Merge branch 'atp-rs5' of https://cpubwin.visualstudio.com/_git/it-client into atp-rs5
@ -65,7 +65,10 @@
|
||||
####### [Troubleshoot deep analysis](windows-defender-atp/respond-file-alerts-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md#troubleshoot-deep-analysis)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### [Auto investigation and remediation](windows-defender-atp/automated-investigations-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
#### [Automated investigation and remediation](windows-defender-atp/automated-investigations-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
##### [Learn about the automated investigation and remediation dashboard](windows-defender-atp/manage-auto-investigation-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### [Secure score](windows-defender-atp/overview-secure-score-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
##### [Threat analytics](windows-defender-atp/threat-analytics.md)
|
||||
###### [Threat analytics for Spectre and Meltdown](windows-defender-atp/threat-analytics-dashboard-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
@ -253,9 +256,6 @@
|
||||
###### [Use the mpcmdrun.exe command line tool to manage next generation protection](windows-defender-antivirus/command-line-arguments-windows-defender-antivirus.md)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### [Manage auto investigation and remediation](windows-defender-atp/manage-auto-investigation-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
|
||||
#### [Configure Secure score dashboard security controls](windows-defender-atp/secure-score-dashboard-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -307,7 +307,7 @@
|
||||
######## [Create and manage machine tags](windows-defender-atp/machine-tags-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
##### [Configure Managed security service provider support](windows-defender-atp/configure-mssp-support-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
##### [Configure managed security service provider (MSSP) support](windows-defender-atp/configure-mssp-support-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### Configure Microsoft threat protection integration
|
||||
|
@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ The basic security audit policy settings in **Security Settings\\Local Policies\
|
||||
|
||||
There are a number of additional differences between the security audit policy settings in these two locations.
|
||||
|
||||
There are nine basic audit policy settings under **Security Settings\\Local Policies\\Audit Policy** and settings under **Advanced Audit Policy Configuration**. The settings available in **Security Settings\\Advanced Audit Policy
|
||||
There are nine basic audit policy settings under **Security Settings\\Local Policies\\Audit Policy** and settings under **Advanced Audit Policy Configuration**. The settings available in **Security Settings\\Advanced Audit Policy
|
||||
Configuration** address similar issues as the nine basic settings in **Local Policies\\Audit Policy**, but they allow administrators to be more selective in the number and types of events to audit. For example, the basic audit policy provides a single setting for account logon, and the advanced audit policy provides four. Enabling the single basic account logon setting would be the equivalent of setting all four advanced account logon settings. In comparison, setting a single advanced audit policy setting does not generate audit events for activities that you are not interested in tracking.
|
||||
|
||||
In addition, if you enable success auditing for the basic **Audit account logon events** setting, only success events will be logged for all account logon–related behaviors. In comparison, depending on the needs of your organization, you can configure success auditing for one advanced account logon setting, failure auditing for a second advanced account logon setting, success and failure auditing for a third advanced account logon setting, or no auditing.
|
||||
@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ The rules that govern how Group Policy settings are applied propagate to the sub
|
||||
| - | - | - | -|
|
||||
| Detailed File Share Auditing | Success | Failure | Success |
|
||||
| Process Creation Auditing | Disabled | Success | Disabled |
|
||||
| Logon Auditing | Success | Failure | Failure |
|
||||
| Logon Auditing | Success | Failure | Failure |
|
||||
|
||||
## <a href="" id="bkmk-14"></a>What is the difference between an object DACL and an object SACL?
|
||||
|
||||
@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ In addition, there are a number of computer management products, such as the Aud
|
||||
|
||||
Users who examine the security event log for the first time can be a bit overwhelmed by the number of audit events that are stored there (which can quickly number in the thousands) and by the structured information that is included for each audit event. Additional information about these events, and the settings used to generate them, can be obtained from the following resources:
|
||||
|
||||
- [Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012 Security Event Details](http://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=35753)
|
||||
- [Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012 Security Event Details](https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=35753)
|
||||
- [Security Audit Events for Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?linkid=157780)
|
||||
- [Security Audit Events for Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?linkid=121868)
|
||||
- [Advanced security audit policy settings](advanced-security-audit-policy-settings.md)
|
||||
@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ Users who examine the security event log for the first time can be a bit overwhe
|
||||
To learn more about security audit policies, see the following resources:
|
||||
|
||||
- [Planning and deploying advanced security audit policies](planning-and-deploying-advanced-security-audit-policies.md)
|
||||
- [Security Monitoring and Attack Detection Planning Guide](http://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/325.advanced-security-auditing-in-windows-7-and-windows-server-2008-r2.aspx)
|
||||
- [Security Monitoring and Attack Detection Planning Guide](https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/325.advanced-security-auditing-in-windows-7-and-windows-server-2008-r2.aspx)
|
||||
- [Security Audit Events for Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?linkid=157780)
|
||||
- [Security Audit Events for Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkId=121868)
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ ms.date: 04/19/2017
|
||||
- Windows Server 2016
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
This event should be generated when registry key was virtualized using [LUAFV](http://blogs.msdn.com/b/alexcarp/archive/2009/06/25/the-deal-with-luafv-sys.aspx).
|
||||
This event should be generated when registry key was virtualized using [LUAFV](https://blogs.msdn.com/b/alexcarp/archive/2009/06/25/the-deal-with-luafv-sys.aspx).
|
||||
|
||||
This event occurs very rarely during standard LUAFV registry key virtualization.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ ms.date: 04/19/2017
|
||||
- Windows Server 2016
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
This event should be generated when file was virtualized using [LUAFV](http://blogs.msdn.com/b/alexcarp/archive/2009/06/25/the-deal-with-luafv-sys.aspx).
|
||||
This event should be generated when file was virtualized using [LUAFV](https://blogs.msdn.com/b/alexcarp/archive/2009/06/25/the-deal-with-luafv-sys.aspx).
|
||||
|
||||
This event occurs very rarely during standard LUAFV file virtualization.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ ms.date: 04/19/2017
|
||||
This topic for the IT professional describes how to monitor changes to central access policy and central access rule definitions when you use advanced security auditing options to monitor dynamic access control objects.
|
||||
Central access policies and rules determine access permissions for multiple files on multiple file servers. Therefore, it is important to monitor changes to them. Like user claim and device claim definitions, central access policy and rule definitions reside in Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS), and they can be monitored just like any other object in Active Directory. Central access policies and rules are critical elements in a Dynamic Access Control deployment. These policies and rules are stored in AD DS, so they should be less likely to be tampered with than other network objects. However, it is important to monitor these objects for potential changes in security auditing and to verify that policies are being enforced.
|
||||
|
||||
Use the following procedures to configure settings to monitor changes to central access policy and central access rule definitions and to verify the changes. These procedures assume that you have configured and deployed Dynamic Access Control, including central access policies, claims, and other components, in your network. If you have not yet deployed Dynamic Access Control in your network, see [Deploy a Central Access Policy (Demonstration Steps)](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh846167.aspx).
|
||||
Use the following procedures to configure settings to monitor changes to central access policy and central access rule definitions and to verify the changes. These procedures assume that you have configured and deployed Dynamic Access Control, including central access policies, claims, and other components, in your network. If you have not yet deployed Dynamic Access Control in your network, see [Deploy a Central Access Policy (Demonstration Steps)](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh846167.aspx).
|
||||
|
||||
>**Note:** Your server might function differently based on the version and edition of the operating system that is installed, your account permissions, and your menu settings.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ This topic for the IT professional describes how to monitor changes to claim typ
|
||||
|
||||
Claim types are one of the basic building blocks of Dynamic Access Control. Claim types can include attributes such as the departments in an organization or the levels of security clearance that apply to classes of users. You can use security auditing to track whether claims are added, modified, enabled, disabled, or deleted.
|
||||
|
||||
Use the following procedures to configure settings to monitor changes to claim types in AD DS. These procedures assume that you have configured and deployed Dynamic Access Control, including central access policies, claims, and other components, in your network. If you have not yet deployed Dynamic
|
||||
Access Control in your network, see [Deploy a Central Access Policy (Demonstration Steps)](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh846167.aspx).
|
||||
Use the following procedures to configure settings to monitor changes to claim types in AD DS. These procedures assume that you have configured and deployed Dynamic Access Control, including central access policies, claims, and other components, in your network. If you have not yet deployed Dynamic
|
||||
Access Control in your network, see [Deploy a Central Access Policy (Demonstration Steps)](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh846167.aspx).
|
||||
|
||||
>**Note:** Your server might function differently based on the version and edition of the operating system that is installed, your account permissions, and your menu settings.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Resource attribute definitions define the basic properties of resource attribute
|
||||
|
||||
For information about monitoring changes to the resource attributes that apply to files, see [Monitor the resource attributes on files and folders](monitor-the-resource-attributes-on-files-and-folders.md).
|
||||
|
||||
Use the following procedures to configure settings to monitor changes to resource attribute definitions in AD DS and to verify the changes. These procedures assume that you have configured and deployed Dynamic Access Control, including central access policies, claims, and other components, in your network. If you have not yet deployed Dynamic Access Control in your network, see [Deploy a Central Access Policy (Demonstration Steps)](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh846167.aspx).
|
||||
Use the following procedures to configure settings to monitor changes to resource attribute definitions in AD DS and to verify the changes. These procedures assume that you have configured and deployed Dynamic Access Control, including central access policies, claims, and other components, in your network. If you have not yet deployed Dynamic Access Control in your network, see [Deploy a Central Access Policy (Demonstration Steps)](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh846167.aspx).
|
||||
|
||||
>**Note:** Your server might function differently based on the version and edition of the operating system that is installed, your account permissions, and your menu settings.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ This security audit policy and the event that it records are generated when the
|
||||
|
||||
For info about monitoring potential central access policy changes for an entire file server, see [Monitor the central access policies that apply on a file server](monitor-the-central-access-policies-that-apply-on-a-file-server.md).
|
||||
|
||||
Use the following procedures to configure settings to monitor central access policies that are associated with files. These procedures assume that you have configured and deployed Dynamic Access Control in your network. For more information about how to configure and deploy Dynamic Access Control, see [Dynamic Access Control: Scenario Overview](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh831717.aspx).
|
||||
Use the following procedures to configure settings to monitor central access policies that are associated with files. These procedures assume that you have configured and deployed Dynamic Access Control in your network. For more information about how to configure and deploy Dynamic Access Control, see [Dynamic Access Control: Scenario Overview](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh831717.aspx).
|
||||
|
||||
>**Note:** Your server might function differently based on the version and edition of the operating system that is installed, your account permissions, and your menu settings.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ ms.date: 04/19/2017
|
||||
|
||||
This topic for the IT professional describes how to monitor changes to the central access policies that apply to a file server when using advanced security auditing options to monitor dynamic access control objects. Central access policies are created on a domain controller and then applied to file servers through Group Policy management.
|
||||
|
||||
Use the following procedures to configure and verify security auditing settings that are used to monitor changes to the set of central access policies on a file server. The following procedures assume that you have configured and deployed dynamic access control, including central access policies, and claims in your network. If you have not yet deployed dynamic access control in your network, see [Deploy a Central Access Policy (Demonstration Steps)](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh846167.aspx).
|
||||
Use the following procedures to configure and verify security auditing settings that are used to monitor changes to the set of central access policies on a file server. The following procedures assume that you have configured and deployed dynamic access control, including central access policies, and claims in your network. If you have not yet deployed dynamic access control in your network, see [Deploy a Central Access Policy (Demonstration Steps)](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh846167.aspx).
|
||||
|
||||
**To configure settings to monitor changes to central access policies**
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ If your organization has a carefully thought out authorization configuration for
|
||||
- Changing the Retention attribute of files that have been marked for retention.
|
||||
- Changing the Department attribute of files that are marked as belonging to a particular department.
|
||||
|
||||
Use the following procedures to configure settings to monitor changes to resource attributes on files and folders. These procedures assume that have configured and deployed central access policies in your network. For more information about how to configure and deploy central access policies, see [Dynamic Access Control: Scenario Overview](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh831717.aspx) .
|
||||
Use the following procedures to configure settings to monitor changes to resource attributes on files and folders. These procedures assume that have configured and deployed central access policies in your network. For more information about how to configure and deploy central access policies, see [Dynamic Access Control: Scenario Overview](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh831717.aspx) .
|
||||
|
||||
>**Note:** Your server might function differently based on the version and edition of the operating system that is installed, your account permissions, and your menu settings.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ This topic for the IT professional describes how to monitor user and device clai
|
||||
|
||||
Device claims are associated with the system that is used to access resources that are protected with Dynamic Access Control. User claims are attributes that are associated with a user. User claims and device claims are included in the user’s security token used at sign-on. For example, information about Department, Company, Project, or Security clearances might be included in the token.
|
||||
|
||||
Use the following procedures to monitor changes to user claims and device claims in the user’s sign-on token and to verify the changes. These procedures assume that you have configured and deployed Dynamic Access Control, including central access policies, claims, and other components, in your network. If you have not yet deployed Dynamic Access Control in your network, see [Deploy a Central Access Policy (Demonstration Steps)](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh846167.aspx).
|
||||
Use the following procedures to monitor changes to user claims and device claims in the user’s sign-on token and to verify the changes. These procedures assume that you have configured and deployed Dynamic Access Control, including central access policies, claims, and other components, in your network. If you have not yet deployed Dynamic Access Control in your network, see [Deploy a Central Access Policy (Demonstration Steps)](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh846167.aspx).
|
||||
|
||||
>**Note:** Your server might function differently based on the version and edition of the operating system that is installed, your account permissions, and your menu settings.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ ms.date: 04/19/2017
|
||||
**Applies to**
|
||||
- Windows 10
|
||||
|
||||
This topic for the IT professional explains the options that security policy planners must consider and the tasks they must complete to deploy an effective security audit policy in a network that includes advanced security audit
|
||||
This topic for the IT professional explains the options that security policy planners must consider and the tasks they must complete to deploy an effective security audit policy in a network that includes advanced security audit
|
||||
policies.
|
||||
|
||||
Organizations invest a large portion of their information technology budgets on security applications and services, such as antimalware software, firewalls, and encryption. But no matter how much security hardware or software you deploy, how tightly you control the rights of users, or how carefully you configure security permissions on your data, you should not consider the job complete unless you have a well-defined, timely auditing strategy to track the effectiveness of your defenses and identify attempts to circumvent them.
|
||||
@ -114,9 +114,9 @@ The following table provides an example of a resource analysis for an organizati
|
||||
|
||||
| Resource class | Where stored | Organizational unit | Business impact | Security or regulatory requirements |
|
||||
| - | - | - | - | - |
|
||||
| Payroll data| Corp-Finance-1| Accounting: Read/Write on Corp-Finance-1<br/>Departmental Payroll Managers: Write only on Corp-Finance-1| High| Financial integrity and employee privacy|
|
||||
| Payroll data| Corp-Finance-1| Accounting: Read/Write on Corp-Finance-1<br/>Departmental Payroll Managers: Write only on Corp-Finance-1| High| Financial integrity and employee privacy|
|
||||
| Patient medical records| MedRec-2| Doctors and Nurses: Read/Write on Med/Rec-2<br/>Lab Assistants: Write only on MedRec-2<br/>Accounting: Read only on MedRec-2| High| Strict legal and regulatory standards|
|
||||
| Consumer health information| Web-Ext-1| Public Relations Web Content Creators: Read/Write on Web-Ext-1<br/>Public: Read only on Web-Ext-1| Low| Public education and corporate image|
|
||||
| Consumer health information| Web-Ext-1| Public Relations Web Content Creators: Read/Write on Web-Ext-1<br/>Public: Read only on Web-Ext-1| Low| Public education and corporate image|
|
||||
|
||||
### Users
|
||||
|
||||
@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ The following table illustrates an analysis of users on a network. Although our
|
||||
| - | - | - |
|
||||
| Account administrators| User accounts and security groups| Account administrators have full privileges to create new user accounts, reset passwords, and modify security group memberships. We need a mechanism to monitor these changes. |
|
||||
| Members of the Finance OU| Financial records| Users in Finance have Read/Write access to critical financial records, but no ability to change permissions on these resources. These financial records are subject to government regulatory compliance requirements. |
|
||||
| External partners | Project Z| Employees of partner organizations have Read/Write access to certain project data and servers relating to Project Z, but not to other servers or data on the network.|
|
||||
| External partners | Project Z| Employees of partner organizations have Read/Write access to certain project data and servers relating to Project Z, but not to other servers or data on the network.|
|
||||
|
||||
### Computers
|
||||
|
||||
@ -145,10 +145,10 @@ Security and auditing requirements and audit event volume can vary considerably
|
||||
- If the computers are servers, desktop computers, or portable computers.
|
||||
- The important applications the computers run, such as Exchange Server, SQL Server, or Forefront Identity Manager.
|
||||
|
||||
>**Note:** If the server applications (including Exchange Server and SQL Server) have audit settings. For more information about auditing in Exchange Server, see the [Exchange 2010 Security Guide](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?linkid=128052). For more information about auditing in SQL Server 2008, see [Auditing (Database Engine)](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkId=163434). For SQL Server 2012, see [SQL Server Audit (Database Engine)](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc280386.aspx).
|
||||
>**Note:** If the server applications (including Exchange Server and SQL Server) have audit settings. For more information about auditing in Exchange Server, see the [Exchange 2010 Security Guide](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?linkid=128052). For more information about auditing in SQL Server 2008, see [Auditing (Database Engine)](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkId=163434). For SQL Server 2012, see [SQL Server Audit (Database Engine)](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc280386.aspx).
|
||||
|
||||
- The operating system versions.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
>**Note:** The operating system version determines which auditing options are available and the volume of audit event data.
|
||||
|
||||
- The business value of the data.
|
||||
@ -159,20 +159,20 @@ The following table illustrates an analysis of computers in an organization.
|
||||
|
||||
| Type of computer and applications | Operating system version | Where located |
|
||||
| - | - | - |
|
||||
| Servers hosting Exchange Server| Windows Server 2008 R2| ExchangeSrv OU|
|
||||
| File servers | Windows Server 2012| Separate resource OUs by department and (in some cases) by location|
|
||||
| Servers hosting Exchange Server| Windows Server 2008 R2| ExchangeSrv OU|
|
||||
| File servers | Windows Server 2012| Separate resource OUs by department and (in some cases) by location|
|
||||
| Portable computers | Windows Vista and Windows 7| Separate portable computer OUs by department and (in some cases) by location|
|
||||
| Web servers | Windows Server 2008 R2 | WebSrv OU|
|
||||
| Web servers | Windows Server 2008 R2 | WebSrv OU|
|
||||
|
||||
### Regulatory requirements
|
||||
|
||||
Many industries and locales have strict and specific requirements for network operations and how resources are protected. In the health care and financial industries, for example, there are strict guidelines for who has access to records and how they are used. Many countries have strict privacy rules. To identify regulatory requirements, work with your organization's legal department and other departments responsible for these requirements. Then consider the security configuration and auditing options that can be used to comply with and verify compliance with these regulations.
|
||||
|
||||
For more info, see the [System Center Process Pack for IT GRC](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd206732.aspx).
|
||||
For more info, see the [System Center Process Pack for IT GRC](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd206732.aspx).
|
||||
|
||||
## <a href="" id="bkmk-2"></a>Mapping the security audit policy to groups of users, computers, and resources in your organization
|
||||
|
||||
By using Group Policy, you can apply your security audit policy to defined groups of users, computers, and resources. To map a security auditing policy to these defined groups in your organization, you should understand the
|
||||
By using Group Policy, you can apply your security audit policy to defined groups of users, computers, and resources. To map a security auditing policy to these defined groups in your organization, you should understand the
|
||||
following considerations for using Group Policy to apply security audit policy settings:
|
||||
|
||||
- The policy settings you identify can be applied by using one or more GPOs. To create and edit a GPO, use the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC). By using the GPMC to link a GPO to selected Active Directory sites, domains, and OUs, you apply the policy settings in the GPO to the users and computers in those Active Directory objects. An OU is the lowest-level Active Directory container to which you can assign Group Policy settings.
|
||||
@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ following considerations for using Group Policy to apply security audit policy s
|
||||
- Advanced security audit policy settings were introduced in Windows Server 2008 R2 or Windows 7 and can be applied to those operating systems and later. These advanced audit polices can only be applied by using Group Policy.
