Merge remote-tracking branch 'refs/remotes/origin/master' into live

This commit is contained in:
LizRoss 2017-05-04 13:46:55 -07:00
commit 37900e6654
2 changed files with 3 additions and 3 deletions

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@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ For client machines that are running Windows 10 1703, LSAIso is running whenever
- **Event ID 15** Credential Guard (LsaIso.exe) is configured but the secure kernel is not running; continuing without Credential Guard. - **Event ID 15** Credential Guard (LsaIso.exe) is configured but the secure kernel is not running; continuing without Credential Guard.
- **Event ID 16** Credential Guard (LsaIso.exe) failed to launch: \[error code\] - **Event ID 16** Credential Guard (LsaIso.exe) failed to launch: \[error code\]
- **Event ID 17** Error reading Credential Guard (LsaIso.exe) UEFI configuration: \[error code\] - **Event ID 17** Error reading Credential Guard (LsaIso.exe) UEFI configuration: \[error code\]
You can also verify that TPM is being used for key protection by checking the following event in the **Microsoft** -> **Windows** -> **Kernel-Boot** event source. If you are running with a TPM, the TPM PCR mask value will be something other than 0. You can also verify that TPM is being used for key protection by checking Event ID 51 in the **Microsoft** -> **Windows** -> **Kernel-Boot** event source. If you are running with a TPM, the TPM PCR mask value will be something other than 0.
- **Event ID 51** VSM Master Encryption Key Provisioning. Using cached copy status: 0x0. Unsealing cached copy status: 0x1. New key generation status: 0x1. Sealing status: 0x1. TPM PCR mask: 0x0. - **Event ID 51** VSM Master Encryption Key Provisioning. Using cached copy status: 0x0. Unsealing cached copy status: 0x1. New key generation status: 0x1. Sealing status: 0x1. TPM PCR mask: 0x0.
## Disable Credential Guard ## Disable Credential Guard

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@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ The Windows Hello for Business PIN is subject to the same set of IT management p
## What if someone steals the laptop or phone? ## What if someone steals the laptop or phone?
To compromise a Windows Hello credential that TPM protects, an attacker must have access to the physical device, and then must find a way to spoof the users biometrics or guess his or her PIN—and all of this must be done before [TPM anti-hammering](/windows/device-security/tpm/tpm-fundamentals#anti-hammering) protection locks the device. To compromise a Windows Hello credential that TPM protects, an attacker must have access to the physical device, and then must find a way to spoof the users biometrics or guess his or her PIN—and all of this must be done before [TPM anti-hammering](/windows/device-security/tpm/tpm-fundamentals#anti-hammering) protection locks the device.
You can provide additional protection for laptops that don't have TPM by enablng BitLocker and setting a policy to limit failed sign-ins. You can provide additional protection for laptops that don't have TPM by enabling BitLocker and setting a policy to limit failed sign-ins.
**Configure BitLocker without TPM** **Configure BitLocker without TPM**
1. Use the Local Group Policy Editor (gpedit.msc) to enable the following policy: 1. Use the Local Group Policy Editor (gpedit.msc) to enable the following policy: