diff --git a/devices/surface-hub/troubleshoot-surface-hub.md b/devices/surface-hub/troubleshoot-surface-hub.md index 678d06e664..a8a77af3b1 100644 --- a/devices/surface-hub/troubleshoot-surface-hub.md +++ b/devices/surface-hub/troubleshoot-surface-hub.md @@ -417,29 +417,7 @@ Possible fixes for issues with Surface Hub first-run program.   -### Skype for Business - ----- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
IssueCausesPossible fixes

Can't call a Skype consumer from my Surface Hub.

Outgoing calls aren't supported yet.

None currently.

  diff --git a/windows/WaaS-infographic.pdf b/windows/WaaS-infographic.pdf new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cb1ef988a1 Binary files /dev/null and b/windows/WaaS-infographic.pdf differ diff --git a/windows/images/W10-WaaS-poster.PNG b/windows/images/W10-WaaS-poster.PNG index 76f843c1b8..d3887faf89 100644 Binary files a/windows/images/W10-WaaS-poster.PNG and b/windows/images/W10-WaaS-poster.PNG differ diff --git a/windows/index.md b/windows/index.md index 50d0140341..5935b2a3a7 100644 --- a/windows/index.md +++ b/windows/index.md @@ -11,7 +11,8 @@ author: brianlic-msft This library provides the core content that IT pros need to evaluate, plan, deploy, secure and manage devices running Windows 10 or Windows 10 Mobile. -
+
+
@@ -76,15 +77,14 @@ This library provides the core content that IT pros need to evaluate, plan, depl ## Get to know Windows as a Service (WaaS)
- + -
The Windows 10 operating system introduces a new way to build, deploy, and service Windows: Windows as a service. Microsoft has reimagined each part of the process, to simplify the lives of IT pros and maintain a consistent Windows 10 experience for its customers. +
Get to know Windows as a Service (WaaS)
The Windows 10 operating system introduces a new way to build, deploy, and service Windows: Windows as a service. Microsoft has reimagined each part of the process, to simplify the lives of IT pros and maintain a consistent Windows 10 experience for its customers. These improvements focus on maximizing customer involvement in Windows development, simplifying the deployment and servicing of Windows client computers, and leveling out the resources needed to deploy and maintain Windows over time. - - [Read more about Windows as a Service](manage/waas-overview.md) - - - Download the WaaS infographic + + - Read more about Windows as a Service
Get to know Windows as a Service (WaaS)
@@ -93,4 +93,5 @@ This library provides the core content that IT pros need to evaluate, plan, depl   +   diff --git a/windows/keep-secure/TOC.md b/windows/keep-secure/TOC.md index a6e97434bf..f0c4a89cb2 100644 --- a/windows/keep-secure/TOC.md +++ b/windows/keep-secure/TOC.md @@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ #### [Deploy code integrity policies: steps](deploy-code-integrity-policies-steps.md) #### [Deploy catalog files to support code integrity policies](deploy-catalog-files-to-support-code-integrity-policies.md) ### [Deploy Device Guard: enable virtualization-based security](deploy-device-guard-enable-virtualization-based-security.md) -## [Mitigate threats by using Windows 10 security features](overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md) ## [Protect derived domain credentials with Credential Guard](credential-guard.md) ### [How Credential Guard works](credential-guard-how-it-works.md) ### [Credential Guard Requirements](credential-guard-requirements.md) diff --git a/windows/keep-secure/change-history-for-keep-windows-10-secure.md b/windows/keep-secure/change-history-for-keep-windows-10-secure.md index d3d40d84ac..8d0b1595b9 100644 --- a/windows/keep-secure/change-history-for-keep-windows-10-secure.md +++ b/windows/keep-secure/change-history-for-keep-windows-10-secure.md @@ -27,14 +27,6 @@ This topic lists new and updated topics in the [Keep Windows 10 secure](index.md |[Available Windows Defender SmartScreen Group Policy and mobile device management (MDM) settings](windows-defender-smartscreen-available-settings.md)|New | |[Use Windows Defender Security Center to set Windows Defender SmartScreen for individual devices](windows-defender-smartscreen-set-individual-device.md)|New | - -## February 2017 - -|New or changed topic |Description | -|---------------------|------------| -|[Overview of threat mitigations in Windows 10](overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md) | Reorganized from existing content, to provide a better overview of threat mitigations. Added information that maps the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) to Windows 10 features. | - - ## January 2017 |New or changed topic |Description | |---------------------|------------| diff --git a/windows/keep-secure/credential-guard-not-protected-scenarios.md b/windows/keep-secure/credential-guard-not-protected-scenarios.md index 6206dbe532..f2c4d556e7 100644 --- a/windows/keep-secure/credential-guard-not-protected-scenarios.md +++ b/windows/keep-secure/credential-guard-not-protected-scenarios.md @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ ---- -title: Scenarios not protected by Credential Guard (Windows 10) +--- +title: Credential Guard protection limits (Windows 10) description: Scenarios not protected by Credential Guard in Windows 10. ms.prod: w10 ms.mktglfcycl: explore @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ localizationpriority: high author: brianlic-msft --- -# Scenarios not protected by Credential Guard +# Credential Guard protection limits **Applies to** - Windows 10 @@ -31,7 +31,12 @@ Some ways to store credentials are not protected by Credential Guard, including: - When Credential Guard is enabled, neither Digest nor CredSSP have access to users' logon credentials. This implies no Single Sign-On use for these protocols. - Supplied credentials for NTLM authentication are not protected. If a user is prompted for and enters credentials for NTLM authentication, these credentials are vulnerable to be read from LSASS memory. Note that these same credentials are vulnerable to key loggers as well. -For further information, see video: [Credentials Protected by Credential Guard](https://mva.microsoft.com/en-us/training-courses/deep-dive-into-credential-guard-16651?l=pdc37LJyC_1204300474) +>[!NOTE] +When Credential Guard is deployed on a VM, Credential Guard protects secrets from attacks inside the VM. However, it does not provide additional protection from privileged system attacks originating from the host. + +>[!NOTE] +Windows logon cached password verifiers (commonly called "cached credentials") +do not qualify as credentials because they cannot be presented to another computer for authentication, and can only be used locally to verify credentials. They are stored in the registry on the local computer and provide validation for credentials when a domain-joined computer cannot connect to AD DS during user logon. These “cached logons”, or more specifically, cached domain account information, can be managed using the security policy setting **Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache** if a domain controller is not available. ## Additional mitigations @@ -41,7 +46,7 @@ Credential Guard can provide mitigations against attacks on derived credentials Credential theft attacks allow the attacker to steal secrets from one device and use them from another device. If a user can sign on to multiple devices then any device could be used to steal credentials. How do you ensure that users only sign on using devices that have Credential Guard enabled? By deploying authentication policies that restrict them to specific domain-joined devices that have been configured with Credential Guard. For the domain controller to know what device a user is signing on from, Kerberos armoring must be used. -### Kerberos armoring +#### Kerberos armoring Kerberos armoring is part of RFC 6113. When a device supports Kerberos armoring, its TGT is used to protect the user's proof of possession which can mitigate offline dictionary attacks. Kerberos armoring also provides the additional benefit of signed KDC errors this mitigates tampering which can result in things such as downgrade attacks. @@ -51,7 +56,7 @@ Kerberos armoring is part of RFC 6113. When a device supports Kerberos armoring, - All the domain controllers in these domains must be configured to support Kerberos armoring. Set the **KDC support for claims, compound authentication, and Kerberos armoring** Group Policy setting to either **Supported** or **Always provide claims**. - All the devices with Credential Guard that the users will be restricted to must be configured to support Kerberos armoring. Enable the **Kerberos client support for claims, compound authentication and Kerberos armoring** Group Policy settings under **Computer Configuration** -> **Administrative Templates** -> **System** -> **Kerberos**. -### Protecting domain-joined device secrets +#### Protecting domain-joined device secrets Since domain-joined devices also use shared secrets for authentication, attackers can steal those secrets as well. By deploying device certificates with Credential Guard, the private key can be protected. Then authentication policies can require that users sign on devices that authenticate using those certificates. This prevents shared secrets stolen from the device to be used with stolen user credentials to sign on as the user. @@ -63,7 +68,7 @@ Domain-joined device certificate authentication has the following requirements: - Windows 10 devices have the CA issuing the domain controller certificates in the enterprise store. - A process is established to ensure the identity and trustworthiness of the device in a similar manner as you would establish the identity and trustworthiness of a user before issuing them a smartcard. -#### Deploying domain-joined device certificates +##### Deploying domain-joined device certificates To guarantee that certificates with the required issuance policy are only installed on the devices these users must use, they must be deployed manually on each device. The same security procedures used for issuing smart cards to users should be applied to device certificates. @@ -95,7 +100,7 @@ CertReq -EnrollCredGuardCert MachineAuthentication > [!NOTE] > You must restart the device after enrolling the machine authentication certificate.   -#### How a certificate issuance policy can be used for access control +##### How a certificate issuance policy can be used for access control Beginning with the Windows Server 2008 R2 domain functional level, domain controllers support for authentication mechanism assurance provides a way to map certificate issuance policy OIDs to universal security groups. Windows Server 2012 domain controllers with claim support can map them to claims. To learn more about authentication mechanism assurance, see [Authentication Mechanism Assurance for AD DS in Windows Server 2008 R2 Step-by-Step Guide](https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd378897(v=ws.10).aspx) on TechNet. @@ -117,7 +122,7 @@ Beginning with the Windows Server 2008 R2 domain functional level, domain contro .\set-IssuancePolicyToGroupLink.ps1 –IssuancePolicyName:"" –groupOU:"" –groupName:”" ``` -### Restricting user sign on +#### Restricting user sign on So we now have completed the following: @@ -146,12 +151,529 @@ Authentication policies have the following requirements: > [!NOTE] > When the authentication policy enforces policy restrictions, users will not be able to sign on using devices that do not have a certificate with the appropriate issuance policy deployed. This applies to both local and remote sign on scenarios. Therefore, it is strongly recommended to first only audit policy restrictions to ensure you don't have unexpected failures. -#### Discovering authentication failures due to authentication policies +##### Discovering authentication failures due to authentication policies To make tracking authentication failures due to authentication policies easier, an operational log exists with just those events. To enable the logs on the domain controllers, in Event Viewer, navigate to **Applications and Services Logs\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Authentication, right-click AuthenticationPolicyFailures-DomainController**, and then click **Enable Log**. To learn more about authentication policy events, see [Authentication Policies and Authentication Policy Silos](https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn486813(v=ws.11).aspx). + + + +### Appendix: Scripts + + +Here is a list of scripts mentioned in this topic. + +#### Get the available issuance policies on the certificate authority + +Save this script file as get-IssuancePolicy.ps1. + +``` syntax +####################################### +## Parameters to be defined ## +## by the user ## +####################################### +Param ( +$Identity, +$LinkedToGroup +) +####################################### +## Strings definitions ## +####################################### +Data getIP_strings { +# culture="en-US" +ConvertFrom-StringData -stringdata @' +help1 = This command can be used to retrieve all available Issuance Policies in a forest. The forest of the currently logged on user is targeted. +help2 = Usage: +help3 = The following parameter is mandatory: +help4 = -LinkedToGroup: +help5 = "yes" will return only Issuance Policies that are linked to groups. Checks that the linked Issuance Policies are linked to valid groups. +help6 = "no" will return only Issuance Policies that are not currently linked to any group. +help7 = "all" will return all Issuance Policies defined in the forest. Checks that the linked Issuance policies are linked to valid groups. +help8 = The following parameter is optional: +help9 = -Identity:. If you specify an identity, the option specified in the "-LinkedToGroup" parameter is ignored. +help10 = Output: This script returns the Issuance Policy objects meeting the criteria defined by the above parameters. +help11 = Examples: +errorIPNotFound = Error: no Issuance Policy could be found with Identity "{0}" +ErrorNotSecurity = Error: Issuance Policy "{0}" is linked to group "{1}" which is not of type "Security". +ErrorNotUniversal = Error: Issuance Policy "{0}" is linked to group "{1}" whose scope is not "Universal". +ErrorHasMembers = Error: Issuance Policy "{0}" is linked to group "{1}" which has a non-empty membership. The group has the following members: +LinkedIPs = The following Issuance Policies are linked to groups: +displayName = displayName : {0} +Name = Name : {0} +dn = distinguishedName : {0} + InfoName = Linked Group Name: {0} + InfoDN = Linked Group DN: {0} +NonLinkedIPs = The following Issuance Policies are NOT linked to groups: +'@ +} +##Import-LocalizedData getIP_strings +import-module ActiveDirectory +####################################### +## Help ## +####################################### +function Display-Help { + "" + $getIP_strings.help1 + "" +$getIP_strings.help2 +"" +$getIP_strings.help3 +" " + $getIP_strings.help4 +" " + $getIP_strings.help5 + " " + $getIP_strings.help6 + " " + $getIP_strings.help7 +"" +$getIP_strings.help8 + " " + $getIP_strings.help9 + "" + $getIP_strings.help10 +"" +"" +$getIP_strings.help11 + " " + '$' + "myIPs = .\get-IssuancePolicy.ps1 -LinkedToGroup:All" + " " + '$' + "myLinkedIPs = .\get-IssuancePolicy.ps1 -LinkedToGroup:yes" + " " + '$' + "myIP = .\get-IssuancePolicy.ps1 -Identity:""Medium Assurance""" +"" +} +$root = get-adrootdse +$domain = get-addomain -current loggedonuser +$configNCDN = [String]$root.configurationNamingContext +if ( !($Identity) -and !($LinkedToGroup) ) { +display-Help +break +} +if ($Identity) { + $OIDs = get-adobject -Filter {(objectclass -eq "msPKI-Enterprise-Oid") -and ((name -eq $Identity) -or (displayname -eq $Identity) -or (distinguishedName -like $Identity)) } -searchBase $configNCDN -properties * + if ($OIDs -eq $null) { +$errormsg = $getIP_strings.ErrorIPNotFound -f $Identity +write-host $errormsg -ForegroundColor Red + } + foreach ($OID in $OIDs) { + if ($OID."msDS-OIDToGroupLink") { +# In case the Issuance Policy is linked to a group, it is good to check whether there is any problem with the mapping. + $groupDN = $OID."msDS-OIDToGroupLink" + $group = get-adgroup -Identity $groupDN + $groupName = $group.Name +# Analyze the group + if ($group.groupCategory -ne "Security") { +$errormsg = $getIP_strings.ErrorNotSecurity -f $Identity, $groupName + write-host $errormsg -ForegroundColor Red + } + if ($group.groupScope -ne "Universal") { + $errormsg = $getIP_strings.ErrorNotUniversal -f $Identity, $groupName +write-host $errormsg -ForegroundColor Red + } + $members = Get-ADGroupMember -Identity $group + if ($members) { + $errormsg = $getIP_strings.ErrorHasMembers -f $Identity, $groupName +write-host $errormsg -ForegroundColor Red + foreach ($member in $members) { + write-host " " $member -ForeGroundColor Red + } + } + } + } + return $OIDs + break +} +if (($LinkedToGroup -eq "yes") -or ($LinkedToGroup -eq "all")) { + $LDAPFilter = "(&(objectClass=msPKI-Enterprise-Oid)(msDS-OIDToGroupLink=*)(flags=2))" + $LinkedOIDs = get-adobject -searchBase $configNCDN -LDAPFilter $LDAPFilter -properties * + write-host "" + write-host "*****************************************************" + write-host $getIP_strings.LinkedIPs + write-host "*****************************************************" + write-host "" + if ($LinkedOIDs -ne $null){ + foreach ($OID in $LinkedOIDs) { +# Display basic information about the Issuance Policies + "" + $getIP_strings.displayName -f $OID.displayName + $getIP_strings.Name -f $OID.Name + $getIP_strings.dn -f $OID.distinguishedName +# Get the linked group. + $groupDN = $OID."msDS-OIDToGroupLink" + $group = get-adgroup -Identity $groupDN + $getIP_strings.InfoName -f $group.Name + $getIP_strings.InfoDN -f $groupDN +# Analyze the group + $OIDName = $OID.displayName + $groupName = $group.Name + if ($group.groupCategory -ne "Security") { + $errormsg = $getIP_strings.ErrorNotSecurity -f $OIDName, $groupName + write-host $errormsg -ForegroundColor Red + } + if ($group.groupScope -ne "Universal") { + $errormsg = $getIP_strings.ErrorNotUniversal -f $OIDName, $groupName + write-host $errormsg -ForegroundColor Red + } + $members = Get-ADGroupMember -Identity $group + if ($members) { + $errormsg = $getIP_strings.ErrorHasMembers -f $OIDName, $groupName + write-host $errormsg -ForegroundColor Red + foreach ($member in $members) { + write-host " " $member -ForeGroundColor Red + } + } + write-host "" + } + }else{ +write-host "There are no issuance policies that are mapped to a group" + } + if ($LinkedToGroup -eq "yes") { + return $LinkedOIDs + break + } +} +if (($LinkedToGroup -eq "no") -or ($LinkedToGroup -eq "all")) { + $LDAPFilter = "(&(objectClass=msPKI-Enterprise-Oid)(!(msDS-OIDToGroupLink=*))(flags=2))" + $NonLinkedOIDs = get-adobject -searchBase $configNCDN -LDAPFilter $LDAPFilter -properties * + write-host "" + write-host "*********************************************************" + write-host $getIP_strings.NonLinkedIPs + write-host "*********************************************************" + write-host "" + if ($NonLinkedOIDs -ne $null) { + foreach ($OID in $NonLinkedOIDs) { +# Display basic information about the Issuance Policies +write-host "" +$getIP_strings.displayName -f $OID.displayName +$getIP_strings.Name -f $OID.Name +$getIP_strings.dn -f $OID.distinguishedName +write-host "" + } + }else{ +write-host "There are no issuance policies which are not mapped to groups" + } + if ($LinkedToGroup -eq "no") { + return $NonLinkedOIDs + break + } +} +``` +> [!NOTE] +> If you're having trouble running this script, try replacing the single quote after the ConvertFrom-StringData parameter. +  +#### Link an issuance policy to a group + +Save the script file as set-IssuancePolicyToGroupLink.ps1. + +``` syntax +####################################### +## Parameters to be defined ## +## by the user ## +####################################### +Param ( +$IssuancePolicyName, +$groupOU, +$groupName +) +####################################### +## Strings definitions ## +####################################### +Data ErrorMsg { +# culture="en-US" +ConvertFrom-StringData -stringdata @' +help1 = This command can be used to set the link between a certificate issuance policy and a universal security group. +help2 = Usage: +help3 = The following parameters are required: +help4 = -IssuancePolicyName: +help5 = -groupName:. If no name is specified, any existing link to a group is removed from the Issuance Policy. +help6 = The following parameter is optional: +help7 = -groupOU:. If this parameter is not specified, the group is looked for or created in the Users container. +help8 = Examples: +help9 = This command will link the issuance policy whose display name is "High Assurance" to the group "HighAssuranceGroup" in the Organizational Unit "OU_FOR_IPol_linked_groups". If the group or the Organizational Unit do not