Devices will fail to register with the service and will be sent to the **Not registered** tab. You’re required to make sure the Azure AD groups that are used with the Custom Autopatch groups don’t have device membership overlaps.
| +| Devices are in the Custom-to-Custom Autopatch group device conflict scenario | You must resolve this conflict.Devices will fail to register with the service and will be sent to the **Not registered** tab. You’re required to make sure the Microsoft Entra groups that are used with the Custom Autopatch groups don’t have device membership overlaps.
| #### Device conflict post device registration diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/deploy/windows-autopatch-groups-overview.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/deploy/windows-autopatch-groups-overview.md index a706404138..b482faa489 100644 --- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/deploy/windows-autopatch-groups-overview.md +++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/deploy/windows-autopatch-groups-overview.md @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ As organizations move to a managed-service model where Microsoft manages update ## What are Windows Autopatch groups? -Autopatch groups is a logical container or unit that groups several [Azure AD groups](/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/active-directory-groups-view-azure-portal), and software update policies, such as [Update rings policy for Windows 10 and later](/mem/intune/protect/windows-10-update-rings) and [feature updates for Windows 10 and later policies](/mem/intune/protect/windows-10-feature-updates). +Autopatch groups is a logical container or unit that groups several [Microsoft Entra groups](/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/active-directory-groups-view-azure-portal), and software update policies, such as [Update rings policy for Windows 10 and later](/mem/intune/protect/windows-10-update-rings) and [feature updates for Windows 10 and later policies](/mem/intune/protect/windows-10-feature-updates). ## Key benefits @@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ Autopatch groups help Microsoft Cloud-Managed services meet organizations where | Benefit | Description | | ----- | ----- | -| Replicating your organizational structure | You can set up Autopatch groups to replicate your organizational structures represented by your existing device-based Azure AD group targeting logic. | +| Replicating your organizational structure | You can set up Autopatch groups to replicate your organizational structures represented by your existing device-based Microsoft Entra group targeting logic. | | Having a flexible number of deployments | Autopatch groups give you the flexibility of having the right number of deployment rings that work within your organization. You can set up to 15 deployment rings per Autopatch group. | -| Deciding which device(s) belong to deployment rings | Along with using your existing device-based Azure AD groups and choosing the number of deployment rings, you can also decide which devices belong to deployment rings during the device registration process when setting up Autopatch groups. | +| Deciding which device(s) belong to deployment rings | Along with using your existing device-based Microsoft Entra groups and choosing the number of deployment rings, you can also decide which devices belong to deployment rings during the device registration process when setting up Autopatch groups. | | Choosing the deployment cadence | You choose the right software update deployment cadence for your business. | ## High-level architecture diagram overview @@ -43,8 +43,8 @@ Autopatch groups is a function app that is part of the device registration micro | Step | Description | | ----- | ----- | | Step 1: Create an Autopatch group | Create an Autopatch group. | -| Step 2: Windows Autopatch uses Microsoft Graph to create Azure AD and policy assignments | Windows Autopatch service uses Microsoft Graph to coordinate the creation of:Azure AD groups that are used with the Dynamic distribution type can be used to distribute devices across several deployment rings based on percentage values that can be customized.
| -| Assigned | You can use one single device-based Azure AD group, either dynamic query-based, or assigned to use in your deployment ring composition. | +| Dynamic | You can use one or more device-based Microsoft Entra groups, either dynamic query-based or assigned to use in your deployment ring composition.Microsoft Entra groups that are used with the Dynamic distribution type can be used to distribute devices across several deployment rings based on percentage values that can be customized.
| +| Assigned | You can use one single device-based Microsoft Entra group, either dynamic query-based, or assigned to use in your deployment ring composition. | | Combination of Dynamic and Assigned | To provide a greater level of flexibility when working on deployment ring compositions, you can combine both device distribution types in Autopatch groups.The combination of Dynamic and Assigned device distribution is **not** supported for the Test and Last deployment ring in Autopatch groups.
| #### About the Test and Last deployment rings @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ If you only keep Test and Last deployment rings in your Default Autopatch group, > Both the **Test** and **Last** deployment rings **can't** be removed or renamed from the Default or Custom Autopatch groups. Autopatch groups don't support the use of one single deployment ring as part of its deployment ring composition because you need at least two deployment rings for their gradual rollout. If you must implement a specific scenario with a single deployment ring, and gradual rollout isn’t required, consider managing these devices outside Windows Autopatch. > [!TIP] -> Both the **Test** and **Last** deployment rings only support one single Azure AD group assignment at a time. If you need to assign more than one Azure AD group, you can nest the other Azure AD groups under the ones you plan to use with the **Test** and **Last** deployment rings. Only one level of Azure AD group nesting is supported. +> Both the **Test** and **Last** deployment rings only support one single Microsoft Entra group assignment at a time. If you need to assign more than one Microsoft Entra group, you can nest the other Microsoft Entra groups under the ones you plan to use with the **Test** and **Last** deployment rings. Only one level of Microsoft Entra group nesting is supported. #### Service-based versus software update-based deployment rings @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ Autopatch groups creates two different layers. Each layer contains its own deplo The service-based deployment ring set is exclusively used to keep Windows Autopatch updated with both service and device-level configuration policies, apps and APIs needed for core functions of the service. -The following are the Azure AD assigned groups that represent the service-based deployment rings. These groups can't be deleted or renamed: +The following are the Microsoft Entra ID assigned groups that represent the service-based deployment rings. These groups can't be deleted or renamed: - Modern Workplace Devices-Windows Autopatch-Test - Modern Workplace Devices-Windows Autopatch-First @@ -168,13 +168,13 @@ The following are the Azure AD assigned groups that represent the service-based - Modern Workplace Devices-Windows Autopatch-Broad > [!CAUTION] -> **Don’t** modify the Azure AD group membership types (Assigned and Dynamic). Otherwise, the Windows Autopatch service won’t be able to read the device group membership from these groups, and causes the Autopatch groups feature and other service-related operations to not work properly.Additionally, it's **not** supported to have Configuration Manager collections directly synced to any Azure AD group created by Autopatch groups.
+> **Don’t** modify the Microsoft Entra group membership types (Assigned and Dynamic). Otherwise, the Windows Autopatch service won’t be able to read the device group membership from these groups, and causes the Autopatch groups feature and other service-related operations to not work properly.Additionally, it's **not** supported to have Configuration Manager collections directly synced to any Microsoft Entra group created by Autopatch groups.
##### Software-based deployment rings The software-based deployment ring set is exclusively used with software update management policies, such as the Windows update ring and feature update policies, in the Default Windows Autopatch group. -The following are the Azure AD assigned groups that represent the software updates-based deployment rings. These groups can't be deleted or renamed: +The following are the Microsoft Entra ID assigned groups that represent the software updates-based deployment rings. These groups can't be deleted or renamed: - Windows Autopatch - Test - Windows Autopatch – Ring1 @@ -183,14 +183,14 @@ The following are the Azure AD assigned groups that represent the software updat - Windows Autopatch – Last > [!IMPORTANT] -> Additional Azure AD assigned groups are created and added to list when you add more deployment rings to the Default Autopatch group. +> Additional Microsoft Entra ID assigned groups are created and added to list when you add more deployment rings to the Default Autopatch group. > [!CAUTION] -> **Don’t** modify the Azure AD group membership types (Assigned and Dynamic). Otherwise, the Windows Autopatch service won’t be able to read the device group membership from these groups, and causes the Autopatch groups feature and other service-related operations to not work properly.Additionally, it's **not** supported to have Configuration Manager collections directly synced to any Azure AD group created by Autopatch groups.
+> **Don’t** modify the Microsoft Entra group membership types (Assigned and Dynamic). Otherwise, the Windows Autopatch service won’t be able to read the device group membership from these groups, and causes the Autopatch groups feature and other service-related operations to not work properly.Additionally, it's **not** supported to have Configuration Manager collections directly synced to any Microsoft Entra group created by Autopatch groups.
### About device registration -Autopatch groups register devices with the Windows Autopatch service when you either [create](../deploy/windows-autopatch-groups-manage-autopatch-groups.md#create-a-custom-autopatch-group) or [edit a Custom Autopatch group](../deploy/windows-autopatch-groups-manage-autopatch-groups.md#edit-the-default-or-a-custom-autopatch-group), and/or when you [edit the Default Autopatch group](../deploy/windows-autopatch-groups-manage-autopatch-groups.md#edit-the-default-or-a-custom-autopatch-group) to use your existing Azure AD groups instead of the Windows Autopatch Device Registration group provided by the service. +Autopatch groups register devices with the Windows Autopatch service when you either [create](../deploy/windows-autopatch-groups-manage-autopatch-groups.md#create-a-custom-autopatch-group) or [edit a Custom Autopatch group](../deploy/windows-autopatch-groups-manage-autopatch-groups.md#edit-the-default-or-a-custom-autopatch-group), and/or when you [edit the Default Autopatch group](../deploy/windows-autopatch-groups-manage-autopatch-groups.md#edit-the-default-or-a-custom-autopatch-group) to use your existing Microsoft Entra groups instead of the Windows Autopatch Device Registration group provided by the service. ## Common ways to use Autopatch groups diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/deploy/windows-autopatch-register-devices.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/deploy/windows-autopatch-register-devices.md index a2734bb584..4cb39e3d34 100644 --- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/deploy/windows-autopatch-register-devices.md +++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/deploy/windows-autopatch-register-devices.md @@ -31,44 +31,48 @@ Windows Autopatch can take over software update management control of devices th ### Windows Autopatch groups device registration -When you either create/edit a [Custom Autopatch group](../deploy/windows-autopatch-groups-overview.md#about-custom-autopatch-groups) or edit the [Default Autopatch group](../deploy/windows-autopatch-groups-overview.md#about-the-default-autopatch-group) to add or remove deployment rings, the device-based Azure AD groups you use when setting up your deployment rings are scanned to see if devices need to be registered with the Windows Autopatch service. +When you either create/edit a [Custom Autopatch group](../deploy/windows-autopatch-groups-overview.md#about-custom-autopatch-groups) or edit the [Default Autopatch group](../deploy/windows-autopatch-groups-overview.md#about-the-default-autopatch-group) to add or remove deployment rings, the device-based Microsoft Entra groups you use when setting up your deployment rings are scanned to see if devices need to be registered with the Windows Autopatch service. -If devices aren’t registered, Autopatch groups starts the device registration process by using your existing device-based Azure AD groups instead of the Windows Autopatch Device Registration group. +If devices aren’t registered, Autopatch groups starts the device registration process by using your existing device-based Microsoft Entra groups instead of the Windows Autopatch Device Registration group. For more information, see [create Custom Autopatch groups](../deploy/windows-autopatch-groups-manage-autopatch-groups.md#create-a-custom-autopatch-group) and [edit Autopatch group](../deploy/windows-autopatch-groups-manage-autopatch-groups.md#edit-the-default-or-a-custom-autopatch-group) to register devices using the Autopatch groups device registration method. -#### Supported scenarios when nesting other Azure AD groups + -Windows Autopatch also supports the following Azure AD nested group scenarios: +#### Supported scenarios when nesting other Microsoft Entra groups -Azure AD groups synced up from: +Windows Autopatch also supports the following Microsoft Entra nested group scenarios: + +Microsoft Entra groups synced up from: - On-premises Active Directory groups (Windows Server AD) - [Configuration Manager collections](/mem/configmgr/core/clients/manage/collections/create-collections#bkmk_aadcollsync) > [!WARNING] -> It isn't recommended to sync Configuration Manager collections straight to the **Windows Autopatch Device Registration** Azure AD group. Use a different Azure AD group when syncing Configuration Manager collections to Azure AD groups then you can nest this or these groups into the **Windows Autopatch Device Registration** Azure AD group. +> It isn't recommended to sync Configuration Manager collections straight to the **Windows Autopatch Device Registration** Microsoft Entra group. Use a different Microsoft Entra group when syncing Configuration Manager collections to Microsoft Entra groups then you can nest this or these groups into the **Windows Autopatch Device Registration** Microsoft Entra group. > [!IMPORTANT] -> The **Windows Autopatch Device Registration** Azure AD group only supports **one level** of Azure AD nested groups. +> The **Windows Autopatch Device Registration** Microsoft Entra group only supports **one level** of Microsoft Entra nested groups. -### Clean up dual state of Hybrid Azure AD joined and Azure registered devices in your Azure AD tenant + -An [Azure AD dual state](/azure/active-directory/devices/hybrid-azuread-join-plan#handling-devices-with-azure-ad-registered-state) occurs when a device is initially connected to Azure AD as an [Azure AD Registered](/azure/active-directory/devices/concept-azure-ad-register) device. However, when you enable Hybrid Azure AD join, the same device is connected twice to Azure AD but as a [Hybrid Azure AD device](/azure/active-directory/devices/concept-azure-ad-join-hybrid). +### Clean up dual state of Microsoft Entra hybrid joined and Azure registered devices in your Microsoft Entra tenant -In the dual state, you end up having two Azure AD device records with different join types for the same device. In this case, the Hybrid Azure AD device record takes precedence over the Azure AD registered device record for any type of authentication in Azure AD, which makes the Azure AD registered device record stale. +An [Microsoft Entra dual state](/azure/active-directory/devices/hybrid-azuread-join-plan#handling-devices-with-azure-ad-registered-state) occurs when a device is initially connected to Microsoft Entra ID as an [Microsoft Entra registered](/azure/active-directory/devices/concept-azure-ad-register) device. However, when you enable Microsoft Entra hybrid join, the same device is connected twice to Microsoft Entra ID but as a [Hybrid Microsoft Entra device](/azure/active-directory/devices/concept-azure-ad-join-hybrid). -It's recommended to detect and clean up stale devices in Azure AD before registering devices with Windows Autopatch, see [How To: Manage state devices in Azure AD](/azure/active-directory/devices/manage-stale-devices). +In the dual state, you end up having two Microsoft Entra device records with different join types for the same device. In this case, the Hybrid Microsoft Entra device record takes precedence over the Microsoft Entra registered device record for any type of authentication in Microsoft Entra ID, which makes the Microsoft Entra registered device record stale. + +It's recommended to detect and clean up stale devices in Microsoft Entra ID before registering devices with Windows Autopatch, see [How To: Manage state devices in Microsoft Entra ID](/azure/active-directory/devices/manage-stale-devices). > [!WARNING] -> If you don't clean up stale devices in Azure AD before registering devices with Windows Autopatch, you might end up seeing devices failing to meet the **Intune or Cloud-Attached (Device must be either Intune-managed or Co-managed)** pre-requisite check in the **Not ready** tab because it's expected that these stale Azure AD devices aren't enrolled into the Intune service anymore. +> If you don't clean up stale devices in Microsoft Entra ID before registering devices with Windows Autopatch, you might end up seeing devices failing to meet the **Intune or Cloud-Attached (Device must be either Intune-managed or Co-managed)** pre-requisite check in the **Not ready** tab because it's expected that these stale Microsoft Entra devices aren't enrolled into the Intune service anymore. ## Prerequisites for device registration To be eligible for Windows Autopatch management, devices must meet a minimum set of required software-based prerequisites: - Windows 10 (1809+)/11 Enterprise or Professional editions (only x64 architecture). -- Either [Hybrid Azure AD-Joined](/azure/active-directory/devices/concept-azure-ad-join-hybrid) or [Azure AD-joined only](/azure/active-directory/devices/concept-azure-ad-join-hybrid) (personal devices aren't supported). +- Either [Microsoft Entra hybrid joined](/azure/active-directory/devices/concept-azure-ad-join-hybrid) or [Microsoft Entra joined only](/azure/active-directory/devices/concept-azure-ad-join-hybrid) (personal devices aren't supported). - Managed by Microsoft Intune. - [Already enrolled into Microsoft Intune](/mem/intune/user-help/enroll-windows-10-device) and/or [Configuration Manager co-management](/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/prepare/windows-autopatch-prerequisites#configuration-manager-co-management-requirements). - Must switch the following Microsoft Configuration Manager [co-management workloads](/mem/configmgr/comanage/how-to-switch-workloads) to Microsoft Intune (either set to Pilot Intune or Intune): @@ -114,20 +118,20 @@ The following are the possible device readiness statuses in Windows Autopatch: A role defines the set of permissions granted to users assigned to that role. You can use one of the following built-in roles in Windows Autopatch to register devices: -- Azure AD Global Administrator +- Microsoft Entra Global Administrator - Intune Service Administrator -For more information, see [Azure AD built-in roles](/azure/active-directory/roles/permissions-reference) and [Role-based access control (RBAC) with Microsoft Intune](/mem/intune/fundamentals/role-based-access-control). +For more information, see [Microsoft Entra built-in roles](/azure/active-directory/roles/permissions-reference) and [Role-based access control (RBAC) with Microsoft Intune](/mem/intune/fundamentals/role-based-access-control). -If you want to assign less-privileged user accounts to perform specific tasks in the Windows Autopatch portal, such as register devices with the service, you can add these user accounts into one of the two Azure AD groups created during the [tenant enrollment](../prepare/windows-autopatch-enroll-tenant.md) process: +If you want to assign less-privileged user accounts to perform specific tasks in the Windows Autopatch portal, such as register devices with the service, you can add these user accounts into one of the two Microsoft Entra groups created during the [tenant enrollment](../prepare/windows-autopatch-enroll-tenant.md) process: -| Azure AD Group name | Discover devices | Modify columns | Refresh device list | Export to .CSV | Device actions | +| Microsoft Entra group name | Discover devices | Modify columns | Refresh device list | Export to .CSV | Device actions | | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | | Modern Workplace Roles - Service Administrator | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | | Modern Workplace Roles - Service Reader | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | > [!TIP] -> If you're adding less-privileged user accounts into the **Modern Workplace Roles - Service Administrator** Azure AD group, it's recommended to add the same users as owners of the **Windows Autopatch Device Registration** Azure AD group. Owners of the **Windows Autopatch Device Registration** Azure AD group can add new devices as members of the group for registration purposes.For more information, see [assign an owner of member of a group in Azure AD](/azure/active-directory/privileged-identity-management/groups-assign-member-owner#assign-an-owner-or-member-of-a-group).
+> If you're adding less-privileged user accounts into the **Modern Workplace Roles - Service Administrator** Microsoft Entra group, it's recommended to add the same users as owners of the **Windows Autopatch Device Registration** Microsoft Entra group. Owners of the **Windows Autopatch Device Registration** Microsoft Entra group can add new devices as members of the group for registration purposes.For more information, see [assign an owner of member of a group in Microsoft Entra ID](/azure/active-directory/privileged-identity-management/groups-assign-member-owner#assign-an-owner-or-member-of-a-group).
## Details about the device registration process @@ -206,7 +210,7 @@ There's a few more device management lifecycle scenarios to consider when planni If a device was previously registered into the Windows Autopatch service, but it needs to be reimaged, you must run one of the device provisioning processes available in Microsoft Intune to reimage the device. -The device will be rejoined to Azure AD (either Hybrid or Azure AD-only). Then, re-enrolled into Intune as well. No further action is required from you or the Windows Autopatch service, because the Azure AD device ID record of that device remains the same. +The device will be rejoined to Microsoft Entra ID (either Hybrid or Microsoft Entra-only). Then, re-enrolled into Intune as well. No further action is required from you or the Windows Autopatch service, because the Microsoft Entra device ID record of that device remains the same. ### Device repair and hardware replacement @@ -216,7 +220,7 @@ If you need to repair a device that was previously registered into the Windows A - MAC address (non-removable NICs) - OS hard drive's serial, model, manufacturer information -When one of these hardware changes occurs, Azure AD creates a new device ID record for that device, even if it's technically the same device. +When one of these hardware changes occurs, Microsoft Entra ID creates a new device ID record for that device, even if it's technically the same device. > [!IMPORTANT] -> If a new Azure AD device ID is generated for a device that was previously registered into the Windows Autopatch service, even if it's technically same device, the new Azure AD device ID must be added either through device direct membership or through nested Azure AD dynamic/assigned group into the **Windows Autopatch Device Registration** Azure AD group. This process guarantees that the newly generated Azure AD device ID is registered with Windows Autopatch and that the device continues to have its software updates managed by the service. +> If a new Microsoft Entra device ID is generated for a device that was previously registered into the Windows Autopatch service, even if it's technically same device, the new Microsoft Entra device ID must be added either through device direct membership or through nested Microsoft Entra dynamic/assigned group into the **Windows Autopatch Device Registration** Microsoft Entra group. This process guarantees that the newly generated Microsoft Entra device ID is registered with Windows Autopatch and that the device continues to have its software updates managed by the service. diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/media/windows-autopatch-device-registration-overview.png b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/media/windows-autopatch-device-registration-overview.png index f77684b8c4..2098b9cd0c 100644 Binary files a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/media/windows-autopatch-device-registration-overview.png and b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/media/windows-autopatch-device-registration-overview.png differ diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/media/windows-autopatch-device-registration-workflow-diagram.png b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/media/windows-autopatch-device-registration-workflow-diagram.png index abd0c884b1..d59d22d90c 100644 Binary files a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/media/windows-autopatch-device-registration-workflow-diagram.png and b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/media/windows-autopatch-device-registration-workflow-diagram.png differ diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/media/windows-autopatch-groups-high-level-architecture-diagram.png b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/media/windows-autopatch-groups-high-level-architecture-diagram.png index 1be4b61b37..2c476a2e64 100644 Binary files a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/media/windows-autopatch-groups-high-level-architecture-diagram.png and b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/media/windows-autopatch-groups-high-level-architecture-diagram.png differ diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/media/windows-autopatch-post-device-registration-readiness-checks.png b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/media/windows-autopatch-post-device-registration-readiness-checks.png index c6abcd6790..75dc395038 100644 Binary files a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/media/windows-autopatch-post-device-registration-readiness-checks.png and b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/media/windows-autopatch-post-device-registration-readiness-checks.png differ diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/media/windows-autopatch-prerequisite-check-workflow-diagram.png b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/media/windows-autopatch-prerequisite-check-workflow-diagram.png index d340ccdecd..9e01c36d3b 100644 Binary files a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/media/windows-autopatch-prerequisite-check-workflow-diagram.png and b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/media/windows-autopatch-prerequisite-check-workflow-diagram.png differ diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-device-alerts.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-device-alerts.md index 0f80250e80..563e6370c5 100644 --- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-device-alerts.md +++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-device-alerts.md @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ Alert resolutions are provided through the Windows Update service and provide th | `CancelledByUser` | User canceled the update | The Windows Update service has reported the update was canceled by the user.It's recommended to work with the end user to allow updates to execute as scheduled.
| | `DamagedMedia` | The update file or hard drive is damaged | The Windows Update service has indicated the update payload might be damaged or corrupt.It's recommended to run `Chkdsk /F` on the device with administrator privileges, then retry the update. For more information, see [chkdsk](/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/chkdsk?tabs=event-viewer).
| | `DeploymentConflict` | Device is in more than one deployment of the same update type. Only the first deployment assigned is effective. | The Windows Update service has reported a policy conflict.For more information, see the [Windows Autopatch Policy Health dashboard](../operate/windows-autopatch-policy-health-and-remediation.md).
If the alert persists, [submit a support request](../operate/windows-autopatch-support-request.md).
| -| `DeviceRegistrationInvalidAzureADDeviceId` | The device isn't able to register or authenticate properly with Windows Update because of an invalid Azure AD Device ID. | The Windows Update service has reported a device registration issue.For more information, see [Windows Autopatch post-device registration readiness checks](../deploy/windows-autopatch-post-reg-readiness-checks.md).
If the alert persists, [submit a support request](../operate/windows-autopatch-support-request.md).
| +| `DeviceRegistrationInvalidAzureADDeviceId` | The device isn't able to register or authenticate properly with Windows Update because of an invalid Microsoft Entra Device ID. | The Windows Update service has reported a device registration issue.For more information, see [Windows Autopatch post-device registration readiness checks](../deploy/windows-autopatch-post-reg-readiness-checks.md).
If the alert persists, [submit a support request](../operate/windows-autopatch-support-request.md).
| | `DeviceRegistrationInvalidGlobalDeviceId` | The device isn't able to register or authenticate properly with Windows Update because of an invalid Global Device ID. |The Windows Update service has reported that the MSA Service may be disabled preventing Global Device ID assignment.Check that the MSA Service is running or able to run on device.
If the alert persists, [submit a support request](../operate/windows-autopatch-support-request.md).
| | `DeviceRegistrationIssue` | The device isn't able to register or authenticate properly with Windows Update. | The Windows Update service has reported a device registration issue.For more information, see [Windows Autopatch post-device registration readiness checks](../deploy/windows-autopatch-post-reg-readiness-checks.md).
If the alert persists, [submit a support request](../operate/windows-autopatch-support-request.md).
| | `DeviceRegistrationNoTrustType` | The device isn't able to register or authenticate properly with Windows Update because it can't establish Trust. | The Windows Update service has reported a device registration issue.For more information, see [Windows Autopatch post-device registration readiness checks](../deploy/windows-autopatch-post-reg-readiness-checks.md).
If the alert persists, [submit a support request](../operate/windows-autopatch-support-request.md).
| diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-exclude-device.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-exclude-device.md index c41dd12e0c..843b7e8d3c 100644 --- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-exclude-device.md +++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-exclude-device.md @@ -16,12 +16,12 @@ ms.collection: # Exclude a device -To avoid end-user disruption, excluding a device in Windows Autopatch only deletes the Windows Autopatch device record itself. Excluding a device can't delete the Microsoft Intune and/or the Azure Active Directory device records. Microsoft assumes you'll keep managing those devices yourself in some capacity. +To avoid end-user disruption, excluding a device in Windows Autopatch only deletes the Windows Autopatch device record itself. Excluding a device can't delete the Microsoft Intune and/or the Microsoft Entra device records. Microsoft assumes you'll keep managing those devices yourself in some capacity. -When you exclude a device from the Windows Autopatch service, the device is flagged as **excluded** so Windows Autopatch doesn't try to restore the device into the service again, since the exclusion command doesn't trigger device membership removal from the **Windows Autopatch Device Registration** group, or any other Azure AD group, used with Autopatch groups. +When you exclude a device from the Windows Autopatch service, the device is flagged as **excluded** so Windows Autopatch doesn't try to restore the device into the service again, since the exclusion command doesn't trigger device membership removal from the **Windows Autopatch Device Registration** group, or any other Microsoft Entra group, used with Autopatch groups. > [!IMPORTANT] -> The Azure AD team doesn't recommend appending query statements to remove specific device from a dynamic query due to dynamic query performance issues. +> The Microsoft Entra team doesn't recommend appending query statements to remove specific device from a dynamic query due to dynamic query performance issues. **To exclude a device:** @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ When you exclude a device from the Windows Autopatch service, the device is flag 1. Once a device or multiple devices are selected, select **Device actions**. Then, select **Exclude device**. > [!WARNING] -> Excluding devices from the Windows Autopatch Device Registration group, or any other Azure AD group, used with Autopatch groups doesn't exclude devices from the Windows Autopatch service. +> Excluding devices from the Windows Autopatch Device Registration group, or any other Microsoft Entra group, used with Autopatch groups doesn't exclude devices from the Windows Autopatch service. ## Only view excluded devices diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-groups-update-management.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-groups-update-management.md index 12e39f7f30..66164cc373 100644 --- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-groups-update-management.md +++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-groups-update-management.md @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Keeping your devices up to date is a balance of speed and stability. Windows Aut Autopatch groups help Microsoft Cloud-Managed services meet all organizations where they are at in their update management journey. -Autopatch groups is a logical container that groups several [Azure AD groups](/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/active-directory-groups-view-azure-portal), and software update policies, such as Windows Update rings and feature update policies, together. +Autopatch groups is a logical container that groups several [Microsoft Entra groups](/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/active-directory-groups-view-azure-portal), and software update policies, such as Windows Update rings and feature update policies, together. For more information on key benefits and how to use Autopatch groups, see [Autopatch groups overview](../deploy/windows-autopatch-groups-overview.md). diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-feature-update-overview.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-feature-update-overview.md index f2522d91fa..8ffc66a28a 100644 --- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-feature-update-overview.md +++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-feature-update-overview.md @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ Windows Autopatch’s default Windows feature update release is a service-driven > [!TIP] > Windows Autopatch allows you to [create custom Windows feature update releases](../operate/windows-autopatch-groups-manage-windows-feature-update-release.md#create-a-custom-release). -When devices are registered by manually adding them to the Windows Autopatch Device Registration Azure AD assigned group, devices are assigned to deployment rings as part of the default Autopatch group. Each deployment ring has its own Windows feature update policy assigned to them. This is intended to minimize unexpected Windows OS upgrades once new devices register with the service. +When devices are registered by manually adding them to the Windows Autopatch Device Registration Microsoft Entra ID assigned group, devices are assigned to deployment rings as part of the default Autopatch group. Each deployment ring has its own Windows feature update policy assigned to them. This is intended to minimize unexpected Windows OS upgrades once new devices register with the service. The policies: @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ There are two scenarios that the Global release is used: | Scenario | Description | | ----- | ----- | -| Scenario #1 | You assign Azure AD groups to be used with the deployment ring (Last) or you add additional deployment rings when you customize the [Default Autopatch group](../deploy/windows-autopatch-groups-manage-autopatch-groups.md#edit-the-default-or-a-custom-autopatch-group).A global Windows feature update policy is automatically assigned behind the scenes to the newly added deployment rings or when you assigned Azure AD groups to the deployment ring (Last) in the Default Autopatch group.
| +| Scenario #1 | You assign Microsoft Entra groups to be used with the deployment ring (Last) or you add additional deployment rings when you customize the [Default Autopatch group](../deploy/windows-autopatch-groups-manage-autopatch-groups.md#edit-the-default-or-a-custom-autopatch-group).A global Windows feature update policy is automatically assigned behind the scenes to the newly added deployment rings or when you assigned Microsoft Entra groups to the deployment ring (Last) in the Default Autopatch group.
| | Scenario #2 | You create new [Custom Autopatch groups](../deploy/windows-autopatch-groups-manage-autopatch-groups.md#create-a-custom-autopatch-group).The global Windows feature policy is automatically assigned behind the scenes to all deployment rings as part of the Custom Autopatch groups you create.
| > [!NOTE] @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ Feature update policies work with Windows Update rings policies. Windows Update The following table details the default Windows Update rings policy values that affect either the default or custom Windows feature updates releases: -| Policy name | Azure AD group assignment | Quality updates deferral in days | Feature updates deferral in days | Feature updates uninstall window in days | Deadline for quality updates in days | Deadline for feature updates in days | Grace period | Auto restart before deadline | +| Policy name | Microsoft Entra group assignment | Quality updates deferral in days | Feature updates deferral in days | Feature updates uninstall window in days | Deadline for quality updates in days | Deadline for feature updates in days | Grace period | Auto restart before deadline | | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | | Windows Autopatch Update Policy - default - Test | Windows Autopatch - Test | 0 | 0 | 30 | 0 | 5 | 0 | Yes | | Windows Autopatch Update Policy - default - Ring1 | Windows Autopatch - Ring1 | 1 | 0 | 30 | 2 | 5 |2 | Yes | diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-feature-update-status-report.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-feature-update-status-report.md index da80289277..8fe50bb86f 100644 --- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-feature-update-status-report.md +++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-feature-update-status-report.md @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ The following information is available as optional columns in the Feature update | Column name | Description | | ----- | ----- | -| Azure Active Directory (AD) device ID | The current Azure AD recorded device ID for the device | +| Microsoft Entra device ID | The current Microsoft Entra ID recorded device ID for the device | | Serial number | The current Intune recorded serial number for the device | | Intune last check in time | The last time the device checked in to Intune | | Service State | The Service State provided from Windows Update | @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ The following options are available: | Option | Description | | ----- | ----- | -| Search | Use to search by device name, Azure AD device ID or serial number | +| Search | Use to search by device name, Microsoft Entra device ID or serial number | | Sort | Select the **column headings** to sort the report data in ascending and descending order. | | Export | Select **Export devices** at the top of the page to export data from this report into a CSV file. | | Filter | Select either the **Add filters** or at the top of the report to filter the results. | diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-feature-update-summary-dashboard.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-feature-update-summary-dashboard.md index 37d261d766..6f8527fdc9 100644 --- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-feature-update-summary-dashboard.md +++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-feature-update-summary-dashboard.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ --- title: Windows feature update summary dashboard description: Provides a broader view of the current Windows OS upgrade status for all devices registered with Windows Autopatch. -ms.date: 07/25/2023 +ms.date: 10/11/2023 ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-updates ms.topic: how-to @@ -17,19 +17,19 @@ ms.collection: # Windows feature update summary dashboard -The summary dashboard provides a broader view of the current Windows OS update status for all devices registered with Windows Autopatch. +The Summary dashboard provides a broader view of the current Windows OS update status for all devices registered with Windows Autopatch. -The first part of the summary dashboard provides you with an all-devices trend report where you can follow the deployment trends within your organization. You can view if updates were successfully installed, failing, in progress, not ready or have their Windows feature update paused. +The first part of the Summary dashboard provides you with an all-devices trend report where you can follow the deployment trends within your organization. You can view if updates were successfully installed, failing, in progress, not ready or have their Windows feature update paused. -**To view a generated summary dashboard for your Windows feature update deployments:** +**To view a generated Summary dashboard for your Windows feature update deployments:** 1. Go to the [Microsoft Intune admin center](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2109431). 1. Select **Reports** from the left navigation menu. -1. Under the **Windows Autopatch** section, select **Windows feature updates (preview)**. +1. Under the **Windows Autopatch** section, select **Windows feature updates**. ## Report information -The following information is available in the summary dashboard: +The following information is available in the Summary dashboard: | Column name | Description | | ----- | ----- | @@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ The following options are available: | Option | Description | | ----- | ----- | -| Refresh | The option to **Refresh** the summary dashboard is available at the top of the page. This process will ensure that the summary dashboard view is updated to the latest available dataset from within the last 24-hour period. | +| Refresh | The option to **Refresh** the Summary dashboard is available at the top of the page. This process ensures that the Summary dashboard view is updated to the latest available dataset from within the last 24-hour period. | | Summary links | Each column represents the summary of included devices. Select the hyperlinked number to produce a filtered report in a new browser tab. | diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-quality-update-status-report.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-quality-update-status-report.md index 703ee03554..af916925f0 100644 --- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-quality-update-status-report.md +++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-quality-update-status-report.md @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ The following information is available as optional columns in the Quality update | Column name | Description | | ----- | ----- | -| Azure Active Directory (AD) device ID | The current Azure AD recorded device ID for the device | +| Microsoft Entra device ID | The current Microsoft Entra ID recorded device ID for the device | | Serial number | The current Intune recorded serial number for the device | | Intune last check in time | The last time the device checked in to Intune | | Service State | The Service State provided from Windows Update | @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ The following options are available: | Option | Description | | ----- | ----- | -| Search | Use to search by device name, Azure AD device ID or serial number | +| Search | Use to search by device name, Microsoft Entra device ID or serial number | | Sort | Select the **column headings** to sort the report data in ascending and descending order. | | Export | Select **Export devices** at the top of the page to export data from this report into a CSV file. | | Filter | Select either the **Add filters** or at the top of the report to filter the results. | diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-quality-update-summary-dashboard.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-quality-update-summary-dashboard.md index 154e93fb08..e744f0c407 100644 --- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-quality-update-summary-dashboard.md +++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-quality-update-summary-dashboard.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ --- title: Windows quality update summary dashboard description: Provides a summary view of the current update status for all devices enrolled into Windows Autopatch with Autopatch groups -ms.date: 07/25/2023 +ms.date: 10/04/2023 ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-updates ms.topic: how-to @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ ms.collection: # Windows quality update summary dashboard -The summary dashboard provides a summary view of the current update status for all devices enrolled into Windows Autopatch. +The Summary dashboard provides a summary view of the current update status for all devices enrolled into Windows Autopatch. **To view the current update status for all your enrolled devices:** @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ The summary dashboard provides a summary view of the current update status for a ## Report information -The following information is available in the summary dashboard: +The following information is available in the Summary dashboard: | Column name | Description | | ----- | ----- | @@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ The following options are available: | Option | Description | | ----- | ----- | -| Refresh | The option to **Refresh** the summary dashboard is available at the top of the page. This process will ensure that the summary dashboard view is updated to the latest available dataset from within the last 24-hour period. | +| Refresh | The option to **Refresh** the Summary dashboard is available at the top of the page. This process ensures that the Summary dashboard view is updated to the latest available dataset from within the last 24-hour period. | | Summary links | Each column represents the summary of included devices. Select the hyperlinked number to produce a filtered report in a new browser tab. | diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-maintain-environment.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-maintain-environment.md index cab93e35da..3b72dc6d90 100644 --- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-maintain-environment.md +++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-maintain-environment.md @@ -23,13 +23,13 @@ After you've completed enrollment in Windows Autopatch, some management settings 1. If any of the items apply to your environment, make the adjustments as described. > [!NOTE] -> As your operations continue in the following months, if you make changes after enrollment to policies in Microsoft Intune, Azure Active Directory, or Microsoft 365 that affect Windows Autopatch, it's possible that Windows Autopatch could stop operating properly. To avoid problems with the service, check the specific settings described in [Fix issues found by the readiness assessment tool](../prepare/windows-autopatch-fix-issues.md) before you change the policies listed there. +> As your operations continue in the following months, if you make changes after enrollment to policies in Microsoft Intune, Microsoft Entra ID, or Microsoft 365 that affect Windows Autopatch, it's possible that Windows Autopatch could stop operating properly. To avoid problems with the service, check the specific settings described in [Fix issues found by the readiness assessment tool](../prepare/windows-autopatch-fix-issues.md) before you change the policies listed there. ## Microsoft Intune settings | Setting | Description | | ----- | ----- | -| Deployment rings for Windows 10 or later | For any deployment rings for Windows 10 or later policies you've created, exclude the **Modern Workplace Devices - All** Azure AD group from each policy. For more information, see [Create and assign deployment rings](/mem/intune/protect/windows-10-update-rings#create-and-assign-update-rings).Windows Autopatch creates some update ring policies. These policies have "**Modern Workplace**" in the name. For example:
When you update your own policies, ensure that you don't exclude the **Modern Workplace Devices - All** Azure AD group from the policies that Windows Autopatch created.
**To resolve the Not ready result:**
After enrolling into Autopatch, make sure that any update ring policies you have **exclude** the **Modern Workplace Devices - All** Azure Active Directory (AD) group. For more information, see [Manage Windows 10 software updates in Intune](/mem/intune/protect/windows-update-for-business-configure).
**To resolve the Advisory result:**
For more information, see [Manage Windows 10 software updates in Intune](/mem/intune/protect/windows-update-for-business-configure).
| +| Deployment rings for Windows 10 or later | For any deployment rings for Windows 10 or later policies you've created, exclude the **Modern Workplace Devices - All** Microsoft Entra group from each policy. For more information, see [Create and assign deployment rings](/mem/intune/protect/windows-10-update-rings#create-and-assign-update-rings).Windows Autopatch creates some update ring policies. These policies have "**Modern Workplace**" in the name. For example:
When you update your own policies, ensure that you don't exclude the **Modern Workplace Devices - All** Microsoft Entra group from the policies that Windows Autopatch created.
**To resolve the Not ready result:**
After enrolling into Autopatch, make sure that any update ring policies you have **exclude** the **Modern Workplace Devices - All** Microsoft Entra group. For more information, see [Manage Windows 10 software updates in Intune](/mem/intune/protect/windows-update-for-business-configure).
**To resolve the Advisory result:**
For more information, see [Manage Windows 10 software updates in Intune](/mem/intune/protect/windows-update-for-business-configure).
| ## Windows Autopatch configurations @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ The type of banner that appears depends on the severity of the action. Currently | Action type | Severity | Description | | ----- | ----- | ----- | -| Maintain tenant access | Critical | Required licenses have expired. The licenses include:To take action on missing licenses, you can visit the Microsoft 365 admin center or contact your Microsoft account manager. Until you have renewed the required licenses to run the service, Windows Autopatch marks your tenant as **inactive**. For more information, see [Microsoft 365 - What happens after my subscription expires?](/microsoft-365/commerce/subscriptions/what-if-my-subscription-expires)
| +| Maintain tenant access | Critical | Required licenses have expired. The licenses include:To take action on missing licenses, you can visit the Microsoft 365 admin center or contact your Microsoft account manager. Until you have renewed the required licenses to run the service, Windows Autopatch marks your tenant as **inactive**. For more information, see [Microsoft 365 - What happens after my subscription expires?](/microsoft-365/commerce/subscriptions/what-if-my-subscription-expires)
| | Maintain tenant access | Critical | Address tenant access issues. Windows Autopatch currently can’t manage your tenant. Until you take action, your tenant is marked as **inactive**, and you have only limited access to the Windows Autopatch portal.Reasons for tenant access issues:
Take action by consenting to allow Windows Autopatch to make the appropriate changes on your behalf. You must be a Global Administrator to consent to this action. Once you provide consent, Windows Autopatch remediates this critical action for you.
For more information, see [Windows Autopatch enterprise applications](../overview/windows-autopatch-privacy.md#tenant-access).
| ### Inactive status diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-microsoft-365-apps-enterprise.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-microsoft-365-apps-enterprise.md index 06e2e12c09..3120c809f3 100644 --- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-microsoft-365-apps-enterprise.md +++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-microsoft-365-apps-enterprise.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ --- title: Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise description: This article explains how Windows Autopatch manages Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise updates -ms.date: 06/23/2023 +ms.date: 10/27/2023 ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-updates ms.topic: how-to @@ -81,7 +81,15 @@ Windows Autopatch doesn't allow you to pause or roll back an update in the Micro ## Allow or block Microsoft 365 App updates -For organizations seeking greater control, you can allow or block Microsoft 365 App updates for Windows Autopatch-enrolled devices. When the Microsoft 365 App update setting is set to **Block**, Windows Autopatch doesn't provide Microsoft 365 App updates on your behalf, and your organizations have full control over these updates. For example, you can continue to receive updates from [channels](/deployoffice/overview-update-channels) other than the default [Monthly Enterprise Channel](/deployoffice/overview-update-channels#monthly-enterprise-channel-overview). +> [!IMPORTANT] +> You must be an Intune Administrator to make changes to the setting. + +For organizations seeking greater control, you can allow or block Microsoft 365 App updates for Windows Autopatch-enrolled devices. + +| Microsoft 365 App setting | Description | +| ----- | ----- | +| **Allow** | When set to **Allow**, Windows Autopatch moves all Autopatch managed devices to the [Monthly Enterprise Channel](/deployoffice/overview-update-channels#monthly-enterprise-channel-overview) and manages updates automatically. To manage updates manually, set the Microsoft 365 App update setting to **Block**. | +| **Block** | When set to **Block**, Windows Autopatch doesn't provide Microsoft 365 App updates on your behalf, and your organizations have full control over these updates. You can continue to receive updates from [channels](/deployoffice/overview-update-channels) other than the default [Monthly Enterprise Channel](/deployoffice/overview-update-channels#monthly-enterprise-channel-overview). | **To allow or block Microsoft 365 App updates:** diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-unenroll-tenant.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-unenroll-tenant.md index ecc8f356a9..2c89d2a8ce 100644 --- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-unenroll-tenant.md +++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/operate/windows-autopatch-unenroll-tenant.md @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ If you're looking to unenroll your tenant from Windows Autopatch, this article d Unenrolling from Windows Autopatch requires manual actions from both you and from the Windows Autopatch Service Engineering Team. The Windows Autopatch Service Engineering Team will: - Remove Windows Autopatch access to your tenant. -- Exclude your devices from the Windows Autopatch service. Excluding your devices from Windows Autopatch won't remove your devices from Intune, Azure AD or Configuration Manager. The Windows Autopatch Service Engineering Team follows the same process and principles as laid out in [Exclude a device](../operate/windows-autopatch-exclude-device.md). +- Exclude your devices from the Windows Autopatch service. Excluding your devices from Windows Autopatch won't remove your devices from Intune, Microsoft Entra ID or Configuration Manager. The Windows Autopatch Service Engineering Team follows the same process and principles as laid out in [Exclude a device](../operate/windows-autopatch-exclude-device.md). - Delete all data that we've stored in the Windows Autopatch data storage. > [!NOTE] @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Unenrolling from Windows Autopatch requires manual actions from both you and fro | Responsibility | Description | | ----- | ----- | | Windows Autopatch data | Windows Autopatch will delete user data that is within the Windows Autopatch service. We won’t make changes to any other data. For more information about how data is used in Windows Autopatch, see [Privacy](../overview/windows-autopatch-privacy.md). | -| Excluding devices | Windows Autopatch will exclude all devices previously registered with the service. Only the Windows Autopatch device record is deleted. We won't delete Microsoft Intune and/or Azure Active Directory device records. For more information, see [Exclude a device](../operate/windows-autopatch-exclude-device.md). | +| Excluding devices | Windows Autopatch will exclude all devices previously registered with the service. Only the Windows Autopatch device record is deleted. We won't delete Microsoft Intune and/or Microsoft Entra device records. For more information, see [Exclude a device](../operate/windows-autopatch-exclude-device.md). | ## Your responsibilities after unenrolling your tenant diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/overview/windows-autopatch-deployment-guide.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/overview/windows-autopatch-deployment-guide.md index fb1b851773..7fc5bce674 100644 --- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/overview/windows-autopatch-deployment-guide.md +++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/overview/windows-autopatch-deployment-guide.md @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ The following deployment steps can be used as a guide to help you to create your | ----- | ----- | | **1A: Set up the service** |[Manage connection endpoints for Windows 10 Enterprise, version 2004](/windows/privacy/manage-windows-2004-endpoints)
[Connection endpoints for Windows 10 Enterprise, version 20H2](/windows/privacy/manage-windows-20h2-endpoints)
[Manage connection endpoints for Windows 10 Enterprise, version 21H1](/windows/privacy/manage-windows-21h1-endpoints)
[Manage connection endpoints for Windows 10 Enterprise, version 21H2](/windows/privacy/manage-windows-21h2-endpoints)
[Manage connection endpoints for Windows 11 Enterprise](/windows/privacy/manage-windows-11-endpoints)
| | Microsoft 365 | [Microsoft 365 URL and IP address ranges](/microsoft-365/enterprise/urls-and-ip-address-ranges?view=o365-worldwide&preserve-view=true) | -| Azure Active Directory | [Hybrid identity required ports and protocols](/azure/active-directory/hybrid/reference-connect-ports)[Active Directory and Active Directory Domain Services Port Requirements](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd772723(v=ws.10))
| +| Microsoft Entra ID | [Hybrid identity required ports and protocols](/azure/active-directory/hybrid/reference-connect-ports)[Active Directory and Active Directory Domain Services Port Requirements](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd772723(v=ws.10))
| | Microsoft Intune | [Intune network configuration requirements](/intune/network-bandwidth-use)[Network endpoints for Microsoft Intune](/mem/intune/fundamentals/intune-endpoints)
| Microsoft Edge | [Allowlist for Microsoft Edge Endpoints](/deployedge/microsoft-edge-security-endpoints) | | Microsoft Teams | [Office 365 URLs and IP address ranges](/microsoft-365/enterprise/urls-and-ip-address-ranges) | diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/prepare/windows-autopatch-enroll-tenant.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/prepare/windows-autopatch-enroll-tenant.md index 3a6e0a1197..95f0ed85fc 100644 --- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/prepare/windows-autopatch-enroll-tenant.md +++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/prepare/windows-autopatch-enroll-tenant.md @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ To start using the Windows Autopatch service, ensure you meet the [Windows Autop > [!IMPORTANT] > The online Readiness assessment tool helps you check your readiness to enroll in Windows Autopatch for the first time. Once you enroll, you'll no longer be able to access the tool again. -The Readiness assessment tool checks the settings in [Microsoft Intune](#microsoft-intune-settings) and [Azure Active Directory](#azure-active-directory-settings) (Azure AD) to ensure the settings work with Windows Autopatch. We aren't, however, checking the workloads in Configuration Manager necessary for Windows Autopatch. For more information about workload prerequisites, see [Configuration Manager co-management requirements](../prepare/windows-autopatch-prerequisites.md#configuration-manager-co-management-requirements). +The Readiness assessment tool checks the settings in [Microsoft Intune](#microsoft-intune-settings) and [Microsoft Entra ID](#azure-active-directory-settings) (Microsoft Entra ID) to ensure the settings work with Windows Autopatch. We aren't, however, checking the workloads in Configuration Manager necessary for Windows Autopatch. For more information about workload prerequisites, see [Configuration Manager co-management requirements](../prepare/windows-autopatch-prerequisites.md#configuration-manager-co-management-requirements). **To access and run the Readiness assessment tool:** @@ -56,9 +56,11 @@ The following are the Microsoft Intune settings: | ----- | ----- | | Deployment rings for Windows 10 or later | Verifies that Intune's deployment rings for Windows 10 or later policy doesn't target all users or all devices. Policies of this type shouldn't target any Windows Autopatch devices. For more information, see [Configure deployment rings for Windows 10 and later in Intune](/mem/intune/protect/windows-10-update-rings). | -### Azure Active Directory settings + -The following are the Azure Active Directory settings: +### Microsoft Entra settings + +The following are the Microsoft Entra settings: | Check | Description | | ----- | ----- | @@ -74,7 +76,7 @@ For each check, the tool reports one of four possible results: | Ready | No action is required before completing enrollment. | | Advisory | Follow the steps in the tool or this article for the best experience with enrollment and for users.You can complete enrollment, but you must fix these issues before you deploy your first device. | | Not ready | You must fix these issues before enrollment. You can't enroll into Windows Autopatch if you don't fix these issues. Follow the steps in the tool or this article to resolve them. | -| Error | The Azure Active Directory (AD) role you're using doesn't have sufficient permissions to run this check. | +| Error | The Microsoft Entra role you're using doesn't have sufficient permissions to run this check. | ## Step 3: Fix issues with your tenant @@ -104,7 +106,7 @@ Once these actions are complete, you've now successfully enrolled your tenant. You can choose to delete the data we collect directly within the Readiness assessment tool. -Windows Autopatch retains the data associated with these checks for 12 months after the last time you ran a check in your Azure Active Directory organization (tenant). After 12 months, we retain the data in a deidentified form. +Windows Autopatch retains the data associated with these checks for 12 months after the last time you ran a check in your Microsoft Entra organization (tenant). After 12 months, we retain the data in a deidentified form. > [!NOTE] > Windows Autopatch will only delete the results we collect within the Readiness assessment tool; Autopatch won't delete any other tenant-level data. diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/prepare/windows-autopatch-fix-issues.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/prepare/windows-autopatch-fix-issues.md index 39f30591e9..8acdf328e5 100644 --- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/prepare/windows-autopatch-fix-issues.md +++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/prepare/windows-autopatch-fix-issues.md @@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ For each check, the tool reports one of four possible results: | Ready | No action is required before completing enrollment. | | Advisory | Follow the steps in the tool or this article for the best experience with enrollment and for users.
You can complete enrollment, but you must fix these issues before you deploy your first device. | | Not ready | You must fix these issues before enrollment. You can't enroll into Windows Autopatch if you don't fix these issues. Follow the steps in the tool or this article to resolve them. | -| Error | The Azure Active Directory (AD) role you're using doesn't have sufficient permission to run this check or your tenant isn't properly licensed for Microsoft Intune. | +| Error | The Microsoft Entra role you're using doesn't have sufficient permission to run this check or your tenant isn't properly licensed for Microsoft Intune. | > [!NOTE] -> The results reported by this tool reflect the status of your settings only at the time that you ran it. If you make changes later to policies in Microsoft Intune, Azure Active Directory (AD), or Microsoft 365, items that were "Ready" can become "Not ready". To avoid problems with Windows Autopatch operations, review the specific settings described in this article before you change any policies. +> The results reported by this tool reflect the status of your settings only at the time that you ran it. If you make changes later to policies in Microsoft Intune, Microsoft Entra ID, or Microsoft 365, items that were "Ready" can become "Not ready". To avoid problems with Windows Autopatch operations, review the specific settings described in this article before you change any policies. ## Microsoft Intune settings @@ -48,9 +48,11 @@ Your "Update rings for Windows 10 or later" policy in Intune must not target any | ----- | ----- | | Advisory | You have an "update ring" policy that targets all devices, all users, or both. Windows Autopatch creates our own update ring policies during enrollment. To avoid conflicts with Windows Autopatch devices, we exclude our devices group from your existing update ring policies that target all devices, all users, or both. You must consent to this change when you go to enroll your tenant.
| -## Azure Active Directory settings + -You can access Azure Active Directory (AD) settings in the [Azure portal](https://portal.azure.com/). +## Microsoft Entra settings + +You can access Microsoft Entra settings in the [Azure portal](https://portal.azure.com/). ### Co-management @@ -66,4 +68,4 @@ Windows Autopatch requires the following licenses: | Result | Meaning | | ----- | ----- | -| Not ready | Windows Autopatch requires Windows 10/11 Enterprise E3 (or higher) to be assigned to your users. Additionally, Azure Active Directory Premium, and Microsoft Intune are required. For more information, see [more about licenses](../prepare/windows-autopatch-prerequisites.md#more-about-licenses). | +| Not ready | Windows Autopatch requires Windows 10/11 Enterprise E3 (or higher) to be assigned to your users. Additionally, Microsoft Entra ID P1 or P2, and Microsoft Intune are required. For more information, see [more about licenses](../prepare/windows-autopatch-prerequisites.md#more-about-licenses). | diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/prepare/windows-autopatch-prerequisites.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/prepare/windows-autopatch-prerequisites.md index 90e7324a39..b0df16842e 100644 --- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/prepare/windows-autopatch-prerequisites.md +++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/prepare/windows-autopatch-prerequisites.md @@ -21,9 +21,9 @@ Getting started with Windows Autopatch has been designed to be easy. This articl | Area | Prerequisite details | | ----- | ----- | -| Licensing | Windows Autopatch requires Windows 10/11 Enterprise E3 (or higher) to be assigned to your users. Additionally, Azure Active Directory Premium and Microsoft Intune are required. For details about the specific service plans, see [more about licenses](#more-about-licenses).For more information on available licenses, see [Microsoft 365 licensing](https://www.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/compare-microsoft-365-enterprise-plans).
For more information about licensing terms and conditions for products and services purchased through Microsoft Commercial Volume Licensing Programs, see the [Product Terms site](https://www.microsoft.com/licensing/terms/). | +| Licensing | Windows Autopatch requires Windows 10/11 Enterprise E3 (or higher) to be assigned to your users. Additionally, Microsoft Entra ID P1 or P2 and Microsoft Intune are required. For details about the specific service plans, see [more about licenses](#more-about-licenses).
For more information on available licenses, see [Microsoft 365 licensing](https://www.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/compare-microsoft-365-enterprise-plans).
For more information about licensing terms and conditions for products and services purchased through Microsoft Commercial Volume Licensing Programs, see the [Product Terms site](https://www.microsoft.com/licensing/terms/). | | Connectivity | All Windows Autopatch devices require connectivity to multiple Microsoft service endpoints from the corporate network.
For the full list of required IPs and URLs, see [Configure your network](../prepare/windows-autopatch-configure-network.md). |
-| Azure Active Directory | Azure Active Directory must either be the source of authority for all user accounts, or user accounts must be synchronized from on-premises Active Directory using the latest supported version of Azure Active Directory Connect to enable Hybrid Azure Active Directory join.
At a minimum, the Windows Update, Device configuration and Office Click-to-Run apps workloads must be set to Pilot Intune or Intune. You must also ensure that the devices you intend on bringing to Windows Autopatch are in the targeted device collection. For more information, see [co-management requirements for Windows Autopatch](#configuration-manager-co-management-requirements).
Other device management prerequisites include:
See [Register your devices](/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/deploy/windows-autopatch-register-devices) for more details on device prerequisites and on how the device registration process works with Windows Autopatch.
For more information on co-management, see [co-management for Windows devices](/mem/configmgr/comanage/overview).
| | Data and privacy | For more information on Windows Autopatch privacy practices, see [Windows Autopatch Privacy](../overview/windows-autopatch-privacy.md). | diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/references/windows-autopatch-changes-to-tenant.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/references/windows-autopatch-changes-to-tenant.md index f0c9059f9c..30030ec7cc 100644 --- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/references/windows-autopatch-changes-to-tenant.md +++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/references/windows-autopatch-changes-to-tenant.md @@ -34,13 +34,15 @@ Windows Autopatch creates an enterprise application in your tenant. This enterpr ### Service principal -Windows Autopatch will create a service principal in your tenant to establish an identity and restrict access to what resources the service has access to within the tenant. For more information, see [Application and service principal objects in Azure Active Directory](/azure/active-directory/develop/app-objects-and-service-principals#service-principal-object). The service principal created by Windows Autopatch is: +Windows Autopatch will create a service principal in your tenant to establish an identity and restrict access to what resources the service has access to within the tenant. For more information, see [Application and service principal objects in Microsoft Entra ID](/azure/active-directory/develop/app-objects-and-service-principals#service-principal-object). The service principal created by Windows Autopatch is: - Modern Workplace Customer APIs -## Azure Active Directory groups + -Windows Autopatch will create the required Azure Active Directory groups to operate the service. +## Microsoft Entra groups + +Windows Autopatch will create the required Microsoft Entra groups to operate the service. The following groups target Windows Autopatch configurations to devices and management of the service by our [first party enterprise applications](#windows-autopatch-enterprise-applications). diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/references/windows-autopatch-driver-and-firmware-updates-public-preview-addendum.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/references/windows-autopatch-driver-and-firmware-updates-public-preview-addendum.md index 00eb8bc49b..21d90312fd 100644 --- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/references/windows-autopatch-driver-and-firmware-updates-public-preview-addendum.md +++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/references/windows-autopatch-driver-and-firmware-updates-public-preview-addendum.md @@ -26,4 +26,4 @@ Capitalized terms used but not defined herein have the meanings given in the Pro ## Data Handling -Driver and Firmware Updates Preview integrates Customer Data from other Products, including Windows, Microsoft Intune, Azure Active Directory, and Office (collectively for purposes of this provision "Windows Autopatch Input Services"). Once Customer Data from Windows Autopatch Input Services is integrated into Driver and Firmware Updates Preview, only the Product Terms and [DPA provisions](https://www.microsoft.com/licensing/terms/product/Glossary/all) applicable to Driver and Firmware Updates Preview apply to that data. +Driver and Firmware Updates Preview integrates Customer Data from other Products, including Windows, Microsoft Intune, Microsoft Entra ID, and Office (collectively for purposes of this provision "Windows Autopatch Input Services"). Once Customer Data from Windows Autopatch Input Services is integrated into Driver and Firmware Updates Preview, only the Product Terms and [DPA provisions](https://www.microsoft.com/licensing/terms/product/Glossary/all) applicable to Driver and Firmware Updates Preview apply to that data. diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/whats-new/windows-autopatch-whats-new-2023.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/whats-new/windows-autopatch-whats-new-2023.md index e9e8b08de8..24650e3a33 100644 --- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/whats-new/windows-autopatch-whats-new-2023.md +++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/whats-new/windows-autopatch-whats-new-2023.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ --- title: What's new 2023 description: This article lists the 2023 feature releases and any corresponding Message center post numbers. -ms.date: 09/11/2023 +ms.date: 10/27/2023 ms.prod: windows-client ms.technology: itpro-updates ms.topic: whats-new @@ -21,6 +21,20 @@ This article lists new and updated feature releases, and service releases, with Minor corrections such as typos, style, or formatting issues aren't listed. +## October 2023 + +### October feature releases or updates + +| Article | Description | +| ----- | ----- | +| [Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise](../operate/windows-autopatch-microsoft-365-apps-enterprise.md#microsoft-365-apps-for-enterprise-update-controls) | Added more information about the Allow setting in the [Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise update controls](../operate/windows-autopatch-microsoft-365-apps-enterprise.md#microsoft-365-apps-for-enterprise-update-controls) section | + +## October service release + +| Message center post number | Description | +| ----- | ----- | +| [MC680344](https://admin.microsoft.com/adminportal/home#/MessageCenter) | Planned Maintenance: Service Improvements | + ## September 2023 ### September feature releases or updates @@ -33,6 +47,8 @@ Minor corrections such as typos, style, or formatting issues aren't listed. | Message center post number | Description | | ----- | ----- | +| [MC678305](https://admin.microsoft.com/adminportal/home#/MessageCenter) | September 2023 Windows Autopatch baseline configuration update | +| [MC678303](https://admin.microsoft.com/adminportal/home#/MessageCenter) | Windows Autopatch availability within Microsoft Intune Admin Center | | [MC674422](https://admin.microsoft.com/adminportal/home#/MessageCenter) | Public Preview: Windows Autopatch Reliability Report | | [MC672750](https://admin.microsoft.com/adminportal/home#/MessageCenter) | August 2023 Windows Autopatch baseline configuration update | diff --git a/windows/hub/breadcrumb/toc.yml b/windows/hub/breadcrumb/toc.yml index b8fb1254fb..211570e4b0 100644 --- a/windows/hub/breadcrumb/toc.yml +++ b/windows/hub/breadcrumb/toc.yml @@ -1,67 +1,3 @@ -items: - - name: Docs - tocHref: / - topicHref: / - items: - - name: Windows - tocHref: /windows/ - topicHref: /windows/resources/ - items: - - name: What's new - tocHref: /windows/whats-new/ - topicHref: /windows/whats-new/ - - name: Configuration - tocHref: /windows/configuration/ - topicHref: /windows/configuration/ - - name: Deployment - tocHref: /windows/deployment/ - topicHref: /windows/deployment/ - items: - - name: Delivery Optimization - tocHref: /windows/deployment/do/ - topicHref: /windows/deployment/do/ - - name: Application management - tocHref: /windows/application-management/ - topicHref: /windows/application-management/ - - name: Client management - tocHref: /windows/client-management/ - topicHref: /windows/client-management/ - items: - - name: CSP reference - tocHref: /windows/client-management/mdm/ - topicHref: /windows/client-management/mdm/ - - name: Privacy - tocHref: /windows/privacy/ - topicHref: /windows/privacy/ - - name: Security - tocHref: /windows/security/ - topicHref: /windows/security/ - items: - - name: Hardware security - tocHref: /windows/security/hardware-security/ - topicHref: /windows/security/hardware-security/ - - name: Operating system security - tocHref: /windows/security/operating-system-security/ - topicHref: /windows/security/operating-system-security/ - - name: Identity protection - tocHref: /windows/security/identity-protection/ - topicHref: /windows/security/identity-protection/ - - name: Application security - tocHref: /windows/security/application-security/ - topicHref: /windows/security/application-security/ - items: - - name: Application Control for Windows - tocHref: /windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/ - topicHref: /windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/ - - name: Microsoft Defender Application Guard - tocHref: /windows/security/application-security/application-isolation/microsoft-defender-application-guard/ - topicHref: /windows/security/application-security/application-isolation/microsoft-defender-application-guard/md-app-guard-overview - - name: Security foundations - tocHref: /windows/security/security-foundations/ - topicHref: /windows/security/security-foundations/ - - name: Security auditing - tocHref: /windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/ - topicHref: /windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/security-auditing-overview - - name: Security policy settings - tocHref: /windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/ - topicHref: /windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/security-policy-settings \ No newline at end of file +- name: Windows + tocHref: /windows/ + topicHref: /windows/index diff --git a/windows/hub/index.yml b/windows/hub/index.yml index b341fb250c..83dda7c0fe 100644 --- a/windows/hub/index.yml +++ b/windows/hub/index.yml @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ metadata: author: paolomatarazzo ms.author: paoloma manager: aaroncz - ms.date: 06/20/2023 + ms.date: 09/26/2023 highlightedContent: items: @@ -34,15 +34,19 @@ highlightedContent: - title: Windows commercial licensing itemType: overview url: /windows/whats-new/windows-licensing + - title: Copilot in Windows + itemType: how-to-guide + url: /windows/client-management/manage-windows-copilot - title: Windows 365 documentation itemType: overview url: /windows-365 - title: Explore all Windows trainings and learning paths for IT pros itemType: learn url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/training/browse/?products=windows&roles=administrator - - title: Enroll Windows client devices in Microsoft Intune - itemType: how-to-guide - url: /mem/intune/fundamentals/deployment-guide-enrollment-windows + +# - title: Enroll Windows client devices in Microsoft Intune +# itemType: how-to-guide +# url: /mem/intune/fundamentals/deployment-guide-enrollment-windows productDirectory: title: Get started @@ -69,10 +73,10 @@ productDirectory: links: - url: /windows/security/threat-protection/windows-security-configuration-framework/windows-security-baselines text: Windows security baselines - - url: /windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/credential-guard-how-it-works - text: Credential Guard - - url: /windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cloud-kerberos-trust - text: Windows Hello for Business cloud Kerberos trust + - url: /windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business + text: Windows Hello for Business + - url: /windows/security/identity-protection/web-sign-in + text: Web sign-in for Windows - url: /windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control text: Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) - url: /windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/md-app-guard-overview @@ -105,8 +109,8 @@ productDirectory: text: Configuration Service Provider (CSP) - url: /windows/client-management/administrative-tools-in-windows-10 text: Windows administrative tools - - url: /windows/client-management/client-tools/quick-assist - text: Use Quick Assist to help users + - url: /windows/client-management/manage-windows-copilot + text: Manage Copilot in Windows - url: /windows/application-management/index text: Learn more about application management > - url: /windows/client-management diff --git a/windows/privacy/basic-level-windows-diagnostic-events-and-fields-1809.md b/windows/privacy/basic-level-windows-diagnostic-events-and-fields-1809.md index 8c7588deb0..3d03e6bc7b 100644 --- a/windows/privacy/basic-level-windows-diagnostic-events-and-fields-1809.md +++ b/windows/privacy/basic-level-windows-diagnostic-events-and-fields-1809.md @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ localizationpriority: high author: DHB-MSFT ms.author: danbrown manager: laurawi -ms.date: 05/23/2023 +ms.date: 09/26/2023 ms.topic: reference --- @@ -1749,6 +1749,30 @@ The following fields are available: - **AppraiserVersion** The version of the Appraiser file that is generating the events. +### Microsoft.Windows.Appraiser.General.SystemProcessorPopCntAdd + +This event sends data indicating whether the system supports the PopCnt CPU requirement for newer versions of Windows, to help keep Windows up-to-date. + +This event includes fields from [Ms.Device.DeviceInventoryChange](#msdevicedeviceinventorychange). + +The following fields are available: + +- **AppraiserVersion** Appraiser version +- **Blocking** Is the upgrade blocked due to the processor missing the PopCnt instruction? +- **PopCntPassed** Whether the machine passes the latest OS hardware requirements or not for the PopCnt instruction. + + +### Microsoft.Windows.Appraiser.General.SystemProcessorPopCntStartSync + +The SystemProcessorPopCntStartSync event indicates that a new set of SystemProcessorPopCntAdd events will be sent. This event is used to understand if the system supports the PopCnt CPU requirement for newer versions of Windows. + +This event includes fields from [Ms.Device.DeviceInventoryChange](#msdevicedeviceinventorychange). + +The following fields are available: + +- **AppraiserVersion** Appraiser version + + ### Microsoft.Windows.Appraiser.General.SystemProcessorPrefetchWAdd This event sends data indicating whether the system supports the PrefetchW CPU requirement, to help keep Windows up to date. @@ -2148,7 +2172,7 @@ This event sends data about Azure presence, type, and cloud domain use in order The following fields are available: -- **AADDeviceId** Azure Active Directory device ID. +- **AADDeviceId** Microsoft Entra ID device ID. - **AzureOSIDPresent** Represents the field used to identify an Azure machine. - **AzureVMType** Represents whether the instance is Azure VM PAAS, Azure VM IAAS or any other VMs. - **CDJType** Represents the type of cloud domain joined for the machine. @@ -2156,7 +2180,7 @@ The following fields are available: - **ContainerType** The type of container, such as process or virtual machine hosted. - **EnrollmentType** Defines the type of MDM enrollment on the device. - **HashedDomain** The hashed representation of the user domain used for login. -- **IsCloudDomainJoined** Is this device joined to an Azure Active Directory (AAD) tenant? true/false +- **IsCloudDomainJoined** Is this device joined to a Microsoft Entra tenant? true/false - **IsDERequirementMet** Represents if the device can do device encryption. - **IsDeviceProtected** Represents if Device protected by BitLocker/Device Encryption - **IsDomainJoined** Indicates whether a machine is joined to a domain. @@ -2164,7 +2188,7 @@ The following fields are available: - **IsMDMEnrolled** Whether the device has been MDM Enrolled or not. - **MPNId** Returns the Partner ID/MPN ID from Regkey. HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\DeployID - **SCCMClientId** This ID correlate systems that send data to Compat Analytics (OMS) and other OMS based systems with systems in an enterprise Configuration Manager environment. -- **ServerFeatures** Represents the features installed on a Windows Server. This can be used by developers and administrators who need to automate the process of determining the features installed on a set of server computers. +- **ServerFeatures** Represents the features installed on a Windows Server. This can be used by developers and administrators who need to automate the process of determining the features installed on a set of server computers. - **SystemCenterID** The Configuration Manager ID is an anonymized one-way hash of the Active Directory Organization identifier @@ -2586,6 +2610,17 @@ The following fields are available: ## Code Integrity events +### Microsoft.Windows.Security.CodeIntegrity.HVCISysprep.AutoEnablementIsBlocked + +Indicates if OEM attempted to block autoenablement via regkey. + +The following fields are available: + +- **BlockHvciAutoenablement** True if auto-enablement was successfully blocked, false otherwise. +- **BlockRequested** Whether an autoenablement block was requested. +- **Scenario** Used to differentiate VBS and HVCI paths. + + ### Microsoft.Windows.Security.CodeIntegrity.HVCISysprep.Compatibility Fires when the compatibility check completes. Gives the results from the check. @@ -2596,6 +2631,18 @@ The following fields are available: - **Issues** If compatibility checks failed, provides bit indexed indicators of issues detected. Table located here: [Check results of HVCI default enablement](/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-hvci-enablement#check-results-of-hvci-default-enablement). +### Microsoft.Windows.Security.CodeIntegrity.HVCISysprep.Enabled + +Fires when auto-enablement is successful and HVCI is being enabled on the device. + +The following fields are available: + +- **Error** Error code if there was an issue during enablement +- **Scenario** Indicates whether enablement was for VBS vs HVCI +- **SuccessfullyEnabled** Indicates whether enablement was successful +- **Upgrade** Indicates whether the event was fired during upgrade (rather than clean install) + + ### Microsoft.Windows.Security.CodeIntegrity.HVCISysprep.HVCIActivity Fires at the beginning and end of the HVCI auto-enablement process in sysprep. @@ -3368,7 +3415,7 @@ The following fields are available: - **ClientID** Client ID being run. - **CoordinatorVersion** Coordinator version of DTU. - **CV** Correlation vector. -- **IsDeviceAADDomainJoined** Indicates whether the device is logged in to the AAD (Azure Active Directory) domain. +- **IsDeviceAADDomainJoined** Indicates whether the device is logged in to the Microsoft Entra domain. - **IsDeviceADDomainJoined** Indicates whether the device is logged in to the AD (Active Directory) domain. - **IsDeviceCloverTrail** Indicates whether the device has a Clover Trail system installed. - **IsDeviceFeatureUpdatingPaused** Indicates whether Feature Update is paused on the device. @@ -5756,6 +5803,44 @@ The following fields are available: - **totalRuns** Total number of running/evaluation from last time. +## Other events + +### Microsoft.Windows.Defender.Engine.Maps.Heartbeat + +Heartbeat is sent once a day to indicate Defender is running and functional. Event includes necessary information to understand health of Defender on the device. + +The following fields are available: + +- **AppVersion** Version of the Defender platform +- **CampRing** Camp ring used for monthly deployment +- **CfaMode** State of Controlled Folder Access +- **ConsumerAsrMode** State of Attack Surface Reduction +- **CountAsrRules** Number of Attack Surface Reduction rules in place +- **EngineRing** Engine ring used for monthly deployment +- **EngineVersion** Version of the AntiMalware Engine +- **HeartbeatType** Enum of the reason the heartbeat is collected +- **IsAsrAnyAudit** Flag to indicate if any Attack Surface Reduction rules are running in Audit mode +- **IsAsrAnyBlock** Flag to indicate if any Attack Surface Reduction rules are running in Block mode +- **IsBeta** Flag to indicate if the user has opted in for Beta updates for Defender +- **IsManaged** Flag to indicate if Defender is running in manage mode +- **IsPassiveMode** Flag to indicate if Defender is in Passive mode for ATP +- **IsSxsPassiveMode** Flag to indicate if Defender is in Passive mode for Limited periodic scanning +- **ProductGuid** Defender Product Guid (static for Defender) +- **PusMode** Mode for blocking potentially unwanted software +- **ShouldHashIds** Do we have ISO Compliance requirement to hash IDs for e5 +- **SignatureRing** Signature ring used for deployments +- **SigVersion** Version of signature VDMs + + +### Microsoft.Windows.SecureBootTelemetry.SecureBootEncodeUEFI + +Information about Secure Boot configuration including the PK, KEKs, DB and DBX files on the device. + +The following fields are available: + +- **SecureBootUEFIEncoding** Information about the PK, KEKs, DB and DBX files on the device. + + ## Privacy consent logging events ### Microsoft.Windows.Shell.PrivacyConsentLogging.PrivacyConsentCompleted @@ -6633,7 +6718,7 @@ The following fields are available: - **CachedEngineVersion** For self-initiated healing, the version of the SIH engine that is cached on the device. If the SIH engine does not exist, the value is null. - **CallerApplicationName** The name provided by the caller who initiated API calls into the software distribution client. - **CapabilityDetectoidGuid** The GUID for a hardware applicability detectoid that could not be evaluated. -- **CDNCountryCode** Two letter country abbreviation for the Content Distribution Network (CDN) location. +- **CDNCountryCode** Two letter country or region abbreviation for the Content Distribution Network (CDN) location. - **CDNId** The unique identifier of a specific device, used to identify how many devices are encountering success or a particular issue. - **ClientVersion** The version number of the software distribution client. - **CommonProps** A bitmask for future flags associated with the Windows Update client behavior. No data is currently reported in this field. Expected value for this field is 0. @@ -6757,7 +6842,7 @@ The following fields are available: - **CallerApplicationName** The name provided by the application that initiated API calls into the software distribution client. - **CbsDownloadMethod** Indicates whether the download was a full- or a partial-file download. - **CbsMethod** The method used for downloading the update content related to the Component Based Servicing (CBS) technology. -- **CDNCountryCode** Two letter country abbreviation for the Content Distribution Network (CDN) location. +- **CDNCountryCode** Two letter country or region abbreviation for the Content Distribution Network (CDN) location. - **CDNId** ID which defines which CDN the software distribution client downloaded the content from. - **ClientVersion** The version number of the software distribution client. - **CommonProps** A bitmask for future flags associated with the Windows Update client behavior. @@ -9667,10 +9752,10 @@ The following fields are available: - **CV** The correlation vector. - **GlobalEventCounter** Counts the events at the global level for telemetry. - **PackageVersion** The package version for currency tools. -- **UnifiedInstallerDeviceAADJoinedHresult** The result code after checking if device is AAD joined. +- **UnifiedInstallerDeviceAADJoinedHresult** The result code after checking if device is Microsoft Entra joined. - **UnifiedInstallerDeviceInDssPolicy** Boolean indicating whether the device is found to be in a DSS policy. - **UnifiedInstallerDeviceInDssPolicyHresult** The result code for checking whether the device is found to be in a DSS policy. -- **UnifiedInstallerDeviceIsAADJoined** Boolean indicating whether a device is AADJ. +- **UnifiedInstallerDeviceIsAADJoined** Boolean indicating whether a device is Microsoft Entra joined. - **UnifiedInstallerDeviceIsAdJoined** Boolean indicating whether a device is AD joined. - **UnifiedInstallerDeviceIsAdJoinedHresult** The result code for checking whether a device is AD joined. - **UnifiedInstallerDeviceIsEducationSku** Boolean indicating whether a device is Education SKU. @@ -9752,7 +9837,7 @@ The following fields are available: ### Microsoft.Windows.UpdateHealthTools.UpdateHealthToolsServiceBlockedByNoDSSJoin -This event is sent when the device is not joined to AAD. The data collected with this event is used to help keep Windows up to date and secure. +This event is sent when the device is not Microsoft Entra joined. The data collected with this event is used to help keep Windows up to date and secure. The following fields are available: diff --git a/windows/privacy/docfx.json b/windows/privacy/docfx.json index 44e5b9392e..35522da4b4 100644 --- a/windows/privacy/docfx.json +++ b/windows/privacy/docfx.json @@ -57,7 +57,10 @@ "jborsecnik", "tiburd", "garycentric", - "beccarobins" + "beccarobins", + "Stacyrch140", + "v-stsavell", + "American-Dipper" ] }, "searchScope": ["Windows 10"] diff --git a/windows/privacy/manage-connections-from-windows-operating-system-components-to-microsoft-services.md b/windows/privacy/manage-connections-from-windows-operating-system-components-to-microsoft-services.md index 9407853770..c487f33918 100644 --- a/windows/privacy/manage-connections-from-windows-operating-system-components-to-microsoft-services.md +++ b/windows/privacy/manage-connections-from-windows-operating-system-components-to-microsoft-services.md @@ -1933,7 +1933,7 @@ To turn off these recommendations, you can use any of the following methods: - In Group Policy, set the "Remove Recommended from Start Menu" policy to Enabled under **User Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Start Menu and Taskbar**. - In an MDM solution, such as Microsoft Intune, you can use the [HideRecentJumplists](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-start#hiderecentjumplists) setting in the Start Policy configuration service provider (CSP). - In the registry, you can set **HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced\Start_TrackDocs** to 0. -- In the UI, you can turn off **Show recommendations for tips, shortcuts, new apps, and more** under **Settings** > **Personalization** > **Start**. +- In the UI, you can turn off **Show recently opened items in Start, Jump Lists, and File Explorer** under **Settings** > **Personalization** > **Start**. ### Allowed traffic list for Windows Restricted Traffic Limited Functionality Baseline diff --git a/windows/privacy/manage-windows-11-endpoints.md b/windows/privacy/manage-windows-11-endpoints.md index ae9fabcf1a..79bba0d70f 100644 --- a/windows/privacy/manage-windows-11-endpoints.md +++ b/windows/privacy/manage-windows-11-endpoints.md @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ ms.localizationpriority: high author: DHB-MSFT ms.author: danbrown manager: laurawi -ms.date: 06/23/2023 +ms.date: 10/06/2023 ms.topic: reference --- @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ The following methodology was used to derive these network endpoints: 2. Leave the device(s) running idle for a week ("idle" means a user isn't interacting with the system/device). 3. Use globally accepted network protocol analyzer/capturing tools and log all background egress traffic. 4. Compile reports on traffic going to public IP addresses. -5. The test virtual machine(s) was logged into using a local account, and wasn't joined to a domain or Azure Active Directory. +5. The test virtual machine(s) was logged into using a local account, and wasn't joined to a domain or Microsoft Entra ID. 6. All traffic was captured in our lab using an IPV4 network. Therefore, no IPV6 traffic is reported here. 7. These tests were conducted in an approved Microsoft lab. It's possible your results may be different. 8. These tests were conducted for one week, but if you capture traffic for longer you may have different results. @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ To view endpoints for non-Enterprise Windows 11 editions, see [Windows 11 connec ||The following endpoint is used by the Photos app to download configuration files, and to connect to the Office 365 portal's shared infrastructure, including Office in a browser. To turn off traffic for this endpoint, either uninstall the Photos app or disable the Microsoft Store. If you disable the Microsoft store, other Store apps can't be installed or updated. Additionally, the Microsoft Store won't be able to revoke malicious Store apps and users will still be able to open them.|TLSv1.2/HTTPS|evoke-windowsservices-tas.msedge.net| |Certificates|||[Learn how to turn off traffic to all of the following endpoint(s) for certificates.](manage-connections-from-windows-operating-system-components-to-microsoft-services.md#automatic-root-certificates-update)| ||Certificates are digital files, stored on client devices, used to both encrypt data and verify the identity of an individual or organization. Trusted root certificates issued by a certification authority (CA) are stored in a certificate trust list (CTL). The Automatic Root Certificates Update mechanism contacts Windows Updates to update the CTL. If a new version of the CTL is identified, the list of trusted root certificates cached on the local device will be updated. Untrusted certificates are certificates where the server certificate issuer is unknown or isn't trusted by the service. Untrusted certificates are also stored in a list on the local device and updated by the Automatic Root Certificates Update mechanism.Not configured: Device doesn't provision Windows Hello for Business for any user.
Enabled: Device provisions Windows Hello for Business using keys or certificates for all users.
Disabled: Device doesn't provision Windows Hello for Business for any user.| -|Use a hardware security device|Computer|
Not configured: Windows Hello for Business will be provisioned using TPM if available, and will be provisioned using software if TPM isn't available.
Enabled: Windows Hello for Business will only be provisioned using TPM. This feature will provision Windows Hello for Business using TPM 1.2 unless the option to exclude them is explicitly set.
Disabled: Windows Hello for Business will be provisioned using TPM if available, and will be provisioned using software if TPM isn't available.| -|Use certificate for on-premises authentication|Computer or user|
Not configured: Windows Hello for Business enrolls a key that is used for on-premises authentication.
Enabled: Windows Hello for Business enrolls a sign-in certificate using ADFS that is used for on-premises authentication.
Disabled: Windows Hello for Business enrolls a key that is used for on-premises authentication.| -|Use PIN recovery|Computer|
Added in Windows 10, version 1703
Not configured: Windows Hello for Business doesn't create or store a PIN recovery secret. PIN reset doesn't use the Azure-based PIN recovery service
Enabled: Windows Hello for Business uses the Azure-based PIN recovery service for PIN reset
Disabled: Windows Hello for Business doesn't create or store a PIN recovery secret. PIN reset doesn't use the Azure-based PIN recovery service.
For more information about using the PIN recovery service for PIN reset see [Windows Hello for Business PIN Reset](hello-feature-pin-reset.md).| -|Use biometrics|Computer|
Not configured: Biometrics can be used as a gesture in place of a PIN
Enabled: Biometrics can be used as a gesture in place of a PIN.
Disabled: Only a PIN can be used as a gesture.|
+|Use Windows Hello for Business|Computer or user|- **Not configured**: Device doesn't provision Windows Hello for Business for any user.
- **Enabled**: Device provisions Windows Hello for Business using keys or certificates for all users.
- **Disabled**: Device doesn't provision Windows Hello for Business for any user.|
+|Use a hardware security device|Computer|- **Not configured**: Windows Hello for Business will be provisioned using TPM if available, and will be provisioned using software if TPM isn't available.
- **Enabled**: Windows Hello for Business will only be provisioned using TPM. This feature will provision Windows Hello for Business using TPM 1.2 unless the option to exclude them is explicitly set.
- **Disabled**: Windows Hello for Business will be provisioned using TPM if available, and will be provisioned using software if TPM isn't available.|
+|Use certificate for on-premises authentication|Computer or user|- **Not configured**: Windows Hello for Business enrolls a key that is used for on-premises authentication.
- **Enabled**: Windows Hello for Business enrolls a sign-in certificate using ADFS that is used for on-premises authentication.
- **Disabled**: Windows Hello for Business enrolls a key that is used for on-premises authentication.|
+|Use PIN recovery|Computer|- Added in Windows 10, version 1703
- **Not configured**: Windows Hello for Business doesn't create or store a PIN recovery secret. PIN reset doesn't use the Azure-based PIN recovery service
- **Enabled**: Windows Hello for Business uses the Azure-based PIN recovery service for PIN reset
- **Disabled**: Windows Hello for Business doesn't create or store a PIN recovery secret. PIN reset doesn't use the Azure-based PIN recovery service.
- For more information about using the PIN recovery service for PIN reset see [Windows Hello for Business PIN Reset](hello-feature-pin-reset.md).|
+|Use biometrics|Computer|- **Not configured**: Biometrics can be used as a gesture in place of a PIN
- **Enabled**: Biometrics can be used as a gesture in place of a PIN.
- **Disabled**: Only a PIN can be used as a gesture.|
### PIN Complexity
|Policy|Scope|Options|
|--- |--- |--- |
-|Require digits|Computer|
Not configured: Users must include a digit in their PIN.
Enabled: Users must include a digit in their PIN.
Disabled: Users can't use digits in their PIN.| -|Require lowercase letters|Computer|
Not configured: Users can't use lowercase letters in their PIN
Enabled: Users must include at least one lowercase letter in their PIN.
Disabled: Users can't use lowercase letters in their PIN.| -|Maximum PIN length|Computer|
Not configured: PIN length must be less than or equal to 127.
Enabled: PIN length must be less than or equal to the number you specify.
Disabled: PIN length must be less than or equal to 127.| -|Minimum PIN length|Computer|
Not configured: PIN length must be greater than or equal to 4.
Enabled: PIN length must be greater than or equal to the number you specify.
Disabled: PIN length must be greater than or equal to 4.| -|Expiration|Computer|
Not configured: PIN doesn't expire.
Enabled: PIN can be set to expire after any number of days between 1 and 730, or PIN can be set to never expire by setting policy to 0.
Disabled: PIN doesn't expire.| -|History|Computer|
Not configured: Previous PINs aren't stored.
Enabled: Specify the number of previous PINs that can be associated to a user account that can't be reused.
Disabled: Previous PINs aren't stored.
Not configured: Windows allows, but doesn't require, special characters in the PIN.
Enabled: Windows requires the user to include at least one special character in their PIN.
Disabled: Windows doesn't allow the user to include special characters in their PIN.| -|Require uppercase letters|Computer|
Not configured: Users can't include an uppercase letter in their PIN.
Enabled: Users must include at least one uppercase letter in their PIN.
Disabled: Users can't include an uppercase letter in their PIN.|
+|Require digits|Computer|- **Not configured**: Users must include a digit in their PIN.
- **Enabled**: Users must include a digit in their PIN.
- **Disabled**: Users can't use digits in their PIN.|
+|Require lowercase letters|Computer|- **Not configured**: Users can't use lowercase letters in their PIN
- **Enabled**: Users must include at least one lowercase letter in their PIN.
- **Disabled**: Users can't use lowercase letters in their PIN.|
+|Maximum PIN length|Computer|- **Not configured**: PIN length must be less than or equal to 127.
- **Enabled**: PIN length must be less than or equal to the number you specify.
- **Disabled**: PIN length must be less than or equal to 127.|
+|Minimum PIN length|Computer|- **Not configured**: PIN length must be greater than or equal to 4.
- **Enabled**: PIN length must be greater than or equal to the number you specify.
- **Disabled**: PIN length must be greater than or equal to 4.|
+|Expiration|Computer|- **Not configured**: PIN doesn't expire.
- **Enabled**: PIN can be set to expire after any number of days between 1 and 730, or PIN can be set to never expire by setting policy to 0.
- **Disabled**: PIN doesn't expire.|
+|History|Computer|- **Not configured**: Previous PINs aren't stored.
- **Enabled**: Specify the number of previous PINs that can be associated to a user account that can't be reused.
- **Disabled**: Previous PINs aren't stored.
**Note** Current PIN is included in PIN history.
+|Require special characters|Computer|- **Not configured**: Windows allows, but doesn't require, special characters in the PIN.
- **Enabled**: Windows requires the user to include at least one special character in their PIN.
- **Disabled**: Windows doesn't allow the user to include special characters in their PIN.|
+|Require uppercase letters|Computer|- **Not configured**: Users can't include an uppercase letter in their PIN.
- **Enabled**: Users must include at least one uppercase letter in their PIN.
- **Disabled**: Users can't include an uppercase letter in their PIN.|
### Phone Sign-in
@@ -56,34 +56,34 @@ The following table lists the Group Policy settings that you can configure for W
The following table lists the MDM policy settings that you can configure for Windows Hello for Business use in your workplace. These MDM policy settings use the [PassportForWork configuration service provider (CSP)](/windows/client-management/mdm/passportforwork-csp).
>[!IMPORTANT]
->Starting in Windows 10, version 1607, all devices only have one PIN associated with Windows Hello for Business. This means that any PIN on a device will be subject to the policies specified in the PassportForWork CSP. The values specified take precedence over any complexity rules set via Exchange ActiveSync (EAS) or the DeviceLock CSP.
+>All devices only have one PIN associated with Windows Hello for Business. This means that any PIN on a device will be subject to the policies specified in the PassportForWork CSP. The values specified take precedence over any complexity rules set via Exchange ActiveSync (EAS) or the DeviceLock CSP.
|Policy|Scope|Default|Options|
|--- |--- |--- |--- |
-|UsePassportForWork|Device or user|True|
True: Windows Hello for Business will be provisioned for all users on the device.
False: Users won't be able to provision Windows Hello for Business.
True: Windows Hello for Business will only be provisioned using TPM.
False: Windows Hello for Business will be provisioned using TPM if available, and will be provisioned using software if TPM isn't available.| -|ExcludeSecurityDevice
TPM12|Device|False|Added in Windows 10, version 1703
True: TPM revision 1.2 modules will be disallowed from being used with Windows Hello for Business.
False: TPM revision 1.2 modules will be allowed to be used with Windows Hello for Business.| -|EnablePinRecovery|Device or use|False|
Added in Windows 10, version 1703
True: Windows Hello for Business uses the Azure-based PIN recovery service for PIN reset.
False: Windows Hello for Business doesn't create or store a PIN recovery secret. PIN reset doesn't use the Azure-based PIN recovery service. For more information about using the PIN recovery service for PIN reset see [Windows Hello for Business PIN Reset](hello-feature-pin-reset.md).|
+|UsePassportForWork|Device or user|True|- True: Windows Hello for Business will be provisioned for all users on the device.
- False: Users won't be able to provision Windows Hello for Business.
**Note:** If Windows Hello for Business is enabled, and then the policy is changed to False, users who previously set up Windows Hello for Business can continue to use it, but won't be able to set up Windows Hello for Business on other devices|
+|RequireSecurityDevice|Device or user|False|- True: Windows Hello for Business will only be provisioned using TPM.
- False: Windows Hello for Business will be provisioned using TPM if available, and will be provisioned using software if TPM isn't available.|
+|ExcludeSecurityDevice
- TPM12|Device|False|Added in Windows 10, version 1703
- True: TPM revision 1.2 modules will be disallowed from being used with Windows Hello for Business.
- False: TPM revision 1.2 modules will be allowed to be used with Windows Hello for Business.|
+|EnablePinRecovery|Device or use|False|- Added in Windows 10, version 1703
- True: Windows Hello for Business uses the Azure-based PIN recovery service for PIN reset.
- False: Windows Hello for Business doesn't create or store a PIN recovery secret. PIN reset doesn't use the Azure-based PIN recovery service. For more information about using the PIN recovery service for PIN reset see [Windows Hello for Business PIN Reset](hello-feature-pin-reset.md).|
### Biometrics
|Policy|Scope|Default|Options|
|--- |--- |--- |--- |
-|UseBiometrics|Device |False|
True: Biometrics can be used as a gesture in place of a PIN for domain sign-in.
False: Only a PIN can be used as a gesture for domain sign-in.| -|
FacialFeaturesUser
EnhancedAntiSpoofing|Device|Not configured|
Not configured: users can choose whether to turn on enhanced anti-spoofing.
True: Enhanced anti-spoofing is required on devices which support it.
False: Users can't turn on enhanced anti-spoofing.|
+|UseBiometrics|Device |False|- True: Biometrics can be used as a gesture in place of a PIN for domain sign-in.
- False: Only a PIN can be used as a gesture for domain sign-in.|
+|- FacialFeaturesUser
- EnhancedAntiSpoofing|Device|Not configured|- Not configured: users can choose whether to turn on enhanced anti-spoofing.
- True: Enhanced anti-spoofing is required on devices which support it.
- False: Users can't turn on enhanced anti-spoofing.|
### PINComplexity
|Policy|Scope|Default|Options|
|--- |--- |--- |--- |
-|Digits |Device or user|1 |
0: Digits are allowed.
1: At least one digit is required.
2: Digits aren't allowed.| -|Lowercase letters |Device or user|2|
0: Lowercase letters are allowed.
1: At least one lowercase letter is required.
2: Lowercase letters aren't allowed.| -|Special characters|Device or user|2|
0: Special characters are allowed.
1: At least one special character is required.
2: Special characters aren't allowed.| -|Uppercase letters|Device or user|2|
0: Uppercase letters are allowed.
1: At least one uppercase letter is required.
2: Uppercase letters aren't allowed.| -|Maximum PIN length |Device or user|127 |
Maximum length that can be set is 127. Maximum length can't be less than minimum setting.| -|Minimum PIN length|Device or user|6|
Minimum length that can be set is 6. Minimum length can't be greater than maximum setting.| -|Expiration |Device or user|0|
Integer value specifies the period of time (in days) that a PIN can be used before the system requires the user to change it. The largest number you can configure for this policy setting is 730. The lowest number you can configure for this policy setting is 0. If this policy is set to 0, then the user's PIN will never expire.| -|History|Device or user|0|
Integer value that specifies the number of past PINs that can be associated to a user account that can't be reused. The largest number you can configure for this policy setting is 50. The lowest number you can configure for this policy setting is 0. If this policy is set to 0, then storage of previous PINs isn't required.|
+|Digits |Device or user|1 |- 0: Digits are allowed.
- 1: At least one digit is required.
- 2: Digits aren't allowed.|
+|Lowercase letters |Device or user|2|- 0: Lowercase letters are allowed.
- 1: At least one lowercase letter is required.
- 2: Lowercase letters aren't allowed.|
+|Special characters|Device or user|2|- 0: Special characters are allowed.
- 1: At least one special character is required.
- 2: Special characters aren't allowed.|
+|Uppercase letters|Device or user|2|- 0: Uppercase letters are allowed.
- 1: At least one uppercase letter is required.
- 2: Uppercase letters aren't allowed.|
+|Maximum PIN length |Device or user|127 |- Maximum length that can be set is 127. Maximum length can't be less than minimum setting.|
+|Minimum PIN length|Device or user|6|- Minimum length that can be set is 6. Minimum length can't be greater than maximum setting.|
+|Expiration |Device or user|0|- Integer value specifies the period of time (in days) that a PIN can be used before the system requires the user to change it. The largest number you can configure for this policy setting is 730. The lowest number you can configure for this policy setting is 0. If this policy is set to 0, then the user's PIN will never expire.|
+|History|Device or user|0|- Integer value that specifies the number of past PINs that can be associated to a user account that can't be reused. The largest number you can configure for this policy setting is 50. The lowest number you can configure for this policy setting is 0. If this policy is set to 0, then storage of previous PINs isn't required.|
### Remote
@@ -92,42 +92,15 @@ The following table lists the MDM policy settings that you can configure for Win
|UseRemotePassport|Device or user|False|Not currently supported.|
>[!NOTE]
-> In Windows 10, version 1709 and later, if policy is not configured to explicitly require letters or special characters, users can optionally set an alphanumeric PIN. Prior to version 1709 the user is required to set a numeric PIN.
+> If a policy isn't explicitly configured to require letters or special characters, users can optionally set an alphanumeric PIN.
## Policy conflicts from multiple policy sources
-Windows Hello for Business is designed to be managed by Group Policy or MDM but not a combination of both. If policies are set from both sources it can result in a mixed result of what is actually enforced for a user or device.
+Windows Hello for Business is designed to be managed by group policy or MDM, but not a combination of both. Avoid mixing group policy and MDM policy settings for Windows Hello for Business. If you mix group policy and MDM policy settings, the MDM settings are ignored until all group policy settings are cleared.
-Policies for Windows Hello for Business are enforced using the following hierarchy: User Group Policy > Computer Group Policy > User MDM > Device MDM > Device Lock policy.
+> [!IMPORTANT]
+> The [*MDMWinsOverGP*](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-controlpolicyconflict#mdmwinsovergp) policy setting doesn't apply to Windows Hello for Business. MDMWinsOverGP only applies to policies in the *Policy CSP*, while the Windows Hello for Business policies are in the *PassportForWork CSP*.
-Feature enablement policy and certificate trust policy are grouped together and enforced from the same source (either GP or MDM), based on the rule above. The Use Passport for Work policy is used to determine the winning policy source.
+## Policy precedence
-All PIN complexity policies are grouped separately from feature enablement and are enforced from a single policy source. Use a hardware security device and RequireSecurityDevice enforcement are also grouped together with PIN complexity policy. Conflict resolution for other Windows Hello for Business policies are enforced on a per policy basis.
-
->[!NOTE]
-> Windows Hello for Business policy conflict resolution logic does not respect the ControlPolicyConflict/MDMWinsOverGP policy in the Policy CSP.
->
->Examples
->
->The following are configured using computer Group Policy:
->
->- Use Windows Hello for Business - Enabled
->- User certificate for on-premises authentication - Enabled
->
->The following are configured using device MDM Policy:
->
->- UsePassportForWork - Disabled
->- UseCertificateForOnPremAuth - Disabled
->- MinimumPINLength - 8
->- Digits - 1
->- LowercaseLetters - 1
->- SpecialCharacters - 1
->
->Enforced policy set:
->
->- Use Windows Hello for Business - Enabled
->- Use certificate for on-premises authentication - Enabled
->- MinimumPINLength - 8
->- Digits - 1
->- LowercaseLetters - 1
->- SpecialCharacters - 1
\ No newline at end of file
+Windows Hello for Business *user policies* take precedence over *computer policies*. If a user policy is set, the corresponded computer policy is ignored. If a user policy is not set, the computer policy is used.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-planning-guide.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-planning-guide.md
index 8375e0ebd3..e12ac5c2e7 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-planning-guide.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-planning-guide.md
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ ms.topic: overview
---
# Planning a Windows Hello for Business Deployment
-Congratulations! You are taking the first step forward in helping move your organizations away from password to a two-factor, convenience authentication for Windows — Windows Hello for Business. This planning guide helps you understand the different topologies, architectures, and components that encompass a Windows Hello for Business infrastructure.
+Congratulations! You're taking the first step forward in helping move your organizations away from password to a two-factor, convenience authentication for Windows — Windows Hello for Business. This planning guide helps you understand the different topologies, architectures, and components that encompass a Windows Hello for Business infrastructure.
This guide explains the role of each component within Windows Hello for Business and how certain deployment decisions affect other aspects of the infrastructure. Armed with your planning worksheet, you'll use that information to select the correct deployment guide for your needs.
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ This guide explains the role of each component within Windows Hello for Business
## Using this guide
-There are many options from which you can choose when deploying Windows Hello for Business. Providing multiple options ensures nearly every organization can deploy Windows Hello for Business. Providing many options makes the deployment appear complex, however, most organization will realize they've already implemented most of the infrastructure on which the Windows Hello for Business deployment depends. It is important to understand that Windows Hello for Business is a distributed system and does take proper planning across multiple teams within an organization.
+There are many options from which you can choose when deploying Windows Hello for Business. Providing multiple options ensures nearly every organization can deploy Windows Hello for Business. Providing many options makes the deployment appear complex, however, most organization will realize they've already implemented most of the infrastructure on which the Windows Hello for Business deployment depends. It's important to understand that Windows Hello for Business is a distributed system and does take proper planning across multiple teams within an organization.
This guide removes the appearance of complexity by helping you make decisions on each aspect of your Windows Hello for Business deployment and the options you'll need to consider. Using this guide also identifies the information needed to help you make decisions about the deployment that best suits your environment. Download the [Windows Hello for Business planning worksheet](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=852514) from the Microsoft Download Center to help track your progress and make your planning easier.
