diff --git a/.openpublishing.redirection.json b/.openpublishing.redirection.json
index ce0912331a..6568445c8a 100644
--- a/.openpublishing.redirection.json
+++ b/.openpublishing.redirection.json
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
{
"redirections": [
{
-"source_path": "windows/deployment/update/waas-servicing-differences.md",
-"redirect_url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/deployment/update/windows-as-a-service",
+"source_path": "windows/application-management/msix-app-packaging-tool-walkthrough.md",
+"redirect_url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/msix/mpt-overview",
"redirect_document_id": true
},
{
-"source_path": "windows/application-management/msix-app-packaging-tool-walkthrough.md",
-"redirect_url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/msix/mpt-overview",
+"source_path": "windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-atp/how-hardware-based-containers-help-protect-windows.md",
+"redirect_url": "/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-system-guard/how-hardware-based-containers-help-protect-windows",
"redirect_document_id": true
},
{
diff --git a/devices/surface/ethernet-adapters-and-surface-device-deployment.md b/devices/surface/ethernet-adapters-and-surface-device-deployment.md
index 2e6455f840..46c4dda2d0 100644
--- a/devices/surface/ethernet-adapters-and-surface-device-deployment.md
+++ b/devices/surface/ethernet-adapters-and-surface-device-deployment.md
@@ -32,9 +32,9 @@ Booting from the network (PXE boot) is only supported when you use an Ethernet a
The following Ethernet devices are supported for network boot with Surface devices:
-- Surface USB to Ethernet adapter
+- Surface USB-C to Ethernet and USB 3.0 Adapter
-- Surface USB 3.0 Ethernet adapter
+- Surface USB 3.0 to Gigabit Ethernet Adapter
- Surface Dock
diff --git a/devices/surface/index.md b/devices/surface/index.md
index 20d2c00e79..e559820d25 100644
--- a/devices/surface/index.md
+++ b/devices/surface/index.md
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ For more information on planning for, deploying, and managing Surface devices in
| [Enable PEAP, EAP-FAST, and Cisco LEAP on Surface devices](enable-peap-eap-fast-and-cisco-leap-on-surface-devices.md) | Find out how to enable support for PEAP, EAP-FAST, or Cisco LEAP protocols on your Surface device. |
| [Manage Surface UEFI settings](manage-surface-uefi-settings.md) | Use Surface UEFI settings to enable or disable devices, configure security settings, and adjust Surface device boot settings. |
| [Surface Enterprise Management Mode](surface-enterprise-management-mode.md) | See how this feature of Surface devices with Surface UEFI allows you to secure and manage firmware settings within your organization. |
+| [Surface Diagnostic Toolkit for Business](surface-diagnostic-toolkit-business.md) | Learn how to investigate, troubleshoot, and resolve hardware, software, and firmware issues with Surface devices. |
| [Surface Data Eraser](microsoft-surface-data-eraser.md) | Find out how the Microsoft Surface Data Eraser tool can help you securely wipe data from your Surface devices. |
| [Top support solutions for Surface devices](support-solutions-surface.md) | These are the top Microsoft Support solutions for common issues experienced using Surface devices in an enterprise. |
| [Change history for Surface documentation](change-history-for-surface.md) | This topic lists new and updated topics in the Surface documentation library. |
diff --git a/windows/configuration/change-history-for-configure-windows-10.md b/windows/configuration/change-history-for-configure-windows-10.md
index 88f01acdce..52fa2a92d0 100644
--- a/windows/configuration/change-history-for-configure-windows-10.md
+++ b/windows/configuration/change-history-for-configure-windows-10.md
@@ -17,6 +17,13 @@ ms.date: 11/07/2018
This topic lists new and updated topics in the [Configure Windows 10](index.md) documentation for Windows 10 and Windows 10 Mobile.
+## February 2019
+
+New or changed topic | Description
+--- | ---
+[Set up a single-app kiosk](kiosk-single-app.md) | Replaced instructions for Microsoft Intune with a link to the Intune documentation.
+[Set up a multi-app kiosk](lock-down-windows-10-to-specific-apps.md) | Replaced instructions for Intune with a link to the Intune documentation.
+
## January 2019
New or changed topic | Description
diff --git a/windows/configuration/kiosk-shelllauncher.md b/windows/configuration/kiosk-shelllauncher.md
index 02c0137f83..e928698268 100644
--- a/windows/configuration/kiosk-shelllauncher.md
+++ b/windows/configuration/kiosk-shelllauncher.md
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Using Shell Launcher, you can configure a kiosk device that runs a Windows deskt
-### Requirements
+## Requirements
>[!WARNING]
>- Windows 10 doesn’t support setting a custom shell prior to OOBE. If you do, you won’t be able to deploy the resulting image.
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ Using Shell Launcher, you can configure a kiosk device that runs a Windows deskt
[See the technical reference for the shell launcher component.](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkId=618603)
-### Configure Shell Launcher
+## Configure Shell Launcher
To set a Windows desktop application as the shell, you first turn on the Shell Launcher feature, and then you can set your custom shell as the default using PowerShell.
diff --git a/windows/configuration/kiosk-single-app.md b/windows/configuration/kiosk-single-app.md
index 7c3e7243b9..64a3ca542a 100644
--- a/windows/configuration/kiosk-single-app.md
+++ b/windows/configuration/kiosk-single-app.md
@@ -238,30 +238,14 @@ When you use the **Provision kiosk devices** wizard in Windows Configuration Des
>
>Account type: Local standard user, Azure AD
-
+
Microsoft Intune and other MDM services enable kiosk configuration through the [AssignedAccess configuration service provider (CSP)](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/client-management/mdm/assignedaccess-csp). Assigned Access has a `KioskModeApp` setting. In the `KioskModeApp` setting, you enter the user account name and the [AUMID](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/customize/enterprise/find-the-application-user-model-id-of-an-installed-app) for the app to run in kiosk mode.
>[!TIP]
>Starting in Windows 10, version 1803, a ShellLauncher node has been added to the [AssignedAccess CSP](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/client-management/mdm/assignedaccess-csp).
-The following steps explain how to configure a kiosk in Microsoft Intune. For other MDM services, see the documentation for your provider.
-
-**To configure kiosk in Microsoft Intune**
-
-2. In the Microsoft Azure portal, search for **Intune** or go to **More services** > **Intune**.
-3. Select **Device configuration**.
-4. Select **Profiles**.
-5. Select **Create profile**.
-6. Enter a friendly name for the profile.
-7. Select **Windows 10 and later** for the platform.
-8. Select **Device restrictions** for the profile type.
-9. Select **Kiosk**.
-10. In **Kiosk Mode**, select **Single app kiosk**.
-1. Enter the user account (Azure AD or a local standard user account).
-11. Enter the Application User Model ID for an installed app.
-14. Select **OK**, and then select **Create**.
-18. Assign the profile to a device group to configure the devices in that group as kiosks.
+To configure a kiosk in Microsoft Intune, see [Windows 10 and Windows Holographic for Business device settings to run as a dedicated kiosk using Intune](https://docs.microsoft.com/intune/kiosk-settings). For other MDM services, see the documentation for your provider.
diff --git a/windows/configuration/lock-down-windows-10-to-specific-apps.md b/windows/configuration/lock-down-windows-10-to-specific-apps.md
index caa9d860ab..b927ef5c8e 100644
--- a/windows/configuration/lock-down-windows-10-to-specific-apps.md
+++ b/windows/configuration/lock-down-windows-10-to-specific-apps.md
@@ -46,30 +46,7 @@ You can configure multi-app kiosks using [Microsoft Intune](#intune) or a [provi
## Configure a kiosk in Microsoft Intune
-1. [Generate the Start layout for the kiosk device.](#startlayout)
-2. In the Microsoft Azure portal, search for **Intune** or go to **More services** > **Intune**.
-3. Select **Device configuration**.
-4. Select **Profiles**.
-5. Select **Create profile**.
-6. Enter a friendly name for the profile.
-7. Select **Windows 10 and later** for the platform.
-8. Select **Kiosk (Preview)** for the profile type.
-9. Select **Kiosk - 1 setting available**.
-10. Select **Add** to define a configuration, which specifies the apps that will run and the layout for the Start menu.
-12. Enter a friendly name for the configuration.
-10. In **Kiosk Mode**, select **Multi app kiosk**.
-13. Select an app type.
- - For **Add Win32 app**, enter a friendly name for the app in **App Name**, and enter the path to the app executable in **Identifier**.
- - For **Add managed apps**, select an app that you manage through Intune.
- - For **Add app by AUMID**, enter the Application User Model ID (AUMID) for an installed UWP app.
-14. Select whether to enable the taskbar.
-15. Browse to and select the Start layout XML file that you generated in step 1.
-16. Add one or more accounts. When the account signs in, only the apps defined in the configuration will be available.
-17. Select **OK**. You can add additional configurations or finish.
-18. Assign the profile to a device group to configure the devices in that group as kiosks.
-
->[!NOTE]
->Managed apps are apps that are in the Microsoft Store for Business that is synced with your Intune subscription.
+To configure a kiosk in Microsoft Intune, see [Windows 10 and Windows Holographic for Business device settings to run as a dedicated kiosk using Intune](https://docs.microsoft.com/intune/kiosk-settings). For explanations of the specific settings, see [Windows 10 and later device settings to run as a kiosk in Intune](https://docs.microsoft.com/intune/kiosk-settings-windows).
## Configure a kiosk using a provisioning package
@@ -178,7 +155,7 @@ The profile **Id** is a GUID attribute to uniquely identify the profile. You can
- For UWP apps, you need to provide the App User Model ID (AUMID). [Learn how to get the AUMID](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkId=614867), or [get the AUMID from the Start Layout XML](#startlayout).
- For desktop apps, you need to specify the full path of the executable, which can contain one or more system environment variables in the form of %variableName% (i.e. %systemroot%, %windir%).
-- To configure the app to launch automatically when the user signs in, include `rs5:AutoLaunch="true"` after the AUMID or path. You can also include arguments to be passed to the app. For an example, see [the AllowedApps sample XML](#apps-sample).
+- To configure a single app to launch automatically when the user signs in, include `rs5:AutoLaunch="true"` after the AUMID or path. You can also include arguments to be passed to the app. For an example, see [the AllowedApps sample XML](#apps-sample).
When the mult-app kiosk configuration is applied to a device, AppLocker rules will be generated to allow the apps that are listed in the configuration. Here are the predefined assigned access AppLocker rules for **UWP apps**:
@@ -674,4 +651,4 @@ In Windows Configuration Designer, under **ProvisioningCommands** > **DeviceCont
## Other methods
-Environments that use WMI can use the [MDM Bridge WMI Provider to configure a kiosk](kiosk-mdm-bridge.md).
\ No newline at end of file
+Environments that use WMI can use the [MDM Bridge WMI Provider to configure a kiosk](kiosk-mdm-bridge.md).
diff --git a/windows/deployment/update/images/security-only-update.png b/windows/deployment/update/images/security-only-update.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9ed3d0f791
Binary files /dev/null and b/windows/deployment/update/images/security-only-update.png differ
diff --git a/windows/deployment/update/waas-configure-wufb.md b/windows/deployment/update/waas-configure-wufb.md
index d87885e183..e4efb40317 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/update/waas-configure-wufb.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/update/waas-configure-wufb.md
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ ms.sitesec: library
author: jaimeo
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.author: jaimeo
-ms.date: 11/16/2018
---
# Configure Windows Update for Business
@@ -17,6 +16,8 @@ ms.date: 11/16/2018
- Windows 10
- Windows 10 Mobile
+- Windows Server 2016
+- Windows Server 2019
> **Looking for consumer information?** See [Windows Update: FAQ](https://support.microsoft.com/help/12373/windows-update-faq)
diff --git a/windows/deployment/update/waas-manage-updates-wufb.md b/windows/deployment/update/waas-manage-updates-wufb.md
index d1fbc267eb..ba0843abc3 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/update/waas-manage-updates-wufb.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/update/waas-manage-updates-wufb.md
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ ms.author: jaimeo
- Windows 10
- Windows 10 Mobile
+- Windows Server 2016
+- Windows Server 2019
> **Looking for consumer information?** See [Windows Update: FAQ](https://support.microsoft.com/help/12373/windows-update-faq)
diff --git a/windows/deployment/update/waas-servicing-differences.md b/windows/deployment/update/waas-servicing-differences.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..27e3799565
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/deployment/update/waas-servicing-differences.md
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+---
+title: Servicing differences between Windows 10 and older operating systems
+description: Learn the differences between servicing Windows 10 and servicing older operating systems.
+keywords: updates, servicing, current, deployment, semi-annual channel, feature, quality, rings, insider, tools
+ms.prod: w10
+ms.mktglfcycl: manage
+ms.sitesec: library
+author: KarenSimWindows
+ms.localizationpriority: medium
+ms.author: karensim
+---
+# Understanding the differences between servicing Windows 10-era and legacy Windows operating systems
+
+>Applies to: Windows 10
+
+>**February 15, 2019: This document has been corrected and edited to reflect that security-only updates for legacy OS versions are not cumulative. They were previously identified as cumulative similar to monthly rollups, which is inaccurate.**
+
+Today, many enterprise customers have a mix of modern and legacy client and server operating systems. Managing the servicing and updating differences between those legacy operating systems and Windows 10 versions adds a level of complexity that is not well understood. This can be confusing. With the end of support for legacy [Windows 7 SP1](https://support.microsoft.com/help/4057281/windows-7-support-will-end-on-january-14-2020) and Windows Server 2008 R2 variants on January 14, 2020, System Administrators have a critical need critical to understand how best to leverage a modern workplace to support system updates.
+
+The following provides an initial overview of how updating client and server differs between the Windows 10-era Operating Systems (such as, Windows 10 version 1709, Windows Server 2016) and legacy operating systems (such as Windows 7, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2).
+
+>[!NOTE]
+>A note on naming convention in this article: For brevity, "Windows 10" refers to all operating systems across client, server and IoT released since July 2015, while "legacy" refers to all operating systems prior to that period for client and server, including Windows 7, Window 8.1, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, etc.
+
+## Infinite fragmentation
+Prior to Windows 10, all updates to operating system (OS) components were published individually. On "Update Tuesday," customers would pick and choose individual updates they wanted to apply. Most chose to update security fixes, while far fewer selected non-security fixes, updated drivers, or installed .NET Framework updates.
+
+As a result, each environment within the global Windows ecosystem that had only a subset of security and non-security fixes installed had a different set of binaries and behaviors than those that consistently installed every available update as tested by Microsoft.
+
+This resulted in a fragmented ecosystem that created diverse challenges in predictively testing interoperability, resulting in high update failure rates - which were subsequently mitigated by customers removing individual updates that were causing issues. Each customer that selectively removed individual updates amplified this fragmentation by creating more diverse environment permutations across the ecosystem. As an IT Administrator once quipped, "If you’ve seen one Windows 7 PC, you have seen one Windows 7 PC," suggesting no consistency or predictability across more than 250M commercial devices at the time.
+
+## Windows 10 – Next generation
+Windows 10 provided an opportunity to end the era of infinite fragmentation. With Windows 10 and the Windows as a service model, updates came rolled together in the "latest cumulative update" (LCU) packages for both client and server. Every new update published includes all changes from previous updates, as well as new fixes. Since Windows client and server share the same code base, these LCUs allow the same update to be installed on the same client and server OS family, further reducing fragmentation.
+
+This helps simplify servicing. Devices with the original Release to Market (RTM) version of a feature release installed could get up to date by installing the most recent LCU.
+
+Windows publishes the new LCU packages for each Windows 10 version (1607, 1709, etc.) on the second Tuesday of each month. This package is classified as a required security update and contains contents from the previous LCU as well as new security, non-security and Internet Explorer 11 (IE11) fixes. The security classification, by definition, requires a reboot of the device to complete installation of the update.
+
+
+
+*Figure 1.0 - High level cumulative update model*
+
+Another benefit of the LCU model is fewer steps. Devices that have the original Release to Market (RTM) version of a release can install the most recent LCU to get up to date in one step, rather than having to install multiple updates with reboots after each.
+
+This cumulative update model for Windows 10 has helped provide the Windows ecosystem with consistent update experiences that can be predicted by baseline testing before release. Even with highly complex updates with hundreds of fixes, the number of incidents with monthly security updates for Windows 10 have fallen month over month since the initial release of Windows 10.
+
+### Points to consider
+
+- Windows 10 does not have the concept of a Security-Only or Monthly Rollup for updates. All updates are an LCU package, which includes the last release plus anything new.
+- Windows 10 no longer has the concept of a "hotfix" since all individual updates must be rolled into the cumulative packages. (Note: Any private fix is offered for customer validation only, and then rolled into an LCU.)
+- [Updates for the .NET Framework](https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/dotnet/2016/10/11/net-framework-monthly-rollups-explained/) are NOT included in the Windows 10 LCU. They are separate packages with different behaviors depending on the version of .NET Framework being updated, and on which OS. As of October 2018, .NET Framework updates for Windows 10 will be separate and have their own cumulative update model.
+- For Windows 10, available update types vary by publishing channel:
+ - For customers using Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) and for the Update Catalog, several different updates types for Windows 10 are rolled together for the core OS in a single LCU package, with exception of Servicing Stack Updates.
+ - Servicing Stack Updates (SSU) are available for download from the Update Catalog and can be imported through WSUS, but will not be automatically synced. (See this example for Windows 10, version 1709) For more information on Servicing Stack Updates, please see this blog.
+ - For customers connecting to Windows Update, the new cloud update architecture uses a database of updates which break out all the different update types, including Servicing Stack Updates (SSU) and Dynamic Updates (DU). The update scanning in the Windows 10 servicing stack on the client automatically takes only the updates that are needed by the device to be completely up to date.
+- Windows 7 and other legacy operating systems have cumulative updates that operate differently than in Windows 10 (see next section).
+
+## Windows 7 and legacy OS versions
+While Windows 10 updates could have been controlled as cumulative from "Day 1," the legacy OS ecosystem for both client and server was highly fragmented. Recognizing the challenges of update quality in a fragmented environment, we moved Windows 7 to a cumulative update model in October 2016.
