# Surface Book 3 Quadro RTX 3000 technical overview
# Surface Book 3 Quadro RTX 3000 technical overview
Surface Book 3 for Business powered by the NVIDIA® Quadro RTX™ 3000 GPU is built for professionals who need real-time rendering, AI acceleration, and advanced graphics and compute performance in a portable form factor. Quadro RTX 3000 fundamentally changes what you can do with the new Surface Book 3:
Surface Book 3 for Business powered by the NVIDIA® Quadro RTX™ 3000 GPU is built for professionals who need real-time rendering, AI acceleration, advanced graphics, and compute performance in a portable form factor. Quadro RTX 3000 fundamentally changes what you can do with the new Surface Book 3:
- **Ray Tracing** - Produce stunning renders, designs and animations faster than ever before with 30 RT Cores for hardware-accelerated ray tracing.
- **Ray Tracing** - Produce stunning renders, designs and animations faster than ever before with 30 RT Cores for hardware-accelerated ray tracing.
- **Artificial Intelligence** - Remove redundant, tedious tasks and compute intensive work with 240 Tensor Cores for GPU-accelerated AI.
- **Artificial Intelligence** - Remove redundant, tedious tasks and compute intensive work with 240 Tensor Cores for GPU-accelerated AI.
@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ Application compatibility testing has historically been a burden when approachin
Most Windows 7–compatible desktop applications will be compatible with Windows 10 straight out of the box. Windows 10 achieved such high compatibility because the changes in the existing Win32 application programming interfaces were minimal. Combined with valuable feedback via the Windows Insider Program and diagnostic data, this level of compatibility can be maintained through each feature update. As for websites, Windows 10 includes Internet Explorer 11 and its backward-compatibility modes for legacy websites. Finally, UWP apps follow a compatibility story similar to desktop applications, so most of them will be compatible with Windows 10.
Most Windows 7–compatible desktop applications will be compatible with Windows 10 straight out of the box. Windows 10 achieved such high compatibility because the changes in the existing Win32 application programming interfaces were minimal. Combined with valuable feedback via the Windows Insider Program and diagnostic data, this level of compatibility can be maintained through each feature update. As for websites, Windows 10 includes Internet Explorer 11 and its backward-compatibility modes for legacy websites. Finally, UWP apps follow a compatibility story similar to desktop applications, so most of them will be compatible with Windows 10.
For the most important business-critical applications, organizations should still perform testing on a regular basis to validate compatibility with new builds. For remaining applications, consider validating them as part of a pilot deployment process to reduce the time spent on compatibility testing. If it’s unclear whether an application is compatible with Windows 10, IT pros can either consult with the ISV or check the supported software directory at [http://www.readyforwindows.com](http://www.readyforwindows.com).
For the most important business-critical applications, organizations should still perform testing on a regular basis to validate compatibility with new builds. For remaining applications, consider validating them as part of a pilot deployment process to reduce the time spent on compatibility testing. Desktop Analytics s a cloud-based service that integrates with Configuration Manager. The service provides insight and intelligence for you to make more informed decisions about the update readiness of your Windows endpoints, including assessment of your existing applications. For more, see [Ready for modern desktop retirement FAQ](https://docs.microsoft.com/mem/configmgr/desktop-analytics/ready-for-windows).
@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ The following methodology was used to derive these network endpoints:
|||HTTP|us.configsvc1.live.com.akadns.net|
|||HTTP|us.configsvc1.live.com.akadns.net|
|Microsoft Edge|This traffic is related to the Microsoft Edge browser.|HTTPS|iecvlist.microsoft.com|
|Microsoft Edge|This traffic is related to the Microsoft Edge browser.|HTTPS|iecvlist.microsoft.com|
|Microsoft forward link redirection service (FWLink)|The following endpoint is used by the Microsoft forward link redirection service (FWLink) to redirect permanent web links to their actual, sometimes transitory, URL. FWlinks are similar to URL shorteners, just longer. If you disable this endpoint, Windows Defender won't be able to update its malware definitions; links from Windows and other Microsoft products to the Web won't work; and PowerShell updateable Help won't update. To disable the traffic, instead disable the traffic that's getting forwarded.|HTTPS|go.microsoft.com|
|Microsoft forward link redirection service (FWLink)|The following endpoint is used by the Microsoft forward link redirection service (FWLink) to redirect permanent web links to their actual, sometimes transitory, URL. FWlinks are similar to URL shorteners, just longer. If you disable this endpoint, Windows Defender won't be able to update its malware definitions; links from Windows and other Microsoft products to the Web won't work; and PowerShell updateable Help won't update. To disable the traffic, instead disable the traffic that's getting forwarded.|HTTPS|go.microsoft.com|
|||HTTP|www.microsoft.com|
|Microsoft Store|||[Learn how to turn off traffic to all of the following endpoint(s).](manage-connections-from-windows-operating-system-components-to-microsoft-services.md#26-microsoft-store)|
|Microsoft Store|||[Learn how to turn off traffic to all of the following endpoint(s).](manage-connections-from-windows-operating-system-components-to-microsoft-services.md#26-microsoft-store)|
||The following endpoint is used for the Windows Push Notification Services (WNS). WNS enables third-party developers to send toast, tile, badge, and raw updates from their own cloud service. This provides a mechanism to deliver new updates to your users in a power-efficient and dependable way. If you turn off traffic for this endpoint, push notifications will no longer work, including MDM device management, mail synchronization, settings synchronization.|HTTPS|*.wns.windows.com|
||The following endpoint is used for the Windows Push Notification Services (WNS). WNS enables third-party developers to send toast, tile, badge, and raw updates from their own cloud service. This provides a mechanism to deliver new updates to your users in a power-efficient and dependable way. If you turn off traffic for this endpoint, push notifications will no longer work, including MDM device management, mail synchronization, settings synchronization.|HTTPS|*.wns.windows.com|
||The following endpoint is used to revoke licenses for malicious apps in the Microsoft Store. To turn off traffic for this endpoint, either uninstall the app or disable the Microsoft Store. If you disable the Microsoft Store, other Microsoft Store apps cannot be installed or updated. Additionally, the Microsoft Store won't be able to revoke malicious apps and users will still be able to open them.|HTTP|storecatalogrevocation.storequality.microsoft.com|
||The following endpoint is used to revoke licenses for malicious apps in the Microsoft Store. To turn off traffic for this endpoint, either uninstall the app or disable the Microsoft Store. If you disable the Microsoft Store, other Microsoft Store apps cannot be installed or updated. Additionally, the Microsoft Store won't be able to revoke malicious apps and users will still be able to open them.|HTTP|storecatalogrevocation.storequality.microsoft.com|
@ -166,7 +167,7 @@ The following methodology was used to derive these network endpoints:
|||HTTP|*.windowsupdate.com|
|||HTTP|*.windowsupdate.com|
||The following endpoints enable connections to Windows Update, Microsoft Update, and the online services of the Store. If you turn off traffic for these endpoints, the device will not be able to connect to Windows Update and Microsoft Update to help keep the device secure. Also, the device will not be able to acquire and update apps from the Store. These are dependent on also enabling "Device authentication" and "Microsoft Account" endpoints.|HTTPS|*.delivery.mp.microsoft.com|
||The following endpoints enable connections to Windows Update, Microsoft Update, and the online services of the Store. If you turn off traffic for these endpoints, the device will not be able to connect to Windows Update and Microsoft Update to help keep the device secure. Also, the device will not be able to acquire and update apps from the Store. These are dependent on also enabling "Device authentication" and "Microsoft Account" endpoints.|HTTPS|*.delivery.mp.microsoft.com|
|||HTTPS|*.update.microsoft.com|
|||HTTPS|*.update.microsoft.com|
||The following endpoint is used for content regulation. If you turn off traffic for this endpoint, the Windows Update Agent will be unable to contact the endpoint and fallback behavior will be used. This may result in content being either incorrectly.|HTTPS|tsfe.trafficshaping.dsp.mp.microsoft.com|
||The following endpoint is used for content regulation. If you turn off traffic for this endpoint, the Windows Update Agent will be unable to contact the endpoint and fallback behavior will be used. This may result in content being either incorrectly downloaded or not downloaded at all.|HTTPS|tsfe.trafficshaping.dsp.mp.microsoft.com|
@ -25,13 +25,13 @@ Some applications, including device drivers, may be incompatible with HVCI.
This can cause devices or software to malfunction and in rare cases may result in a blue screen. Such issues may occur after HVCI has been turned on or during the enablement process itself.
This can cause devices or software to malfunction and in rare cases may result in a blue screen. Such issues may occur after HVCI has been turned on or during the enablement process itself.
If this happens, see [Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting) for remediation steps.
If this happens, see [Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting) for remediation steps.
>[!NOTE]
>[!NOTE]
>Because it makes use of *Mode Based Execution Control*, HVCI works better with Intel Kaby Lake or AMD Zen 2 CPUs and newer. Processors without MBEC will rely on an emulation of this feature, called *Restricted User Mode*, which has a bigger impact on performance.
>Because it makes use of *Mode Based Execution Control*, HVCI works better with Intel Kaby Lake or AMD Zen 2 CPUs and newer. Processors without MBEC will rely on an emulation of this feature, called *Restricted User Mode*, which has a bigger impact on performance.
## HVCI Features
## HVCI Features
* HVCI protects modification of the Control Flow Guard (CFG) bitmap.
* HVCI protects modification of the Control Flow Guard (CFG) bitmap.
* HVCI also ensure your other Truslets, like Credential Guard, have a valid certificate.
* HVCI also ensures that your other trusted processes, like Credential Guard, have got a valid certificate.
* Modern device drivers must also have an EV (Extended Validation) certificate and should support HVCI.
* Modern device drivers must also have an EV (Extended Validation) certificate and should support HVCI.
