREV-1]: /previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/ff829851(v=ws.11) +[PS-1]: /powershell/module/microsoft.graph.identity.signins/get-mginformationprotectionbitlockerrecoverykey diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/toc.yml b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/toc.yml index 1fd7418979..ba7f125549 100644 --- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/toc.yml +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/toc.yml @@ -1,44 +1,35 @@ items: - name: Overview href: index.md -- name: BitLocker device encryption - href: bitlocker-device-encryption-overview-windows-10.md -- name: BitLocker Countermeasures - href: bitlocker-countermeasures.md -- name: Deployment guides +- name: BitLocker countermeasures + href: countermeasures.md +- name: BitLocker planning guide + href: planning-guide.md +- name: Configure BitLocker + href: configure.md +- name: BitLocker operations guide + href: operations-guide.md +- name: BitLocker recovery guide items: - - name: Planning for BitLocker - href: prepare-your-organization-for-bitlocker-planning-and-policies.md - - name: BitLocker basic deployment - href: bitlocker-basic-deployment.md - - name: BitLocker deployment comparison - href: bitlocker-deployment-comparison.md + - name: BitLocker recovery overview + href: recovery-overview.md + - name: BitLocker recovery process + href: recovery-process.md + - name: Preboot recovery screen + href: preboot-recovery-screen.md - name: How-to guides items: - - name: Manage BitLocker in your organization - href: bitlocker-management-for-enterprises.md - - name: Configure BitLocker on Windows Server - href: bitlocker-how-to-deploy-on-windows-server.md - - name: Manage BitLocker with Drive Encryption Tools - href: bitlocker-use-bitlocker-drive-encryption-tools-to-manage-bitlocker.md - - name: Use BitLocker Recovery Password Viewer - href: bitlocker-use-bitlocker-recovery-password-viewer.md - - name: BitLocker Recovery Guide - href: bitlocker-recovery-guide-plan.md - - name: Protect cluster shared volumes and storage area networks with BitLocker - href: protecting-cluster-shared-volumes-and-storage-area-networks-with-bitlocker.md -- name: BitLocker features - items: - - name: Network Unlock - href: bitlocker-how-to-enable-network-unlock.md -- name: Reference - items: - - name: BitLocker Group Policy settings - href: bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md - - name: BCD settings - href: bcd-settings-and-bitlocker.md - - name: BitLocker frequently asked questions (FAQ) - href: faq.yml + - name: Install BitLocker on Windows Server + href: install-server.md + - name: Configure Network Unlock + href: network-unlock.md + - name: Protect cluster shared volumes and storage area networks + href: csv-san.md + +- name: BCD settings + href: bcd-settings-and-bitlocker.md +- name: Frequently asked questions (FAQ) + href: faq.yml - name: Troubleshooting items: - name: Troubleshoot BitLocker 🔗 diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/encrypted-hard-drive.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/encrypted-hard-drive.md index 42e381d999..368b0d1c10 100644 --- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/encrypted-hard-drive.md +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/encrypted-hard-drive.md @@ -1,39 +1,44 @@ --- -title: Encrypted Hard Drive -description: Encrypted Hard Drive uses the rapid encryption that is provided by BitLocker Drive Encryption to enhance data security and management. -ms.date: 11/08/2022 -ms.topic: conceptual +title: Encrypted hard drives +description: Learn how encrypted hard drives use the rapid encryption that is provided by BitLocker to enhance data security and management. +ms.date: 10/18/2023 +ms.topic: concept-article --- -# Encrypted Hard Drive +# Encrypted hard drives -Encrypted hard drive uses the rapid encryption that is provided by BitLocker drive encryption to enhance data security and management. +## Overview -By offloading the cryptographic operations to hardware, Encrypted hard drives increase BitLocker performance and reduce CPU usage and power consumption. Because Encrypted hard drives encrypt data quickly, enterprise devices can expand BitLocker deployment with minimal impact on productivity. +Encrypted hard drives are a class of hard drives that are self-encrypted at the hardware level and allow for full disk hardware encryption while being transparent to the user. These drives combine the security and management benefits provided by BitLocker Drive Encryption with the power of self-encrypting drives. -Encrypted hard drives are a new class of hard drives that are self-encrypting at a hardware level and allow for full disk hardware encryption. You can install Windows to encrypted hard drives without additional modification, beginning with Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012. +By offloading the cryptographic operations to hardware, encrypted hard drives increase BitLocker performance and reduce CPU usage and power consumption. Because encrypted hard drives encrypt data quickly, BitLocker deployment can be expanded across enterprise devices with little to no impact on productivity. Encrypted hard drives provide: -- **Better performance**: Encryption hardware, integrated into the drive controller, allows the drive to operate at full data rate with no performance degradation. -- **Strong security based in hardware**: Encryption is always "on" and the keys for encryption never leave the hard drive. User authentication is performed by the drive before it will unlock, independently of the operating system -- **Ease of use**: Encryption is transparent to the user, and the user doesn't need to enable it. Encrypted Hard Drives are easily erased using on-board encryption key; there's no need to re-encrypt data on the drive. -- **Lower cost of ownership**: There's no need for new infrastructure to manage encryption keys, since BitLocker uses your existing infrastructure to store recovery information. Your device operates more efficiently because processor cycles don't need to be used for the encryption process. +- **Better performance**: Encryption hardware, integrated into the drive controller, allows the drive to operate at full data rate with no performance degradation +- **Strong security based in hardware**: Encryption is always *on* and the keys for encryption never leave the hard drive. User authentication is performed by the drive before it unlocks, independently of the operating system +- **Ease of use**: Encryption is transparent to the user, and the user doesn't need to enable it. Encrypted hard drives are easily erased using on-board encryption key; there's no need to re-encrypt data on the drive +- **Lower cost of ownership**: There's no need for new infrastructure to manage encryption keys, since BitLocker uses your existing infrastructure to store recovery information. Your device operates more efficiently because processor cycles don't need to be used for the encryption process Encrypted hard drives are supported natively in the operating system through the following mechanisms: -- **Identification**: The operating system identifies that the drive is an Encrypted hard drive device type. -- **Activation**: The operating system disk management utility activates, creates and maps volumes to ranges/bands as appropriate. -- **Configuration**: The operating system creates and maps volumes to ranges/bands as appropriate. -- **API**: API support for applications to manage Encrypted hard drives independent of BitLocker drive encryption (BDE). -- **BitLocker support**: Integration with the BitLocker Control Panel provides a seamless BitLocker end-user experience. +- **Identification**: The operating system identifies that the drive is an *encrypted hard drive* device-type +- **Activation**: The operating system disk management utility activates, creates and maps volumes to ranges/bands as appropriate +- **Configuration**: The operating system creates and maps volumes to ranges/bands as appropriate +- **API**: API support for applications to manage encrypted hard drives independent of BitLocker drive encryption +- **BitLocker support**: Integration with the BitLocker Control Panel provides a seamless BitLocker user experience >[!WARNING] ->Self-encrypting hard drives and encrypted hard drives for Windows are not the same type of devices. Encrypted hard drives for Windows require compliance for specific TCG protocols as well as IEEE 1667 compliance; Self-encrypting hard drives do not have these requirements. It is important to confirm that the device type is an encrypted hard drive for Windows when planning for deployment. +>*Self-encrypting hard drives* and *encrypted hard drives* for Windows are not the same type of devices: +> +> - encrypted hard drives for Windows require compliance for specific TCG protocols as well as IEEE 1667 compliance +> - self-encrypting hard drives don't have these requirements +> +>It's important to confirm that the device type is an encrypted hard drive for Windows when planning for deployment. -If you're a storage device vendor who is looking for more info on how to implement Encrypted Hard Drive, see the [Encrypted Hard Drive Device Guide](/previous-versions/windows/hardware/design/dn653989(v=vs.85)). +When the operating system identifies an encrypted hard drive, it activates the *security mode*. This activation lets the drive controller generate a *media key* for every volume that the host computer creates. The media key, which is never exposed outside the disk, is used to rapidly encrypt or decrypt every byte of data that is sent or received from the disk. -[!INCLUDE [encrypted-hard-drive](../../../../includes/licensing/encrypted-hard-drive.md)] +If you're a storage device vendor who is looking for more info on how to implement encrypted hard drive, see the [encrypted hard drive device guide](/previous-versions/windows/hardware/design/dn653989(v=vs.85)). ## System Requirements @@ -41,58 +46,55 @@ To use encrypted hard drives, the following system requirements apply: For an encrypted hard drive used as a **data drive**: -- The drive must be in an uninitialized state. -- The drive must be in a security inactive state. +- The drive must be in an uninitialized state +- The drive must be in a security inactive state For an encrypted hard drive used as a **startup drive**: -- The drive must be in an uninitialized state. -- The drive must be in a security inactive state. -- The computer must be UEFI 2.3.1 based and have the EFI\_STORAGE\_SECURITY\_COMMAND\_PROTOCOL defined. (This protocol is used to allow programs running in the EFI boot services environment to send security protocol commands to the drive). -- The computer must have the compatibility support module (CSM) disabled in UEFI. -- The computer must always boot natively from UEFI. +- The drive must be in an uninitialized state +- The drive must be in a security inactive state +- The computer must be UEFI 2.3.1 based and have the `EFI\_STORAGE\_SECURITY\_COMMAND\_PROTOCOL` defined. This protocol is used to allow programs running in the EFI boot services environment to send security protocol commands to the drive +- The computer must have the compatibility support module (CSM) disabled in UEFI +- The computer must always boot natively from UEFI >[!WARNING] >All encrypted hard drives must be attached to non-RAID controllers to function properly. -## Technical overview +[!INCLUDE [encrypted-hard-drive](../../../../includes/licensing/encrypted-hard-drive.md)] -Rapid encryption in BitLocker directly addresses the security needs of enterprises while offering improved performance. In versions of Windows earlier than Windows Server 2012, BitLocker required a two-step process to complete read/write requests. In Windows Server 2012, Windows 8, or later versions, encrypted hard drives offload the cryptographic operations to the drive controller for much greater efficiency. When the operating system identifies an encrypted hard drive, it activates the security mode. This activation lets the drive controller generate a media key for every volume that the host computer creates. This media key, which is never exposed outside the disk, is used to rapidly encrypt or decrypt every byte of data that is sent or received from the disk. +## Configure encrypted hard drives as startup drives -## Configuring encrypted hard drives as startup drives +To configure encrypted hard drives as startup drives, use the same methods as standard hard drives: -Configuration of encrypted hard drives as startup drives is done using the same methods as standard hard drives. These methods include: +- **Deploy from media**: configuration of encrypted hard drives happens automatically through the installation process +- **Deploy from network**: this deployment method involves booting a Windows PE environment and using imaging tools to apply a Windows image from a network share. With this method, the Enhanced Storage optional component needs to be included in the Windows PE image. Enable this component using Server Manager, Windows PowerShell, or the DISM command line tool. If the component isn't present, configuration of encrypted hard drives doesn't work +- **Deploy from server**: this deployment method involves PXE booting a client with encrypted hard drives present. Configuration of encrypted hard drives happens automatically in this environment when the Enhanced Storage component is added to the PXE boot image. During deployment, the [TCGSecurityActivationDisabled](/windows-hardware/customize/desktop/unattend/microsoft-windows-enhancedstorage-adm-tcgsecurityactivationdisabled) setting in `unattend.xml` controls the encryption behavior of encrypted hard drives +- **Disk duplication**: this deployment method involves use of a previously configured device and disk duplication tools to apply a Windows image to an encrypted hard drive. Images made using disk duplicators don't work -- **Deploy from media**: Configuration of Encrypted Hard Drives happens automatically through the installation process. -- **Deploy from network**: This deployment method involves booting a Windows PE environment and using imaging tools to apply a Windows image from a network share. Using this method, the Enhanced Storage optional component needs to be included in the Windows PE image. You can enable this component using Server Manager, Windows PowerShell, or the DISM command line tool. If this component isn't present, configuration of Encrypted Hard Drives won't work. -- **Deploy from server**: This deployment method involves PXE booting a client with Encrypted Hard Drives present. Configuration of Encrypted Hard Drives happens automatically in this environment when the Enhanced Storage component is added to the PXE boot image. During deployment, the [TCGSecurityActivationDisabled](/windows-hardware/customize/desktop/unattend/microsoft-windows-enhancedstorage-adm-tcgsecurityactivationdisabled) setting in unattend.xml controls the encryption behavior of Encrypted Hard Drives. -- **Disk Duplication**: This deployment method involves use of a previously configured device and disk duplication tools to apply a Windows image to an Encrypted Hard Drive. Disks must be partitioned using at least Windows 8 or Windows Server 2012 for this configuration to work. Images made using disk duplicators won't work. +## Configure hardware-based encryption with policy settings -## Configuring hardware-based encryption with group policy +There are three policy settings to manage how BitLocker uses hardware-based encryption and which encryption algorithms to use. If these settings aren't configured or disabled on systems that are equipped with encrypted drives, BitLocker uses software-based encryption: -There are three related Group Policy settings that help you manage how BitLocker uses hardware-based encryption and which encryption algorithms to use. If these settings aren't configured or disabled on systems that are equipped with encrypted drives, BitLocker uses software-based encryption: - -- [Configure use of hardware-based encryption for fixed data drives](bitlocker/bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md#configure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-fixed-data-drives) -- [Configure use of hardware-based encryption for removable data drives](bitlocker/bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md#configure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-removable-data-drives) -- [Configure use of hardware-based encryption for operating system drives](bitlocker/bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md#configure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-operating-system-drives) +- [Configure use of hardware-based encryption for fixed data drives](bitlocker/configure.md?tabs=fixed#configure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-fixed-data-drives) +- [Configure use of hardware-based encryption for removable data drives](bitlocker/configure.md?tabs=removable#configure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-removable-data-drives) +- [Configure use of hardware-based encryption for operating system drives](bitlocker/configure.md?tabs=os#configure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-operating-system-drives) ## Encrypted hard drive architecture -Encrypted hard drives utilize two encryption keys on the device to control the locking and unlocking of data on the drive. These encryption keys are the data encryption key (DEK) and the authentication key (AK). +Encrypted hard drives utilize two encryption keys on the device to control the locking and unlocking of data on the drive. These encryption keys are the *Data Encryption Key* (DEK) and the *Authentication Key* (AK): -The Data Encryption Key is the key used to encrypt all of the data on the drive. The drive generates the DEK and it never leaves the device. It's stored in an encrypted format at a random location on the drive. If the DEK is changed or erased, data encrypted using the DEK is irrecoverable. +- the Data Encryption Key is used to encrypt all the data on the drive. The drive generates the DEK and it never leaves the device. It's stored in an encrypted format at a random location on the drive. If the DEK is changed or erased, data encrypted using the DEK is irrecoverable. +- the AK is the key used to unlock data on the drive. A hash of the key is stored on the drive and requires confirmation to decrypt the DEK -The AK is the key used to unlock data on the drive. A hash of the key is stored on the drive and requires confirmation to decrypt the DEK. +When a device with an encrypted hard drive is in a powered-off state, the drive locks automatically. As a device powers on, the device remains in a locked state and is only unlocked after the AK decrypts the DEK. Once the AK decrypts the DEK, read-write operations can take place on the device. -When a computer with an encrypted hard drive is in a powered-off state, the drive locks automatically. As a computer powers on, the device remains in a locked state and is only unlocked after the AK decrypts the DEK. Once the AK decrypts the DEK, read-write operations can take place on the device. +When data is written to the drive, it passes through an encryption engine before the write operation completes. Likewise, reading data from the drive requires the encryption engine to decrypt the data before passing that data back to the user. If the AK needs to be changed or erased, the data on the drive doesn't need to be re-encrypted. A new Authentication Key needs to be created and it re-encrypts the DEK. Once completed, the DEK can now be unlocked using the new AK, and read-writes to the volume can continue. -When writing data to the drive, it passes through an encryption engine before the write operation completes. Likewise, reading data from the drive requires the encryption engine to decrypt the data before passing that data back to the user. If the AK needs to be changed or erased, the data on the drive doesn't need to be re-encrypted. A new Authentication Key needs to be created and it will re-encrypt the DEK. Once completed, the DEK can now be unlocked using the new AK, and read-writes to the volume can continue. +## Reconfigure encrypted hard drives -## Reconfiguring encrypted hard drives - -Many encrypted hard drive devices come pre-configured for use. If reconfiguration of the drive is required, use the following procedure after removing all available volumes and reverting the drive to an uninitialized state: +Many encrypted hard drive devices come preconfigured for use. If reconfiguration of the drive is required, use the following procedure after removing all available volumes and reverting the drive to an uninitialized state: 1. Open Disk Management (`diskmgmt.msc`) -2. Initialize the disk and select the appropriate partition style (MBR or GPT) -3. Create one or more volumes on the disk. -4. Use the BitLocker setup wizard to enable BitLocker on the volume. +1. Initialize the disk and select the appropriate partition style (MBR or GPT) +1. Create one or more volumes on the disk. +1. Use the BitLocker setup wizard to enable BitLocker on the volume. diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/toc.yml b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/toc.yml index 0131f73784..decdd162a6 100644 --- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/toc.yml +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/toc.yml @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ items: - name: BitLocker href: bitlocker/toc.yml -- name: Encrypted Hard Drive +- name: Encrypted hard drives href: encrypted-hard-drive.md - name: Personal data encryption (PDE) href: personal-data-encryption/toc.yml diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/index.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/index.md index 1c0cd9103b..4b093fe6f8 100644 --- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/index.md +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/index.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ title: Windows operating system security description: Securing the operating system includes system security, encryption, network security, and threat protection. ms.date: 08/02/2023 -ms.topic: article +ms.topic: overview --- # Windows operating system security diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/basic-firewall-policy-design.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/basic-firewall-policy-design.md index 5733a89690..748a749676 100644 --- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/basic-firewall-policy-design.md +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/basic-firewall-policy-design.md @@ -1,14 +1,12 @@ --- title: Basic Firewall Policy Design description: Protect the devices in your organization from unwanted network traffic that gets through the perimeter defenses by using basic firewall policy design. -ms.prod: windows-client ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 12/31/2017 +ms.date: 11/07/2023 --- # Basic Firewall Policy Design - Many organizations have a network perimeter firewall that is designed to prevent the entry of malicious traffic in to the organization's network, but don't have a host-based firewall enabled on each device in the organization. The Basic Firewall Policy Design helps you to protect the devices in your organization from unwanted network traffic that gets through the perimeter defenses, or that originates from inside your network. In this design, you deploy firewall rules to each device in your organization to allow traffic that is required by the programs that are used. Traffic that doesn't match the rules is dropped. @@ -17,22 +15,16 @@ Traffic can be blocked or permitted based on the characteristics of each network Many network administrators don't want to tackle the difficult task of determining all the appropriate rules for every program that is used by the organization, and then maintaining that list over time. In fact, most programs don't require specific firewall rules. The default behavior of Windows and most contemporary applications makes this task easy: -- On client devices, the default firewall behavior already supports typical client programs. Programs create any required rules for you as part of the installation process. You only have to create a rule if the client program must be able to receive unsolicited inbound network traffic from another device. - -- When you install a server program that must accept unsolicited inbound network traffic, the installation program likely creates or enables the appropriate rules on the server for you. - - For example, when you install a server role, the appropriate firewall rules are created and enabled automatically. - -- For other standard network behavior, the predefined rules that are built into Windows 11, Windows 10, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2008, Windows 8, and Windows 7 can easily be configured in a GPO and deployed to the devices in your organization. - - For example, by using the predefined groups for Core Networking and File and Printer Sharing you can easily configure GPOs with rules for those frequently used networking protocols. +- On client devices, the default firewall behavior already supports typical client programs. Programs create any required rules for you as part of the installation process. You only have to create a rule if the client program must be able to receive unsolicited inbound network traffic from another device +- When you install a server program that must accept unsolicited inbound network traffic, the installation program likely creates or enables the appropriate rules on the server for you. For example, when you install a server role, the appropriate firewall rules are created and enabled automatically +- For other standard network behavior, the predefined rules that are built into Windows can be configured in a GPO and deployed to the devices in your organization. For example, by using the predefined groups for Core Networking and File and Printer Sharing you can easily configure GPOs with rules for those frequently used networking protocols. With a few exceptions, the firewall can be enabled on all configurations. Therefore, we recommend that you enable the firewall on every device in your organization. The term "device" includes servers in your perimeter network, on mobile and remote clients that connect to the network, and on all servers and clients in your internal network. > [!CAUTION] > Stopping the service associated with Windows Defender Firewall with Advanced Security is not supported by Microsoft. -By default, in new installations, Windows Defender Firewall with Advanced Security is turned on in Windows Server 2012, Windows 8, and later. +Windows Defender Firewall with Advanced Security is turned on by default. If you turn off the Windows Defender Firewall service you lose other benefits provided by the service, such as the ability to use IPsec connection security rules, Windows Service Hardening, and network protection from forms of attacks that use network fingerprinting. @@ -42,22 +34,18 @@ An organization typically uses this design as a first step toward a more compreh After implementing this design, you'll have centralized management of the firewall rules applied to all devices that are running Windows in your organization. -> [!IMPORTANT] +> [!IMPORTANT] > If you also intend to deploy the [Domain Isolation Policy Design](domain-isolation-policy-design.md), or the [Server Isolation Policy Design](server-isolation-policy-design.md), we recommend that you do the design work for all three designs together, and then deploy in layers that correspond with each design. The basic firewall design can be applied to devices that are part of an Active Directory forest. Active Directory is required to provide the centralized management and deployment of Group Policy objects that contain the firewall settings and rules. For more information about this design: -- This design coincides with the deployment goal to [Protect Devices from Unwanted Network Traffic](protect-devices-from-unwanted-network-traffic.md). - -- To learn more about this design, see [Firewall Policy Design Example](firewall-policy-design-example.md). - -- Before completing the design, gather the information described in [Designing a Windows Defender Firewall with Advanced Security Strategy](designing-a-windows-firewall-with-advanced-security-strategy.md). - -- To help you make the decisions required in this design, see [Planning Settings for a Basic Firewall Policy](planning-settings-for-a-basic-firewall-policy.md). - -- For a list of detailed tasks that you can use to deploy your basic firewall policy design, see [Checklist: Implementing a Basic Firewall Policy Design](checklist-implementing-a-basic-firewall-policy-design.md). +- This design coincides with the deployment goal to [Protect Devices from Unwanted Network Traffic](protect-devices-from-unwanted-network-traffic.md) +- To learn more about this design, see [Firewall Policy Design Example](firewall-policy-design-example.md) +- Before completing the design, gather the information described in [Designing a Windows Defender Firewall with Advanced Security Strategy](designing-a-windows-firewall-with-advanced-security-strategy.md) +- To help you make the decisions required in this design, see [Planning Settings for a Basic Firewall Policy](planning-settings-for-a-basic-firewall-policy.md) +- For a list of detailed tasks that you can use to deploy your basic firewall policy design, see [Checklist: Implementing a Basic Firewall Policy Design](checklist-implementing-a-basic-firewall-policy-design.md) > [!div class="nextstepaction"] > [Domain Isolation Policy Design](domain-isolation-policy-design.md) diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/create-windows-firewall-rules-in-intune.