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Merged PR 15057: master
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Joey Caparas
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@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 02/28/2019
|
||||
ms.date: 04/02/2019
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# BitLocker Group Policy settings
|
||||
@ -1167,7 +1167,8 @@ This policy controls how BitLocker reacts to systems that are equipped with encr
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
<tr class="even">
|
||||
<td align="left"><p><strong>When not configured</strong></p></td>
|
||||
<td align="left"><p>BitLocker uses hardware-based encryption with the encryption algorithm that is set for the drive. If hardware-based encryption is not available, BitLocker software-based encryption is used instead.</p></td>
|
||||
<td align="left"><p>BitLocker software-based encryption is used irrespective of hardware-based encryption ability.
|
||||
</p></td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
</tbody>
|
||||
</table>
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||||
@ -1221,7 +1222,7 @@ This policy controls how BitLocker reacts when encrypted drives are used as oper
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
<tr class="even">
|
||||
<td align="left"><p><strong>When not configured</strong></p></td>
|
||||
<td align="left"><p>BitLocker uses hardware-based encryption with the encryption algorithm that is set for the drive. If hardware-based encryption is not available, BitLocker software-based encryption is used instead.</p></td>
|
||||
<td align="left"><p>BitLocker software-based encryption is used irrespective of hardware-based encryption ability. </p></td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
</tbody>
|
||||
</table>
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||||
@ -1277,7 +1278,7 @@ This policy controls how BitLocker reacts to encrypted drives when they are used
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
<tr class="even">
|
||||
<td align="left"><p><strong>When not configured</strong></p></td>
|
||||
<td align="left"><p>BitLocker uses hardware-based encryption with the encryption algorithm that is set for the drive. If hardware-based encryption is not available, BitLocker software-based encryption is used instead.</p></td>
|
||||
<td align="left"><p>BitLocker software-based encryption is used irrespective of hardware-based encryption ability. </p></td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
</tbody>
|
||||
</table>
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||||
|
||||
@ -7,28 +7,28 @@ ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
|
||||
ms.sitesec: library
|
||||
ms.pagetype: security
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||||
author: brianlic-msft
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||||
ms.date: 04/19/2017
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||||
ms.topic: article
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||||
ms.date: 04/02/2019
|
||||
---
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||||
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||||
# Encrypted Hard Drive
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||||
|
||||
**Applies to**
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||||
- Windows 10
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- Windows Server 2019
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- Windows Server 2016
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||||
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||||
Encrypted Hard Drive uses the rapid encryption that is provided by BitLocker Drive Encryption to enhance data security and management.
|
||||
|
||||
By offloading the cryptographic operations to hardware, Encrypted Hard Drives increase BitLocker performance and reduce CPU usage and power consumption. Because Encrypted Hard Drives encrypt data quickly, enterprise devices can expand BitLocker deployment with minimal impact on productivity.
|
||||
|
||||
Encrypted Hard Drives are a new class of hard drives that are self-encrypting at a hardware level and allow for full disk hardware encryption. In Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, and later you can install to these devices without additional modification.
|
||||
Encrypted Hard Drives are a new class of hard drives that are self-encrypting at a hardware level and allow for full disk hardware encryption. You can install Windows to Encrypted Hard Drives without additional modification beginning with Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012.
|
||||
|
||||
Some of the benefits of Encrypted Hard Drives include:
|
||||
Encrypted Hard Drives provide:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Better performance**: Encryption hardware, integrated into the drive controller, allows the drive to operate at full data rate with no performance degradation.
|
||||
- **Strong security based in hardware**: Encryption is always "on" and the keys for encryption never leave the hard drive. User authentication is performed by the drive before it will unlock, independently of the operating system
|
||||
- **Ease of use**: Encryption is transparent to the user because it is on by default. There is no user interaction needed to enable encryption. Encrypted Hard Drives are easily erased using on-board encryption key; there is no need to re-encrypt data on the drive.
|
||||
- **Lower cost of ownership**: There is no need for new infrastructure to manage encryption keys, since BitLocker leverages your Active Directory Domain Services infrastructure to store recovery information. Your device operates more efficiently because processor cycles do not need to be used for the encryption process.
|
||||
- **Ease of use**: Encryption is transparent to the user, and the user doesn't need to enable it. Encrypted Hard Drives are easily erased using on-board encryption key; there is no need to re-encrypt data on the drive.
