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Merge branch 'master' into MDBranch20H2UpdatePolicy
This commit is contained in:
Manika Dhiman
GitHub
commit
4a556d76d2
@ -1113,8 +1113,8 @@ ADMX Info:
|
||||
<!--/ADMXMapped-->
|
||||
<!--SupportedValues-->
|
||||
Supported values:
|
||||
- true - Enable
|
||||
- false - Disable (Default)
|
||||
- 0 - Disable (Default)
|
||||
- 1 - Enable
|
||||
<!--/SupportedValues-->
|
||||
<!--Example-->
|
||||
|
||||
@ -4607,4 +4607,3 @@ Footnotes:
|
||||
- 8 - Available in Windows 10, version 2004.
|
||||
|
||||
<!--/Policies-->
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -144,6 +144,8 @@
|
||||
href: update/media-dynamic-update.md
|
||||
- name: Migrating and acquiring optional Windows content
|
||||
href: update/optional-content.md
|
||||
- name: Safeguard holds
|
||||
href: update/safeguard-holds.md
|
||||
- name: Manage the Windows 10 update experience
|
||||
items:
|
||||
- name: Manage device restarts after updates
|
||||
@ -237,6 +239,8 @@
|
||||
items:
|
||||
- name: How to troubleshoot Windows Update
|
||||
href: update/windows-update-troubleshooting.md
|
||||
- name: Opt out of safeguard holds
|
||||
href: update/safeguard-opt-out.md
|
||||
- name: Determine the source of Windows Updates
|
||||
href: update/windows-update-sources.md
|
||||
- name: Common Windows Update errors
|
||||
|
||||
BIN
windows/deployment/update/images/safeguard-hold-notification.png
Normal file
BIN
windows/deployment/update/images/safeguard-hold-notification.png
Normal file
Binary file not shown.
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 36 KiB |
43
windows/deployment/update/safeguard-holds.md
Normal file
43
windows/deployment/update/safeguard-holds.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: Safeguard holds
|
||||
description: What are safeguard holds, how can you tell if one is in effect, and what to do about it
|
||||
ms.prod: w10
|
||||
ms.mktglfcycl: manage
|
||||
author: jaimeo
|
||||
ms.localizationpriority: medium
|
||||
ms.author: jaimeo
|
||||
manager: laurawi
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Safeguard holds
|
||||
|
||||
Microsoft uses quality and compatibility data to identify issues that might cause a Windows 10 feature update to fail or roll back. When find such an issue, we might apply holds to the updating service to prevent affected devices from installing the update in order to safeguard them from these experiences. We also use holds when a customer, a partner, or Microsoft internal validation finds an issue that would cause severe impact (for example, rollback of the update, data loss, loss of connectivity, or loss of key functionality) and when a workaround is not immediately available.
|
||||
|
||||
Safeguard holds prevent a device with a known issue from being offered a new operating system version. We renew the offering once a fix is found and verified. We use holds to ensure customers have a successful experience as their device moves to a new version of Windows 10.
|
||||
|
||||
The lifespan of holds varies depending on the time required to investigate and fix an issue. During this time Microsoft works diligently to procure, develop, and validate a fix and then offer it to affected devices. We monitor quality and compatibility data to confirm that a fix is complete before releasing the hold. Once we release the hold, Windows Update will resume offering new operating system versions to devices.
|
||||
Safeguard holds only affect devices that use the Window Update service for updates. We encourage IT admins who manage updates to devices through other channels (such as media installations or updates coming from Windows Server Update Services (WSUS)) to remain aware of known issues that might also be present in their environments.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Am I affected by a safeguard hold?
|
||||
|
||||
IT admins can use [Update Compliance](update-compliance-feature-update-status.md#safeguard-holds) to monitor various update health metrics for devices in their organization, including ones affected by a safeguard hold that prevents them from updating to a newer operating system version.
|
||||
|
||||
Queries identify Safeguard IDs for each affected device, giving IT admins a detailed view into the various protections extended to devices. Safeguard IDs for publicly discussed known issues are also included in the [Windows Release Health](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/release-information/status-windows-10-1903) dashboard, where you can easily find information related to publicly available safeguards.
|
||||
|
||||
On devices that use Windows Update (but not Windows Update for Business), the **Windows Update** page in the Settings app displays a message stating that an update is on its way, but not ready for the device. Instead of the option to download and install the update, users will see this message:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
If you see this message, it means one or more holds affect your device. When the issue is fixed and the update is safe to install, we’ll release the hold and the update can resume safely.
|
||||
|
||||
## What can I do?
|
||||
|
||||
We recommend that you do not attempt to manually update until issues have been resolved and holds released.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> Opting out of a safeguard hold can put devices at risk from known performance issues. We strongly recommend that you complete robust testing to ensure the impact is acceptable before opting out.
|
||||
|
||||
With that in mind, IT admins who stay informed with [Update Compliance](update-compliance-feature-update-status.md#safeguard-holds) and the [Windows Release Health](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/release-information/status-windows-10-1903) dashboard can choose to temporarily [opt-out of the protection of all safeguard holds](safeguard-opt-out.md) and allow an update to proceed. We recommend opting out only in an IT environment and for validation purposes. If you do opt out of a hold, this condition is temporary. Once an update is complete, protection of safeguard holds is reinstated automatically.
|
||||
32
windows/deployment/update/safeguard-opt-out.md
Normal file
32
windows/deployment/update/safeguard-opt-out.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: Opt out of safeguard holds
|
||||
description: Steps to install an update even it if has a safeguard hold applied
|
||||
ms.prod: w10
|
||||
ms.mktglfcycl: manage
|
||||
author: jaimeo
|
||||
ms.localizationpriority: medium
|
||||
ms.author: jaimeo
|
||||
manager: laurawi
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Opt out of safeguard holds
|
||||
|
||||
Safeguard holds prevent a device with a known compatibility issue from being offered a new Windows 10 feature update by using Windows Update. We use safeguard holds to protect the device and user from a failed or poor update experience. We renew the offering once a fix is issued and is verified on an affected device. For more information about safeguard holds, see [Safeguard holds](safeguard-holds.md).
|
||||
|
||||
## How can I opt out of safeguard holds?
|
||||
|
||||
IT admins can, if necessary, opt devices out of safeguard protections by using the disable safeguards policy. In a Mobile Device Management (MDM) tool, use the **Update/DisableWUfBSafeguards** CSP. In Group Policy, use the **Disable safeguards for Feature Updates** Group Policy. This policy is available to Windows Update for Business devices running Windows 10, version 1809 or later that have installed the October 2020 security update.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!CAUTION]
|
||||
> Opting out of a safeguard hold can put devices at risk from known performance issues.
|
||||
|
||||
We recommend opting out only in an IT environment and for validation purposes. You can also validate an upcoming Windows 10 feature update version without the safeguards being applied by using the Release Preview channel of the Windows Insider Program for Business.
|
||||
|
||||
Disabling safeguards does not guarantee your device will be able to successfully update. The update might still fail and will likely result in a bad experience since you are bypassing the protection against known issues.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!NOTE]
|
||||
> After a device installs a new Windows 10 version, the **Disable safeguards for Feature Updates** Group Policy will revert to “not configured” even if it was previously enabled. We do this to ensure the admin is consciously disabling Microsoft’s default protection from known issues for each new feature update.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -47,16 +47,6 @@ Update Compliance reporting offers two queries to help you retrieve data relat
|
||||
|
||||
Update Compliance reporting will display the Safeguard IDs for known issues affecting a device in the **DeploymentErrorCode** column. Safeguard IDs for publicly discussed known issues are also included in the Windows Release Health dashboard, where you can easily find information related to publicly available safeguards.
|
||||
|
||||
### Opting out of safeguard hold
|
||||
|
||||
Microsoft will release a device from a safeguard hold when it has determined it can safely and smoothly install a feature update, but you are ultimately in control of your devices and can opt out if desired.
|
||||
To opt out, set the registry key as follows:
|
||||
|
||||
- Registry Key Path :: **Computer\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion**
|
||||
- Create New Key :: **502505fe-762c-4e80-911e-0c3fa4c63fb0**
|
||||
- Name :: **DataRequireGatedScanForFeatureUpdates**
|
||||
- Type :: **REG_DWORD**
|
||||
- Value :: **0**
|
||||
|
||||
Setting this registry key to **0** will force the device to opt out from *all* safeguard holds. Any other value, or deleting the key, will resume compatibility protection on the device.
|
||||
### Opt out of safeguard hold
|
||||
|
||||
You can [opt out of safeguard protections](safeguard-opt-out.md) by using the **Disable safeguards for Feature Updates** Group Policy. This policy is available to Windows Update for Business devices running Windows 10, version 1809 or later that have installed the October 2020 security update.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Clients need to trust domain controllers and the best way to do this is to ensur
|
||||
|
||||
Domain controllers automatically request a domain controller certificate (if published) when they discover an enterprise certificate authority is added to Active Directory. However, certificates based on the *Domain Controller* and *Domain Controller Authentication* certificate templates do not include the **KDC Authentication** object identifier (OID), which was later added to the Kerberos RFC. Therefore, domain controllers need to request a certificate based on the Kerberos Authentication certificate template.
|
||||
|
||||
By default, the Active Directory Certificate Authority provides and publishes the Kerberos Authentication certificate template. However, the cryptography configuration included in the provided template is based on older and less performant cryptography APIs. To ensure domain controllers request the proper certificate with the best available cryptography, use the **Kerberos Authentication** certificate template a baseline to create an updated domain controller certificate template.
|
||||
By default, the Active Directory Certificate Authority provides and publishes the Kerberos Authentication certificate template. However, the cryptography configuration included in the provided template is based on older and less performant cryptography APIs. To ensure domain controllers request the proper certificate with the best available cryptography, use the **Kerberos Authentication** certificate template as a baseline to create an updated domain controller certificate template.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Create a Domain Controller Authentication (Kerberos) Certificate Template
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ ms.custom: bitlocker
|
||||
|
||||
# BitLocker recovery guide
|
||||
|
||||
**Applies to**
|
||||
**Applies to:**
|
||||
|
||||
- Windows 10
|
||||
|
||||
@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ This article assumes that you understand how to set up AD DS to back up BitLock
|
||||
|
||||
This article does not detail how to configure AD DS to store the BitLocker recovery information.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## <a href="" id="bkmk-whatisrecovery"></a>What is BitLocker recovery?
|
||||
|
||||
BitLocker recovery is the process by which you can restore access to a BitLocker-protected drive in the event that you cannot unlock the drive normally. In a recovery scenario, you have the following options to restore access to the drive:
|
||||
@ -40,6 +41,7 @@ BitLocker recovery is the process by which you can restore access to a BitLocker
|
||||
- A data recovery agent can use their credentials to unlock the drive. If the drive is an operating system drive, the drive must be mounted as a data drive on another computer for the data recovery agent to unlock it.
|
||||
- A domain administrator can obtain the recovery password from AD DS and use it to unlock the drive. Storing recovery passwords in AD DS is recommended to provide a way for IT professionals to be able to obtain recovery passwords for drives in their organization if needed. This method requires that you have enabled this recovery method in the BitLocker Group Policy setting **Choose how BitLocker-protected operating system drives can be recovered** located at **Computer Configuration\\Administrative Templates\\Windows Components\\BitLocker Drive Encryption\\Operating System Drives** in the Local Group Policy Editor. For more information, see [BitLocker Group Policy settings](bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### What causes BitLocker recovery?
|
||||
|
||||
The following list provides examples of specific events that will cause BitLocker to enter recovery mode when attempting to start the operating system drive:
|
||||
@ -95,18 +97,19 @@ If software maintenance requires the computer be restarted and you are using two
|
||||
|
||||
Recovery has been described within the context of unplanned or undesired behavior, but you can also cause recovery as an intended production scenario, in order to manage access control. For example, when you redeploy desktop or laptop computers to other departments or employees in your enterprise, you can force BitLocker into recovery before the computer is given to a new user.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## <a href="" id="bkmk-testingrecovery"></a>Testing recovery
|
||||
|
||||
Before you create a thorough BitLocker recovery process, we recommend that you test how the recovery process works for both end users (people who call your helpdesk for the recovery password) and administrators (people who help the end user get the recovery password). The –forcerecovery command of manage-bde is an easy way for you to step through the recovery process before your users encounter a recovery situation.
|
||||
|
||||
**To force a recovery for the local computer**
|
||||
**To force a recovery for the local computer:**
|
||||
|
||||
1. Click the **Start** button, type **cmd** in the **Start Search** box, right-click **cmd.exe**, and then click **Run as administrator**.
|
||||
2. At the command prompt, type the following command and then press ENTER:
|
||||
`manage-bde -forcerecovery <BitLockerVolume>`
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
**To force recovery for a remote computer**
|
||||
**To force recovery for a remote computer:**
|
||||
|
||||
1. On the Start screen, type **cmd.exe**, and then click **Run as administrator**.
|
||||
2. At the command prompt, type the following command and then press ENTER:
|
||||
@ -115,6 +118,7 @@ Before you create a thorough BitLocker recovery process, we recommend that you t
|
||||
> [!NOTE]
|
||||
> Recovery triggered by `-forcerecovery` persists for multiple restarts until a TPM protector is added or protection is suspended by the user. When using Modern Standby devices (such as Surface devices), the `-forcerecovery` option is not recommended because BitLocker will have to be unlocked and disabled manually from the WinRE environment before the OS can boot up again. For more information, see [BitLocker Troubleshooting: Continuous reboot loop with BitLocker recovery on a slate device](https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/18671.bitlocker-troubleshooting-continuous-reboot-loop-with-bitlocker-recovery-on-a-slate-device.aspx).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## <a href="" id="bkmk-planningrecovery"></a>Planning your recovery process
|
||||
|
||||
When planning the BitLocker recovery process, first consult your organization's current best practices for recovering sensitive information. For example: How does your enterprise handle lost Windows passwords? How does your organization perform smart card PIN resets? You can use these best practices and related resources (people and tools) to help formulate a BitLocker recovery model.
|
||||
@ -134,10 +138,12 @@ When you determine your recovery process, you should:
|
||||
|
||||
- [Post-recovery analysis](#bkmk-planningpostrecovery)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### <a href="" id="bkmk-selfrecovery"></a>Self-recovery
|
||||
|
||||
In some cases, users might have the recovery password in a printout or a USB flash drive and can perform self-recovery. We recommend that your organization create a policy for self-recovery. If self-recovery includes using a password or recovery key stored on a USB flash drive, the users should be warned not to store the USB flash drive in the same place as the PC, especially during travel, for example if both the PC and the recovery items are in the same bag it would be very easy for access to be gained to the PC by an unauthorized user. Another policy to consider is having users contact the Helpdesk before or after performing self-recovery so that the root cause can be identified.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### <a href="" id="bkmk-recoveryretrieval"></a>Recovery password retrieval
|
||||
|
||||
If the user does not have a recovery password in a printout or on a USB flash drive, the user will need to be able to retrieve the recovery password from an online source. If the PC is a member of a domain the recovery password can be backed up to AD DS. However, this does not happen by default, you must have configured the appropriate Group Policy settings before BitLocker was enabled on the PC. BitLocker Group Policy settings can be found in the Local Group Policy Editor or the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) under **Computer Configuration\\Administrative Templates\\Windows Components\\BitLocker Drive Encryption**. The following policy settings define the recovery methods that can be used to restore access to a BitLocker-protected drive if an authentication method fails or is unable to be used.
|
||||
@ -145,6 +151,7 @@ If the user does not have a recovery password in a printout or on a USB flash dr
|
||||
- **Choose how BitLocker-protected operating system drives can be recovered**
|
||||
- **Choose how BitLocker-protected fixed drives can be recovered**
|
||||
- **Choose how BitLocker-protected removable drives can be recovered**
|
||||
|
||||
In each of these policies, select **Save BitLocker recovery information to Active Directory Domain Services** and then choose which BitLocker recovery information to store in Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS). Select the **Do not enable BitLocker until recovery information is stored in AD
|
||||
DS** check box if you want to prevent users from enabling BitLocker unless the computer is connected to the domain and the backup of BitLocker recovery information for the drive to AD DS succeeds.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -161,18 +168,22 @@ You can use the following list as a template for creating your own recovery proc
|
||||
- [Gather information to determine why recovery occurred](#bkmk-gatherinfo)
|
||||
- [Give the user the recovery password](#bkmk-givepassword)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### <a href="" id="bkmk-recordcomputername"></a>Record the name of the user's computer
|
||||
|
||||
You can use the name of the user's computer to locate the recovery password in AD DS. If the user does not know the name of the computer, ask the user to read the first word of the **Drive Label** in the **BitLocker Drive Encryption Password Entry** user interface. This is the computer name when BitLocker was enabled and is probably the current name of the computer.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### <a href="" id="bkmk-verifyidentity"></a>Verify the user's identity
|
||||
|
||||
You should verify that the person that is asking for the recovery password is truly the authorized user of that computer. You may also wish to verify that the computer with the name the user provided belongs to the user.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### <a href="" id="bkmk-locatepassword"></a>Locate the recovery password in AD DS
|
||||
|
||||
Locate the Computer object with the matching name in AD DS. Because Computer object names are listed in the AD DS global catalog, you should be able to locate the object even if you have a multi-domain forest.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### Multiple recovery passwords
|
||||
|
||||
If multiple recovery passwords are stored under a computer object in AD DS, the name of the BitLocker recovery information object includes the date that the password was created.
|
||||
@ -181,10 +192,12 @@ If at any time you are unsure what password to provide, or if you think you migh
|
||||
|
||||
Since the password ID is a unique value that is associated with each recovery password stored in AD DS, running a query using this ID will find the correct password to unlock the encrypted volume.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### <a href="" id="bkmk-gatherinfo"></a>Gather information to determine why recovery occurred
|
||||
|
||||
Before you give the user the recovery password, you should gather any information that will help determine why the recovery was needed, in order to analyze the root cause during the post-recovery analysis. For more info about post-recovery analysis, see [Post-recovery analysis](#bkmk-planningpostrecovery).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### <a href="" id="bkmk-givepassword"></a>Give the user the recovery password
|
||||
|
||||
Because the recovery password is 48 digits long the user may need to record the password by writing it down or typing it on a different computer. If you are using MBAM, the recovery password will be regenerated after it is recovered from the MBAM database to avoid the security risks associated with an uncontrolled password.
|
||||
@ -192,16 +205,18 @@ Because the recovery password is 48 digits long the user may need to record the
|
||||
> [!NOTE]
|
||||
> Because the 48-digit recovery password is long and contains a combination of digits, the user might mishear or mistype the password. The boot-time recovery console uses built-in checksum numbers to detect input errors in each 6-digit block of the 48-digit recovery password, and offers the user the opportunity to correct such errors.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### <a href="" id="bkmk-planningpostrecovery"></a>Post-recovery analysis
|
||||
|
||||
When a volume is unlocked using a recovery password, an event is written to the event log and the platform validation measurements are reset in the TPM to match the current configuration. Unlocking the volume means that the encryption key has been released and is ready for on-the-fly encryption
|
||||
when data is written to the volume, and on-the-fly decryption when data is read from the volume. After the volume is unlocked, BitLocker behaves the same way, regardless of how the access was granted.
|
||||
|
||||
If you notice that a computer is having repeated recovery password unlocks, you might want to have an administrator can perform post-recovery analysis to determine the root cause of the recovery and refresh BitLocker platform validation so that the user no longer needs to enter a recovery password each time that the computer starts up. See:
|
||||
If you notice that a computer is having repeated recovery password unlocks, you might want to have an administrator perform post-recovery analysis to determine the root cause of the recovery and refresh BitLocker platform validation so that the user no longer needs to enter a recovery password each time that the computer starts up. See:
|
||||
|
||||
- [Determine the root cause of the recovery](#bkmk-determinecause)
|
||||
- [Refresh BitLocker protection](#bkmk-refreshprotection)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### <a href="" id="bkmk-determinecause"></a>Determine the root cause of the recovery
|
||||
|
||||
If a user needed to recover the drive, it is important to determine the root cause that initiated the recovery as soon as possible. Properly analyzing the state of the computer and detecting tampering may reveal threats that have broader implications for enterprise security.
|
||||
@ -219,6 +234,7 @@ Review and answer the following questions for your organization:
|
||||
|
||||
To help you answer these questions, use the BitLocker command-line tool to view the current configuration and protection mode (for example, **manage-bde -status**). Scan the event log to find events that help indicate why recovery was initiated (for example, if boot file change occurred). Both of these capabilities can be performed remotely.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### <a href="" id="bkmk-refreshprotection"></a>Resolve the root cause
|
||||
|
||||
After you have identified what caused recovery, you can reset BitLocker protection and avoid recovery on every startup.
|
||||
@ -231,6 +247,8 @@ The details of this reset can vary according to the root cause of the recovery.
|
||||
- [Unknown PIN](#bkmk-unknownpin)
|
||||
- [Lost startup key](#bkmk-loststartup)
|
||||
- [Changes to boot files](#bkmk-changebootknown)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### <a href="" id="bkmk-unknownpin"></a>Unknown PIN
|
||||
|
||||
If a user has forgotten the PIN, you must reset the PIN while you are logged on to the computer in order to prevent BitLocker from initiating recovery each time the computer is restarted.
|
||||
@ -239,11 +257,12 @@ If a user has forgotten the PIN, you must reset the PIN while you are logged on
|
||||
|
||||
1. Unlock the computer using the recovery password.
|
||||
2. Reset the PIN:
|
||||
1. Right-click the drive and then click **Change PIN**
|
||||
1. Right-click the drive and then click **Change PIN**.
|
||||
2. In the BitLocker Drive Encryption dialog, click **Reset a forgotten PIN**. If you are not logged in with an administrator account you must provide administrative credentials at this time.
|
||||
3. In the PIN reset dialog, provide and confirm the new PIN to use and then click **Finish**.
|
||||
3. You will use the new PIN the next time you unlock the drive.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### <a href="" id="bkmk-loststartup"></a>Lost startup key
|
||||
|
||||
If you have lost the USB flash drive that contains the startup key, then you must unlock the drive by using the recovery key and then create a new startup key.
|
||||
@ -254,18 +273,22 @@ If you have lost the USB flash drive that contains the startup key, then you mus
|
||||
2. Open Manage BitLocker.
|
||||
3. Click **Duplicate start up key**, insert the clean USB drive on which you are going to write the key and then click **Save**.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### <a href="" id="bkmk-changebootknown"></a>Changes to boot files
|
||||
|
||||
This error might occur if you updated the firmware. As a best practice you should suspend BitLocker before making changes the firmware and then resume protection after the update has completed. This prevents the computer from going into recovery mode. However if changes were made when BitLocker protection was on you can simply log on to the computer using the recovery password and the platform validation profile will be updated so that recovery will not occur the next time.
|
||||
This error might occur if you updated the firmware. As a best practice you should suspend BitLocker before making changes to the firmware and then resume protection after the update has completed. This prevents the computer from going into recovery mode. However if changes were made when BitLocker protection was on you can simply log on to the computer using the recovery password and the platform validation profile will be updated so that recovery will not occur the next time.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Windows RE and BitLocker Device Encryption
|
||||
|
||||
Windows Recovery Environment (RE) can be used to recover access to a drive protected by [BitLocker Device Encryption](bitlocker-device-encryption-overview-windows-10.md). If a PC is unable to boot after two failures, Startup Repair will automatically start. When Startup Repair is launched automatically due to boot failures, it will only execute operating system and driver file repairs, provided that the boot logs or any available crash dump point to a specific corrupted file. In Windows 8.1 and later, devices that include firmware to support specific TPM measurements for PCR\[7\] the TPM can validate that Windows RE is a trusted operating environment and will unlock any BitLocker-protected drives if Windows RE has not been modified. If the Windows RE environment has been modified, for example the TPM has been disabled, the drives will stay locked until the BitLocker recovery key is provided. If Startup Repair is not able to be run automatically from the PC and instead Windows RE is manually started from a repair disk, the BitLocker recovery key must be provided to unlock the BitLocker–protected drives.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## BitLocker recovery screen
|
||||
|
||||
During BitLocker recovery, Windows can display a custom recovery message and hints that identify where a key can be retrieved from. These improvements can help a user during BitLocker recovery.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### Custom recovery message
|
||||
|
||||
BitLocker Group Policy settings in Windows 10, version 1511, let you configure a custom recovery message and URL on the BitLocker recovery screen, which can include the address of the BitLocker self-service recovery portal, the IT internal website, or a phone number for support.
|
||||
@ -281,9 +304,10 @@ Example of customized recovery screen:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### BitLocker recovery key hints
|
||||
|
||||
BitLocker metadata has been enhanced in Windows 10, version 1903 to include information about when and where the BitLocker recovery key was backed up. This information is not exposed through the UI or any public API. It is used solely by the BitLocker recovery screen in the form of hints to help a user locate a volume's recovery key. Hints are displayed on the recovery screen and refer to the location where key has been saved. Hints are displayed in both the modern (blue) and legacy (black) recovery screen. This applies to both the bootmanager recovery screen and the WinRE unlock screen.
|
||||
BitLocker metadata has been enhanced in Windows 10, version 1903 to include information about when and where the BitLocker recovery key was backed up. This information is not exposed through the UI or any public API. It is used solely by the BitLocker recovery screen in the form of hints to help a user locate a volume's recovery key. Hints are displayed on the recovery screen and refer to the location where the key has been saved. Hints are displayed in both the modern (blue) and legacy (black) recovery screen. This applies to both the boot manager recovery screen and the WinRE unlock screen.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -302,6 +326,7 @@ There are rules governing which hint is shown during the recovery (in order of p
|
||||
8. There is no specific hint for keys saved to an on-premises Active Directory. In this case, a custom message (if configured) or a generic message, "Contact your organization's help desk," will be displayed.
|
||||
9. If two recovery keys are present on the disk, but only one has been successfully backed up, the system will ask for a key that has been backed up, even if another key is newer.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### Example 1 (single recovery key with single backup)
|
||||
|
||||
| Custom URL | Yes |
|
||||
@ -316,6 +341,7 @@ There are rules governing which hint is shown during the recovery (in order of p
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### Example 2 (single recovery key with single backup)
|
||||
|
||||
| Custom URL | Yes |
|
||||
@ -330,6 +356,7 @@ There are rules governing which hint is shown during the recovery (in order of p
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### Example 3 (single recovery key with multiple backups)
|
||||
|
||||
| Custom URL | No |
|
||||
@ -344,6 +371,7 @@ There are rules governing which hint is shown during the recovery (in order of p
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### Example 4 (multiple recovery passwords)
|
||||
|
||||
| Custom URL | No |
|
||||
@ -373,6 +401,7 @@ There are rules governing which hint is shown during the recovery (in order of p
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### Example 5 (multiple recovery passwords)
|
||||
|
||||
| Custom URL | No |
|
||||
@ -402,10 +431,12 @@ There are rules governing which hint is shown during the recovery (in order of p
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## <a href="" id="bkmk-usingaddrecovery"></a>Using additional recovery information
|
||||
|
||||
Besides the 48-digit BitLocker recovery password, other types of recovery information are stored in Active Directory. This section describes how this additional information can be used.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### BitLocker key package
|
||||
|
||||
If the recovery methods discussed earlier in this document do not unlock the volume, you can use the BitLocker Repair tool to decrypt the volume at the block level. The tool uses the BitLocker key package to help recover encrypted data from severely damaged drives. You can then use this recovered data to salvage encrypted data, even after the correct recovery password has failed to unlock the damaged volume. We recommend that you still save the recovery password. A key package cannot be used without the corresponding recovery password.
|
||||
@ -415,6 +446,7 @@ If the recovery methods discussed earlier in this document do not unlock the vol
|
||||
|
||||
The BitLocker key package is not saved by default. To save the package along with the recovery password in AD DS you must select the **Backup recovery password and key package** option in the Group Policy settings that control the recovery method. You can also export the key package from a working volume. For more details on how to export key packages, see [Retrieving the BitLocker Key Package](#bkmk-appendixc).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## <a href="" id="bkmk-appendixb"></a>Resetting recovery passwords
|
||||
|
||||
You should invalidate a recovery password after it has been provided and used. It should also be done when you intentionally want to invalidate an existing recovery password for any reason.
|
||||
@ -424,7 +456,7 @@ You can reset the recovery password in two ways:
|
||||
- **Use manage-bde** You can use manage-bde to remove the old recovery password and add a new recovery password. The procedure identifies the command and the syntax for this method.
|
||||
- **Run a script** You can run a script to reset the password without decrypting the volume. The sample script in the procedure illustrates this functionality. The sample script creates a new recovery password and invalidates all other passwords.
|
||||
|
||||
**To reset a recovery password using manage-bde**
|
||||
**To reset a recovery password using manage-bde:**
|
||||
|
||||
1. Remove the previous recovery password
|
||||
|
||||
@ -453,7 +485,7 @@ You can reset the recovery password in two ways:
|
||||
> [!WARNING]
|
||||
> You must include the braces in the ID string.
|
||||
|
||||
**To run the sample recovery password script**
|
||||
**To run the sample recovery password script:**
|
||||
|
||||
1. Save the following sample script in a VBScript file. For example: ResetPassword.vbs.
|
||||
2. At the command prompt, type a command similar to the following:
|
||||
@ -466,7 +498,7 @@ You can reset the recovery password in two ways:
|
||||
> [!NOTE]
|
||||
> To manage a remote computer, you can specify the remote computer name rather than the local computer name.
|
||||
|
||||
You can use the following sample script to create a VBScript file to reset the recovery passwords.
|
||||
You can use the following sample script to create a VBScript file to reset the recovery passwords:
|
||||
|
||||
```vb
|
||||
' Target drive letter
|
||||
@ -539,6 +571,7 @@ WScript.Echo "A new recovery password has been added. Old passwords have been re
|
||||
'WScript.Echo "Type ""manage-bde -protectors -get " & strDriveLetter & " -type recoverypassword"" to view existing passwords."
