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how-it-works updates
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ms.date: 06/26/2023
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ms.date: 08/08/2023
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title: How Windows Defender Credential Guard works
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title: How Windows Defender Credential Guard works
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description: Learn how Windows Defender Credential Guard uses virtualization to protect secrets, so that only privileged system software can access them.
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description: Learn how Windows Defender Credential Guard uses virtualization to protect secrets, so that only privileged system software can access them.
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ms.topic: conceptual
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ms.topic: conceptual
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# How Windows Defender Credential Guard works
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# How Windows Defender Credential Guard works
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Kerberos, NTLM, and Credential manager isolate secrets by using virtualization-based security. Previous versions of Windows stored secrets in the Local Security Authority (LSA). Prior to Windows 10, the LSA stored secrets used by the operating system in its process memory. With Windows Defender Credential Guard enabled, the LSA process in the operating system talks to a new component called the isolated LSA process that stores and protects those secrets. Data stored by the isolated LSA process is protected using Virtualization-based security and isn't accessible to the rest of the operating system. LSA uses remote procedure calls to communicate with the isolated LSA process.
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Kerberos, NTLM, and Credential Manager isolate secrets by using virtualization-based security (VBS). Previous versions of Windows stored secrets in its process memory, in the Local Security Authority (LSA) process. With Windows Defender Credential Guard enabled, the LSA process in the operating system talks to a component called the *isolated LSA process* that stores and protects those secrets. Data stored by the isolated LSA process is protected using VBS and isn't accessible to the rest of the operating system. LSA uses remote procedure calls to communicate with the isolated LSA process.
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For security reasons, the isolated LSA process doesn't host any device drivers. Instead, it only hosts a small subset of operating system binaries that are needed for security and nothing else. All of these binaries are signed with a certificate that is trusted by virtualization-based security and these signatures are validated before launching the file in the protected environment.
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For security reasons, the isolated LSA process doesn't host any device drivers. Instead, it only hosts a small subset of operating system binaries that are needed for security and nothing else. All the binaries are signed with a certificate that is trusted by VBS and the signatures are validated before launching the file in the protected environment.
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When Windows Defender Credential Guard is enabled, NTLMv1, MS-CHAPv2, Digest, and CredSSP can't use the signed-in credentials. Thus, single sign-on doesn't work with these protocols. However, applications can prompt for credentials or use credentials stored in the Windows Vault, which aren't protected by Windows Defender Credential Guard with any of these protocols. It is recommended that valuable credentials, such as the sign-in credentials, aren't to be used with any of these protocols. If these protocols must be used by domain or Azure AD users, secondary credentials should be provisioned for these use cases.
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When Windows Defender Credential Guard is enabled, NTLMv1, MS-CHAPv2, Digest, and CredSSP can't use the signed-in credentials. Thus, single sign-on doesn't work with these protocols. However, applications can prompt for credentials or use credentials stored in the Windows Vault, which aren't protected by Windows Defender Credential Guard with any of these protocols.
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> [!CAUTION]
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> It's recommended that valuable credentials, such as the sign-in credentials, aren't used with NTLMv1, MS-CHAPv2, Digest, or CredSSP protocols. If these protocols must be used by domain or Azure AD users, secondary credentials should be provisioned for these use cases.
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When Windows Defender Credential Guard is enabled, Kerberos doesn't allow unconstrained Kerberos delegation or DES encryption, not only for signed-in credentials, but also prompted or saved credentials.
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When Windows Defender Credential Guard is enabled, Kerberos doesn't allow unconstrained Kerberos delegation or DES encryption, not only for signed-in credentials, but also prompted or saved credentials.
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@ -25,17 +28,17 @@ Some ways to store credentials are not protected by Windows Defender Credential
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- Software that manages credentials outside of Windows feature protection
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- Software that manages credentials outside of Windows feature protection
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- Local accounts and Microsoft Accounts
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- Local accounts and Microsoft Accounts
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- Windows Defender Credential Guard doesn't protect the Active Directory database running on Windows Server domain controllers. It also doesn't protect credential input pipelines, such as Windows Server running Remote Desktop Gateway. If you're using a Windows Server OS as a client PC, it will get the same protection as it would when running a Windows client OS.
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- Windows Defender Credential Guard doesn't protect the Active Directory database running on Windows Server domain controllers. It also doesn't protect credential input pipelines, such as Windows Server running Remote Desktop Gateway. If you're using a Windows Server OS as a client PC, it will get the same protection as it would when running a Windows client OS
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- Key loggers
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- Key loggers
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- Physical attacks
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- Physical attacks
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- Doesn't prevent an attacker with malware on the PC from using the privileges associated with any credential. We recommend using dedicated PCs for high value accounts, such as IT Pros and users with access to high value assets in your organization.
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- Doesn't prevent an attacker with malware on the PC from using the privileges associated with any credential. We recommend using dedicated PCs for high value accounts, such as IT Pros and users with access to high value assets in your organization
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- Third-party security packages
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- Third-party security packages
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- Digest and CredSSP credentials
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- Digest and CredSSP credentials
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- When Windows Defender Credential Guard is enabled, neither Digest nor CredSSP have access to users' logon credentials. This implies no Single Sign-On use for these protocols.
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- When Windows Defender Credential Guard is enabled, neither Digest nor CredSSP have access to users' logon credentials. This implies no Single Sign-On use for these protocols
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- Supplied credentials for NTLM authentication aren't protected. If a user is prompted for and enters credentials for NTLM authentication, these credentials are vulnerable to be read from LSASS memory. These same credentials are vulnerable to key loggers as well.-
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- Supplied credentials for NTLM authentication aren't protected. If a user is prompted for and enters credentials for NTLM authentication, these credentials are vulnerable to be read from LSASS memory. These same credentials are vulnerable to key loggers as well
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- Kerberos service tickets aren't protected by Credential Guard, but the Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) is.
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- Kerberos service tickets aren't protected by Credential Guard, but the Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) is protected
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- When Windows Defender Credential Guard is deployed on a VM, Windows Defender Credential Guard protects secrets from attacks inside the VM. However, it doesn't provide additional protection from privileged system attacks originating from the host.
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- When Windows Defender Credential Guard is deployed on a VM, Windows Defender Credential Guard protects secrets from attacks inside the VM. However, it doesn't provide additional protection from privileged system attacks originating from the host
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- Windows logon cached password verifiers (commonly called "cached credentials")
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- Windows logon cached password verifiers (commonly called *cached credentials*)
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don't qualify as credentials because they can't be presented to another computer for authentication, and can only be used locally to verify credentials. They're stored in the registry on the local computer and provide validation for credentials when a domain-joined computer can't connect to AD DS during user logon. These *cached logons*, or more specifically, *cached domain account information*, can be managed using the security policy setting **Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache** if a domain controller isn't available.
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don't qualify as credentials because they can't be presented to another computer for authentication, and can only be used locally to verify credentials. They're stored in the registry on the local computer and provide validation for credentials when a domain-joined computer can't connect to AD DS during user logon. These *cached logons*, or more specifically, *cached domain account information*, can be managed using the security policy setting **Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache** if a domain controller isn't available.
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## See also
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## See also
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
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title: Windows Defender Credential Guard overview
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title: Windows Defender Credential Guard overview
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description: Learn about Windows Defender Credential Guard and how it isolates secrets so that only privileged system software can access them.
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description: Learn about Windows Defender Credential Guard and how it isolates secrets so that only privileged system software can access them.
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ms.date: 08/08/2023
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ms.date: 08/08/2023
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ms.topic: conceptual
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ms.topic: overview
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ms.collection:
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ms.collection:
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- highpri
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- highpri
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- tier1
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- tier1
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