|
||||
- **Lower cost of ownership**: There is no need for new infrastructure to manage encryption keys, since BitLocker leverages your existing infrastructure to store recovery information. Your device operates more efficiently because processor cycles do not need to be used for the encryption process.
|
||||
|
||||
Encrypted Hard Drives are supported natively in the operating system through the following mechanisms:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -38,20 +38,21 @@ Encrypted Hard Drives are supported natively in the operating system through the
|
||||
- **API**: API support for applications to manage Encrypted Hard Drives independently of BitLocker Drive Encryption (BDE)
|
||||
- **BitLocker support**: Integration with the BitLocker Control Panel provides a seamless BitLocker end user experience.
|
||||
|
||||
>**Warning:** Self-Encrypting Hard Drives and Encrypted Hard Drives for Windows are not the same type of device. Encrypted Hard Drives for Windows require compliance for specific TCG protocols as well as IEEE 1667 compliance; Self-Encrypting Hard Drives do not have these requirements. It is important to confirm the device type is an Encrypted Hard Drive for Windows when planning for deployment.
|
||||
>[!WARNING]
|
||||
>Self-Encrypting Hard Drives and Encrypted Hard Drives for Windows are not the same type of device. Encrypted Hard Drives for Windows require compliance for specific TCG protocols as well as IEEE 1667 compliance; Self-Encrypting Hard Drives do not have these requirements. It is important to confirm the device type is an Encrypted Hard Drive for Windows when planning for deployment.
|
||||
|
||||
If you are a storage device vendor who is looking for more info on how to implement Encrypted Hard Drive, see the [Encrypted Hard Drive Device Guide](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/dn653989.aspx).
|
||||
|
||||
## System Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
To use Encrypted Hard Drive, the following system requirements apply:
|
||||
To use Encrypted Hard Drives, the following system requirements apply:
|
||||
|
||||
For Encrypted Hard Drives used as **data drives**:
|
||||
For an Encrypted Hard Drive used as a **data drive**:
|
||||
|
||||
- The drive must be in an uninitialized state.
|
||||
- The drive must be in a security inactive state.
|
||||
|
||||
For Encrypted Hard Drives used as **startup drives**:
|
||||
For an Encrypted Hard Drive used as a **startup drive**:
|
||||
|
||||
- The drive must be in an uninitialized state.
|
||||
- The drive must be in a security inactive state.
|
||||
@ -59,7 +60,8 @@ For Encrypted Hard Drives used as **startup drives**:
|
||||
- The computer must have the Compatibility Support Module (CSM) disabled in UEFI.
|
||||
- The computer must always boot natively from UEFI.
|
||||
|
||||
>**Warning:** All Encrypted Hard Drives must be attached to non-RAID controllers to function properly.
|
||||
>[!WARNING]
|
||||
>All Encrypted Hard Drives must be attached to non-RAID controllers to function properly.
|
||||
|
||||
## Technical overview
|
||||
|
||||
@ -74,7 +76,15 @@ Configuration of Encrypted Hard Drives as startup drives is done using the same
|
||||
- **Deploy from server**: This deployment method involves PXE booting a client with Encrypted Hard Drives present. Configuration of Encrypted Hard Drives happens automatically in this environment when the Enhanced Storage component is added to the PXE boot image. During deployment, the [TCGSecurityActivationDisabled](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/dn923247.aspx) setting in unattend.xml controls the encryption behavior of Encrypted Hard Drives.
|
||||
- **Disk Duplication**: This deployment method involves use of a previously configured device and disk duplication tools to apply a Windows image to an Encrypted Hard Drive. Disks must be partitioned using at least Windows 8 or Windows Server 2012 for this configuration to work. Images made using disk duplicators will not work.
|
||||
|
||||
### Encrypted Hard Drive Architecture
|
||||
## Configuring hardware-based encryption with Group Policy
|
||||
|
||||
There are three related Group Policy settings that help you manage how BitLocker uses hardware-based envryption and which encryption algorithms to use. If these settings are not configured or disabled on systems that are equipped with encrypted drives, BitLocker uses software-based encryption:
|
||||
|
||||
- [Configure use of hardware-based encryption for fixed data drives](bitlocker/bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md#a-href-idbkmk-hdefxdaconfigure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-fixed-data-drives)
|
||||
- [Configure use of hardware-based encryption for removable data drives](bitlocker/bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md#a-href-idbkmk-hderddaconfigure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-removable-data-drives)
|
||||
- [Configure use of hardware-based encryption for operating system drives](bitlocker/bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md#a-href-idbkmk-hdeosdaconfigure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-operating-system-drives)
|
||||
|
||||
## Encrypted Hard Drive Architecture
|
||||
|
||||
Encrypted Hard Drives utilize two encryption keys on the device to control the locking and unlocking of data on the drive. These are the Data Encryption Key (DEK) and the Authentication Key (AK).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Coin miners
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# How Microsoft identifies malware and potentially unwanted applications
|
||||
|
||||
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Exploits and exploit kits
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -12,11 +12,12 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Fileless threats
|
||||
|
||||
What exactly is a fileless threat? The term "fileless" suggests that a threat that does not come in a file, such as a backdoor that lives only in the memory of a machine. However, there's no generally accepted definition. The terms is used broadly; it's also used to describe malware families that do rely on files in order to operate.