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## <a href="" id="bkmk-appendixc"></a>Retrieving the BitLocker key package
|
||||
|
||||
You can use two methods to retrieve the key package, as described in [Using Additional Recovery Information](#bkmk-usingaddrecovery):
|
||||
@ -548,14 +581,14 @@ You can use two methods to retrieve the key package, as described in [Using Addi
|
||||
|
||||
The following sample script exports all previously-saved key packages from AD DS.
|
||||
|
||||
**To run the sample key package retrieval script**
|
||||
**To run the sample key package retrieval script:**
|
||||
|
||||
1. Save the following sample script in a VBScript file. For example: GetBitLockerKeyPackageADDS.vbs.
|
||||
2. At the command prompt, type a command similar to the following:
|
||||
|
||||
**cscript GetBitLockerKeyPackageADDS.vbs -?**
|
||||
|
||||
You can use the following sample script to create a VBScript file to retrieve the BitLocker key package from AD DS.
|
||||
You can use the following sample script to create a VBScript file to retrieve the BitLocker key package from AD DS:
|
||||
|
||||
```vb
|
||||
' --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
@ -697,7 +730,7 @@ WScript.Quit
|
||||
|
||||
The following sample script exports a new key package from an unlocked, encrypted volume.
|
||||
|
||||
**To run the sample key package retrieval script**
|
||||
**To run the sample key package retrieval script:**
|
||||
|
||||
1. Save the following sample script in a VBScript file. For example: GetBitLockerKeyPackage.vbs
|
||||
2. Open an administrator command prompt, type a command similar to the following:
|
||||
@ -882,6 +915,7 @@ Function BinaryToString(Binary)
|
||||
End Function
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## See also
|
||||
|
||||
- [BitLocker overview](bitlocker-overview.md)
|
||||
|
||||
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ ms.author: deniseb
|
||||
ms.custom: nextgen
|
||||
ms.reviewer:
|
||||
manager: dansimp
|
||||
ms.date: 10/21/2020
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Configure and validate exclusions based on file extension and folder location
|
||||
@ -187,7 +188,7 @@ The following table describes how the wildcards can be used and provides some ex
|
||||
|Wildcard |Examples |
|
||||
|---------|---------|
|
||||
|`*` (asterisk) <br/><br/>In **file name and file extension inclusions**, the asterisk replaces any number of characters, and only applies to files in the last folder defined in the argument. <br/><br/>In **folder exclusions**, the asterisk replaces a single folder. Use multiple `*` with folder slashes `\` to indicate multiple nested folders. After matching the number of wild carded and named folders, all subfolders are also included. | `C:\MyData\*.txt` would include `C:\MyData\notes.txt`<br/><br/>`C:\somepath\*\Data` would include any file in `C:\somepath\Archives\Data and its subfolders` and `C:\somepath\Authorized\Data and its subfolders` <br/><br/>`C:\Serv\*\*\Backup` would include any file in `C:\Serv\Primary\Denied\Backup and its subfolders` and `C:\Serv\Secondary\Allowed\Backup and its subfolders` |
|
||||
|`?` (question mark) <br/><br/>In **file name and file extension inclusions**, the question mark replaces a single character, and only applies to files in the last folder defined in the argument. <br/><br/>In **folder exclusions**, the question mark replaces a single character in a folder name. After matching the number of wild carded and named folders, all subfolders are also included. |`C:\MyData\my` would include `C:\MyData\my1.zip` <br/><br/>`C:\somepath\?\Data` would include any file in `C:\somepath\P\Data` and its subfolders <br/><br/>`C:\somepath\test0?\Data` would include any file in `C:\somepath\test01\Data` and its subfolders |
|
||||
|`?` (question mark) <br/><br/>In **file name and file extension inclusions**, the question mark replaces a single character, and only applies to files in the last folder defined in the argument. <br/><br/>In **folder exclusions**, the question mark replaces a single character in a folder name. After matching the number of wild carded and named folders, all subfolders are also included. |`C:\MyData\my?` would include `C:\MyData\my1.zip` <br/><br/>`C:\somepath\?\Data` would include any file in `C:\somepath\P\Data` and its subfolders <br/><br/>`C:\somepath\test0?\Data` would include any file in `C:\somepath\test01\Data` and its subfolders |
|
||||
|Environment variables <br/><br/>The defined variable is populated as a path when the exclusion is evaluated. |`%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\CustomLogFiles` would include `C:\ProgramData\CustomLogFiles\Folder1\file1.txt` |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -61,10 +61,10 @@ You can also randomize the times when each endpoint checks and downloads protect
|
||||
|
||||
4. Click **Policies** then **Administrative templates**.
|
||||
|
||||
5. Expand the tree to **Windows components > Microsoft Defender Antivirus > Signature Updates** and configure the following settings:
|
||||
5. Expand the tree to **Windows components** > **Microsoft Defender Antivirus** > **Signature Intelligence Updates** and configure the following settings:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Double-click the **Specify the interval to check for security intelligence updates** setting and set the option to **Enabled**. Enter the number of hours between updates. Click **OK**.
|
||||
2. Double-click the **Specify the day of the week to check for security intelligence updates** setting and set the option to **Enabled**. Enter the day of the week to check for updates. Click **OK**.
|
||||
1. Double-click the **Specify the day of the week to check for security intelligence updates** setting and set the option to **Enabled**. Enter the day of the week to check for updates. Click **OK**.
|
||||
2. Double-click the **Specify the interval to check for security intelligence updates** setting and set the option to **Enabled**. Enter the number of hours between updates. Click **OK**.
|
||||
3. Double-click the **Specify the time to check for security intelligence updates** setting and set the option to **Enabled**. Enter the time when updates should be checked. The time is based on the local time of the endpoint. Click **OK**.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -103,8 +103,3 @@ See the following for more information and allowed parameters:
|
||||
- [Manage updates for mobile devices and virtual machines (VMs)](manage-updates-mobile-devices-vms-microsoft-defender-antivirus.md)
|
||||
- [Microsoft Defender Antivirus in Windows 10](microsoft-defender-antivirus-in-windows-10.md)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ ms.author: deniseb
|
||||
ms.custom: nextgen
|
||||
ms.reviewer:
|
||||
manager: dansimp
|
||||
ms.date: 10/08/2020
|
||||
ms.date: 10/21/2020
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Manage Microsoft Defender Antivirus updates and apply baselines
|
||||
@ -319,6 +319,7 @@ The below table provides the Microsoft Defender Antivirus platform and engine ve
|
||||
|
||||
|Windows 10 release |Platform version |Engine version |Support phase |
|
||||
|-|-|-|-|
|
||||
|2004 (20H1) |4.18.2004.6 |1.1.17000.2 | Technical upgrade Support (Only) |
|
||||
|1909 (19H2) |4.18.1902.5 |1.1.16700.3 | Technical upgrade Support (Only) |
|
||||
|1903 (19H1) |4.18.1902.5 |1.1.15600.4 | Technical upgrade Support (Only) |
|
||||
|1809 (RS5) |4.18.1807.18075 |1.1.15000.2 | Technical upgrade Support (Only) |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -36,9 +36,6 @@ You can review event IDs in the [Event Viewer](https://msdn.microsoft.com/librar
|
||||
|
||||
For example, if devices are not appearing in the **Devices list**, you might need to look for event IDs on the devices. You can then use this table to determine further troubleshooting steps.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!NOTE]
|
||||
> It can take several days for devices to begin reporting to the Microsoft Defender ATP service.
|
||||
|
||||
**Open Event Viewer and find the Microsoft Defender ATP service event log:**
|
||||
|
||||
1. Click **Start** on the Windows menu, type **Event Viewer**, and press **Enter**.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ ms.localizationpriority: medium
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
author: denisebmsft
|
||||
ms.author: deniseb
|
||||
ms.date: 04/02/2019
|
||||
ms.date: 10/21/2020
|
||||
ms.reviewer:
|
||||
manager: dansimp
|
||||
ms.custom: asr
|
||||
@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ DeviceEvents
|
||||
You can review the Windows event log to see events that are created when exploit protection blocks (or audits) an app:
|
||||
|
||||
|Provider/source | Event ID | Description|
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
|:---|:---|:---|
|
||||
|Security-Mitigations | 1 | ACG audit |
|
||||
|Security-Mitigations | 2 | ACG enforce |
|
||||
|Security-Mitigations | 3 | Do not allow child processes audit |
|
||||
@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ The mitigations available in EMET are included natively in Windows 10 (starting
|
||||
The table in this section indicates the availability and support of native mitigations between EMET and exploit protection.
|
||||
|
||||
|Mitigation | Available under exploit protection | Available in EMET |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
|:---|:---|:---|
|
||||
|Arbitrary code guard (ACG) | yes | yes<br />As "Memory Protection Check" |
|
||||
|Block remote images | yes | yes<br/>As "Load Library Check" |
|
||||
|Block untrusted fonts | yes | yes |
|
||||
@ -131,8 +131,6 @@ The table in this section indicates the availability and support of native mitig
|
||||
## See also
|
||||
|
||||
- [Protect devices from exploits](exploit-protection.md)
|
||||
- [Evaluate exploit protection](evaluate-exploit-protection.md)
|
||||
- [Enable exploit protection](enable-exploit-protection.md)
|
||||
- [Configure and audit exploit protection mitigations](customize-exploit-protection.md)
|
||||
- [Import, export, and deploy exploit protection configurations](import-export-exploit-protection-emet-xml.md)
|
||||
- [Troubleshoot exploit protection](troubleshoot-exploit-protection-mitigations.md)
|
||||
- [Optimize ASR rule deployment and detections](configure-machines-asr.md)
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ ms.localizationpriority: medium
|
||||
manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.topic: overview
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Threat and vulnerability management
|
||||
|
||||
@ -23,10 +23,10 @@ ms.topic: article
|
||||
|
||||
[!INCLUDE [Microsoft 365 Defender rebranding](../../includes/microsoft-defender.md)]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
**Applies to:**
|
||||
|
||||
- [Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Microsoft Defender ATP)](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?linkid=2069559)
|
||||
- [Threat and vulnerability management](next-gen-threat-and-vuln-mgt.md)
|
||||
|
||||
>Want to experience Microsoft Defender ATP? [Sign up for a free trial.](https://www.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/windows/microsoft-defender-atp?ocid=docs-wdatp-portaloverview-abovefoldlink)
|
||||
|
||||
@ -54,14 +54,23 @@ Examples of devices that should be assigned a high value:
|
||||
1. Navigate to any device page, the easiest place is from the device inventory.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Select **Device value** from three dots next to the actions bar at the top of the page.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
<br><br>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
3. A flyout will appear with the current device value and what it means. Review the value of the device and choose the one that best fits your device.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## How device value impacts your exposure score
|
||||
|
||||
The exposure score is a weighted average across all devices. If you have device groups, you can also filter the score by device group.
|
||||
|
||||
- Normal devices have a weight of 1
|
||||
- Low value devices have a weight of 0.75
|
||||
- High value devices have a weight of NumberOfAssets / 10.
