From 82eb5fd8291776cc8f55b12945ef971fa1738ce2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: valemieux <98555474+valemieux@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2022 17:37:33 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 1/8] Added action types table and queries 1 & 2 --- ...events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md | 44 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+) diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/querying-application-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/querying-application-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md index f5f01d8caa..c64a55680f 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/querying-application-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/querying-application-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md @@ -28,6 +28,18 @@ In November 2018, we added functionality in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint that Advanced hunting in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint allows customers to query data using a rich set of capabilities. WDAC events can be queried with using an ActionType that starts with “AppControl”. This capability is supported beginning with Windows version 1607. +## Action Types + +| ActionType Name | Description | +| - | - | +| AppControlPolicyApplied | WDAC policy successfully deployed event | +| AppControlExecutableAudited | WDAC policy user mode binary audited | +| AppControlCodeIntegritySigningInformation | WDAC policy user mode binary audit event associated signing information | +| AppControlCodeIntegrityPolicyAudited | | +| AppControlCodeIntegrityOriginAudited | The user mode binary would have been blocked because of managed installer or the reputation returned by ISG. Since the policy is in audit mode, the app was allowed to run | +| AppControlCodeIntegrityOriginAllowed | The user mode binary was allowed because of managed installer or the reputation returned by ISG | +| AppControlCIScriptAudited | The script would have been blocked by WDAC. Since the policy is in audit mode, the app was allowed to run | + Here is a simple example query that shows all the WDAC events generated in the last seven days from machines being monitored by Microsoft Defender for Endpoint: ``` @@ -44,3 +56,35 @@ The query results can be used for several important functions related to managin Since applications still run in audit mode, it is an ideal way to see the impact and correctness of the rules included in the policy. Integrating the generated events with Advanced hunting makes it much easier to have broad deployments of audit mode policies and see how the included rules would impact those systems in real world usage. This audit mode data will help streamline the transition to using policies in enforced mode. - Monitoring blocks from policies in enforced mode Policies deployed in enforced mode may block executables or scripts that fail to meet any of the included allow rules. Legitimate new applications and updates or potentially unwanted or malicious software could be blocked. In either case, the Advanced hunting queries report the blocks for further investigation. + +Query Example 1: +Context: Query the application control action types summarized by type for past 7 days +``` +DeviceEvents +| where Timestamp > ago(7d) +| where ActionType startswith "AppControl" +| summarize Count = count() by ActionType +| order by Count desc +``` + +Query Example #2: + +Context: Query to determine audit blocks in the past 7 days +``` +DeviceEvents +| where ActionType startswith "AppControlExecutableAudited" +| where Timestamp > ago(7d) +|project DeviceId, // the device ID where the audit block happened +FileName, // The audit blocked app's filename +FolderPath, // The audit blocked app's device path +InitiatingProcessFileName, // The file name of the parent process loading the executable +InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName, // The company name of the parent process loading the executable +InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName, // The original file name of the parent process loading the executable +InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName, // The product name of the parent process loading the executable +InitiatingProcessSHA256, // The SHA256 of the parent process loading the executable +Timestamp, // The timestamp +ReportId, // The report ID +InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion, // The product version of the parent process loading the executable +InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription, // The file description of the parent process loading the executable +AdditionalFields +``` \ No newline at end of file From b24797ff9ac6ecff8f1e57d8f185c09d0b483ff9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: valemieux <98555474+valemieux@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2022 14:52:32 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 2/8] Update querying-application-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md --- ...events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md | 78 +++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/querying-application-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/querying-application-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md index c64a55680f..0916cb3074 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/querying-application-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/querying-application-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md @@ -20,25 +20,39 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec # Querying Application Control events centrally using Advanced hunting -A Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) policy logs events locally in Windows Event Viewer in either enforced or audit mode. -While Event Viewer helps to see the impact on a single system, IT Pros want to gauge the impact across many systems. +A Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) policy logs events locally in Windows Event Viewer in either enforced or audit mode. +While Event Viewer helps to see the impact on a single system, IT Pros want to gauge the impact across many systems. -In November 2018, we added functionality in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint that makes it easy to view WDAC events centrally from all systems that are connected to Defender for Endpoint. +In November 2018, we added functionality in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint that makes it easy to view WDAC events centrally from all systems that are connected to Defender for Endpoint. -Advanced hunting in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint allows customers to query data using a rich set of capabilities. WDAC events can be queried with using an ActionType that starts with “AppControl”. +Advanced hunting in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint allows customers to query data using a rich set of capabilities. WDAC events can be queried with using an ActionType that starts with “AppControl”. This capability is supported beginning with Windows version 1607. ## Action Types -| ActionType Name | Description | -| - | - | -| AppControlPolicyApplied | WDAC policy successfully deployed event | -| AppControlExecutableAudited | WDAC policy user mode binary audited | -| AppControlCodeIntegritySigningInformation | WDAC policy user mode binary audit event associated signing information | -| AppControlCodeIntegrityPolicyAudited | | -| AppControlCodeIntegrityOriginAudited | The user mode binary would have been blocked because of managed installer or the reputation returned by ISG. Since the policy is in audit mode, the app was allowed to run | -| AppControlCodeIntegrityOriginAllowed | The user mode binary was allowed because of managed installer or the reputation returned by ISG | -| AppControlCIScriptAudited | The script would have been blocked by WDAC. Since the policy is in audit mode, the app was allowed to run | +| ActionType Name | ETW Source Event ID | Description | +| - | - | - | +| AppControlCodeIntegrityDriverRevoked | 3023 | The driver file under validation did not meet the requirements to pass the application control policy. | +| AppControlCodeIntegrityImageRevoked | 3036 | The signed file under validation is signed by a code signing certificate that has been revoked by Microsoft or the certificate issuing authority. | +| AppControlCodeIntegrityPolicyAudited | 3076 | This event is the main WDAC block event for audit mode policies. It indicates that the file would have been blocked if the WDAC policy was enforced. | +| AppControlCodeIntegrityPolicyBlocked | 3077 | This event is the main WDAC block event for enforced policies. It indicates that the file did not pass your WDAC policy and was blocked. | +| AppControlExecutableAudited | 8003 | Applied only when the Audit only enforcement mode is enabled. Specifies that the .exe or .dll file would be blocked if the Enforce rules enforcement mode were enabled. | +| AppControlExecutableBlocked | 8004 | The .exe or .dll file cannot run. | +| AppControlPackagedAppAudited | 8021 | Applied only when the Audit only enforcement mode is enabled. Specifies that the packaged app would be blocked if the Enforce rules enforcement mode were enabled. | +| AppControlPackagedAppBlocked | 8022 | The packaged app was blocked by the policy. | +| AppControlScriptAudited | 8006 | Applied only when the Audit only enforcement mode is enabled. Specifies that the script or .msi file would be blocked if the Enforce rules enforcement mode were enabled. | +| AppControlScriptBlocked | 8007 | Access to is restricted by the administrator. Applied only when the Enforce rules enforcement mode is set either directly or indirectly through Group Policy inheritance. The script or .msi file cannot run. | +| AppControlCIScriptAudited | 8028 | Audit script/MSI file generated by Windows LockDown Policy (WLDP) being called by the scripthosts themselves. | +| AppControlCIScriptBlocked | 8029 | Block script/MSI file generated by Windows LockDown Policy (WLDP) being called by the scripthosts themselves. | +| AppControlCodeIntegrityOriginAllowed | 3090 | File was allowed due to good reputation (ISG) or installation source (managed installer). | +| AppControlCodeIntegrityOriginAudited | 3091 | Reputation (ISG) and installation source (managed installer) information for an audited file. | +| AppControlCodeIntegrityOriginBlocked | 3092 | Reputation (ISG) and installation source (managed installer) information for a blocked file. | +| AppControlCodeIntegrityPolicyLoaded | 3099 | Indicates that a policy has been successfully loaded. | +| AppControlCodeIntegritySigningInformation | 3089 | Signing information event correlated with either a 3076 or 3077 event. One 3089 event is generated for each signature of a file. | +| AppControlPolicyApplied | 8001 | Indicates that the AppLocker policy was successfully applied to the computer. | + +Learn more about the [Understanding Application Control event IDs (Windows)](event-id-explanations) + Here is a simple example query that shows all the WDAC events generated in the last seven days from machines being monitored by Microsoft Defender for Endpoint: @@ -52,13 +66,14 @@ ActionType startswith "AppControl" The query results can be used for several important functions related to managing WDAC including: -- Assessing the impact of deploying policies in audit mode +- Assessing the impact of deploying policies in audit mode