+
+Customers saw the LCU model used for Windows 10 as having packages that were too large and represented too much of a change for legacy operating systems, so a different model was implemented. Windows instead offered one cumulative package (Monthly Rollup) and one individual package (Security Only) for all legacy operating systems.
+
+The Monthly Rollup includes new non-security (if appropriate), security updates, Internet Explorer (IE) updates, and all updates from the previous month similar to the Windows 10 model. The Security-only package includes only new security updates for the month. This means that any security updates from any previous month are not included in current month’s Security-Only Package. If a Security-Only update is missed, it is missed. Those updates will not appear in a future Security-Only update. Additionally, a cumulative package is offered for IE, which can be tested and installed separately, reducing the total update package size. The IE cumulative update includes both security and non-security fixes following the same model as Windows 10.
+
+
+*Figure 2.0 - Legacy OS security-only update model*
+
+Moving to the cumulative model for legacy OS versions continues to improve predictability of update quality. The Windows legacy environments which have fully updated machines with Monthly Rollups are running the same baseline against which all legacy OS version updates are tested. These include all of the updates (security and non-security) prior to and after October 2016. Many customer environments do not have all updates prior to this change installed, which leaves some continued fragmentation in the ecosystem. Further, customers who are installing Security-Only Updates and potentially doing so inconsistently are also more fragmented than Microsoft’s test environments for legacy OS version. This remaining fragmentation results in issues like those seen when the September 2016 Servicing Stack Update (SSU) was needed for smooth installation of the August 2018 security update. These environments did not have the SSU applied previously.
+
+### Points to consider
+- Windows 7 and Windows 8 legacy operating system updates [moved from individual to cumulative in October 2016](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/Windows-Blog-Archive/More-on-Windows-7-and-Windows-8-1-servicing-changes/ba-p/166783). Devices with updates missing prior to that point are still missing those updates, as they were not included in the subsequent cumulative packages.
+- "Hotfixes" are no longer published for legacy OS versions. All updates are rolled into the appropriate package depending on their classification as either non-security, security, or Internet Explorer updates. (Note: any private fix is offered for customer validation only. Once validated they are then rolled into a Monthly Rollup or IE cumulative update, as appropriate.)
+- Both Monthly Rollups and Security-only updates released on Update Tuesday for legacy OS versions are identified as "security required" updates, because both have the full set of security updates in them. The Monthly Rollup may have additional non-security updates that are not included in the Security Only update. The "security" classification requires the device be rebooted so the update can be fully installed.
+- Given the differences between the cumulative Monthly Rollups and the single-month Security-only update packages, switching between these update types is not advised. Differences in the baselines of these packages may result in installation errors and conflicts. Choosing one and staying on that update type with high consistency – Monthly Rollup or Security-only – is recommended.
+- With all Legacy OS versions now in the Extended Support stage of their 10-year lifecycle, they typically receive only security updates for both Monthly Rollup and Security Only updates. Using Express for the Monthly Rollup results in almost the same package size as Security Only, with the added confidence of ensuring all relevant updates are installed.
+- In [February 2017](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/Windows-Blog-Archive/Simplified-servicing-for-Windows-7-and-Windows-8-1-the-latest/ba-p/166798), Windows pulled IE updates out of the legacy OS versions Security-only updates, while leaving them in the Monthly Rollup updates. This was done specifically to reduce package size based on customer feedback.
+- The IE cumulative update includes both security and non-security updates and is also needed for to help secure the entire environment. This update can be installed separately or as part of the Monthly Rollup.
+- [Updates for .NET Framework](https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/dotnet/2016/10/11/net-framework-monthly-rollups-explained/) are NOT included in legacy Monthly Rollup or Security Only packages. They are separate packages with different behaviors depending on the version of the .NET Framework, and which legacy OS, being updated.
+- For [Windows Server 2008 SP2](https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/windowsserver/2018/06/12/windows-server-2008-sp2-servicing-changes/), cumulative updates began in October 2018, and follow the same model as Windows 7. Updates for IE9 are included in those packages, as the last supported version of Internet Explorer for that Legacy OS version.
+
+## Public preview releases
+Lastly, the cumulative update model directly impacts the public Preview releases offered in the 3rd and/or 4th weeks of the month. Update Tuesday, also referred to as the "B" week release occurs on the second Tuesday of the month. It is always a required security update across all operating systems. In addition to this monthly release, Windows also releases non-security update "previews" targeting the 3rd (C) and the 4th (D) weeks of the month. These preview releases include that month’s B-release plus a set of non-security updates for testing and validation as a cumulative package. We recommend IT Administrators uses the C/D previews to test the update in their environments. Any issues identified with the updates in the C/D releases are identified and then fixed or removed, prior to being rolled up in to the next month’s B release package together with new security updates. Security-only Packages are not part of the C/D preview program.
+
+### Examples
+Windows 10 version 1709:
+- (9B) September 11, 2018 Update Tuesday / B release - includes security, non-security and IE update. This update is categorized as "Required, Security" it requires a system reboot.
+- (9C) September 26, 2018 Preview C release - includes everything from 9B PLUS some non-security updates for testing/validation. This update is qualified as not required, non-security. No system reboot is required.
+- (10B) October 9, 2018 Update Tuesday / B release includes all fixes included in 9B, all fixes in 9C and introduces new security fixes and IE updates. This update is qualified as "Required, Security" and requires a system reboot.
+All of these updates are cumulative and build on each other for Windows 10. This is in contrast to legacy OS versions, where the 9C release becomes part of the "Monthly Rollup," but not the "Security Only" update. In other words, a Window 7 SP1 9C update is part of the cumulative "Monthly Rollup" but not included in the "Security Only" update because the fixes are qualified as "non-security". This is an important variation to note on the two models.
+
+
+*Figure 3.0 - Preview releases within the Windows 10 LCU model*
+
+## Previews vs. on-demand releases
+In 2018, we experienced incidents which required urgent remediation that didn’t map to the monthly update release cadence. These incidents were situations that required an immediate fix to an Update Tuesday release. While Windows engineering worked aggressively to respond within a week of the B-release, these "on-demand" releases created confusion with the C Preview releases.
+
+As a general policy, if a Security-Only package has a regression, which is defined as an unintentional error in the code of an update, then the fix for that regression will be added to the next month’s Security-Only Update. The fix for that regression may also be offered as part an On-Demand release and will be rolled into the next Monthly Update. (Note: Exceptions do exist to this policy, based on timing.)
+
+### Point to consider
+- When Windows identifies an issue with a Update Tuesday release, engineering teams work to remediate or fix the issue as quickly as possible. The outcome is often a new update which may be released at any time, including during the 3rd or 4th week of the month. Such updates are independent of the regularly scheduled "C" and "D" update previews. These updates are created on-demand to remediate a customer impacting issue. In most cases they are qualified as a "non-security" update, and do not require a system reboot.
+- Rarely do incidents with Update Tuesday releases impact more than .1% of the total population. With the new Windows Update (WU) architecture, updates can be targeted to affected devices. This targeting is not available through the Update Catalog or WSUS channels, however.
+- On-demand releases address a specific issue with an Update Tuesday release and are often qualified as "non-security" for one of two reasons. First, the fix may not be an additional security fix, but a non-security change to the update. Second, the "non-security" designation allows individuals or companies to choose when and how to reboot the devices, rather than forcing a system reboot on all Windows devices receiving the update globally. This trade-off is rarely a difficult choice as it has the potential to impact customer experience across client and server, across consumer and commercial customers for more than one billion devices.
+- Because the cumulative model is used across Window 10 and legacy Windows OS versions, despite variations between these OS versions, an out of band release will include all of the changes from the Update Tuesday release plus the fix that addresses the issue. And since Windows no longer releases hotfixes, everything is cumulative in some way.
+
+In closing, I hope this overview of the update model across current and legacy Windows OS versions highlights the benefits of the Windows 10 cumulative update model to help defragment the Windows ecosystem environments, simplify servicing and help make systems more secure.
+
+## Resources
+- [Simplifying updates for Windows 7 and 8.1](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/Windows-Blog-Archive/Simplifying-updates-for-Windows-7-and-8-1/ba-p/166530)
+- [Further simplifying servicing models for Windows 7 and Windows 8.1](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/Windows-Blog-Archive/Further-simplifying-servicing-models-for-Windows-7-and-Windows-8/ba-p/166772)
+- [More on Windows 7 and Windows 8.1 servicing changes](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/Windows-Blog-Archive/More-on-Windows-7-and-Windows-8-1-servicing-changes/ba-p/166783)
+- [.NET Framework Monthly Rollups Explained](https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/dotnet/2016/10/11/net-framework-monthly-rollups-explained/)
+- [Simplified servicing for Windows 7 and Windows 8.1: the latest improvements](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/Windows-Blog-Archive/Simplified-servicing-for-Windows-7-and-Windows-8-1-the-latest/ba-p/166798)
+- [Windows Server 2008 SP2 servicing changes](https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/windowsserver/2018/06/12/windows-server-2008-sp2-servicing-changes/)
+- [Windows 10 update servicing cadence](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/Windows-IT-Pro-Blog/Windows-10-update-servicing-cadence/ba-p/222376)
+- [Windows 7 servicing stack updates: managing change and appreciating cumulative updates](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/Windows-IT-Pro-Blog/Windows-7-servicing-stack-updates-managing-change-and/ba-p/260434)
diff --git a/windows/deployment/update/windows-as-a-service.md b/windows/deployment/update/windows-as-a-service.md
index 9f15d874d2..25472e32ba 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/update/windows-as-a-service.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/update/windows-as-a-service.md
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ Everyone wins when transparency is a top priority. We want you to know when upda
The latest news:
+- Windows Update for Business and the retirement of SAC-T - February 14, 2019
- Application compatibility in the Windows ecosystem - January 15, 2019
- Windows monthly security and quality updates overview - January 10, 2019
- Driver quality in the Windows ecosystem - December 19, 2018
diff --git a/windows/deployment/upgrade/troubleshoot-upgrade-errors.md b/windows/deployment/upgrade/troubleshoot-upgrade-errors.md
index afefc6519e..e363b4d807 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/upgrade/troubleshoot-upgrade-errors.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/upgrade/troubleshoot-upgrade-errors.md
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
ms.sitesec: library
ms.pagetype: deploy
author: greg-lindsay
-ms.date: 03/30/2018
ms.localizationpriority: medium
---
@@ -22,7 +21,7 @@ ms.localizationpriority: medium
If a Windows 10 upgrade is not successful, it can be very helpful to understand *when* an error occurred in the upgrade process.
-Briefly, the upgrade process consists of four phases: **Downlevel**, **SafeOS**, **First boot**, and **Second boot**. The computer will reboot once between each phase.
+Briefly, the upgrade process consists of four phases: **Downlevel**, **SafeOS**, **First boot**, and **Second boot**. The computer will reboot once between each phase. Note: Progress is tracked in the registry during the upgrade process using the following key: **HKLM\System\Setup\mosetup\volatile\SetupProgress**. This key is volatile and only present during the upgrade process; it contains a binary value in the range 0-100.
These phases are explained in greater detail [below](#the-windows-10-upgrade-process). First, let's summarize the actions performed during each phase because this affects the type of errors that can be encountered.
diff --git a/windows/deployment/upgrade/windows-10-edition-upgrades.md b/windows/deployment/upgrade/windows-10-edition-upgrades.md
index e9b94e674c..fc3d890534 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/upgrade/windows-10-edition-upgrades.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/upgrade/windows-10-edition-upgrades.md
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.sitesec: library
ms.pagetype: mobile
author: greg-lindsay
-ms.date: 10/25/2018
---
# Windows 10 edition upgrade
@@ -59,7 +58,6 @@ X = unsupported
| **Pro for Workstations > Enterprise** |  |  |  | 
(1703 - PC)
(1709 - MSfB) |  |  |
| **Pro Education > Education** |  |  |  | 
(MSfB) |  |  |
| **Enterprise > Education** |  |  |  | 
(MSfB) |  |  |
-| **Enterprise LTSC > Enterprise** |  |  |  | 
(MSfB) |  |  |
| **Mobile > Mobile Enterprise** |  | |  |  |  |  |
> [!NOTE]
diff --git a/windows/deployment/upgrade/windows-10-upgrade-paths.md b/windows/deployment/upgrade/windows-10-upgrade-paths.md
index c4d8887279..91d6394973 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/upgrade/windows-10-upgrade-paths.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/upgrade/windows-10-upgrade-paths.md
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ ms.sitesec: library
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.pagetype: mobile
author: greg-lindsay
-ms.date: 07/06/2018
---
# Windows 10 upgrade paths
@@ -24,7 +23,7 @@ This topic provides a summary of available upgrade paths to Windows 10. You can
>**Windows 10 LTSC/LTSB**: Due to [naming changes](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/deployment/update/waas-overview#naming-changes), product versions that display Windows 10 LTSB will be replaced with Windows 10 LTSC in subsequent feature updates. The term LTSC is used here to refer to all long term servicing versions.
->In-place upgrade from Windows 7, Windows 8.1, or Windows 10 semi-annual channel to Windows 10 LTSC is not supported. **Note**: Windows 10 LTSC 2015 did not block this upgrade path. This was corrected in the Windows 10 LTSC 2016 release, which will now only allow data-only and clean install options. You can upgrade from Windows 10 LTSC to Windows 10 semi-annual channel, provided that you upgrade to the same or a newer build version. For example, Windows 10 Enterprise 2016 LTSB can be upgraded to Windows 10 Enterprise version 1607 or later.
+>In-place upgrade from Windows 7, Windows 8.1, or Windows 10 semi-annual channel to Windows 10 LTSC is not supported. **Note**: Windows 10 LTSC 2015 did not block this upgrade path. This was corrected in the Windows 10 LTSC 2016 release, which will now only allow data-only and clean install options. You can upgrade from Windows 10 LTSC to Windows 10 semi-annual channel, provided that you upgrade to the same or a newer build version. For example, Windows 10 Enterprise 2016 LTSB can be upgraded to Windows 10 Enterprise version 1607 or later. Upgrade is supported using the in-place upgrade process (using Windows setup).
>**Windows N/KN**: Windows "N" and "KN" SKUs follow the same upgrade paths shown below. If the pre-upgrade and post-upgrade editions are not the same type (e.g. Windows 8.1 Pro N to Windows 10 Pro), personal data will be kept but applications and settings will be removed during the upgrade process.
diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopilot/registration-auth.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopilot/registration-auth.md
index e47d792388..5a5dcf695d 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopilot/registration-auth.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopilot/registration-auth.md
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ For a CSP to register Windows Autopilot devices on behalf of a customer, the cus

- Select the checkbox indicating whether or not you want delegated admin rights:

- - NOTE: Depending on your partner, they might request Delegated Admin Permissions (DAP) when requesting this consent. You should ask them to use the newer DAP-free process (shown in tihs document) if possible. If not, you can easily remove their DAP status either from Microsoft Store for Business or the Office 365 admin portal: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/partner-center/customers_revoke_admin_privileges
+ - NOTE: Depending on your partner, they might request Delegated Admin Permissions (DAP) when requesting this consent. You should ask them to use the newer DAP-free process (shown in this document) if possible. If not, you can easily remove their DAP status either from Microsoft Store for Business or the Office 365 admin portal: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/partner-center/customers_revoke_admin_privileges
- Send the template above to the customer via email.
2. Customer with global administrator privileges in Microsoft Store for Business (MSfB) clicks the link in the body of the email once they receive it from the CSP, which takes them directly to the following MSfB page:
diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopilot/self-deploying.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopilot/self-deploying.md
index 697dc354e7..68138d4b86 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopilot/self-deploying.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopilot/self-deploying.md
@@ -14,46 +14,38 @@ ms.author: greg-lindsay
# Windows Autopilot Self-Deploying mode (Preview)
-**Applies to: Windows 10, build 17672 or later**
+**Applies to: Windows 10, version 1809 or later**
-Windows Autopilot self-deploying mode offers truly zero touch provisioning. With this mode, all you need to do is power on a device, plug it into Ethernet, and watch Windows Autopilot fully configure the device. No additional user interaction is required.
->[!NOTE]
->In order to display an organization-specific logo and organization name during the Autopilot process, Azure Active Directory Company Branding needs to be configured with the images and text that should be displayed. See [Quickstart: Add company branding to your sign-in page in Azure AD](https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/customize-branding) for more details.
+Windows Autopilot self-deploying mode enables a device to be deployed with little to no user interaction. For devices with an Ethernet connection, no user interaction is required; for devices connected via Wi-fi, no interaction is required after making the Wi-fi connection (choosing the language, locale, and keyboard, then making a network connection).
-
-
->[!NOTE]
->While today there is a “Next” button that must be clicked to continue the deployment process, and an Activities opt-in page in OOBE, both of these will be removed in future Insider Preview builds to enable a completely automated deployment process – no user authentication or user interaction will be required.
-
-Self-deploying mode can register the device into an organization’s Azure Active Directory tenant, enroll the device in the organization’s mobile device management (MDM) provider (leveraging Azure AD for automatic MDM enrollment), and ensure that all policies, applications, certificates, and networking profiles are provisioned on the device before the user ever logs on (levering the enrollment status page to prevent access to the desktop until the device is fully provisioned).
+Self-deploying mode joins the device into Azure Active Directory, enrolls the device in Intune (or another MDM service) leveraging Azure AD for automatic MDM enrollment, and ensures that all policies, applications, certificates, and networking profiles are provisioned on the device, leveraging the enrollment status page to prevent access to the desktop until the device is fully provisioned.
>[!NOTE]
>Self-deploying mode does not support Active Directory Join or Hybrid Azure AD Join. All devices will be joined to Azure Active Directory.
-Because self-deploying mode uses a device’s TPM 2.0 hardware to authenticate the device into an organization’s Azure AD tenant, devices without TPM 2.0 cannot be used with this mode.
+Self-deploying mode is designed to deploy Windows 10 as a kiosk, digital signage device, or a shared device. When setting up a kiosk, you can leverage the new Kiosk Browser, an app built on Microsoft Edge that can be used to create a tailored, MDM-managed browsing experience. When combined with MDM policies to create a local account and configure it to automatically log on, the complete configuration of the device can be automated. Find out more about these options by reading simplifying kiosk management for IT with Windows 10. See [Set up a kiosk or digital sign in Intune or other MDM service](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/configuration/setup-kiosk-digital-signage#set-up-a-kiosk-or-digital-sign-in-intune-or-other-mdm-service) for additional details.
>[!NOTE]
->If you attempt a self-deploying mode deployment on a device that does not have support TPM 2.0 or on a virtual machine, the process will fail when verifying the device with an 0x800705B4 timeout error.
+>Self-deploying mode does not presently associate a user with the device (since no user ID or password is specified as part of the process). As a result, some Azure AD and Intune capabilities (such as BitLocker recovery, installation of apps from the Company Portal, or Conditional Access) may not be available to a user that signs into the device.
-Windows Autopilot self-deploying mode enables you to effortlessly deploy Windows 10 as a kiosk, digital signage device, or a shared device. When setting up a kiosk, you can leverage the new Kiosk Browser, an app built on Microsoft Edge that can be used to create a tailored, MDM-managed browsing experience. When combined with MDM policies to create a local account and configure it to automatically log on, the complete configuration of the device can be automated. Find out more about these options by reading simplifying kiosk management for IT with Windows 10. See [Set up a kiosk or digital sign in Intune or other MDM service](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/configuration/setup-kiosk-digital-signage#set-up-a-kiosk-or-digital-sign-in-intune-or-other-mdm-service) for additional details.
-
-Windows Autopilot self-deploying mode is available on Windows 10 build 17672 or higher. When configuring an Autopilot profile in Microsoft Intune, you’ll see a new drop-down menu that asks for the deployment mode. In that menu, select Self-deploying (preview) and apply that profile to the devices you’d like to validate.
+
+
+## Requirements
+
+Because self-deploying mode uses a device’s TPM 2.0 hardware to authenticate the device into an organization’s Azure AD tenant, devices without TPM 2.0 cannot be used with this mode. The devices must also support TPM device attestation. (All newly-manufactured Windows devices should meet these requirements.)
+
+>[!NOTE]
+>If you attempt a self-deploying mode deployment on a device that does not have support TPM 2.0 or on a virtual machine, the process will fail when verifying the device with an 0x800705B4 timeout error. (Hyper-V virtual TPMs are not supported.)
+
+In order to display an organization-specific logo and organization name during the Autopilot process, Azure Active Directory Company Branding needs to be configured with the images and text that should be displayed. See [Quickstart: Add company branding to your sign-in page in Azure AD](https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/customize-branding) for more details.
## Step by step
In order to perform a self-deploying mode deployment using Windows Autopilot, the following preparation steps need to be completed:
- Create an Autopilot profile for self-deploying mode with the desired settings. In Microsoft Intune, this mode is explicitly chosen when creating the profile. (Note that it is not possible to create a profile in the Microsoft Store for Business or Partner Center for self-deploying mode.)
-- If using Intune, create a device group in Azure Active Directory and assign the Autopilot profile to that group.
-
-For each machine that will be deployed using self-deploying mode, these additional steps are needed:
-
-- Ensure that the device supports TPM 2.0 and device attestation. (Note that virtual machines are not supported.)
-- Ensure that the device has been added to Windows Autopilot. This can be done automatically by an OEM or partner at the time the device is purchased, or it can be done through a manual harvesting process later. See [Adding devices to Windows Autopilot](add-devices.md) for more information.
-- Ensure an Autopilot profile has been assigned to the device:
- - If using Intune and Azure Active Directory dynamic device groups, this can be done automatically.
- - If using Intune and Azure Active Directory static device groups, manually add the device to the device group.
- - If using other methods (e.g. Microsoft Store for Business or Partner Center), manually assign an Autopilot profile to the device.
+- If using Intune, create a device group in Azure Active Directory and assign the Autopilot profile to that group. Ensure that the profile has been assigned to the device before attempting to deploy that device.
+- Boot the device, connecting it to Wi-fi if required, then wait for the provisioning process to complete.
## Validation
@@ -72,4 +64,4 @@ When performing a self-deploying mode deployment using Windows Autopilot, the fo
- Remain at the logon screen, where any member of the organization can log on by specifying their Azure AD credentials.
- Automatically sign in as a local account, for devices configured as a kiosk or digital signage.
-In case the observed results do not match these expectations, consult the [Windows Autopilot Troubleshooting](troubleshooting.md) documentation.
\ No newline at end of file
+In case the observed results do not match these expectations, consult the [Windows Autopilot Troubleshooting](troubleshooting.md) documentation.
diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopilot/windows-autopilot-requirements-licensing.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopilot/windows-autopilot-requirements-licensing.md
index 686969c4ac..f88d935d8c 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopilot/windows-autopilot-requirements-licensing.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopilot/windows-autopilot-requirements-licensing.md
@@ -17,13 +17,7 @@ ms.author: greg-lindsay
Windows Autopilot depends on specific capabilities available in Windows 10 and Azure Active Directory; it also requires an MDM service such as Microsoft Intune. These capabilities can be obtained through various editions and subscription programs:
-- Windows 10 version 1703 or higher must be used. Supported editions are the following:
- - Pro
- - Pro Education
- - Pro for Workstations
- - Enterprise
- - Education
-- One of the following, to provide needed Azure Active Directory (automatic MDM enrollment and company branding features) and MDM functionality:
+- To provide needed Azure Active Directory (automatic MDM enrollment and company branding features) and MDM functionality, one of the following is required:
- [Microsoft 365 Business subscriptions](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/business)
- [Microsoft 365 F1 subscriptions](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/enterprise/firstline)
- [Microsoft 365 Academic A1, A3, or A5 subscriptions](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/education/buy-license/microsoft365/default.aspx)
@@ -32,6 +26,6 @@ Windows Autopilot depends on specific capabilities available in Windows 10 and A
- [Intune for Education subscriptions](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/intune-education/what-is-intune-for-education), which include all needed Azure AD and Intune features
- [Azure Active Directory Premium P1 or P2](https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/active-directory/) and [Microsoft Intune subscriptions](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-platform/microsoft-intune) (or an alternative MDM service)
-Additionally, the following are also recommended but not required:
+Additionally, the following are also recommended (but not required):
- [Office 365 ProPlus](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/p/office-365-proplus/CFQ7TTC0K8R0), which can be deployed easily via Intune (or other MDM services)
- [Windows Subscription Activation](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/deployment/windows-10-enterprise-subscription-activation), to automatically step up devices from Windows 10 Pro to Windows 10 Enterprise
diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopilot/windows-autopilot-requirements.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopilot/windows-autopilot-requirements.md
index 52a620b6cd..ae16b100af 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopilot/windows-autopilot-requirements.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopilot/windows-autopilot-requirements.md
@@ -15,7 +15,17 @@ ms.author: greg-lindsay
**Applies to: Windows 10**
-Windows Autopilot depends on specific capabilities available in Windows 10, Azure Active Directory, and MDM services such as Microsoft Intune. In order to use Windows Autopilot and leverage these capabilities, some requirements must be met:
+Windows Autopilot depends on specific capabilities available in Windows 10, Azure Active Directory, and MDM services such as Microsoft Intune. In order to use Windows Autopilot and leverage these capabilities, some requirements must be met.
+
+- Windows 10 version 1703 (semi-annual channel) or higher is required.
+- The following editions are supported:
+ - Pro
+ - Pro Education
+ - Pro for Workstations
+ - Enterprise
+ - Education
+
+- Windows 10 Enterprise 2019 LTSC is also supported.
See the following topics for details on licensing, network, and configuration requirements:
- [Licensing requirements](windows-autopilot-requirements-licensing.md)
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/WebAuthnAPIs.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/WebAuthnAPIs.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..94caf55f34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/WebAuthnAPIs.md
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+---
+title: WebAuthn APIs
+description: Enabling password-less authentication for your sites and apps
+ms.prod: w10
+ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
+ms.sitesec: library
+ms.pagetype: security, mobile
+author: aabhathipsay
+ms.author: aathipsa
+ms.localizationpriority: medium
+ms.date: 02/15/2019
+---
+# WebAuthn APIs for password-less authentication on Windows 10
+
+
+### Passwords leave your customers vulnerable. With the new WebAuthn APIs, your sites and apps can leverage password-less authentication.
+
+Microsoft has long been a proponent to do away with passwords.
+While working towards that goal, we'd like to introduce you to the latest Windows 10 (version 1903) W3C/FIDO2 Win32 WebAuthn platform APIs!
+These APIs allow Microsoft developer partners and the developer community to leverage Windows Hello and FIDO2 security keys
+as a password-less authentication mechanism for their applications on Windows 10 devices.
+
+#### What does this mean?
+This opens opportunities for developers or relying parties (RPs) to enable password-less authentication.
+They can now leverage [Windows Hello](https://aka.ms/whfb) or [FIDO2 Security Keys](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/microsoft-compatible-security-key)
+as a password-less multi-factor credential for authentication.
+
+Users of these sites can use any browser that supports WebAuthn Windows 10 APIs for password-less authentication
+ and will have a familiar and consistent experience on Windows 10, no matter which browser they use to get to the RPs site!
+
+The native Windows 10 WebAuthn APIs are currently supported by Microsoft Edge on Windows 10 1809 or later
+ and latest versions of other browsers.
+
+Developers of FIDO2 authentication keys should use the new Windows 10 APIs, to enable these scenarios in a consistent way for users.
+ Moreover, this enables the use of all the transports available per FIDO2 specifications - USB, NFC and BLE
+ without having to deal with the interaction and management overhead.
+This also implies browsers or apps on Windows 10 will no longer have direct access to above transports for FIDO related messaging.
+
+#### Where can developers learn more?
+The new Windows 10 APIs are documented on [GitHub](https://github.com/Microsoft/webauthn)
+
+
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/TOC.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/TOC.md
index d1c214ecbe..7bd8b0766d 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/TOC.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/TOC.md
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
##### [Hardware-based isolation](windows-defender-atp/overview-hardware-based-isolation.md)
###### [Application isolation](windows-defender-application-guard/wd-app-guard-overview.md)
####### [System requirements](windows-defender-application-guard/reqs-wd-app-guard.md)
-###### [System isolation](windows-defender-atp/how-hardware-based-containers-help-protect-windows.md)
+###### [System integrity](windows-defender-system-guard/how-hardware-based-root-of-trust-helps-protect-windows.md)
##### [Application control](windows-defender-application-control/windows-defender-application-control.md)
##### [Exploit protection](windows-defender-exploit-guard/exploit-protection-exploit-guard.md)
##### [Network protection](windows-defender-exploit-guard/network-protection-exploit-guard.md)
@@ -122,7 +122,9 @@
### [Configure and manage capabilities](windows-defender-atp/onboard.md)
#### [Configure attack surface reduction](windows-defender-atp/configure-attack-surface-reduction.md)
-##### [Hardware-based isolation](windows-defender-application-guard/install-wd-app-guard.md)
+####Hardware-based isolation
+##### [System isolation](windows-defender-system-guard/system-guard-secure-launch-and-smm-protection.md)
+##### [Application isolation](windows-defender-application-guard/install-wd-app-guard.md)
###### [Configuration settings](windows-defender-application-guard/configure-wd-app-guard.md)
##### [Application control](windows-defender-application-control/windows-defender-application-control.md)
##### Device control
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/coinminer-malware.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/coinminer-malware.md
index e74b6ea5f4..acafa8b532 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/coinminer-malware.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/coinminer-malware.md
@@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ ms.sitesec: library
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.author: ellevin
author: levinec
-ms.date: 08/17/2018
+manager: dansimp
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+ms.topic: article
---
# Coin miners
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/coordinated-malware-eradication.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/coordinated-malware-eradication.md
index b33d8c80f8..8c2b11944e 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/coordinated-malware-eradication.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/coordinated-malware-eradication.md
@@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ ms.sitesec: library
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.author: ellevin
author: levinec
-ms.date: 07/12/2018
+manager: dansimp
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+ms.topic: article
---
# Coordinated Malware Eradication
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/criteria.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/criteria.md
index 10391a6db9..c0a0e11884 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/criteria.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/criteria.md
@@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ ms.sitesec: library
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.author: ellevin
author: levinec
-ms.date: 08/01/2018
+manager: dansimp
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+ms.topic: article
---
# How Microsoft identifies malware and potentially unwanted applications
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/cybersecurity-industry-partners.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/cybersecurity-industry-partners.md
index 8a1c4b9338..37903b6e79 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/cybersecurity-industry-partners.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/cybersecurity-industry-partners.md
@@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ ms.sitesec: library
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.author: ellevin
author: levinec
-ms.date: 07/12/2018
+manager: dansimp
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+ms.topic: conceptual
---
# Industry collaboration programs
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/developer-faq.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/developer-faq.md
index e6979a1851..a2bbd64cbe 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/developer-faq.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/developer-faq.md
@@ -10,7 +10,10 @@ ms.pagetype: security
ms.author: macapara
author: mjcaparas
ms.localizationpriority: medium
-ms.date: 07/01/2018
+manager: dansimp
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+ms.topic: article
---
# Software developer FAQ
@@ -18,24 +21,29 @@ ms.date: 07/01/2018
This page provides answers to common questions we receive from software developers. For general guidance about submitting malware or incorrectly detected files, read the submission guide.
## Does Microsoft accept files for a known list or false-positive prevention program?
+
No. We do not accept these requests from software developers. Signing your program's files in a consistent manner, with a digital certificate issued by a trusted root authority, helps our research team quickly identify the source of a program and apply previously gained knowledge. In some cases, this might result in your program being quickly added to the known list or, far less frequently, in adding your digital certificate to a list of trusted publishers.
## How do I dispute the detection of my program?
-Submit the file in question as a software developer. Wait until your submission has a final determination.
+
+Submit the file in question as a software developer. Wait until your submission has a final determination.
If you're not satisfied with our determination of the submission, use the developer contact form provided with the submission results to reach Microsoft. We will use the information you provide to investigate further if necessary.
We encourage all software vendors and developers to read about how Microsoft identifies malware and unwanted software.
## Why is Microsoft asking for a copy of my program?
+
This can help us with our analysis. Participants of the Microsoft Active Protection Service (MAPS) may occasionally receive these requests. The requests will stop once our systems have received and processed the file.
## Why does Microsoft classify my installer as a software bundler?
+
It contains instructions to offer a program classified as unwanted software. You can review the criteria we use to check applications for behaviors that are considered unwanted.
## Why is the Windows Firewall blocking my program?
+
This is not related to Windows Defender Antivirus and other Microsoft antimalware. You can find out more about Windows Firewall from the Microsoft Developer Network.
## Why does the Windows Defender SmartScreen say my program is not commonly downloaded?
-This is not related to Windows Defender Antivirus and other Microsoft antimalware. You can find out more from the SmartScreen website.
+This is not related to Windows Defender Antivirus and other Microsoft antimalware. You can find out more from the SmartScreen website.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/developer-info.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/developer-info.md
index 4e1e50a9d6..64dc28a46a 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/developer-info.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/developer-info.md
@@ -10,14 +10,19 @@ ms.pagetype: security
ms.author: macapara
author: mjcaparas
ms.localizationpriority: medium
-ms.date: 07/13/2018
+manager: dansimp
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+ms.topic: article
---
# Information for developers
+
Learn about the common questions we receive from software developers and get other developer resources such as detection criteria and file submissions.
-## In this section
-Topic | Description
+## In this section
+
+Topic | Description
:---|:---
[Software developer FAQ](developer-faq.md) | Provides answers to common questions we receive from software developers.
[Developer resources](developer-resources.md) | Provides information about how to submit files, detection criteria, and how to check your software against the latest Security intelligence and cloud protection from Microsoft.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/developer-resources.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/developer-resources.md
index 78e8f2f4e8..49f709ec74 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/developer-resources.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/developer-resources.md
@@ -6,11 +6,14 @@ search.product: eADQiWindows 10XVcnh
ms.prod: w10
ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
ms.sitesec: library
+ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.pagetype: security
ms.author: macapara
author: mjcaparas
-ms.localizationpriority: medium
-ms.date: 07/13/2018
+manager: dansimp
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+ms.topic: article
---
# Software developer resources
@@ -19,7 +22,9 @@ Concerned about the detection of your software?
If you believe that your application or program has been incorrectly detected by Microsoft security software, submit the relevant files for analysis.
Check out the following resources for information on how to submit and view submissions:
+
- [Submit files](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/filesubmission)
+
- [View your submissions](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/submissionhistory)
## Additional resources
@@ -34,4 +39,4 @@ Find more guidance about the file submission and detection dispute process in ou
### Scan your software
-Use [Windows Defender Antivirus](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-antivirus/windows-defender-antivirus-in-windows-10?ocid=cx-docs-avreports) to check your software against the latest Security intelligence and cloud protection from Microsoft.
+Use [Windows Defender Antivirus](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-antivirus/windows-defender-antivirus-in-windows-10) to check your software against the latest Security intelligence and cloud protection from Microsoft.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/exploits-malware.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/exploits-malware.md
index 460e31a545..9a519a1f3d 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/exploits-malware.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/exploits-malware.md
@@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ ms.sitesec: library
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.author: ellevin
author: levinec
-ms.date: 08/17/2018
+manager: dansimp
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+ms.topic: article
---
# Exploits and exploit kits
@@ -26,7 +29,7 @@ The infographic below shows how an exploit kit might attempt to exploit a device

-*Example of how exploit kits work*
+*Figure 1. Example of how exploit kits work*
Several notable threats, including Wannacry, exploit the Server Message Block (SMB) vulnerability CVE-2017-0144 to launch malware.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/fileless-threats.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/fileless-threats.md
index 435ac333f9..51d21fcd0c 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/fileless-threats.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/fileless-threats.md
@@ -6,12 +6,15 @@ ms.prod: w10
ms.mktglfcycl: secure
ms.sitesec: library
ms.localizationpriority: medium
-ms.author: eravena
-author: eavena
-ms.date: 09/14/2018
+ms.author: ellevin
+author: levinec
+manager: dansimp
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+ms.topic: article
---
-#Fileless threats
+# Fileless threats
What exactly is a fileless threat? The term "fileless" suggests that a threat that does not come in a file, such as a backdoor that lives only in the memory of a machine. However, there's no generally accepted definition. The terms is used broadly; it's also used to describe malware families that do rely on files in order to operate.
@@ -24,50 +27,50 @@ To shed light on this loaded term, we grouped fileless threats into different ca
We can classify fileless threats by their entry point, which indicates how fileless malware can arrive on a machine: via an exploit; through compromised hardware; or via regular execution of applications and scripts.
-Next, we can list the form of entry point: for example, exploits can be based on files or network data; PCI peripherals are a type of hardware vector; and scripts and executables are sub-categories of the execution vector.
+Next, we can list the form of entry point: for example, exploits can be based on files or network data; PCI peripherals are a type of hardware vector; and scripts and executables are sub-categories of the execution vector.
Finally, we can classify the host of the infection: for example, a Flash application that may contain an exploit; a simple executable; a malicious firmware from a hardware device; or an infected MBR, which could bootstrap the execution of a malware before the operating system even loads.
This helps us divide and categorize the various kinds of fileless threats. Clearly, the categories are not all the same: some are more dangerous but also more difficult to implement, while others are more commonly used despite (or precisely because of) not being very advanced.
-From this categorization, we can glean three big types of fileless threats based on how much fingerprint they may leave on infected machines.
+From this categorization, we can glean three big types of fileless threats based on how much fingerprint they may leave on infected machines.
-##Type I: No file activity performed
+## Type I: No file activity performed
-A completely fileless malware can be considered one that never requires writing a file on the disk. How would such malware infect a machine in the first place? An example scenario could be a target machine receiving malicious network packets that exploit the EternalBlue vulnerability, leading to the installation of the DoublePulsar backdoor, which ends up residing only in the kernel memory. In this case, there is no file or any data written on a file.
+A completely fileless malware can be considered one that never requires writing a file on the disk. How would such malware infect a machine in the first place? An example scenario could be a target machine receiving malicious network packets that exploit the EternalBlue vulnerability, leading to the installation of the DoublePulsar backdoor, which ends up residing only in the kernel memory. In this case, there is no file or any data written on a file.
Another scenario could involve compromised devices, where malicious code could be hiding in device firmware (such as a BIOS), a USB peripheral (like the BadUSB attack), or even in the firmware of a network card. All these examples do not require a file on the disk in order to run and can theoretically live only in memory, surviving even reboots, disk reformats, and OS reinstalls.
Infections of this type can be extra difficult to detect and remediate. Antivirus products usually don’t have the capability to access firmware for inspection; even if they did, it would be extremely challenging to detect and remediate threats at this level. Because this type of fileless malware requires high levels of sophistication and often depend on particular hardware or software configuration, it’s not an attack vector that can be exploited easily and reliably. For this reason, while extremely dangerous, threats of this type tend to be very uncommon and not practical for most attacks.
-##Type II: Indirect file activity
+## Type II: Indirect file activity
-There are other ways that malware can achieve fileless presence on a machine without requiring significant engineering effort. Fileless malware of this type don’t directly write files on the file system, but they can end up using files indirectly. This is the case for [Poshspy backdoor](https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html). Attackers installed a malicious PowerShell command within the WMI repository and configured a WMI filter to run such command periodically.
+There are other ways that malware can achieve fileless presence on a machine without requiring significant engineering effort. Fileless malware of this type don’t directly write files on the file system, but they can end up using files indirectly. This is the case for [Poshspy backdoor](https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html). Attackers installed a malicious PowerShell command within the WMI repository and configured a WMI filter to run such command periodically.
It’s possible to carry out such installation via command line without requiring the presence of the backdoor to be on a file in the first place. The malware can thus be installed and theoretically run without ever touching the file system. However, the WMI repository is stored on a physical file that is a central storage area managed by the CIM Object Manager and usually contains legitimate data. Therefore, while the infection chain does technically use a physical file, for practical purposes it’s considered a fileless attack given that the WMI repository is a multi-purpose data container that cannot be simply detected and removed.
-##Type III: Files required to operate
+## Type III: Files required to operate
Some malware can have some sort of fileless persistence but not without using files in order to operate. An example for this scenario is Kovter, which creates a shell open verb handler in the registry for a random file extension. This action means that opening a file with such extension will lead to the execution of a script through the legitimate tool mshta.exe.

*Figure 2. Kovter’s registry key*
-When the open verb is invoked, the associated command from the registry is launched, which results in the execution of a small script. This script reads data from a further registry key and executes it, in turn leading to the loading of the final payload. However, to trigger the open verb in the first place, Kovter has to drop a file with the same extension targeted by the verb (in the example above, the extension is .bbf5590fd). It also has to set an auto-run key configured to open such file when the machine starts.
+When the open verb is invoked, the associated command from the registry is launched, which results in the execution of a small script. This script reads data from a further registry key and executes it, in turn leading to the loading of the final payload. However, to trigger the open verb in the first place, Kovter has to drop a file with the same extension targeted by the verb (in the example above, the extension is .bbf5590fd). It also has to set an auto-run key configured to open such file when the machine starts.
Despite the use of files, and despite the fact that the registry too is stored in physical files, Kovter is considered a fileless threat because the file system is of no practical use: the files with random extension contain junk data that is not usable in verifying the presence of the threat, and the files that store the registry are containers that cannot be detected and deleted if malicious content is present.
-##Categorizing fileless threats by infection host
+## Categorizing fileless threats by infection host
Having described the broad categories, we can now dig into the details and provide a breakdown of the infection hosts. This comprehensive classification covers the panorama of what is usually referred to as fileless malware. It drives our efforts to research and develop new protection features that neutralize classes of attacks and ensure malware does not get the upper hand in the arms race.
-###Exploits
+### Exploits
**File-based** (Type III: executable, Flash, Java, documents): An initial file may exploit the operating system, the browser, the Java engine, the Flash engine, etc. in order to execute a shellcode and deliver a payload in memory. While the payload is fileless, the initial entry vector is a file.
**Network-based** (Type I): A network communication that takes advantage of a vulnerability in the target machine can achieve code execution in the context of an application or the kernel. An example is WannaCry, which exploits a previously fixed vulnerability in the SMB protocol to deliver a backdoor within the kernel memory.
-###Hardware
+### Hardware
**Device-based** (Type I: network card, hard disk): Devices like hard disks and network cards require chipsets and dedicated software to function. A software residing and running in the chipset of a device is called a firmware. Although a complex task, the firmware can be infected by malware, as the [Equation espionage group has been caught doing](https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/equation-hdd-malware/7623/).
@@ -79,7 +82,7 @@ Having described the broad categories, we can now dig into the details and provi
**Hypervisor-based** (Type I): Modern CPUs provide hardware hypervisor support, allowing the operating system to create robust virtual machines. A virtual machine runs in a confined, simulated environment, and is in theory unaware of the emulation. A malware taking over a machine may implement a small hypervisor in order to hide itself outside of the realm of the running operating system. Malware of this kind has been theorized in the past, and eventually real hypervisor rootkits [have been observed](http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2017/Jun/29), although very few are known to date.
-###Execution and injection
+### Execution and injection
**File-based** (Type III: executables, DLLs, LNK files, scheduled tasks): This is the standard execution vector. A simple executable can be launched as a first-stage malware to run an additional payload in memory or inject it into other legitimate running processes.
@@ -89,8 +92,8 @@ Having described the broad categories, we can now dig into the details and provi
**Disk-based** (Type II: Boot Record): The [Boot Record](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boot_sector) is the first sector of a disk or volume and contains executable code required to start the boot process of the operating system. Threats like [Petya](https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2017/06/27/new-ransomware-old-techniques-petya-adds-worm-capabilities/?source=mmpc) are capable of infecting the Boot Record by overwriting it with malicious code, so that when the machine is booted the malware immediately gains control (and in the case of Petya, with disastrous consequences). The Boot Record resides outside the file system, but it’s accessible by the operating system, and modern antivirus products have the capability to scan and restore it.
-##Defeating fileless malware
+## Defeating fileless malware
-At Microsoft, we actively monitor the security landscape to identify new threat trends and develop solutions that continuously enhance Windows security and mitigate classes of threats. We instrument durable protections that are effective against a wide range of threats. Through AntiMalware Scan Interface (AMSI), behavior monitoring, memory scanning, and boot sector protection, Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection [(Windows Defender ATP)](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/WindowsForBusiness/windows-atp?ocid=docs-fileless) can inspect fileless threats even with heavy obfuscation. Machine learning technologies in the cloud allow us to scale these protections against new and emerging threats.
+At Microsoft, we actively monitor the security landscape to identify new threat trends and develop solutions that continuously enhance Windows security and mitigate classes of threats. We instrument durable protections that are effective against a wide range of threats. Through AntiMalware Scan Interface (AMSI), behavior monitoring, memory scanning, and boot sector protection, Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection [(Windows Defender ATP)](https://www.microsoft.com/WindowsForBusiness/windows-atp?ocid=docs-fileless) can inspect fileless threats even with heavy obfuscation. Machine learning technologies in the cloud allow us to scale these protections against new and emerging threats.
To learn more, read: [Out of sight but not invisible: Defeating fileless malware with behavior monitoring, AMSI, and next-gen AV](https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2018/09/27/out-of-sight-but-not-invisible-defeating-fileless-malware-with-behavior-monitoring-amsi-and-next-gen-av/)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/index.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/index.md
index 1b234b902e..cde3c3a454 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/index.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/index.md
@@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ ms.sitesec: library
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.author: ellevin
author: levinec
-ms.date: 08/17/2018
+manager: dansimp
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+ms.topic: conceptual
---
# Security intelligence
@@ -19,6 +22,6 @@ Here you will find information about different types of malware, safety tips on
* [Submit files for analysis](submission-guide.md)
* [Safety Scanner download](safety-scanner-download.md)
-Keep up with the latest malware news and research. Check out our [Windows security blogs](https://aka.ms/wdsecurityblog) and follow us on [Twitter](https://twitter.com/wdsecurity) for the latest news, discoveries, and protections.
+Keep up with the latest malware news and research. Check out our [Windows security blogs](https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/?product=windows,windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection) and follow us on [Twitter](https://twitter.com/wdsecurity) for the latest news, discoveries, and protections.
Learn more about [Windows security](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/index).
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/macro-malware.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/macro-malware.md
index 1feeecd262..f58b40e4bf 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/macro-malware.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/macro-malware.md
@@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ ms.sitesec: library
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.author: ellevin
author: levinec
-ms.date: 08/17/2018
+manager: dansimp
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+ms.topic: article
---
# Macro malware
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/malware-naming.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/malware-naming.md
index 2dd0229441..c2073434a4 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/malware-naming.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/malware-naming.md
@@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ ms.sitesec: library
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.author: ellevin
author: levinec
-ms.date: 08/17/2018
+manager: dansimp
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+ms.topic: article
---
# Malware names
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/phishing.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/phishing.md
index bc99e5240b..31666e81cb 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/phishing.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/phishing.md
@@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ ms.sitesec: library
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.author: ellevin
author: levinec
-ms.date: 08/17/2018
+manager: dansimp
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+ms.topic: article
---
# Phishing
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/prevent-malware-infection.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/prevent-malware-infection.md
index 4340c81fde..6826c7b1af 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/prevent-malware-infection.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/prevent-malware-infection.md
@@ -8,14 +8,15 @@ ms.sitesec: library
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.author: ellevin
author: levinec
-ms.date: 08/17/2018
+manager: dansimp
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+ms.topic: article
---
# Prevent malware infection
Malware authors are always looking for new ways to infect computers. Follow the simple tips below to stay protected and minimize threats to your data and accounts.
-You can also browse the many [software and application solutions](https://review.docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/intelligence/prevent-malware-infection?branch=wdsi-migration-stuff#software-solutions) available to you.
-
## Keep software up-to-date
[Exploits](exploits-malware.md) typically use vulnerabilities in popular software such as web browsers, Java, Adobe Flash Player, and Microsoft Office to infect devices. Software updates patch vulnerabilities so they aren't available to exploits anymore.
@@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ Email and other messaging tools are a few of the most common ways your device ca
* Use an email service that provides protection against malicious attachments, links, and abusive senders. [Microsoft Office 365](https://support.office.com/article/Anti-spam-and-anti-malware-protection-in-Office-365-5ce5cf47-2120-4e51-a403-426a13358b7e) has built-in antimalware, link protection, and spam filtering.
-For more information, see [Phishing](phishing.md).
+For more information, see [phishing](phishing.md).
## Watch out for malicious or compromised websites
@@ -50,7 +51,7 @@ Using pirated content is not only illegal, it can also expose your device to mal
Users do not openly discuss visits to these sites, so any untoward experience are more likely to stay unreported.
-To stay safe, download movies, music, and apps from official publisher websites or stores. Consider running a streamlined OS such as [Windows 10 Pro SKU S Mode](https://www.microsoft.com/windows/windows-10-s?ocid=cx-wdsi-articles), which ensures that only vetted apps from the Windows Store are installed.
+To stay safe, download movies, music, and apps from official publisher websites or stores. Consider running a streamlined OS such as [Windows 10 Pro SKU S Mode](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/s-mode?ocid=cx-wdsi-articles), which ensures that only vetted apps from the Windows Store are installed.
## Don't attach unfamiliar removable drives
@@ -94,7 +95,7 @@ Microsoft provides comprehensive security capabilities that help protect against
* [Microsoft Exchange Online Protection (EOP)](https://products.office.com/exchange/exchange-email-security-spam-protection) offers enterprise-class reliability and protection against spam and malware, while maintaining access to email during and after emergencies.
-* [Microsoft Safety Scanner](https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/products/scanner) helps remove malicious software from computers. NOTE: This tool does not replace your antimalware product.
+* [Microsoft Safety Scanner](safety-scanner-download.md) helps remove malicious software from computers. NOTE: This tool does not replace your antimalware product.
* [Microsoft 365](https://docs.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/enterprise/#pivot=itadmin&panel=it-security) includes Office 365, Windows 10, and Enterprise Mobility + Security. These resources power productivity while providing intelligent security across users, devices, and data.
@@ -114,4 +115,4 @@ Microsoft provides comprehensive security capabilities that help protect against
Windows Defender ATP antivirus capabilities helps reduce the chances of infection and will automatically remove threats that it detects.
-In case threat removal is unsuccessful, read about [troubleshooting malware detection and removal problems](https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/help/troubleshooting-infection).
\ No newline at end of file
+In case threat removal is unsuccessful, read about [troubleshooting malware detection and removal problems](https://support.microsoft.com/help/4466982/windows-10-troubleshoot-problems-with-detecting-and-removing-malware).
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/ransomware-malware.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/ransomware-malware.md
index 3441ceb6d7..5e39af26b7 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/ransomware-malware.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/ransomware-malware.md
@@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ ms.sitesec: library
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.author: ellevin
author: levinec
-ms.date: 08/17/2018
+manager: dansimp
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+ms.topic: article
---
# Ransomware
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/rootkits-malware.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/rootkits-malware.md
index cf0bc0334f..7f3d5bf8b2 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/rootkits-malware.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/rootkits-malware.md
@@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ ms.sitesec: library
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.author: ellevin
author: levinec
-ms.date: 08/17/2018
+manager: dansimp
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+ms.topic: article
---
# Rootkits
@@ -50,7 +53,7 @@ For more general tips, see [prevent malware infection](prevent-malware-infection
Microsoft security software includes a number of technologies designed specifically to remove rootkits. If you think you might have a rootkit on your device and your antimalware software isn’t detecting it, you might need an extra tool that lets you boot to a known trusted environment.
-[Windows Defender Offline](https://windows.microsoft.com/windows/what-is-windows-defender-offline) can be launched from Windows Security Center and has the latest anti-malware updates from Microsoft. It’s designed to be used on devices that aren't working correctly due to a possible malware infection.
+[Windows Defender Offline](https://support.microsoft.com/help/17466/windows-defender-offline-help-protect-my-pc) can be launched from Windows Security Center and has the latest anti-malware updates from Microsoft. It’s designed to be used on devices that aren't working correctly due to a possible malware infection.
[System Guard](https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2017/10/23/hardening-the-system-and-maintaining-integrity-with-windows-defender-system-guard/) in Windows 10 protects against rootkits and threats that impact system integrity.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/safety-scanner-download.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/safety-scanner-download.md
index b4f4ff5cc4..b122b4f14c 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/safety-scanner-download.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/safety-scanner-download.md
@@ -6,11 +6,15 @@ ms.prod: w10
ms.mktglfcycl: secure
ms.sitesec: library
ms.localizationpriority: medium
-ms.author: dansimp
-author: dansimp
-ms.date: 08/01/2018
+ms.author: ellevin
+author: levinec
+manager: dansimp
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+ms.topic: article
---
# Microsoft Safety Scanner
+
Microsoft Safety Scanner is a scan tool designed to find and remove malware from Windows computers. Simply download it and run a scan to find malware and try to reverse changes made by identified threats.
- [Download Microsoft Safety Scanner (32-bit)](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=212733)
@@ -37,9 +41,9 @@ For more information about the Safety Scanner, see the support article on [how t
## Related resources
-- [Troubleshooting Safety Scanner](https://support.microsoft.com/kb/2520970)
-- [Windows Defender Antivirus](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/windows-defender)
+- [Troubleshooting Safety Scanner](https://support.microsoft.com/help/2520970/how-to-troubleshoot-an-error-when-you-run-the-microsoft-safety-scanner)
+- [Windows Defender Antivirus](https://www.microsoft.com/windows/comprehensive-security)
- [Microsoft Security Essentials](https://support.microsoft.com/help/14210/security-essentials-download)
-- [Removing difficult threats](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/help/troubleshooting-infection)
-- [Submit file for malware analysis](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/filesubmission)
-- [Microsoft antimalware and threat protection solutions](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/products)
\ No newline at end of file
+- [Removing difficult threats](https://support.microsoft.com/help/4466982/windows-10-troubleshoot-problems-with-detecting-and-removing-malware)
+- [Submit file for malware analysis](https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/filesubmission)
+- [Microsoft antimalware and threat protection solutions](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-atp/windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/submission-guide.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/submission-guide.md
index 8713b5332e..5ef22fbc0b 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/submission-guide.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/submission-guide.md
@@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ ms.sitesec: library
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.author: ellevin
author: levinec
-ms.date: 08/01/2018
+manager: dansimp
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+ms.topic: article
---
# Submit files for analysis
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/supply-chain-malware.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/supply-chain-malware.md
index 340a2bf9f0..82d2b453d7 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/supply-chain-malware.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/supply-chain-malware.md
@@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ ms.sitesec: library
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.author: ellevin
author: levinec
-ms.date: 08/17/2018
+manager: dansimp
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+ms.topic: article
---
# Supply chain attacks
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/support-scams.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/support-scams.md
index 098be59223..461a852aa9 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/support-scams.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/support-scams.md
@@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ ms.sitesec: library
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.author: ellevin
author: levinec
-ms.date: 08/17/2018
+manager: dansimp
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+ms.topic: article
---
# Tech support scams
@@ -60,4 +63,4 @@ Help Microsoft stop scammers, whether they claim to be from Microsoft or from an
**www.microsoft.com/reportascam**
-You can also report any **unsafe website** that you suspect is a phishing website or contains malicious content directly to Microsoft by filling out a [Report an unsafe site form](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/support/report-unsafe-site) or using built in web browser functionality.
+You can also report any **unsafe website** that you suspect is a phishing website or contains malicious content directly to Microsoft by filling out a [Report an unsafe site form](https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/support/report-unsafe-site) or using built in web browser functionality.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/top-scoring-industry-antivirus-tests.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/top-scoring-industry-antivirus-tests.md
index fdb25b78be..db3886f938 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/top-scoring-industry-antivirus-tests.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/top-scoring-industry-antivirus-tests.md
@@ -8,11 +8,15 @@ ms.sitesec: library
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.author: ellevin
author: levinec
+manager: dansimp
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+ms.topic: article
---
# Top scoring in industry tests
-Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection ([Windows Defender ATP](https://www.microsoft.com/WindowsForBusiness/windows-atp?ocid=cx-docs-avreports)) technologies consistently achieve high scores in independent tests, demonstrating the strength of its enterprise threat protection capabilities. Microsoft aims to be transparent about these test scores. This page summarizes the results and provides analysis.
+Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection ([Windows Defender ATP](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/WindowsForBusiness/windows-atp?ocid=cx-docs-avreports)) technologies consistently achieve high scores in independent tests, demonstrating the strength of its enterprise threat protection capabilities. Microsoft aims to be transparent about these test scores. This page summarizes the results and provides analysis.
## Endpoint detection & response
@@ -106,8 +110,8 @@ SE Labs tests a range of solutions used by products and services to detect and/o
It is important to remember that Microsoft sees a wider and broader set of threats beyond what’s tested in the evaluations highlighted above. For example, in an average month, we identify over 100 million new threats. Even if an independent tester can acquire and test 1% of those threats, that is a million tests across 20 or 30 products. In other words, the vastness of the malware landscape makes it extremely difficult to evaluate the quality of protection against real world threats.
-The capabilities within [Windows Defender ATP](https://www.microsoft.com/WindowsForBusiness/windows-atp?ocid=cx-docs-avreports) provide [additional layers of protection](https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2017/12/11/detonating-a-bad-rabbit-windows-defender-antivirus-and-layered-machine-learning-defenses?ocid=cx-docs-avreports) that are not factored into industry tests, and address some of the latest and most sophisticated threats. Isolating AV from the rest of Windows Defender ATP creates a partial picture of how our security stack operates in the real world. For example, attack surface reduction and endpoint detection & response capabilities can help prevent malware from getting onto devices in the first place. We have proven that [Windows Defender ATP components catch samples](https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RE2ouJA?ocid=cx-docs-avreports) that Windows Defender Antivirus missed in these industry tests, which is more representative of how effectively our security suite protects customers in the real world.
+The capabilities within [Windows Defender ATP](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsforbusiness?ocid=cx-docs-avreports) provide [additional layers of protection](https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2017/12/11/detonating-a-bad-rabbit-windows-defender-antivirus-and-layered-machine-learning-defenses?ocid=cx-docs-avreports) that are not factored into industry tests, and address some of the latest and most sophisticated threats. Isolating AV from the rest of Windows Defender ATP creates a partial picture of how our security stack operates in the real world. For example, attack surface reduction and endpoint detection & response capabilities can help prevent malware from getting onto devices in the first place. We have proven that [Windows Defender ATP components catch samples](https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RE2ouJA?ocid=cx-docs-avreports) that Windows Defender Antivirus missed in these industry tests, which is more representative of how effectively our security suite protects customers in the real world.
-Using independent tests, customers can view one aspect of their security suite but can't assess the complete protection of all the security features. Microsoft is highly engaged in working with several independent testers to evolve security testing to focus on the end-to-end security stack. In the meantime, customers can evaluate Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection in their own networks by signing up for a [90-day trial of Windows Defender ATP](https://www.microsoft.com/windowsforbusiness/windows-atp?ocid=cx-docs-avreports), or [enabling Preview features on existing tenants](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-atp/preview-settings-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection?ocid=cx-docs-avreports).
+Using independent tests, customers can view one aspect of their security suite but can't assess the complete protection of all the security features. Microsoft is highly engaged in working with several independent testers to evolve security testing to focus on the end-to-end security stack. In the meantime, customers can evaluate Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection in their own networks by signing up for a [90-day trial of Windows Defender ATP](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/WindowsForBusiness/windows-atp?ocid=cx-docs-avreports), or [enabling Preview features on existing tenants](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-atp/preview-settings-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection?ocid=cx-docs-avreports).

diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/trojans-malware.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/trojans-malware.md
index 47a21f4308..0494fb62b7 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/trojans-malware.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/trojans-malware.md
@@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ ms.sitesec: library
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.author: ellevin
author: levinec
-ms.date: 08/17/2018
+manager: dansimp
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+ms.topic: article
---
# Trojans
@@ -37,6 +40,6 @@ Use the following free Microsoft software to detect and remove it:
- [Windows Defender Antivirus](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-antivirus/windows-defender-antivirus-in-windows-10) for Windows 10 and Windows 8.1, or [Microsoft Security Essentials](https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=5201) for previous versions of Windows.
-- [Microsoft Safety Scanner](https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/products/scanner)
+- [Microsoft Safety Scanner](safety-scanner-download.md)
For more general tips, see [prevent malware infection](prevent-malware-infection.md).
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/understanding-malware.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/understanding-malware.md
index 2f819e06b0..afe18b8e94 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/understanding-malware.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/understanding-malware.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
title: Understanding malware & other threats
-description: Learn about the world's most prevalent viruses, malware, and other threats. Understand how they arrive, their detailed behaviors, infection symptoms, and how to prevent & remove them.
+description: Learn about the most prevalent viruses, malware, and other threats. Understand how they arrive, their detailed behaviors, infection symptoms, and how to prevent & remove them.
keywords: security, malware, virus, malware, threat, analysis, research, encyclopedia, dictionary, glossary, ransomware, support scams, unwanted software, computer infection, virus infection, descriptions, remediation, latest threats, mmpc, microsoft malware protection center, wdsi
ms.prod: w10
ms.mktglfcycl: secure
@@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ ms.sitesec: library
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.author: ellevin
author: levinec
-ms.date: 08/17/2018
+manager: dansimp
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+ms.topic: conceptual
---
# Understanding malware & other threats
@@ -16,7 +19,7 @@ Malware is a term used to describe malicious applications and code that can caus
Cybercriminals that distribute malware are often motivated by money and will use infected computers to launch attacks, obtain banking credentials, collect information that can be sold, sell access to computing resources, or extort payment from victims.
-As criminals become more sophisticated with their attacks, Microsoft is here to help. Windows 10 is the most secure version of Windows yet and includes many features to help protect you whether you're at home, at work, or on the go. With [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Windows Defender ATP)](https://wincom.blob.core.windows.net/documents/Windows10_Commercial_Comparison.pdf), businesses can stay protected with next-generation protection and other security capabilities.
+As criminals become more sophisticated with their attacks, Microsoft is here to help. Windows 10 is the most secure version of Windows yet and includes many features to help protect you whether you're at home, at work, or on the go. With Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection ([Windows Defender ATP](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/WindowsForBusiness/windows-atp?ocid=cx-docs-avreports)), businesses can stay protected with next-generation protection and other security capabilities.
For good general tips, check out the [prevent malware infection](prevent-malware-infection.md) topic.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/unwanted-software.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/unwanted-software.md
index 1bd6897c42..bea8e40fca 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/unwanted-software.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/unwanted-software.md
@@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ ms.sitesec: library
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.author: ellevin
author: levinec
-ms.date: 08/17/2018
+manager: dansimp
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+ms.topic: article
---
# Unwanted software
@@ -30,7 +33,7 @@ Here are some indications of unwanted software:
Some indicators are harder to recognize because they are less disruptive, but are still unwanted. For example, unwanted software can modify web pages to display specific ads, monitor browsing activities, or remove control of the browser.
-Microsoft uses an extensive [evaluation criteria](https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/antimalware-support/malware-and-unwanted-software-evaluation-criteria) to identify unwanted software.
+Microsoft uses an extensive [evaluation criteria](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/criteria) to identify unwanted software.
## How to protect against unwanted software
@@ -57,4 +60,4 @@ If you only recently noticed symptoms of unwanted software infection, consider s
You may also need to **remove browser add-ons** in your browsers, such as Internet Explorer, Firefox, or Chrome.
-In case threat removal is unsuccessful, read about [troubleshooting malware detection and removal problems](https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/help/troubleshooting-infection).
+In case threat removal is unsuccessful, read about [troubleshooting malware detection and removal problems](https://support.microsoft.com/help/4466982/windows-10-troubleshoot-problems-with-detecting-and-removing-malware).
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/virus-information-alliance-criteria.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/virus-information-alliance-criteria.md
index 7ce546eeed..b7d6bd79e6 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/virus-information-alliance-criteria.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/virus-information-alliance-criteria.md
@@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ ms.sitesec: library
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.author: ellevin
author: levinec
-ms.date: 07/12/2018
+manager: dansimp
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+ms.topic: article
---
# Virus Information Alliance
@@ -46,4 +49,4 @@ To be eligible for VIA your organization must:
3. Be willing to sign and adhere to the VIA membership agreement.
-If your organization meets these criteria and is interested in joining, [apply for membership now](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/alliances/apply-alliance-membership). If you have questions, [contact us for more information](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/alliances/collaboration-inquiry).
\ No newline at end of file
+If your organization meets these criteria and is interested in joining, [apply for membership now](https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/alliances/apply-alliance-membership). If you have questions, [contact us for more information](https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/alliances/collaboration-inquiry).
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/virus-initiative-criteria.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/virus-initiative-criteria.md
index 7536a99f1e..f87f26230b 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/virus-initiative-criteria.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/virus-initiative-criteria.md
@@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ ms.sitesec: library
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.author: ellevin
author: levinec
-ms.date: 07/12/2018
+manager: dansimp
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+ms.topic: article
---
# Microsoft Virus Initiative
@@ -54,4 +57,4 @@ Your organization must meet the following eligibility requirements to participat
### Apply now
-If your organization meets these criteria and is interested in joining, [apply for membership now](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/alliances/apply-alliance-membership). If you have questions, [contact us for more information](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/alliances/collaboration-inquiry).
\ No newline at end of file
+If your organization meets these criteria and is interested in joining, [apply for membership now](https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/alliances/apply-alliance-membership). If you have questions, [contact us for more information](https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/alliances/collaboration-inquiry).
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/worms-malware.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/worms-malware.md
index c9e7ce8541..0916baf125 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/worms-malware.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/worms-malware.md
@@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ ms.sitesec: library
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.author: ellevin
author: levinec
-ms.date: 08/17/2018
+manager: dansimp
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+ms.topic: article
---
# Worms
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-atp/TOC.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-atp/TOC.md
index b31f4ecc52..d3ddc702eb 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-atp/TOC.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-atp/TOC.md
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
#### [Hardware-based isolation](overview-hardware-based-isolation.md)
##### [Application isolation](../windows-defender-application-guard/wd-app-guard-overview.md)
###### [System requirements](../windows-defender-application-guard/reqs-wd-app-guard.md)
-##### [System isolation](how-hardware-based-containers-help-protect-windows.md)
+##### [System integrity](../windows-defender-system-guard/how-hardware-based-root-of-trust-helps-protect-windows.md)
#### [Application control](../windows-defender-application-control/windows-defender-application-control.md)
#### [Exploit protection](../windows-defender-exploit-guard/exploit-protection-exploit-guard.md)
#### [Network protection](../windows-defender-exploit-guard/network-protection-exploit-guard.md)
@@ -120,7 +120,9 @@
## [Configure and manage capabilities](onboard.md)
### [Configure attack surface reduction](configure-attack-surface-reduction.md)
-#### [Hardware-based isolation](../windows-defender-application-guard/install-wd-app-guard.md)
+###Hardware-based isolation
+#### [System integrity](../windows-defender-system-guard/system-guard-secure-launch-and-smm-protection.md)
+#### [Application isolation](../windows-defender-application-guard/install-wd-app-guard.md)
##### [Configuration settings](../windows-defender-application-guard/configure-wd-app-guard.md)
#### [Application control](../windows-defender-application-control/windows-defender-application-control.md)
#### Device control
@@ -136,7 +138,6 @@
#### [Controlled folder access](../windows-defender-exploit-guard/enable-controlled-folders-exploit-guard.md)
##### [Customize controlled folder access](../windows-defender-exploit-guard/customize-controlled-folders-exploit-guard.md)
#### [Attack surface reduction controls](../windows-defender-exploit-guard/enable-attack-surface-reduction.md)
-##### [Customize attack surface reduction](../windows-defender-exploit-guard/customize-attack-surface-reduction.md)
#### [Network firewall](../windows-firewall/windows-firewall-with-advanced-security-deployment-guide.md)
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-atp/how-hardware-based-containers-help-protect-windows.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-atp/how-hardware-based-containers-help-protect-windows.md
deleted file mode 100644
index b1928497b1..0000000000
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-atp/how-hardware-based-containers-help-protect-windows.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
----
-title: How hardware-based containers help protect Windows 10 (Windows 10)
-description: Windows 10 uses containers to isolate sensitive system services and data, enabling them to remain secure even when the operating system has been compromised.
-ms.assetid: 8d6e0474-c475-411b-b095-1c61adb2bdbb
-search.appverid: met150
-ms.prod: w10
-ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
-ms.sitesec: library
-ms.pagetype: security
-ms.localizationpriority: medium
-manager: dansimp
-audience: ITPro
-ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
-ms.topic: article
-author: justinha
-ms.date: 08/01/2018
----
-
-
-# Windows Defender System Guard: How hardware-based containers help protect Windows 10
-
-Windows 10 uses containers to isolate sensitive system services and data, enabling them to remain secure even when the operating system has been compromised.
-Windows 10 protects critical resources, such as the Windows authentication stack, single sign-on tokens, Windows Hello biometric stack, and Virtual Trusted Platform Module, by using a container type called Windows Defender System Guard.
-
-Windows Defender System Guard reorganizes the existing Windows 10 system integrity features under one roof and sets up the next set of investments in Windows security. It's designed to make the these security guarantees:
-
-- Protect and maintain the integrity of the system as it starts up
-- Protect and maintain the integrity of the system after it's running
-- Validate that system integrity has truly been maintained through local and remote attestation
-
-## Maintaining the integrity of the system as it starts
-
-With Windows 7, one of the means attackers would use to persist and evade detection was to install what is often referred to as a bootkit or rootkit on the system. This malicious software would start before Windows started, or during the boot process itself, enabling it to start with the highest level of privilege.
-
-With Windows 10 running on modern hardware (that is, Windows 8-certified or greater) we have a hardware-based root of trust that helps us ensure that no unauthorized firmware or software (such as a bootkit) can start before the Windows bootloader. This hardware-based root of trust comes from the device’s Secure Boot feature, which is part of the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI).
-
-After successful verification and startup of the device’s firmware and Windows bootloader, the next opportunity for attackers to tamper with the system’s integrity is while the rest of the Windows operating system and defenses are starting. As an attacker, embedding your malicious code using a rootkit within the boot process enables you to gain the maximum level of privilege and gives you the ability to more easily persist and evade detection.
-
-This is where Windows Defender System Guard protection begins with its ability to ensure that only properly signed and secure Windows files and drivers, including third party, can start on the device. At the end of the Windows boot process, System Guard will start the system’s antimalware solution, which scans all third party drivers, at which point the system boot process is completed. In the end, Windows Defender System Guard helps ensure that the system securely boots with integrity and that it hasn’t been compromised before the remainder of your system defenses start.
-
-
-
-## Maintaining integrity of the system after it’s running (run time)
-
-Prior to Windows 10, if an attacker exploited the system and gained SYSTEM level privilege or they compromised the kernel itself, it was game over. The level of control that an attacker would acquire in this condition would enable them to tamper with and bypass many, if not all, of your system defenses. While we have a number of development practices and technologies (such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard) that have made it difficult to gain this level of privilege in Windows 10, the reality is that we needed a way to maintain the integrity of the most sensitive Windows services and data, even when the highest level of privilege has been secured by an adversary.
-
-With Windows 10, we introduced the concept of virtualization-based security (VBS), which enables us to contain the most sensitive Windows services and data in hardware-based isolation, which is the Windows Defender System Guard container. This secure environment provides us with the hardware-based security boundary we need to be able to secure and maintain the integrity of critical system services at run time like Credential Guard, Device Guard, Virtual TPM and parts of Windows Defender Exploit Guard, just to name a few.
-
-
-
-## Validating platform integrity after Windows is running (run time)
-
-While Windows Defender System Guard provides advanced protection that will help protect and maintain the integrity of the platform during boot and at run time, the reality is that we must apply an "assume breach" mentality to even our most sophisticated security technologies. We should be able to trust that the technologies are successfully doing their jobs, but we also need the ability to verify that they were successful in achieving their goals. When it comes to platform integrity, we can’t just trust the platform, which potentially could be compromised, to self-attest to its security state. So Windows Defender System Guard includes a series of technologies that enable remote analysis of the device’s integrity.
-
-As Windows 10 boots, a series of integrity measurements are taken by Windows Defender System Guard using the device’s Trusted Platform Module 2.0 (TPM 2.0). This process and data are hardware-isolated away from Windows to help ensure that the measurement data is not subject to the type of tampering that could happen if the platform was compromised. From here, the measurements can be used to determine the integrity of the device’s firmware, hardware configuration state, and Windows boot-related components, just to name a few. After the system boots, Windows Defender System Guard signs and seals these measurements using the TPM. Upon request, a management system like Intune or System Center Configuration Manager can acquire them for remote analysis. If Windows Defender System Guard indicates that the device lacks integrity, the management system can take a series of actions, such as denying the device access to resources.
-
-
-
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-atp/user-roles-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-atp/user-roles-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md
index 15fb762c58..89ee51ebff 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-atp/user-roles-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-atp/user-roles-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md
@@ -35,13 +35,16 @@ The following steps guide you on how to create roles in Windows Defender Securit
3. Enter the role name, description, and permissions you'd like to assign to the role.
- **Role name**
-
- **Description**
-
- **Permissions**
- **View data** - Users can view information in the portal.
- **Alerts investigation** - Users can manage alerts, initiate automated investigations, collect investigation packages, manage machine tags, and export machine timeline.
- **Active remediation actions** - Users can take response actions and approve or dismiss pending remediation actions.
+ - **Manage portal system settings** - Users can configure storage settings, SIEM and threat intel API settings (applies globally), advanced settings, automated file uploads, roles and machine groups.
+
+ >[!NOTE]
+ >This setting is only available in the Windows Defender ATP administrator (default) role.
+
- **Manage security settings** - Users can configure alert suppression settings, manage allowed/blocked lists for automation, manage folder exclusions for automation, onboard and offboard machines, and manage email notifications.
4. Click **Next** to assign the role to an Azure AD group.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard.md
index 5d0bab6314..f010ab338b 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
title: Use attack surface reduction rules to prevent malware infection
-description: ASR rules can help prevent exploits from using apps and scripts to infect machines with malware
+description: Attack surface reduction rules can help prevent exploits from using apps and scripts to infect machines with malware
keywords: Attack surface reduction, hips, host intrusion prevention system, protection rules, anti-exploit, antiexploit, exploit, infection prevention
search.product: eADQiWindows 10XVcnh
ms.pagetype: security
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ ms.pagetype: security
ms.localizationpriority: medium
author: andreabichsel
ms.author: v-anbic
-ms.date: 11/29/2018
---
# Reduce attack surfaces with attack surface reduction rules
@@ -20,26 +19,25 @@ ms.date: 11/29/2018
- [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Windows Defender ATP)](https://wincom.blob.core.windows.net/documents/Windows10_Commercial_Comparison.pdf)
-Attack surface reduction rules help prevent actions and apps that are typically used by exploit-seeking malware to infect machines. This feature is part of Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection and provides:
+Attack surface reduction rules help prevent behaviors malware often uses to infect computers with malicious code. You can set attack surface reduction rules for computers running Windows 10, version 1803 or later, or Windows Server 2019.
-- Rules you can set to enable or disable specific behaviors that are typically used by malware and malicious apps to infect machines, such as:
- - Executable files and scripts used in Office apps or web mail that attempt to download or run files
- - Scripts that are obfuscated or otherwise suspicious
- - Behaviors that apps undertake that are not usually initiated during normal day-to-day work
-- Centralized monitoring and reporting with deep optics that help you connect the dots across events, computers and devices, and networks
-- Analytics to enable ease of deployment, by using [audit mode](audit-windows-defender-exploit-guard.md) to show how attack surface reduction rules would impact your organization if they were enabled
+To use attack surface reduction rules, you need a Windows 10 Enterprise E3 license or higher. A Windows E5 license gives you the advanced management capabilities to power them. These include monitoring, analytics, and workflows available in [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection](../windows-defender-atp/windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md), as well as reporting and configuration capabilities in the M365 Security Center. These advanced capabilities aren't available with an E3 license, but you can use attack surface reduction rule events in Event Viewer to help facilitate deployment.
-When an attack surface reduction rule is triggered, a notification displays from the Action Center on the user's computer. You can [customize the notification](customize-attack-surface-reduction.md#customize-the-notification) with your company details and contact information.
+Attack surface reduction rules target behaviors that malware and malicious apps typically use to infect computers, including:
-Attack surface reduction is supported on Windows 10, version 1709 and later and Windows Server 2019.
+- Executable files and scripts used in Office apps or web mail that attempt to download or run files
+- Obfuscated or otherwise suspicious scripts
+- Behaviors that apps don't usually initiate during normal day-to-day work
-## Requirements
+You can use [audit mode](audit-windows-defender-exploit-guard.md) to evaluate how attack surface reduction rules would impact your organization if they were enabled. It's best to run all rules in audit mode first so you can understand their impact on your line-of-business applications. Many line-of-business applications are written with limited security concerns, and they may perform tasks similar to malware. By monitoring audit data and [adding exclusions](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/enable-attack-surface-reduction#exclude-files-and-folders-from-asr-rules) for necessary applications, you can deploy attack surface reduction rules without impacting productivity.
-Attack surface reduction rules are a feature of Windows Defender ATP and require Windows 10 Enterprise E5 and [Windows Defender AV real-time protection](../windows-defender-antivirus/configure-real-time-protection-windows-defender-antivirus.md).
+Triggered rules display a notification on the device. You can [customize the notification](customize-attack-surface-reduction.md#customize-the-notification) with your company details and contact information. The notification also displays in the Windows Defender ATP Security Center and on the M365 console.
+
+For information about configuring attack surface reduction rules, see [Enable attack surface reduction rules](enable-attack-surface-reduction.md).
## Attack surface reduction rules
-The following sections describe what each rule does. Each rule is identified by a rule GUID, as in the following table.
+The following sections describe each of the 15 attack surface reduction rules. This table shows their corresponding GUIDs, which you use if you're configuring the rules with Group Policy:
Rule name | GUID
-|-
@@ -50,7 +48,7 @@ Block Office applications from injecting code into other processes | 75668C1F-73
Block JavaScript or VBScript from launching downloaded executable content | D3E037E1-3EB8-44C8-A917-57927947596D
Block execution of potentially obfuscated scripts | 5BEB7EFE-FD9A-4556-801D-275E5FFC04CC
Block Win32 API calls from Office macro | 92E97FA1-2EDF-4476-BDD6-9DD0B4DDDC7B
-Block executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criteria | 01443614-cd74-433a-b99e-2ecdc07bfc25
+Block executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criterion | 01443614-cd74-433a-b99e-2ecdc07bfc25
Use advanced protection against ransomware | c1db55ab-c21a-4637-bb3f-a12568109d35
Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem (lsass.exe) | 9e6c4e1f-7d60-472f-ba1a-a39ef669e4b2
Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands | d1e49aac-8f56-4280-b9ba-993a6d77406c
@@ -58,147 +56,186 @@ Block untrusted and unsigned processes that run from USB | b2b3f03d-6a65-4f7b-a9
Block Office communication application from creating child processes | 26190899-1602-49e8-8b27-eb1d0a1ce869
Block Adobe Reader from creating child processes | 7674ba52-37eb-4a4f-a9a1-f0f9a1619a2c
-### Rule: Block executable content from email client and webmail
+Each rule description indicates which apps or file types the rule applies to. In general, the rules for Office apps apply to only Word, Excel, PowerPoint, and OneNote, or they apply to Outlook. Except where specified, attack surface reduction rules don't apply to any other Office apps.
-This rule blocks the following file types from being run or launched from an email seen in either Microsoft Outlook or webmail (such as Gmail.com or Outlook.com):
+### Block executable content from email client and webmail
+
+This rule blocks the following file types from launching from email in Microsoft Outlook or Outlook.com and other popular webmail providers:
- Executable files (such as .exe, .dll, or .scr)
- Script files (such as a PowerShell .ps, VisualBasic .vbs, or JavaScript .js file)
-- Script archive files
-### Rule: Block all Office applications from creating child processes
+Intune name: Execution of executable content (exe, dll, ps, js, vbs, etc.) dropped from email (webmail/mail client) (no exceptions)
-Office apps will not be allowed to create child processes. This includes Word, Excel, PowerPoint, OneNote, and Access.
+SCCM name: Block executable content from email client and webmail
->[!NOTE]
->This does not include Outlook. For Outlook, please see [Block Office communication applications from creating child processes](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard#rule-block-office-communication-applications-from-creating-child-processes).
+GUID: BE9BA2D9-53EA-4CDC-84E5-9B1EEEE46550
-This is a typical malware behavior, especially for macro-based attacks that attempt to use Office apps to launch or download malicious executables.
+### Block all Office applications from creating child processes
-### Rule: Block Office applications from creating executable content
+This rule blocks Office apps from creating child processes. This includes Word, Excel, PowerPoint, OneNote, and Access.
-This rule targets typical behaviors used by suspicious and malicious add-ons and scripts (extensions) that create or launch executable files. This is a typical malware technique.
+This is a typical malware behavior, especially malware that abuses Office as a vector, using VBA macros and exploit code to download and attempt to run additional payload. Some legitimate line-of-business applications might also use behaviors like this, including spawning a command prompt or using PowerShell to configure registry settings.
-Extensions will be blocked from being used by Office apps. Typically these extensions use the Windows Scripting Host (.wsh files) to run scripts that automate certain tasks or provide user-created add-on features.
+Intune name: Office apps launching child processes
-### Rule: Block Office applications from injecting code into other processes
+SCCM name: Block Office application from creating child processes
-Office apps, including Word, Excel, PowerPoint, and OneNote, will not be able to inject code into other processes.
+GUID: D4F940AB-401B-4EFC-AADC-AD5F3C50688A
-This is typically used by malware to run malicious code in an attempt to hide the activity from antivirus scanning engines.
+### Block Office applications from creating executable content
-### Rule: Block JavaScript or VBScript From launching downloaded executable content
+This rule prevents Office apps, including Word, Excel, and PowerPoint, from creating executable content.
-JavaScript and VBScript scripts can be used by malware to launch other malicious apps.
+This rule targets a typical behavior where malware uses Office as a vector to break out of Office and save malicious components to disk, where they persist and survive a computer reboot. This rule prevents malicious code from being written to disk.
-This rule prevents these scripts from being allowed to launch apps, thus preventing malicious use of the scripts to spread malware and infect machines.
+Intune name: Office apps/macros creating executable content
-### Rule: Block execution of potentially obfuscated scripts
+SCCM name: Block Office applications from creating executable content
-Malware and other threats can attempt to obfuscate or hide their malicious code in some script files.
+GUID: 3B576869-A4EC-4529-8536-B80A7769E899
-This rule prevents scripts that appear to be obfuscated from running.
+### Block Office applications from injecting code into other processes
-### Rule: Block Win32 API calls from Office macro
+Attackers might attempt to use Office apps to migrate malicious code into other processes through code injection, so the code can masquerade as a clean process. This rule blocks code injection attempts from Office apps into other processes. There are no known legitimate business purposes for using code injection.
-Malware can use macro code in Office files to import and load Win32 DLLs, which can then be used to make API calls to allow further infection throughout the system.
+This rule applies to Word, Excel, and PowerPoint.
-This rule attempts to block Office files that contain macro code that is capable of importing Win32 DLLs. This includes Word, Excel, PowerPoint, and OneNote.
+Intune name: Office apps injecting code into other processes (no exceptions)
-### Rule: Block executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criteria
+SCCM name: Block Office applications from injecting code into other processes
+
+GUID: 75668C1F-73B5-4CF0-BB93-3ECF5CB7CC84
+
+### Block JavaScript or VBScript from launching downloaded executable content
+
+Malware often uses JavaScript and VBScript scripts to launch other malicious apps.
+
+Malware written in JavaScript or VBS often acts as a downloader to fetch and launch additional native payload from the Internet. This rule prevents scripts from launching downloaded content, helping to prevent malicious use of the scripts to spread malware and infect machines. This isn't a common line-of-business use, but line-of-business applications sometimes use scripts to download and launch installers. You can exclude scripts so they're allowed to run.
+
+>[!IMPORTANT]
+>File and folder exclusions don't apply to this attack surface reduction rule.
+
+Intune name: js/vbs executing payload downloaded from Internet (no exceptions)
+
+SCCM name: Block JavaScript or VBScript from launching downloaded executable content
+
+GUID: D3E037E1-3EB8-44C8-A917-57927947596D
+
+### Block execution of potentially obfuscated scripts
+
+Script obfuscation is a common technique that both malware authors and legitimate applications use to hide intellectual property or decrease script loading times. This rule detects suspicious properties within an obfuscated script.
+
+Intune name: Obfuscated js/vbs/ps/macro code
+
+SCCM name: Block execution of potentially obfuscated scripts.
+
+GUID: 5BEB7EFE-FD9A-4556-801D-275E5FFC04CC
+
+### Block Win32 API calls from Office macros
+
+Office VBA provides the ability to use Win32 API calls, which malicious code can abuse. Most organizations don't use this functionality, but might still rely on using other macro capabilities. This rule allows you to prevent using Win32 APIs in VBA macros, which reduces the attack surface.
+
+Intune name: Win32 imports from Office macro code
+
+SCCM name: Block Win32 API calls from Office macros
+
+GUID: 92E97FA1-2EDF-4476-BDD6-9DD0B4DDDC7B
+
+### Block executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criterion
-This rule blocks the following file types from being run or launched unless they meet prevalence or age criteria set by admins, or they are in a trusted list or exclusion list:
+This rule blocks the following file types from launching unless they either meet prevalence or age criteria, or they're in a trusted list or exclusion list:
- Executable files (such as .exe, .dll, or .scr)
>[!NOTE]
>You must [enable cloud-delivered protection](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-antivirus/enable-cloud-protection-windows-defender-antivirus) to use this rule.
+
+Intune name: Executables that don't meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criteria
+
+SCCM name: Block executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criteria
+
+GUID: 01443614-cd74-433a-b99e-2ecdc07bfc25
-### Rule: Use advanced protection against ransomware
+### Use advanced protection against ransomware
-This rule provides an extra layer of protection against ransomware. Executable files that enter the system will be scanned to determine whether they are trustworthy. If the files exhibit characteristics that closely resemble ransomware, they are blocked from being run or launched, provided they are not already in the trusted list or exception list.
+This rule provides an extra layer of protection against ransomware. It scans executable files entering the system to determine whether they're trustworthy. If the files closely resemble ransomware, this rule blocks them from running, unless they're in a trusted list or exclusion list.
>[!NOTE]
>You must [enable cloud-delivered protection](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-antivirus/enable-cloud-protection-windows-defender-antivirus) to use this rule.
+
+Intune name: Advanced ransomware protection
+
+SCCM name: Use advanced protection against ransomware
+
+GUID: c1db55ab-c21a-4637-bb3f-a12568109d35
-### Rule: Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem (lsass.exe)
+### Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem (lsass.exe)
Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) authenticates users who log in to a Windows computer. Windows Defender Credential Guard in Windows 10 normally prevents attempts to extract credentials from LSASS. However, some organizations can't enable Credential Guard on all of their computers because of compatibility issues with custom smartcard drivers or other programs that load into the Local Security Authority (LSA). In these cases, attackers can use tools like Mimikatz to scrape cleartext passwords and NTLM hashes from LSASS. This rule helps mitigate that risk by locking down LSASS.
>[!NOTE]
- >Some apps are coded to enumerate all running processes and to attempt opening them with exhaustive permissions. This results in the app accessing LSASS even when it's not necessary. ASR will deny the app's process open action and log the details to the security event log. Entry in the event log for access denial by itself is not an indication of the presence of a malicious threat.
+ >In some apps, the code enumerates all running processes and attempts to open them with exhaustive permissions. This rule denies the app's process open action and logs the details to the security event log. This rule can generate a lot of noise. If you have an app that overly enumerates LSASS, you need to add it to the exclusion list. By itself, this event log entry doesn't necessarily indicate a malicious threat.
+
+Intune name: Flag credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem
+
+SCCM name: Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem
+
+GUID: 9e6c4e1f-7d60-472f-ba1a-a39ef669e4b2
+
+### Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands
-### Rule: Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands
-
This rule blocks processes through PsExec and WMI commands from running, to prevent remote code execution that can spread malware attacks.
+>[!IMPORTANT]
+>File and folder exclusions do not apply to this attack surface reduction rule.
+
>[!WARNING]
->[Only use this rule if you are managing your devices with [Intune](https://docs.microsoft.com/intune) or another MDM solution. This rule is incompatible with management through [System Center Configuration Manager](https://docs.microsoft.com/sccm) because this rule blocks WMI commands that the Configuration Manager client uses to function correctly.]
+>Only use this rule if you're managing your devices with [Intune](https://docs.microsoft.com/intune) or another MDM solution. This rule is incompatible with management through [System Center Configuration Manager](https://docs.microsoft.com/sccm) because this rule blocks WMI commands the SCCM client uses to function correctly.
+
+Intune name: Process creation from PSExec and WMI commands
+
+SCCM name: Not applicable
+
+GUID: d1e49aac-8f56-4280-b9ba-993a6d77406c
-### Rule: Block untrusted and unsigned processes that run from USB
+### Block untrusted and unsigned processes that run from USB
With this rule, admins can prevent unsigned or untrusted executable files from running from USB removable drives, including SD cards. Blocked file types include:
- Executable files (such as .exe, .dll, or .scr)
- Script files (such as a PowerShell .ps, VisualBasic .vbs, or JavaScript .js file)
-### Rule: Block Office communication application from creating child processes
+Intune name: Untrusted and unsigned processes that run from USB
-Outlook will not be allowed to create child processes.
+SCCM name: Block untrusted and unsigned processes that run from USB
-This is a typical malware behavior, especially for macro-based attacks that attempt to use Office apps to launch or download malicious executables.
+GUID: b2b3f03d-6a65-4f7b-a9c7-1c7ef74a9ba4
+
+### Block Office communication application from creating child processes
+
+This rule prevents Outlook from creating child processes. It protects against social engineering attacks and prevents exploit code from abusing a vulnerability in Outlook. To achieve this, the rule prevents the launch of additional payload while still allowing legitimate Outlook functions. It also protects against [Outlook rules and forms exploits](https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/office365security/defending-against-rules-and-forms-injection/) that attackers can use when a user's credentials are compromised.