|
||||
- If you have 100 devices, each high value device will have a weight of 10 (100/10)
|
||||
|
||||
## Related topics
|
||||
|
||||
- [Threat and vulnerability management overview](next-gen-threat-and-vuln-mgt.md)
|
||||
- [Exposure Score](tvm-exposure-score.md)
|
||||
- [APIs](next-gen-threat-and-vuln-mgt.md#apis)
|
||||
@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
**Applies to:**
|
||||
|
||||
- [Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Microsoft Defender ATP)](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?linkid=2146631)
|
||||
- [Threat and vulnerability management](next-gen-threat-and-vuln-mgt.md)
|
||||
|
||||
>Want to experience Microsoft Defender ATP? [Sign up for a free trial.](https://www.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/windows/microsoft-defender-atp?ocid=docs-wdatp-portaloverview-abovefoldlink)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
|
||||
[!INCLUDE [Microsoft 365 Defender rebranding](../../includes/microsoft-defender.md)]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
**Applies to:**
|
||||
|
||||
- [Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Microsoft Defender ATP)](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?linkid=2069559)
|
||||
|
||||
@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
[!INCLUDE [Microsoft 365 Defender rebranding](../../includes/microsoft-defender.md)]
|
||||
|
||||
**Applies to:**
|
||||
|
||||
- [Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Microsoft Defender ATP)](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?linkid=2069559)
|
||||
- [Threat and vulnerability management](next-gen-threat-and-vuln-mgt.md)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
**Applies to:**
|
||||
|
||||
- [Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Microsoft Defender ATP)](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?linkid=2146631)
|
||||
- [Threat and vulnerability management](next-gen-threat-and-vuln-mgt.md)
|
||||
|
||||
>Want to experience Microsoft Defender ATP? [Sign up for a free trial.](https://www.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/windows/microsoft-defender-atp?ocid=docs-wdatp-portaloverview-abovefoldlink)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ ms.topic: article
|
||||
**Applies to:**
|
||||
|
||||
- [Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Microsoft Defender ATP)](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?linkid=2146631)
|
||||
- [Threat and vulnerability management](next-gen-threat-and-vuln-mgt.md)
|
||||
|
||||
>Want to experience Microsoft Defender ATP? [Sign up for a free trial.](https://www.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/windows/microsoft-defender-atp?ocid=docs-wdatp-portaloverview-abovefoldlink)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -22,10 +22,10 @@ ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
|
||||
[!INCLUDE [Microsoft 365 Defender rebranding](../../includes/microsoft-defender.md)]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
**Applies to:**
|
||||
|
||||
- [Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Microsoft Defender ATP)](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?linkid=2146631)
|
||||
- [Threat and vulnerability management](next-gen-threat-and-vuln-mgt.md)
|
||||
|
||||
>[!NOTE]
|
||||
> Configuration score is now part of threat and vulnerability management as Microsoft Secure Score for Devices.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
**Applies to:**
|
||||
|
||||
- [Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Microsoft Defender ATP)](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?linkid=2069559)
|
||||
- [Threat and vulnerability management](next-gen-threat-and-vuln-mgt.md)
|
||||
|
||||
>Want to experience Microsoft Defender ATP? [Sign up for a free trial.](https://www.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/windows/microsoft-defender-atp?ocid=docs-wdatp-portaloverview-abovefoldlink)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
|
||||
**Applies to:**
|
||||
- [Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Microsoft Defender ATP)](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?linkid=2146631)
|
||||
- [Threat and vulnerability management](next-gen-threat-and-vuln-mgt.md)
|
||||
|
||||
>Want to experience Microsoft Defender ATP? [Sign up for a free trial.](https://www.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/windows/microsoft-defender-atp?ocid=docs-wdatp-portaloverview-abovefoldlink)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
|
||||
#### [Authorize reputable apps with Intelligent Security Graph (ISG)](use-windows-defender-application-control-with-intelligent-security-graph.md)
|
||||
#### [Use multiple WDAC policies](deploy-multiple-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md)
|
||||
#### [Microsoft recommended block rules](microsoft-recommended-block-rules.md)
|
||||
#### [Microsoft recommended driver block rules](microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules.md)
|
||||
### Create your initial WDAC policy
|
||||
#### [Example WDAC base policies](example-wdac-base-policies.md)
|
||||
#### [Policy creation for common WDAC usage scenarios](types-of-devices.md)
|
||||
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,389 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: Microsoft recommended driver block rules (Windows 10)
|
||||
description: View a list of recommended block rules to block vulnerable third party drivers discovered by Microsoft and the security research community.
|
||||
keywords: security, malware, kernel mode, driver
|
||||
ms.assetid: 8d6e0474-c475-411b-b095-1c61adb2bdbb
|
||||
ms.prod: w10
|
||||
ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
|
||||
ms.sitesec: library
|
||||
ms.pagetype: security
|
||||
ms.localizationpriority: medium
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
author: jgeurten
|
||||
ms.reviewer: isbrahm
|
||||
ms.author: dansimp
|
||||
manager: dansimp
|
||||
ms.date: 10/15/2020
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Microsoft recommended driver block rules
|
||||
|
||||
**Applies to:**
|
||||
|
||||
- Windows 10
|
||||
- Windows Server 2016 and above
|
||||
|
||||
Microsoft has strict requirements for code running in kernel. Consequently, malicious actors are turning to exploit vulnerabilities in legitimate and signed kernel drivers to run malware in kernel. One of the many strengths of the Windows platform is our strong collaboration with independent hardware vendors (IHVs) and OEMs. Microsoft works closely with our IHVs and security community to ensure the highest level of driver security for our customers and when vulnerabilities in drivers do arise, that they are patched and rolled out to the ecosystem in an expedited manner. Microsoft then adds the vulnerable versions of the drivers to our ecosystem block policy which is applied to the following sets of devices:
|
||||
|
||||
- Hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI) enabled devices
|
||||
- Windows 10 in S mode (S mode) devices
|
||||
|
||||
Microsoft recommends enabling [HVCI](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/device-guard/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity) or S mode to protect your devices against security threats. If this is not possible, Microsoft recommends blocking the following list of drivers by merging this policy with your existing Windows Defender Application Control policy. Blocking kernel drivers without sufficient testing can result in devices or software to malfunction, and in rare cases, blue screen. It is recommended to first validate this policy in [audit mode](audit-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md) and review the audit block events.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
> [!Note]
|
||||
> This application list will be updated with the latest vendor information as application vulnerabilities are resolved and new issues are discovered. It is recommended that this policy be first validated in audit mode before rolling the rules into enforcement mode.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
```xml
|
||||
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
|
||||
<SiPolicy xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:sipolicy">
|
||||
<VersionEx>10.0.19565.0</VersionEx>
|
||||
<PolicyTypeID>{D2BDA982-CCF6-4344-AC5B-0B44427B6816}</PolicyTypeID>
|
||||
<PlatformID>{2E07F7E4-194C-4D20-B7C9-6F44A6C5A234}</PlatformID>
|
||||
<Rules>
|
||||
<Rule>
|
||||
<Option>Enabled:Unsigned System Integrity Policy</Option>
|
||||
</Rule>
|
||||
<Rule>
|
||||
<Option>Enabled:Audit Mode</Option>
|
||||
</Rule>
|
||||
<Rule>
|
||||
<Option>Enabled:Advanced Boot Options Menu</Option>
|
||||
</Rule>
|
||||
</Rules>
|
||||
<!--EKUS-->
|
||||
<EKUs />
|
||||
<!--File Rules-->
|
||||
<FileRules>
|
||||
<Allow ID="ID_ALLOW_ALL_1" FriendlyName="" FileName="*" />
|
||||