exist, you will be prompted to create them. +help10 = This command will unlink the issuance policy whose name is "402.164959C40F4A5C12C6302E31D5476062" from any group. +MultipleIPs = Error: Multiple Issuance Policies with name or display name "{0}" were found in the subtree of "{1}" +NoIP = Error: no issuance policy with name or display name "{0}" could be found in the subtree of "{1}". +IPFound = An Issuance Policy with name or display name "{0}" was successfully found: {1} +MultipleOUs = Error: more than 1 Organizational Unit with name "{0}" could be found in the subtree of "{1}". +confirmOUcreation = Warning: The Organizational Unit that you specified does not exist. Do you want to create it? +OUCreationSuccess = Organizational Unit "{0}" successfully created. +OUcreationError = Error: Organizational Unit "{0}" could not be created. +OUFoundSuccess = Organizational Unit "{0}" was successfully found. +multipleGroups = Error: More than one group with name "{0}" was found in Organizational Unit "{1}". +confirmGroupCreation = Warning: The group that you specified does not exist. Do you want to create it? +groupCreationSuccess = Univeral Security group "{0}" successfully created. +groupCreationError = Error: Univeral Security group "{0}" could not be created. +GroupFound = Group "{0}" was successfully found. +confirmLinkDeletion = Warning: The Issuance Policy "{0}" is currently linked to group "{1}". Do you really want to remove the link? +UnlinkSuccess = Certificate issuance policy successfully unlinked from any group. +UnlinkError = Removing the link failed. +UnlinkExit = Exiting without removing the link from the issuance policy to the group. +IPNotLinked = The Certificate issuance policy is not currently linked to any group. If you want to link it to a group, you should specify the -groupName option when starting this script. +ErrorNotSecurity = Error: You cannot link issuance Policy "{0}" to group "{1}" because this group is not of type "Security". +ErrorNotUniversal = Error: You cannot link issuance Policy "{0}" to group "{1}" because the scope of this group is not "Universal". +ErrorHasMembers = Error: You cannot link issuance Policy "{0}" to group "{1}" because it has a non-empty membership. The group has the following members: +ConfirmLinkReplacement = Warning: The Issuance Policy "{0}" is currently linked to group "{1}". Do you really want to update the link to point to group "{2}"? +LinkSuccess = The certificate issuance policy was successfully linked to the specified group. +LinkError = The certificate issuance policy could not be linked to the specified group. +ExitNoLinkReplacement = Exiting without setting the new link. +'@ +} +# import-localizeddata ErrorMsg +function Display-Help { +"" +write-host $ErrorMsg.help1 +"" +write-host $ErrorMsg.help2 +"" +write-host $ErrorMsg.help3 +write-host "`t" $ErrorMsg.help4 +write-host "`t" $ErrorMsg.help5 +"" +write-host $ErrorMsg.help6 +write-host "`t" $ErrorMsg.help7 +"" +"" +write-host $ErrorMsg.help8 +"" +write-host $ErrorMsg.help9 +".\Set-IssuancePolicyToGroupMapping.ps1 -IssuancePolicyName ""High Assurance"" -groupOU ""OU_FOR_IPol_linked_groups"" -groupName ""HighAssuranceGroup"" " +"" +write-host $ErrorMsg.help10 +'.\Set-IssuancePolicyToGroupMapping.ps1 -IssuancePolicyName "402.164959C40F4A5C12C6302E31D5476062" -groupName $null ' +"" +} +# Assumption: The group to which the Issuance Policy is going +# to be linked is (or is going to be created) in +# the domain the user running this script is a member of. +import-module ActiveDirectory +$root = get-adrootdse +$domain = get-addomain -current loggedonuser +if ( !($IssuancePolicyName) ) { +display-Help +break +} +####################################### +## Find the OID object ## +## (aka Issuance Policy) ## +####################################### +$searchBase = [String]$root.configurationnamingcontext +$OID = get-adobject -searchBase $searchBase -Filter { ((displayname -eq $IssuancePolicyName) -or (name -eq $IssuancePolicyName)) -and (objectClass -eq "msPKI-Enterprise-Oid")} -properties * +if ($OID -eq $null) { +$tmp = $ErrorMsg.NoIP -f $IssuancePolicyName, $searchBase +write-host $tmp -ForeGroundColor Red +break; +} +elseif ($OID.GetType().IsArray) { +$tmp = $ErrorMsg.MultipleIPs -f $IssuancePolicyName, $searchBase +write-host $tmp -ForeGroundColor Red +break; +} +else { +$tmp = $ErrorMsg.IPFound -f $IssuancePolicyName, $OID.distinguishedName +write-host $tmp -ForeGroundColor Green +} +####################################### +## Find the container of the group ## +####################################### +if ($groupOU -eq $null) { +# default to the Users container +$groupContainer = $domain.UsersContainer +} +else { +$searchBase = [string]$domain.DistinguishedName +$groupContainer = get-adobject -searchBase $searchBase -Filter { (Name -eq $groupOU) -and (objectClass -eq "organizationalUnit")} +if ($groupContainer.count -gt 1) { +$tmp = $ErrorMsg.MultipleOUs -f $groupOU, $searchBase +write-host $tmp -ForegroundColor Red +break; +} +elseif ($groupContainer -eq $null) { +$tmp = $ErrorMsg.confirmOUcreation +write-host $tmp " ( (y)es / (n)o )" -ForegroundColor Yellow -nonewline +$userChoice = read-host +if ( ($userChoice -eq "y") -or ($userChoice -eq "yes") ) { +new-adobject -Name $groupOU -displayName $groupOU -Type "organizationalUnit" -ProtectedFromAccidentalDeletion $true -path $domain.distinguishedName +if ($?){ +$tmp = $ErrorMsg.OUCreationSuccess -f $groupOU +write-host $tmp -ForegroundColor Green +} +else{ +$tmp = $ErrorMsg.OUCreationError -f $groupOU +write-host $tmp -ForeGroundColor Red +break; +} +$groupContainer = get-adobject -searchBase $searchBase -Filter { (Name -eq $groupOU) -and (objectClass -eq "organizationalUnit")} +} +else { +break; +} +} +else { +$tmp = $ErrorMsg.OUFoundSuccess -f $groupContainer.name +write-host $tmp -ForegroundColor Green +} +} +####################################### +## Find the group ## +####################################### +if (($groupName -ne $null) -and ($groupName -ne "")){ +##$searchBase = [String]$groupContainer.DistinguishedName +$searchBase = $groupContainer +$group = get-adgroup -Filter { (Name -eq $groupName) -and (objectClass -eq "group") } -searchBase $searchBase +if ($group -ne $null -and $group.gettype().isarray) { +$tmp = $ErrorMsg.multipleGroups -f $groupName, $searchBase +write-host $tmp -ForeGroundColor Red +break; +} +elseif ($group -eq $null) { +$tmp = $ErrorMsg.confirmGroupCreation +write-host $tmp " ( (y)es / (n)o )" -ForegroundColor Yellow -nonewline +$userChoice = read-host +if ( ($userChoice -eq "y") -or ($userChoice -eq "yes") ) { +new-adgroup -samAccountName $groupName -path $groupContainer.distinguishedName -GroupScope "Universal" -GroupCategory "Security" +if ($?){ +$tmp = $ErrorMsg.GroupCreationSuccess -f $groupName +write-host $tmp -ForegroundColor Green +}else{ +$tmp = $ErrorMsg.groupCreationError -f $groupName +write-host $tmp -ForeGroundColor Red +break +} +$group = get-adgroup -Filter { (Name -eq $groupName) -and (objectClass -eq "group") } -searchBase $searchBase +} +else { +break; +} +} +else { +$tmp = $ErrorMsg.GroupFound -f $group.Name +write-host $tmp -ForegroundColor Green +} +} +else { +##### +## If the group is not specified, we should remove the link if any exists +##### +if ($OID."msDS-OIDToGroupLink" -ne $null) { +$tmp = $ErrorMsg.confirmLinkDeletion -f $IssuancePolicyName, $OID."msDS-OIDToGroupLink" +write-host $tmp " ( (y)es / (n)o )" -ForegroundColor Yellow -nonewline +$userChoice = read-host +if ( ($userChoice -eq "y") -or ($userChoice -eq "yes") ) { +set-adobject -Identity $OID -Clear "msDS-OIDToGroupLink" +if ($?) { +$tmp = $ErrorMsg.UnlinkSuccess +write-host $tmp -ForeGroundColor Green +}else{ +$tmp = $ErrorMsg.UnlinkError +write-host $tmp -ForeGroundColor Red +} +} +else { +$tmp = $ErrorMsg.UnlinkExit +write-host $tmp +break +} +} +else { +$tmp = $ErrorMsg.IPNotLinked +write-host $tmp -ForeGroundColor Yellow +} +break; +} +####################################### +## Verify that the group is ## +## Universal, Security, and ## +## has no members ## +####################################### +if ($group.GroupScope -ne "Universal") { +$tmp = $ErrorMsg.ErrorNotUniversal -f $IssuancePolicyName, $groupName +write-host $tmp -ForeGroundColor Red +break; +} +if ($group.GroupCategory -ne "Security") { +$tmp = $ErrorMsg.ErrorNotSecurity -f $IssuancePolicyName, $groupName +write-host $tmp -ForeGroundColor Red +break; +} +$members = Get-ADGroupMember -Identity $group +if ($members -ne $null) { +$tmp = $ErrorMsg.ErrorHasMembers -f $IssuancePolicyName, $groupName +write-host $tmp -ForeGroundColor Red +foreach ($member in $members) {write-host " $member.name" -ForeGroundColor Red} +break; +} +####################################### +## We have verified everything. We ## +## can create the link from the ## +## Issuance Policy to the group. ## +####################################### +if ($OID."msDS-OIDToGroupLink" -ne $null) { +$tmp = $ErrorMsg.ConfirmLinkReplacement -f $IssuancePolicyName, $OID."msDS-OIDToGroupLink", $group.distinguishedName +write-host $tmp "( (y)es / (n)o )" -ForegroundColor Yellow -nonewline +$userChoice = read-host +if ( ($userChoice -eq "y") -or ($userChoice -eq "yes") ) { +$tmp = @{'msDS-OIDToGroupLink'= $group.DistinguishedName} +set-adobject -Identity $OID -Replace $tmp +if ($?) { +$tmp = $Errormsg.LinkSuccess +write-host $tmp -Foreground Green +}else{ +$tmp = $ErrorMsg.LinkError +write-host $tmp -Foreground Red +} +} else { +$tmp = $Errormsg.ExitNoLinkReplacement +write-host $tmp +break +} +} +else { +$tmp = @{'msDS-OIDToGroupLink'= $group.DistinguishedName} +set-adobject -Identity $OID -Add $tmp +if ($?) { +$tmp = $Errormsg.LinkSuccess +write-host $tmp -Foreground Green +}else{ +$tmp = $ErrorMsg.LinkError +write-host $tmp -Foreground Red +} +} +``` + +> [!NOTE] +> If you're having trouble running this script, try replacing the single quote after the ConvertFrom-StringData parameter. + + + + +## Troubleshooting Credential Guard + + + +### Known Issues + +Microsoft is aware of certain issues with Credential Guard that affect client machines that run Windows 10. +• For devices with Credential Guard enabled, a sign-in attempt that fails because of a bad password counts as two bad password attempts instead of one. Consequently, if your enterprise has an account lockout policy based on a certain number of failed password attempts, that threshold will be reached in half the number of attempts. + +This issue has been