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/create-windows-firewall-rules-in-intune.md index f2316edf7e..2ee70cb742 100644 --- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/create-windows-firewall-rules-in-intune.md +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/create-windows-firewall-rules-in-intune.md @@ -1,18 +1,16 @@ --- title: Create Windows Firewall rules in Intune description: Learn how to use Intune to create rules in Windows Defender Firewall with Advanced Security. Start by creating a profile in Device Configuration in Intune. -ms.prod: windows-client ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 12/31/2017 +ms.date: 11/07/2023 --- # Create Windows Firewall rules in Intune - >[!IMPORTANT] >This information relates to prereleased product which may be substantially modified before it's commercially released. Microsoft makes no warranties, express or implied, with respect to the information provided here. -To get started, Open the [Microsoft Intune admin center](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2109431), and then go to **Devices** > **Windows** > **Configuration profiles** > **Create profile** > Choose **Windows 10 and later** as the platform, Choose **Templates**, then **Endpoint protection** as the profile type. +To get started, Open the [Microsoft Intune admin center](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2109431), and then go to **Devices** > **Windows** > **Configuration profiles** > **Create profile** > Choose **Windows 10 and later** as the platform, Choose **Templates**, then **Endpoint protection** as the profile type. Select Windows Defender Firewall. :::image type="content" source="images/windows-firewall-intune.png" alt-text="Example of a Windows Defender Firewall policy in Microsoft Intune and the Intune admin center."::: @@ -24,76 +22,86 @@ Select Windows Defender Firewall. The firewall rule configurations in Intune use the Windows CSP for Firewall. For more information, see [Firewall CSP](/windows/client-management/mdm/firewall-csp). ## Application -Control connections for an app or program. -Apps and programs can be specified either file path, package family name, or Windows service short name. -The file path of an app is its location on the client device. -For example, C:\Windows\System\Notepad.exe. -[Learn more](/windows/client-management/mdm/firewall-csp#filepath) +Control connections for an app or program. +Apps and programs can be specified either file path, package family name, or Windows service short name. -Package family names can be retrieved by running the Get-AppxPackage command from PowerShell. -[Learn more](https://aka.ms/intunefirewallPackageNameFromPowerShell) +The file path of an app is its location on the client device. +For example, C:\Windows\System\Notepad.exe. +[Learn more](/windows/client-management/mdm/firewall-csp#filepath) -Windows service short names are used in cases when a service, not an application, is sending or receiving traffic. -Default is All. +Package family names can be retrieved by running the Get-AppxPackage command from PowerShell. +[Learn more](https://aka.ms/intunefirewallPackageNameFromPowerShell) + +Windows service short names are used in cases when a service, not an application, is sending or receiving traffic. +Default is All. [Learn more](/windows/client-management/mdm/firewall-csp#servicename) ## Protocol -Select the protocol for this port rule. Transport layer protocols—TCP and UDP—allow you to specify ports or port ranges. For custom protocols, enter a number between 0 and 255 representing the IP protocol. -Default is Any. +Select the protocol for this port rule. Transport layer protocols—TCP and UDP—allow you to specify ports or port ranges. For custom protocols, enter a number between 0 and 255 representing the IP protocol. + +Default is Any. [Learn more](/windows/client-management/mdm/firewall-csp#protocol) ## Local ports -Comma separated list of ranges. For example, *100-120,200,300-320*. Default is All. + +Comma separated list of ranges. For example, *100-120,200,300-320*. Default is All. [Learn more](/windows/client-management/mdm/firewall-csp#localportranges) ## Remote ports -Comma separated list of ranges. For example, *100-120,200,300-320*. Default is All. + +Comma separated list of ranges. For example, *100-120,200,300-320*. Default is All. [Learn more](/windows/client-management/mdm/firewall-csp#remoteportranges) ## Local addresses + Comma-separated list of local addresses covered by the rule. Valid tokens include: -- \* indicates any local address. If present, this token must be the only one included. -- A subnet can be specified using either the subnet mask or network prefix notation. If a subnet mask or a network prefix isn't specified, the subnet mask default is 255.255.255.255. -- A valid IPv6 address. -- An IPv4 address range in the format of "start address-end address" with no spaces included. -- An IPv6 address range in the format of "start address-end address" with no spaces included. Default is Any address. + +- `*` indicates any local address. If present, this token must be the only one included +- A subnet can be specified using either the subnet mask or network prefix notation. If a subnet mask or a network prefix isn't specified, the subnet mask default is 255.255.255.255 +- A valid IPv6 address +- An IPv4 address range in the format of "start address-end address" with no spaces included +- An IPv6 address range in the format of "start address-end address" with no spaces included. Default is Any address [Learn more](/windows/client-management/mdm/firewall-csp#localaddressranges) ## Remote addresses -List of comma separated tokens specifying the remote addresses covered by the rule. Tokens are case insensitive. Valid tokens include: -- \* indicates any remote address. If present, this token must be the only one included. -- Defaultgateway -- DHCP -- DNS -- WINS -- Intranet (supported on Windows versions 1809+) -- RmtIntranet (supported on Windows versions 1809+) -- Internet (supported on Windows versions 1809+) -- Ply2Renders (supported on Windows versions 1809+) -- LocalSubnet indicates any local address on the local subnet. -- A subnet can be specified using either the subnet mask or network prefix notation. If neither a subnet mask not a network prefix is specified, the subnet mask defaults to 255.255.255.255. -- A valid IPv6 address. -- An IPv4 address range in the format of "start address-end address" with no spaces included. -- An IPv6 address range in the format of "start address-end address" with no spaces included. -Default is Any address. +List of comma separated tokens specifying the remote addresses covered by the rule. Tokens are case insensitive. Valid tokens include: + +- `*` indicates any remote address. If present, this token must be the only one included +- Defaultgateway +- DHCP +- DNS +- WINS +- Intranet +- RmtIntranet +- Internet +- Ply2Renders +- LocalSubnet indicates any local address on the local subnet +- A subnet can be specified using either the subnet mask or network prefix notation. If neither a subnet mask not a network prefix is specified, the subnet mask defaults to 255.255.255.255 +- A valid IPv6 address +- An IPv4 address range in the format of "start address-end address" with no spaces included +- An IPv6 address range in the format of "start address-end address" with no spaces included + +Default is Any address [Learn more](https://aka.ms/intunefirewallremotaddressrule) ## Edge traversal (UI coming soon) -Indicates whether edge traversal is enabled or disabled for this rule. The EdgeTraversal setting indicates that specific inbound traffic is allowed to tunnel through NATs and other edge devices using the Teredo tunneling technology. In order for this setting to work correctly, the application or service with the inbound firewall rule needs to support IPv6. The primary application of this setting allows listeners on the host to be globally addressable through a Teredo IPv6 address. New rules have the EdgeTraversal property disabled by default. This setting can only be configured via Intune Graph at this time. + +Indicates whether edge traversal is enabled or disabled for this rule. The EdgeTraversal setting indicates that specific inbound traffic is allowed to tunnel through NATs and other edge devices using the Teredo tunneling technology. In order for this setting to work correctly, the application or service with the inbound firewall rule needs to support IPv6. The primary application of this setting allows listeners on the host to be globally addressable through a Teredo IPv6 address. New rules have the EdgeTraversal property disabled by default. This setting can only be configured via Intune Graph at this time. [Learn more](/windows/client-management/mdm/firewall-csp#edgetraversal) ## Authorized users -Specifies the list of authorized local users for this rule. A list of authorized users can't be specified if the rule being authored is targeting a Windows service. Default is all users. + +Specifies the list of authorized local users for this rule. A list of authorized users can't be specified if the rule being authored is targeting a Windows service. Default is all users. [Learn more](/windows/client-management/mdm/firewall-csp#localuserauthorizedlist) diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/filter-origin-documentation.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/filter-origin-documentation.md index 31071302f6..b875b47bbf 100644 --- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/filter-origin-documentation.md +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/filter-origin-documentation.md @@ -1,51 +1,38 @@ --- title: Filter origin audit log improvements description: Filter origin documentation audit log improvements -ms.prod: windows-client ms.topic: troubleshooting -ms.date: 12/31/2017 +ms.date: 11/07/2023 --- # Filter origin audit log improvements Debugging packet drops is a continuous issue to Windows customers. In the past, customers had limited information about packet drops. -Typically, when investigating packet drop events, a customer would use the field `Filter Run-Time ID` from Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) audits 5157 or 5152. +Typically, when investigating packet drop events, a customer would use the field `Filter Run-Time ID` from Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) audits 5157 or 5152. ![Event properties.](images/event-properties-5157.png) -The filter ID uniquely identifies the filter that caused the packet drop. The filter ID can be searched in the WFP state dump output to trace back to the Firewall rule where the filter originated from. +The filter ID uniquely identifies the filter that caused the packet drop. The filter ID can be searched in the WFP state dump output to trace back to the Firewall rule where the filter originated from. However, the filter ID isn't a reliable source for tracing back to the filter or the rule, as the filter ID can change for many reasons despite the rule not changing at all. This change in ID makes the diagnosis process error-prone and difficult. -However, the filter ID isn't a reliable source for tracing back to the filter or the rule, as the filter ID can change for many reasons despite the rule not changing at all. This change in ID makes the diagnosis process error-prone and difficult. - -For customers to debug packet drop events correctly and efficiently, they would need more context about the blocking filter such as its origin. - -The blocking filters can be categorized under these filter origins: +For customers to debug packet drop events correctly and efficiently, they would need more context about the blocking filter such as its origin. The blocking filters can be categorized under these filter origins: 1. Firewall rules - -2. Firewall default block filters - - a. AppContainer loopback - - b. Boottime default - - c. Quarantine default - - d. Query user default - - e. Stealth - - f. Universal Windows Platform (UWP) default - - g. Windows Service Hardening (WSH) default +1. Firewall default block filters + 1. AppContainer loopback + 1. Boot time default + 1. Quarantine default + 1. Query user default + 1. Stealth + 1. Universal Windows Platform (UWP) default + 1. Windows Service Hardening (WSH) default The next section describes the improvements made to audits 5157 and 5152, and how the above filter origins are used in these events. These improvements were added in the Windows Server 2022 and Windows 11 releases. - - ## Improved firewall audit - + +## Improved firewall audit + The two new fields added to the audit 5157 and 5152 events are `Filter Origin` and `Interface Index`. - + The `Filter Origin` field helps