> Want to experience Microsoft Defender ATP? [Sign up for a free trial.](https://www.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/windows/microsoft-defender-atp?ocid=docs-wdatp-configserver-abovefoldlink)
> Want to experience Microsoft Defender ATP? [Sign up for a free trial.](https://www.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/windows/microsoft-defender-atp?ocid=docs-wdatp-configserver-abovefoldlink)
@ -37,9 +38,9 @@ The service supports the onboarding of the following servers:
- Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1
- Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1
- Windows Server 2012 R2
- Windows Server 2012 R2
- Windows Server 2016
- Windows Server 2016
- Windows Server, version 1803
- Windows Server (SAC) version 1803 and later
- Windows Server 2019 and later
- Windows Server 2019 and later
- Windows Server 2019 core edition
For a practical guidance on what needs to be in place for licensing and infrastructure, see [Protecting Windows Servers with Microsoft Defender ATP](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/What-s-New/Protecting-Windows-Server-with-Windows-Defender-ATP/m-p/267114#M128).
For a practical guidance on what needs to be in place for licensing and infrastructure, see [Protecting Windows Servers with Microsoft Defender ATP](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/What-s-New/Protecting-Windows-Server-with-Windows-Defender-ATP/m-p/267114#M128).
@ -58,21 +59,23 @@ There are two options to onboard Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1, Windows Server 2012
### Option 1: Onboard servers through Microsoft Defender Security Center
### Option 1: Onboard servers through Microsoft Defender Security Center
You'll need to take the following steps if you choose to onboard servers through Microsoft Defender Security Center.
You'll need to take the following steps if you choose to onboard servers through Microsoft Defender Security Center.
- For Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1 or Windows Server 2012 R2, ensure that you install the following hotfix:
- For Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1 or Windows Server 2012 R2, ensure that you install the following hotfix:
- [Update for customer experience and diagnostic telemetry](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/3080149/update-for-customer-experience-and-diagnostic-telemetry)
- [Update for customer experience and diagnostic telemetry](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/3080149/update-for-customer-experience-and-diagnostic-telemetry)
- In addition, for Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1, ensure that you fulfill the following requirements:
- In addition, for Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1, ensure that you fulfill the following requirements:
- Install the [February monthly update rollup](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/4074598/windows-7-update-kb4074598)
- Install the [February monthly update rollup](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/4074598/windows-7-update-kb4074598)
- Install either [.NET framework 4.5](https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=30653) (or later) or [KB3154518](https://support.microsoft.com/help/3154518/support-for-tls-system-default-versions-included-in-the-net-framework)
- Install either [.NET framework 4.5](https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=30653) (or later) or [KB3154518](https://support.microsoft.com/help/3154518/support-for-tls-system-default-versions-included-in-the-net-framework)
- For Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1 and Windows Server 2012 R2: Configure and update System Center Endpoint Protection clients.
- For Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1 and Windows Server 2012 R2: Configure and update System Center Endpoint Protection clients.
> [!NOTE]
> [!NOTE]
> This step is required only if your organization uses System Center Endpoint Protection (SCEP) and you're onboarding Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1 and Windows Server 2012 R2.
> This step is required only if your organization uses System Center Endpoint Protection (SCEP) and you're onboarding Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1 and Windows Server 2012 R2.
- Turn on server monitoring from Microsoft Defender Security Center.
- Turn on server monitoring from Microsoft Defender Security Center.
- If you're already leveraging System Center Operations Manager (SCOM) or Azure Monitor (formerly known as Operations Management Suite (OMS)), attach the Microsoft Monitoring Agent (MMA) to report to your Microsoft Defender ATP workspace through Multihoming support. Otherwise, install and configure MMA to report sensor data to Microsoft Defender ATP as instructed below. For more information, see [Collect log data with Azure Log Analytics agent](https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/azure-monitor/platform/log-analytics-agent).
- If you're already leveraging System Center Operations Manager (SCOM) or Azure Monitor (formerly known as Operations Management Suite (OMS)), attach the Microsoft Monitoring Agent (MMA) to report to your Microsoft Defender ATP workspace through Multihoming support.
Otherwise, install and configure MMA to report sensor data to Microsoft Defender ATP as instructed below. For more information, see [Collect log data with Azure Log Analytics agent](https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/azure-monitor/platform/log-analytics-agent).
> [!TIP]
> [!TIP]
> After onboarding the machine, you can choose to run a detection test to verify that it is properly onboarded to the service. For more information, see [Run a detection test on a newly onboarded Microsoft Defender ATP endpoint](run-detection-test.md).
> After onboarding the machine, you can choose to run a detection test to verify that it is properly onboarded to the service. For more information, see [Run a detection test on a newly onboarded Microsoft Defender ATP endpoint](run-detection-test.md).
@ -83,6 +86,7 @@ Microsoft Defender ATP integrates with System Center Endpoint Protection. The in
The following steps are required to enable this integration:
The following steps are required to enable this integration:
- Install the [January 2017 anti-malware platform update for Endpoint Protection clients](https://support.microsoft.com/help/3209361/january-2017-anti-malware-platform-update-for-endpoint-protection-clie)
- Install the [January 2017 anti-malware platform update for Endpoint Protection clients](https://support.microsoft.com/help/3209361/january-2017-anti-malware-platform-update-for-endpoint-protection-clie)
- Configure the SCEP client Cloud Protection Service membership to the **Advanced** setting
- Configure the SCEP client Cloud Protection Service membership to the **Advanced** setting
@ -128,9 +132,8 @@ Once completed, you should see onboarded servers in the portal within an hour.
4. Follow the onboarding instructions in [Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection with Azure Security Center](https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/security-center/security-center-wdatp).
4. Follow the onboarding instructions in [Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection with Azure Security Center](https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/security-center/security-center-wdatp).
## Windows Server (SAC) version 1803, Windows Server 2019, and Windows Server 2019 Core edition
## Windows Server, version 1803 and Windows Server 2019
To onboard Windows Server (SAC) version 1803, Windows Server 2019, or Windows Server 2019 Core edition, refer to the supported methods and versions below.
To onboard Windows Server, version 1803 or Windows Server 2019, refer to the supported methods and versions below.
> [!NOTE]
> [!NOTE]
> The Onboarding package for Windows Server 2019 through Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager currently ships a script. For more information on how to deploy scripts in Configuration Manager, see [Packages and programs in Configuration Manager](https://docs.microsoft.com/configmgr/apps/deploy-use/packages-and-programs).
> The Onboarding package for Windows Server 2019 through Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager currently ships a script. For more information on how to deploy scripts in Configuration Manager, see [Packages and programs in Configuration Manager](https://docs.microsoft.com/configmgr/apps/deploy-use/packages-and-programs).
@ -150,20 +153,20 @@ Support for Windows Server, provide deeper insight into activities happening on
2. If you're running a third-party antimalware solution, you'll need to apply the following Windows Defender AV passive mode settings. Verify that it was configured correctly:
2. If you're running a third-party antimalware solution, you'll need to apply the following Windows Defender AV passive mode settings. Verify that it was configured correctly:
c. Confirm that a recent event containing the passive mode event is found:
1. Confirm that a recent event containing the passive mode event is found:
3. Run the following command to check if Windows Defender AV is installed:
3. Run the following command to check if Windows Defender AV is installed:
@ -191,7 +194,7 @@ The following capabilities are included in this integration:
## Offboard servers
## Offboard servers
You can offboard Windows Server, version 1803 and Windows 2019 in the same method available for Windows 10 client machines.
You can offboard Windows Server (SAC), Windows Server 2019, and Windows Server 2019 Core edition in the same method available for Windows 10 client machines.
For other server versions, you have two options to offboard servers from the service:
For other server versions, you have two options to offboard servers from the service:
- Uninstall the MMA agent
- Uninstall the MMA agent
@ -221,11 +224,12 @@ To offboard the server, you can use either of the following methods:
#### Run a PowerShell command to remove the configuration
#### Run a PowerShell command to remove the configuration
1. Get your Workspace ID:
1. Get your Workspace ID:
a. In the navigation pane, select **Settings** > **Onboarding**.
b. Select **Windows Server 2012 R2 and 2016** as the operating system and get your Workspace ID:
1. In the navigation pane, select **Settings** > **Onboarding**.
1. Select **Windows Server 2012 R2 and 2016** as the operating system and get your Workspace ID:
2. Open an elevated PowerShell and run the following command. Use the Workspace ID you obtained and replacing `WorkspaceID`:
2. Open an elevated PowerShell and run the following command. Use the Workspace ID you obtained and replacing `WorkspaceID`:
@ -198,9 +198,9 @@ Use netsh to configure a system-wide static proxy.
1. Open an elevated command-line:
1. Open an elevated command-line:
a. Go to **Start** and type **cmd**.
1. Go to **Start** and type **cmd**.
b. Right-click **Command prompt** and select **Run as administrator**.
1. Right-click **Command prompt** and select **Run as administrator**.
2. Enter the following command and press **Enter**:
2. Enter the following command and press **Enter**:
@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ needed if the machine is on Windows 10, version 1803 or later.
Service location | Microsoft.com DNS record
Service location | Microsoft.com DNS record
-|-
-|-
Common URLs for all locations | ```crl.microsoft.com```<br> ```ctldl.windowsupdate.com``` <br>```events.data.microsoft.com```<br>```notify.windows.com```<br> ```settings-win.data.microsoft.com```
Common URLs for all locations | ```crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/*```<br> ```ctldl.windowsupdate.com``` <br>```www.microsoft.com/pkiops/*```<br>```events.data.microsoft.com```<br>```notify.windows.com```<br> ```settings-win.data.microsoft.com```
European Union | ```eu.vortex-win.data.microsoft.com``` <br> ```eu-v20.events.data.microsoft.com``` <br> ```usseu1northprod.blob.core.windows.net``` <br>```usseu1westprod.blob.core.windows.net``` <br> ```winatp-gw-neu.microsoft.com``` <br> ```winatp-gw-weu.microsoft.com``` <br>```wseu1northprod.blob.core.windows.net``` <br>```wseu1westprod.blob.core.windows.net```
European Union | ```eu.vortex-win.data.microsoft.com``` <br> ```eu-v20.events.data.microsoft.com``` <br> ```usseu1northprod.blob.core.windows.net``` <br>```usseu1westprod.blob.core.windows.net``` <br> ```winatp-gw-neu.microsoft.com``` <br> ```winatp-gw-weu.microsoft.com``` <br>```wseu1northprod.blob.core.windows.net``` <br>```wseu1westprod.blob.core.windows.net```
@ -253,9 +253,9 @@ Microsoft Defender ATP is built on Azure cloud, deployed in the following region
You can find the Azure IP range on [Microsoft Azure Datacenter IP Ranges](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=41653).
You can find the Azure IP range on [Microsoft Azure Datacenter IP Ranges](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=41653).
> [!NOTE]
> [!NOTE]
> As a cloud-based solution, the IP range can change. It's recommended you move to DNS resolving setting.
> As a cloud-based solution, the IP address range can change. It's recommended you move to DNS resolving setting.
## Next step
## Next step
|||
|||
|:-------|:-----|
|:-------|:-----|
| <br>[Phase 3: Onboard](onboarding.md) | Onboard devices to the service so the Microsoft Defender ATP service can get sensor data from them
| <br>[Phase 3: Onboard](onboarding.md) | Onboard devices to the service so that the Microsoft Defender ATP service can get sensor data from them.
@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ Results of deep analysis are matched against threat intelligence and any matches
Use the deep analysis feature to investigate the details of any file, usually during an investigation of an alert or for any other reason where you suspect malicious behavior. This feature is available within the **Deep analysis** tab, on the file's profile page.
Use the deep analysis feature to investigate the details of any file, usually during an investigation of an alert or for any other reason where you suspect malicious behavior. This feature is available within the **Deep analysis** tab, on the file's profile page.
**Submit for deep analysis** is enabled when the file is available in the Microsoft Defender ATP backend sample collection, or if it was observed on a Windows 10 machine that supports submitting to deep analysis.
**Submit for deep analysis** is enabled when the file is available in the Microsoft Defender ATP backend sample collection, or if it was observed on a Windows 10 machine that supports submitting to deep analysis.
>Want to experience Microsoft Defender ATP? [Sign up for a free trial.](https://www.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/windows/microsoft-defender-atp?ocid=docs-wdatp-portaloverview-abovefoldlink)
>Want to experience Microsoft Defender ATP? [Sign up for a free trial.](https://www.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/windows/microsoft-defender-atp?ocid=docs-wdatp-portaloverview-abovefoldlink)
Microsoft Defender ATP Threat & Vulnerability management's discovery capability shows in the **Software inventory** page. The software inventory includes the name of the product or vendor, the latest version it is in, and the number of weaknesses and vulnerabilities detected with it.
Microsoft Defender ATP Threat & Vulnerability management's discovery capability shows in the **Software inventory** page. The software inventory includes the name of the product or vendor, the latest version it is in, and the number of weaknesses and vulnerabilities detected with it.
@ -35,17 +35,17 @@ This topic provides an overview of some of the software and firmware threats fac
## The security threat landscape
## The security threat landscape
Today’s security threat landscape is one of aggressive and tenacious threats. In previous years, malicious attackers mostly focused on gaining community recognition through their attacks or the thrill of temporarily taking a system offline. Since then, attacker’s motives have shifted toward making money, including holding devices and data hostage until the owner pays the demanded ransom. Modern attacks increasingly focus on large-scale intellectual property theft; targeted system degradation that can result in financial loss; and now even cyberterrorism that threatens the security of individuals, businesses, and national interests all over the world. These attackers are typically highly trained individuals and security experts, some of whom are in the employ of nation states that have large budgets and seemingly unlimited human resources. Threats like these require an approach that can meet this challenge.
Today's security threat landscape is one of aggressive and tenacious threats. In previous years, malicious attackers mostly focused on gaining community recognition through their attacks or the thrill of temporarily taking a system offline. Since then, attacker's motives have shifted toward making money, including holding devices and data hostage until the owner pays the demanded ransom. Modern attacks increasingly focus on large-scale intellectual property theft; targeted system degradation that can result in financial loss; and now even cyberterrorism that threatens the security of individuals, businesses, and national interests all over the world. These attackers are typically highly trained individuals and security experts, some of whom are in the employ of nation states that have large budgets and seemingly unlimited human resources. Threats like these require an approach that can meet this challenge.
In recognition of this landscape, Windows 10 Creator's Update (Windows 10, version 1703) includes multiple security features that were created to make it difficult (and costly) to find and exploit many software vulnerabilities. These features are designed to:
In recognition of this landscape, Windows 10 Creator's Update (Windows 10, version 1703) includes multiple security features that were created to make it difficult (and costly) to find and exploit many software vulnerabilities. These features are designed to:
- Eliminate entire classes of vulnerabilities
- Eliminate entire classes of vulnerabilities
- Break exploitation techniques
- Break exploitation techniques
- Contain the damage and prevent persistence
- Contain the damage and prevent persistence
- Limit the window of opportunity to exploit
- Limit the window of opportunity to exploit
The following sections provide more detail about security mitigations in Windows 10, version 1703.
The following sections provide more detail about security mitigations in Windows 10, version 1703.
@ -59,14 +59,14 @@ Windows 10 mitigations that you can configure are listed in the following two ta
|---|---|
|---|---|
| **Windows Defender SmartScreen**<br> helps prevent<br>malicious applications<br>from being downloaded | Windows Defender SmartScreen can check the reputation of a downloaded application by using a service that Microsoft maintains. The first time a user runs an app that originates from the Internet (even if the user copied it from another PC), SmartScreen checks to see if the app lacks a reputation or is known to be malicious, and responds accordingly.<br><br>**More information**: [Windows Defender SmartScreen](#windows-defender-smartscreen), later in this topic |
| **Windows Defender SmartScreen**<br> helps prevent<br>malicious applications<br>from being downloaded | Windows Defender SmartScreen can check the reputation of a downloaded application by using a service that Microsoft maintains. The first time a user runs an app that originates from the Internet (even if the user copied it from another PC), SmartScreen checks to see if the app lacks a reputation or is known to be malicious, and responds accordingly.<br><br>**More information**: [Windows Defender SmartScreen](#windows-defender-smartscreen), later in this topic |
| **Credential Guard**<br> helps keep attackers<br>from gaining access through<br>Pass-the-Hash or<br>Pass-the-Ticket attacks | Credential Guard uses virtualization-based security to isolate secrets, such as NTLM password hashes and Kerberos Ticket Granting Tickets, so that only privileged system software can access them.<br>Credential Guard is included in Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows Server 2016.<br><br>**More information**: [Protect derived domain credentials with Credential Guard](/windows/access-protection/credential-guard/credential-guard) |
| **Credential Guard**<br> helps keep attackers<br>from gaining access through<br>Pass-the-Hash or<br>Pass-the-Ticket attacks | Credential Guard uses virtualization-based security to isolate secrets, such as NTLM password hashes and Kerberos Ticket Granting Tickets, so that only privileged system software can access them.<br>Credential Guard is included in Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows Server 2016.<br><br>**More information**: [Protect derived domain credentials with Credential Guard](/windows/access-protection/credential-guard/credential-guard) |
| **Enterprise certificate pinning**<br> helps prevent <br>man-in-the-middle attacks<br>that leverage PKI | Enterprise certificate pinning enables you to protect your internal domain names from chaining to unwanted certificates or to fraudulently issued certificates. With enterprise certificate pinning, you can “pin” (associate) an X.509 certificate and its public key to its Certification Authority, either root or leaf. <br><br>**More information**: [Enterprise Certificate Pinning](/windows/access-protection/enterprise-certificate-pinning) |
| **Enterprise certificate pinning**<br> helps prevent <br>man-in-the-middle attacks<br>that leverage PKI | Enterprise certificate pinning enables you to protect your internal domain names from chaining to unwanted certificates or to fraudulently issued certificates. With enterprise certificate pinning, you can "pin" (associate) an X.509 certificate and its public key to its Certification Authority, either root or leaf. <br><br>**More information**: [Enterprise Certificate Pinning](/windows/access-protection/enterprise-certificate-pinning) |
| **Device Guard**<br> helps keep a device<br>from running malware or<br>other untrusted apps | Device Guard includes a Code Integrity policy that you create; a whitelist of trusted apps—the only apps allowed to run in your organization. Device Guard also includes a powerful system mitigation called hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI), which leverages virtualization-based security (VBS) to protect Windows’ kernel-mode code integrity validation process. HVCI has specific hardware requirements, and works with Code Integrity policies to help stop attacks even if they gain access to the kernel.<br>Device Guard is included in Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows Server 2016.<br><br>**More information**: [Introduction to Device Guard](/windows/device-security/device-guard/introduction-to-device-guard-virtualization-based-security-and-code-integrity-policies) |
| **Device Guard**<br> helps keep a device<br>from running malware or<br>other untrusted apps | Device Guard includes a Code Integrity policy that you create; a whitelist of trusted apps—the only apps allowed to run in your organization. Device Guard also includes a powerful system mitigation called hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI), which leverages virtualization-based security (VBS) to protect Windows' kernel-mode code integrity validation process. HVCI has specific hardware requirements, and works with Code Integrity policies to help stop attacks even if they gain access to the kernel.<br>Device Guard is included in Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows Server 2016.<br><br>**More information**: [Introduction to Device Guard](/windows/device-security/device-guard/introduction-to-device-guard-virtualization-based-security-and-code-integrity-policies) |
| **Windows Defender Antivirus**,<br>which helps keep devices<br>free of viruses and other<br>malware | Windows 10 includes Windows Defender Antivirus, a robust inbox antimalware solution. Windows Defender Antivirus has been significantly improved since it was introduced in Windows 8.<br><br>**More information**: [Windows Defender Antivirus](#windows-defender-antivirus), later in this topic |
| **Windows Defender Antivirus**,<br>which helps keep devices<br>free of viruses and other<br>malware | Windows 10 includes Windows Defender Antivirus, a robust inbox antimalware solution. Windows Defender Antivirus has been significantly improved since it was introduced in Windows 8.<br><br>**More information**: [Windows Defender Antivirus](#windows-defender-antivirus), later in this topic |
| **Blocking of untrusted fonts**<br> helps prevent fonts<br>from being used in<br>elevation-of-privilege attacks | Block Untrusted Fonts is a setting that allows you to prevent users from loading fonts that are "untrusted" onto your network, which can mitigate elevation-of-privilege attacks associated with the parsing of font files. However, as of Windows 10, version 1703, this mitigation is less important, because font parsing is isolated in an [AppContainer sandbox](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/mt595898(v=vs.85).aspx) (for a list describing this and other kernel pool protections, see [Kernel pool protections](#kernel-pool-protections), later in this topic).<br><br>**More information**: [Block untrusted fonts in an enterprise](/windows/threat-protection/block-untrusted-fonts-in-enterprise) |