resolved for clients that run Windows 10 version 1703. For clients that run Windows 10 version 1607, a hotfix is available for download to resolve the issue. For clients that run Windows 10 versions 1507 or 1511, no hotfix is available. For those operating systems, to resolve the issue, you can upgrade the client to a later version of Windows 10. As a workaround, administrators can either choose to increase the account lockout threshold accordingly, consistent with current security policy, or can disable Credential Guard. For further information, see Credential Guard generates double bad password count + +Credential guard has known issues on Windows 10 when used with certain third-party applications: + +• Applications Appsense and Lumension E S. are known to cause high CPU utilization on Windows 10 client machines with credential guard enabled. +• Citrix Applications are known to cause high CPU utilization on Windows 10 client machines. This issue is currently under investigation. +• Cisco Proxy Agents are known to cause authentication failure on Windows 10 client machines. This issue is currently under investigation. +• Client machines with Credential Guard enabled cannot access shares on For further information see: Machines with Credential Guard enabled unable to connect to IBM File Servers + + + + + + +### How-to + + + + + + + + + ## See also **Deep Dive into Credential Guard: Related videos** diff --git a/windows/keep-secure/override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md b/windows/keep-secure/override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md index 1412786961..68ad8780c0 100644 --- a/windows/keep-secure/override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md +++ b/windows/keep-secure/override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md @@ -24,12 +24,11 @@ Windows 10 includes Group Policy-configurable “Process Mitigation Options” t The Group Policy settings in this topic are related to three types of process mitigations. In Windows 10, all three types are on by default for 64-bit applications, but by using the Group Policy settings described in this topic, you can configure additional protections. The types of process mitigations are: -- **Data Execution Prevention (DEP)** is a system-level memory protection feature that enables the operating system to mark one or more pages of memory as non-executable, preventing code from being run from that region of memory, to help prevent exploitation of buffer overruns. DEP helps prevent code from being run from data pages such as the default heap, stacks, and memory pools. For more information, see [Data Execution Prevention](overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md#data-execution-prevention). +- **Data Execution Prevention (DEP)** is a system-level memory protection feature that enables the operating system to mark one or more pages of memory as non-executable, preventing code from being run from that region of memory, to help prevent exploitation of buffer overruns. DEP helps prevent code from being run from data pages such as the default heap, stacks, and memory pools. -- **Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP)** is designed to block exploits that use the Structured Exception Handler (SEH) overwrite technique. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps to protect apps regardless of whether they have been compiled with the latest improvements. For more information, see [Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection](overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md#structured-exception-handling-overwrite-protection). - -- **Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)** loads DLLs into random memory addresses at boot time to mitigate against malware that’s designed to attack specific memory locations, where specific DLLs are expected to be loaded. For more information, see [Address Space Layout Randomization](overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md#address-space-layout-randomization). +- **Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP)** is designed to block exploits that use the Structured Exception Handler (SEH) overwrite technique. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps to protect apps regardless of whether they have been compiled with the latest improvements. +- **Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)** loads DLLs into random memory addresses at boot time to mitigate against malware that’s designed to attack specific memory locations, where specific DLLs are expected to be loaded. To find additional ASLR protections in the table below, look for `IMAGES` or `ASLR`. The following procedure describes how to use Group Policy to override individual **Process Mitigation Options** settings. diff --git a/windows/keep-secure/overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md b/windows/keep-secure/overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md deleted file mode 100644 index 718ca488fb..0000000000 --- a/windows/keep-secure/overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,411 +0,0 @@ ---- -title: Mitigate threats by using Windows 10 security features (Windows 10) -description: This topic provides an overview of software and firmware threats faced in the current security landscape, and the mitigations that Windows 10 offers in response to these threats. -ms.prod: w10 -ms.mktglfcycl: deploy -ms.sitesec: library -ms.pagetype: security -localizationpriority: high -author: justinha ---- - -# Mitigate threats by using Windows 10 security features - -**Applies to:** -- Windows 10 - -This topic provides an overview of software and firmware threats faced in the current security landscape, and the mitigations that Windows 10 offers in response to these threats. For information about related types of protection offered by Windows and Office, see [Related topics](#related-topics). - -| **Section** | **Contents** | -|--------------|-------------------------| -| [The security threat landscape](#threat-landscape) | Describes the current nature of the security threat landscape, and outlines the basic ways that Windows 10 is designed to mitigate software exploits and similar threats. | -| [Windows 10 mitigations that you can configure](#windows-10-mitigations-that-you-can-configure) | Provides tables of configurable threat mitigations with links to more information. Product features such as Device Guard appear in [Table 1](#windows-10-mitigations-that-you-can-configure), and memory protection options such as Data Execution Prevention appear in [Table 2](#table-2). | -| [Windows 10 mitigations that need no configuration](#windows-10-mitigations-that-need-no-configuration) | Provides descriptions of Windows 10 mitigations that require no configuration—they are built into the operating system. For example, heap protections and kernel pool protections are built into Windows 10. | -| [Understanding Windows 10 in relation to the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit](#understanding-windows-10-in-relation-to-the-enhanced-mitigation-experience-toolkit) | For IT professionals who are familiar with the [Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET)](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/2458544), describes how the mitigations in EMET correspond to features built into Windows 10. It also describes how to convert an XML settings file created in EMET into mitigation policies for Windows 10. | - -This topic focuses on pre-breach mitigations aimed at device protection and threat resistance. These protections work with other security defenses in Windows 10, as shown in the following illustration: - -Types of defenses in Windows 10 - -**Figure 1.  Device protection and threat resistance as part of the Windows 10 security defenses** - -## The security threat landscape - -Today’s security threat landscape is one of aggressive and tenacious threats. In previous years, malicious attackers mostly focused on gaining community recognition through their attacks and the personal enjoyment of temporarily taking a system offline. Since then, attacker’s motives have shifted toward monetizing their attacks, which includes holding machines and data hostage until the owners pay the demanded ransom, and exploiting the valuable information the attackers discover for monetary gain. Unlike these examples, modern attacks increasingly focus on large-scale intellectual property theft; targeted system degradation that results in financial loss; and now even cyberterrorism that threatens the security of individuals, businesses, and national interests all over the world. These attackers are typically highly trained individuals and security experts, some of whom are in the employ of nation states that have large budgets, seemingly unlimited human resources, and unknown motives. Threats like these require a different approach and mitigations that can meet the challenge. - -In recognition of this landscape, Windows 10, version 1703 includes multiple security features that were created to make it difficult (and costly) to find and exploit software vulnerabilities. These features are designed to: - -- Eliminate entire classes of vulnerabilities - -- Break exploitation techniques - -- Contain damage and prevent persistence - -- Limit the window of opportunity to exploit - -The following sections provide more detail about security mitigations in Windows 10, version 1703. - -## Windows 10 mitigations that you can configure - -Windows 10 mitigations that you can configure are listed in the following two tables. The first table focuses on features such as Device Guard, and the second table describes memory protection options such as Data Execution Prevention. Memory protection options provide specific mitigations against malware that attempts to manipulate memory to gain control of a system. - -**Table 1  Windows 10 mitigations that you can configure** - -| Mitigation and corresponding threat | Description and links | -|---|---| -| **Windows Defender SmartScreen**,
which helps prevent
malicious applications
from being downloaded | Windows Defender SmartScreen can check the reputation of a downloaded application by using a service that Microsoft maintains. The first time a user runs an app that originates from the Internet (even if the user copied it from another PC), SmartScreen checks to see if the app lacks a reputation or is known to be malicious, and responds accordingly.