<Allow ID="ID_ALLOW_ALL_2" FriendlyName="" FileName="*" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_BANDAI_SHA1" FriendlyName="bandai.sys Hash Sha1" Hash="0F780B7ADA5DD8464D9F2CC537D973F5AC804E9C" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_BANDAI_SHA256" FriendlyName="bandai.sys Hash Sha256" Hash="7FD788358585E0B863328475898BB4400ED8D478466D1B7F5CC0252671456CC8" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_BANDAI_SHA1_PAGE" FriendlyName="bandai.sys Hash Page Sha1" Hash="EA360A9F23BB7CF67F08B88E6A185A699F0C5410" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_BANDAI_SHA256_PAGE" FriendlyName="bandai.sys Hash Page Sha256" Hash="BB83738210650E09307CE869ACA9BFA251024D3C47B1006B94FCE2846313F56E" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_CAPCOM_SHA1" FriendlyName="capcom.sys Hash Sha1" Hash="1D1CAFC73C97C6BCD2331F8777D90FDCA57125A3" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_CAPCOM_SHA256" FriendlyName="capcom.sys Hash Sha256" Hash="FAA08CB609A5B7BE6BFDB61F1E4A5E8ADF2F5A1D2492F262483DF7326934F5D4" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_CAPCOM_SHA1_PAGE" FriendlyName="capcom.sys Hash Page Sha1" Hash="69006FBBD1B150FB9404867A5BCDC04FE0FC1BAD" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_CAPCOM_SHA256_PAGE" FriendlyName="capcom.sys Hash Page Sha256" Hash="42589C7CE89941060465096C4661654B43E38C1F9D05D66239825E8FCCF52705" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_FIDDRV_SHA1" FriendlyName="fiddrv.sys Hash Sha1" Hash="8CC8974A05E81678E3D28ACFE434E7804ABD019C" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_FIDDRV_SHA256" FriendlyName="fiddrv.sys Hash Sha256" Hash="97B976F7E7E5DF7AF0781BBBB33CB5F3F7A59EFDD07995253B31DE8123352A67" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_FIDDRV_SHA1_PAGE" FriendlyName="fiddrv.sys Hash Page Sha1" Hash="282BB241BDA5C4C1B8EB9BF56D018896649CA0E1" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_FIDDRV_SHA256_PAGE" FriendlyName="fiddrv.sys Hash Page Sha256" Hash="1ED9DA2DA2539284404E0701E6BA3C9EB37BE10353E826F425A194D247B8B7CE" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_FIDDRV64_SHA1" FriendlyName="fiddrv64.sys Hash Sha1" Hash="10E15BA8FF8ED926DDD3636CEC66A0F08C9860A4" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_FIDDRV64_SHA256" FriendlyName="fiddrv64.sys Hash Sha256" Hash="FEEF191064D18B6FB63B7299415D1B1E2EC8FCDD742854AA96268D0EC4A0F7B6" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_FIDDRV64_SHA1_PAGE" FriendlyName="fiddrv64.sys Hash Page Sha1" Hash="E4436C8C42BA5FFABD58A3B2256F6E86CCC907AB" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_FIDDRV64_SHA256_PAGE" FriendlyName="fiddrv64.sys Hash Page Sha256" Hash="2D48414647A7F9DEA30F19074EBF8F17E55E9031B8604794CEB88369C8C52532" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_FIDPCIDRV_SHA1" FriendlyName="fidpcidrv.sys Hash Sha1" Hash="08596732304351B311970FF96B21F451F23B1E25" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_FIDPCIDRV_SHA256" FriendlyName="fidpcidrv.sys Hash Sha256" Hash="7B7E0E1453E733050B586A6FAC91883DBB85AE0775C84C4CEB967CFC9B4EFD10" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_FIDPCIDRV_SHA1_PAGE" FriendlyName="fidpcidrv.sys Hash Page Sha1" Hash="7838FB56FDAB816BC1900A4720EEA2FC9972EF7A" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_FIDPCIDRV_SHA256_PAGE" FriendlyName="fidpcidrv.sys Hash Page Sha256" Hash="0893E186E236315FE78A7EF41ED71617E75D90D2D14FE93911E0D9344BEAF69F" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_FIDPCIDRV64_SHA1" FriendlyName="fidpcidrv64.sys Hash Sha1" Hash="4789B910023A667BEE70FF1F1A8F369CFFB10FE8" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_FIDPCIDRV64_SHA256" FriendlyName="fidpcidrv64.sys Hash Sha256" Hash="7FB0F6FC5BDD22D53F8532CB19DA666A77A66FFB1CF3919A2E22B66C13B415B7" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_FIDPCIDRV64_SHA1_PAGE" FriendlyName="fidpcidrv64.sys Hash Page Sha1" Hash="EEFF4EC4EBC12C6ACD2C930DC2EAAF877CFEC7EC" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_FIDPCIDRV64_SHA256_PAGE" FriendlyName="fidpcidrv64.sys Hash Page Sha256" Hash="B98E008DFEA10EC74C89D08F12F31C12F52234BE6FFFF06B6B9E749BFEA6CBED" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_GDRV" FriendlyName="gdrv.sys" FileName="gdrv.sys" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_GLCKIO2_SHA1" FriendlyName="GLCKIO2.sys Hash Sha1" Hash="D99B80B3269D735CAC43AF5E43483E64CA7961C3" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_GLCKIO2_SHA256" FriendlyName="GLCKIO2.sys Hash Sha256" Hash="47DBA240967FD0088BE618163672DFBDDF0138178CCCD45B54037F622B221220" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_GLCKIO2_SHA1_PAGE" FriendlyName="GLCKIO2.sys Hash Page Sha1" Hash="51E0740AAEE5AE76B0095C92908C97B817DB8BEA" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_GLCKIO2_SHA256_PAGE" FriendlyName="GLCKIO2.sys Hash Page Sha256" Hash="E7F011E9857C7DB5AACBD424612CD7E3D12C363FDC8F072DDFAF9E2E5C85F5F3" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_GVCIDRV64_SHA1" FriendlyName="GVCIDrv64.sys Hash Sha1" Hash="4EAE38E9DC262EB7B6EDE4B3D3F4AD068933845E" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_GVCIDRV64_SHA256" FriendlyName="GVCIDrv64.sys Hash Sha256" Hash="2FF09BB919A9909068166C30322C4E904BEFEBA5429E9A11D011297FB8A73C07" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_GVCIDRV64_SHA1_PAGE" FriendlyName="GVCIDrv64.sys Hash Page Sha1" Hash="6980122AEF4E2D5D7A6DDDB6DA76A166C460E0A1" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_GVCIDRV64_SHA256_PAGE" FriendlyName="GVCIDrv64.sys Hash Page Sha256" Hash="A69247025DD32DC15E06FEE362B494BCC6105D34B8D7091F7EC3D9000BD71501" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_WINFLASH64_SHA1" FriendlyName="WinFlash64.sys Hash Sha1" Hash="DA21F5889F8374C3961856D681ADEC3D663D2964" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_WINFLASH64_SHA256" FriendlyName="WinFlash64.sys Hash Sha256" Hash="F2B51FBEEAD17F5EE34D5B4A3A83C848FB76F8F0E80769212E137A7AA539A3BC" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_WINFLASH64_SHA1_PAGE" FriendlyName="WinFlash64.sys Hash Page Sha1" Hash="C5057A4FD3C9B58F4C9AB9FE356081DF8804BF98" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_WINFLASH64_SHA256_PAGE" FriendlyName="WinFlash64.sys Hash Page Sha256" Hash="C8FA1EC3D03050FBC1AA677F2C0348690521291219E8D2E94F0EA9E9174B9156" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_AMIFLDRV64_SHA1" FriendlyName="amifldrv64.sys Hash Sha1" Hash="B0EC7D971DA8AE84C0ED8F88A5D46B23996E636C" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_AMIFLDRV64_SHA256C" FriendlyName="amifldrv64.sys Hash Sha256" Hash="038F39558035292F1D794B7CF49F8E751E8633DAEC31454FE85CCCBEA83BA3FB" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_AMIFLDRV64_SHA1_PAGE" FriendlyName="amifldrv64.sys Hash Page Sha1" Hash="C9CC3779ED67755220DBF9592EC2AC0E1DE363DC" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_AMIFLDRV64_SHA256_PAGE" FriendlyName="amifldrv64.sys Hash Page Sha256" Hash="AA594D977312A944B14351C075634E7C59B42687928FBCDA8E2C4CEA46686DD9" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_ASUPIO64_SHA1F" FriendlyName="AsUpIO64.sys Hash Sha1" Hash="2A95F882DD9BAFCC57F144A2708A7EC67DD7844C" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_ASUPIO64_SHA256" FriendlyName="AsUpIO64.sys Hash Sha256" Hash="7F75D91844B0C162EEB24D14BCF63B7F230E111DAA7B0A26EAA489EEB22D9057" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_ASUPIO64_SHA1_PAGE" FriendlyName="AsUpIO64.sys Hash Page Sha1" Hash="316E7872A227F0EAD483D244805E9FF4D3569F6F" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_ASUPIO64_SHA256_PAGE" FriendlyName="AsUpIO64.sys Hash Page Sha256" Hash="5958CBE6CF7170C4B66893777BDE66343F5536A98610BD188E10D47DB84BC04C" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_BSFLASH64_SHA1" FriendlyName="BS_Flash64.sys Hash Sha1" Hash="5107438A02164E1BCEDD556A786F37F59CD04231" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_BSFLASH64_SHA256" FriendlyName="BS_Flash64.sys Hash Sha256" Hash="543C3F024E4AFFD0AAFA3A229FA19DBE7A70972BB18ED6347D3492DD174EDAC5" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_BSFLASH64_SHA1_PAGE" FriendlyName="BS_Flash64.sys Hash Page Sha1" Hash="26C398B86FD33B3E6C4348F780C4CF758C99C8FD" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_BSFLASH64_SHA256_PAGE" FriendlyName="BS_Flash64.sys Hash Page Sha256" Hash="8BF958AFA751D7AB66EBB1FAE25679E6F0FDE72078AEFC09F1824EEFA526005E" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_BSHWMIO64_SHA1" FriendlyName="BS_HWMIo64.sys Hash Sha1" Hash="3281135748C9C7A9DDACE55C648C720AF810475F" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_BSHWMIO64_SHA256" FriendlyName="BS_HWMIo64.sys Hash Sha256" Hash="3DE51A3102DB7297D96B4DE5B60ACA5F3A07E8577BBBED7F755F1DE9A9C38E75" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_BSHWMIO64_SHA1_PAGE" FriendlyName="BS_HWMIo64.sys Hash Page Sha1" Hash="FC5F231383FE72E298893010A9A3714B205C4110" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_BSHWMIO64_SHA256_PAGE" FriendlyName="BS_HWMIo64.sys Hash Page Sha256" Hash="6AD3624CA1DC38ECEEC75234E50934B1BAD7C72621DC57DEAB09044D0135877D" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_MSIO64_SHA1" FriendlyName="MsIo64.sys Hash Sha1" Hash="7E732ACB7CFAD9BA043A9350CDEFF25D742BECB8" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_MSIO64_SHA256" FriendlyName="MsIo64.sys Hash Sha256" Hash="7018D515A6C781EA6097CA71D0F0603AD0D689F7EC99DB27FCACD492A9E86027" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_MSIO64_SHA1_PAGE" FriendlyName="MsIo64.sys Hash Page Sha1" Hash="CDE1A50E1DF7870F8E4AFD8631E45A847C714C0A" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_MSIO64_SHA256_PAGE" FriendlyName="MsIo64.sys Hash Page Sha256" Hash="05736AB8B48DF84D81CB2CC0FBDC9D3DA34C22DB67A3E71C6F4B6B3923740DD5" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_PIDDRV_SHA1" FriendlyName="piddrv.sys Hash Sha1" Hash="877C6C36A155109888FE1F9797B93CB30B4957EF" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_PIDDRV_SHA256" FriendlyName="piddrv.sys Hash Sha256" Hash="4E19D4CE649C28DD947424483796BEACE3656284FB0379D97DDDD320AA602BBC" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_PIDDRV_SHA1_PAGE" FriendlyName="piddrv.sys Hash Page Sha1" Hash="A7D827A41B2C4B7638495CD1D77926F1BA902978" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_PIDDRV_SHA256_PAGE" FriendlyName="piddrv.sys Hash Page Sha256" Hash="EAC7316089DBAF7DF79A531355547BBDA22FA0921E31BBA0D27BCC88234E9ED3" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_PIDDRV64_SHA1" FriendlyName="piddrv64.sys Hash Sha1" Hash="0C2599D738D01A82EC91725F499ACEBBCFB47CC9" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_PIDDRV64_SHA256" FriendlyName="piddrv64.sys Hash Sha256" Hash="B97F870C501714FA453CF18AE8A30C87D08FF1E6D784AFDBB0121AEA3DA2DC28" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_PIDDRV64_SHA1_PAGE" FriendlyName="piddrv64.sys Hash Page Sha1" Hash="C978063E678233C5EFB8F002FEF000FD479CC632" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_PIDDRV64_SHA256_PAGE" FriendlyName="piddrv64.sys Hash Page Sha256" Hash="1081CCD57FD35998634103AE1E736638D82351092ACD30FE75084EA6A08CA0F7" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_SEMAV6MSR64_SHA1" FriendlyName="semav6msr64.sys Hash Sha1" Hash="E3DBE2AA03847DF621591A4CAD69A5609DE5C237" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_SEMAV6MSR64_SHA256" FriendlyName="semav6msr64.sys Hash Sha256" Hash="EB71A8ECEF692E74AE356E8CB734029B233185EE5C2CCB6CC87CC6B36BEA65CF" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_SEMAV6MSR64_SHA1_PAGE" FriendlyName="semav6msr64.sys Hash Page Sha1" Hash="F3821EC0AEF270F749DF9F44FBA91AFA5C8C38E8" />