|
||||
|
||||
>**Important:** Whether you apply advanced audit policies by using Group Policy or by using logon scripts, do not use both the basic audit policy settings under **Local Policies\\Audit Policy** and the advanced settings under **Security Settings\\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration**. Using both basic and advanced audit policy settings can cause unexpected results in audit reporting.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
If you use **Advanced Audit Policy Configuration** settings or use logon scripts to apply advanced audit policies, be sure to enable the **Audit: Force audit policy subcategory settings (Windows Vista or later) to override audit policy category settings** policy setting under **Local Policies\\Security Options**. This will prevent conflicts between similar settings by forcing basic security auditing to be ignored.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ Depending on your goals, different sets of audit settings may be of particular v
|
||||
|
||||
### Data and resource activity
|
||||
|
||||
For many organizations, compromising the organization's data resources can cause tremendous financial losses, in addition to lost prestige and legal liability. If your organization has critical data resources that need to be
|
||||
For many organizations, compromising the organization's data resources can cause tremendous financial losses, in addition to lost prestige and legal liability. If your organization has critical data resources that need to be
|
||||
protected against any breach, the following settings can provide extremely valuable monitoring and forensic data:
|
||||
|
||||
- Object Access\\[Audit File Share](audit-file-share.md). This policy setting allows you to track what content was accessed, the source (IP address and port) of the request, and the user account that was used for the access. The volume of event data generated by this setting will vary depending on the number of client computers that attempt to access the file share. On a file server or domain controller, volume may be high due to SYSVOL access by client computers for policy processing. If you do not need to record routine access by client computers that have permissions on the file share, you may want to log audit events only for failed attempts to access the file share.
|
||||
@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ protected against any breach, the following settings can provide extremely valua
|
||||
>**Note:** To audit user attempts to access all file system objects on a computer, use the Global Object Access Auditing settings [Registry (Global Object Access Auditing)](registry-global-object-access-auditing.md) or [File System (Global Object Access Auditing)](file-system-global-object-access-auditing.md).
|
||||
|
||||
- Object Access\\[Audit Handle Manipulation](audit-handle-manipulation.md). This policy setting determines whether the operating system generates audit events when a handle to an object is opened or closed. Only objects with configured SACLs generate these events, and only if the attempted handle operation matches the SACL.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Event volume can be high, depending on how SACLs are configured. When used together with the **Audit File System** or **Audit Registry** policy settings, the **Audit Handle Manipulation** policy setting can provide an administrator with useful "reason for access" audit data that details the precise permissions on which the audit event is based. For example, if a file is configured as a Read-only resource but a user attempts to save changes to the file, the audit event will log not only the event, but also the permissions that were used (or attempted to be used) to save the file changes.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Global Object Access Auditing**. A growing number of organizations are using security auditing to comply with regulatory requirements that govern data security and privacy. But demonstrating that strict controls are being enforced can be extremely difficult. To address this issue, the supported versions of Windows include two **Global Object Access Auditing** policy settings, one for the registry and one for the file system. When you configure these settings, they apply a global system access control SACL on all objects of that class on a system, which cannot be overridden or circumvented.
|
||||
@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ Not all versions of Windows support advanced audit policy settings or the use of
|
||||
|
||||
The audit policy settings under **Local Policies\\Audit Policy** overlap with audit policy settings under **Security Settings\\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration**. However, the advanced audit policy categories and subcategories make it possible to focus your auditing efforts on the most critical activities while reducing the amount of audit data that is less important to your organization.
|
||||
|
||||
For example, **Local Policies\\Audit Policy** contains a single setting called [Audit account logon events](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc787176.aspx). When this setting is configured, it generates at least 10 types of audit events.
|
||||
For example, **Local Policies\\Audit Policy** contains a single setting called [Audit account logon events](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc787176.aspx). When this setting is configured, it generates at least 10 types of audit events.
|
||||
|
||||
In comparison, the Account Logon category under **Security Settings\\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration** provides the following advanced settings, which allow you to focus your auditing:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ In addition, whether you choose to leave audit data on an individual computer or
|
||||
- **Archive the log when full, do not overwrite events**. This option can be used when all log data needs to be saved, but it also suggests that you may not be reviewing audit data frequently enough.
|
||||
- **Do not overwrite events (Clear logs manually)**. This option stops the collection of audit data when the log file reaches its maximum size. Older data is retained at the expense of the most recent audit events. Use this option only if you do not want to lose any audit data, do not want to create an archive of the event log, and are committed to reviewing data before the maximum log size is reached.
|
||||
|
||||
You can also configure the audit log size and other key management options by using Group Policy settings. You can configure the event log settings in the following locations within the GPMC: **Computer
|
||||
You can also configure the audit log size and other key management options by using Group Policy settings. You can configure the event log settings in the following locations within the GPMC: **Computer
|
||||
Configuration\\Administrative Templates\\Windows Components\\Event Log Service\\Security**. These options include:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Maximum Log Size (KB)**. This policy setting specifies the maximum size of the log files. The user interfaces in the Local Group Policy Editor and Event Viewer allow you to enter values as large as 2 TB. If this setting is not configured, event logs have a default maximum size of 20 megabytes.
|
||||
|
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ ms.date: 04/19/2017
|
||||
|
||||
This guide explains the process of setting up advanced security auditing capabilities that are made possible through settings and events that were introduced in Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012.
|
||||
|
||||
These procedures can be deployed with the advanced security auditing capabilities described in [Deploy Security Auditing with Central Audit Policies (Demonstration Steps)](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh831542.aspx).
|
||||
These procedures can be deployed with the advanced security auditing capabilities described in [Deploy Security Auditing with Central Audit Policies (Demonstration Steps)](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh831542.aspx).
|
||||
|
||||
## In this guide
|
||||
|
||||
@ -29,12 +29,12 @@ Domain administrators can create and deploy expression-based security audit poli
|
||||
| - | - |
|
||||
| [Monitor the central access policies that apply on a file server](monitor-the-central-access-policies-that-apply-on-a-file-server.md) | This topic for the IT professional describes how to monitor changes to the central access policies that apply to a file server when using advanced security auditing options to monitor dynamic access control objects. Central access policies are created on a domain controller and then applied to file servers through Group Policy management. |
|
||||
| [Monitor the use of removable storage devices](monitor-the-use-of-removable-storage-devices.md) | This topic for the IT professional describes how to monitor attempts to use removable storage devices to access network resources. It describes how to use advanced security auditing options to monitor dynamic access control objects. |
|
||||
| [Monitor resource attribute definitions](monitor-resource-attribute-definitions.md)| This topic for the IT professional describes how to monitor changes to resource attribute definitions when you are using advanced security auditing options to monitor dynamic access control objects.|
|
||||
| [Monitor resource attribute definitions](monitor-resource-attribute-definitions.md)| This topic for the IT professional describes how to monitor changes to resource attribute definitions when you are using advanced security auditing options to monitor dynamic access control objects.|
|
||||
| [Monitor central access policy and rule definitions](monitor-central-access-policy-and-rule-definitions.md) | This topic for the IT professional describes how to monitor changes to central access policy and central access rule definitions when you use advanced security auditing options to monitor dynamic access control objects. |
|
||||
| [Monitor user and device claims during sign-in](monitor-user-and-device-claims-during-sign-in.md)| This topic for the IT professional describes how to monitor user and device claims that are associated with a user’s security token when you are using advanced security auditing options to monitor dynamic access control objects. |
|
||||
| [Monitor the resource attributes on files and folders](monitor-the-resource-attributes-on-files-and-folders.md)| This topic for the IT professional describes how to monitor attempts to change settings to the resource attributes on files when you are using advanced security auditing options to monitor dynamic access control objects. |
|
||||
| [Monitor the central access policies associated with files and folders](monitor-the-central-access-policies-associated-with-files-and-folders.md)| This topic for the IT professional describes how to monitor changes to the central access policies that are associated with files and folders when you are using advanced security auditing options to monitor dynamic access control objects. |
|
||||
| [Monitor claim types](monitor-claim-types.md) | This topic for the IT professional describes how to monitor changes to claim types that are associated with dynamic access control when you are using advanced security auditing options.|
|
||||
| [Monitor claim types](monitor-claim-types.md) | This topic for the IT professional describes how to monitor changes to claim types that are associated with dynamic access control when you are using advanced security auditing options.|
|
||||
|
||||
>**Important:** This procedure can be configured on computers running any of the supported Windows operating systems. The other monitoring procedures can be configured only as part of a functioning dynamic access control deployment.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ ms.prod: w10
|
||||
ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
|
||||
ms.sitesec: library
|
||||
ms.pagetype: security
|
||||
ms.localizationpriority: high
|
||||
author: dansimp
|
||||
ms.date: 09/03/2018
|
||||
---
|
||||
@ -17,7 +18,7 @@ Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (ATP) is a unified platform for prev
|
||||
<td><a href="#asr"><center><img src="images/ASR_icon.png"> <br><b>Attack surface reduction</b></center></a></td>
|
||||
<td><center><a href="#ngp"><img src="images/ngp_icon.png"><br> <b>Next generation protection</b></a></center></td>
|
||||
<td><center><a href="#edr"><img src="images/edr_icon.png"><br> <b>Endpoint detection and response</b></a></center></td>
|
||||
<td><center><a href="#ai"><img src="images/AR_icon.png"><br> <b>Auto investigation and remediation</b></a></center></td>
|
||||
<td><center><a href="#ai"><img src="images/AR_icon.png"><br> <b>Automated investigation and remediation</b></a></center></td>
|
||||
<td><center><a href="#ss"><img src="images/SS_icon.png"><br><b>Secure score</b></a></center></td>
|
||||
<td><center><img src="images/AH_icon.png"><a href="#ah"><br><b>Advanced hunting</b></a></center></td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
@ -70,7 +71,7 @@ Endpoint protection and response capabilities are put in place to detect, invest
|
||||
|
||||
<a name="ai"></a>
|
||||
|
||||
**Auto investigation and remediation**<br>
|
||||
**Automated investigation and remediation**<br>
|
||||
In conjunction with being able to quickly respond to advanced attacks, Windows Defender ATP offers automatic investigation and remediation capabilities that help reduce the volume of alerts in minutes at scale.
|
||||
|
||||
- [Automated investigation and remediation](windows-defender-atp/automated-investigations-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
|
@ -32,4 +32,4 @@ Organizations participating in the CME effort work together to help eradicate se
|
||||
|
||||
Any organization that is involved in cybersecurity and antimalware or interested in fighting cybercrime can participate in CME campaigns by enrolling in the [Virus Information Alliance (VIA) program](virus-information-alliance-criteria.md). It ensures that everyone agrees to use the information and tools available for campaigns for their intended purpose (that is, the eradication of malware).
|
||||
|
||||
Please apply using our [membership application form](http://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/partnerships/apply.aspx) to get started.
|
||||
Please apply using our [membership application form](https://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/partnerships/apply.aspx) to get started.
|
@ -19,6 +19,6 @@ Here you will find information about different types of malware, safety tips on
|
||||
* [Submit files for analysis](submission-guide.md)
|
||||
* [Safety Scanner download](safety-scanner-download.md)
|
||||
|
||||
Keep up with the latest malware news and research. Check out our [Windows security blogs](http://aka.ms/wdsecurityblog) and follow us on [Twitter](https://twitter.com/wdsecurity) for the latest news, discoveries, and protections.
|
||||
Keep up with the latest malware news and research. Check out our [Windows security blogs](https://aka.ms/wdsecurityblog) and follow us on [Twitter](https://twitter.com/wdsecurity) for the latest news, discoveries, and protections.
|
||||
|
||||
Learn more about [Windows security](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/index).
|
@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ To identify potentially harmful websites, keep the following in mind:
|
||||
|
||||
* Sites that aggressively open popups and display misleading buttons often trick users into accepting content through constant popups or mislabeled buttons.
|
||||
|
||||
To block malicious websites, use a modern web browser like [Microsoft Edge](http://www.microsoft.com/windows/microsoft-edge?ocid=cx-wdsi-articles) which identifies phishing and malware websites and checks downloads for malware.
|
||||
To block malicious websites, use a modern web browser like [Microsoft Edge](https://www.microsoft.com/windows/microsoft-edge?ocid=cx-wdsi-articles) which identifies phishing and malware websites and checks downloads for malware.
|
||||
|
||||
If you encounter an unsafe site, click **More […] > Send feedback** on Microsoft Edge. You can also [report unsafe sites directly to Microsoft](https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/support/report-unsafe-site).
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -22,17 +22,17 @@ For example, if you were to ask a device to list all of the programs that are ru
|
||||
|
||||
Many modern malware families use rootkits to try and avoid detection and removal, including:
|
||||
|
||||
* [Alureon](http://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/threat/encyclopedia/Entry.aspx?Name=Win32%2fAlureon)
|
||||
* [Alureon](https://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/threat/encyclopedia/Entry.aspx?Name=Win32%2fAlureon)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Cutwail](http://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/threat/encyclopedia/Entry.aspx?Name=Win32%2fCutwail)
|
||||
* [Cutwail](https://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/threat/encyclopedia/Entry.aspx?Name=Win32%2fCutwail)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Datrahere](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win64/Detrahere) (Zacinlo)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Rustock](http://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/threat/encyclopedia/entry.aspx?Name=Win32%2fRustock)
|
||||
* [Rustock](https://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/threat/encyclopedia/entry.aspx?Name=Win32%2fRustock)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Sinowal](http://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/threat/encyclopedia/Entry.aspx?Name=Win32%2fSinowal)
|
||||
* [Sinowal](https://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/threat/encyclopedia/Entry.aspx?Name=Win32%2fSinowal)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Sirefef](http://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/threat/encyclopedia/Entry.aspx?Name=Win32%2fSirefef)
|
||||
* [Sirefef](https://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/threat/encyclopedia/Entry.aspx?Name=Win32%2fSirefef)
|
||||
|
||||
## How to protect against rootkits
|
||||
|
||||
@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ For more general tips, see [prevent malware infection](prevent-malware-infection
|
||||
|
||||
Microsoft security software includes a number of technologies designed specifically to remove rootkits. If you think you might have a rootkit on your device and your antimalware software isn’t detecting it, you might need an extra tool that lets you boot to a known trusted environment.
|
||||
|
||||
[Windows Defender Offline](http://windows.microsoft.com/windows/what-is-windows-defender-offline) can be launched from Windows Security Center and has the latest anti-malware updates from Microsoft. It’s designed to be used on devices that aren't working correctly due to a possible malware infection.
|
||||
[Windows Defender Offline](https://windows.microsoft.com/windows/what-is-windows-defender-offline) can be launched from Windows Security Center and has the latest anti-malware updates from Microsoft. It’s designed to be used on devices that aren't working correctly due to a possible malware infection.
|
||||
|
||||
[System Guard](https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2017/10/23/hardening-the-system-and-maintaining-integrity-with-windows-defender-system-guard/) in Windows 10 protects against rootkits and threats that impact system integrity.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -34,6 +34,6 @@ There are many types of malware, including:
|
||||
- [Unwanted software](unwanted-software.md)
|
||||
- [Worms](worms-malware.md)
|
||||
|
||||
Keep up with the latest malware news and research. Check out our [Windows security blogs](http://aka.ms/wdsecurityblog) and follow us on [Twitter](https://twitter.com/wdsecurity) for the latest news, discoveries, and protections.
|
||||
Keep up with the latest malware news and research. Check out our [Windows security blogs](https://aka.ms/wdsecurityblog) and follow us on [Twitter](https://twitter.com/wdsecurity) for the latest news, discoveries, and protections.
|
||||
|
||||
Learn more about [Windows security](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/index).
|
@ -46,6 +46,6 @@ To be eligible for VIA your organization must:
|
||||
|
||||
3. Be willing to sign and adhere to the VIA membership agreement.
|
||||
|
||||
If your organization wants to apply and meets this criteria, you can apply using our [membership application form](http://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/partnerships/apply.aspx).
|
||||
If your organization wants to apply and meets this criteria, you can apply using our [membership application form](https://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/partnerships/apply.aspx).
|
||||
|
||||
If you have any questions, you can also contact us using our [partnerships contact form](http://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/partnerships/contactus.aspx).
|
||||
If you have any questions, you can also contact us using our [partnerships contact form](https://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/partnerships/contactus.aspx).
|
@ -54,4 +54,4 @@ Your organization must meet the following eligibility requirements to participat
|
||||
|
||||
### Apply to MVI
|
||||
|
||||
If your organization wants to apply and meets this criteria, you can apply using our [membership application form](http://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/partnerships/apply.aspx).
|
||||
If your organization wants to apply and meets this criteria, you can apply using our [membership application form](https://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/partnerships/apply.aspx).
|
@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ Over time, new ways to manage security policy settings have been introduced, whi
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
<tr class="odd">
|
||||
<td align="left"><p>Software Restriction Policies</p>
|
||||
<p>See [Administer Software Restriction Policies](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh994606.aspx).</p></td>
|
||||
<p>See [Administer Software Restriction Policies](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh994606.aspx).</p></td>
|
||||
<td align="left"><p>Gpedit.msc</p>
|
||||
<p>Software Restriction Policies (SRP) is a Group Policy-based feature that identifies software programs running on computers in a domain, and it controls the ability of those programs to run.</p></td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ The Security Compliance Manager is a downloadable tool that helps you plan, depl
|
||||
|
||||
## <a href="" id="bkmk-scw"></a>Using the Security Configuration Wizard
|
||||
|
||||
The Security Configuration Wizard (SCW) guides you through the process of creating, editing, applying, or rolling back a security policy. A security policy that you create with SCW is an .xml file that, when applied, configures services, network security, specific registry values, and audit policy.
|
||||
The Security Configuration Wizard (SCW) guides you through the process of creating, editing, applying, or rolling back a security policy. A security policy that you create with SCW is an .xml file that, when applied, configures services, network security, specific registry values, and audit policy.
|
||||
SCW is a role-based tool: You can use it to create a policy that enables services, firewall rules, and settings that are required for a selected server to perform specific roles. For example, a server might be a file server, a print server, or a domain controller.
|
||||
|
||||
The following are considerations for using SCW:
|
||||
@ -158,13 +158,13 @@ The SCW can be accessed through Server Manager or by running scw.exe. The wizard
|
||||
|
||||
The Security Policy Wizard configures services and network security based on the server’s role, as well as configures auditing and registry settings.