| **Blocking of untrusted fonts**<br> helps prevent fonts<br>from being used in<br>elevation-of-privilege attacks | Block Untrusted Fonts is a setting that allows you to prevent users from loading fonts that are "untrusted" onto your network, which can mitigate elevation-of-privilege attacks associated with the parsing of font files. However, as of Windows 10, version 1703, this mitigation is less important, because font parsing is isolated in an [AppContainer sandbox](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/secauthz/appcontainer-isolation) (for a list describing this and other kernel pool protections, see [Kernel pool protections](#kernel-pool-protections), later in this topic).<br><br>**More information**: [Block untrusted fonts in an enterprise](/windows/threat-protection/block-untrusted-fonts-in-enterprise) |
| **Memory protections**<br> help prevent malware<br>from using memory manipulation<br>techniques such as buffer<br>overruns | These mitigations, listed in [Table 2](#table-2), help to protect against memory-based attacks, where malware or other code manipulates memory to gain control of a system (for example, malware that attempts to use buffer overruns to inject malicious executable code into memory. Note:<br>A subset of apps will not be able to run if some of these mitigations are set to their most restrictive settings. Testing can help you maximize protection while still allowing these apps to run.<br><br>**More information**: [Table 2](#table-2), later in this topic |
| **Memory protections**<br> help prevent malware<br>from using memory manipulation<br>techniques such as buffer<br>overruns | These mitigations, listed in [Table 2](#table-2), help to protect against memory-based attacks, where malware or other code manipulates memory to gain control of a system (for example, malware that attempts to use buffer overruns to inject malicious executable code into memory. Note:<br>A subset of apps will not be able to run if some of these mitigations are set to their most restrictive settings. Testing can help you maximize protection while still allowing these apps to run.<br><br>**More information**: [Table 2](#table-2), later in this topic |
| **UEFI Secure Boot**<br> helps protect<br>the platform from<br>bootkits and rootkits | Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Secure Boot is a security standard for firmware built in to PCs by manufacturers beginning with Windows 8. It helps to protect the boot process and firmware against tampering, such as from a physically present attacker or from forms of malware that run early in the boot process or in kernel after startup.<br><br>**More information**: [UEFI and Secure Boot](/windows/device-security/bitlocker/bitlocker-countermeasures#uefi-and-secure-boot)</a> |
| **UEFI Secure Boot**<br> helps protect<br>the platform from<br>bootkits and rootkits | Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Secure Boot is a security standard for firmware built in to PCs by manufacturers beginning with Windows 8. It helps to protect the boot process and firmware against tampering, such as from a physically present attacker or from forms of malware that run early in the boot process or in kernel after startup.<br><br>**More information**: [UEFI and Secure Boot](/windows/device-security/bitlocker/bitlocker-countermeasures#uefi-and-secure-boot)</a> |
| **Early Launch Antimalware (ELAM)**<br> helps protect<br>the platform from<br>rootkits disguised as drivers | Early Launch Antimalware (ELAM) is designed to enable the antimalware solution to start before all non-Microsoft drivers and apps. If malware modifies a boot-related driver, ELAM will detect the change, and Windows will prevent the driver from starting, thus blocking driver-based rootkits.<br><br>**More information**: [Early Launch Antimalware](/windows/device-security/bitlocker/bitlocker-countermeasures#protection-during-startup) |
| **Early Launch Antimalware (ELAM)**<br> helps protect<br>the platform from<br>rootkits disguised as drivers | Early Launch Antimalware (ELAM) is designed to enable the antimalware solution to start before all non-Microsoft drivers and apps. If malware modifies a boot-related driver, ELAM will detect the change, and Windows will prevent the driver from starting, thus blocking driver-based rootkits.<br><br>**More information**: [Early Launch Antimalware](/windows/device-security/bitlocker/bitlocker-countermeasures#protection-during-startup) |
| **Device Health Attestation**<br> helps prevent<br>compromised devices from<br>accessing an organization’s<br>assets | Device Health Attestation (DHA) provides a way to confirm that devices attempting to connect to an organization's network are in a healthy state, not compromised with malware. When DHA has been configured, a device’s actual boot data measurements can be checked against the expected "healthy" boot data. If the check indicates a device is unhealthy, the device can be prevented from accessing the network.<br><br>**More information**: [Control the health of Windows 10-based devices](/windows/device-security/protect-high-value-assets-by-controlling-the-health-of-windows-10-based-devices) and [Device Health Attestation](https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/security/device-health-attestation) |
| **Device Health Attestation**<br> helps prevent<br>compromised devices from<br>accessing an organization's<br>assets | Device Health Attestation (DHA) provides a way to confirm that devices attempting to connect to an organization's network are in a healthy state, not compromised with malware. When DHA has been configured, a device's actual boot data measurements can be checked against the expected "healthy" boot data. If the check indicates a device is unhealthy, the device can be prevented from accessing the network.<br><br>**More information**: [Control the health of Windows 10-based devices](/windows/device-security/protect-high-value-assets-by-controlling-the-health-of-windows-10-based-devices) and [Device Health Attestation](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/security/device-health-attestation) |
Configurable Windows 10 mitigations designed to help protect against memory manipulation require in-depth understanding of these threats and mitigations and knowledge about how the operating system and applications handle memory. The standard process for maximizing these types of mitigations is to work in a test lab to discover whether a given setting interferes with any applications that you use so that you can deploy settings that maximize protection while still allowing apps to run correctly.
Configurable Windows 10 mitigations designed to help protect against memory manipulation require in-depth understanding of these threats and mitigations and knowledge about how the operating system and applications handle memory. The standard process for maximizing these types of mitigations is to work in a test lab to discover whether a given setting interferes with any applications that you use so that you can deploy settings that maximize protection while still allowing apps to run correctly.
@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ As an IT professional, you can ask application developers and software vendors t
Windows Defender SmartScreen notifies users if they click on reported phishing and malware websites, and helps protect them against unsafe downloads or make informed decisions about downloads.
Windows Defender SmartScreen notifies users if they click on reported phishing and malware websites, and helps protect them against unsafe downloads or make informed decisions about downloads.
For Windows10, Microsoft improved SmartScreen (now called Windows Defender SmartScreen) protection capability by integrating its app reputation abilities into the operating system itself, which allows Windows Defender SmartScreen to check the reputation of files downloaded from the Internet and warn users when they’re about to run a high-risk downloaded file. The first time a user runs an app that originates from the Internet, Windows Defender SmartScreen checks the reputation of the application by using digital signatures and other factors against a service that Microsoft maintains. If the app lacks a reputation or is known to be malicious, Windows Defender SmartScreen warns the user or blocks execution entirely, depending on how the administrator has configured Microsoft Intune or Group Policy settings.
For Windows10, Microsoft improved SmartScreen (now called Windows Defender SmartScreen) protection capability by integrating its app reputation abilities into the operating system itself, which allows Windows Defender SmartScreen to check the reputation of files downloaded from the Internet and warn users when they're about to run a high-risk downloaded file. The first time a user runs an app that originates from the Internet, Windows Defender SmartScreen checks the reputation of the application by using digital signatures and other factors against a service that Microsoft maintains. If the app lacks a reputation or is known to be malicious, Windows Defender SmartScreen warns the user or blocks execution entirely, depending on how the administrator has configured Microsoft Intune or Group Policy settings.
For more information, see [Microsoft Defender SmartScreen overview](microsoft-defender-smartscreen/microsoft-defender-smartscreen-overview.md).
For more information, see [Microsoft Defender SmartScreen overview](microsoft-defender-smartscreen/microsoft-defender-smartscreen-overview.md).
@ -92,39 +92,39 @@ For more information, see [Microsoft Defender SmartScreen overview](microsoft-de
Windows Defender Antivirus in Windows 10 uses a multi-pronged approach to improve antimalware:
Windows Defender Antivirus in Windows 10 uses a multi-pronged approach to improve antimalware:
- **Cloud-delivered protection** helps detect and block new malware within seconds, even if the malware has never been seen before. The service, available as of Windows 10, version 1703, uses distributed resources and machine learning to deliver protection to endpoints at a rate that is far faster than traditional signature updates.
- **Cloud-delivered protection** helps detect and block new malware within seconds, even if the malware has never been seen before. The service, available as of Windows 10, version 1703, uses distributed resources and machine learning to deliver protection to endpoints at a rate that is far faster than traditional signature updates.
- **Rich local context** improves how malware is identified. Windows 10 informs Windows Defender Antivirus not only about content like files and processes but also where the content came from, where it has been stored, and more. The information about source and history enables Windows Defender Antivirus to apply different levels of scrutiny to different content.
- **Rich local context** improves how malware is identified. Windows 10 informs Windows Defender Antivirus not only about content like files and processes but also where the content came from, where it has been stored, and more. The information about source and history enables Windows Defender Antivirus to apply different levels of scrutiny to different content.
- **Extensive global sensors** help keep Windows Defender Antivirus current and aware of even the newest malware. This is accomplished in two ways: by collecting the rich local context data from end points and by centrally analyzing that data.
- **Extensive global sensors** help keep Windows Defender Antivirus current and aware of even the newest malware. This is accomplished in two ways: by collecting the rich local context data from end points and by centrally analyzing that data.
- **Tamper proofing** helps guard Windows Defender Antivirus itself against malware attacks. For example, Windows Defender Antivirus uses Protected Processes, which prevents untrusted processes from attempting to tamper with Windows Defender Antivirus components, its registry keys, and so on. ([Protected Processes](#protected-processes) is described later in this topic.)
