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Merge pull request #859 from jotob-msft/block_list

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Add Microsoft block list topic/scripts
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Elizabeth Ross 2017-06-13 16:11:26 -07:00 committed by GitHub
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windows/device-security/device-guard/deploy-code-integrity-policies-steps.md
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@ -20,7 +20,472 @@ For an overview of the process described in the following procedures, see [Deplo
The process for creating a golden code integrity policy from a reference system is straightforward. This section outlines the process that is required to successfully create a code integrity policy with Windows PowerShell. First, for this example, you must initiate variables to be used during the creation process. Rather than using variables, you can simply use the full file paths in the command. Next, you create the code integrity policy by scanning the system for installed applications. When created, the policy file is converted to binary format so that Windows can consume its contents.
> **Note**  Before you begin this procedure, ensure that the reference PC is clean of viruses or malware. Each piece of installed software should be validated as trustworthy before you create this policy. Also, be sure that any software that you would like to be scanned is installed on the system before you create the code integrity policy.
> **Note**  Before you begin this procedure, make sure that the reference PC is virus and malware-free,and that any software you want to be scanned is installed on the system before creating the code integrity policy.
### Scripting and applications
Each installed software application should be validated as trustworthy before you create a policy. We recommend that you review the reference PC for software that can load arbitrary DLLs and run code or scripts that could render the PC more vulnerable. Examples include software aimed at development or scripting such as msbuild.exe (part of Visual Studio and the .NET Framework) which can be removed, and Windows Script Host (WSH), which can be manually disabled if you do not want it to run scripts.
You can remove or disable such software on reference PCs used to create code integrity policies. You can also fine-tune your control by using Device Guard in combination with AppLocker, as described in [Device Guard with AppLocker](https://technet.microsoft.com/itpro/windows/keep-secure/introduction-to-device-guard-virtualization-based-security-and-code-integrity-policies#device-guard-with-applocker).
Members of the security community<sup>*</sup> continuously collaborate with Microsoft to help protect customers. With the help of their valuable reports, Microsoft has identified a list of valid applications that an attacker could also potentially use to bypass Device Guard code integrity policies.
In certain circumstances, if the use case is appropriate, for example if your operational scenario requires elevated security, you may want to block these applications. For example, if you have a code integrity policy that trusts all Microsoft-signed applications, we recommend that you block the following applications (optional in the case of cscript.exe and wscript.exe) from running on your systems:
- bash.exe
- bginfo.exe
- cdb.exe
- cscript.exe<sup>1</sup>
- csi.exe
- dnx.exe
- fsi.exe
- kd.exe
- lxssmanager.dll
- msbuild.exe<sup>2</sup>
- mshta.exe
- ntsd.exe
- rcsi.exe
- windbg.exe
- wscript.exe<sup>1</sup>
<sup>1</sup> Microsoft Windows Script Host (WSH) is an automation technology for Microsoft Windows operating systems that allows scripts to load and run. It comprises two files, wscript.exe and cscript.exe. When WSH is enabled, scripts are allowed. However, when Device Guard is enabled, the functionality of WSH scripts is restricted by default.
<sup>2</sup> If you are using your reference system in a development context and use msbuild.exe to build managed applications, we recommend that you whitelist msbuild.exe in your code integrity policies. However, if your reference system is an end user device that is not being used in a development context, we recommend that you block msbuild.exe.
<sup>*</sup> Microsoft recognizes the efforts of those in the security community who help us protect customers through responsible vulnerability disclosure, and extends thanks to the following people:
|Name|Twitter|
|---|---|
|Casey Smith |@subTee|
|Matt Graeber | @mattifestation|
|Matt Nelson | @enigma0x3|
|Oddvar Moe |@Oddvarmoe|
<br />
>!Note
>This application list is fluid and will be updated with the latest vendor information as application vulnerabilities are resolved and new issues are discovered.
When an application version is upgraded, you may want to add deny rules to your code integrity policies for that application’s previous, less secure versions, especially to fix a vulnerability or potential Device Guard bypass. Certain vendors may or may not intend to update their software to work with Device Guard.
To block the listed applications, you can merge this policy into your existing policy by adding the following deny rules using the Powershell Merge-CIPolicy cmdlet:
```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<SiPolicy xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:sipolicy">
<VersionEx>10.0.0.0</VersionEx>
<PolicyTypeID>{A244370E-44C9-4C06-B551-F6016E563076}</PolicyTypeID>
<PlatformID>{2E07F7E4-194C-4D20-B7C9-6F44A6C5A234}</PlatformID>
<Rules>
<Rule>
<Option>Enabled:Unsigned System Integrity Policy</Option>
</Rule>
<Rule>
<Option>Enabled:Audit Mode</Option>
</Rule>
<Rule>
<Option>Enabled:Advanced Boot Options Menu</Option>
</Rule>
<Rule>
<Option>Required:Enforce Store Applications</Option>
</Rule>
<Rule>
<Option>Enabled:UMCI</Option>
</Rule>
</Rules>
<!--EKUS-->
<EKUs />
<!--File Rules-->
<FileRules>
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_BGINFO" FriendlyName="bginfo.exe" FileName="BGINFO.Exe" MinimumFileVersion = "4.21.0.0" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_CBD" FriendlyName="cdb.exe" FileName="CDB.Exe" MinimumFileVersion = "65535.65535.65535.65535" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_KD" FriendlyName="kd.exe" FileName="kd.Exe" MinimumFileVersion = "65535.65535.65535.65535" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_WINDBG" FriendlyName="windbg.exe" FileName="windbg.Exe" MinimumFileVersion = "65535.65535.65535.65535" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_MSBUILD" FriendlyName="MSBuild.exe" FileName="MSBuild.Exe" MinimumFileVersion = "65535.65535.65535.65535" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_CSI" FriendlyName="csi.exe" FileName="csi.Exe" MinimumFileVersion = "65535.65535.65535.65535" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_DNX" FriendlyName="dnx.exe" FileName="dnx.Exe" MinimumFileVersion = "65535.65535.65535.65535" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_RCSI" FriendlyName="rcsi.exe" FileName="rcsi.Exe" MinimumFileVersion = "65535.65535.65535.65535" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_NTSD" FriendlyName="ntsd.exe" FileName="ntsd.Exe" MinimumFileVersion = "65535.65535.65535.65535" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_LXSS" FriendlyName="LxssManager.dll" FileName="LxssManager.dll" MinimumFileVersion = "65535.65535.65535.65535" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_BASH" FriendlyName="bash.exe" FileName="bash.exe" MinimumFileVersion = "65535.65535.65535.65535" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_FSI" FriendlyName="fsi.exe" FileName="fsi.exe" MinimumFileVersion = "65535.65535.65535.65535" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_MSHTA" FriendlyName="mshta.exe" FileName="mshta.exe" MinimumFileVersion = "65535.65535.65535.65535" />
</FileRules>
<!--Signers-->
<Signers />
<!--Driver Signing Scenarios-->
<SigningScenarios>
<SigningScenario Value="131" ID="ID_SIGNINGSCENARIO_DRIVERS_1" FriendlyName="Driver Signing Scenarios">
<ProductSigners>
<FileRulesRef>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_KD" />
</FileRulesRef>
</ProductSigners>
</SigningScenario>
<SigningScenario Value="12" ID="ID_SIGNINGSCENARIO_WINDOWS" FriendlyName="User Mode Signing Scenarios">
<ProductSigners>
<FileRulesRef>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_BGINFO"/>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_CBD"/>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_KD"/>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_WINDBG"/>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_MSBUILD"/>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_CSI"/>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_DNX"/>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_RCSI"/>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_NTSD"/>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_LXSS"/>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_BASH"/>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_FSI"/>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_MSHTA"/>
</FileRulesRef>
</ProductSigners>
</SigningScenario>
</SigningScenarios>
<UpdatePolicySigners />
<CiSigners />
<HvciOptions>0</HvciOptions>
</SiPolicy>
```
### Disable Windows Script Host
If you are using Device Guard code integrity policies, the policies place constraints on Powershell and WSH scripts. When Device Guard is enabled, by default, PowerShell scripts execute in “ConstrainedLanguage” language mode, in which neither wscript.exe and cscript.exe can invoke untrusted Active X controls or COM objects. However, signed PowerShell scripts are permitted to execute in “FullLanguage” language mode, and trusted or signed wscript or cscript scripts can invoke Active X controls or COM objects. For further information on Powershell language modes, see [Language Modes](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/reference/4.0/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_language_modes).
Alternatively, though script hosts are safer with Device Guard enabled, if your reference PC does not require any scripting, you may want to completely disable WSH. Disabling WSH prevents all users from running any scripts, including VBScript and JScript scripts. Note that some applications may require WSH to be enabled. You can disable WSH by configuring Device Guard code integrity policies.
### Disable Windows Script Host using code integrity policies
To disable Windows Script Hosting, you can simply create further deny rules to add the script hosts (wscript.exe and cscript.exe) to the list of blocked applications in your code integrity policy as follows:
```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<SiPolicy xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:sipolicy" FriendlyName="Windows Recommended Deny List Policy">
<VersionEx>1.0.0.0</VersionEx>
<PolicyTypeID>{A244370E-44C9-4C06-B551-F6016E563076}</PolicyTypeID>
<PlatformID>{2E07F7E4-194C-4D20-B7C9-6F44A6C5A234}</PlatformID>
<Rules>
<Rule>
<Option>Enabled:Unsigned System Integrity Policy</Option>
</Rule>
<Rule>
<Option>Enabled:Advanced Boot Options Menu</Option>
</Rule>
<Rule>
<Option>Required:Enforce Store Applications</Option>
</Rule>
<Rule>
<Option>Enabled:UMCI</Option>
</Rule>
</Rules>
<!--EKUS-->
<EKUs />
<!--File Rules-->
<FileRules>
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_BGINFO" FriendlyName="bginfo.exe" FileName="BGINFO.Exe" MinimumFileVersion = "4.21.0.0” />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_CBD" FriendlyName="cdb.exe" FileName="CDB.Exe" MinimumFileVersion = "65535.65535.65535.65535" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_KD" FriendlyName="kd.exe" FileName="kd.Exe" MinimumFileVersion = "65535.65535.65535.65535" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_WINDBG" FriendlyName="windbg.exe" FileName="windbg.Exe" MinimumFileVersion = "65535.65535.65535.65535" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_MSBUILD" FriendlyName="MSBuild.exe" FileName="MSBuild.Exe" MinimumFileVersion = "65535.65535.65535.65535" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_WSCRIPT" FriendlyName="wscript.exe" FileName="wscript.exe" MinimumFileVersion = "65535.65535.65535.65535" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_CSCRIPT" FriendlyName="cscript.exe" FileName="cscript.exe" MinimumFileVersion = "65535.65535.65535.65535" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_CSI" FriendlyName="csi.exe" FileName="csi.Exe" MinimumFileVersion = "65535.65535.65535.65535" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_DNX" FriendlyName="dnx.exe" FileName="dnx.Exe" MinimumFileVersion = "65535.65535.65535.65535" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_RCSI" FriendlyName="rcsi.exe" FileName="rcsi.Exe" MinimumFileVersion = "65535.65535.65535.65535" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_NTSD" FriendlyName="ntsd.exe" FileName="ntsd.Exe" MinimumFileVersion = "65535.65535.65535.65535" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_LXSS" FriendlyName="LxssManager.dll" FileName="LxssManager.dll" MinimumFileVersion = "65535.65535.65535.65535" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_BASH" FriendlyName="bash.exe" FileName="bash.exe" MinimumFileVersion = "65535.65535.65535.65535" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_FSI" FriendlyName="fsi.exe" FileName="fsi.exe" MinimumFileVersion = "65535.65535.65535.65535" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_MSHTA" FriendlyName="mshta.exe" FileName="mshta.exe" MinimumFileVersion = "65535.65535.65535.65535" />
</FileRules>
<!--Signers-->
<Signers>
</Signers>
<SigningScenarios>
<!--Kernel Mode Signing Scenario-->
<SigningScenario Value="131" ID="ID_SIGNINGSCENARIO_KMCI" FriendlyName="Kernel Mode Signing Scenario">
<ProductSigners />
</SigningScenario>
<!--User Mode Signing Scenario-->
<SigningScenario Value="12" ID="ID_SIGNINGSCENARIO_UMCI" FriendlyName="User Mode Signing Scenario">
<ProductSigners>
<FileRulesRef>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_BGINFO"/>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_CBD"/>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_KD"/>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_WINDBG"/>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_MSBUILD"/>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_WSCRIPT"/>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_CSCRIPT"/>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_CSI"/>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_DNX"/>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_RCSI"/>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_NTSD"/>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_LXSS"/>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_BASH"/>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_FSI"/>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_MSHTA"/>
</FileRulesRef>
</ProductSigners>
</SigningScenario>
</SigningScenarios>
<UpdatePolicySigners />
<CiSigners />
</SiPolicy>
```
<br />
The June 2017 Windows updates resolve a vulnerability in Powershell that allowed an attacker to bypass Device Guard code integrity policies. Powershell cmdlets cannot be blocked by name or version, and therefore must be blocked by their corresponding hashes. We recommend that you block the following Powershell cmdlets and merge this policy into your existing policy by adding the following deny rules using the Merge-CIPolicy cmdlet:
```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<SiPolicy xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:sipolicy">
<VersionEx>10.0.0.0</VersionEx>
<PolicyTypeID>{A244370E-44C9-4C06-B551-F6016E563076}</PolicyTypeID>
<PlatformID>{2E07F7E4-194C-4D20-B7C9-6F44A6C5A234}</PlatformID>
<Rules>
<Rule>
<Option>Enabled:Unsigned System Integrity Policy</Option>
</Rule>
<Rule>
<Option>Enabled:Audit Mode</Option>
</Rule>
<Rule>
<Option>Enabled:Advanced Boot Options Menu</Option>
</Rule>
<Rule>
<Option>Required:Enforce Store Applications</Option>
</Rule>
<Rule>
<Option>Enabled:UMCI</Option>
</Rule>
</Rules>
<!--EKUS-->
<EKUs />
<!--File Rules-->
<FileRules>
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_0" FriendlyName="Powershell 0" Hash="1AC4D8D8B672A2D74AB1815E8A3FEF6952892D1E" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_1" FriendlyName="Powershell 1" Hash="25C57E0305E7FFB4C259D741B87F90D66BDA9801AE68A0F589D9F15D95C15821" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_2" FriendlyName="Powershell 2" Hash="AA085BE6498D2E3F527F3D72A5D1C604508133F0CDC05AD404BB49E8E3FB1A1B" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_3" FriendlyName="Powershell 3" Hash="573129BCCA3C8492498C35E45676B3D348438464" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_4" FriendlyName="Powershell 4" Hash="FBA274406B503B464B349805149E6AA722909CC9" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_5" FriendlyName="Powershell 5" Hash="91459EF46223540305C42FD50DF0B3C62148A0DB70F6B588AB29D11C5750F784" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_6" FriendlyName="Powershell 6" Hash="BACA825D0852E2D8F3D92381D112B99B5DD56D9F" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_7" FriendlyName="Powershell 7" Hash="3AF2587E8B62F88DC363D7F5308EE4C1A6147338" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_8" FriendlyName="Powershell 8" Hash="A9E655A96A124BC361D9CC5C7663FC033AA6F6609916EFAA76B6A6E9713A0D32" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_9" FriendlyName="Powershell 9" Hash="8BC6761CDB3A2114DC04B3167C27CD9A8D3F8F08" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_10" FriendlyName="Powershell 10" Hash="11F936112832738AD9B3A1C67537D5542DE8E86856CF2A5893C4D26CF3A2C558" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_11" FriendlyName="Powershell 11" Hash="7DBB41B87FAA887DE456C8E6A72E09D2839FA1E7" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_12" FriendlyName="Powershell 12" Hash="632CC37793AC704329C943765A684F9D22DBE50A1D951CAA576E72613F4BFC82" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_13" FriendlyName="Powershell 13" Hash="FA2F82EAAE3E9F04E7ABCBF3BEA5403F3D7D67CE" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_14" FriendlyName="Powershell 14" Hash="55A114886D75A8CAD1B8B8A867D42384CF6E337E" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_15" FriendlyName="Powershell 15" Hash="DED853481A176999723413685A79B36DD0F120F9" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_16" FriendlyName="Powershell 16" Hash="D027E09D9D9828A87701288EFC91D240C0DEC2C3" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_17" FriendlyName="Powershell 17" Hash="46936F4F0AFE4C87D2E55595F74DDDFFC9AD94EE" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_18" FriendlyName="Powershell 18" Hash="5090F22BB9C0B168C7F5E9E800784A05AFCCBC4F" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_19" FriendlyName="Powershell 19" Hash="A920D0706FCEA648D28638E9198BCC368996B8FD" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_20" FriendlyName="Powershell 20" Hash="93E22F2BA6C8B1C09F100F9C0E3B06FAF2D1DDB6" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_21" FriendlyName="Powershell 21" Hash="943E307BE7B0B381715CA5CC0FAB7B558025BA80" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_22" FriendlyName="Powershell 22" Hash="DDE4D9A08514347CDE706C42920F43523FC74DEA" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_23" FriendlyName="Powershell 23" Hash="48092864C96C4BF9B68B5006EAEDAB8B57B3738C" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_24" FriendlyName="Powershell 24" Hash="7F6725BA8CCD2DAEEFD0C9590A5DF9D98642CCEA" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_25" FriendlyName="Powershell 25" Hash="AEBFE7497F4A1947B5CB32650843CA0F85BD56D0" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_26" FriendlyName="Powershell 26" Hash="8FB604CD72701B83BC265D87F52B36C6F14E5DBE" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_27" FriendlyName="Powershell 27" Hash="CE70309DB83C9202F45028EBEC252747F4936E6F" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_28" FriendlyName="Powershell 28" Hash="DE6A02520E1D7325025F2761A97D36E407E8490C" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_29" FriendlyName="Powershell 29" Hash="B663138BF1D91C74EB25C68378B3E68E3F9E936A" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_30" FriendlyName="Powershell 30" Hash="79D5991CF1ED52C7E6AE7F5FDE3F0D9240BE62F3" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_31" FriendlyName="Powershell 31" Hash="9D71AD914DBB2FDF793742AA63AEEF4E4A430790" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_32" FriendlyName="Powershell 32" Hash="7484FD78A9298DBA24AC5C882D16DB6146E53712" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_33" FriendlyName="Powershell 33" Hash="CE2DAA6B3E9F5DF9216F2060AFB48B7558033B66" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_34" FriendlyName="Powershell 34" Hash="4C4847F430305B8BF755EB09F02F3DD229F6BC2D" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_35" FriendlyName="Powershell 35" Hash="CC968868EDC6718DA14DDDB11228A04D5D5BD9A5" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_36" FriendlyName="Powershell 36" Hash="78C3C6AEF52A6A5392C55F1EC98AF18053B3087D" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_37" FriendlyName="Powershell 37" Hash="783FFB771F08BCF55C2EA474B5460EB65EA9444C" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_38" FriendlyName="Powershell 38" Hash="7386F0FFAEED9F14CB087719A82633CE341AF18C" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_39" FriendlyName="Powershell 39" Hash="D60BC43CAD0E2CD119F0F29BA3E85EDA6B6409B0" />
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_D_40" FriendlyName="Powershell 40" Hash="B303D1689ED99613E4F52CE6E5F96AAEBC3A45C3" />
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</FileRules>
<!--Signers-->
<Signers />
<!--Driver Signing Scenarios-->
<SigningScenarios>
<SigningScenario Value="131" ID="ID_SIGNINGSCENARIO_DRIVERS_1" FriendlyName="Auto generated policy on 06-12-2017">
<ProductSigners>
<FileRulesRef>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_11" />
</FileRulesRef>
</ProductSigners>
</SigningScenario>
<SigningScenario Value="12" ID="ID_SIGNINGSCENARIO_WINDOWS" FriendlyName="Auto generated policy on 06-12-2017">
<ProductSigners>
<FileRulesRef>
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_0" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_1" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_2" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_3" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_4" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_5" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_6" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_7" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_8" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_9" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_10" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_11" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_12" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_13" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_14" />
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<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_35" />
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<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_37" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_38" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_39" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_40" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_41" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_42" />
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<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_44" />
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<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_50" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_51" />
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<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_58" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_59" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_60" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_61" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_62" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_63" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_64" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_65" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_66" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_67" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_68" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_69" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_70" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_71" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_72" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_73" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_74" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_75" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_76" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_77" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_78" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_79" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_80" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_81" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_82" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_83" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_84" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_85" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_86" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_87" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_88" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_89" />
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_D_90" />
</FileRulesRef>
</ProductSigners>
</SigningScenario>
</SigningScenarios>
<UpdatePolicySigners />
<CiSigners />
<HvciOptions>0</HvciOptions>
</SiPolicy>
```
<br />
To create a code integrity policy, copy each of the following commands into an elevated Windows PowerShell session, in order:

13
windows/device-security/device-guard/planning-and-getting-started-on-the-device-guard-deployment-process.md
View File

@ -25,12 +25,21 @@ This topic provides a roadmap for planning and getting started on the Device Gua
3. **Review how much variety in software and hardware is needed by roles or departments**. When several departments all use the same hardware and software, you might need to deploy only one code integrity policy for them. More variety across departments might mean you need to create and manage more code integrity policies. The following questions can help you clarify how many code integrity policies to create:
- How standardized is the hardware?<br>This can be relevant because of drivers. You could create a code integrity policy on hardware that uses a particular set of drivers, and if other drivers in your environment use the same signature, they would also be allowed to run. However, you might need to create several code integrity policies on different "reference" hardware, then merge the policies together, to ensure that the resulting policy recognizes all the drivers in your environment.
- Is there already a list of accepted applications?<br>A list of accepted applications can be used to help create a baseline code integrity policy.<br>As of Windows 10, version 1703, it might also be useful to have a list of plug-ins, add-ins, or modules that you want to allow only in a specific app (such as a line-of-business app). Similarly, it might be useful to have a list of plug-ins, add-ins, or modules that you want to block in a specific app (such as a browser).
- What software does each department or role need? Should they be able to install and run other departments’ software?<br>If multiple departments are allowed to run the same list of software, you might be able to merge several code integrity policies to simplify management.
- Are there departments or roles where unique, restricted software is used?<br>If one department needs to run an application that no other department is allowed, it might require a separate code integrity policy. Similarly, if only one department must run an old version of an application (while other departments allow only the newer version), it might require a separate code integrity policy.
- Is there already a list of accepted applications?<br>A list of accepted applications can be used to help create a baseline code integrity policy.<br>As of Windows 10, version 1703, it might also be useful to have a list of plug-ins, add-ins, or modules that you want to allow only in a specific app (such as a line-of-business app). Similarly, it might be useful to have a list of plug-ins, add-ins, or modules that you want to block in a specific app (such as a browser).
- As part of a threat review process, have you reviewed systems for software that can load arbitrary DLLs or run code or scripts?
In day-to-day operations, your organization’s security policy may allow certain applications, code, or scripts to run on your systems depending on their role and the context. However, if your security policy requires that you run only trusted applications, code, and scripts on your systems, you may decide to lock these systems down securely with Device Guard code integrity policies.
You can also fine-tune your control by using Device Guard in combination with AppLocker, as described in [Device Guard with AppLocker](https://technet.microsoft.com/itpro/windows/keep-secure/introduction-to-device-guard-virtualization-based-security-and-code-integrity-policies#device-guard-with-applocker).
Legitimate applications from trusted vendors provide valid functionality. However, an attacker could also potentially use that same functionality to run malicious executable code that could bypass code integrity policies. For operational scenarios that require elevated security, certain applications with known Code Integrity bypasses may represent a security risk if you whitelist them in your code integrity policies. Other applications whose older versions have vulnerabilities also represent a risk. Therefore, you may want to deny or block such applications from your code integrity policies. Once applications with vulnerabilities are fixed, you can create a rule that only allows the fixed version or newer versions of that application. The decision to allow or block applications depends on the context and on how the reference system is being used.
Security professionals collaborate with Microsoft® continuously to help protect customers. With the help of their valuable reports, Microsoft has identified a list of known applications that an attacker could potentially use to bypass Device Guard code integrity policies.
Depending on the context, you may want to block these applications. To see the list of applications, and for use case examples such as disabling Windows Script Host (WSH) or disabling msbuild.exe, See [Deploy code integrity policies: steps](https://technet.microsoft.com/itpro/windows/keep-secure/deploy-code-integrity-policies-steps)).
4. **Identify LOB applications that are currently unsigned**. Although requiring signed code (through code integrity policies) protects against many threats, your organization might use unsigned LOB applications, for which the process of signing might be difficult. You might also have applications that are signed, but you want to add a secondary signature to them. If so, identify these applications, because you will need to create a catalog file for them. For a basic description of catalog files, see the table in [Introduction to Device Guard: virtualization-based security and code integrity policies](introduction-to-device-guard-virtualization-based-security-and-code-integrity-policies.md). For more background information about catalog files, see [Reviewing your applications: application signing and catalog files](requirements-and-deployment-planning-guidelines-for-device-guard.md#reviewing-your-applications-application-signing-and-catalog-files).
## Getting started on the deployment process