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about SCW, including procedures, see [Security Configuration Wizard](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc754997.aspx).
|
||||
For more information about SCW, including procedures, see [Security Configuration Wizard](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc754997.aspx).
|
||||
|
||||
## <a href="" id="bkmk-scmtool"></a>Working with the Security Configuration Manager
|
||||
|
||||
The Security Configuration Manager tool set allows you to create, apply, and edit the security for your local device, organizational unit, or domain.
|
||||
|
||||
For procedures on how to use the Security Configuration Manager, see [Security Configuration Manager](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc758219(WS.10).aspx).
|
||||
For procedures on how to use the Security Configuration Manager, see [Security Configuration Manager](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc758219(WS.10).aspx).
|
||||
|
||||
The following table lists the features of the Security Configuration Manager.
|
||||
<table>
|
||||
@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ The state of the operating system and apps on a device is dynamic. For example,
|
||||
|
||||
Regular analysis enables you to track and ensure an adequate level of security on each computer as part of an enterprise risk management program. You can tune the security levels and, most importantly, detect any security flaws that may occur in the system over time.
|
||||
|
||||
Security Configuration and Analysis enables you to quickly review security analysis results. It presents recommendations alongside of current system settings and uses visual flags or remarks to highlight any areas where the current settings do not match the proposed level of security. Security
|
||||
Security Configuration and Analysis enables you to quickly review security analysis results. It presents recommendations alongside of current system settings and uses visual flags or remarks to highlight any areas where the current settings do not match the proposed level of security. Security
|
||||
Configuration and Analysis also offers the ability to resolve any discrepancies that analysis reveals.
|
||||
|
||||
### <a href="" id="h2-359810173"></a>Security configuration
|
||||
@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ If you modify the security settings on your local device by using the local secu
|
||||
|
||||
### Using the Security Configuration Manager
|
||||
|
||||
For procedures on how to use the Security Configuration Manager, see [Security Configuration Manager How To](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc784762(WS.10).aspx). This section contains information in this topic about:
|
||||
For procedures on how to use the Security Configuration Manager, see [Security Configuration Manager How To](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc784762(WS.10).aspx). This section contains information in this topic about:
|
||||
|
||||
- [Applying security settings](#bkmk-applysecsettings)
|
||||
- [Importing and exporting security templates](#bkmk-impexpsectmpl)
|
||||
@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ For security settings that are defined by more than one policy, the following or
|
||||
3. Site Policy
|
||||
4. Local computer Policy
|
||||
|
||||
For example, a workstation that is joined to a domain will have its local security settings overridden by the domain policy wherever there is a conflict. Likewise, if the same workstation is a member of an Organizational Unit, the settings applied from the Organizational Unit's policy will override
|
||||
For example, a workstation that is joined to a domain will have its local security settings overridden by the domain policy wherever there is a conflict. Likewise, if the same workstation is a member of an Organizational Unit, the settings applied from the Organizational Unit's policy will override
|
||||
both the domain and local settings. If the workstation is a member of more than one Organizational Unit, then the Organizational Unit that immediately contains the workstation has the highest order of precedence.
|
||||
> **Note** Use gpresult.exe to find out what policies are applied to a device and in what order.
|
||||
For domain accounts, there can be only one account policy that includes password policies, account lockout policies, and Kerberos policies.
|
||||
|
@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ Clients that run Windows 10 version 1607 will not show details on the sign-in sc
|
||||
If the **Privacy** setting is turned on, details will show.
|
||||
|
||||
The **Privacy** setting cannot be changed for clients in bulk.
|
||||
Instead, apply [KB 4013429](http://www.catalog.update.microsoft.com/Search.aspx?q=KB4013429) to clients that run Windows 10 version 1607 so they behave similarly to previous versions of Windows.
|
||||
Instead, apply [KB 4013429](https://www.catalog.update.microsoft.com/Search.aspx?q=KB4013429) to clients that run Windows 10 version 1607 so they behave similarly to previous versions of Windows.
|
||||
Clients that run later versions of Windows 10 do not require a hotfix.
|
||||
|
||||
There are related Group Policy settings:
|
||||
@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ If **Block user from showing account details on sign-in** is enabled, then only
|
||||
Users will not be able to show details.
|
||||
|
||||
If **Block user from showing account details on sign-in** is not enabled, then you can set **Interactive logon: Display user information when the session is locked** to **User display name, domain and user names** to show additional details such as domain\username.
|
||||
In this case, clients that run Windows 10 version 1607 need [KB 4013429](http://www.catalog.update.microsoft.com/Search.aspx?q=KB4013429) applied.
|
||||
In this case, clients that run Windows 10 version 1607 need [KB 4013429](https://www.catalog.update.microsoft.com/Search.aspx?q=KB4013429) applied.
|
||||
Users will not be able to hide additional details.
|
||||
|
||||
If **Block user from showing account details on sign-in** is not enabled and **Don’t display last signed-in** is enabled, the username will not be shown.
|
||||
|
@ -21,18 +21,18 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values and security considerations for t
|
||||
|
||||
This policy setting allows you to set the encryption types that the Kerberos protocol is allowed to use. If it is not selected, the encryption type will not be allowed. This setting might affect compatibility with client computers or services and applications. Multiple selections are permitted.
|
||||
|
||||
For more information, see [article 977321](http://support.microsoft.com/kb/977321) in the Microsoft Knowledge Base.
|
||||
For more information, see [article 977321](https://support.microsoft.com/kb/977321) in the Microsoft Knowledge Base.
|
||||
|
||||
The following table lists and explains the allowed encryption types.
|
||||
|
||||
| Encryption type | Description and version support |
|
||||
| - | - |
|
||||
| DES_CBC_CRC | Data Encryption Standard with Cipher Block Chaining using the Cyclic Redundancy Check function<br/>Supported in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, and Windows Server 2008. The Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 operating systems do not support DES| by default.
|
||||
| DES_CBC_CRC | Data Encryption Standard with Cipher Block Chaining using the Cyclic Redundancy Check function<br/>Supported in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, and Windows Server 2008. The Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 operating systems do not support DES| by default.
|
||||
| DES_CBC_MD5| Data Encryption Standard with Cipher Block Chaining using the Message-Digest algorithm 5 checksum function<br/>Supported in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, and Windows Server 2008. The Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 operating systems do not support DES by default. |
|
||||
| RC4_HMAC_MD5| Rivest Cipher 4 with Hashed Message Authentication Code using the Message-Digest algorithm 5 checksum function<br/>Supported in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.|
|
||||
| RC4_HMAC_MD5| Rivest Cipher 4 with Hashed Message Authentication Code using the Message-Digest algorithm 5 checksum function<br/>Supported in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.|
|
||||
| AES128_HMAC_SHA1| Advanced Encryption Standard in 128 bit cipher block with Hashed Message Authentication Code using the Secure Hash Algorithm (1).<br/>Not supported in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, or Windows Server 2003. Supported in Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2. |
|
||||
| AES256_HMAC_SHA1| Advanced Encryption Standard in 256 bit cipher block with Hashed Message Authentication Code using the Secure Hash Algorithm (1).<br/>Not supported in Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, or Windows Server 2003. Supported in Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2. |
|
||||
| Future encryption types| Reserved by Microsoft for additional encryption types that might be implemented.|
|
||||
| Future encryption types| Reserved by Microsoft for additional encryption types that might be implemented.|
|
||||
|
||||
### Possible values
|
||||
|
||||
@ -59,12 +59,12 @@ Computer Configuration\\Windows Settings\\Security Settings\\Local Policies\\Sec
|
||||
### Default values
|
||||
| Server type or Group Policy Object (GPO) | Default value |
|
||||
| - | - |
|
||||
| Default domain policy| Not defined|
|
||||
| Default domain controller policy| Not defined|
|
||||
| Stand-alone server default settings | Not defined|
|
||||
| Domain controller effective default settings | None of these encryption types that are available in this policy are allowed.|
|
||||
| Member server effective default settings | None of these encryption types that are available in this policy are allowed.|
|
||||
| Effective GPO default settings on client computers | None of these encryption types that are available in this policy are allowed.|
|
||||
| Default domain policy| Not defined|
|
||||
| Default domain controller policy| Not defined|
|
||||
| Stand-alone server default settings | Not defined|
|
||||
| Domain controller effective default settings | None of these encryption types that are available in this policy are allowed.|
|
||||
| Member server effective default settings | None of these encryption types that are available in this policy are allowed.|
|
||||
| Effective GPO default settings on client computers | None of these encryption types that are available in this policy are allowed.|
|
||||
|
||||
## Security considerations
|
||||
|
||||
@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
|
||||
|
||||
### Vulnerability
|
||||
|
||||
Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7 do not support the DES cryptographic suites because stronger ones are available. To enable Kerberos interoperability with non-Windows versions of the Kerberos protocol, these suites can be enabled. However, doing so might open attack vectors on computers running
|
||||
Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7 do not support the DES cryptographic suites because stronger ones are available. To enable Kerberos interoperability with non-Windows versions of the Kerberos protocol, these suites can be enabled. However, doing so might open attack vectors on computers running
|
||||
Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7. You can also disable DES for your computers running Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008.
|
||||
|
||||
### Countermeasure
|
||||
|
@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Learn about an approach to collect events from devices in your organization. Thi
|
||||
|
||||
Windows Event Forwarding (WEF) reads any operational or administrative event log on a device in your organization and forwards the events you choose to a Windows Event Collector (WEC) server.
|
||||
|
||||
To accomplish this, there are two different of subscriptions published to client devices - the Baseline subscription and the suspect subscription. The Baseline subscription enrolls all devices in your organization, and a Suspect subscription only includes devices that have been added by you. The
|
||||
To accomplish this, there are two different of subscriptions published to client devices - the Baseline subscription and the suspect subscription. The Baseline subscription enrolls all devices in your organization, and a Suspect subscription only includes devices that have been added by you. The
|
||||
Suspect subscription collects additional events to help build context for system activity and can quickly be updated to accommodate new events and/or scenarios as needed without impacting baseline operations.
|
||||
|
||||
This implementation helps differentiate where events are ultimately stored. Baseline events can be sent to devices with online analytical capability, such as Security Event Manager (SEM), while also sending events to a MapReduce system, such as HDInsight or Hadoop, for long-term storage and deeper analysis. Events from the Suspect subscription are sent directly to a MapReduce system due to volume and lower signal/noise ratio, they are largely used for host forensic analysis.
|
||||
@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ WEF handles VPN, RAS, and DirectAccess scenarios well and will reconnect and sen
|
||||
|
||||
### How is client progress tracked?
|
||||
|
||||
The WEC server maintains in its registry the bookmark information and last heartbeat time for each event source for each WEF subscription. When an event source re-connects to a WEC server, the last bookmark position is sent to the device to use as a starting point to resume forwarding events. If a
|
||||
The WEC server maintains in its registry the bookmark information and last heartbeat time for each event source for each WEF subscription. When an event source re-connects to a WEC server, the last bookmark position is sent to the device to use as a starting point to resume forwarding events. If a
|
||||
WEF client has no events to send, the WEF client will connect periodically to send a Heartbeat to the WEC server to indicate it is active. This heartbeat value can be individually configured for each subscription.
|
||||
|
||||
### Will WEF work in an IPv4, IPv6, or mixed IPv4/IPv6 environment?
|
||||
@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ When the event log overwrites existing events (resulting in data loss if the dev
|
||||
|
||||
### What format is used for forwarded events?
|
||||
|
||||
WEF has two modes for forwarded events. The default is “Rendered Text” which includes the textual description of the event as you would see it in Event Viewer. This means that the event size is effectively doubled or tripled depending on the size of the rendered description. The alternative mode is
|
||||
WEF has two modes for forwarded events. The default is “Rendered Text” which includes the textual description of the event as you would see it in Event Viewer. This means that the event size is effectively doubled or tripled depending on the size of the rendered description. The alternative mode is
|
||||
“Events” (also sometimes referred to as “Binary” format) – which is just the event XML itself sent in binary XML format (as it would be written to the evtx file.) This is very compact and can more than double the event volume a single WEC server can accommodate.
|
||||
|
||||
A subscription “testSubscription” can be configured to use the Events format through the WECUTIL utility:
|
||||
@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ Wecutil ss “testSubscription” /cf:Events
|
||||
|
||||
### How frequently are WEF events delivered?
|
||||
|
||||
Event delivery options are part of the WEF subscription configuration parameters – There are three built-in subscription delivery options: Normal, Minimize Bandwidth, and Minimize Latency. A fourth, catch-all called “Custom” is available but cannot be selected or configured through the WEF UI by using Event Ciewer. The Custom delivery option must be selected and configured using the WECUTIL.EXE command-line application. All subscription options define a maximum event count and maximum event age, if either limit is exceeded then the accumulated events are sent to the event collector.
|
||||
Event delivery options are part of the WEF subscription configuration parameters – There are three built-in subscription delivery options: Normal, Minimize Bandwidth, and Minimize Latency. A fourth, catch-all called “Custom” is available but cannot be selected or configured through the WEF UI by using Event Viewer. The Custom delivery option must be selected and configured using the WECUTIL.EXE command-line application. All subscription options define a maximum event count and maximum event age, if either limit is exceeded then the accumulated events are sent to the event collector.
|
||||
|
||||
This table outlines the built-in delivery options:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ This table outlines the built-in delivery options:
|
||||
| Minimize bandwidth | This option ensures that the use of network bandwidth for event delivery is strictly controlled. It is an appropriate choice if you want to limit the frequency of network connections made to deliver events. It uses push delivery mode and sets a batch timeout of 6 hours. In addition, it uses a heartbeat interval of 6 hours. |
|
||||
| Minimize latency | This option ensures that events are delivered with minimal delay. It is an appropriate choice if you are collecting alerts or critical events. It uses push delivery mode and sets a batch timeout of 30 seconds. |
|
||||
|
||||
For more info about delivery options, see [Configure Advanced Subscription Settings](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc749167.aspx).
|
||||
For more info about delivery options, see [Configure Advanced Subscription Settings](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc749167.aspx).
|
||||
|
||||
The primary difference is in the latency which events are sent from the client. If none of the built-in options meet your requirements you can set Custom event delivery options for a given subscription from an elevated command prompt:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -640,15 +640,15 @@ Here are the minimum steps for WEF to operate:
|
||||
<!-- Legacy PowerShell pipeline execution details (800) -->
|
||||
<Select Path="Windows PowerShell">*[System[(EventID=800)]]</Select>
|
||||
</Query>
|
||||
</QueryList>
|
||||
</QueryList>
|
||||
```
|
||||
## <a href="" id="bkmk-appendixg"></a>Appendix G - Online resources
|
||||
|
||||
You can get more info with the following links:
|
||||
|
||||
- [Event Selection](http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/aa385231.aspx)
|
||||
- [Event Queries and Event XML](http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/bb399427.aspx)
|
||||
- [Event Query Schema](http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/aa385760.aspx)
|
||||
- [Windows Event Collector](http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb427443.aspx)
|
||||
- [Event Selection](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/aa385231.aspx)
|
||||
- [Event Queries and Event XML](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/bb399427.aspx)
|
||||
- [Event Query Schema](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/aa385760.aspx)
|
||||
- [Windows Event Collector](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb427443.aspx)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ ms.date: 07/27/2017
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# WannaCrypt ransomware worm targets out-of-date systems
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
On May 12, 2017 we detected a new ransomware that spreads like a worm by leveraging vulnerabilities that have been previously fixed. While security updates are automatically applied in most computers, some users and enterprises may delay deployment of patches. Unfortunately, the ransomware, known as [WannaCrypt](https://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/threat/encyclopedia/Entry.aspx?Name=Ransom:Win32/WannaCrypt), appears to have affected computers that have not applied the patch for these vulnerabilities. While the attack is unfolding, we remind users to install [MS17-010](https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms17-010.aspx) if they have not already done so.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -30,10 +30,10 @@ WannaCrypt's spreading mechanism is borrowed from [well-known](https://packetsto
|
||||
The exploit code used by WannaCrypt was designed to work only against unpatched Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 (or earlier OS) systems, so Windows 10 PCs are not affected by this attack.
|
||||
|
||||
We haven't found evidence of the exact initial entry vector used by this threat, but there are two scenarios that we believe are highly possible explanations for the spread of this ransomware:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
- Arrival through social engineering emails designed to trick users to run the malware and activate the worm-spreading functionality with the SMB exploit
|
||||
- Infection through SMB exploit when an unpatched computer is addressable from other infected machines
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Dropper
|
||||
|
||||
The threat arrives as a dropper Trojan that has the following two components:
|
||||
@ -42,14 +42,14 @@ The threat arrives as a dropper Trojan that has the following two components:
|
||||
2. The ransomware known as WannaCrypt
|
||||
|
||||
The dropper tries to connect the following domains using the API `InternetOpenUrlA()`:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
- www[.]iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea[.]com
|
||||
- www[.]ifferfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea[.]com
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
If connection to the domains is successful, the dropper does not infect the system further with ransomware or try to exploit other systems to spread; it simply stops execution. However, if the connection fails, the threat proceeds to drop the ransomware and creates a service on the system.
|
||||
|
||||
In other words, unlike in most malware infections, **IT Administrators should NOT block these domains**. Note that the malware is not proxy-aware, so a local DNS record may be required. This does not need to point to the Internet, but can resolve to any accessible server which will accept connections on TCP 80.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
The threat creates a service named *mssecsvc2.0*, whose function is to exploit the SMB vulnerability in other computers accessible from the infected system:
|
||||
@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ Service Name: mssecsvc2.0
|
||||
Service Description: (Microsoft Security Center (2.0) Service)
|
||||
Service Parameters: '-m security'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
## WannaCrypt ransomware
|
||||
@ -66,16 +66,16 @@ Service Parameters: '-m security'
|
||||
The ransomware component is a dropper that contains a password-protected .zip archive in its resource section. The document encryption routine and the files in the .zip archive contain support tools, a decryption tool, and the ransom message. In the samples we analyzed, the password for the .zip archive is 'WNcry@2ol7'.
|
||||
|
||||
When run, WannaCrypt creates the following registry keys:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
- *HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\\\<random string> = '\<malware working directory>\tasksche.exe'*
|
||||
- *HKLM\SOFTWARE\WanaCrypt0r\\wd = '\<malware working directory>'*
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
It changes the wallpaper to a ransom message by modifying the following registry key:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
- *HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\Wallpaper: '\<malware working directory>\\@WanaDecryptor@.bmp'*
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
It creates the following files in the malware's working directory:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
- *00000000.eky*
|
||||
- *00000000.pky*
|
||||
- *00000000.res*
|
||||
@ -131,13 +131,13 @@ It creates the following files in the malware's working directory:
|
||||
- *taskdl.exe*
|
||||
- *taskse.exe*
|
||||
- *u.wnry*
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
WannaCrypt may also create the following files:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
- *%SystemRoot%\tasksche.exe*
|
||||
- *%SystemDrive%\intel\\\<random directory name>\tasksche.exe*
|
||||
- *%ProgramData%\\\<random directory name>\tasksche.exe*
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
It may create a randomly named service that has the following associated ImagePath: `cmd.exe /c '<malware working directory>\tasksche.exe'`.
|
||||
|
||||
It then searches the whole computer for any file with any of the following file name extensions: *.123, .jpeg , .rb , .602 , .jpg , .rtf , .doc , .js , .sch , .3dm , .jsp , .sh , .3ds , .key , .sldm , .3g2 , .lay , .sldm , .3gp , .lay6 , .sldx , .7z , .ldf , .slk , .accdb , .m3u , .sln , .aes , .m4u , .snt , .ai , .max , .sql , .ARC , .mdb , .sqlite3 , .asc , .mdf , .sqlitedb , .asf , .mid , .stc , .asm , .mkv , .std , .asp , .mml , .sti , .avi , .mov , .stw , .backup , .mp3 , .suo , .bak , .mp4 , .svg , .bat , .mpeg , .swf , .bmp , .mpg , .sxc , .brd , .msg , .sxd , .bz2 , .myd , .sxi , .c , .myi , .sxm , .cgm , .nef , .sxw , .class , .odb , .tar , .cmd , .odg , .tbk , .cpp , .odp , .tgz , .crt , .ods , .tif , .cs , .odt , .tiff , .csr , .onetoc2 , .txt , .csv , .ost , .uop , .db , .otg , .uot , .dbf , .otp , .vb , .dch , .ots , .vbs , .der' , .ott , .vcd , .dif , .p12 , .vdi , .dip , .PAQ , .vmdk , .djvu , .pas , .vmx , .docb , .pdf , .vob , .docm , .pem , .vsd , .docx , .pfx , .vsdx , .dot , .php , .wav , .dotm , .pl , .wb2 , .dotx , .png , .wk1 , .dwg , .pot , .wks , .edb , .potm , .wma , .eml , .potx , .wmv , .fla , .ppam , .xlc , .flv , .pps , .xlm , .frm , .ppsm , .xls , .gif , .ppsx , .xlsb , .gpg , .ppt , .xlsm , .gz , .pptm , .xlsx , .h , .pptx , .xlt , .hwp , .ps1 , .xltm , .ibd , .psd , .xltx , .iso , .pst , .xlw , .jar , .rar , .zip , .java , .raw.*
|
||||
@ -152,15 +152,15 @@ After completing the encryption process, the malware deletes the volume shadow c
|
||||
It then replaces the desktop background image with the following message:
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
It also runs an executable showing a ransom note which indicates a $300 ransom in Bitcoins as well as a timer:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
The text is localized into the following languages: Bulgarian, Chinese (simplified), Chinese (traditional), Croatian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Filipino, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Indonesian, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Latvian, Norwegian, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Russian, Slovak, Spanish, Swedish, Turkish, and Vietnamese.
|
||||
|
||||
The ransomware also demonstrates the decryption capability by allowing the user to decrypt a few random files, free of charge. It then quickly reminds the user to pay the ransom to decrypt all the remaining files.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
## Spreading capability
|
||||
@ -168,15 +168,15 @@ The ransomware also demonstrates the decryption capability by allowing the user
|
||||
The worm functionality attempts to infect unpatched Windows machines in the local network. At the same time, it also executes massive scanning on Internet IP addresses to find and infect other vulnerable computers. This activity results in large SMB traffic from the infected host, which can be observed by SecOps personnel, as shown below.
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
The Internet scanning routine randomly generates octets to form the IPv4 address. The malware then targets that IP to attempt to exploit CVE-2017-0145. The threat avoids infecting the IPv4 address if the randomly generated value for first octet is 127 or if the value is equal to or greater than 224, in order to skip local loopback interfaces. Once a vulnerable machine is found and infected, it becomes the next hop to infect other machines. The vicious infection cycle continues as the scanning routing discovers unpatched computers.
|
||||
|
||||
When it successfully infects a vulnerable computer, the malware runs kernel-level shellcode that seems to have been copied from the public backdoor known as DOUBLEPULSAR, but with certain adjustments to drop and execute the ransomware dropper payload, both for x86 and x64 systems.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Protection against the WannaCrypt attack
|
||||
|
||||
To get the latest protection from Microsoft, upgrade to [Windows 10](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/windows-10-upgrade). Keeping your computers [up-to-date](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/portal/mmpc/help/updatefaqs.aspx) gives you the benefits of the latest features and proactive mitigations built into the latest versions of Windows.
|
||||
@ -185,20 +185,20 @@ We recommend customers that have not yet installed the security update [MS17-010
|
||||
|
||||
- Disable SMBv1 with the steps documented at [Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 2696547](https://support.microsoft.com/kb/2696547) and as [recommended previously](https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/filecab/2016/09/16/stop-using-smb1/)
|
||||
- Consider adding a rule on your router or firewall to block incoming SMB traffic on port 445
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
[Windows Defender Antivirus](https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/windows-defender-in-windows-10) detects this threat as [Ransom:Win32/WannaCrypt](https://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/threat/encyclopedia/Entry.aspx?Name=Ransom:Win32/WannaCrypt) as of the *1.243.297.0* update. Windows Defender Antivirus uses cloud-based protection, helping to protect you from the latest threats.
|
||||
|
||||
For enterprises, use [Device Guard](https://technet.microsoft.com/itpro/windows/keep-secure/device-guard-deployment-guide) to lock down devices and provide kernel-level virtualization-based security, allowing only trusted applications to run, effectively preventing malware from running.
|
||||
|
||||
Use [Office 365 Advanced Threat Protection](https://blogs.office.com/2015/04/08/introducing-exchange-online-advanced-threat-protection/), which has machine learning capability that blocks dangerous email threats, such as the emails carrying ransomware.
|
||||
|
||||
Monitor networks with [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection](http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/WindowsForBusiness/windows-atp), which alerts security operations teams about suspicious activities. Download this playbook to see how you can leverage Windows Defender ATP to detect, investigate, and mitigate ransomware in networks: [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection - Ransomware response playbook](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=55090).
|
||||
Monitor networks with [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/WindowsForBusiness/windows-atp), which alerts security operations teams about suspicious activities. Download this playbook to see how you can leverage Windows Defender ATP to detect, investigate, and mitigate ransomware in networks: [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection - Ransomware response playbook](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=55090).
|
||||
|
||||
## Resources
|
||||
|
||||
Download English language security updates: [Windows Server 2003 SP2 x64](http://download.windowsupdate.com/d/csa/csa/secu/2017/02/windowsserver2003-kb4012598-x64-custom-enu_f24d8723f246145524b9030e4752c96430981211.exe), [Windows Server 2003 SP2 x86,](http://download.windowsupdate.com/c/csa/csa/secu/2017/02/windowsserver2003-kb4012598-x86-custom-enu_f617caf6e7ee6f43abe4b386cb1d26b3318693cf.exe) [Windows XP SP2 x64](http://download.windowsupdate.com/d/csa/csa/secu/2017/02/windowsserver2003-kb4012598-x64-custom-enu_f24d8723f246145524b9030e4752c96430981211.exe), [Windows XP SP3 x86](http://download.windowsupdate.com/d/csa/csa/secu/2017/02/windowsxp-kb4012598-x86-custom-enu_eceb7d5023bbb23c0dc633e46b9c2f14fa6ee9dd.exe), [Windows XP Embedded SP3 x86](http://download.windowsupdate.com/c/csa/csa/secu/2017/02/windowsxp-kb4012598-x86-embedded-custom-enu_8f2c266f83a7e1b100ddb9acd4a6a3ab5ecd4059.exe), [Windows 8 x86,](http://download.windowsupdate.com/c/msdownload/update/software/secu/2017/05/windows8-rt-kb4012598-x86_a0f1c953a24dd042acc540c59b339f55fb18f594.msu) [Windows 8 x64](http://download.windowsupdate.com/c/msdownload/update/software/secu/2017/05/windows8-rt-kb4012598-x64_f05841d2e94197c2dca4457f1b895e8f632b7f8e.msu)
|
||||
|
||||
Download localized language security updates: [Windows Server 2003 SP2 x64](http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyId=d3cb7407-3339-452e-8371-79b9c301132e), [Windows Server 2003 SP2 x86](http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyId=350ec04d-a0ba-4a50-9be3-f900dafeddf9), [Windows XP SP2 x64](http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyId=5fbaa61b-15ce-49c7-9361-cb5494f9d6aa), [Windows XP SP3 x86](http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyId=7388c05d-9de6-4c6a-8b21-219df407754f), [Windows XP Embedded SP3 x86](http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyId=a1db143d-6ad2-4e7e-9e90-2a73316e1add), [Windows 8 x86](http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyId=6e2de6b7-9e43-4b42-aca2-267f24210340), [Windows 8 x64](http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyId=b08bb3f1-f156-4e61-8a68-077963bae8c0)
|
||||
Download localized language security updates: [Windows Server 2003 SP2 x64](https://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyId=d3cb7407-3339-452e-8371-79b9c301132e), [Windows Server 2003 SP2 x86](https://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyId=350ec04d-a0ba-4a50-9be3-f900dafeddf9), [Windows XP SP2 x64](https://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyId=5fbaa61b-15ce-49c7-9361-cb5494f9d6aa), [Windows XP SP3 x86](https://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyId=7388c05d-9de6-4c6a-8b21-219df407754f), [Windows XP Embedded SP3 x86](https://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyId=a1db143d-6ad2-4e7e-9e90-2a73316e1add), [Windows 8 x86](https://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyId=6e2de6b7-9e43-4b42-aca2-267f24210340), [Windows 8 x64](https://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyId=b08bb3f1-f156-4e61-8a68-077963bae8c0)
|
||||
|
||||
MS17-010 Security Update: [https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms17-010.aspx](https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms17-010.aspx)
|
||||
|
||||
@ -209,12 +209,12 @@ General information on ransomware: [https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/por
|
||||
## Indicators of compromise
|
||||
|
||||
SHA1 of samples analyzed:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
- 51e4307093f8ca8854359c0ac882ddca427a813c
|
||||
- e889544aff85ffaf8b0d0da705105dee7c97fe26
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Files created:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
- %SystemRoot%\mssecsvc.exe
|
||||
- %SystemRoot%\tasksche.exe
|
||||
- %SystemRoot%\qeriuwjhrf
|
||||
@ -240,12 +240,12 @@ Files created:
|
||||
- Taskse.exe
|
||||
- Files with '.wnry' extension
|
||||
- Files with '.WNCRY' extension
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Registry keys created:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
- HKLM\SOFTWARE\WanaCrypt0r\wd
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
*Karthik Selvaraj, Elia Florio, Andrea Lelli, and Tanmay Ganacharya*<br />*Microsoft Malware Protection Center*
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -17,13 +17,13 @@ ms.date: 10/13/2017
|
||||
|
||||
>This guide provides a detailed description of the most important security features in the Windows 10 Mobile operating system—identity access and control, data protection, malware resistance, and app platform security.
|
||||
|
||||
Smartphones now serve as a primary productivity tool for business workers and, just like desktops or laptops, need to be secured against malware and data theft. Protecting these devices can be challenging due to the wide range of device operating systems and configurations and the fact that many employees use their own personal devices. IT needs to secure corporate assets on every device, but also ensure the privacy of the user’s personal apps and data.
|
||||
Smartphones now serve as a primary productivity tool for business workers and, just like desktops or laptops, need to be secured against malware and data theft. Protecting these devices can be challenging due to the wide range of device operating systems and configurations and the fact that many employees use their own personal devices. IT needs to secure corporate assets on every device, but also ensure the privacy of the user’s personal apps and data.
|
||||
Windows 10 Mobile addresses these security concerns directly, whether workers are using personal or corporate-owned devices. It uses the same security technologies as the Windows 10 operating system to help protect against known and emerging security threats across the spectrum of attack vectors. These technologies include:
|
||||
- **Windows Hello for Business** Enhanced identity and access control features ensure that only authorized users can access corporate data and resources. Windows Hello simplifies multifactor authentication (MFA) deployment and use, offering PIN, companion device, and biometric authentication methods.
|
||||
- **Windows Hello for Business** Enhanced identity and access control features ensure that only authorized users can access corporate data and resources. Windows Hello simplifies multifactor authentication (MFA) deployment and use, offering PIN, companion device, and biometric authentication methods.
|
||||
- **Windows Information Protection** Automatic data separation keeps corporate information from being shared with personal data and apps.
|
||||
- **Malware resistance** Multi-layered protections built into the device hardware, startup processes, and app platform help reduce the threat of malware that can compromise employee devices.
|
||||
- **Malware resistance** Multi-layered protections built into the device hardware, startup processes, and app platform help reduce the threat of malware that can compromise employee devices.
|
||||
|
||||
This guide helps IT administrators better understand the security features in Windows 10 Mobile, which can be used to improve protection against unauthorized access, data leakage, and malware.
|
||||
This guide helps IT administrators better understand the security features in Windows 10 Mobile, which can be used to improve protection against unauthorized access, data leakage, and malware.
|
||||
|
||||
**In this article:**
|
||||
- Windows Hello for Business
|
||||
@ -32,25 +32,25 @@ This guide helps IT administrators better understand the security features in Wi
|
||||
|
||||
## Windows Hello
|
||||
|
||||
Windows 10 Mobile includes Windows Hello, a simple, yet powerful, multifactor authentication solution that confirms a user’s identity before allowing access to corporate confidential information and resources. Multifactor authentication is a more secure alternative to password-based device security. Users dislike having to enter long, complex passwords – particularly on a mobile device touch screen – that corporate policy requires they change frequently. This leads to poor security practices like password reuse, written down passwords, or weak password creation.
|
||||
Windows 10 Mobile includes Windows Hello, a simple, yet powerful, multifactor authentication solution that confirms a user’s identity before allowing access to corporate confidential information and resources. Multifactor authentication is a more secure alternative to password-based device security. Users dislike having to enter long, complex passwords – particularly on a mobile device touch screen – that corporate policy requires they change frequently. This leads to poor security practices like password reuse, written down passwords, or weak password creation.
|
||||
|
||||
Windows Hello offers a simple, cost-effective way to deploy multifactor authentication across your organization. Unlike smart cards, it does not require public key infrastructure or the implementation of additional hardware. Workers use a PIN, a companion device (like Microsoft Band), or biometrics to validate their identity for accessing corporate resources on their Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) registered Windows 10 Mobile device.
|
||||
Windows Hello offers a simple, cost-effective way to deploy multifactor authentication across your organization. Unlike smart cards, it does not require public key infrastructure or the implementation of additional hardware. Workers use a PIN, a companion device (like Microsoft Band), or biometrics to validate their identity for accessing corporate resources on their Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) registered Windows 10 Mobile device.
|
||||
|
||||
Because Windows Hello is supported across all Windows 10 devices, organizations can uniformly implement multifactor authentication across their environment. Deploying Windows Hello on Windows 10 Mobile devices does require Azure AD (sold separately), but you can use Azure AD Connect to synchronize with your on-premises Active Directory services.
|
||||
|
||||
Windows Hello supports iris scan, fingerprint, and facial recognition-based authentication for devices that have biometric sensors.
|
||||
Windows Hello supports iris scan, fingerprint, and facial recognition-based authentication for devices that have biometric sensors.
|
||||
|
||||
>**Note:** When Windows 10 first shipped, it included **Microsoft Passport** and **Windows Hello**, which worked together to provide multifactor authentication. To simplify deployment and improve supportability, Microsoft has combined these technologies into a single solution under the **Windows Hello** name. Customers who have already deployed these technologies will not experience any change in functionality. Customers who have yet to evaluate Windows Hello will find it easier to deploy due to simplified policies, documentation, and semantics.
|
||||
>**Note:** When Windows 10 first shipped, it included **Microsoft Passport** and **Windows Hello**, which worked together to provide multifactor authentication. To simplify deployment and improve supportability, Microsoft has combined these technologies into a single solution under the **Windows Hello** name. Customers who have already deployed these technologies will not experience any change in functionality. Customers who have yet to evaluate Windows Hello will find it easier to deploy due to simplified policies, documentation, and semantics.
|
||||
|
||||
### <a href="" id="secured-credentials"></a>Secured credentials
|
||||
|
||||
Windows Hello eliminates the use of passwords for login, reducing the risk that an attacker will steal and reuse a user’s credentials. Windows 10 Mobile devices are required to have a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), a microchip that enables advanced security features. The TPM creates encryption keys that are “wrapped” with the TPM’s own storage root key, which is itself stored within the TPM to prevent credentials from being compromised. Encryption keys created by the TPM can only be decrypted by the same TPM, which protects the key material from attackers who want to capture and reuse it.
|
||||
Windows Hello eliminates the use of passwords for login, reducing the risk that an attacker will steal and reuse a user’s credentials. Windows 10 Mobile devices are required to have a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), a microchip that enables advanced security features. The TPM creates encryption keys that are “wrapped” with the TPM’s own storage root key, which is itself stored within the TPM to prevent credentials from being compromised. Encryption keys created by the TPM can only be decrypted by the same TPM, which protects the key material from attackers who want to capture and reuse it.
|
||||
|
||||
To compromise Windows Hello credentials, an attacker would need access to the physical device, and then find a way to spoof the user’s biometric identity or guess his or her PIN. All of this would have to be accomplished before TPM brute-force resistance capabilities lock the mobile device, the theft-protection mechanism kicks in, or the user or corporate administrator remotely wipes the device. With TPM-based protection, an attacker’s window of opportunity for compromising a user’s credentials is greatly reduced.
|
||||
|
||||
### <a href="" id="support-for-biometrics"></a>Support for biometrics
|
||||
|
||||
Biometrics help prevent credential theft and make it easier for users to login to their devices. Users always have their biometric identity with them – there is nothing to forget, lose, or leave behind. Attackers would need to have both access to the user’s device and be able to impersonate the user’s biometric identity to gain access to corporate resources, which is far more difficult than stealing a password.
|
||||
Biometrics help prevent credential theft and make it easier for users to login to their devices. Users always have their biometric identity with them – there is nothing to forget, lose, or leave behind. Attackers would need to have both access to the user’s device and be able to impersonate the user’s biometric identity to gain access to corporate resources, which is far more difficult than stealing a password.
|
||||
|
||||
Windows Hello supports three biometric sensor scenarios:
|
||||
- **Facial recognition** uses special IR cameras to reliably tell the difference between a photograph or scan and a living person. Several vendors are shipping external cameras that incorporate this technology, and major manufacturers are already shipping laptops with integrated facial-recognition technology. Both Surface Pro 4 and Surface Book support this technology.
|
||||
@ -71,9 +71,9 @@ A Windows Hello companion device enables a physical device, like a wearable, to
|
||||
|
||||
In some cases, the companion device for Windows Hello enables a physical device, like a phone, wearable, or other types of device to store all of the user’s credentials. Storage of the credentials on a mobile device makes it possible to use them on any supporting device, like a kiosk or family PC, and eliminates the need to enroll Windows Hello on each device. Companion devices also help enable organizations to meet regulatory requirements, such as Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication 140-2, (FIPS 140-2).
|
||||
|
||||
### <a href="" id="standards-based-approach"></a>Standards-based approach
|
||||
### <a href="" id="standards-based-approach"></a>Standards-based approach
|
||||
|
||||
The Fast Identity Online (FIDO) Alliance is a nonprofit organization that works to address the lack of interoperability among strong authentication devices and the problems users face in creating and remembering multiple user names and passwords. FIDO standards help reduce reliance on passwords to authenticate users of online services securely, allowing any business network, app, website, or cloud application to interface with a broad variety of existing and future FIDO-enabled devices and operating system platforms.
|
||||
The Fast Identity Online (FIDO) Alliance is a nonprofit organization that works to address the lack of interoperability among strong authentication devices and the problems users face in creating and remembering multiple user names and passwords. FIDO standards help reduce reliance on passwords to authenticate users of online services securely, allowing any business network, app, website, or cloud application to interface with a broad variety of existing and future FIDO-enabled devices and operating system platforms.
|
||||
|
||||
In 2014, Microsoft joined the board of the FIDO Alliance. The FIDO 1.0 specifications, published in December 2014, provide for two types of authentications: password-less (known as UAF) and second factor (U2F). The FIDO Alliance is working on a set of 2.0 proposals that incorporate the best ideas from its U2F and UAF FIDO 1.0 standards. Microsoft has contributed Windows Hello technology to the FIDO 2.0 specification workgroup for review and feedback and continues to work with the FIDO Alliance as the FIDO 2.0 specification moves forward. Interoperability of FIDO products is a hallmark of FIDO authentication. Microsoft believes that bringing a FIDO solution to market will help solve a critical need for both enterprises and consumers.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ In 2014, Microsoft joined the board of the FIDO Alliance. The FIDO 1.0 specifica
|
||||
|
||||
Enterprises have seen huge growth in the convergence of personal and corporate data storage. Personal data is frequently stored on corporate devices and vice versa. This fluidity increases the potential for sensitive corporate data to be accidentally compromised.
|
||||
|
||||
Inadvertent disclosure is rapidly becoming the biggest source of confidential data leakage as organizations allow personal devices to access corporate resources. It’s easy to imagine that an employee using work email on their personal phone could unintentionally save an attachment containing sensitive company information to personal cloud storage, which could be shared with unauthorized people. This accidental sharing of corporate data is just one example of the challenges common to using mobile devices in the workplace. To prevent this type of data leakage, most solutions require users to login with a separate username and password to a container that stores all corporate apps and data, an experience that degrades user productivity.
|
||||
Inadvertent disclosure is rapidly becoming the biggest source of confidential data leakage as organizations allow personal devices to access corporate resources. It’s easy to imagine that an employee using work email on their personal phone could unintentionally save an attachment containing sensitive company information to personal cloud storage, which could be shared with unauthorized people. This accidental sharing of corporate data is just one example of the challenges common to using mobile devices in the workplace. To prevent this type of data leakage, most solutions require users to login with a separate username and password to a container that stores all corporate apps and data, an experience that degrades user productivity.
|
||||
|
||||
Windows 10 Mobile includes Windows Information Protection to transparently keep corporate data secure and personal data private. Because corporate data is always protected, users cannot inadvertently copy it or share it with unauthorized users or apps. Key features include:
|
||||
- Automatically tag personal and corporate data.
|
||||
@ -89,13 +89,13 @@ Windows 10 Mobile includes Windows Information Protection to transparently keep
|
||||
- Control which apps can access corporate data.
|
||||
- Control which apps can access a virtual private network (VPN) connection.
|
||||
- Prevent users from copying corporate data to public locations.
|
||||
- Help ensure business data is inaccessible when the device is in a locked state.
|
||||
- Help ensure business data is inaccessible when the device is in a locked state.
|
||||
|
||||
### <a href="" id="enlightened-apps"></a>Enlightened apps
|
||||
|
||||
Third-party data loss protection solutions usually require developers to wrap their apps. However, Windows Information Protection builds this intelligence right into Windows 10 Mobile so most apps require nothing extra to prevent inappropriate corporate data sharing.
|
||||
|
||||
Windows Information Protection classifies apps into two categories: enlightened and unenlightened. Enlighted apps can differentiate between corporate and personal data, correctly determining which to protect based on internal policies. Corporate data will be encrypted on the managed device and attempts to copy/paste or share this information with non-corporate apps or users will fail. Unenlightened apps, when marked as corporate-managed, consider all data corporate and encrypt everything by default.
|
||||
Windows Information Protection classifies apps into two categories: enlightened and unenlightened. Enlighted apps can differentiate between corporate and personal data, correctly determining which to protect based on internal policies. Corporate data will be encrypted on the managed device and attempts to copy/paste or share this information with non-corporate apps or users will fail. Unenlightened apps, when marked as corporate-managed, consider all data corporate and encrypt everything by default.
|
||||
|
||||
When you do not want all data encrypted by default – because it would create a poor user experience – developers should consider enlightening apps by adding code and compiling them using the Windows Information Protection application programming interfaces. The most likely candidates for enlightenment are apps that:
|
||||
- Don’t use common controls for saving files.