- **Tamper proofing** helps guard Windows Defender Antivirus itself against malware attacks. For example, Windows Defender Antivirus uses Protected Processes, which prevents untrusted processes from attempting to tamper with Windows Defender Antivirus components, its registry keys, and so on. ([Protected Processes](#protected-processes) is described later in this topic.)
- **Enterprise-level features** give IT pros the tools and configuration options necessary to make Windows Defender Antivirus an enterprise-class antimalware solution.
- **Enterprise-level features** give IT pros the tools and configuration options necessary to make Windows Defender Antivirus an enterprise-class antimalware solution.
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For more information, see [Windows Defender in Windows 10](windows-defender-antivirus/windows-defender-antivirus-in-windows-10.md) and [Windows Defender Overview for Windows Server](https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/security/windows-defender/windows-defender-overview-windows-server).
For more information, see [Windows Defender in Windows 10](windows-defender-antivirus/windows-defender-antivirus-in-windows-10.md) and [Windows Defender Overview for Windows Server](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/security/windows-defender/windows-defender-overview-windows-server).
For information about Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection, a service that helps enterprises to detect, investigate, and respond to advanced and targeted attacks on their networks, see [Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection (ATP)](https://www.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/windows/microsoft-defender-atp) (resources) and [Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection (ATP)](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/microsoft-defender-advanced-threat-protection) (documentation).
For information about Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection, a service that helps enterprises to detect, investigate, and respond to advanced and targeted attacks on their networks, see [Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection (ATP)](https://www.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/windows/microsoft-defender-atp) (resources) and [Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection (ATP)](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/microsoft-defender-advanced-threat-protection) (documentation).
### Data Execution Prevention
### Data Execution Prevention
Malware depends on its ability to insert a malicious payload into memory with the hope that it will be executed later. Wouldn’t it be great if you could prevent malware from running if it wrote to an area that has been allocated solely for the storage of information?
Malware depends on its ability to insert a malicious payload into memory with the hope that it will be executed later. Wouldn't it be great if you could prevent malware from running if it wrote to an area that has been allocated solely for the storage of information?
Data Execution Prevention (DEP) does exactly that, by substantially reducing the range of memory that malicious code can use for its benefit. DEP uses the No eXecute bit on modern CPUs to mark blocks of memory as read-only so that those blocks can’t be used to execute malicious code that may be inserted by means of a vulnerability exploit.
Data Execution Prevention (DEP) does exactly that, by substantially reducing the range of memory that malicious code can use for its benefit. DEP uses the No eXecute bit on modern CPUs to mark blocks of memory as read-only so that those blocks can't be used to execute malicious code that may be inserted by means of a vulnerability exploit.
**To use Task Manager to see apps that use DEP**
**To use Task Manager to see apps that use DEP**
1. Open Task Manager: Press Ctrl+Alt+Del and select **Task Manager**, or search the Start screen.
1. Open Task Manager: Press Ctrl+Alt+Del and select **Task Manager**, or search the Start screen.
2. Click **More Details** (if necessary), and then click the **Details** tab.
2. Click **More Details** (if necessary), and then click the **Details** tab.
3. Right-click any column heading, and then click **Select Columns**.
3. Right-click any column heading, and then click **Select Columns**.
4. In the **Select Columns** dialog box, select the last **Data Execution Prevention** check box.
4. In the **Select Columns** dialog box, select the last **Data Execution Prevention** check box.
5. Click **OK**.
5. Click **OK**.
You can now see which processes have DEP enabled.
You can now see which processes have DEP enabled.
@ -138,19 +138,19 @@ You can use Control Panel to view or change DEP settings.
#### To use Control Panel to view or change DEP settings on an individual PC
#### To use Control Panel to view or change DEP settings on an individual PC
1. Open Control Panel, System: click Start, type **Control Panel System**, and press ENTER.
1. Open Control Panel, System: click Start, type **Control Panel System**, and press ENTER.
2. Click **Advanced system settings**, and then click the **Advanced** tab.
2. Click **Advanced system settings**, and then click the **Advanced** tab.
3. In the **Performance** box, click **Settings**.
3. In the **Performance** box, click **Settings**.
4. In **Performance Options**, click the **Data Execution Prevention** tab.
4. In **Performance Options**, click the **Data Execution Prevention** tab.
5. Select an option:
5. Select an option:
- **Turn on DEP for essential Windows programs and services only**
- **Turn on DEP for essential Windows programs and services only**
- **Turn on DEP for all programs and services except those I select**. If you choose this option, use the **Add** and **Remove** buttons to create the list of exceptions for which DEP will not be turned on.
- **Turn on DEP for all programs and services except those I select**. If you choose this option, use the **Add** and **Remove** buttons to create the list of exceptions for which DEP will not be turned on.
#### To use Group Policy to control DEP settings
#### To use Group Policy to control DEP settings
@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ You can use the Group Policy setting called **Process Mitigation Options** to co
Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP) helps prevent attackers from being able to use malicious code to exploit the [Structured Exception Handler](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680657(v=vs.85).aspx) (SEH), which is integral to the system and allows (non-malicious) apps to handle exceptions appropriately. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps to protect applications regardless of whether they have been compiled with the latest improvements.
Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP) helps prevent attackers from being able to use malicious code to exploit the [Structured Exception Handling](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/debug/structured-exception-handling) (SEH), which is integral to the system and allows (non-malicious) apps to handle exceptions appropriately. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps to protect applications regardless of whether they have been compiled with the latest improvements.
You can use the Group Policy setting called **Process Mitigation Options** to control the SEHOP setting. A few applications have compatibility problems with SEHOP, so be sure to test for your environment. To use the Group Policy setting, see [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md).
You can use the Group Policy setting called **Process Mitigation Options** to control the SEHOP setting. A few applications have compatibility problems with SEHOP, so be sure to test for your environment. To use the Group Policy setting, see [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md).
@ -174,13 +174,13 @@ Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) makes that type of attack much more di
Windows10 applies ASLR holistically across the system and increases the level of entropy many times compared with previous versions of Windows to combat sophisticated attacks such as heap spraying. 64-bit system and application processes can take advantage of a vastly increased memory space, which makes it even more difficult for malware to predict where Windows10 stores vital data. When used on systems that have TPMs, ASLR memory randomization will be increasingly unique across devices, which makes it even more difficult for a successful exploit that works on one system to work reliably on another.
Windows10 applies ASLR holistically across the system and increases the level of entropy many times compared with previous versions of Windows to combat sophisticated attacks such as heap spraying. 64-bit system and application processes can take advantage of a vastly increased memory space, which makes it even more difficult for malware to predict where Windows10 stores vital data. When used on systems that have TPMs, ASLR memory randomization will be increasingly unique across devices, which makes it even more difficult for a successful exploit that works on one system to work reliably on another.
You can use the Group Policy setting called **Process Mitigation Options** to control ASLR settings (“Force ASLR” and “Bottom-up ASLR”), as described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md).
You can use the Group Policy setting called **Process Mitigation Options** to control ASLR settings ("Force ASLR" and "Bottom-up ASLR"), as described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md).
## Mitigations that are built in to Windows 10
## Mitigations that are built in to Windows 10
Windows 10 provides many threat mitigations to protect against exploits that are built into the operating system and need no configuration within the operating system. The table that follows describes some of these mitigations.
Windows 10 provides many threat mitigations to protect against exploits that are built into the operating system and need no configuration within the operating system. The table that follows describes some of these mitigations.
Control Flow Guard (CFG) is a mitigation that does not need configuration within the operating system, but does require that an application developer configure the mitigation into the application when it’s compiled. CFG is built into Microsoft Edge, IE11, and other areas in Windows 10, and can be built into many other applications when they are compiled.
Control Flow Guard (CFG) is a mitigation that does not need configuration within the operating system, but does require that an application developer configure the mitigation into the application when it's compiled. CFG is built into Microsoft Edge, IE11, and other areas in Windows 10, and can be built into many other applications when they are compiled.