identify the cause of the drop. Packet drops from firewall are explicitly dropped by default block filters created by the Windows Firewall service or a firewall rule that may be created by users, policies, services, apps, etc. `Filter Origin` specifies either the rule ID (a unique identifier of a Firewall rule) or the name of one of the default block filters. @@ -54,14 +41,14 @@ The `Interface Index` field specifies the network interface in which the packet To enable a specific audit event, run the corresponding command in an administrator command prompt: -|**Audit #**|**Enable command**|**Link**| +|Audit #|Enable command|Link| |:-----|:-----|:-----| -|**5157**|`Auditpol /set /category:"System" /SubCategory:"Filtering Platform Connection" /success:enable /failure:enable`|[5157(F): The Windows Filtering Platform has blocked a connection.](../../../threat-protection/auditing/event-5157.md)| -|**5152**|`Auditpol /set /category:"System" /SubCategory:"Filtering Platform Packet Drop" /success:enable /failure:enable`|[5152(F): The Windows Filtering Platform blocked a packet.](../../../threat-protection/auditing/event-5152.md)| +|5157|`Auditpol /set /category:"System" /SubCategory:"Filtering Platform Connection" /success:enable /failure:enable`|[5157(F): The Windows Filtering Platform has blocked a connection.](../../../threat-protection/auditing/event-5157.md)| +|5152|`Auditpol /set /category:"System" /SubCategory:"Filtering Platform Packet Drop" /success:enable /failure:enable`|[5152(F): The Windows Filtering Platform blocked a packet.](../../../threat-protection/auditing/event-5152.md)| -## Example flow of debugging packet drops with filter origin +## Example flow of debugging packet drops with filter origin -As the audit surfaces `Filter Origin` and `Interface Index`, the network admin can determine the root cause of the network packet drop and the interface it happened on. +As the audit surfaces `Filter Origin` and `Interface Index`, the network admin can determine the root cause of the network packet drop, and the interface it happened on. ![Event audit.](images/event-audit-5157.png) @@ -69,7 +56,7 @@ The next sections are divided by `Filter Origin` type, the value is either a rul ## Firewall rules -Run the following PowerShell command to generate the rule information using `Filter Origin`. +Run the following PowerShell command to generate the rule information using `Filter Origin`. ```Powershell Get-NetFirewallRule -Name "" @@ -85,27 +72,27 @@ After identifying the rule that caused the drop, the network admin can now modif ## Firewall default block filters -**AppContainer loopback** +### AppContainer loopback Network drop events from the AppContainer loopback block filter origin occur when localhost loopback isn't enabled properly for the Universal Windows Platform (UWP) app. To enable localhost loopback in a local debugging environment, see [Communicating with localhost](/windows/iot-core/develop-your-app/loopback). -To enable localhost loopback for a published app that requires loopback access to communicate with another UWP or packaged win32 app, see [uap4:LoopbackAccessRules](/uwp/schemas/appxpackage/uapmanifestschema/element-uap4-loopbackaccessrules). +To enable localhost loopback for a published app that requires loopback access to communicate with another UWP or packaged Win32 app, see [uap4:LoopbackAccessRules](/uwp/schemas/appxpackage/uapmanifestschema/element-uap4-loopbackaccessrules). -**Boottime default** +### Boot time default -Network drop events from the boottime default block filter origin occur when the computer is booting up and the firewall service isn't yet running. Services will need to create a boottime allow filter to allow the traffic. It should be noted that it's not possible to add boottime filters through firewall rules. +Network drop events from the boot time default block filter origin occur when the computer is booting up and the firewall service isn't yet running. Services need to create a boot time allow filter to allow the traffic. It should be noted that it's not possible to add boot time filters through firewall rules. -**Quarantine default** +### Quarantine default -Network drops from the quarantine default block filter occur when the interface is temporarily quarantined by Firewall service. The firewall service quarantines an interface when it detects a change on the network, and based on several other factors, the firewall service may put the interface in quarantine as a safeguard. When an interface is in quarantine, the quarantine default block filter will block any new non-loopback inbound connections. +Network drops from the quarantine default *block filter* occur when the interface is temporarily quarantined by the Firewall service. The firewall service quarantines an interface when it detects a change on the network, and based on several other factors, the firewall service might put the interface in quarantine as a safeguard. When an interface quarantined, the quarantine default *block filter* blocks any new non-loopback inbound connections. Run the following PowerShell command to generate more information about the interface: ```Powershell -Get-NetIPInterface –InterfaceIndex -Get-NetIPInterface –InterfaceIndex 5 +Get-NetIPInterface -InterfaceIndex +Get-NetIPInterface -InterfaceIndex 5 ``` ![Quarantine default block filter.](images/quarantine-default-block-filter.png) @@ -115,13 +102,12 @@ To learn more about the quarantine feature, see [Quarantine behavior](quarantine >[!NOTE] > Quarantine-related packet drops are often transient and signify nothing more than a network change on the interface. -**Query user default** +### Query user default -Network packet drops from query user default block filters occur when there's no explicit rule created to allow an inbound connection for the packet. When an application binds to a socket but doesn't have a corresponding inbound rule to allow packets on that port, Windows generates a pop up for the user to allow or deny the app to receive packets on the available network categories. If the user clicks to deny the connection in this popup, subsequent inbound packets to the app will be dropped. To resolve the drops: +Network packet drops from query user default block filters occur when there's no explicit rule created to allow an inbound connection for the packet. When an application binds to a socket but doesn't have a corresponding inbound rule to allow packets on that port, Windows generates a pop-up for the user to allow or deny the app to receive packets on the available network categories. If the user selects to deny the connection in the pop-up, subsequent inbound packets to the app will be dropped. To resolve the drops: -1. Create an inbound firewall rule to allow the packet for this application. This packet will allow the packet to bypass any query user default block filters. - -2. Delete any block query user rules that may have been auto generated by the firewall service. +1. Create an inbound firewall rule to allow the packet for this application. The rule allows the packet to bypass any query user default block filters +1. Delete any block query user rules that may have been auto generated by the firewall service To generate a list of all the query user block rules, you can run the following PowerShell command: @@ -131,31 +117,32 @@ Get-NetFirewallRule | Where {$_.Name -like "*Query User*"} ![Query user default block filter.](images/query-user-default-block-filters.png) -The query user pop-up feature is enabled by default. +The query user pop-up feature is enabled by default. To disable the query user pop-up, you can run the following command in administrative command prompt: -```Console +```cmd Netsh set allprofiles inboundusernotification disable ``` + Or in PowerShell: ```Powershell Set-NetFirewallProfile -NotifyOnListen False ``` -**Stealth** +### Stealth Network drops from stealth filters are typically made to prevent port scanning. To disable stealth-mode, see [Disable stealth mode in Windows](/troubleshoot/windows-server/networking/disable-stealth-mode). -**UWP default** +### UWP default -Network drops from Universal Windows Platform (UWP) default inbound/outbound block filters are often caused by the UWP app not being configured correctly (that is, the UWP app is missing the correct capability tokens or loopback isn't enabled) or the private range is configured incorrectly. +Network drops from Universal Windows Platform (UWP) default inbound/outbound block filters are often caused by the UWP app not being configured correctly (that is, the UWP app is missing the correct capability tokens or loopback isn't enabled) or the private range is configured incorrectly. For more information on how to debug drops caused by UWP default block filters, see [Troubleshooting UWP App Connectivity Issues](troubleshooting-uwp-firewall.md). -**WSH default** +### WSH default -Network drops from Windows Service Hardening (WSH) default filters indicate that there wasn't an explicit Windows Service Hardening allow rule to allow network traffic for the protected service. The service owner will need to configure allow rules for the service if the block isn't expected. +Network drops from Windows Service Hardening (WSH) default filters indicate that there wasn't an explicit Windows Service Hardening allow rule to allow network traffic for the protected service. The service owner needs to configure *allow rules* for the service if the block isn't expected. diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/firewall-settings-lost-on-upgrade.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/firewall-settings-lost-on-upgrade.md index 0d63234aba..89ffce298a 100644 --- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/firewall-settings-lost-on-upgrade.md +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/firewall-settings-lost-on-upgrade.md @@ -1,9 +1,8 @@ --- title: Troubleshooting Windows Firewall settings after a Windows upgrade description: Firewall settings lost on upgrade -ms.prod: windows-client ms.topic: troubleshooting -ms.date: 12/31/2017 +ms.date: 11/07/2023 --- # Troubleshooting Windows Firewall settings after a Windows upgrade @@ -14,9 +13,9 @@ Use this article to troubleshoot firewall settings that are turned off after upg To help you organize your list, individual built-in firewall rules are categorized within a group. For example, the following rules form part of the Remote Desktop group. -- Remote Desktop – Shadow (TCP-In) -- Remote Desktop – User Mode (TCP-In) -- Remote Desktop – User-Mode (UDP-In) +- Remote Desktop - Shadow (TCP-In) +- Remote Desktop - User Mode (TCP-In) +- Remote Desktop - User-Mode (UDP-In) Other group examples include **core networking**, **file and print sharing**, and **network discovery**. Grouping allows administrators to manage sets of similar rules by filtering on categories in the firewall interface (wf.msc). Do this filtering by right-clicking on either **Inbound** or **Outbound Rules** and selecting **Filter by Group**. Optionally, you can use PowerShell using the `Get-NetFirewallRule` cmdlet with the `-Group` switch. @@ -24,7 +23,7 @@ Other group examples include **core networking**, **file and print sharing**, an Get-NetFirewallRule -Group ``` -> [!NOTE] +> [!NOTE] > Microsoft recommends to enable or disable an entire group instead of individual rules. Microsoft recommends that you enable/disable all of the rules within a group instead of one or two individual rules. This recommendation is because groups aren't only used to organize rules and allow batch rule modification by type, but they also represent a 'unit' by which rule state is maintained across a Windows upgrade. Rule groups, as opposed to individual rules, are the unit by which the update process determines what should be enabled/disabled when the upgrade is complete. diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/troubleshooting-uwp-firewall.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/troubleshooting-uwp-firewall.md index e120af6116..36ec68be9d 100644 --- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/troubleshooting-uwp-firewall.md +++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/troubleshooting-uwp-firewall.md @@ -1,9 +1,8 @@ --- title: Troubleshooting UWP App Connectivity Issues in Windows Firewall description: Troubleshooting UWP App Connectivity Issues in Windows Firewall -ms.prod: windows-client ms.topic: troubleshooting -ms.date: 12/31/2017 +ms.date: 11/07/2023 --- # Troubleshooting UWP App Connectivity Issues @@ -15,28 +14,24 @@ This document guides you through steps to debug Universal Windows Platform (UWP ## Typical causes of connectivity issues -UWP app network connectivity issues are typically caused by: +UWP app network connectivity issues are typically caused by: -1. The UWP applications not being permitted to receive loopback traffic. This permission must be configured. By default, UWP applications aren't allowed to receive loopback traffic. -2. The UWP app is missing the proper capability tokens. -3. The private range is configured incorrectly. For example, the private range is set incorrectly through GP/MDM policies, etc. +1. The UWP applications not being permitted to receive loopback traffic. This permission must be configured. By default, UWP applications aren't allowed to receive loopback traffic +1. The UWP app is missing the proper capability tokens +1. The private range is configured incorrectly. For example, the private range is set incorrectly through GP/MDM policies, etc. To understand these causes more thoroughly, there are several concepts to review. -The traffic of network packets (what's permitted and what’s not) on Windows is determined by the Windows Filtering Platform (WFP). When a UWP app -or the private range is configured incorrectly, it affects how the UWP app’s network traffic will be processed by WFP. +The traffic of network packets (what's permitted and what's not) on Windows is determined by the Windows Filtering Platform (WFP). When a UWP app +or the private range is configured incorrectly, it affects how the UWP app's network traffic will be processed by WFP. -When a packet is processed by WFP, the characteristics of that packet must explicitly