**More information**: [Windows Defender SmartScreen](#windows-defender-smartscreen), later in this topic | -| **Credential Guard**,
which helps keep attackers
from gaining access through
Pass-the-Hash or
Pass-the-Ticket attacks | Credential Guard uses virtualization-based security to isolate secrets, such as NTLM password hashes and Kerberos Ticket Granting Tickets, so that only privileged system software can access them.
Credential Guard is included in Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows Server 2016.

**More information**: [Protect derived domain credentials with Credential Guard](credential-guard.md) | -| **Enterprise certificate pinning**,
which helps keep users
from being deceived by
man-in-the-middle attacks
that leverage PKI | Enterprise certificate pinning enables you to protect your internal domain names from chaining to unwanted certificates or to fraudulently issued certificates. With enterprise certificate pinning, you can “pin” (associate) an X.509 certificate and its public key to its legitimate Certification Authority, either root or leaf.

**More information**: [Enterprise Certificate Pinning](enterprise-certificate-pinning.md) | -| **Device Guard**,
which helps keep a device
from running malware or
other untrusted apps | Device Guard includes Code Integrity policies, a whitelist you create of trusted apps—the only apps allowed to run in your organization. Device Guard also includes a powerful system mitigation called hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI), which leverages virtualization-based security (VBS) to protect Windows’ kernel-mode code integrity validation process. HVCI has specific hardware requirements, and works with Code Integrity policies to help stop attacks even if they gain entrance to the kernel.
Device Guard is included in Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows Server 2016.

**More information**: [Introduction to Device Guard](introduction-to-device-guard-virtualization-based-security-and-code-integrity-policies.md) | -| **Windows Defender Antivirus**,
which helps keep devices
free of viruses and other
known software threats | Windows 10 includes Windows Defender Antivirus, a robust inbox antimalware solution. Windows Defender Antivirus has been significantly improved since it was introduced in Windows 8.

**More information**: [Windows Defender Antivirus](#windows-defender-antivirus), later in this topic | -| **Blocking of untrusted fonts**,
which helps prevent fonts
from being used in
elevation-of-privilege attacks | The Block Untrusted Fonts setting allows you to prevent users from loading untrusted fonts onto your network, which can mitigate elevation-of-privilege attacks associated with the parsing of font files. However, as of Windows 10, version 1703, this mitigation is less important, because font parsing is isolated in an [AppContainer sandbox](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/mt595898(v=vs.85).aspx) (for a list describing this and other kernel pool protections, see [Kernel pool protections](#kernel-pool-protections), later in this topic).

**More information**: [Block untrusted fonts in an enterprise](block-untrusted-fonts-in-enterprise.md) | -| **Memory protections** listed in [Table 2](#table-2),
which help prevent malware
from using memory manipulation
techniques such as buffer
overruns | This set of mitigations helps to protect against memory-based attacks, where malware or other code manipulates memory to gain control of a system. For example, malware might use buffer overruns to inject malicious executable code into memory.
A minority of trusted apps will not be able to run if some of these mitigations are set to their most restrictive settings. Testing can help you maximize protection while still allowing needed apps to run correctly.

**More information**: [Table 2](#table-2), later in this topic | -| **UEFI Secure Boot**,
which helps protect
the platform from
bootkits and rootkits | Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Secure Boot helps to protect the boot process and firmware from tampering, such as from a physically present attacker or from forms of malware that run early in the boot process or in kernel after startup.

**More information**: [UEFI and Secure Boot](bitlocker-countermeasures.md#uefi-and-secure-boot) | -| **Early Launch Antimalware (ELAM)**,
which helps protect
the platform from
rootkits disguised as drivers | Early Launch Antimalware (ELAM) is designed to enable the antimalware solution to start before all non-Microsoft drivers and apps. If malware modifies a boot-related driver, ELAM will detect the change, and Windows will prevent the driver from starting, thus blocking driver-based rootkits.

**More information**: [Early Launch Antimalware](bitlocker-countermeasures.md#protection-during-startup) | -| **Device Health Attestation**,
which helps prevent
compromised devices from
accessing an organization’s
assets | Device Health Attestation (DHA) provides a way to confirm that devices attempting to connect to an organization's network are in a healthy state, not compromised with malware. When DHA has been configured, a device’s actual boot data measurements can be checked against the expected "healthy" boot data. If the check indicates a device is unhealthy, the device can be prevented from accessing the network.

**More information**: [Control the health of Windows 10-based devices](protect-high-value-assets-by-controlling-the-health-of-windows-10-based-devices.md) and [Device Health Attestation](https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/security/device-health-attestation) | - -Configurable Windows 10 mitigations oriented specifically toward memory manipulation are listed in the following table. Detailed understanding of these threats and mitigations requires knowledge of how the operating system and applications handle memory—knowledge used by developers but not necessarily by IT professionals. However, from an IT professional’s perspective, the basic process for maximizing these types of mitigations is to work in a test lab to discover whether a given setting interferes with any needed applications. Then you can deploy settings that maximize protection while still allowing needed apps to run correctly. - -Also, as an IT professional, you can ask application developers and software vendors to deliver applications compiled with an additional protection called Control Flow Guard (CFG). No configuration is needed in the operating system—the protection is compiled into applications, as described in [Control Flow Guard](#control-flow-guard), later in this topic. - -### Table 2  Configurable Windows 10 mitigations designed to protect against memory exploits - -| Mitigation and corresponding threat | Description | -|---|---| -| **Data Execution Prevention (DEP),**
which helps prevent
exploitation of buffer overruns | **Data Execution Prevention (DEP)** is a system-level memory protection feature that has been available in Windows operating systems for over a decade. DEP enables the operating system to mark one or more pages of memory as non-executable, which prevents code from being run from that region of memory, to help prevent exploitation of buffer overruns.
DEP helps prevent code from being run from data pages such as the default heap, stacks, and memory pools. Although some applications have compatibility problems with DEP, the vast majority of applications do not.
For more information, see [Data Execution Prevention](#data-execution-prevention), later in this topic.

**Group Policy settings**: DEP is on by default for 64-bit applications, but you can configure additional DEP protections by using the Group Policy settings described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). | -| **SEHOP**,
which helps prevent
overwrites of the
Structured Exception Handler | **Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP)** is designed to block exploits that use the Structured Exception Handler (SEH) overwrite technique. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps to protect apps regardless of whether they have been compiled with the latest improvements. Although some applications have compatibility problems with SEHOP, the vast majority of applications do not.
For more information, see [Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection](#structured-exception-handling-overwrite-protection), later in this topic.

**Group Policy setting**: SEHOP is on by default for 64-bit applications, but you can configure additional SEHOP protections by using the Group Policy setting described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). | -| **ASLR**,
which mitigates malware
attacks based on
expected memory locations | **Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)** loads DLLs into random memory addresses at boot time. This mitigates malware that's designed to attack specific memory locations, where specific DLLs are expected to be loaded.
For more information, see [Address Space Layout Randomization](#address-space-layout-randomization), later in this topic.

**Group Policy settings**: ASLR is on by default for 64-bit applications, but you can configure additional ASLR protections by using the Group Policy settings described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). | - -### Windows Defender SmartScreen - -Windows Defender SmartScreen notifies users if they click on reported phishing and malware websites, and helps protect them against unsafe downloads or make informed decisions about downloads. - -Starting with Windows Internet Explorer 8, the SmartScreen Filter has helped protect users from both malicious applications and nefarious websites by using the SmartScreen Filter’s application and URL reputation services. The SmartScreen Filter in Internet Explorer would check URLs and newly downloaded apps against an online reputation service that Microsoft maintained. If the app or URL were not known to be safe, SmartScreen Filter would warn the user or even prevent the app or URL from loading, depending on how systems administrators had configured Group Policy settings. - -For Windows 10, Microsoft further developed SmartScreen, now called Windows Defender SmartScreen, by integrating its app reputation abilities into the operating system itself, which allows SmartScreen to check the reputation of files downloaded from the Internet and warn users when they’re about to run a high-risk downloaded file. The first time a user runs an app that originates from the Internet, SmartScreen checks the reputation of the application by using digital signatures and other factors against a service that Microsoft maintains. If the app lacks a reputation or is known to be malicious, SmartScreen warns the user or blocks execution entirely, depending on how the administrator has configured Microsoft Intune or Group Policy settings. - -For more information, see [Windows Defender SmartScreen overview](windows-defender-smartscreen-overview.md). - -### Windows Defender Antivirus - -Windows included Windows Defender Antivirus, a robust inbox antimalware solution, starting with Windows 8, when it was called Windows Defender. With Windows 10, Microsoft significantly improved Windows Defender Antivirus. Windows Defender Antivirus in Windows 10 uses a multi-pronged approach to improve antimalware: - -- **Cloud-delivered protection** helps detect and block new malware within seconds, even if the malware has never been seen before. The service, available as of Windows 10, version 1703, uses distributed resources and machine learning to deliver protection to endpoints at a rate that is far faster than traditional signature updates. - -- **Rich local context** improves how malware is identified. Windows 10 informs Windows Defender Antivirus not only about content like files and processes but also where the content came from, where it has been stored, and more. The information about source and history enables Windows Defender Antivirus to apply different levels of scrutiny to different content. - -- **Extensive global sensors** help keep Windows Defender Antivirus current and aware of even the newest malware. This is accomplished in two ways: by collecting the rich local context data from end points and by centrally analyzing that data. - -- **Tamper proofing** helps guard Windows Defender Antivirus itself against malware attacks. For example, Windows Defender Antivirus uses Protected Processes, which prevents untrusted processes from attempting to tamper with Windows Defender Antivirus components, its registry keys, and so on. ([Protected Processes](#protected-processes) is described later in this topic.) - -- **Enterprise-level features** give IT pros the tools and configuration options necessary to make Windows Defender Antivirus an enterprise-class antimalware solution. - - - -For more information, see [Windows Defender in Windows 10](windows-defender-in-windows-10.md) and [Windows Defender Overview for Windows Server](https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/security/windows-defender/windows-defender-overview-windows-server). - -For information about Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection, a service that helps enterprises to detect, investigate, and respond to advanced and targeted attacks on their networks, see [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (ATP)](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/WindowsForBusiness/windows-atp) (resources) and [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (ATP)](https://technet.microsoft.com/itpro/windows/keep-secure/windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection) (documentation). - -### Data Execution Prevention - -Malware depends on its ability to put a malicious payload into memory with the hope that it will be executed later. Wouldn’t it be great if you could prevent malware from running if it wrote to an area that has been allocated solely for the storage of information? - -Data Execution Prevention (DEP) does exactly that, by substantially reducing the range of memory that malicious code can use for its benefit. DEP uses the No eXecute bit on modern CPUs to mark blocks of memory as read-only so that those blocks can’t be used to execute malicious code that may be inserted within through a vulnerability exploit. - -Because of the importance of DEP, users cannot install Windows 10 on a computer that does not have DEP capability. Fortunately, most processors released since the mid-2000s support DEP. - -**To use Task Manager to see which apps use DEP** - -1. Open Task Manager: Press Ctrl+Alt+Del and select **Task Manager**, or search the Start screen. - -2. Click **More Details** (if necessary), and then click the **Details** tab. - -3. Right-click any column heading, and then click **Select Columns**. - -4. In the **Select Columns** dialog box, select the last **Data Execution Prevention** check box. - -5. Click **OK**. - -You can now see which processes have DEP enabled. Figure 2 shows the processes running on a Windows 10 PC with a single process that does not support DEP. - - - -![Processes with DEP enabled in Windows 10](images/security-fig5-dep.png) - -**Figure 2.  Processes on which DEP has been enabled in Windows 10** - -You can use Control Panel to view or change DEP settings. - -#### To use Control Panel to view or change DEP settings on an individual PC - -1. Open Control Panel, System: click Start, type **Control Panel System**, and press ENTER. - -2. Click **Advanced system settings**, and then click the **Advanced** tab. - -3. In the **Performance** box, click **Settings**. - -4. In **Performance Options**, click the **Data Execution Prevention** tab. - -5. Select an option: - - - **Turn on DEP for essential Windows programs and services only** - - - **Turn on DEP for all programs and services except those I select**. If you choose this option, use the **Add** and **Remove** buttons to create the list of exceptions for which DEP will not be turned on. - -#### To use Group Policy to control DEP settings - -You can use the Group Policy setting called **Process Mitigation Options** to control DEP settings. Although some applications have compatibility problems with DEP, the vast majority of applications do not. To use the Group Policy setting, see [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). - -### Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection - -Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP) helps prevent attackers from being able to use malicious code to exploit the [Structured Exception Handler](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680657(v=vs.85).aspx) (SEH), which is integral to the system and allows (non-malicious) apps to handle exceptions appropriately. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps to protect applications regardless of whether they have been compiled with the latest improvements. - -You can use the Group Policy setting called **Process Mitigation Options** to control the SEHOP setting. Although some applications have compatibility problems with SEHOP, the vast majority of applications do not. To use the Group Policy setting, see [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). - -### Address Space Layout Randomization - -One of the most common techniques used to gain access to a system is to find a vulnerability in a privileged process that is already running, guess or find a location in memory where important system code and data have been placed, and then overwrite that information with a malicious payload. In the early days of operating systems, any malware that could write directly to the system memory could do such a thing; the malware would simply overwrite system memory in well-known and predictable locations. - -Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) makes that type of attack much more difficult because it randomizes how and where important data is stored in memory. With ASLR, it is more difficult for malware to find the specific location it needs to attack. Figure 3 illustrates how ASLR works by showing how the locations of different critical Windows components can change in memory between restarts. - -![ASLR at work](images/security-fig4-aslr.png) - -**Figure 3.  ASLR at work** - -Although the ASLR implementation in Windows 7 was effective, it wasn’t applied holistically across the operating system, and the level of entropy (cryptographic randomization) wasn’t always at the highest possible level. To decrease the likelihood that sophisticated attacks such as heap spraying could succeed, starting with Windows 8, Microsoft applied ASLR holistically across the system and increased the level of entropy many times. - -The ASLR implementation in Windows 10 is greatly improved over Windows 7, especially with 64-bit system and application processes that can take advantage of a vastly increased memory space, which makes it even more difficult for malware to predict where Windows 10 stores vital data. When used on systems that have TPMs, ASLR memory randomization will be increasingly unique across devices, which makes it even more difficult for a successful exploit that works on one system to work reliably on another. - -You can use the Group Policy setting called **Process Mitigation Options** to control ASLR settings (“Force ASLR” and “Bottom-up ASLR”), as described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). - -## Windows 10 mitigations that need no configuration - -Windows 10 provides many threat mitigations that are built into the operating system and need no configuration within the operating system. The table that follows describes some of these mitigations. - -One of the mitigations, Control Flow Guard (CFG), needs no configuration within the operating system, but does require that the application developer configure the mitigation into the application when it’s compiled. CFG is built into Microsoft Edge, IE11, and other features in Windows 10, and can be built into many other applications when they are compiled. - -### Table 3   Windows 10 mitigations to protect against memory exploits – no configuration needed - -| Mitigation and corresponding threat | Description | -|---|---| -| **SMB hardening for SYSVOL and NETLOGON shares**,
which mitigates
man-in-the-middle attacks | Client connections to the Active Directory Domain Services default SYSVOL and NETLOGON shares on domain controllers now require SMB signing and mutual authentication (such as Kerberos).

**More information**: [SMB hardening improvements for SYSVOL and NETLOGON shares](#smb-hardening-improvements-for-sysvol-and-netlogon-shares), later in this topic. | -| **Protected Processes**,
which help prevent one process
from tampering with another
process | With the Protected Processes feature, Windows 10 prevents untrusted processes from interacting or tampering with those that have been specially signed.

**More information**: [Protected Processes](#protected-processes), later in this topic. | -| **Universal Windows apps protections**,
which screen downloadable
apps and run them in
an AppContainer sandbox | Universal Windows apps are carefully screened before being made available, and they run in an AppContainer sandbox with limited privileges and capabilities.

**More information**: [Universal Windows apps protections](#universal-windows-apps-protections), later in this topic. | -| **Heap protections**,
which help prevent
exploitation of the heap | Windows 10 includes protections for the heap, such as the use of internal data structures which help protect against corruption of memory used by the heap.

**More information**: [Windows heap protections](#windows-heap-protections), later in this topic. | -| **Kernel pool protections**,
which help prevent
exploitation of pool memory
used by the kernel | Windows 10 includes protections for the pool of memory used by the kernel. For example, safe unlinking protects against pool overruns that are combined with unlinking operations to create an attack.

**More information**: [Kernel pool protections](#kernel-pool-protections), later in this topic. | -| **Control Flow Guard**,
which mitigates exploits
that are based on
flow between code locations
in memory | Control Flow Guard (CFG) is a mitigation that requires no configuration within the operating system, but instead can be built into software when it’s compiled. It is built into Microsoft Edge, IE11, and other features in Windows 10. CFG can be built into applications written in C or C++, or applications compiled using Visual Studio 2015.
For such an application, CFG can detect an attacker’s attempt to change the intended flow of code. If this occurs, CFG terminates the application. Administrators can request software vendors to deliver Windows applications compiled with CFG enabled.

