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Paolo Matarazzo
2024-07-11 17:20:40 -04:00
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36
windows/deployment/TOC.yml
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@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
- name: Plan
items:
- name: Plan for Windows 11
href: /windows/whats-new/windows-11-plan?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json
href: /windows/whats-new/windows-11-plan?context=/windows/deployment/context/context
- name: Create a deployment plan
href: update/create-deployment-plan.md
- name: Define readiness criteria
@ -41,12 +41,12 @@
- name: Define your servicing strategy
href: update/plan-define-strategy.md
- name: Delivery Optimization for Windows client updates
href: do/waas-delivery-optimization.md?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json
href: do/waas-delivery-optimization.md?context=/windows/deployment/context/context
items:
- name: Using a proxy with Delivery Optimization
href: do/delivery-optimization-proxy.md?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json
href: do/delivery-optimization-proxy.md?context=/windows/deployment/context/context
- name: Delivery Optimization client-service communication
href: do/delivery-optimization-workflow.md?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json
href: do/delivery-optimization-workflow.md?context=/windows/deployment/context/context
- name: Windows 10 deployment considerations
href: planning/windows-10-deployment-considerations.md
- name: Windows 10 infrastructure requirements
@ -56,17 +56,17 @@
- name: Features removed or planned for replacement
items:
- name: Windows client features lifecycle
href: /windows/whats-new/feature-lifecycle?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json
href: /windows/whats-new/feature-lifecycle?context=/windows/deployment/context/context
- name: Deprecated features
href: /windows/whats-new/deprecated-features?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json
href: /windows/whats-new/deprecated-features?context=/windows/deployment/context/context
- name: Resources for deprecated features
href: /windows/whats-new/deprecated-features-resources?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json
href: /windows/whats-new/deprecated-features-resources?context=/windows/deployment/context/context
- name: Removed features
href: /windows/whats-new/removed-features?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json
href: /windows/whats-new/removed-features?context=/windows/deployment/context/context
- name: Prepare
items:
- name: Prepare for Windows 11
href: /windows/whats-new/windows-11-prepare?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json
href: /windows/whats-new/windows-11-prepare?context=/windows/deployment/context/context
- name: Prepare to deploy Windows client updates
href: update/prepare-deploy-windows.md
- name: Evaluate and update infrastructure
@ -74,7 +74,7 @@
- name: Update Baseline
href: update/update-baseline.md
- name: Set up Delivery Optimization for Windows client updates
href: do/waas-delivery-optimization-setup.md?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json
href: do/waas-delivery-optimization-setup.md?context=/windows/deployment/context/context
- name: Configure BranchCache for Windows client updates
href: update/waas-branchcache.md
- name: Prepare for deployment with Configuration Manager
@ -324,25 +324,25 @@
- name: Resolve Windows upgrade errors
href: upgrade/resolve-windows-upgrade-errors.md
- name: Quick fixes
href: /troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/windows-10-upgrade-quick-fixes?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json
href: /troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/windows-10-upgrade-quick-fixes?context=/windows/deployment/context/context
- name: SetupDiag
href: upgrade/setupdiag.md
- name: Troubleshooting upgrade errors
href: /troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/windows-10-upgrade-issues-troubleshooting?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json
href: /troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/windows-10-upgrade-issues-troubleshooting?context=/windows/deployment/context/context
- name: Windows error reporting
href: upgrade/windows-error-reporting.md
- name: Upgrade error codes
href: /troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/windows-10-upgrade-error-codes?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json
href: /troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/windows-10-upgrade-error-codes?context=/windows/deployment/context/context
- name: Log files
href: upgrade/log-files.md
- name: Resolution procedures
href: /troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/windows-10-upgrade-resolution-procedures?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json
href: /troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/windows-10-upgrade-resolution-procedures?context=/windows/deployment/context/context
- name: Submit Windows client upgrade errors
href: upgrade/submit-errors.md
- name: Troubleshoot Windows Update
items:
- name: How to troubleshoot Windows Update
href: /troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/windows-update-issues-troubleshooting?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json
href: /troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/windows-update-issues-troubleshooting?context=/windows/deployment/context/context
- name: Opt out of safeguard holds
href: update/safeguard-opt-out.md
- name: Determine the source of Windows Updates
@ -350,7 +350,7 @@
- name: Windows Update security
href: ./update/windows-update-security.md
- name: Common Windows Update errors
href: /troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/common-windows-update-errors?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json
href: /troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/common-windows-update-errors?context=/windows/deployment/context/context
- name: Windows Update error code reference
href: update/windows-update-error-reference.md
- name: Troubleshoot the Windows Update for Business deployment service
@ -371,13 +371,13 @@
- name: Servicing stack updates
href: update/servicing-stack-updates.md
- name: Update CSP policies
href: /windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-update?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json
href: /windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-update?context=/windows/deployment/context/context
- name: Additional Windows Update settings
href: update/waas-wu-settings.md
- name: Update other Microsoft products
href: update/update-other-microsoft-products.md
- name: Delivery Optimization reference
href: do/waas-delivery-optimization-reference.md?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json
href: do/waas-delivery-optimization-reference.md?context=/windows/deployment/context/context
- name: FoD and language packs for WSUS and Configuration Manager
href: update/fod-and-lang-packs.md
- name: Windows client in S mode

4
windows/deployment/context/context.yml Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
### YamlMime: ContextObject
brand: windows
breadcrumb_path: ../breadcrumb/toc.yml
toc_rel: ../toc.yml

7
windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/deploy/windows-autopatch-register-devices.md
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Register your devices
description: This article details how to register devices in Autopatch.
ms.date: 02/15/2024
ms.date: 07/10/2024
ms.service: windows-client
ms.subservice: itpro-updates
ms.topic: how-to
@ -112,10 +112,7 @@ The following are the possible device readiness statuses in Windows Autopatch:
## Built-in roles required for device registration
A role defines the set of permissions granted to users assigned to that role. You can use one of the following built-in roles in Windows Autopatch to register devices:
- Microsoft Entra Global Administrator
- Intune Service Administrator
A role defines the set of permissions granted to users assigned to that role. You can use the **Intune Service Administrator** role to register devices.
For more information, see [Microsoft Entra built-in roles](/azure/active-directory/roles/permissions-reference) and [Role-based access control (RBAC) with Microsoft Intune](/mem/intune/fundamentals/role-based-access-control).

4
windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-policy-health-and-remediation.md
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: policy health and remediation
description: Describes what Autopatch does it detects policies in the tenant are either missing or modified to states that affect the service
ms.date: 07/08/2024
ms.date: 07/10/2024
ms.service: windows-client
ms.subservice: itpro-updates
ms.topic: how-to
@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ Alerts are raised when deployment rings don't have the required policies and the
## Built-in roles required for remediation actions
The minimum role required to restore configurations is **Intune Service Administrator**. You can also perform these actions in the Global administrator role.
The minimum role required to restore configurations is **Intune Service Administrator**.
## Restore device configuration policy

3
windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-and-feature-update-reports-overview.md
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Windows quality and feature update reports overview
description: This article details the types of reports available and info about update device eligibility, device update health, device update trends in Windows Autopatch.
ms.date: 04/09/2024
ms.date: 07/10/2024
ms.service: windows-client
ms.subservice: itpro-updates
ms.topic: conceptual
@ -53,7 +53,6 @@ The Windows feature update report types are organized into the following focus a
Users with the following permissions can access the reports:
- Global Administrator
- Intune Service Administrator
- Global Reader
- Services Support Administrator

2
windows/security/hardware-security/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
title: Enable memory integrity
description: This article explains the steps to opt in to using memory integrity on Windows devices.
ms.topic: conceptual
ms.date: 03/26/2024
ms.date: 07/10/2024
appliesto:
- "✅ <a href=\"https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/release-health/supported-versions-windows-client\" target=\"_blank\">Windows 11</a>"
- "✅ <a href=\"https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/release-health/supported-versions-windows-client\" target=\"_blank\">Windows 10</a>"

12
windows/security/hardware-security/how-hardware-based-root-of-trust-helps-protect-windows.md
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
title: How System Guard helps protect Windows
description: Learn how System Guard reorganizes the existing Windows system integrity features under one roof.
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 01/16/2024
ms.date: 07/10/2024
ms.topic: conceptual
---
@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Also, a bug fix for UEFI code can take a long time to design, build, retest, val
### Secure Launch—the Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (DRTM)
[System Guard Secure Launch](system-guard-secure-launch-and-smm-protection.md), first introduced in Windows 10 version 1809, aims to alleviate these issues by leveraging a technology known as the Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (DRTM). DRTM lets the system freely boot into untrusted code initially, but shortly after launches the system into a trusted state by taking control of all CPUs and forcing them down a well-known and measured code path. This has the benefit of allowing untrusted early UEFI code to boot the system, but then being able to securely transition into a trusted and measured state.
[System Guard Secure Launch](system-guard-secure-launch-and-smm-protection.md), first introduced in Windows 10 version 1809, aims to alleviate these issues by using a technology known as the Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (DRTM). DRTM lets the system freely boot into untrusted code initially, but shortly after launches the system into a trusted state by taking control of all CPUs and forcing them down a well-known and measured code path. This has the benefit of allowing untrusted early UEFI code to boot the system, but then being able to securely transition into a trusted and measured state.
![System Guard Secure Launch.](images/system-guard-secure-launch.png)
@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ Secure Launch simplifies management of SRTM measurements because the launch code
### System Management Mode (SMM) protection
System Management Mode (SMM) is a special-purpose CPU mode in x86 microcontrollers that handles power management, hardware configuration, thermal monitoring, and anything else the manufacturer deems useful. Whenever one of these system operations is requested, a non-maskable interrupt (SMI) is invoked at runtime, which executes SMM code installed by the BIOS. SMM code executes in the highest privilege level and is invisible to the OS, which makes it an attractive target for malicious activity. Even if System Guard Secure Launch is used to late launch, SMM code can potentially access hypervisor memory and change the hypervisor.
System Management Mode (SMM) is a special-purpose CPU mode in x86 microcontrollers that handles power management, hardware configuration, thermal monitoring, and anything else the manufacturer deems useful. Whenever one of these system operations is requested, a nonmaskable interrupt (SMI) is invoked at runtime, which executes SMM code installed by the BIOS. SMM code executes in the highest privilege level and is invisible to the OS, which makes it an attractive target for malicious activity. Even if System Guard Secure Launch is used to late launch, SMM code can potentially access hypervisor memory and change the hypervisor.
To defend against this, two techniques are used:
@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ This feature is available for the following processors:
|AUX Policy|The required AUX policy must be as follows: <ul><li> A = TPM2_PolicyLocality (Locality 3 & Locality 4) </li><li>B = TPM2_PolicyCommandCode (TPM_CC_NV_UndefineSpecial)</li><li>authPolicy = \{A} OR {{A} AND \{B}}</li><li>authPolicy digest = 0xef, 0x9a, 0x26, 0xfc, 0x22, 0xd1, 0xae, 0x8c, 0xec, 0xff, 0x59, 0xe9, 0x48, 0x1a, 0xc1, 0xec, 0x53, 0x3d, 0xbe, 0x22, 0x8b, 0xec, 0x6d, 0x17, 0x93, 0x0f, 0x4c, 0xb2, 0xcc, 0x5b, 0x97, 0x24</li></ul>|
|TPM NV Index|Platform firmware must set up a TPM NV index for use by the OS with: <ul><li>Handle: 0x01C101C0 </li><li>Attributes: <ul><li>TPMA_NV_POLICYWRITE</li><li>TPMA_NV_PPREAD </li><li>TPMA_NV_OWNERREAD</li><li>TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD</li><li>TPMA_NV_POLICYREAD</li><li>TPMA_NV_NO_DA</li><li>TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE</li><li>TPMA_NV_POLICY_DELETE</li></ul> <li>A policy of: </li><ul><li>A = TPM2_PolicyAuthorize(MSFT_DRTM_AUTH_BLOB_SigningKey)</li><li>B = TPM2_PolicyCommandCode(TPM_CC_NV_UndefineSpaceSpecial) </li><li> authPolicy = \{A} OR {{A} AND \{B}} </li><li> Digest value of 0xcb, 0x45, 0xc8, 0x1f, 0xf3, 0x4b, 0xcf, 0x0a, 0xfb, 0x9e, 0x1a, 0x80, 0x29, 0xfa, 0x23, 0x1c, 0x87, 0x27, 0x30, 0x3c, 0x09, 0x22, 0xdc, 0xce, 0x68, 0x4b, 0xe3, 0xdb, 0x81, 0x7c, 0x20, 0xe1 </li></ul></ul> |
|Platform firmware|Platform firmware must carry all code required to execute an Intel&reg; Trusted Execution Technology secure launch: <ul><li>Intel&reg; SINIT ACM must be carried in the OEM BIOS</li><li>Platforms must ship with a production ACM signed by the correct production Intel&reg; ACM signer for the platform</li></ul>|
|Platform firmware update|System firmware is recommended to be updated via UpdateCapsule in Windows Update. |
|Platform firmware update|It's recommended to update System firmware via UpdateCapsule in Windows Update. |
### Requirements for AMD&reg; processors starting with Zen2 or later silicon
@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ This feature is available for the following processors:
|Modern/Connected Standby|Platforms must support Modern/Connected Standby.|
|TPM NV Index|Platform firmware must set up a TPM NV index for use by the OS with: <ul><li>Handle: 0x01C101C0 </li><li>Attributes: <ul><li>TPMA_NV_POLICYWRITE</li><li>TPMA_NV_PPREAD </li><li>TPMA_NV_OWNERREAD</li><li>TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD</li><li>TPMA_NV_POLICYREAD</li><li>TPMA_NV_NO_DA</li><li>TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE</li><li>TPMA_NV_POLICY_DELETE</li></ul> <li>A policy of: </li><ul><li>A = TPM2_PolicyAuthorize(MSFT_DRTM_AUTH_BLOB_SigningKey)</li><li>B = TPM2_PolicyCommandCode(TPM_CC_NV_UndefineSpaceSpecial) </li><li> authPolicy = \{A} OR {{A} AND \{B}} </li><li> Digest value of 0xcb, 0x45, 0xc8, 0x1f, 0xf3, 0x4b, 0xcf, 0x0a, 0xfb, 0x9e, 0x1a, 0x80, 0x29, 0xfa, 0x23, 0x1c, 0x87, 0x27, 0x30, 0x3c, 0x09, 0x22, 0xdc, 0xce, 0x68, 0x4b, 0xe3, 0xdb, 0x81, 0x7c, 0x20, 0xe1 </li></ul></ul> |
|Platform firmware|Platform firmware must carry all code required to execute Secure Launch: <ul><li>AMD&reg; Secure Launch platforms must ship with AMD&reg; DRTM driver devnode exposed and the AMD&reg; DRTM driver installed</li></ul><br/>Platform must have AMD&reg; Secure Processor Firmware Anti-Rollback protection enabled <br/> Platform must have AMD&reg; Memory Guard enabled.|
|Platform firmware update|System firmware is recommended to be updated via UpdateCapsule in Windows Update. |
|Platform firmware update|It's recommended to update System firmware via UpdateCapsule in Windows Update. |
### Requirements for Qualcomm&reg; processors with SD850 or later chipsets
@ -112,4 +112,4 @@ This feature is available for the following processors:
|Monitor Mode Page Tables|All Monitor Mode page tables must: <ul><li>NOT contain any mappings to EfiConventionalMemory (for example no OS/VMM owned memory) </li><li>They must NOT have execute and write permissions for the same page </li><li>Platforms must only allow Monitor Mode pages marked as executable </li><li>The memory map must report Monitor Mode as EfiReservedMemoryType</li><li>Platforms must provide mechanism to protect the Monitor Mode page tables from modification</li></ul> |
|Modern/Connected Standby|Platforms must support Modern/Connected Standby.|
|Platform firmware|Platform firmware must carry all code required to launch.|
|Platform firmware update|System firmware is recommended to be updated via UpdateCapsule in Windows Update. |
|Platform firmware update|It's recommended to update System firmware via UpdateCapsule in Windows Update. |

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windows/security/hardware-security/index.md
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Windows hardware security
description: Learn more about hardware security features support in Windows.
ms.date: 07/28/2023
ms.date: 07/10/2024
ms.topic: overview
appliesto:
---

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windows/security/hardware-security/kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt.md
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@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn how Kernel DMA Protection protects Windows devices against dr
ms.collection:
- tier1
ms.topic: conceptual
ms.date: 01/09/2024
ms.date: 07/10/2024
---
# Kernel DMA Protection
@ -20,16 +20,16 @@ Drive-by DMA attacks are attacks that occur while the owner of the system isn't
## How Windows protects against DMA drive-by attacks
Windows uses the system *Input/Output Memory Management Unit (IOMMU)* to block external peripherals from starting and performing DMA, unless the drivers for these peripherals support memory isolation (such as DMA-remapping). Peripherals with [DMA Remapping compatible drivers][LINK-1] will be automatically enumerated, started, and allowed to perform DMA to their assigned memory regions.
Windows uses the system *Input/Output Memory Management Unit (IOMMU)* to block external peripherals from starting and performing DMA, unless the drivers for these peripherals support memory isolation (such as DMA-remapping). Peripherals with [DMA Remapping compatible drivers][LINK-1] are automatically enumerated, started, and allowed to perform DMA to their assigned memory regions.
By default, peripherals with DMA Remapping incompatible drivers will be blocked from starting and performing DMA until an authorized user signs into the system or unlocks the screen. IT administrators can modify the default behavior applied to devices with DMA Remapping incompatible drivers using MDM or group policies.
By default, peripherals with DMA Remapping incompatible drivers are blocked from starting and performing DMA until an authorized user signs into the system or unlocks the screen. IT administrators can modify the default behavior applied to devices with DMA Remapping incompatible drivers using MDM or group policies.
## User experience
When Kernel DMA Protection is enabled:
- Peripherals with DMA Remapping-compatible device drivers will be automatically enumerated and started
- Peripherals with DMA Remapping-incompatible drivers will be blocked from starting if the peripheral was plugged in before an authorized user logs in, or while the screen is locked. Once the system is unlocked, the peripheral driver will be started by the OS, and the peripheral will continue to function normally until the system is rebooted, or the peripheral is unplugged. The peripheral will continue to function normally if the user locks the screen or signs out of the system.
- Peripherals with DMA Remapping-compatible device drivers are automatically enumerated and started
- Peripherals with DMA Remapping-incompatible drivers are blocked from starting if the peripheral was plugged in before an authorized user logs in, or while the screen is locked. Once the system is unlocked, the peripheral driver is started by the OS, and the peripheral continues to function normally until the system is rebooted, or the peripheral is unplugged. The peripheral will continue to function normally if the user locks the screen or signs out of the system.
[!INCLUDE [kernel-direct-memory-access-dma-protection](../../../includes/licensing/kernel-direct-memory-access-dma-protection.md)]
@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ Kernel DMA Protection isn't compatible with other BitLocker DMA attacks counterm
## Check if Kernel DMA Protection is enabled
Systems that support Kernel DMA Protection will enable the feature automatically, with no user or IT admin configuration required.
Systems that support Kernel DMA Protection enable the feature automatically, with no user or IT admin configuration required.
You can use the Windows Security settings to check if Kernel DMA Protection is enabled:
@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ You can use the Windows Security settings to check if Kernel DMA Protection is e
:::image type="content" source="images/kernel-dma-protection-security-center.png" alt-text="Screenshot of Kernel DMA protection in Windows Security." lightbox="images/kernel-dma-protection-security-center.png" border="true":::
Alternatively, you can use the System Information desktop app (`msinfo32.exe`). If the system supports Kernel DMA Protection, the **Kernel DMA Protection** value will be set to **ON**.
Alternatively, you can use the System Information desktop app (`msinfo32.exe`). If the system supports Kernel DMA Protection, the **Kernel DMA Protection** value is set to **ON**.
:::image type="content" source="images/kernel-dma-protection.png" alt-text="Screenshot of Kernel DMA protection in System Information." lightbox="images/kernel-dma-protection.png" border="true":::
@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ Use the Windows-provided drivers for the peripherals, when available. If there a
### My system's Kernel DMA Protection is off. Can DMA-remapping for a specific device be turned on?
Yes. DMA remapping for a specific device can be turned on independent from Kernel DMA Protection. For example, if the driver opts in and VT-d (Virtualization Technology for Directed I/O) is turned on, then DMA remapping will be enabled for the devices driver even if Kernel DMA Protection is turned off.
Yes. DMA remapping for a specific device can be turned on independent from Kernel DMA Protection. For example, if the driver opts in and VT-d (Virtualization Technology for Directed I/O) is turned on, then DMA remapping is enabled for the devices driver even if Kernel DMA Protection is turned off.
Kernel DMA Protection is a policy that allows or blocks devices to perform DMA, based on their remapping state and capabilities.
@ -117,5 +117,4 @@ The policy can be enabled by using:
[LINK-1]: /windows-hardware/drivers/pci/enabling-dma-remapping-for-device-drivers
[LINK-2]: /windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-dmaguard#dmaguard-policies
[LINK-3]: /windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-kernel-dma-protection
[EXT-1]: https://thunderbolttechnology.net/security/Thunderbolt%203%20and%20Security.pdf

4
windows/security/hardware-security/pluton/microsoft-pluton-security-processor.md
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
title: Microsoft Pluton security processor
description: Learn more about Microsoft Pluton security processor
ms.topic: conceptual
ms.date: 02/19/2024
ms.date: 07/10/2024
---
# Microsoft Pluton security processor
@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Microsoft Pluton is currently available on devices with Ryzen 6000 and Qualcomm
## What is Microsoft Pluton?
Designed by Microsoft and built by silicon partners, Microsoft Pluton is a secure crypto-processor built into the CPU for security at the core to ensure code integrity and the latest protection with updates delivered by Microsoft through Windows Update. Pluton protects credentials, identities, personal data and encryption keys. Information is significantly harder to be removed even if an attacker installs malware or has complete physical possession of the PC.
Designed by Microsoft and built by silicon partners, Microsoft Pluton is a secure crypto-processor built into the CPU for security at the core to ensure code integrity and the latest protection with updates delivered by Microsoft through Windows Update. Pluton protects credentials, identities, personal data, and encryption keys. Information is significantly harder to be removed even if an attacker installs malware or has complete physical possession of the PC.
Microsoft Pluton is designed to provide the functionality of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and deliver other security functionality beyond what is possible with the TPM 2.0 specification, and allows for other Pluton firmware and OS features to be delivered over time via Windows Update. For more information, see [Microsoft Pluton as TPM](pluton-as-tpm.md).