|
||||
<Deny ID="ID_DENY_SEMAV6MSR64_SHA256_PAGE" FriendlyName="semav6msr64.sys Hash Page Sha256" Hash="4F12EE563E7496E7105D67BF64AF6B436902BE4332033AF0B5A242B206372CB7" />
|
||||
<FileAttrib ID="ID_FILEATTRIB_CPUZ_DRIVER" FriendlyName="" FileName="cpuz.sys" MinimumFileVersion="0.0.0.0" MaximumFileVersion="1.0.4.3" />
|
||||
<FileAttrib ID="ID_FILEATTRIB_ELBY_DRIVER" FriendlyName="" FileName="ElbyCDIO.sys" MinimumFileVersion="0.0.0.0" MaximumFileVersion="6.0.3.2" />
|
||||
<FileAttrib ID="ID_FILEATTRIB_LIBNICM_DRIVER" FriendlyName="" FileName="libnicm.sys" MinimumFileVersion="0.0.0.0" MaximumFileVersion="3.1.12.0" />
|
||||
<FileAttrib ID="ID_FILEATTRIB_MTCBSV64" FriendlyName="mtcBSv64.sys FileAttribute" FileName="mtcBSv64.sys" MinimumFileVersion="0.0.0.0" MaximumFileVersion="21.2.0.0" />
|
||||
<FileAttrib ID="ID_FILEATTRIB_NICM_DRIVER" FriendlyName="" FileName="NICM.SYS" MinimumFileVersion="0.0.0.0" MaximumFileVersion="3.1.12.0" />
|
||||
<FileAttrib ID="ID_FILEATTRIB_NSCM_DRIVER" FriendlyName="" FileName="nscm.sys" MinimumFileVersion="0.0.0.0" MaximumFileVersion="3.1.12.0" />
|
||||
<FileAttrib ID="ID_FILEATTRIB_SANDRA_DRIVER" FriendlyName="" FileName="sandra.sys" MinimumFileVersion="0.0.0.0" MaximumFileVersion="10.12.0.0" />
|
||||
<FileAttrib ID="ID_FILEATTRIB_RTKIO64_DRIVER" FriendlyName="" FileName="rtkio64.sys " MinimumFileVersion="65535.65535.65535.65535" />
|
||||
<FileAttrib ID="ID_FILEATTRIB_RTKIOW10X64_DRIVER" FriendlyName="" FileName="rtkiow10x64.sys " MinimumFileVersion="65535.65535.65535.65535" />
|
||||
<FileAttrib ID="ID_FILEATTRIB_RTKIOW8X64_DRIVER" FriendlyName="" FileName="rtkiow8x64.sys " MinimumFileVersion="65535.65535.65535.65535" />
|
||||
<FileAttrib ID="ID_FILEATTRIB_BSMI" FriendlyName="" FileName="BSMI.sys" MinimumFileVersion="0.0.0.0" MaximumFileVersion="1.0.0.3" />
|
||||
<FileAttrib ID="ID_FILEATTRIB_BS_HWMIO64" FriendlyName="" FileName="BS_HWMIO64_W10.sys" MinimumFileVersion="0.0.0.0" MaximumFileVersion="10.0.1806.2200" />
|
||||
<FileAttrib ID="ID_FILEATTRIB_BS_I2CIO" FriendlyName="" FileName="BS_I2cIo.sys" MinimumFileVersion="0.0.0.0" MaximumFileVersion="1.1.0.0" />
|
||||
<FileAttrib ID="ID_FILEATTRIB_NTIOLIB" FriendlyName="" FileName="NTIOLib.sys" MinimumFileVersion="0.0.0.0" MaximumFileVersion="1.0.0.0" />
|
||||
<FileAttrib ID="ID_FILEATTRIB_NCHGBIOS2X64" FriendlyName="" FileName="NCHGBIOS2x64.SYS" MinimumFileVersion="0.0.0.0" MaximumFileVersion="4.2.4.0" />
|
||||
<FileAttrib ID="ID_FILEATTRIB_SEGWINDRVX64" FriendlyName="segwindrvx64.sys FileAttribute" FileName="segwindrvx64.sys" MinimumFileVersion="0.0.0.0" MaximumFileVersion="100.0.7.2" />
|
||||
</FileRules>
|
||||
<!--Signers-->
|
||||
<Signers>
|
||||
<Signer ID="ID_SIGNER_F_1" Name="VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2010 CA">
|
||||
<CertRoot Type="TBS" Value="4843A82ED3B1F2BFBEE9671960E1940C942F688D" />
|
||||
<CertPublisher Value="CPUID" />
|
||||
<FileAttribRef RuleID="ID_FILEATTRIB_CPUZ_DRIVER" />
|
||||
</Signer>
|
||||
<Signer ID="ID_SIGNER_F_2" Name="Microsoft Windows Third Party Component CA 2014">
|
||||
<CertRoot Type="TBS" Value="D8BE9E4D9074088EF818BC6F6FB64955E90378B2754155126FEEBBBD969CF0AE" />
|
||||
<CertPublisher Value="Microsoft Windows Hardware Compatibility Publisher" />
|
||||
<FileAttribRef RuleID="ID_FILEATTRIB_CPUZ_DRIVER" />
|
||||
</Signer>
|
||||
<Signer ID="ID_SIGNER_CPUZ" Name="DigiCert EV Code Signing CA (SHA2)">
|
||||
<CertRoot Type="TBS" Value="EEC58131DC11CD7F512501B15FDBC6074C603B68CA91F7162D5A042054EDB0CF" />
|
||||
<CertPublisher Value="CPUID" />
|
||||
<FileAttribRef RuleID="ID_FILEATTRIB_CPUZ_DRIVER" />
|
||||
</Signer>
|
||||
<Signer ID="ID_SIGNER_ELBY" Name="GlobalSign Primary Object Publishing CA">
|
||||
<CertRoot Type="TBS" Value="041750993D7C9E063F02DFE74699598640911AAB" />
|
||||
<CertPublisher Value="Elaborate Bytes AG" />
|
||||
<FileAttribRef RuleID="ID_FILEATTRIB_ELBY_DRIVER" />
|
||||
</Signer>
|
||||
<Signer ID="ID_SIGNER_NOVELL" Name="VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2009-2 CA">
|
||||
<CertRoot Type="TBS" Value="4CDC38C800761463749C3CBD94A12F32E49877BF" />
|
||||
<CertPublisher Value="Novell, Inc." />
|
||||
<FileAttribRef RuleID="ID_FILEATTRIB_LIBNICM_DRIVER" />
|
||||
<FileAttribRef RuleID="ID_FILEATTRIB_NICM_DRIVER" />
|
||||
<FileAttribRef RuleID="ID_FILEATTRIB_NSCM_DRIVER" />
|
||||
</Signer>
|
||||
<Signer ID="ID_SIGNER_SANDRA" Name="GeoTrust TrustCenter CodeSigning CA I">
|
||||
<CertRoot Type="TBS" Value="172F39BCA3DDA7C6D5169C96B34A5FE7E96FF0BD" />
|
||||
<CertPublisher Value="SiSoftware Ltd" />
|
||||
<FileAttribRef RuleID="ID_FILEATTRIB_SANDRA_DRIVER" />
|
||||
</Signer>
|
||||
<Signer ID="ID_SIGNER_MIMIKATZ_KERNEL" Name="GlobalSign CodeSigning CA - G2">
|
||||
<CertRoot Type="TBS" Value="589A7D4DF869395601BA7538A65AFAE8C4616385" />
|
||||
<CertPublisher Value="Benjamin Delpy" />
|
||||
</Signer>
|
||||
<Signer ID="ID_SIGNER_MIMIKATZ_USER" Name="Certum Code Signing CA SHA2">
|
||||
<CertRoot Type="TBS" Value="F7B6EEB3A567223000A61F68C53B458193557C17E5D512D2825BCB13E5FC9BE5" />
|
||||
<CertPublisher Value="Open Source Developer, Benjamin Delpy" />
|
||||
</Signer>
|
||||
<Signer ID="ID_SIGNER_SPEEDFAN" Name="VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2004 CA">
|
||||
<CertRoot Type="TBS" Value="C7FC1727F5B75A6421A1F95C73BBDB23580C48E5" />
|
||||
<CertPublisher Value="Sokno S.R.L." />
|
||||
</Signer>
|
||||
<Signer ID="ID_SIGNER_RWEVERY" Name="GlobalSign CodeSigning CA - G2">
|
||||
<CertRoot Type="TBS" Value="589A7D4DF869395601BA7538A65AFAE8C4616385" />
|
||||
<CertPublisher Value="ChongKim Chan" />
|
||||
</Signer>
|
||||
<Signer ID="ID_SIGNER_VBOX" Name="GlobalSign Primary Object Publishing CA">
|
||||
<CertRoot Type="TBS" Value="041750993D7C9E063F02DFE74699598640911AAB" />
|
||||
<CertPublisher Value="innotek GmbH" />
|
||||
</Signer>
|
||||
<Signer ID="ID_SIGNER_REALTEK" Name="DigiCert EV Code Signing CA">
|
||||
<CertRoot Type="TBS" Value="2D54C16A8F8B69CCDEA48D0603C132F547A5CF75" />
|
||||
<CertPublisher Value="Realtek Semiconductor Corp." />
|
||||
<FileAttribRef RuleID="ID_FILEATTRIB_RTKIO64_DRIVER" />
|
||||
<FileAttribRef RuleID="ID_FILEATTRIB_RTKIOW10X64_DRIVER" />
|
||||
<FileAttribRef RuleID="ID_FILEATTRIB_RTKIOW8X64_DRIVER" />
|
||||
</Signer>
|
||||
<Signer ID="ID_SIGNER_REALTEK_2" Name="DigiCert EV Code Signing CA (SHA2)">
|
||||
<CertRoot Type="TBS" Value="EEC58131DC11CD7F512501B15FDBC6074C603B68CA91F7162D5A042054EDB0CF" />
|
||||
<CertPublisher Value="Realtek Semiconductor Corp." />
|
||||
<FileAttribRef RuleID="ID_FILEATTRIB_RTKIO64_DRIVER" />
|
||||
<FileAttribRef RuleID="ID_FILEATTRIB_RTKIOW10X64_DRIVER" />
|
||||
<FileAttribRef RuleID="ID_FILEATTRIB_RTKIOW8X64_DRIVER" />
|
||||
</Signer>
|
||||
<Signer ID="ID_SIGNER_WINDOWS_3RD_PARTY_2014" Name="Microsoft Windows Third Party Component CA 2014">
|
||||
<CertRoot Type="TBS" Value="D8BE9E4D9074088EF818BC6F6FB64955E90378B2754155126FEEBBBD969CF0AE" />
|
||||
<CertPublisher Value="Microsoft Windows Hardware Compatibility Publisher" />
|
||||
<FileAttribRef RuleID="ID_FILEATTRIB_RTKIOW10X64_DRIVER" />
|
||||
<FileAttribRef RuleID="ID_FILEATTRIB_BS_HWMIO64" />
|
||||
</Signer>
|
||||
<Signer ID="ID_SIGNER_VERISIGN_2004" Name="VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2004 CA">
|
||||
<CertRoot Type="TBS" Value="C7FC1727F5B75A6421A1F95C73BBDB23580C48E5" />
|
||||
<CertPublisher Value="Mitac Technology Corporation" />
|
||||
<FileAttribRef RuleID="ID_FILEATTRIB_MTCBSV64" />
|
||||
</Signer>
|
||||
<Signer ID="ID_SIGNER_VERISIGN_2009" Name="VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2009-2 CA">
|
||||
<CertRoot Type="TBS" Value="4CDC38C800761463749C3CBD94A12F32E49877BF" />
|
||||
<CertPublisher Value="BIOSTAR MICROTECH INT'L CORP" />
|
||||
<FileAttribRef RuleID="ID_FILEATTRIB_BSMI" />
|
||||
</Signer>
|
||||
<Signer ID="ID_SIGNER_VERISIGN_BIOSTAR" Name="VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2004 CA">
|
||||
<CertRoot Type="TBS" Value="C7FC1727F5B75A6421A1F95C73BBDB23580C48E5" />
|
||||
<CertPublisher Value="BIOSTAR MICROTECH INT'L CORP" />
|
||||
<FileAttribRef RuleID="ID_FILEATTRIB_BS_I2CIO" />
|
||||
</Signer>
|
||||
<Signer ID="ID_SIGNER_GLOBALSIGN_G2_MICROSTAR" Name="GlobalSign CodeSigning CA - G2">
|
||||
<CertRoot Type="TBS" Value="589A7D4DF869395601BA7538A65AFAE8C4616385" />
|
||||
<CertPublisher Value="MICRO-STAR INTERNATIONAL CO., LTD." />
|
||||
<FileAttribRef RuleID="ID_FILEATTRIB_NTIOLIB" />
|
||||
</Signer>
|
||||
<Signer ID="ID_SIGNER_VERISIGN_TOSHIBA" Name="VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2010 CA">
|
||||
<CertRoot Type="TBS" Value="4843A82ED3B1F2BFBEE9671960E1940C942F688D" />
|
||||
<CertPublisher Value="TOSHIBA CORPORATION" />
|
||||
<FileAttribRef RuleID="ID_FILEATTRIB_NCHGBIOS2X64" />
|
||||
</Signer>
|
||||
<Signer ID="ID_SIGNER_GLOBALSIGN_MICROSTAR" Name="GlobalSign Primary Object Publishing CA">
|
||||
<CertRoot Type="TBS" Value="041750993D7C9E063F02DFE74699598640911AAB" />
|
||||
<CertPublisher Value="Micro-Star Int'l Co. Ltd." />
|
||||
<FileAttribRef RuleID="ID_FILEATTRIB_NTIOLIB" />
|
||||
</Signer>
|
||||
<Signer ID="ID_SIGNER_VERISIGN_INSYDE" Name="VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2010 CA">
|
||||
<CertRoot Type="TBS" Value="4843A82ED3B1F2BFBEE9671960E1940C942F688D" />
|
||||
<CertPublisher Value="Insyde Software Corp." />
|
||||
<FileAttribRef RuleID="ID_FILEATTRIB_SEGWINDRVX64" />
|
||||
</Signer>
|
||||
</Signers>
|
||||
<!--Driver Signing Scenarios-->
|
||||
<SigningScenarios>
|
||||
<SigningScenario Value="131" ID="ID_SIGNINGSCENARIO_DENIED_VULN_MAL_SIGNERS" FriendlyName="Signers of known vulnerable or malicious drivers">
|
||||
<ProductSigners>
|
||||
<DeniedSigners>
|
||||
<DeniedSigner SignerId="ID_SIGNER_MIMIKATZ_KERNEL" />
|
||||
<DeniedSigner SignerId="ID_SIGNER_MIMIKATZ_USER" />
|
||||
<DeniedSigner SignerId="ID_SIGNER_NOVELL" />
|
||||
<DeniedSigner SignerId="ID_SIGNER_RWEVERY" />
|
||||
<DeniedSigner SignerId="ID_SIGNER_SANDRA" />
|
||||
<DeniedSigner SignerId="ID_SIGNER_SPEEDFAN" />
|
||||
<DeniedSigner SignerId="ID_SIGNER_VBOX" />
|
||||
<DeniedSigner SignerId="ID_SIGNER_CPUZ" />
|
||||
<DeniedSigner SignerId="ID_SIGNER_ELBY" />
|
||||
<DeniedSigner SignerId="ID_SIGNER_F_1" />
|
||||
<DeniedSigner SignerId="ID_SIGNER_F_2" />
|
||||
<DeniedSigner SignerId="ID_SIGNER_REALTEK" />
|
||||
<DeniedSigner SignerId="ID_SIGNER_REALTEK_2" />
|
||||
<DeniedSigner SignerId="ID_SIGNER_VERISIGN_2004" />
|
||||
<DeniedSigner SignerId="ID_SIGNER_WINDOWS_3RD_PARTY_2014" />
|
||||
<DeniedSigner SignerId="ID_SIGNER_VERISIGN_2009" />
|
||||
<DeniedSigner SignerId="ID_SIGNER_VERISIGN_BIOSTAR" />
|
||||
<DeniedSigner SignerId="ID_SIGNER_GLOBALSIGN_G2_MICROSTAR" />
|
||||
<DeniedSigner SignerId="ID_SIGNER_VERISIGN_TOSHIBA" />
|
||||
<DeniedSigner SignerId="ID_SIGNER_GLOBALSIGN_MICROSTAR" />
|
||||
<DeniedSigner SignerId="ID_SIGNER_VERISIGN_INSYDE" />
|
||||
</DeniedSigners>
|
||||
<FileRulesRef>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_ALLOW_ALL_1"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_BANDAI_SHA1" />
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_BANDAI_SHA256" />
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_BANDAI_SHA1_PAGE" />
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_BANDAI_SHA256_PAGE" />
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_CAPCOM_SHA1" />
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_CAPCOM_SHA256" />
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_CAPCOM_SHA1_PAGE" />
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_CAPCOM_SHA256_PAGE" />
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_FIDDRV_SHA1"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_FIDDRV_SHA256"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_FIDDRV_SHA1_PAGE"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_FIDDRV_SHA256_PAGE"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_FIDDRV64_SHA1"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_FIDDRV64_SHA256"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_FIDDRV64_SHA1_PAGE"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_FIDDRV64_SHA256_PAGE"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_FIDPCIDRV_SHA1"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_FIDPCIDRV_SHA256"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_FIDPCIDRV_SHA1_PAGE"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_FIDPCIDRV_SHA256_PAGE"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_FIDPCIDRV64_SHA1"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_FIDPCIDRV64_SHA256"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_FIDPCIDRV64_SHA1_PAGE"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_FIDPCIDRV64_SHA256_PAGE"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_GDRV" />
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_GLCKIO2_SHA1"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_GLCKIO2_SHA256"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_GLCKIO2_SHA1_PAGE"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_GLCKIO2_SHA256_PAGE"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_GVCIDRV64_SHA1"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_GVCIDRV64_SHA256"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_GVCIDRV64_SHA1_PAGE"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_GVCIDRV64_SHA256_PAGE"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_WINFLASH64_SHA1"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_WINFLASH64_SHA256"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_WINFLASH64_SHA1_PAGE"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_WINFLASH64_SHA256_PAGE"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_AMIFLDRV64_SHA1"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_AMIFLDRV64_SHA256C"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_AMIFLDRV64_SHA1_PAGE"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_AMIFLDRV64_SHA256_PAGE"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_ASUPIO64_SHA1F" />
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_ASUPIO64_SHA256" />
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_ASUPIO64_SHA1_PAGE"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_ASUPIO64_SHA256_PAGE"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_BSFLASH64_SHA1"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_BSFLASH64_SHA256"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_BSFLASH64_SHA1_PAGE"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_BSFLASH64_SHA256_PAGE"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_BSHWMIO64_SHA1" />
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_BSHWMIO64_SHA256"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_BSHWMIO64_SHA1_PAGE"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_BSHWMIO64_SHA256_PAGE"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_MSIO64_SHA1"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_MSIO64_SHA256"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_MSIO64_SHA1_PAGE"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_MSIO64_SHA256_PAGE"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_PIDDRV_SHA1"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_PIDDRV_SHA256"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_PIDDRV_SHA1_PAGE"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_PIDDRV_SHA256_PAGE"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_PIDDRV64_SHA1"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_PIDDRV64_SHA256"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_PIDDRV64_SHA1_PAGE"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_PIDDRV64_SHA256_PAGE"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_SEMAV6MSR64_SHA1"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_SEMAV6MSR64_SHA256"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_SEMAV6MSR64_SHA1_PAGE"/>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_DENY_SEMAV6MSR64_SHA256_PAGE"/>
|
||||
</FileRulesRef>
|
||||
</ProductSigners>
|
||||
</SigningScenario>
|
||||
<SigningScenario Value="12" ID="ID_SIGNINGSCENARIO_WINDOWS" FriendlyName="">
|
||||
<ProductSigners>
|
||||
<FileRulesRef>
|
||||
<FileRuleRef RuleID="ID_ALLOW_ALL_2" />
|
||||
</FileRulesRef>
|
||||
</ProductSigners>
|
||||
</SigningScenario>
|
||||
</SigningScenarios>
|
||||
<UpdatePolicySigners />
|
||||
<CiSigners />
|
||||
<HvciOptions>0</HvciOptions>
|
||||
<Settings>
|
||||
<Setting Provider="PolicyInfo" Key="Information" ValueName="Name">
|
||||
<Value>
|
||||
<String>Microsoft Windows Driver Policy</String>
|
||||
</Value>
|
||||
</Setting>
|
||||
<Setting Provider="PolicyInfo" Key="Information" ValueName="Id">
|
||||
<Value>
|
||||
<String>10.0.19565.0</String>
|
||||
</Value>
|
||||
</Setting>
|
||||
</Settings>
|
||||
</SiPolicy>
|
||||
```
|
||||
<br />
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## More information
|
||||
|
||||
- [Merge Windows Defender Application Control policies](merge-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md)
|
||||
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 10/13/2017
|
||||
ms.date: 10/21/2020
|
||||
ms.reviewer:
|
||||
ms.custom: asr
|
||||
---
|
||||
@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ ms.custom: asr
|
||||
**Applies to**
|
||||
- Windows 10
|
||||
- Windows Server 2016
|
||||
- Windows Server 2019
|
||||
|
||||
This is an overview of the Windows Defender Firewall with Advanced Security (WFAS) and Internet Protocol security (IPsec) features.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -48,4 +49,3 @@ To help address your organizational network security challenges, Windows Defende
|
||||
|
||||
- **Extends the value of existing investments.** Because Windows Defender Firewall is a host-based firewall that is included with the operating system, there is no additional hardware or software required. Windows Defender Firewall is also designed to complement existing non-Microsoft network security solutions through a documented application programming interface (API).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user