|
||||
What exactly is a fileless threat? The term "fileless" suggests that a threat that does not come in a file, such as a backdoor that lives only in the memory of a machine. However, there's no generally accepted definition. The terms is used broadly; it's also used to describe malware families that do rely on files in order to operate.
|
||||
|
||||
Given that attacks involve [several stages](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/ATT&CK_Matrix) for functionalities like execution, persistence, information theft, lateral movement, communication with command-and-control, etc., some parts of the attack chain may be fileless, while others may involve the filesystem in some form or another.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -25,13 +26,13 @@ To shed light on this loaded term, we grouped fileless threats into different ca
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
*Figure 1. Comprehensive diagram of fileless malware*
|
||||
|
||||
We can classify fileless threats by their entry point, which indicates how fileless malware can arrive on a machine: via an exploit; through compromised hardware; or via regular execution of applications and scripts.
|
||||
We can classify fileless threats by their entry point, which indicates how fileless malware can arrive on a machine: via an exploit; through compromised hardware; or via regular execution of applications and scripts.
|
||||
|
||||
Next, we can list the form of entry point: for example, exploits can be based on files or network data; PCI peripherals are a type of hardware vector; and scripts and executables are sub-categories of the execution vector.
|
||||
|
||||
Finally, we can classify the host of the infection: for example, a Flash application that may contain an exploit; a simple executable; a malicious firmware from a hardware device; or an infected MBR, which could bootstrap the execution of a malware before the operating system even loads.
|
||||
|
||||
This helps us divide and categorize the various kinds of fileless threats. Clearly, the categories are not all the same: some are more dangerous but also more difficult to implement, while others are more commonly used despite (or precisely because of) not being very advanced.
|
||||
This helps us divide and categorize the various kinds of fileless threats. Clearly, the categories are not all the same: some are more dangerous but also more difficult to implement, while others are more commonly used despite (or precisely because of) not being very advanced.
|
||||
|
||||
From this categorization, we can glean three big types of fileless threats based on how much fingerprint they may leave on infected machines.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -39,7 +40,7 @@ From this categorization, we can glean three big types of fileless threats based
|
||||
|
||||
A completely fileless malware can be considered one that never requires writing a file on the disk. How would such malware infect a machine in the first place? An example scenario could be a target machine receiving malicious network packets that exploit the EternalBlue vulnerability, leading to the installation of the DoublePulsar backdoor, which ends up residing only in the kernel memory. In this case, there is no file or any data written on a file.
|
||||
|
||||
Another scenario could involve compromised devices, where malicious code could be hiding in device firmware (such as a BIOS), a USB peripheral (like the BadUSB attack), or even in the firmware of a network card. All these examples do not require a file on the disk in order to run and can theoretically live only in memory, surviving even reboots, disk reformats, and OS reinstalls.
|
||||
Another scenario could involve compromised devices, where malicious code could be hiding in device firmware (such as a BIOS), a USB peripheral (like the BadUSB attack), or even in the firmware of a network card. All these examples do not require a file on the disk in order to run and can theoretically live only in memory, surviving even reboots, disk reformats, and OS reinstalls.
|
||||
|
||||
Infections of this type can be extra difficult to detect and remediate. Antivirus products usually don’t have the capability to access firmware for inspection; even if they did, it would be extremely challenging to detect and remediate threats at this level. Because this type of fileless malware requires high levels of sophistication and often depend on particular hardware or software configuration, it’s not an attack vector that can be exploited easily and reliably. For this reason, while extremely dangerous, threats of this type tend to be very uncommon and not practical for most attacks.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ Having described the broad categories, we can now dig into the details and provi
|
||||
|
||||
**File-based** (Type III: executable, Flash, Java, documents): An initial file may exploit the operating system, the browser, the Java engine, the Flash engine, etc. in order to execute a shellcode and deliver a payload in memory. While the payload is fileless, the initial entry vector is a file.
|
||||
|
||||
**Network-based** (Type I): A network communication that takes advantage of a vulnerability in the target machine can achieve code execution in the context of an application or the kernel. An example is WannaCry, which exploits a previously fixed vulnerability in the SMB protocol to deliver a backdoor within the kernel memory.
|
||||
**Network-based** (Type I): A network communication that takes advantage of a vulnerability in the target machine can achieve code execution in the context of an application or the kernel. An example is WannaCry, which exploits a previously fixed vulnerability in the SMB protocol to deliver a backdoor within the kernel memory.
|
||||
|
||||
### Hardware
|
||||
|
||||
@ -76,9 +77,9 @@ Having described the broad categories, we can now dig into the details and provi
|
||||
|
||||
**CPU-based** (Type I): Modern CPUs are extremely complex and may include subsystems running firmware for management purposes. Such firmware may be vulnerable to hijacking and allow the execution of malicious code that would hence operate from within the CPU. In December 2017, two researchers reported a vulnerability that can allow attackers to execute code inside the [Management Engine (ME)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Management_Engine) present in any modern CPU from Intel. Meanwhile, the attacker group PLATINUM has been observed to have the capability to use Intel's [Active Management Technology (AMT)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Active_Management_Technology) to perform [invisible network communications](https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2017/06/07/platinum-continues-to-evolve-find-ways-to-maintain-invisibility/) bypassing the installed operating system. ME and AMT are essentially autonomous micro-computers that live inside the CPU and that operate at a very low level. Because these technologies’ purpose is to provide remote manageability, they have direct access to hardware, are independent of the operating system, and can run even if the computer is turned off. Besides being vulnerable at the firmware level, CPUs could be manufactured with backdoors inserted directly in the hardware circuitry. This attack has been [researched and proved possible](https://www.emsec.rub.de/media/crypto/veroeffentlichungen/2015/03/19/beckerStealthyExtended.pdf) in the past. Just recently it has been reported that certain models of x86 processors contain a secondary embedded RISC-like CPU core that can [effectively provide a backdoor](https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/08/10/via_c3_x86_processor_backdoor/) through which regular applications can gain privileged execution.
|
||||
|
||||
**USB-based** (Type I): USB devices of all kinds can be reprogrammed with a malicious firmware capable of interacting with the operating system in nefarious ways. This is the case of the [BadUSB technique](https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/07/this-thumbdrive-hacks-computers-badusb-exploit-makes-devices-turn-evil/), demonstrated few years ago, which allows a reprogrammed USB stick to act as a keyboard that sends commands to machines via keystrokes, or as a network card that can redirect traffic at will.
|
||||
**USB-based** (Type I): USB devices of all kinds can be reprogrammed with a malicious firmware capable of interacting with the operating system in nefarious ways. This is the case of the [BadUSB technique](https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/07/this-thumbdrive-hacks-computers-badusb-exploit-makes-devices-turn-evil/), demonstrated few years ago, which allows a reprogrammed USB stick to act as a keyboard that sends commands to machines via keystrokes, or as a network card that can redirect traffic at will.
|
||||
|
||||
**BIOS-based** (Type I): A BIOS is a firmware running inside a chipset. It executes when a machine is powered on, initializes the hardware, and then transfers control to the boot sector. It’s a very important component that operates at a very low level and executes before the boot sector. It’s possible to reprogram the BIOS firmware with malicious code, as has happened in the past with the [Mebromi rootkit](https://www.webroot.com/blog/2011/09/13/mebromi-the-first-bios-rootkit-in-the-wild/).
|
||||
**BIOS-based** (Type I): A BIOS is a firmware running inside a chipset. It executes when a machine is powered on, initializes the hardware, and then transfers control to the boot sector. It’s a very important component that operates at a very low level and executes before the boot sector. It’s possible to reprogram the BIOS firmware with malicious code, as has happened in the past with the [Mebromi rootkit](https://www.webroot.com/blog/2011/09/13/mebromi-the-first-bios-rootkit-in-the-wild/).
|
||||
|
||||
**Hypervisor-based** (Type I): Modern CPUs provide hardware hypervisor support, allowing the operating system to create robust virtual machines. A virtual machine runs in a confined, simulated environment, and is in theory unaware of the emulation. A malware taking over a machine may implement a small hypervisor in order to hide itself outside of the realm of the running operating system. Malware of this kind has been theorized in the past, and eventually real hypervisor rootkits [have been observed](http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2017/Jun/29), although very few are known to date.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Macro malware
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Malware names
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Phishing
|
||||
|
||||
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Prevent malware infection
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Ransomware
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Rootkits
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Microsoft Safety Scanner
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Submit files for analysis
|
||||
|
||||
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Supply chain attacks
|
||||
|
||||
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Tech support scams
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Top scoring in industry tests
|
||||
@ -40,9 +41,13 @@ Windows Defender Antivirus is part of the [next generation](https://www.youtub
|
||||
|
||||
The AV-TEST Product Review and Certification Report tests on three categories: protection, performance, and usability. The scores listed below are for the Protection category which has two scores: Real-World Testing and the AV-TEST reference set (known as "Prevalent Malware").
|
||||
|
||||
- November - December 2018 AV-TEST Business User test: [Protection score 6.0/6.0](https://www.av-test.org/en/antivirus/business-windows-client/windows-10/december-2018/microsoft-windows-defender-antivirus-4.18-185074/) | [Analysis](https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RWusR9) <sup>**Latest**</sup>
|
||||
- January - February 2019 AV-TEST Business User test: [Protection score 6.0/6.0](https://www.av-test.org/en/antivirus/business-windows-client/windows-10/december-2018/microsoft-windows-defender-antivirus-4.18-185074/) <sup>**Latest**</sup>
|
||||
|
||||
Windows Defender Antivirus achieved an overall Protection score of 6.0/6.0, detecting 100% of 19,956 malware samples. This is the fourth consecutive cycle that Windows Defender Antivirus achieved a perfect score.
|
||||
Windows Defender Antivirus achieved an overall Protection score of 6.0/6.0, with 19,956 malware samples used. This is the fifth consecutive cycle that Windows Defender Antivirus achieved a perfect score.
|
||||
|
||||
- November - December 2018 AV-TEST Business User test: [Protection score 6.0/6.0](https://www.av-test.org/en/antivirus/business-windows-client/windows-10/december-2018/microsoft-windows-defender-antivirus-4.18-185074/) | [Analysis](https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RWusR9)
|
||||
|
||||
Windows Defender Antivirus achieved an overall Protection score of 6.0/6.0, detecting 100% of 19,956 malware samples.
|
||||
|
||||
- September - October 2018 AV-TEST Business User test: [Protection score 6.0/6.0](https://www.av-test.org/en/antivirus/business-windows-client/windows-10/october-2018/microsoft-windows-defender-antivirus-4.18-184174/) | [Analysis](https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RWqOqD)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Trojans
|
||||
|
||||
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Understanding malware & other threats
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Unwanted software
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Worms
|
||||
|
||||
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 04/19/2017
|
||||
ms.date: 04/01/2019
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Audit: Audit the use of Backup and Restore privilege
|
||||
@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ When the backup and restore function is used, it creates a copy of the file syst
|
||||
### Countermeasure
|
||||
|
||||
Enable the **Audit: Audit the use of Backup and Restore privilege** setting. Alternatively, implement automatic log backup by configuring the **AutoBackupLogFiles** registry key. If you enable this option when the [Audit privilege use](../auditing/basic-audit-privilege-use.md) setting is also enabled, an audit event is generated for every file that is backed up or restored. This information could help you to identify an account that was used to accidentally or maliciously restore data in an unauthorized manner.
|
||||
For more information about configuring this key, see Microsoft Knowledge Base article [100879](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkId=100879).
|
||||
For more information about configuring this key, see [Eventlog Key](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/EventLog/eventlog-key).