### Table 3 Windows 10 mitigations to protect against memory exploits – no configuration needed
### Table 3 Windows 10 mitigations to protect against memory exploits – no configuration needed
@ -191,29 +191,29 @@ Control Flow Guard (CFG) is a mitigation that does not need configuration within
| **Universal Windows apps protections**<br>screen downloadable<br>apps and run them in<br>an AppContainer sandbox | Universal Windows apps are carefully screened before being made available, and they run in an AppContainer sandbox with limited privileges and capabilities.<br><br>**More information**: [Universal Windows apps protections](#universal-windows-apps-protections), later in this topic. |
| **Universal Windows apps protections**<br>screen downloadable<br>apps and run them in<br>an AppContainer sandbox | Universal Windows apps are carefully screened before being made available, and they run in an AppContainer sandbox with limited privileges and capabilities.<br><br>**More information**: [Universal Windows apps protections](#universal-windows-apps-protections), later in this topic. |
| **Heap protections**<br>help prevent<br>exploitation of the heap | Windows 10 includes protections for the heap, such as the use of internal data structures which help protect against corruption of memory used by the heap.<br><br>**More information**: [Windows heap protections](#windows-heap-protections), later in this topic. |
| **Heap protections**<br>help prevent<br>exploitation of the heap | Windows 10 includes protections for the heap, such as the use of internal data structures which help protect against corruption of memory used by the heap.<br><br>**More information**: [Windows heap protections](#windows-heap-protections), later in this topic. |
| **Kernel pool protections**<br>help prevent<br>exploitation of pool memory<br>used by the kernel | Windows 10 includes protections for the pool of memory used by the kernel. For example, safe unlinking protects against pool overruns that are combined with unlinking operations that can be used to create an attack.<br><br>**More information**: [Kernel pool protections](#kernel-pool-protections), later in this topic. |
| **Kernel pool protections**<br>help prevent<br>exploitation of pool memory<br>used by the kernel | Windows 10 includes protections for the pool of memory used by the kernel. For example, safe unlinking protects against pool overruns that are combined with unlinking operations that can be used to create an attack.<br><br>**More information**: [Kernel pool protections](#kernel-pool-protections), later in this topic. |
| **Control Flow Guard**<br>helps mitigate exploits<br>that are based on<br>flow between code locations<br>in memory | Control Flow Guard (CFG) is a mitigation that requires no configuration within the operating system, but instead is built into software when it’s compiled. It is built into Microsoft Edge, IE11, and other areas in Windows 10. CFG can be built into applications written in C or C++, or applications compiled using Visual Studio 2015.<br>For such an application, CFG can detect an attacker’s attempt to change the intended flow of code. If this occurs, CFG terminates the application. You can request software vendors to deliver Windows applications compiled with CFG enabled.<br><br>**More information**: [Control Flow Guard](#control-flow-guard), later in this topic. |
| **Control Flow Guard**<br>helps mitigate exploits<br>that are based on<br>flow between code locations<br>in memory | Control Flow Guard (CFG) is a mitigation that requires no configuration within the operating system, but instead is built into software when it's compiled. It is built into Microsoft Edge, IE11, and other areas in Windows 10. CFG can be built into applications written in C or C++, or applications compiled using Visual Studio 2015.<br>For such an application, CFG can detect an attacker's attempt to change the intended flow of code. If this occurs, CFG terminates the application. You can request software vendors to deliver Windows applications compiled with CFG enabled.<br><br>**More information**: [Control Flow Guard](#control-flow-guard), later in this topic. |
| **Protections built into Microsoft Edge** (the browser)<br>helps mitigate multiple<br>threats | Windows 10 includes an entirely new browser, Microsoft Edge, designed with multiple security improvements.<br><br>**More information**: [Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer 11](#microsoft-edge-and-internet-explorer11), later in this topic. |
| **Protections built into Microsoft Edge** (the browser)<br>helps mitigate multiple<br>threats | Windows 10 includes an entirely new browser, Microsoft Edge, designed with multiple security improvements.<br><br>**More information**: [Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer 11](#microsoft-edge-and-internet-explorer11), later in this topic. |
### SMB hardening improvements for SYSVOL and NETLOGON shares
### SMB hardening improvements for SYSVOL and NETLOGON shares
In Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016, client connections to the Active Directory Domain Services default SYSVOL and NETLOGON shares on domain controllers require Server Message Block (SMB) signing and mutual authentication (such as Kerberos). This reduces the likelihood of man-in-the-middle attacks. If SMB signing and mutual authentication are unavailable, a computer running Windows 10 or Windows Server 2016 won’t process domain-based Group Policy and scripts.
In Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016, client connections to the Active Directory Domain Services default SYSVOL and NETLOGON shares on domain controllers require Server Message Block (SMB) signing and mutual authentication (such as Kerberos). This reduces the likelihood of man-in-the-middle attacks. If SMB signing and mutual authentication are unavailable, a computer running Windows 10 or Windows Server 2016 won't process domain-based Group Policy and scripts.
> [!NOTE]
> [!NOTE]
> The registry values for these settings aren’t present by default, but the hardening rules still apply until overridden by Group Policy or other registry values. For more information on these security improvements, (also referred to as UNC hardening), see [Microsoft Knowledge Base article 3000483](https://support.microsoft.com/help/3000483/ms15-011-vulnerability-in-group-policy-could-allow-remote-code-execution-february-10,-2015) and [MS15-011 & MS15-014: Hardening Group Policy](https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2015/02/10/ms15-011-ms15-014-hardening-group-policy/).
> The registry values for these settings aren't present by default, but the hardening rules still apply until overridden by Group Policy or other registry values. For more information on these security improvements, (also referred to as UNC hardening), see [Microsoft Knowledge Base article 3000483](https://support.microsoft.com/help/3000483/ms15-011-vulnerability-in-group-policy-could-allow-remote-code-execution-february-10,-2015) and [MS15-011 & MS15-014: Hardening Group Policy](https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2015/02/10/ms15-011-ms15-014-hardening-group-policy/).
### Protected Processes
### Protected Processes
Most security controls are designed to prevent the initial infection point. However, despite all the best preventative controls, malware might eventually find a way to infect the system. So, some protections are built to place limits on malware that gets on the device. Protected Processes creates limits of this type.
Most security controls are designed to prevent the initial infection point. However, despite all the best preventative controls, malware might eventually find a way to infect the system. So, some protections are built to place limits on malware that gets on the device. Protected Processes creates limits of this type.
With Protected Processes, Windows 10 prevents untrusted processes from interacting or tampering with those that have been specially signed. Protected Processes defines levels of trust for processes. Less trusted processes are prevented from interacting with and therefore attacking more trusted processes. Windows 10 uses Protected Processes more broadly across the operating system, and as in Windows 8.1, implements them in a way that can be used by 3rd party anti-malware vendors, as described in [Protecting Anti-Malware Services](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/dn313124(v=vs.85).aspx). This helps make the system and antimalware solutions less susceptible to tampering by malware that does manage to get on the system.
With Protected Processes, Windows 10 prevents untrusted processes from interacting or tampering with those that have been specially signed. Protected Processes defines levels of trust for processes. Less trusted processes are prevented from interacting with and therefore attacking more trusted processes. Windows 10 uses Protected Processes more broadly across the operating system, and as in Windows 8.1, implements them in a way that can be used by 3rd party anti-malware vendors, as described in [Protecting Anti-Malware Services](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/services/protecting-anti-malware-services-). This helps make the system and antimalware solutions less susceptible to tampering by malware that does manage to get on the system.
### Universal Windows apps protections
### Universal Windows apps protections
When users download Universal Windows apps from the Microsoft Store, it’s unlikely that they will encounter malware because all apps go through a careful screening process before being made available in the store. Apps that organizations build and distribute through sideloading processes will need to be reviewed internally to ensure that they meet organizational security requirements.
When users download Universal Windows apps from the Microsoft Store, it's unlikely that they will encounter malware because all apps go through a careful screening process before being made available in the store. Apps that organizations build and distribute through sideloading processes will need to be reviewed internally to ensure that they meet organizational security requirements.
Regardless of how users acquire Universal Windows apps, they can use them with increased confidence. Universal Windows apps run in an AppContainer sandbox with limited privileges and capabilities. For example, Universal Windows apps have no system-level access, have tightly controlled interactions with other apps, and have no access to data unless the user explicitly grants the application permission.
Regardless of how users acquire Universal Windows apps, they can use them with increased confidence. Universal Windows apps run in an AppContainer sandbox with limited privileges and capabilities. For example, Universal Windows apps have no system-level access, have tightly controlled interactions with other apps, and have no access to data unless the user explicitly grants the application permission.
In addition, all Universal Windows apps follow the security principle of least privilege. Apps receive only the minimum privileges they need to perform their legitimate tasks, so even if an attacker exploits an app, the damage the exploit can do is severely limited and should be contained within the sandbox. The Microsoft Store displays the exact capabilities the app requires (for example, access to the camera), along with the app’s age rating and publisher.
In addition, all Universal Windows apps follow the security principle of least privilege. Apps receive only the minimum privileges they need to perform their legitimate tasks, so even if an attacker exploits an app, the damage the exploit can do is severely limited and should be contained within the sandbox. The Microsoft Store displays the exact capabilities the app requires (for example, access to the camera), along with the app's age rating and publisher.
### Windows heap protections
### Windows heap protections
@ -221,29 +221,29 @@ The *heap* is a location in memory that Windows uses to store dynamic applicatio
Windows10 has several important improvements to the security of the heap:
Windows10 has several important improvements to the security of the heap:
- **Heap metadata hardening** for internal data structures that the heap uses, to improve protections against memory corruption.
- **Heap metadata hardening** for internal data structures that the heap uses, to improve protections against memory corruption.
- **Heap allocation randomization**, that is, the use of randomized locations and sizes for heap memory allocations, which makes it more difficult for an attacker to predict the location of critical memory to overwrite. Specifically, Windows10 adds a random offset to the address of a newly allocated heap, which makes the allocation much less predictable.
- **Heap allocation randomization**, that is, the use of randomized locations and sizes for heap memory allocations, which makes it more difficult for an attacker to predict the location of critical memory to overwrite. Specifically, Windows10 adds a random offset to the address of a newly allocated heap, which makes the allocation much less predictable.
- **Heap guard pages** before and after blocks of memory, which work as tripwires. If an attacker attempts to write past a block of memory (a common technique known as a buffer overflow), the attacker will have to overwrite a guard page. Any attempt to modify a guard page is considered a memory corruption, and Windows10 responds by instantly terminating the app.
- **Heap guard pages** before and after blocks of memory, which work as tripwires. If an attacker attempts to write past a block of memory (a common technique known as a buffer overflow), the attacker will have to overwrite a guard page. Any attempt to modify a guard page is considered a memory corruption, and Windows10 responds by instantly terminating the app.
### Kernel pool protections
### Kernel pool protections
The operating system kernel in Windows sets aside two pools of memory, one that remains in physical memory (“nonpaged pool”) and one that can be paged in and out of physical memory (“paged pool”). There are many mitigations that have been added over time, such as process quota pointer encoding; lookaside, delay free, and pool page cookies; and PoolIndex bounds checks. Windows 10 adds multiple “pool hardening” protections, such as integrity checks, that help protect the kernel pool against more advanced attacks.
The operating system kernel in Windows sets aside two pools of memory, one which remains in physical memory ("nonpaged pool") and one which can be paged in and out of physical memory ("paged pool"). There are many mitigations that have been added over time, such as process quota pointer encoding; lookaside, delay free, and pool page cookies; and PoolIndex bounds checks. Windows 10 adds multiple "pool hardening" protections, such as integrity checks, that help protect the kernel pool against more advanced attacks.
In addition to pool hardening, Windows 10 includes other kernel hardening features:
In addition to pool hardening, Windows 10 includes other kernel hardening features:
- **Kernel DEP** and **Kernel ASLR**: Follow the same principles as [Data Execution Prevention](#data-execution-prevention) and [Address Space Layout Randomization](#address-space-layout-randomization), described earlier in this topic.
- **Kernel DEP** and **Kernel ASLR**: Follow the same principles as [Data Execution Prevention](#data-execution-prevention) and [Address Space Layout Randomization](#address-space-layout-randomization), described earlier in this topic.