match all the conditions of a filter to either be permitted or dropped to its target address. Connectivity issues typically happen when the packet doesn't match any of the filter conditions, leading the packet to be dropped by a default block filter. The presence of the default block filters ensures network isolation for UWP applications. Specifically, it guarantees a network drop for a packet that doesn't have the correct capabilities for the resource it's trying to reach. Such a packet drop ensures the application’s granular access to each resource type and preventing the application from escaping its environment. +When a packet is processed by WFP, the characteristics of that packet must explicitly match all the conditions of a filter to either be permitted or dropped to its target address. Connectivity issues typically happen when the packet doesn't match any of the filter conditions, leading the packet to be dropped by a default block filter. The presence of the default block filters ensures network isolation for UWP applications. Specifically, it guarantees a network drop for a packet that doesn't have the correct capabilities for the resource it's trying to reach. Such a packet drop ensures the application's granular access to each resource type and preventing the application from escaping its environment. -For more information on the filter arbitration algorithm and network isolation, -see [Filter -Arbitration](/windows/win32/fwp/filter-arbitration) -and -[Isolation](/windows/win32/secauthz/appcontainer-isolation). +For more information on the filter arbitration algorithm and network isolation, see [Filter Arbitration](/windows/win32/fwp/filter-arbitration) and [Isolation](/windows/win32/secauthz/appcontainer-isolation). The following sections cover debugging case examples for loopback and non-loopback UWP app network connectivity issues. -> [!NOTE] +> [!NOTE] > As improvements to debugging and diagnostics in the Windows Filtering Platform are made, the trace examples in this document may not exactly match the traces collected on previous releases of Windows. @@ -46,15 +41,17 @@ If you need to establish a TCP/IP connection between two processes on the same h To enable loopback for client outbound connections, run the following command at a command prompt: -```console +```cmd CheckNetIsolation.exe LoopbackExempt -a -n= ``` To enable loopback for server inbound connections, run the following command at a command prompt: -```console + +```cmd CheckNetIsolation.exe LoopbackExempt -is -n= ``` + You can ensure loopback is enabled by checking the appx manifests of both the sender and receiver. For more information about loopback scenarios, see [Communicating with @@ -62,7 +59,7 @@ localhost (loopback)](/windows/iot-core/develop-your-app/loopback). >[!NOTE] ->If you are in the middle of developing a UWA application and want to test its loopback, ensure to uninstall and re-install the UWA app if the network capabilities change for whatever reason. +>If you are in the middle of developing a UWA application and want to test its loopback, ensure to uninstall and re-install the UWA app if the network capabilities change for whatever reason. Also, see [How to enable loopback and troubleshoot network isolation (Windows Runtime apps)](/previous-versions/windows/apps/hh780593(v=win.10)). @@ -78,7 +75,7 @@ Netsh wfp capture start keywords=19 Netsh wfp capture stop ``` -These commands generate a wfpdiag.cab. Inside the .cab exists a wfpdiag.xml, which contains any allow or drop netEvents and filters that existed during that repro. Without “keywords=19”, the trace will only collect drop netEvents. +These commands generate a wfpdiag.cab. Inside the .cab exists a wfpdiag.xml, which contains any allow or drop netEvents and filters that existed during that repro. Without "keywords=19", the trace will only collect drop netEvents. Inside the wfpdiag.xml, search for netEvents that have FWPM_NET_EVENT_TYPE_CLASSIFY_DROP as the netEvent type. To find the relevant drop events, search for the drop events with matching destination IP address, @@ -86,7 +83,7 @@ package SID, or application ID name. The characters in the application ID name will be separated by periods: ```XML -(ex) +(ex) \\.d.e.v.i.c.e.\\.h.a.r.d.d.i.s.k.v.o.l.u.m.e.1.\\.w.i.n.d.o.w.s.\\.s.y.s.t.e.m.3.2.\\.s.v.c.h.o.s.t...e.x.e... @@ -108,7 +105,8 @@ In this scenario, the app could successfully send a packet to the Internet targe The following code shows the allow netEvent of the app connecting to the target IP. The netEvent contains information about the packet including its local address, remote address, capabilities, etc. -**Classify Allow netEvent, Wfpdiag-Case-1.xml** +### Classify Allow netEvent, `Wfpdiag-Case-1.xml` + ```xml
    @@ -120,18 +118,18 @@ remote address, capabilities, etc. FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_LOCAL_PORT_SET FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_REMOTE_PORT_SET FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_APP_ID_SET - FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_USER_ID_SET + FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_USER_ID_SET FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_IP_VERSION_SET FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_PACKAGE_ID_SET FWP_IP_VERSION_V6 - 6 - 2001:4898:30:3:256c:e5ba:12f3:beb1 + 6 + 2001:4898:30:3:256c:e5ba:12f3:beb1 2620:1ec:c11::200 52127 443 0 - + 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 \\.d.e.v.i.c.e.\\.h.a.r.d.d.i.s.k.v.o.l.u.m.e.1.\\.p.r.o.g.r.a.m. .f.i.l.e.s.\\.w.i.n.d.o.w.s.a.p.p.s.\\.a.f.6.9.2.b.f.f.-.6.7.7.9.-.4.2.4.f.-.8.7.0.e.-.f.6.e.5.9.c.5.0.2.3.4.9._.1...1...1.0...0._.x.6.4._._.5.c.0.3.7.j.a.r.5.8.3.9.r.\\.u.w.p.s.o.c.k.e.t.c.l.i.e.n.t...e.x.e... @@ -154,7 +152,7 @@ remote address, capabilities, etc. 0000000000000000 - + FWP_CAPABILITIES_FLAG_INTERNET_CLIENT FWP_CAPABILITIES_FLAG_INTERNET_CLIENT_SERVER FWP_CAPABILITIES_FLAG_PRIVATE_NETWORK @@ -168,9 +166,9 @@ remote address, capabilities, etc. FWP_ACTION_PERMIT - 121167 - FWPP_SUBLAYER_INTERNAL_FIREWALL_WF - FWP_ACTION_PERMIT + 121167 + FWPP_SUBLAYER_INTERNAL_FIREWALL_WF + FWP_ACTION_PERMIT @@ -181,7 +179,8 @@ The following is the filter that permitted the packet to be sent to the target address according to the **terminatingFiltersInfo** in the **netEvent**. This packet was allowed by Filter #125918, from the InternetClient Default Rule. -**InternetClient Default Rule Filter #125918, Wfpdiag-Case-1.xml** +### InternetClient Default Rule Filter #125918, `Wfpdiag-Case-1.xml` + ```xml {3389708e-f7ae-4ebc-a61a-f659065ab24e} @@ -196,7 +195,7 @@ allowed by Filter #125918, from the InternetClient Default Rule. .+...... FWPM_LAYER_ALE_AUTH_CONNECT_V6 - FWPM_SUBLAYER_MPSSVC_WSHFWPM_SUBLAYER_MPSSVC_WSH FWP_EMPTY @@ -211,61 +210,62 @@ allowed by Filter #125918, from the InternetClient Default Rule. FWPM_CONDITION_IP_REMOTE_ADDRESS - FWP_MATCH_RANGE - - FWP_RANGE_TYPE - - + FWP_MATCH_RANGE + + FWP_RANGE_TYPE + + FWP_BYTE_ARRAY16_TYPE :: FWP_BYTE_ARRAY16_TYPE ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff - - - - - - FWPM_CONDITION_ORIGINAL_PROFILE_ID - FWP_MATCH_EQUAL - - FWP_UINT32 - 1 - - - - FWPM_CONDITION_CURRENT_PROFILE_ID - FWP_MATCH_EQUAL - - FWP_UINT32 - 1 - - - - FWPM_CONDITION_ALE_USER_ID - FWP_MATCH_EQUAL - - FWP_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_TYPE - O:LSD:(A;;CC;;;S-1-15-3-1)(A;;CC;;;WD)(A;;CC;;;AN) - - - - - FWP_ACTION_PERMIT - - - 0 - - 125918 - - FWP_UINT64 - 103079219136 - + + + + + + FWPM_CONDITION_ORIGINAL_PROFILE_ID + FWP_MATCH_EQUAL + + FWP_UINT32 + 1 + + + + FWPM_CONDITION_CURRENT_PROFILE_ID + FWP_MATCH_EQUAL + + FWP_UINT32 + 1 + + + + FWPM_CONDITION_ALE_USER_ID + FWP_MATCH_EQUAL + + FWP_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_TYPE + O:LSD:(A;;CC;;;S-1-15-3-1)(A;;CC;;;WD)(A;;CC;;;AN) + + + + + FWP_ACTION_PERMIT + + + 0 + + 125918 + + FWP_UINT64 + 103079219136 + ``` -**Capabilities Condition in Filter \#125918, Wfpdiag-Case-1.xml** +### Capabilities Condition in Filter #125918, `Wfpdiag-Case-1.xml` + ```xml FWPM_CONDITION_ALE_USER_ID @@ -276,26 +276,23 @@ allowed by Filter #125918, from the InternetClient Default Rule. ``` + This condition enables checking capabilities in this filter. -The important part of this condition is **S-1-15-3-1**, which is the capability SID -for **INTERNET_CLIENT** privileges. +The important part of this condition is **S-1-15-3-1**, which is the capability SID for **INTERNET_CLIENT** privileges. + +From the **netEvent** capabilities section, capabilities from netEvent, Wfpdiag-Case-1.xml. -From the **netEvent** capabilities section, -capabilities from netEvent, Wfpdiag-Case-1.xml. ```xml - - FWP_CAPABILITIES_FLAG_INTERNET_CLIENT FWP_CAPABILITIES_FLAG_INTERNET_CLIENT_SERVER + + FWP_CAPABILITIES_FLAG_INTERNET_CLIENT + FWP_CAPABILITIES_FLAG_INTERNET_CLIENT_SERVER FWP_CAPABILITIES_FLAG_PRIVATE_NETWORK ``` -These capabilities show the packet came from an app with an Internet client token (**FWP_CAPABILITIES_FLAG_INTERNET_CLIENT**) which matches the capability SID in the -filter. All the other conditions are also met for the filter, so the packet is -allowed. -Something to note is that the only capability token required for the packet to -reach bing.com was the Internet client token, even though this example showed -the packet having all capabilities. +These capabilities show the packet came from an app with an Internet client token (**FWP_CAPABILITIES_FLAG_INTERNET_CLIENT**) which matches the capability SID in the filter. All the other conditions are also met for the filter, so the packet is +allowed. Something to note is that the only capability token required for the packet to reach bing.com was the Internet client token, even though this example showed the packet having all capabilities. ## Case 2: UWP APP can't reach Internet target address and has no capabilities @@ -304,7 +301,8 @@ In this example, the UWP app is unable to connect to bing.com The following example is that of a drop netEvent that was captured in the trace. -**Classify Drop netEvent, Wfpdiag-Case-2.xml** +### Classify Drop netEvent, `Wfpdiag-Case-2.xml` + ```xml
    @@ -373,12 +371,11 @@ The following example is that of a drop netEvent that was captured in the trace. ``` -The first thing that you should check in the **netEvent** is the capabilities -field. In this example, the capabilities field is empty, indicating that the -UWP app wasn't configured with any capability tokens to allow it to connect to -a network. -**Internal Fields from netEvent, Wfpdiag-Case-2.xml** +The first thing that you should check in the **netEvent** is the capabilities field. In this example, the capabilities field is empty, indicating that the UWP app wasn't configured with any capability tokens to allow it to connect to a network. + +### Internal Fields from netEvent, `Wfpdiag-Case-2.xml` + ```xml @@ -400,9 +397,11 @@ a network. ``` + The **netEvent** also shows information about the filter that explicitly dropped this packet, like the **FilterId**, listed under classify drop. -**Classify Drop from netEvent, Wfpdiag-Case-2.xml** +### Classify Drop from netEvent, `Wfpdiag-Case-2.xml` + ```xml 68893 @@ -417,71 +416,66 @@ The **netEvent** also shows information about the filter that explicitly dropped 0 ``` + If you search for the filter #68893 in Wfpdiag-Case2.xml, you'll see that the packet was dropped by a Block Outbound Default Rule filter. -**Block Outbound Default Rule Filter #68893, Wfpdiag-Case-2.xml** +### Block Outbound Default Rule Filter #68893, `Wfpdiag-Case-2.xml` ```xml - {6d51582f-bcf8-42c4-afc9-e2ce7155c11b} + {6d51582f-bcf8-42c4-afc9-e2ce7155c11b} /t - **Block Outbound Default Rule** - Block Outbound Default Rule - - - {4b153735-1049-4480-aab4-d1b9bdc03710} - - b001000000000000 - ........ - - FWPM_LAYER_ALE_AUTH_CONNECT_V6 - {b3cdd441-af90-41ba-a745-7c6008ff2300} - - FWP_EMPTY - - - - FWPM_CONDITION_ALE_PACKAGE_ID - FWP_MATCH_NOT_EQUAL - - FWP_SID - S-1-0-0 - - - - - FWP_ACTION_BLOCK - - - 0 - - 68893 - - FWP_UINT64 - 68719476736 - + **Block Outbound Default Rule** + Block Outbound Default Rule + + + {4b153735-1049-4480-aab4-d1b9bdc03710} + + b001000000000000 + ........ + + FWPM_LAYER_ALE_AUTH_CONNECT_V6 + {b3cdd441-af90-41ba-a745-7c6008ff2300} + + FWP_EMPTY + + + + FWPM_CONDITION_ALE_PACKAGE_ID + FWP_MATCH_NOT_EQUAL + + FWP_SID + S-1-0-0 + + + + + FWP_ACTION_BLOCK + + + 0 + + 68893 + + FWP_UINT64 + 68719476736 + ``` -A packet will reach a default block filter if the packet was unable to match any of the conditions of other filters, and not allowed by the other filters in -the same sublayer. +A packet will reach a default block filter if the packet was unable to match any of the conditions of other filters, and not allowed by the other filters in the same sublayer. -If the packet had the correct capability token, -**FWP_CAPABILITIES_FLAG_INTERNET_CLIENT**, it would have matched a condition for a -non-default block filter, and would have been permitted to reach bing.com. -Without the correct capability tokens, the packet will be explicitly dropped by -a default block outbound filter. +If the packet had the correct capability token, **FWP_CAPABILITIES_FLAG_INTERNET_CLIENT**, it would have matched a condition for a non-default block filter, and would have been permitted to reach bing.com. Without the correct capability tokens, the packet will be explicitly dropped by a default block outbound filter. ## Case 3: UWP app can't reach Internet target address without Internet Client capability In this example, the app is unable to connect to bing.com [2620:1ec:c11::200]. -The app in this scenario only has private network capabilities (Client and -Server). The app is trying to connect to an Internet resource (bing.com), but -only has a private network token. Therefore, the packet will be dropped. +The app in this scenario only has private network capabilities (Client and Server). The app is trying to connect to an Internet resource (bing.com), but only has a private network token. Therefore, the packet will be dropped. + +### Classify Drop netEvent, `Wfpdiag-Case-3.xml` -**Classify Drop netEvent, Wfpdiag-Case-3.xml** ```xml