@@ -52,9 +52,9 @@ The cloud only deployment model is for organizations who only have cloud identit
The hybrid deployment model is for organizations that:
-- Are federated with Azure Active Directory
-- Have identities synchronized to Azure Active Directory using Azure Active Directory Connect
-- Use applications hosted in Azure Active Directory, and want a single sign-in user experience for both on-premises and Azure Active Directory resources
+- Are federated with Microsoft Entra ID
+- Have identities synchronized to Microsoft Entra ID using Microsoft Entra Connect
+- Use applications hosted in Microsoft Entra ID, and want a single sign-in user experience for both on-premises and Microsoft Entra resources
> [!Important]
> Hybrid deployments support non-destructive PIN reset that works with both the certificate trust and key trust models.
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ The hybrid deployment model is for organizations that:
> - Reset above lock screen (_I forgot my PIN_ link) - Windows 10, version 1903
##### On-premises
-The on-premises deployment model is for organizations that do not have cloud identities or use applications hosted in Azure Active Directory.
+The on-premises deployment model is for organizations that do not have cloud identities or use applications hosted in Microsoft Entra ID.
> [!Important]
> On-premises deployments support destructive PIN reset that works with both the certificate trust and the key trust models.
@@ -81,9 +81,9 @@ It's fundamentally important to understand which deployment model to use for a s
A deployment's trust type defines how each Windows Hello for Business client authenticates to the on-premises Active Directory. There are two trust types: key trust and certificate trust.
> [!NOTE]
-> Windows Hello for Business introduced a new trust model called cloud Kerberos trust, in early 2022. This model enables deployment of Windows Hello for Business using the infrastructure introduced for supporting [security key sign-in on Hybrid Azure AD-joined devices and on-premises resource access on Azure AD Joined devices](/azure/active-directory/authentication/howto-authentication-passwordless-security-key-on-premises). For more information, see [Hybrid Cloud Kerberos Trust Deployment](hello-hybrid-cloud-kerberos-trust.md).
+> Windows Hello for Business introduced a new trust model called cloud Kerberos trust, in early 2022. This model enables deployment of Windows Hello for Business using the infrastructure introduced for supporting [security key sign-in on Microsoft Entra hybrid joined devices and on-premises resource access on Microsoft Entra joined devices](/azure/active-directory/authentication/howto-authentication-passwordless-security-key-on-premises). For more information, see [Hybrid Cloud Kerberos Trust Deployment](hello-hybrid-cloud-kerberos-trust.md).
-The key trust type does not require issuing authentication certificates to end users. Users authenticate using a hardware-bound key created during the built-in provisioning experience. This requires an adequate distribution of Windows Server 2016 or later domain controllers relative to your existing authentication and the number of users included in your Windows Hello for Business deployment. Read the [Planning an adequate number of Windows Server 2016 or later Domain Controllers for Windows Hello for Business deployments](hello-adequate-domain-controllers.md) to learn more.
+The key trust type doesn't require issuing authentication certificates to end users. Users authenticate using a hardware-bound key created during the built-in provisioning experience. This requires an adequate distribution of Windows Server 2016 or later domain controllers relative to your existing authentication and the number of users included in your Windows Hello for Business deployment. Read the [Planning an adequate number of Windows Server 2016 or later Domain Controllers for Windows Hello for Business deployments](hello-adequate-domain-controllers.md) to learn more.
The certificate trust type issues authentication certificates to end users. Users authenticate using a certificate requested using a hardware-bound key created during the built-in provisioning experience. Unlike key trust, certificate trust does not require Windows Server 2016 domain controllers (but still requires [Windows Server 2016 or later Active Directory schema](/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-trust#directories)). Users can use their certificate to authenticate to any Windows Server 2008 R2, or later, domain controller.
@@ -92,33 +92,33 @@ The certificate trust type issues authentication certificates to end users. Use
#### Device registration
-All devices included in the Windows Hello for Business deployment must go through device registration. Device registration enables devices to authenticate to identity providers. For cloud only and hybrid deployment, the identity provider is Azure Active Directory. For on-premises deployments, the identity provider is the on-premises server running the Windows Server 2016 Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) role.
+All devices included in the Windows Hello for Business deployment must go through device registration. Device registration enables devices to authenticate to identity providers. For cloud only and hybrid deployment, the identity provider is Microsoft Entra ID. For on-premises deployments, the identity provider is the on-premises server running the Windows Server 2016 Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) role.
#### Key registration
-The built-in Windows Hello for Business provisioning experience creates a hardware bound asymmetric key pair as their user's credentials. The private key is protected by the device's security modules; however, the credential is a user key (not a device key). The provisioning experience registers the user's public key with the identity provider. For cloud only and hybrid deployments, the identity provider is Azure Active Directory. For on-premises deployments, the identity provider is the on-premises server running Windows Server 2016 Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) role.
+The built-in Windows Hello for Business provisioning experience creates a hardware bound asymmetric key pair as their user's credentials. The private key is protected by the device's security modules; however, the credential is a user key (not a device key). The provisioning experience registers the user's public key with the identity provider. For cloud only and hybrid deployments, the identity provider is Microsoft Entra ID. For on-premises deployments, the identity provider is the on-premises server running Windows Server 2016 Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) role.
#### Multifactor authentication
> [!IMPORTANT]
-> As of July 1, 2019, Microsoft will no longer offer MFA Server for new deployments. New customers who require multi-factor authentication for their users should use cloud-based Azure AD Multi-Factor Authentication. Existing customers who have activated MFA Server prior to July 1, 2019 will be able to download the latest version, future updates and generate activation credentials as usual. See [Getting started with the Azure AD Multi-Factor Authentication Server](/azure/active-directory/authentication/howto-mfaserver-deploy) for more details.
+> As of July 1, 2019, Microsoft will no longer offer MFA Server for new deployments. New customers who require multifactor authentication for their users should use cloud-based Microsoft Entra multifactor authentication. Existing customers who have activated MFA Server prior to July 1, 2019 will be able to download the latest version, future updates and generate activation credentials as usual. See [Getting started with the Azure Multi-Factor Authentication Server](/azure/active-directory/authentication/howto-mfaserver-deploy) for more details.
-The goal of Windows Hello for Business is to move organizations away from passwords by providing them a strong credential that provides easy two-factor authentication. The built-in provisioning experience accepts the user's weak credentials (username and password) as the first factor authentication; however, the user must provide a second factor of authentication before Windows provisions a strong credential.
+The goal of Windows Hello for Business is to move organizations away from passwords by providing them a with strong credential that provides easy two-factor authentication. The built-in provisioning experience accepts the user's weak credentials (username and password) as the first factor authentication; however, the user must provide a second factor of authentication before Windows provisions a strong credential.
-Cloud only and hybrid deployments provide many choices for multi-factor authentication. On-premises deployments must use a multi-factor authentication that provides an AD FS multi-factor adapter to be used in conjunction with the on-premises Windows Server 2016 AD FS server role. Organizations can use the on-premises Azure AD Multi-Factor Authentication server, or choose from several third parties (Read [Microsoft and third-party additional authentication methods](/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/operations/configure-additional-authentication-methods-for-ad-fs#microsoft-and-third-party-additional-authentication-methods) for more information).
+Cloud only and hybrid deployments provide many choices for multifactor authentication. On-premises deployments must use a multifactor authentication that provides an AD FS multifactor adapter to be used in conjunction with the on-premises Windows Server 2016 AD FS server role. Organizations can use the on-premises Azure Multi-Factor Authentication Server, or choose from several third parties (Read [Microsoft and third-party additional authentication methods](/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/operations/configure-additional-authentication-methods-for-ad-fs#microsoft-and-third-party-additional-authentication-methods) for more information).
> [!NOTE]
-> Azure AD Multi-Factor Authentication is available through:
+> Microsoft Entra multifactor authentication is available through:
> * Microsoft Enterprise Agreement
> * Open Volume License Program
> * Cloud Solution Providers program
> * Bundled with
-> * Azure Active Directory Premium
+> * Microsoft Entra ID P1 or P2
> * Enterprise Mobility Suite
> * Enterprise Cloud Suite
#### Directory synchronization
-Hybrid and on-premises deployments use directory synchronization, however, each for a different purpose. Hybrid deployments use Azure Active Directory Connect to synchronize Active Directory identities or credentials between itself and Azure Active Directory. This helps enable single sign-on to Azure Active Directory and its federated components. On-premises deployments use directory synchronization to import users from Active Directory to the Azure MFA Server, which sends data to the Azure MFA cloud service to perform the verification.
+Hybrid and on-premises deployments use directory synchronization, however, each for a different purpose. Hybrid deployments use Microsoft Entra Connect to synchronize Active Directory identities or credentials between itself and Microsoft Entra ID. This helps enable single sign-on to Microsoft Entra ID and its federated components. On-premises deployments use directory synchronization to import users from Active Directory to the Azure MFA Server, which sends data to the Azure MFA cloud service to perform the verification.
### Management
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ Modern management is an emerging device management paradigm that leverages the c
Windows Hello for Business is an exclusive Windows 10 and Windows 11 feature. As part of the Windows as a Service strategy, Microsoft has improved the deployment, management, and user experience with each new release of Windows and introduced support for new scenarios.
-Most deployment scenarios require a minimum of Windows 10, version 1511, also known as the November Update. The client requirement may change based on different components in your existing infrastructure, or other infrastructure choices made later in planning your deployment. Those components and choices may require a minimum client running Windows 10, version 1703, also known as the Creators Update.
+Most deployment scenarios require a minimum of Windows 10, version 1511, also known as the November Update. The client requirement might change based on different components in your existing infrastructure, or other infrastructure choices made later in planning your deployment. Those components and choices might require a minimum client running Windows 10, version 1703, also known as the Creators Update.
### Active Directory
@@ -145,11 +145,11 @@ Hybrid and on-premises deployments include Active Directory as part of their inf
### Public Key Infrastructure
-The Windows Hello for Business deployment depends on an enterprise public key infrastructure as a trust anchor for authentication. Domain controllers for hybrid and on-premises deployments need a certificate in order for Windows devices to trust the domain controller as legitimate. Deployments using the certificate trust type need an enterprise public key infrastructure and a certificate registration authority to issue authentication certificates to users. Hybrid deployments may need to issue VPN certificates to users to enable connectivity on-premises resources.
+The Windows Hello for Business deployment depends on an enterprise public key infrastructure as a trust anchor for authentication. Domain controllers for hybrid and on-premises deployments need a certificate in order for Windows devices to trust the domain controller as legitimate. Deployments using the certificate trust type need an enterprise public key infrastructure and a certificate registration authority to issue authentication certificates to users. Hybrid deployments might need to issue VPN certificates to users to enable connectivity on-premises resources.
### Cloud
-Some deployment combinations require an Azure account, and some require Azure Active Directory for user identities. These cloud requirements may only need an Azure account while other features need an Azure Active Directory Premium subscription. The planning process identifies and differentiates the components that are needed from those that are optional.
+Some deployment combinations require an Azure account, and some require Microsoft Entra ID for user identities. These cloud requirements may only need an Azure account while other features need a Microsoft Entra ID P1 or P2 subscription. The planning process identifies and differentiates the components that are needed from those that are optional.
## Planning a Deployment
@@ -173,13 +173,13 @@ If your organization does not have cloud resources, write **On-Premises** in box
### Trust type
-Hybrid Azure AD-joined devices managed by Group Policy need the Windows Server 2016 AD FS role to issue certificates. Hybrid Azure AD-joined devices and Azure AD-joined devices managed by Intune or a compatible MDM need the Windows Server NDES server role to issue certificates.
+Microsoft Entra hybrid joined devices managed by Group Policy need the Windows Server 2016 AD FS role to issue certificates. Microsoft Entra hybrid joined devices and Microsoft Entra joined devices managed by Intune or a compatible MDM need the Windows Server NDES server role to issue certificates.
Choose a trust type that is best suited for your organizations. Remember, the trust type determines two things. Whether you issue authentication certificates to your users and if your deployment needs Windows Server 2016 domain controllers.
One trust model is not more secure than the other. The major difference is based on the organization comfort with deploying Windows Server 2016 domain controllers and not enrolling users with end entity certificates (key-trust) against using existing domain controllers and needing to enroll certificates for all their users (certificate trust).
-Because the certificate trust types issues certificates, there is more configuration and infrastructure needed to accommodate user certificate enrollment, which could also be a factor to consider in your decision. Additional infrastructure needed for certificate-trust deployments includes a certificate registration authority. In a federated environment, you need to activate the Device Writeback option in Azure AD Connect.
+Because the certificate trust types issues certificates, there is more configuration and infrastructure needed to accommodate user certificate enrollment, which could also be a factor to consider in your decision. Additional infrastructure needed for certificate-trust deployments includes a certificate registration authority. In a federated environment, you need to activate the Device Writeback option in Microsoft Entra Connect.
If your organization wants to use the key trust type, write **key trust** in box **1b** on your planning worksheet. Write **Windows Server 2016** in box **4d**. Write **N/A** in box **5b**.
@@ -203,17 +203,17 @@ If box **1a** on your planning worksheet reads **on-premises**, write **AD FS**
### Directory Synchronization
-Windows Hello for Business is strong user authentication, which usually means there is an identity (a user or username) and a credential (typically a key pair). Some operations require writing or reading user data to or from the directory. For example, reading the user's phone number to perform multi-factor authentication during provisioning or writing the user's public key.
+Windows Hello for Business is strong user authentication, which usually means there is an identity (a user or username) and a credential (typically a key pair). Some operations require writing or reading user data to or from the directory. For example, reading the user's phone number to perform multifactor authentication during provisioning or writing the user's public key.
-If box **1a** on your planning worksheet reads **cloud only**, write **N/A** in box **1e**. User information is written directly to Azure Active Directory and there is not another directory with which the information must be synchronized.
+If box **1a** on your planning worksheet reads **cloud only**, write **N/A** in box **1e**. User information is written directly to Microsoft Entra ID and there is not another directory with which the information must be synchronized.
-If box **1a** on your planning worksheet reads **hybrid**, then write **Azure AD Connect** in box **1e** on your planning worksheet.
+If box **1a** on your planning worksheet reads **hybrid**, then write **Microsoft Entra Connect** in box **1e** on your planning worksheet.
-If box **1a** on your planning worksheet reads **on-premises**, then write **Azure MFA Server**. This deployment exclusively uses Active Directory for user information with the exception of the multi-factor authentication. The on-premises Azure MFA server synchronizes a subset of the user information, such as phone number, to provide multi-factor authentication while the user's credentials remain on the on-premises network.
+If box **1a** on your planning worksheet reads **on-premises**, then write **Azure MFA Server**. This deployment exclusively uses Active Directory for user information with the exception of the multifactor authentication. The on-premises Azure MFA server synchronizes a subset of the user information, such as phone number, to provide multifactor authentication while the user's credentials remain on the on-premises network.
-### Multifactor Authentication
+### Multifactor authentication
-The goal of Windows Hello for Business is to move user authentication away from passwords to a strong, key-based user authentication. Passwords are weak credentials and cannot be trusted by themselves as an attacker with a stolen password could be attempting to enroll in Windows Hello for Business. To keep the transition from a weak to a strong credential secure, Windows Hello for Business relies on multi-factor authentication during provisioning to have some assurances that the user identity provisioning a Windows Hello for Business credential is the proper identity.
+The goal of Windows Hello for Business is to move user authentication away from passwords to a strong, key-based user authentication. Passwords are weak credentials and cannot be trusted by themselves as an attacker with a stolen password could be attempting to enroll in Windows Hello for Business. To keep the transition from a weak to a strong credential secure, Windows Hello for Business relies on multifactor authentication during provisioning to have some assurances that the user identity provisioning a Windows Hello for Business credential is the proper identity.
If box **1a** on your planning worksheet reads **cloud only**, then your only option is to use the Azure MFA cloud service. Write **Azure MFA** in box **1f** on your planning worksheet.
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ If box **1a** on your planning worksheet reads **hybrid**, then you have a few o
You can directly use the Azure MFA cloud service for the second factor of authentication. Users contacting the service must authenticate to Azure prior to using the service.
-If your Azure AD Connect is configured to synchronize identities (usernames only), then your users are redirected to your local on-premises federation server for authentication and then redirected back to the Azure MFA cloud service. Otherwise, your Azure AD Connect is configured to synchronize credentials (username and passwords), which enables your users to authenticate to Azure Active Directory and use the Azure MFA cloud service. If you choose to use the Azure MFA cloud service directly, write **Azure MFA** in box **1f** on your planning worksheet.
+If your Microsoft Entra Connect is configured to synchronize identities (usernames only), then your users are redirected to your local on-premises federation server for authentication and then redirected back to the Azure MFA cloud service. Otherwise, your Microsoft Entra Connect is configured to synchronize credentials (username and passwords), which enables your users to authenticate to Microsoft Entra ID and use the Azure MFA cloud service. If you choose to use the Azure MFA cloud service directly, write **Azure MFA** in box **1f** on your planning worksheet.
You can configure your on-premises Windows Server 2016 AD FS role to use the Azure MFA service adapter. In this configuration, users are redirected to the on premises AD FS server (synchronizing identities only). The AD FS server uses the MFA adapter to communicate to the Azure MFA service to perform the second factor of authentication. If you choose to use AD FS with the Azure MFA cloud service adapter, write **AD FS with Azure MFA cloud adapter** in box **1f** on your planning worksheet.
@@ -241,10 +241,10 @@ If you choose to use AD FS with the Azure MFA server adapter, write **AD FS with
Windows Hello for Business provides organizations with many policy settings and granular control on how these settings may be applied to both computers and users. The type of policy management you can use depends on your selected deployment and trust models.
-If box **1a** on your planning worksheet reads **cloud only**, write **N/A** in box **2a** on your planning worksheet. You have the option to manage non-domain joined devices. If you choose to manage Azure Active Directory-joined devices, write **modern management** in box **2b** on your planning worksheet. Otherwise, write** N/A** in box **2b**.
+If box **1a** on your planning worksheet reads **cloud only**, write **N/A** in box **2a** on your planning worksheet. You have the option to manage non-domain joined devices. If you choose to manage Microsoft Entra joined devices, write **modern management** in box **2b** on your planning worksheet. Otherwise, write** N/A** in box **2b**.
> [!NOTE]
-> Azure Active Directory-joined devices without modern management automatically enroll in Windows Hello for Business using the default policy settings. Use modern management to adjust policy settings to match the business needs of your organization.
+> Microsoft Entra joined devices without modern management automatically enroll in Windows Hello for Business using the default policy settings. Use modern management to adjust policy settings to match the business needs of your organization.
If box **1a** on your planning worksheet reads **on-prem**, write **GP** in box **2a** on your planning worksheet. Write **N/A** in box **2b** on your worksheet.
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ Windows Hello for Business is a feature exclusive to Windows 10 and Windows 11.
If box **1a** on your planning worksheet reads **cloud only**, write **N/A** in box **3a** on your planning worksheet. Optionally, you may write **1511 or later** in box **3b** on your planning worksheet if you plan to manage non-domain joined devices.
> [!NOTE]
-> Azure Active Directory-joined devices without modern management automatically enroll in Windows Hello for Business using the default policy settings. Use modern management to adjust policy settings to match the business needs of your organization.
+> Microsoft Entra joined devices without modern management automatically enroll in Windows Hello for Business using the default policy settings. Use modern management to adjust policy settings to match the business needs of your organization.
Write **1511 or later** in box **3a** on your planning worksheet if any of the following are true.
* Box **2a** on your planning worksheet read **modern management**.
@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ If box **1a** on your planning worksheet reads **cloud only**, ignore the public
If box **1b** on your planning worksheet reads **key trust**, write **N/A** in box **5b** on your planning worksheet. Key trust doesn't require any change in public key infrastructure, skip this part and go to **Cloud** section.
-The registration authority only relates to certificate trust deployments and the management used for domain and non-domain joined devices. Hybrid Azure AD-joined devices managed by Group Policy need the Windows Server 2016 AD FS role to issue certificates. Hybrid Azure AD-joined devices and Azure AD-joined devices managed by Intune or a compatible MDM need the Windows Server NDES server role to issue certificates.
+The registration authority only relates to certificate trust deployments and the management used for domain and non-domain joined devices. Microsoft Entra hybrid joined devices managed by Group Policy need the Windows Server 2016 AD FS role to issue certificates. Microsoft Entra hybrid joined devices and Microsoft Entra joined devices managed by Intune or a compatible MDM need the Windows Server NDES server role to issue certificates.
If box **2a** reads **GP** and box **2b** reads **modern management**, write **AD FS RA and NDES** in box **5b** on your planning worksheet. In box **5c**, write the following certificate templates names and issuances:
@@ -323,18 +323,18 @@ If box **1a** on your planning worksheet reads **cloud only** or **hybrid**, wri
If box **1a** on your planning worksheet reads **on-premises**, and box **1f** reads **AD FS with third party**, write **No** in box **6a** on your planning worksheet. Otherwise, write **Yes** in box **6a** as you need an Azure account for per-consumption MFA billing. Write **No** in box **6b** on your planning worksheet—on-premises deployments do not use the cloud directory.
-Windows Hello for Business does not require an Azure AD premium subscription. However, some dependencies, such as [MDM automatic enrollment](/mem/intune/enrollment/quickstart-setup-auto-enrollment) and [Conditional Access](/azure/active-directory/conditional-access/overview) do.
+Windows Hello for Business does not require a Microsoft Entra ID P1 or P2 subscription. However, some dependencies, such as [MDM automatic enrollment](/mem/intune/enrollment/quickstart-setup-auto-enrollment) and [Conditional Access](/azure/active-directory/conditional-access/overview) do.
If box **1a** on your planning worksheet reads **on-premises**, write **No** in box **6c** on your planning worksheet.
-If box **1a** on your planning worksheet reads **hybrid** and box **1b** reads **key trust**, write **No** in box **6c** on your planning worksheet. You can deploy Windows Hello for Business using the Azure Active Directory free tier. All Azure Active Directory free accounts can use Azure AD Multi-Factor Authentication through the use of security defaults. Some Azure AD Multi-Factor Authentication features require a license. For more details, see [Features and licenses for Azure AD Multi-Factor Authentication](/azure/active-directory/authentication/concept-mfa-licensing).
+If box **1a** on your planning worksheet reads **hybrid** and box **1b** reads **key trust**, write **No** in box **6c** on your planning worksheet. You can deploy Windows Hello for Business using the Microsoft Entra ID Free tier. All Microsoft Entra ID Free accounts can use Microsoft Entra multifactor authentication through the use of security defaults. Some Microsoft Entra multifactor authentication features require a license. For more details, see [Features and licenses for Microsoft Entra multifactor authentication](/azure/active-directory/authentication/concept-mfa-licensing).
-If box **5b** on your planning worksheet reads **AD FS RA**, write **Yes** in box **6c** on your planning worksheet. Enrolling a certificate using the AD FS registration authority requires devices to authenticate to the AD FS server, which requires device write-back, an Azure AD Premium feature.
+If box **5b** on your planning worksheet reads **AD FS RA**, write **Yes** in box **6c** on your planning worksheet. Enrolling a certificate using the AD FS registration authority requires devices to authenticate to the AD FS server, which requires device write-back, a Microsoft Entra ID P1 or P2 feature.
-Modern managed devices do not require an Azure AD premium subscription. By forgoing the subscription, your users must manually enroll devices in the modern management software, such as Intune or a supported third-party MDM.
+Modern managed devices do not require a Microsoft Entra ID P1 or P2 subscription. By forgoing the subscription, your users must manually enroll devices in the modern management software, such as Intune or a supported third-party MDM.
If boxes **2a** or **2b** read **modern management** and you want devices to automatically enroll in your modern management software, write **Yes** in box **6c** on your planning worksheet. Otherwise, write **No** in box **6c**.
## Congratulations, You're Done
-Your Windows Hello for Business planning worksheet should be complete. This guide provided understanding of the components used in the Windows Hello for Business infrastructure and rationalization of why they are used. The worksheet gives you an overview of the requirements needed to continue the next phase of the deployment. With this worksheet, you'll be able to identify key elements of your Windows Hello for Business deployment.
+Your Windows Hello for Business planning worksheet should be complete. This guide provided understanding of the components used in the Windows Hello for Business infrastructure and rationalization of why they're used. The worksheet gives you an overview of the requirements needed to continue the next phase of the deployment. With this worksheet, you'll be able to identify key elements of your Windows Hello for Business deployment.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-prepare-people-to-use.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-prepare-people-to-use.md
index 96c1df3462..87cd5f6ea5 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-prepare-people-to-use.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-prepare-people-to-use.md
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ When you set a policy to require Windows Hello for Business in the workplace, yo
After enrollment in Hello, users should use their gesture (such as a PIN or fingerprint) for access to corporate resources. Their gesture is only valid on the enrolled device.
-Although the organization may require users to change their Active Directory or Azure Active Directory (AD) account password at regular intervals, changes to their passwords have no effect on Hello.
+Although the organization may require users to change their Active Directory or Microsoft Entra account password at regular intervals, changes to their passwords have no effect on Hello.
People who are currently using virtual or physical smart cards for authentication can use their virtual smart card to verify their identity when they set up Hello.
@@ -52,4 +52,3 @@ If your policy allows it, people can use biometrics (fingerprint, iris, and faci
- [Windows Hello errors during PIN creation](hello-errors-during-pin-creation.md)
- [Event ID 300 - Windows Hello successfully created](/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-faq)
- [Windows Hello biometrics in the enterprise](hello-biometrics-in-enterprise.md)
-
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similarity index 100%
rename from windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless/gpmc-require-smart-card-policy.png
rename to windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless-strategy/gpmc-require-smart-card-policy.png
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless/gpmc-security-options.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless-strategy/gpmc-security-options.png
similarity index 100%
rename from windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless/gpmc-security-options.png
rename to windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless-strategy/gpmc-security-options.png
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless/require-whfb-smart-card-policy.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless-strategy/require-whfb-smart-card-policy.png
similarity index 100%
rename from windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless/require-whfb-smart-card-policy.png
rename to windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless-strategy/require-whfb-smart-card-policy.png
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless/server-2012-adac-user-scril.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless-strategy/server-2012-adac-user-scril.png
similarity index 100%
rename from windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless/server-2012-adac-user-scril.png
rename to windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless-strategy/server-2012-adac-user-scril.png
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless/server-2016-adac-domain-scril.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless-strategy/server-2016-adac-domain-scril.png
similarity index 100%
rename from windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless/server-2016-adac-domain-scril.png
rename to windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless-strategy/server-2016-adac-domain-scril.png
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless/server-2016-adac-user-scril.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless-strategy/server-2016-adac-user-scril.png
similarity index 100%
rename from windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless/server-2016-adac-user-scril.png
rename to windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless-strategy/server-2016-adac-user-scril.png
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless/edge-on.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless/edge-on.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..06a13b6f1a
Binary files /dev/null and b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless/edge-on.png differ
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless/key-credential-provider.svg b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless/key-credential-provider.svg
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dd8c09b2dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless/key-credential-provider.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless/lock-screen-off.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless/lock-screen-off.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ccfade47d9
Binary files /dev/null and b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless/lock-screen-off.png differ
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless/lock-screen-on.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless/lock-screen-on.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..abb9b6456d
Binary files /dev/null and b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless/lock-screen-on.png differ
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless/uac-off.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless/uac-off.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8913baa8ce
Binary files /dev/null and b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless/uac-off.png differ
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless/uac-on.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless/uac-on.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b0d03a6299
Binary files /dev/null and b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/passwordless/uac-on.png differ
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset.gif b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset.gif
index 2ef07cd63c..d8aba4d740 100644
Binary files a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset.gif and b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/pin-reset.gif differ
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/includes/hello-deployment-cloud.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/includes/hello-deployment-cloud.md
index a9b2685f07..17dc33d7c4 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/includes/hello-deployment-cloud.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/includes/hello-deployment-cloud.md
@@ -3,4 +3,4 @@ ms.date: 12/08/2022
ms.topic: include
---
-[cloud :::image type="icon" source="../../../images/icons/information.svg" border="false":::](../hello-how-it-works-technology.md#cloud-deployment "For organizations using Azure AD-only identities. Device management is usually done via Intune/MDM")
\ No newline at end of file
+[cloud :::image type="icon" source="../../../images/icons/information.svg" border="false":::](../hello-how-it-works-technology.md#cloud-deployment "For organizations using Microsoft Entra-only identities. Device management is usually done via Intune/MDM")
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/includes/hello-deployment-hybrid.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/includes/hello-deployment-hybrid.md
index b6ba025722..a67cb2cf2b 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/includes/hello-deployment-hybrid.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/includes/hello-deployment-hybrid.md
@@ -3,4 +3,4 @@ ms.date: 12/08/2022
ms.topic: include
---
-[hybrid :::image type="icon" source="../../../images/icons/information.svg" border="false":::](../hello-how-it-works-technology.md#hybrid-deployment "For organizations using Active Directory identities synchronized to Azure AD. Device management is usually done via Group Policy or Intune/MDM")
\ No newline at end of file
+[hybrid :::image type="icon" source="../../../images/icons/information.svg" border="false":::](../hello-how-it-works-technology.md#hybrid-deployment "For organizations using Active Directory identities synchronized to Microsoft Entra ID. Device management is usually done via Group Policy or Intune/MDM")
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/includes/hello-deployment-onpremises.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/includes/hello-deployment-onpremises.md
index 5426da4561..c33f3da2de 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/includes/hello-deployment-onpremises.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/includes/hello-deployment-onpremises.md
@@ -3,4 +3,4 @@ ms.date: 12/08/2022
ms.topic: include
---
-[on-premises :::image type="icon" source="../../../images/icons/information.svg" border="false":::](../hello-how-it-works-technology.md#on-premises-deployment "For organizations using Active Directory identities, not synchronized to Azure AD. Device management is usually done via Group Policy")
\ No newline at end of file
+[on-premises :::image type="icon" source="../../../images/icons/information.svg" border="false":::](../hello-how-it-works-technology.md#on-premises-deployment "For organizations using Active Directory identities, not synchronized to Microsoft Entra ID. Device management is usually done via Group Policy")
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/includes/hello-join-aad.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/includes/hello-join-aad.md
index 82f5f99a23..29b890c78b 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/includes/hello-join-aad.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/includes/hello-join-aad.md
@@ -3,4 +3,4 @@ ms.date: 12/08/2022
ms.topic: include
---
-[Azure AD join :::image type="icon" source="../../../images/icons/information.svg" border="false":::](../hello-how-it-works-technology.md#azure-active-directory-join "Devices that are Azure AD joined do not have any dependencies on Active Directory. Only local users accounts and Azure AD users can sign in to these devices")
\ No newline at end of file
+[Microsoft Entra join :::image type="icon" source="../../../images/icons/information.svg" border="false":::](../hello-how-it-works-technology.md#azure-active-directory-join "Devices that are Microsoft Entra joined do not have any dependencies on Active Directory. Only local users accounts and Microsoft Entra users can sign in to these devices")
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/includes/hello-join-hybrid.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/includes/hello-join-hybrid.md
index ba8b5df65a..80f9992cb8 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/includes/hello-join-hybrid.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/includes/hello-join-hybrid.md
@@ -3,4 +3,4 @@ ms.date: 12/08/2022
ms.topic: include
---
-[hybrid Azure AD join :::image type="icon" source="../../../images/icons/information.svg" border="false":::](../hello-how-it-works-technology.md#hybrid-azure-ad-join "Devices that are hybrid Azure AD joined don't have any dependencies on Azure AD. Only local users accounts and Active Directory users can sign in to these devices. Active Directory users that are synchronized to Azure AD will have single-sign on to both Active Directory and Azure AD-protected resources")
\ No newline at end of file
+[Microsoft Entra hybrid join :::image type="icon" source="../../../images/icons/information.svg" border="false":::](../hello-how-it-works-technology.md#hybrid-azure-ad-join "Devices that are Microsoft Entra hybrid joined don't have any dependencies on Microsoft Entra ID. Only local users accounts and Active Directory users can sign in to these devices. Active Directory users that are synchronized to Microsoft Entra ID will have single-sign on to both Active Directory and Microsoft Entra protected resources")
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/index.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/index.md
index e0d3b1306e..953074993d 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/index.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/index.md
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Windows Hello lets users authenticate to:
- A Microsoft account.
- An Active Directory account.
-- A Microsoft Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) account.
+- A Microsoft Entra account.
- Identity Provider Services or Relying Party Services that support [Fast ID Online (FIDO) v2.0](https://fidoalliance.org/) authentication.
After an initial two-step verification of the user during enrollment, Windows Hello is set up on the user's device and Windows asks the user to set a gesture, which can be a biometric, such as a fingerprint, or a PIN. The user provides the gesture to verify their identity. Windows then uses Windows Hello to authenticate users.
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ Windows Hello helps protect user identities and user credentials. Because the us
- Windows Hello credentials are based on certificate or asymmetrical key pair. Windows Hello credentials can be bound to the device, and the token that is obtained using the credential is also bound to the device.
-- An identity provider validates the user identity and maps the Windows Hello public key to a user account during the registration step. Example providers are Active Directory, Azure AD, or a Microsoft account.
+- An identity provider validates the user identity and maps the Windows Hello public key to a user account during the registration step. Example providers are Active Directory, Microsoft Entra ID, or a Microsoft account.
- Keys can be generated in hardware (TPM 1.2 or 2.0 for enterprises, and TPM 2.0 for consumers) or software, based on the policy. To guarantee that keys are generated in hardware, you must set policy.
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ Windows Hello helps protect user identities and user credentials. Because the us
- PIN entry and biometric gesture both trigger Windows 10 and later to use the private key to cryptographically sign data that is sent to the identity provider. The identity provider verifies the user's identity and authenticates the user.
-- Personal (Microsoft account) and corporate (Active Directory or Azure AD) accounts use a single container for keys. All keys are separated by identity providers' domains to help ensure user privacy.