**More information**: [Control Flow Guard](#control-flow-guard), later in this topic. | -| **Protections built into Microsoft Edge** (the browser),
which mitigate multiple
threats | Windows 10 includes an entirely new browser, Microsoft Edge, designed with multiple security improvements.

**More information**: [Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer 11](#microsoft-edge-and-internet-explorer-11), later in this topic. | - -### SMB hardening improvements for SYSVOL and NETLOGON shares - -In Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016, client connections to the Active Directory Domain Services default SYSVOL and NETLOGON shares on domain controllers require Server Message Block (SMB) signing and mutual authentication (such as Kerberos). This reduces the likelihood of man-in-the-middle attacks. If SMB signing and mutual authentication are unavailable, a computer running Windows 10 or Windows Server 2016 won’t process domain-based Group Policy and scripts. - -> [!NOTE] -> The registry values for these settings aren’t present by default, but the hardening rules still apply until overridden by Group Policy or other registry values. For more information on these security improvements, (also referred to as UNC hardening), see [Microsoft Knowledge Base article 3000483](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/3000483/ms15-011-vulnerability-in-group-policy-could-allow-remote-code-execution-february-10,-2015) and [MS15-011 & MS15-014: Hardening Group Policy](https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2015/02/10/ms15-011-ms15-014-hardening-group-policy/). - -### Protected Processes - -Most security controls are designed to prevent the initial infection point. However, despite all the best preventative controls, malware might eventually find a way to infect the system. So, some protections are built to place limits on any malware that might be running. Protected Processes creates limits of this type. - -With Protected Processes, Windows 10 prevents untrusted processes from interacting or tampering with those that have been specially signed. Protected Processes defines levels of trust for processes. Less trusted processes are prevented from interacting with and therefore attacking more trusted processes. Windows 10 uses Protected Processes more broadly across the operating system, and as in Windows 8.1, implements them in a way that can be used by 3rd party anti-malware vendors, as described in [Protecting Anti-Malware Services](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/dn313124(v=vs.85).aspx). This helps make the system and antimalware solutions less susceptible to tampering by malware that does manage to get on the system. - -### Universal Windows apps protections - -When users download Universal Windows apps or even Windows Classic applications (Win32) from the Windows Store, it’s unlikely that they will encounter malware because all apps go through a careful screening process before being made available in the store. Apps that organizations build and distribute through sideloading processes will need to be reviewed internally to ensure that they meet organizational security requirements. - -Regardless of how users acquire Universal Windows apps, they can use them with increased confidence. Unlike Windows Classic applications, which can run with elevated privileges and have potentially sweeping access to the system and data, Universal Windows apps run in an AppContainer sandbox with limited privileges and capabilities. For example, Universal Windows apps have no system-level access, have tightly controlled interactions with other apps, and have no access to data unless the user explicitly grants the application permission. - -In addition, all Universal Windows apps follow the security principle of least privilege. Apps receive only the minimum privileges they need to perform their legitimate tasks, so even if an attacker exploits an app, the damage the exploit can do is severely limited and should be contained within the sandbox. The Windows Store displays the exact capabilities the app requires (for example, access to the camera), along with the app’s age rating and publisher. - -### Windows heap protections - -The *heap* is a location in memory that Windows uses to store dynamic application data. Windows 10 continues to improve on earlier Windows heap designs by further mitigating the risk of heap exploits that could be used as part of an attack. - -Windows 10 has several important improvements to the security of the heap over Windows 7: - -- **Heap metadata hardening** for internal data structures that the heap uses, to improve protections against memory corruption. - -- **Heap allocation randomization**, that is, the use of randomized locations and sizes for heap memory allocations, which makes it more difficult for an attacker to predict the location of critical memory to overwrite. Specifically, Windows 10 adds a random offset to the address of a newly allocated heap, which makes the allocation much less predictable. - -- **Heap guard pages** before and after blocks of memory, which work as tripwires. If an attacker attempts to write past a block of memory (a common technique known as a buffer overflow), the attacker will have to overwrite a guard page. Any attempt to modify a guard page is considered a memory corruption, and Windows 10 responds by instantly terminating the app. - -### Kernel pool protections - -The operating system kernel in Windows sets aside two pools of memory, one that remains in physical memory (“nonpaged pool”) and one that can be paged in and out of physical memory (“paged pool”). There are many types of attacks that have been attempted against these pools, such as process quota pointer encoding; lookaside, delay free, and pool page cookies; and PoolIndex bounds checks. Windows 10 has multiple “pool hardening” protections, such as integrity checks, that help protect the kernel pool against such attacks. - -In addition to pool hardening, Windows 10 includes other kernel hardening features: - -- **Kernel DEP** and **Kernel ASLR**: Follow the same principles as [Data Execution Prevention](#data-execution-prevention) and [Address Space Layout Randomization](#address-space-layout-randomization), described earlier in this topic. - -- **Font parsing in AppContainer:** Isolates font parsing in an [AppContainer sandbox](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/mt595898(v=vs.85).aspx). - -- **Disabling of NT Virtual DOS Machine (NTVDM)**: The old NTVDM kernel module (for running 16-bit applications) is disabled by default, which neutralizes the associated vulnerabilities. (Enabling NTVDM decreases protection against Null dereference and other exploits.) - -- **Supervisor Mode Execution Prevention (SMEP)**: Prevents the kernel (the “supervisor”) from executing code in user pages, a common technique used by attackers for local kernel elevation of privilege (EOP). This requires processor support found in Intel Ivy Bridge or later processors, or ARM with PXN support. - -- **Safe unlinking:** Protects against pool overruns that are combined with unlinking operations to create an attack. Windows 10 includes global safe unlinking, which extends heap and kernel pool safe unlinking to all usage of LIST\_ENTRY and includes the “FastFail” mechanism to enable rapid and safe process termination. - -- **Memory reservations**: The lowest 64 KB of process memory is reserved for the system. Apps are not allowed to allocate that portion of the memory. This makes it more difficult for malware to use techniques such as “NULL dereference” to overwrite critical system data structures in memory. - -### Control Flow Guard - -When applications are loaded into memory, they are allocated space based on the size of the code, requested memory, and other factors. When an application begins to execute code, it calls additional code located in other memory addresses. The relationships between the code locations are well known—they are written in the code itself—but previous to Windows 10, the flow between these locations was not enforced, which gave attackers the opportunity to change the flow to meet their needs. - -This kind of threat is mitigated in Windows 10 through the Control Flow Guard (CFG) feature. When a trusted application that was compiled to use CFG calls code, CFG verifies that the code location called is trusted for execution. If the location is not trusted, the application is immediately terminated as a potential security risk. - -An administrator cannot configure CFG; rather, an application developer can take advantage of CFG by configuring it when the application is compiled. Administrators should consider asking application developers and software vendors to deliver trustworthy Windows applications compiled with CFG enabled. For example, it can be enabled for applications written in C or C++, or applications compiled using Visual Studio 2015. For information about enabling CFG for a Visual Studio 2015 project, see [Control Flow Guard](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/mt637065(v=vs.85).aspx). - -Of course, browsers are a key entry point for attacks, so Microsoft Edge, IE, and other Windows features take full advantage of CFG. - -### Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer 11 - -Browser security is a critical component of any security strategy, and for good reason: the browser is the user’s interface to the Internet, an environment with many malicious sites and content waiting to attack. Most users cannot perform at least part of their job without a browser, and many users are completely reliant on one. This reality has made the browser the number one pathway from which malicious hackers initiate their attacks. - -All browsers enable some amount of extensibility to do things beyond the original scope of the browser. Two common examples of this are Flash and Java extensions that enable their respective applications to run inside a browser. Keeping Windows 10 secure for web browsing and applications, especially for these two content types, is a priority. - -Windows 10 includes an entirely new browser, Microsoft Edge. Microsoft Edge is more secure in multiple ways, especially: - -- **Smaller attack surface; no support for non-Microsoft binary extensions**. Multiple browser components with vulnerable attack surfaces have been removed from Microsoft Edge. Components that have been removed include legacy document modes and script engines, Browser Helper Objects (BHOs), ActiveX controls, and Java. However, Microsoft Edge supports Flash content and PDF viewing by default through built-in extensions. - -- **Runs 64-bit processes.** A 64-bit PC running an older version of Windows often runs in 32-bit compatibility mode to support older and less secure extensions. When Microsoft Edge runs on a 64-bit PC, it runs only 64-bit processes, which are much more secure against exploits. - -- **Includes Memory Garbage Collection (MemGC)**. This helps protect against use-after-free (UAF) issues. - -- **Designed as a Universal Windows app.** Microsoft Edge is inherently compartmentalized and runs in an AppContainer that sandboxes the browser from the system, data, and other apps. IE11 on Windows 10 can also take advantage of the same AppContainer technology through Enhanced Protect Mode. However, because IE11 can run ActiveX and BHOs, the browser and sandbox are susceptible to a much broader range of attacks than Microsoft Edge. - -- **Simplifies security configuration tasks.** Because Microsoft Edge uses a simplified application structure and a single sandbox configuration, there are fewer required security settings. In addition, Microsoft Edge default settings align with security best practices, which makes it more secure by default. - -In addition to Microsoft Edge, Microsoft includes IE11 in Windows 10, primarily for backwards-compatibility with websites and with binary extensions that do not work with Microsoft Edge. It should not be configured as the primary browser but rather as an optional or automatic switchover. We recommend using Microsoft Edge as the primary web browser because it provides compatibility with the modern web and the best possible security. - -For sites that require IE11 compatibility, including those that require binary extensions and plug ins, enable Enterprise mode and use the Enterprise Mode Site List to define which sites have the dependency. With this configuration, when users use Microsoft Edge and it identifies a site that requires IE11, they will automatically be switched to IE11. - -### Functions that software vendors can use to build mitigations into apps - -Some of the protections available in Windows 10 are provided through functions that can be called from apps or other software. Such software is less likely to provide openings for exploits. If you are working with a software vendor, you can request that they include these security-oriented functions in the application. The following table lists some types of mitigations and the corresponding security-oriented functions that can be used in apps. - -> [!NOTE] -> Control Flow Guard (CFG) is also an important mitigation that a developer can include in software when it is compiled. For more information, see [Control Flow Guard](#control-flow-guard), earlier in this topic. - -### Table 4   Functions available to developers for building mitigations into apps - -| Mitigation | Function | -|-------------|-----------| -| LoadLib image loading restrictions | [UpdateProcThreadAttribute function](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms686880(v=vs.85).aspx)
\[PROCESS\_CREATION\_MITIGATION\_POLICY\_IMAGE\_LOAD\_NO\_REMOTE\_ALWAYS\_ON\] | -| MemProt dynamic code restriction | [UpdateProcThreadAttribute function](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms686880(v=vs.85).aspx)
\[PROCESS\_CREATION\_MITIGATION\_POLICY\_PROHIBIT\_DYNAMIC\_CODE\_ALWAYS\_ON\] | -| Child Process Restriction to restrict the ability to create child processes | [UpdateProcThreadAttribute function](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms686880(v=vs.85).aspx)
\[PROC\_THREAD\_ATTRIBUTE\_CHILD\_PROCESS\_POLICY\] | -| Code Integrity Restriction to restrict image loading | [SetProcessMitigationPolicy function](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/hh769088(v=vs.85).aspx)
\[ProcessSignaturePolicy\] | -| Win32k System Call Disable Restriction to restrict ability to use NTUser and GDI | [SetProcessMitigationPolicy function](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/hh769088(v=vs.85).aspx)
\[ProcessSystemCallDisablePolicy\] | -| High Entropy ASLR for up to 1TB of variance in memory allocations | [UpdateProcThreadAttribute function](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms686880(v=vs.85).aspx)
\[PROCESS\_CREATION\_MITIGATION\_POLICY\_HIGH\_ENTROPY\_ASLR\_ALWAYS\_ON\] | -| Strict handle checks to raise immediate exception upon bad handle reference | [UpdateProcThreadAttribute function](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms686880(v=vs.85).aspx)
\[PROCESS\_CREATION\_MITIGATION\_POLICY\_STRICT\_HANDLE\_CHECKS\_ALWAYS\_ON\] | -| Extension point disable to block the use of certain third-party extension points | [UpdateProcThreadAttribute function](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms686880(v=vs.85).aspx)
\[PROCESS\_CREATION\_MITIGATION\_POLICY\_EXTENSION\_POINT\_DISABLE\_ALWAYS\_ON\] | -| Heap terminate on corruption to protect the system against a corrupted heap | [UpdateProcThreadAttribute function](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms686880(v=vs.85).aspx)
\[PROCESS\_CREATION\_MITIGATION\_POLICY\_HEAP\_TERMINATE\_ALWAYS\_ON\] | - -## Understanding Windows 10 in relation to the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit - -You might already be familiar with the [Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET)](https://support.microsoft.com/kb/2458544), which has since 2009 offered a variety of exploit mitigations, and an interface for configuring those mitigations. If you are familiar with EMET, you can use this section to understand how those mitigations map to Windows 10. Many of EMET’s mitigations have been built into Windows 10, some with additional improvements. However, some EMET mitigations carry high performance cost, are not considered durable, or appear to be relatively ineffective against modern threats, and therefore have not been brought into Windows 10. - -EMET has benefited many enterprise IT admins and other security enthusiasts and early adopters, yet has also fallen behind the pace of security innovation in Windows. For this reason and because many of EMET’s mitigations and security mechanisms already exist in Windows 10 and have been improved, particularly those assessed to have high effectiveness at mitigating known bypasses, version 5.5*x* has been announced as the final major version release for EMET (see [Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit](https://technet.microsoft.com/security/jj653751)). - -The following table lists EMET features in relation to Windows 10 features. - -### Table 5   EMET features in relation to Windows 10 features - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Specific EMET featuresHow these EMET features map
-to Windows 10 features
    -