6
windows/security/hardware-security/pluton/pluton-as-tpm.md
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@ -2,12 +2,12 @@
title: Microsoft Pluton as Trusted Platform Module (TPM 2.0)
description: Learn more about Microsoft Pluton security processor as Trusted Platform Module (TPM 2.0)
ms.topic: conceptual
ms.date: 02/19/2024
ms.date: 07/10/2024
---
# Microsoft Pluton as Trusted Platform Module
Microsoft Pluton is designed to provide the functionality of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) thereby establishing the silicon root of trust. Microsoft Pluton supports the TPM 2.0 industry standard allowing customers to immediately benefit from the enhanced security in Windows features that rely on TPM including BitLocker, Windows Hello, and Windows Defender System Guard.
Microsoft Pluton is designed to provide the functionality of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) thereby establishing the silicon root of trust. Microsoft Pluton supports the TPM 2.0 industry standard allowing customers to immediately benefit from the enhanced security in Windows features that rely on TPM including BitLocker, Windows Hello, and System Guard.
As with other TPMs, credentials, encryption keys, and other sensitive information can't be easily extracted from Pluton even if an attacker installs malware or has complete physical possession of the device. Storing sensitive data like encryption keys securely within the Pluton processor, which is isolated from the rest of the system, helps ensure that emerging attack techniques such as speculative execution can't access key material.
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ To learn more about the TPM related scenarios that benefit from Pluton, see [TPM
## Microsoft Pluton as a security processor alongside discrete TPM
Microsoft Pluton can be used as a TPM, or in conjunction with a TPM. Although Pluton builds security directly into the CPU, device manufacturers may choose to use discrete TPM as the default TPM, while having Pluton available to the system as a security processor for use cases beyond the TPM.
Microsoft Pluton can be used as a TPM, or with a TPM. Although Pluton builds security directly into the CPU, device manufacturers might choose to use discrete TPM as the default TPM, while having Pluton available to the system as a security processor for use cases beyond the TPM.
Pluton is integrated within the SoC subsystem, and provides a flexible, updatable platform for running firmware that implements end-to-end security functionality authored, maintained, and updated by Microsoft.

28
windows/security/hardware-security/system-guard-secure-launch-and-smm-protection.md
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@ -1,14 +1,13 @@
---
title: System Guard Secure Launch and SMM protection
description: Explains how to configure System Guard Secure Launch and System Management Mode (SMM protection) to improve the startup security of Windows 10 devices.
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 07/31/2023
description: Explains how to configure System Guard Secure Launch and System Management Mode (SMM protection) to improve the startup security of Windows devices.
ms.date: 07/10/2024
ms.topic: conceptual
---
# System Guard Secure Launch and SMM protection
This topic explains how to configure [System Guard Secure Launch and System Management Mode (SMM) protection](how-hardware-based-root-of-trust-helps-protect-windows.md) to improve the startup security of Windows 10 and Windows 11 devices. The information below is presented from a client perspective.
This article explains how to configure [System Guard Secure Launch and System Management Mode (SMM) protection](how-hardware-based-root-of-trust-helps-protect-windows.md) to improve the startup security of Windows 10 and Windows 11 devices. The information below is presented from a client perspective.
> [!NOTE]
> System Guard Secure Launch feature requires a supported processor. For more information, see [System requirements for System Guard](how-hardware-based-root-of-trust-helps-protect-windows.md#system-requirements-for-system-guard).
@ -28,35 +27,30 @@ System Guard Secure Launch can be configured for Mobile Device Management (MDM)
### Group Policy
1. Click **Start** > type and then click **Edit group policy**.
2. Click **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **System** > **Device Guard** > **Turn On Virtualization Based Security** > **Secure Launch Configuration**.
1. Select **Start** > type and then select **Edit group policy**.
1. Select **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **System** > **Device Guard** > **Turn On Virtualization Based Security** > **Secure Launch Configuration**.
![Secure Launch Configuration.](images/secure-launch-group-policy.png)
### Windows Security
Click **Start** > **Settings** > **Update & Security** > **Windows Security** > **Open Windows Security** > **Device security** > **Core isolation** > **Firmware protection**.
Select **Start** > **Settings** > **Update & Security** > **Windows Security** > **Open Windows Security** > **Device security** > **Core isolation** > **Firmware protection**.
![Windows Security settings.](images/secure-launch-security-app.png)
### Registry
1. Open Registry editor.
2. Click **HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE** > **SYSTEM** > **CurrentControlSet** > **Control** > **DeviceGuard** > **Scenarios**.
3. Right-click **Scenarios** > **New** > **Key** and name the new key **SystemGuard**.
4. Right-click **SystemGuard** > **New** > **DWORD (32-bit) Value** and name the new DWORD **Enabled**.
5. Double-click **Enabled**, change the value to **1**, and click **OK**.
1. Select **HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE** > **SYSTEM** > **CurrentControlSet** > **Control** > **DeviceGuard** > **Scenarios**.
1. Right-click **Scenarios** > **New** > **Key** and name the new key **SystemGuard**.
1. Right-click **SystemGuard** > **New** > **DWORD (32-bit) Value** and name the new DWORD **Enabled**.
1. Double-click **Enabled**, change the value to **1**, and click **OK**.
![Secure Launch Registry.](images/secure-launch-registry.png)
## How to verify System Guard Secure Launch is configured and running
To verify that Secure Launch is running, use System Information (MSInfo32). Click **Start**, search for **System Information**, and look under **Virtualization-based Security Services Running** and **Virtualization-based Security Services Configured**.
To verify that Secure Launch is running, use System Information (MSInfo32). Select **Start**, search for **System Information**, and look under **Virtualization-based Security Services Running** and **Virtualization-based Security Services Configured**.
![Verifying Secure Launch is running in the Windows Security settings.](images/secure-launch-msinfo.png)

2
windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/backup-tpm-recovery-information-to-ad-ds.md
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
title: Back up TPM recovery information to Active Directory
description: Learn how to back up the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) recovery information to Active Directory.
ms.topic: conceptual
ms.date: 11/17/2023
ms.date: 07/10/2024
---
# Back up the TPM recovery information to AD DS

9
windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/change-the-tpm-owner-password.md
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@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
---
title: Change the TPM owner password
description: This topic for the IT professional describes how to change the password or PIN for the owner of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) that is installed on your system.
description: This article for the IT professional describes how to change the password or PIN for the owner of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) that is installed on your system.
ms.topic: conceptual
ms.date: 11/17/2023
ms.date: 07/10/2024
---
# Change the TPM owner password
@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ Without the owner password, you can still perform all the preceding actions with
Instead of changing your owner password, you can also use the following options to manage your TPM:
- **Clear the TPM** - If you want to invalidate all of the existing keys that have been created since you took ownership of the TPM, you can clear it. For important precautions for this process, and instructions for completing it, see [Clear all the keys from the TPM](initialize-and-configure-ownership-of-the-tpm.md#clear-all-the-keys-from-the-tpm).
- **Turn off the TPM** - With TPM 1.2 and Windows 10, versions 1507 and 1511, you can turn off the TPM. Turn off the TPM if you want to keep all existing keys and data intact and disable the services that are provided by the TPM. For more info, see [Turn off the TPM](initialize-and-configure-ownership-of-the-tpm.md#turn-off-the-tpm).
## Changing the TPM owner password
@ -44,7 +43,3 @@ To change to a new TPM owner password, in `TPM.msc`, select **Change Owner Passw
## Use the TPM cmdlets
You can manage the TPM using Windows PowerShell. For details, see [TPM Cmdlets in Windows PowerShell](/powershell/module/trustedplatformmodule).
## Related articles
- [Trusted Platform Module](trusted-platform-module-overview.md)

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windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm.md
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@ -2,12 +2,12 @@
title: How Windows uses the TPM
description: Learn how Windows uses the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to enhance security.
ms.topic: conceptual
ms.date: 11/17/2023
ms.date: 07/10/2024
---
# How Windows uses the Trusted Platform Module
The Windows operating system places hardware-based security deeper inside many features, maximizing platform security while increasing usability. To achieve many of these security enhancements, Windows makes extensive use of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). This article offers an overview of the TPM, describes how it works, and discusses the benefits that TPM brings to Windows and the cumulative security impact of running Windows on a device with a TPM.
The Windows operating system places hardware-based security deeper inside many features, maximizing platform security while increasing usability. To achieve many of these security enhancements, Windows makes extensive use of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). This article offers an overview of the TPM, describes how it works, and discusses the benefits that TPM brings to Windows and the cumulative security effect of running Windows on a device with a TPM.
## TPM Overview
@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is the nonprofit organization that publishes a
OEMs implement the TPM as a component in a trusted computing platform, such as a PC, tablet, or phone. Trusted computing platforms use the TPM to support privacy and security scenarios that software alone can't achieve. For example, software alone can't reliably report whether malware is present during the system startup process. The close integration between TPM and platform increases the transparency of the startup process and supports evaluating device health by enabling reliable measuring and reporting of the software that starts the device. Implementation of a TPM as part of a trusted computing platform provides a hardware root of trust-that is, it behaves in a trusted way. For example, if a key stored in a TPM has properties that disallow exporting the key, that key *truly can't leave the TPM*.
The TCG designed the TPM as a low-cost, mass-market security solution that addresses the requirements of different customer segments. There are variations in the security properties of different TPM implementations just as there are variations in customer and regulatory requirements for different sectors. In public-sector procurement, for example, some governments have clearly defined security requirements for TPMs, whereas others don't.
The TCG designed the TPM as a low-cost, mass-market security solution that addresses the requirements of different customer segments. There are variations in the security properties of different TPM implementations just as there are variations in customer and regulatory requirements for different sectors. In public-sector procurement, for example, some governments clearly define security requirements for TPMs, whereas others don't.
Certification programs for TPMs-and technology in general-continue to evolve as the speed of innovation increases. Although having a TPM is clearly better than not having a TPM, Microsoft's best advice is to determine your organization's security needs and research any regulatory requirements associated with procurement for your industry. The result is a balance between scenarios used, assurance level, cost, convenience, and availability.
@ -51,11 +51,11 @@ Smart cards are physical devices that typically store a single certificate and t
In Windows, the Virtual Smart Card feature allows the TPM to mimic a permanently inserted smart card. The TPM becomes *something the user has* but still requires a PIN. While physical smart cards limit the number of PIN attempts before locking the card and requiring a reset, a virtual smart card relies on the TPM's dictionary attack protection to prevent too many PIN guesses.
For TPM-based virtual smart cards, the TPM protects the use and storage of the certificate private key, so that it can't be copied when it is in use or stored and used elsewhere. Using a component that is part of the system rather than a separate physical smart card, can reduce total cost of ownership. The *lost card* or *card left at home* scenarios are not applicable, and the benefits of smart card-based multifactor authentication is preserved. For users, virtual smart cards are simple to use, requiring only a PIN to unlock. Virtual smart cards support the same scenarios that physical smart cards support, including signing in to Windows or authenticating for resource access.
For TPM-based virtual smart cards, the TPM protects the use and storage of the certificate private key, so that it can't be copied when it is in use or stored and used elsewhere. Using a component that is part of the system rather than a separate physical smart card, can reduce total cost of ownership. The *lost card* or *card left at home* scenarios aren't applicable, and the benefits of smart card-based multifactor authentication is preserved. For users, virtual smart cards are simple to use, requiring only a PIN to unlock. Virtual smart cards support the same scenarios that physical smart cards support, including signing in to Windows or authenticating for resource access.
## Windows Hello for Business
Windows Hello for Business provides authentication methods intended to replace passwords, which can be difficult to remember and easily compromised. In addition, username/password solutions for authentication often reuse the same credential combinations on multiple devices and services. If those credentials are compromised, they are compromised in multiple places. Windows Hello for Business combines the information provisioned on each device (i.e., the cryptographic key) with additional information to authenticate users. On a system that has a TPM, the TPM can protect the key. If a system does not have a TPM, software-based techniques protect the key. The additional information the user supplies can be a PIN value or, if the system has the necessary hardware, biometric information, such as fingerprint or facial recognition. To protect privacy, the biometric information is used only on the provisioned device to access the provisioned key: it is not shared across devices.
Windows Hello for Business provides authentication methods intended to replace passwords, which can be difficult to remember and easily compromised. In addition, username/password solutions for authentication often reuse the same credential combinations on multiple devices and services. If those credentials are compromised, they're compromised in multiple places. Windows Hello for Business combines the information provisioned on each device (that is, the cryptographic key) with additional information to authenticate users. On a system that has a TPM, the TPM can protect the key. If a system doesn't have a TPM, software-based techniques protect the key. The additional information the user supplies can be a PIN value or, if the system has the necessary hardware, biometric information, such as fingerprint or facial recognition. To protect privacy, the biometric information is used only on the provisioned device to access the provisioned key: it isn't shared across devices.
The adoption of new authentication technology requires that identity providers and organizations deploy and use that technology. Windows Hello for Business lets users authenticate with their existing Microsoft account, an Active Directory account, a Microsoft Entra account, or even non-Microsoft Identity Provider Services or Relying Party Services that support [Fast ID Online V2.0 authentication](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkId=533889).
@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ Identity providers have flexibility in how they provision credentials on client
- **Endorsement key**. The TPM manufacturer can create a special key in the TPM called an endorsement key. An endorsement key certificate, signed by the manufacturer, says that the endorsement key is present in a TPM that the manufacturer made. Solutions can use the certificate with the TPM containing the endorsement key to confirm a scenario really involves a TPM from a specific TPM manufacturer (instead of malware acting like a TPM).
- **Attestation identity key**. To protect privacy, most TPM scenarios do not directly use an actual endorsement key. Instead, they use attestation identity keys, and an identity certificate authority (CA) uses the endorsement key and its certificate to prove that one or more attestation identity keys actually exist in a real TPM. The identity CA issues attestation identity key certificates. More than one identity CA will generally see the same endorsement key certificate that can uniquely identify the TPM, but any number of attestation identity key certificates can be created to limit the information shared in other scenarios.
- **Attestation identity key**. To protect privacy, most TPM scenarios don't directly use an actual endorsement key. Instead, they use attestation identity keys, and an identity certificate authority (CA) uses the endorsement key and its certificate to prove that one or more attestation identity keys actually exist in a real TPM. The identity CA issues attestation identity key certificates. More than one identity CA will generally see the same endorsement key certificate that can uniquely identify the TPM, but any number of attestation identity key certificates can be created to limit the information shared in other scenarios.
:::image type="content" alt-text="TPM Capabilities." source="images/tpm-capabilities.png" lightbox="images/tpm-capabilities.png":::
*Figure 1: TPM Cryptographic Key Management*
@ -72,15 +72,15 @@ For Windows Hello for Business, Microsoft can fill the role of the identity CA.
## BitLocker Drive Encryption
BitLocker provides full-volume encryption to protect data at rest. The most common device configuration splits the hard drive into several volumes. The operating system and user data reside on one volume that holds confidential information, and other volumes hold public information such as boot components, system information and recovery tools. (These other volumes are used infrequently enough that they do not need to be visible to users.) Without more protections in place, if the volume containing the operating system and user data is not encrypted, someone can boot another operating system and easily bypass the intended operating system's enforcement of file permissions to read any user data.
BitLocker provides full-volume encryption to protect data at rest. The most common device configuration splits the hard drive into several volumes. The operating system and user data reside on one volume that holds confidential information, and other volumes hold public information such as boot components, system information and recovery tools. (These other volumes are used infrequently enough that they don't need to be visible to users.) Without more protections in place, if the volume containing the operating system and user data isn't encrypted, someone can boot another operating system and easily bypass the intended operating system's enforcement of file permissions to read any user data.
In the most common configuration, BitLocker encrypts the operating system volume so that if the computer or hard disk is lost or stolen when powered off, the data on the volume remains confidential. When the computer is turned on, starts normally, and proceeds to the Windows logon prompt, the only path forward is for the user to log on with his or her credentials, allowing the operating system to enforce its normal file permissions. If something about the boot process changes, however-for example, a different operating system is booted from a USB device-the operating system volume and user data can't be read and are not accessible. The TPM and system firmware collaborate to record measurements of how the system started, including loaded software and configuration details such as whether boot occurred from the hard drive or a USB device. BitLocker relies on the TPM to allow the use of a key only when startup occurs in an expected way. The system firmware and TPM are carefully designed to work together to provide the following capabilities:
In the most common configuration, BitLocker encrypts the operating system volume so that if the computer or hard disk is lost or stolen when powered off, the data on the volume remains confidential. When the computer is turned on, starts normally, and proceeds to the Windows sign-in prompt, the only path forward is for the user to sign in with their credentials, allowing the operating system to enforce its normal file permissions. If something about the boot process changes, however-for example, a different operating system is booted from a USB device-the operating system volume and user data can't be read and aren't accessible. The TPM and system firmware collaborate to record measurements of how the system started, including loaded software and configuration details such as whether boot occurred from the hard drive or a USB device. BitLocker relies on the TPM to allow the use of a key only when startup occurs in an expected way. The system firmware and TPM are carefully designed to work together to provide the following capabilities:
- **Hardware root of trust for measurement**. A TPM allows software to send it commands that record measurements of software or configuration information. This information can be calculated using a hash algorithm that essentially transforms a lot of data into a small, statistically unique hash value. The system firmware has a component called the Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM) that is implicitly trusted. The CRTM unconditionally hashes the next software component and records the measurement value by sending a command to the TPM. Successive components, whether system firmware or operating system loaders, continue the process by measuring any software components they load before running them. Because each component's measurement is sent to the TPM before it runs, a component can't erase its measurement from the TPM. (However, measurements are erased when the system is restarted.) The result is that at each step of the system startup process, the TPM holds measurements of boot software and configuration information. Any changes in boot software or configuration yield different TPM measurements at that step and later steps. Because the system firmware unconditionally starts the measurement chain, it provides a hardware-based root of trust for the TPM measurements. At some point in the startup process, the value of recording all loaded software and configuration information diminishes and the chain of measurements stops. The TPM allows for the creation of keys that can be used only when the platform configuration registers that hold the measurements have specific values.
- **Key used only when boot measurements are accurate**. BitLocker creates a key in the TPM that can be used only when the boot measurements match an expected value. The expected value is calculated for the step in the startup process when Windows Boot Manager runs from the operating system volume on the system hard drive. Windows Boot Manager, which is stored unencrypted on the boot volume, needs to use the TPM key so that it can decrypt data read into memory from the operating system volume and startup can proceed using the encrypted operating system volume. If a different operating system is booted or the configuration is changed, the measurement values in the TPM will be different, the TPM will not let Windows Boot Manager use the key, and the startup process can't proceed normally because the data on the operating system can't be decrypted. If someone tries to boot the system with a different operating system or a different device, the software or configuration measurements in the TPM will be wrong and the TPM will not allow use of the key needed to decrypt the operating system volume. As a failsafe, if measurement values change unexpectedly, the user can always use the BitLocker recovery key to access volume data. Organizations can configure BitLocker to store the recovery key-in Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS).
- **Key used only when boot measurements are accurate**. BitLocker creates a key in the TPM that can be used only when the boot measurements match an expected value. The expected value is calculated for the step in the startup process when Windows Boot Manager runs from the operating system volume on the system hard drive. Windows Boot Manager, which is stored unencrypted on the boot volume, needs to use the TPM key so that it can decrypt data read into memory from the operating system volume and startup can proceed using the encrypted operating system volume. If a different operating system is booted or the configuration is changed, the measurement values in the TPM will be different, the TPM won't let Windows Boot Manager use the key, and the startup process can't proceed normally because the data on the operating system can't be decrypted. If someone tries to boot the system with a different operating system or a different device, the software or configuration measurements in the TPM will be wrong and the TPM won't allow use of the key needed to decrypt the operating system volume. As a failsafe, if measurement values change unexpectedly, the user can always use the BitLocker recovery key to access volume data. Organizations can configure BitLocker to store the recovery key-in Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS).
Device hardware characteristics are important to BitLocker and its ability to protect data. One consideration is whether the device provides attack vectors when the system is at the logon screen. For example, if the Windows device has a port that allows direct memory access so that someone can plug in hardware and read memory, an attacker can read the operating system volume's decryption key from memory while at the Windows logon screen. To mitigate this risk, organizations can configure BitLocker so that the TPM key requires both the correct software measurements and an authorization value. The system startup process stops at Windows Boot Manager, and the user is prompted to enter the authorization value for the TPM key or insert a USB device with the value. This process stops BitLocker from automatically loading the key into memory where it might be vulnerable, but has a less desirable user experience.
Device hardware characteristics are important to BitLocker and its ability to protect data. One consideration is whether the device provides attack vectors when the system is at the sign-in screen. For example, if the Windows device has a port that allows direct memory access so that someone can plug in hardware and read memory, an attacker can read the operating system volume's decryption key from memory while at the Windows sign-in screen. To mitigate this risk, organizations can configure BitLocker so that the TPM key requires both the correct software measurements and an authorization value. The system startup process stops at Windows Boot Manager, and the user is prompted to enter the authorization value for the TPM key or insert a USB device with the value. This process stops BitLocker from automatically loading the key into memory where it might be vulnerable, but has a less desirable user experience.
Newer hardware and Windows work better together to disable direct memory access through ports and reduce attack vectors. The result is that organizations can deploy more systems without requiring users to enter additional authorization information during the startup process. The right hardware allows BitLocker to be used with the "TPM-only" configuration giving users a single sign-on experience without having to enter a PIN or USB key during boot.
@ -92,17 +92,17 @@ For software measurements, Device Encryption relies on measurements of the autho
## Measured Boot
Windows 8 introduced Measured Boot as a way for the operating system to record the chain of measurements of software components and configuration information in the TPM through the initialization of the Windows operating system. In previous Windows versions, the measurement chain stopped at the Windows Boot Manager component itself, and the measurements in the TPM were not helpful for understanding the starting state of Windows.
Windows 8 introduced Measured Boot as a way for the operating system to record the chain of measurements of software components and configuration information in the TPM through the initialization of the Windows operating system. In previous Windows versions, the measurement chain stopped at the Windows Boot Manager component itself, and the measurements in the TPM weren't helpful for understanding the starting state of Windows.
The Windows boot process happens in stages and often involves non-Microsoft drivers to communicate with vendor-specific hardware or implement antimalware solutions. For software, Measured Boot records measurements of the Windows kernel, Early-Launch Anti-Malware drivers, and boot drivers in the TPM. For configuration settings, Measured Boot records security-relevant information such as signature data that antimalware drivers use and configuration data about Windows security features (e.g., whether BitLocker is on or off).
The Windows boot process happens in stages and often involves non-Microsoft drivers to communicate with vendor-specific hardware or implement anti-malware solutions. For software, Measured Boot records measurements of the Windows kernel, Early-Launch anti-malware drivers, and boot drivers in the TPM. For configuration settings, Measured Boot records security-relevant information such as signature data that anti-malware drivers use and configuration data about Windows security features (for example, whether BitLocker is on or off).
Measured Boot ensures that TPM measurements fully reflect the starting state of Windows software and configuration settings. If security settings and other protections are set up correctly, they can be trusted to maintain the security of the running operating system thereafter. Other scenarios can use the operating system's starting state to determine whether the running operating system should be trusted.
TPM measurements are designed to avoid recording any privacy-sensitive information as a measurement. As an additional privacy protection, Measured Boot stops the measurement chain at the initial starting state of Windows. Therefore, the set of measurements does not include details about which applications are in use or how Windows is being used. Measurement information can be shared with external entities to show that the device is enforcing adequate security policies and did not start with malware.
TPM measurements are designed to avoid recording any privacy-sensitive information as a measurement. As an additional privacy protection, Measured Boot stops the measurement chain at the initial starting state of Windows. Therefore, the set of measurements doesn't include details about which applications are in use or how Windows is being used. Measurement information can be shared with external entities to show that the device is enforcing adequate security policies and didn't start with malware.
The TPM provides the following way for scenarios to use the measurements recorded in the TPM during boot:
- **Remote Attestation**. Using an attestation identity key, the TPM can generate and cryptographically sign a statement (or*quote*) of the current measurements in the TPM. Windows can create unique attestation identity keys for various scenarios to prevent separate evaluators from collaborating to track the same device. Additional information in the quote is cryptographically scrambled to limit information sharing and better protect privacy. By sending the quote to a remote entity, a device can attest which software and configuration settings were used to boot the device and initialize the operating system. An attestation identity key certificate can provide further assurance that the quote is coming from a real TPM. Remote attestation is the process of recording measurements in the TPM, generating a quote, and sending the quote information to another system that evaluates the measurements to establish trust in a device. Figure 2 illustrates this process.
- **Remote Attestation**. Using an attestation identity key, the TPM can generate and cryptographically sign a statement (or *quote*) of the current measurements in the TPM. Windows can create unique attestation identity keys for various scenarios to prevent separate evaluators from collaborating to track the same device. Additional information in the quote is cryptographically scrambled to limit information sharing and better protect privacy. By sending the quote to a remote entity, a device can attest which software and configuration settings were used to boot the device and initialize the operating system. An attestation identity key certificate can provide further assurance that the quote is coming from a real TPM. Remote attestation is the process of recording measurements in the TPM, generating a quote, and sending the quote information to another system that evaluates the measurements to establish trust in a device. Figure 2 illustrates this process.
When new security features are added to Windows, Measured Boot adds security-relevant configuration information to the measurements recorded in the TPM. Measured Boot enables remote attestation scenarios that reflect the system firmware and the Windows initialization state.
@ -111,24 +111,22 @@ When new security features are added to Windows, Measured Boot adds security-rel
## Health Attestation
Some Windows improvements help security solutions implement remote attestation scenarios. Microsoft provides a Health Attestation service, which can create attestation identity key certificates for TPMs from different manufacturers as well as parse measured boot information to extract simple security assertions, such as whether BitLocker is on or off. The simple security assertions can be used to evaluate device health.
Some Windows improvements help security solutions implement remote attestation scenarios. Microsoft provides a Health Attestation service, which can create attestation identity key certificates for TPMs from different manufacturers and parse measured boot information to extract simple security assertions, such as whether BitLocker is on or off. The simple security assertions can be used to evaluate device health.
Mobile device management (MDM) solutions can receive simple security assertions from the Microsoft Health Attestation service for a client without having to deal with the complexity of the quote or the detailed TPM measurements. MDM solutions can act on the security information by quarantining unhealthy devices or blocking access to cloud services such as Microsoft Office 365.
## Credential Guard
Credential Guard is a new feature in Windows that helps protect Windows credentials in organizations that have deployed AD DS. Historically, a user's credentials (such as a logon password) were hashed to generate an authorization token. The user employed the token to access resources that he or she was permitted to use. One weakness of the token model is that malware that had access to the operating system kernel could look through the computer's memory and harvest all the access tokens currently in use. The attacker could then use harvested tokens to log on to other machines and collect more credentials. This kind of attack is called a "pass the hash" attack, a malware technique that infects one machine to infect many machines across an organization.
Credential Guard is a new feature in Windows that helps protect Windows credentials in organizations that have deployed AD DS. Historically, a user's credentials (such as a sign-in password) were hashed to generate an authorization token. The user employed the token to access resources that they were permitted to use. One weakness of the token model is that malware that had access to the operating system kernel could look through the computer's memory and harvest all the access tokens currently in use. The attacker could then use harvested tokens to sign in to other machines and collect more credentials. This kind of attack is called a "pass the hash" attack, a malware technique that infects one machine to infect many machines across an organization.
Similar to the way Microsoft Hyper-V keeps virtual machines (VMs) separate from one another, Credential Guard uses virtualization to isolate the process that hashes credentials in a memory area that the operating system kernel can't access. This isolated memory area is initialized and protected during the boot process so that components in the larger operating system environment can't tamper with it. Credential Guard uses the TPM to protect its keys with TPM measurements, so they are accessible only during the boot process step when the separate region is initialized; they are not available for the normal operating system kernel. The local security authority code in the Windows kernel interacts with the isolated memory area by passing in credentials and receiving single-use authorization tokens in return.
Similar to the way Microsoft Hyper-V keeps virtual machines (VMs) separate from one another, Credential Guard uses virtualization to isolate the process that hashes credentials in a memory area that the operating system kernel can't access. This isolated memory area is initialized and protected during the boot process so that components in the larger operating system environment can't tamper with it. Credential Guard uses the TPM to protect its keys with TPM measurements, so they're accessible only during the boot process step when the separate region is initialized; they aren't available for the normal operating system kernel. The local security authority code in the Windows kernel interacts with the isolated memory area by passing in credentials and receiving single-use authorization tokens in return.
The resulting solution provides defense in depth, because even if malware runs in the operating system kernel, it can't access the secrets inside the isolated memory area that actually generates authorization tokens. The solution does not solve the problem of key loggers because the passwords such loggers capture actually pass through the normal Windows kernel, but when combined with other solutions, such as smart cards for authentication, Credential Guard greatly enhances the protection of credentials in Windows.
The resulting solution provides defense in depth, because even if malware runs in the operating system kernel, it can't access the secrets inside the isolated memory area that actually generates authorization tokens. The solution doesn't solve the problem of key loggers because the passwords such loggers capture actually pass through the normal Windows kernel, but when combined with other solutions, such as smart cards for authentication, Credential Guard greatly enhances the protection of credentials in Windows.
## Conclusion
The TPM adds hardware-based security benefits to Windows. When installed on hardware that includes a TPM, Window delivers remarkably improved security benefits. The following table summarizes the key benefits of the TPM's major features.
<br/>
| Feature | Benefits when used on a system with a TPM |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Platform Crypto Provider | - If the machine is compromised, the private key associated with the certificate can't be copied off the device.<br>- The TPM's dictionary attack mechanism protects PIN values to use a certificate. |
@ -138,8 +136,6 @@ The TPM adds hardware-based security benefits to Windows. When installed on hard
| Device Encryption | With a Microsoft account and the right hardware, consumers' devices seamlessly benefit from data-at-rest protection. |
| Measured Boot | A hardware root of trust contains boot measurements that help detect malware during remote attestation. |
| Health Attestation | MDM solutions can easily perform remote attestation and evaluate client health before granting access to resources or cloud services such as Office 365. |
| Credential Guard | Defense in depth increases so that even if malware has administrative rights on one machine, it is significantly more difficult to compromise additional machines in an organization. |
| Credential Guard | Defense in depth increases so that even if malware has administrative rights on one machine, it's significantly more difficult to compromise additional machines in an organization. |
<br />
Although some of the aforementioned features have additional hardware requirements (e.g., virtualization support), the TPM is a cornerstone of Windows security. Microsoft and other industry stakeholders continue to improve the global standards associated with TPM and find more and more applications that use it to provide tangible benefits to customers. Microsoft has included support for most TPM features in its version of Windows for the Internet of Things (IoT) called [Windows IoT Core](/windows/iot-core/windows-iot-core). IoT devices that might be deployed in insecure physical locations and connected to cloud services like [Azure IoT Hub](https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/services/iot-hub/) for management can use the TPM in innovative ways to address their emerging security requirements.
Although some of the aforementioned features have more hardware requirements (for example, virtualization support), the TPM is a cornerstone of Windows security. Microsoft and other industry stakeholders continue to improve the global standards associated with TPM and find more applications that use it to provide tangible benefits to customers. Microsoft has included support for most TPM features in its version of Windows for the Internet of Things (IoT) called [Windows IoT Core](/windows/iot-core/windows-iot-core). IoT devices that might be deployed in insecure physical locations and connected to cloud services like [Azure IoT Hub](https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/services/iot-hub/) for management can use the TPM in innovative ways to address their emerging security requirements.