    @@ -555,489 +549,473 @@ only has a private network token. Therefore, the packet will be dropped. ## Case 4: UWP app can't reach Intranet target address without Private Network capability -In this example, the UWP app is unable to reach the Intranet target address, -10.50.50.50, because it doesn't have a Private Network capability. +In this example, the UWP app is unable to reach the Intranet target address, 10.50.50.50, because it doesn't have a Private Network capability. + +### Classify Drop netEvent, `Wfpdiag-Case-4.xml` -**Classify Drop netEvent, Wfpdiag-Case-4.xml** ```xml
    - 2020-05-22T21:29:28.601Z - - FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_IP_PROTOCOL_SET - FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_LOCAL_ADDR_SET - FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_REMOTE_ADDR_SET - FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_LOCAL_PORT_SET - FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_REMOTE_PORT_SET - FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_APP_ID_SET - FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_USER_ID_SET - FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_IP_VERSION_SET - FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_PACKAGE_ID_SET - - FWP_IP_VERSION_V4 - 6 - 10.216.117.17 - 10.50.50.50 - 52998 - 53 - 0 - - 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 - \\.d.e.v.i.c.e.\\.h.a.r.d.d.i.s.k.v.o.l.u.m.e.1.\\.p.r.o.g.r.a.m. - .f.i.l.e.s.\\.w.i.n.d.o.w.s.a.p.p.s.\\.a.f.6.9.2.b.f.f.-.6.7.7.9.-.4.2.4.f.-.8.7.0.e.-.f.6.e.5.9.c.5.0.2.3.4.9._.1...1...1.1...0._.x.6.4._._.5.c.0.3.7.j.a.r.5.8.3.9.r.\\.u.w.p.s.o.c.k.e.t.c.l.i.e.n.t...e.x.e... - - S-1-5-21-2993214446-1947230185-131795049-1000 - FWP_AF_INET - S-1-15-2-4163697451-3176919390-1155390458-2883473650-3020241727-522149888-4067122936 - - 0 - + 2020-05-22T21:29:28.601Z + + FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_IP_PROTOCOL_SET + FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_LOCAL_ADDR_SET + FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_REMOTE_ADDR_SET + FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_LOCAL_PORT_SET + FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_REMOTE_PORT_SET + FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_APP_ID_SET + FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_USER_ID_SET + FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_IP_VERSION_SET + FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_PACKAGE_ID_SET + + FWP_IP_VERSION_V4 + 6 + 10.216.117.17 + 10.50.50.50 + 52998 + 53 + 0 + + 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 + \\.d.e.v.i.c.e.\\.h.a.r.d.d.i.s.k.v.o.l.u.m.e.1.\\.p.r.o.g.r.a.m. + .f.i.l.e.s.\\.w.i.n.d.o.w.s.a.p.p.s.\\.a.f.6.9.2.b.f.f.-.6.7.7.9.-.4.2.4.f.-.8.7.0.e.-.f.6.e.5.9.c.5.0.2.3.4.9._.1...1...1.1...0._.x.6.4._._.5.c.0.3.7.j.a.r.5.8.3.9.r.\\.u.w.p.s.o.c.k.e.t.c.l.i.e.n.t...e.x.e... + + S-1-5-21-2993214446-1947230185-131795049-1000 + FWP_AF_INET + S-1-15-2-4163697451-3176919390-1155390458-2883473650-3020241727-522149888-4067122936 + + 0 +
    - FWPM_NET_EVENT_TYPE_CLASSIFY_DROP - - 121180 - 48 - 0 - 1 - 1 - MS_FWP_DIRECTION_OUT - false - - 0 - 0 + FWPM_NET_EVENT_TYPE_CLASSIFY_DROP + + 121180 + 48 + 0 + 1 + 1 + MS_FWP_DIRECTION_OUT + false + + 0 + 0 - - 0000000000000000 - - FWP_CAPABILITIES_FLAG_INTERNET_CLIENT - FWP_CAPABILITIES_FLAG_INTERNET_CLIENT_SERVER - - 0 - - - - 121180 - FWPP_SUBLAYER_INTERNAL_FIREWALL_WSH - FWP_ACTION_BLOCK - - - 121165 - FWPP_SUBLAYER_INTERNAL_FIREWALL_WF - FWP_ACTION_PERMIT - - + + 0000000000000000 + + FWP_CAPABILITIES_FLAG_INTERNET_CLIENT + FWP_CAPABILITIES_FLAG_INTERNET_CLIENT_SERVER + + 0 + + + + 121180 + FWPP_SUBLAYER_INTERNAL_FIREWALL_WSH + FWP_ACTION_BLOCK + + + 121165 + FWPP_SUBLAYER_INTERNAL_FIREWALL_WF + FWP_ACTION_PERMIT + +     ``` -## Case 5: UWP app can't reach “Intranet” target address with Private Network capability -In this example, the UWP app is unable to reach the Intranet target address, -10.1.1.1, even though it has a Private Network capability token. +## Case 5: UWP app can't reach "Intranet" target address with Private Network capability + +In this example, the UWP app is unable to reach the Intranet target address, 10.1.1.1, even though it has a Private Network capability token. + +### Classify Drop netEvent, `Wfpdiag-Case-5.xml` -**Classify Drop netEvent, Wfpdiag-Case-5.xml** ```xml -
    - 2020-05-22T20:54:53.499Z - - FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_IP_PROTOCOL_SET - FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_LOCAL_ADDR_SET - FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_REMOTE_ADDR_SET - FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_LOCAL_PORT_SET - FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_REMOTE_PORT_SET - FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_APP_ID_SET - FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_USER_ID_SET - FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_IP_VERSION_SET - FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_PACKAGE_ID_SET - - FWP_IP_VERSION_V4 - 6 - 10.216.117.17 - 10.1.1.1 - 52956 - 53 - 0 - - 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 - \\.d.e.v.i.c.e.\\.h.a.r.d.d.i.s.k.v.o.l.u.m.e.1.\\.p.r.o.g.r.a.m. - .f.i.l.e.s.\\.w.i.n.d.o.w.s.a.p.p.s.\\.a.f.6.9.2.b.f.f.-.6.7.7.9.-.4.2.4.f.-.8.7.0.e.-.f.6.e.5.9.c.5.0.2.3.4.9._.1...1...1.3...0._.x.6.4._._.5.c.0.3.7.j.a.r.5.8.3.9.r.\\.u.w.p.s.o.c.k.e.t.c.l.i.e.n.t...e.x.e... - - S-1-5-21-2993214446-1947230185-131795049-1000 - FWP_AF_INET - S-1-15-2-4163697451-3176919390-1155390458-2883473650-3020241727-522149888-4067122936 - - 0 - +
    + 2020-05-22T20:54:53.499Z + + FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_IP_PROTOCOL_SET + FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_LOCAL_ADDR_SET + FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_REMOTE_ADDR_SET + FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_LOCAL_PORT_SET + FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_REMOTE_PORT_SET + FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_APP_ID_SET + FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_USER_ID_SET + FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_IP_VERSION_SET + FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_PACKAGE_ID_SET + + FWP_IP_VERSION_V4 + 6 + 10.216.117.17 + 10.1.1.1 + 52956 + 53 + 0 + + 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 + \\.d.e.v.i.c.e.\\.h.a.r.d.d.i.s.k.v.o.l.u.m.e.1.\\.p.r.o.g.r.a.m. + .f.i.l.e.s.\\.w.i.n.d.o.w.s.a.p.p.s.\\.a.f.6.9.2.b.f.f.-.6.7.7.9.-.4.2.4.f.-.8.7.0.e.-.f.6.e.5.9.c.5.0.2.3.4.9._.1...1...1.3...0._.x.6.4._._.5.c.0.3.7.j.a.r.5.8.3.9.r.\\.u.w.p.s.o.c.k.e.t.c.l.i.e.n.t...e.x.e... + + S-1-5-21-2993214446-1947230185-131795049-1000 + FWP_AF_INET + S-1-15-2-4163697451-3176919390-1155390458-2883473650-3020241727-522149888-4067122936 + + 0 +
    - FWPM_NET_EVENT_TYPE_CLASSIFY_DROP - - 121180 - 48 - 0 - 1 - 1 - MS_FWP_DIRECTION_OUT - false - - 0 - 0 - - - - 0000000000000000 - - FWP_CAPABILITIES_FLAG_PRIVATE_NETWORK - - 0 - - - - 121180 - FWPP_SUBLAYER_INTERNAL_FIREWALL_WSH - FWP_ACTION_BLOCK - - - 121165 - FWPP_SUBLAYER_INTERNAL_FIREWALL_WF - FWP_ACTION_PERMIT - - - + FWPM_NET_EVENT_TYPE_CLASSIFY_DROP + + 121180 + 48 + 0 + 1 + 1 + MS_FWP_DIRECTION_OUT + false + + 0 + 0 + + + + 0000000000000000 + + FWP_CAPABILITIES_FLAG_PRIVATE_NETWORK + + 0 + + + + 121180 + FWPP_SUBLAYER_INTERNAL_FIREWALL_WSH + FWP_ACTION_BLOCK + + + 121165 + FWPP_SUBLAYER_INTERNAL_FIREWALL_WF + FWP_ACTION_PERMIT + + + ``` + The following shows the filter that blocked the event: -**Block Outbound Default Rule Filter \#121180, Wfpdiag-Case-5.xml** +### Block Outbound Default Rule Filter #121180, `Wfpdiag-Case-5.xml` ```xml - {e62a1a22-c80a-4518-a7f8-e7d1ef3a9ff6} - - Block Outbound Default Rule - Block Outbound Default Rule - - - FWPM_PROVIDER_MPSSVC_WSH - - c029000000000000 - .)...... - - FWPM_LAYER_ALE_AUTH_CONNECT_V4 - FWPM_SUBLAYER_MPSSVC_WSH - - FWP_EMPTY - - - - FWPM_CONDITION_ALE_PACKAGE_ID - FWP_MATCH_NOT_EQUAL - - FWP_SID - S-1-0-0 - - - - - FWP_ACTION_BLOCK - - - 0 - - 121180 - - FWP_UINT64 - 274877906944 - + {e62a1a22-c80a-4518-a7f8-e7d1ef3a9ff6} + + Block Outbound Default Rule + Block Outbound Default Rule + + + FWPM_PROVIDER_MPSSVC_WSH + + c029000000000000 + .)...... + + FWPM_LAYER_ALE_AUTH_CONNECT_V4 + FWPM_SUBLAYER_MPSSVC_WSH + + FWP_EMPTY + + + + FWPM_CONDITION_ALE_PACKAGE_ID + FWP_MATCH_NOT_EQUAL + + FWP_SID + S-1-0-0 + + + + + FWP_ACTION_BLOCK + + + 0 + + 121180 + + FWP_UINT64 + 274877906944 + ``` -If the target was in the private range, then it should have been allowed by a -PrivateNetwork Outbound Default Rule filter. -The following PrivateNetwork Outbound Default Rule filters have conditions for matching Intranet IP addresses. Since the expected Intranet target address, -10.1.1.1, isn't included in these filters it becomes clear that the address isn't in the private range. Check the policies that configure the private range -on the device (MDM, Group Policy, etc.) and make sure it includes the private target address you wanted to reach. +If the target was in the private range, then it should have been allowed by a PrivateNetwork Outbound Default Rule filter. + +The following PrivateNetwork Outbound Default Rule filters have conditions for matching Intranet IP addresses. Since the expected Intranet target address, 10.1.1.1, isn't included in these filters it becomes clear that the address isn't in the private range. Check the policies that configure the private range on the device (MDM, Group Policy, etc.) and make sure it includes the private target address you wanted to reach. + +### PrivateNetwork Outbound Default Rule Filters, `Wfpdiag-Case-5.xml` -**PrivateNetwork Outbound Default Rule Filters, Wfpdiag-Case-5.xml** ```xml - {fd65507b-e356-4e2f-966f-0c9f9c1c6e78} - - PrivateNetwork Outbound Default Rule - PrivateNetwork Outbound Default Rule - - - FWPM_PROVIDER_MPSSVC_WSH - - f22d000000000000 - .-...... - - FWPM_LAYER_ALE_AUTH_CONNECT_V4 - FWPM_SUBLAYER_MPSSVC_WSH - - FWP_EMPTY - - - - FWPM_CONDITION_ALE_PACKAGE_ID - FWP_MATCH_NOT_EQUAL - - FWP_SID - S-1-0-0 - - - - FWPM_CONDITION_IP_REMOTE_ADDRESS - FWP_MATCH_EQUAL - - FWP_UINT32 - 1.1.1.1 - - - - FWPM_CONDITION_ORIGINAL_PROFILE_ID - FWP_MATCH_EQUAL - - FWP_UINT32 - 1 - - - - FWPM_CONDITION_CURRENT_PROFILE_ID - FWP_MATCH_EQUAL - - FWP_UINT32 - 1 - - - - FWPM_CONDITION_ALE_USER_ID - FWP_MATCH_EQUAL - - FWP_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_TYPE - O:LSD:(A;;CC;;;S-1-15-3-3)(A;;CC;;;WD)(A;;CC;;;AN) - - - - - FWP_ACTION_PERMIT - - - 0 - - 129656 - - FWP_UINT64 - 144115600392724416 - - - - {b11b4f8a-222e-49d6-8d69-02728681d8bc} - - PrivateNetwork Outbound Default Rule - PrivateNetwork Outbound Default Rule - - - FWPM_PROVIDER_MPSSVC_WSH - - f22d000000000000 - .-...... - - FWPM_LAYER_ALE_AUTH_CONNECT_V4 - FWPM_SUBLAYER_MPSSVC_WSH - - FWP_EMPTY - - - - FWPM_CONDITION_ALE_PACKAGE_ID - FWP_MATCH_NOT_EQUAL - - FWP_SID - S-1-0-0 - - - - FWPM_CONDITION_IP_REMOTE_ADDRESS - FWP_MATCH_RANGE - - FWP_RANGE_TYPE - - - FWP_UINT32 - 172.16.0.0 - - - FWP_UINT32 - 172.31.255.255 - - - - - - FWPM_CONDITION_ORIGINAL_PROFILE_ID - FWP_MATCH_EQUAL - - FWP_UINT32 - 1 - - - - FWPM_CONDITION_CURRENT_PROFILE_ID - FWP_MATCH_EQUAL - - FWP_UINT32 - 1 - - - - FWPM_CONDITION_ALE_USER_ID - FWP_MATCH_EQUAL - - FWP_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_TYPE - O:LSD:(A;;CC;;;S-1-15-3-3)(A;;CC;;;WD)(A;;CC;;;AN) - - - - - FWP_ACTION_PERMIT - - - 0 - - 129657 - - FWP_UINT64 - 36029209335832512 - + {fd65507b-e356-4e2f-966f-0c9f9c1c6e78} + + PrivateNetwork Outbound Default Rule + PrivateNetwork Outbound Default Rule + + + FWPM_PROVIDER_MPSSVC_WSH + + f22d000000000000 + .-...... + + FWPM_LAYER_ALE_AUTH_CONNECT_V4 + FWPM_SUBLAYER_MPSSVC_WSH + + FWP_EMPTY + + + + FWPM_CONDITION_ALE_PACKAGE_ID + FWP_MATCH_NOT_EQUAL + + FWP_SID + S-1-0-0 + + + + FWPM_CONDITION_IP_REMOTE_ADDRESS + FWP_MATCH_EQUAL + + FWP_UINT32 + 1.1.1.1 + + + + FWPM_CONDITION_ORIGINAL_PROFILE_ID + FWP_MATCH_EQUAL + + FWP_UINT32 + 1 + + + + FWPM_CONDITION_CURRENT_PROFILE_ID + FWP_MATCH_EQUAL + + FWP_UINT32 + 1 + + + + FWPM_CONDITION_ALE_USER_ID + FWP_MATCH_EQUAL + + FWP_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_TYPE + O:LSD:(A;;CC;;;S-1-15-3-3)(A;;CC;;;WD)(A;;CC;;;AN) + + + + + FWP_ACTION_PERMIT + + + 0 + + 129656 + + FWP_UINT64 + 144115600392724416 + + + + {b11b4f8a-222e-49d6-8d69-02728681d8bc} + + PrivateNetwork Outbound Default Rule + PrivateNetwork Outbound Default Rule + + + FWPM_PROVIDER_MPSSVC_WSH + + f22d000000000000 + .-...... + + FWPM_LAYER_ALE_AUTH_CONNECT_V4 + FWPM_SUBLAYER_MPSSVC_WSH + + FWP_EMPTY + + + + FWPM_CONDITION_ALE_PACKAGE_ID + FWP_MATCH_NOT_EQUAL + + FWP_SID + S-1-0-0 + + + + FWPM_CONDITION_IP_REMOTE_ADDRESS + FWP_MATCH_RANGE + + FWP_RANGE_TYPE + + + FWP_UINT32 + 172.16.0.0 + + + FWP_UINT32 + 172.31.255.255 + + + + + + FWPM_CONDITION_ORIGINAL_PROFILE_ID + FWP_MATCH_EQUAL + + FWP_UINT32 + 1 + + + + FWPM_CONDITION_CURRENT_PROFILE_ID + FWP_MATCH_EQUAL + + FWP_UINT32 + 1 + + + + FWPM_CONDITION_ALE_USER_ID + FWP_MATCH_EQUAL + + FWP_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_TYPE + O:LSD:(A;;CC;;;S-1-15-3-3)(A;;CC;;;WD)(A;;CC;;;AN) + + + + + FWP_ACTION_PERMIT + + + 0 + + 129657 + + FWP_UINT64 + 36029209335832512 + - {21cd82bc-6077-4069-94bf-750e5a43ca23} - - PrivateNetwork Outbound Default Rule - PrivateNetwork Outbound Default Rule - - - FWPM_PROVIDER_MPSSVC_WSH - - f22d000000000000 - .-...... - - FWPM_LAYER_ALE_AUTH_CONNECT_V4 - FWPM_SUBLAYER_MPSSVC_WSH - - FWP_EMPTY - - - - FWPM_CONDITION_ALE_PACKAGE_ID - FWP_MATCH_NOT_EQUAL - - FWP_SID - S-1-0-0 - - - - FWPM_CONDITION_IP_REMOTE_ADDRESS - FWP_MATCH_RANGE - - FWP_RANGE_TYPE - - - FWP_UINT32 - 192.168.0.0 - - - FWP_UINT32 - 192.168.255.255 - - - - - - FWPM_CONDITION_ORIGINAL_PROFILE_ID - FWP_MATCH_EQUAL - - FWP_UINT32 - 1 - - - - FWPM_CONDITION_CURRENT_PROFILE_ID - FWP_MATCH_EQUAL - - FWP_UINT32 - 1 - - - - FWPM_CONDITION_ALE_USER_ID - FWP_MATCH_EQUAL - - FWP_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_TYPE - O:LSD:(A;;CC;;;S-1-15-3-3)(A;;CC;;;WD)(A;;CC;;;AN) - - - - - FWP_ACTION_PERMIT - - - 0 - - 129658 - - FWP_UINT64 - 36029209335832512 - + {21cd82bc-6077-4069-94bf-750e5a43ca23} + + PrivateNetwork Outbound Default Rule + PrivateNetwork Outbound Default Rule + + + FWPM_PROVIDER_MPSSVC_WSH + + f22d000000000000 + .