+- Personal (Microsoft account) and corporate (Active Directory or Microsoft Entra ID) accounts use a single container for keys. All keys are separated by identity providers' domains to help ensure user privacy.
- Certificate private keys can be protected by the Windows Hello container and the Windows Hello gesture.
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ For details, see [How Windows Hello for Business works](hello-how-it-works.md).
## Comparing key-based and certificate-based authentication
-Windows Hello for Business can use either keys (hardware or software) or certificates in hardware or software. Enterprises that have a public key infrastructure (PKI) for issuing and managing end user certificates can continue to use PKI in combination with Windows Hello for Business. Enterprises that don't use PKI or want to reduce the effort associated with managing user certificates can rely on key-based credentials for Windows Hello. This functionality still uses certificates on the domain controllers as a root of trust. Starting with Windows 10 version 21H2, there's a feature called cloud Kerberos trust for hybrid deployments, which uses Azure AD as the root of trust. cloud Kerberos trust uses key-based credentials for Windows Hello but doesn't require certificates on the domain controller.
+Windows Hello for Business can use either keys (hardware or software) or certificates in hardware or software. Enterprises that have a public key infrastructure (PKI) for issuing and managing end user certificates can continue to use PKI in combination with Windows Hello for Business. Enterprises that don't use PKI or want to reduce the effort associated with managing user certificates can rely on key-based credentials for Windows Hello. This functionality still uses certificates on the domain controllers as a root of trust. Starting with Windows 10 version 21H2, there's a feature called cloud Kerberos trust for hybrid deployments, which uses Microsoft Entra ID as the root of trust. cloud Kerberos trust uses key-based credentials for Windows Hello but doesn't require certificates on the domain controller.
Windows Hello for Business with a key, including cloud Kerberos trust, doesn't support supplied credentials for RDP. RDP doesn't support authentication with a key or a self signed certificate. RDP with Windows Hello for Business is supported with certificate based deployments as a supplied credential. Windows Hello for Business with a key credential can be used with [Remote Credential Guard](../remote-credential-guard.md).
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/passwordless-strategy.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/passwordless-strategy.md
index 690c5f984c..a66a69f90c 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/passwordless-strategy.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/passwordless-strategy.md
@@ -13,11 +13,11 @@ This article describes Windows' password-less strategy and how Windows Hello for
Over the past few years, Microsoft has continued their commitment to enabling a world without passwords.
-:::image type="content" source="images/passwordless/four-steps-passwordless-strategy.png" alt-text="Diagram of stair-step strategy with four steps.":::
+:::image type="content" source="images/passwordless-strategy/four-steps-passwordless-strategy.png" alt-text="Diagram of stair-step strategy with four steps.":::
### 1. Develop a password replacement offering
-Before you move away from passwords, you need something to replace them. With Windows 10 and Windows 11, Microsoft introduced Windows Hello for Business, a strong, hardware protected two-factor credential that enables single sign-on to Azure Active Directory and Active Directory.
+Before you move away from passwords, you need something to replace them. With Windows 10 and Windows 11, Microsoft introduced Windows Hello for Business, a strong, hardware protected two-factor credential that enables single sign-on to Microsoft Entra ID and Active Directory.
Deploying Windows Hello for Business is the first step towards a password-less environment. Windows Hello for Business coexists nicely with existing password-based security. Users are likely to use Windows Hello for Business because of its convenience, especially when combined with biometrics. However, some workflows and applications may still need passwords. This early stage is about implementing an alternative and getting users used to it.
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ After successfully moving a work persona to password freedom, you can prioritize
### Password-less replacement offering (step 1)
-The first step to password freedom is providing an alternative to passwords. Windows 10 and Windows 11 provide an affordable and easy in-box alternative to passwords, Windows Hello for Business, a strong, two-factor authentication to Azure Active Directory and Active Directory.
+The first step to password freedom is providing an alternative to passwords. Windows 10 and Windows 11 provide an affordable and easy in-box alternative to passwords, Windows Hello for Business, a strong, two-factor authentication to Microsoft Entra ID and Active Directory.
#### Identify test users that represent the targeted work persona
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ Next, you'll want to plan your Windows Hello for Business deployment. Your test
With the Windows Hello for Business infrastructure in place, you can limit Windows Hello for Business enrollments to the targeted work personas. The great news is that you'll only need to deploy the infrastructure once. When other targeted work personas need to start using Windows Hello for Business, add them to a group. You'll use the first work persona to validate your Windows Hello for Business deployment.
> [!NOTE]
-> There are many different ways to connect a device to Azure. Deployments may vary based on how the device is joined to Azure Active Directory. Review your planning guide and deployment guide to ensure additional infrastructure is not needed for an additional Azure joined devices.
+> There are many different ways to connect a device to Azure. Deployments may vary based on how the device is joined to Microsoft Entra ID. Review your planning guide and deployment guide to ensure additional infrastructure is not needed for an additional Azure joined devices.
#### Validate that passwords and Windows Hello for Business work
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ Start mitigating password usages based on the workflows of your targeted persona
Mitigating password usage with applications is one of the more challenging obstacles in the password-less journey. If your organization develops the application, then you are in better shape the common-off-the-shelf software (COTS).
-The ideal mitigation for applications that prompt the user for a password is to enable those applications to use an existing authenticated identity, such as Azure Active Directory or Active Directory. Work with the applications vendors to have them add support for Azure identities. For on-premises applications, have the application use Windows integrated authentication. The goal for your users should be a seamless single sign-on experience where each user authenticates once when they sign-in to Windows. Use this same strategy for applications that store their own identities in their own databases.
+The ideal mitigation for applications that prompt the user for a password is to enable those applications to use an existing authenticated identity, such as Microsoft Entra ID or Active Directory. Work with the applications vendors to have them add support for Azure identities. For on-premises applications, have the application use Windows integrated authentication. The goal for your users should be a seamless single sign-on experience where each user authenticates once when they sign-in to Windows. Use this same strategy for applications that store their own identities in their own databases.
Each scenario on your list should now have a problem statement, an investigation as to why the password was used, and a mitigation plan on how to make the password usage go away. Armed with this data, one-by-one, close the gaps on user-visible passwords. Change policies and procedures as needed, make infrastructure changes where possible. Convert in-house applications to use federated identities or Windows integrated authentication. Work with third-party software vendors to update their software to support federated identities or Windows integrated authentication.
@@ -224,17 +224,17 @@ Windows provides two ways to prevent your users from using passwords. You can us
You can use Group Policy to deploy an interactive logon security policy setting to the computer. This policy setting is found under **Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Local Policy > Security Options**. The name of the policy setting depends on the version of the operating systems you use to configure Group Policy.
-:::image type="content" source="images/passwordless/gpmc-security-options.png" alt-text="The Group Policy Management Editor displaying the location of the Security Options node.":::
+:::image type="content" source="images/passwordless-strategy/gpmc-security-options.png" alt-text="The Group Policy Management Editor displaying the location of the Security Options node.":::
**Windows Server 2016 and earlier**
The policy name for these operating systems is **Interactive logon: Require smart card**.
-:::image type="content" source="images/passwordless/gpmc-require-smart-card-policy.png" alt-text="The Group Policy Management Editor displaying the location of the policy 'Interactive logon: Require smart card'.":::
+:::image type="content" source="images/passwordless-strategy/gpmc-require-smart-card-policy.png" alt-text="The Group Policy Management Editor displaying the location of the policy 'Interactive logon: Require smart card'.":::
**Windows 10, version 1703 or later using Remote Server Administrator Tools**
The policy name for these operating systems is **Interactive logon: Require Windows Hello for Business or smart card**.
-:::image type="content" source="images/passwordless/require-whfb-smart-card-policy.png" alt-text="Highlighting the security policy 'Interactive logon: Require Windows Hello for Business or smart card'.":::
+:::image type="content" source="images/passwordless-strategy/require-whfb-smart-card-policy.png" alt-text="Highlighting the security policy 'Interactive logon: Require Windows Hello for Business or smart card'.":::
When you enable this security policy setting, Windows prevents users from signing in or unlocking with a password. The password credential provider remains visible to the user. If a user tries to use a password, Windows informs the user they must use Windows Hello for Business or a smart card.
@@ -242,11 +242,11 @@ When you enable this security policy setting, Windows prevents users from signin
You can use Group Policy to deploy an administrative template policy setting to the computer. This policy setting is found under **Computer Configuration > Policies > Administrative Templates > System > Logon**:
-:::image type="content" source="images/passwordless/gpmc-exclude-credential-providers.png" alt-text="The Group Policy Management Editor displaying the location of 'Logon' node and the policy setting 'Exclude credential providers'.":::
+:::image type="content" source="images/passwordless-strategy/gpmc-exclude-credential-providers.png" alt-text="The Group Policy Management Editor displaying the location of 'Logon' node and the policy setting 'Exclude credential providers'.":::
The name of the policy setting is **Exclude credential providers**. The value to enter in the policy to hide the password credential provider is `{60b78e88-ead8-445c-9cfd-0b87f74ea6cd}`.
-:::image type="content" source="images/passwordless/exclude-credential-providers-properties.png" alt-text="Properties of the policy setting 'Exclude credential providers'.":::
+:::image type="content" source="images/passwordless-strategy/exclude-credential-providers-properties.png" alt-text="Properties of the policy setting 'Exclude credential providers'.":::
Excluding the password credential provider hides the password credential provider from Windows and any application that attempts to load it. This configuration prevents the user from entering a password using the credential provider. However, this change doesn't prevent applications from creating their own password collection dialogs and prompting the user for a password using custom dialogs.
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ The account options on a user account include the option **Smart card is require
The following image shows the SCRIL setting for a user in Active Directory Users and Computers:
-:::image type="content" source="images/passwordless/aduc-account-scril.png" alt-text="Example user properties in Active Directory that shows the SCRIL setting on Account options.":::
+:::image type="content" source="images/passwordless-strategy/aduc-account-scril.png" alt-text="Example user properties in Active Directory that shows the SCRIL setting on Account options.":::
When you configure a user account for SCRIL, Active Directory changes the affected user's password to a random 128 bits of data. Additionally, domain controllers hosting the user account don't allow the user to sign-in interactively with a password. Users will no longer need to change their password when it expires, because passwords for SCRIL users don't expire. The users are effectively password-less because:
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ When you configure a user account for SCRIL, Active Directory changes the affect
The following image shows the SCRIL setting for a user in Active Directory Administrative Center on Windows Server 2012:
-:::image type="content" source="images/passwordless/server-2012-adac-user-scril.png" alt-text="Example user properties in Windows Server 2012 Active Directory Administrative Center that shows the SCRIL setting.":::
+:::image type="content" source="images/passwordless-strategy/server-2012-adac-user-scril.png" alt-text="Example user properties in Windows Server 2012 Active Directory Administrative Center that shows the SCRIL setting.":::
> [!NOTE]
> Although a SCRIL user's password never expires in early domains, you can toggle the SCRIL configuration on a user account to generate a new random 128 bit password. Use the following process to toggle this configuration:
@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ The following image shows the SCRIL setting for a user in Active Directory Admin
The following image shows the SCRIL setting for a user in Active Directory Administrative Center on Windows Server 2016:
-:::image type="content" source="images/passwordless/server-2016-adac-user-scril.png" alt-text="Example user properties in Windows Server 2016 Active Directory Administrative Center that shows the SCRIL setting.":::
+:::image type="content" source="images/passwordless-strategy/server-2016-adac-user-scril.png" alt-text="Example user properties in Windows Server 2016 Active Directory Administrative Center that shows the SCRIL setting.":::
> [!TIP]
> Windows Hello for Business was formerly known as Microsoft Passport.
@@ -332,8 +332,7 @@ Domains configured for Windows Server 2016 or later domain functional level can
In this configuration, passwords for SCRIL-configured users expire based on Active Directory password policy settings. When the SCRIL user authenticates from a domain controller, the domain controller recognizes the password has expired, and automatically generates a new random 128-bit password for the user as part of the authentication. This feature is great because your users don't experience any change password notifications or any authentication outages.
-:::image type="content" source="images/passwordless/server-2016-adac-domain-scril.png" alt-text="The Active Directory Administrative Center on Windows Server 2016 showing the domain setting for SCRIL.":::
+:::image type="content" source="images/passwordless-strategy/server-2016-adac-domain-scril.png" alt-text="The Active Directory Administrative Center on Windows Server 2016 showing the domain setting for SCRIL.":::
> [!NOTE]
> Some components within Windows 10, such as Data Protection APIs and NTLM authentication, still need artifacts of a user possessing a password. This configuration provides interoperability by reducing the usage surface while Microsoft continues to close the gaps to remove the password completely.
-
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/toc.yml b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/toc.yml
index ad2fc7674a..ee0f2774a8 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/toc.yml
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/toc.yml
@@ -4,8 +4,6 @@ items:
- name: Concepts
expanded: true
items:
- - name: Passwordless strategy
- href: passwordless-strategy.md
- name: Why a PIN is better than a password
href: hello-why-pin-is-better-than-password.md
- name: Windows Hello biometrics in the enterprise
@@ -43,7 +41,7 @@ items:
- name: Configure and provision Windows Hello for Business
href: hello-hybrid-key-trust-provision.md
displayName: key trust
- - name: Configure SSO for Azure AD joined devices
+ - name: Configure SSO for Microsoft Entra joined devices
href: hello-hybrid-aadj-sso.md
displayName: key trust
- name: Certificate trust deployment
@@ -60,10 +58,10 @@ items:
- name: Configure and provision Windows Hello for Business
href: hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-provision.md
displayName: certificate trust
- - name: Configure SSO for Azure AD joined devices
+ - name: Configure SSO for Microsoft Entra joined devices
href: hello-hybrid-aadj-sso.md
displayName: certificate trust
- - name: Deploy certificates to Azure AD joined devices
+ - name: Deploy certificates to Microsoft Entra joined devices
href: hello-hybrid-aadj-sso-cert.md
displayName: certificate trust
- name: On-premises deployments
@@ -112,6 +110,8 @@ items:
items:
- name: PIN reset
href: hello-feature-pin-reset.md
+ - name: Windows Hello Enhanced Security Sign-in (ESS) 🔗
+ href: /windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/windows-hello-enhanced-sign-in-security
- name: Dual enrollment
href: hello-feature-dual-enrollment.md
- name: Dynamic Lock
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/images/delete-passkey.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/images/delete-passkey.png
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index 0000000000..240b3a9695
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index 0000000000..5aa3daea3d
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new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..785a45596b
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index 0000000000..4139c708c3
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new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..df46054877
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diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/images/laptop.svg b/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/images/laptop.svg
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2440c97fd5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/images/laptop.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/images/linked-device-connect.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/images/linked-device-connect.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..34cb085968
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index 0000000000..48bd40f658
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new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5aeacdae7a
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diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/images/phone.svg b/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/images/phone.svg
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..acb1dce81f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/images/phone.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/images/qr-code.svg b/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/images/qr-code.svg
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d84c521351
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/images/qr-code.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/images/save-passkey.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/images/save-passkey.png
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index 0000000000..9dd3799a14
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index 0000000000..a17554e17c
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diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/images/security-key-setup.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/images/security-key-setup.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..192d63cc74
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diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/images/security-key-use.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/images/security-key-use.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1513aa359e
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diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/images/usb.svg b/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/images/usb.svg
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..18027400c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/images/usb.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/images/use-passkey.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/images/use-passkey.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1ff07346ea
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diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/images/website.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/images/website.png
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index 0000000000..d344d8dbde
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diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/index.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/index.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..40d33d3ed3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys/index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,329 @@
+---
+title: Support for passkeys in Windows
+description: Learn about passkeys and how to use them on Windows devices.
+ms.collection:
+- highpri
+- tier1
+ms.topic: article
+ms.date: 09/27/2023
+appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows 11
+- ✅ Windows 10
+---
+
+# Support for passkeys in Windows
+
+Passkeys provide a more secure and convenient method to logging into websites and applications compared to passwords. Unlike passwords, which users must remember and type, passkeys are stored as secrets on a device and can use a device's unlock mechanism (such as biometrics or a PIN). Passkeys can be used without the need for other sign-in challenges, making the authentication process faster, secure, and more convenient.
+
+You can use passkeys with any applications or websites that support them, to create and sign in with Windows Hello. Once a passkey is created and stored with Windows Hello, you can use your device's biometrics or PIN to sign in. Alternatively, you can use a companion device (phone or tablet) to sign in.
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> Starting in Windows 11, version 22H2 with [KB5030310][KB-1], Windows provides a native experience for passkey management. However, passkeys can be used in all supported versions of Windows clients.
+
+This article describes how to create and use passkeys on Windows devices.
+
+## How passkeys work
+
+Microsoft has long been a founding member of the FIDO Alliance and has helped to define and use passkeys natively within a platform authenticator like Windows Hello. Passkeys utilize the FIDO industry security standard, which is adopted by all major platforms. Leading technology companies like Microsoft are backing passkeys as part of the FIDO Alliance, and numerous websites and apps are integrating support for passkeys.
+
+The FIDO protocols rely on standard public/private key cryptography techniques to offer more secure authentication. When a user registers with an online service, their client device generates a new key pair. The private key is stored securely on the user's device, while the public key is registered with the service. To authenticate, the client device must prove that it possesses the private key by signing a challenge. The private keys can only be used after they're unlocked by the user using the Windows Hello unlock factor (biometrics or PIN).
+
+FIDO protocols prioritize user privacy, as they're designed to prevent online services from sharing information or tracking users across different services. Additionally, any biometric information used in the authentication process remains on the user's device and isn't transmitted across the network or to the service.
+
+### Passkeys compared to passwords
+
+Passkeys have several advantages over passwords, including their ease of use and intuitive nature. Unlike passwords, passkeys are easy to create, don't need to be remembered, and don't need to be safeguarded. Additionally, passkeys are unique to each website or application, preventing their reuse. They're highly secure because they're only stored on the user's devices, with the service only storing public keys. Passkeys are designed to prevent attackers to guess or obtain them, which helps to make them resistant to phishing attempts where the attacker may try to trick the user into revealing the private key. Passkeys are enforced by the browsers or operating systems to only be used for the appropriate service, rather than relying on human verification. Finally, passkeys provide cross-device and cross-platform authentication, meaning that a passkey from one device can be used to sign in on another device.
+
+[!INCLUDE [passkey](../../../../includes/licensing/passkeys.md)]
+
+## User experiences
+
+### Create a passkey
+
+Follow these steps to create a passkey from a Windows device:
+
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="4":::
+
+ 1. Open a website or app that supports passkeys
+
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="4":::
+
+ 2. Create a passkey from your account settings
+
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="4":::
+ 3. Choose where to save the passkey. By default, Windows offers to save the passkey locally if you're using Windows Hello or Windows Hello for Business. If you select the option **Use another device**, you can choose to save the passkey in one of the following locations:
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="3":::
+
+- **This Windows device**: the passkey is saved locally on your Windows device, and protected by Windows Hello (biometrics and PIN)
+- **iPhone, iPad or Android device**: the passkey is saved on a phone or tablet, protected by the device's biometrics, if offered by the device. This option requires you to scan a QR code with your phone or tablet, which must be in proximity of the Windows device
+- **Linked device**: the passkey is saved on a phone or tablet, protected by the device's biometrics, if offered by the device. This option requires the linked device to be in proximity of the Windows device, and it's only supported for Android devices
+- **Security key**: the passkey is saved to a FIDO2 security key, protected by the key's unlock mechanism (for example, biometrics or PIN)
+
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column span="1":::
+ :::image type="content" source="images/save-passkey.png" alt-text="Screenshot showing a dialog box prompting the user to pick a location to store the passkey." lightbox="images/save-passkey.png" border="false":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="4":::
+ 4. Select **Next**
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+
+Pick one of the following options to learn how to save a passkey, based on where you want to store it.
+
+#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/laptop.svg" border="false"::: **Windows device**](#tab/windows)
+
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="3":::
+
+ 5. Select a Windows Hello verification method and proceed with the verification, then select **OK**
+
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column span="1":::
+ :::image type="content" source="images/hello-save.png" alt-text="Screenshot showing the Windows Hello face verification method." lightbox="images/hello-save.png" border="false":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="3":::
+
+ 6. The passkey is saved to your Windows device. To confirm select **OK**
+
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column span="1":::
+ :::image type="content" source="images/hello-save-confirm.png" alt-text="Screenshot confirming that the passkey is saved to the Windows device" lightbox="images/hello-save-confirm.png" border="false":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+
+#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/qr-code.svg" border="false"::: **New phone or tablet**](#tab/mobile)
+
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="3":::
+
+ 5. Scan the QR code with your phone or tablet. Wait for the connection to the device to be established and follow the instructions to save the passkey
+
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column span="1":::
+ :::image type="content" source="images/device-save-qr.png" alt-text="Screenshot showing the QR code asking the user to scan on the device." lightbox="images/device-save-qr.png" border="false":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="3":::
+
+ 6. Once the passkey is saved to your phone or tablet, select **OK**
+
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column span="1":::
+ :::image type="content" source="images/device-save.png" alt-text="Screenshot confirming that the passkey is saved to the device." lightbox="images/device-save.png" border="false":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+
+#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/phone.svg" border="false"::: **Linked phone or tablet**](#tab/linked)
+
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="3":::
+
+ 5. Once the connection to the linked device is established, follow the instructions on the device to save the passkey
+
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column span="1":::
+ :::image type="content" source="images/linked-device-connect.png" alt-text="Screenshot showing the passkey save dialog connecting to a linked device." lightbox="images/linked-device-connect.png" border="false":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="3":::
+
+ 6. Once the passkey is saved to your linked device, select **OK**
+
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column span="1":::
+ :::image type="content" source="images/linked-device-save.png" alt-text="Screenshot confirming that the passkey is saved to the linked device." lightbox="images/linked-device-save.png" border="false":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+
+#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/usb.svg" border="false"::: **Security key**](#tab/key)
+
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="3":::
+
+ 5. Select **OK** to confirm that you want to set up a security key, and unlock the security key using the key's unlock mechanism
+
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column span="1":::
+ :::image type="content" source="images/security-key-setup.png" alt-text="Screenshot showing a prompt to use a security key to store the passkey." lightbox="images/security-key-setup.png" border="false":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="3":::
+
+ 6. Once the passkey is saved to the security key, select **OK**
+
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column span="1":::
+ :::image type="content" source="images/security-key-save.png" alt-text="Screenshot confirming that the passkey is saved to the security key." lightbox="images/security-key-save.png" border="false":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+
+---
+
+### Use a passkey
+
+Follow these steps to use a passkey:
+
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="3":::
+ 1. Open a website or app that supports passkeys
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column span="1":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="3":::
+ 2. Select **Sign in with a passkey**, or a similar option
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column span="1":::
+ :::image type="content" source="images/website.png" alt-text="Screenshot of a website offering the passkey sign in option." lightbox="images/website.png" border="false":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="3":::
+ 3. If a passkey is stored locally and protected by Windows Hello, you're prompted to use Windows Hello to sign in. If you select the option **Use another device**, you can choose one of the following options:
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="3":::
+- **This Windows device**: use this option to use a passkey that is stored locally on your Windows device, and protected by Windows Hello
+- **iPhone, iPad or Android device**: use this option if you want to sign in with a passkey stored on a phone or tablet. This option requires you to scan a QR code with your phone or tablet, which must be in proximity of the Windows device
+- **Linked device**: use this option if you want to sign in with a passkey stored on a device that is in proximity of the Windows device. This option is only supported for Android devices
+- **Security key**: use this option if you want to sign in with a passkey stored on a FIDO2 security key
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column span="1":::
+ :::image type="content" source="images/use-passkey.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the passkey dialog prompting the user to pick where the passkey is stored." lightbox="images/use-passkey.png" border="false":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+
+Pick one of the following options to learn how to use a passkey, based on where you saved it.
+
+#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/laptop.svg" border="false"::: **Windows device**](#tab/windows)
+
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="3":::
+
+ 4. Select a Windows Hello unlock option
+
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column span="1":::
+ :::image type="content" source="images/hello-use.png" alt-text="Screenshot showing the Windows Hello prompt for a verification method." lightbox="images/hello-use.png" border="false":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="3":::
+
+ 5. Select **OK** to continue signing in
+
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column span="1":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+
+#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/qr-code.svg" border="false"::: **Phone or tablet**](#tab/mobile)
+
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="3":::
+
+ 4. Scan the QR code with your phone or tablet where you saved the passkey. Once the connection to the device is established, follow the instructions to use the passkey
+
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column span="1":::
+ :::image type="content" source="images/device-use.png" alt-text="Screenshot showing the QR code to scan from your phone or tablet." lightbox="images/device-use.png" border="false":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="4":::
+
+ 5. You're signed in to the website or app
+
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+
+#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/phone.svg" border="false"::: **Linked phone or tablet**](#tab/linked)
+
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="3":::
+
+ 4. Once the connection to the linked device is established, follow the instructions on the device to use the passkey
+
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column span="1":::
+ :::image type="content" source="images/linked-device-use.png" alt-text="Screenshot showing that the linked device is connected to Windows." lightbox="images/linked-device-use.png" border="false":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="3":::
+
+ 5. You're signed in to the website or app
+
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column span="1":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+
+#### [:::image type="icon" source="images/usb.svg" border="false"::: **Security key**](#tab/key)
+
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="3":::
+
+ 4. Unlock the security key using the key's unlock mechanism
+
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column span="1":::
+ :::image type="content" source="images/security-key-use.png" alt-text="Screenshot showing a prompt asking the user to unlock the security key." lightbox="images/security-key-use.png" border="false":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="3":::
+
+ 5. You're signed in to the website or app
+
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column span="1":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+
+---
+
+### Manage passkeys
+
+Starting in Windows 11, version 22H2 with [KB5030310][KB-1], you can use the Settings app to view and manage passkeys saved for apps or websites. Go to **Settings > Accounts > Passkeys**, or use the following shortcut:
+
+> [!div class="nextstepaction"]
+>
+> [Manage passkeys][MSS-1]
+
+- A list of saved passkeys is displayed and you can filter them by name
+- To delete a passkey, select **... > Delete passkey** next to the passkey name
+
+:::image type="content" source="images/delete-passkey.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the Settings app showing the delete option for a passkey." lightbox="images/delete-passkey.png" border="false":::
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> Some passkeys for *login.microsoft.com* can't be deleted, as they're used with Microsoft Entra ID and/or Microsoft Account for signing in to the device and Microsoft services.
+
+## :::image type="icon" source="../../images/icons/feedback.svg" border="false"::: Provide feedback
+
+To provide feedback for passkeys, open [**Feedback Hub**][FHUB] and use the category **Security and Privacy > Passkey**.
+
+
+
+[FHUB]: feedback-hub:?tabid=2&newFeedback=true
+[KB-1]: https://support.microsoft.com/kb/5030310
+[MSS-1]: ms-settings:savedpasskeys
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/passwordless-experience/images/edge-on.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/passwordless-experience/images/edge-on.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..06a13b6f1a
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diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/passwordless-experience/images/key-credential-provider.svg b/windows/security/identity-protection/passwordless-experience/images/key-credential-provider.svg
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dd8c09b2dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/passwordless-experience/images/key-credential-provider.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/passwordless-experience/images/lock-screen-off.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/passwordless-experience/images/lock-screen-off.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ccfade47d9
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new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..abb9b6456d
Binary files /dev/null and b/windows/security/identity-protection/passwordless-experience/images/lock-screen-on.png differ
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/passwordless-experience/images/uac-off.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/passwordless-experience/images/uac-off.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8913baa8ce
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diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/passwordless-experience/images/uac-on.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/passwordless-experience/images/uac-on.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b0d03a6299
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diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/passwordless-experience/index.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/passwordless-experience/index.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7ea73c4603
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/passwordless-experience/index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+---
+title: Windows passwordless experience
+description: Learn how Windows passwordless experience enables your organization to move away from passwords.
+ms.collection:
+ - highpri
+ - tier1
+ms.date: 09/27/2023
+ms.topic: how-to
+appliesto:
+ - ✅ Windows 11
+---
+
+# Windows passwordless experience
+
+Starting in Windows 11, version 22H2 with [KB5030310][KB-1], *Windows passwordless experience* is a security policy that promotes a user experience without passwords on Microsoft Entra joined devices.\
+When the policy is enabled, certain Windows authentication scenarios don't offer users the option to use a password, helping organizations and preparing users to gradually move away from passwords.
+
+With Windows passwordless experience, users who sign in with Windows Hello or a FIDO2 security key:
+
+- Can't use the password credential provider on the Windows lock screen
+- Aren't prompted to use a password during in-session authentications (for example, UAC elevation, password manager in the browser, etc.)
+- Don't have the option *Accounts > Change password* in the Settings app
+
+ >[!NOTE]
+ >Users can reset their password using CTRL+ALT+DEL > **Manage your account**
+
+Windows passwordless experience doesn't affect the initial sign-in experience and local accounts. It only applies to subsequent sign-ins for Microsoft Entra accounts. It also doesn't prevent a user from signing in with a password when using the *Other user* option in the lock screen.\
+The password credential provider is hidden only for the last signed in user who signed in Windows Hello or a FIDO2 security key. Windows passwordless experience isn't about preventing users from using passwords, rather to guide and educate them to not use passwords.
+
+This article explains how to enable Windows passwordless experience and describes the user experiences.
+
+>[!TIP]
+> Windows Hello for Business users can achieve passwordless sign-in from the first sign-in using the Web sign-in feature. For more information about Web sign-in, see [Web sign-in for Windows devices](../web-sign-in/index.md).
+
+## System requirements
+
+Windows passwordless experience has the following requirements:
+
+- Windows 11, version 22H2 with [KB5030310][KB-1] or later
+- Microsoft Entra joined
+- Windows Hello for Business credentials enrolled for the user, or a FIDO2 security key
+- MDM-managed: Microsoft Intune or other MDM solution
+
+>[!NOTE]
+>Microsoft Entra hybrid joined devices and Active Directory domain joined devices are currently out of scope.
+
+[!INCLUDE [windows-passwordless-experience](../../../../includes/licensing/windows-passwordless-experience.md)]
+
+## Enable Windows passwordless experience with Intune
+
+[!INCLUDE [intune-settings-catalog-1](../../../../includes/configure/intune-settings-catalog-1.md)]
+
+| Category | Setting name | Value |
+|--|--|--|
+| **Authentication** | Enable Passwordless Experience | Enabled |
+
+[!INCLUDE [intune-settings-catalog-2](../../../../includes/configure/intune-settings-catalog-2.md)]
+
+Alternatively, you can configure devices using a [custom policy][INT-2] with the [Policy CSP][CSP-1].
+
+| Setting |
+|--------|
+| - **OMA-URI:** `./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/Authentication/EnablePasswordlessExperience`
- **Data type:** int
- **Value:** `1`|
+
+## User experiences
+
+### Lock screen experience
+
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="3":::
+ **Passwordless experience turned off**: users can sign in using a password, as indicated by the presence of the password credential provider :::image type="icon" source="images/key-credential-provider.svg" border="false"::: in the Windows lock screen.
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column span="1":::
+ :::image type="content" source="images/lock-screen-off.png" lightbox="images/lock-screen-off.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the Windows lock screen showing the fingerprint, PIN and password credential providers.":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="3":::
+ **Passwordless experience turned on**: the password credential provider :::image type="icon" source="images/key-credential-provider.svg" border="false"::: is missing for the last user who signed in with strong credentials. A user can either sign in using a strong credential or opt to use the *Other user* option to sign in with a password.
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column span="1":::
+ :::image type="content" source="images/lock-screen-on.png" lightbox="images/lock-screen-on.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the Windows lock screen showing the fingerprint and PIN credential providers only. The password credential provider is missing.":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+
+### In-session authentication experiences
+
+When Windows passwordless experience is enabled, users can't use the password credential provider for in-session authentication scenarios. In-session authentication scenarios include:
+
+- Password Manager in a web browser
+- Connecting to file shares or intranet sites
+- User Account Control (UAC) elevation, except if a local user account is used for elevation
+
+>[!NOTE]
+> RDP sign in defaults to the credential provider used during sign-in. However, a user can select the option *Use a different account* to sign in with a password.
+>
+> *Run as different user* is not impacted by Windows passwordless experience.
+
+Example of UAC elevation experience:
+
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="3":::
+ **Passwordless experience turned off**: UAC elevation allows the user to authenticate using a password.
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column span="1":::
+ :::image type="content" source="images/uac-off.png" lightbox="images/uac-off.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the UAC prompt showing username and password fields.":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="3":::
+ **Passwordless experience turned on**: UAC elevation doesn't allow the user to use the password credential provider for the currently logged on user. The user can authenticate using Windows Hello, a FIDO2 security key or a local user account, if available.
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column span="1":::
+ :::image type="content" source="images/uac-on.png" lightbox="images/uac-on.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the UAC prompt showing fingerprint and PIN options only.":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+
+## Recommendations
+
+Here's a list of recommendations to consider before enabling Windows passwordless experience:
+
+- If Windows Hello for Business is enabled, configure the [PIN reset](../hello-for-business/hello-feature-pin-reset.md) feature to allow users to reset their PIN from the lock screen. The PIN reset experience is improved starting in Windows 11, version 22H2 with [KB5030310][KB-1]
+- Don't configure the security policy *Interactive logon: Don't display last signed-in*, as it prevents Windows passwordless experience from working
+- Don't disable the password credential provider using the *Exclude credential providers* policy. The key differences between the two policies are:
+ - The Exclude credential providers policy disables passwords for *all accounts*, including local accounts. Windows passwordless experience only applies to Microsoft Entra accounts that sign in with Windows Hello or a FIDO2 security key. It also excludes *Other User* from the policy, so users have a backup sign in option
+ - Exclude credential providers policy prevents the use of passwords for RDP and *Run as* authentication scenarios
+- To facilitate helpdesk support operations, consider enabling the local administrator account or create a separate one, randomizing its password using the [Windows Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS)][SERV-1]
+
+## Known issues
+
+There's a known issue affecting the in-session authentication experience when using FIDO2 security keys, where security keys aren't always an available option. The product group is aware of this behavior and plans to improve this in the future.