33
windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/initialize-and-configure-ownership-of-the-tpm.md
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
title: Troubleshoot the TPM
description: Learn how to view and troubleshoot the Trusted Platform Module (TPM).
ms.topic: conceptual
ms.date: 11/17/2023
ms.date: 07/10/2024
ms.collection:
- tier1
---
@ -13,9 +13,6 @@ This article provides information how to troubleshoot the Trusted Platform Modul
- [Troubleshoot TPM initialization](#tpm-initialization)
- [Clear all the keys from the TPM](#clear-all-the-keys-from-the-tpm)
With TPM 1.2 and Windows 11, you can also take the following actions:
- [Turn on or turn off the TPM](#turn-on-or-turn-off-the-tpm)
For information about the TPM cmdlets, see [TPM Cmdlets in Windows PowerShell](/powershell/module/trustedplatformmodule/?view=win10-ps&preserve-view=true).
@ -28,17 +25,17 @@ Windows automatically initializes and takes ownership of the TPM. There's no nee
If you find that Windows isn't able to initialize the TPM automatically, review the following information:
- You can try clearing the TPM to the factory default values, allowing Windows to reinitialize it. For important precautions for this process, and instructions for completing it, see [Clear all the keys from the TPM](#clear-all-the-keys-from-the-tpm)
- If the TPM is a TPM 2.0 and isn't detected by Windows, verify that your computer hardware contains a Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) that is Trusted Computing Group-compliant. Also, ensure that in the UEFI settings, the TPM hasn't been disabled or hidden from the operating system
- If you have TPM 1.2 with Windows 11, the TPM might be turned off, and need to be turned back on, as described in [Turn on the TPM](#turn-on-the-tpm). When it's turned back on, Windows will reinitialize it
- If you're attempting to set up BitLocker with the TPM, check which TPM driver is installed on the computer. We recommend always using one of the TPM drivers that is provided by Microsoft and is protected with BitLocker. If a non-Microsoft TPM driver is installed, it may prevent the default TPM driver from loading and cause BitLocker to report that a TPM isn't present on the computer. If you have a non-Microsoft driver installed, remove it, and then allow the operating system to initialize the TPM
- You can try clearing the TPM to the factory default values, allowing Windows to reinitialize it. For important precautions for this process, and instructions for completing it, see [Clear all the keys from the TPM](#clear-all-the-keys-from-the-tpm).
- If the TPM is a TPM 2.0 and isn't detected by Windows, verify that your computer hardware contains a Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) that is Trusted Computing Group-compliant. Also, ensure that in the UEFI settings, the TPM hasn't been disabled or hidden from the operating system.
- If you have TPM 1.2 with Windows 11, the TPM might be turned off, and need to be turned back on, as described in [Turn on the TPM](#turn-on-the-tpm). When it's turned back on, Windows reinitializes it.
- If you're attempting to set up BitLocker with the TPM, check which TPM driver is installed on the computer. We recommend always using one of the TPM drivers that is provided by Microsoft and is protected with BitLocker. If a non-Microsoft TPM driver is installed, it may prevent the default TPM driver from loading and cause BitLocker to report that a TPM isn't present on the computer. If you have a non-Microsoft driver installed, remove it, and then allow the operating system to initialize the TPM.
### Network connection issues for domain-joined Windows 11 devices
If you have Windows 11, the initialization of the TPM can't complete when your computer has network connection issues and both of the following conditions exist:
- An administrator has configured your computer to require that TPM recovery information be saved in Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS). This requirement can be configured through group policy
- A domain controller can't be reached. This scenario may occur on a device that is currently disconnected from the internal network, separated from the domain by a firewall, or experiencing a network component failure (such as an unplugged cable or a faulty network adapter)
- An administrator has configured your computer to require that TPM recovery information be saved in Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS). This requirement can be configured through group policy.
- A domain controller can't be reached. This scenario may occur on a device that is currently disconnected from the internal network, separated from the domain by a firewall, or experiencing a network component failure (such as an unplugged cable or a faulty network adapter).
If these issues occur, an error message appears, and you can't complete the initialization process. To avoid the issue, allow Windows to initialize the TPM while you're connected to the corporate network, and you can contact a domain controller.
@ -46,7 +43,7 @@ If these issues occur, an error message appears, and you can't complete the init
Some systems may have multiple TPMs and the active TPM may be toggled in UEFI. Windows doesn't support this configuration. If you switch TPMs, Windows might not properly detect or interact with the new TPM. If you plan to switch TPMs, you should toggle to the new TPM, clear it, and reinstall Windows. For more information, see [Clear all the keys from the TPM](#clear-all-the-keys-from-the-tpm).
For example, toggling TPMs will cause BitLocker to enter recovery mode. We strongly recommend that, on systems with two TPMs, one TPM is selected to be used and the selection isn't changed.
For example, toggling TPMs cause BitLocker to enter recovery mode. We strongly recommend that, on systems with two TPMs, one TPM is selected for use and the selection isn't changed.
## Clear all the keys from the TPM
@ -61,11 +58,11 @@ Clearing the TPM resets it to an unowned state. After you clear the TPM, the Win
Clearing the TPM can result in data loss. To protect against such loss, review the following precautions:
- Clearing the TPM causes you to lose all created keys associated with the TPM, and data protected by those keys, such as a virtual smart card or a sign-in PIN. Make sure that you have a backup and recovery method for any data that is protected or encrypted by the TPM
- Don't clear the TPM on a device you don't own, such as a work or school PC, without being instructed to do so by your IT administrator
- If you want to temporarily suspend TPM operations on Windows 11, you can turn off the TPM. For more information, see [Turn off the TPM](#turn-off-the-tpm)
- Always use functionality in the operating system (such as TPM.msc) to the clear the TPM. Don't clear the TPM directly from UEFI
- Because your TPM security hardware is a physical part of your computer, before clearing the TPM, you might want to read the manuals or instructions that came with your computer, or search the manufacturer's website
- Clearing the TPM causes you to lose all created keys associated with the TPM, and data protected by those keys, such as a virtual smart card or a sign-in PIN. Make sure that you have a backup and recovery method for any data that is protected or encrypted by the TPM.
- Don't clear the TPM on a device you don't own, such as a work or school PC, without being instructed to do so by your IT administrator.
- If you want to temporarily suspend TPM operations on Windows 11, you can turn off the TPM. For more information, see [Turn off the TPM](#turn-off-the-tpm).
- Always use functionality in the operating system (such as TPM.msc) to clear the TPM. Don't clear the TPM directly from UEFI.
- Because your TPM security hardware is a physical part of your computer, before clearing the TPM, you might want to read the manuals or instructions that came with your computer, or search the manufacturer's website.
Membership in the local Administrators group, or equivalent, is the minimum required to complete this procedure.
@ -76,7 +73,7 @@ Membership in the local Administrators group, or equivalent, is the minimum requ
1. Select **Security processor details**.
1. Select **Security processor troubleshooting**.
1. Select **Clear TPM**.
- You'll be prompted to restart the computer. During the restart, you might be prompted by the UEFI to press a button to confirm that you wish to clear the TPM.
- You'll be prompted to restart the computer. During the restart, you might be prompted to press a button to confirm that you wish to clear the TPM.
- After the device restarts, your TPM will be automatically prepared for use by Windows.
## Turn on or turn off the TPM
@ -100,7 +97,7 @@ If you want to stop using the services that are provided by the TPM, you can use
1. Open the TPM MMC (`tpm.msc`).
1. In the **Action** pane, select **Turn TPM Off** to display the **Turn off the TPM security hardware** page.
1. In the **Turn off the TPM security hardware** dialog box, select a method to enter your owner password and turning off the TPM:
- If you saved your TPM owner password on a removable storage device, insert it, and then select **I have the owner password file**. In the **Select backup file with the TPM owner password** dialog box, select **Browse** to locate the *.tpm* file that is saved on your removable storage device, select **Open**, and then select **Turn TPM Off**.
- If you saved your TPM owner password on a removable storage device, insert it, and then select **I have the owner password file**. In the **Select backup file with the TPM owner password** dialog box, select **Browse** to locate the `.tpm` file that is saved on your removable storage device, select **Open**, and then select **Turn TPM Off**.
- If you don't have the removable storage device with your saved TPM owner password, select **I want to enter the password**. In the **Type your TPM owner password** dialog box, type your password (including hyphens), and then select **Turn TPM Off**.
- If you didn't save your TPM owner password or no longer know it, select **I do not have the TPM owner password**, and follow the instructions that are provided in the dialog box and subsequent UEFI screens to turn off the TPM without entering the password.

16
windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/manage-tpm-commands.md
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@ -2,14 +2,14 @@
title: Manage TPM commands
description: This article for the IT professional describes how to manage which Trusted Platform Module (TPM) commands are available to domain users and to local users.
ms.topic: conceptual
ms.date: 11/17/2023
ms.date: 07/10/2024
---
# Manage TPM commands
This article for the IT professional describes how to manage which Trusted Platform Module (TPM) commands are available to domain users and to local users.
After a computer user takes ownership of the TPM, the TPM owner can limit which TPM commands can be run by creating a list of blocked TPM commands. The list can be created and applied to all computers in a domain by using Group Policy, or a list can be created for individual computers by using the TPM MMC. Because some hardware vendors might provide additional commands or the Trusted Computing Group may decide to add commands in the future, the TPM MMC also supports the ability to block new commands.
After a computer user takes ownership of the TPM, the TPM owner can limit which TPM commands can be run by creating a list of blocked TPM commands. The list can be created and applied to all computers in a domain by using Group Policy, or a list can be created for individual computers by using the TPM MMC. Because some hardware vendors might provide more commands or the Trusted Computing Group might decide to add commands in the future, the TPM MMC also supports the ability to block new commands.
The following procedures describe how to manage the TPM command lists. You must be a member of the local Administrators group.
@ -33,34 +33,24 @@ The following procedures describe how to manage the TPM command lists. You must
> [!NOTE]
> For a list of commands, see links in the [TPM Specification](https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/tpm-main-specification/).
1. After you have added numbers for each command that you want to block, select **OK** twice.
1. After adding numbers for each command that you want to block, select **OK** twice.
1. Close the Local Group Policy Editor.
## Block or allow TPM commands by using the TPM MMC
1. Open the TPM MMC (`tpm.msc`). If the **User Account Control** dialog box appears, confirm that the action it displays is what you want, and then select **Yes**.
1. In the console tree, select **Command Management**. A list of TPM commands is displayed.
1. In the list, select a command that you want to block or allow.
1. Under **Actions**, select **Block Selected Command** or **Allow Selected Command** as needed. If **Allow Selected Command** is unavailable, that command is currently blocked by Group Policy.
## Block new commands
1. Open the TPM MMC (`tpm.msc`). If the **User Account Control** dialog box appears, confirm that the action it displays is what you want, and then select **Yes**.
1. In the console tree, select **Command Management**. A list of TPM commands is displayed.
1. In the **Action** pane, select **Block New Command**. The **Block New Command** dialog box is displayed.
1. In the **Command Number** text box, type the number of the new command that you want to block, and then select **OK**. The command number you entered is added to the blocked list.
## Use the TPM cmdlets
You can manage the TPM using Windows PowerShell. For details, see [TrustedPlatformModule PowerShell cmdlets](/powershell/module/trustedplatformmodule/?view=win10-ps&preserve-view=true).
## Related articles
- [Trusted Platform Module](trusted-platform-module-overview.md)

10
windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/manage-tpm-lockout.md
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
title: Manage TPM lockout
description: This article for the IT professional describes how to manage the lockout feature for the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) in Windows.
ms.topic: conceptual
ms.date: 11/17/2023
ms.date: 07/10/2024
---
# Manage TPM lockout
@ -21,11 +21,11 @@ In some cases, encryption keys are protected by a TPM by requiring a valid autho
TPM 2.0 devices have standardized lockout behavior which Windows configures. TPM 2.0 devices have a maximum count threshold and a healing time. Windows configures the maximum count to be 32 and the healing time to be 10 minutes. This configuration means that every continuous 10 minutes of powered on operation without an event causes the counter to decrease by 1.
If your TPM has entered lockout mode or is responding slowly to commands, you can reset the lockout value by using the following procedures. Resetting the TPM lockout requires the TPM owner's authorization. This value is no longer retained by default starting with Windows 10 version 1607 and higher.
If your TPM is in lockout mode or is responding slowly to commands, you can reset the lockout value by using the following procedures. Resetting the TPM lockout requires the TPM owner's authorization. This value is no longer retained by default starting with Windows 10 version 1607 and higher.
### TPM 1.2
The industry standards from the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) specify that TPM manufacturers must implement some form of protection logic in TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 chips. TPM 1.2 devices implement different protection mechanisms and behavior. In general, the TPM chip takes exponentially longer to respond if incorrect authorization values are sent to the TPM. Some TPM chips may not store failed attempts over time. Other TPM chips may store every failed attempt indefinitely. Therefore, some users may experience increasingly longer delays when they mistype an authorization value that is sent to the TPM. These delays can prevent them from using the TPM for a period of time.
The industry standards from the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) specify that TPM manufacturers must implement some form of protection logic in TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 chips. TPM 1.2 devices implement different protection mechanisms and behavior. In general, the TPM chip takes exponentially longer to respond if incorrect authorization values are sent to the TPM. Some TPM chips might not store failed attempts over time. Other TPM chips might store every failed attempt indefinitely. Therefore, some users might experience increasingly longer delays when they mistype an authorization value that is sent to the TPM. These delays can prevent them from using the TPM for some time.
## Reset the TPM lockout by using the TPM MMC
@ -73,7 +73,3 @@ For information about mitigating dictionary attacks that use the lockout setting
## Use the TPM cmdlets
You can manage the TPM using Windows PowerShell. For details, see [TPM Cmdlets in Windows PowerShell](/powershell/module/trustedplatformmodule/).
## Related articles
- [Trusted Platform Module](trusted-platform-module-overview.md)

12
windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/switch-pcr-banks-on-tpm-2-0-devices.md
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@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
---
title: UnderstandPCR banks on TPM 2.0 devices
title: Understand PCR banks on TPM 2.0 devices
description: Learn about what happens when you switch PCR banks on TPM 2.0 devices.
ms.topic: conceptual
ms.date: 11/17/2023
ms.date: 07/10/2024
---
# PCR banks on TPM 2.0 devices
@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ It's important to note that this binding to PCR values also includes the hashing
## What happens when PCR banks are switched?
When the PCR banks are switched, the algorithm used to compute the hashed values stored in the PCRs during extend operations is changed. Each hash algorithm will return a different cryptographic signature for the same inputs.
When the PCR banks are switched, the algorithm used to compute the hashed values stored in the PCRs during extend operations is changed. Each hash algorithm returns a different cryptographic signature for the same inputs.
As a result, if the currently used PCR bank is switched all keys that have been bound to the previous PCR values will no longer work. For example, if you had a key bound to the SHA-1 value of PCR[12] and subsequently changed the PCR bank to SHA-256, the banks wouldn't match, and you would be unable to use that key. The BitLocker key is secured using the PCR banks and Windows won't be able to unseal it if the PCR banks are switched while BitLocker is enabled.
As a result, if the currently used PCR bank is switched, all keys that are bound to the previous PCR values no longer work. For example, if you had a key bound to the SHA-1 value of PCR[12] and later changed the PCR bank to SHA-256, the banks wouldn't match, and you would be unable to use that key. The BitLocker key is secured using the PCR banks and Windows can't unseal it if the PCR banks are switched while BitLocker is enabled.
## What can I do to switch PCRs when BitLocker is already active?
@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ You can configure a TPM to have multiple PCR banks active. When BIOS performs me
- DWORD: `TPMActivePCRBanks`
- Defines which PCR banks are currently active. This value should be interpreted as a bitmap for which the bits are defined in the [TCG Algorithm Registry](https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tcg-algorithm-registry/) Table 21 of Revision 1.27.
Windows checks which PCR banks are active and supported by the BIOS. Windows also checks if the measured boot log supports measurements for all active PCR banks. Windows will prefer the use of the SHA-256 bank for measurements and will fall back to SHA1 PCR bank if one of the pre-conditions isn't met.
Windows checks which PCR banks are active and supported by the BIOS. Windows also checks if the measured boot log supports measurements for all active PCR banks. Windows prefers the use of the SHA-256 bank for measurements and falls back to SHA1 PCR bank if one of the preconditions isn't met.
You can identify which PCR bank is currently used by Windows by looking at the registry:
@ -51,4 +51,4 @@ You can identify which PCR bank is currently used by Windows by looking at the r
- DWORD: `TPMDigestAlgID`
- Algorithm ID of the PCR bank that Windows is currently using. This value represents an algorithm identifier as defined in the [TCG Algorithm Registry](https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tcg-algorithm-registry/) Table 3 of Revision 1.27.
Windows only uses one PCR bank to continue boot measurements. All other active PCR banks will be extended with a separator to indicate that they aren't used by Windows and measurements that appear to be from Windows shouldn't be trusted.
Windows only uses one PCR bank to continue boot measurements. All other active PCR banks are extended with a separator to indicate that they aren't used by Windows and measurements that appear to be from Windows shouldn't be trusted.

4
windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/tpm-fundamentals.md
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
title: Trusted Platform Module (TPM) fundamentals
description: Learn about the components of the Trusted Platform Module and how they're used to mitigate dictionary attacks.
ms.topic: conceptual
ms.date: 11/17/2023
ms.date: 07/10/2024
---
# TPM fundamentals
@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ TPM 2.0 allows some keys to be created without an authorization value associated
Originally, BitLocker allowed from 4 to 20 characters for a PIN. Windows Hello has its own PIN for sign-in, which can be 4 to 127 characters. Both BitLocker and Windows Hello use the TPM to prevent PIN brute-force attacks.
Windows 10, version 1607 and earlier used Dictionary Attack Prevention parameters. The Dictionary Attack Prevention Parameters provide a way to balance security needs with usability. For example, when BitLocker is used with a TPM + PIN configuration, the number of PIN guesses is limited over time. A TPM 2.0 in this example could be configured to allow only 32 PIN guesses immediately, and then only one more guess every two hours. This totals a maximum of about 4415 guesses per year. If the PIN is four digits, all 9999 possible PIN combinations could be attempted in a little over two years.
Windows 10, version 1607 and earlier used Dictionary Attack Prevention parameters. The Dictionary Attack Prevention Parameters provide a way to balance security needs with usability. For example, when BitLocker is used with a TPM + PIN configuration, the number of PIN guesses is limited over time. A TPM 2.0 in this example could be configured to allow only 32 PIN guesses immediately, and then only one more guess every two hours. This totals a maximum of about 4,415 guesses per year. If the PIN is four digits, all 9999 possible PIN combinations could be attempted in a little over two years.
Starting in Windows 10, version 1703, the minimum length for the BitLocker PIN was increased to six characters, to better align with other Windows features that use TPM 2.0, including Windows Hello. Increasing the PIN length requires a greater number of guesses for an attacker. Therefore, the lockout duration between each guess was shortened to allow legitimate users to retry a failed attempt sooner while maintaining a similar level of protection. In case the legacy parameters for lockout threshold and recovery time need to be used, make sure that GPO is enabled and [configure the system to use legacy Dictionary Attack Prevention Parameters setting for TPM 2.0](/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/trusted-platform-module-services-group-policy-settings#configure-the-system-to-use-legacy-dictionary-attack-prevention-parameters-setting-for-tpm-20).

34
windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/tpm-recommendations.md
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@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
---
title: TPM recommendations
description: This topic provides recommendations for Trusted Platform Module (TPM) technology for Windows.
description: This article provides recommendations for Trusted Platform Module (TPM) technology for Windows.
ms.topic: conceptual
ms.date: 11/17/2023
ms.date: 07/10/2024
ms.collection:
- tier1
---
# TPM recommendations
This topic provides recommendations for Trusted Platform Module (TPM) technology for Windows.
This article provides recommendations for Trusted Platform Module (TPM) technology for Windows.
For a basic feature description of TPM, see the [Trusted Platform Module Technology Overview](trusted-platform-module-overview.md).
@ -17,24 +17,24 @@ For a basic feature description of TPM, see the [Trusted Platform Module Technol
Traditionally, TPMs are discrete chips soldered to a computer's motherboard. Such implementations allow the computer's original equipment manufacturer (OEM) to evaluate and certify the TPM separate from the rest of the system. Discrete TPM implementations are common. However, they can be problematic for integrated devices that are small or have low power consumption. Some newer TPM implementations integrate TPM functionality into the same chipset as other platform components while still providing logical separation similar to discrete TPM chips.
TPMs are passive: they receive commands and return responses. To realize the full benefit of a TPM, the OEM must carefully integrate system hardware and firmware with the TPM to send it commands and react to its responses. TPMs were originally designed to provide security and privacy benefits to a platform's owner and users, but newer versions can provide security and privacy benefits to the system hardware itself. Before it can be used for advanced scenarios, however, a TPM must be provisioned. Windows automatically provisions a TPM, but if the user is planning to reinstall the operating system, he or she may need to clear the TPM before reinstalling so that Windows can take full advantage of the TPM.
TPMs are passive: they receive commands and return responses. To realize the full benefit of a TPM, the OEM must carefully integrate system hardware and firmware with the TPM to send it commands and react to its responses. TPMs were originally designed to provide security and privacy benefits to a platform's owner and users, but newer versions can provide security and privacy benefits to the system hardware itself. Before it can be used for advanced scenarios, however, a TPM must be provisioned. Windows automatically provisions a TPM, but if the user is planning to reinstall the operating system, they may need to clear the TPM before reinstalling so that Windows can take full advantage of the TPM.
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is the nonprofit organization that publishes and maintains the TPM specification. The TCG exists to develop, define, and promote vendor-neutral, global industry standards. These standards support a hardware-based root of trust for interoperable trusted computing platforms. The TCG also publishes the TPM specification as the international standard ISO/IEC 11889, using the Publicly Available Specification Submission Process that the Joint Technical Committee 1 defines between the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).
OEMs implement the TPM as a component in a trusted computing platform, such as a PC, tablet, or phone. Trusted computing platforms use the TPM to support privacy and security scenarios that software alone cannot achieve. For example, software alone cannot reliably report whether malware is present during the system startup process. The close integration between TPM and platform increases the transparency of the startup process and supports evaluating device health by enabling reliable measuring and reporting of the software that starts the device. Implementation of a TPM as part of a trusted computing platform provides a hardware root of trust-that is, it behaves in a trusted way. For example, if a key stored in a TPM has properties that disallow exporting the key, that key truly cannot leave the TPM.
OEMs implement the TPM as a component in a trusted computing platform, such as a PC, tablet, or phone. Trusted computing platforms use the TPM to support privacy and security scenarios that software alone can't achieve. For example, software alone can't reliably report whether malware is present during the system startup process. The close integration between TPM and platform increases the transparency of the startup process and supports evaluating device health by enabling reliable measuring and reporting of the software that starts the device. Implementation of a TPM as part of a trusted computing platform provides a hardware root of trust-that is, it behaves in a trusted way. For example, if a key stored in a TPM has properties that disallow exporting the key, that key truly can't leave the TPM.
The TCG designed the TPM as a low-cost, mass-market security solution that addresses the requirements of different customer segments. There are variations in the security properties of different TPM implementations just as there are variations in customer and regulatory requirements for different sectors. In public-sector procurement, for example, some governments have clearly defined security requirements for TPMs whereas others do not.
The TCG designed the TPM as a low-cost, mass-market security solution that addresses the requirements of different customer segments. There are variations in the security properties of different TPM implementations just as there are variations in customer and regulatory requirements for different sectors. In public-sector procurement, for example, some governments clearly define security requirements for TPMs whereas others don't.
## TPM 1.2 vs. 2.0 comparison
From an industry standard, Microsoft has been an industry leader in moving and standardizing on TPM 2.0, which has many key realized benefits across algorithms, crypto, hierarchy, root keys, authorization and NV RAM.
From an industry standard, Microsoft has been an industry leader in moving and standardizing on TPM 2.0, which has many key realized benefits across algorithms, crypto, hierarchy, root keys, authorization, and NV RAM.
## Why TPM 2.0?
TPM 2.0 products and systems have important security advantages over TPM 1.2, including:
- The TPM 1.2 spec only allows for the use of RSA and the SHA-1 hashing algorithm.
- For security reasons, some entities are moving away from SHA-1. Notably, NIST has required many federal agencies to move to SHA-256 as of 2014, and technology leaders, including Microsoft and Google have announced they will remove support for SHA-1 based signing or certificates in 2017.
- For security reasons, some entities are moving away from SHA-1. Notably, NIST requires many federal agencies to move to SHA-256 as of 2014, and technology leaders, including Microsoft and Google have removed support for SHA-1 based signing or certificates in 2017.
- TPM 2.0 **enables greater crypto agility** by being more flexible with respect to cryptographic algorithms.
- TPM 2.0 supports newer algorithms, which can improve drive signing and key generation performance. For the full list of supported algorithms, see the [TCG Algorithm Registry](http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/tcg-algorithm-registry/). Some TPMs don't support all algorithms.
- For the list of algorithms that Windows supports in the platform cryptographic storage provider, see [CNG Cryptographic Algorithm Providers](/windows/win32/seccertenroll/cng-cryptographic-algorithm-providers).
@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ There are three implementation options for TPMs:
- Integrated TPM solution, using dedicated hardware integrated into one or more semiconductor packages alongside, but logically separate from, other components.
- Firmware TPM solution, running the TPM in firmware in a Trusted Execution mode of a general purpose computation unit.
Windows uses any compatible TPM in the same way. Microsoft does not take a position on which way a TPM should be implemented and there is a wide ecosystem of available TPM solutions, which should suit all needs.
Windows uses any compatible TPM in the same way. Microsoft doesn't take a position on which way a TPM should be implemented and there's a wide ecosystem of available TPM solutions, which should suit all needs.
## Is there any importance for TPM for consumers?
@ -84,25 +84,21 @@ The following table defines which Windows features require TPM support.
| Windows Features | TPM Required | Supports TPM 1.2 | Supports TPM 2.0 | Details |
|--|--|--|--|--|
| Measured Boot | Yes | Yes | Yes | Measured Boot requires TPM 1.2 or 2.0 and UEFI Secure Boot. TPM 2.0 is recommended since it supports newer cryptographic algorithms. TPM 1.2 only supports the SHA-1 algorithm which is being deprecated. |
| Measured Boot | Yes | Yes | Yes | Measured Boot requires TPM 1.2 or 2.0 and UEFI Secure Boot. TPM 2.0 is recommended since it supports newer cryptographic algorithms. TPM 1.2 only supports the SHA-1 algorithm, which is being deprecated. |
| BitLocker | No | Yes | Yes | TPM 1.2 or 2.0 are supported but TPM 2.0 is recommended. [Device Encryption requires Modern Standby](../../operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/index.md#device-encryption) including TPM 2.0 support |
| Device Encryption | Yes | N/A | Yes | Device Encryption requires Modern Standby/Connected Standby certification, which requires TPM 2.0. |
| Windows Defender Application Control (Device Guard) | No | Yes | Yes |
| Windows Defender System Guard (DRTM) | Yes | No | Yes | TPM 2.0 and UEFI firmware is required. |
| Credential Guard | No | Yes | Yes | Windows 10, version 1507 (End of Life as of May 2017) only supported TPM 2.0 for Credential Guard. Beginning with Windows 10, version 1511, TPM 1.2 and 2.0 are supported. Paired with Windows Defender System Guard, TPM 2.0 provides enhanced security for Credential Guard. Windows 11 requires TPM 2.0 by default to facilitate easier enablement of this enhanced security for customers. |
| Device Health Attestation | Yes | Yes | Yes | TPM 2.0 is recommended since it supports newer cryptographic algorithms. TPM 1.2 only supports the SHA-1 algorithm which is being deprecated. |
| Windows Hello/Windows Hello for Business | No | Yes | Yes | Microsoft Entra join supports both versions of TPM, but requires TPM with keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC) and Endorsement Key (EK) certificate for key attestation support. TPM 2.0 is recommended over TPM 1.2 for better performance and security. Windows Hello as a FIDO platform authenticator will take advantage of TPM 2.0 for key storage. |
| System Guard (DRTM) | Yes | No | Yes | TPM 2.0 and UEFI firmware is required. |
| Credential Guard | No | Yes | Yes | Windows 10, version 1507 (End of Life as of May 2017) only supported TPM 2.0 for Credential Guard. Beginning with Windows 10, version 1511, TPM 1.2 and 2.0 are supported. Paired with System Guard, TPM 2.0 provides enhanced security for Credential Guard. Windows 11 requires TPM 2.0 by default to facilitate easier enablement of this enhanced security for customers. |
| Device Health Attestation | Yes | Yes | Yes | TPM 2.0 is recommended since it supports newer cryptographic algorithms. TPM 1.2 only supports the SHA-1 algorithm, which is being deprecated. |
| Windows Hello/Windows Hello for Business | No | Yes | Yes | Microsoft Entra join supports both versions of TPM, but requires TPM with keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC) and Endorsement Key (EK) certificate for key attestation support. TPM 2.0 is recommended over TPM 1.2 for better performance and security. Windows Hello as a FIDO platform authenticator takes advantage of TPM 2.0 for key storage. |
| UEFI Secure Boot | No | Yes | Yes |
| TPM Platform Crypto Provider Key Storage Provider | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Virtual Smart Card | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Certificate storage | No | Yes | Yes | TPM is only required when the certificate is stored in the TPM. |
| Autopilot | No | N/A | Yes | If you intend to deploy a scenario which requires TPM (such as white glove and self-deploying mode), then TPM 2.0 and UEFI firmware are required. |
| Autopilot | No | N/A | Yes | If you intend to deploy a scenario, which requires TPM (such as white glove and self-deploying mode), then TPM 2.0 and UEFI firmware are required. |
| SecureBIO | Yes | No | Yes | TPM 2.0 and UEFI firmware is required. |
## OEM Status on TPM 2.0 system availability and certified parts
Government customers and enterprise customers in regulated industries may have acquisition standards that require use of common certified TPM parts. As a result, OEMs, who provide the devices, may be required to use only certified TPM components on their commercial class systems. For more information, contact your OEM or hardware vendor.
## Related topics
- [Trusted Platform Module](trusted-platform-module-overview.md)

2
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
title: Trusted Platform Module Technology Overview
description: Learn about the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and how Windows uses it for access control and authentication.
ms.topic: conceptual
ms.date: 11/17/2023
ms.date: 07/10/2024
ms.collection:
- tier1
---

72
windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/trusted-platform-module-services-group-policy-settings.md
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@ -1,13 +1,52 @@
---
title: TPM Group Policy settings
description: This topic describes the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Services that can be controlled centrally by using Group Policy settings.
description: This article describes the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Services that can be controlled centrally by using Group Policy settings.
ms.topic: conceptual
ms.date: 11/17/2023
ms.date: 07/10/2024
---
# TPM Group Policy settings
This topic describes the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Services that can be controlled centrally by using Group Policy settings. The Group Policy settings for TPM services are located under **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **System** > **Trusted Platform Module Services**.
This article describes the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Services that can be controlled centrally by using Group Policy settings. The Group Policy settings for TPM services are located under **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **System** > **Trusted Platform Module Services**.
## Configure the list of blocked TPM commands
This policy setting allows you to manage the Group Policy list of Trusted Platform Module (TPM) commands blocked by Windows.
If you enable this policy setting, Windows blocks the specified commands from being sent to the TPM on the computer. TPM commands are referenced by a command number. For example, command number `129` is `TPM_OwnerReadInternalPub`, and command number `170` is `TPM_FieldUpgrade`.
If you disable or don't configure this policy setting, only those TPM commands specified through the default or local lists may be blocked by Windows. The default list of blocked TPM commands is preconfigured by Windows. You can view the default list by running `tpm.msc`, navigating to the "Command Management" section, and making visible the "On Default Block List" column. The local list of blocked TPM commands is configured outside of Group Policy by running `tpm.msc` or through scripting against the Win32_Tpm interface.
## Configure the system to clear the TPM if it is not in a ready state
This policy setting configures the system to prompt the user to clear the TPM if the TPM is detected to be in any state other than Ready. This policy takes effect only if the system's TPM is in a state other than Ready, including if the TPM is "Ready, with reduced functionality". The prompt to clear the TPM will start occurring after the next reboot, upon user sign-in only if the logged in user is part of the Administrators group for the system. The prompt can be dismissed, but will reappear after every reboot and sign-in until the policy is disabled or until the TPM is in a Ready state.
## Ignore the default list of blocked TPM commands
This policy setting allows you to enforce or ignore the computer's local list of blocked Trusted Platform Module (TPM) commands.
If you enable this policy setting, Windows ignores the computer's local list of blocked TPM commands and will only block those TPM commands specified by Group Policy or the default list.
The local list of blocked TPM commands is configured outside of Group Policy by running `tpm.msc` or through scripting against the `Win32_Tpm` interface. The default list of blocked TPM commands is preconfigured by Windows. See the related policy setting to configure the Group Policy list of blocked TPM commands.
If you disable or don't configure this policy setting, Windows blocks the TPM commands found in the local list, in addition to commands in the Group Policy and default lists of blocked TPM commands.
## Ignore the local list of blocked TPM commands
This policy setting configures how much of the TPM owner authorization information is stored in the registry of the local computer. Depending on the amount of TPM owner authorization information stored locally, the operating system and TPM-based applications can perform certain TPM actions, which require TPM owner authorization without requiring the user to enter the TPM owner password.
You can choose to have the operating system store either the full TPM owner authorization value, the TPM administrative delegation blob plus the TPM user delegation blob, or none.
If you enable this policy setting, Windows stores the TPM owner authorization in the registry of the local computer according to the operating system managed TPM authentication setting you choose.
Choose the operating system managed TPM authentication setting of "Full" to store the full TPM owner authorization, the TPM administrative delegation blob and the TPM user delegation blob in the local registry. This setting allows use of the TPM without requiring remote or external storage of the TPM owner authorization value. This setting is appropriate for scenarios, which don't depend on preventing reset of the TPM anti-hammering logic or changing the TPM owner authorization value. Some TPM-based applications may require this setting be changed before features, which depend on the TPM anti-hammering logic can be used.
Choose the operating system managed TPM authentication setting of "Delegated" to store only the TPM administrative delegation blob and the TPM user delegation blob in the local registry. This setting is appropriate for use with TPM-based applications that depend on the TPM anti-hammering logic.
Choose the operating system managed TPM authentication setting of "None" for compatibility with previous operating systems and applications or for use with scenarios that require TPM owner authorization not be stored locally. Using this setting might cause issues with some TPM-based applications.
> [!NOTE]
> If the operating system managed TPM authentication setting is changed from "Full" to "Delegated", the full TPM owner authorization value is regenerated and any copies of the original TPM owner authorization value are invalidated.
## Configure the level of TPM owner authorization information available to the operating system
@ -24,11 +63,11 @@ This policy setting configured which TPM authorization values are stored in the
There are three TPM owner authentication settings that are managed by the Windows operating system. You can choose a value of **Full**, **Delegate**, or **None**.
- **Full**: This setting stores the full TPM owner authorization, the TPM administrative delegation blob, and the TPM user delegation blob in the local registry. With this setting, you can use the TPM without requiring remote or external storage of the TPM owner authorization value. This setting is appropriate for scenarios that do not require you to reset the TPM anti-hammering logic or change the TPM owner authorization value. Some TPM-based applications may require that this setting is changed before features that depend on the TPM anti-hammering logic can be used. Full owner authorization in TPM 1.2 is similar to lockout authorization in TPM 2.0. Owner authorization has a different meaning for TPM 2.0.
- **Full**: This setting stores the full TPM owner authorization, the TPM administrative delegation blob, and the TPM user delegation blob in the local registry. With this setting, you can use the TPM without requiring remote or external storage of the TPM owner authorization value. This setting is appropriate for scenarios that don't require you to reset the TPM anti-hammering logic or change the TPM owner authorization value. Some TPM-based applications may require that this setting is changed before features that depend on the TPM anti-hammering logic can be used. Full owner authorization in TPM 1.2 is similar to lockout authorization in TPM 2.0. Owner authorization has a different meaning for TPM 2.0.
- **Delegated**: This setting stores only the TPM administrative delegation blob and the TPM user delegation blob in the local registry. This setting is appropriate for use with TPM-based applications that depend on the TPM antihammering logic. This is the default setting in Windows prior to version 1703.
- **None**: This setting provides compatibility with previous operating systems and applications. You can also use it for scenarios when TPM owner authorization cannot be stored locally. Using this setting might cause issues with some TPM-based applications.
- **None**: This setting provides compatibility with previous operating systems and applications. You can also use it for scenarios when TPM owner authorization can't be stored locally. Using this setting might cause issues with some TPM-based applications.
> [!NOTE]
> If the operating system managed TPM authentication setting is changed from **Full** to **Delegated**, the full TPM owner authorization value will be regenerated, and any copies of the previously set TPM owner authorization value will be invalid.
@ -46,31 +85,31 @@ The following table shows the TPM owner authorization values in the registry.
| 2 | Delegated |
| 4 | Full |
If you enable this policy setting, the Windows operating system will store the TPM owner authorization in the registry of the local computer according to the TPM authentication setting you choose.
If you enable this policy setting, the Windows operating system stores the TPM owner authorization in the registry of the local computer according to the TPM authentication setting you choose.
On Windows 10 prior to version 1607, if you disable or do not configure this policy setting, and the **Turn on TPM backup to Active Directory Domain Services** policy setting is also disabled or not configured, the default setting is to store the full TPM authorization value in the local registry. If this policy is disabled or not configured, and the **Turn on TPM backup to Active Directory Domain Services** policy setting is enabled, only the administrative delegation and the user delegation blobs are stored in the local registry.
On Windows 10 prior to version 1607, if you disable or don't configure this policy setting, and the **Turn on TPM backup to Active Directory Domain Services** policy setting is also disabled or not configured, the default setting is to store the full TPM authorization value in the local registry. If this policy is disabled or not configured, and the **Turn on TPM backup to Active Directory Domain Services** policy setting is enabled, only the administrative delegation and the user delegation blobs are stored in the local registry.
## Standard User Lockout Duration
This policy setting allows you to manage the duration in minutes for counting standard user authorization failures for Trusted Platform Module (TPM) commands requiring authorization. An authorization failure occurs each time a standard user sends a command to the TPM and receives an error response that indicates an authorization failure occurred. Authorization failures that are older than the duration you set are ignored. If the number of TPM commands with an authorization failure within the lockout duration equals a threshold, a standard user is prevented from sending commands that require
authorization to the TPM.
The TPM is designed to protect itself against password guessing attacks by entering a hardware lockout mode when it receives too many commands with an incorrect authorization value. When the TPM enters a lockout mode, it is global for all users (including administrators) and for Windows features such as BitLocker Drive Encryption.
The TPM is designed to protect itself against password guessing attacks by entering a hardware lockout mode when it receives too many commands with an incorrect authorization value. When the TPM enters a lockout mode, it's global for all users (including administrators) and for Windows features such as BitLocker Drive Encryption.
This setting helps administrators prevent the TPM hardware from entering a lockout mode by slowing the speed at which standard users can send commands that require authorization to the TPM.
For each standard user, two thresholds apply. Exceeding either threshold prevents the user from sending a command that requires authorization to the TPM. Use the following policy settings to set the lockout duration:
- [Standard User Individual Lockout Threshold](#standard-user-individual-lockout-threshold): This value is the maximum number of authorization failures that each standard user can have before the user is not allowed to send commands that require authorization to the TPM.
- [Standard User Total Lockout Threshold](#standard-user-total-lockout-threshold): This value is the maximum total number of authorization failures that all standard users can have before all standard users are not allowed to send commands that require authorization to the TPM.
- [Standard User Individual Lockout Threshold](#standard-user-individual-lockout-threshold): This value is the maximum number of authorization failures that each standard user can have before the user isn't allowed to send commands that require authorization to the TPM.
- [Standard User Total Lockout Threshold](#standard-user-total-lockout-threshold): This value is the maximum total number of authorization failures that all standard users can have before all standard users aren't allowed to send commands that require authorization to the TPM.
An administrator with the TPM owner password can fully reset the TPM's hardware lockout logic by using the Windows Defender Security Center. Each time an administrator resets the TPM's hardware lockout logic, all prior standard user TPM authorization failures are ignored. This allows standard users to immediately use the TPM normally.
If you do not configure this policy setting, a default value of 480 minutes (8 hours) is used.
If you don't configure this policy setting, a default value of 480 minutes (8 hours) is used.
## Standard User Individual Lockout Threshold
This policy setting allows you to manage the maximum number of authorization failures for each standard user for the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). This value is the maximum number of authorization failures that each standard user can have before the user is not allowed to send commands that require authorization to the TPM. If the number of authorization failures for the user within the duration that is set for the **Standard User Lockout Duration** policy setting equals this value, the standard user is prevented from sending commands that require authorization to the Trusted Platform Module (TPM).
This policy setting allows you to manage the maximum number of authorization failures for each standard user for the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). This value is the maximum number of authorization failures that each standard user can have before the user isn't allowed to send commands that require authorization to the TPM. If the number of authorization failures for the user within the duration that is set for the **Standard User Lockout Duration** policy setting equals this value, the standard user is prevented from sending commands that require authorization to the Trusted Platform Module (TPM).
This setting helps administrators prevent the TPM hardware from entering a lockout mode by slowing the speed at which standard users can send commands that require authorization to the TPM.
@ -78,7 +117,7 @@ An authorization failure occurs each time a standard user sends a command to the
An administrator with the TPM owner password can fully reset the TPM's hardware lockout logic by using the Windows Defender Security Center. Each time an administrator resets the TPM's hardware lockout logic, all prior standard user TPM authorization failures are ignored. This allows standard users to immediately use the TPM normally.
If you do not configure this policy setting, a default value of 4 is used. A value of zero means that the operating system will not allow standard users to send commands to the TPM, which might cause an authorization failure.
If you don't configure this policy setting, a default value of 4 is used. A value of zero means that the operating system won't allow standard users to send commands to the TPM, which might cause an authorization failure.
## Standard User Total Lockout Threshold
@ -90,7 +129,7 @@ An authorization failure occurs each time a standard user sends a command to the
An administrator with the TPM owner password can fully reset the TPM's hardware lockout logic by using the Windows Defender Security Center. Each time an administrator resets the TPM's hardware lockout logic, all prior standard user TPM authorization failures are ignored. This allows standard users to immediately use the TPM normally.
If you do not configure this policy setting, a default value of 9 is used. A value of zero means that the operating system will not allow standard users to send commands to the TPM, which might cause an authorization failure.
If you don't configure this policy setting, a default value of 9 is used. A value of zero means that the operating system won't allow standard users to send commands to the TPM, which might cause an authorization failure.
## Configure the system to use legacy Dictionary Attack Prevention Parameters setting for TPM 2.0
@ -114,14 +153,13 @@ You can change what users see about TPM in **Windows Security**. The Group Polic
### Disable the Clear TPM button
If you don't want users to be able to click the **Clear TPM** button in **Windows Security**, you can disable it with this Group Policy setting. Select **Enabled** to make the **Clear TPM** button unavailable for use.
If you don't want users to be able to select the **Clear TPM** button in **Windows Security**, you can disable it with this Group Policy setting. Select **Enabled** to make the **Clear TPM** button unavailable for use.
### Hide the TPM Firmware Update recommendation
If you don't want users to see the recommendation to update TPM firmware, you can disable it with this setting. Select **Enabled** to prevent users from seeing a recommendation to update their TPM firmware when a vulnerable firmware is detected.
## Related topics
## Related articles
- [Trusted Platform Module](trusted-platform-module-overview.md)
- [TPM Cmdlets in Windows PowerShell](/powershell/module/trustedplatformmodule/?view=win10-ps&preserve-view=true)
- [BitLocker planning guide](../../operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/planning-guide.md)