- **Font parsing in AppContainer:** Isolates font parsing in an [AppContainer sandbox](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/mt595898(v=vs.85).aspx).
- **Font parsing in AppContainer:** Isolates font parsing in an [AppContainer sandbox](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/secauthz/appcontainer-isolation).
- **Disabling of NTVirtual DOS Machine (NTVDM)**: The old NTVDM kernel module (for running 16-bit applications) is disabled by default, which neutralizes the associated vulnerabilities. (Enabling NTVDM decreases protection against Null dereference and other exploits.)
- **Disabling of NTVirtual DOS Machine (NTVDM)**: The old NTVDM kernel module (for running 16-bit applications) is disabled by default, which neutralizes the associated vulnerabilities. (Enabling NTVDM decreases protection against Null dereference and other exploits.)
- **Supervisor Mode Execution Prevention (SMEP)**: Helps prevent the kernel (the “supervisor”) from executing code in user pages, a common technique used by attackers for local kernel elevation of privilege (EOP). This requires processor support found in Intel Ivy Bridge or later processors, or ARM with PXN support.
- **Supervisor Mode Execution Prevention (SMEP)**: Helps prevent the kernel (the "supervisor") from executing code in user pages, a common technique used by attackers for local kernel elevation of privilege (EOP). This requires processor support found in Intel Ivy Bridge or later processors, or ARM with PXN support.
- **Safe unlinking:** Helps protect against pool overruns that are combined with unlinking operations to create an attack. Windows 10 includes global safe unlinking, which extends heap and kernel pool safe unlinking to all usage of LIST\_ENTRY and includes the “FastFail” mechanism to enable rapid and safe process termination.
- **Safe unlinking:** Helps protect against pool overruns that are combined with unlinking operations to create an attack. Windows 10 includes global safe unlinking, which extends heap and kernel pool safe unlinking to all usage of LIST\_ENTRY and includes the "FastFail" mechanism to enable rapid and safe process termination.
- **Memory reservations**: The lowest 64 KB of process memory is reserved for the system. Apps are not allowed to allocate that portion of the memory. This makes it more difficult for malware to use techniques such as “NULL dereference” to overwrite critical system data structures in memory.
- **Memory reservations**: The lowest 64 KB of process memory is reserved for the system. Apps are not allowed to allocate that portion of the memory. This makes it more difficult for malware to use techniques such as "NULL dereference" to overwrite critical system data structures in memory.
### Control Flow Guard
### Control Flow Guard
@ -251,31 +251,31 @@ When applications are loaded into memory, they are allocated space based on the
This kind of threat is mitigated in Windows 10 through the Control Flow Guard (CFG) feature. When a trusted application that was compiled to use CFG calls code, CFG verifies that the code location called is trusted for execution. If the location is not trusted, the application is immediately terminated as a potential security risk.
This kind of threat is mitigated in Windows 10 through the Control Flow Guard (CFG) feature. When a trusted application that was compiled to use CFG calls code, CFG verifies that the code location called is trusted for execution. If the location is not trusted, the application is immediately terminated as a potential security risk.
An administrator cannot configure CFG; rather, an application developer can take advantage of CFG by configuring it when the application is compiled. Consider asking application developers and software vendors to deliver trustworthy Windows applications compiled with CFG enabled. For example, it can be enabled for applications written in C or C++, or applications compiled using Visual Studio 2015. For information about enabling CFG for a Visual Studio 2015 project, see [Control Flow Guard](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/mt637065(v=vs.85).aspx).
An administrator cannot configure CFG; rather, an application developer can take advantage of CFG by configuring it when the application is compiled. Consider asking application developers and software vendors to deliver trustworthy Windows applications compiled with CFG enabled. For example, it can be enabled for applications written in C or C++, or applications compiled using Visual Studio 2015. For information about enabling CFG for a Visual Studio 2015 project, see [Control Flow Guard](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/secbp/control-flow-guard).
Of course, browsers are a key entry point for attacks, so Microsoft Edge, IE, and other Windows features take full advantage of CFG.
Of course, browsers are a key entry point for attacks, so Microsoft Edge, IE, and other Windows features take full advantage of CFG.
### Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer11
### Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer11
Browser security is a critical component of any security strategy, and for good reason: the browser is the user’s interface to the Internet, an environment with many malicious sites and content waiting to attack. Most users cannot perform at least part of their job without a browser, and many users are completely reliant on one. This reality has made the browser the common pathway from which malicious hackers initiate their attacks.
Browser security is a critical component of any security strategy, and for good reason: the browser is the user's interface to the Internet, an environment with many malicious sites and content waiting to attack. Most users cannot perform at least part of their job without a browser, and many users are completely reliant on one. This reality has made the browser the common pathway from which malicious hackers initiate their attacks.
All browsers enable some amount of extensibility to do things beyond the original scope of the browser. Two common examples of this are Flash and Java extensions that enable their respective applications to run inside a browser. Keeping Windows10 secure for web browsing and applications, especially for these two content types, is a priority.
All browsers enable some amount of extensibility to do things beyond the original scope of the browser. Two common examples of this are Flash and Java extensions that enable their respective applications to run inside a browser. Keeping Windows10 secure for web browsing and applications, especially for these two content types, is a priority.
Windows 10 includes an entirely new browser, Microsoft Edge. Microsoft Edge is more secure in multiple ways, especially:
Windows 10 includes an entirely new browser, Microsoft Edge. Microsoft Edge is more secure in multiple ways, especially:
- **Smaller attack surface; no support for non-Microsoft binary extensions**. Multiple browser components with vulnerable attack surfaces have been removed from Microsoft Edge. Components that have been removed include legacy document modes and script engines, Browser Helper Objects (BHOs), ActiveX controls, and Java. However, Microsoft Edge supports Flash content and PDF viewing by default through built-in extensions.
- **Smaller attack surface; no support for non-Microsoft binary extensions**. Multiple browser components with vulnerable attack surfaces have been removed from Microsoft Edge. Components that have been removed include legacy document modes and script engines, Browser Helper Objects (BHOs), ActiveX controls, and Java. However, Microsoft Edge supports Flash content and PDF viewing by default through built-in extensions.
- **Runs 64-bit processes.** A 64-bit PC running an older version of Windows often runs in 32-bit compatibility mode to support older and less secure extensions. When Microsoft Edge runs on a 64-bit PC, it runs only 64-bit processes, which are much more secure against exploits.
- **Runs 64-bit processes.** A 64-bit PC running an older version of Windows often runs in 32-bit compatibility mode to support older and less secure extensions. When Microsoft Edge runs on a 64-bit PC, it runs only 64-bit processes, which are much more secure against exploits.
- **Includes Memory Garbage Collection (MemGC)**. This helps protect against use-after-free (UAF) issues.
- **Includes Memory Garbage Collection (MemGC)**. This helps protect against use-after-free (UAF) issues.
- **Designed as a Universal Windows app.** Microsoft Edge is inherently compartmentalized and runs in an AppContainer that sandboxes the browser from the system, data, and other apps. IE11 on Windows10 can also take advantage of the same AppContainer technology through Enhanced Protect Mode. However, because IE11 can run ActiveX and BHOs, the browser and sandbox are susceptible to a much broader range of attacks than Microsoft Edge.
- **Designed as a Universal Windows app.** Microsoft Edge is inherently compartmentalized and runs in an AppContainer that sandboxes the browser from the system, data, and other apps. IE11 on Windows10 can also take advantage of the same AppContainer technology through Enhanced Protect Mode. However, because IE11 can run ActiveX and BHOs, the browser and sandbox are susceptible to a much broader range of attacks than Microsoft Edge.
- **Simplifies security configuration tasks.** Because Microsoft Edge uses a simplified application structure and a single sandbox configuration, there are fewer required security settings. In addition, Microsoft Edge default settings align with security best practices, which makes it more secure by default.
- **Simplifies security configuration tasks.** Because Microsoft Edge uses a simplified application structure and a single sandbox configuration, there are fewer required security settings. In addition, Microsoft Edge default settings align with security best practices, which makes it more secure by default.
In addition to Microsoft Edge, Microsoft includes IE11 in Windows10, primarily for backwards-compatibility with websites and with binary extensions that do not work with Microsoft Edge. It should not be configured as the primary browser but rather as an optional or automatic switchover. We recommend using Microsoft Edge as the primary web browser because it provides compatibility with the modern web and the best possible security.
In addition to Microsoft Edge, Microsoft includes IE11 in Windows10, primarily for backwards-compatibility with websites and with binary extensions that do not work with Microsoft Edge. It should not be configured as the primary browser but rather as an optional or automatic switchover. We recommend using Microsoft Edge as the primary web browser because it provides compatibility with the modern web and the best possible security.
For sites that require IE11 compatibility, including those that require binary extensions and plugins, enable Enterprise mode and use the Enterprise Mode Site List to define which sites have the dependency. With this configuration, when Microsoft Edge identifies a site that requires IE11, users will automatically be switched to IE11.
For sites that require IE11 compatibility, including those that require binary extensions and plug-ins, enable Enterprise mode and use the Enterprise Mode Site List to define which sites have the dependency. With this configuration, when Microsoft Edge identifies a site that requires IE11, users will automatically be switched to IE11.
