diff --git a/windows/keep-secure/overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md b/windows/keep-secure/overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md
index af68c19062..afb6419299 100644
--- a/windows/keep-secure/overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md
+++ b/windows/keep-secure/overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md
@@ -35,14 +35,14 @@ Windows 10 mitigations that you can configure are listed in the following two ta
| Mitigation and corresponding threat | Description and links |
|---|---|
-| **Device Guard**,
which helps keep a device free of
malware or other untrusted apps
(can be enhanced by Secure Boot, described in the next row) | Device Guard includes Code Integrity policies, a whitelist you create of trusted apps—the only apps allowed to run in your organization. Device Guard also includes virtualization-based security (VBS), which has specific hardware requirements, and works with Code Integrity policies to help stop attacks even if they gain entrance to the kernel.
Device Guard is included in Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows Server 2016.
**More information**: [Introduction to Device Guard](introduction-to-device-guard-virtualization-based-security-and-code-integrity-policies.md) |
-| **UEFI Secure Boot**,
which mitigates against
bootkits and rootkits | Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Secure Boot helps protect the boot process and firmware from tampering, such as from a physically present attacker or from forms of malware that run early in the boot process or in kernel after startup.
**More information**: [UEFI and Secure Boot](bitlocker-countermeasures.md#uefi-and-secure-boot) |
-| **Credential Guard**,
which mitigates against
credential theft attacks, such as Pass-the-Hash or Pass-The-Ticket | Credential Guard uses virtualization-based security to isolate secrets, such as NTLM password hashes and Kerberos Ticket Granting Tickets, so that only privileged system software can access them.
Credential Guard is included in Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows Server 2016.
**More information**: [Protect derived domain credentials with Credential Guard](credential-guard.md) |
-| **Blocking of untrusted fonts**,
which mitigates against
elevation-of-privilege attacks from untrusted fonts | The Block Untrusted Fonts setting allows you to prevent users from loading untrusted fonts onto your network. Blocking untrusted fonts helps prevent both remote (web-based or email-based) and local elevation-of-privilege attacks associated with the parsing of font files.
**More information**: [Block untrusted fonts in an enterprise](block-untrusted-fonts-in-enterprise.md) |
-| **OS key pinning**,
which mitigates against
man-in-the-middle attacks that leverage PKI | With OS key pinning, you can “pin” (associate) an X.509 certificate and its public key to its legitimate Certification Authority (root or leaf). This provides validation for digitally signed certificates (SSL certificates) used while browsing, and mitigates against man-in the-middle attacks that involve these certificates.
**More information**: OS_KEY_PINNING_LINK. |
-| **The SmartScreen Filter**,
which mitigates against
malicious applications that
a user might download | The SmartScreen Filter can check the reputation of a downloaded application by using a service that Microsoft maintains. The first time a user runs an app that originates from the Internet (even if the user copied it from another PC), the SmartScreen filter checks to see if the app lacks a reputation or is known to be malicious, and responds accordingly.
**More information**: [The SmartScreen Filter](#the-smartscreen-filter), later in this topic |
-| **Windows Defender** (antimalware), which mitigates against
multiple threats | Windows 10 includes Windows Defender, a robust inbox antimalware solution. Windows Defender has been significantly improved since it was introduced in Windows 8.
**More information**: [Windows Defender](#windows-defender), later in this topic |
-| **Memory protections** listed in [Table 2](#table-2),
which mitigate against
malware that uses memory
manipulation techniques such as
buffer overruns | This set of mitigations helps protect against memory-based attacks, where malware or other code manipulates memory to gain control of a system. For example, malware may use buffer overruns to inject malicious executable code into memory.
A minority of trusted apps will not be able to run if some of these mitigations are set to their most restrictive settings. Testing can help you maximize protection while still allowing needed apps to run correctly.
**More information**: [Table 2](#table-2), later in this topic |
+| **Device Guard**,
which helps keep a device free of
malware or other untrusted apps
(can be enhanced by Secure Boot, described in the next row) | Device Guard includes Code Integrity policies, a whitelist you create of trusted apps—the only apps allowed to run in your organization. Device Guard also includes virtualization-based security (VBS), which has specific hardware requirements, and works with Code Integrity policies to help stop attacks even if they gain entrance to the kernel.
Device Guard is included in Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows Server 2016.
**More information**: [Introduction to Device Guard](introduction-to-device-guard-virtualization-based-security-and-code-integrity-policies.md) |
+| **UEFI Secure Boot**,
which mitigates against
bootkits and rootkits | Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Secure Boot helps protect the boot process and firmware from tampering, such as from a physically present attacker or from forms of malware that run early in the boot process or in kernel after startup.
**More information**: [UEFI and Secure Boot](bitlocker-countermeasures.md#uefi-and-secure-boot) |
+| **Credential Guard**,
which mitigates against
credential theft attacks, such as Pass-the-Hash or Pass-The-Ticket | Credential Guard uses virtualization-based security to isolate secrets, such as NTLM password hashes and Kerberos Ticket Granting Tickets, so that only privileged system software can access them.
Credential Guard is included in Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows Server 2016.
**More information**: [Protect derived domain credentials with Credential Guard](credential-guard.md) |
+| **Blocking of untrusted fonts**,
which mitigates against
elevation-of-privilege attacks from untrusted fonts | The Block Untrusted Fonts setting allows you to prevent users from loading untrusted fonts onto your network. Blocking untrusted fonts helps prevent both remote (web-based or email-based) and local elevation-of-privilege attacks associated with the parsing of font files.
**More information**: [Block untrusted fonts in an enterprise](block-untrusted-fonts-in-enterprise.md) |
+| **OS key pinning**,
which mitigates against
man-in-the-middle attacks that leverage PKI | With OS key pinning, you can “pin” (associate) an X.509 certificate and its public key to its legitimate Certification Authority (root or leaf). This provides validation for digitally signed certificates (SSL certificates) used while browsing, and mitigates against man-in the-middle attacks that involve these certificates.
**More information**: OS_KEY_PINNING_LINK |
+| **The SmartScreen Filter**,
which mitigates against
malicious applications that
a user might download | The SmartScreen Filter can check the reputation of a downloaded application by using a service that Microsoft maintains. The first time a user runs an app that originates from the Internet (even if the user copied it from another PC), the SmartScreen filter checks to see if the app lacks a reputation or is known to be malicious, and responds accordingly.
**More information**: [The SmartScreen Filter](#the-smartscreen-filter), later in this topic |
+| **Windows Defender** (antimalware), which mitigates against
multiple threats | Windows 10 includes Windows Defender, a robust inbox antimalware solution. Windows Defender has been significantly improved since it was introduced in Windows 8.
**More information**: [Windows Defender](#windows-defender), later in this topic |
+| **Memory protections** listed in [Table 2](#table-2),
which mitigate against
malware that uses memory
manipulation techniques such as
buffer overruns | This set of mitigations helps protect against memory-based attacks, where malware or other code manipulates memory to gain control of a system. For example, malware may use buffer overruns to inject malicious executable code into memory.
A minority of trusted apps will not be able to run if some of these mitigations are set to their most restrictive settings. Testing can help you maximize protection while still allowing needed apps to run correctly.
**More information**: [Table 2](#table-2), later in this topic |
Configurable Windows 10 mitigations oriented specifically toward memory manipulation are listed in the following table. Detailed understanding of these threats and mitigations requires knowledge of how the operating system and applications handle memory—knowledge used by developers but not necessarily by IT professionals. However, from an IT professional’s perspective, the basic process for maximizing these types of mitigations is to work in a test lab to discover whether a given setting interferes with any needed applications. Then you can deploy settings that maximize protection while still allowing needed apps to run correctly.
@@ -52,9 +52,9 @@ Also, as an IT professional, you can ask application developers and software ven
| Mitigation and corresponding threat | Description |
|---|---|
-| **Data Execution Prevention (DEP),** which mitigates against
exploitation of buffer overruns | **Data Execution Prevention (DEP)** is a system-level memory protection feature that has been available in Windows operating systems for over a decade. DEP enables the system to mark one or more pages of memory as non-executable, which prevents code from being run from that region of memory, to help prevent exploitation of buffer overruns.
DEP helps prevent code from being run from data pages such as the default heap, stacks, and memory pools. Although some applications have compatibility problems with DEP, the vast majority of applications do not.
For more information, see [Data Execution Prevention](#data-execution-prevention), later in this topic.
**Group Policy settings**: You can configure additional DEP protections, beyond those available by default, by using the Group Policy described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). |
-| **SEHOP**,
which mitigates against
overwrites of the Structured Exception Handler | **Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP)** is designed to block exploits that use the Structured Exception Handler (SEH) overwrite technique. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps protect applications regardless of whether they have been compiled with the latest improvements. Although some applications have compatibility problems with SEHOP, the vast majority of applications do not.
For more information, see [Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection](#structured-exception-handling-overwrite-protection), later in this topic.
**Group Policy setting**: You can configure additional SEHOP protections, beyond those available by default, by using the Group Policy described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). |
-| **ASLR**,
which mitigates against
malware attacks based on expected memory locations | Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) loads DLLs into random memory addresses at boot time. This mitigates against malware designed to attack specific memory locations where specific DLLs are expected to be loaded.
For more information, see [Address Space Layout Randomization](#address-space-layout-randomization), later in this topic.
**Group Policy settings**: You can configure additional ASLR protections, beyond those available by default, by using the Group Policy described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). |
+| **Data Execution Prevention (DEP),** which mitigates against
exploitation of buffer overruns | **Data Execution Prevention (DEP)** is a system-level memory protection feature that has been available in Windows operating systems for over a decade. DEP enables the system to mark one or more pages of memory as non-executable, which prevents code from being run from that region of memory, to help prevent exploitation of buffer overruns.
DEP helps prevent code from being run from data pages such as the default heap, stacks, and memory pools. Although some applications have compatibility problems with DEP, the vast majority of applications do not.
For more information, see [Data Execution Prevention](#data-execution-prevention), later in this topic.
**Group Policy settings**: You can configure additional DEP protections, beyond those available by default, by using the Group Policy described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). |
+| **SEHOP**,
which mitigates against
overwrites of the Structured Exception Handler | **Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP)** is designed to block exploits that use the Structured Exception Handler (SEH) overwrite technique. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps protect applications regardless of whether they have been compiled with the latest improvements. Although some applications have compatibility problems with SEHOP, the vast majority of applications do not.
For more information, see [Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection](#structured-exception-handling-overwrite-protection), later in this topic.
**Group Policy setting**: You can configure additional SEHOP protections, beyond those available by default, by using the Group Policy described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). |
+| **ASLR**,
which mitigates against
malware attacks based on expected memory locations | **Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)** loads DLLs into random memory addresses at boot time. This mitigates against malware designed to attack specific memory locations where specific DLLs are expected to be loaded.
For more information, see [Address Space Layout Randomization](#address-space-layout-randomization), later in this topic.
**Group Policy settings**: You can configure additional ASLR protections, beyond those available by default, by using the Group Policy described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). |
### Data Execution Prevention
@@ -176,12 +176,12 @@ One of the mitigations, Control Flow Guard (CFG), needs no configuration within
| Mitigation and corresponding threat | Description |
|---|---|
-| **Heap protections**,
which mitigate against
exploitation of the heap | Windows 10 includes protections for the heap, such as the use of internal data structures which help protect against corruption of memory used by the heap.
**More information**: [Windows heap protections](#windows-heap-protections), later in this topic. |
-| **Kernel pool protections**,
which mitigate against
exploitation of pool memory used by the kernel | Windows 10 includes protections for the pool of memory used by the kernel. For example, safe unlinking protects against pool overruns that are combined with unlinking operations to create an attack.
**More information**: [Kernel pool protections](#kernel-pool-protections), later in this topic. |
-| **Control Flow Guard**,
which mitigates against
exploits based on flow between code locations in memory | Control Flow Guard (CFG) is a mitigation that requires no configuration within the operating system, but instead can be built into software when it’s compiled. It is built into Microsoft Edge, IE11, and other features in Windows 10. It can also be built into applications when they’re compiled. For example, it can be built into applications written in C or C++, or applications compiled using Visual Studio 2015.
For such an application, CFG can detect an attacker’s attempt to change the intended flow of code. If this occurs, CFG terminates the application. Administrators can request software vendors to deliver Windows applications compiled with CFG enabled.
**More information**: [Control Flow Guard](#control-flow-guard), later in this topic. |
-| **Protected Processes**,
to mitigate against
one process tampering
with another process | With the Protected Processes feature, Windows 10 prevents untrusted processes from interacting or tampering with those that have been specially signed.
**More information**: [Protected Processes](#protected-processes), later in this topic. |
-| **Universal Windows apps protections**,
which mitigate against
multiple threats | Universal Windows apps are carefully screened before being made available, and they run in an AppContainer sandbox with limited privileges and capabilities.
**More information**: [Universal Windows apps protections](#universal-windows-apps-protections), later in this topic. |
-| **Protections built into Microsoft Edge** (the browser),
which mitigate against
multiple threats | Windows 10 includes an entirely new browser, Microsoft Edge, designed with multiple security improvements.
**More information**: [Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer 11](#microsoft-edge-and-internet-explorer-11), later in this topic. |
+| **Heap protections**,
which mitigate against
exploitation of the heap | Windows 10 includes protections for the heap, such as the use of internal data structures which help protect against corruption of memory used by the heap.
**More information**: [Windows heap protections](#windows-heap-protections), later in this topic. |
+| **Kernel pool protections**,
which mitigate against
exploitation of pool memory used by the kernel | Windows 10 includes protections for the pool of memory used by the kernel. For example, safe unlinking protects against pool overruns that are combined with unlinking operations to create an attack.
**More information**: [Kernel pool protections](#kernel-pool-protections), later in this topic. |
+| **Control Flow Guard**,
which mitigates against
exploits based on flow between code locations in memory | Control Flow Guard (CFG) is a mitigation that requires no configuration within the operating system, but instead can be built into software when it’s compiled. It is built into Microsoft Edge, IE11, and other features in Windows 10. It can also be built into applications when they’re compiled. For example, it can be built into applications written in C or C++, or applications compiled using Visual Studio 2015.
For such an application, CFG can detect an attacker’s attempt to change the intended flow of code. If this occurs, CFG terminates the application. Administrators can request software vendors to deliver Windows applications compiled with CFG enabled.
**More information**: [Control Flow Guard](#control-flow-guard), later in this topic. |
+| **Protected Processes**,
to mitigate against
one process tampering
with another process | With the Protected Processes feature, Windows 10 prevents untrusted processes from interacting or tampering with those that have been specially signed.
**More information**: [Protected Processes](#protected-processes), later in this topic. |
+| **Universal Windows apps protections**,
which mitigate against
multiple threats | Universal Windows apps are carefully screened before being made available, and they run in an AppContainer sandbox with limited privileges and capabilities.
**More information**: [Universal Windows apps protections](#universal-windows-apps-protections), later in this topic. |
+| **Protections built into Microsoft Edge** (the browser),
which mitigate against
multiple threats | Windows 10 includes an entirely new browser, Microsoft Edge, designed with multiple security improvements.
**More information**: [Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer 11](#microsoft-edge-and-internet-explorer-11), later in this topic. |
### Windows heap protections