+
+### :::image type="icon" source="../../images/icons/feedback.svg" border="false"::: Provide feedback
+
+To provide feedback for Windows passwordless experience, open [**Feedback Hub**][FHUB] and use the category **Security and Privacy > Passwordless experience**.
+
+
+
+[CSP-1]: /windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-authentication#enablepasswordlessexperience
+[FHUB]: feedback-hub://?tabid=2&newFeedback=true&feedbackType=1
+[INT-2]: /mem/intune/configuration/custom-settings-windows-10
+[KB-1]: https://support.microsoft.com/kb/5030310
+[SERV-1]: /windows-server/identity/laps/laps-overview
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/remote-credential-guard.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/remote-credential-guard.md
index 7351dd93ae..5c99653fe4 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/remote-credential-guard.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/remote-credential-guard.md
@@ -211,8 +211,8 @@ For more information about LAPS, see [What is Windows LAPS][LEARN-1].
Here are some additional considerations for Remote Credential Guard:
- Remote Credential Guard doesn't support compound authentication. For example, if you're trying to access a file server from a remote host that requires a device claim, access will be denied
-- Remote Credential Guard can be used only when connecting to a device that is joined to an Active Directory domain. It can't be used when connecting to remote devices joined to Azure Active Directory (Azure AD)
-- Remote Credential Guard can be used from an Azure AD joined client to connect to an Active Directory joined remote host, as long as the client can authenticate using Kerberos
+- Remote Credential Guard can be used only when connecting to a device that is joined to an Active Directory domain. It can't be used when connecting to remote devices joined to Microsoft Entra ID
+- Remote Credential Guard can be used from a Microsoft Entra joined client to connect to an Active Directory joined remote host, as long as the client can authenticate using Kerberos
- Remote Credential Guard only works with the RDP protocol
- No credentials are sent to the target device, but the target device still acquires Kerberos Service Tickets on its own
- The server and client must authenticate using Kerberos
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-group-policy-and-registry-settings.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-group-policy-and-registry-settings.md
index f3f0e7de99..81d22a9785 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-group-policy-and-registry-settings.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-group-policy-and-registry-settings.md
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ The following smart card-related Group Policy settings are in Computer Configura
| Group Policy setting and registry key | Default | Description |
|------------------------------------------|------------|---------------|
-| Interactive logon: Require smart card
**scforceoption** | Disabled | This security policy setting requires users to sign in to a computer by using a smart card.
**Enabled** Users can sign in to the computer only by using a smart card.
**Disabled** Users can sign in to the computer by using any method. |
+| Interactive logon: Require smart card
**scforceoption** | Disabled | This security policy setting requires users to sign in to a computer by using a smart card.
**Enabled** Users can sign in to the computer only by using a smart card.
**Disabled** Users can sign in to the computer by using any method.
NOTE: the Windows LAPS-managed local account is exempted from this policy when Enabled. For more information see [Windows LAPS integration with smart card policy](/windows-server/identity/laps/laps-concepts#windows-laps-integration-with-smart-card-policy).
|
| Interactive logon: Smart card removal behavior
**scremoveoption** | This policy setting isn't defined, which means that the system treats it as **No Action**. | This setting determines what happens when the smart card for a signed-in user is removed from the smart card reader. The options are:
**No Action**
**Lock Workstation**: The workstation is locked when the smart card is removed, so users can leave the area, take their smart card with them, and still maintain a protected session.
**Force Logoff**: The user is automatically signed out when the smart card is removed.
**Disconnect if a Remote Desktop Services session**: Removal of the smart card disconnects the session without signing out the user. The user can reinsert the smart card and resume the session later, or at another computer that's equipped with a smart card reader, without having to sign in again. If the session is local, this policy setting functions identically to the **Lock Workstation** option.
**Note**: In earlier versions of Windows Server, Remote Desktop Services was called Terminal Services. |
From the Local Security Policy Editor (secpol.msc), you can edit and apply system policies to manage credential delegation for local or domain computers.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/toc.yml b/windows/security/identity-protection/toc.yml
index 2b006e3ca0..5762bfaf81 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/toc.yml
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/toc.yml
@@ -3,16 +3,18 @@ items:
href: index.md
- name: Passwordless sign-in
items:
- - name: Windows Hello for Business 🔗
- href: hello-for-business/index.md
+ - name: Passwordless strategy
+ href: hello-for-business/passwordless-strategy.md
+ - name: Windows Hello for Business
+ href: hello-for-business/toc.yml
- name: Windows presence sensing
href: https://support.microsoft.com/windows/wake-your-windows-11-pc-when-you-approach-82285c93-440c-4e15-9081-c9e38c1290bb
- - name: Windows Hello for Business Enhanced Security Sign-in (ESS) 🔗
- href: /windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/windows-hello-enhanced-sign-in-security
- - name: FIDO 2 security key 🔗
+ - name: FIDO2 security key 🔗
href: /azure/active-directory/authentication/howto-authentication-passwordless-security-key
- - name: Federated sign-in 🔗
- href: /education/windows/federated-sign-in
+ - name: Windows passwordless experience
+ href: passwordless-experience/index.md
+ - name: Passkeys
+ href: passkeys/index.md
- name: Smart Cards
href: smart-cards/toc.yml
- name: Virtual smart cards
@@ -20,6 +22,10 @@ items:
displayName: VSC
- name: Enterprise Certificate Pinning
href: enterprise-certificate-pinning.md
+ - name: Web sign-in
+ href: web-sign-in/index.md
+ - name: Federated sign-in 🔗
+ href: /education/windows/federated-sign-in
- name: Advanced credential protection
items:
- name: Windows LAPS (Local Administrator Password Solution) 🔗
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/web-sign-in/images/lock-screen.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/web-sign-in/images/lock-screen.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dfe0a0687e
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diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/web-sign-in/images/web-sign-in-authenticator.gif b/windows/security/identity-protection/web-sign-in/images/web-sign-in-authenticator.gif
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..499f39dbb5
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diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/web-sign-in/images/web-sign-in-authenticator.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/web-sign-in/images/web-sign-in-authenticator.png
new file mode 100644
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diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/web-sign-in/images/web-sign-in-credential-provider.svg b/windows/security/identity-protection/web-sign-in/images/web-sign-in-credential-provider.svg
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1afb38e115
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/web-sign-in/images/web-sign-in-credential-provider.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/web-sign-in/images/web-sign-in-federated-auth.gif b/windows/security/identity-protection/web-sign-in/images/web-sign-in-federated-auth.gif
new file mode 100644
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new file mode 100644
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new file mode 100644
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diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/web-sign-in/images/web-sign-in-preferred-tenant.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/web-sign-in/images/web-sign-in-preferred-tenant.png
new file mode 100644
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new file mode 100644
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diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/web-sign-in/images/web-sign-in-tap.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/web-sign-in/images/web-sign-in-tap.png
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diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/web-sign-in/index.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/web-sign-in/index.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f13acff6dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/web-sign-in/index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+---
+title: Web sign-in for Windows
+description: Learn how Web sign-in in Windows works, key scenarios, and how to configure it.
+ms.date: 09/27/2023
+ms.topic: how-to
+appliesto:
+ - ✅ Windows 11
+ms.collection:
+ - highpri
+ - tier1
+---
+
+# Web sign-in for Windows
+
+Starting in Windows 11, version 22H2 with [KB5030310][KB-1], you can enable a web-based sign-in experience on Microsoft Entra joined devices, unlocking new sign-in options and capabilities.
+This feature is called *Web sign-in*.
+
+Web sign-in is a *credential provider*, and it was initially introduced in Windows 10 with support for Temporary Access Pass (TAP) only. With the release of Windows 11, the supported scenarios and capabilities of Web sign-in are expanded.\
+For example, you can sign in with the Microsoft Authenticator app or with a SAML-P federated identity.
+
+This article describes how to configure Web sign-in and the supported key scenarios.
+
+## System requirements
+
+To use web sign-in, the clients must meet the following prerequisites:
+
+- Windows 11, version 22H2 with [5030310][KB-1], or later
+- Must be [Microsoft Entra joined](/entra/identity/devices/concept-directory-join)
+- Must have Internet connectivity, as the authentication is done over the Internet
+
+[!INCLUDE [federated-sign-in](../../../../includes/licensing/web-sign-in.md)]
+
+## Configure web sign-in
+
+To use web sign-in, your devices must be configured with different policies. Review the following instructions to configure your devices using either Microsoft Intune or a provisioning package (PPKG).
+
+#### [:::image type="icon" source="../../images/icons/intune.svg"::: **Intune**](#tab/intune)
+
+[!INCLUDE [intune-settings-catalog-1](../../../../includes/configure/intune-settings-catalog-1.md)]
+
+| Category | Setting name | Value |
+|--|--|--|
+| Authentication | Enable Web Sign In | Enabled |
+| Authentication | Configure Web Sign In Allowed Urls | This setting is optional, and it contains a list of domains required for sign in, for example:
- `idp.example.com`
- `example.com` |
+| Authentication | Configure Webcam Access Domain Names | This setting is optional, and it should be configured if you need to use the webcam during the sign-in process. Specify the list of domains that are allowed to use the webcam during the sign-in process, for example: `example.com` |
+
+[!INCLUDE [intune-settings-catalog-2](../../../../includes/configure/intune-settings-catalog-2.md)]
+
+Alternatively, you can configure devices using a [custom policy][INT-1] with the following settings:
+
+| OMA-URI | More information |
+|-|-|
+| `./Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/Authentication/EnableWebSignIn`| [EnableWebSignIn](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-authentication#enablewebsignin) |
+| `./Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/Authentication/ConfigureWebSignInAllowedUrls`|[ConfigureWebSignInAllowedUrls](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-authentication#configurewebsigninallowedurls)|
+| `./Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/Authentication/ConfigureWebCamAccessDomainNames`|[ConfigureWebcamAccessDomainNames](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-authentication#configurewebcamaccessdomainnames)|
+
+#### [:::image type="icon" source="../../images/icons/provisioning-package.svg"::: **PPKG**](#tab/ppkg)
+
+[!INCLUDE [provisioning-package-1](../../../../includes/configure/provisioning-package-1.md)]
+
+| Path | Setting name | Value |
+|--|--|--|
+| `Policies/Authentication` | `EnableWebSignIn` | Enabled |
+| `Policies/Authentication` | `ConfigureWebSignInAllowedUrls` | This setting is optional, and it contains a semicolon-separated list of domains required for sign in, for example: `idp.example.com;example.com` |
+| `Policies/Authentication` | `ConfigureWebCamAccessDomainNames` | This setting is optional, and it should be configured if you need to use the webcam during the sign-in process. Specify the list of domains that are allowed to use the webcam during the sign-in process, separated by a semicolon. For example: `example.com` |
+
+[!INCLUDE [provisioning-package-2](../../../../includes/configure/provisioning-package-2.md)]
+
+---
+
+## User experiences
+
+Once the devices are configured, a new sign-in experience becomes available, as indicated by the presence of the Web sign-in credential provider :::image type="icon" source="images/web-sign-in-credential-provider.svg" border="false"::: in the Windows lock screen.
+
+:::image type="content" source="images/lock-screen.png" border="false" lightbox="images/lock-screen.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the Windows lock screen showing the Web sign-in credential provider.":::
+
+Here's a list of key scenarios supported by Web sign-in, and a brief animation showing the user experience. Select the thumbnail to start the animation.
+
+### Passwordless sign-in
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="3":::
+ Users can sign in to Windows passwordless, even before enrolling in Windows Hello for Business. For example, by using the Microsoft Authenticator app as a sign-in method.
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column span="1":::
+ :::image type="content" source="images/web-sign-in-authenticator.png" border="false" lightbox="images/web-sign-in-authenticator.gif" alt-text="Animation of the Web sign-in experience with Microsoft Authenticator.":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+
+> [!TIP]
+> When used in conjuction with *Windows Hello for Business passwordless*, you can hide the password credential provider from the lock screen as well as in-session authentication scenarios. This enables a truly passwordless Windows experience.
+
+To learn more:
+- [Enable passwordless sign-in with Microsoft Authenticator][AAD-1]
+- [Passwordless authentication options for Microsoft Entra ID][AAD-2]
+- [Windows passwordless experience](../passwordless-experience/index.md)
+
+### Windows Hello for Business PIN reset
+
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="3":::
+ The Windows Hello PIN reset flow is seamless and more robust than in previous versions.
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column span="1":::
+ :::image type="content" source="images/web-sign-in-pin-reset.png" border="false" lightbox="images/web-sign-in-pin-reset.gif" alt-text="Animation of the PIN reset in experience.":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+
+For more information, see [PIN reset](../hello-for-business/hello-feature-pin-reset.md).
+
+### Temporary Access Pass (TAP)
+
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="3":::
+ A Temporary Access Pass (TAP) is a time-limited passcode granted by an administrator to a user. Users can sign in with a TAP using the Web sign-in credential provider. For example:
+
+ - to onboard Windows Hello for Business or a FIDO2 security key
+ - if lost or forgotten FIDO2 security key and unknown password
+
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column span="1":::
+ :::image type="content" source="images/web-sign-in-tap.png" border="false" lightbox="images/web-sign-in-tap.gif" alt-text="Animation of the TAP sign in experience.":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+
+For more information, see [Use a Temporary Access Pass][AAD-3].
+
+### Sign in with a federated identity
+
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="3":::
+ If the Microsoft Entra tenant is federated with a third-party SAML-P identity provider (IdP), federated users can sign using the Web sign-in credential provider.
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column span="1":::
+ :::image type="content" source="images/web-sign-in-federated-auth.png" border="false" lightbox="images/web-sign-in-federated-auth.gif" alt-text="Animation of the sign in experience with a federated user.":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+
+> [!TIP]
+> To improve the user experience for federated identities:
+>
+> - Configure the *preferred Microsoft Entra tenant name* feature, which allows users to select the domain name during the sign-in process. The users are then automatically redirected to the identity provider sign-in page.
+> - Enable Windows Hello for Business. Once the user signs in, the user can enroll in Windows Hello for Business and then use it to sign in to the device
+
+For more information about preferred tenant name, see [Authentication CSP - PreferredAadTenantDomainName][WIN-1].
+
+## Important considerations
+
+Here's a list of important considerations to keep in mind when configuring or using Web sign-in:
+
+- Cached credentials aren't supported with Web sign-in. If the device is offline, the user can't use the Web sign-in credential provider to sign in
+- After sign out, the user isn't displayed in the user selection list
+- Once enabled, the Web sign-in credential provider is the default credential provider for new users signing in to the device. To change the default credential provider, you can use the [DefaultCredentialProvider][WIN-2] ADMX-backed policy
+- The user can exit the Web sign-in flow by pressing Ctrl+Alt+Delete to get back to the Windows lock screen
+
+### Known issues
+
+- If you attempt to sign in while the device is offline, you get the following message: *It doesn't look that you're connected to the Internet. Check your connection and try again*. Selecting the *Back to sign-in* option doesn't bring you back to the lock screen. As a workaround, you can press Ctrl+Alt+Delete to get back to the lock screen.
+
+### :::image type="icon" source="../../images/icons/feedback.svg" border="false"::: Provide feedback
+
+To provide feedback for web sign-in, open [**Feedback Hub**][FHUB] and use the category **Security and Privacy > Passwordless experience**.
+
+
+
+[AAD-1]: /azure/active-directory/authentication/howto-authentication-passwordless-phone
+[AAD-2]: /azure/active-directory/authentication/concept-authentication-passwordless
+[AAD-3]: /azure/active-directory/authentication/howto-authentication-temporary-access-pass
+[FHUB]: feedback-hub://?tabid=2&newFeedback=true&feedbackType=1
+[INT-1]: /mem/intune/configuration/custom-settings-windows-10
+[KB-1]: https://support.microsoft.com/kb/5030310
+[WIN-1]: /windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-authentication#preferredaadtenantdomainname
+[WIN-2]: /windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-credentialproviders#defaultcredentialprovider
diff --git a/windows/security/images/icons/feedback.svg b/windows/security/images/icons/feedback.svg
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2ecd143695
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/security/images/icons/feedback.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+
diff --git a/windows/security/images/icons/key.svg b/windows/security/images/icons/key.svg
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c9df33c18f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/security/images/icons/key.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/images/icons/provisioning-package.svg b/windows/security/images/icons/provisioning-package.svg
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dbbad7d780
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/security/images/icons/provisioning-package.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/includes/sections/application.md b/windows/security/includes/sections/application.md
index 34f9e6a785..8b6b510ef4 100644
--- a/windows/security/includes/sections/application.md
+++ b/windows/security/includes/sections/application.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
author: paolomatarazzo
ms.author: paoloma
-ms.date: 08/02/2023
+ms.date: 09/18/2023
ms.topic: include
---
@@ -10,17 +10,17 @@ ms.topic: include
| Feature name | Description |
|:---|:---|
| **[Smart App Control](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/windows-defender-application-control)** | Smart App Control prevents users from running malicious applications on Windows devices by blocking untrusted or unsigned applications. Smart App Control goes beyond previous built-in browser protections, by adding another layer of security that is woven directly into the core of the OS at the process level. Using AI, our new Smart App Control only allows processes to run that are predicted to be safe based on existing and new intelligence processed daily. Smart App Control builds on top of the same cloud-based AI used in Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) to predict the safety of an application, so people can be confident they're using safe and reliable applications on their new Windows 11 devices, or Windows 11 devices that have been reset. |
-| **[AppLocker](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/applocker-overview)** | |
| **[Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC)](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/windows-defender-application-control)** | Your organization is only as secure as the applications that run on your devices. With application control, apps must earn trust to run, in contrast to an application trust model where all code is assumed trustworthy. By helping prevent unwanted or malicious code from running, application control is an important part of an effective security strategy. Many organizations cite application control as one of the most effective means for addressing the threat of executable file-based malware.
Windows 10 and above include Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) and AppLocker. WDAC is the next generation app control solution for Windows and provides powerful control over what runs in your environment. Customers who were using AppLocker on previous versions of Windows can continue to use the feature as they consider whether to switch to WDAC for the stronger protection. |
+| **[AppLocker](/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/applocker-overview)** | |
| **[User Account Control (UAC)](/windows/security/application-security/application-control/user-account-control/)** | User Account Control (UAC) helps prevent malware from damaging a device. With UAC, apps and tasks always run in the security context of a non-administrator account, unless an administrator authorizes administrator-level access to the system. UAC can block the automatic installation of unauthorized apps and prevents inadvertent changes to system settings. Enabling UAC helps to prevent malware from altering device settings and potentially gaining access to networks and sensitive data. UAC can also block the automatic installation of unauthorized apps and prevent inadvertent changes to system settings. |
-| **[Microsoft vulnerable driver blocklist](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules)** | The Windows kernel is the most privileged software and is therefore a compelling target for malware authors. Since Windows has strict requirements for code running in the kernel, cybercriminals commonly exploit vulnerabilities in kernel drivers to get access. Microsoft works with the ecosystem partners to constantly identify and respond to potentially vulnerable kernel drivers.
Prior to Windows 11, version 22H2, the operating system enforced a block policy when HVCI is enabled to prevent vulnerable versions of drivers from running. Starting in Windows 11, version 22H2, the block policy is enabled by default for all new Windows devices, and users can opt-in to enforce the policy from the Windows Security app. |
+| **[Microsoft vulnerable driver blocklist](/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/design/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules)** | The Windows kernel is the most privileged software and is therefore a compelling target for malware authors. Since Windows has strict requirements for code running in the kernel, cybercriminals commonly exploit vulnerabilities in kernel drivers to get access. Microsoft works with the ecosystem partners to constantly identify and respond to potentially vulnerable kernel drivers.
Prior to Windows 11, version 22H2, the operating system enforced a block policy when HVCI is enabled to prevent vulnerable versions of drivers from running. Starting in Windows 11, version 22H2, the block policy is enabled by default for all new Windows devices, and users can opt-in to enforce the policy from the Windows Security app. |
## Application isolation
| Feature name | Description |
|:---|:---|
-| **[Microsoft Defender Application Guard (MDAG) for Edge standalone mode](/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/md-app-guard-overview)** | Standalone mode allows Windows users to use hardware-isolated browsing sessions without any administrator or management policy configuration. In this mode, user must manually start Microsoft Edge in Application Guard from Edge menu for browsing untrusted sites. |
-| **[Microsoft Defender Application Guard (MDAG) for Edge enterprise mode and enterprise management](/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/configure-md-app-guard)** | Microsoft Defender Application Guard protects users' desktop while they browse the Internet using Microsoft Edge browser. Application Guard in enterprise mode automatically redirects untrusted website navigation in an anonymous and isolated Hyper-V based container, which is separate from the host operating system. With Enterprise mode, you can define your corporate boundaries by explicitly adding trusted domains and can customizing the Application Guard experience to meet and enforce your organization needs on Windows devices. |
+| **[Microsoft Defender Application Guard (MDAG) for Edge standalone mode](/windows/security/application-security/application-isolation/microsoft-defender-application-guard/md-app-guard-overview)** | Standalone mode allows Windows users to use hardware-isolated browsing sessions without any administrator or management policy configuration. In this mode, user must manually start Microsoft Edge in Application Guard from Edge menu for browsing untrusted sites. |
+| **[Microsoft Defender Application Guard (MDAG) for Edge enterprise mode and enterprise management](/windows/security/application-security/application-isolation/microsoft-defender-application-guard/configure-md-app-guard)** | Microsoft Defender Application Guard protects users' desktop while they browse the Internet using Microsoft Edge browser. Application Guard in enterprise mode automatically redirects untrusted website navigation in an anonymous and isolated Hyper-V based container, which is separate from the host operating system. With Enterprise mode, you can define your corporate boundaries by explicitly adding trusted domains and can customizing the Application Guard experience to meet and enforce your organization needs on Windows devices. |
| **Microsoft Defender Application Guard (MDAG) public APIs** | Enable applications using them to be isolated Hyper-V based container, which is separate from the host operating system. |
| **[Microsoft Defender Application Guard (MDAG) for Microsoft Office](https://support.microsoft.com/office/application-guard-for-office-9e0fb9c2-ffad-43bf-8ba3-78f785fdba46)** | Application Guard protects Office files including Word, PowerPoint, and Excel. Application icons have a small shield if Application Guard has been enabled and they are under protection. |
| **[Microsoft Defender Application Guard (MDAG) configure via MDM](/windows/client-management/mdm/windowsdefenderapplicationguard-csp)** | The WindowsDefenderApplicationGuard configuration service provider (CSP) is used by the enterprise to configure the settings in Microsoft Defender Application Guard. |
diff --git a/windows/security/includes/sections/cloud-services.md b/windows/security/includes/sections/cloud-services.md
index 07fc5b88b5..efde3a725d 100644
--- a/windows/security/includes/sections/cloud-services.md
+++ b/windows/security/includes/sections/cloud-services.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
author: paolomatarazzo
ms.author: paoloma
-ms.date: 08/02/2023
+ms.date: 09/18/2023
ms.topic: include
---
@@ -9,10 +9,10 @@ ms.topic: include
| Feature name | Description |
|:---|:---|
-| **[Azure AD join, Active Directory domain join, and Hybrid Azure AD join with single sign-on (SSO)](/azure/active-directory/devices/concept-azure-ad-join)** | Microsoft Azure Active Directory is a comprehensive cloud-based identity management solution that helps enable secure access to applications, networks, and other resources and guard against threats. |
-| **[Security baselines](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-security-configuration-framework/windows-security-baselines)** | Windows 11 supports modern device management so that IT pros can manage company security policies and business applications without compromising user privacy on corporate or employee-owned devices. With MDM solutions, IT can manage Windows 11 using industry-standard protocols. To simplify setup for users, management features are built directly into Windows, eliminating the need for a separate MDM client.
Windows 11 can be configured with Microsoft's MDM security baseline backed by ADMX policies, which functions like the Microsoft GP-based security baseline. The security baseline enables IT administrators to easily address security concerns and compliance needs for modern cloud-managed devices. |
+| **[Active Directory domain join, Microsoft Entra join, and Microsoft Entra hybrid join with single sign-on (SSO)](/azure/active-directory/devices/concept-directory-join)** | Microsoft Entra ID is a comprehensive cloud-based identity management solution that helps enable secure access to applications, networks, and other resources and guard against threats. |
+| **[Security baselines](/windows/security/operating-system-security/device-management/windows-security-configuration-framework/windows-security-baselines)** | Windows 11 supports modern device management so that IT pros can manage company security policies and business applications without compromising user privacy on corporate or employee-owned devices. With MDM solutions, IT can manage Windows 11 using industry-standard protocols. To simplify setup for users, management features are built directly into Windows, eliminating the need for a separate MDM client.
Windows 11 can be configured with Microsoft's MDM security baseline backed by ADMX policies, which functions like the Microsoft GP-based security baseline. The security baseline enables IT administrators to easily address security concerns and compliance needs for modern cloud-managed devices. |
| **[Remote wipe](/windows/client-management/mdm/remotewipe-csp)** | When a device is lost or stolen, IT administrators may want to remotely wipe data stored on the device. A helpdesk agent may also want to reset devices to fix issues encountered by remote workers.
With the Remote Wipe configuration service provider (CSP), an MDM solution can remotely initiate any of the following operations on a Windows device: reset the device and remove user accounts and data, reset the device and clean the drive, reset the device but persist user accounts and data. |
| **[Modern device management through (MDM)](/windows/client-management/mdm-overview)** | Windows 11 supports modern device management through mobile device management (MDM) protocols.
IT pros can manage company security policies and business applications without compromising user privacy on corporate or employee-owned devices. With MDM solutions, IT can manage Windows 11 using industry-standard protocols.
To simplify setup for users, management features are built directly into Windows, eliminating the need for a separate MDM client. |
| **[Universal Print](/universal-print/)** | Unlike traditional print solutions that rely on Windows print servers, Universal Print is a Microsoft hosted cloud subscription service that supports a zero-trust security model by enabling network isolation of printers, including the Universal Print connector software, from the rest of the organization's resources. |
| **[Windows Autopatch](/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/)** | With the Autopatch service, IT teams can delegate management of updates to Windows 10/11, Microsoft Edge, and Microsoft 365 apps to Microsoft. Under the hood, Autopatch takes over configuration of the policies and deployment service of Windows Update for Business. What the customer gets are endpoints that are up to date, thanks to dynamically generated rings for progressive deployment that will pause and/or roll back updates (where possible) when issues arise.
The goal is to provide peace of mind to IT pros, encourage rapid adoption of updates, and to reduce bandwidth required to deploy them successfully, thereby closing gaps in protection that may have been open to exploitation by malicious actors. |
-| **[Windows Autopilot](/windows/deployment/windows-autopilot)** | Windows Autopilot simplifies the way devices get deployed, reset, and repurposed, with an experience that is zero touch for IT. |
+| **[Windows Autopilot](/autopilot/)** | Windows Autopilot simplifies the way devices get deployed, reset, and repurposed, with an experience that is zero touch for IT. |
diff --git a/windows/security/includes/sections/hardware.md b/windows/security/includes/sections/hardware.md
index 11a4f97b60..fa6c065293 100644
--- a/windows/security/includes/sections/hardware.md
+++ b/windows/security/includes/sections/hardware.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
author: paolomatarazzo
ms.author: paoloma
-ms.date: 08/02/2023
+ms.date: 09/18/2023
ms.topic: include
---
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ ms.topic: include
| **[Virtualization-based security (VBS)](/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-vbs)** | In addition to a modern hardware root-of-trust, there are numerous other capabilities in the latest chips that harden the operating system against threats, such as by protecting the boot process, safeguarding the integrity of memory, isolating security sensitive compute logic, and more. Two examples include Virtualization-based security (VBS) and Hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI). Virtualization-based security (VBS), also known as core isolation, is a critical building block in a secure system. VBS uses hardware virtualization features to host a secure kernel separated from the operating system. This means that even if the operating system is compromised, the secure kernel remains protected.
Starting with Windows 10, all new devices are required to ship with firmware support for VBS and HCVI enabled by default in the BIOS. Customers can then enable the OS support in Windows.
With new installs of Windows 11, OS support for VBS and HVCI is turned on by default for all devices that meet prerequisites. |
| **[Hypervisor-protected Code Integrity (HVCI)](/windows/security/hardware-security/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity)** | Hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI), also called memory integrity, uses VBS to run Kernel Mode Code Integrity (KMCI) inside the secure VBS environment instead of the main Windows kernel. This helps to prevent attacks that attempt to modify kernel mode code, such as drivers. The KMCI role is to check that all kernel code is properly signed and hasn't been tampered with before it is allowed to run. HVCI helps to ensure that only validated code can be executed in kernel-mode.
Starting with Windows 10, all new devices are required to ship with firmware support for VBS and HCVI enabled by default in the BIOS. Customers can then enable the OS support in Windows.
With new installs of Windows 11, OS support for VBS and HVCI is turned on by default for all devices that meet prerequisites. |
| **[Hardware-enforced stack protection](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-os-platform-blog/understanding-hardware-enforced-stack-protection/ba-p/1247815)** | Hardware-enforced stack protection integrates software and hardware for a modern defense against cyberthreats such as memory corruption and zero-day exploits. Based on Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) from Intel and AMD Shadow Stacks, hardware-enforced stack protection is designed to protect against exploit techniques that try to hijack return addresses on the stack. |
-| **[Kernel Direct Memory Access (DMA) protection](/windows/security/information-protection/kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt)** | Kernel DMA Protection protects against external peripherals from gaining unauthorized access to memory. Physical threats such as drive-by Direct Memory Access (DMA) attacks typically happen quickly while the system owner isn't present. PCIe hot plug devices such as Thunderbolt, USB4, and CFexpress allow users to attach new classes of external peripherals, including graphics cards or other PCI devices, to their PCs with the plug-and-play ease of USB. Because PCI hot plug ports are external and easily accessible, devices are susceptible to drive-by DMA attacks. |
+| **[Kernel Direct Memory Access (DMA) protection](/windows/security/hardware-security/kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt)** | Kernel DMA Protection protects against external peripherals from gaining unauthorized access to memory. Physical threats such as drive-by Direct Memory Access (DMA) attacks typically happen quickly while the system owner isn't present. PCIe hot plug devices such as Thunderbolt, USB4, and CFexpress allow users to attach new classes of external peripherals, including graphics cards or other PCI devices, to their PCs with the plug-and-play ease of USB. Because PCI hot plug ports are external and easily accessible, devices are susceptible to drive-by DMA attacks. |
## Secured-core PC
diff --git a/windows/security/includes/sections/identity.md b/windows/security/includes/sections/identity.md
index 191dfb47cb..5a643de599 100644
--- a/windows/security/includes/sections/identity.md
+++ b/windows/security/includes/sections/identity.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
author: paolomatarazzo
ms.author: paoloma
-ms.date: 08/02/2023
+ms.date: 09/18/2023
ms.topic: include
---
@@ -9,20 +9,23 @@ ms.topic: include
| Feature name | Description |
|:---|:---|
-| **[Windows Hello for Business](/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business)** | Windows 11 devices can protect user identities by removing the need to use passwords from day one. It's easy to get started with the method that's right for your organization. A password may only need to be used once during the provisioning process, after which people use a PIN, face, or fingerprint to unlock credentials and sign into the device.
Windows Hello for Business replaces the username and password by combining a security key or certificate with a PIN or biometrics data, and then mapping the credentials to a user account during setup. There are multiple ways to deploy Windows Hello for Business, depending on your organization's needs. Organizations that rely on certificates typically use on-premises public key infrastructure (PKI) to support authentication through Certificate Trust. Organizations using key trust deployment require root-of-trust provided by certificates on domain controllers. |
-| **[Windows presence sensing](https://support.microsoft.com/windows/wake-your-windows-11-pc-when-you-approach-82285c93-440c-4e15-9081-c9e38c1290bb)** | Windows presence sensing provides another layer of data security protection for hybrid workers. Windows 11 devices can intelligently adapt to your presence to help you stay secure and productive, whether you're working at home, the office, or a public environment. Windows presence sensing combines presence detection sensors with Windows Hello facial recognition to automatically lock your device when you leave, and then unlock your device and sign you in using Windows Hello facial recognition when you return. Requires OEM supporting hardware. |
+| **[Windows Hello for Business](/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/)** | Windows 11 devices can protect user identities by removing the need to use passwords from day one. It's easy to get started with the method that's right for your organization. A password may only need to be used once during the provisioning process, after which people use a PIN, face, or fingerprint to unlock credentials and sign into the device.