### Functions that software vendors can use to build mitigations into apps
### Functions that software vendors can use to build mitigations into apps
@ -288,21 +288,21 @@ Some of the protections available in Windows 10 are provided through functions t
| Child Process Restriction to restrict the ability to create child processes | [UpdateProcThreadAttribute function](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686880(v=vs.85).aspx)<br>\[PROC\_THREAD\_ATTRIBUTE\_CHILD\_PROCESS\_POLICY\] |
| Child Process Restriction to restrict the ability to create child processes | [UpdateProcThreadAttribute function](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-updateprocthreadattribute)<br>\[PROC\_THREAD\_ATTRIBUTE\_CHILD\_PROCESS\_POLICY\] |
| Win32k System Call Disable Restriction to restrict ability to use NTUser and GDI | [SetProcessMitigationPolicy function](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/hh769088(v=vs.85).aspx)<br>\[ProcessSystemCallDisablePolicy\] |
| Win32k System Call Disable Restriction to restrict ability to use NTUser and GDI | [SetProcessMitigationPolicy function](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-setprocessmitigationpolicy)<br>\[ProcessSystemCallDisablePolicy\] |
| High Entropy ASLR for up to 1TB of variance in memory allocations | [UpdateProcThreadAttribute function](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686880(v=vs.85).aspx)<br>\[PROCESS\_CREATION\_MITIGATION\_POLICY\_HIGH\_ENTROPY\_ASLR\_ALWAYS\_ON\] |
| High Entropy ASLR for up to 1TB of variance in memory allocations | [UpdateProcThreadAttribute function](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-updateprocthreadattribute)<br>\[PROCESS\_CREATION\_MITIGATION\_POLICY\_HIGH\_ENTROPY\_ASLR\_ALWAYS\_ON\] |
| Strict handle checks to raise immediate exception upon bad handle reference | [UpdateProcThreadAttribute function](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686880(v=vs.85).aspx)<br>\[PROCESS\_CREATION\_MITIGATION\_POLICY\_STRICT\_HANDLE\_CHECKS\_ALWAYS\_ON\] |
| Strict handle checks to raise immediate exception upon bad handle reference | [UpdateProcThreadAttribute function](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-updateprocthreadattribute)<br>\[PROCESS\_CREATION\_MITIGATION\_POLICY\_STRICT\_HANDLE\_CHECKS\_ALWAYS\_ON\] |
| Extension point disable to block the use of certain third-party extension points | [UpdateProcThreadAttribute function](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686880(v=vs.85).aspx)<br>\[PROCESS\_CREATION\_MITIGATION\_POLICY\_EXTENSION\_POINT\_DISABLE\_ALWAYS\_ON\] |
| Extension point disable to block the use of certain third-party extension points | [UpdateProcThreadAttribute function](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-updateprocthreadattribute)<br>\[PROCESS\_CREATION\_MITIGATION\_POLICY\_EXTENSION\_POINT\_DISABLE\_ALWAYS\_ON\] |
| Heap terminate on corruption to protect the system against a corrupted heap | [UpdateProcThreadAttribute function](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686880(v=vs.85).aspx)<br>\[PROCESS\_CREATION\_MITIGATION\_POLICY\_HEAP\_TERMINATE\_ALWAYS\_ON\] |
| Heap terminate on corruption to protect the system against a corrupted heap | [UpdateProcThreadAttribute function](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-updateprocthreadattribute)<br>\[PROCESS\_CREATION\_MITIGATION\_POLICY\_HEAP\_TERMINATE\_ALWAYS\_ON\] |
## Understanding Windows 10 in relation to the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit
## Understanding Windows 10 in relation to the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit
You might already be familiar with the [Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET)](https://support.microsoft.com/kb/2458544), which has since 2009 offered a variety of exploit mitigations, and an interface for configuring those mitigations. You can use this section to understand how EMET mitigations relate to those in Windows 10. Many of EMET’s mitigations have been built into Windows 10, some with additional improvements. However, some EMET mitigations carry high performance cost, or appear to be relatively ineffective against modern threats, and therefore have not been brought into Windows 10.
You might already be familiar with the [Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET)](https://support.microsoft.com/kb/2458544), which has since 2009 offered a variety of exploit mitigations, and an interface for configuring those mitigations. You can use this section to understand how EMET mitigations relate to those in Windows 10. Many of EMET's mitigations have been built into Windows 10, some with additional improvements. However, some EMET mitigations carry high performance cost, or appear to be relatively ineffective against modern threats, and therefore have not been brought into Windows 10.
Because many of EMET’s mitigations and security mechanisms already exist in Windows 10 and have been improved, particularly those assessed to have high effectiveness at mitigating known bypasses, version 5.5*x* has been announced as the final major version release for EMET (see [Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit](https://technet.microsoft.com/security/jj653751)).
Because many of EMET's mitigations and security mechanisms already exist in Windows 10 and have been improved, particularly those assessed to have high effectiveness at mitigating known bypasses, version 5.5*x* has been announced as the final major version release for EMET (see [Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit](https://web.archive.org/web/20170928073955/https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/security/jj653751)).
The following table lists EMET features in relation to Windows 10 features.
The following table lists EMET features in relation to Windows 10 features.
@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ to Windows 10 features</strong></th>
<td><ul>
<td><ul>
<li><p>Null Page</p></li>
<li><p>Null Page</p></li>
</ul></td>
</ul></td>
<td>Mitigations for this threat are built into Windows 10, as described in the “Memory reservations” item in <ahref="#kernel-pool-protections">Kernel pool protections</a>, earlier in this topic.</td>
<td>Mitigations for this threat are built into Windows 10, as described in the "Memory reservations" item in <ahref="#kernel-pool-protections">Kernel pool protections</a>, earlier in this topic.</td>
</tr>
</tr>
<trclass="even">
<trclass="even">
<td><ul>
<td><ul>
@ -352,9 +352,9 @@ to Windows 10 features</strong></th>
<td>Mitigated in Windows 10 with applications compiled with Control Flow Guard, as described in <ahref="#control-flow-guard">Control Flow Guard</a>, earlier in this topic.</td>
<td>Mitigated in Windows 10 with applications compiled with Control Flow Guard, as described in <ahref="#control-flow-guard">Control Flow Guard</a>, earlier in this topic.</td>
</tr>
</tr>
@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ to Windows 10 features</strong></th>
### Converting an EMET XML settings file into Windows 10 mitigation policies
### Converting an EMET XML settings file into Windows 10 mitigation policies
One of EMET’s strengths is that it allows you to import and export configuration settings for EMET mitigations as an XML settings file for straightforward deployment. To generate mitigation policies for Windows 10 from an EMET XML settings file, you can install the ProcessMitigations PowerShell module. In an elevated PowerShell session, run this cmdlet:
One of EMET's strengths is that it allows you to import and export configuration settings for EMET mitigations as an XML settings file for straightforward deployment. To generate mitigation policies for Windows 10 from an EMET XML settings file, you can install the ProcessMitigations PowerShell module. In an elevated PowerShell session, run this cmdlet:
- **Convert EMET settings to Windows 10 settings**: You can run ConvertTo-ProcessMitigationPolicy and provide an EMET XML settings file as input, which will generate a result file of Windows 10 mitigation settings. For example:
- **Convert EMET settings to Windows 10 settings**: You can run ConvertTo-ProcessMitigationPolicy and provide an EMET XML settings file as input, which will generate a result file of Windows 10 mitigation settings. For example:
- **Audit and modify the converted settings (the output file)**: Additional cmdlets let you apply, enumerate, enable, disable, and save settings in the output file. For example, this cmdlet enables SEHOP and disables MandatoryASLR and DEPATL registry settings for Notepad:
- **Audit and modify the converted settings (the output file)**: Additional cmdlets let you apply, enumerate, enable, disable, and save settings in the output file. For example, this cmdlet enables SEHOP and disables MandatoryASLR and DEPATL registry settings for Notepad:
- **Convert Attack surface reduction (ASR) settings to a Code Integrity policy file**: If the input file contains any settings for EMET’s Attack surface reduction (ASR) mitigation, the converter will also create a Code Integrity policy file. In this case, you can complete the merging, auditing, and deployment process for the Code Integrity policy, as described in [Deploy Device Guard: deploy code integrity policies](/windows/device-security/device-guard/deploy-device-guard-deploy-code-integrity-policies). This will enable protections on Windows 10 equivalent to EMET’s ASR protections.
- **Convert Attack surface reduction (ASR) settings to a Code Integrity policy file**: If the input file contains any settings for EMET's Attack surface reduction (ASR) mitigation, the converter will also create a Code Integrity policy file. In this case, you can complete the merging, auditing, and deployment process for the Code Integrity policy, as described in [Deploy Device Guard: deploy code integrity policies](/windows/device-security/device-guard/deploy-device-guard-deploy-code-integrity-policies). This will enable protections on Windows 10 equivalent to EMET's ASR protections.
- **Convert Certificate Trust settings to enterprise certificate pinning rules**: If you have an EMET “Certificate Trust” XML file (pinning rules file), you can also use ConvertTo-ProcessMitigationPolicy to convert the pinning rules file into an enterprise certificate pinning rules file. Then you can finish enabling that file as described in [Enterprise Certificate Pinning](/windows/access-protection/enterprise-certificate-pinning). For example:
- **Convert Certificate Trust settings to enterprise certificate pinning rules**: If you have an EMET "Certificate Trust" XML file (pinning rules file), you can also use ConvertTo-ProcessMitigationPolicy to convert the pinning rules file into an enterprise certificate pinning rules file. Then you can finish enabling that file as described in [Enterprise Certificate Pinning](/windows/access-protection/enterprise-certificate-pinning). For example:
@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ Windows Virtual Desktop is a comprehensive desktop and app virtualization servic
#### Microsoft Endpoint Manager
#### Microsoft Endpoint Manager
Configuration Manager, Intune, Desktop Analytics, Co-Management, and Device Management Admin Console are now are [Microsoft Endpoint Manager](https://docs.microsoft.com/configmgr/). See the Nov. 4 2019 [announcement](https://www.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/blog/2019/11/04/use-the-power-of-cloud-intelligence-to-simplify-and-accelerate-it-and-the-move-to-a-modern-workplace/). Also see [Modern management and security principles driving our Microsoft Endpoint Manager vision](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/Enterprise-Mobility-Security/Modern-management-and-security-principles-driving-our-Microsoft/ba-p/946797).
Configuration Manager, Intune, Desktop Analytics, Co-Management, and Device Management Admin Console are now [Microsoft Endpoint Manager](https://docs.microsoft.com/configmgr/). See the Nov. 4 2019 [announcement](https://www.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/blog/2019/11/04/use-the-power-of-cloud-intelligence-to-simplify-and-accelerate-it-and-the-move-to-a-modern-workplace/). Also see [Modern management and security principles driving our Microsoft Endpoint Manager vision](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/Enterprise-Mobility-Security/Modern-management-and-security-principles-driving-our-Microsoft/ba-p/946797).
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