>[!NOTE]
->This rule applies to Outlook only.
+>This rule applies to Outlook and Outlook.com only.
-### Rule: Block Adobe Reader from creating child processes
+Intune name: Not yet available
-This rule blocks Adobe Reader from creating child processes.
+SCCM name: Not yet available
-## Review attack surface reduction rule events in the Windows Defender ATP Security Center
+GUID: 26190899-1602-49e8-8b27-eb1d0a1ce869
-Windows Defender ATP provides detailed reporting into events and blocks as part of its [alert investigation scenarios](../windows-defender-atp/investigate-alerts-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md).
+### Block Adobe Reader from creating child processes
-You can query Windows Defender ATP data by using [Advanced hunting](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-atp/advanced-hunting-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection). If you're using [audit mode](audit-windows-defender-exploit-guard.md), you can use Advanced hunting to see how attack surface reduction rules would affect your environment if they were enabled.
+Through social engineering or exploits, malware can download and launch additional payloads and break out of Adobe Reader. This rule prevents attacks like this by blocking Adobe Reader from creating additional processes.
-## Review attack surface reduction rule events in Windows Event Viewer
+Intune name: Not applicable
-You can review the Windows event log to see events that are created when an attack surface reduction rule is triggered (or audited):
+SCCM name: Not applicable
-1. Download the [Exploit Guard Evaluation Package](https://aka.ms/mp7z2w) and extract the file *asr-events.xml* to an easily accessible location on the machine.
+GUID: 7674ba52-37eb-4a4f-a9a1-f0f9a1619a2c
-2. Type **Event viewer** in the Start menu to open the Windows Event Viewer.
-
-3. On the left panel, under **Actions**, click **Import custom view...**
-
-4. Navigate to the Exploit Guard Evaluation Package, and select the file *asr-events.xml*. Alternatively, [copy the XML directly](event-views-exploit-guard.md).
-
-5. Click **OK**.
-
-6. This will create a custom view that filters to only show the following events related to attack surface reduction rules:
-
- Event ID | Description
--|-
-5007 | Event when settings are changed
-1122 | Event when rule fires in Audit-mode
-1121 | Event when rule fires in Block-mode
-
-### Event fields
-
-- **ID**: matches with the Rule-ID that triggered the block/audit.
-- **Detection time**: Time of detection
-- **Process Name**: The process that performed the "operation" that was blocked/audited
-- **Description**: Additional details about the event or audit, including Security intelligence, engine, and product version of Windows Defender Antivirus
-
-## Attack surface reduction rules in Windows 10 Enterprise E3
-
-A subset of attack surface reduction rules are also available on Windows 10 Enterprise E3 without the benefit of centralized monitoring, reporting, and analytics. For more information, see [Use attack surface reduction rules in Windows 10 Enterprise E3](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/attack-surface-reduction-rules-in-windows-10-enterprise-e3).
-
- ## In this section
-
-Topic | Description
----|---
-[Evaluate attack surface reduction rules](evaluate-attack-surface-reduction.md) | Use a tool to see a number of scenarios that demonstrate how attack surface reduction rules work, and what events would typically be created.
-[Enable attack surface reduction rules](enable-attack-surface-reduction.md) | Use Group Policy, PowerShell, or MDM CSPs to enable and manage attack surface reduction rules in your network.
-[Customize attack surface reduction rules](customize-attack-surface-reduction.md) | Exclude specified files and folders from being evaluated by attack surface reduction rules and customize the notification that appears on a user's machine when a rule blocks an app or file.
+## Related topics
+- [Enable attack surface reduction rules](enable-attack-surface-reduction.md)
+- [Evaluate attack surface reduction rules](evaluate-attack-surface-reduction.md)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/enable-attack-surface-reduction.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/enable-attack-surface-reduction.md
index 8e84a3872c..c89bbdc0fa 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/enable-attack-surface-reduction.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/enable-attack-surface-reduction.md
@@ -11,101 +11,168 @@ ms.pagetype: security
ms.localizationpriority: medium
author: andreabichsel
ms.author: v-anbic
-ms.date: 10/17/2018
---
# Enable attack surface reduction rules
-**Applies to:**
+[Attack surface reduction rules](attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard.md) help prevent actions and apps that malware often uses to infect computers. You can set attack surface reduction rules for computers running Windows 10 or Windows Server 2019.
-- [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Windows Defender ATP)](https://wincom.blob.core.windows.net/documents/Windows10_Commercial_Comparison.pdf)
+To use ASR rules, you need either a Windows 10 Enterprise E3 or E5 license. We recommend an E5 license so you can take advantage of the advanced monitoring and reporting capabilities available in Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Windows Defender ATP). These advanced capabilities aren't available with an E3 license, but you can develop your own monitoring and reporting tools to use in conjuction with ASR rules.
-Attack surface reduction rules help prevent actions and apps that are typically used by exploit-seeking malware to infect machines. Attack surface reduction rules are supported on Windows Server 2019 as well as Windows 10 clients.
+## Exclude files and folders from ASR rules
+
+You can exclude files and folders from being evaluated by most attack surface reduction rules. This means that even if an ASR rule determines the file or folder contains malicious behavior, it will not block the file from running. This could potentially allow unsafe files to run and infect your devices.
+
+>[!WARNING]
+>Excluding files or folders can severely reduce the protection provided by ASR rules. Excluded files will be allowed to run, and no report or event will be recorded.
+>
+>If ASR rules are detecting files that you believe shouldn't be detected, you should [use audit mode first to test the rule](enable-attack-surface-reduction.md#enable-and-audit-attack-surface-reduction-rules).
+
+>[!IMPORTANT]
+>File and folder exclusions do not apply to the following ASR rules:
+>
+>- Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands
+>- Block JavaScript or VBScript from launching downloaded executable content
+
+You can specify individual files or folders (using folder paths or fully qualified resource names) but you can't specify which rules the exclusions apply to.
+
+ASR rules support environment variables and wildcards. For information about using wildcards, see [Use wildcards in the file name and folder path or extension exclusion lists](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-antivirus/configure-extension-file-exclusions-windows-defender-antivirus#use-wildcards-in-the-file-name-and-folder-path-or-extension-exclusion-lists).
+
+The following procedures for enabling ASR rules include instructions for how to exclude files and folders.
## Enable and audit attack surface reduction rules
-You can use Group Policy, PowerShell, or MDM CSPs to configure the state or mode for each rule. This can be useful if you only want to enable some rules, or you want to enable rules individually in audit mode.
+It's best to use an enterprise-level management platform like Intune or System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM) to configure ASR rules, but you can also use Group Policy, PowerShell, or third-party mobile device management (MDM) CSPs.
-For further details on how audit mode works, and when you might want to use it, see the [audit Windows Defender Exploit Guard topic](audit-windows-defender-exploit-guard.md).
+>[!WARNING]
+>If you manage your computers and devices with Intune, SCCM, or other enterprise-level management platform, the management software will overwrite any conflicting Group Policy or PowerShell settings on startup.
-Attack surface reduction rules are identified by their unique rule ID.
+For a complete list of ASR rules, see [Reduce attack surfaces with attack surface reduction rules](attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard.md).
-You can manually add the rules by using the GUIDs in the following table:
+Each ASR rule contains three settings:
-Rule description | GUID
--|-
-Block executable content from email client and webmail | be9ba2d9-53ea-4cdc-84e5-9B1eeee46550
-Block all Office applications from creating child processes | d4f940ab-401b-4efc-aadc-ad5f3c50688a
-Block Office applications from creating executable content | 3b576869-a4eC-4529-8536-b80a7769e899
-Block Office applications from injecting code into other processes | 75668c1f-73b5-4Cf0-bb93-3ecf5cb7cc84
-Block JavaScript or VBScript from launching downloaded executable content | d3e037e1-3eb8-44c8-a917-57927947596d
-Block execution of potentially obfuscated scripts | 5beb7efe-fd9A-4556-801d-275e5ffc04cc
-Block Win32 API calls from Office macro | 92e97fa1-2edf-4476-bdd6-9dd0B4dddc7b
-Block executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criteria | 01443614-cd74-433a-b99e-2ecdc07bfc25
-Use advanced protection against ransomware | c1db55ab-c21a-4637-bb3f-a12568109d35
-Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem (lsass.exe) | 9e6c4e1f-7d60-472f-ba1a-a39ef669e4b2
-Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands | d1e49aac-8f56-4280-b9ba-993a6d77406c
-Block untrusted and unsigned processes that run from USB | b2b3f03d-6a65-4f7b-a9c7-1c7ef74a9ba4
-Block Office communication applications from creating child processes | 26190899-1602-49e8-8b27-eb1d0a1ce869
-Block Adobe Reader from creating child processes | 7674ba52-37eb-4a4f-a9a1-f0f9a1619a2c
+* Not configured: Disable the ASR rule
+* Block: Enable the ASR rule
+* Audit: Evaluate how the ASR rule would impact your organization if enabled
-See the [Attack surface reduction](attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard.md) topic for details on each rule.
+For further details on how audit mode works and when to use it, see [Audit Windows Defender Exploit Guard](audit-windows-defender-exploit-guard.md).
-### Use Group Policy to enable or audit attack surface reduction rules
+### Enable ASR rules in Intune
-1. On your Group Policy management computer, open the [Group Policy Management Console](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc731212.aspx), right-click the Group Policy Object you want to configure and click **Edit**.
+1. In Intune, select *Device configuration* > *Profiles*. Choose an existing endpoint protection profile or create a new one. To create a new one, select *Create profile* and enter information for this profile. For *Profile type*, select *Endpoint protection*. If you've chosen an existing profile, select *Properties* and then select *Settings*.
-2. In the **Group Policy Management Editor** go to **Computer configuration** and click **Administrative templates**.
+2. In the *Endpoint protection* pane, select *Windows Defender Exploit Guard*, then select *Attack Surface Reduction*. Select the desired setting for each ASR rule.
-3. Expand the tree to **Windows components** > **Windows Defender Antivirus** > **Windows Defender Exploit Guard** > **Attack surface reduction**.
+3. Under *Attack Surface Reduction exceptions*, you can enter individual files and folders, or you can select *Import* to import a CSV file that contains files and folders to exclude from ASR rules. Each line in the CSV file should be in the following format:
+
+
-4. Double-click the **Configure Attack surface reduction rules** setting and set the option to **Enabled**. You can then set the individual state for each rule in the options section:
+4. Select *OK* on the three configuration panes and then select *Create* if you're creating a new endpoint protection file or *Save* if you're editing an existing one.
+
+### Enable ASR rules in SCCM
+
+For information about enabling ASR rules and setting exclusions in SCCM, see [Create and deploy an Exploit Guard policy](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sccm/protect/deploy-use/create-deploy-exploit-guard-policy).
+
+### Enable ASR rules with Group Policy
+
+>[!WARNING]
+>If you manage your computers and devices with Intune, SCCM, or other enterprise-level management platform, the management software will overwrite any conflicting Group Policy settings on startup.
+
+1. On your Group Policy management computer, open the [Group Policy Management Console](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc731212.aspx), right-click the Group Policy Object you want to configure and click **Edit**.
+
+2. In the **Group Policy Management Editor** go to **Computer configuration** and click **Administrative templates**.
+
+3. Expand the tree to **Windows components** > **Windows Defender Antivirus** > **Windows Defender Exploit Guard** > **Attack surface reduction**.
+
+4. Select **Configure Attack surface reduction rules** and select **Enabled**. You can then set the individual state for each rule in the options section:
- Click **Show...** and enter the rule ID in the **Value name** column and your desired state in the **Value** column as follows:
- - Block mode = 1
- - Disabled = 0
- - Audit mode = 2
+ - Disable = 0
+ - Block (enable ASR rule) = 1
+ - Audit = 2
-
+ 
+
+5. To exclude files and folders from ASR rules, select the **Exclude files and paths from Attack surface reduction rules** setting and set the option to **Enabled**. Click **Show** and enter each file or folder in the **Value name** column. Enter **0** in the **Value** column for each item.
-### Use PowerShell to enable or audit attack surface reduction rules
+### Enable ASR rules with PowerShell
+
+>[!WARNING]
+>If you manage your computers and devices with Intune, SCCM, or other enterprise-level management platform, the management software will overwrite any conflicting PowerShell settings on startup.
+
+1. Type **powershell** in the Start menu, right click **Windows PowerShell** and click **Run as administrator**.
-1. Type **powershell** in the Start menu, right click **Windows PowerShell** and click **Run as administrator**
2. Enter the following cmdlet:
```PowerShell
Set-MpPreference -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions Enabled
```
-You can enable the feature in audit mode using the following cmdlet:
+ To enable ASR rules in audit mode, use the following cmdlet:
-```PowerShell
-Add-MpPreference -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions AuditMode
-```
-Use `Disabled` insead of `AuditMode` or `Enabled` to turn the feature off.
+ ```PowerShell
+ Add-MpPreference -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions AuditMode
+ ```
->[!IMPORTANT>
->You must specify the state individually for each rule, but you can combine rules and states in a comma seperated list.
->
->In the following example, the first two rules will be enabled, the third rule will be disabled, and the fourth rule will be enabled in audit mode:
->
->```PowerShell
->Set-MpPreference -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids ,,, -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions Enabled, Enabled, Disabled, AuditMode
->```
+ To turn off ASR rules, use the following cmdlet:
+ ```PowerShell
+ Add-MpPreference -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions Disabled
+ ```
-You can also the `Add-MpPreference` PowerShell verb to add new rules to the existing list.
+ >[!IMPORTANT]
+ >You must specify the state individually for each rule, but you can combine rules and states in a comma-separated list.
+ >
+ >In the following example, the first two rules will be enabled, the third rule will be disabled, and the fourth rule will be enabled in audit mode:
+ >
+ >```PowerShell
+ >Set-MpPreference -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids ,,, -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions Enabled, Enabled, Disabled, AuditMode
+ >```
->[!WARNING]
->`Set-MpPreference` will always overwrite the existing set of rules. If you want to add to the existing set, you should use `Add-MpPreference` instead.
->You can obtain a list of rules and their current state by using `Get-MpPreference`
+ You can also the `Add-MpPreference` PowerShell verb to add new rules to the existing list.
+ >[!WARNING]
+ >`Set-MpPreference` will always overwrite the existing set of rules. If you want to add to the existing set, you should use `Add-MpPreference` instead.
+ >You can obtain a list of rules and their current state by using `Get-MpPreference`
-### Use MDM CSPs to enable attack surface reduction rules
+3. To exclude files and folders from ASR rules, use the following cmdlet:
-Use the [./Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/Defender/AttackSurfaceReductionRules](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-defender#defender-attacksurfacereductionrules) configuration service provider (CSP) to individually enable and set the mode for each rule.
+ ```PowerShell
+ Add-MpPreference -AttackSurfaceReductionOnlyExclusions ""
+ ```
+
+ Continue to use `Add-MpPreference -AttackSurfaceReductionOnlyExclusions` to add more files and folders to the list.
+
+ >[!IMPORTANT]
+ >Use `Add-MpPreference` to append or add apps to the list. Using the `Set-MpPreference` cmdlet will overwrite the existing list.
+
+### Enable ASR rules with MDM CSPs
+
+Use the [./Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/Defender/AttackSurfaceReductionRules](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-defender#defender-attacksurfacereductionrules) configuration service provider (CSP) to individually enable and set the mode for each rule.
+
+The following is a sample for reference, using [GUID values for ASR rules](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard#attack-surface-reduction-rules).
+
+OMA-URI path: ./Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/Defender/AttackSurfaceReductionRules
+
+Value: {75668C1F-73B5-4CF0-BB93-3ECF5CB7CC84}=2|{3B576869-A4EC-4529-8536-B80A7769E899}=1|{D4F940AB-401B-4EfC-AADC-AD5F3C50688A}=2|{D3E037E1-3EB8-44C8-A917-57927947596D}=1|{5BEB7EFE-FD9A-4556-801D-275E5FFC04CC}=0|{BE9BA2D9-53EA-4CDC-84E5-9B1EEEE46550}=1
+
+The values to enable, disable, or enable in audit mode are:
+
+- Disable = 0
+- Block (enable ASR rule) = 1
+- Audit = 2
+
+Use the [./Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/Defender/AttackSurfaceReductionOnlyExclusions](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-defender#defender-attacksurfacereductiononlyexclusions) configuration service provider (CSP) to add exclusions.
+
+Example:
+
+OMA-URI path: ./Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/Defender/AttackSurfaceReductionOnlyExclusions
+
+Value: c:\path|e:\path|c:\Whitelisted.exe
+
+>[!NOTE]
+>Be sure to enter OMA-URI values without spaces.
## Related topics
- [Reduce attack surfaces with attack surface reduction rules](attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard.md)
-- [Customize attack surface reduction](customize-attack-surface-reduction.md)
- [Evaluate attack surface reduction](evaluate-attack-surface-reduction.md)
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/enable-controlled-folders-exploit-guard.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/enable-controlled-folders-exploit-guard.md
index 79fb8541bf..4f95d8c023 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/enable-controlled-folders-exploit-guard.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/enable-controlled-folders-exploit-guard.md
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ ms.pagetype: security
ms.localizationpriority: medium
author: andreabichsel
ms.author: v-anbic
-ms.date: 10/02/2018
+ms.date: 02/14/2019
---
# Enable controlled folder access
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ ms.date: 10/02/2018
- [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Windows Defender ATP)](https://wincom.blob.core.windows.net/documents/Windows10_Commercial_Comparison.pdf)
-Controlled folder access helps you protect valuable data from malicious apps and threats, such as ransomware. It is part of [Windows Defender Exploit Guard](windows-defender-exploit-guard.md). Controlled folder access is supported on Windows Server 2019 as well as Windows 10 clients.
+[Controlled folder access](controlled-folders-exploit-guard.md) helps you protect valuable data from malicious apps and threats, such as ransomware. It is part of [Windows Defender Exploit Guard](windows-defender-exploit-guard.md). Controlled folder access is supported on Windows Server 2019 as well as Windows 10 clients.
This topic describes how to enable Controlled folder access with the Windows Security app, Group Policy, PowerShell, and mobile device management (MDM) configuration service providers (CSPs).
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/enable-exploit-protection.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/enable-exploit-protection.md
index 70500e0307..69d9054c81 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/enable-exploit-protection.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/enable-exploit-protection.md
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ ms.pagetype: security
ms.localizationpriority: medium
author: andreabichsel
ms.author: v-anbic
-ms.date: 08/08/2018
+ms.date: 02/14/2019
---
# Enable exploit protection
@@ -20,9 +20,9 @@ ms.date: 08/08/2018
- [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Windows Defender ATP)](https://wincom.blob.core.windows.net/documents/Windows10_Commercial_Comparison.pdf)
-Exploit protection applies helps protect devices from malware that use exploits to spread and infect. It consists of a number of mitigations that can be applied at either the operating system level, or at the individual app level.
+[Exploit protection](exploit-protection-exploit-guard.md) helps protect against malware that uses exploits to infect devices and spread. It consists of a number of mitigations that can be applied to either the operating system or individual apps.
-Many of the features that were part of the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) are included in exploit protection.
+Many features from the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) are included in exploit protection.
## Enable and audit exploit protection
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/enable-network-protection.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/enable-network-protection.md
index d147c77d43..ee0f20632d 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/enable-network-protection.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/enable-network-protection.md
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ ms.pagetype: security
ms.localizationpriority: medium
author: andreabichsel
ms.author: v-anbic
-ms.date: 05/30/2018
+ms.date: 02/14/2019
---
# Enable network protection
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ ms.date: 05/30/2018
- [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Windows Defender ATP)](https://wincom.blob.core.windows.net/documents/Windows10_Commercial_Comparison.pdf)
-Network protection helps to prevent employees from using any application to access dangerous domains that may host phishing scams, exploits, and other malicious content on the Internet.
+[Network protection](network-protection-exploit-guard.md) helps to prevent employees from using any application to access dangerous domains that may host phishing scams, exploits, and other malicious content on the Internet.
This topic describes how to enable network protection with Group Policy, PowerShell cmdlets, and configuration service providers (CSPs) for mobile device management (MDM).
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/network-protection-exploit-guard.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/network-protection-exploit-guard.md
index b6ef34d2fc..78f14e5a59 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/network-protection-exploit-guard.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/network-protection-exploit-guard.md
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ ms.pagetype: security
ms.localizationpriority: medium
author: andreabichsel
ms.author: v-anbic
-ms.date: 11/29/2018
+ms.date: 02/14/2019
---
# Protect your network
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ You can review the Windows event log to see events that are created when network
1125 | Event when network protection fires in audit mode
1126 | Event when network protection fires in block mode
- ## In this section
+ ## Related topics
Topic | Description
---|---
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/troubleshoot-asr.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/troubleshoot-asr.md
index 5711270ae7..46df2bf21d 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/troubleshoot-asr.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/troubleshoot-asr.md
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ ms.pagetype: security
ms.localizationpriority: medium
author: andreabichsel
ms.author: v-anbic
-ms.date: 09/18/2018
---
# Troubleshoot attack surface reduction rules
@@ -40,7 +39,7 @@ Attack surface reduction rules will only work on devices with the following cond
> - Endpoints are running Windows 10 Enterprise E5, version 1709 (also known as the Fall Creators Update).
> - Endpoints are using Windows Defender Antivirus as the sole antivirus protection app. [Using any other antivirus app will cause Windows Defender AV to disable itself](../windows-defender-antivirus/windows-defender-antivirus-compatibility.md).
> - [Real-time protection](../windows-defender-antivirus/configure-real-time-protection-windows-defender-antivirus.md) is enabled.
-> - Audit mode is not enabled. Use Group Policy to set the rule to **Disabled** (value: **0**) as described in the [Enable ASR topic](enable-attack-surface-reduction.md#use-group-policy-to-enable-or-audit-attack-surface-reduction-rules).
+> - Audit mode is not enabled. Use Group Policy to set the rule to **Disabled** (value: **0**) as described in [Enable attack surface reduction rules](enable-attack-surface-reduction.md).
If these pre-requisites have all been met, proceed to the next step to test the rule in audit mode.
@@ -61,7 +60,7 @@ Follow the instructions in [Use the demo tool to see how attack surface reductio
Audit mode allows the rule to report as if it actually blocked the file or process, but will still allow the file to run.
-1. Enable audit mode for the specific rule you want to test. Use Group Policy to set the rule to **Audit mode** (value: **2**) as described in [Enable attack surface reduction rules](enable-attack-surface-reduction.md#use-group-policy-to-enable-or-audit-attack-surface-reduction-rules).
+1. Enable audit mode for the specific rule you want to test. Use Group Policy to set the rule to **Audit mode** (value: **2**) as described in [Enable attack surface reduction rules](enable-attack-surface-reduction.md).
2. Perform the activity that is causing an issue (for example, open or execute the file or process that should be blocked but is being allowed).
3. [Review the attack surface reductio rule event logs](attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard.md) to see if the rule would have blocked the file or process if the rule had been set to **Enabled**.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-system-guard/how-hardware-based-root-of-trust-helps-protect-windows.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-system-guard/how-hardware-based-root-of-trust-helps-protect-windows.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7531187507
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-system-guard/how-hardware-based-root-of-trust-helps-protect-windows.md
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+---
+title: How a hardware-based root of trust helps protect Windows 10 (Windows 10)
+description: Windows 10 uses a hardware-based root of trust to securely protect systems against firmware exploits.
+ms.assetid: 8d6e0474-c475-411b-b095-1c61adb2bdbb
+search.appverid: met150
+ms.prod: w10
+ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
+ms.sitesec: library
+ms.pagetype: security
+ms.localizationpriority: medium
+author: justinha
+ms.date: 02/14/2019
+---
+
+
+# Windows Defender System Guard: How a hardware-based root of trust helps protect Windows 10
+
+In order to protect critical resources such as the Windows authentication stack, single sign-on tokens, the Windows Hello biometric stack, and the Virtual Trusted Platform Module, a system's firmware and hardware must be trustworthy.
+
+Windows Defender System Guard reorganizes the existing Windows 10 system integrity features under one roof and sets up the next set of investments in Windows security. It's designed to make these security guarantees:
+
+- Protect and maintain the integrity of the system as it starts up
+- Validate that system integrity has truly been maintained through local and remote attestation
+
+## Maintaining the integrity of the system as it starts
+
+### Static Root of Trust for Measurement (SRTM)
+
+With Windows 7, one of the means attackers would use to persist and evade detection was to install what is often referred to as a bootkit or rootkit on the system.
+This malicious software would start before Windows started, or during the boot process itself, enabling it to start with the highest level of privilege.
+
+With Windows 10 running on modern hardware (that is, Windows 8-certified or greater) a hardware-based root of trust helps ensure that no unauthorized firmware or software (such as a bootkit) can start before the Windows bootloader.
+This hardware-based root of trust comes from the device’s Secure Boot feature, which is part of the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI).
+This technique of measuring the static early boot UEFI components is called the Static Root of Trust for Measurement (SRTM).
+
+As there are thousands of PC vendors that produce numerous models with different UEFI BIOS versions, there becomes an incredibly large number of SRTM measurements upon bootup.
+Two techniques exist to establish trust here—either maintain a list of known 'bad' SRTM measurements (also known as a blacklist), or a list of known 'good' SRTM measurements (also known as a whitelist).
+Each option has a drawback:
+
+- A list of known 'bad' SRTM measurements allows a hacker to change just 1 bit in a component to create an entirely new SRTM hash that needs to be listed.
+- A list of known 'good' SRTM measurements requires each new BIOS/PC combination measurement to be carefully added, which is slow.
+In addition, a bug fix for UEFI code can take a long time to design, build, retest, validate, and redeploy.
+
+### Secure Launch—the Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (DRTM)
+
+Windows Defender System Guard Secure Launch, first introduced in Windows 10 version 1809, aims to alleviate these issues by leveraging a technology known as the Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (DRTM).
+DRTM lets the system freely boot into untrusted code initially, but shortly after launches the system into a trusted state by taking control of all CPUs and forcing them down a well-known and measured code path.
+This has the benefit of allowing untrusted early UEFI code to boot the system, but then being able to securely transition into a trusted and measured state.
+
+
+
+
+Secure Launch simplifies management of SRTM measurements because the launch code is now unrelated to a specific hardware configuration. This means the number of valid code measurements is small, and future updates can be deployed more widely and quickly.
+
+### System Management Mode (SMM) protection
+
+System Management Mode (SMM) is a special-purpose CPU mode in x86 microcontrollers that handles power management, hardware configuration, thermal monitoring, and anything else the manufacturer deems useful.
+Whenever one of these system operations is requested, a non-maskable interrupt (SMI) is invoked at runtime, which executes SMM code installed by the BIOS.
+SMM code executes in the highest privilege level and is invisible to the OS, which makes it an attractive target for malicious activity. Even if DRTM is used to late launch, SMM code can potentially access hypervisor memory and change the hypervisor.
+To defend against this, two techniques are used:
+
+1. Paging protection to prevent inappropriate access to code and data
+2. SMM hardware supervision and attestation
+
+Paging protection can be implemented to lock certain code tables to be read-only to prevent tampering.
+This prevents access to any memory that has not been specifically assigned.
+
+A hardware-enforced processor feature known as a supervisor SMI handler can monitor the SMM and make sure it does not access any part of the address space that it is not supposed to.
+
+SMM protection is built on top of the Secure Launch technology and requires it to function.
+In the future, Windows 10 will also measure this SMI Handler’s behavior and attest that no OS-owned memory has been tampered with.
+
+## Validating platform integrity after Windows is running (run time)
+
+While Windows Defender System Guard provides advanced protection that will help protect and maintain the integrity of the platform during boot and at run time, the reality is that we must apply an "assume breach" mentality to even our most sophisticated security technologies. We should be able to trust that the technologies are successfully doing their jobs, but we also need the ability to verify that they were successful in achieving their goals. When it comes to platform integrity, we can’t just trust the platform, which potentially could be compromised, to self-attest to its security state. So Windows Defender System Guard includes a series of technologies that enable remote analysis of the device’s integrity.
+
+As Windows 10 boots, a series of integrity measurements are taken by Windows Defender System Guard using the device’s Trusted Platform Module 2.0 (TPM 2.0). This process and data are hardware-isolated away from Windows to help ensure that the measurement data is not subject to the type of tampering that could happen if the platform was compromised. From here, the measurements can be used to determine the integrity of the device’s firmware, hardware configuration state, and Windows boot-related components, just to name a few.
+
+
+
+
+After the system boots, Windows Defender System Guard signs and seals these measurements using the TPM. Upon request, a management system like Intune or System Center Configuration Manager can acquire them for remote analysis. If Windows Defender System Guard indicates that the device lacks integrity, the management system can take a series of actions, such as denying the device access to resources.
+
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-system-guard/images/secure-launch-group-policy.png b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-system-guard/images/secure-launch-group-policy.png
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diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-system-guard/system-guard-secure-launch-and-smm-protection.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-system-guard/system-guard-secure-launch-and-smm-protection.md
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-system-guard/system-guard-secure-launch-and-smm-protection.md
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+---
+title: System Guard Secure Launch and SMM protection (Windows 10)
+description: Explains how to configure System Guard Secure Launch and System Management Mode (SMM protection) to improve the startup security of Windows 10 devices.
+search.appverid: met150
+ms.prod: w10
+ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
+ms.sitesec: library
+ms.pagetype: security
+ms.localizationpriority: medium
+author: justinha
+ms.date: 02/14/2019
+---
+
+# System Guard Secure Launch and SMM protection
+
+This topic explains how to configure System Guard Secure Launch and System Management Mode (SMM) protection to improve the startup security of Windows 10 devices.
+
+## How to enable System Guard Secure Launch
+
+You can enable System Guard Secure Launch by using any of these options:
+
+- [Mobile Device Management (MDM)](#mobile-device-management)
+- [Group Policy](#group-policy)
+- [Windows Security app](#windows-security-app)
+- [Registry](#registry)
+
+### Mobile Device Management
+
+System Guard Secure Launch can be configured for Mobile Device Management (MDM) by using DeviceGuard policies in the Policy CSP, specifically [DeviceGuard/ConfigureSystemGuardLaunch](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-deviceguard#deviceguard-configuresystemguardlaunch).
+
+### Group Policy
+
+1. Click **Start** > type and then click **Edit group policy**.
+2. Click **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **System** > **Device Guard** > **Turn On Virtualization Based Security** > **Secure Launch Configuration**.
+
+
+
+### Windows Security app
+
+Click **Start** > **Settings** > **Update & Security** > **Windows Security** > **Open Windows Security** > **Device security** > **Core isolation** > **Firmware protection**.
+
+
+
+### Registry
+
+1. Open Registry editor.
+2. Click **HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE** > **SYSTEM** > **CurrentControlSet** > **Control** > **DeviceGuard** > **Scenarios**.
+3. Right-click **Scenarios** > **New** > **Key** and name the new key **SystemGuard**.
+4. Right-click **SystemGuard** > **New** > **DWORD (32-bit) Value** and name the new DWORD **Enabled**.
+5. Double-click **Enabled**, change the value to **1**, and click **OK**.
+
+
+
+## How to verify System Guard Secure Launch is configured and running
+
+To verify that Secure Launch is running, use System Information (MSInfo32). Click **Start**, search for **System Information**, and look under **Virtualization-based Security Services Running** and **Virtualization-based Security Services Configured**.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/windows/whats-new/ltsc/whats-new-windows-10-2019.md b/windows/whats-new/ltsc/whats-new-windows-10-2019.md
index 7fa78b0435..94f4540a5d 100644
--- a/windows/whats-new/ltsc/whats-new-windows-10-2019.md
+++ b/windows/whats-new/ltsc/whats-new-windows-10-2019.md
@@ -32,8 +32,9 @@ The Windows 10 Enterprise LTSC 2019 release is an important release for LTSC use
## Microsoft Intune
->[!NOTE]
->Some features that are described on this page require Microsoft Intune. Currently, information about Microsoft Intune support for LTSC 2019 is pending.
+>Microsoft Intune supports LTSC 2019 and later.
+
+
## Security
@@ -188,6 +189,20 @@ This is an update to the [BitLocker CSP](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/clie
This feature will soon be enabled on Olympia Corp as an optional feature.
+#### Delivering BitLocker policy to AutoPilot devices during OOBE
+
+You can choose which encryption algorithm to apply to BitLocker encryption capable devices, rather than automatically having those devices encrypt themselves with the default algorithm. This allows the encryption algorithm (and other BitLocker policies that must be applied prior to encryption), to be delivered before BitLocker encryption begins.
+
+For example, you can choose the XTS-AES 256 encryption algorithm, and have it applied to devices that would normally encrypt themselves automatically with the default XTS-AES 128 algorithm during OOBE.
+
+To achieve this:
+
+1. Configure the [encryption method settings](https://docs.microsoft.com/intune/endpoint-protection-windows-10#windows-encryption) in the Windows 10 Endpoint Protection profile to the desired encryption algorithm.
+2. [Assign the policy](https://docs.microsoft.com/intune/device-profile-assign) to your Autopilot device group.
+ - **IMPORTANT**: The encryption policy must be assigned to **devices** in the group, not users.
+3. Enable the Autopilot [Enrollment Status Page](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/deployment/windows-autopilot/enrollment-status) (ESP) for these devices.
+ - **IMPORTANT**: If the ESP is not enabled, the policy will not apply before encryption starts.
+
### Identity protection
Improvements have been added are to Windows Hello for Business and Credential Guard.
@@ -258,6 +273,33 @@ We’ve continued to work on the **Current threats** area in [Virus & threat pr

+## Deployment
+
+### Windows Autopilot
+
+[Windows Autopilot](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/deployment/windows-autopilot/windows-autopilot) is a deployment tool introduced with Windows 10, version 1709 and is also available for Windows 10 Enterprise 2019 LTSC (and later versions). Windows Autopilot provides a modern device lifecycle management service powered by the cloud to deliver a zero touch experience for deploying Windows 10.
+
+Windows Autopilot is currently available with Surface, Dell, HP, and Lenovo. Other OEM partners such as Panasonic, and Acer will support Autopilot soon. Check the [Windows IT Pro Blog](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/Windows-IT-Pro-Blog) or this article for updated information.
+
+Using Intune, Autopilot now enables locking the device during provisioning during the Windows Out Of Box Experience (OOBE) until policies and settings for the device get provisioned, thereby ensuring that by the time the user gets to the desktop, the device is secured and configured correctly.
+
+You can also apply an Autopilot deployment profile to your devices using Microsoft Store for Business. When people in your organization run the out-of-box experience on the device, the profile configures Windows based on the Autopilot deployment profile you applied to the device. For more information, see [Manage Windows device deployment with Windows Autopilot Deployment](https://docs.microsoft.com/microsoft-store/add-profile-to-devices).
+
+#### Windows Autopilot self-deploying mode
+
+Windows Autopilot self-deploying mode enables a zero touch device provisioning experience. Simply power on the device, plug it into the Ethernet, and the device is fully configured automatically by Windows Autopilot.
+
+This self-deploying capability removes the current need to have an end user interact by pressing the “Next” button during the deployment process.
+
+You can utilize Windows Autopilot self-deploying mode to register the device to an AAD tenant, enroll in your organization’s MDM provider, and provision policies and applications, all with no user authentication or user interaction required.
+
+To learn more about Autopilot self-deploying mode and to see step-by-step instructions to perform such a deployment, [Windows Autopilot self-deploying mode](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/deployment/windows-autopilot/self-deploying).
+
+
+#### Autopilot Reset
+
+IT Pros can use Autopilot Reset to quickly remove personal files, apps, and settings. A custom login screen is available from the lock screen that enables you to apply original settings and management enrollment (Azure Active Directory and device management) so that devices are returned to a fully configured, known, IT-approved state and ready to use. For more information, see [Reset devices with Autopilot Reset](https://docs.microsoft.com/education/windows/autopilot-reset).
+
## Sign-in
### Faster sign-in to a Windows 10 shared pc