|
||||
|
||||
### Potential impact
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ ms.pagetype: security
|
||||
ms.localizationpriority: medium
|
||||
author: andreabichsel
|
||||
ms.author: v-anbic
|
||||
ms.date: 03/26/2018
|
||||
ms.date: 04/02/2019
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Reduce attack surfaces with attack surface reduction rules
|
||||
@ -236,15 +236,6 @@ SCCM name: Not applicable
|
||||
|
||||
GUID: 7674ba52-37eb-4a4f-a9a1-f0f9a1619a2c
|
||||
|
||||
## Review attack surface reduction events in Windows Event Viewer
|
||||
|
||||
You can review the Windows event log to see events that are created when attack surface rules block (or audit) an app:
|
||||
|
||||
Event ID | Description
|
||||
5007 | Event when settings are changed
|
||||
1121 | Event when an attack surface reduction rule fires in audit mode
|
||||
1122 | Event when an attack surface reduction rule fires in block mode
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Related topics
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ ms.pagetype: security
|
||||
ms.localizationpriority: medium
|
||||
author: andreabichsel
|
||||
ms.author: v-anbic
|
||||
ms.date: 09/18/2018
|
||||
ms.date: 04/02/2019
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -37,32 +37,13 @@ You can use Group Policy, PowerShell, and configuration service providers (CSPs)
|
||||
>You can also visit the Windows Defender Testground website at [demo.wd.microsoft.com](https://demo.wd.microsoft.com?ocid=cx-wddocs-testground) to confirm the features are working and see how they work.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|Audit options | How to enable audit mode | How to view events |
|
||||
|- | - | - |
|
||||
|Audit applies to all events | [Enable controlled folder access](enable-controlled-folders-exploit-guard.md) | [Controlled folder access events](evaluate-controlled-folder-access.md#review-controlled-folder-access-events-in-windows-event-viewer) |
|
||||
|Audit applies to individual rules | [Enable attack surface reduction rules](enable-attack-surface-reduction.md) | [Attack surface reduction rule events](evaluate-attack-surface-reduction.md#review-attack-surface-reduction-events-in-windows-event-viewer) |
|
||||
|Audit applies to all events | [Enable network protection](enable-network-protection.md) | [Network protection events](evaluate-network-protection.md#review-network-protection-events-in-windows-event-viewer) |
|
||||
|Audit applies to individual mitigations | [Enable exploit protection](enable-exploit-protection.md) | [Exploit protection events](exploit-protection-exploit-guard.md#review-exploit-protection-events-in-windows-event-viewer) |
|
||||
|
||||
Audit options | How to enable audit mode | How to view events
|
||||
- | - | -
|
||||
Audit applies to all events | [Enable controlled folder access](enable-controlled-folders-exploit-guard.md) | [Controlled folder access events](evaluate-controlled-folder-access.md#review-controlled-folder-access-events-in-windows-event-viewer)
|
||||
Audit applies to individual rules | [Enable attack surface reduction rules](enable-attack-surface-reduction.md) | [Attack surface reduction rule events](attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard.md#review-attack-surface-reduction-events-in-windows-event-viewer)
|
||||
Audit applies to all events | [Enable network protection](enable-network-protection.md) | [Network protection events](evaluate-network-protection.md#review-network-protection-events-in-windows-event-viewer)
|
||||
Audit applies to individual mitigations | [Enable exploit protection](enable-exploit-protection.md) | [Exploit protection events](exploit-protection-exploit-guard.md#review-exploit-protection-events-in-windows-event-viewer)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
You can also use the a custom PowerShell script that enables the features in audit mode automatically:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Download the [Exploit Guard Evaluation Package](https://aka.ms/mp7z2w) and extract the file *Enable-ExploitGuardAuditMode.ps1* to an easily accessible location on the machine.
|
||||
|
||||
1. Type **powershell** in the Start menu.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Right-click **Windows PowerShell**, click **Run as administrator** and click **Yes** or enter admin credentials at the prompt.
|
||||
|
||||
3. Enter the following in the PowerShell window to enable Controlled folder access and Attack surface reduction in audit mode:
|
||||
```PowerShell
|
||||
Set-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Force
|
||||
<location>\Enable-ExploitGuardAuditMode.ps1
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Replace \<location> with the folder path where you placed the file.
|
||||
|
||||
A message should appear to indicate that audit mode was enabled.
|
||||
|
||||
## Related topics
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 03/15/2019
|
||||
ms.date: 04/01/2019
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Enable virtualization-based protection of code integrity
|
||||
@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ If this happens, see [Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting) for remediation steps.
|
||||
>HVCI works with modern 7th gen CPUs or higher and its equivalent on AMD. CPU new feature is required *Mode based execution control (MBE) Virtualization*.
|
||||
|
||||
>[!TIP]
|
||||
> "The Secure Kernel relies on the Mode-Based Execution Control (MBEC) feature, if present in hardware, which enhances the SLAT with a user/kernel executable bit, or the hypervisor’s software emulation of this feature, called Restricted User Mode (RUM).". Mark Russinovich and Alex Ionescu. Windows Internals 7th Edition book
|
||||
> "The Secure Kernel relies on the Mode-Based Execution Control (MBEC) feature, if present in hardware, which enhances the SLAT with a user/kernel executable bit, or the hypervisor’s software emulation of this feature, called Restricted User Mode (RUM)." Mark Russinovich and Alex Ionescu. Windows Internals 7th Edition book
|
||||
|
||||
## HVCI Features
|
||||
|
||||
@ -291,6 +291,6 @@ Set-VMSecurity -VMName <VMName> -VirtualizationBasedSecurityOptOut $true
|
||||
### Requirements for running HVCI in Hyper-V virtual machines
|
||||
- The Hyper-V host must run at least Windows Server 2016 or Windows 10 version 1607.
|
||||
- The Hyper-V virtual machine must be Generation 2, and running at least Windows Server 2016 or Windows 10.
|
||||
- HVCI and [virtualization](https://docs.microsoft.com/virtualization/hyper-v-on-windows/user-guide/nested-virtualization) can be enabled at the same time
|
||||
- HVCI and [nested virtualization](https://docs.microsoft.com/virtualization/hyper-v-on-windows/user-guide/nested-virtualization) can be enabled at the same time
|
||||
- Virtual Fibre Channel adapters are not compatible with HVCI. Before attaching a virtual Fibre Channel Adapter to a virtual machine, you must first opt out of virtualization-based security using `Set-VMSecurity`.
|
||||
- The AllowFullSCSICommandSet option for pass-through disks is not compatible with HVCI. Before configuring a pass-through disk with AllowFullSCSICommandSet, you must first opt out of virtualization-based security using `Set-VMSecurity`.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ ms.pagetype: security
|
||||
ms.localizationpriority: medium
|
||||
author: andreabichsel
|
||||
ms.author: v-anbic
|
||||
ms.date: 11/16/2018
|
||||
ms.date: 04/02/2019
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Evaluate attack surface reduction rules
|
||||
@ -45,6 +45,17 @@ This enables all attack surface reduction rules in audit mode.
|
||||
>If you want to fully audit how attack surface reduction rules will work in your organization, you'll need to use a management tool to deploy this setting to machines in your network(s).
|
||||
You can also use Group Policy, Intune, or MDM CSPs to configure and deploy the setting, as described in the main [Attack surface reduction rules topic](attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard.md).
|
||||
|
||||
## Review attack surface reduction events in Windows Event Viewer
|
||||
|
||||
To review apps that would have been blocked, open Event Viewer and filter for Event ID 1121 in the Microsoft-Windows-Windows-Defender/Operational log. The following table lists all network protection events.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Event ID | Description |
|
||||
|----------|-------------|
|
||||
|5007 | Event when settings are changed |
|
||||
| 1121 | Event when an attack surface reduction rule fires in audit mode |
|
||||
| 1122 | Event when an attack surface reduction rule fires in block mode |
|
||||
|
||||
## Customize attack surface reduction rules
|
||||
|
||||
During your evaluation, you may wish to configure each rule individualy or exclude certain files and processes from being evaluated by the feature.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ ms.pagetype: security
|
||||
ms.localizationpriority: medium
|
||||
author: andreabichsel
|
||||
ms.author: v-anbic
|
||||
ms.date: 03/26/2019
|
||||
ms.date: 04/02/2019
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Evaluate exploit protection
|
||||
@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Exploit protection | Security-Mitigations (Kernel Mode/User Mode) | 11 | Code in
|
||||
- [Enable exploit protection](enable-exploit-protection.md)
|
||||
- [Configure and audit exploit protection mitigations](customize-exploit-protection.md)
|
||||
- [Import, export, and deploy exploit protection configurations](import-export-exploit-protection-emet-xml.md)
|
||||
- [Troubleshoot exploit protection](troubleshoot-exploit-protection-mitigations.md)
|
||||
- [Enable network protection](enable-network-protection.md)
|
||||
- [Enable controlled folder access](enable-controlled-folders-exploit-guard.md)
|
||||
- [Enable attack surface reduction](enable-attack-surface-reduction.md)
|
||||
|
||||
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ ms.pagetype: security
|
||||
ms.localizationpriority: medium
|
||||
author: andreabichsel
|
||||
ms.author: v-anbic
|
||||
ms.date: 04/01/2019
|
||||
ms.date: 04/02/2019
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Evaluate network protection
|
||||
@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ ms.date: 04/01/2019
|
||||
|
||||
- [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Windows Defender ATP)](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?linkid=2069559)
|
||||
|
||||
Network protection helps prevent employees from using any application to access dangerous domains that may host phishing scams, exploits, and other malicious content on the Internet.