  • DEP

    • -

  • SEHOP

    • -

  • ASLR (Force ASLR, Bottom-up ASLR)

    • -

Included in Windows 10 as configurable features. See Table 2, earlier in this topic.

-

Also see the section that follows for steps you can take to convert your EMET settings for these features into policies that you can apply to Windows 10.

    -

  • Load Library Check (LoadLib)

    • -

  • Memory Protection Check (MemProt)

    • -
Supported in Windows 10, for all applications that are written to use these functions. See Table 4, earlier in this topic.
    -

  • Null Page

    • -
No action needed; mitigations for this threat are built into Windows 10, as described in the “Memory reservations” item in Kernel pool protections, earlier in this topic.
    -

  • Heap Spray

    • -

  • EAF

    • -

  • EAF+

    • -
Windows 10 does not include mitigations that map specifically to these EMET features, because they are seen as low impact in the current threat landscape, and do not significantly increase the difficulty of exploiting vulnerabilities. Microsoft remains committed to monitoring the security environment as new exploits appear and taking steps to harden the operating system against them.
    -

  • Caller Check

    • -

  • Simulate Execution Flow

    • -

  • Stack Pivot

    • -

  • Deep Hooks (an ROP “Advanced Mitigation”)

    • -

  • Anti Detours (an ROP “Advanced Mitigation”)

    • -

  • Banned Functions (an ROP “Advanced Mitigation”)

    • -
Mitigated in Windows 10 with applications compiled with Control Flow Guard, as described in Control Flow Guard, earlier in this topic.
- -### Converting an EMET XML settings file into Windows 10 mitigation policies - -One of EMET’s strengths is that it allows you to import and export configuration settings for EMET mitigations as an XML settings file for straightforward deployment. To generate mitigation policies for Windows 10 from an EMET XML settings file, you can install the ProcessMitigations PowerShell module. In an elevated PowerShell session, run this cmdlet: - -```powershell -Install-Module -Name ProcessMitigations -``` - -The ConvertTo-ProcessMitigationPolicy cmdlet can: - -- **Convert EMET settings to Windows 10 settings**: You can run ConvertTo-ProcessMitigationPolicy and provide an EMET XML settings file as input, which will generate an output file of Windows 10 mitigation settings. For example: - - ```powershell - ConvertTo-ProcessMitigationPolicy -EMETfile emetpolicy.xml -output newconfiguration.xml - ``` - -- **Audit and modify the converted settings (the output file)**: Additional cmdlets let you apply, enumerate, enable, disable, and save settings in the output file. For example, this cmdlet enables SEHOP and disables MandatoryASLR and DEPATL registry settings for Notepad: - - ```powershell - Set-ProcessMitigation -Name notepad.exe -Enable SEHOP -Disable MandatoryASLR,DEPATL - ``` - -- **Convert Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) settings to a Code Integrity policy file**: If the input file contains any settings for EMET’s Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) mitigation, the converter will also create a Code Integrity policy file. In this case, you can complete the merging, auditing, and deployment process for the Code Integrity policy, as described in [Deploy Device Guard: deploy code integrity policies](deploy-device-guard-deploy-code-integrity-policies.md). This will enable protections on Windows 10 equivalent to EMET’s ASR protections. - -- **Convert Certificate Trust settings to enterprise certificate pinning rules**: If you have an EMET “Certificate Trust” XML file (pinning rules file), you can also use ConvertTo-ProcessMitigationPolicy to convert the pinning rules file into an enterprise certificate pinning rules file. Then you can finish enabling that file as described in [Enterprise Certificate Pinning](enterprise-certificate-pinning.md). For example: - - ```powershell - ConvertTo-ProcessMitigationPolicy -EMETfile certtrustrules.xml -output enterprisecertpinningrules.xml - ``` - -#### EMET-related products - -Microsoft Consulting Services (MCS) and Microsoft Support/Premier Field Engineering (PFE) offer enterprise deliveries for EMET, support for EMET, and EMET-related reporting and auditing products such as the EMET Enterprise Reporting Service (ERS). For any enterprise customers who use such products today or who are interested in similar capabilities, we recommend evaluating [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection](windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md) (ATP). - -## Related topics - -- [Keep Windows 10 secure](index.md) -- [Security technologies in Windows 10](security-technologies.md) -- [Security and Assurance in Windows Server 2016](https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/security/security-and-assurance) -- [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (ATP) - resources](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/WindowsForBusiness/windows-atp) -- [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (ATP) - documentation](windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md) -- [Exchange Online Advanced Threat Protection Service Description](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/exchange-online-advanced-threat-protection-service-description.aspx) -- [Office 365 Advanced Threat Protection](https://products.office.com/en-us/exchange/online-email-threat-protection) -- [Microsoft Malware Protection Center](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/portal/mmpc/default.aspx) - -