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windows/security/operating-system-security/device-management/block-untrusted-fonts-in-enterprise.md
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@ -3,12 +3,12 @@ title: Block untrusted fonts in an enterprise
description: To help protect your company from attacks that may originate from untrusted or attacker controlled font files, we've created the Blocking Untrusted Fonts feature.
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.topic: how-to
ms.date: 12/22/2023
ms.date: 07/10/2024
---
# Block untrusted fonts in an enterprise
To help protect your company from attacks that may originate from untrusted or attacker-controlled font files, we've created the Blocking Untrusted Fonts feature. Using this feature, you can turn on a global setting that stops your employees from loading untrusted fonts processed using the Graphics Device Interface (GDI) onto your network. Untrusted fonts are any font installed outside of the `%windir%\Fonts` directory. Blocking untrusted fonts helps prevent both remote (web-based or email-based) and local EOP attacks that can happen during the font file-parsing process.
To help protect your company from attacks that may originate from untrusted or attacker-controlled font files, you can block untrusted fonts. Using this feature, you can turn on a global setting that stops your employees from loading untrusted fonts processed using the Graphics Device Interface (GDI) onto your network. Untrusted fonts are any font installed outside of the `%windir%\Fonts` directory. Blocking untrusted fonts helps prevent both remote (web-based or email-based) and local EOP attacks that can happen during the font file-parsing process.
## What does this mean for me?
@ -44,11 +44,11 @@ Use Group Policy or the registry to turn this feature on, off, or to use audit m
**To turn on and use the Blocking Untrusted Fonts feature through Group Policy**
1. Open the Group Policy editor (gpedit.msc) and go to `Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\System\Mitigation Options\Untrusted Font Blocking`.
2. Click **Enabled** to turn on the feature, and then click one of the following **Mitigation Options**:
2. Select **Enabled** to turn on the feature, and then select one of the following **Mitigation Options**:
- **Block untrusted fonts and log events.** Turns on the feature, blocking untrusted fonts and logging installation attempts to the event log.
- **Do not block untrusted fonts.** Turns on the feature, but doesn't block untrusted fonts nor does it log installation attempts to the event log.
- **Log events without blocking untrusted fonts**. Turns on the feature, logging installation attempts to the event log, but not blocking untrusted fonts.
3. Click **OK**.
3. Select **OK**.
**To turn on and use the Blocking Untrusted Fonts feature through the registry**
@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ To turn this feature on, off, or to use audit mode:
1. Open the registry editor (regedit.exe) and go to `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Kernel\`.
2. If the **MitigationOptions** key isn't there, right-click and add a new **QWORD (64-bit) Value**, renaming it to **MitigationOptions**.
3. Right click on the **MitigationOptions** key, and then click **Modify**. The **Edit QWORD (64-bit) Value** box opens.
3. Right select on the **MitigationOptions** key, and then select **Modify**. The **Edit QWORD (64-bit) Value** box opens.
4. Make sure the **Base** option is **Hexadecimal**, and then update the **Value data**, making sure you keep your existing value, like in the important note below:
- **To turn this feature on.** Type **1000000000000**.
- **To turn this feature off.** Type **2000000000000**.
@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ After you figure out the problematic fonts, you can try to fix your apps in two
**To fix your apps by installing the problematic fonts (recommended)**
On each computer with the app installed, right-click on the font name and click **Install**. The font should automatically install into your `%windir%\Fonts` directory. If it doesn't, you'll need to manually copy the font files into the **Fonts** directory and run the installation from there.
On each computer with the app installed, right-click on the font name and select **Install**. The font should automatically install into your `%windir%\Fonts` directory. If it doesn't, you need to manually copy the font files into the **Fonts** directory and run the installation from there.
**To fix your apps by excluding processes**

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windows/security/operating-system-security/device-management/override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md
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@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ title: Override Process Mitigation Options
description: How to use Group Policy to override individual Process Mitigation Options settings and to help enforce specific app-related security policies.
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.topic: how-to
ms.date: 12/22/2023
ms.date: 07/10/2024
---
# Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies
@ -13,10 +13,10 @@ Windows includes group policy-configurable "Process Mitigation Options" that add
> [!IMPORTANT]
> We recommend trying these mitigations in a test lab before deploying to your organization, to determine if they interfere with your organization's required apps.
The Group Policy settings in this topic are related to three types of process mitigations. All three types are on by default for 64-bit applications, but by using the Group Policy settings described in this topic, you can configure more protections. The types of process mitigations are:
The Group Policy settings in this article are related to three types of process mitigations. All three types are on by default for 64-bit applications, but by using the Group Policy settings described in this article, you can configure more protections. The types of process mitigations are:
- **Data Execution Prevention (DEP)** is a system-level memory protection feature that enables the operating system to mark one or more pages of memory as non-executable, preventing code from being run from that region of memory, to help prevent exploitation of buffer overruns. DEP helps prevent code from being run from data pages such as the default heap, stacks, and memory pools. For more information, see [Data Execution Prevention](../../threat-protection/overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md#data-execution-prevention).
- **Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP)** is designed to block exploits that use the Structured Exception Handler (SEH) overwrite technique. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps to protect apps regardless of whether they've been compiled with the latest improvements. For more information, see [Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection](../../threat-protection/overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md#structured-exception-handling-overwrite-protection).
- **Data Execution Prevention (DEP)** is a system-level memory protection feature that enables the operating system to mark one or more pages of memory as nonexecutable, preventing code from being run from that region of memory, to help prevent exploitation of buffer overruns. DEP helps prevent code from being run from data pages such as the default heap, stacks, and memory pools. For more information, see [Data Execution Prevention](../../threat-protection/overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md#data-execution-prevention).
- **Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP)** is designed to block exploits that use the Structured Exception Handler (SEH) overwrite technique. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps to protect apps regardless of whether they're compiled with the latest improvements. For more information, see [Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection](../../threat-protection/overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md#structured-exception-handling-overwrite-protection).
- **Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)** loads DLLs into random memory addresses at boot time to mitigate against malware that's designed to attack specific memory locations, where specific DLLs are expected to be loaded. For more information, see [Address Space Layout Randomization](../../threat-protection/overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md#address-space-layout-randomization). To find more ASLR protections in the table below, look for `IMAGES` or `ASLR`.
The following procedure describes how to use Group Policy to override individual **Process Mitigation Options** settings.
@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ The following procedure describes how to use Group Policy to override individual
![Screenshot of the Group Policy editor: Process Mitigation Options with setting enabled and Show button active.](images/gp-process-mitigation-options.png)
2. Click **Enabled**, and then in the **Options** area, click **Show** to open the **Show Contents** box, where you'll be able to add your apps and the appropriate bit flag values, as shown in the [Setting the bit field](#setting-the-bit-field) and [Example](#example) sections of this topic.
2. Select **Enabled**, and then in the **Options** area, select **Show** to open the **Show Contents** box, where you can add your apps and the appropriate bit flag values, as shown in the [Setting the bit field](#setting-the-bit-field) and [Example](#example) sections of this article.
> [!IMPORTANT]
> For each app you want to include, you must include:
@ -45,14 +45,14 @@ Here's a visual representation of the bit flag locations for the various Process
Where the bit flags are read from right to left and are defined as:
| Flag | Bit location | Setting | Details |
|------|--------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| A | 0 | `PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_DEP_ENABLE (0x00000001)` | Turns on Data Execution Prevention (DEP) for child processes. |
| B | 1 | `PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_DEP_ATL_THUNK_ENABLE (0x00000002)` | Turns on DEP-ATL thunk emulation for child processes. DEP-ATL thunk emulation lets the system intercept non-executable (NX) faults that originate from the Active Template Library (ATL) thunk layer, and then emulate and handle the instructions so the process can continue to run. |
| C | 2 | `PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_SEHOP_ENABLE (0x00000004)` | Turns on Structured Exception Handler Overwrite Protection (SEHOP) for child processes. SEHOP helps to block exploits that use the Structured Exception Handler (SEH) overwrite technique. |
| D | 8 | `PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_FORCE_RELOCATE_IMAGES_ALWAYS_ON (0x00000100)` | Uses the force Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) setting to act as though an image base collision happened at load time, forcibly rebasing images that aren't dynamic base compatible. Images without the base relocation section won't be loaded if relocations are required. |
| E | 15 | `PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR_ALWAYS_ON (0x00010000)` | Turns on the bottom-up randomization policy, which includes stack randomization options and causes a random location to be used as the lowest user address. |
| F | 16 | `PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR_ALWAYS_OFF (0x00020000)` | Turns off the bottom-up randomization policy, which includes stack randomization options and causes a random location to be used as the lowest user address. |
| Flag | Bit location | Setting | Details |
|--|--|--|--|
| A | 0 | `PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_DEP_ENABLE (0x00000001)` | Turns on Data Execution Prevention (DEP) for child processes. |
| B | 1 | `PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_DEP_ATL_THUNK_ENABLE (0x00000002)` | Turns on DEP-ATL thunk emulation for child processes. DEP-ATL thunk emulation lets the system intercept nonexecutable (NX) faults that originate from the Active Template Library (ATL) thunk layer, and then emulate and handle the instructions so the process can continue to run. |
| C | 2 | `PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_SEHOP_ENABLE (0x00000004)` | Turns on Structured Exception Handler Overwrite Protection (SEHOP) for child processes. SEHOP helps to block exploits that use the Structured Exception Handler (SEH) overwrite technique. |
| D | 8 | `PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_FORCE_RELOCATE_IMAGES_ALWAYS_ON (0x00000100)` | Uses the force Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) setting to act as though an image base collision happened at load time, forcibly rebasing images that aren't dynamic base compatible. Images without the base relocation section aren't loaded if relocations are required. |
| E | 15 | `PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR_ALWAYS_ON (0x00010000)` | Turns on the bottom-up randomization policy, which includes stack randomization options and causes a random location to be used as the lowest user address. |
| F | 16 | `PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR_ALWAYS_OFF (0x00020000)` | Turns off the bottom-up randomization policy, which includes stack randomization options and causes a random location to be used as the lowest user address. |
### Example