Windows Hello for Business replaces the username and password by combining a security key or certificate with a PIN or biometrics data, and then mapping the credentials to a user account during setup. There are multiple ways to deploy Windows Hello for Business, depending on your organization's needs. Organizations that rely on certificates typically use on-premises public key infrastructure (PKI) to support authentication through Certificate Trust. Organizations using key trust deployment require root-of-trust provided by certificates on domain controllers. |
+| **[Windows presence sensing](https://support.microsoft.com/windows/managing-presence-sensing-settings-in-windows-11-82285c93-440c-4e15-9081-c9e38c1290bb)** | Windows presence sensing provides another layer of data security protection for hybrid workers. Windows 11 devices can intelligently adapt to your presence to help you stay secure and productive, whether you're working at home, the office, or a public environment. Windows presence sensing combines presence detection sensors with Windows Hello facial recognition to automatically lock your device when you leave, and then unlock your device and sign you in using Windows Hello facial recognition when you return. Requires OEM supporting hardware. |
| **[Windows Hello for Business Enhanced Security Sign-in (ESS)](/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/windows-hello-enhanced-sign-in-security)** | Windows Hello biometrics also supports enhanced sign-in security, which uses specialized hardware and software components to raise the security bar even higher for biometric sign in.
Enhanced sign-in security biometrics uses VBS and the TPM to isolate user authentication processes and data and secure the pathway by which the information is communicated. These specialized components protect against a class of attacks that include biometric sample injection, replay, tampering, and more.
For example, fingerprint readers must implement Secure Device Connection Protocol, which uses key negotiation and a Microsoft-issued certificate to protect and securely store user authentication data. For facial recognition, components such as the Secure Devices (SDEV) table and process isolation with trustlets help prevent additional class of attacks. |
-| **[Fast Identity Online (FIDO2) security key](/azure/active-directory/authentication/howto-authentication-passwordless-security-key)** | Fast Identity Online (FIDO) defined CTAP and WebAuthN specifications are becoming the open standard for providing strong authentication that is non-phishable, user-friendly, and privacy-respecting with implementations from major platform providers and relying parties. FIDO standards and certifications are becoming recognized as the leading standard for creating secure authentication solutions across enterprises, governments, and consumer markets.
Windows 11 can use external FIDO2 security keys for authentication alongside or in addition to Windows Hello which is also a FIDO2 certified passwordless solution. Windows 11 can be used as a FIDO authenticator for many popular identity management services. |
-| **[Federated sign-in](/education/windows/federated-sign-in)** | Windows 11 Education editions support federated sign-in with third-party identity providers. Federated sign-in enables secure sign in through methods like QR codes or pictures. |
+| **[Windows passwordless experience](/windows/security/identity-protection/passwordless-experience)** | Windows passwordless experience is a security policy that aims to create a more user-friendly experience for Microsoft Entra joined devices by eliminating the need for passwords in certain authentication scenarios. By enabling this policy, users will not be given the option to use a password in these scenarios, which helps organizations transition away from passwords over time. |
+| **[Passkeys](/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys)** | Passkeys provide a more secure and convenient method to logging into websites and applications compared to passwords. Unlike passwords, which users must remember and type, passkeys are stored as secrets on a device and can use a device's unlock mechanism (such as biometrics or a PIN). Passkeys can be used without the need for other sign in challenges, making the authentication process faster, secure, and more convenient. |
+| **[FIDO2 security key](/azure/active-directory/authentication/howto-authentication-passwordless-security-key)** | Fast Identity Online (FIDO) defined CTAP and WebAuthN specifications are becoming the open standard for providing strong authentication that is non-phishable, user-friendly, and privacy-respecting with implementations from major platform providers and relying parties. FIDO standards and certifications are becoming recognized as the leading standard for creating secure authentication solutions across enterprises, governments, and consumer markets.
Windows 11 can use external FIDO2 security keys for authentication alongside or in addition to Windows Hello which is also a FIDO2 certified passwordless solution. Windows 11 can be used as a FIDO authenticator for many popular identity management services. |
| **[Smart Cards for Windows Service](/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-smart-cards-for-windows-service)** | Organizations also have the option of using smart cards, an authentication method that pre-dates biometric sign in. Smart cards are tamper-resistant, portable storage devices that can enhance Windows security when authenticating clients, signing code, securing e-mail, and signing in with Windows domain accounts. Smart cards can only be used to sign into domain accounts, not local accounts. When a password is used to sign into a domain account, Windows uses the Kerberos version 5 (v5) protocol for authentication. If you use a smart card, the operating system uses Kerberos v5 authentication with X.509 v3 certificates. |
## Advanced credential protection
| Feature name | Description |
|:---|:---|
-| **[Windows LAPS](/windows-server/identity/laps/laps-overview)** | Windows Local Administrator Password Solution (Windows LAPS) is a Windows feature that automatically manages and backs up the password of a local administrator account on your Azure Active Directory-joined or Windows Server Active Directory-joined devices. You also can use Windows LAPS to automatically manage and back up the Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM) account password on your Windows Server Active Directory domain controllers. An authorized administrator can retrieve the DSRM password and use it. |
+| **[Web sign-in](/windows/security/identity-protection/web-sign-in)** | Web sign-in is a credential provider initially introduced in Windows 10 with support for Temporary Access Pass (TAP) only. With the release of Windows 11, the supported scenarios and capabilities of Web sign-in have been expanded. For example, users can sign-in to Windows using the Microsoft Authenticator app or with a federated identity. |
+| **[Federated sign-in](/education/windows/federated-sign-in)** | Windows 11 Education editions support federated sign-in with third-party identity providers. Federated sign-in enables secure sign in through methods like QR codes or pictures. |
+| **[Windows LAPS](/windows-server/identity/laps/laps-overview)** | Windows Local Administrator Password Solution (Windows LAPS) is a Windows feature that automatically manages and backs up the password of a local administrator account on your Microsoft Entra joined or Windows Server Active Directory-joined devices. You also can use Windows LAPS to automatically manage and back up the Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM) account password on your Windows Server Active Directory domain controllers. An authorized administrator can retrieve the DSRM password and use it. |
| **[Account Lockout Policy](/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/account-lockout-policy)** | Account Lockout Policy settings control the response threshold for failed logon attempts and the actions to be taken after the threshold is reached. |
-| **[Enhanced phishing protection with SmartScreen](/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-smartscreen/phishing-protection-microsoft-defender-smartscreen)** | Users who are still using passwords can benefit from powerful credential protection. Microsoft Defender SmartScreen includes enhanced phishing protection to automatically detect when a user enters their Microsoft password into any app or website. Windows then identifies if the app or site is securely authenticating to Microsoft and warns if the credentials are at risk. Since users are alerted at the moment of potential credential theft, they can take preemptive action before their password is used against them or their organization. |
+| **[Enhanced phishing protection with SmartScreen](/windows/security/operating-system-security/virus-and-threat-protection/microsoft-defender-smartscreen/enhanced-phishing-protection)** | Users who are still using passwords can benefit from powerful credential protection. Microsoft Defender SmartScreen includes enhanced phishing protection to automatically detect when a user enters their Microsoft password into any app or website. Windows then identifies if the app or site is securely authenticating to Microsoft and warns if the credentials are at risk. Since users are alerted at the moment of potential credential theft, they can take preemptive action before their password is used against them or their organization. |
| **[Access Control (ACL/SACL)](/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/access-control)** | Access control in Windows ensures that shared resources are available to users and groups other than the resource's owner and are protected from unauthorized use. IT administrators can manage users', groups', and computers' access to objects and assets on a network or computer. After a user is authenticated, the Windows operating system implements the second phase of protecting resources by using built-in authorization and access control technologies to determine if an authenticated user has the correct permissions.
Access Control Lists (ACL) describe the permissions for a specific object and can also contain System Access Control Lists (SACL). SACLs provide a way to audit specific system level events, such as when a user attempt to access file system objects. These events are essential for tracking activity for objects that are sensitive or valuable and require extra monitoring. Being able to audit when a resource attempts to read or write part of the operating system is critical to understanding a potential attack. |
-| **[Credential Guard](/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard)** | Credential Guard uses hardware-backed, Virtualization-based security (VBS) to protect against credential theft. With Credential Guard, the Local Security Authority (LSA) stores and protects secrets in an isolated environment that isn't accessible to the rest of the operating system. LSA uses remote procedure calls to communicate with the isolated LSA process.
By protecting the LSA process with Virtualization-based security, Credential Guard shields systems from credential theft attack techniques like pass-the-hash or pass-the-ticket. It also helps prevent malware from accessing system secrets even if the process is running with admin privileges. |
+| **[Credential Guard](/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/)** | Enabled by default in Windows 11 Enterprise, Credential Guard uses hardware-backed, Virtualization-based security (VBS) to protect against credential theft. With Credential Guard, the Local Security Authority (LSA) stores and protects secrets in an isolated environment that isn't accessible to the rest of the operating system. LSA uses remote procedure calls to communicate with the isolated LSA process.
By protecting the LSA process with Virtualization-based security, Credential Guard shields systems from credential theft attack techniques like pass-the-hash or pass-the-ticket. It also helps prevent malware from accessing system secrets even if the process is running with admin privileges. |
| **[Remote Credential Guard](/windows/security/identity-protection/remote-credential-guard)** | Remote Credential Guard helps you protect your credentials over a Remote Desktop connection by redirecting the Kerberos requests back to the device that is requesting the connection. It also provides single sign-on experiences for Remote Desktop sessions.
Administrator credentials are highly privileged and must be protected. When you use Remote Credential Guard to connect during Remote Desktop sessions, your credential and credential derivatives are never passed over the network to the target device. If the target device is compromised, your credentials aren't exposed. |
diff --git a/windows/security/includes/sections/operating-system-security.md b/windows/security/includes/sections/operating-system-security.md
index 3a748fac25..4a4ee4acf2 100644
--- a/windows/security/includes/sections/operating-system-security.md
+++ b/windows/security/includes/sections/operating-system-security.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
author: paolomatarazzo
ms.author: paoloma
-ms.date: 08/02/2023
+ms.date: 09/18/2023
ms.topic: include
---
@@ -9,10 +9,11 @@ ms.topic: include
| Feature name | Description |
|:---|:---|
-| **[Secure Boot and Trusted Boot](/windows/security/trusted-boot)** | Secure Boot and Trusted Boot help to prevent malware and corrupted components from loading when a device starts.
Secure Boot starts with initial boot-up protection, and then Trusted Boot picks up the process. Together, Secure Boot and Trusted Boot help to ensure the system boots up safely and securely. |
+| **[Secure Boot and Trusted Boot](/windows/security/operating-system-security/system-security/trusted-boot)** | Secure Boot and Trusted Boot help to prevent malware and corrupted components from loading when a device starts.
Secure Boot starts with initial boot-up protection, and then Trusted Boot picks up the process. Together, Secure Boot and Trusted Boot help to ensure the system boots up safely and securely. |
| **[Measured boot](/windows/compatibility/measured-boot)** | Measured Boot measures all important code and configuration settings during the boot of Windows. This includes: the firmware, boot manager, hypervisor, kernel, secure kernel and operating system. Measured Boot stores the measurements in the TPM on the machine, and makes them available in a log that can be tested remotely to verify the boot state of the client.
The Measured Boot feature provides antimalware software with a trusted (resistant to spoofing and tampering) log of all boot components that started before it. The antimalware software can use the log to determine whether components that ran before it are trustworthy, or if they are infected with malware. The antimalware software on the local machine can send the log to a remote server for evaluation. The remote server may initiate remediation actions, either by interacting with software on the client, or through out-of-band mechanisms, as appropriate. |
-| **[Device health attestation service](/windows/security/threat-protection/protect-high-value-assets-by-controlling-the-health-of-windows-10-based-devices)** | The Windows device health attestation process supports a zero-trust paradigm that shifts the focus from static, network-based perimeters, to users, assets, and resources. The attestation process confirms the device, firmware, and boot process are in a good state and have not been tampered with before they can access corporate resources. The determinations are made with data stored in the TPM, which provides a secure root of trust. The information is sent to an attestation service, such as Azure Attestation, to verify the device is in a trusted state. Then, an MDM tool like Microsoft Intune reviews device health and connects this information with Azure Active Directory for conditional access. |
+| **[Device health attestation service](/windows/security/operating-system-security/system-security/protect-high-value-assets-by-controlling-the-health-of-windows-10-based-devices)** | The Windows device health attestation process supports a zero-trust paradigm that shifts the focus from static, network-based perimeters, to users, assets, and resources. The attestation process confirms the device, firmware, and boot process are in a good state and have not been tampered with before they can access corporate resources. The determinations are made with data stored in the TPM, which provides a secure root of trust. The information is sent to an attestation service, such as Azure Attestation, to verify the device is in a trusted state. Then, an MDM tool like Microsoft Intune reviews device health and connects this information with Microsoft Entra ID for conditional access. |
| **[Windows security policy settings and auditing](/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/security-policy-settings)** | Microsoft provides a robust set of security settings policies that IT administrators can use to protect Windows devices and other resources in their organization. |
+| **[Assigned Access (kiosk mode)](/windows/configuration/kiosk-methods)** | Some desktop devices in an enterprise serve a special purpose. For example, a PC in the lobby that customers use to see your product catalog. Or, a PC displaying visual content as a digital sign. Windows client offers two different locked-down experiences for public or specialized use: A single-app kiosk that runs a single Universal Windows Platform (UWP) app in full screen above the lock screen, or A multi-app kiosk that runs one or more apps from the desktop.
Kiosk configurations are based on Assigned Access, a feature in Windows that allows an administrator to manage the user's experience by limiting the application entry points exposed to the user. |
## Virus and threat protection
@@ -24,20 +25,21 @@ ms.topic: include
| **[Tamper protection settings for MDE](/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/prevent-changes-to-security-settings-with-tamper-protection)** | Tamper protection is a capability in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint that helps protect certain security settings, such as virus and threat protection, from being disabled or changed. During some kinds of cyber attacks, bad actors try to disable security features on devices. Disabling security features provides bad actors with easier access to your data, the ability to install malware, and the ability to exploit your data, identity, and devices. Tamper protection helps guard against these types of activities. |
| **[Controlled folder access](/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/controlled-folders)** | You can protect your valuable information in specific folders by managing app access to specific folders. Only trusted apps can access protected folders, which are specified when controlled folder access is configured. Commonly used folders, such as those used for documents, pictures, downloads, are typically included in the list of controlled folders. Controlled folder access works with a list of trusted apps. Apps that are included in the list of trusted software work as expected. Apps that are not included in the trusted list are prevented from making any changes to files inside protected folders.
Controlled folder access helps to protect user's valuable data from malicious apps and threats, such as ransomware. |
| **[Exploit protection](/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/exploit-protection)** | Exploit protection automatically applies several exploit mitigation techniques to operating system processes and apps. Exploit protection works best with Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, which gives organizations detailed reporting into exploit protection events and blocks as part of typical alert investigation scenarios. You can enable exploit protection on an individual device, and then use MDM or group policy to distribute the configuration file to multiple devices. When a mitigation is encountered on the device, a notification will be displayed from the Action Center. You can customize the notification with your company details and contact information. You can also enable the rules individually to customize which techniques the feature monitors. |
-| **[Microsoft Defender SmartScreen](/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-smartscreen/microsoft-defender-smartscreen-overview)** | Microsoft Defender SmartScreen protects against phishing, malware websites and applications, and the downloading of potentially malicious files. For enhanced phishing protection, SmartScreen also alerts people when they are entering their credentials into a potentially risky location. IT can customize which notifications appear via MDM or group policy. The protection runs in audit mode by default, giving IT admins full control to make decisions around policy creation and enforcement. |
+| **[Microsoft Defender SmartScreen](/windows/security/operating-system-security/virus-and-threat-protection/microsoft-defender-smartscreen/)** | Microsoft Defender SmartScreen protects against phishing, malware websites and applications, and the downloading of potentially malicious files. For enhanced phishing protection, SmartScreen also alerts people when they are entering their credentials into a potentially risky location. IT can customize which notifications appear via MDM or group policy. The protection runs in audit mode by default, giving IT admins full control to make decisions around policy creation and enforcement. |
| **[Microsoft Defender for Endpoint](/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint)** | Microsoft Defender for Endpoint is an enterprise endpoint detection and response solution that helps security teams to detect, investigate, and respond to advanced threats. Organizations can use the rich event data and attack insights Defender for Endpoint provides to investigate incidents. Defender for Endpoint brings together the following elements to provide a more complete picture of security incidents: endpoint behavioral sensors, cloud security analytics, threat intelligence and rich response capabilities. |
## Network security
| Feature name | Description |
|:---|:---|
-| **[Transport layer security (TLS)](/windows-server/security/tls/tls-ssl-schannel-ssp-overview)** | Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a cryptographic protocol designed to provide communications security over a network. TLS 1.3 is the latest version of the protocol and is enabled by default in Windows 11. This version eliminates obsolete cryptographic algorithms, enhances security over older versions, and aims to encrypt as much of the TLS handshake as possible. The handshake is more performant with one fewer round trip per connection on average, and supports only five strong cipher suites which provide perfect forward secrecy and less operational risk. |
+| **[Transport Layer Security (TLS)](/windows-server/security/tls/tls-ssl-schannel-ssp-overview)** | Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a cryptographic protocol designed to provide communications security over a network. TLS 1.3 is the latest version of the protocol and is enabled by default in Windows 11. This version eliminates obsolete cryptographic algorithms, enhances security over older versions, and aims to encrypt as much of the TLS handshake as possible. The handshake is more performant with one fewer round trip per connection on average, and supports only five strong cipher suites which provide perfect forward secrecy and less operational risk. |
+| **[Domain Name System (DNS) security](/windows-server/networking/dns/doh-client-support)** | Starting in Windows 11, the Windows DNS client supports DNS over HTTPS (DoH), an encrypted DNS protocol. This allows administrators to ensure their devices protect DNS queries from on-path attackers, whether they are passive observers logging browsing behavior or active attackers trying to redirect clients to malicious sites.
In a zero-trust model where there is no trust placed in a network boundary, having a secure connection to a trusted name resolver is required. |
| **Bluetooth pairing and connection protection** | The number of Bluetooth devices connected to Windows continues to increase. Windows supports all standard Bluetooth pairing protocols, including classic and LE Secure connections, secure simple pairing, and classic and LE legacy pairing. Windows also implements host based LE privacy. Windows updates help users stay current with OS and driver security features in accordance with the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG), Standard Vulnerability Reports, as well as issues beyond those required by the Bluetooth core industry standards. Microsoft strongly recommends that users ensure their firmware and/ or software of their Bluetooth accessories are kept up to date. |
| **[WiFi Security](https://support.microsoft.com/windows/faster-and-more-secure-wi-fi-in-windows-26177a28-38ed-1a8e-7eca-66f24dc63f09)** | Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) is a security certification programs designed to secure wireless networks. WPA3 is the latest version of the certification and provides a more secure and reliable connection method as compared to WPA2 and older security protocols. Windows supports three WPA3 modes: WPA3 personal with the Hash-to-Element (H2E) protocol, WPA3 Enterprise, and WPA3 Enterprise 192-bit Suite B.
Windows 11 also supports WFA defined WPA3 Enterprise that includes enhanced Server Cert validation and TLS 1.3 for authentication using EAP-TLS Authentication. |
| **Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE)** | Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE) is a technology that allows wireless devices to establish encrypted connections to public Wi-Fi hotspots. |
-| **[Windows Firewall](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-firewall/windows-firewall-with-advanced-security)** | Windows Firewall with Advanced Securityprovides host-based, two-way network traffic filtering, blocking unauthorized traffic flowing into or out of the local device based on the types of networks to which the device is connected. Windows Firewall reduces the attack surface of a device with rules to restrict or allow traffic by many properties such as IP addresses, ports, or program paths. Reducing the attack surface of a device increases manageability and decreases the likelihood of a successful attack.
With its integration with Internet Protocol Security (IPsec), Windows Firewall provides a simple way to enforce authenticated, end-to-end network communications. It provides scalable, tiered access to trusted network resources, helping to enforce integrity of the data, and optionally helping to protect the confidentiality of the data. Windows Firewall is a host-based firewall that is included with the operating system, there is no additional hardware or software required. Windows Firewall is also designed to complement existing non-Microsoft network security solutions through a documented application programming interface (API). |
-| **[Virtual private network (VPN)](/windows/security/identity-protection/vpn/vpn-guide)** | The Windows VPN client platform includes built in VPN protocols, configuration support, a common VPN user interface, and programming support for custom VPN protocols. VPN apps are available in the Microsoft Store for both enterprise and consumer VPNs, including apps for the most popular enterprise VPN gateways.
In Windows 11, the most commonly used VPN controls are integrated right into the Quick Actions pane. From the Quick Actions pane, users can see the status of their VPN, start and stop the VPN tunnels, and access the Settings app for more controls. |
-| **[Always On VPN (device tunnel)](/windows-server/remote/remote-access/vpn/always-on-vpn/)** | With Always On VPN, you can create a dedicated VPN profile for the device. Unlike User Tunnel, which only connects after a user logs on to the device, Device Tunnel allows the VPN to establish connectivity before a user sign-in. Both Device Tunnel and User Tunnel operate independently with their VPN profiles, can be connected at the same time, and can use different authentication methods and other VPN configuration settings as appropriate. |
+| **[Windows Firewall](/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/windows-firewall-with-advanced-security)** | Windows Firewall with Advanced Securityprovides host-based, two-way network traffic filtering, blocking unauthorized traffic flowing into or out of the local device based on the types of networks to which the device is connected. Windows Firewall reduces the attack surface of a device with rules to restrict or allow traffic by many properties such as IP addresses, ports, or program paths. Reducing the attack surface of a device increases manageability and decreases the likelihood of a successful attack.
With its integration with Internet Protocol Security (IPsec), Windows Firewall provides a simple way to enforce authenticated, end-to-end network communications. It provides scalable, tiered access to trusted network resources, helping to enforce integrity of the data, and optionally helping to protect the confidentiality of the data. Windows Firewall is a host-based firewall that is included with the operating system, there is no additional hardware or software required. Windows Firewall is also designed to complement existing non-Microsoft network security solutions through a documented application programming interface (API). |
+| **[Virtual private network (VPN)](/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/vpn/vpn-guide)** | The Windows VPN client platform includes built in VPN protocols, configuration support, a common VPN user interface, and programming support for custom VPN protocols. VPN apps are available in the Microsoft Store for both enterprise and consumer VPNs, including apps for the most popular enterprise VPN gateways.
In Windows 11, the most commonly used VPN controls are integrated right into the Quick Actions pane. From the Quick Actions pane, users can see the status of their VPN, start and stop the VPN tunnels, and access the Settings app for more controls. |
+| **[Always On VPN (device tunnel)](/Windows-server/remote/remote-access/overview-always-on-vpn)** | With Always On VPN, you can create a dedicated VPN profile for the device. Unlike User Tunnel, which only connects after a user logs on to the device, Device Tunnel allows the VPN to establish connectivity before a user sign-in. Both Device Tunnel and User Tunnel operate independently with their VPN profiles, can be connected at the same time, and can use different authentication methods and other VPN configuration settings as appropriate. |
| **[Direct Access](/windows-server/remote/remote-access/directaccess/directaccess)** | DirectAccess allows connectivity for remote users to organization network resources without the need for traditional Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections.
With DirectAccess connections, remote devices are always connected to the organization and there's no need for remote users to start and stop connections. |
| **[Server Message Block (SMB) file service](/windows-server/storage/file-server/file-server-smb-overview)** | SMB Encryption provides end-to-end encryption of SMB data and protects data from eavesdropping occurrences on internal networks. In Windows 11, the SMB protocol has significant security updates, including AES-256 bits encryption, accelerated SMB signing, Remote Directory Memory Access (RDMA) network encryption, and SMB over QUIC for untrusted networks. Windows 11 introduces AES-256-GCM and AES-256-CCM cryptographic suites for SMB 3.1.1 encryption. Windows administrators can mandate the use of more advanced security or continue to use the more compatible, and still-safe, AES-128 encryption. |
| **[Server Message Block Direct (SMB Direct)](/windows-server/storage/file-server/smb-direct)** | SMB Direct (SMB over remote direct memory access) is a storage protocol that enables direct memory-to-memory data transfers between device and storage, with minimal CPU usage, while using standard RDMA-capable network adapters.
SMB Direct supports encryption, and now you can operate with the same safety as traditional TCP and the performance of RDMA. Previously, enabling SMB encryption disabled direct data placement, making RDMA as slow as TCP. Now data is encrypted before placement, leading to relatively minor performance degradation while adding AES-128 and AES-256 protected packet privacy. |
@@ -46,8 +48,8 @@ ms.topic: include
| Feature name | Description |
|:---|:---|
-| **[BitLocker management](/windows/security/information-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-management-for-enterprises)** | The BitLocker CSP allows an MDM solution, like Microsoft Intune, to manage the BitLocker encryption features on Windows devices. This includes OS volumes, fixed drives and removeable storage, and recovery key management into Azure AD. |
-| **[BitLocker enablement](/windows/security/information-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-overview)** | BitLocker Drive Encryption is a data protection feature that integrates with the operating system and addresses the threats of data theft or exposure from lost, stolen, or inappropriately decommissioned computers. BitLocker uses AES algorithm in XTS or CBC mode of operation with 128-bit or 256-bit key length to encrypt data on the volume. Cloud storage on Microsoft OneDrive or Azure can be used to save recovery key content. BitLocker can be managed by any MDM solution such as Microsoft Intune, using a configuration service provider (CSP).
BitLocker provides encryption for the OS, fixed data, and removable data drives leveraging technologies like hardware security test interface (HSTI), Modern Standby, UEFI Secure Boot and TPM. |
-| **[Encrypted hard drive](/windows/security/information-protection/encrypted-hard-drive)** | Encrypted hard drives are a class of hard drives that are self-encrypted at the hardware level and allow for full disk hardware encryption while being transparent to the device user. These drives combine the security and management benefits provided by BitLocker Drive Encryption with the power of self-encrypting drives.
By offloading the cryptographic operations to hardware, encrypted hard drives increase BitLocker performance and reduce CPU usage and power consumption. Because encrypted hard drives encrypt data quickly, BitLocker deployment can be expanded across enterprise devices with little to no impact on productivity. |
-| **[Personal data encryption (PDE)](/windows/security/information-protection/personal-data-encryption/overview-pde)** | Personal data encryption (PDE) works with BitLocker and Windows Hello for Business to further protect user documents and other files, including when the device is turned on and locked. Files are encrypted automatically and seamlessly to give users more security without interrupting their workflow.
Windows Hello for Business is used to protect the container which houses the encryption keys used by PDE. When the user signs in, the container gets authenticated to release the keys in the container to decrypt user content. |
-| **[Email Encryption (S/MIME)](/windows/security/identity-protection/configure-s-mime)** | Email encryption enables users to encrypt outgoing email messages and attachments, so only intended recipients with a digital ID (certificate) can read them. Users can digitally sign a message, which verifies the identity of the sender and confirms the message has not been tampered with. The encrypted messages can be sent by a user to other users within their organization or external contacts if they have proper encryption certificates. |
+| **[BitLocker management](/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-management-for-enterprises)** | The BitLocker CSP allows an MDM solution, like Microsoft Intune, to manage the BitLocker encryption features on Windows devices. This includes OS volumes, fixed drives and removeable storage, and recovery key management into Microsoft Entra ID. |
+| **[BitLocker enablement](/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/)** | BitLocker Drive Encryption is a data protection feature that integrates with the operating system and addresses the threats of data theft or exposure from lost, stolen, or inappropriately decommissioned computers. BitLocker uses AES algorithm in XTS or CBC mode of operation with 128-bit or 256-bit key length to encrypt data on the volume. Cloud storage on Microsoft OneDrive or Azure can be used to save recovery key content. BitLocker can be managed by any MDM solution such as Microsoft Intune, using a configuration service provider (CSP).
BitLocker provides encryption for the OS, fixed data, and removable data drives leveraging technologies like hardware security test interface (HSTI), Modern Standby, UEFI Secure Boot and TPM. |
+| **[Encrypted hard drive](/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/encrypted-hard-drive)** | Encrypted hard drives are a class of hard drives that are self-encrypted at the hardware level and allow for full disk hardware encryption while being transparent to the device user. These drives combine the security and management benefits provided by BitLocker Drive Encryption with the power of self-encrypting drives.
By offloading the cryptographic operations to hardware, encrypted hard drives increase BitLocker performance and reduce CPU usage and power consumption. Because encrypted hard drives encrypt data quickly, BitLocker deployment can be expanded across enterprise devices with little to no impact on productivity. |
+| **[Personal data encryption (PDE)](/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/)** | Personal data encryption (PDE) works with BitLocker and Windows Hello for Business to further protect user documents and other files, including when the device is turned on and locked. Files are encrypted automatically and seamlessly to give users more security without interrupting their workflow.
Windows Hello for Business is used to protect the container which houses the encryption keys used by PDE. When the user signs in, the container gets authenticated to release the keys in the container to decrypt user content. |
+| **[Email Encryption (S/MIME)](/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/configure-s-mime)** | Email encryption enables users to encrypt outgoing email messages and attachments, so only intended recipients with a digital ID (certificate) can read them. Users can digitally sign a message, which verifies the identity of the sender and confirms the message has not been tampered with. The encrypted messages can be sent by a user to other users within their organization or external contacts if they have proper encryption certificates. |
diff --git a/windows/security/includes/sections/security-foundations.md b/windows/security/includes/sections/security-foundations.md
index 61eb75d6e8..7a85af0543 100644
--- a/windows/security/includes/sections/security-foundations.md
+++ b/windows/security/includes/sections/security-foundations.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
author: paolomatarazzo
ms.author: paoloma
-ms.date: 08/02/2023
+ms.date: 09/18/2023
ms.topic: include
---
@@ -11,14 +11,14 @@ ms.topic: include
|:---|:---|
| **[Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL)](/windows/security/security-foundations/msft-security-dev-lifecycle)** | The Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) introduces security best practices, tools, and processes throughout all phases of engineering and development. |
| **[OneFuzz service](https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/09/15/microsoft-onefuzz-framework-open-source-developer-tool-fix-bugs/)** | A range of tools and techniques - such as threat modeling, static analysis, fuzz testing, and code quality checks - enable continued security value to be embedded into Windows by every engineer on the team from day one. Through the SDL practices, Microsoft engineers are continuously provided with actionable and up-to-date methods to improve development workflows and overall product security before the code has been released. |
-| **[Microsoft Windows Insider Preview bounty program](https://www.microsoft.com/msrc/bounty-windows-insider-preview)** | As part of our secure development process, the Microsoft Windows Insider Preview bounty program invites eligible researchers across the globe to find and submit vulnerabilities that reproduce in the latest Windows Insider Preview (WIP) Dev Channel. The goal of the Windows Insider Preview bounty program is to uncover significant vulnerabilities that have a direct and demonstrable impact on the security of customers using the latest version of Windows.
Through this collaboration with researchers across the globe, our teams identify critical vulnerabilities that were not previously found during development and quickly fix the issues before releasing the final Windows. |
+| **[Microsoft Windows Insider Preview bounty program](https://www.microsoft.com/msrc/bounty-windows-insider-preview)** | As part of our secure development process, the Microsoft Windows Insider Preview bounty program invites eligible researchers across the globe to find and submit vulnerabilities that reproduce in the latest Windows Insider Preview (WIP) Dev Channel. The goal of the Windows Insider Preview bounty program is to uncover significant vulnerabilities that have a direct and demonstrable impact on the security of customers using the latest version of Windows.
Through this collaboration with researchers across the globe, our teams identify critical vulnerabilities that were not previously found during development and quicky fix the issues before releasing the final Windows. |
## Certification
| Feature name | Description |
|:---|:---|
-| **[Common Criteria certifications](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-platform-common-criteria)** | Common Criteria (CC) is an international standard currently maintained by national governments who participate in the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement. CC defines a common taxonomy for security functional requirements, security assurance requirements, and an evaluation methodology used to ensure products undergoing evaluation satisfy the functional and assurance requirements. Microsoft ensures that products incorporate the features and functions required by relevant Common Criteria Protection Profiles and completes Common Criteria certifications of Microsoft Windows products. |
-| **[Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140 validation](/windows/security/threat-protection/fips-140-validation)** | The Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication 140 is a U.S. government standard that defines the minimum security requirements for cryptographic modules in IT products. Microsoft maintains an active commitment to meeting the requirements of the FIPS 140 standard, having validated cryptographic modules against FIPS 140-2 since it was first established in 2001. Multiple Microsoft products, including Windows 11, Windows 10, Windows Server, and many cloud services, use these cryptographic modules. |
+| **[Common Criteria certifications](/windows/security/security-foundations/certification/windows-platform-common-criteria)** | Common Criteria (CC) is an international standard currently maintained by national governments who participate in the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement. CC defines a common taxonomy for security functional requirements, security assurance requirements, and an evaluation methodology used to ensure products undergoing evaluation satisfy the functional and assurance requirements. Microsoft ensures that products incorporate the features and functions required by relevant Common Criteria Protection Profiles and completes Common Criteria certifications of Microsoft Windows products. |
+| **[Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140 validation](/windows/security/security-foundations/certification/fips-140-validation)** | The Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication 140 is a U.S. government standard that defines the minimum security requirements for cryptographic modules in IT products. Microsoft maintains an active commitment to meeting the requirements of the FIPS 140 standard, having validated cryptographic modules against FIPS 140-2 since it was first established in 2001. Multiple Microsoft products, including Windows 11, Windows 10, Windows Server, and many cloud services, use these cryptographic modules. |
## Secure supply chain
@@ -26,4 +26,4 @@ ms.topic: include
|:---|:---|
| **Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)** | SBOMs are leveraged to provide the transparency and provenance of the content as it moves through various stages of the Windows supply chain. This enables trust between each supply chain segment, ensures that tampering has not taken place during ingestion and along the way, and provides a provable chain of custody for the product that we ship to customers. |
| **[Azure Code Signing](/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/deployment/use-code-signing-for-better-control-and-protection)** | Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) enables customers to define policies for controlling what is allowed to run on their devices. WDAC policies can be remotely applied to devices using an MDM solution like Microsoft Intune.