|
||||
@ -104,14 +104,14 @@ When you do not want all data encrypted by default – because it would create a
|
||||
|
||||
In many cases, most apps don’t require enlightenment for them to use Windows Information Protection. Simply adding them to the allow list is the only step you need to take. Line-of-Business (LOB) apps are a good example of where this works well because they only handle corporate data.
|
||||
|
||||
**When is app enlightenment required?**
|
||||
- **Required**
|
||||
**When is app enlightenment required?**
|
||||
- **Required**
|
||||
- App needs to work with both personal and enterprise data.
|
||||
- **Recommended**
|
||||
- **Recommended**
|
||||
- App handles only corporate data, but needs to modify a file (such as a configuration file) in order to launch, uninstall itself, update etc. Without enlightenment you wouldn’t be able to properly revoke these apps.
|
||||
- App needs to access enterprise data, while protection under lock is activated.
|
||||
- **Not required**
|
||||
- App handles only corporate data
|
||||
- App handles only corporate data
|
||||
- App handles only personal data
|
||||
|
||||
### <a href="" id="companion-devices"></a>Data leakage control
|
||||
@ -130,17 +130,17 @@ The extent to which users will be prevented from copying and pasting data from a
|
||||
|
||||
Most third-party solutions require an app wrapper that directs enterprise data into a password-protected container and keeps personal data outside the container. Depending on the implementation, this may require two different versions of the same apps to be running on the device: one for personal data and another for enterprise data.
|
||||
|
||||
Windows Information Protection provides data separation without requiring a container or special version of an app to access business or personal data. There is no separate login required to see your corporate data or open your corporate applications. Windows Information Protection identifies enterprise data and encrypts it to only enterprise use. Data separation is automatic and seamless.
|
||||
Windows Information Protection provides data separation without requiring a container or special version of an app to access business or personal data. There is no separate login required to see your corporate data or open your corporate applications. Windows Information Protection identifies enterprise data and encrypts it to only enterprise use. Data separation is automatic and seamless.
|
||||
|
||||
### <a href="" id="companion-devices"></a>Encryption
|
||||
|
||||
Windows 10 Mobile uses device encryption, based on BitLocker technology, to encrypt all internal storage, including operating systems and data storage partitions. The user can activate device encryption, or the IT department can activate and enforce encryption for company-managed devices through MDM tools. When device encryption is turned on, all data stored on the phone is encrypted automatically. A Windows 10 Mobile device with encryption turned on helps protect the confidentiality of data stored – even if the device is lost or stolen. The combination of Windows Hello lock and data encryption makes it extremely difficult for an unauthorized party to retrieve sensitive information from the device.
|
||||
|
||||
You can customize how device encryption works to meet your unique security requirements. Device encryption even enables you to define your own cipher suite. For example, you can specify the algorithm and key size that Windows 10 Mobile uses for data encryption, which Transport Layer Security (TLS) cipher suites are permitted, and whether Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) policy is enabled. The list below shows the policies you can change to customize device encryption on Windows 10 Mobile devices.
|
||||
- Cryptography
|
||||
- Cryptography
|
||||
- Allow FIPS Algorithm: This policy enables or disable the FIPS policy. A restart is needed to enforce this policy. The default value is disabled.
|
||||
- TLS Cipher Suite: This policy contains a list of the cryptographic cipher algorithms allowed for Secure Sockets Layer connections.
|
||||
- BitLocker
|
||||
- BitLocker
|
||||
- Encryption Method: Configures the BitLocker Drive Encryption Method and cipher strength. The default value is AES-CBC 128-bit. If the device cannot use the value specified, it will use another one.
|
||||
|
||||
To help make the device even more secured against outside interference, Windows 10 Mobile also now includes protection-under-lock. That means that encryption keys are removed from memory whenever a device is locked. Apps are unable to access sensitive data while the device is in a locked state, so hackers and malware have no way to find and co-opt keys. Everything is locked up tight with the TPM until the user unlocks the device with Windows Hello.
|
||||
@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ UEFI can run internal integrity checks that verify the firmware’s digital sign
|
||||
|
||||
When a mobile device with UEFI and Secure Boot starts, the UEFI firmware verifies the bootloader’s digital signature to verify that no one has modified it after it was digitally signed. The firmware also verifies that a trusted authority issued the bootloader’s digital signature. This check helps to ensure that the system starts only after checking that the bootloader is both trusted and unmodified since signing.
|
||||
|
||||
All Windows 10 Mobile devices always have Secure Boot enabled. In addition, they trust only the Windows operating system signature. Neither Windows 10 Mobile, apps, or even malware can change the UEFI configuration. For more information about UEFI with Secure Boot, read [Protecting the pre-OS environment with UEFI](http://blogs.msdn.com/b/b8/archive/2011/09/22/protecting-the-pre-os-environment-with-uefi.aspx)
|
||||
All Windows 10 Mobile devices always have Secure Boot enabled. In addition, they trust only the Windows operating system signature. Neither Windows 10 Mobile, apps, or even malware can change the UEFI configuration. For more information about UEFI with Secure Boot, read [Protecting the pre-OS environment with UEFI](https://blogs.msdn.com/b/b8/archive/2011/09/22/protecting-the-pre-os-environment-with-uefi.aspx)
|
||||
|
||||
### <a href="" id="companion-devices"></a>Trusted Platform Module
|
||||
|
||||
@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ In earlier versions of Windows, the biggest challenge with rootkits and bootkits
|
||||
|
||||
Windows 10 Mobile implements the Measured Boot feature, which uses the TPM hardware component to record a series of measurements for critical startup-related components, including firmware, Windows boot components, and drivers. Because Measured Boot uses the hardware-based security capabilities of TPM, which isolates and protects the measurement data against malware attacks, the log data is well protected against even sophisticated attacks.
|
||||
|
||||
Measured Boot focuses on acquiring the measurement data and protecting it against tampering. To provide more complete security, it must be coupled with a service that can analyze the data to determine device health.
|
||||
Measured Boot focuses on acquiring the measurement data and protecting it against tampering. To provide more complete security, it must be coupled with a service that can analyze the data to determine device health.
|
||||
|
||||
### <a href="" id="device-health-attestation"></a>Device Health Attestation
|
||||
|
||||
@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ You cannot configure CFG; rather, an application developer can take advantage of
|
||||
|
||||
### <a href="" id="protected-processes"></a>Protected Processes
|
||||
|
||||
Unfortunately, no device is immune to malware. Despite all the best preventative controls, malware can eventually find a way to infect any operating system or hardware platform. So, although prevention with a defense-in-depth strategy is important, additional malware controls are required.
|
||||
Unfortunately, no device is immune to malware. Despite all the best preventative controls, malware can eventually find a way to infect any operating system or hardware platform. So, although prevention with a defense-in-depth strategy is important, additional malware controls are required.
|
||||
If malware is running on a system, you need to limit what it can do Protected Processes prevents untrusted processes from tampering with those that have been specially signed. Protected Processes defines levels of trust for processes: it prevents less trusted processes from interacting with and therefore attacking more trusted processes. Windows 10 Mobile uses Protected Processes broadly throughout the operating system.
|
||||
|
||||
### <a href="" id="appcontainer"></a>AppContainer
|
||||
@ -352,13 +352,13 @@ The combination of Device Guard and AppContainer help to prevent unauthorized ap
|
||||
The web browser is a critical component of any security strategy. It is the user’s interface to the Internet, an environment teeming with malicious sites and potentially dangerous content. Most users cannot perform at least part of their job without a browser, and many users are completely reliant on one. This reality has made the browser the number one pathway from which malicious hackers initiate their attacks.
|
||||
|
||||
Windows 10 Mobile includes Microsoft Edge, an entirely new web browser that goes beyond browsing with features like Reading View. Microsoft Edge is more secure than previous Microsoft web browsers in several ways:
|
||||
- **Microsoft Edge on Windows 10 Mobile does not support extensions.** Microsoft Edge has built-in PDF viewing capability.
|
||||
- **Microsoft Edge on Windows 10 Mobile does not support extensions.** Microsoft Edge has built-in PDF viewing capability.
|
||||
- **Microsoft Edge is designed as a UWP app.** It is inherently compartmentalized and runs in an AppContainer that sandboxes the browser from the system, data, and other apps.
|
||||
- **Microsoft Edge simplifies security configuration tasks.** Because Microsoft Edge uses a simplified application structure and a single sandbox configuration, fewer security settings are required. In addition, Microsoft established Microsoft Edge default settings that align with security best practices, making it more secure by design.
|
||||
|
||||
## Summary
|
||||
|
||||
Windows 10 Mobile provides security on personal and corporate-owned devices to protect against unauthorized access, data leakage, and malware threats. All of the features covered in this paper – multifactor authentication, data separation, and malware resistance – are seamlessly incorporated into the operating system. This means enterprises are protected without compromising the productivity and ease of use that drives users to bring mobile devices into the workplace.
|
||||
Windows 10 Mobile provides security on personal and corporate-owned devices to protect against unauthorized access, data leakage, and malware threats. All of the features covered in this paper – multifactor authentication, data separation, and malware resistance – are seamlessly incorporated into the operating system. This means enterprises are protected without compromising the productivity and ease of use that drives users to bring mobile devices into the workplace.
|
||||
|
||||
## Revision History
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ ms.date: 09/03/2018
|
||||
- Windows Management Instruction (WMI)
|
||||
- Mobile Device Management (MDM)
|
||||
|
||||
<a id="protection-updates"></a>
|
||||
<a id="protection-updates"></a>
|
||||
<!-- this has been used as anchor in VDI content -->
|
||||
|
||||
There are two components to managing protection updates - where the updates are downloaded from, and when updates are downloaded and applied.
|
||||
@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ You can use the following sources:
|
||||
- [Windows Server Update Service (WSUS)](https://technet.microsoft.com/windowsserver/bb332157.aspx)
|
||||
- System Center Configuration Manager
|
||||
- A network file share
|
||||
- The [Microsoft Malware Protection Center definitions page (MMPC)](http://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/definitions/adl.aspx)
|
||||
- The [Microsoft Malware Protection Center definitions page (MMPC)](https://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/definitions/adl.aspx)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
When updates are published, some logic will be applied to minimize the size of the update. In most cases, only the "delta" (or the differences between the latest update and the update that is currently installed on the endpoint) will be downloaded and applied. However, the size of the delta depends on:
|
||||
@ -74,8 +74,8 @@ Microsoft Update | You want your endpoints to connect directly to Microsoft Upda
|
||||
File share | You have non-Internet-connected devices (such as VMs). You can use your Internet-connected VM host to download the updates to a network share, from which the VMs can obtain the updates. See the [VDI deployment guide](deployment-vdi-windows-defender-antivirus.md) for how file shares can be used in virtual desktop infrastructure (VDI) environments.
|
||||
Configuration Manager | You are using System Center Configuration Manager to update your endpoints.
|
||||
MMPC | You need to download the latest protection updates because of a recent infection or to help provision a strong, base image for [VDI deployment](deployment-vdi-windows-defender-antivirus.md). This option should generally be used only as a final fallback source, and not the primary source. It will only be used if updates cannot be downloaded from WSUS or Microsoft Update for [a specified number of days](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/threat-protection/windows-defender-antivirus/manage-outdated-endpoints-windows-defender-antivirus#set-the-number-of-days-before-protection-is-reported-as-out-of-date).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
You can manage the order in which update sources are used with Group Policy, System Center Configuration Manager, PowerShell cmdlets, and WMI.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!IMPORTANT]
|
||||
@ -94,16 +94,16 @@ The procedures in this article first describe how to set the order, and then how
|
||||
4. Click **Policies** then **Administrative templates**.
|
||||
|
||||
5. Expand the tree to **Windows components > Windows Defender > Signature updates** and configure the following settings:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Double-click the **Define the order of sources for downloading definition updates** setting and set the option to **Enabled**.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Enter the order of sources, separated by a single pipe, for example: `InternalDefinitionUpdateServer|MicrosoftUpdateServer|MMPC`, as shown in the following screenshot.
|
||||
1. Double-click the **Define the order of sources for downloading definition updates** setting and set the option to **Enabled**.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Enter the order of sources, separated by a single pipe, for example: `InternalDefinitionUpdateServer|MicrosoftUpdateServer|MMPC`, as shown in the following screenshot.
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
3. Click **OK**. This will set the order of protection update sources.
|
||||
3. Click **OK**. This will set the order of protection update sources.
|
||||
|
||||
1. Double-click the **Define file shares for downloading definition updates** setting and set the option to **Enabled**.
|
||||
1. Double-click the **Define file shares for downloading definition updates** setting and set the option to **Enabled**.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Enter the file share source. If you have multiple sources, enter each source in the order they should be used, separated by a single pipe. Use [standard UNC notation](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/gg465305.aspx) for denoting the path, for example: `\\host-name1\share-name\object-name|\\host-name2\share-name\object-name`. If you do not enter any paths then this source will be skipped when the VM downloads updates.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ See the following for more information:
|
||||
- [Set-MpPreference -SignatureFallbackOrder](https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/powershell/windows/defender/set-mppreference#-signaturefallbackorder)
|
||||
- [Set-MpPreference -SignatureDefinitionUpdateFileSharesSouce](https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/powershell/windows/defender/set-mppreference#-signaturedefinitionupdatefilesharessources)
|
||||
- [Use PowerShell cmdlets to configure and run Windows Defender Antivirus](use-powershell-cmdlets-windows-defender-antivirus.md)
|
||||
- [Defender cmdlets](https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn433280.aspx)
|
||||
- [Defender cmdlets](https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn433280.aspx)
|
||||
|
||||
**Use Windows Management Instruction (WMI) to manage the update location:**
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ ms.date: 09/21/2017
|
||||
# Administer AppLocker
|
||||
|
||||
**Applies to**
|
||||
- Windows 10
|
||||
- Windows 10
|
||||
- Windows Server
|
||||
|
||||
This topic for IT professionals provides links to specific procedures to use when administering AppLocker policies.
|
||||
@ -65,6 +65,6 @@ You must have Edit Setting permission to edit a GPO. By default, members of the
|
||||
|
||||
## Using Windows PowerShell to administer AppLocker
|
||||
|
||||
For how-to info about administering AppLocker with Windows PowerShell, see [Use the AppLocker Windows PowerShell Cmdlets](use-the-applocker-windows-powershell-cmdlets.md). For reference info and examples how to administer AppLocker with Windows PowerShell, see the [AppLocker cmdlets](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh847210.aspx).
|
||||
For how-to info about administering AppLocker with Windows PowerShell, see [Use the AppLocker Windows PowerShell Cmdlets](use-the-applocker-windows-powershell-cmdlets.md). For reference info and examples how to administer AppLocker with Windows PowerShell, see the [AppLocker cmdlets](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh847210.aspx).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ ms.date: 09/21/2017
|
||||
# Determine which apps are digitally signed on a reference device
|
||||
|
||||
**Applies to**
|
||||
- Windows 10
|
||||
- Windows 10
|
||||
- Windows Server
|
||||
|
||||
This topic for the IT professional describes how to use AppLocker logs and tools to determine which applications are digitally signed.
|
||||
@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Membership in the local **Administrators** group, or equivalent, is the minimum
|
||||
|
||||
2. Analyze the publisher's name and digital signature status from the output of the command.
|
||||
|
||||
For command parameters, syntax, and examples, see [Get-AppLockerFileInformation](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee460961.aspx).
|
||||
For command parameters, syntax, and examples, see [Get-AppLockerFileInformation](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee460961.aspx).
|
||||
|
||||
## Related topics
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ ms.date: 09/21/2017
|
||||
# Manage packaged apps with AppLocker
|
||||
|
||||
**Applies to**
|
||||
- Windows 10
|
||||
- Windows 10
|
||||
- Windows Server
|
||||
|
||||
This topic for IT professionals describes concepts and lists procedures to help you manage Packaged apps with AppLocker as part of your overall application control strategy.
|
||||
|
||||
## Understanding Packaged apps and Packaged app installers for AppLocker
|
||||
|
||||
Packaged apps, also known as Universal Windows apps, are based on a model that ensures all the files within an app package share the same identity. With classic Windows apps, each file within the app could have a unique identity.
|
||||
Packaged apps, also known as Universal Windows apps, are based on a model that ensures all the files within an app package share the same identity. With classic Windows apps, each file within the app could have a unique identity.
|
||||
With packaged apps, it is possible to control the entire app by using a single AppLocker rule.
|
||||
|
||||
>**Note:** AppLocker supports only publisher rules for packaged apps. All packaged apps must be signed by the software publisher because Windows does not support unsigned packaged apps.
|
||||
@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Typically, an app consists of multiple components: the installer that is used to
|
||||
|
||||
### <a href="" id="bkmk-compareclassicmetro"></a>Comparing classic Windows apps and packaged apps
|
||||
|
||||
AppLocker policies for packaged apps can only be applied to apps installed on computers running at least Windows Server 2012 or Windows 8, but classic Windows apps can be controlled on devices running at least Windows Server
|
||||
AppLocker policies for packaged apps can only be applied to apps installed on computers running at least Windows Server 2012 or Windows 8, but classic Windows apps can be controlled on devices running at least Windows Server
|
||||
2008 R2 or Windows 7. The rules for classic Windows apps and packaged apps can be enforced in tandem. The differences between packaged apps and classic Windows apps that you should consider include:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Installing the apps** All packaged apps can be installed by a standard user, whereas a number of classic Windows apps require administrative privileges to install. In an environment where most of the users are standard users, you might not have numerous exe rules (because classic Windows apps require administrative privileges to install), but you might want to have more explicit policies for packaged apps.
|
||||
@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ You can use two methods to create an inventory of packaged apps on a computer: t
|
||||
|
||||
>**Note:** Not all packaged apps are listed in AppLocker’s application inventory wizard. Certain app packages are framework packages that are leveraged by other apps. By themselves, these packages cannot do anything, but blocking such packages can inadvertently cause failure for apps that you want to allow. Instead, you can create Allow or Deny rules for the packaged apps that use these framework packages. The AppLocker user interface deliberately filters out all the packages that are registered as framework packages. For info about how to create an inventory list, see [Create list of apps deployed to each business group](create-list-of-applications-deployed-to-each-business-group.md).
|
||||
|
||||
For info about how to use the **Get-AppxPackage** Windows PowerShell cmdlet, see the [AppLocker PowerShell Command Reference](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh847210.aspx).
|
||||
For info about how to use the **Get-AppxPackage** Windows PowerShell cmdlet, see the [AppLocker PowerShell Command Reference](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh847210.aspx).
|
||||
|
||||
For info about creating rules for Packaged apps, see [Create a rule for packaged apps](create-a-rule-for-packaged-apps.md).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ Consider the following info when you are designing and deploying apps:
|
||||
|
||||
- Because AppLocker supports only publisher rules for packaged apps, collecting the installation path information for packaged apps is not necessary.
|
||||
- You cannot create hash- or path-based rules for packaged apps because all packaged apps and packaged app installers are signed by the software publisher of the package. Classic Windows apps were not always consistently signed; therefore, AppLocker has to support hash- or path-based rules.
|
||||
- By default, if there are no rules in a particular rule collection, AppLocker allows every file that is included in that rule collection. For example, if there are no Windows Installer rules, AppLocker allows all .msi, .msp, and .mst files to run. An existing AppLocker policy that was targeted at computers running Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7 would not have rules for Packaged apps. Therefore, when a computer running at least Windows Server 2012 or
|
||||
- By default, if there are no rules in a particular rule collection, AppLocker allows every file that is included in that rule collection. For example, if there are no Windows Installer rules, AppLocker allows all .msi, .msp, and .mst files to run. An existing AppLocker policy that was targeted at computers running Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7 would not have rules for Packaged apps. Therefore, when a computer running at least Windows Server 2012 or
|
||||
Windows 8 joins a domain where an AppLocker policy is already configured, users would be allowed to run any packaged app. This might be contrary to your design.
|
||||
|
||||
To prevent all packaged apps from running on a newly domain-joined computer, by default AppLocker blocks all packaged apps on a computer running at least Windows Server 2012 or Windows 8 if the existing domain policy has rules configured in the exe rule collection. You must take explicit action to allow packaged apps in your enterprise. You can allow only a select set of packaged apps. Or if you want to allow all packaged apps, you can create a default rule for the packaged apps collection.
|
||||
@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ Just as there are differences in managing each rule collection, you need to mana
|
||||
|
||||
1. Gather information about which Packaged apps are running in your environment. For information about how to do this, see [Create list of apps deployed to each business group](create-list-of-applications-deployed-to-each-business-group.md).
|
||||
|
||||
2. Create AppLocker rules for specific packaged apps based on your policy strategies. For more information, see [Create a rule for packaged apps](create-a-rule-for-packaged-apps.md) and [Packaged Apps Default Rules in AppLocker](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee460941(WS.10).aspx).
|
||||
2. Create AppLocker rules for specific packaged apps based on your policy strategies. For more information, see [Create a rule for packaged apps](create-a-rule-for-packaged-apps.md) and [Packaged Apps Default Rules in AppLocker](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee460941(WS.10).aspx).
|
||||
|
||||
3. Continue to update the AppLocker policies as new package apps are introduced into your environment. To do this, see [Add rules for packaged apps to existing AppLocker rule-set](add-rules-for-packaged-apps-to-existing-applocker-rule-set.md).
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ ms.date: 09/21/2017
|
||||
# Merge AppLocker policies by using Set-ApplockerPolicy
|
||||
|
||||
**Applies to**
|
||||
- Windows 10
|
||||
- Windows 10
|
||||
- Windows Server
|
||||
|
||||
This topic for IT professionals describes the steps to merge AppLocker policies by using Windows PowerShell.
|
||||
|
||||
The **Set-AppLockerPolicy** cmdlet sets the specified Group Policy Object (GPO) to contain the specified AppLocker policy. If no Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is specified, the local GPO is the default. When the Merge parameter is used, rules in the specified AppLocker policy will be merged with the AppLocker rules in the target GPO specified in the LDAP path. The merging of policies will remove rules with duplicate rule IDs, and the enforcement setting specified by the AppLocker policy in the target GPO will be preserved. If the Merge parameter is not specified, then the new policy will overwrite the existing policy.
|
||||
|
||||
For info about using **Set-AppLockerPolicy**, including syntax descriptions and parameters, see [Set-AppLockerPolicy](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh847212.aspx).
|
||||
For info about using **Set-AppLockerPolicy**, including syntax descriptions and parameters, see [Set-AppLockerPolicy](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh847212.aspx).
|
||||
|
||||
For info about using Windows PowerShell for AppLocker, including how to import the AppLocker cmdlets into Windows PowerShell, see [Use the AppLocker Windows PowerShell cmdlets](use-the-applocker-windows-powershell-cmdlets.md).
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ ms.date: 09/21/2017
|
||||
# Requirements to use AppLocker
|
||||
|
||||
**Applies to**
|
||||
- Windows 10
|
||||
- Windows 10
|
||||
- Windows Server
|
||||
|
||||
This topic for the IT professional lists software requirements to use AppLocker on the supported Windows operating systems.
|
||||
@ -35,21 +35,21 @@ The following table show the on which operating systems AppLocker features are s
|
||||
|
||||
| Version | Can be configured | Can be enforced | Available rules | Notes |
|
||||
| - | - | - | - | - |
|
||||
| Windows 10| Yes| Yes| Packaged apps<br/>Executable<br/>Windows Installer<br/>Script<br/>DLL| You can use the [AppLocker CSP](http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/dn920019.aspx) to configure AppLocker policies on any edition of Windows 10 supported by Mobile Device Management (MDM). You can only manage AppLocker with Group Policy on devices running Windows 10 Enterprise, Windows 10 Education, and Windows Server 2016. |
|
||||
| Windows Server 2016<br/>Windows Server 2012 R2<br/>Windows Server 2012| Yes| Yes| Packaged apps<br/>Executable<br/>Windows Installer<br/>Script<br/>DLL| |
|
||||
| Windows 10| Yes| Yes| Packaged apps<br/>Executable<br/>Windows Installer<br/>Script<br/>DLL| You can use the [AppLocker CSP](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/dn920019.aspx) to configure AppLocker policies on any edition of Windows 10 supported by Mobile Device Management (MDM). You can only manage AppLocker with Group Policy on devices running Windows 10 Enterprise, Windows 10 Education, and Windows Server 2016. |
|
||||
| Windows Server 2016<br/>Windows Server 2012 R2<br/>Windows Server 2012| Yes| Yes| Packaged apps<br/>Executable<br/>Windows Installer<br/>Script<br/>DLL| |
|
||||
| Windows 8.1 Pro| Yes| No| N/A||
|
||||
| Windows 8.1 Enterprise| Yes| Yes| Packaged apps<br/>Executable<br/>Windows Installer<br/>Script<br/>DLL| |
|
||||
| Windows RT 8.1| No| No| N/A||
|
||||
| Windows 8.1 Enterprise| Yes| Yes| Packaged apps<br/>Executable<br/>Windows Installer<br/>Script<br/>DLL| |
|
||||
| Windows RT 8.1| No| No| N/A||
|
||||
| Windows 8 Pro| Yes| No| N/A||
|
||||
| Windows 8 Enterprise| Yes| Yes| Packaged apps<br/>Executable<br/>Windows Installer<br/>Script<br/>DLL||
|
||||
| Windows RT| No| No| N/A| |
|
||||
| Windows 8 Enterprise| Yes| Yes| Packaged apps<br/>Executable<br/>Windows Installer<br/>Script<br/>DLL||
|
||||
| Windows RT| No| No| N/A| |
|
||||
| Windows Server 2008 R2 Standard| Yes| Yes| Executable<br/>Windows Installer<br/>Script<br/>DLL| Packaged app rules will not be enforced.|
|
||||
| Windows Server 2008 R2 Enterprise|Yes| Yes| Executable<br/>Windows Installer<br/>Script<br/>DLL| Packaged app rules will not be enforced.|
|
||||
| Windows Server 2008 R2 Datacenter| Yes| Yes| Executable<br/>Windows Installer<br/>Script<br/>DLL| Packaged app rules will not be enforced.|
|
||||
| Windows Server 2008 R2 for Itanium-Based Systems| Yes| Yes| Executable<br/>Windows Installer<br/>Script<br/>DLL| Packaged app rules will not be enforced.|
|
||||
| Windows Server 2008 R2 Datacenter| Yes| Yes| Executable<br/>Windows Installer<br/>Script<br/>DLL| Packaged app rules will not be enforced.|
|
||||
| Windows Server 2008 R2 for Itanium-Based Systems| Yes| Yes| Executable<br/>Windows Installer<br/>Script<br/>DLL| Packaged app rules will not be enforced.|
|
||||
| Windows 7 Ultimate| Yes| Yes| Executable<br/>Windows Installer<br/>Script<br/>DLL| Packaged app rules will not be enforced.|
|
||||
| Windows 7 Enterprise| Yes| Yes| Executable<br/>Windows Installer<br/>Script<br/>DLL| Packaged app rules will not be enforced.|
|
||||
| Windows 7 Professional| Yes| No| Executable<br/>Windows Installer<br/>Script<br/>DLL| No AppLocker rules are enforced.|
|
||||
| Windows 7 Enterprise| Yes| Yes| Executable<br/>Windows Installer<br/>Script<br/>DLL| Packaged app rules will not be enforced.|
|
||||
| Windows 7 Professional| Yes| No| Executable<br/>Windows Installer<br/>Script<br/>DLL| No AppLocker rules are enforced.|
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
AppLocker is not supported on versions of the Windows operating system not listed above. Software Restriction Policies can be used with those versions. However, the SRP Basic User feature is not supported on the above operating systems.
|
||||
|
@ -13,19 +13,19 @@ ms.date: 09/21/2017
|
||||
# Security considerations for AppLocker
|
||||
|
||||
**Applies to**
|
||||
- Windows 10
|
||||
- Windows 10
|
||||
- Windows Server
|
||||
|
||||
This topic for the IT professional describes the security considerations you need to address when implementing AppLocker.
|
||||
|
||||
The purpose of AppLocker is to restrict the access to software, and therefore, the data accessed by the software, to a specific group of users or within a defined business group. The following are security considerations for
|
||||
The purpose of AppLocker is to restrict the access to software, and therefore, the data accessed by the software, to a specific group of users or within a defined business group. The following are security considerations for
|
||||
AppLocker:
|
||||
|
||||
AppLocker is deployed within an enterprise and administered centrally by those in IT with trusted credentials. This makes its policy creation and deployment conform to similar policy deployment processes and security restrictions.
|
||||
|
||||
AppLocker policies are distributed through known processes and by known means within the domain through Group Policy. But AppLocker policies can also be set on individual computers if the person has administrator privileges, and those policies might be contrary to the organization's written security policy. The enforcement settings for local policies are overridden by the same AppLocker policies in a Group Policy Object (GPO). However, because AppLocker rules are additive, a local policy that is not in a GPO will still be evaluated for that computer.
|
||||
|
||||
Microsoft does not provide a way to develop any extensions to AppLocker. The interfaces are not public. A user with administrator credentials can automate some AppLocker processes by using Windows PowerShell cmdlets. For info about the Windows PowerShell cmdlets for AppLocker, see the [AppLocker Cmdlets in Windows PowerShell](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee460962.aspx).
|
||||
Microsoft does not provide a way to develop any extensions to AppLocker. The interfaces are not public. A user with administrator credentials can automate some AppLocker processes by using Windows PowerShell cmdlets. For info about the Windows PowerShell cmdlets for AppLocker, see the [AppLocker Cmdlets in Windows PowerShell](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee460962.aspx).
|
||||
|
||||
AppLocker runs in the context of Administrator or LocalSystem, which is the highest privilege set. This security context has the potential of misuse. If a user with administrative credentials makes changes to an AppLocker policy on a local device that is joined to a domain, those changes could be overwritten or disallowed by the GPO that contains the AppLocker rule for the same file (or path) that was changed on the local device. However, because AppLocker rules are additive, a local policy that is not in a GPO will still be evaluated for that computer. If the local computer is not joined to a domain and is not administered by Group Policy, a person with administrative credentials can alter the AppLocker policy.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ ms.date: 09/21/2017
|
||||
# Use a reference device to create and maintain AppLocker policies
|
||||
|
||||
**Applies to**
|
||||
- Windows 10
|
||||
- Windows 10
|
||||
- Windows Server
|
||||
|
||||
This topic for the IT professional describes the steps to create and maintain AppLocker policies by using a reference computer.
|
||||
@ -58,8 +58,8 @@ If AppLocker policies are currently running in your production environment, expo
|
||||
|
||||
You should test each set of rules to ensure that they perform as intended. The **Test-AppLockerPolicy** Windows PowerShell cmdlet can be used to determine whether any of the rules in your rule collection will be blocked on your reference device. Perform the steps on each reference device that you used to define the AppLocker policy. Ensure that the reference device is joined to the domain and that it is receiving the AppLocker policy from the appropriate GPO. Because AppLocker rules are inherited from linked GPOs, you should deploy all of the rules to simultaneously test all of your test GPOs. Use the following procedures to complete this step:
|
||||
|
||||
- [Test an AppLocker Policy with Test-AppLockerPolicy](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee791772(WS.10).aspx)
|
||||
- [Discover the Effect of an AppLocker Policy](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee791823(WS.10).aspx)
|
||||
- [Test an AppLocker Policy with Test-AppLockerPolicy](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee791772(WS.10).aspx)
|
||||
- [Discover the Effect of an AppLocker Policy](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee791823(WS.10).aspx)
|
||||
|
||||
>**Caution:** If you have set the enforcement setting on the rule collection to **Enforce rules** or you have not configured the rule collection, the policy will be implemented when the GPO is updated in the next step. If you have set the enforcement setting on the rule collection to **Audit only**, application access events are written to the AppLocker log, and the policy will not take effect.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ When the AppLocker policy has been tested successfully, it can be imported into
|
||||
|
||||
- [Export an AppLocker policy to an XML file](export-an-applocker-policy-to-an-xml-file.md)
|
||||
- [Import an AppLocker policy into a GPO](import-an-applocker-policy-into-a-gpo.md) or
|
||||
- [Discover the Effect of an AppLocker Policy](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee791823(WS.10).aspx)
|
||||
- [Discover the Effect of an AppLocker Policy](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee791823(WS.10).aspx)
|
||||
|
||||
If the AppLocker policy enforcement setting is **Audit only** and you are satisfied that the policy is fulfilling your intent, you can change it to **Enforce rules**. For info about how to change the enforcement setting, see [Configure an AppLocker policy for enforce rules](configure-an-applocker-policy-for-enforce-rules.md).
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -13,41 +13,41 @@ ms.date: 09/21/2017
|
||||
# Use the AppLocker Windows PowerShell cmdlets
|
||||
|
||||
**Applies to**
|
||||
- Windows 10
|
||||
- Windows 10
|
||||
- Windows Server
|
||||
|
||||
This topic for IT professionals describes how each AppLocker Windows PowerShell cmdlet can help you administer your AppLocker application control policies.
|
||||
|
||||
## AppLocker Windows PowerShell cmdlets
|
||||
|
||||
The five AppLocker cmdlets are designed to streamline the administration of an AppLocker policy. They can be used to help create, test, maintain, and troubleshoot an AppLocker policy. The cmdlets are intended to be used in conjunction with the AppLocker user interface that is accessed through the
|
||||
The five AppLocker cmdlets are designed to streamline the administration of an AppLocker policy. They can be used to help create, test, maintain, and troubleshoot an AppLocker policy. The cmdlets are intended to be used in conjunction with the AppLocker user interface that is accessed through the
|
||||
Microsoft Management Console (MMC) snap-in extension to the Local Security Policy snap-in and Group Policy Management Console.
|
||||
|
||||
To edit or update a Group Policy Object (GPO) by using the AppLocker cmdlets, you must have Edit Setting permission. By default, members of the **Domain Admins** group, the **Enterprise Admins** group, and the **Group Policy Creator Owners** group have this permission. To perform tasks by using the
|
||||
To edit or update a Group Policy Object (GPO) by using the AppLocker cmdlets, you must have Edit Setting permission. By default, members of the **Domain Admins** group, the **Enterprise Admins** group, and the **Group Policy Creator Owners** group have this permission. To perform tasks by using the
|
||||
Local Security policy snap-in, you must be a member of the local **Administrators** group, or equivalent, on the computer.
|
||||
|
||||
### Retrieve application information
|
||||
|
||||
The [Get-AppLockerFileInformation](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh847209.aspx) cmdlet retrieves the AppLocker file information from a list of files or from an event log. File information that is retrieved can include publisher information, file hash information, and file path information.
|
||||
The [Get-AppLockerFileInformation](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh847209.aspx) cmdlet retrieves the AppLocker file information from a list of files or from an event log. File information that is retrieved can include publisher information, file hash information, and file path information.
|
||||
|
||||
File information from an event log may not contain all of these fields. Files that are not signed do not have any publisher information.
|
||||
|
||||
### Set AppLocker policy
|
||||
|
||||
The [Set-AppLockerPolicy](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh847212.aspx) cmdlet sets the specified GPO to contain the specified AppLocker policy. If no Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is specified, the local GPO is the default.
|
||||
The [Set-AppLockerPolicy](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh847212.aspx) cmdlet sets the specified GPO to contain the specified AppLocker policy. If no Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is specified, the local GPO is the default.
|
||||
|
||||
### Retrieve an AppLocker policy
|
||||
|
||||
The [Get-AppLockerPolicy](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh847214.aspx) cmdlet gets the AppLocker policy from the local GPO, from a specified GPO, or from the effective AppLocker policy on the device. The output of the AppLocker policy is an AppLockerPolicy object or an XML-formatted string.
|
||||
The [Get-AppLockerPolicy](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh847214.aspx) cmdlet gets the AppLocker policy from the local GPO, from a specified GPO, or from the effective AppLocker policy on the device. The output of the AppLocker policy is an AppLockerPolicy object or an XML-formatted string.
|
||||
|
||||
### Generate rules for a given user or group
|
||||
|
||||
The [New-AppLockerPolicy](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh847211.aspx) cmdlet uses a list of file information to automatically generate rules for a given user or group. It can generate rules based on publisher, hash, or path information. Use **Get-AppLockerFileInformation** to create the
|
||||
The [New-AppLockerPolicy](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh847211.aspx) cmdlet uses a list of file information to automatically generate rules for a given user or group. It can generate rules based on publisher, hash, or path information. Use **Get-AppLockerFileInformation** to create the
|
||||
list of file information.
|
||||
|
||||
### Test the AppLocker Policy against a file set
|
||||
|
||||
The [Test-AppLockerPolicy](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh847213.aspx) cmdlet uses the specified AppLocker policy to test whether a specified list of files are allowed to run or not on the local device for a specific user.
|
||||
The [Test-AppLockerPolicy](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/hh847213.aspx) cmdlet uses the specified AppLocker policy to test whether a specified list of files are allowed to run or not on the local device for a specific user.
|
||||
|
||||
## Additional resources
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -6,8 +6,9 @@ ms.prod: w10
|
||||
ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
|
||||
ms.sitesec: library
|
||||
ms.pagetype: security
|
||||
author: brianlic-msft
|
||||
ms.date: 09/21/2017
|
||||
author: andreabichsel
|
||||
msauthor: v-anbic
|
||||
ms.date: 08/27/2018
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Working with AppLocker rules
|
||||
@ -60,6 +61,8 @@ The AppLocker console is organized into rule collections, which are executable f
|
||||
When DLL rules are used, AppLocker must check each DLL that an application loads. Therefore, users may experience a reduction in performance if DLL rules are used.
|
||||
|
||||
The DLL rule collection is not enabled by default. To learn how to enable the DLL rule collection, see [DLL rule collections](#bkmk-dllrulecollections).
|
||||
|
||||
EXE rules apply to portable executable (PE) files. AppLocker checks whether a file is a valid PE file, rather than just applying rules based on file extension, which attackers can easily change. Regardless of the file extension, the AppLocker EXE rule collection will work on a file as long as it is a valid PE file.
|
||||
|
||||
## Rule conditions
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -63,7 +63,10 @@
|
||||
###### [View deep analysis reports](respond-file-alerts-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md#view-deep-analysis-reports)
|
||||
###### [Troubleshoot deep analysis](respond-file-alerts-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md#troubleshoot-deep-analysis)
|
||||
|
||||
### [Auto investigation and remediation](automated-investigations-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
### [Automated investigation and remediation](automated-investigations-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
#### [Learn about the automated investigation and remediation dashboard](manage-auto-investigation-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### [Secure score](overview-secure-score-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
#### [Threat analytics](threat-analytics.md)
|
||||
#### [Threat analytics for Spectre and meltdown](threat-analytics-dashboard-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
@ -252,8 +255,6 @@
|
||||
##### [Use the mpcmdrun.exe command line tool to manage next generation protection](../windows-defender-antivirus/command-line-arguments-windows-defender-antivirus.md)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### [Manage auto investigation and remediation](manage-auto-investigation-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
|
||||
### [Configure Secure score dashboard security controls](secure-score-dashboard-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
|
||||
### Management and API support
|
||||
@ -303,7 +304,7 @@
|
||||
###### [Create and manage machine groups](machine-groups-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
####### [Create and manage machine tags](machine-tags-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
|
||||
#### [Configure Managed security service provider support](configure-mssp-support-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
#### [Configure managed security service provider (MSSP) support](configure-mssp-support-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
|
||||
### Configure Microsoft threat protection integration
|
||||
#### [Configure conditional access](configure-conditional-access-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
|
@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ The default machine group is configured for semi-automatic remediation. This mea
|
||||
When a pending action is approved, the entity is then remediated and this new state is reflected in the **Entities** tab of the investigation.
|
||||
|
||||
## Related topic
|
||||
- [Manage automated investigations](manage-auto-investigation-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
- [Learn about the automated investigations dashboard](manage-auto-investigation-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ You'll need to take the following configuration steps to enable the managed secu
|
||||
> - MSSP customers: Organizations that engage the services of MSSPs.
|
||||
|
||||
The integration will allow MSSPs to take the following actions:
|
||||
- Get access to MSSP customer<EFBFBD>s Windows Defender Security Center portal
|
||||
- Get access to MSSP customer's Windows Defender Security Center portal
|
||||
- Get email notifications, and
|
||||
- Fetch alerts through security information and event management (SIEM) tools
|
||||
|
||||
@ -57,20 +57,30 @@ This action is taken by the MSSP. It allows MSSPs to fetch alerts using APIs.