Since applications still run in audit mode, it is an ideal way to see the impact and correctness of the rules included in the policy. Integrating the generated events with Advanced hunting makes it much easier to have broad deployments of audit mode policies and see how the included rules would impact those systems in real world usage. This audit mode data will help streamline the transition to using policies in enforced mode. - Monitoring blocks from policies in enforced mode - Policies deployed in enforced mode may block executables or scripts that fail to meet any of the included allow rules. Legitimate new applications and updates or potentially unwanted or malicious software could be blocked. In either case, the Advanced hunting queries report the blocks for further investigation. + Policies deployed in enforced mode may block executables or scripts that fail to meet any of the included allow rules. Legitimate new applications and updates or potentially unwanted or malicious software could be blocked. In either case, the Advanced hunting queries report the blocks for further investigation. + +## Example Advanced Hunting Application Control Queries ## +Query Example 1: Query the application control action types summarized by type for past 7 days -Query Example 1: -Context: Query the application control action types summarized by type for past 7 days ``` DeviceEvents | where Timestamp > ago(7d) @@ -67,24 +82,23 @@ DeviceEvents | order by Count desc ``` -Query Example #2: +Query Example #2: Query to determine audit blocks in the past 7 days -Context: Query to determine audit blocks in the past 7 days ``` DeviceEvents | where ActionType startswith "AppControlExecutableAudited" | where Timestamp > ago(7d) -|project DeviceId, // the device ID where the audit block happened -FileName, // The audit blocked app's filename -FolderPath, // The audit blocked app's device path -InitiatingProcessFileName, // The file name of the parent process loading the executable -InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName, // The company name of the parent process loading the executable -InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName, // The original file name of the parent process loading the executable -InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName, // The product name of the parent process loading the executable -InitiatingProcessSHA256, // The SHA256 of the parent process loading the executable -Timestamp, // The timestamp -ReportId, // The report ID -InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion, // The product version of the parent process loading the executable -InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription, // The file description of the parent process loading the executable +|project DeviceId, // the device ID where the audit block happened +FileName, // The audit blocked app's filename +FolderPath, // The audit blocked app's device path +InitiatingProcessFileName, // The file name of the parent process loading the executable +InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName, // The company name of the parent process loading the executable +InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName, // The original file name of the parent process loading the executable +InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName, // The product name of the parent process loading the executable +InitiatingProcessSHA256, // The SHA256 of the parent process loading the executable +Timestamp, // The timestamp +ReportId, // The report ID +InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion, // The product version of the parent process loading the executable +InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription, // The file description of the parent process loading the executable AdditionalFields -``` \ No newline at end of file +``` From bfb4af670d84e0c814455114f45176c47eed26be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: valemieux <98555474+valemieux@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2022 14:57:45 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 3/8] Added ActionTypes table and example queries --- ...ication-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/querying-application-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/querying-application-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md index 0916cb3074..e51c7663ad 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/querying-application-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/querying-application-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ This capability is supported beginning with Windows version 1607. | AppControlPackagedAppAudited | 8021 | Applied only when the Audit only enforcement mode is enabled. Specifies that the packaged app would be blocked if the Enforce rules enforcement mode were enabled. | | AppControlPackagedAppBlocked | 8022 | The packaged app was blocked by the policy. | | AppControlScriptAudited | 8006 | Applied only when the Audit only enforcement mode is enabled. Specifies that the script or .msi file would be blocked if the Enforce rules enforcement mode were enabled. | -| AppControlScriptBlocked | 8007 | Access to is restricted by the administrator. Applied only when the Enforce rules enforcement mode is set either directly or indirectly through Group Policy inheritance. The script or .msi file cannot run. | +| AppControlScriptBlocked | 8007 | Access to file name is restricted by the administrator. Applied only when the Enforce rules enforcement mode is set either directly or indirectly through Group Policy inheritance. The script or .msi file cannot run. | | AppControlCIScriptAudited | 8028 | Audit script/MSI file generated by Windows LockDown Policy (WLDP) being called by the scripthosts themselves. | | AppControlCIScriptBlocked | 8029 | Block script/MSI file generated by Windows LockDown Policy (WLDP) being called by the scripthosts themselves. | | AppControlCodeIntegrityOriginAllowed | 3090 | File was allowed due to good reputation (ISG) or installation source (managed installer). | @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ This capability is supported beginning with Windows version 1607. | AppControlCodeIntegritySigningInformation | 3089 | Signing information event correlated with either a 3076 or 3077 event. One 3089 event is generated for each signature of a file. | | AppControlPolicyApplied | 8001 | Indicates that the AppLocker policy was successfully applied to the computer. | -Learn more about the [Understanding Application Control event IDs (Windows)](event-id-explanations) +Learn more about the [Understanding Application Control event IDs (Windows)](event-id-explanations.md) Here is a simple example query that shows all the WDAC events generated in the last seven days from machines being monitored by Microsoft Defender for Endpoint: From f5cf7fa36ebccbf23aa42fa2ea28a49182dfdb2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: valemieux <98555474+valemieux@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2022 17:28:25 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 4/8] Changed verbiage to meet Acrolinx requirements --- ...events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md | 36 +++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/querying-application-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/querying-application-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md index e51c7663ad..ab420c9aae 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/querying-application-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/querying-application-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md @@ -21,9 +21,9 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec # Querying Application Control events centrally using Advanced hunting A Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) policy logs events locally in Windows Event Viewer in either enforced or audit mode. -While Event Viewer helps to see the impact on a single system, IT Pros want to gauge the impact across many systems. +While Event Viewer helps to see the impact on a single system, IT Pros want to gauge it across many systems. -In November 2018, we added functionality in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint that makes it easy to view WDAC events centrally from all systems that are connected to Defender for Endpoint. +In November 2018, we added functionality in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint that makes it easy to view WDAC events centrally from all connected systems. Advanced hunting in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint allows customers to query data using a rich set of capabilities. WDAC events can be queried with using an ActionType that starts with “AppControl”. This capability is supported beginning with Windows version 1607. @@ -32,29 +32,29 @@ This capability is supported beginning with Windows version 1607. | ActionType Name | ETW Source Event ID | Description | | - | - | - | -| AppControlCodeIntegrityDriverRevoked | 3023 | The driver file under validation did not meet the requirements to pass the application control policy. | +| AppControlCodeIntegrityDriverRevoked | 3023 | The driver file under validation didn't meet the requirements to pass the application control policy. | | AppControlCodeIntegrityImageRevoked | 3036 | The signed file under validation is signed by a code signing certificate that has been revoked by Microsoft or the certificate issuing authority. | -| AppControlCodeIntegrityPolicyAudited | 3076 | This event is the main WDAC block event for audit mode policies. It indicates that the file would have been blocked if the WDAC policy was enforced. | -| AppControlCodeIntegrityPolicyBlocked | 3077 | This event is the main WDAC block event for enforced policies. It indicates that the file did not pass your WDAC policy and was blocked. | -| AppControlExecutableAudited | 8003 | Applied only when the Audit only enforcement mode is enabled. Specifies that the .exe or .dll file would be blocked if the Enforce rules enforcement mode were enabled. | -| AppControlExecutableBlocked | 8004 | The .exe or .dll file cannot run. | -| AppControlPackagedAppAudited | 8021 | Applied only when the Audit only enforcement mode is enabled. Specifies that the packaged app would be blocked if the Enforce rules enforcement mode were enabled. | +| AppControlCodeIntegrityPolicyAudited | 3076 | This event is the main WDAC block event for audit mode policies. It indicates the file would have been blocked if the WDAC policy was enforced. | +| AppControlCodeIntegrityPolicyBlocked | 3077 | This event is the main WDAC block event for enforced policies. It indicates the file didn't pass your WDAC policy and was blocked. | +| AppControlExecutableAudited | 8003 | Applied only when the Audit only enforcement mode is enabled. Specifies the .exe or .dll file would be blocked if the Enforce rules enforcement mode were enabled. | +| AppControlExecutableBlocked | 8004 | The .exe or .dll file can't run. | +| AppControlPackagedAppAudited | 8021 | Applied only when the Audit only enforcement mode is enabled. Specifies the packaged app would be blocked if the Enforce rules enforcement mode were enabled. | | AppControlPackagedAppBlocked | 8022 | The packaged app was blocked by the policy. | -| AppControlScriptAudited | 8006 | Applied only when the Audit only enforcement mode is enabled. Specifies that the script or .msi file would be blocked if the Enforce rules enforcement mode were