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@ -3,14 +3,14 @@ title: Use Windows Event Forwarding to help with intrusion detection
description: Learn about an approach to collect events from devices in your organization. This article talks about events in both normal operations and when an intrusion is suspected.
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.topic: how-to
ms.date: 12/22/2023
ms.date: 07/10/2024
---
# Use Windows Event Forwarding to help with intrusion detection
Learn about an approach to collect events from devices in your organization. This article talks about events in both normal operations and when an intrusion is suspected.
Windows Event Forwarding (WEF) reads any operational or administrative event log on a device in your organization and forwards the events you choose to a Windows Event Collector (WEC) server.
Windows Event Forwarding (WEF) reads any operational or administrative event logged on a device in your organization and forwards the events you choose to a Windows Event Collector (WEC) server.
To accomplish this functionality, there are two different subscriptions published to client devices - the Baseline subscription and the suspect subscription. The Baseline subscription enrolls all devices in your organization, and a Suspect subscription only includes devices that have been added by you. The Suspect subscription collects more events to help build context for system activity and can quickly be updated to accommodate new events and/or scenarios as needed without impacting baseline operations.
@ -35,12 +35,12 @@ For the minimum recommended audit policy and registry system ACL settings, see [
> [!NOTE]
> These are only minimum values need to meet what the WEF subscription selects.
From a WEF subscription management perspective, the event queries provided should be used in two separate subscriptions for ease of maintenance; only machines meeting specific criteria would be allowed access to the targeted subscription, this access would be determined by an algorithm or an analysts' direction. All devices should have access to the Baseline subscription.
From a WEF subscription management perspective, the event queries provided should be used in two separate subscriptions for ease of maintenance; only machines meeting specific criteria would be allowed access to the targeted subscription. This access would be determined by an algorithm or an analysts' direction. All devices should have access to the Baseline subscription.
This system of dual subscription means you would create two base subscriptions:
- **Baseline WEF subscription**. Events collected from all hosts; these events include some role-specific events, which will only be emitted by those machines.
- **Targeted WEF subscription**. Events collected from a limited set of hosts due to unusual activity and/or heightened awareness for those systems.
- **Baseline WEF subscription**. Events collected from all hosts; these events include some role-specific events, which will only be emitted by those machines.
- **Targeted WEF subscription**. Events collected from a limited set of hosts due to unusual activity and/or heightened awareness for those systems.
Each using the respective event query below. For the Targeted subscription, enabling the "read existing events" option should be set to true to allow collection of existing events from systems. By default, WEF subscriptions will only forward events generated after the WEF subscription was received by the client.
@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ The longer answer is: The **Eventlog-forwardingPlugin/Operational** event channe
### Is WEF Push or Pull?
A WEF subscription can be configured to be pushed or pulled, but not both. The simplest, most flexible IT deployment with the greatest scalability can be achieved by using a push, or source initiated, subscription. WEF clients are configured by using a GPO and the built-in forwarding client is activated. For pull, collector initiated, the subscription on the WEC server is pre-configured with the names of the WEF Client devices from which events are to be selected. Those clients are to be configured ahead of time to allow the credentials used in the subscription to access their event logs remotely (normally by adding the credential to the **Event Log Readers** built-in local security group.) A useful scenario: closely monitoring a specific set of machines.
A WEF subscription can be configured to be pushed or pulled, but not both. The simplest, most flexible IT deployment with the greatest scalability can be achieved by using a push, or source initiated, subscription. WEF clients are configured by using a GPO and the built-in forwarding client is activated. For pull, collector initiated, the subscription on the WEC server is preconfigured with the names of the WEF Client devices from which events are to be selected. Those clients are to be configured ahead of time to allow the credentials used in the subscription to access their event logs remotely (normally by adding the credential to the **Event Log Readers** built-in local security group.) A useful scenario: closely monitoring a specific set of machines.
### Will WEF work over VPN or RAS?
@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ WEF handles VPN, RAS, and DirectAccess scenarios well and will reconnect and sen
### How is client progress tracked?
The WEC server maintains in its registry the bookmark information and last heartbeat time for each event source for each WEF subscription. When an event source reconnects to a WEC server, the last bookmark position is sent to the device to use as a starting point to resume forwarding events. If a
WEF client has no events to send, the WEF client will connect periodically to send a Heartbeat to the WEC server to indicate it's active. This heartbeat value can be individually configured for each subscription.
WEF client has no events to send, the WEF client connects periodically to send a Heartbeat to the WEC server to indicate it's active. This heartbeat value can be individually configured for each subscription.
### Will WEF work in an IPv4, IPv6, or mixed IPv4/IPv6 environment?
@ -130,19 +130,19 @@ For collector initiated subscriptions: The subscription contains the list of mac
### Can a client communicate to multiple WEF Event Collectors?
Yes. If you desire a High-Availability environment, configure multiple WEC servers with the same subscription configuration and publish both WEC Server URIs to WEF clients. WEF Clients will forward events simultaneously to the configured subscriptions on the WEC servers, if they have the appropriate access.
Yes. If you desire a High-Availability environment, configure multiple WEC servers with the same subscription configuration and publish both WEC Server URIs to WEF clients. WEF Clients forward events simultaneously to the configured subscriptions on the WEC servers, if they have the appropriate access.
### What are the WEC server's limitations?
There are three factors that limit the scalability of WEC servers. The general rule for a stable WEC server on commodity hardware is planning for a total of 3,000 events per second on average for all configured subscriptions.
- **Disk I/O**. The WEC server doesn't process or validate the received event, but rather buffers the received event and then logs it to a local event log file (EVTX file). The speed of logging to the EVTX file is limited by the disk write speed. Isolating the EVTX file to its own array or using high speed disks can increase the number of events per second that a single WEC server can receive.
- **Network Connections**. While a WEF source doesn't maintain a permanent, persistent connection to the WEC server, it doesn't immediately disconnect after sending its events. This leniency means that the number of WEF sources that can simultaneously connect to the WEC server is limited to the open TCP ports available on the WEC server.
- **Registry size**. For each unique device that connects to a WEF subscription, there's a registry key (corresponding to the FQDN of the WEF Client) created to store bookmark and source heartbeat information. If this information isn't pruned to remove inactive clients, this set of registry keys can grow to an unmanageable size over time.
- **Disk I/O**. The WEC server doesn't process or validate the received event, but rather buffers the received event and then logs it to a local event log file (EVTX file). The speed of logging to the EVTX file is limited by the disk write speed. Isolating the EVTX file to its own array or using high speed disks can increase the number of events per second that a single WEC server can receive.
- **Network Connections**. While a WEF source doesn't maintain a permanent, persistent connection to the WEC server, it doesn't immediately disconnect after sending its events. This leniency means that the number of WEF sources that can simultaneously connect to the WEC server is limited to the open TCP ports available on the WEC server.
- **Registry size**. For each unique device that connects to a WEF subscription, there's a registry key (corresponding to the FQDN of the WEF Client) created to store bookmark and source heartbeat information. If this information isn't pruned to remove inactive clients, this set of registry keys can grow to an unmanageable size over time.
- When a subscription has &gt;1000 WEF sources connect to it over its operational lifetime, also known as lifetime WEF sources, Event Viewer can become unresponsive for a few minutes when selecting the **Subscriptions** node in the left-navigation, but will function normally afterwards.
- At &gt;50,000 lifetime WEF sources, Event Viewer is no longer an option and wecutil.exe (included with Windows) must be used to configure and manage subscriptions.
- At &gt;100,000 lifetime WEF sources, the registry won't be readable and the WEC server will likely have to be rebuilt.
- When a subscription has &gt;1000 WEF sources connect to it over its operational lifetime, also known as lifetime WEF sources, Event Viewer can become unresponsive for a few minutes when selecting the **Subscriptions** node in the left-navigation, but will function normally afterwards.
- At &gt;50,000 lifetime WEF sources, Event Viewer is no longer an option and wecutil.exe (included with Windows) must be used to configure and manage subscriptions.
- At &gt;100,000 lifetime WEF sources, the registry won't be readable and the WEC server will likely have to be rebuilt.
## Subscription information
@ -158,56 +158,56 @@ The subscription is essentially a collection of query statements applied to the
To gain the most value out of the baseline subscription, we recommend having the following requirements set on the device to ensure that the clients are already generating the required events to be forwarded off the system.
- Apply a security audit policy that is a super-set of the recommended minimum audit policy. For more info, see [Appendix A - Minimum Recommended minimum Audit Policy](#bkmk-appendixa). This policy ensures that the security event log is generating the required events.
- Apply at least an Audit-Only AppLocker policy to devices.
- Apply a security audit policy that is a super-set of the recommended minimum audit policy. For more info, see [Appendix A - Minimum Recommended minimum Audit Policy](#bkmk-appendixa). This policy ensures that the security event log is generating the required events.
- Apply at least an Audit-Only AppLocker policy to devices.
- If you're already allowing or restricting events by using AppLocker, then this requirement is met.
- AppLocker events contain useful information, such as file hash and digital signature information for executables and scripts.
- If you're already allowing or restricting events by using AppLocker, then this requirement is met.
- AppLocker events contain useful information, such as file hash and digital signature information for executables and scripts.
- Enable disabled event channels and set the minimum size for modern event files.
- Currently, there's no GPO template for enabling or setting the maximum size for the modern event files. This threshold must be defined by using a GPO. For more info, see [Appendix C - Event Channel Settings (enable and Channel Access) methods](#bkmk-appendixc).
- Enable disabled event channels and set the minimum size for modern event files.
- Currently, there's no GPO template for enabling or setting the maximum size for the modern event files. This threshold must be defined by using a GPO. For more info, see [Appendix C - Event Channel Settings (enable and Channel Access) methods](#bkmk-appendixc).
The annotated event query can be found in the following. For more info, see [Appendix F - Annotated Suspect Subscription Event Query](#bkmk-appendixf).
- Anti-malware events from Microsoft Antimalware or Windows Defender. These events can be configured for any given anti-malware product easily if it writes to the Windows event log.
- Anti-malware events from Windows Security. These events can be configured for any given anti-malware product easily if it writes to the Windows event log.
- Security event log Process Create events.
- AppLocker Process Create events (EXE, script, packaged App installation and execution).
- Registry modification events. For more info, see [Appendix B - Recommended minimum Registry System ACL Policy](#bkmk-appendixb).
- OS startup and shutdown
- Startup events include operating system version, service pack level, QFE version, and boot mode.
- Startup events include operating system version, service pack level, QFE version, and boot mode.
- Service install
- Includes what the name of the service, the image path, and who installed the service.
- Includes what the name of the service, the image path, and who installed the service.
- Certificate Authority audit events
- These events are only applicable on systems with the Certificate Authority role installed.
- Logs certificate requests and responses.
- These events are only applicable on systems with the Certificate Authority role installed.
- Logs certificate requests and responses.
- User profile events
- Use of a temporary profile or unable to create a user profile may indicate an intruder is interactively logging into a device but not wanting to leave a persistent profile behind.
- Use of a temporary profile or unable to create a user profile may indicate an intruder is interactively logging into a device but not wanting to leave a persistent profile behind.
- Service start failure
- Failure codes are localized, so you have to check the message DLL for values.
- Failure codes are localized, so you have to check the message DLL for values.
- Network share access events
- Filter out IPC$ and /NetLogon file shares, which are expected and noisy.
- Filter out IPC$ and /NetLogon file shares, which are expected and noisy.
- System shutdown initiate requests
- Find out what initiated the restart of a device.
- Find out what initiated the restart of a device.
- User-initiated interactive sign-out event
- User-initiated interactive sign out event
- Remote Desktop Services sessions connect, reconnect, or disconnect.
- EMET events, if EMET is installed.
- Event forwarding plugin events
- For monitoring WEF subscription operations, such as Partial Success events. This event is useful for diagnosing deployment issues.
- For monitoring WEF subscription operations, such as Partial Success events. This event is useful for diagnosing deployment issues.
- Network share creation and deletion
@ -217,111 +217,111 @@ The annotated event query can be found in the following. For more info, see [App
- Sign-in sessions
- Sign-in success for interactive (local and Remote Interactive/Remote Desktop)
- Sign-in success for services for non-built-in accounts, such as LocalSystem, LocalNetwork, and so on.
- Sign-in success for batch sessions
- Sign-in session close, which is sign-out events for non-network sessions.
- Sign-in success for interactive (local and Remote Interactive/Remote Desktop)
- Sign-in success for services for non-built-in accounts, such as LocalSystem, LocalNetwork, and so on.
- Sign-in success for batch sessions
- Sign-in session close, which is sign out events for non-network sessions.
- Windows Error Reporting (Application crash events only)
- This session can help detect early signs of intruder not familiar with enterprise environment using targeted malware.
- This session can help detect early signs of intruder not familiar with enterprise environment using targeted malware.
- Event log service events
- Errors, start events, and stop events for the Windows Event Log service.
- Errors, start events, and stop events for the Windows Event Log service.
- Event log cleared (including the Security Event Log)
- This event could indicate an intruder that is covering their tracks.
- This event could indicate an intruder that is covering their tracks.
- Special privileges assigned to new sign in
- This assignation indicates that at the time of signing in, a user is either an Administrator or has the sufficient access to make themselves Administrator.
- This assignation indicates that at the time of signing in, a user is either an Administrator or has the sufficient access to make themselves Administrator.
- Outbound Remote Desktop Services session attempts
- Visibility into potential beachhead for intruder
- Visibility into potential beachhead for intruder
- System time changed
- SMB Client (mapped drive connections)
- Account credential validation
- Local accounts or domain accounts on domain controllers
- Local accounts or domain accounts on domain controllers
- A user was added or removed from the local Administrators security group.
- Crypto API private key accessed
- Associated with signing objects using the locally stored private key.
- Associated with signing objects using the locally stored private key.
- Task Scheduler task creation and delete
- Task Scheduler allows intruders to run code at specified times as LocalSystem.
- Task Scheduler allows intruders to run code at specified times as LocalSystem.
- Sign-in with explicit credentials
- Detect credential use changes by intruders to access more resources.
- Detect credential use changes by intruders to access more resources.
- Smartcard card holder verification events
- This event detects when a smartcard is being used.
- This event detects when a smartcard is being used.
### Suspect subscription
This subscription adds some possible intruder-related activity to help analyst further refine their determinations about the state of the device.
- Sign-in session creation for network sessions
- Sign-in session creation for network sessions
- Enables time-series analysis of network graphs.
- Enables time-series analysis of network graphs.
- RADIUS and VPN events
- RADIUS and VPN events
- Useful if you use a Microsoft IAS RADIUS/VPN implementation. It shows user-&gt; IP address assignment with remote IP address connecting to the enterprise.
- Useful if you use a Microsoft IAS RADIUS/VPN implementation. It shows user-&gt; IP address assignment with remote IP address connecting to the enterprise.
- Crypto API X509 object and build chain events
- Crypto API X509 object and build chain events
- Detects known bad certificate, CA, or sub-CA
- Detects unusual process use of CAPI
- Detects known bad certificate, CA, or sub-CA
- Detects unusual process use of CAPI
- Groups assigned to local sign in
- Groups assigned to local sign in
- Gives visibility to groups that enable account-wide access
- Allows better planning for remediation efforts
- Excludes well known, built-in system accounts.
- Gives visibility to groups that enable account-wide access
- Allows better planning for remediation efforts
- Excludes well known, built-in system accounts.
- Sign-in session exit
- Sign-in session exit
- Specific for network sign-in sessions.
- Specific for network sign-in sessions.
- Client DNS lookup events
- Client DNS lookup events
- Returns what process performed a DNS query and the results returned from the DNS server.
- Returns what process performed a DNS query and the results returned from the DNS server.
- Process exit
- Process exit
- Enables checking for processes terminating unexpectedly.
- Enables checking for processes terminating unexpectedly.
- Local credential validation or signing in with explicit credentials
- Local credential validation or signing in with explicit credentials
- Generated when the local SAM is authoritative for the account credentials being authenticated.
- Noisy on domain controllers
- On client devices, it's only generated when local accounts sign in.
- Generated when the local SAM is authoritative for the account credentials being authenticated.
- Noisy on domain controllers
- On client devices, it's only generated when local accounts sign in.
- Registry modification audit events
- Registry modification audit events
- Only when a registry value is being created, modified, or deleted.
- Only when a registry value is being created, modified, or deleted.
- Wireless 802.1x authentication
- Wireless 802.1x authentication
- Detect wireless connection with a peer MAC address
- Detect wireless connection with a peer MAC address
- Windows PowerShell logging
- Windows PowerShell logging
- Covers Windows PowerShell 2.0 and later and includes the Windows PowerShell 5.0 logging improvements for in-memory attacks using Windows PowerShell.
- Includes Windows PowerShell remoting logging
- Covers Windows PowerShell 2.0 and later and includes the Windows PowerShell 5.0 logging improvements for in-memory attacks using Windows PowerShell.
- Includes Windows PowerShell remoting logging
- User Mode Driver Framework "Driver Loaded" event
- User Mode Driver Framework "Driver Loaded" event
- Can possibly detect a USB device loading multiple device drivers. For example, a USB\_STOR device loading the keyboard or network driver.
- Can possibly detect a USB device loading multiple device drivers. For example, a USB\_STOR device loading the keyboard or network driver.
## <a href="" id="bkmk-appendixa"></a>Appendix A - Minimum recommended minimum audit policy

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@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ title: Get support for security baselines
description: Find answers to frequently asked question on how to get support for baselines, the Security Compliance Toolkit (SCT), and related articles.
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.topic: conceptual
ms.date: 10/31/2023
ms.date: 07/10/2024
---
# Get Support

4
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
title: Guide to removing Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer (MBSA)
description: This article documents the removal of Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer (MBSA) and provides alternative solutions.
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.date: 07/11/2023
ms.date: 07/10/2024
ms.topic: conceptual
---
@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ For example:
[![Screenshot that shows the PowerShell script.](images/powershell-example.png)](https://www.powershellgallery.com/packages/Scan-UpdatesOffline/1.0)
The preceding scripts use the [WSUS offline scan file](https://support.microsoft.com/help/927745/detailed-information-for-developers-who-use-the-windows-update-offline) (wsusscn2.cab) to perform a scan and get the same information on missing updates as MBSA supplied. MBSA also relied on the wsusscn2.cab to determine which updates were missing from a given system without connecting to any online service or server. The wsusscn2.cab file is still available and there are currently no plans to remove or replace it.
The wsusscn2.cab file contains the metadata of only security updates, update rollups and service packs available from Microsoft Update; it doesn't contain any information on non-security updates, tools or drivers.
The wsusscn2.cab file contains the metadata of only security updates, update rollups, and service packs available from Microsoft Update; it doesn't contain any information on non-security updates, tools, or drivers.
## More information

2
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
title: Microsoft Security Compliance Toolkit Guide
description: This article describes how to use Security Compliance Toolkit in your organization.
ms.topic: conceptual
ms.date: 10/31/2023
ms.date: 07/10/2024
---
# Microsoft Security Compliance Toolkit - How to use

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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
title: Security baselines guide
description: Learn how to use security baselines in your organization.
ms.topic: conceptual
ms.date: 07/11/2023
ms.date: 07/10/2024
---
# Security baselines
@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ For more information, see the following blog post: [Sticking with well-known and
## What are security baselines?
Every organization faces security threats. However, the types of security threats that are of most concern to one organization can be different from another organization. For example, an e-commerce company may focus on protecting its internet-facing web apps, while a hospital may focus on protecting confidential patient information. The one thing that all organizations have in common is a need to keep their apps and devices secure. These devices must be compliant with the security standards (or security baselines) defined by the organization.
Every organization faces security threats. However, the types of security threats that are of most concern to one organization can be different from another organization. For example, an e-commerce company might focus on protecting its internet-facing web apps, while a hospital might focus on protecting confidential patient information. The one thing that all organizations have in common is a need to keep their apps and devices secure. These devices must be compliant with the security standards (or security baselines) defined by the organization.
A security baseline is a group of Microsoft-recommended configuration settings that explains their security implication. These settings are based on feedback from Microsoft security engineering teams, product groups, partners, and customers.

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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Windows operating system security
description: Securing the operating system includes system security, encryption, network security, and threat protection.
ms.date: 08/02/2023
ms.date: 07/10/2024
ms.topic: overview
---

4
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
title: Cryptography and Certificate Management
description: Get an overview of cryptography and certificate management in Windows
ms.topic: conceptual
ms.date: 08/11/2023
ms.date: 07/10/2024
ms.reviewer: skhadeer, raverma
---
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ ms.reviewer: skhadeer, raverma
Cryptography uses code to convert data so that only a specific recipient can read it by using a key. Cryptography enforces privacy to prevent anyone except the intended recipient from reading data, integrity to ensure data is free of tampering, and authentication that verifies identity to ensure that communication is secure. The cryptography stack in Windows extends from the chip to the cloud enabling Windows, applications, and services protect system and user secrets.
Cryptography in Windows is Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140 certified. FIPS 140 certification ensures that US government approved algorithms are being used (RSA for signing, ECDH with NIST curves for key agreement, AES for symmetric encryption, and SHA2 for hashing), tests module integrity to prove that no tampering has occurred and proves the randomness for entropy sources.
Cryptography in Windows is Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140 certified. FIPS 140 certification ensures that US government approved algorithms are being used (RSA for signing, ECDH with NIST curves for key agreement, AES for symmetric encryption, and SHA2 for hashing), tests module integrity to prove that no tampering occurred and proves the randomness for entropy sources.
Windows cryptographic modules provide low-level primitives such as:

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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Control the health of Windows devices
description: This article details an end-to-end solution that helps you protect high-value assets by enforcing, controlling, and reporting the health of Windows devices.
ms.date: 08/11/2023
ms.date: 07/10/2024
ms.topic: conceptual
---
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ This article details an end-to-end solution that helps you protect high-value as
## Introduction
For Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) scenarios, employees bring commercially available devices to access both work-related resources and their personal data. Users want to use the device of their choice to access the organization's applications, data, and resources not only from the internal network but also from anywhere. This phenomenon is also known as the consumerization of IT.
For Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) scenarios, users bring commercially available devices to access both work-related resources and their personal data. Users want to use the device of their choice to access the organization's applications, data, and resources not only from the internal network but also from anywhere. This phenomenon is also known as the consumerization of IT.
Users want to have the best productivity experience when accessing corporate applications and working on organization data from their devices. That means they don't tolerate being prompted to enter their work credentials each time they access an application or a file server. From a security perspective, it also means that users manipulate corporate credentials and corporate data on unmanaged devices.
@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Windows is an important component of an end-to-end security solution that focuse
Today's computing threat landscape is increasing at a speed never encountered before. The sophistication of criminal attacks is growing, and there's no doubt that malware now targets both consumers and professionals in all industries.
During recent years, one particular category of threat has become prevalent: advanced persistent threats (APTs). The term APT is commonly used to describe any attack that seems to target individual organizations on an on-going basis. In fact, this type of attack typically involves determined adversaries who may use any methods or techniques necessary.
During recent years, one particular category of threat has become prevalent: advanced persistent threats (APTs). The term APT is commonly used to describe any attack that seems to target individual organizations on an ongoing basis. In fact, this type of attack typically involves determined adversaries who may use any methods or techniques necessary.
With the BYOD phenomena, a poorly maintained device represents a target of choice. For an attacker, it's an easy way to breach the security network perimeter, gain access to, and then steal high-value assets.
@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ This section describes what Windows offers in terms of security defenses and wha
### Windows hardware-based security defenses
The most aggressive forms of malware try to insert themselves into the boot process as early as possible so that they can take control of the operating system early and prevent protection mechanisms and antimalware software from working. This type of malicious code is often called a rootkit or bootkit. The best way to avoid having to deal with low-level malware is to secure the boot process so that the device is protected from the very start. Windows supports multiple layers of boot protection. Some of these features are available only if specific types of hardware are installed. For more information, see the [Hardware requirements](#hardware-requirements) section.
The most aggressive forms of malware try to insert themselves into the boot process as early as possible so that they can take control of the operating system early and prevent protection mechanisms and anti-malware software from working. This type of malicious code is often called a rootkit or bootkit. The best way to avoid having to deal with low-level malware is to secure the boot process so that the device is protected from the very start. Windows supports multiple layers of boot protection. Some of these features are available only if specific types of hardware are installed. For more information, see the [Hardware requirements](#hardware-requirements) section.
:::image type="content" alt-text="figure 4." source="images/hva-fig4-hardware.png":::
@ -153,14 +153,14 @@ Windows supports features to help prevent sophisticated low-level malware like r
- **Early Launch Antimalware (ELAM).** ELAM tests all drivers before they load and prevents unapproved drivers from loading.
Traditional antimalware apps don't start until after the boot drivers have been loaded, which gives a rootkit that is disguised as a driver the opportunity to work. ELAM is a Windows mechanism introduced in a previous version of Windows that allows antimalware software to run early in the boot sequence. Thus, the antimalware component is the first third-party component to run and control the initialization of other boot drivers until the Windows operating system is operational. When the system is started with a complete runtime environment (network access, storage, and so on), then a full-featured antimalware is loaded.
Traditional anti-malware apps don't start until after the boot drivers have been loaded, which gives a rootkit that is disguised as a driver the opportunity to work. ELAM is a Windows mechanism introduced in a previous version of Windows that allows anti-malware software to run early in the boot sequence. Thus, the anti-malware component is the first third-party component to run and control the initialization of other boot drivers until the Windows operating system is operational. When the system is started with a complete runtime environment (network access, storage, and so on), then a full-featured anti-malware is loaded.
ELAM can load a Microsoft or non-Microsoft antimalware driver before all non-Microsoft boot drivers and applications, thus continuing the chain of trust established by Secure Boot and Trusted Boot. Because the operating system hasn't started yet, and because Windows needs to boot as quickly as possible, ELAM has a simple task: Examine every boot driver and determine whether it is on the list of trusted drivers. If it's not trusted, Windows won't load it.
ELAM can load a Microsoft or non-Microsoft anti-malware driver before all non-Microsoft boot drivers and applications, thus continuing the chain of trust established by Secure Boot and Trusted Boot. Because the operating system hasn't started yet, and because Windows needs to boot as quickly as possible, ELAM has a simple task: Examine every boot driver and determine whether it is on the list of trusted drivers. If it's not trusted, Windows won't load it.
> [!NOTE]
> Windows Defender, Microsoft's antimalware included by default in Windows, supports ELAM; it can be replaced with a third-party antimalware compatible solution. The name of the Windows Defender ELAM driver is WdBoot.sys. Windows Defender uses its ELAM driver to roll back any malicious changes made to the Windows Defender driver at the next reboot. This prevents kernel mode malware making lasting changes to Windows Defender's mini-filter driver before shutdown or reboot.
The ELAM signed driver is loaded before any other third-party drivers or applications, which allows the antimalware software to detect and block any attempts to tamper with the boot process by trying to load unsigned or untrusted code.
The ELAM signed driver is loaded before any other third-party drivers or applications, which allows the anti-malware software to detect and block any attempts to tamper with the boot process by trying to load unsigned or untrusted code.
The ELAM driver is a small driver with a small policy database that has a narrow scope, focused on drivers that are loaded early at system launch. The policy database is stored in a registry hive that is also measured to the TPM, to record the operational parameters of the ELAM driver. An ELAM driver must be signed by Microsoft and the associated certificate must contain the complementary EKU (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.61.4.1).
@ -170,9 +170,9 @@ Windows supports features to help prevent sophisticated low-level malware like r
- **Hypervisor-protected Code Integrity (HVCI).** Hypervisor-protected Code Integrity is a feature of Device Guard that ensures only drivers, executables, and DLLs that comply with the Device Guard Code Integrity policy are allowed to run.
When enabled and configured, Windows can start the Hyper-V virtualization-based security services. HVCI helps protect the system core (kernel), privileged drivers, and system defenses, like antimalware solutions, by preventing malware from running early in the boot process, or after startup.
When enabled and configured, Windows can start the Hyper-V Virtualization-based security services. HVCI helps protect the system core (kernel), privileged drivers, and system defenses, like anti-malware solutions, by preventing malware from running early in the boot process, or after startup.
HVCI uses virtualization-based security to isolate Code Integrity, the only way kernel memory can become executable is through a Code Integrity verification. This dependency on verification means that kernel memory pages can never be Writable and Executable (W+X) and executable code can't be directly modified.
HVCI uses Virtualization-based security to isolate Code Integrity, the only way kernel memory can become executable is through a Code Integrity verification. This dependency on verification means that kernel memory pages can never be Writable and Executable (W+X) and executable code can't be directly modified.
> [!NOTE]
> Device Guard devices that run Kernel Mode Code Integrity with virtualization-based security must have compatible drivers. For additional information, please read the [Driver compatibility with Device Guard in Windows](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-hardware-certification/driver-compatibility-with-device-guard-in-windows-10/ba-p/364865) blog post.
@ -184,17 +184,17 @@ Windows supports features to help prevent sophisticated low-level malware like r
In Windows, Credential Guard aims to protect domain corporate credentials from theft and reuse by malware. With Credential Guard, Windows implemented an architectural change that fundamentally prevents the current forms of the pass-the-hash (PtH) attack.
This attack-free state is accomplished by using Hyper-V and the new virtualization-based security feature to create a protected container where trusted code and secrets are isolated from the Windows kernel. This accomplishment means that even if the Windows kernel is compromised, an attacker has no way to read and extract the data required to initiate a PtH attack. Credential Guard prevents this unauthorized access because the memory where secrets are stored is no longer accessible from the regular OS, even in kernel mode - the hypervisor controls who can access the memory.
This attack-free state is accomplished by using Hyper-V and the new Virtualization-based security feature to create a protected container where trusted code and secrets are isolated from the Windows kernel. This accomplishment means that even if the Windows kernel is compromised, an attacker has no way to read and extract the data required to initiate a PtH attack. Credential Guard prevents this unauthorized access because the memory where secrets are stored is no longer accessible from the regular OS, even in kernel mode - the hypervisor controls who can access the memory.
- **Health attestation.** The device's firmware logs the boot process, and Windows can send it to a trusted server that can check and assess the device's health.
Windows takes measurements of the UEFI firmware and each of the Windows and antimalware components are made as they load during the boot process. Additionally, they're taken and measured sequentially, not all at once. When these measurements are complete, their values are digitally signed and stored securely in the TPM and can't be changed unless the system is reset.
Windows takes measurements of the UEFI firmware and each of the Windows and anti-malware components are made as they load during the boot process. Additionally, they're taken and measured sequentially, not all at once. When these measurements are complete, their values are digitally signed and stored securely in the TPM and can't be changed unless the system is reset.
For more information, see [Secured Boot and Measured Boot: Hardening Early Boot Components Against Malware](/previous-versions/windows/hardware/design/dn653311(v=vs.85)).
During each subsequent boot, the same components are measured, which allows comparison of the measurements against an expected baseline. For more security, the values measured by the TPM can be signed and transmitted to a remote server, which can then perform the comparison. This process, called *remote device health attestation*, allows the server to verify health status of the Windows device.
Although Secure Boot is a proactive form of protection, health attestation is a reactive form of boot protection. Health attestation ships disabled in Windows and is enabled by an antimalware or an MDM vendor. Unlike Secure Boot, health attestation won't stop the boot process and enter remediation when a measurement doesn't work. But with conditional access control, health attestation will help to prevent access to high-value assets.
Although Secure Boot is a proactive form of protection, health attestation is a reactive form of boot protection. Health attestation ships disabled in Windows and is enabled by an anti-malware or an MDM vendor. Unlike Secure Boot, health attestation won't stop the boot process and enter remediation when a measurement doesn't work. But with conditional access control, health attestation helps to prevent access to high-value assets.
### Virtualization-based security
@ -202,16 +202,16 @@ Virtualization-based security provides a new trust boundary for Windows and uses
Virtualization-based security helps to protect against a compromised kernel or a malicious user with Administrator privileges. Virtualization-based security isn't trying to protect against a physical attacker.
The following Windows services are protected with virtualization-based security:
The following Windows services are protected with Virtualization-based security:
- **Credential Guard** (LSA Credential Isolation): prevents pass-the-hash attacks and enterprise credential theft that happens by reading and dumping the content of lsass memory
- **Device Guard** (Hyper-V Code Integrity): Device Guard uses the new virtualization-based security in Windows to isolate the Code Integrity service from the Windows kernel itself, which lets the service use signatures defined by your enterprise-controlled policy to help determine what is trustworthy. In effect, the Code Integrity service runs alongside the kernel in a Windows hypervisor-protected container.
- **Device Guard** (Hyper-V Code Integrity): Device Guard uses the new Virtualization-based security in Windows to isolate the Code Integrity service from the Windows kernel itself, which lets the service use signatures defined by your enterprise-controlled policy to help determine what is trustworthy. In effect, the Code Integrity service runs alongside the kernel in a Windows hypervisor-protected container.
- **Other isolated services**: for example, on Windows Server 2016, there's the vTPM feature that allows you to have encrypted virtual machines (VMs) on servers.
> [!NOTE]
> Virtualization-based security is only available with Enterprise edition. Virtualization-based security requires devices with UEFI (2.3.1 or higher) with Secure Boot enabled, x64 processor with Virtualization Extensions and SLAT enabled. IOMMU, TPM 2.0. and support for Secure Memory overwritten are optional, but recommended.
The schema below is a high-level view of Windows with virtualization-based security.
The schema below is a high-level view of Windows with Virtualization-based security.
:::image type="content" alt-text="figure 5." source="images/hva-fig5-virtualbasedsecurity.png":::
@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ credential isolation is enabled, it then spawns LsaIso.exe as an isolated proces
Device Guard is a feature of Windows Enterprise that allows organizations to lock down a device to help protect it from running untrusted software. In this configuration, the only applications allowed to run are those applications that are trusted by the organization.
The trust decision to execute code is performed by using Hyper-V Code Integrity, which runs in virtualization-based security, a Hyper-V protected container that runs alongside regular Windows.
The trust decision to execute code is performed by using Hyper-V Code Integrity, which runs in Virtualization-based security, a Hyper-V protected container that runs alongside regular Windows.
Hyper-V Code Integrity is a feature that validates the integrity of a driver or system file each time it's loaded into memory. Code integrity detects whether an unsigned driver or system file is being loaded into the kernel, or whether a system file has been modified by malicious software that is being run by a user account with Administrator privileges. On x64-based versions of Windows, kernel-mode drivers must be digitally signed.
@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ Device Guard needs to be planned and configured to be truly effective. It isn't
There are three different parts that make up the Device Guard solution in Windows:
- The first part is a base **set of hardware security features** introduced with the previous version of Windows. TPM for hardware cryptographic operations and UEFI with modern firmware, along with Secure Boot, allows you to control what the device is running when the systems start.
- After the hardware security feature, there's the code integrity engine. In Windows, **Code Integrity is now fully configurable** and now resides in Isolated user mode, a part of the memory that is protected by virtualization-based security.
- After the hardware security feature, there's the code integrity engine. In Windows, **Code Integrity is now fully configurable** and now resides in Isolated user mode, a part of the memory that is protected by Virtualization-based security.
- The last part of Device Guard is **manageability**. Code Integrity configuration is exposed through specific Group Policy Objects, PowerShell cmdlets, and MDM configuration service providers (CSPs).
For more information on how to deploy Device Guard in an enterprise, see the [Device Guard deployment guide](/windows/device-security/device-guard/device-guard-deployment-guide).
@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ To protect high-value assets, SAWs are used to make secure connections to those
Similarly, on corporate fully managed workstations, where applications are installed by using a distribution tool like Microsoft Configuration Manager, Intune, or any third-party device management, then Device Guard is applicable. In that type of scenario, the organization has a good idea of the software that an average user is running.
It could be challenging to use Device Guard on corporate, lightly managed workstations where the user is typically allowed to install software on their own. When an organization offers great flexibility, it's difficult to run Device Guard in enforcement mode. Nevertheless, Device Guard can be run in Audit mode, and in that case, the event log will contain a record of any binaries that violated the Device Guard policy. When Device Guard is used in Audit mode, organizations can get rich data about drivers and applications that users install and run.
It could be challenging to use Device Guard on corporate, lightly managed workstations where the user is typically allowed to install software on their own. When an organization offers great flexibility, it's difficult to run Device Guard in enforcement mode. Nevertheless, Device Guard can be run in Audit mode, and in that case, the event log contains a record of any binaries that violated the Device Guard policy. When Device Guard is used in Audit mode, organizations can get rich data about drivers and applications that users install and run.
Before you can benefit from the protection included in Device Guard, Code Integrity policy must be created by using tools provided by Microsoft, but the policy can be deployed with common management tools, like Group Policy. The Code Integrity policy is a binary-encoded XML document that includes configuration settings for both the User and Kernel-modes of Windows, along with restrictions on Windows script hosts. Device Guard Code Integrity policy restricts what code can run on a device.
@ -286,14 +286,14 @@ Device Guard policy into the UpdateSigner section.
On computers with Device Guard, Microsoft proposes to move from a world where unsigned apps can be run without restriction to a world where only signed and trusted code is allowed to run on Windows.
With Windows, organizations will make line-of-business (LOB) apps available to members of the organization through the Microsoft Store infrastructure. More specifically, LOB apps will be available in a private store within the public Microsoft Store. Microsoft Store signs and distributes Universal
With Windows, organizations make line-of-business (LOB) apps available to members of the organization through the Microsoft Store infrastructure. More specifically, LOB apps are available in a private store within the public Microsoft Store. Microsoft Store signs and distributes Universal
Windows apps and Classic Windows apps. All apps downloaded from the Microsoft Store are signed.
In organizations today, many LOB applications are unsigned. Code signing is frequently viewed as a tough problem to solve for various reasons, like the lack of code signing expertise. Even if code signing is a best practice, many internal applications aren't signed.
Windows includes tools that allow IT pros to take applications that have been already packaged and run them through a process to create more signatures that can be distributed along with existing applications.
### Why are antimalware and device management solutions still necessary?
### Why are anti-malware and device management solutions still necessary?
Although allowlist mechanisms are efficient at ensuring that only trusted applications can be run, they can't prevent the compromise of a trusted (but vulnerable) application by malicious content designed to exploit a known vulnerability. Device Guard doesn't protect against user mode malicious code run by exploiting vulnerabilities.
@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ Vulnerabilities are weaknesses in software that could allow an attacker to compr
It's common to see attackers distributing specially crafted content in an attempt to exploit known vulnerabilities in user mode software like web browsers (and their plug-ins), Java virtual machines, PDF readers, or document editors. As of today, 90 percent of discovered vulnerabilities affect user mode applications compared to the operating system and kernel mode drivers that host them.
To combat these threats, patching is the single most effective control, with antimalware software forming complementary layers of defense.
To combat these threats, patching is the single most effective control, with anti-malware software forming complementary layers of defense.
Most application software has no facility for updating itself, so even if the software vendor publishes an update that fixes the vulnerability, the user may not know that the update is available or how to obtain it, and therefore remains vulnerable to attack. Organizations still need to manage devices and to patch vulnerabilities.
@ -319,23 +319,23 @@ For more information on device health attestation, see the [Detect an unhealthy
### Hardware requirements
The following table details the hardware requirements for both virtualization-based security services and the health attestation feature. For more information, see [Minimum hardware requirements](/windows-hardware/design/minimum/minimum-hardware-requirements-overview).
The following table details the hardware requirements for both Virtualization-based security services and the health attestation feature. For more information, see [Minimum hardware requirements](/windows-hardware/design/minimum/minimum-hardware-requirements-overview).
|Hardware|Motivation|
|--- |--- |
|UEFI 2.3.1 or later firmware with Secure Boot enabled|Required to support UEFI Secure Boot. UEFI Secure Boot ensures that the device boots only authorized code. Additionally, Boot Integrity (Platform Secure Boot) must be supported following the requirements in Hardware Compatibility Specification for Systems for Windows under the subsection: "System.Fundamentals.Firmware.CS.UEFISecureBoot.ConnectedStandby"|
|Virtualization extensions, such as Intel VT-x, AMD-V, and SLAT must be enabled|Required to support virtualization-based security. **Note:** Device Guard can be enabled without using virtualization-based security.|
|X64 processor|Required to support virtualization-based security that uses Windows Hypervisor. Hyper-V is supported only on x64 processor (and not on x86). Direct Memory Access (DMA) protection can be enabled to provide extra memory protection but requires processors to include DMA protection technologies.|
|Virtualization extensions, such as Intel VT-x, AMD-V, and SLAT must be enabled|Required to support Virtualization-based security. **Note:** Device Guard can be enabled without using Virtualization-based security.|
|X64 processor|Required to support Virtualization-based security that uses Windows Hypervisor. Hyper-V is supported only on x64 processor (and not on x86). Direct Memory Access (DMA) protection can be enabled to provide extra memory protection but requires processors to include DMA protection technologies.|
|IOMMU, such as Intel VT-d, AMD-Vi|Support for the IOMMU in Windows enhances system resiliency against DMA attacks.|
|Trusted Platform Module (TPM)|Required to support health attestation and necessary for other key protections for virtualization-based security. TPM 2.0 is supported. Support for TPM 1.2 was added beginning in Windows 10, version 1607 (RS1)|
|Trusted Platform Module (TPM)|Required to support health attestation and necessary for other key protections for Virtualization-based security. TPM 2.0 is supported. Support for TPM 1.2 was added beginning in Windows 10, version 1607 (RS1)|
This section presented information about several closely related controls in Windows . The multi-layer defenses and in-depth approach help to eradicate low-level malware during boot sequence. Virtualization-based security is a fundamental operating system architecture change that adds a new security boundary. Device Guard and Credential Guard respectively help to block untrusted code and protect corporate domain credentials from theft and reuse. This section also briefly discussed the importance of managing devices and patching vulnerabilities. All these technologies can be used to harden and lock down devices while limiting the risk of attackers compromising them.
This section presented information about several closely related controls in Windows. The multi-layer defenses and in-depth approach help to eradicate low-level malware during boot sequence. Virtualization-based security is a fundamental operating system architecture change that adds a new security boundary. Device Guard and Credential Guard respectively help to block untrusted code and protect corporate domain credentials from theft and reuse. This section also briefly discussed the importance of managing devices and patching vulnerabilities. All these technologies can be used to harden and lock down devices while limiting the risk of attackers compromising them.
## Detect an unhealthy Windows-based device
As of today, many organizations only consider devices to be compliant with company policy after they've passed various checks that show, for example, that the operating system is in the correct state, properly configured, and has security protection enabled. Unfortunately, with today's systems, this form of reporting isn't entirely reliable because malware can spoof a software statement about system health. A rootkit, or a similar low-level exploit, can report a false healthy state to traditional compliance tools.
The biggest challenge with rootkits is that they can be undetectable to the client. Because they start before antimalware, and they have system-level privileges, they can completely disguise themselves while continuing to access system resources. As a result, traditional computers infected with rootkits appear to be healthy, even with antimalware running.
The biggest challenge with rootkits is that they can be undetectable to the client. Because they start before anti-malware, and they have system-level privileges, they can completely disguise themselves while continuing to access system resources. As a result, traditional computers infected with rootkits appear to be healthy, even with anti-malware running.
As previously discussed, the health attestation feature of Windows uses the TPM hardware component to securely record a measurement of every boot-related component, including firmware, Windows kernel, and even early boot drivers. Because health attestation uses the hardware-based security capabilities of TPM, the log of all boot measured components remains out of the reach of any malware.
@ -345,9 +345,9 @@ After the devices attest a trusted boot state, they can prove that they aren't r
To understand the concept of device health, it's important to know traditional measures that IT pros have taken to prevent the breach of malware. Malware control technologies are highly focused on the prevention of installation and distribution.
However, the use of traditional malware prevention technologies like antimalware or patching solutions brings a new set of issues for IT pros: the ability to monitor and control the compliance of devices accessing organization's resources.
However, the use of traditional malware prevention technologies like anti-malware or patching solutions brings a new set of issues for IT pros: the ability to monitor and control the compliance of devices accessing organization's resources.
The definition of device compliance will vary based on an organization's installed antimalware, device configuration settings, patch management baseline, and other security requirements. But health of the device is part of the overall device compliance policy.
The definition of device compliance will vary based on an organization's installed anti-malware, device configuration settings, patch management baseline, and other security requirements. But health of the device is part of the overall device compliance policy.
The health of the device isn't binary and depends on the organization's security implementation. The Health Attestation Service provides information back to the MDM on which security features are enabled during the boot of the device by using trustworthy hardware TPM.
@ -364,13 +364,13 @@ A relying party like an MDM can inspect the report generated by the remote healt
> [!NOTE]
> To use the health attestation feature of Windows, the device must be equipped with a discrete or firmware TPM. There is no restriction on any particular edition of Windows.
Windows supports health attestation scenarios by allowing applications access to the underlying health attestation configuration service provider (CSP) so that applications can request a health attestation token. The measurement of the boot sequence can be checked at any time locally by an antimalware or an MDM agent.
Windows supports health attestation scenarios by allowing applications access to the underlying health attestation configuration service provider (CSP) so that applications can request a health attestation token. The measurement of the boot sequence can be checked at any time locally by an anti-malware or an MDM agent.
Remote device health attestation combined with an MDM provides a hardware-rooted method for reporting the current security status and detecting any changes, without having to trust the software running on the system.
In the case where malicious code is running on the device, the use of a remote server is required. If a rootkit is present on the device, the antimalware is no longer reliable, and its behavior can be hijacked by a malicious code running early in the startup sequence. This reason is what makes it important to use Secure Boot and Device Guard, to control which code is loaded during the boot sequence.
In the case where malicious code is running on the device, the use of a remote server is required. If a rootkit is present on the device, the anti-malware is no longer reliable, and its behavior can be hijacked by a malicious code running early in the startup sequence. This reason is what makes it important to use Secure Boot and Device Guard, to control which code is loaded during the boot sequence.
The antimalware software can search to determine whether the boot sequence contains any signs of malware, such as a rootkit. It can also send the TCG log and the PCRs to a remote health attestation server to provide a separation between the measurement component and the verification component.
The anti-malware software can search to determine whether the boot sequence contains any signs of malware, such as a rootkit. It can also send the TCG log and the PCRs to a remote health attestation server to provide a separation between the measurement component and the verification component.
Health attestation logs the measurements in various TPM Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) and TCG logs during the boot process.
@ -602,7 +602,7 @@ The figure below shows how the Health Attestation Service is expected to work wi
:::image type="content" alt-text="figure 10." source="images/hva-fig9-intune.png":::
An MDM solution can then use health state statements and take them to the next level by coupling with client policies that will enable conditional access to be granted based on the device's ability to prove that it's malware free, its antimalware system is functional and up to date, the
An MDM solution can then use health state statements and take them to the next level by coupling with client policies that will enable conditional access to be granted based on the device's ability to prove that it's malware free, its anti-malware system is functional and up to date, the
firewall is running, and the devices patch state is compliant.
Finally, resources can be protected by denying access to endpoints that are unable to prove they're healthy. This feature is much needed for BYOD devices that need to access organizational resources.
@ -736,7 +736,7 @@ The following list contains high-level key takeaways to improve the security pos
- **Use virtualization-based security**
When you have Kernel Mode Code Integrity protected by virtualization-based security, the code integrity rules are still enforced even if a vulnerability allows unauthorized kernel mode memory access. Keep in mind that Device Guard devices that run Kernel Code Integrity with virtualization-based security must have compatible drivers.
When you have Kernel Mode Code Integrity protected by Virtualization-based security, the code integrity rules are still enforced even if a vulnerability allows unauthorized kernel mode memory access. Keep in mind that Device Guard devices that run Kernel Code Integrity with Virtualization-based security must have compatible drivers.
- **Start to deploy Device Guard with Audit mode**
@ -756,7 +756,7 @@ The following list contains high-level key takeaways to improve the security pos
Health attestation is a key feature of Windows that includes client and cloud components to control access to high-value assets based on a user and their device's identity and compliance with corporate governance policy. Organizations can choose to detect and report unhealthy devices, or to configure health enforcement rules based on their needs. Health attestation provides an end-to-end security model and integration points, which vendors and software developers can use to build and integrate a customized solution.
## Related topics
## Related articles
- [Protect derived domain credentials with Credential Guard](/windows/access-protection/credential-guard/credential-guard)
- [Device Guard deployment guide](/windows/device-security/device-guard/device-guard-deployment-guide)

8
windows/security/operating-system-security/system-security/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process.md
View File

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
title: Secure the Windows boot process
description: This article describes how Windows security features help protect your PC from malware, including rootkits and other applications.
ms.topic: conceptual
ms.date: 08/11/2023
ms.date: 07/10/2024
ms.collection:
- tier1
---
@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ These requirements help protect you from rootkits while allowing you to run any
To prevent malware from abusing these options, the user must manually configure the UEFI firmware to trust a non-certified bootloader or to turn off Secure Boot. Software can't change the Secure Boot settings.
The default state of Secure Boot has a wide circle of trust, which can result in customers trusting boot components they may not need. Since the Microsoft 3rd Party UEFI CA certificate signs the bootloaders for all Linux distributions, trusting the Microsoft 3rd Party UEFI CA signature in the UEFI database increase s the attack surface of systems. A customer who intended to only trust and boot a single Linux distribution will trust all distributions - much more than their desired configuration. A vulnerability in any of the bootloaders exposes the system and places the customer at risk of exploit for a bootloader they never intended to use, as seen in recent vulnerabilities, for example [with the GRUB bootloader](https://msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/ADV200011) or [firmware-level rootkit]( https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/researchers-uncover-dangerous-new-firmware-level-rootkit) affecting boot components. [Secured-core PCs](/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/OEM-highly-secure-11) require Secure Boot to be enabled and configured to distrust the Microsoft 3rd Party UEFI CA signature, by default, to provide customers with the most secure configuration of their PCs possible.
The default state of Secure Boot has a wide circle of trust, which can result in customers trusting boot components they may not need. Since the Microsoft 3rd Party UEFI CA certificate signs the bootloaders for all Linux distributions, trusting the Microsoft 3rd Party UEFI CA signature in the UEFI database increase s the attack surface of systems. A customer who intended to only trust and boot a single Linux distribution will trust all distributions - more than their desired configuration. A vulnerability in any of the bootloaders exposes the system and places the customer at risk of exploit for a bootloader they never intended to use, as seen in recent vulnerabilities, for example [with the GRUB bootloader](https://msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/ADV200011) or [firmware-level rootkit]( https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/researchers-uncover-dangerous-new-firmware-level-rootkit) affecting boot components. [Secured-core PCs](/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/OEM-highly-secure-11) require Secure Boot to be enabled and configured to distrust the Microsoft 3rd Party UEFI CA signature, by default, to provide customers with the most secure configuration of their PCs possible.
To trust and boot operating systems, like Linux, and components signed by the UEFI signature, Secured-core PCs can be configured in the BIOS menu to add the signature in the UEFI database by following these steps:
@ -91,11 +91,11 @@ Like most mobile devices, Arm-based devices, such as the Microsoft Surface RT de
Trusted Boot takes over where Secure Boot ends. The bootloader verifies the digital signature of the Windows kernel before loading it. The Windows kernel, in turn, verifies every other component of the Windows startup process, including the boot drivers, startup files, and ELAM. If a file has been modified, the bootloader detects the problem and refuses to load the corrupted component. Often, Windows can automatically repair the corrupted component, restoring the integrity of Windows and allowing the PC to start normally.
## Early Launch Anti-Malware
## Early Launch anti-malware
Because Secure Boot has protected the bootloader and Trusted Boot has protected the Windows kernel, the next opportunity for malware to start is by infecting a non-Microsoft boot driver. Traditional anti-malware apps don't start until after the boot drivers have been loaded, giving a rootkit disguised as a driver the opportunity to work.
Early Launch Anti-Malware (ELAM) can load a Microsoft or non-Microsoft anti-malware driver before all non-Microsoft boot drivers and applications, thus continuing the chain of trust established by Secure Boot and Trusted Boot. Because the OS hasn't started yet, and because Windows needs to boot as quickly as possible, ELAM has a simple task: examine every boot driver and determine whether it is on the list of trusted drivers. If it's not trusted, Windows doesn't load it.
Early Launch anti-malware (ELAM) can load a Microsoft or non-Microsoft anti-malware driver before all non-Microsoft boot drivers and applications, thus continuing the chain of trust established by Secure Boot and Trusted Boot. Because the OS hasn't started yet, and because Windows needs to boot as quickly as possible, ELAM has a simple task: examine every boot driver and determine whether it is on the list of trusted drivers. If it's not trusted, Windows doesn't load it.
An ELAM driver isn't a full-featured anti-malware solution; that loads later in the boot process. Windows Defender (included with Windows) supports ELAM, as does several non-Microsoft anti-malware apps.