|
||||
## Grant the MSSP access to the portal
|
||||
|
||||
>[!NOTE]
|
||||
>These set of steps are directed towards the MSSP customer. Access to the portal can can only be done by the MSSP customer.
|
||||
> These set of steps are directed towards the MSSP customer. <br>
|
||||
> Access to the portal can can only be done by the MSSP customer.
|
||||
|
||||
As a MSSP customer, you'll need to take the following configuration steps to grant the MSSP access to Windows Defender Security Center.
|
||||
|
||||
Authentication and authorization of the MSSP user is built on top of Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) B2B functionality.
|
||||
|
||||
You'll need to take the following 2 steps:
|
||||
- Add MSSP user to your tenant as a guest user
|
||||
- Grant MSSP user access to Windows Defender Security Center
|
||||
|
||||
### Add MSSP user to your tenant as a guest user
|
||||
Add a user who is a member of the MSSP tenant to your tenant as a guest user.
|
||||
|
||||
To grant portal access to the MSSP, you must add the MSSP user to your Azure AD as a guest user. For more information, see [Add Azure Active Directory B2B collaboration users in the Azure portal](https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/b2b/add-users-administrator).
|
||||
|
||||
### Grant MSSP user access to Windows Defender Security Center
|
||||
Grant the guest user access and permissions to your Windows Defender Security Center tenant.
|
||||
|
||||
Adding a guest user is done in a similar way to regular users. They must be added to a corresponding group.
|
||||
Granting access to guest user is done the same way as granting access to a user who is a member of your tenant.
|
||||
|
||||
If you're using basic permissions to access the portal, the guest user must be assigned a Security Administrator role. For more information, see [Use basic permissions to access the portal](basic-permissions-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md).
|
||||
If you're using basic permissions to access the portal, the guest user must be assigned a Security Administrator role in **your** tenant. For more information, see [Use basic permissions to access the portal](basic-permissions-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md).
|
||||
|
||||
If you're using role-based access control (RBAC), the guest user must be to added to the appropriate group or groups. Fore more information on RBAC in Windows Defender ATP, see [Manage portal access using RBAC](rbac-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md).
|
||||
If you're using role-based access control (RBAC), the guest user must be to added to the appropriate group or groups in **your** tenant. Fore more information on RBAC in Windows Defender ATP, see [Manage portal access using RBAC](rbac-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md).
|
||||
|
||||
>[!NOTE]
|
||||
>There is no difference between the Member user and Guest user roles from RBAC perspective.
|
||||
@ -86,7 +96,7 @@ As a MSSP customer, you can always remove or modify the permissions granted to t
|
||||
|
||||
By default, MSSP customers access their Windows Defender Security Center tenant through the following URL: `https://securitycenter.windows.com`.
|
||||
|
||||
MSSPs however, will need to use a tenant-specific URL in the following format: `https://securitycenter.windows.com?tid=target_tenant_id` to access the MSSP customer portal.
|
||||
MSSPs however, will need to use a tenant-specific URL in the following format: `https://securitycenter.windows.com?tid=customer_tenant_id` to access the MSSP customer portal.
|
||||
|
||||
In general, MSSPs will need to be added to each of the MSSP customer's Azure AD that they intend to manage.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -99,7 +109,7 @@ Use the following steps to obtain the MSSP customer tenant ID and then use the I
|
||||
|
||||
3. Select **Azure Active Directory > Properties**. You'll find the tenant ID in the Directory ID field.
|
||||
|
||||
4. Access the MSSP customer portal by replacing the `tenant_id` value in the following URL: `https://securitycenter.windows.com?tid=target_tenant_id`.
|
||||
4. Access the MSSP customer portal by replacing the `customer_tenant_id` value in the following URL: `https://securitycenter.windows.com?tid=customer_tenant_id`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Configure alert notifications that are sent to MSSPs
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ The following suggested actions can help fix issues related to a misconfigured m
|
||||
- [Verify client connectivity to Windows Defender ATP service URLs](configure-proxy-internet-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md#verify-client-connectivity-to-windows-defender-atp-service-urls)</br>
|
||||
Verify the proxy configuration completed successfully, that WinHTTP can discover and communicate through the proxy server in your environment, and that the proxy server allows traffic to the Windows Defender ATP service URLs.
|
||||
|
||||
If you took corrective actions and the machine status is still misconfigured, [open a support ticket](http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkID=761093&clcid=0x409).
|
||||
If you took corrective actions and the machine status is still misconfigured, [open a support ticket](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkID=761093&clcid=0x409).
|
||||
|
||||
### No sensor data
|
||||
A misconfigured machine with status ‘No sensor data’ has communication with the service but can only report partial sensor data.
|
||||
@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ If the machines aren't reporting correctly, you might need to check that the Win
|
||||
- [Ensure that Windows Defender Antivirus is not disabled by policy](troubleshoot-onboarding-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md#ensure-that-windows-defender-antivirus-is-not-disabled-by-a-policy)</br>
|
||||
If your machines are running a third-party antimalware client, the Windows Defender ATP agent needs the Windows Defender Antivirus Early Launch Antimalware (ELAM) driver to be enabled.
|
||||
|
||||
If you took corrective actions and the machine status is still misconfigured, [open a support ticket](http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkID=761093&clcid=0x409).
|
||||
If you took corrective actions and the machine status is still misconfigured, [open a support ticket](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkID=761093&clcid=0x409).
|
||||
|
||||
## Related topic
|
||||
- [Check sensor health state in Windows Defender ATP](check-sensor-status-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
|
Before Width: | Height: | Size: 68 KiB After Width: | Height: | Size: 67 KiB |
After Width: | Height: | Size: 65 KiB |
After Width: | Height: | Size: 112 KiB |
Before Width: | Height: | Size: 7.1 KiB After Width: | Height: | Size: 6.9 KiB |
Before Width: | Height: | Size: 21 KiB After Width: | Height: | Size: 24 KiB |
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ ms.date: 09/03/2018
|
||||
**Applies to:**
|
||||
- Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Windows Defender ATP)
|
||||
|
||||
[!include[Prerelease<EFBFBD>information](prerelease.md)]
|
||||
[!include[Prerelease information](prerelease.md)]
|
||||
|
||||
When a cybersecurity threat is emerging, or a potential attacker is deploying its tactics, techniques/tools, and procedures (TTPs) on the network, Windows Defender ATP will quickly trigger alerts and launch matching automatic investigations.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Windows Defender ATP applies correlation analytics and aggregates all related al
|
||||
Topic | Description
|
||||
:---|:---
|
||||
[View and organize the Incidents queue](view-incidents-queue.md)| See the list of incidents and learn how to apply filters to limit the list and get a more focused view.
|
||||
[Manage incidents](manage-incidents-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md) | Leanr how to manage incidents by assigning it, updating its status, or setting its classification and other actions.
|
||||
[Manage incidents](manage-incidents-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md) | Learn how to manage incidents by assigning it, updating its status, or setting its classification and other actions.
|
||||
[Investigate incidents](investigate-incidents-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)| See associated alerts, manage the incident, see alert metadata, and visualizations to help you investigate an incident.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -41,9 +41,8 @@ Select **Investigations** to see all the automatic investigations launched by th
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
## Going through the evidence
|
||||
It helps your organization to see a summary and the status of the evidence collated through the incident.
|
||||
|
||||
Your team lead, for example, can take a quick look at the Evidence page to know how many has been analyzed or remediated so far, out of all the evidence collated.
|
||||
Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection automatically investigates all the incidents' supported events and suspicious entities in the alerts, providing you with auto-response and information about the important files, processes, services, and more. This helps quickly detect and block potential threats in the incident.
|
||||
Each of the analyzed entities will be marked as infected, remediated, or suspicious.
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: Manage automated investigations to investigate and remediate threats in Windows Defender Security Center
|
||||
title: Learn about the automated investigations dashboard in Windows Defender Security Center
|
||||
description: View the list of automated investigations, its status, detection source and other details.
|
||||
keywords: automated, investigation, detection, source, threat types, id, tags, machines, duration, filter export
|
||||
keywords: autoir, automated, investigation, detection, dashboard, source, threat types, id, tags, machines, duration, filter export
|
||||
search.product: eADQiWindows 10XVcnh
|
||||
ms.prod: w10
|
||||
ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
|
||||
@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ ms.pagetype: security
|
||||
ms.author: macapara
|
||||
author: mjcaparas
|
||||
ms.localizationpriority: medium
|
||||
ms.date: 05/21/2018
|
||||
ms.date: 09/03/2018
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Manage automated investigations in Windows Defender Security Center
|
||||
# Learn about the automated investigations dashboard
|
||||
By default, the Automated investigations list displays investigations initiated in the last week. You can also choose to select other time ranges from the drop-down menu or specify a custom range.
|
||||
|
||||
>[!NOTE]
|
||||
|
@ -1,16 +1,17 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: Configure Microsoft Cloud App Security integration
|
||||
description:
|
||||
keywords:
|
||||
description: Learn how to turn on the settings to enable the Windows Defender ATP integration with Microsoft Cloud App Security.
|
||||
keywords: cloud, app, security, settings, integration, discovery, report
|
||||
search.product: eADQiWindows 10XVcnh
|
||||
ms.prod: w10
|
||||
ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
|
||||
ms.sitesec: library
|
||||
ms.pagetype: security
|
||||
ms.author: ellevin
|
||||
author: levinec
|
||||
ms.author: macapara
|
||||
author: mjcaparas
|
||||
ms.localizationpriority: high
|
||||
ms.date: 09/03/2018
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Configure Microsoft Cloud App Security integration
|
||||
@ -20,9 +21,15 @@ ms.date: 09/03/2018
|
||||
[!include[Prerelease<73>information](prerelease.md)]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
To benefit from Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (ATP) cloud app discovery signals, turn on Microsoft Cloud App Security integration in the **Windows Defender ATP Settings** page, under **Advanced features**:
|
||||
To benefit from Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (ATP) cloud app discovery signals, turn on Microsoft Cloud App Security integration.
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
1. In the navigation pane, select **Preferences setup** > **Advanced features**.
|
||||
2. Select **Microsoft Cloud App Security** and switch the toggle to **On**.
|
||||
3. Click **Save preferences**.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
Once activated, Windows Defender ATP will immediately start forwarding discovery signals to Cloud App Security.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -32,13 +39,15 @@ Once activated, Windows Defender ATP will immediately start forwarding discovery
|
||||
|
||||
2. Navigate to the Cloud Discovery dashboard.
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
3. Select **Win10 Endpoint Users report**, which contains the data coming from Windows Defender ATP.
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
This report is similar to the existing discovery report with one major difference: you can now benefit from visibility to the machine context.
|
||||
|
||||
Notice the new **Machine**s tab that allows you to view the data split to the device dimensions. This is available in the main report page or any subpage (e.g., when drilling down to a specific cloud app).
|
||||
Notice the new **Machines** tab that allows you to view the data split to the device dimensions. This is available in the main report page or any subpage (for example, when drilling down to a specific cloud app).
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
@ -48,5 +57,4 @@ For more information about cloud discovery, see [Working with discovered apps](h
|
||||
If you are interested in trying Microsoft Cloud App Security, see [Microsoft Cloud App Security Trial](https://signup.microsoft.com/Signup?OfferId=757c4c34-d589-46e4-9579-120bba5c92ed&ali=1).
|
||||
|
||||
## Related topic
|
||||
|
||||
- [Microsoft Cloud App Security integration](microsoft-cloud-app-security-integration.md)
|
@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ ms.prod: w10
|
||||
ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
|
||||
ms.sitesec: library
|
||||
ms.pagetype: security
|
||||
ms.author: ellevin
|
||||
author: levinec
|
||||
ms.author: macapara
|
||||
author: mjcaparas
|
||||
ms.localizationpriority: high
|
||||
ms.date: 09/03/2018
|
||||
---
|
||||
@ -19,23 +19,21 @@ ms.date: 09/03/2018
|
||||
|
||||
[!include[Prerelease<73>information](prerelease.md)]
|
||||
|
||||
[Cloud App Security](https://docs.microsoft.com/cloud-app-security/what-is-cloud-app-security) gives you visibility into your cloud apps and services by allowing you to control and limit access to cloud apps, while enforcing compliance requirements on data stored in the cloud.
|
||||
Microsoft Cloud App Security (Cloud App Security) is a comprehensive solution that gives visibility into cloud apps and services by allowing you to control and limit access to cloud apps, while enforcing compliance requirements on data stored in the cloud. For more information, see [Cloud App Security](https://docs.microsoft.com/cloud-app-security/what-is-cloud-app-security).
|
||||
|
||||
Cloud App Security integrates into your eco-system in two places:
|
||||
## Windows Defender ATP and Cloud App Security integration
|
||||
|
||||
1. Firewall and proxy servers route your endpoints traffic to the web and forward cloud traffic logs to Cloud App Security.
|
||||
Cloud App Security discovery relies on cloud traffic logs being forwarded to it from enterprise firewall and proxy servers. Windows Defender ATP integrates with Cloud App Security by collecting and forwarding all cloud app networking activities, providing unparalleled visibility to cloud app usage. The monitoring functionality is built into the device, providing complete coverage of network activity.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Cloud App Security connects to your cloud app public API to enable control and governance of the data stored on cloud apps.
|
||||
The integration provides the following major improvements to the existing Cloud App Security discovery:
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
- Available everywhere - Since the network activity is collected directly from the endpoint, it's available wherever the device is, on or off corporate network, as it's no longer depended on traffic routed through the enterprise firewall or proxy servers.
|
||||
|
||||
Microsoft Cloud App Security (Cloud App Security) is a comprehensive solution that helps you keep control of assets through improved visibility over cloud apps that are being used across an organization. Cloud Discovery analyzes network traffic data to provide you with ongoing visibility into cloud use, Shadow IT, and the risk Shadow IT poses into your organization.
|
||||
|
||||
Windows Defender ATP provides one-click integration with Cloud Discovery by forwarding network connection data gathered from onboarded machines and users. These signals are sent to Cloud App Security, giving administrators deeper visibility into cloud usage, including the use of unsanctioned cloud services.
|
||||
|
||||
By leveraging the Windows Defender ATP endpoint network sensor signals, this integration further enhances Cloud App Security visibility into machine related activity and expanding coverage of off-network traffic.
|
||||
- Works out of the box, no configuration required <20> Forwarding cloud traffic logs to Cloud App Security requires firewall and proxy server configuration. With the Windows Defender ATP and Cloud App Security integration, there<72>s no configuration required. Just switch it on in Windows Defender Security Center settings and you<6F>re good to go.
|
||||
|
||||
- Device context <20> Cloud traffic logs lack device context. Windows Defender ATP network activity is reported with the device context (which device accessed the cloud app), so you are able to understand exactly where (device) the network activity took place, in addition to who (user) performed it.
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about cloud discovery, see [Working with discovered apps](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-app-security/discovered-apps).
|
||||
|
||||
## Related topic
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ To address this demand, managed security service providers (MSSP) offer to deliv
|
||||
Windows Defender ATP adds support for this scenario by providing MSSP integration.
|
||||
|
||||
The integration will allow MSSPs to take the following actions:
|
||||
- Get access to MSSP customer<EFBFBD>s Windows Defender Security Center portal
|
||||
- Get access to MSSP customer's Windows Defender Security Center portal
|
||||
- Get email notifications, and
|
||||
- Fetch alerts through security information and event management (SIEM) tools
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: Requirements and deployment planning guidelines for irtualization-based protection of code integrity (Windows 10)
|
||||
description: To help you plan a deployment of Microsoft Windows Defender Device Guard, this article describes hardware requirements for Windows Defender Device Guard, outlines deployment approaches, and describes methods for code signing and the deployment of code integrity policies.
|
||||
description: To help you plan a deployment of Microsoft Windows Defender Device Guard, this article describes hardware requirements for Windows Defender Device Guard, outlines deployment approaches, and describes methods for code signing and the deployment of code integrity policies.
|
||||
keywords: virtualization, security, malware
|
||||
ms.prod: w10
|
||||
ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
|
||||
@ -15,9 +15,9 @@ ms.date: 10/20/2017
|
||||
|
||||
- Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Windows Defender ATP)
|
||||
|
||||
Computers must meet certain hardware, firmware, and software requirements in order to take adavantage of all of the virtualization-based security (VBS) features in Windows Defender Device Guard. Computers lacking these requirements can still be protected by Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) policies—the difference is that those computers will not be as hardened against certain threats.
|
||||
Computers must meet certain hardware, firmware, and software requirements in order to take adavantage of all of the virtualization-based security (VBS) features in Windows Defender Device Guard. Computers lacking these requirements can still be protected by Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) policies—the difference is that those computers will not be as hardened against certain threats.
|
||||
|
||||
For example, hardware that includes CPU virtualization extensions and SLAT will be hardened against malware that attempts to gain access to the kernel, but without protected BIOS options such as “Boot only from internal hard drive,” the computer could be booted (by a malicious person who has physical access) into an operating system on bootable media.
|
||||
For example, hardware that includes CPU virtualization extensions and SLAT will be hardened against malware that attempts to gain access to the kernel, but without protected BIOS options such as “Boot only from internal hard drive,” the computer could be booted (by a malicious person who has physical access) into an operating system on bootable media.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!WARNING]
|
||||
> Virtualization-based protection of code integrity may be incompatible with some devices and applications. We strongly recommend testing this configuration in your lab before enabling virtualization-based protection of code integrity on production systems. Failure to do so may result in unexpected failures up to and including data loss or a blue screen error (also called a stop error).
|
||||
@ -25,13 +25,13 @@ For example, hardware that includes CPU virtualization extensions and SLAT will
|
||||
The following tables provide more information about the hardware, firmware, and software required for deployment of various Windows Defender Device Guard features. The tables describe baseline protections, plus protections for improved security that are associated with hardware and firmware options available in 2015, 2016, and 2017.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!NOTE]
|
||||
> Beginning with Windows 10, version 1607, Trusted Platform Module (TPM 2.0) must be enabled by default on new computers.
|
||||
> Beginning with Windows 10, version 1607, Trusted Platform Module (TPM 2.0) must be enabled by default on new computers.
|
||||
|
||||
## Baseline protections
|
||||
|
||||
|Baseline Protections | Description | Security benefits |
|
||||
|--------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|-------------------|
|
||||
| Hardware: **64-bit CPU** | A 64-bit computer is required for the Windows hypervisor to provide VBS. | |
|
||||
| Hardware: **64-bit CPU** | A 64-bit computer is required for the Windows hypervisor to provide VBS. | |
|
||||
| Hardware: **CPU virtualization extensions**,<br>plus **extended page tables** | These hardware features are required for VBS:<br>One of the following virtualization extensions:<br>• VT-x (Intel) or<br>• AMD-V<br>And:<br>• Extended page tables, also called Second Level Address Translation (SLAT). | VBS provides isolation of the secure kernel from the normal operating system. Vulnerabilities and zero-days in the normal operating system cannot be exploited because of this isolation. |
|
||||
| Firmware: **UEFI firmware version 2.3.1.c or higher with UEFI Secure Boot** | See the following Windows Hardware Compatibility Program requirement: [System.Fundamentals.Firmware.UEFISecureBoot](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/design/compatibility/systems#systemfundamentalsfirmwareuefisecureboot) | UEFI Secure Boot helps ensure that the device boots only authorized code. This can prevent boot kits and root kits from installing and persisting across reboots. |
|
||||
| Firmware: **Secure firmware update process** | UEFI firmware must support secure firmware update found under the following Windows Hardware Compatibility Program requirement: [System.Fundamentals.Firmware.UEFISecureBoot](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/design/compatibility/systems#systemfundamentalsfirmwareuefisecureboot) | UEFI firmware just like software can have security vulnerabilities that, when found, need to be patched through firmware updates. Patching helps prevent root kits from getting installed. |
|
||||
@ -64,11 +64,11 @@ The following tables describe additional hardware and firmware qualifications, a
|
||||
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
|
||||
### Additional security qualifications starting with Windows 10, version 1703
|
||||
### Additional security qualifications starting with Windows 10, version 1703
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Protections for Improved Security | Description | Security benefits |
|
||||
|---------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|------|
|
||||
| Firmware: **VBS enablement of NX protection for UEFI runtime services** | • VBS will enable No-Execute (NX) protection on UEFI runtime service code and data memory regions. UEFI runtime service code must support read-only page protections, and UEFI runtime service data must not be exceutable.<br>• UEFI runtime service must meet these requirements: <br> • Implement UEFI 2.6 EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE. All UEFI runtime service memory (code and data) must be described by this table. <br> • PE sections need to be page-aligned in memory (not required for in non-volitile storage).<br> • The Memory Attributes Table needs to correctly mark code and data as RO/NX for configuration by the OS:<br> • All entries must include attributes EFI_MEMORY_RO, EFI_MEMORY_XP, or both <br> • No entries may be left with neither of the above attributes, indicating memory that is both exceutable and writable. Memory must be either readable and executable or writeable and non-executable. <br><blockquote><p><strong>Notes:</strong><br>• This only applies to UEFI runtime service memory, and not UEFI boot service memory. <br>• This protection is applied by VBS on OS page tables.</p></blockquote><br> Please also note the following: <br>• Do not use sections that are both writeable and exceutable<br>• Do not attempt to directly modify executable system memory<br>• Do not use dynamic code | • Vulnerabilities in UEFI runtime, if any, will be blocked from compromising VBS (such as in functions like UpdateCapsule and SetVariable)<br>• Reduces the attack surface to VBS from system firmware. |
|
||||
| Firmware: **Firmware support for SMM protection** | The [Windows SMM Security Mitigations Table (WSMT) specification](http://download.microsoft.com/download/1/8/A/18A21244-EB67-4538-BAA2-1A54E0E490B6/WSMT.docx) contains details of an Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI) table that was created for use with Windows operating systems that support Windows virtualization-based security (VBS) features.| • Protects against potential vulnerabilities in UEFI runtime services, if any, will be blocked from compromising VBS (such as in functions like UpdateCapsule and SetVariable)<br>• Reduces the attack surface to VBS from system firmware.<br>• Blocks additional security attacks against SMM. |
|
||||
| Firmware: **Firmware support for SMM protection** | The [Windows SMM Security Mitigations Table (WSMT) specification](https://download.microsoft.com/download/1/8/A/18A21244-EB67-4538-BAA2-1A54E0E490B6/WSMT.docx) contains details of an Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI) table that was created for use with Windows operating systems that support Windows virtualization-based security (VBS) features.| • Protects against potential vulnerabilities in UEFI runtime services, if any, will be blocked from compromising VBS (such as in functions like UpdateCapsule and SetVariable)<br>• Reduces the attack surface to VBS from system firmware.<br>• Blocks additional security attacks against SMM. |
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ Other examples of incompatibility include:
|
||||
|
||||
- Network monitoring tools might be unable to parse ESP packets that are not encrypted (ESP-Null).
|
||||
|
||||
>**Note:** Microsoft Message Analyzer can help in troubleshooting of unencrypted IPsec packets. The latest version of Message Analyzer is available on the [Microsoft Download Center](http://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=44226).
|
||||
>**Note:** Microsoft Message Analyzer can help in troubleshooting of unencrypted IPsec packets. The latest version of Message Analyzer is available on the [Microsoft Download Center](https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=44226).
|
||||
|
||||
## Network address translation (NAT)
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ This topic discusses several other things that you should examine to see whether
|
||||
|
||||
Because IPsec uses mathematically intensive cryptographic techniques, it can consume significant overhead on a device. Areas to watch:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Encryption.** You might use 256-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES-256) and 384-bit Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-384) to check integrity in situations that require the strongest available encryption and key exchange protection. If you have NICs that support IPsec Task Offload, you can reduce the effect that encryption has on network throughput. For more information, see [IPsec Task Offload](http://technet.microsoft.com/network/dd277647.aspx).
|
||||
- **Encryption.** You might use 256-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES-256) and 384-bit Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-384) to check integrity in situations that require the strongest available encryption and key exchange protection. If you have NICs that support IPsec Task Offload, you can reduce the effect that encryption has on network throughput. For more information, see [IPsec Task Offload](https://technet.microsoft.com/network/dd277647.aspx).
|
||||
|
||||
- **Security association (SA) negotiation.** You can use a shorter lifetime for the main mode SA, such as three hours, but then you might need to make tradeoffs. Because each main mode SA occupies approximately 5 KB of RAM, situations in which a server brokers tens of thousands of concurrent connections can lead to overutilization.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ ms.date: 04/19/2017
|
||||
|
||||
Although network perimeter firewalls provide important protection to network resources from external threats, there are network threats that a perimeter firewall cannot protect against. Some attacks might successfully penetrate the perimeter firewall, and at that point what can stop it? Other attacks might originate from inside the network, such as malware that is brought in on portable media and run on a trusted device. Portable device are often taken outside the network and connected directly to the Internet, without adequate protection between the device and security threats.
|
||||
|
||||
Reports of targeted attacks against organizations, governments, and individuals have become more widespread in recent years. For a general overview of these threats, also known as advanced persistent threats (APT), see the [Microsoft Security Intelligence Report](http://www.microsoft.com/security/sir/default.aspx).
|
||||
Reports of targeted attacks against organizations, governments, and individuals have become more widespread in recent years. For a general overview of these threats, also known as advanced persistent threats (APT), see the [Microsoft Security Intelligence Report](https://www.microsoft.com/security/sir/default.aspx).
|
||||
|
||||
Running a host-based firewall on every device that your organization manages is an important layer in a "defense-in-depth" security strategy. A host-based firewall can help protect against attacks that originate from inside the network and also provide additional protection against attacks from outside the network that manage to penetrate the perimeter firewall. It also travels with a portable device to provide protection when it is away from the organization's network.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ Add-ADGroupMember -Identity "IPsec client and servers" -Members $computer
|
||||
$computer = Get-ADComputer -LDAPFilter "(name=server1)"
|
||||
Add-ADGroupMember -Identity "IPsec client and servers" -Members $computer
|
||||
|
||||
# Create and link the GPO to the domain
|
||||
# Create and link the GPO to the domain
|
||||
$gpo = New-gpo IPsecRequireInRequestOut
|
||||
$gpo | new-gplink -target "dc=corp,dc=contoso,dc=com" -LinkEnabled Yes
|
||||
|
||||
@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ $gpo | Set-GPPermissions -TargetName "IPsec client and servers" -TargetType Grou
|
||||
$gpo | Set-GPPermissions -TargetName "Authenticated Users" -TargetType Group -PermissionLevel None -Replace
|
||||
|
||||
#Set up the certificate for authentication
|
||||
$gponame = "corp.contoso.com\IPsecRequireInRequestOut"
|
||||
$gponame = "corp.contoso.com\IPsecRequireInRequestOut"
|
||||
$certprop = New-NetIPsecAuthProposal -machine -cert -Authority "DC=com, DC=contoso, DC=corp, CN=corp-APP1-CA"
|
||||
$myauth = New-NetIPsecPhase1AuthSet -DisplayName "IKEv2TestPhase1AuthSet" -proposal $certprop –PolicyStore GPO:$gponame
|
||||
|
||||
@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ New-NetIPsecRule -DisplayName "My IKEv2 Rule" -RemoteAddress any -Phase1AuthSet
|
||||
Make sure that you install the required certificates on the participating computers.
|
||||
|
||||
>**Note:**
|
||||
- For local devices, you can import the certificates manually if you have administrator access to the computer. For more info, see [Import or export certificates and private keys](http://windows.microsoft.com/windows-vista/Import-or-export-certificates-and-private-keys).
|
||||
- For local devices, you can import the certificates manually if you have administrator access to the computer. For more info, see [Import or export certificates and private keys](https://windows.microsoft.com/windows-vista/Import-or-export-certificates-and-private-keys).
|
||||
- You need a root certificate and a computer certificate on all devices that participate in the secure connection. Save the computer certificate in the **Personal/Certificates** folder.
|
||||
- For remote devices, you can create a secure website to facilitate access to the script and certificates.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ In future versions of Windows, Microsoft might remove the netsh functionality fo
|
||||
|
||||
Windows PowerShell and netsh command references are at the following locations.
|
||||
|
||||
- [Netsh Commands for Windows Defender Firewall](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc771920)
|
||||
- [Netsh Commands for Windows Defender Firewall](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc771920)
|
||||
|
||||
## Scope
|
||||
|
||||
@ -38,11 +38,11 @@ This guide is intended for IT pros, system administrators, and IT managers, and
|
||||
| Section | Description |
|
||||
| - | - |
|
||||
| [Set profile global defaults](#bkmk-profileglobaldefaults) | Enable and control firewall behavior|
|
||||
| [Deploy basic firewall rules](#deploy-basic-firewall-rules)| How to create, modify, and delete firewall rules|
|
||||
| [Manage Remotely](#manage-remotely) | Remote management by using `-CimSession`|
|
||||
| [Deploy basic IPsec rule settings](#deploy-basic-ipsec-rule-settings) | IPsec rules and associated parameters|
|
||||
| [Deploy secure firewall rules with IPsec](#deploy-secure-firewall-rules-with-ipsec) | Domain and server isolation|
|
||||
| [Additional resources](#additional-resources) | More information about Windows PowerShell|
|
||||
| [Deploy basic firewall rules](#deploy-basic-firewall-rules)| How to create, modify, and delete firewall rules|
|
||||
| [Manage Remotely](#manage-remotely) | Remote management by using `-CimSession`|
|
||||
| [Deploy basic IPsec rule settings](#deploy-basic-ipsec-rule-settings) | IPsec rules and associated parameters|
|
||||
| [Deploy secure firewall rules with IPsec](#deploy-secure-firewall-rules-with-ipsec) | Domain and server isolation|
|
||||
| [Additional resources](#additional-resources) | More information about Windows PowerShell|
|
||||
|
||||
## <a href="" id="bkmk-profileglobaldefaults"></a>Set profile global defaults
|
||||
|
||||
@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ The following scriptlets set the default inbound and outbound actions, specifies
|
||||
**Netsh**
|
||||
|
||||
``` syntax
|
||||
netsh advfirewall set allprofiles firewallpolicy blockinbound,allowoutbound
|
||||
netsh advfirewall set allprofiles firewallpolicy blockinbound,allowoutbound
|
||||
netsh advfirewall set allprofiles settings inboundusernotification enable
|
||||
netsh advfirewall set allprofiles settings unicastresponsetomulticast enable
|
||||
netsh advfirewall set allprofiles logging filename %SystemRoot%\System32\LogFiles\Firewall\pfirewall.log
|
||||
@ -87,26 +87,26 @@ Set-NetFirewallProfile -DefaultInboundAction Block -DefaultOutboundAction Allow
|
||||
|
||||
### Disable Windows Defender Firewall with Advanced Security
|
||||
|
||||
Microsoft recommends that you do not disable Windows Defender Firewall because you lose other benefits provided by the service, such as the ability to use Internet Protocol security (IPsec) connection security rules, network protection from attacks that employ network fingerprinting, [Windows Service Hardening](http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=104976), and [boot time filters](https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/networking/2009/03/24/stopping-the-windows-authenticating-firewall-service-and-the-boot-time-policy/).
|
||||
Microsoft recommends that you do not disable Windows Defender Firewall because you lose other benefits provided by the service, such as the ability to use Internet Protocol security (IPsec) connection security rules, network protection from attacks that employ network fingerprinting, [Windows Service Hardening](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=104976), and [boot time filters](https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/networking/2009/03/24/stopping-the-windows-authenticating-firewall-service-and-the-boot-time-policy/).
|
||||
|
||||
Disabling Windows Defender Firewall with Advanced Security can also cause problems, including:
|
||||
|
||||
- Start menu can stop working
|
||||
- Modern applications can fail to install or update
|
||||
- Activation of Windows via phone fails
|
||||
- Activation of Windows via phone fails
|
||||
- Application or OS incompatibilities that depend on Windows Defender Firewall
|
||||
|
||||
Microsoft recommends disabling Windows Defender Firewall only when installing a third-party firewall, and resetting Windows Defender Firewall back to defaults when the third-party software is disabled or removed.
|
||||
Microsoft recommends disabling Windows Defender Firewall only when installing a third-party firewall, and resetting Windows Defender Firewall back to defaults when the third-party software is disabled or removed.
|
||||
|
||||
If disabling Windows Defender Firewall is required, do not disable it by stopping the Windows Defender Firewall service (in the **Services** snap-in, the display name is Windows Defender Firewall and the service name is MpsSvc).
|
||||
Stopping the Windows Defender Firewall service is not supported by Microsoft.
|
||||
|
||||
Non-Microsoft firewall software can programmatically disable only the parts of Windows Defender Firewall that need to be disabled for compatibility.
|
||||
You should not disable the firewall yourself for this purpose.
|
||||
Non-Microsoft firewall software can programmatically disable only the parts of Windows Defender Firewall that need to be disabled for compatibility.
|
||||
You should not disable the firewall yourself for this purpose.
|
||||
|
||||
The proper method to disable the Windows Defender Firewall is to disable the Windows Defender Firewall Profiles and leave the service running.
|
||||
|
||||
Use the following procedure to turn the firewall off, or disable the Group Policy setting **Computer Configuration|Administrative Templates|Network|Network Connections|Windows Defender Firewall|Domain Prolfile|Windows Defender Firewall:Protect all network connections**.
|
||||
Use the following procedure to turn the firewall off, or disable the Group Policy setting **Computer Configuration|Administrative Templates|Network|Network Connections|Windows Defender Firewall|Domain Prolfile|Windows Defender Firewall:Protect all network connections**.
|
||||
For more information, see [Windows Defender Firewall with Advanced Security deployment guide](windows-firewall-with-advanced-security-deployment-guide.md).
|
||||
|
||||
The following example disables Windows Defender Firewall for all profiles.
|
||||
@ -145,13 +145,13 @@ Here, **domain.contoso.com** is the name of your Active Directory Domain Service
|
||||
|
||||
``` syntax
|
||||
netsh advfirewall set store gpo=domain.contoso.com\gpo_name
|
||||
netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="Block Outbound Telnet" dir=out program=%SystemRoot%\System32\telnet.exe protocol=tcp localport=23 action=block
|
||||
netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="Block Outbound Telnet" dir=out program=%SystemRoot%\System32\telnet.exe protocol=tcp localport=23 action=block
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Windows PowerShell
|
||||
|
||||
``` syntax
|
||||
New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName “Block Outbound Telnet” -Direction Outbound -Program %SystemRoot%\System32\tlntsvr.exe –Protocol TCP –LocalPort 23 -Action Block –PolicyStore domain.contoso.com\gpo_name
|
||||
New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName “Block Outbound Telnet” -Direction Outbound -Program %SystemRoot%\System32\tlntsvr.exe –Protocol TCP –LocalPort 23 -Action Block –PolicyStore domain.contoso.com\gpo_name
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### GPO Caching
|
||||
@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ Windows PowerShell
|
||||
``` syntax
|
||||
$gpo = Open-NetGPO –PolicyStore domain.contoso.com\gpo_name
|
||||
New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName “Block Outbound Telnet” -Direction Outbound -Program %SystemRoot%\System32\telnet.exe –Protocol TCP –LocalPort 23 -Action Block –GPOSession $gpo
|
||||
Save-NetGPO –GPOSession $gpo
|
||||
Save-NetGPO –GPOSession $gpo
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Note that this does not batch your individual changes, it loads and saves the entire GPO at once. So if any other changes are made by other administrators, or in a different Windows PowerShell window, saving the GPO overwrites those changes.
|
||||
@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ If the group is not specified at rule creation time, the rule can be added to th
|
||||
Windows PowerShell
|
||||
|
||||
``` syntax
|
||||
$rule = Get-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName “Allow Inbound Telnet”
|
||||
$rule = Get-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName “Allow Inbound Telnet”
|
||||
$rule.Group = “Telnet Management”
|
||||
$rule | Set-NetFirewallRule
|
||||
```
|
||||
@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ New-NetIPsecRule -DisplayName “Require Inbound Authentication” -PolicyStore
|
||||
|
||||
### Add custom authentication methods to an IPsec rule
|
||||
|
||||
If you want to create a custom set of quick-mode proposals that includes both AH and ESP in an IPsec rule object, you create the associated objects separately and link their associations. For more information about authentication methods, see [Choosing the IPsec Protocol](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc757847(WS.10).aspx) .
|
||||
If you want to create a custom set of quick-mode proposals that includes both AH and ESP in an IPsec rule object, you create the associated objects separately and link their associations. For more information about authentication methods, see [Choosing the IPsec Protocol](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc757847(WS.10).aspx) .
|
||||
|
||||
You can then use the newly created custom quick-mode policies when you create IPsec rules. The cryptography set object is linked to an IPsec rule object.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ For objects that come from a GPO (the *–PolicyStoreSourceType* parameter is sp
|
||||
Windows PowerShell
|
||||
|
||||
``` syntax
|
||||
Get-NetIPsecRule –DisplayName “Require Inbound Authentication” –TracePolicyStore
|
||||
Get-NetIPsecRule –DisplayName “Require Inbound Authentication” –TracePolicyStore
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
It is important to note that the revealed sources do not contain a domain name.
|
||||
@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ Windows PowerShell
|
||||
``` syntax
|
||||
$kerbprop = New-NetIPsecAuthProposal –Machine –Kerberos
|
||||
$Phase1AuthSet = New-NetIPsecPhase1AuthSet -DisplayName "Kerberos Auth Phase1" -Proposal $kerbprop –PolicyStore domain.contoso.com\domain_isolation
|
||||
New-NetIPsecRule –DisplayName “Basic Domain Isolation Policy” –Profile Domain –Phase1AuthSet $Phase1AuthSet.Name –InboundSecurity Require –OutboundSecurity Request –PolicyStore domain.contoso.com\domain_isolation
|
||||
New-NetIPsecRule –DisplayName “Basic Domain Isolation Policy” –Profile Domain –Phase1AuthSet $Phase1AuthSet.Name –InboundSecurity Require –OutboundSecurity Request –PolicyStore domain.contoso.com\domain_isolation
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Configure IPsec tunnel mode
|
||||
@ -578,7 +578,7 @@ To deploy server isolation, we layer a firewall rule that restricts traffic to a
|
||||
|
||||
The following firewall rule allows Telnet traffic from user accounts that are members of a custom group called “Authorized to Access Server.” This access can additionally be restricted based on the device, user, or both by specifying the restriction parameters.
|
||||
|
||||
A Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) string is created by extending a user or group’s security identifier (SID). For more information about finding a group’s SID, see: [Finding the SID for a group account](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc753463(WS.10).aspx#bkmk_FINDSID).
|
||||
A Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) string is created by extending a user or group’s security identifier (SID). For more information about finding a group’s SID, see: [Finding the SID for a group account](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc753463(WS.10).aspx#bkmk_FINDSID).
|
||||
|
||||
Restricting access to a group allows administrations to extend strong authentication support through Windows Defender Firewall and/or IPsec policies.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -600,7 +600,7 @@ Windows PowerShell
|
||||
$secureMachineGroup = "D:(A;;CC;;;$SIDofSecureMachineGroup)"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
For more information about how to create security groups or how to determine the SDDL string, see [Working with SIDs](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/ff730940.aspx).
|
||||
For more information about how to create security groups or how to determine the SDDL string, see [Working with SIDs](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/ff730940.aspx).
|
||||
|
||||
Telnet is an application that does not provide encryption. This application can send data, such as names and passwords, over the network. This data can be intercepted by malicious users. If an administrator would like to allow the use of Telnet, but protect the traffic, a firewall rule that requires IPsec encryption can be created. This is necessary so that the administrator can be certain that when this application is used, all of the traffic sent or received by this port is encrypted. If IPsec fails to authorize the connection, no traffic is allowed from this application.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -633,7 +633,7 @@ Set-NetFirewallSetting -RemoteMachineTransportAuthorizationList $secureMachineGr
|
||||
|
||||
### Create firewall rules that allow IPsec-protected network traffic (authenticated bypass)
|
||||
|
||||
Authenticated bypass allows traffic from a specified trusted device or user to override firewall block rules. This is helpful when an administrator wants to use scanning servers to monitor and update devices without the need to use port-level exceptions. For more information, see [How to enable authenticated firewall bypass](http://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc753463(WS.10).aspx).
|
||||
Authenticated bypass allows traffic from a specified trusted device or user to override firewall block rules. This is helpful when an administrator wants to use scanning servers to monitor and update devices without the need to use port-level exceptions. For more information, see [How to enable authenticated firewall bypass](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc753463(WS.10).aspx).
|
||||
|
||||
In this example, we assume that a blocking firewall rule exists. This example permits any network traffic on any port from any IP address to override the block rule, if the traffic is authenticated as originating from a device or user account that is a member of the specified device or user security group.
|
||||
|
||||
|