|
||||
[Network protection](network-protection-exploit-guard.md) helps prevent employees from using any application to access dangerous domains that may host phishing scams, exploits, and other malicious content on the Internet.
|
||||
|
||||
This topic helps you evaluate Network protection by enabling the feature and guiding you to a testing site. The site in this evaluation topic are not malicious, they are specially created websites that pretend to be malicious. The site will replicate the behavior that would happen if a user visted a malicious site or domain.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -55,11 +55,11 @@ The network connection will be allowed and a test message will be displayed.
|
||||
|
||||
To review apps that would have been blocked, open Event Viewer and filter for Event ID 1125 in the Microsoft-Windows-Windows-Defender/Operational log. The following table lists all network protection events.
|
||||
|
||||
Event ID | Provide/Source | Description
|
||||
-|-
|
||||
5007 | Windows Defender (Operational) | Event when settings are changed
|
||||
1125 | Windows Defender (Operational) | Event when a network connection is audited
|
||||
1126 | Windows Defender (Operational) | Event when a network connection is blocked
|
||||
| Event ID | Provide/Source | Description |
|
||||
|-|-|-|
|
||||
|5007 | Windows Defender (Operational) | Event when settings are changed |
|
||||
|1125 | Windows Defender (Operational) | Event when a network connection is audited |
|
||||
|1126 | Windows Defender (Operational) | Event when a network connection is blocked |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Related topics
|
||||
|
||||
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ ms.pagetype: security
|
||||
ms.localizationpriority: medium
|
||||
author: andreabichsel
|
||||
ms.author: v-anbic
|
||||
ms.date: 03/26/2018
|
||||
ms.date: 04/02/2019
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Protect devices from exploits
|
||||
@ -154,5 +154,6 @@ Validate image dependency integrity | [!include[Check mark yes](images/svg/check
|
||||
- [Enable exploit protection](enable-exploit-protection.md)
|
||||
- [Configure and audit exploit protection mitigations](customize-exploit-protection.md)
|
||||
- [Import, export, and deploy exploit protection configurations](import-export-exploit-protection-emet-xml.md)
|
||||
- [Troubleshoot exploit protection](troubleshoot-exploit-protection-mitigations.md)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 04/19/2017
|
||||
ms.date: 04/02/2019
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Assign Security Group Filters to the GPO
|
||||
@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ ms.date: 04/19/2017
|
||||
|
||||
To make sure that your GPO is applied to the correct computers, use the Group Policy Management MMC snap-in to assign security group filters to the GPO.
|
||||
|
||||
>**Important:** This deployment guide uses the method of adding the Domain Computers group to the membership group for the main isolated domain after testing is complete and you are ready to go live in production. To make this method work, you must prevent any computer that is a member of either the boundary or encryption zone from applying the GPO for the main isolated domain. For example, on the GPOs for the main isolated domain, deny Read and Apply Group Policy permissions to the membership groups for the boundary and encryption zones.
|
||||
>[!IMPORTANT]
|
||||
>This deployment guide uses the method of adding the Domain Computers group to the membership group for the main isolated domain after testing is complete and you are ready to go live in production. To make this method work, you must prevent any computer that is a member of either the boundary or encryption zone from applying the GPO for the main isolated domain. For example, on the GPOs for the main isolated domain, deny Read and Apply Group Policy permissions to the membership groups for the boundary and encryption zones.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -47,7 +48,8 @@ Use the following procedure to add a group to the security filter on the GPO tha
|
||||
|
||||
3. In the details pane, under **Security Filtering**, click **Authenticated Users**, and then click **Remove**.
|
||||
|
||||
>**Note:** You must remove the default permission granted to all authenticated users and computers to restrict the GPO to only the groups you specify.
|
||||
>[!NOTE]
|
||||
>You must remove the default permission granted to all authenticated users and computers to restrict the GPO to only the groups you specify. If the GPO contains User settings, and the **Authenticated Users** group is removed, and new security filtering is added using a security group that only contains user accounts, the GPO can fail to apply. Details and various workarounds are mentioned in this [Microsoft blog](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/Core-Infrastructure-and-Security/Who-broke-my-user-GPOs/ba-p/258781).
|
||||
|
||||
4. Click **Add**.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user