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windows/security/operating-system-security/system-security/trusted-boot.md
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
title: Secure Boot and Trusted Boot
description: Trusted Boot prevents corrupted components from loading during the boot-up process in Windows 11
ms.topic: conceptual
ms.date: 10/30/2023
ms.date: 07/10/2024
ms.reviewer: jsuther
appliesto:
- "✅ <a href=\"https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/release-health/supported-versions-windows-client\" target=\"_blank\">Windows 11</a>"
@ -10,15 +10,15 @@ appliesto:
# Secure Boot and Trusted Boot
*This article describes Secure Boot and Trusted Boot, security measures built into Windows 11.*
This article describes Secure Boot and Trusted Boot, security measures built into Windows 11.
Secure Boot and Trusted Boot help prevent malware and corrupted components from loading when a Windows 11 device is starting. Secure Boot starts with initial boot-up protection, and then Trusted Boot picks up the process. Together, Secure Boot and Trusted Boot help to ensure your Windows 11 system boots up safely and securely.
## Secure Boot
The first step in protecting the operating system is to ensure that it boots securely after the initial hardware and firmware boot sequences have safely finished their early boot sequences. Secure Boot makes a safe and trusted path from the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) through the Windows kernel's Trusted Boot sequence. Malware attacks on the Windows boot sequence are blocked by the signature-enforcement handshakes throughout the boot sequence between the UEFI, bootloader, kernel, and application environments.
The first step in protecting the operating system is to ensure that it boots securely after the initial hardware and firmware boot sequences safely finish their early boot sequences. Secure Boot makes a safe and trusted path from the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) through the Windows kernel's Trusted Boot sequence. Malware attacks on the Windows boot sequence are blocked by the signature-enforcement handshakes throughout the boot sequence between the UEFI, bootloader, kernel, and application environments.
As the PC begins the boot process, it first verifies that the firmware is digitally signed, reducing the risk of firmware rootkits. Secure Boot then checks all code that runs before the operating system and checks the OS bootloader's digital signature to ensure that it's trusted by the Secure Boot policy and hasn't been tampered with.
As the PC begins the boot process, it first verifies that the firmware is digitally signed, reducing the risk of firmware rootkits. Secure Boot then checks all code that runs before the operating system, and checks the OS bootloader's digital signature to ensure that it's trusted by the Secure Boot policy and hasn't been tampered with.
## Trusted Boot

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windows/security/operating-system-security/virus-and-threat-protection/microsoft-defender-smartscreen/available-settings.md
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@ -1,66 +1,57 @@
---
title: Available Microsoft Defender SmartScreen Group Policy and mobile device management (MDM) settings
title: Available Microsoft Defender SmartScreen settings
description: A list of all available settings for Microsoft Defender SmartScreen using Group Policy and mobile device management (MDM) settings.
ms.date: 08/11/2023
ms.date: 07/10/2024
ms.topic: reference
---
# Available Microsoft Defender SmartScreen Group Policy and mobile device management (MDM) settings
Microsoft Defender SmartScreen works with Intune, Group Policy, and mobile device management (MDM) settings to help you manage your organization's computer settings. Based on how you set up Microsoft Defender SmartScreen, you can show employees a warning page and let them continue to the site, or you can block the site entirely.
# Available Microsoft Defender SmartScreen settings
See [Windows 10 and Windows 11 settings to protect devices using Intune](/intune/endpoint-protection-windows-10#windows-defender-smartscreen-settings) for the controls you can use in Intune.
Microsoft Defender SmartScreen works with Intune, Group Policy, and mobile device management (MDM) settings to help you manage your organization's computer settings. Based on how you set up Microsoft Defender SmartScreen, you can show users a warning page and let them continue to the site, or you can block the site entirely.
See [Windows settings to protect devices using Intune](/intune/endpoint-protection-windows-10#windows-defender-smartscreen-settings) for the controls you can use in Intune.
> [!NOTE]
> For a list of settings available for Enhanced phishing protection, see [Enhanced phishing protection](enhanced-phishing-protection.md#configure-enhanced-phishing-protection-for-your-organization).
## Group Policy settings
SmartScreen uses registry-based Administrative Template policy settings.
Setting|Supported on|Description|
|--- |--- |--- |
|**Windows 10, version 2004:** Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Defender SmartScreen\Explorer\Configure Windows Defender SmartScreen|**Windows 10, version 1703:** Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Defender SmartScreen\Explorer\Configure Windows Defender SmartScreen<br/><br/>**Windows 10, Version 1607 and earlier:** Administrative Templates\Windows Components\File Explorer\Configure Windows SmartScreen<br/><br/>**At least Windows Server 2012, Windows 8 or Windows RT**|This policy setting turns on Microsoft Defender SmartScreen. <br/><br/>If you enable this setting, it turns on Microsoft Defender SmartScreen and your employees are unable to turn it off. Additionally, when enabling this feature, you must also pick whether Microsoft Defender SmartScreen should Warn your employees or Warn and prevent bypassing the message (effectively blocking the employee from the site).<br/><br/>If you disable this setting, it turns off Microsoft Defender SmartScreen and your employees are unable to turn it on. <br/><br/>If you don't configure this setting, your employees can decide whether to use Microsoft Defender SmartScreen.|
|**Windows 10, version 2004:** Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Defender SmartScreen\Explorer\Configure App Install Control|**Windows 10, version 1703:** Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Defender SmartScreen\Explorer\Configure App Install Control|This policy setting is intended to prevent malicious content from affecting your user's devices when downloading executable content from the internet.<br/><br/>This setting doesn't protect against malicious content from USB devices, network shares, or other non-internet sources.<br/><br/>**Important:** Using a trustworthy browser helps ensure that these protections work as expected.|
|**Windows 10, version 2004:** Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Defender SmartScreen\Microsoft Edge\Configure Windows Defender SmartScreen (Microsoft Edge version 45 and earlier)<br/><br/>Administrative Templates\Microsoft Edge\SmartScreen settings\Configure Microsoft Defender SmartScreen (Microsoft Edge version 77 or later)<br/><br/>**Windows 10, version 1703:** Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Defender SmartScreen\Microsoft Edge\Configure Windows Defender SmartScreen (Microsoft Edge version 45 and earlier)<br/><br/>Administrative Templates\Microsoft Edge\SmartScreen settings\Configure Microsoft Defender SmartScreen (Microsoft Edge version 77 or later)<br/><br/>**Windows 10, Version 1607 and earlier:** Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Microsoft Edge\Configure Windows SmartScreen|Microsoft Edge on Windows 10 or Windows 11|This policy setting turns on Microsoft Defender SmartScreen. <br/><br/>If you enable this setting, it turns on Microsoft Defender SmartScreen and your employees are unable to turn it off.<br/><br/>If you disable this setting, it turns off Microsoft Defender SmartScreen and your employees are unable to turn it on. <br/><br/>If you don't configure this setting, your employees can decide whether to use Microsoft Defender SmartScreen.|
|**Windows 10, version 2004:** Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Defender SmartScreen\Microsoft Edge\Prevent bypassing Windows Defender SmartScreen prompts for files (Microsoft Edge version 45 and earlier)<br/><br/>Administrative Templates\Microsoft Edge\SmartScreen settings\Prevent bypassing of Microsoft Defender SmartScreen warnings about downloads (Microsoft Edge version 77 or later)<br/><br/>**Windows 10, version 1703:** Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Defender SmartScreen\Microsoft Edge\Prevent bypassing Windows Defender SmartScreen prompts for files (Microsoft Edge version 45 and earlier)<br/><br/>Administrative Templates\Microsoft Edge\SmartScreen settings\Prevent bypassing of Microsoft Defender SmartScreen warnings about downloads (Microsoft Edge version 77 or later)<br/><br/>**Windows 10, Version 1511 and 1607:** Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Microsoft Edge\Prevent bypassing Windows SmartScreen prompts for files|Microsoft Edge on Windows 10, version 1511 or later|This policy setting stops employees from bypassing the Microsoft Defender SmartScreen warnings about potentially malicious files.<br/><br/>If you enable this setting, it stops employees from bypassing the warning, stopping the file download.<br/><br/>If you disable or don't configure this setting, your employees can bypass the warnings and continue to download potentially malicious files.|
|**Windows 10, version 2004:** Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Defender SmartScreen\Microsoft Edge\Prevent bypassing Windows Defender SmartScreen prompts for sites (Microsoft Edge version 45 and earlier)<br/><br/>Administrative Templates\Microsoft Edge\SmartScreen settings\Prevent bypassing Microsoft Defender SmartScreen prompts for sites (Microsoft Edge version 77 or later)<br/><br/>**Windows 10, version 1703:** Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Defender SmartScreen\Microsoft Edge\Prevent bypassing Windows Defender SmartScreen prompts for sites (Microsoft Edge version 45 and earlier)<br/><br/>Administrative Templates\Microsoft Edge\SmartScreen settings\Prevent bypassing Microsoft Defender SmartScreen prompts for sites (Microsoft Edge version 77 or later)<br/><br/>**Windows 10, Version 1511 and 1607:** Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Microsoft Edge\Prevent bypassing Windows SmartScreen prompts for sites|Microsoft Edge on Windows 10, version 1511 or later|This policy setting stops employees from bypassing the Microsoft Defender SmartScreen warnings about potentially malicious sites.<br/><br/>If you enable this setting, it stops employees from bypassing the warning, stopping them from going to the site.<br/><br/>If you disable or don't configure this setting, your employees can bypass the warnings and continue to visit a potentially malicious site.|
|Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Internet Explorer\Prevent managing SmartScreen Filter|Internet Explorer 9 or later|This policy setting prevents the employee from managing Microsoft Defender SmartScreen.<br/><br/>If you enable this policy setting, the employee isn't prompted to turn on Microsoft Defender SmartScreen. All website addresses that aren't on the filter's allowlist are sent automatically to Microsoft without prompting the employee.<br/><br/>If you disable or don't configure this policy setting, the employee is prompted to decide whether to turn on Microsoft Defender SmartScreen during the first-run experience.|
|Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Internet Explorer\Prevent bypassing SmartScreen Filter warnings|Internet Explorer 8 or later|This policy setting determines whether an employee can bypass warnings from Microsoft Defender SmartScreen.<br/><br/>If you enable this policy setting, Microsoft Defender SmartScreen warnings block the employee.<br/><br/>If you disable or don't configure this policy setting, the employee can bypass Microsoft Defender SmartScreen warnings.|
|Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Internet Explorer\Prevent bypassing SmartScreen Filter warnings about files that aren't commonly downloaded from the Internet|Internet Explorer 9 or later|This policy setting determines whether the employee can bypass warnings from Microsoft Defender SmartScreen. Microsoft Defender SmartScreen warns the employee about executable files that Internet Explorer users don't commonly download from the Internet.<br/><br/>If you enable this policy setting, Microsoft Defender SmartScreen warnings block the employee.<br/><br/>If you disable or don't configure this policy setting, the employee can bypass Microsoft Defender SmartScreen warnings.|
|Setting|Description|
|---|--- |
|Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Windows Defender SmartScreen > Explorer > Configure Windows Defender SmartScreen | This policy setting turns on Microsoft Defender SmartScreen. <br/><br/>If you enable this setting, it turns on Microsoft Defender SmartScreen and your users are unable to turn it off. Additionally, when enabling this feature, you must also pick whether Microsoft Defender SmartScreen should Warn your users or Warn and prevent bypassing the message (effectively blocking the user from the site).<br/><br/>If you disable this setting, it turns off Microsoft Defender SmartScreen and your users are unable to turn it on. <br/><br/>If you don't configure this setting, your users can decide whether to use Microsoft Defender SmartScreen.|
|Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Windows Defender SmartScreen > Explorer > Configure App Install Control| This policy setting is intended to prevent malicious content from affecting your user's devices when downloading executable content from the internet.<br/><br/>This setting doesn't protect against malicious content from USB devices, network shares, or other non-internet sources.<br/><br/>**Important:** Using a trustworthy browser helps ensure that these protections work as expected.|
|Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Windows Defender SmartScreen > Microsoft Edge > Configure Windows Defender SmartScreen | This policy setting lets you configure whether to turn on Windows Defender SmartScreen. Windows Defender SmartScreen provides warning messages to help protect your users from potential phishing scams and malicious software. By default, Windows Defender SmartScreen is turned on. <br><br>If you enable this setting, Windows Defender SmartScreen is turned on, and users can't turn it off. <br><br>If you disable this setting, Windows Defender SmartScreen is turned off, and users can't turn it on. <br><br>If you don't configure this setting, users can choose whether to use Windows Defender SmartScreen. |
|Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Windows Defender SmartScreen > Microsoft Edge > Prevent bypassing Windows Defender SmartScreen prompts for sites | This policy setting lets you decide whether users can override the Windows Defender SmartScreen warnings about potentially malicious websites. <br><br>If you enable this setting, users can't ignore Windows Defender SmartScreen warnings and they're blocked from continuing to the site. <br><br>If you disable or don't configure this setting, users can ignore Windows Defender SmartScreen warnings and continue to the site. |
## MDM settings
If you manage your policies using Microsoft Intune, use these MDM policy settings. All settings support desktop computers running Windows 10/11 Pro or Windows 10/11 Enterprise, enrolled with Microsoft Intune.
For Microsoft Defender SmartScreen Microsoft Edge MDM policies, see [Policy CSP - Browser](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-browser).
|Setting|Supported versions|Details|
|--- |--- |--- |
|AllowSmartScreen|Windows 10|<li>**URI full path.** ./Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/Browser/AllowSmartScreen<li>**Data type.** Integer<li>**Allowed values:**<ul><li>**0 .** Turns off Microsoft Defender SmartScreen in Microsoft Edge.<li>**1.** Turns on Microsoft Defender SmartScreen in Microsoft Edge.|
|EnableAppInstallControl|Windows 10, version 1703|<li>**URI full path.** ./Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/SmartScreen/EnableAppInstallControl<li>**Data type.** Integer<li>**Allowed values:**<ul><li>**0 .** Turns off Application Installation Control, allowing users to download and install files from anywhere on the web.<li>**1.** Turns on Application Installation Control, allowing users to install apps from the Microsoft Store only.|
|EnableSmartScreenInShell|Windows 10, version 1703|<li>**URI full path.** ./Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/SmartScreen/EnableSmartScreenInShell<li>**Data type.** Integer<li>**Allowed values:**<ul><li>**0 .** Turns off Microsoft Defender SmartScreen in Windows for app and file execution.<li>**1.** Turns on Microsoft Defender SmartScreen in Windows for app and file execution.|
|PreventOverrideForFilesInShell|Windows 10, version 1703|<li>**URI full path.** ./Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/SmartScreen/PreventOverrideForFilesInShell<li>**Data type.** Integer<li>**Allowed values:**<ul><li>**0 .** Employees can ignore Microsoft Defender SmartScreen warnings and run malicious files.<li>**1.** Employees can't ignore Microsoft Defender SmartScreen warnings and run malicious files.|
|PreventSmartScreenPromptOverride|Windows 10, Version 1511 and Windows 11|<li>**URI full path.** ./Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/Browser/PreventSmartscreenPromptOverride<li>**Data type.** Integer<li>**Allowed values:**<ul><li>**0 .** Employees can ignore Microsoft Defender SmartScreen warnings.<li>**1.** Employees can't ignore Microsoft Defender SmartScreen warnings.|
|PreventSmartScreenPromptOverrideForFiles|Windows 10, Version 1511 and Windows 11|<li>**URI full path.** ./Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/Browser/PreventSmartScreenPromptOverrideForFiles<li>**Data type.** Integer<li>**Allowed values:**<ul><li>**0 .** Employees can ignore Microsoft Defender SmartScreen warnings for files.<li>**1.** Employees can't ignore Microsoft Defender SmartScreen warnings for files.|
- [AllowSmartScreen](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-browser#allowsmartscreen)
- [EnableAppInstallControl](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-smartscreen#enableappinstallcontrol)
- [EnableSmartScreenInShell](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-smartscreen#enablesmartscreeninshell)
- [PreventOverrideForFilesInShell](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-smartscreen#preventoverrideforfilesinshell)
- [PreventSmartScreenPromptOverride](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-browser#preventsmartscreenpromptoverride)
- [PreventSmartScreenPromptOverrideForFiles](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-browser#preventsmartscreenpromptoverrideforfiles)
## Recommended Group Policy and MDM settings for your organization
By default, Microsoft Defender SmartScreen lets employees bypass warnings. Unfortunately, this feature can let employees continue to an unsafe site or to continue to download an unsafe file, even after being warned. Because of this possibility, we strongly recommend that you set up Microsoft Defender SmartScreen to block high-risk interactions instead of providing just a warning.
By default, Microsoft Defender SmartScreen lets users bypass warnings. Unfortunately, this feature can let users continue to an unsafe site or to continue to download an unsafe file, even after being warned. Because of this possibility, we strongly recommend that you set up Microsoft Defender SmartScreen to block high-risk interactions instead of providing just a warning.
To better help you protect your organization, we recommend turning on and using these specific Microsoft Defender SmartScreen Group Policy and MDM settings.
|Group Policy setting|Recommendation|
|--- |--- |
|Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Microsoft Edge\Configure Windows Defender SmartScreen (Microsoft Edge version 45 and earlier)<br/><br/>Administrative Templates\Microsoft Edge\SmartScreen settings\Configure Microsoft Defender SmartScreen (Microsoft Edge version 77 or later)|**Enable.** Turns on Microsoft Defender SmartScreen.|
|Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Microsoft Edge\Prevent bypassing Windows Defender SmartScreen prompts for sites (Microsoft Edge version 45 and earlier)<br/><br/>Administrative Templates\Microsoft Edge\SmartScreen settings\Prevent bypassing Windows Defender SmartScreen prompts for sites (Microsoft Edge version 77 or later)|**Enable.** Stops employees from ignoring warning messages and continuing to a potentially malicious website.|
|Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Microsoft Edge\Prevent bypassing Windows Defender SmartScreen prompts for files (Microsoft Edge version 45 and earlier)<br/><br/>Administrative Templates\Microsoft Edge\SmartScreen settings\Prevent bypassing of Microsoft Defender SmartScreen warnings about downloads (Microsoft Edge version 77 or later)|**Enable.** Stops employees from ignoring warning messages and continuing to download potentially malicious files.|
|Administrative Templates\Windows Components\File Explorer\Configure Windows Defender SmartScreen|**Enable with the Warn and prevent bypass option.** Stops employees from ignoring warning messages about malicious files downloaded from the Internet.|
|Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Microsoft Edge > Configure Windows Defender SmartScreen|**Enable.** Turns on Microsoft Defender SmartScreen.|
|Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Microsoft Edge > Prevent bypassing Windows Defender SmartScreen prompts for sites|**Enable.** Stops users from ignoring warning messages and continuing to a potentially malicious website.|
|Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Explorer > Configure Windows Defender SmartScreen|**Enable with the Warn and prevent bypass option.** Stops users from ignoring warning messages about malicious files downloaded from the Internet.|
|MDM setting|Recommendation|
|--- |--- |
|Browser/AllowSmartScreen|**1.** Turns on Microsoft Defender SmartScreen.|
|Browser/PreventSmartScreenPromptOverride|**1.** Stops employees from ignoring warning messages and continuing to a potentially malicious website.|
|Browser/PreventSmartScreenPromptOverrideForFiles|**1.** Stops employees from ignoring warning messages and continuing to download potentially malicious files.|
|Browser/PreventSmartScreenPromptOverride|**1.** Stops users from ignoring warning messages and continuing to a potentially malicious website.|
|Browser/PreventSmartScreenPromptOverrideForFiles|**1.** Stops users from ignoring warning messages and continuing to download potentially malicious files.|
|SmartScreen/EnableSmartScreenInShell|**1.** Turns on Microsoft Defender SmartScreen in Windows.<br/><br/>Requires at least Windows 10, version 1703.|
|SmartScreen/PreventOverrideForFilesInShell|**1.** Stops employees from ignoring warning messages about malicious files downloaded from the Internet.<br/><br/>Requires at least Windows 10, version 1703.|
## Related articles
- [Available Group Policy and Mobile Device Management (MDM) settings for Microsoft Edge](/microsoft-edge/deploy/available-policies)
|SmartScreen/PreventOverrideForFilesInShell|**1.** Stops users from ignoring warning messages about malicious files downloaded from the Internet.<br/><br/>Requires at least Windows 10, version 1703.|

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windows/security/operating-system-security/virus-and-threat-protection/microsoft-defender-smartscreen/enhanced-phishing-protection.md
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Enhanced Phishing Protection in Microsoft Defender SmartScreen
description: Learn how Enhanced Phishing Protection for Microsoft Defender SmartScreen helps protect Microsoft school or work passwords against phishing and unsafe usage on sites and apps.
ms.date: 11/02/2023
ms.date: 07/10/2024
ms.topic: conceptual
appliesto:
- ✅ <a href="https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/release-health/supported-versions-windows-client" target="_blank">Windows 11, version 22H2</a>
@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ If a user signs into Windows using a password, Enhanced Phishing Protection work
- If users type their work or school password into a website or app that SmartScreen finds suspicious, Enhanced Phishing Protection can automatically collect information from that website or app to help identify security threats. For example, the content displayed, sounds played, and application memory.
> [!NOTE]
> When a user signs-in to a device using a Windows Hello for Business PIN or biometric, Enhanced Phishing Protection does not alert the user or send events to [Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE)](/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/).
> When a user signs in to a device using a Windows Hello for Business PIN or biometric, Enhanced Phishing Protection does not alert the user or send events to [Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE)](/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/).
## Benefits of Enhanced Phishing Protection in Microsoft Defender SmartScreen
@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Enhanced Phishing Protection provides robust phishing protections for work or sc
## Configure Enhanced Phishing Protection for your organization
Enhanced Phishing Protection can be configured via Microsoft Intune, Group Policy Objects (GPO) or Configuration Service Providers (CSP) with an MDM service. These settings are available to configure your devices using either Microsoft Intune, GPO or CSP.
Enhanced Phishing Protection can be configured via Microsoft Intune, Group Policy Objects (GPO) or Configuration Service Providers (CSP) with an MDM service. These settings are available to configure your devices using either Microsoft Intune, GPO, or CSP.
| Setting | Description |
|--|--|
@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ Enhanced Phishing Protection allows organizations to add their custom identity p
To add your organization's custom sign-in URL to Enhanced Phishing Protection, configure the `EnableWebSignIn` policy in the [Authentication Policy CSP](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-authentication#enablewebsignin). For more information, see [Web sign-in for Windows](../../../identity-protection/web-sign-in/index.md).
Follow these instructions to configure your devices using either Microsoft Intune, GPO or CSP.
Follow these instructions to configure your devices using either Microsoft Intune, GPO, or CSP.
#### [:::image type="icon" source="../../../images/icons/intune.svg"::: **Intune**](#tab/intune)

2
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---
title: Microsoft Defender SmartScreen overview
description: Learn how Microsoft Defender SmartScreen protects against phishing or malware websites and applications, and the downloading of potentially malicious files.
ms.date: 08/11/2023
ms.date: 07/10/2024
ms.topic: conceptual
appliesto:
- ✅ <a href="https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/release-health/supported-versions-windows-client" target="_blank">Windows 11</a>