-...... + + FWPM_LAYER_ALE_AUTH_CONNECT_V4 + FWPM_SUBLAYER_MPSSVC_WSH + + FWP_EMPTY + + + + FWPM_CONDITION_ALE_PACKAGE_ID + FWP_MATCH_NOT_EQUAL + + FWP_SID + S-1-0-0 + + + + FWPM_CONDITION_IP_REMOTE_ADDRESS + FWP_MATCH_RANGE + + FWP_RANGE_TYPE + + + FWP_UINT32 + 192.168.0.0 + + + FWP_UINT32 + 192.168.255.255 + + + + + + FWPM_CONDITION_ORIGINAL_PROFILE_ID + FWP_MATCH_EQUAL + + FWP_UINT32 + 1 + + + + FWPM_CONDITION_CURRENT_PROFILE_ID + FWP_MATCH_EQUAL + + FWP_UINT32 + 1 + + + + FWPM_CONDITION_ALE_USER_ID + FWP_MATCH_EQUAL + + FWP_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_TYPE + O:LSD:(A;;CC;;;S-1-15-3-3)(A;;CC;;;WD)(A;;CC;;;AN) + + + + + FWP_ACTION_PERMIT + + + 0 + + 129658 + + FWP_UINT64 + 36029209335832512 + ``` -## Debugging Past Drops -If you're debugging a network drop from the past or from a remote machine, you -may have traces already collected from Feedback Hub, such as nettrace.etl and -wfpstate.xml. Once nettrace.etl is converted, nettrace.txt will have the -netEvents of the reproduced event, and wfpstate.xml will contain the filters -that were present on the machine at the time. +## Debugging Past Drops -If you don't have a live repro or traces already collected, you can still -collect traces after the UWP network connectivity issue has happened by running -these commands in an admin command prompt +If you're debugging a network drop from the past or from a remote machine, you may have traces already collected from Feedback Hub, such as nettrace.etl and wfpstate.xml. Once nettrace.etl is converted, nettrace.txt will have the netEvents of the reproduced event, and wfpstate.xml will contain the filters that were present on the machine at the time. + +If you don't have a live repro or traces already collected, you can still collect traces after the UWP network connectivity issue has happened by running these commands in an admin command prompt: ```xml - - Netsh wfp show netevents - Netsh wfp show state + + Netsh wfp show netevents + Netsh wfp show state ``` -**Netsh wfp show netevents** creates netevents.xml, which contains the past -net events. **Netsh wfp show state** creates wfpstate.xml, which contains -the current filters present on the machine. +`Netsh wfp show netevents` creates `netevents.xml`, which contains the past net events. `Netsh wfp show state` creates wfpstate.xml, which contains the current filters present on the machine. Unfortunately, collecting traces after the UWP network connectivity issue isn't always reliable. -NetEvents on the device are stored in a buffer. Once that buffer has reached -maximum capacity, the buffer will overwrite older net events. Due to the buffer -overwrite, it's possible that the collected netevents.xml won't contain the -net event associated with the UWP network connectivity issue. It could have been ov -overwritten. Additionally, filters on the device can get deleted and re-added -with different filterIds due to miscellaneous events on the device. Because of -these implications, a **filterId** from **netsh wfp show netevents** may not necessarily match any -filter in **netsh wfp show state** because that **filterId** may be outdated. +NetEvents on the device are stored in a buffer. Once that buffer has reached maximum capacity, the buffer will overwrite older net events. Due to the buffer overwrite, it's possible that the collected netevents.xml won't contain the net event associated with the UWP network connectivity issue. It could have been overwritten. Additionally, filters on the device can get deleted and re-added with different filterIds due to miscellaneous events on the device. Because of these implications, a **filterId** from **netsh wfp show netevents** may not necessarily match any filter in **netsh wfp show state** because that **filterId** may be outdated. -If you can reproduce the UWP network connectivity issue consistently, we -recommend using the commands from Debugging Live Drops instead. +If you can reproduce the UWP network connectivity issue consistently, we recommend using the commands from Debugging Live Drops instead. -Additionally, you can still follow the examples from Debugging Live Drops -section using the trace commands in this section, even if you don't have a live -repro. The **netEvents** and filters are stored in one file in Debugging Live Drops +Additionally, you can still follow the examples from Debugging Live Drops section using the trace commands in this section, even if you don't have a live repro. The **netEvents** and filters are stored in one file in Debugging Live Drops as opposed to two separate files in the following Debugging Past Drops examples. ## Case 7: Debugging Past Drop - UWP app can't reach Internet target address and has no capabilities In this example, the UWP app is unable to connect to bing.com. -Classify Drop Net Event, NetEvents-Case-7.xml +### Classify Drop Net Event, `NetEvents-Case-7.xml` ```xml @@ -1108,15 +1086,12 @@ Classify Drop Net Event, NetEvents-Case-7.xml ``` -The Internal fields list no active capabilities, and the packet is dropped at -filter 206064. +The Internal fields list no active capabilities, and the packet is dropped at nfilter 206064. -This filter is a default block rule filter, meaning the packet passed through every -filter that could have allowed it, but because conditions didn’t match for any of -those filters, the packet fell to the filter that blocks any packet that the -Security Descriptor doesn’t match. +This filter is a default block rule filter, meaning the packet passed through every filter that could have allowed it, but because conditions didn't match for any of those filters, the packet fell to the filter that blocks any packet that the +Security Descriptor doesn't match. -**Block Outbound Default Rule Filter \#206064, FilterState-Case-7.xml** +### Block Outbound Default Rule Filter #206064, `FilterState-Case-7.xml` ```xml @@ -1159,165 +1134,166 @@ Security Descriptor doesn’t match. ``` + ## Case 8: Debugging Past Drop - UWP app connects to Internet target address with all capabilities In this example, the UWP app successfully connects to bing.com [204.79.197.200]. -**Classify Allow Net Event, NetEvents-Case-8.xml** +### Classify Allow Net Event, `NetEvents-Case-8.xml` ```xml -
    - 2020-05-04T18:49:55.101Z - - FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_IP_PROTOCOL_SET - FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_LOCAL_ADDR_SET - FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_REMOTE_ADDR_SET - FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_LOCAL_PORT_SET - FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_REMOTE_PORT_SET - FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_APP_ID_SET - FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_USER_ID_SET - FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_IP_VERSION_SET - FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_PACKAGE_ID_SET - - FWP_IP_VERSION_V4 - 6 - 10.195.36.30 - 204.79.197.200 - 61673 - 443 - 0 - - 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 - \\.d.e.v.i.c.e.\\.h.a.r.d.d.i.s.k.v.o.l.u.m.e.1.\\.p.r.o.g.r.a.m. - .f.i.l.e.s.\\.w.i.n.d.o.w.s.a.p.p.s.\\.a.f.6.9.2.b.f.f.-.6.7.7.9.-.4.2.4.f.-.8.7.0.e.-.f.6.e.5.9.c.5.0.2.3.4.9._.1...1...1.0...0._.x.6.4._._.5.c.0.3.7.j.a.r.5.8.3.9.r.\\.u.w.p.s.o.c.k.e.t.c.l.i.e.n.t...e.x.e... - - S-1-5-21-1578316205-4060061518-881547182-1000 - FWP_AF_INET - S-1-15-2-4163697451-3176919390-1155390458-2883473650-3020241727-522149888-4067122936 - - 0 - -
    - FWPM_NET_EVENT_TYPE_CLASSIFY_ALLOW - - 208757 - 48 - 0 - 1 - 1 - - - - 0000000000000000 - - FWP_CAPABILITIES_FLAG_INTERNET_CLIENT - FWP_CAPABILITIES_FLAG_INTERNET_CLIENT_SERVER - FWP_CAPABILITIES_FLAG_PRIVATE_NETWORK - - 0 - - - - 208757 - FWPP_SUBLAYER_INTERNAL_FIREWALL_WSH - FWP_ACTION_PERMIT - - - 206049 - FWPP_SUBLAYER_INTERNAL_FIREWALL_WF - FWP_ACTION_PERMIT - - - +
    + 2020-05-04T18:49:55.101Z + + FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_IP_PROTOCOL_SET + FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_LOCAL_ADDR_SET + FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_REMOTE_ADDR_SET + FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_LOCAL_PORT_SET + FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_REMOTE_PORT_SET + FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_APP_ID_SET + FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_USER_ID_SET + FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_IP_VERSION_SET + FWPM_NET_EVENT_FLAG_PACKAGE_ID_SET + + FWP_IP_VERSION_V4 + 6 + 10.195.36.30 + 204.79.197.200 + 61673 + 443 + 0 + + 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 + \\.d.e.v.i.c.e.\\.h.a.r.d.d.i.s.k.v.o.l.u.m.e.1.\\.p.r.o.g.r.a.m. + .f.i.l.e.s.\\.w.i.n.d.o.w.s.a.p.p.s.\\.a.f.6.9.2.b.f.f.-.6.7.7.9.-.4.2.4.f.-.8.7.0.e.-.f.6.e.5.9.c.5.0.2.3.4.9._.1...1...1.0...0._.x.6.4._._.5.c.0.3.7.j.a.r.5.8.3.9.r.\\.u.w.p.s.o.c.k.e.t.c.l.i.e.n.t...e.x.e... + + S-1-5-21-1578316205-4060061518-881547182-1000 + FWP_AF_INET + S-1-15-2-4163697451-3176919390-1155390458-2883473650-3020241727-522149888-4067122936 + + 0 + +
    + FWPM_NET_EVENT_TYPE_CLASSIFY_ALLOW + + 208757 + 48 + 0 + 1 + 1 + + + + 0000000000000000 + + FWP_CAPABILITIES_FLAG_INTERNET_CLIENT + FWP_CAPABILITIES_FLAG_INTERNET_CLIENT_SERVER + FWP_CAPABILITIES_FLAG_PRIVATE_NETWORK + + 0 + + + + 208757 + FWPP_SUBLAYER_INTERNAL_FIREWALL_WSH + FWP_ACTION_PERMIT + + + 206049 + FWPP_SUBLAYER_INTERNAL_FIREWALL_WF + FWP_ACTION_PERMIT + + +     ``` + All capabilities are enabled and the resulting filter determining the flow of the packet is 208757. The filter stated above with action permit: -**InternetClient Default Rule Filter \#208757, FilterState-Case-8.xml** +### InternetClient Default Rule Filter #208757, `FilterState-Case-8.xml` + ```xml - {e0f6f24e-1f0a-4f1a-bdd8-b9277c144fb5} - - InternetClient Default Rule - InternetClient Default Rule - - - FWPM_PROVIDER_MPSSVC_WSH - - e167000000000000 - .g...... - - FWPM_LAYER_ALE_AUTH_CONNECT_V4 - FWPM_SUBLAYER_MPSSVC_WSH - - FWP_EMPTY - - - - FWPM_CONDITION_ALE_PACKAGE_ID - FWP_MATCH_NOT_EQUAL - - FWP_SID - S-1-0-0 - - - - FWPM_CONDITION_IP_REMOTE_ADDRESS - FWP_MATCH_RANGE - - FWP_RANGE_TYPE - - - FWP_UINT32 - 0.0.0.0 - - - FWP_UINT32 - 255.255.255.255 - - - - - - FWPM_CONDITION_ORIGINAL_PROFILE_ID - FWP_MATCH_EQUAL - - FWP_UINT32 - 1 - - - - FWPM_CONDITION_CURRENT_PROFILE_ID - FWP_MATCH_EQUAL - - FWP_UINT32 - 1 - - - - FWPM_CONDITION_ALE_USER_ID - FWP_MATCH_EQUAL - - FWP_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_TYPE - O:LSD:(A;;CC;;;S-1-15-3-1)(A;;CC;;;WD)(A;;CC;;;AN) - - - - - FWP_ACTION_PERMIT - - - 0 - - 208757 - - FWP_UINT64 - 412316868544 - - + {e0f6f24e-1f0a-4f1a-bdd8-b9277c144fb5} + + InternetClient Default Rule + InternetClient Default Rule + + + FWPM_PROVIDER_MPSSVC_WSH + + e167000000000000 + .g...... + + FWPM_LAYER_ALE_AUTH_CONNECT_V4 + FWPM_SUBLAYER_MPSSVC_WSH + + FWP_EMPTY + + + + FWPM_CONDITION_ALE_PACKAGE_ID + FWP_MATCH_NOT_EQUAL + + FWP_SID + S-1-0-0 + + + + FWPM_CONDITION_IP_REMOTE_ADDRESS + FWP_MATCH_RANGE + + FWP_RANGE_TYPE + + + FWP_UINT32 + 0.0.0.0 + + + FWP_UINT32 + 255.255.255.255 + + + + + + FWPM_CONDITION_ORIGINAL_PROFILE_ID + FWP_MATCH_EQUAL + + FWP_UINT32 + 1 + + + + FWPM_CONDITION_CURRENT_PROFILE_ID + FWP_MATCH_EQUAL + + FWP_UINT32 + 1 + + + + FWPM_CONDITION_ALE_USER_ID + FWP_MATCH_EQUAL + + FWP_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_TYPE + O:LSD:(A;;CC;;;S-1-15-3-1)(A;;CC;;;WD)(A;;CC;;;AN) + + + + + FWP_ACTION_PERMIT + + + 0 + + 208757 + + FWP_UINT64 + 412316868544 + + ``` -The capabilities field in a netEvent was added to the traces in the Windows 10 -May 2019 Update. diff --git a/windows/security/security-foundations/zero-trust-windows-device-health.md b/windows/security/security-foundations/zero-trust-windows-device-health.md index 65cc2e9e7d..f80e2bf591 100644 --- a/windows/security/security-foundations/zero-trust-windows-device-health.md +++ b/windows/security/security-foundations/zero-trust-windows-device-health.md @@ -1,14 +1,11 @@ --- title: Zero Trust and Windows device health description: Describes the process of Windows device health attestation -ms.reviewer: ms.topic: conceptual manager: aaroncz ms.author: paoloma author: paolomatarazzo -ms.prod: windows-client -ms.technology: itpro-security -ms.date: 12/31/2017 +ms.date: 11/07/2023 --- # Zero Trust and Windows device health @@ -17,11 +14,9 @@ Organizations need a security model that more effectively adapts to the complexi The [Zero Trust](https://www.microsoft.com/security/business/zero-trust) principles are: -- **Verify explicitly**. Always authenticate and authorize based on all available data points, including user identity, location, device health, service or workload, data classification, and monitor anomalies. - -- **Use least-privileged access**. Limit user access with just-in-time and just-enough-access, risk-based adaptive policies, and data protection to help secure data and maintain productivity. - -- **Assume breach**. Prevent attackers from obtaining access to minimize potential damage to data and systems. Protect privileged roles, verify end-to-end encryption, use analytics to get visibility, and drive threat detection to improve defenses. +- **Verify explicitly**. Always authenticate and authorize based on all available data points, including user identity, location, device health, service or workload, data classification, and monitor anomalies +- **Use least-privileged access**. Limit user access with just-in-time and just-enough-access, risk-based adaptive policies, and data protection to help secure data and maintain productivity +- **Assume breach**. Prevent attackers from obtaining access to minimize potential damage to data and systems. Protect privileged roles, verify end-to-end encryption, use analytics to get visibility, and drive threat detection to improve defenses The Zero Trust concept of **verify explicitly** applies to the risks introduced by both devices and users. Windows enables **device health attestation** and **conditional access** capabilities, which are used to grant access to corporate resources. @@ -45,25 +40,19 @@ Windows includes many security features to help protect users from malware and a A summary of the steps involved in attestation and Zero Trust on the device side are as follows: -1. During each step of the boot process, such as a file load, update of special variables, and more, information such as file hashes and signature are measured in the TPM PCRs. The measurements are bound by a [Trusted Computing Group specification](https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/pc-client-platform-tpm-profile-ptp-specification/) (TCG) that dictates what events can be recorded and the format of each event. +1. During each step of the boot process, such as a file load, update of special variables, and more, information such as file hashes and signature are measured in the TPM PCRs. The measurements are bound by a [Trusted Computing Group specification](https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/pc-client-platform-tpm-profile-ptp-specification/) (TCG) that dictates what events can be recorded and the format of each event +1. Once Windows has booted, the attestor/verifier requests the TPM to fetch the measurements stored in its Platform Configuration Register (PCR) alongside a TCG log. The measurements in both these components together form the attestation evidence that is then sent to the attestation service +1. The TPM is verified by using the keys/cryptographic material available on the chipset with an [Azure Certificate Service](/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/tpm-key-attestation) +1. This information is then sent to the attestation service in the cloud to verify that the device is safe. Microsoft Endpoint Manger integrates with Microsoft Azure Attestation to review device health comprehensively and connect this information with Microsoft Entra Conditional Access. This integration is key for Zero Trust solutions that help bind trust to an untrusted device +1. The attestation service does the following tasks: -2. Once Windows has booted, the attestor/verifier requests the TPM to fetch the measurements stored in its Platform Configuration Register (PCR) alongside a TCG log. The measurements in both these components together form the attestation evidence that is then sent to the attestation service. + - Verify the integrity of the evidence. This verification is done by validating the PCRs that match the values recomputed by replaying the TCG log + - Verify that the TPM has a valid Attestation Identity Key issued by the authenticated TPM + - Verify that the security features are in the expected states -3. The TPM is verified by using the keys/cryptographic material available on the chipset with an [Azure Certificate Service](/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/tpm-key-attestation). - -4. This information is then sent to the attestation service in the cloud to verify that the device is safe. Microsoft Endpoint Manger integrates with Microsoft Azure Attestation to review device health comprehensively and connect this information with Microsoft Entra Conditional Access. This integration is key for Zero Trust solutions that help bind trust to an untrusted device. - -5. The attestation service does the following tasks: - - - Verify the integrity of the evidence. This verification is done by validating the PCRs that match the values recomputed by replaying the TCG log. - - Verify that the TPM has a valid Attestation Identity Key issued by the authenticated TPM. - - Verify that the security features are in the expected states. - -6. The attestation service returns an attestation report that contains information about the security features based on the policy configured in the attestation service. - -7. The device then sends the report to the Microsoft Intune cloud to assess the trustworthiness of the platform according to the admin-configured device compliance rules. - -8. Conditional access, along with device-compliance state then decides to allow or deny access. +1. The attestation service returns an attestation report that contains information about the security features based on the policy configured in the attestation service +1. The device then sends the report to the Microsoft Intune cloud to assess the trustworthiness of the platform according to the admin-configured device compliance rules +1. Conditional access, along with device-compliance state then decides to allow or deny access ## Other Resources diff --git a/windows/whats-new/deprecated-features.md b/windows/whats-new/deprecated-features.md index e48df0109c..2e3845bfba 100644 --- a/windows/whats-new/deprecated-features.md +++ b/windows/whats-new/deprecated-features.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ --- title: Deprecated features in the Windows client description: Review the list of features that Microsoft is no longer actively developing in Windows 10 and Windows 11. -ms.date: 11/03/2023 +ms.date: 11/07/2023 ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-fundamentals ms.localizationpriority: medium @@ -36,17 +36,18 @@ The features in this article are no longer being actively developed, and might b |Feature | Details and mitigation | Deprecation announced | | --- | --- | --- | +| Tips | The Tips app is deprecated and will be removed in a future release of Windows. Content in the app will continue to be updated with information about new Windows features until the app is removed. | November 2023 | | Computer Browser | The Computer Browser driver and service are deprecated. The browser (browser protocol and service) is a dated and insecure device location protocol. This protocol, service, and driver were first disabled by default in Windows 10 with the removal of the SMB1 service. For more information on Computer Browser, see [MS-BRWS Common Internet File System](/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-brws/3cfbad92-09b3-4abc-808f-c6f6347d5677). | November 2023 | | Webclient (WebDAV) Service | The Webclient (WebDAV) service is deprecated. The Webclient service isn't started by default in Windows. For more information on WebDAV, see [WebDAV - Win32 apps](/windows/win32/webdav/webdav-portal). | November 2023 | | Remote Mailslots | Remote Mailslots are deprecated. The Remote Mailslot protocol is a dated, simple, unreliable, insecure IPC method first introduced in MS DOS. This protocol was first disabled by default in [Windows 11 Insider Preview Build ](https://blogs.windows.com/windows-insider/2023/03/08/announcing-windows-11-insider-preview-build-25314/). For more information on Remote Mailslots, see [About Mailslots](/windows/win32/ipc/about-mailslots) and [[MS-MAIL]: Remote Mailslot Protocol](/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-mail/8ea19aa4-6e5a-4aed-b628-0b5cd75a1ab9).| November 2023 | | Timeline for Microsoft Entra accounts | Cross-device syncing of Microsoft Entra user activity history will stop starting in January 2024. Microsoft will stop storing this data in the cloud, aligning with [the previous change for Microsoft accounts (MSA)](https://blogs.windows.com/windows-insider/2021/04/14/announcing-windows-10-insider-preview-build-21359) in 2021. The timeline user experience was retired in Windows 11, although it remains in Windows 10. The timeline user experience and all your local activity history still remains on Windows 10 devices. Users can access web history using their browser and access recent files through OneDrive and Office. | October 2023 | -| VBScript | VBScript is being deprecated. In future releases of Windows, VBScript will be available as a feature on demand before its removal from the operating system. For more information, see [Resources for deprecated features](deprecated-features-resources.md#vbscript). | October 2023 | +| VBScript | VBScript is deprecated. In future releases of Windows, VBScript will be available as a feature on demand before its removal from the operating system. For more information, see [Resources for deprecated features](deprecated-features-resources.md#vbscript). | October 2023 | | WordPad | WordPad is no longer being updated and will be removed in a future release of Windows. We recommend Microsoft Word for rich text documents like .doc and .rtf and Windows Notepad for plain text documents like .txt. | September 1, 2023 | | AllJoyn | Microsoft's implementation of AllJoyn which included the [Windows.Devices.AllJoyn API namespace](/uwp/api/windows.devices.alljoyn), a [Win32 API](/windows/win32/api/_alljoyn/), a [management configuration service provider (CSP)](/windows/client-management/mdm/alljoynmanagement-csp), and an [Alljoyn Router Service](/windows-server/security/windows-services/security-guidelines-for-disabling-system-services-in-windows-server#alljoyn-router-service) has been deprecated. [AllJoyn](https://openconnectivity.org/technology/reference-implementation/alljoyn/), sponsored by AllSeen Alliance, was an open source discovery and communication protocol for Internet of Things scenarios such as turning on/off lights or reading temperatures.AllSeen Alliance promoted the AllJoyn project from 2013 until 2016 when it merged with the Open Connectivity Foundation (OCF), the sponsors of [Iotivity.org](https://iotivity.org/), another protocol for Internet of Things scenarios. Customers should refer to the [Iotivity.org](https://iotivity.org/) website for alternatives such as [Iotivity Lite](https://github.com/iotivity/iotivity-lite) or [Iotivity](https://github.com/iotivity/iotivity). | August 17, 2023 | | TLS 1.0 and 1.1 | Over the past several years, internet standards and regulatory bodies have [deprecated or disallowed](https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8996.html) TLS versions 1.0 and 1.1 due to various security issues. Starting in Windows 11 Insider Preview builds for September 2023 and continuing in future Windows OS releases, TLS 1.0 and 1.1 will be disabled by default. This change increases the security posture of Windows customers and encourages modern protocol adoption. For organizations that need to use these versions, there's an option to re-enable TLS 1.0 or TLS 1.1. For more information, see [Resources for deprecated features](deprecated-features-resources.md). | August 1, 2023| | Cortana in Windows | Cortana in Windows as a standalone app is deprecated. This change only impacts Cortana in Windows, and your productivity assistant, Cortana, will continue to be available in Outlook mobile, Teams mobile, Microsoft Teams display, and Microsoft Teams rooms. | June 2023 | | Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool (MSDT) | [MSDT](/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/msdt) is deprecated and will be removed in a future release of Windows. MSDT is used to gather diagnostic data for analysis by support professionals. For more information, see [Resources for deprecated features](deprecated-features-resources.md) | January 2023 | -| Universal Windows Platform (UWP) Applications for 32-bit Arm | This change is applicable only to devices with an Arm processor, for example Snapdragon processors from Qualcomm. If you have a PC built with a processor from Intel or AMD, this content is not applicable. If you are not sure which type of processor you have, check **Settings** > **System** > **About**.

    Support for 32-bit Arm versions of applications will be removed in a future release of Windows 11. After this change, for the small number of applications affected, app features might be different and you might notice a difference in performance. For more technical details about this change, see [Update app architecture from Arm32 to Arm64](/windows/arm/arm32-to-arm64). | January 2023 | +| Universal Windows Platform (UWP) Applications for 32-bit Arm | This change is applicable only to devices with an Arm processor, for example Snapdragon processors from Qualcomm. If you have a PC built with a processor from Intel or AMD, this content isn't applicable. If you aren't sure which type of processor you have, check **Settings** > **System** > **About**.

    Support for 32-bit Arm versions of applications will be removed in a future release of Windows 11. After this change, for the small number of applications affected, app features might be different and you might notice a difference in performance. For more technical details about this change, see [Update app architecture from Arm32 to Arm64](/windows/arm/arm32-to-arm64). | January 2023 | | Update Compliance | [Update Compliance](/windows/deployment/update/update-compliance-monitor), a cloud-based service for the Windows client, is no longer being developed. This service has been replaced with [Windows Update for Business reports](/windows/deployment/update/wufb-reports-overview), which provides reporting on client compliance with Microsoft updates from the Azure portal. | November 2022| | Windows Information Protection | [Windows Information Protection](/windows/security/information-protection/windows-information-protection/protect-enterprise-data-using-wip) will no longer be developed in future versions of Windows. For more information, see [Announcing sunset of Windows Information Protection (WIP)](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2202124).

    For your data protection needs, Microsoft recommends that you use [Microsoft Purview Information Protection](/microsoft-365/compliance/information-protection) and [Microsoft Purview Data Loss Prevention](/microsoft-365/compliance/dlp-learn-about-dlp). | July 2022 | | BitLocker To Go Reader | **Note: BitLocker to Go as a feature is still supported.**
    Reading of BitLocker-protected removable drives ([BitLocker To Go](/windows/security/information-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-to-go-faq)) from Windows XP or Windows Vista in later operating systems is deprecated and might be removed in a future release of Windows client.
    The following items might not be available in a future release of Windows client:
    - ADMX policy: **Allow access to BitLocker-protected removable data drives from earlier versions of Windows**
    - Command line parameter: [`manage-bde -DiscoveryVolumeType`](/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/manage-bde-on) (-dv)
    - Catalog file: **c:\windows\BitLockerDiscoveryVolumeContents**
    - BitLocker 2 Go Reader app: **bitlockertogo.exe** and associated files | 21H1 |