enabled. | -| AppControlScriptBlocked | 8007 | Access to file name is restricted by the administrator. Applied only when the Enforce rules enforcement mode is set either directly or indirectly through Group Policy inheritance. The script or .msi file cannot run. | -| AppControlCIScriptAudited | 8028 | Audit script/MSI file generated by Windows LockDown Policy (WLDP) being called by the scripthosts themselves. | -| AppControlCIScriptBlocked | 8029 | Block script/MSI file generated by Windows LockDown Policy (WLDP) being called by the scripthosts themselves. | +| AppControlScriptAudited | 8006 | Applied only when the Audit only enforcement mode is enabled. Specifies the script or .msi file would be blocked if the Enforce rules enforcement mode were enabled. | +| AppControlScriptBlocked | 8007 | Access to file name is restricted by the administrator. Applied only when the Enforce rules enforcement mode is set either directly or indirectly through Group Policy inheritance. The script or .msi file can't run. | +| AppControlCIScriptAudited | 8028 | Audit script/MSI file generated by Windows LockDown Policy (WLDP) being called by the script hosts themselves. | +| AppControlCIScriptBlocked | 8029 | Block script/MSI file generated by Windows LockDown Policy (WLDP) being called by the script hosts themselves. | | AppControlCodeIntegrityOriginAllowed | 3090 | File was allowed due to good reputation (ISG) or installation source (managed installer). | | AppControlCodeIntegrityOriginAudited | 3091 | Reputation (ISG) and installation source (managed installer) information for an audited file. | | AppControlCodeIntegrityOriginBlocked | 3092 | Reputation (ISG) and installation source (managed installer) information for a blocked file. | -| AppControlCodeIntegrityPolicyLoaded | 3099 | Indicates that a policy has been successfully loaded. | +| AppControlCodeIntegrityPolicyLoaded | 3099 | Indicates a policy has been successfully loaded. | | AppControlCodeIntegritySigningInformation | 3089 | Signing information event correlated with either a 3076 or 3077 event. One 3089 event is generated for each signature of a file. | -| AppControlPolicyApplied | 8001 | Indicates that the AppLocker policy was successfully applied to the computer. | +| AppControlPolicyApplied | 8001 | Indicates the AppLocker policy was successfully applied to the computer. | Learn more about the [Understanding Application Control event IDs (Windows)](event-id-explanations.md) -Here is a simple example query that shows all the WDAC events generated in the last seven days from machines being monitored by Microsoft Defender for Endpoint: +Here's a simple example query that shows all the WDAC events generated in the last seven days from machines being monitored by Microsoft Defender for Endpoint: ``` DeviceEvents @@ -67,12 +67,12 @@ ActionType startswith "AppControl" The query results can be used for several important functions related to managing WDAC including: - Assessing the impact of deploying policies in audit mode - Since applications still run in audit mode, it is an ideal way to see the impact and correctness of the rules included in the policy. Integrating the generated events with Advanced hunting makes it much easier to have broad deployments of audit mode policies and see how the included rules would impact those systems in real world usage. This audit mode data will help streamline the transition to using policies in enforced mode. + Since applications still run in audit mode, it's an ideal way to see the impact and correctness of the rules included in the policy. Integrating the generated events with Advanced Hunting makes it much easier to have broad deployments of audit mode policies and see how the included rules would influence those systems in real world usage. This audit mode data will help streamline the transition to using policies in enforced mode. - Monitoring blocks from policies in enforced mode Policies deployed in enforced mode may block executables or scripts that fail to meet any of the included allow rules. Legitimate new applications and updates or potentially unwanted or malicious software could be blocked. In either case, the Advanced hunting queries report the blocks for further investigation. ## Example Advanced Hunting Application Control Queries ## -Query Example 1: Query the application control action types summarized by type for past 7 days +Query Example 1: Query the application control action types summarized by type for past seven days ``` DeviceEvents @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ DeviceEvents | order by Count desc ``` -Query Example #2: Query to determine audit blocks in the past 7 days +Query Example #2: Query to determine audit blocks in the past seven days ``` DeviceEvents From 424fdec1e8a9a82aecc59e24c8fa96c908a7d1d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: valemieux <98555474+valemieux@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2022 17:33:21 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 5/8] Updating example queries layout --- ...ontrol-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md | 12 ++---------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/querying-application-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/querying-application-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md index ab420c9aae..7887ecbbbd 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/querying-application-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/querying-application-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md @@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ This capability is supported beginning with Windows version 1607. Learn more about the [Understanding Application Control event IDs (Windows)](event-id-explanations.md) +## Example Advanced Hunting Application Control Queries ## +Query Example 1: Query the application control action types summarized by type for past seven days Here's a simple example query that shows all the WDAC events generated in the last seven days from machines being monitored by Microsoft Defender for Endpoint: @@ -71,16 +73,6 @@ The query results can be used for several important functions related to managin - Monitoring blocks from policies in enforced mode Policies deployed in enforced mode may block executables or scripts that fail to meet any of the included allow rules. Legitimate new applications and updates or potentially unwanted or malicious software could be blocked. In either case, the Advanced hunting queries report the blocks for further investigation. -## Example Advanced Hunting Application Control Queries ## -Query Example 1: Query the application control action types summarized by type for past seven days - -``` -DeviceEvents -| where Timestamp > ago(7d) -| where ActionType startswith "AppControl" -| summarize Count = count() by ActionType -| order by Count desc -``` Query Example #2: Query to determine audit blocks in the past seven days From 8776ce74a20a4c16a0dda37145243d515af1b839 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: valemieux <98555474+valemieux@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2022 13:22:12 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 6/8] Updating query example 2 for 6283 --- ...-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/querying-application-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/querying-application-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md index 7887ecbbbd..24c4d8dfd2 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/querying-application-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/querying-application-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md @@ -82,15 +82,15 @@ DeviceEvents | where Timestamp > ago(7d) |project DeviceId, // the device ID where the audit block happened FileName, // The audit blocked app's filename -FolderPath, // The audit blocked app's device path +FolderPath, // The audit blocked app's system path without the FileName InitiatingProcessFileName, // The file name of the parent process loading the executable InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName, // The company name of the parent process loading the executable InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName, // The original file name of the parent process loading the executable InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName, // The product name of the parent process loading the executable -InitiatingProcessSHA256, // The SHA256 of the parent process loading the executable -Timestamp, // The timestamp -ReportId, // The report ID +InitiatingProcessSHA256, // The SHA256 flat hash of the parent process loading the executable +Timestamp, // The event creation timestamp +ReportId, // The report ID - randomly generated by MDE AH InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion, // The product version of the parent process loading the executable InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription, // The file description of the parent process loading the executable -AdditionalFields +AdditionalFields // Additional fields contains FQBN for signed binaries. These contain the CN of the leaf certificate, product name, original filename and version of the audited binary ``` From 774256f302e5dc2c7f893a60e8480b6cde95ae62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: greg-lindsay Date: Tue, 1 Mar 2022 11:47:20 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 7/8] update 10-year to variable --- windows/deployment/update/waas-overview.md | 2 +- windows/whats-new/ltsc/index.md | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/windows/deployment/update/waas-overview.md b/windows/deployment/update/waas-overview.md index 6997fcb62d..f98345cef2 100644 --- a/windows/deployment/update/waas-overview.md +++ b/windows/deployment/update/waas-overview.md @@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ Specialized systems—such as devices that control medical equipment, point-of-s > > The Long-term Servicing channel is not intended for deployment on most or all the devices in an organization; it should be used only for special-purpose devices. As a general guideline, a device with Microsoft Office installed is a general-purpose device, typically used by an information worker, and therefore it is better suited for the General Availability channel. -Microsoft never publishes feature updates through Windows Update on devices that run Windows 10 Enterprise LTSC. Instead, it typically offers new LTSC releases every 2–3 years, and organizations can choose to install them as in-place upgrades or even skip releases over a 10-year life cycle. +Microsoft never publishes feature updates through Windows Update on devices that run Windows 10 Enterprise LTSC. Instead, it typically offers new LTSC releases every 2–3 years, and organizations can choose to install them as in-place upgrades or even skip releases over a the product lifecycle. Always check your individual LTSC release to verify its servicing lifecycle. For more information, see [release information](/windows/release-health/release-information), or perform a search on the [product lifecycle information](/lifecycle/products/) page. > [!NOTE] > LTSC releases will support the currently released processors and chipsets at the time of release of the LTSC. As future CPU generations are released, support will be created through future LTSC releases that customers can deploy for those systems. For more information, see **Supporting the latest processor and chipsets on Windows** in [Lifecycle support policy FAQ - Windows Products](/lifecycle/faq/windows). diff --git a/windows/whats-new/ltsc/index.md b/windows/whats-new/ltsc/index.md index f233c9e457..fccfe691e0 100644 --- a/windows/whats-new/ltsc/index.md +++ b/windows/whats-new/ltsc/index.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ The following table summarizes equivalent feature update versions of Windows 10 > [!NOTE] > The Long-Term Servicing Channel was previously called the Long-Term Servicing Branch (LTSB). All references to LTSB are changed in this article to LTSC for consistency, even though the name of previous versions might still be displayed as LTSB. -With the LTSC servicing model, customers can delay receiving feature updates and instead only receive monthly quality updates on devices. Features from Windows 10 that could be updated with new functionality, including Cortana, Edge, and all in-box Universal Windows apps, are also not included. Feature updates are offered in new LTSC releases every 2–3 years instead of every 6 months, and organizations can choose to install them as in-place upgrades or even skip releases over a 10-year life cycle. Microsoft is committed to providing bug fixes and security patches for each LTSC release during this 10 year period. +With the LTSC servicing model, customers can delay receiving feature updates and instead only receive monthly quality updates on devices. Features from Windows 10 that could be updated with new functionality, including Cortana, Edge, and all in-box Universal Windows apps, are also not included. Feature updates are offered in new LTSC releases every 2–3 years instead of every 6 months, and organizations can choose to install them as in-place upgrades, or even skip releases. Microsoft is committed to providing bug fixes and security patches for each LTSC release during the extended LTSC servicing lifecycle. Always check your individual LTSC release to verify its servicing lifecycle. For more information, see [release information](/windows/release-health/release-information), or perform a search on the [product lifecycle information](/lifecycle/products/) page. > [!IMPORTANT] > The Long-Term Servicing Channel is not intended for deployment on most or all the PCs in an organization. The LTSC edition of Windows 10 provides customers with access to a deployment option for their special-purpose devices and environments. These devices typically perform a single important task and don’t need feature updates as frequently as other devices in the organization. These devices are also typically not heavily dependent on support from external apps and tools. Since the feature set for LTSC does not change for the lifetime of the release, over time there might be some external tools that do not continue to provide legacy support. See [LTSC: What is it, and when it should be used](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/Windows-IT-Pro-Blog/LTSC-What-is-it-and-when-should-it-be-used/ba-p/293181). From 0ae936eb325e19c8fc0d6984981b438df8b2c6f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: denisebmsft <18405051+denisebmsft@users.noreply.github.comgit> Date: Tue, 1 Mar 2022 13:22:14 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 8/8] Update querying-application-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md --- ...ation-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/querying-application-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/querying-application-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md index 2e6e4ab436..9406a7c464 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/querying-application-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/querying-application-control-events-centrally-using-advanced-hunting.md @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ author: jsuther1974 ms.reviewer: isbrahm ms.author: dansimp manager: dansimp -ms.date: 12/06/2018 +ms.date: 03/01/2022 ms.technology: windows-sec --- @@ -70,9 +70,9 @@ ActionType startswith "AppControl" The query results can be used for several important functions related to managing WDAC including: - Assessing the impact of deploying policies in audit mode - Since applications still run in audit mode, it's an ideal way to see the impact and correctness of the rules included in the policy. Integrating the generated events with advanced hunting makes it much easier to have broad deployments of audit mode policies and see how the included rules would influence those systems in real-world usage. This audit mode data will help streamline the transition to using policies in enforced mode. + Since applications still run in audit mode, it's an ideal way to see the impact and correctness of the rules included in the policy. Integrating the generated events with Advanced Hunting makes it much easier to have broad deployments of audit mode policies and see how the included rules would influence those systems in real world usage. This audit mode data will help streamline the transition to using policies in enforced mode. - Monitoring blocks from policies in enforced mode - Policies deployed in enforced mode may block executables or scripts that fail to meet any of the included allow rules. Legitimate new applications and updates or potentially unwanted or malicious software could be blocked. In either case, the advanced hunting queries report the blocks for further investigation. + Policies deployed in enforced mode may block executables or scripts that fail to meet any of the included allow rules. Legitimate new applications and updates or potentially unwanted or malicious software could be blocked. In either case, the Advanced hunting queries report the blocks for further investigation. Query Example #2: Query to determine audit blocks in the past seven days