To simplify WDAC enablement, organizations can take advantage of Azure Code Signing, a secure and fully managed service for signing WDAC policies and apps.
Azure Code Signing minimizes the complexity of code signing with a turnkey service backed by a Microsoft managed certificate authority, eliminating the need to procure and self-manage any signing certificates. The service is managed just as any other Azure resource and integrates easily with the leading development and CI/CD toolsets. |
-| **[Windows application software development kit (SDK)](https://developer.microsoft.com/windows/downloads/windows-sdk/)** | Developers have an opportunity to design highly secure applications that benefit from the latest Windows safeguards. The Windows App SDK provides a unified set of APIs and tools for developing secure desktop apps for Windows. To help create apps that are up-to-date and protected, the SDK follows the same security standards, protocols, and compliance as the core Windows operating system. |
+| **[Windows application software development kit (SDK)](https://developer.microsoft.com/windows/downloads/windows-sdk/)** | Developers have an opportunity to design highly secure applications that benefit from the latest Windows safeguards. The Windows App SDK provides a unified set of APIs and tools for developing secure desktop apps for Windows. To help create apps that are up-to-date and protected, the SDK follows the same security standards, protocols, and compliance as the core Windows operating system. |
diff --git a/windows/security/index.yml b/windows/security/index.yml
index 963c96d66e..40983d837f 100644
--- a/windows/security/index.yml
+++ b/windows/security/index.yml
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ metadata:
author: paolomatarazzo
ms.author: paoloma
manager: aaroncz
- ms.date: 08/11/2023
+ ms.date: 09/18/2023
highlightedContent:
items:
@@ -73,14 +73,14 @@ productDirectory:
links:
- url: /windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business
text: Windows Hello for Business
- - url: /windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard
- text: Credential Guard
- - url: /windows-server/identity/laps/laps-overview
- text: Windows LAPS (Local Administrator Password Solution)
+ - url: /windows/security/identity-protection/passwordless-experience
+ text: Windows passwordless experience
+ - url: /windows/security/identity-protection/web-sign-in
+ text: Web sign-in for Windows
+ - url: /windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys
+ text: Support for passkeys in Windows
- url: /windows/security/operating-system-security/virus-and-threat-protection/microsoft-defender-smartscreen/enhanced-phishing-protection
text: Enhanced phishing protection with SmartScreen
- - url: /education/windows/federated-sign-in
- text: Federated sign-in (EDU)
- url: /windows/security/identity-protection
text: Learn more about identity protection >
diff --git a/windows/security/information-protection/windows-information-protection/create-and-verify-an-efs-dra-certificate.md b/windows/security/information-protection/windows-information-protection/create-and-verify-an-efs-dra-certificate.md
index 303f8c3057..d730747292 100644
--- a/windows/security/information-protection/windows-information-protection/create-and-verify-an-efs-dra-certificate.md
+++ b/windows/security/information-protection/windows-information-protection/create-and-verify-an-efs-dra-certificate.md
@@ -122,18 +122,18 @@ It's possible that you might revoke data from an unenrolled device only to later
## Auto-recovery of encryption keys
Starting with Windows 10, version 1709, WIP includes a data recovery feature that lets your employees auto-recover access to work files if the encryption key is lost and the files are no longer accessible. This typically happens if an employee reimages the operating system partition, removing the WIP key info, or if a device is reported as lost and you mistakenly target the wrong device for unenrollment.
-To help make sure employees can always access files, WIP creates an auto-recovery key that's backed up to their Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) identity.
+To help make sure employees can always access files, WIP creates an auto-recovery key that's backed up to their Microsoft Entra identity.
-The employee experience is based on signing in with an Azure AD work account. The employee can either:
+The employee experience is based on signing in with a Microsoft Entra ID work account. The employee can either:
- Add a work account through the **Windows Settings > Accounts > Access work or school > Connect** menu.
-OR-
-- Open **Windows Settings > Accounts > Access work or school > Connect** and choose the **Join this device to Azure Active Directory** link, under **Alternate actions**.
+- Open **Windows Settings > Accounts > Access work or school > Connect** and choose the **Join this device to Microsoft Entra ID** link, under **Alternate actions**.
>[!Note]
- >To perform an Azure AD Domain Join from the Settings page, the employee must have administrator privileges to the device.
+ >To perform a Microsoft Entra Domain Join from the Settings page, the employee must have administrator privileges to the device.
After signing in, the necessary WIP key info is automatically downloaded and employees are able to access the files again.
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ After signing in, the necessary WIP key info is automatically downloaded and emp
The **Access work or school settings** page appears.
-3. Sign-in to Azure AD as the employee and verify that the files now open
+3. Sign-in to Microsoft Entra ID as the employee and verify that the files now open
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/information-protection/windows-information-protection/create-vpn-and-wip-policy-using-intune-azure.md b/windows/security/information-protection/windows-information-protection/create-vpn-and-wip-policy-using-intune-azure.md
index 709de2a54d..c3badb03b9 100644
--- a/windows/security/information-protection/windows-information-protection/create-vpn-and-wip-policy-using-intune-azure.md
+++ b/windows/security/information-protection/windows-information-protection/create-vpn-and-wip-policy-using-intune-azure.md
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ After you've created your VPN policy, you'll need to deploy it to the same group
1. On the **App policy** blade, select your newly created policy, select **User groups** from the menu that appears, and then select **Add user group**.
- A list of user groups, made up of all of the security groups in your Azure Active Directory, appear in the **Add user group** blade.
+ A list of user groups, made up of all of the security groups in your Microsoft Entra ID, appear in the **Add user group** blade.
2. Choose the group you want your policy to apply to, and then select **Select** to deploy the policy.
diff --git a/windows/security/information-protection/windows-information-protection/create-wip-policy-using-intune-azure.md b/windows/security/information-protection/windows-information-protection/create-wip-policy-using-intune-azure.md
index 6cb50dc76b..c73eda005f 100644
--- a/windows/security/information-protection/windows-information-protection/create-wip-policy-using-intune-azure.md
+++ b/windows/security/information-protection/windows-information-protection/create-wip-policy-using-intune-azure.md
@@ -27,23 +27,23 @@ You can create an app protection policy in Intune either with device enrollment
- MAM has more **Access** settings for Windows Hello for Business.
- MAM can [selectively wipe company data](/intune/apps-selective-wipe) from a user's personal device.
-- MAM requires an [Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) Premium license](/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/active-directory-whatis#what-are-the-azure-ad-licenses).
-- An Azure AD Premium license is also required for WIP auto-recovery, where a device can re-enroll and regain access to protected data. WIP auto-recovery depends on Azure AD registration to back up the encryption keys, which requires device auto-enrollment with MDM.
+- MAM requires an [Microsoft Entra ID P1 or P2 license](/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/active-directory-whatis#what-are-the-azure-ad-licenses).
+- A Microsoft Entra ID P1 or P2 license is also required for WIP auto-recovery, where a device can re-enroll and regain access to protected data. WIP auto-recovery depends on Microsoft Entra registration to back up the encryption keys, which requires device auto-enrollment with MDM.
- MAM supports only one user per device.
- MAM can only manage [enlightened apps](enlightened-microsoft-apps-and-wip.md).
- Only MDM can use [BitLocker CSP](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp) policies.
-- If the same user and device are targeted for both MDM and MAM, the MDM policy will be applied to devices joined to Azure AD. For personal devices that are workplace-joined (that is, added by using **Settings** > **Email & accounts** > **Add a work or school account**), the MAM-only policy will be preferred but it's possible to upgrade the device management to MDM in **Settings**. Windows Home edition only supports WIP for MAM-only; upgrading to MDM policy on Home edition will revoke WIP-protected data access.
+- If the same user and device are targeted for both MDM and MAM, the MDM policy will be applied to devices joined to Microsoft Entra ID. For personal devices that are workplace-joined (that is, added by using **Settings** > **Email & accounts** > **Add a work or school account**), the MAM-only policy will be preferred but it's possible to upgrade the device management to MDM in **Settings**. Windows Home edition only supports WIP for MAM-only; upgrading to MDM policy on Home edition will revoke WIP-protected data access.
## Prerequisites
-Before you can create a WIP policy using Intune, you need to configure an MDM or MAM provider in Azure Active Directory (Azure AD). MAM requires an [Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) Premium license](/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/active-directory-whatis#what-are-the-azure-ad-licenses). An Azure AD Premium license is also required for WIP auto-recovery, where a device can re-enroll and regain access to protected data. WIP auto-recovery relies on Azure AD registration to back up the encryption keys, which requires device auto-enrollment with MDM.
+Before you can create a WIP policy using Intune, you need to configure an MDM or MAM provider in Microsoft Entra ID. MAM requires an [Microsoft Entra ID P1 or P2 license](/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/active-directory-whatis#what-are-the-azure-ad-licenses). A Microsoft Entra ID P1 or P2 license is also required for WIP auto-recovery, where a device can re-enroll and regain access to protected data. WIP auto-recovery relies on Microsoft Entra registration to back up the encryption keys, which requires device auto-enrollment with MDM.
## Configure the MDM or MAM provider
1. Sign in to the Azure portal.
-2. Select **Azure Active Directory** > **Mobility (MDM and MAM)** > **Microsoft Intune**.
+2. Select **Microsoft Entra ID** > **Mobility (MDM and MAM)** > **Microsoft Intune**.
3. Select **Restore Default URLs** or enter the settings for MDM or MAM user scope and select **Save**:
@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ For example:
URL <,proxy>|URL <,proxy>|/*AppCompat*/
```
-When you use this string, we recommend that you also turn on [Azure Active Directory Conditional Access](/azure/active-directory/active-directory-conditional-access), using the **Domain joined or marked as compliant** option, which blocks apps from accessing any enterprise cloud resources that are protected by conditional access.
+When you use this string, we recommend that you also turn on [Microsoft Entra Conditional Access](/azure/active-directory/active-directory-conditional-access), using the **Domain joined or marked as compliant** option, which blocks apps from accessing any enterprise cloud resources that are protected by conditional access.
Value format with proxy:
diff --git a/windows/security/introduction.md b/windows/security/introduction.md
index 69e2193bf2..92105b512d 100644
--- a/windows/security/introduction.md
+++ b/windows/security/introduction.md
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ A Zero Trust security model gives the right people the right access at the right
1. When verified, give people and devices access to only necessary resources for the necessary amount of time
1. Use continuous analytics to drive threat detection and improve defenses
-For Windows 11, the Zero Trust principle of *verify explicitly* applies to risks introduced by both devices and people. Windows 11 provides *chip-to-cloud security*, enabling IT administrators to implement strong authorization and authentication processes with features like [Windows Hello for Business](identity-protection/hello-for-business/index.md). IT administrators also gain attestation and measurements for determining if a device meets requirements and can be trusted. Windows 11 works out-of-the-box with Microsoft Intune and Azure Active Directory, which enables timely and seamless access decisions. Furthermore, IT administrators can easily customize Windows to meet specific user and policy requirements for access, privacy, compliance, and more.
+For Windows 11, the Zero Trust principle of *verify explicitly* applies to risks introduced by both devices and people. Windows 11 provides *chip-to-cloud security*, enabling IT administrators to implement strong authorization and authentication processes with features like [Windows Hello for Business](identity-protection/hello-for-business/index.md). IT administrators also gain attestation and measurements for determining if a device meets requirements and can be trusted. Windows 11 works out-of-the-box with Microsoft Intune and Microsoft Entra ID, which enables timely and seamless access decisions. Furthermore, IT administrators can easily customize Windows to meet specific user and policy requirements for access, privacy, compliance, and more.
### Security, by default
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ Passwords have been an important part of digital security for a long time, and t
### Connecting to cloud services
-Microsoft offers comprehensive cloud services for identity, storage, and access management in addition to the tools needed to attest that Windows devices connecting to your network are trustworthy. You can also enforce compliance and conditional access with a modern device management (MDM) service such as Microsoft Intune, which works with Azure Active Directory and Microsoft Azure Attestation to control access to applications and data through the cloud.
+Microsoft offers comprehensive cloud services for identity, storage, and access management in addition to the tools needed to attest that Windows devices connecting to your network are trustworthy. You can also enforce compliance and conditional access with a modern device management (MDM) service such as Microsoft Intune, which works with Microsoft Entra ID and Microsoft Azure Attestation to control access to applications and data through the cloud.
## Next steps
diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-basic-deployment.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-basic-deployment.md
index 52cc2816b8..16a611c770 100644
--- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-basic-deployment.md
+++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-basic-deployment.md
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ For the operating system volume the **BitLocker Drive Encryption Wizard** presen
The recovery key can be stored using the following methods:
- - **Save to your Azure AD account** (if applicable)
+ - **Save to your Microsoft Entra account** (if applicable)
- **Save to a USB flash drive**
- **Save to a file** - the file needs to be saved to a location that isn't on the computer itself such as a network folder or OneDrive
- **Print the recovery key**
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ Encrypting data volumes using the BitLocker control panel works in a similar fas
3. The **BitLocker Drive Encryption Wizard** presents options for storage of the recovery key. These options are the same as for operating system volumes:
- - **Save to your Azure AD account** (if applicable)
+ - **Save to your Microsoft Entra account** (if applicable)
- **Save to a USB flash drive**
- **Save to a file** - the file needs to be saved to a location that isn't on the computer itself such as a network folder or OneDrive
- **Print the recovery key**
diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-deployment-comparison.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-deployment-comparison.md
index 1654153fec..dd95d6dbc5 100644
--- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-deployment-comparison.md
+++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-deployment-comparison.md
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ This article depicts the BitLocker deployment comparison chart.
| *Minimum client operating system version* | Windows 11 and Windows 10 | Windows 11, Windows 10, and Windows 8.1 | Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 10 IoT, and Windows 11 |
| *Supported Windows SKUs* | Enterprise, Pro, Education | Enterprise, Pro, Education | Enterprise |
| *Minimum Windows version* | 1909 | None | None |
-| *Supported domain-joined status* | Microsoft Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) joined, hybrid Azure AD joined | Active Directory-joined, hybrid Azure AD joined | Active Directory-joined |
+| *Supported domain-joined status* | Microsoft Entra joined, Microsoft Entra hybrid joined | Active Directory-joined, Microsoft Entra hybrid joined | Active Directory-joined |
| *Permissions required to manage policies* | Endpoint security manager or custom | Full administrator or custom | Domain Admin or Delegated GPO access |
| *Cloud or on premises* | Cloud | On premises | On premises |
| Server components required? | | ✅ | ✅ |
@@ -31,16 +31,16 @@ This article depicts the BitLocker deployment comparison chart.
| *Select cipher strength and algorithms for fixed drives* | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
| *Select cipher strength and algorithms for removable drives* | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
| *Select cipher strength and algorithms for operating environment drives* | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
-| *Standard recovery password storage location* | Azure AD or Active Directory | Configuration Manager site database | MBAM database |
-| *Store recovery password for operating system and fixed drives to Azure AD or Active Directory* | Yes (Active Directory and Azure AD) | Yes (Active Directory only) | Yes (Active Directory only) |
+| *Standard recovery password storage location* | Microsoft Entra ID or Active Directory | Configuration Manager site database | MBAM database |
+| *Store recovery password for operating system and fixed drives to Microsoft Entra ID or Active Directory* | Yes (Active Directory and Microsoft Entra ID) | Yes (Active Directory only) | Yes (Active Directory only) |
| *Customize preboot message and recovery link* | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
| *Allow/deny key file creation* | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
| *Deny Write permission to unprotected drives* | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
| *Can be administered outside company network* | ✅ | ✅ | |
| *Support for organization unique IDs* | | ✅ | ✅ |
-| *Self-service recovery* | Yes (through Azure AD or Company Portal app) | ✅ | ✅ |
+| *Self-service recovery* | Yes (through Microsoft Entra ID or Company Portal app) | ✅ | ✅ |
| *Recovery password rotation for fixed and operating environment drives* | Yes (Windows 10, version 1909 and later) | ✅ | ✅ |
-| *Wait to complete encryption until recovery information is backed up to Azure AD* | ✅ | | |
+| *Wait to complete encryption until recovery information is backed up to Microsoft Entra ID* | ✅ | | |
| *Wait to complete encryption until recovery information is backed up to Active Directory* | | ✅ | ✅ |
| *Allow or deny Data Recovery Agent* | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
| *Unlock a volume using certificate with custom object identifier* | | ✅ | ✅ |
diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-device-encryption-overview-windows-10.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-device-encryption-overview-windows-10.md
index d93426076e..7b8887a82c 100644
--- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-device-encryption-overview-windows-10.md
+++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-device-encryption-overview-windows-10.md
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ Unlike a standard BitLocker implementation, BitLocker Device Encryption is enabl
With this configuration, the recovery password is created automatically when the computer joins the domain, and then the recovery key is backed up to AD DS, the TPM protector is created, and the clear key is removed.
-- Similar to signing in with a domain account, the clear key is removed when the user signs in to an Azure AD account on the device. As described in the bullet point above, the recovery password is created automatically when the user authenticates to Azure AD. Then, the recovery key is backed up to Azure AD, the TPM protector is created, and the clear key is removed.
+- Similar to signing in with a domain account, the clear key is removed when the user signs in to a Microsoft Entra account on the device. As described in the bullet point above, the recovery password is created automatically when the user authenticates to Microsoft Entra ID. Then, the recovery key is backed up to Microsoft Entra ID, the TPM protector is created, and the clear key is removed.
Microsoft recommends automatically enabling BitLocker Device Encryption on any systems that support it. However, the automatic BitLocker Device Encryption process can be prevented by changing the following registry setting:
@@ -160,4 +160,4 @@ Part of the Microsoft Desktop Optimization Pack, Microsoft BitLocker Administrat
Going forward, the functionality of MBAM will be incorporated into Configuration Manager. For more information, see [Plan for BitLocker management](/mem/configmgr/protect/plan-design/bitlocker-management).
-Enterprises not using Configuration Manager can use the built-in features of Azure AD and Microsoft Intune for administration and monitoring. For more information, see [Monitor device encryption with Intune](/mem/intune/protect/encryption-monitor).
+Enterprises not using Configuration Manager can use the built-in features of Microsoft Entra ID and Microsoft Intune for administration and monitoring. For more information, see [Monitor device encryption with Intune](/mem/intune/protect/encryption-monitor).
diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-management-for-enterprises.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-management-for-enterprises.md
index c88b6cde1e..e9c661179f 100644
--- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-management-for-enterprises.md
+++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-management-for-enterprises.md
@@ -17,22 +17,24 @@ Though much Windows [BitLocker documentation](index.md) has been published, cust
Companies that image their own computers using Configuration Manager can use an existing task sequence to [pre-provision BitLocker](/configmgr/osd/understand/task-sequence-steps#BKMK_PreProvisionBitLocker) encryption while in Windows Preinstallation Environment (WinPE) and can then [enable protection](/configmgr/osd/understand/task-sequence-steps#BKMK_EnableBitLocker). These steps during an operating system deployment can help ensure that computers are encrypted from the start, even before users receive them. As part of the imaging process, a company could also decide to use Configuration Manager to pre-set any desired [BitLocker Group Policy](bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md).
-Enterprises can use [Microsoft BitLocker Administration and Monitoring (MBAM)](/microsoft-desktop-optimization-pack/mbam-v25/) to manage client computers with BitLocker that are domain-joined on-premises until [mainstream support ends in July 2019](/lifecycle/products/?alpha=Microsoft%20BitLocker%20Administration%20and%20Monitoring%202.5%20Service%20Pack%201%2F) or they can receive extended support until April 2026. Thus, over the next few years, a good strategy for enterprises will be to plan and move to cloud-based management for BitLocker. Refer to the [PowerShell examples](#powershell-examples) to see how to store recovery keys in Azure Active Directory (Azure AD).
+Enterprises can use [Microsoft BitLocker Administration and Monitoring (MBAM)](/microsoft-desktop-optimization-pack/mbam-v25/) to manage client computers with BitLocker that are domain-joined on-premises until [mainstream support ends in July 2019](/lifecycle/products/?alpha=Microsoft%20BitLocker%20Administration%20and%20Monitoring%202.5%20Service%20Pack%201%2F) or they can receive extended support until April 2026. Thus, over the next few years, a good strategy for enterprises will be to plan and move to cloud-based management for BitLocker. Refer to the [PowerShell examples](#powershell-examples) to see how to store recovery keys in Microsoft Entra ID.
> [!IMPORTANT]
> Microsoft BitLocker Administration and Monitoring (MBAM) capabilities are offered through Configuration Manager BitLocker Management. See [Plan for BitLocker management](/mem/configmgr/protect/plan-design/bitlocker-management) in the Configuration Manager documentation for additional information.
-## Managing devices joined to Azure Active Directory
+
-Devices joined to Azure AD are managed using Mobile Device Management (MDM) policy from an MDM solution such as Microsoft Intune. Prior to Windows 10, version 1809, only local administrators can enable BitLocker via Intune policy. Starting with Windows 10, version 1809, Intune can enable BitLocker for standard users. [BitLocker Device Encryption](bitlocker-device-encryption-overview-windows-10.md#bitlocker-device-encryption) status can be queried from managed machines via the [Policy Configuration Settings Provider (CSP)](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-configuration-service-provider/), which reports on whether BitLocker Device Encryption is enabled on the device. Compliance with BitLocker Device Encryption policy can be a requirement for [Conditional Access](https://www.microsoft.com/cloud-platform/conditional-access/) to services like Exchange Online and SharePoint Online.
+## Managing devices joined to Microsoft Entra ID
+
+Devices joined to Microsoft Entra ID are managed using Mobile Device Management (MDM) policy from an MDM solution such as Microsoft Intune. Prior to Windows 10, version 1809, only local administrators can enable BitLocker via Intune policy. Starting with Windows 10, version 1809, Intune can enable BitLocker for standard users. [BitLocker Device Encryption](bitlocker-device-encryption-overview-windows-10.md#bitlocker-device-encryption) status can be queried from managed machines via the [Policy Configuration Settings Provider (CSP)](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-configuration-service-provider/), which reports on whether BitLocker Device Encryption is enabled on the device. Compliance with BitLocker Device Encryption policy can be a requirement for [Conditional Access](https://www.microsoft.com/cloud-platform/conditional-access/) to services like Exchange Online and SharePoint Online.
Starting with Windows 10 version 1703, the enablement of BitLocker can be triggered over MDM either by the [Policy CSP](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-configuration-service-provider/) or the [BitLocker CSP](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp/). The BitLocker CSP adds policy options that go beyond ensuring that encryption has occurred, and is available on computers that run Windows 11, Windows 10, and on Windows phones.
-For hardware that is compliant with Modern Standby and HSTI, when using either of these features, [BitLocker Device Encryption](bitlocker-device-encryption-overview-windows-10.md#bitlocker-device-encryption) is automatically turned on whenever the user joins a device to Azure AD. Azure AD provides a portal where recovery keys are also backed up, so users can retrieve their own recovery key for self-service, if necessary. For older devices that aren't yet encrypted, beginning with Windows 10 version 1703, admins can use the [BitLocker CSP](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp/) to trigger encryption and store the recovery key in Azure AD. This process and feature is applicable to Azure Hybrid AD as well.
+For hardware that is compliant with Modern Standby and HSTI, when using either of these features, [BitLocker Device Encryption](bitlocker-device-encryption-overview-windows-10.md#bitlocker-device-encryption) is automatically turned on whenever the user joins a device to Microsoft Entra ID. Microsoft Entra ID provides a portal where recovery keys are also backed up, so users can retrieve their own recovery key for self-service, if necessary. For older devices that aren't yet encrypted, beginning with Windows 10 version 1703, admins can use the [BitLocker CSP](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp/) to trigger encryption and store the recovery key in Microsoft Entra ID. This process and feature is applicable to Azure Hybrid AD as well.
## Managing workplace-joined PCs and phones
-For Windows PCs and Windows Phones that are enrolled using **Connect to work or school account**, BitLocker Device Encryption is managed over MDM, the same as devices joined to Azure AD.
+For Windows PCs and Windows Phones that are enrolled using **Connect to work or school account**, BitLocker Device Encryption is managed over MDM, the same as devices joined to Microsoft Entra ID.
## Managing servers
@@ -47,9 +49,9 @@ If a server is being installed manually, such as a stand-alone server, then choo
## PowerShell examples
-For Azure AD-joined computers, including virtual machines, the recovery password should be stored in Azure AD.
+For Microsoft Entra joined computers, including virtual machines, the recovery password should be stored in Microsoft Entra ID.
-**Example**: *Use PowerShell to add a recovery password and back it up to Azure AD before enabling BitLocker*
+**Example**: *Use PowerShell to add a recovery password and back it up to Microsoft Entra ID before enabling BitLocker*
```powershell
Add-BitLockerKeyProtector -MountPoint "C:" -RecoveryPasswordProtector
diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-recovery-guide-plan.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-recovery-guide-plan.md
index c934ae7570..a2bf3f755c 100644
--- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-recovery-guide-plan.md
+++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-recovery-guide-plan.md
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ BitLocker metadata has been enhanced starting in Windows 10, version 1903, to in

> [!IMPORTANT]
-> It is not recommend to print recovery keys or saving them to a file. Instead, use Active Directory backup or a cloud-based backup. Cloud-based backup includes Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) and Microsoft account.
+> It is not recommend to print recovery keys or saving them to a file. Instead, use Active Directory backup or a cloud-based backup. Cloud-based backup includes Microsoft Entra ID and Microsoft account.
There are rules governing which hint is shown during the recovery (in the order of processing):
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ There are rules governing which hint is shown during the recovery (in the order
4. Prioritize keys with successful backup over keys that have never been backed up.
-5. Prioritize backup hints in the following order for remote backup locations: **Microsoft Account > Azure AD > Active Directory**.
+5. Prioritize backup hints in the following order for remote backup locations: **Microsoft Account > Microsoft Entra ID > Active Directory**.
6. If a key has been printed and saved to file, display a combined hint, "Look for a printout or a text file with the key," instead of two separate hints.
@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ There are rules governing which hint is shown during the recovery (in the order
| Custom URL | Yes |
|----------------------|------------|
| Saved to Microsoft Account | Yes |
-| Saved to Azure AD | No |
+| Saved to Microsoft Entra ID | No |
| Saved to Active Directory | No |
| Printed | No |
| Saved to file | No |
@@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ There are rules governing which hint is shown during the recovery (in the order
| Custom URL | Yes |
|----------------------|------------|
| Saved to Microsoft Account | No |
-| Saved to Azure AD | No |
+| Saved to Microsoft Entra ID | No |
| Saved to Active Directory | Yes |
| Printed | No |
| Saved to file | No |
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ There are rules governing which hint is shown during the recovery (in the order
| Custom URL | No |
|----------------------|------------|
| Saved to Microsoft Account | Yes |
-| Saved to Azure AD | Yes |
+| Saved to Microsoft Entra ID | Yes |
| Saved to Active Directory | No |
| Printed | Yes |
| Saved to file | Yes |
@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ There are rules governing which hint is shown during the recovery (in the order
| Custom URL | No |
|----------------------|-----------------|
| Saved to Microsoft Account | No |
-| Saved to Azure AD | No |
+| Saved to Microsoft Entra ID | No |
| Saved to Active Directory | No |
| Printed | No |
| Saved to file | Yes |
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ There are rules governing which hint is shown during the recovery (in the order
| Custom URL | No |
|----------------------|-----------------|
| Saved to Microsoft Account | No |
-| Saved to Azure AD | No |
+| Saved to Microsoft Entra ID | No |
| Saved to Active Directory | No |
| Printed | No |
| Saved to file | No |
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ There are rules governing which hint is shown during the recovery (in the order
| Custom URL | No |
|----------------------|-----------------|
| Saved to Microsoft Account | Yes |
-| Saved to Azure AD | Yes |
+| Saved to Microsoft Entra ID | Yes |
| Saved to Active Directory | No |
| Printed | No |
| Saved to file | No |
@@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ There are rules governing which hint is shown during the recovery (in the order
| Custom URL | No |
|----------------------|-----------------|
| Saved to Microsoft Account | No |
-| Saved to Azure AD | Yes |
+| Saved to Microsoft Entra ID | Yes |
| Saved to Active Directory | No |
| Printed | No |
| Saved to file | No |
diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/faq.yml b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/faq.yml
index 9af21917f8..7f560a14b9 100644
--- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/faq.yml
+++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/faq.yml
@@ -473,4 +473,4 @@ sections:
- question: |
Can I use BitLocker with virtual machines (VMs)?
answer: |
- Yes. Password protectors and virtual TPMs can be used with BitLocker to protect virtual machines. VMs can be domain joined, Azure AD-joined, or workplace-joined (via **Settings** > **Accounts** > **Access work or school** > **Connect**) to receive policy. Encryption can be enabled either while creating the VM or by using other existing management tools such as the BitLocker CSP, or even by using a startup script or sign-in script delivered by Group Policy. Windows Server 2016 also supports [Shielded VMs and guarded fabric](/windows-server/virtualization/guarded-fabric-shielded-vm/guarded-fabric-and-shielded-vms-top-node) to protect VMs from malicious administrators.
+ Yes. Password protectors and virtual TPMs can be used with BitLocker to protect virtual machines. VMs can be domain joined, Microsoft Entra joined, or workplace-joined (via **Settings** > **Accounts** > **Access work or school** > **Connect**) to receive policy. Encryption can be enabled either while creating the VM or by using other existing management tools such as the BitLocker CSP, or even by using a startup script or sign-in script delivered by Group Policy. Windows Server 2016 also supports [Shielded VMs and guarded fabric](/windows-server/virtualization/guarded-fabric-shielded-vm/guarded-fabric-and-shielded-vms-top-node) to protect VMs from malicious administrators.
diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/configure.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/configure.md
index 7a7277136f..dc6e715410 100644
--- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/configure.md
+++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/configure.md
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ The following table lists the recommended settings to improve PDE's security.
|Kernel-mode crash dumps and live dumps|Kernel-mode crash dumps and live dumps can potentially cause the keys used by PDE to protect content to be exposed. For greatest security, disable kernel-mode crash dumps and live dumps.|
|Windows Error Reporting (WER)/user-mode crash dumps|Disabling Windows Error Reporting prevents user-mode crash dumps. User-mode crash dumps can potentially cause the keys used by PDE to protect content to be exposed. For greatest security, disable user-mode crash dumps.|
|Hibernation|Hibernation files can potentially cause the keys used by Personal Data Encryption (PDE) to protect content to be exposed. For greatest security, disable hibernation.|
-|Allow users to select when a password is required when resuming from connected standby |When this policy isn't configured on Azure AD joined devices, users on a Connected Standby device can change the amount of time after the device´s screen turns off before a password is required to wake the device. During the time when the screen turns off but a password isn't required, the keys used by PDE to protect content could potentially be exposed. It's recommended to explicitly disable this policy on Azure AD joined devices.|
+|Allow users to select when a password is required when resuming from connected standby |When this policy isn't configured on Microsoft Entra joined devices, users on a Connected Standby device can change the amount of time after the device´s screen turns off before a password is required to wake the device. During the time when the screen turns off but a password isn't required, the keys used by PDE to protect content could potentially be exposed. It's recommended to explicitly disable this policy on Microsoft Entra joined devices.|
## Configure PDE with Microsoft Intune
diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/index.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/index.md
index 0608ea1a7c..14df705407 100644
--- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/index.md
+++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/index.md
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Unlike BitLocker that releases data encryption keys at boot, PDE doesn't release
To use PDE, the following prerequisites must be met:
- Windows 11, version 22H2 and later
-- The devices must be [Azure AD joined][AAD-1]. Domain-joined and hybrid Azure AD joined devices aren't supported
+- The devices must be [Microsoft Entra joined][AAD-1]. Domain-joined and Microsoft Entra hybrid joined devices aren't supported
- Users must sign in using [Windows Hello for Business](../../../identity-protection/hello-for-business/index.md)
> [!IMPORTANT]
diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/vpn/how-to-use-single-sign-on-sso-over-vpn-and-wi-fi-connections.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/vpn/how-to-use-single-sign-on-sso-over-vpn-and-wi-fi-connections.md
index ae9673a74d..f61993984e 100644
--- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/vpn/how-to-use-single-sign-on-sso-over-vpn-and-wi-fi-connections.md
+++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/vpn/how-to-use-single-sign-on-sso-over-vpn-and-wi-fi-connections.md
@@ -74,8 +74,8 @@ If the credentials are certificate-based, then the elements in the following tab
|------------------|---------------|
| SubjectName | The user's distinguished name (DN) where the domain components of the distinguished name reflect the internal DNS namespace when the SubjectAlternativeName does not have the fully qualified UPN required to find the domain controller. This requirement is relevant in multi-forest environments as it ensures a domain controller can be located. |
| SubjectAlternativeName | The user's fully qualified UPN where a domain name component of the user's UPN matches the organizations internal domain's DNS namespace. This requirement is relevant in multi-forest environments as it ensures a domain controller can be located when the SubjectName does not have the DN required to find the domain controller. |
-| Key Storage Provider (KSP) | If the device is joined to Azure AD, a discrete SSO certificate is used. |
-| EnhancedKeyUsage | One or more of the following EKUs is required: