\UserSid\Policies`**
+- DWORD: **UsePassportForWork**
+- Value = **0** for Disable, or Value = **1** for Enable
+
+For your reference, these registry settings can be applied from Local or Group Policies.
+
+- Local/GPO User Policy: **`HKEY_USERS\UserSID\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\PassportForWork`**
+- Local/GPO Device Policy: **`HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\PassportForWork`**
+- DWORD: **Enabled**
+- Value = **0** for Disable or Value = **1** for Enable
+
+If there's a conflicting Device policy and User policy, the User policy would take precedence. We don't recommend creating Local/GPO registry settings that could conflict with an Intune policy. This conflict could lead to unexpected results.
+
+## Related reference documents for Azure AD join scenarios
+
+- [Azure AD joined devices](/azure/active-directory/devices/concept-azure-ad-join)
+- [Plan your Azure Active Directory device deployment](/azure/active-directory/devices/plan-device-deployment)
+- [How to: Plan your Azure AD join implementation](/azure/active-directory/devices/azureadjoin-plan)
+- [How to manage the local administrators group on Azure AD joined devices](/azure/active-directory/devices/assign-local-admin)
+- [Manage device identities using the Azure portal](/azure/active-directory/devices/device-management-azure-portal)
+- [Azure AD Join Single Sign-on Deployment](hello-hybrid-aadj-sso.md)
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-faq.yml b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-faq.yml
index eb89236d09..405b6710ad 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-faq.yml
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-faq.yml
@@ -69,9 +69,9 @@ sections:
answer: |
It's currently possible to set a convenience PIN on Azure Active Directory Joined or Hybrid Active Directory Joined devices. Convenience PIN is not supported for Azure Active Directory user accounts (synchronized identities included). It's only supported for on-premises Domain Joined users and local account users.
- - question: Can I use an external camera when my laptop is closed or docked?
+ - question: Can I use an external Windows Hello compatible camera when my laptop is closed or docked?
answer: |
- No. Windows 10 currently only supports one Windows Hello for Business camera and does not fluidly switch to an external camera when the computer is docked with the lid closed. The product group is aware of this and is investigating this topic further.
+ Yes. Starting with Windows 10, version 21H2 an external Windows Hello compatible camera can be used if a device already supports an internal Windows Hello camera. When both cameras are present, the external camera will be be used for face authentication. For more information see [IT tools to support Windows 10, version 21H1](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-it-pro-blog/it-tools-to-support-windows-10-version-21h1/ba-p/2365103).
- question: Why does authentication fail immediately after provisioning hybrid key trust?
answer: |
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ sections:
Organizations that have the on-premises deployment of Windows Hello for Business, or those not using Windows 10 Enterprise can use destructive PIN reset. With destructive PIN reset, users that have forgotten their PIN can authenticate by using their password and then performing a second factor of authentication to re-provision their Windows Hello for Business credential. Re-provisioning deletes the old credential and requests a new credential and certificate. On-premises deployments need network connectivity to their domain controllers, Active Directory Federation Services, and their issuing certificate authority to perform a destructive PIN reset. Also, for hybrid deployments, destructive PIN reset is only supported with the certificate trust model and the latest updates to Active Directory Federation Services.
- question: |
- Which is better or more secure: key trust or certificate trust?
+ Which is better or more secure, key trust or certificate trust?
answer: |
The trust models of your deployment determine how you authenticate to Active Directory (on-premises). Both key trust and certificate trust use the same hardware-backed, two-factor credential. The difference between the two trust types are:
- Required domain controllers
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-feature-pin-reset.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-feature-pin-reset.md
index 6d1ae1fbd1..c772362fa2 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-feature-pin-reset.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-feature-pin-reset.md
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ The [ConfigureWebSignInAllowedUrls](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-au
- **Description:** (Optional) List of domains that are allowed during PIN reset flows.
- **OMA-URI:** ./Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/Authentication/ConfigureWebSignInAllowedUrls
- **Data type:** String
- - **Value**: Provide a semicolon delimited list of domains needed for authentication during the PIN reset scenario. An example value would be "signin.contoso.com;portal.contoso.com"
+ - **Value**: Provide a semicolon delimited list of domains needed for authentication during the PIN reset scenario. An example value would be signin.contoso.com;portal.contoso.com (no double quotes)

@@ -218,4 +218,4 @@ The [ConfigureWebSignInAllowedUrls](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-au
- [Windows Hello and password changes](hello-and-password-changes.md)
- [Windows Hello errors during PIN creation](hello-errors-during-pin-creation.md)
- [Event ID 300 - Windows Hello successfully created](hello-event-300.md)
-- [Windows Hello biometrics in the enterprise](hello-biometrics-in-enterprise.md)
\ No newline at end of file
+- [Windows Hello biometrics in the enterprise](hello-biometrics-in-enterprise.md)
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-trust-prereqs.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-trust-prereqs.md
index d867b494ec..28ff8d49c6 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-trust-prereqs.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-trust-prereqs.md
@@ -74,6 +74,9 @@ The two directories used in hybrid deployments must be synchronized. You need A
Organizations using older directory synchronization technology, such as DirSync or Azure AD sync, need to upgrade to Azure AD Connect. In case the schema of your local AD DS was changed since the last directory synchronization, you may need to [refresh directory schema](/azure/active-directory/hybrid/how-to-connect-installation-wizard#refresh-directory-schema).
+> [!NOTE]
+> User accounts enrolling for Windows Hello for Business in a Hybrid Certificate Trust scenario must have a UPN matching a verified domain name in Azure AD. For more details, see [Troubleshoot Post-Join issues](/azure/active-directory/devices/troubleshoot-hybrid-join-windows-current#troubleshoot-post-join-issues).
+
> [!NOTE]
> Windows Hello for Business is tied between a user and a device. Both the user and device need to be synchronized between Azure Active Directory and Active Directory.
@@ -152,4 +155,4 @@ If your environment is already federated and supports Azure device registration,
3. [New Installation Baseline](hello-hybrid-cert-new-install.md)
4. [Configure Azure Device Registration](hello-hybrid-cert-trust-devreg.md)
5. [Configure Windows Hello for Business settings](hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-settings.md)
-6. [Sign-in and Provision](hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-provision.md)
\ No newline at end of file
+6. [Sign-in and Provision](hello-hybrid-cert-whfb-provision.md)
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/allowlist.png b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/allowlist.png
index 097b1e036d..5b1df9448e 100644
Binary files a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/allowlist.png and b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/images/pinreset/allowlist.png differ
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/toc.yml b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/toc.yml
index 5c90875208..60161ce7da 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/toc.yml
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/toc.yml
@@ -101,6 +101,8 @@
href: hello-cert-trust-validate-deploy-mfa.md
- name: Configure Windows Hello for Business policy settings
href: hello-cert-trust-policy-settings.md
+ - name: Azure AD join cloud only deployment
+ href: hello-aad-join-cloud-only-deploy.md
- name: Managing Windows Hello for Business in your organization
href: hello-manage-in-organization.md
- name: Deploying Certificates to Key Trust Users to Enable RDP
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-use-virtual-smart-cards.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-use-virtual-smart-cards.md
index cb9d870d46..789da743aa 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-use-virtual-smart-cards.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-use-virtual-smart-cards.md
@@ -80,8 +80,12 @@ A TPM-based virtual smart card is labeled **Security Device** in the user interf
## Changing the PIN
-The PIN for virtual smart card can be changed by pressing Ctrl+Alt+Del, and then selecting the TPM virtual smart card under **Sign in options**.
-
+The PIN for a virtual smart card can be changed by following these steps:
+- Sign in with the old PIN or password.
+- Press Ctrl+Alt+Del and choose **Change a password**.
+- Select **Sign-in Options**.
+- Select the virtual smart card icon.
+- Enter and confirm the new PIN.
## Resolving issues
### TPM not provisioned
@@ -100,4 +104,4 @@ Sometimes, due to frequent incorrect PIN attempts from a user, the TPM may enter
## See also
-For information about authentication, confidentiality, and data integrity use cases, see [Virtual Smart Card Overview](virtual-smart-card-overview.md).
\ No newline at end of file
+For information about authentication, confidentiality, and data integrity use cases, see [Virtual Smart Card Overview](virtual-smart-card-overview.md).
diff --git a/windows/security/information-protection/TOC.yml b/windows/security/information-protection/TOC.yml
index 9965f322db..bcaa9d74d7 100644
--- a/windows/security/information-protection/TOC.yml
+++ b/windows/security/information-protection/TOC.yml
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@
href: bitlocker\bitlocker-using-with-other-programs-faq.yml
- name: "Prepare your organization for BitLocker: Planning and policies"
href: bitlocker\prepare-your-organization-for-bitlocker-planning-and-policies.md
+ - name: BitLocker deployment comparison
+ href: bitlocker\bitlocker-deployment-comparison.md
- name: BitLocker basic deployment
href: bitlocker\bitlocker-basic-deployment.md
- name: "BitLocker: How to deploy on Windows Server 2012 and later"
diff --git a/windows/security/information-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-deployment-comparison.md b/windows/security/information-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-deployment-comparison.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0fbc7f9f48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/security/information-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-deployment-comparison.md
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+---
+title: BitLocker deployment comparison (Windows 10)
+description: This article shows the BitLocker deployment comparison chart.
+ms.prod: w10
+ms.mktglfcycl: explore
+ms.sitesec: library
+ms.pagetype: security
+ms.localizationpriority: medium
+author: lovina-saldanha
+ms.author: v-lsaldanha
+manager: dansimp
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+ms.topic: conceptual
+ms.date: 05/20/2021
+ms.custom: bitlocker
+---
+
+# BitLocker deployment comparison
+
+**Applies to**
+
+- Windows 10
+
+This article depicts the BitLocker deployment comparison chart.
+
+## BitLocker deployment comparison chart
+
+| |Microsoft Intune |Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager |Microsoft BitLocker Administration and Monitoring (MBAM) |
+|---------|---------|---------|---------|
+|**Requirements**||||
+|Minimum client operating system version |Windows 10 | Windows 10 and Windows 8.1 | Windows 7 and later |
+|Supported Windows 10 SKUs | Enterprise, Pro, Education | Enterprise, Pro, Education | Enterprise |
+|Minimum Windows 10 version |1909 | None | None |
+|Supported domain-joined status | Microsoft Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) joined, hybrid Azure AD joined | Active Directory joined, hybrid Azure AD joined | Active Directory joined |
+|Permissions required to manage policies | Endpoint security manager or custom | Full administrator or custom | Domain Admin or Delegated GPO access |
+|Cloud or on premises | Cloud | On premises | On premises |
+|Server components required? | | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: |
+|Additional agent required? | No (device enrollment only) | Configuration Manager client | MBAM client |
+|Administrative plane | Microsoft Endpoint Manager admin center | Configuration Manager console | Group Policy Management Console and MBAM sites |
+|Administrative portal installation required | | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: |
+|Compliance reporting capabilities | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: |
+|Force encryption | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: |
+|Encryption for storage cards (mobile) | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | |
+|Allow recovery password | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: |
+|Manage startup authentication | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: |
+|Select cipher strength and algorithms for fixed drives | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: |
+|Select cipher strength and algorithms for removable drives | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: |
+|Select cipher strength and algorithms for operating environment drives | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: |
+|Standard recovery password storage location | Azure AD or Active Directory | Configuration Manager site database | MBAM database |
+|Store recovery password for operating system and fixed drives to Azure AD or Active Directory | Yes (Active Directory and Azure AD) | Yes (Active Directory only) | Yes (Active Directory only) |
+|Customize preboot message and recovery link | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: |
+|Allow/deny key file creation | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: |
+|Deny Write permission to unprotected drives | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: |
+|Can be administered outside company network | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | |
+|Support for organization unique IDs | | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: |
+|Self-service recovery | Yes (through Azure AD or Company Portal app) | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: |
+|Recovery password rotation for fixed and operating environment drives | Yes (Windows 10, version 1909 and later) | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: |
+|Wait to complete encryption until recovery information is backed up to Azure AD | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | | |
+|Wait to complete encryption until recovery information is backed up to Active Directory | | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: |
+|Allow or deny Data Recovery Agent | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: |
+|Unlock a volume using certificate with custom object identifier | | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: |
+|Prevent memory overwrite on restart | | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: |
+|Configure custom Trusted Platform Module Platform Configuration Register profiles | | | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: |
+|Manage auto-unlock functionality | | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: | :::image type="content" source="images/yes-icon.png" alt-text="supported"::: |
diff --git a/windows/security/information-protection/bitlocker/images/yes-icon.png b/windows/security/information-protection/bitlocker/images/yes-icon.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bbae7d3052
Binary files /dev/null and b/windows/security/information-protection/bitlocker/images/yes-icon.png differ
diff --git a/windows/security/information-protection/bitlocker/ts-bitlocker-decode-measured-boot-logs.md b/windows/security/information-protection/bitlocker/ts-bitlocker-decode-measured-boot-logs.md
index 6424a91e8b..bab9c21e3e 100644
--- a/windows/security/information-protection/bitlocker/ts-bitlocker-decode-measured-boot-logs.md
+++ b/windows/security/information-protection/bitlocker/ts-bitlocker-decode-measured-boot-logs.md
@@ -94,6 +94,9 @@ To find the PCR information, go to the end of the file.
## Use PCPTool to decode Measured Boot logs
+> [!NOTE]
+> PCPTool is a Visual Studio solution, but you need to build the executable before you can start using this tool.
+
PCPTool is part of the [TPM Platform Crypto-Provider Toolkit](https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=52487). The tool decodes a Measured Boot log file and converts it into an XML file.
To download and install PCPTool, go to the Toolkit page, select **Download**, and follow the instructions.
@@ -111,4 +114,4 @@ where the variables represent the following values:
The content of the XML file resembles the following.
-
\ No newline at end of file
+
diff --git a/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/tpm-recommendations.md b/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/tpm-recommendations.md
index 6179ba0c0a..658a7d98d5 100644
--- a/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/tpm-recommendations.md
+++ b/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/tpm-recommendations.md
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ TPM 2.0 products and systems have important security advantages over TPM 1.2, in
> [!NOTE]
> TPM 2.0 is not supported in Legacy and CSM Modes of the BIOS. Devices with TPM 2.0 must have their BIOS mode configured as Native UEFI only. The Legacy and Compatibility Support Module (CSM) options must be disabled. For added security Enable the Secure Boot feature.
-
+>
> Installed Operating System on hardware in legacy mode will stop the OS from booting when the BIOS mode is changed to UEFI. Use the tool [MBR2GPT](/windows/deployment/mbr-to-gpt) before changing the BIOS mode which will prepare the OS and the disk to support UEFI.
## Discrete, Integrated or Firmware TPM?
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ For end consumers, TPM is behind the scenes but is still very relevant. TPM is u
### Windows 10 for desktop editions (Home, Pro, Enterprise, and Education)
-- Since July 28, 2016, all new device models, lines or series (or if you are updating the hardware configuration of a existing model, line or series with a major update, such as CPU, graphic cards) must implement and enable by default TPM 2.0 (details in section 3.7 of the [Minimum hardware requirements](/windows-hardware/design/minimum/minimum-hardware-requirements-overview) page). The requirement to enable TPM 2.0 only applies to the manufacturing of new devices. For TPM recommendations for specific Windows features, see [TPM and Windows Features](#tpm-and-windows-features).
+- Since July 28, 2016, all new device models, lines or series (or if you are updating the hardware configuration of an existing model, line or series with a major update, such as CPU, graphic cards) must implement and enable by default TPM 2.0 (details in section 3.7 of the [Minimum hardware requirements](/windows-hardware/design/minimum/minimum-hardware-requirements-overview) page). The requirement to enable TPM 2.0 only applies to the manufacturing of new devices. For TPM recommendations for specific Windows features, see [TPM and Windows Features](#tpm-and-windows-features).
### IoT Core
@@ -111,21 +111,20 @@ The following table defines which Windows features require TPM support.
Windows Features | TPM Required | Supports TPM 1.2 | Supports TPM 2.0 | Details |
-|-|-|-|-
- Measured Boot | Yes | Yes | Yes | Measured Boot requires TPM 1.2 or 2.0 and UEFI Secure Boot
+ Measured Boot | Yes | Yes | Yes | Measured Boot requires TPM 1.2 or 2.0 and UEFI Secure Boot. TPM 2.0 is recommended since it supports newer cryptographic algorithms. TPM 1.2 only supports the SHA-1 algorithm which is being deprecated.
BitLocker | No | Yes | Yes | TPM 1.2 or 2.0 are supported but TPM 2.0 is recommended. [Automatic Device Encryption requires Modern Standby](../bitlocker/bitlocker-device-encryption-overview-windows-10.md#bitlocker-device-encryption) including TPM 2.0 support
Device Encryption | Yes | N/A | Yes | Device Encryption requires Modern Standby/Connected Standby certification, which requires TPM 2.0.
Windows Defender Application Control (Device Guard) | No | Yes | Yes
- Windows Defender System Guard | Yes | No | Yes
- Credential Guard | No | Yes | Yes | Windows 10, version 1507 (End of Life as of May 2017) only supported TPM 2.0 for Credential Guard. Beginning with Windows 10, version 1511, TPM 1.2 and 2.0 are supported.
- Device Health Attestation| Yes | Yes | Yes
- Windows Hello/Windows Hello for Business| No | Yes | Yes | Azure AD join supports both versions of TPM, but requires TPM with keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC) and Endorsement Key (EK) certificate for key attestation support.
+ Windows Defender System Guard (DRTM) | Yes | No | Yes | TPM 2.0 and UEFI firmware is required.
+ Credential Guard | No | Yes | Yes | Windows 10, version 1507 (End of Life as of May 2017) only supported TPM 2.0 for Credential Guard. Beginning with Windows 10, version 1511, TPM 1.2 and 2.0 are supported. Paired with Windows Defender System Guard, TPM 2.0 provides enhanced security for Credential Guard. Windows 11 requires TPM 2.0 by default to facilitate easier enablement of this enhanced security for customers.
+ Device Health Attestation| Yes | Yes | Yes | TPM 2.0 is recommended since it supports newer cryptographic algorithms. TPM 1.2 only supports the SHA-1 algorithm which is being deprecated.
+ Windows Hello/Windows Hello for Business| No | Yes | Yes | Azure AD join supports both versions of TPM, but requires TPM with keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC) and Endorsement Key (EK) certificate for key attestation support. TPM 2.0 is recommended over TPM 1.2 for better performance and security. Windows Hello as a FIDO platform authenticator will take advantage of TPM 2.0 for key storage.
UEFI Secure Boot | No | Yes | Yes
TPM Platform Crypto Provider Key Storage Provider| Yes | Yes | Yes
Virtual Smart Card | Yes | Yes | Yes
Certificate storage | No | Yes | Yes | TPM is only required when the certificate is stored in the TPM.
Autopilot | No | N/A | Yes | If you intend to deploy a scenario which requires TPM (such as white glove and self-deploying mode), then TPM 2.0 and UEFI firmware are required.
SecureBIO | Yes | No | Yes | TPM 2.0 and UEFI firmware is required.
- DRTM | Yes | No | Yes | TPM 2.0 and UEFI firmware is required.
## OEM Status on TPM 2.0 system availability and certified parts
@@ -133,4 +132,4 @@ Government customers and enterprise customers in regulated industries may have a
## Related topics
-- [Trusted Platform Module](trusted-platform-module-top-node.md) (list of topics)
\ No newline at end of file
+- [Trusted Platform Module](trusted-platform-module-top-node.md) (list of topics)
diff --git a/windows/security/information-protection/windows-information-protection/create-wip-policy-using-intune-azure.md b/windows/security/information-protection/windows-information-protection/create-wip-policy-using-intune-azure.md
index c10b2990b3..62291e7f81 100644
--- a/windows/security/information-protection/windows-information-protection/create-wip-policy-using-intune-azure.md
+++ b/windows/security/information-protection/windows-information-protection/create-wip-policy-using-intune-azure.md
@@ -52,9 +52,9 @@ Before you can create a WIP policy using Intune, you need to configure an MDM or
## Create a WIP policy
-1. Sign in to the Azure portal.
+1. Sign in to the [Microsoft Endpoint Manager](https://endpoint.microsoft.com/).
-2. Open Microsoft Intune and click **Client apps** > **App protection policies** > **Create policy**.
+2. Open Microsoft Intune and click **Apps** > **App protection policies** > **Create policy**.

@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ Specify the proxy servers your devices will go through to reach your cloud resou
Using this server type indicates that the cloud resources you’re connecting to are enterprise resources.
This list shouldn’t include any servers listed in your Internal proxy servers list.
-Internal proxy servers must be used only for WIP-protected (enterprise) traffic.
+Proxy servers must be used only for non-WIP-protected (non-enterprise) traffic.
Separate multiple resources with the ";" delimiter.
```console
@@ -497,8 +497,8 @@ proxy.contoso.com:80;proxy2.contoso.com:443
Specify the internal proxy servers your devices will go through to reach your cloud resources. Using this server type indicates that the cloud resources you’re connecting to are enterprise resources.
-This list shouldn’t include any servers listed in your Proxy servers list.
-Proxy servers must be used only for non-WIP-protected (non-enterprise) traffic.
+This list shouldn’t include any servers listed in your Proxy servers list.
+Internal proxy servers must be used only for WIP-protected (enterprise) traffic.
Separate multiple resources with the ";" delimiter.
```console
@@ -507,8 +507,6 @@ contoso.internalproxy1.com;contoso.internalproxy2.com
### IPv4 ranges
-Starting with Windows 10, version 1703, this field is optional.
-
Specify the addresses for a valid IPv4 value range within your intranet.
These addresses, used with your Network domain names, define your corporate network boundaries.
Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) notation isn’t supported.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/TOC.yml b/windows/security/threat-protection/TOC.yml
index 3c8e12e04c..e310d0d993 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/TOC.yml
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/TOC.yml
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@
- name: Information for developers
items:
- name: Software developer FAQ
- href: intelligence/developer-faq.md
+ href: intelligence/developer-faq.yml
- name: Software developer resources
href: intelligence/developer-resources.md
- name: The Windows Security app
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-privilege-use-events.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-privilege-use-events.md
index 87c74a4998..7e8dea77c3 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-privilege-use-events.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-privilege-use-events.md
@@ -21,8 +21,7 @@ ms.technology: mde
- Windows 10
- Windows Server 2016
-
-This auditing subcategory should not have any events in it, but for some reason Success auditing will enable generation of event 4985(S): The state of a transaction has changed.
+This auditing subcategory should not have any events in it, but for some reason Success auditing will enable the generation of event [4985(S): The state of a transaction has changed](/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4985).
| Computer Type | General Success | General Failure | Stronger Success | Stronger Failure | Comments |
|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|
@@ -35,4 +34,3 @@ This auditing subcategory should not have any events in it, but for some reason
- [4985](event-4985.md)(S): The state of a transaction has changed.
-
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-account-management.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-account-management.md
index 10a7cb1c8c..5541fc0f63 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-account-management.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-account-management.md
@@ -44,51 +44,51 @@ set this value to **No auditing**, in the **Properties** dialog box for this pol
You can configure this security setting by opening the appropriate policy under Computer Configuration\\Windows Settings\\Security Settings\\Local Policies\\Audit Policy.
-| Account management events | Description |
-|---------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
-| 624 | A user account was created. |
-| 627 | A user password was changed. |
-| 628 | A user password was set. |
-| 630 | A user account was deleted. |
-| 631 | A global group was created. |
-| 632 | A member was added to a global group. |
-| 633 | A member was removed from a global group. |
-| 634 | A global group was deleted. |
-| 635 | A new local group was created. |
-| 636 | A member was added to a local group. |
-| 637 | A member was removed from a local group. |
-| 638 | A local group was deleted. |
-| 639 | A local group account was changed. |
-| 641 | A global group account was changed. |
-| 642 | A user account was changed. |
-| 643 | A domain policy was modified. |
-| 644 | A user account was auto locked. |
-| 645 | A computer account was created. |
-| 646 | A computer account was changed. |
-| 647 | A computer account was deleted. |
-| 648 | A local security group with security disabled was created.
**Note:** SECURITY_DISABLED in the formal name means that this group cannot be used to grant permissions in access checks. |
-| 649 | A local security group with security disabled was changed. |
-| 650 | A member was added to a security-disabled local security group. |
-| 651 | A member was removed from a security-disabled local security group. |
-| 652 | A security-disabled local group was deleted. |
-| 653 | A security-disabled global group was created. |
-| 645 | A security-disabled global group was changed. |
-| 655 | A member was added to a security-disabled global group. |
-| 656 | A member was removed from a security-disabled global group. |
-| 657 | A security-disabled global group was deleted. |
-| 658 | A security-enabled universal group was created. |
-| 659 | A security-enabled universal group was changed. |
-| 660 | A member was added to a security-enabled universal group. |
-| 661 | A member was removed from a security-enabled universal group. |
-| 662 | A security-enabled universal group was deleted. |
-| 663 | A security-disabled universal group was created. |
-| 664 | A security-disabled universal group was changed. |
-| 665 | A member was added to a security-disabled universal group. |
-| 666 | A member was removed from a security-disabled universal group. |
-| 667 | A security-disabled universal group was deleted. |
-| 668 | A group type was changed. |
-| 684 | Set the security descriptor of members of administrative groups. |
-| 685 | Set the security descriptor of members of administrative groups.
**Note:** Every 60 minutes on a domain controller a background thread searches all members of administrative groups (such as domain, enterprise, and schema administrators) and applies a fixed security descriptor on them. This event is logged. |
+| Account management events | Description |
+| :-----------------------: | :---------- |
+| 4720 | A user account was created. |
+| 4723 | A user password was changed. |
+| 4724 | A user password was set. |
+| 4726 | A user account was deleted. |
+| 4727 | A global group was created. |
+| 4728 | A member was added to a global group. |
+| 4729 | A member was removed from a global group. |
+| 4730 | A global group was deleted. |
+| 4731 | A new local group was created. |
+| 4732 | A member was added to a local group. |
+| 4733 | A member was removed from a local group. |
+| 4734 | A local group was deleted. |
+| 4735 | A local group account was changed. |
+| 4737 | A global group account was changed. |
+| 4738 | A user account was changed. |
+| 4739 | A domain policy was modified. |
+| 4740 | A user account was auto locked. |
+| 4741 | A computer account was created. |
+| 4742 | A computer account was changed. |
+| 4743 | A computer account was deleted. |
+| 4744 | A local security group with security disabled was created.
**Note:** SECURITY_DISABLED in the formal name means that this group cannot be used to grant permissions in access checks |
+| 4745 | A local security group with security disabled was changed. |
+| 4746 | A member was added to a security-disabled local security group. |
+| 4747 | A member was removed from a security-disabled local security group. |
+| 4748 | A security-disabled local group was deleted. |
+| 4749 | A security-disabled global group was created. |
+| 4750 | A security-disabled global group was changed. |
+| 4751 | A member was added to a security-disabled global group. |
+| 4752 | A member was removed from a security-disabled global group. |
+| 4753 | A security-disabled global group was deleted. |
+| 4754 | A security-enabled universal group was created. |
+| 4755 | A security-enabled universal group was changed. |
+| 4756 | A member was added to a security-enabled universal group. |
+| 4757 | A member was removed from a security-enabled universal group. |
+| 4758 | A security-enabled universal group was deleted. |
+| 4759 | A security-disabled universal group was created. |
+| 4760 | A security-disabled universal group was changed. |
+| 4761 | A member was added to a security-disabled universal group. |
+| 4762 | A member was removed from a security-disabled universal group. |
+| 4763 | A security-disabled universal group was deleted. |
+| 4764 | A group type was changed. |
+| 4780 | Set the security descriptor of members of administrative groups. |
+| 685 | Set the security descriptor of members of administrative groups.
**Note:** Every 60 minutes on a domain controller a background thread searches all members of administrative groups (such as domain, enterprise, and schema administrators) and applies a fixed security descriptor on them. This event is logged. |
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4624.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4624.md
index f34d8e3ae4..27db3be3f3 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4624.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4624.md
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ For 4624(S): An account was successfully logged on.
| **High-value accounts**: You might have high-value domain or local accounts for which you need to monitor each action.
Examples of high-value accounts are database administrators, built-in local administrator account, domain administrators, service accounts, domain controller accounts and so on. | Monitor this event with the **"New Logon\\Security ID"** that corresponds to the high-value account or accounts. |
| **Anomalies or malicious actions**: You might have specific requirements for detecting anomalies or monitoring potential malicious actions. For example, you might need to monitor for use of an account outside of working hours. | When you monitor for anomalies or malicious actions, use the **"New Logon\\Security ID"** (with other information) to monitor how or when a particular account is being used. |
| **Non-active accounts**: You might have non-active, disabled, or guest accounts, or other accounts that should never be used. | Monitor this event with the **"New Logon\\Security ID"** that corresponds to the accounts that should never be used. |
-| **Account whitelist**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a "allow list-only" action, review the **"New Logon\\Security ID"** for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
+| **Account allow list**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a "allow list-only" action, review the **"New Logon\\Security ID"** for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
| **Accounts of different types**: You might want to ensure that certain actions are performed only by certain account types, for example, local or domain account, machine or user account, vendor or employee account, and so on. | If this event corresponds to an action you want to monitor for certain account types, review the **"New Logon\\Security ID"** to see whether the account type is as expected. |
| **External accounts**: You might be monitoring accounts from another domain, or "external" accounts that are not allowed to perform certain actions (represented by certain specific events). | Monitor this event for the **"Subject\\Account Domain"** corresponding to accounts from another domain or "external" accounts. |
| **Restricted-use computers or devices**: You might have certain computers, machines, or devices on which certain people (accounts) should not typically perform any actions. | Monitor the target **Computer:** (or other target device) for actions performed by the **"New Logon\\Security ID"** that you are concerned about. |
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4627.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4627.md
index ff63c0c122..0ae5e51990 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4627.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4627.md
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ ms.technology: mde
- Windows Server 2016
-
+
***Subcategory:*** [Audit Group Membership](audit-group-membership.md)
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4648.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4648.md
index 8483ee08ac..44eb565de4 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4648.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4648.md
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ The following table is similar to the table in [Appendix A: Security monitoring
| **High-value accounts**: You might have high value domain or local accounts for which you need to monitor each action.
Examples of high value accounts are database administrators, built-in local administrator account, domain administrators, service accounts, domain controller accounts and so on. | Monitor this event with the **“Subject\\Security ID”** or “**Account Whose Credentials Were Used\\Security ID**” that correspond to the high value account or accounts. |
| **Anomalies or malicious actions**: You might have specific requirements for detecting anomalies or monitoring potential malicious actions. For example, you might need to monitor for use of an account outside of working hours. | When you monitor for anomalies or malicious actions, use the **“Subject\\Security ID”** and “**Account Whose Credentials Were Used\\Security ID**” (with other information) to monitor how or when a particular account is being used. |
| **Non-active accounts**: You might have non-active, disabled, or guest accounts, or other accounts that should never be used. | Monitor this event with the **“Subject\\Security ID”** or “**Account Whose Credentials Were Used\\Security ID**” that correspond to the accounts that should never be used. |
-| **Account allow list**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “whitelist-only” action, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** and “**Account Whose Credentials Were Used\\Security ID**” for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
+| **Account allow list**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “allow list-only” action, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** and “**Account Whose Credentials Were Used\\Security ID**” for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
| **External accounts**: You might be monitoring accounts from another domain, or “external” accounts that are not allowed to perform the action corresponding to this event. | Monitor for the **“Subject\\Account Domain”** or “**Account Whose Credentials Were Used\\Security ID**” corresponding to accounts from another domain or “external” accounts. |
| **Restricted-use computers or devices**: You might have certain computers, machines, or devices on which certain people (accounts) should not typically perform any actions. | Monitor the target **Computer:** (or other target device) for actions performed by the **“Subject\\Security ID”** or “**Account Whose Credentials Were Used\\Security ID**” that you are concerned about.
For example, you might monitor to ensure that “**Account Whose Credentials Were Used\\Security ID**” is not used to log on to a certain computer. |
| **Account naming conventions**: Your organization might have specific naming conventions for account names. | Monitor “**Subject\\Account Name”** and “**Account Whose Credentials Were Used\\Security ID**” for names that don’t comply with naming conventions. |
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688.md
index 39167d9431..6e90a42a1e 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688.md
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ For 4688(S): A new process has been created.
| **High-value accounts**: You might have high-value domain or local accounts for which you need to monitor each action.
Examples of high-value accounts are database administrators, built-in local administrator account, domain administrators, service accounts, domain controller accounts and so on. | Monitor all events with the **"Creator Subject\\Security ID"** or **"Target Subject\\Security ID"** that corresponds to the high-value account or accounts. |
| **Anomalies or malicious actions**: You might have specific requirements for detecting anomalies or monitoring potential malicious actions. For example, you might need to monitor for use of an account outside of working hours. | When you monitor for anomalies or malicious actions, use the **"Creator Subject\\Security ID"** or **"Target Subject\\Security ID"** (with other information) to monitor how or when a particular account is being used. |
| **Non-active accounts**: You might have non-active, disabled, or guest accounts, or other accounts that should never be used. | Monitor all events with the **"Creator Subject\\Security ID"** or **"Target Subject\\Security ID"** that corresponds to the accounts that should never be used. |
-| **Account whitelist**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a "whitelist-only" action, review the **"Creator Subject\\Security ID"** and **"Target Subject\\Security ID"** for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
+| **Account allow list**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a "allow list-only" action, review the **"Creator Subject\\Security ID"** and **"Target Subject\\Security ID"** for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
| **Accounts of different types**: You might want to ensure that certain actions are performed only by certain account types, for example, local or domain account, machine or user account, vendor or employee account, and so on. | If this event corresponds to an action you want to monitor for certain account types, review the **"Creator Subject\\Security ID"** or **"Target Subject\\Security ID"** to see whether the account type is as expected. |
| **External accounts**: You might be monitoring accounts from another domain, or "external" accounts that are not allowed to perform certain actions (represented by certain specific events). | Monitor the specific events for the **"Creator Subject\\Security ID"** or **"Target Subject\\Security ID"** corresponding to accounts from another domain or "external" accounts. |
| **Restricted-use computers or devices**: You might have certain computers, machines, or devices on which certain people (accounts) should not typically perform any actions. | Monitor the target **Computer:** (or other target device) for actions performed by the **"Creator Subject\\Security ID"** or **"Target Subject\\Security ID"** that you are concerned about. |
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4696.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4696.md
index 520d0d5d1e..e35c7d44e0 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4696.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4696.md
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ For 4696(S): A primary token was assigned to process.
| **High-value accounts**: You might have high-value domain or local accounts for which you need to monitor each action.
Examples of high-value accounts are database administrators, built-in local administrator account, domain administrators, service accounts, domain controller accounts and so on. | Monitor this event with the **“Subject\\Security ID”** or **“New Token Information\\Security ID”** that corresponds to the high-value account or accounts. |
| **Anomalies or malicious actions**: You might have specific requirements for detecting anomalies or monitoring potential malicious actions. For example, you might need to monitor for use of an account outside of working hours. | When you monitor for anomalies or malicious actions, use the **“Subject\\Security ID”** or **“New Token Information\\Security ID”** (with other information) to monitor how or when a particular account is being used. |
| **Non-active accounts**: You might have non-active, disabled, or guest accounts, or other accounts that should never be used. | Monitor this event with the **“Subject\\Security ID”** or **“New Token Information\\Security ID”** that corresponds to the accounts that should never be used. |
-| **Account whitelist**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “whitelist-only” action, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** and **“New Token Information\\Security ID”** for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
+| **Account allow list**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “allow list-only” action, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** and **“New Token Information\\Security ID”** for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
| **Accounts of different types**: You might want to ensure that certain actions are performed only by certain account types, for example, local or domain account, machine or user account, vendor or employee account, and so on. | If this event corresponds to an action you want to monitor for certain account types, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** or **“New Token Information\\Security ID”** to see whether the account type is as expected. |
| **External accounts**: You might be monitoring accounts from another domain, or “external” accounts that are not allowed to perform certain actions (represented by certain specific events). | Monitor this event for the **“Subject\\Security ID”** or **“New Token Information\\Security ID”** corresponding to accounts from another domain or “external” accounts. |
| **Restricted-use computers or devices**: You might have certain computers, machines, or devices on which certain people (accounts) should not typically perform any actions. | Monitor the target **Computer:** (or other target device) for actions performed by the **“Subject\\Security ID”** or **“New Token Information\\Security ID”** that you are concerned about. |
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4703.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4703.md
index 243fa17ce2..3d024b8ccf 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4703.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4703.md
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ Otherwise, see the recommendations in the following table.
| **High-value accounts**: You might have high-value domain or local accounts for which you need to monitor each action.
Examples of high-value accounts are database administrators, built-in local administrator account, domain administrators, service accounts, domain controller accounts and so on. | Monitor this event with the **“Subject\\Security ID”** that corresponds to the high-value account or accounts. |
| **Anomalies or malicious actions**: You might have specific requirements for detecting anomalies or monitoring potential malicious actions. For example, you might need to monitor for use of an account outside of working hours. | When you monitor for anomalies or malicious actions, use the **“Subject\\Security ID”** (with other information) to monitor how or when a particular account is being used. |
| **Non-active accounts**: You might have non-active, disabled, or guest accounts, or other accounts that should never be used. | Monitor this event with the **“Subject\\Security ID”** or “**Target Account\\Security ID**” that correspond to the accounts that should never be used. |
-| **Account whitelist**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “whitelist-only” action, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** for accounts that are outside the allow list. Also check the “**Target Account\\Security ID**” and **“Enabled Privileges”** to see what was enabled. |
+| **Account allow list**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “allow list-only” action, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** for accounts that are outside the allow list. Also check the “**Target Account\\Security ID**” and **“Enabled Privileges”** to see what was enabled. |
| **Accounts of different types**: You might want to ensure that certain actions are performed only by certain account types, for example, local or domain account, machine or user account, vendor or employee account, and so on. | If this event corresponds to an action you want to monitor for certain account types, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** to see whether the account type is as expected. |
| **External accounts**: You might be monitoring accounts from another domain, or “external” accounts that are not allowed to perform certain actions (represented by certain specific events). | Monitor this event for the **“Subject\\Account Domain”** corresponding to accounts from another domain or “external” accounts. |
| **Restricted-use computers or devices**: You might have certain computers, machines, or devices on which certain people (accounts) should perform only limited actions, or no actions at all. | Monitor the target **Computer:** (or other target device) for actions performed by the **“Subject\\Security ID”** that you are concerned about.
Also check **“Target Account\\Security ID”** to see whether the change in privileges should be made on that computer for that account. |
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4704.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4704.md
index 4dc7eb2c64..a4e0e07aa3 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4704.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4704.md
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ For 4704(S): A user right was assigned.
| **High-value accounts**: You might have high-value domain or local accounts for which you need to monitor each action.
Examples of high-value accounts are database administrators, built-in local administrator account, domain administrators, service accounts, domain controller accounts and so on. | Monitor this event with the **“Subject\\Security ID”** that corresponds to the high-value account or accounts. |
| **Anomalies or malicious actions**: You might have specific requirements for detecting anomalies or monitoring potential malicious actions. For example, you might need to monitor for use of an account outside of working hours. | When you monitor for anomalies or malicious actions, use the **“Subject\\Security ID”** (with other information) to monitor how or when a particular account is being used. |
| **Non-active accounts**: You might have non-active, disabled, or guest accounts, or other accounts that should never be used. | Monitor this event with the **“Subject\\Security ID”** or “**Target Account\\ Account Name**” that correspond to the accounts that should never be used. |
-| **Account whitelist**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “whitelist-only” action, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** for accounts that are outside the allow list. Also check the “**Target Account\\Account Name**” and **“New Right”** to see what was enabled. |
+| **Account allow list**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “allow list-only” action, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** for accounts that are outside the allow list. Also check the “**Target Account\\Account Name**” and **“New Right”** to see what was enabled. |
| **Accounts of different types**: You might want to ensure that certain actions are performed only by certain account types, for example, local or domain account, machine or user account, vendor or employee account, and so on. | If this event corresponds to an action you want to monitor for certain account types, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** to see whether the account type is as expected. |
| **External accounts**: You might be monitoring accounts from another domain, or “external” accounts that are not allowed to perform certain actions (represented by certain specific events). | Monitor this event for the **“Subject\\Account Domain”** corresponding to accounts from another domain or “external” accounts. |
| **Restricted-use computers or devices**: You might have certain computers, machines, or devices on which certain people (accounts) should perform only limited actions, or no actions at all. | Monitor the target **Computer:** (or other target device) for actions performed by the **“Subject\\Security ID”** that you are concerned about.
Also check **“Target Account\\ Account Name”** to see whether the change in rights should be made on that computer for that account. |
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4705.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4705.md
index 9478ffd125..83accc384e 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4705.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4705.md
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ For 4705(S): A user right was removed.
| **High-value accounts**: You might have high-value domain or local accounts for which you need to monitor each action.
Examples of high-value accounts are database administrators, built-in local administrator account, domain administrators, service accounts, domain controller accounts and so on. | Monitor this event with the **“Subject\\Security ID”** that corresponds to the high-value account or accounts. |
| **Anomalies or malicious actions**: You might have specific requirements for detecting anomalies or monitoring potential malicious actions. For example, you might need to monitor for use of an account outside of working hours. | When you monitor for anomalies or malicious actions, use the **“Subject\\Security ID”** (with other information) to monitor how or when a particular account is being used. |
| **Non-active accounts**: You might have non-active, disabled, or guest accounts, or other accounts that should never be used. | Monitor this event with the **“Subject\\Security ID”** or “**Target Account\\Account Name**” that correspond to the accounts that should never be used. |
-| **Account whitelist**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “whitelist-only” action, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** for accounts that are outside the allow list.
If you have specific user rights policies, for example, an allow list of accounts that can perform certain actions, monitor this event to confirm that it was appropriate that the “**Removed Right**” was removed from “**Target** **Account\\Account Name**.” |
+| **Account allow list**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “allow list-only” action, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** for accounts that are outside the allow list.
If you have specific user rights policies, for example, an allow list of accounts that can perform certain actions, monitor this event to confirm that it was appropriate that the “**Removed Right**” was removed from “**Target** **Account\\Account Name**.” |
| **Accounts of different types**: You might want to ensure that certain actions are performed only by certain account types, for example, local or domain account, machine or user account, vendor or employee account, and so on. | If this event corresponds to an action you want to monitor for certain account types, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** and “**Target Account\\Account Name”** to see whether the account type is as expected.
For example, if some accounts have critical user rights which should never be removed, monitor this event for the **“Target** **Account\\Account Name”** and the appropriate rights.
As another example, if non-administrative accounts should never be granted certain user rights (for example, **SeAuditPrivilege**), you might monitor this event, because a right can be removed only after it was previously granted. |
| **External accounts**: You might be monitoring accounts from another domain, or “external” accounts that are not allowed to perform certain actions (represented by certain specific events). | Monitor this event for the **“Subject\\Account Domain”** corresponding to accounts from another domain or “external” accounts. |
| **Restricted-use computers or devices**: You might have certain computers, machines, or devices on which certain people (accounts) should perform only limited actions, or no actions at all. | Monitor the target **Computer:** (or other target device) for actions performed by the **“Subject\\Security ID”** that you are concerned about. Also be sure to check “**Target Account\\Account Name**” to see whether user rights should be removed from that account (or whether that account should have any rights on that computer).
For high-value servers or other computers, we recommend that you track this event and investigate whether the specific “**Removed Right**” should be removed from “**Target** **Account\\Account Name**” in each case. |
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4717.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4717.md
index 32576cdc3b..3b438e68d4 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4717.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4717.md
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ For 4717(S): System security access was granted to an account.
| **High-value accounts**: You might have high-value domain or local accounts for which you need to monitor each action.
Examples of high-value accounts are database administrators, built-in local administrator account, domain administrators, service accounts, domain controller accounts and so on. | Monitor this event with the **“Subject\\Security ID”** and “**Account Modified\\Account Name”** that correspond to the high-value account or accounts. |
| **Anomalies or malicious actions**: You might have specific requirements for detecting anomalies or monitoring potential malicious actions. For example, you might need to monitor for use of an account outside of working hours. | When you monitor for anomalies or malicious actions, use the **“Subject\\Security ID”** (with other information) to monitor how or when a particular account is being used. |
| **Non-active accounts**: You might have non-active, disabled, or guest accounts, or other accounts that should never be used. | Monitor this event with the **“Subject\\Security ID”** that corresponds to the accounts that should never be used. |
-| **Account whitelist**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “whitelist-only” action, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** for accounts that are outside the allow list.
If you have specific user logon rights policies, for example, an allow list of accounts that can log on to certain computers, monitor this event to confirm that any “**Access Right**” was granted only to the appropriate “**Account Modified\\Account Name**.” |
+| **Account allow list**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “allow list-only” action, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** for accounts that are outside the allow list.
If you have specific user logon rights policies, for example, an allow list of accounts that can log on to certain computers, monitor this event to confirm that any “**Access Right**” was granted only to the appropriate “**Account Modified\\Account Name**.” |
| **Accounts of different types**: You might want to ensure that certain actions are performed only by certain account types, for example, local or domain account, machine or user account, vendor or employee account, and so on. | If this event corresponds to an action you want to monitor for certain account types, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** and “**Account Modified\\Account Name”** to see whether the account type is as expected.
For example, if non-service accounts should never be granted certain logon rights (for example, **SeServiceLogonRight**), monitor this event for those accounts and rights. |
| **External accounts**: You might be monitoring accounts from another domain, or “external” accounts that are not allowed to perform certain actions (represented by certain specific events). | Monitor this event for the **“Subject\\Account Domain”** corresponding to accounts from another domain or “external” accounts. |
| **Restricted-use computers or devices**: You might have certain computers, machines, or devices on which certain people (accounts) should perform only limited actions, or no actions at all. | Monitor the target **Computer:** (or other target device) for actions performed by the **“Subject\\Security ID”** that you are concerned about. Also be sure to check “**Account Modified\\Account Name**” to see whether logon rights should be granted to that account.
For high-value servers or other computers, we recommend that you track this event and investigate whether the specific “**Access Right**” should be granted to “**Account Modified\\Account Name**” in each case. |
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4718.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4718.md
index 2c7f91f8c7..75f96131fe 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4718.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4718.md
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ For 4718(S): System security access was removed from an account.
| **High-value accounts**: You might have high-value domain or local accounts for which you need to monitor each action.
Examples of high-value accounts are database administrators, built-in local administrator account, domain administrators, service accounts, domain controller accounts and so on. | Monitor this event with the **“Subject\\Security ID”** and “**Account Modified\\Account Name”** that correspond to the high-value account or accounts. |
| **Anomalies or malicious actions**: You might have specific requirements for detecting anomalies or monitoring potential malicious actions. For example, you might need to monitor for use of an account outside of working hours. | When you monitor for anomalies or malicious actions, use the **“Subject\\Security ID”** (with other information) to monitor how or when a particular account is being used. |
| **Non-active accounts**: You might have non-active, disabled, or guest accounts, or other accounts that should never be used. | Monitor this event with the **“Subject\\Security ID”** that corresponds to the accounts that should never be used. |
-| **Account whitelist**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “whitelist-only” action, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** for accounts that are outside the allow list.
If you have specific user logon rights policies, for example, an allow list of accounts that can log on to certain computers, monitor this event to confirm that it was appropriate that the “**Access Right**” was removed from “**Account Modified\\Account Name**.” |
+| **Account allow list**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “allow list-only” action, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** for accounts that are outside the allow list.
If you have specific user logon rights policies, for example, an allow list of accounts that can log on to certain computers, monitor this event to confirm that it was appropriate that the “**Access Right**” was removed from “**Account Modified\\Account Name**.” |
| **Accounts of different types**: You might want to ensure that certain actions are performed only by certain account types, for example, local or domain account, machine or user account, vendor or employee account, and so on. | If this event corresponds to an action you want to monitor for certain account types, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** and “**Account Modified\\Account Name”** to see whether the account type is as expected.
For example, if critical remote network service accounts have user logon rights which should never be removed (for example, **SeNetworkLogonRight**), monitor this event for the **“Account Modified\\Account Name”** and the appropriate rights.
As another example, if non-service accounts should never be granted certain logon rights (for example, **SeServiceLogonRight**), you might monitor this event, because a right can be removed only after it was previously granted. |
| **External accounts**: You might be monitoring accounts from another domain, or “external” accounts that are not allowed to perform certain actions (represented by certain specific events). | Monitor this event for the **“Subject\\Account Domain”** corresponding to accounts from another domain or “external” accounts. |
| **Restricted-use computers or devices**: You might have certain computers, machines, or devices on which certain people (accounts) should perform only limited actions, or no actions at all. | Monitor the target **Computer:** (or other target device) for actions performed by the **“Subject\\Security ID”** that you are concerned about. Also be sure to check “**Account Modified\\Account Name**” to see whether logon rights should be removed from that account.
For high-value servers or other computers, we recommend that you track this event and investigate whether the specific “**Access Right**” should be removed from “**Account Modified\\Account Name**” in each case. |
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4732.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4732.md
index 43c74c4d05..543455432e 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4732.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4732.md
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ For 4732(S): A member was added to a security-enabled local group.
| **High-value accounts**: You might have high-value domain or local accounts for which you need to monitor each action.
Examples of high-value accounts are database administrators, built-in local administrator account, domain administrators, service accounts, domain controller accounts and so on. | Monitor this event with the **“Subject\\Security ID”** and **“Member\\Security ID”** that correspond to the high-value account or accounts. |
| **Anomalies or malicious actions**: You might have specific requirements for detecting anomalies or monitoring potential malicious actions. For example, you might need to monitor for use of an account outside of working hours. | When you monitor for anomalies or malicious actions, use the **“Subject\\Security ID”** (with other information) to monitor how or when a particular account is being used. |
| **Non-active accounts**: You might have non-active, disabled, or guest accounts, or other accounts that should never be used. | Monitor this event with the **“Subject\\Security ID”** and **“Member\\Security ID”** that correspond to the accounts that should never be used. |
-| **Account whitelist**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “whitelist-only” action, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
+| **Account allow list**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “allow list-only” action, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
| **Accounts of different types**: You might want to ensure that certain actions are performed only by certain account types, for example, local or domain account, machine or user account, vendor or employee account, and so on. | If this event corresponds to an action you want to monitor for certain account types, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** to see whether the account type is as expected. |
| **External accounts**: You might be monitoring accounts from another domain, or “external” accounts that are not allowed to perform certain actions (represented by certain specific events). | Monitor this event for the **“Subject\\Account Domain”** corresponding to accounts from another domain or “external” accounts. |
| **Restricted-use computers or devices**: You might have certain computers, machines, or devices on which certain people (accounts) should not typically perform any actions. | Monitor the target **Computer:** (or other target device) for actions performed by the **“Subject\\Security ID”** that you are concerned about. |
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4733.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4733.md
index b7bad044d0..2b749c0511 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4733.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4733.md
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ For 4733(S): A member was removed from a security-enabled local group.
| **High-value accounts**: You might have high-value domain or local accounts for which you need to monitor each action.
Examples of high-value accounts are database administrators, built-in local administrator account, domain administrators, service accounts, domain controller accounts and so on. | Monitor this event with the **“Subject\\Security ID”** and **“Member\\Security ID”** that correspond to the high-value account or accounts. |
| **Anomalies or malicious actions**: You might have specific requirements for detecting anomalies or monitoring potential malicious actions. For example, you might need to monitor for use of an account outside of working hours. | When you monitor for anomalies or malicious actions, use the **“Subject\\Security ID”** (with other information) to monitor how or when a particular account is being used. |
| **Non-active accounts**: You might have non-active, disabled, or guest accounts, or other accounts that should never be used. | Monitor this event with the **“Subject\\Security ID”** and **“Member\\Security ID”** that correspond to the accounts that should never be used. |
-| **Account whitelist**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “whitelist-only” action, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
+| **Account allow list**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “allow list-only” action, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
| **Accounts of different types**: You might want to ensure that certain actions are performed only by certain account types, for example, local or domain account, machine or user account, vendor or employee account, and so on. | If this event corresponds to an action you want to monitor for certain account types, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** to see whether the account type is as expected. |
| **External accounts**: You might be monitoring accounts from another domain, or “external” accounts that are not allowed to perform certain actions (represented by certain specific events). | Monitor this event for the **“Subject\\Account Domain”** corresponding to accounts from another domain or “external” accounts. |
| **Restricted-use computers or devices**: You might have certain computers, machines, or devices on which certain people (accounts) should not typically perform any actions. | Monitor the target **Computer:** (or other target device) for actions performed by the **“Subject\\Security ID”** that you are concerned about. |
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4751.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4751.md
index a6ac4afde8..39888ce838 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4751.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4751.md
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ For 4751(S): A member was added to a security-disabled global group.
| **High-value accounts**: You might have high-value domain or local accounts for which you need to monitor each action.
Examples of high-value accounts are database administrators, built-in local administrator account, domain administrators, service accounts, domain controller accounts and so on. | Monitor this event with the **“Subject\\Security ID”** and **“Member\\Security ID”** that correspond to the high-value account or accounts. |
| **Anomalies or malicious actions**: You might have specific requirements for detecting anomalies or monitoring potential malicious actions. For example, you might need to monitor for use of an account outside of working hours. | When you monitor for anomalies or malicious actions, use the **“Subject\\Security ID”** (with other information) to monitor how or when a particular account is being used. |
| **Non-active accounts**: You might have non-active, disabled, or guest accounts, or other accounts that should never be used. | Monitor this event with the **“Subject\\Security ID”** and **“Member\\Security ID”** that correspond to the accounts that should never be used. |
-| **Account whitelist**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “whitelist-only” action, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
+| **Account allow list**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “allow list-only” action, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
| **Accounts of different types**: You might want to ensure that certain actions are performed only by certain account types, for example, local or domain account, machine or user account, vendor or employee account, and so on. | If this event corresponds to an action you want to monitor for certain account types, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** to see whether the account type is as expected. |
| **External accounts**: You might be monitoring accounts from another domain, or “external” accounts that are not allowed to perform certain actions (represented by certain specific events). | Monitor this event for the **“Subject\\Account Domain”** corresponding to accounts from another domain or “external” accounts. |
| **Restricted-use computers or devices**: You might have certain computers, machines, or devices on which certain people (accounts) should not typically perform any actions. | Monitor the target **Computer:** (or other target device) for actions performed by the **“Subject\\Security ID”** that you are concerned about. |
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4752.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4752.md
index 7a81d28e4f..a1e4dff838 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4752.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4752.md
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ For 4752(S): A member was removed from a security-disabled global group.
| **High-value accounts**: You might have high-value domain or local accounts for which you need to monitor each action.
Examples of high-value accounts are database administrators, built-in local administrator account, domain administrators, service accounts, domain controller accounts and so on. | Monitor this event with the **“Subject\\Security ID”** and **“Member\\Security ID”** that correspond to the high-value account or accounts. |
| **Anomalies or malicious actions**: You might have specific requirements for detecting anomalies or monitoring potential malicious actions. For example, you might need to monitor for use of an account outside of working hours. | When you monitor for anomalies or malicious actions, use the **“Subject\\Security ID”** (with other information) to monitor how or when a particular account is being used. |
| **Non-active accounts**: You might have non-active, disabled, or guest accounts, or other accounts that should never be used. | Monitor this event with the **“Subject\\Security ID”** and **“Member\\Security ID”** that correspond to the accounts that should never be used. |
-| **Account whitelist**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “whitelist-only” action, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
+| **Account allow list**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “allow list-only” action, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
| **Accounts of different types**: You might want to ensure that certain actions are performed only by certain account types, for example, local or domain account, machine or user account, vendor or employee account, and so on. | If this event corresponds to an action you want to monitor for certain account types, review the **“Subject\\Security ID”** to see whether the account type is as expected. |
| **External accounts**: You might be monitoring accounts from another domain, or “external” accounts that are not allowed to perform certain actions (represented by certain specific events). | Monitor this event for the **“Subject\\Account Domain”** corresponding to accounts from another domain or “external” accounts. |
| **Restricted-use computers or devices**: You might have certain computers, machines, or devices on which certain people (accounts) should not typically perform any actions. | Monitor the target **Computer:** (or other target device) for actions performed by the **“Subject\\Security ID”** that you are concerned about. |
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4768.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4768.md
index d4de56e2c7..cea554341c 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4768.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4768.md
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ For 4768(S, F): A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested.
| **High-value accounts**: You might have high-value domain or local accounts for which you need to monitor each action.
Examples of high-value accounts are database administrators, built-in local administrator account, domain administrators, service accounts, domain controller accounts and so on. | Monitor this event with the **“User ID”** that corresponds to the high-value account or accounts. |
| **Anomalies or malicious actions**: You might have specific requirements for detecting anomalies or monitoring potential malicious actions. For example, you might need to monitor for use of an account outside of working hours. | When you monitor for anomalies or malicious actions, use the **“User ID”** (with other information) to monitor how or when a particular account is being used. |
| **Non-active accounts**: You might have non-active, disabled, or guest accounts, or other accounts that should never be used. | Monitor this event with the **“User ID”** that corresponds to the accounts that should never be used. |
-| **Account whitelist**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “whitelist-only” action, review the **“User ID”** for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
+| **Account allow list**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “allow list-only” action, review the **“User ID”** for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
| **External accounts**: You might be monitoring accounts from another domain, or “external” accounts that are not allowed to perform certain actions (represented by certain specific events). | Monitor this event for the **“Supplied Realm Name”** corresponding to another domain or “external” location. |
| **Account naming conventions**: Your organization might have specific naming conventions for account names. | Monitor “**User ID”** for names that don’t comply with naming conventions. |
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4771.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4771.md
index f63ab02819..c5aea23ecb 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4771.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4771.md
@@ -166,13 +166,78 @@ The most common values:
> Table 6. Kerberos ticket flags.
-- **Failure Code** \[Type = HexInt32\]**:** hexadecimal failure code of failed TGT issue operation. The table below contains the list of the most common error codes for this event:
+- **Failure Code** \[Type = HexInt32\]**:** hexadecimal failure code of failed TGT issue operation. The table below contains the list of the error codes for this event as defined in [RFC 4120](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4120#section-7.5.9):
| Code | Code Name | Description | Possible causes |
|------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
-| 0x10 | KDC\_ERR\_PADATA\_TYPE\_NOSUPP | KDC has no support for PADATA type (pre-authentication data) | Smart card logon is being attempted and the proper certificate cannot be located. This problem can happen because the wrong certification authority (CA) is being queried or the proper CA cannot be contacted in order to get Domain Controller or Domain Controller Authentication certificates for the domain controller.
It can also happen when a domain controller doesn’t have a certificate installed for smart cards (Domain Controller or Domain Controller Authentication templates). |
-| 0x17 | KDC\_ERR\_KEY\_EXPIRED | Password has expired—change password to reset | The user’s password has expired. |
-| 0x18 | KDC\_ERR\_PREAUTH\_FAILED | Pre-authentication information was invalid | The wrong password was provided. |
+| 0x0 | KDC\_ERR\_NONE | No error |
+| 0x1 | KDC\_ERR\_NAME\_EXP | Client's entry in database has expired |
+| 0x2 | KDC\_ERR\_SERVICE\_EXP | Server's entry in database has expired |
+| 0x3 | KDC\_ERR\_BAD\_PVNO | Requested protocol version number not supported |
+| 0x4 | KDC\_ERR\_C\_OLD\_MAST\_KVNO | Client's key encrypted in old master key |
+| 0x5 | KDC\_ERR\_S\_OLD\_MAST\_KVNO | Server's key encrypted in old master key |
+| 0x6 | KDC\_ERR\_C\_PRINCIPAL\_UNKNOWN | Client not found in Kerberos database |
+| 0x7 | KDC\_ERR\_S\_PRINCIPAL\_UNKNOWN | Server not found in Kerberos database |
+| 0x8 | KDC\_ERR\_PRINCIPAL\_NOT\_UNIQUE | Multiple principal entries in database |
+| 0x9 | KDC\_ERR\_NULL\_KEY | The client or server has a null key |
+| 0xa | KDC\_ERR\_CANNOT\_POSTDATE | Ticket not eligible for postdating |
+| 0xb | KDC\_ERR\_NEVER\_VALID | Requested starttime is later than end time |
+| 0xc | KDC\_ERR\_POLICY | KDC policy rejects request |
+| 0xd | KDC\_ERR\_BADOPTION | KDC cannot accommodate requested option |
+| 0xe | KDC\_ERR\_ETYPE\_NOSUPP | KDC has no support for encryption type |
+| 0xf | KDC\_ERR\_SUMTYPE\_NOSUPP | KDC has no support for checksum type |
+| 0x10 | KDC\_ERR\_PADATA\_TYPE\_NOSUPP | KDC has no support for PADATA type (pre-authentication data)|Smart card logon is being attempted and the proper certificate cannot be located. This problem can happen because the wrong certification authority (CA) is being queried or the proper CA cannot be contacted in order to get Domain Controller or Domain Controller Authentication certificates for the domain controller.
It can also happen when a domain controller doesn’t have a certificate installed for smart cards (Domain Controller or Domain Controller Authentication templates).
+| 0x11 | KDC\_ERR\_TRTYPE\_NOSUPP | KDC has no support for transited type |
+| 0x12 | KDC\_ERR\_CLIENT\_REVOKED | Clients credentials have been revoked |
+| 0x13 | KDC\_ERR\_SERVICE\_REVOKED | Credentials for server have been revoked |
+| 0x14 | KDC\_ERR\_TGT\_REVOKED | TGT has been revoked |
+| 0x15 | KDC\_ERR\_CLIENT\_NOTYET | Client not yet valid; try again later |
+| 0x16 | KDC\_ERR\_SERVICE\_NOTYET | Server not yet valid; try again later |
+| 0x17 | KDC\_ERR\_KEY\_EXPIRED | Password has expired—change password to reset |The user’s password has expired.
+| 0x18 | KDC\_ERR\_PREAUTH\_FAILED | Pre-authentication information was invalid |The wrong password was provided.
+| 0x19 | KDC\_ERR\_PREAUTH\_REQUIRED | Additional pre-authentication required |
+| 0x1a | KDC\_ERR\_SERVER\_NOMATCH | Requested server and ticket don't match |
+| 0x1b | KDC\_ERR\_MUST\_USE\_USER2USER | Server principal valid for user2user only |
+| 0x1c | KDC\_ERR\_PATH\_NOT\_ACCEPTED | KDC Policy rejects transited path |
+| 0x1d | KDC\_ERR\_SVC\_UNAVAILABLE | A service is not available |
+| 0x1f | KRB\_AP\_ERR\_BAD\_INTEGRITY | Integrity check on decrypted field failed |
+| 0x20 | KRB\_AP\_ERR\_TKT\_EXPIRED | Ticket expired |
+| 0x21 | KRB\_AP\_ERR\_TKT\_NYV | Ticket not yet valid |
+| 0x22 | KRB\_AP\_ERR\_REPEAT | Request is a replay |
+| 0x23 | KRB\_AP\_ERR\_NOT\_US | The ticket isn't for us |
+| 0x24 | KRB\_AP\_ERR\_BADMATCH | Ticket and authenticator don't match |
+| 0x25 | KRB\_AP\_ERR\_SKEW | Clock skew too great |
+| 0x26 | KRB\_AP\_ERR\_BADADDR | Incorrect net address |
+| 0x27 | KRB\_AP\_ERR\_BADVERSION | Protocol version mismatch |
+| 0x28 | KRB\_AP\_ERR\_MSG\_TYPE | Invalid msg type |
+| 0x29 | KRB\_AP\_ERR\_MODIFIED | Message stream modified |
+| 0x2a | KRB\_AP\_ERR\_BADORDER | Message out of order |
+| 0x2c | KRB\_AP\_ERR\_BADKEYVER | Specified version of key is not available |
+| 0x2d | KRB\_AP\_ERR\_NOKEY | Service key not available |
+| 0x2e | KRB\_AP\_ERR\_MUT\_FAIL | Mutual authentication failed |
+| 0x2f | KRB\_AP\_ERR\_BADDIRECTION | Incorrect message direction |
+| 0x30 | KRB\_AP\_ERR\_METHOD | Alternative authentication method required |
+| 0x31 | KRB\_AP\_ERR\_BADSEQ | Incorrect sequence number in message |
+| 0x32 | KRB\_AP\_ERR\_INAPP\_CKSUM | Inappropriate type of checksum in message |
+| 0x33 | KRB\_AP\_PATH\_NOT\_ACCEPTED | Policy rejects transited path |
+| 0x34 | KRB\_ERR\_RESPONSE\_TOO\_BIG | Response too big for UDP; retry with TCP |
+| 0x3c | KRB\_ERR\_GENERIC | Generic error (description in e-text) |
+| 0x3d | KRB\_ERR\_FIELD\_TOOLONG | Field is too long for this implementation |
+| 0x3e | KDC\_ERROR\_CLIENT\_NOT\_TRUSTED | Reserved for PKINIT |
+| 0x3f | KDC\_ERROR\_KDC\_NOT\_TRUSTED | Reserved for PKINIT |
+| 0x40 | KDC\_ERROR\_INVALID\_SIG | Reserved for PKINIT |
+| 0x41 | KDC\_ERR\_KEY\_TOO\_WEAK | Reserved for PKINIT |
+| 0x42 | KDC\_ERR\_CERTIFICATE\_MISMATCH | Reserved for PKINIT |
+| 0x43 | KRB\_AP\_ERR\_NO\_TGT | No TGT available to validate USER-TO-USER |
+| 0x44 | KDC\_ERR\_WRONG\_REALM | Reserved for future use |
+| 0x45 | KRB\_AP\_ERR\_USER\_TO\_USER\_REQUIRED | Ticket must be for USER-TO-USER |
+| 0x46 | KDC\_ERR\_CANT\_VERIFY\_CERTIFICATE | Reserved for PKINIT |
+| 0x47 | KDC\_ERR\_INVALID\_CERTIFICATE | Reserved for PKINIT |
+| 0x48 | KDC\_ERR\_REVOKED\_CERTIFICATE | Reserved for PKINIT |
+| 0x49 | KDC\_ERR\_REVOCATION\_STATUS\_UNKNOWN | Reserved for PKINIT |
+| 0x4a | KDC\_ERR\_REVOCATION\_STATUS\_UNAVAILABLE | Reserved for PKINIT |
+| 0x4b | KDC\_ERR\_CLIENT\_NAME\_MISMATCH | Reserved for PKINIT |
+| 0x4c | KDC\_ERR\_KDC\_NAME\_MISMATCH | Reserved for PKINIT |
- **Pre-Authentication Type** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the code of [pre-Authentication](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc772815(v=ws.10)) type that was used in TGT request.
@@ -209,7 +274,7 @@ For 4771(F): Kerberos pre-authentication failed.
| **High-value accounts**: You might have high-value domain or local accounts for which you need to monitor each action.
Examples of high-value accounts are database administrators, built-in local administrator account, domain administrators, service accounts, domain controller accounts and so on. | Monitor this event with the **“Security ID”** that corresponds to the high-value account or accounts. |
| **Anomalies or malicious actions**: You might have specific requirements for detecting anomalies or monitoring potential malicious actions. For example, you might need to monitor for use of an account outside of working hours. | When you monitor for anomalies or malicious actions, use the **“Security ID”** (with other information) to monitor how or when a particular account is being used. |
| **Non-active accounts**: You might have non-active, disabled, or guest accounts, or other accounts that should never be used. | Monitor this event with the **“Security ID”** that corresponds to the accounts that should never be used. |
-| **Account allow list**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “whitelist-only” action, review the **“Security ID”** for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
+| **Account allow list**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “allow list-only” action, review the **“Security ID”** for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
| **Account naming conventions**: Your organization might have specific naming conventions for account names. | Monitor “**Subject\\Account Name”** for names that don’t comply with naming conventions. |
- You can track all [4771](event-4771.md) events where the **Client Address** is not from your internal IP range or not from private IP ranges.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4776.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4776.md
index d5d1fcdf4f..75dc6a4a69 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4776.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4776.md
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ For 4776(S, F): The computer attempted to validate the credentials for an accoun
| **High-value accounts**: You might have high-value domain or local accounts for which you need to monitor each action.
Examples of high-value accounts are database administrators, built-in local administrator account, domain administrators, service accounts, domain controller accounts and so on. | Monitor this event with the **“Logon Account”** that corresponds to the high-value account or accounts. |
| **Anomalies or malicious actions**: You might have specific requirements for detecting anomalies or monitoring potential malicious actions. For example, you might need to monitor for use of an account outside of working hours. | When you monitor for anomalies or malicious actions, use the **“Logon Account”** value (with other information) to monitor how or when a particular account is being used.
To monitor activity of specific user accounts outside of working hours, monitor the appropriate **Logon Account + Source Workstation** pairs. |
| **Non-active accounts**: You might have non-active, disabled, or guest accounts, or other accounts that should never be used. | Monitor this event with the **“Logon Account”** that should never be used. |
-| **Account allow list**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “whitelist-only” action, review the **“Logon Account”** for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
+| **Account allow list**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “allow list-only” action, review the **“Logon Account”** for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
| **Restricted-use computers**: You might have certain computers from which certain people (accounts) should not log on. | Monitor the target **Source Workstation** for credential validation requests from the **“Logon Account”** that you are concerned about. |
| **Account naming conventions**: Your organization might have specific naming conventions for account names. | Monitor “**Logon Account”** for names that don’t comply with naming conventions. |
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4778.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4778.md
index 74b7630bc6..8293e41487 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4778.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4778.md
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ For 4778(S): A session was reconnected to a Window Station.
| **High-value accounts**: You might have high-value domain or local accounts for which you need to monitor each action.
Examples of high-value accounts are database administrators, built-in local administrator account, domain administrators, service accounts, domain controller accounts and so on. | Monitor this event with the **“Subject\\Account Name”** that corresponds to the high-value account or accounts. |
| **Anomalies or malicious actions**: You might have specific requirements for detecting anomalies or monitoring potential malicious actions. For example, you might need to monitor for use of an account outside of working hours. | When you monitor for anomalies or malicious actions, use the **“Subject\\Account Name”** (with other information) to monitor how or when a particular account is being used. |
| **Non-active accounts**: You might have non-active, disabled, or guest accounts, or other accounts that should never be used. | Monitor this event with the **“Subject\\Account Name”** that corresponds to the accounts that should never be used. |
-| **Account allow list**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “whitelist-only” action, review the **“Subject\\Account Name”** for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
+| **Account allow list**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “allow list-only” action, review the **“Subject\\Account Name”** for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
| **Accounts of different types**: You might want to ensure that certain actions are performed only by certain account types, for example, local or domain account, machine or user account, vendor or employee account, and so on. | If this event corresponds to an action you want to monitor for certain account types, review the **“Subject\\Account Name”** to see whether the account type is as expected. |
| **External accounts**: You might be monitoring accounts from another domain, or “external” accounts that are not allowed to perform certain actions (represented by certain specific events). | Monitor this event for the **“Subject\\Account Domain”** corresponding to accounts from another domain or “external” accounts. |
| **Restricted-use computers or devices**: You might have certain computers, machines, or devices on which certain people (accounts) should not typically perform any actions. | Monitor the target **Computer:** (or other target device) for actions performed by the **“Subject\\Account Name”** that you are concerned about. |
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4779.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4779.md
index 7cf0dec285..f9c2757ab6 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4779.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4779.md
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ For 4779(S): A session was disconnected from a Window Station.
| **High-value accounts**: You might have high-value domain or local accounts for which you need to monitor each action.
Examples of high-value accounts are database administrators, built-in local administrator account, domain administrators, service accounts, domain controller accounts and so on. | Monitor this event with the **“Subject\\Account Name”** that corresponds to the high-value account or accounts. |
| **Anomalies or malicious actions**: You might have specific requirements for detecting anomalies or monitoring potential malicious actions. For example, you might need to monitor for use of an account outside of working hours. | When you monitor for anomalies or malicious actions, use the **“Subject\\Account Name”** (with other information) to monitor how or when a particular account is being used. |
| **Non-active accounts**: You might have non-active, disabled, or guest accounts, or other accounts that should never be used. | Monitor this event with the **“Subject\\Account Name”** that corresponds to the accounts that should never be used. |
-| **Account whitelist**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “whitelist-only” action, review the **“Subject\\Account Name”** for accounts that are outside the whitelist. |
+| **Account allow list**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “allow list-only” action, review the **“Subject\\Account Name”** for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
| **Accounts of different types**: You might want to ensure that certain actions are performed only by certain account types, for example, local or domain account, machine or user account, vendor or employee account, and so on. | If this event corresponds to an action you want to monitor for certain account types, review the **“Subject\\Account Name”** to see whether the account type is as expected. |
| **External accounts**: You might be monitoring accounts from another domain, or “external” accounts that are not allowed to perform certain actions (represented by certain specific events). | Monitor this event for the **“Subject\\Account Domain”** corresponding to accounts from another domain or “external” accounts. |
| **Restricted-use computers or devices**: You might have certain computers, machines, or devices on which certain people (accounts) should not typically perform any actions.
For example, you might have computers to which connections should not be made from certain accounts or addresses. | Monitor the target **Computer:** (or other target device) for actions performed by the **“Subject\\Account Name”** that you are concerned about.
If you have a target **Computer:** (or other target device) to which connections should not be made from certain accounts or addresses, monitor this event for the corresponding **Client Name** or **Client Address**. |
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/TOC.yml b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/TOC.yml
index 6c1f372f77..eb239b51c5 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/TOC.yml
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/TOC.yml
@@ -55,6 +55,6 @@
- name: Information for developers
items:
- name: Software developer FAQ
- href: developer-faq.md
+ href: developer-faq.yml
- name: Software developer resources
href: developer-resources.md
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/developer-faq.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/developer-faq.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 73ca4ec48c..0000000000
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/developer-faq.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
----
-title: Software developer FAQ
-ms.reviewer:
-description: This page provides answers to common questions we receive from software developers
-keywords: wdsi, software, developer, faq, dispute, false-positive, classify, installer, software, bundler, blocking
-search.product: eADQiWindows 10XVcnh
-ms.prod: m365-security
-ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
-ms.sitesec: library
-ms.pagetype: security
-ms.author: dansimp
-author: dansimp
-ms.localizationpriority: medium
-manager: dansimp
-audience: ITPro
-ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
-ms.topic: article
-ms.technology: mde
----
-
-# Software developer FAQ
-
-This page provides answers to common questions we receive from software developers. For general guidance about submitting malware or incorrectly detected files, read the submission guide.
-
-## Does Microsoft accept files for a known list or false-positive prevention program?
-
-No. We don't accept these requests from software developers. Signing your program's files in a consistent manner, with a digital certificate issued by a trusted root authority, helps our research team quickly identify the source of a program and apply previously gained knowledge. In some cases, this might result in your program being quickly added to the known list. Far less frequently, in will add your digital certificate to a list of trusted publishers.
-
-## How do I dispute the detection of my program?
-
-Submit the file in question as a software developer. Wait until your submission has a final determination.
-
-If you're not satisfied with our determination of the submission, use the developer contact form provided with the submission results to reach Microsoft. We'll use the information you provide to investigate further if necessary.
-
-We encourage all software vendors and developers to read about [how Microsoft identifies malware and Potentially Unwanted Applications (PUA)](criteria.md).
-
-## Why is Microsoft asking for a copy of my program?
-
-Providing copies can help us with our analysis. Participants of the [Microsoft Active Protection Service (MAPS)](https://www.microsoft.com/msrc/mapp) may occasionally receive these requests. The requests will stop once our systems have received and processed the file.
-
-## Why does Microsoft classify my installer as a software bundler?
-
-It contains instructions to offer a program classified as unwanted software. You can review the [criteria](criteria.md) we use to check applications for behaviors that are considered unwanted.
-
-## Why is the Windows Defender Firewall blocking my program?
-
-Firewall blocks aren't related to Microsoft Defender Antivirus and other Microsoft antimalware. [Learn about Windows Defender Firewall](../windows-firewall/windows-firewall-with-advanced-security.md).
-
-## Why does the Microsoft Defender Windows Defender SmartScreen say my program isn't commonly downloaded?
-
-This isn't related to Microsoft Defender Antivirus and other Microsoft antimalware. [Learn about Microsoft Defender Windows Defender SmartScreen](../microsoft-defender-smartscreen/microsoft-defender-smartscreen-overview.md)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/developer-faq.yml b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/developer-faq.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..04300736d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/developer-faq.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+### YamlMime:FAQ
+metadata:
+ title: Software developer FAQ
+ ms.reviewer:
+ description: This page provides answers to common questions we receive from software developers
+ keywords: wdsi, software, developer, faq, dispute, false-positive, classify, installer, software, bundler, blocking
+ search.product: eADQiWindows 10XVcnh
+ ms.prod: m365-security
+ ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
+ ms.sitesec: library
+ ms.pagetype: security
+ ms.author: dansimp
+ author: dansimp
+ ms.localizationpriority: medium
+ manager: dansimp
+ audience: ITPro
+ ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+ ms.topic: article
+ ms.technology: mde
+
+title: Software developer FAQ
+summary: This page provides answers to common questions we receive from software developers. For general guidance about submitting malware or incorrectly detected files, read the submission guide.
+
+
+sections:
+ - name: Ignored
+ questions:
+ - question: |
+ Does Microsoft accept files for a known list or false-positive prevention program?
+ answer: |
+ No. We don't accept these requests from software developers. Signing your program's files in a consistent manner, with a digital certificate issued by a trusted root authority, helps our research team quickly identify the source of a program and apply previously gained knowledge. In some cases, this might result in your program being quickly added to the known list. Far less frequently, in will add your digital certificate to a list of trusted publishers.
+
+ - question: |
+ How do I dispute the detection of my program?
+ answer: |
+ Submit the file in question as a software developer. Wait until your submission has a final determination.
+
+ If you're not satisfied with our determination of the submission, use the developer contact form provided with the submission results to reach Microsoft. We'll use the information you provide to investigate further if necessary.
+
+ We encourage all software vendors and developers to read about [how Microsoft identifies malware and Potentially Unwanted Applications (PUA)](criteria.md).
+
+ - question: |
+ Why is Microsoft asking for a copy of my program?
+ answer: |
+ Providing copies can help us with our analysis. Participants of the [Microsoft Active Protection Service (MAPS)](https://www.microsoft.com/msrc/mapp) may occasionally receive these requests. The requests will stop once our systems have received and processed the file.
+
+ - question: |
+ Why does Microsoft classify my installer as a software bundler?
+ answer: |
+ It contains instructions to offer a program classified as unwanted software. You can review the [criteria](criteria.md) we use to check applications for behaviors that are considered unwanted.
+
+ - question: |
+ Why is the Windows Defender Firewall blocking my program?
+ answer: |
+ Firewall blocks aren't related to Microsoft Defender Antivirus and other Microsoft antimalware. [Learn about Windows Defender Firewall](../windows-firewall/windows-firewall-with-advanced-security.md).
+
+ - question: |
+ Why does the Microsoft Defender Windows Defender SmartScreen say my program isn't commonly downloaded?
+ answer: |
+ This isn't related to Microsoft Defender Antivirus and other Microsoft antimalware. [Learn about Microsoft Defender Windows Defender SmartScreen](../microsoft-defender-smartscreen/microsoft-defender-smartscreen-overview.md)
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/developer-resources.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/developer-resources.md
index 659eaad25b..3b7d080b28 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/developer-resources.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/developer-resources.md
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ To objectively identify malware and unidentified software, Microsoft applies a [
### Developer questions
-Find more guidance about the file submission and detection dispute process in our [FAQ for software developers](developer-faq.md).
+Find more guidance about the file submission and detection dispute process in our [FAQ for software developers](developer-faq.yml).
### Scan your software
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/fileless-threats.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/fileless-threats.md
index 39371c3da0..e2029f3c2c 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/fileless-threats.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/fileless-threats.md
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ Besides being vulnerable at the firmware level, CPUs could be manufactured with
## Defeating fileless malware
-At Microsoft, we actively monitor the security landscape to identify new threat trends and develop solutions to mitigate classes of threats. We instrument durable protections that are effective against a wide range of threats. Through AntiMalware Scan Interface (AMSI), behavior monitoring, memory scanning, and boot sector protection, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint](https://www.microsoft.com/windowsforbusiness?ocid=docs-fileless) can inspect fileless threats even with heavy obfuscation. Machine learning technologies in the cloud allow us to scale these protections against new and emerging threats.
+At Microsoft, we actively monitor the security landscape to identify new threat trends and develop solutions to mitigate classes of threats. We instrument durable protections that are effective against a wide range of threats. Through AntiMalware Scan Interface (AMSI), behavior monitoring, memory scanning, and boot sector protection, [Microsoft Defender for Endpoint](/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/microsoft-defender-endpoint) can inspect fileless threats even with heavy obfuscation. Machine learning technologies in the cloud allow us to scale these protections against new and emerging threats.
To learn more, read: [Out of sight but not invisible: Defeating fileless malware with behavior monitoring, AMSI, and next-gen AV](https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2018/09/27/out-of-sight-but-not-invisible-defeating-fileless-malware-with-behavior-monitoring-amsi-and-next-gen-av/)
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/ransomware-malware.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/ransomware-malware.md
index 4f7f59f8ff..5a04348f87 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/ransomware-malware.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/ransomware-malware.md
@@ -26,9 +26,9 @@ The trend towards increasingly sophisticated malware behavior, highlighted by th
Most ransomware infections start with:
-* Email messages with attachments that try to install ransomware.
+- Email messages with attachments that try to install ransomware.
-* Websites hosting [exploit kits](exploits-malware.md) that attempt to use vulnerabilities in web browsers and other software to install ransomware.
+- Websites hosting [exploit kits](exploits-malware.md) that attempt to use vulnerabilities in web browsers and other software to install ransomware.
Once ransomware infects a device, it starts encrypting files, folders, entire hard drive partitions using encryption algorithms like RSA or RC4.
@@ -38,11 +38,11 @@ Ransomware is one of the most lucrative revenue channels for cybercriminals, so
Sophisticated ransomware like **Spora**, **WannaCrypt** (also known as WannaCry), and **Petya** (also known as NotPetya) spread to other computers via network shares or exploits.
-* Spora drops ransomware copies in network shares.
+- Spora drops ransomware copies in network shares.
-* WannaCrypt exploits the Server Message Block (SMB) vulnerability CVE-2017-0144 (also called EternalBlue) to infect other computers.
+- WannaCrypt exploits the Server Message Block (SMB) vulnerability CVE-2017-0144 (also called EternalBlue) to infect other computers.
-* A Petya variant exploits the same vulnerability, in addition to CVE-2017-0145 (also known as EternalRomance), and uses stolen credentials to move laterally across networks.
+- A Petya variant exploits the same vulnerability, in addition to CVE-2017-0145 (also known as EternalRomance), and uses stolen credentials to move laterally across networks.
Older ransomware like **Reveton** (nicknamed "Police Trojan" or "Police ransomware") locks screens instead of encrypting files. They display a full screen image and then disable Task Manager. The files are safe, but they're effectively inaccessible. The image usually contains a message claiming to be from law enforcement that says the computer has been used in illegal cybercriminal activities and a fine needs to be paid.
@@ -52,16 +52,26 @@ Ransomware like **Cerber** and **Locky** search for and encrypt specific file ty
## How to protect against ransomware
- Organizations can be targeted specifically by attackers, or they can be caught in the wide net cast by cybercriminal operations. Large organizations are high value targets and attackers can demand bigger ransoms.
+Organizations can be targeted specifically by attackers, or they can be caught in the wide net cast by cybercriminal operations. Large organizations are high value targets because attackers can demand bigger ransoms.
-We recommend:
+To provide the best protection against ransomware attacks, Microsoft recommends that you:
-* Back up important files regularly. Use the 3-2-1 rule. Keep three backups of your data, on two different storage types, and at least one backup offsite.
+- Back up important files regularly. Use the 3-2-1 rule. Keep three backups of your data, on two different storage types, and at least one backup offsite.
-* Apply the latest updates to your operating systems and apps.
+- Apply the latest updates to your operating systems and apps.
-* Educate your employees so they can identify social engineering and spear-phishing attacks.
+- Educate your employees so they can identify social engineering and spear-phishing attacks.
-* [Controlled folder access](/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/controlled-folders). It can stop ransomware from encrypting files and holding the files for ransom.
+- [Implement controlled folder access](/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/controlled-folders). It can stop ransomware from encrypting files and holding the files for ransom.
-For more general tips, see [prevent malware infection](prevent-malware-infection.md).
\ No newline at end of file
+For more general tips, see [prevent malware infection](prevent-malware-infection.md).
+
+## Human-operated ransomware
+
+Unlike auto-spreading ransomware like WannaCry or NotPetya, human-operated ransomware is the result of active and ongoing attacks that target an organization rather than a single device. Cybercriminals use their knowledge of common system and security misconfigurations and vulnerabilities to infiltrate the organization, navigate the enterprise network, adapt to the environment, and exploit its weaknesses as they go.
+
+Hallmarks of these human-operated ransomware attacks typically include credential theft and lateral movement and can result in deployment of ransomware payloads to high business impact resources that attackers choose. Once deployed, the attackers contact the organization with their ransom demands.
+
+The same primary prevention techniques described in this article should be implemented to prevent human-operated ransomware. For additional preventative measures against human-operated ransomware, see this [article](/security/compass/human-operated-ransomware).
+
+See [this blog post](https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/) from the Microsoft 365 Defender Threat Intelligence Team for more information and attack chain analysis of actual human-operated ransomware attacks.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/TOC.yml b/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/TOC.yml
index c77a91d3e5..ee887e168a 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/TOC.yml
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/TOC.yml
@@ -12,4 +12,4 @@
- name: Microsoft Defender Application Guard Extension
href: md-app-guard-browser-extension.md
- name: FAQ
- href: faq-md-app-guard.md
+ href: faq-md-app-guard.yml
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/configure-md-app-guard.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/configure-md-app-guard.md
index 208da5965e..593984f0dc 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/configure-md-app-guard.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/configure-md-app-guard.md
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ ms.pagetype: security
ms.localizationpriority: medium
author: denisebmsft
ms.author: deniseb
-ms.date: 05/06/2021
+ms.date: 05/24/2021
ms.reviewer:
manager: dansimp
ms.custom: asr
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Application Guard uses both network isolation and application-specific settings.
## Network isolation settings
-These settings, located at **Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Network\Network Isolation**, help you define and manage your organization's network boundaries. Application Guard uses this information to automatically transfer any requests to access the non-corporate resources into the Application Guard container.
+These settings, located at `Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Network\Network Isolation`, help you define and manage your organization's network boundaries. Application Guard uses this information to automatically transfer any requests to access the non-corporate resources into the Application Guard container.
> [!NOTE]
> You must configure either the Enterprise resource domains hosted in the cloud or Private network ranges for apps settings on your employee devices to successfully turn on Application Guard using enterprise mode. Proxy servers must be a neutral resource listed in the "Domains categorized as both work and personal" policy.
@@ -48,11 +48,11 @@ These settings, located at **Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Net
|`..contoso.com`|2|Trust all levels of the domain hierarchy that are to the left of the dot. Matching sites include `shop.contoso.com`, `us.shop.contoso.com`, `www.us.shop.contoso.com`, but NOT `contoso.com` itself.|
## Application-specific settings
-These settings, located at **Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Microsoft Defender Application Guard**, can help you to manage your company's implementation of Application Guard.
+These settings, located at `Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Microsoft Defender Application Guard`, can help you to manage your company's implementation of Application Guard.
|Name|Supported versions|Description|Options|
|-----------|------------------|-----------|-------|
-|Configure Microsoft Defender Application Guard clipboard settings|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1709 or higherWindows 10 Pro, 1803 or higher|Determines whether Application Guard can use the clipboard functionality.|**Enabled.** Turns On the clipboard functionality and lets you choose whether to additionally:
-Disable the clipboard functionality completely when Virtualization Security is enabled.
- Enable copying of certain content from Application Guard into Microsoft Edge.
- Enable copying of certain content from Microsoft Edge into Application Guard. **Important:** Allowing copied content to go from Microsoft Edge into Application Guard can cause potential security risks and isn't recommended.
**Disabled or not configured.** Completely turns Off the clipboard functionality for Application Guard.|
+|Configure Microsoft Defender Application Guard clipboard settings|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1709 or higher
Windows 10 Pro, 1803 or higher|Determines whether Application Guard can use the clipboard functionality.|**Enabled.** Turns On the clipboard functionality and lets you choose whether to additionally:
- Disable the clipboard functionality completely when Virtualization Security is enabled.
- Enable copying of certain content from Application Guard into Microsoft Edge.
- Enable copying of certain content from Microsoft Edge into Application Guard. **Important:** Allowing copied content to go from Microsoft Edge into Application Guard can cause potential security risks and isn't recommended.
**Disabled or not configured.** Completely turns Off the clipboard functionality for Application Guard.|
|Configure Microsoft Defender Application Guard print settings|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1709 or higher
Windows 10 Pro, 1803 or higher|Determines whether Application Guard can use the print functionality.|**Enabled.** Turns On the print functionality and lets you choose whether to additionally:
- Enable Application Guard to print into the XPS format.
- Enable Application Guard to print into the PDF format.
- Enable Application Guard to print to locally attached printers.
- Enable Application Guard to print from previously connected network printers. Employees can't search for additional printers.
**Disabled or not configured.** Completely turns Off the print functionality for Application Guard.|
|Block enterprise websites to load non-enterprise content in IE and Edge|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1709 or higher|Determines whether to allow Internet access for apps not included on the **Allowed Apps** list.|**Enabled.** Prevents network traffic from both Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge to non-enterprise sites that can't render in the Application Guard container.
**NOTE**: This action might also block assets cached by CDNs and references to analytics sites. Add them to the trusted enterprise resources to avoid broken pages.
**Disabled or not configured.** Prevents Microsoft Edge to render network traffic to non-enterprise sites that can't render in Application Guard. |
|Allow Persistence|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1709 or higher
Windows 10 Pro, 1803 or higher|Determines whether data persists across different sessions in Microsoft Defender Application Guard.|**Enabled.** Application Guard saves user-downloaded files and other items (such as, cookies, Favorites, and so on) for use in future Application Guard sessions.
**Disabled or not configured.** All user data within Application Guard is reset between sessions.
**NOTE**: If you later decide to stop supporting data persistence for your employees, you can use our Windows-provided utility to reset the container and to discard any personal data.
**To reset the container:**
1. Open a command-line program and navigate to `Windows/System32`.
2. Type `wdagtool.exe cleanup`. The container environment is reset, retaining only the employee-generated data.
3. Type `wdagtool.exe cleanup RESET_PERSISTENCE_LAYER`. The container environment is reset, including discarding all employee-generated data.|
@@ -61,6 +61,3 @@ These settings, located at **Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Win
|Allow hardware-accelerated rendering for Microsoft Defender Application Guard|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1803 or higher
Windows 10 Pro, 1803 or higher|Determines whether Microsoft Defender Application Guard renders graphics using hardware or software acceleration.|**Enabled.** Microsoft Defender Application Guard uses Hyper-V to access supported, high-security rendering graphics hardware (GPUs). These GPUs improve rendering performance and battery life while using Microsoft Defender Application Guard, particularly for video playback and other graphics-intensive use cases. If this setting is enabled without connecting any high-security rendering graphics hardware, Microsoft Defender Application Guard will automatically revert to software-based (CPU) rendering. **Important:** Be aware that enabling this setting with potentially compromised graphics devices or drivers might pose a risk to the host device.
**Disabled or not configured.** Microsoft Defender Application Guard uses software-based (CPU) rendering and won’t load any third-party graphics drivers or interact with any connected graphics hardware.|
|Allow camera and microphone access in Microsoft Defender Application Guard|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Pro, 1809 or higher|Determines whether to allow camera and microphone access inside Microsoft Defender Application Guard.|**Enabled.** Applications inside Microsoft Defender Application Guard are able to access the camera and microphone on the user's device. **Important:** Be aware that enabling this policy with a potentially compromised container could bypass camera and microphone permissions and access the camera and microphone without the user's knowledge.
**Disabled or not configured.** Applications inside Microsoft Defender Application Guard are unable to access the camera and microphone on the user's device.|
|Allow Microsoft Defender Application Guard to use Root Certificate Authorities from a user's device|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Pro, 1809 or higher|Determines whether Root Certificates are shared with Microsoft Defender Application Guard.|**Enabled.** Certificates matching the specified thumbprint are transferred into the container. Use a comma to separate multiple certificates.
**Disabled or not configured.** Certificates are not shared with Microsoft Defender Application Guard.|
-|Allow users to trust files that open in Microsoft Defender Application Guard|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1809 or higher|Determines whether users are able to manually trust untrusted files to open them on the host.|**Enabled.** Users are able to manually trust files or trust files after an antivirus check.
**Disabled or not configured.** Users are unable to manually trust files and files continue to open in Microsoft Defender Application Guard.|
-|Allow extensions in the container|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1709 or higher
Windows 10 Pro, 1803 or higher|Determines whether Application Guard can use extensions.|**Enabled.** Favorites are able to sync from the host browser to the container. Note that this doesn’t work the other way around. The favorites sync to the user’s work profile by default.
**Disabled.** Users are not able to access their favorites from within the Application Guard container.|
-|Allow favorites sync|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1709 or higher
Windows 10 Pro, 1803 or higher|Determines whether favorites can be accessible from Application Guard container.|**Enabled.** Favorites are able to sync from the host browser to the container, but it doesn’t work the other way around. The favorites sync to the user’s work profile by default.
**Disabled.** Users are not able to access their favorites from within the Application Guard container.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/faq-md-app-guard.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/faq-md-app-guard.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0e4406aaa5..0000000000
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/faq-md-app-guard.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,210 +0,0 @@
----
-title: FAQ - Microsoft Defender Application Guard (Windows 10)
-description: Learn about the commonly asked questions and answers for Microsoft Defender Application Guard.
-ms.prod: m365-security
-ms.mktglfcycl: manage
-ms.sitesec: library
-ms.pagetype: security
-ms.localizationpriority: medium
-author: denisebmsft
-ms.author: deniseb
-ms.date: 05/12/2021
-ms.reviewer:
-manager: dansimp
-ms.custom: asr
-ms.technology: mde
----
-
-# Frequently asked questions - Microsoft Defender Application Guard
-
-**Applies to:** [Microsoft Defender for Endpoint](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?linkid=2069559)
-
-This article lists frequently asked questions with answers for Microsoft Defender Application Guard (Application Guard). Questions span features, integration with the Windows operating system, and general configuration.
-
-## Frequently Asked Questions
-
-### Can I enable Application Guard on machines equipped with 4-GB RAM?
-
-We recommend 8-GB RAM for optimal performance but you can use the following registry DWORD values to enable Application Guard on machines that aren't meeting the recommended hardware configuration.
-
-`HKLM\software\Microsoft\Hvsi\SpecRequiredProcessorCount` (Default is four cores.)
-
-`HKLM\software\Microsoft\Hvsi\SpecRequiredMemoryInGB` (Default is 8 GB.)
-
-`HKLM\software\Microsoft\Hvsi\SpecRequiredFreeDiskSpaceInGB` (Default is 5 GB.)
-
-### Can employees download documents from the Application Guard Edge session onto host devices?
-
-In Windows 10 Enterprise edition, version 1803, users are able to download documents from the isolated Application Guard container to the host PC. This capability is managed by policy.
-
-In Windows 10 Enterprise edition, version 1709, or Windows 10 Professional edition, version 1803, it is not possible to download files from the isolated Application Guard container to the host computer. However, employees can use the **Print as PDF** or **Print as XPS** options and save those files to the host device.
-
-### Can employees copy and paste between the host device and the Application Guard Edge session?
-
-Depending on your organization's settings, employees can copy and paste images (.bmp) and text to and from the isolated container.
-
-### Why don't employees see their favorites in the Application Guard Edge session?
-
-Depending on your organization’s settings, it might be that Favorites Sync is turned off. To manage the policy, see: [Microsoft Edge and Microsoft Defender Application Guard | Microsoft Docs](/deployedge/microsoft-edge-security-windows-defender-application-guard)
-
-### Why aren’t employees able to see their extensions in the Application Guard Edge session?
-
-Make sure to enable the extensions policy on your Application Guard configuration.
-
-### How do I configure Microsoft Defender Application Guard to work with my network proxy (IP-Literal Addresses)?
-
-Application Guard requires proxies to have a symbolic name, not just an IP address. IP-Literal proxy settings such as `192.168.1.4:81` can be annotated as `itproxy:81` or using a record such as `P19216810010` for a proxy with an IP address of `192.168.100.10`. This applies to Windows 10 Enterprise edition, version 1709 or higher. These would be for the proxy policies under Network Isolation in Group Policy or Intune.
-
-### Which Input Method Editors (IME) in 19H1 are not supported?
-
-The following Input Method Editors (IME) introduced in Windows 10, version 1903 are currently not supported in Microsoft Defender Application Guard:
-
-- Vietnam Telex keyboard
-- Vietnam number key-based keyboard
-- Hindi phonetic keyboard
-- Bangla phonetic keyboard
-- Marathi phonetic keyboard
-- Telugu phonetic keyboard
-- Tamil phonetic keyboard
-- Kannada phonetic keyboard
-- Malayalam phonetic keyboard
-- Gujarati phonetic keyboard
-- Odia phonetic keyboard
-- Punjabi phonetic keyboard
-
-### I enabled the hardware acceleration policy on my Windows 10 Enterprise, version 1803 deployment. Why are my users still only getting CPU rendering?
-
-This feature is currently experimental only and is not functional without an additional registry key provided by Microsoft. If you would like to evaluate this feature on a deployment of Windows 10 Enterprise, version 1803, contact Microsoft and we’ll work with you to enable the feature.
-
-### What is the WDAGUtilityAccount local account?
-
-WDAGUtilityAccount is part of Application Guard, beginning with Windows 10, version 1709 (Fall Creators Update). It remains disabled by default, unless Application Guard is enabled on your device. WDAGUtilityAccount is used to sign in to the Application Guard container as a standard user with a random password. It is NOT a malicious account. If *Run as a service* permissions are revoked for this account, you might see the following error:
-
-**Error: 0x80070569, Ext error: 0x00000001; RDP: Error: 0x00000000, Ext error: 0x00000000 Location: 0x00000000**
-
-We recommend that you do not modify this account.
-
-### How do I trust a subdomain in my site list?
-
-To trust a subdomain, you must precede your domain with two dots (..). For example: `..contoso.com` ensures that `mail.contoso.com` or `news.contoso.com` are trusted. The first dot represents the strings for the subdomain name (mail or news), and the second dot recognizes the start of the domain name (`contoso.com`). This prevents sites such as `fakesitecontoso.com` from being trusted.
-
-### Are there differences between using Application Guard on Windows Pro vs Windows Enterprise?
-
-When using Windows Pro or Windows Enterprise, you have access to using Application Guard in Standalone Mode. However, when using Enterprise you have access to Application Guard in Enterprise-Managed Mode. This mode has some extra features that the Standalone Mode does not. For more information, see [Prepare to install Microsoft Defender Application Guard](./install-md-app-guard.md).
-
-### Is there a size limit to the domain lists that I need to configure?
-
-Yes, both the Enterprise Resource domains that are hosted in the cloud and the domains that are categorized as both work and personal have a 16383-B limit.
-
-### Why does my encryption driver break Microsoft Defender Application Guard?
-
-Microsoft Defender Application Guard accesses files from a VHD mounted on the host that needs to be written during setup. If an encryption driver prevents a VHD from being mounted or from being written to, Application Guard does not work and results in an error message (**0x80070013 ERROR_WRITE_PROTECT**).
-
-### Why do the Network Isolation policies in Group Policy and CSP look different?
-
-There is not a one-to-one mapping among all the Network Isolation policies between CSP and GP. Mandatory network isolation policies to deploy Application Guard are different between CSP and GP.
-
-- Mandatory network isolation GP policy to deploy Application Guard: **DomainSubnets or CloudResources**
-
-- Mandatory network isolation CSP policy to deploy Application Guard: **EnterpriseCloudResources or (EnterpriseIpRange and EnterpriseNetworkDomainNames)**
-
-- For EnterpriseNetworkDomainNames, there is no mapped CSP policy.
-
-Application Guard accesses files from a VHD mounted on the host that needs to be written during setup. If an encryption driver prevents a VHD from being mounted or from being written to, Application Guard does not work and results in an error message (**0x80070013 ERROR_WRITE_PROTECT**).
-
-### Why did Application Guard stop working after I turned off hyperthreading?
-
-If hyperthreading is disabled (because of an update applied through a KB article or through BIOS settings), there is a possibility Application Guard no longer meets the minimum requirements.
-
-### Why am I getting the error message "ERROR_VIRTUAL_DISK_LIMITATION"?
-
-Application Guard might not work correctly on NTFS compressed volumes. If this issue persists, try uncompressing the volume.
-
-### Why am I getting the error message "ERR_NAME_NOT_RESOLVED" after not being able to reach the PAC file?
-
-This is a known issue. To mitigate this you need to create two firewall rules. For information about creating a firewall rule by using Group Policy, see the following resources:
-
-- [Create an inbound icmp rule](../windows-firewall/create-an-inbound-icmp-rule.md)
-- [Open Group Policy management console for Microsoft Defender Firewall](../windows-firewall/open-the-group-policy-management-console-to-windows-firewall-with-advanced-security.md)
-
-#### First rule (DHCP Server)
-1. Program path: `%SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe`
-
-2. Local Service: `Sid: S-1-5-80-2009329905-444645132-2728249442-922493431-93864177 (Internet Connection Service (SharedAccess))`
-
-3. Protocol UDP
-
-4. Port 67
-
-#### Second rule (DHCP Client)
-This is the same as the first rule, but scoped to local port 68. In the Microsoft Defender Firewall user interface go through the following steps:
-
-1. Right-click on inbound rules, and then create a new rule.
-
-2. Choose **custom rule**.
-
-3. Specify the following program path: `%SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe`.
-
-4. Specify the following settings:
- - Protocol Type: UDP
- - Specific ports: 67
- - Remote port: any
-
-5. Specify any IP addresses.
-
-6. Allow the connection.
-
-7. Specify to use all profiles.
-
-8. The new rule should show up in the user interface. Right click on the **rule** > **properties**.
-
-9. In the **Programs and services** tab, under the **Services** section, select **settings**.
-
-10. Choose **Apply to this Service** and select **Internet Connection Sharing (ICS) Shared Access**.
-
-### Why can I not launch Application Guard when Exploit Guard is enabled?
-
-There is a known issue such that if you change the Exploit Protection settings for CFG and possibly others, hvsimgr cannot launch. To mitigate this issue, go to **Windows Security** > **App and Browser control** > **Exploit Protection Setting**, and then switch CFG to **use default**.
-
-### How can I disable portions of ICS without breaking Application Guard?
-
-ICS is enabled by default in Windows, and ICS must be enabled in order for Application Guard to function correctly. We do not recommend disabling ICS; however, you can disable ICS in part by using a Group Policy and editing registry keys.
-
-1. In the Group Policy setting, **Prohibit use of Internet Connection Sharing on your DNS domain network**, set it to **Disabled**.
-
-2. Disable IpNat.sys from ICS load as follows:
-`System\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\DisableIpNat = 1`
-
-3. Configure ICS (SharedAccess) to enabled as follows:
-`HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Start = 3`
-
-4. (This is optional) Disable IPNAT as follows:
-`HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\IPNat\Start = 4`
-
-5. Reboot the device.
-
-### Why doesn't the container fully load when device control policies are enabled?
-
-Allow-listed items must be configured as "allowed" in the Group Policy Object to ensure AppGuard works properly.
-
-Policy: Allow installation of devices that match any of the following device IDs:
-
-- `SCSI\DiskMsft____Virtual_Disk____`
-- `{8e7bd593-6e6c-4c52-86a6-77175494dd8e}\msvhdhba`
-- `VMS_VSF`
-- `root\Vpcivsp`
-- `root\VMBus`
-- `vms_mp`
-- `VMS_VSP`
-- `ROOT\VKRNLINTVSP`
-- `ROOT\VID`
-- `root\storvsp`
-- `vms_vsmp`
-- `VMS_PP`
-
-Policy: Allow installation of devices using drivers that match these device setup classes
-- `{71a27cdd-812a-11d0-bec7-08002be2092f}`
-
-## See also
-
-[Configure Microsoft Defender Application Guard policy settings](./configure-md-app-guard.md)
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/faq-md-app-guard.yml b/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/faq-md-app-guard.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..98fc46090b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/faq-md-app-guard.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
+### YamlMime:FAQ
+metadata:
+ title: FAQ - Microsoft Defender Application Guard (Windows 10)
+ description: Learn about the commonly asked questions and answers for Microsoft Defender Application Guard.
+ ms.prod: m365-security
+ ms.mktglfcycl: manage
+ ms.sitesec: library
+ ms.pagetype: security
+ ms.localizationpriority: medium
+ author: denisebmsft
+ ms.author: deniseb
+ ms.date: 06/16/2021
+ ms.reviewer:
+ manager: dansimp
+ ms.custom: asr
+ ms.technology: mde
+
+title: Frequently asked questions - Microsoft Defender Application Guard
+summary: |
+ **Applies to:** [Microsoft Defender for Endpoint](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?linkid=2069559)
+
+ This article lists frequently asked questions with answers for Microsoft Defender Application Guard (Application Guard). Questions span features, integration with the Windows operating system, and general configuration.
+
+ ## Frequently Asked Questions
+
+sections:
+ - name: Frequently Asked Questions
+ questions:
+ - question: |
+ Can I enable Application Guard on machines equipped with 4-GB RAM?
+ answer: |
+ We recommend 8-GB RAM for optimal performance but you can use the following registry DWORD values to enable Application Guard on machines that aren't meeting the recommended hardware configuration.
+
+ `HKLM\software\Microsoft\Hvsi\SpecRequiredProcessorCount` (Default is four cores.)
+
+ `HKLM\software\Microsoft\Hvsi\SpecRequiredMemoryInGB` (Default is 8 GB.)
+
+ `HKLM\software\Microsoft\Hvsi\SpecRequiredFreeDiskSpaceInGB` (Default is 5 GB.)
+
+ - question: |
+ My network configuration uses a proxy and I’m running into a “Cannot resolve External URLs from MDAG Browser: Error: err_connection_refused”. How do I resolve that?
+ answer: |
+ The manual or PAC server must be a hostname (not IP) that is neutral on the site-list. Additionally, if the PAC script returns a proxy, it must meet those same requirements.
+
+ To make sure the FQDNs (Fully Qualified Domain Names) for the “PAC file” and the “proxy servers the PAC file redirects to” are added as Neutral Resources in the Network Isolation policies used by Application Guard, you can:
+
+ - Verify this by going to edge://application-guard-internals/#utilities and entering the FQDN for the pac/proxy in the “check url trust” field and verifying that it says “Neutral”.
+ - It must be a FQDN. A simple IP address will not work.
+ - Optionally, if possible, the IP addresses associated with the server hosting the above should be removed from the Enterprise IP Ranges in the Network Isolation policies used by Application Guard.
+
+ - question: |
+ Can employees download documents from the Application Guard Edge session onto host devices?
+ answer: |
+ In Windows 10 Enterprise edition, version 1803, users are able to download documents from the isolated Application Guard container to the host PC. This capability is managed by policy.
+
+ In Windows 10 Enterprise edition, version 1709, or Windows 10 Professional edition, version 1803, it is not possible to download files from the isolated Application Guard container to the host computer. However, employees can use the **Print as PDF** or **Print as XPS** options and save those files to the host device.
+
+ - question: |
+ Can employees copy and paste between the host device and the Application Guard Edge session?
+ answer: |
+ Depending on your organization's settings, employees can copy and paste images (.bmp) and text to and from the isolated container.
+
+ - question: |
+ Why don't employees see their favorites in the Application Guard Edge session?
+ answer: |
+ Depending on your organization’s settings, it might be that Favorites Sync is turned off. To manage the policy, see: [Microsoft Edge and Microsoft Defender Application Guard | Microsoft Docs](/deployedge/microsoft-edge-security-windows-defender-application-guard).
+
+ - question: |
+ Why aren’t employees able to see their extensions in the Application Guard Edge session?
+ answer: |
+ Make sure to enable the extensions policy on your Application Guard configuration.
+
+ - question: |
+ I’m trying to watch playback video with HDR, why is the HDR option missing?
+ answer: |
+ In order for HDR video playback to work in the container, vGPU Hardware Acceleration needs to be enabled in Application Guard.
+
+ - question: |
+ How do I configure Microsoft Defender Application Guard to work with my network proxy (IP-Literal Addresses)?
+ answer: |
+ Application Guard requires proxies to have a symbolic name, not just an IP address. IP-Literal proxy settings such as `192.168.1.4:81` can be annotated as `itproxy:81` or using a record such as `P19216810010` for a proxy with an IP address of `192.168.100.10`. This applies to Windows 10 Enterprise edition, version 1709 or higher. These would be for the proxy policies under Network Isolation in Group Policy or Intune.
+
+ - question: |
+ Which Input Method Editors (IME) in 19H1 are not supported?
+ answer: |
+ The following Input Method Editors (IME) introduced in Windows 10, version 1903 are currently not supported in Microsoft Defender Application Guard:
+
+ - Vietnam Telex keyboard
+ - Vietnam number key-based keyboard
+ - Hindi phonetic keyboard
+ - Bangla phonetic keyboard
+ - Marathi phonetic keyboard
+ - Telugu phonetic keyboard
+ - Tamil phonetic keyboard
+ - Kannada phonetic keyboard
+ - Malayalam phonetic keyboard
+ - Gujarati phonetic keyboard
+ - Odia phonetic keyboard
+ - Punjabi phonetic keyboard
+
+ - question: |
+ I enabled the hardware acceleration policy on my Windows 10 Enterprise, version 1803 deployment. Why are my users still only getting CPU rendering?
+ answer: |
+ This feature is currently experimental only and is not functional without an additional registry key provided by Microsoft. If you would like to evaluate this feature on a deployment of Windows 10 Enterprise, version 1803, contact Microsoft and we’ll work with you to enable the feature.
+
+ - question: |
+ What is the WDAGUtilityAccount local account?
+ answer: |
+ WDAGUtilityAccount is part of Application Guard, beginning with Windows 10, version 1709 (Fall Creators Update). It remains disabled by default, unless Application Guard is enabled on your device. WDAGUtilityAccount is used to sign in to the Application Guard container as a standard user with a random password. It is NOT a malicious account. If *Run as a service* permissions are revoked for this account, you might see the following error:
+
+ **Error: 0x80070569, Ext error: 0x00000001; RDP: Error: 0x00000000, Ext error: 0x00000000 Location: 0x00000000**
+
+ We recommend that you do not modify this account.
+
+ - question: |
+ How do I trust a subdomain in my site list?
+ answer: |
+ To trust a subdomain, you must precede your domain with two dots (..). For example: `..contoso.com` ensures that `mail.contoso.com` or `news.contoso.com` are trusted. The first dot represents the strings for the subdomain name (mail or news), and the second dot recognizes the start of the domain name (`contoso.com`). This prevents sites such as `fakesitecontoso.com` from being trusted.
+
+ - question: |
+ Are there differences between using Application Guard on Windows Pro vs Windows Enterprise?
+ answer: |
+ When using Windows Pro or Windows Enterprise, you have access to using Application Guard in Standalone Mode. However, when using Enterprise you have access to Application Guard in Enterprise-Managed Mode. This mode has some extra features that the Standalone Mode does not. For more information, see [Prepare to install Microsoft Defender Application Guard](./install-md-app-guard.md).
+
+ - question: |
+ Is there a size limit to the domain lists that I need to configure?
+ answer: |
+ Yes, both the Enterprise Resource domains that are hosted in the cloud and the domains that are categorized as both work and personal have a 16383-B limit.
+
+ - question: |
+ Why does my encryption driver break Microsoft Defender Application Guard?
+ answer: |
+ Microsoft Defender Application Guard accesses files from a VHD mounted on the host that needs to be written during setup. If an encryption driver prevents a VHD from being mounted or from being written to, Application Guard does not work and results in an error message (**0x80070013 ERROR_WRITE_PROTECT**).
+
+ - question: |
+ Why do the Network Isolation policies in Group Policy and CSP look different?
+ answer: |
+ There is not a one-to-one mapping among all the Network Isolation policies between CSP and GP. Mandatory network isolation policies to deploy Application Guard are different between CSP and GP.
+
+ - Mandatory network isolation GP policy to deploy Application Guard: **DomainSubnets or CloudResources**
+
+ - Mandatory network isolation CSP policy to deploy Application Guard: **EnterpriseCloudResources or (EnterpriseIpRange and EnterpriseNetworkDomainNames)**
+
+ - For EnterpriseNetworkDomainNames, there is no mapped CSP policy.
+
+ Application Guard accesses files from a VHD mounted on the host that needs to be written during setup. If an encryption driver prevents a VHD from being mounted or from being written to, Application Guard does not work and results in an error message (**0x80070013 ERROR_WRITE_PROTECT**).
+
+ - question: |
+ Why did Application Guard stop working after I turned off hyperthreading?
+ answer: |
+ If hyperthreading is disabled (because of an update applied through a KB article or through BIOS settings), there is a possibility Application Guard no longer meets the minimum requirements.
+
+ - question: |
+ Why am I getting the error message "ERROR_VIRTUAL_DISK_LIMITATION"?
+ answer: |
+ Application Guard might not work correctly on NTFS compressed volumes. If this issue persists, try uncompressing the volume.
+
+ - question: |
+ Why am I getting the error message "ERR_NAME_NOT_RESOLVED" after not being able to reach the PAC file?
+ answer: |
+ This is a known issue. To mitigate this you need to create two firewall rules. For information about creating a firewall rule by using Group Policy, see the following resources:
+
+ - [Create an inbound icmp rule](../windows-firewall/create-an-inbound-icmp-rule.md)
+ - [Open Group Policy management console for Microsoft Defender Firewall](../windows-firewall/open-the-group-policy-management-console-to-windows-firewall-with-advanced-security.md)
+
+ ### First rule (DHCP Server)
+ - Program path: `%SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe`
+
+ - Local Service: `Sid: S-1-5-80-2009329905-444645132-2728249442-922493431-93864177 (Internet Connection Service (SharedAccess))`
+
+ - Protocol UDP
+
+ - Port 67
+
+ ### Second rule (DHCP Client)
+ This is the same as the first rule, but scoped to local port 68. In the Microsoft Defender Firewall user interface go through the following steps:
+
+ 1. Right-click on inbound rules, and then create a new rule.
+
+ 2. Choose **custom rule**.
+
+ 3. Specify the following program path: `%SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe`.
+
+ 4. Specify the following settings:
+ - Protocol Type: UDP
+ - Specific ports: 67
+ - Remote port: any
+
+ 5. Specify any IP addresses.
+
+ 6. Allow the connection.
+
+ 7. Specify to use all profiles.
+
+ 8. The new rule should show up in the user interface. Right click on the **rule** > **properties**.
+
+ 9. In the **Programs and services** tab, under the **Services** section, select **settings**.
+
+ 10. Choose **Apply to this Service** and select **Internet Connection Sharing (ICS) Shared Access**.
+
+ - question: |
+ Why can I not launch Application Guard when Exploit Guard is enabled?
+ answer: |
+ There is a known issue such that if you change the Exploit Protection settings for CFG and possibly others, hvsimgr cannot launch. To mitigate this issue, go to **Windows Security** > **App and Browser control** > **Exploit Protection Setting**, and then switch CFG to **use default**.
+
+ - question: |
+ How can I disable portions of ICS without breaking Application Guard?
+ answer: |
+ ICS is enabled by default in Windows, and ICS must be enabled in order for Application Guard to function correctly. We do not recommend disabling ICS; however, you can disable ICS in part by using a Group Policy and editing registry keys.
+
+ 1. In the Group Policy setting, **Prohibit use of Internet Connection Sharing on your DNS domain network**, set it to **Disabled**.
+
+ 2. Disable IpNat.sys from ICS load as follows:
+ `System\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\DisableIpNat = 1`
+
+ 3. Configure ICS (SharedAccess) to enabled as follows:
+ `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Start = 3`
+
+ 4. (This is optional) Disable IPNAT as follows:
+ `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\IPNat\Start = 4`
+
+ 5. Reboot the device.
+
+ - question: |
+ Why doesn't the container fully load when device control policies are enabled?
+ answer: |
+ Allow-listed items must be configured as "allowed" in the Group Policy Object to ensure AppGuard works properly.
+
+ Policy: Allow installation of devices that match any of the following device IDs:
+
+ - `SCSI\DiskMsft____Virtual_Disk____`
+ - `{8e7bd593-6e6c-4c52-86a6-77175494dd8e}\msvhdhba`
+ - `VMS_VSF`
+ - `root\Vpcivsp`
+ - `root\VMBus`
+ - `vms_mp`
+ - `VMS_VSP`
+ - `ROOT\VKRNLINTVSP`
+ - `ROOT\VID`
+ - `root\storvsp`
+ - `vms_vsmp`
+ - `VMS_PP`
+
+ Policy: Allow installation of devices using drivers that match these device setup classes
+ - `{71a27cdd-812a-11d0-bec7-08002be2092f}`
+
+additionalContent: |
+
+ ## See also
+
+ [Configure Microsoft Defender Application Guard policy settings](./configure-md-app-guard.md)
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/md-app-guard-overview.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/md-app-guard-overview.md
index 9c41f91b39..83850f5a21 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/md-app-guard-overview.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/md-app-guard-overview.md
@@ -52,5 +52,5 @@ Application Guard has been created to target several types of devices:
|[Testing scenarios using Microsoft Defender Application Guard in your business or organization](test-scenarios-md-app-guard.md)|Provides a list of suggested testing scenarios that you can use to test Application Guard in your organization.|
| [Microsoft Defender Application Guard Extension for web browsers](md-app-guard-browser-extension.md) | Describes the Application Guard extension for Chrome and Firefox, including known issues, and a troubleshooting guide |
| [Microsoft Defender Application Guard for Microsoft Office](/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/install-app-guard) | Describes Application Guard for Microsoft Office, including minimum hardware requirements, configuration, and a troubleshooting guide |
-|[Frequently asked questions - Microsoft Defender Application Guard](faq-md-app-guard.md)|Provides answers to frequently asked questions about Application Guard features, integration with the Windows operating system, and general configuration.|
+|[Frequently asked questions - Microsoft Defender Application Guard](faq-md-app-guard.yml)|Provides answers to frequently asked questions about Application Guard features, integration with the Windows operating system, and general configuration.|
|[Use a network boundary to add trusted sites on Windows devices in Microsoft Intune](/mem/intune/configuration/network-boundary-windows)|Network boundary, a feature that helps you protect your environment from sites that aren't trusted by your organization.|
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-compliance-toolkit-10.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-compliance-toolkit-10.md
index 3662667af2..2a578d07ab 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-compliance-toolkit-10.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-compliance-toolkit-10.md
@@ -28,13 +28,13 @@ The SCT enables administrators to effectively manage their enterprise’s Group
The Security Compliance Toolkit consists of:
- Windows 10 security baselines
- - Windows 10 Version 20H2 (October 2020 Update)
- - Windows 10 Version 2004 (May 2020 Update)
- - Windows 10 Version 1909 (November 2019 Update)
- - Windows 10 Version 1809 (October 2018 Update)
- - Windows 10 Version 1803 (April 2018 Update)
- - Windows 10 Version 1607 (Anniversary Update)
- - Windows 10 Version 1507
+ - Windows 10, Version 21H1 (May 2021 Update)
+ - Windows 10, Version 20H2 (October 2020 Update)
+ - Windows 10, Version 2004 (May 2020 Update)
+ - Windows 10, Version 1909 (November 2019 Update)
+ - Windows 10, Version 1809 (October 2018 Update)
+ - Windows 10, Version 1607 (Anniversary Update)
+ - Windows 10, Version 1507
- Windows Server security baselines
- Windows Server 2019
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ The Security Compliance Toolkit consists of:
- Windows Server 2012 R2
- Microsoft Office security baseline
- - Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise (Sept 2019)
+ - Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise, Version 2104
- Microsoft Edge security baseline
- Version 88
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/access-this-computer-from-the-network.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/access-this-computer-from-the-network.md
index d20934b1f3..55c80b17f7 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/access-this-computer-from-the-network.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/access-this-computer-from-the-network.md
@@ -14,17 +14,20 @@ manager: dansimp
audience: ITPro
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
ms.topic: conceptual
-ms.date: 04/19/2017
+ms.date: 06/11/2021
ms.technology: mde
---
# Access this computer from the network - security policy setting
**Applies to**
-- Windows 10
+- Windows 10, Azure Stack HCI, Windows Server 2022, Windows Server 2019, Windows Server 2016
Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security considerations for the **Access this computer from the network** security policy setting.
+> [!WARNING]
+> If running Windows Server or Azure Stack HCI Failover Clustering, don't remove Authenticated Users from the **Access this computer from the network** policy setting. Doing so may induce an unexpected production outage. This is due to the local user account CLIUSR that is used to run the cluster service. CLIUSR is not a member of the local Administrators group and if the Authenticated Users group is removed, the cluster service won't have sufficient rights to function or start properly.
+
## Reference
The **Access this computer from the network** policy setting determines which users can connect to the device from the network. This capability is required by a number of network protocols, including Server Message Block (SMB)-based protocols, NetBIOS, Common Internet File System (CIFS), and Component Object Model Plus (COM+).
@@ -43,6 +46,7 @@ Constant: SeNetworkLogonRight
- On desktop devices or member servers, grant this right only to users and administrators.
- On domain controllers, grant this right only to authenticated users, enterprise domain controllers, and administrators.
+- On failover clusters, make sure this right is granted to authenticated users.
- This setting includes the **Everyone** group to ensure backward compatibility. Upon Windows upgrade, after you have verified that all users and groups are correctly migrated, you should remove the **Everyone** group and use the **Authenticated Users** group instead.
### Location
@@ -104,6 +108,8 @@ from servers in the domain if members of the **Domain Users** group are included
If you remove the **Access this computer from the network** user right on domain controllers for all users, no one can log on to the domain or use network resources. If you remove this user right on member servers, users cannot connect to those servers through the network. If you have installed optional components such as ASP.NET or Internet Information Services (IIS), you may need to assign this user right to additional accounts that are required by those components. It is important to verify that authorized users are assigned this user right for the devices that they need to access the network.
+If running Windows Server or Azure Stack HCI Failover Clustering, do not remove Authenticated Users from the Access this computer from the network policy setting. Doing so may induce an unexpected production outage. This is due to the local user account CLIUSR that is used to run the cluster service. CLIUSR is not a member of the local Administrators group and if the Authenticated Users group is removed, the cluster service will not have sufficient rights to function or start properly.
+
## Related topics
[User Rights Assignment](user-rights-assignment.md)
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/network-security-allow-pku2u-authentication-requests-to-this-computer-to-use-online-identities.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/network-security-allow-pku2u-authentication-requests-to-this-computer-to-use-online-identities.md
index 716b1da171..671eb87720 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/network-security-allow-pku2u-authentication-requests-to-this-computer-to-use-online-identities.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/network-security-allow-pku2u-authentication-requests-to-this-computer-to-use-online-identities.md
@@ -74,17 +74,18 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
### Vulnerability
-Enabling this policy setting allows a user’s account on one computer to be associated with an online identity, such as Microsoft account. That account can then log on to a peer device (if the peer device is likewise configured) without the use of a Windows logon account (domain or local). This setup is beneficial for workgroups or home groups. But in a domain-joined environment, it might circumvent established security policies.
+Enabling this policy setting allows a user’s account on one computer to be associated with an online identity, such as Microsoft account or an Azure AD account. That account can then log on to a peer device (if the peer device is likewise configured) without the use of a Windows logon account (domain or local). This setup is not only beneficial, but required for Azure AD joined devices, where they are signed in with an online identity and are issued certificates by Azure AD. This policy may not be relevant for an *on-premises only* environment and might circumvent established security policies. However, it does not pose any threats in a hybrid environment where Azure AD is used as it relies on the user's online identity and Azure AD to authenticate.
### Countermeasure
-Set this policy to *Disabled* or don't configure this security policy for domain-joined devices.
+Set this policy to *Disabled* or don't configure this security policy for *on-premises only* environments.
### Potential impact
-If you don't set or you disable this policy, the PKU2U protocol won't be used to authenticate between peer devices, which forces users to follow domain-defined access control policies. If you enable this policy, you allow your users to authenticate by using local certificates between systems that aren't part of a domain that uses PKU2U. This configuration allows users to share resources between devices.
+If you don't set or you disable this policy, the PKU2U protocol won't be used to authenticate between peer devices, which forces users to follow domain-defined access control policies. This is a valid configuration in *on-premises only* environments. Please be aware that some roles/features (such as Failover Clustering) do not utilize a domain account for its PKU2U authentication and will cease to function properly when disabling this policy.
+
+If you enable this policy in a hybrid environment, you allow your users to authenticate by using certificates issued by Azure AD and their online identity between the corresponding devices. This configuration allows users to share resources between such devices. Without enabling this policy, remote connections to an Azure AD joined device will not work.
-Please be aware that some roles/features (such as Failover Clustering) do not utilize a domain account for its PKU2U authentication and will cease to function properly when disabling this policy.
## Related topics
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/TOC.yml b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/TOC.yml
index eaf0d1aa66..2a9d13497a 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/TOC.yml
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/TOC.yml
@@ -21,9 +21,7 @@
href: select-types-of-rules-to-create.md
items:
- name: Allow apps installed by a managed installer
- href: use-windows-defender-application-control-with-managed-installer.md
- - name: Configure managed installer rules
- href: configure-wdac-managed-installer.md
+ href: configure-authorized-apps-deployed-with-a-managed-installer.md
- name: Allow reputable apps with Intelligent Security Graph (ISG)
href: use-windows-defender-application-control-with-intelligent-security-graph.md
- name: Allow COM object registration
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/applocker-overview.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/applocker-overview.md
index b7dcbcddd8..29d54546be 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/applocker-overview.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/applocker-overview.md
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ The following are examples of scenarios in which AppLocker can be used:
- In addition to other measures, you need to control the access to sensitive data through app usage.
> [!NOTE]
-> AppLocker is a defense-in-depth security feature and **not** a [security boundary](https://www.microsoft.com/msrc/windows-security-servicing-criteria). [Windows Defender Application Control](https://www.microsoft.com/msrc/windows-security-servicing-criteria) should be used when the goal is to provide robust protection against a threat and there are expected to be no by-design limitations that would prevent the security feature from achieving this goal.
+> AppLocker is a defense-in-depth security feature and not a [security boundary](https://www.microsoft.com/msrc/windows-security-servicing-criteria). [Windows Defender Application Control](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/wdac-and-applocker-overview) should be used when the goal is to provide robust protection against a threat and there are expected to be no by-design limitations that would prevent the security feature from achieving this goal.
AppLocker can help you protect the digital assets within your organization, reduce the threat of malicious software being introduced into your environment, and improve the management of application control and the maintenance of application control policies.
@@ -143,4 +143,3 @@ For reference in your security planning, the following table identifies the base
| [AppLocker design guide](applocker-policies-design-guide.md) | This topic for the IT professional introduces the design and planning steps required to deploy application control policies by using AppLocker. |
| [AppLocker deployment guide](applocker-policies-deployment-guide.md) | This topic for IT professionals introduces the concepts and describes the steps required to deploy AppLocker policies. |
| [AppLocker technical reference](applocker-technical-reference.md) | This overview topic for IT professionals provides links to the topics in the technical reference. |
-
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/audit-and-enforce-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/audit-and-enforce-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c1d7ac7c71
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/audit-and-enforce-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+---
+title: Use audit events to create then enforce WDAC policy rules (Windows 10)
+description: Learn how audits allow admins to discover apps, binaries, and scripts that should be added to a WDAC policy, then learn how to switch that WDAC policy from audit to enforced mode.
+keywords: security, malware
+ms.assetid: 8d6e0474-c475-411b-b095-1c61adb2bdbb
+ms.prod: m365-security
+ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
+ms.sitesec: library
+ms.pagetype: security
+ms.localizationpriority: medium
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+author: jsuther1974
+ms.reviewer: jogeurte
+ms.author: dansimp
+manager: dansimp
+ms.date: 05/03/2021
+ms.technology: mde
+---
+
+# Use audit events to create WDAC policy rules and Convert **base** policy from audits to enforced
+
+**Applies to:**
+
+- Windows 10
+- Windows Server 2016 and above
+
+Running Application Control in audit mode lets you discover applications, binaries, and scripts that are missing from your WDAC policy but should be included.
+
+While a WDAC policy is running in audit mode, any binary that runs but would have been denied is logged in the **Applications and Services Logs\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CodeIntegrity\\Operational** event log. Script and MSI are logged in the **Applications and Services Logs\\Microsoft\\Windows\\AppLocker\\MSI and Script** event log. These events can be used to generate a new WDAC policy that can be merged with the original Base policy or deployed as a separate Supplemental policy, if allowed.
+
+## Overview of the process to create WDAC policy to allow apps using audit events
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> You must have already deployed a WDAC audit mode policy to use this process. If you have not already done so, see [Deploying Windows Defender Application Control policies](windows-defender-application-control-deployment-guide.md).
+
+To familiarize yourself with creating WDAC rules from audit events, follow these steps on a device with a WDAC audit mode policy.
+
+1. Install and run an application not allowed by the WDAC policy but that you want to allow.
+
+2. Review the **CodeIntegrity - Operational** and **AppLocker - MSI and Script** event logs to confirm events, like those shown in Figure 1, are generated related to the application. For information about the types of events you should see, refer to [Understanding Application Control events](event-id-explanations.md).
+
+ **Figure 1. Exceptions to the deployed WDAC policy**
+
+ 
+
+3. In an elevated PowerShell session, run the following commands to initialize variables used by this procedure. This procedure builds upon the **Lamna_FullyManagedClients_Audit.xml** policy introduced in [Create a WDAC policy for fully managed devices](create-wdac-policy-for-fully-managed-devices.md) and will produce a new policy called **EventsPolicy.xml**.
+
+ ```powershell
+ $PolicyName= "Lamna_FullyManagedClients_Audit"
+ $LamnaPolicy=$env:userprofile+"\Desktop\"+$PolicyName+".xml"
+ $EventsPolicy=$env:userprofile+"\Desktop\EventsPolicy.xml"
+ $EventsPolicyWarnings=$env:userprofile+"\Desktop\EventsPolicyWarnings.txt"
+ ```
+
+4. Use [New-CIPolicy](/powershell/module/configci/new-cipolicy) to generate a new WDAC policy from logged audit events. This example uses a **FilePublisher** file rule level and a **Hash** fallback level. Warning messages are redirected to a text file **EventsPolicyWarnings.txt**.
+
+ ```powershell
+ New-CIPolicy -FilePath $EventsPolicy -Audit -Level FilePublisher -Fallback Hash –UserPEs -MultiplePolicyFormat 3> $EventsPolicyWarnings
+ ```
+
+ > [!NOTE]
+ > When you create policies from audit events, you should carefully consider the file rule level that you select to trust. The preceding example uses the **FilePublisher** rule level with a fallback level of **Hash**, which may be more specific than desired. You can re-run the above command using different **-Level** and **-Fallback** options to meet your needs. For more information about WDAC rule levels, see [Understand WDAC policy rules and file rules](select-types-of-rules-to-create.md).
+
+5. Find and review the WDAC policy file **EventsPolicy.xml** that should be found on your desktop. Ensure that it only includes file and signer rules for applications, binaries, and scripts you wish to allow. You can remove rules by manually editing the policy XML or use the WDAC Policy Wizard tool (see [Editing existing base and supplemental WDAC policies with the Wizard](wdac-wizard-editing-policy.md)).
+
+6. Find and review the text file **EventsPolicyWarnings.txt** that should be found on your desktop. This file will include a warning for any files that WDAC couldn't create a rule for at either the specified rule level or fallback rule level.
+
+ > [!NOTE]
+ > New-CIPolicy only creates rules for files that can still be found on disk. Files which are no longer present on the system will not have a rule created to allow them. However, the event log should have sufficient information to allow these files by manually editing the policy XML to add rules. You can use an existing rule as a template and verify your results against the WDAC policy schema definition found at **%windir%\schemas\CodeIntegrity\cipolicy.xsd**.
+
+7. Merge **EventsPolicy.xml** with the Base policy **Lamna_FullyManagedClients_Audit.xml** or convert it to a supplemental policy.
+
+ For information on merging policies, refer to [Merge Windows Defender Application Control policies](merge-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md) and for information on supplemental policies see [Use multiple Windows Defender Application Control Policies](deploy-multiple-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md).
+
+8. Convert the Base or Supplemental policy to binary and deploy using your preferred method.
+
+## Convert WDAC **BASE** policy from audit to enforced
+
+As described in [common WDAC deployment scenarios](types-of-devices.md), we'll use the example of **Lamna Healthcare Company (Lamna)** to illustrate this scenario. Lamna is attempting to adopt stronger application policies, including the use of application control to prevent unwanted or unauthorized applications from running on their managed devices.
+
+**Alice Pena** is the IT team lead responsible for Lamna's WDAC rollout.
+
+Alice previously created and deployed a policy for the organization's [fully managed devices](create-wdac-policy-for-fully-managed-devices.md). They updated the policy based on audit event data as described in [Use audit events to create WDAC policy rules](audit-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md) and redeployed it. All remaining audit events are as expected and Alice is ready to switch to enforcement mode.
+
+1. Initialize the variables that will be used and create the enforced policy by copying the audit version.
+
+ ```powershell
+ $EnforcedPolicyName = "Lamna_FullyManagedClients_Enforced"
+ $AuditPolicyXML = $env:USERPROFILE+"\Desktop\Lamna_FullyManagedClients_Audit.xml"
+ $EnforcedPolicyXML = $env:USERPROFILE+"\Desktop\"+$EnforcedPolicyName+".xml"
+ cp $AuditPolicyXML $EnforcedPolicyXML
+ ```
+
+2. Use [Set-CIPolicyIdInfo](/powershell/module/configci/set-cipolicyidinfo) to give the new policy a unique ID, and descriptive name. Changing the ID and name lets you deploy the enforced policy side by side with the audit policy. Do this step if you plan to harden your WDAC policy over time. If you prefer to replace the audit policy in-place, you can skip this step.
+
+ ```powershell
+ $EnforcedPolicyID = Set-CIPolicyIdInfo -FilePath $EnforcedPolicyXML -PolicyName $EnforcedPolicyName -ResetPolicyID
+ $EnforcedPolicyID = $EnforcedPolicyID.Substring(11)
+ ```
+
+ > [!NOTE]
+ > If Set-CIPolicyIdInfo does not output the new PolicyID value on your Windows 10 version, you will need to obtain the *PolicyId* value from the XML directly.
+
+3. *[Optionally]* Use [Set-RuleOption](/powershell/module/configci/set-ruleoption) to enable rule options 9 (“Advanced Boot Options Menu”) and 10 (“Boot Audit on Failure”). Option 9 allows users to disable WDAC enforcement for a single boot session from a pre-boot menu. Option 10 instructs Windows to switch the policy from enforcement to audit only if a boot critical kernel-mode driver is blocked. We strongly recommend these options when deploying a new enforced policy to your first deployment ring. Then, if no issues are found, you can remove the options and restart your deployment.
+
+ ```powershell
+ Set-RuleOption -FilePath $EnforcedPolicyXML -Option 9
+ Set-RuleOption -FilePath $EnforcedPolicyXML -Option 10
+ ```
+
+4. Use Set-RuleOption to delete the audit mode rule option, which changes the policy to enforcement:
+
+ ```powershell
+ Set-RuleOption -FilePath $EnforcedPolicyXML -Option 3 -Delete
+ ```
+
+5. Use [ConvertFrom-CIPolicy](/powershell/module/configci/convertfrom-cipolicy) to convert the new WDAC policy to binary:
+
+ > [!NOTE]
+ > If you did not use -ResetPolicyID in Step 2 above, then you must replace $EnforcedPolicyID in the following command with the *PolicyID* attribute found in your base policy XML.
+
+ ```powershell
+ $EnforcedPolicyBinary = $env:USERPROFILE+"\Desktop\"+$EnforcedPolicyName+"_"+$EnforcedPolicyID+".xml"
+ ConvertFrom-CIPolicy $EnforcedPolicyXML $EnforcedPolicyBinary
+ ```
+
+## Make copies of any needed **supplemental** policies to use with the enforced base policy
+
+Since the enforced policy was given a unique PolicyID in the previous procedure, you need to duplicate any needed supplemental policies to use with the enforced policy. Supplemental policies always inherit the Audit or Enforcement mode from the base policy they modify. If you didn't reset the enforcement base policy's PolicyID, you can skip this procedure.
+
+1. Initialize the variables that will be used and create a copy of the current supplemental policy. Some variables and files from the previous procedure will also be used.
+
+ ```powershell
+ $SupplementalPolicyName = "Lamna_Supplemental1"
+ $CurrentSupplementalPolicy = $env:USERPROFILE+"\Desktop\"+$SupplementalPolicyName+"_Audit.xml"
+ $EnforcedSupplementalPolicy = $env:USERPROFILE+"\Desktop\"+$SupplementalPolicyName+"_Enforced.xml"
+ ```
+
+2. Use [Set-CIPolicyIdInfo](/powershell/module/configci/set-cipolicyidinfo) to give the new supplemental policy a unique ID and descriptive name, and change which base policy to supplement.
+
+ ```powershell
+ $SupplementalPolicyID = Set-CIPolicyIdInfo -FilePath $EnforcedSupplementalPolicy -PolicyName $SupplementalPolicyName -SupplementsBasePolicyID $EnforcedPolicyID -BasePolicyToSupplementPath $EnforcedPolicyXML -ResetPolicyID
+ $SupplementalPolicyID = $SupplementalPolicyID.Substring(11)
+ ```
+
+ > [!NOTE]
+ > If Set-CIPolicyIdInfo does not output the new PolicyID value on your Windows 10 version, you will need to obtain the *PolicyId* value from the XML directly.
+
+3. Use [ConvertFrom-CIPolicy](/powershell/module/configci/convertfrom-cipolicy) to convert the new WDAC supplemental policy to binary:
+
+ ```powershell
+ $EnforcedSuppPolicyBinary = $env:USERPROFILE+"\Desktop\"+$SupplementalPolicyName+"_"+$SupplementalPolicyID+".xml"
+ ConvertFrom-CIPolicy $EnforcedSupplementalPolicy $EnforcedSuppPolicyBinary
+ ```
+
+4. Repeat the steps above if you have other supplemental policies to update.
+
+## Deploy your enforced policy and supplemental policies
+
+Now that your base policy is in enforced mode, you can begin to deploy it to your managed endpoints. For information about deploying policies, see [Deploying Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) policies](windows-defender-application-control-deployment-guide.md).
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/configure-authorized-apps-deployed-with-a-managed-installer.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/configure-authorized-apps-deployed-with-a-managed-installer.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6612e9fbf7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/configure-authorized-apps-deployed-with-a-managed-installer.md
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+---
+title: Configure authorized apps deployed with a WDAC managed installer (Windows 10)
+description: Explains how to configure a custom Manged Installer.
+keywords: security, malware
+ms.assetid: 8d6e0474-c475-411b-b095-1c61adb2bdbb
+ms.prod: m365-security
+ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
+ms.sitesec: library
+ms.pagetype: security
+ms.localizationpriority: medium
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
+author: jsuther1974
+ms.reviewer: isbrahm
+ms.author: dansimp
+manager: dansimp
+ms.date: 08/14/2020
+ms.technology: mde
+---
+
+# Configuring authorized apps deployed by a managed installer with AppLocker and Windows Defender Application Control
+
+**Applies to:**
+
+- Windows 10
+- Windows Server 2019
+
+Windows 10, version 1703 introduced a new option for Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC), called managed installer, that helps balance security and manageability when enforcing application control policies. This option lets you automatically allow applications installed by a designated software distribution solution such as Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager.
+
+## How does a managed installer work?
+
+A new rule collection in AppLocker specifies binaries that are trusted by the organization as an authorized source for application deployment. When one of these binaries runs, Windows will monitor the binary's process (and processes it launches) then tag all files it writes as having originated from a managed installer. The managed installer rule collection is configured using Group Policy and can be applied with the Set-AppLockerPolicy PowerShell cmdlet. You can't currently set managed installers with the AppLocker CSP through MDM.
+
+Having defined your managed installers using AppLocker, you can then configure WDAC to trust files installed by a managed installer by adding the "Enabled:Managed Installer" option to your WDAC policy. Once that option is set, WDAC will check for managed installer origin information when determining whether or not to allow a binary to run. As long as there are no deny rules present for the file, WDAC will allow a file to run based on its managed installer origin.
+
+You should ensure that the WDAC policy allows the system/boot components and any other authorized applications that can't be deployed through a managed installer.
+
+## Security considerations with managed installer
+
+Since managed installer is a heuristic-based mechanism, it doesn't provide the same security guarantees that explicit allow or deny rules do.
+It is best suited for use where each user operates as a standard user and where all software is deployed and installed by a software distribution solution, such as Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (MEMCM).
+
+Users with administrator privileges, or malware running as an administrator user on the system, may be able to circumvent the intent of Windows Defender Application Control when the managed installer option is allowed.
+
+If a managed installer process runs in the context of a user with standard privileges, then it is possible that standard users or malware running as standard user may be able to circumvent the intent of Windows Defender Application Control.
+
+Some application installers may automatically run the application at the end of the installation process. If this happens when the installer is run by a managed installer, then the managed installer's heuristic tracking and authorization will extend to all files created during the first run of the application. This could result in over-authorization for executables that were not intended. To avoid that outcome, ensure that the application deployment solution used as a managed installer limits running applications as part of installation.
+
+## Known limitations with managed installer
+
+- Application control, based on managed installer, does not support applications that self-update. If an application deployed by a managed installer later updates itself, the updated application files won't include the managed installer origin information, and may not be able to run. When you rely on managed installers, you must deploy and install all application updates using a managed installer, or include rules to authorize the app in the WDAC policy. In some cases, it may be possible to also designate an application binary that performs self-updates as a managed installer. Proper review for functionality and security should be performed for the application before using this method.
+
+- [Packaged apps (MSIX)](/windows/msix/) deployed through a managed installer aren't tracked by the managed installer heuristic and will need to be separately authorized in your WDAC policy. See [Manage packaged apps with WDAC](manage-packaged-apps-with-windows-defender-application-control.md).
+
+- Some applications or installers may extract, download, or generate binaries and immediately attempt to run them. Files run by such a process may not be allowed by the managed installer heuristic. In some cases, it may be possible to also designate an application binary that performs such an operation as a managed installer. Proper review for functionality and security should be performed for the application before using this method.
+
+- The managed installer heuristic doesn't authorize kernel drivers. The WDAC policy must have rules that allow the necessary drivers to run.
+
+## Configuring the managed installer
+
+Setting up managed installer tracking and application execution enforcement requires applying both an AppLocker and WDAC policy, with specific rules and options enabled.
+There are three primary steps to keep in mind:
+
+- Specify managed installers, by using the Managed Installer rule collection in AppLocker policy.
+- Enable service enforcement in AppLocker policy.
+- Enable the managed installer option in a WDAC policy.
+
+## Specify managed installers using the Managed Installer rule collection in AppLocker policy
+
+The identity of the managed installer executable(s) is specified in an AppLocker policy, in a Managed Installer rule collection.
+
+### Create Managed Installer rule collection
+
+Currently, neither the AppLocker policy creation UI in GPO Editor nor the PowerShell cmdlets allow for directly specifying rules for the Managed Installer rule collection. However, you can use a text editor to make the simple changes needed to an EXE or DLL rule collection policy, to specify Type="ManagedInstaller", so that the new rule can be imported into a GPO.
+
+1. Use [New-AppLockerPolicy](/powershell/module/applocker/new-applockerpolicy?view=win10-ps) to make an EXE rule for the file you are designating as a managed installer. Note that only EXE file types can be designated as managed installers. Below is an example using the rule type Publisher with a hash fallback but other rule types can be used as well. You may need to reformat the output for readability.
+
+ ```powershell
+ Get-ChildItem | Get-AppLockerFileInformation | New-AppLockerPolicy -RuleType Publisher, Hash -User Everyone -Xml > AppLocker_MI_PS_ISE.xml
+ ```
+
+2. Manually rename the rule collection to ManagedInstaller
+
+ Change
+
+ ```powershell
+
+ ```
+
+ to
+
+ ```powershell
+
+ ```
+
+An example of a valid Managed Installer rule collection using Microsoft Endpoint Config Manager (MEMCM) is shown below.
+
+```xml
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+```
+
+### Enable service enforcement in AppLocker policy
+
+Since many installation processes rely on services, it is typically necessary to enable tracking of services.
+Correct tracking of services requires the presence of at least one rule in the rule collection. So, a simple audit only rule will suffice. This can be added to the policy created above, which specifies your managed installer rule collection.
+
+For example:
+
+```xml
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+```
+
+## Enable the managed installer option in WDAC policy
+
+In order to enable trust for the binaries laid down by managed installers, the "Enabled: Managed Installer" option must be specified in your WDAC policy.
+This can be done by using the [Set-RuleOption cmdlet](/powershell/module/configci/set-ruleoption) with Option 13.
+
+Below are steps to create a WDAC policy which allows Windows to boot and enables the managed installer option.
+
+1. Copy the DefaultWindows_Audit policy into your working folder from "C:\Windows\schemas\CodeIntegrity\ExamplePolicies\DefaultWindows_Audit.xml"
+
+2. Reset the policy ID to ensure it is in multiple policy format, and give it a different GUID from the example policies. Also, give it a friendly name to help with identification.
+
+ For example:
+
+ ```powershell
+ Set-CIPolicyIdInfo -FilePath -PolicyName "" -ResetPolicyID
+ ```
+
+3. Set Option 13 (Enabled:Managed Installer)
+
+ ```powershell
+ Set-RuleOption -FilePath -Option 13
+ ```
+
+## Set the AppLocker filter driver to autostart
+
+To enable the managed installer, you need to set the AppLocker filter driver to autostart, and start it.
+
+To do so, run the following command as an Administrator:
+
+```console
+appidtel.exe start [-mionly]
+```
+
+Specify "-mionly" if you will not use the Intelligent Security Graph (ISG).
+
+## Enabling managed installer logging events
+
+Refer to [Understanding Application Control Events](event-id-explanations.md#optional-intelligent-security-graph-isg-or-managed-installer-mi-diagnostic-events) for information on enabling optional managed installer diagnostic events.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/create-wdac-policy-for-fully-managed-devices.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/create-wdac-policy-for-fully-managed-devices.md
index 8399532bab..cceb8da77d 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/create-wdac-policy-for-fully-managed-devices.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/create-wdac-policy-for-fully-managed-devices.md
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ Alice has defined a policy for Lamna's fully-managed devices that makes some tra
Possible mitigations:
- Use signed WDAC policies and UEFI BIOS access protection to prevent tampering of WDAC policies.
- **Managed installer**
- See [security considerations with managed installer](use-windows-defender-application-control-with-managed-installer.md#security-considerations-with-managed-installer)
+ See [security considerations with managed installer](configure-authorized-apps-deployed-with-a-managed-installer.md#security-considerations-with-managed-installer)
Existing mitigations applied:
- Limit who can elevate to administrator on the device.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/create-wdac-policy-for-lightly-managed-devices.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/create-wdac-policy-for-lightly-managed-devices.md
index 08e82cbe13..c4dabcde4c 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/create-wdac-policy-for-lightly-managed-devices.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/create-wdac-policy-for-lightly-managed-devices.md
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ In order to minimize user productivity impact, Alice has defined a policy that m
- Use signed WDAC policies and UEFI BIOS access protection to prevent tampering of WDAC policies.
- Limit who can elevate to administrator on the device.
- **Managed installer**
- See [security considerations with managed installer](use-windows-defender-application-control-with-managed-installer.md#security-considerations-with-managed-installer)
+ See [security considerations with managed installer](configure-authorized-apps-deployed-with-a-managed-installer.md#security-considerations-with-managed-installer)
Possible mitigations:
- Create and deploy signed catalog files as part of the app deployment process in order to remove the requirement for managed installer.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/deploy-multiple-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/deploy-multiple-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md
index 80ef49b096..1f9364ad64 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/deploy-multiple-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/deploy-multiple-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md
@@ -101,7 +101,11 @@ To deploy policies locally using the new multiple policy format, follow these st
### Deploying multiple policies via ApplicationControl CSP
-Multiple WDAC policies can be managed from an MDM server through ApplicationControl configuration service provider (CSP). The CSP also provides support for rebootless policy deployment. See [ApplicationControl CSP](/windows/client-management/mdm/applicationcontrol-csp) for more information on deploying multiple policies, optionally using MEM Intune's Custom OMA-URI capability.
+Multiple WDAC policies can be managed from an MDM server through ApplicationControl configuration service provider (CSP). The CSP also provides support for rebootless policy deployment.
+
+However, when policies are un-enrolled from an MDM server, the CSP will attempt to remove every policy from devices, not just the policies added by the CSP. The reason for this is that the ApplicationControl CSP doesn't track enrollment sources for individual policies, even though it will query all policies on a device, regardless if they were deployed by the CSP.
+
+See [ApplicationControl CSP](/windows/client-management/mdm/applicationcontrol-csp) for more information on deploying multiple policies, optionally using MEM Intune's Custom OMA-URI capability.
> [!NOTE]
> WMI and GP do not currently support multiple policies. Instead, customers who cannot directly access the MDM stack should use the [ApplicationControl CSP via the MDM Bridge WMI Provider](/windows/client-management/mdm/applicationcontrol-csp#powershell-and-wmi-bridge-usage-guidance) to manage Multiple Policy Format WDAC policies.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/deployment/deploy-wdac-policies-with-memcm.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/deployment/deploy-wdac-policies-with-memcm.md
index 73357d0809..c5fd34e870 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/deployment/deploy-wdac-policies-with-memcm.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/deployment/deploy-wdac-policies-with-memcm.md
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ MEMCM includes native support for WDAC, which allows you to configure Windows 10
- [Optional] Reputable apps as defined by the Intelligent Security Graph (ISG)
- [Optional] Apps and executables already installed in admin-definable folder locations that MEMCM will allow through a one-time scan during policy creation on managed endpoints.
+Note that MEMCM does not remove policies once deployed. To stop enforcement, you should switch the policy to audit mode, which will produce the same effect. If you want to disable WDAC altogether (including audit mode), you can deploy a script to delete the policy file from disk, and either trigger a reboot or wait for the next reboot.
+
For more information on using MEMCM's native WDAC policies, see [Windows Defender Application Control management with Configuration Manager](/mem/configmgr/protect/deploy-use/use-device-guard-with-configuration-manager)
## Deploy custom WDAC policies using Packages/Programs or Task Sequences
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/deployment/deploy-wdac-policies-with-script.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/deployment/deploy-wdac-policies-with-script.md
index 3aed014401..ca2d5fed65 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/deployment/deploy-wdac-policies-with-script.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/deployment/deploy-wdac-policies-with-script.md
@@ -52,6 +52,20 @@ This topic describes how to deploy Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) p
& $RefreshPolicyTool
```
+### Deploying signed policies
+
+In addition to the steps outlined above, the binary policy file must also be copied to the device's EFI partition. Deploying your policy via [MEM](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/deploy-windows-defender-application-control-policies-using-intune) or the Application Control CSP will handle this step automatically.
+
+1. Mount the EFI volume and make the directory, if it does not exist, in an elevated PowerShell prompt:
+```powershell
+mountvol J: /S
+J:
+mkdir J:\EFI\Microsoft\Boot\CiPolicies\Active
+```
+
+2. Copy the signed policy binary as `{PolicyGUID}.cip` to J:\EFI\Microsoft\Boot\CiPolicies\Active
+3. Reboot the system.
+
## Script-based deployment process for Windows 10 versions earlier than 1903
1. Initialize the variables to be used by the script.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/enforce-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/enforce-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md
index 784baf06c2..6c3b04eb5a 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/enforce-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/enforce-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md
@@ -52,8 +52,6 @@ Alice previously created and deployed a policy for the organization's [fully man
$EnforcedPolicyID = $EnforcedPolicyID.Substring(11)
```
- > [!NOTE]
- > If Set-CIPolicyIdInfo does not output the new PolicyID value on your Windows 10 version, you will need to obtain the *PolicyId* value from the XML directly.
3. *[Optionally]* Use [Set-RuleOption](/powershell/module/configci/set-ruleoption) to enable rule options 9 (“Advanced Boot Options Menu”) and 10 (“Boot Audit on Failure”). Option 9 allows users to disable WDAC enforcement for a single boot session from a pre-boot menu. Option 10 instructs Windows to switch the policy from enforcement to audit only if a boot critical kernel-mode driver is blocked. We strongly recommend these options when deploying a new enforced policy to your first deployment ring. Then, if no issues are found, you can remove the options and restart your deployment.
@@ -74,7 +72,7 @@ Alice previously created and deployed a policy for the organization's [fully man
> If you did not use -ResetPolicyID in Step 2 above, then you must replace $EnforcedPolicyID in the following command with the *PolicyID* attribute found in your base policy XML.
```powershell
- $EnforcedPolicyBinary = $env:USERPROFILE+"\Desktop\"+$EnforcedPolicyName+"_"+$EnforcedPolicyID+".xml"
+ $EnforcedPolicyBinary = $env:USERPROFILE+"\Desktop\"+$EnforcedPolicyID+".cip"
ConvertFrom-CIPolicy $EnforcedPolicyXML $EnforcedPolicyBinary
```
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/event-id-explanations.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/event-id-explanations.md
index b464707f61..6ac3422250 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/event-id-explanations.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/event-id-explanations.md
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ author: jsuther1974
ms.reviewer: isbrahm
ms.author: dansimp
manager: dansimp
-ms.date: 3/17/2020
+ms.date: 06/02/2021
ms.technology: mde
---
@@ -22,45 +22,49 @@ ms.technology: mde
A Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) policy logs events locally in Windows Event Viewer in either enforced or audit mode. These events are generated under two locations:
- - Event IDs beginning with 30 appear in Applications and Services logs – Microsoft – Windows – CodeIntegrity – Operational
+- Event IDs beginning with 30 appear in **Applications and Services logs** > **Microsoft** > **Windows** > **CodeIntegrity** > **Operational**
- - Event IDs beginning with 80 appear in Applications and Services logs – Microsoft – Windows – AppLocker – MSI and Script
+- Event IDs beginning with 80 appear in **Applications and Services logs** > **Microsoft** > **Windows** > **AppLocker** > **MSI and Script**
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> These event IDs are not applicable on Windows Server Core edition.
## Microsoft Windows CodeIntegrity Operational log event IDs
| Event ID | Explanation |
-|----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+|--------|-----------|
| 3076 | Audit executable/dll file |
| 3077 | Block executable/dll file |
-| 3089 | Signing information event correlated with either a 3076 or 3077 event. One 3089 event is generated for each signature of a file. Contains the total number of signatures on a file and an index as to which signature it is.
Unsigned files will generate a single 3089 event with TotalSignatureCount 0. Correlated in the "System" portion of the event data under "Correlation ActivityID". |
+| 3089 | Signing information event correlated with either a 3076 or 3077 event. One 3089 event is generated for each signature of a file. Contains the total number of signatures on a file and an index as to which signature it is. Unsigned files will generate a single 3089 event with TotalSignatureCount 0. Correlated in the "System" portion of the event data under "Correlation ActivityID". |
| 3099 | Indicates that a policy has been loaded |
-## Microsoft Windows Applocker MSI and Script log event IDs
+## Microsoft Windows AppLocker MSI and Script log event IDs
| Event ID | Explanation |
-|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
-| 8028 | Audit script/MSI file generated by Windows LockDown Policy (WLDP) being called by the scripthosts themselves. Note: there is no WDAC enforcement on 3rd party scripthosts. |
+|--------|-----------|
+| 8028 | Audit script/MSI file generated by Windows LockDown Policy (WLDP) being called by the script hosts themselves. Note: there is no WDAC enforcement on third-party script hosts. |
| 8029 | Block script/MSI file |
-| 8038 | Signing information event correlated with either a 8028 or 8029 event. One 8038 event is generated for each signature of a script file. Contains the total number of signatures on a script file and an index as to which signature it is. Unsigned script files will generate a single 8038 event with TotalSignatureCount 0. Correlated in the "System" portion of the event data under "Correlation ActivityID". | |
+| 8036| COM object was blocked. To learn more about COM object authorization, see [Allow COM object registration in a Windows Defender Application Control policy](allow-com-object-registration-in-windows-defender-application-control-policy.md). |
+| 8038 | Signing information event correlated with either an 8028 or 8029 event. One 8038 event is generated for each signature of a script file. Contains the total number of signatures on a script file and an index as to which signature it is. Unsigned script files will generate a single 8038 event with TotalSignatureCount 0. Correlated in the "System" portion of the event data under "Correlation ActivityID". | |
## Optional Intelligent Security Graph (ISG) or Managed Installer (MI) diagnostic events
-If either the ISG or MI is enabled in a WDAC policy, you can optionally choose to enable 3090, 3091, and 3092 events to provide additional diagnostic information.
+If either the ISG or MI is enabled in a WDAC policy, you can optionally choose to enable 3090, 3091, and 3092 events to provide more diagnostic information.
| Event ID | Explanation |
-|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+|--------|---------|
| 3090 | Allow executable/dll file |
| 3091 | Audit executable/dll file |
| 3092 | Block executable/dll file |
-3090, 3091, and 3092 events are generated based on the status code of whether a binary passed the policy, regardless of what reputation it was given or whether it was allowed by a designated MI. The SmartLocker template which appears in the event should indicate why the binary passed/failed. Only one event is generated per binary pass/fail. If both ISG and MI are disabled, 3090, 3091, and 3092 events will not be generated.
+3090, 3091, and 3092 events are generated based on the status code of whether a binary passed the policy, regardless of what reputation it was given or whether it was allowed by a designated MI. The SmartLocker template that appears in the event should indicate why the binary passed/failed. Only one event is generated per binary pass/fail. If both ISG and MI are disabled, 3090, 3091, and 3092 events will not be generated.
### SmartLocker template
-Below are the fields which help to diagnose what a 3090, 3091, or 3092 event indicates.
+Below are the fields that help to diagnose what a 3090, 3091, or 3092 event indicates.
| Name | Explanation |
-|-------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+|------|------|
| StatusCode | STATUS_SUCCESS indicates a binary passed the active WDAC policies. If so, a 3090 event is generated. If not, a 3091 event is generated if the blocking policy is in audit mode, and a 3092 event is generated if the policy is in enforce mode. |
| ManagedInstallerEnabled | Policy trusts a MI |
| PassesManagedInstaller | File originated from a trusted MI |
@@ -75,9 +79,49 @@ In order to enable 3091 audit events and 3092 block events, you must create a Te
```powershell
reg add hklm\system\currentcontrolset\control\ci -v TestFlags -t REG_DWORD -d 0x100
```
-
-In order to enable 3090 allow events as well as 3091 and 3092 events, you must instead create a TestFlags regkey with a value of 0x300. You can do so using the following PowerShell command:
+
+To enable 3090 allow events, and 3091 and 3092 events, you must instead create a TestFlags regkey with a value of 0x300. You can do so using the following PowerShell command:
```powershell
reg add hklm\system\currentcontrolset\control\ci -v TestFlags -t REG_DWORD -d 0x300
```
+
+## Appendix
+A list of other relevant event IDs and their corresponding description.
+
+| Event ID | Description |
+|-------|------|
+| 3001 | An unsigned driver was attempted to load on the system. |
+| 3002 | Code Integrity could not verify the boot image as the page hash could not be found. |
+| 3004 | Code Integrity could not verify the file as the page hash could not be found. |
+| 3010 | The catalog containing the signature for the file under validation is invalid. |
+| 3011 | Code Integrity finished loading the signature catalog. |
+| 3012 | Code Integrity started loading the signature catalog. |
+| 3023 | The driver file under validation did not meet the requirements to pass the application control policy. |
+| 3024 | Windows application control was unable to refresh the boot catalog file. |
+| 3026 | The catalog loaded is signed by a signing certificate that has been revoked by Microsoft and/or the certificate issuing authority. |
+| 3033 | The file under validation did not meet the requirements to pass the application control policy. |
+| 3034 | The file under validation would not meet the requirements to pass the application control policy if the policy was enforced. The file was allowed since the policy is in audit mode. |
+| 3036 | The signed file under validation is signed by a code signing certificate that has been revoked by Microsoft or the certificate issuing authority. |
+| 3064 | If the policy was enforced, a user mode DLL under validation would not meet the requirements to pass the application control policy. The DLL was allowed since the policy is in audit mode. |
+| 3065 | [Ignored] If the policy was enforced, a user mode DLL under validation would not meet the requirements to pass the application control policy. |
+| 3074 | Page hash failure while hypervisor-protected code integrity was enabled. |
+| 3075 | This event monitors the performance of the Code Integrity policy check a file. |
+| 3079 | The file under validation did not meet the requirements to pass the application control policy. |
+| 3080 | If the policy was in enforced mode, the file under validation would not have met the requirements to pass the application control policy. |
+| 3081 | The file under validation did not meet the requirements to pass the application control policy. |
+| 3082 | If the policy was in enforced mode, the non-WHQL driver would have been denied by the policy. |
+| 3084 | Code Integrity will enforce the WHQL Required policy setting on this session. |
+| 3085 | Code Integrity will not enforce the WHQL Required policy setting on this session. |
+| 3086 | The file under validation does not meet the signing requirements for an isolated user mode (IUM) process. |
+| 3095 | This Code Integrity policy cannot be refreshed and must be rebooted instead. |
+| 3097 | The Code Integrity policy cannot be refreshed. |
+| 3100 | The application control policy was refreshed but was unsuccessfully activated. Retry. |
+| 3101 | Code Integrity started refreshing the policy. |
+| 3102 | Code Integrity finished refreshing the policy. |
+| 3103 | Code Integrity is ignoring the policy refresh. |
+| 3104 | The file under validation does not meet the signing requirements for a PPL (protected process light) process. |
+| 3105 | Code Integrity is attempting to refresh the policy. |
+| 3108 | Windows mode change event was successful. |
+| 3110 | Windows mode change event was unsuccessful. |
+| 3111 | The file under validation did not meet the hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI) policy. |
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/event-tag-explanations.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/event-tag-explanations.md
index 6ee1d70486..2ae5aa34a4 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/event-tag-explanations.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/event-tag-explanations.md
@@ -27,13 +27,14 @@ Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) events include a number of fields wh
Represents the type of signature which verified the image.
| SignatureType Value | Explanation |
-|----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+|---|----------|
| 0 | Unsigned or verification has not been attempted |
| 1 | Embedded signature |
| 2 | Cached signature; presence of CI EA shows that file had been previously verified |
+| 3 | Cached catalog verified via Catalog Database or searching catalog directly |
| 4 | Un-cached catalog verified via Catalog Database or searching catalog directly |
| 5 | Successfully verified using an EA that informs CI which catalog to try first |
-|6 | AppX / MSIX package catalog verified |
+| 6 | AppX / MSIX package catalog verified |
| 7 | File was verified |
## ValidatedSigningLevel
@@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ Represents the type of signature which verified the image.
Represents the signature level at which the code was verified.
| ValidatedSigningLevel Value | Explanation |
-|----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+|---|----------|
| 0 | Signing level has not yet been checked |
| 1 | File is unsigned |
| 2 | Trusted by WDAC policy |
@@ -60,16 +61,22 @@ Represents the signature level at which the code was verified.
Represents why verification failed, or if it succeeded.
| VerificationError Value | Explanation |
-|----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+|---|----------|
| 0 | Successfully verified signature |
+| 1 | File has an invalid hash |
| 2 | File contains shared writable sections |
+| 3 | File is not signed|
| 4 | Revoked signature |
| 5 | Expired signature |
+| 6 | File is signed using a weak hashing algorithm which does not meet the minimum policy |
| 7 | Invalid root certificate |
| 8 | Signature was unable to be validated; generic error |
| 9 | Signing time not trusted |
+| 10 | The file must be signed using page hashes for this scenario |
+| 11 | Page hash mismatch |
| 12 | Not valid for a PPL (Protected Process Light) |
| 13 | Not valid for a PP (Protected Process) |
+| 14 | The signature is missing the required ARM EKU |
| 15 | Failed WHQL check |
| 16 | Default policy signing level not met |
| 17 | Custom policy signing level not met; returned when signature doesn't validate against an SBCP-defined set of certs |
@@ -80,5 +87,36 @@ Represents why verification failed, or if it succeeded.
| 22 | Not IUM (Isolated User Mode) signed; indicates trying to load a non-trustlet binary into a trustlet |
| 23 | Invalid image hash |
| 24 | Flight root not allowed; indicates trying to run flight-signed code on production OS |
+| 25 | Anti-cheat policy violation |
| 26 | Explicitly denied by WADC policy |
+| 27 | The signing chain appears to be tampered/invalid |
| 28 | Resource page hash mismatch |
+
+## Microsoft Root CAs trusted by Windows
+
+The rule means trust anything signed by a certificate that chains to this root CA.
+
+| Root ID | Root Name |
+|---|----------|
+| 0| None |
+| 1| Unknown |
+| 2 | Self-Signed |
+| 3 | Authenticode |
+| 4 | Microsoft Product Root 1997 |
+| 5 | Microsoft Product Root 2001 |
+| 6 | Microsoft Product Root 2010 |
+| 7 | Microsoft Standard Root 2011 |
+| 8 | Microsoft Code Verification Root 2006 |
+| 9 | Microsoft Test Root 1999 |
+| 10 | Microsoft Test Root 2010 |
+| 11 | Microsoft DMD Test Root 2005 |
+| 12 | Microsoft DMDRoot 2005 |
+| 13 | Microsoft DMD Preview Root 2005 |
+| 14 | Microsoft Flight Root 2014 |
+| 15 | Microsoft Third Party Marketplace Root |
+| 16 | Microsoft ECC Testing Root CA 2017 |
+| 17 | Microsoft ECC Development Root CA 2018 |
+| 18 | Microsoft ECC Product Root CA 2018 |
+| 19 | Microsoft ECC Devices Root CA 2017 |
+
+For well-known roots, the TBS hashes for the certificates are baked into the code for WDAC. For example, they don’t need to be listed as TBS hashes in the policy file.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/feature-availability.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/feature-availability.md
index 3f411ffb3e..16dd454c61 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/feature-availability.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/feature-availability.md
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ ms.technology: mde
| Per-User and Per-User group rules | Not available (policies are device-wide) | Available on Windows 8+ |
| Kernel mode policies | Available on all Windows 10 versions | Not available |
| Per-app rules | [Available on 1703+](./use-windows-defender-application-control-policy-to-control-specific-plug-ins-add-ins-and-modules.md) | Not available |
-| Managed Installer (MI) | [Available on 1703+](./use-windows-defender-application-control-with-managed-installer.md) | Not available |
+| Managed Installer (MI) | [Available on 1703+](./configure-authorized-apps-deployed-with-a-managed-installer.md) | Not available |
| Reputation-Based intelligence | [Available on 1709+](./use-windows-defender-application-control-with-intelligent-security-graph.md) | Not available |
| Multiple policy support | [Available on 1903+](./deploy-multiple-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md) | Not available |
| Path-based rules | [Available on 1903+.](./select-types-of-rules-to-create.md#more-information-about-filepath-rules) Exclusions are not supported. Runtime user-writeability check enforced by default. | Available on Windows 8+. Exclusions are supported. No runtime user-writeability check. |
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules.md
index 887fc765be..d409657e10 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules.md
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
---
title: Microsoft recommended driver block rules (Windows 10)
-description: View a list of recommended block rules to block vulnerable third-party drivers discovered by Microsoft and the security research community.
-keywords: security, malware, kernel mode, driver
+description: View a list of recommended block rules to block vulnerable third-party drivers discovered by Microsoft and the security research community.
+keywords: security, malware, kernel mode, driver
ms.assetid: 8d6e0474-c475-411b-b095-1c61adb2bdbb
-ms.prod: m365-security
+ms.prod: w10
ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
ms.sitesec: library
ms.pagetype: security
@@ -14,8 +14,7 @@ author: jgeurten
ms.reviewer: isbrahm
ms.author: dansimp
manager: dansimp
-ms.date: 10/15/2020
-ms.technology: mde
+ms.date:
---
# Microsoft recommended driver block rules
@@ -30,7 +29,7 @@ Microsoft has strict requirements for code running in kernel. Consequently, mali
- Hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI) enabled devices
- Windows 10 in S mode (S mode) devices
-Microsoft recommends enabling [HVCI](../device-guard/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md) or S mode to protect your devices against security threats. If this is not possible, Microsoft recommends blocking the following list of drivers by merging this policy with your existing Windows Defender Application Control policy. Blocking kernel drivers without sufficient testing can result in devices or software to malfunction, and in rare cases, blue screen. It is recommended to first validate this policy in [audit mode](audit-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md) and review the audit block events.
+Microsoft recommends enabling [HVCI](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/device-guard/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity) or S mode to protect your devices against security threats. If this is not possible, Microsoft recommends blocking the following list of drivers by merging this policy with your existing Windows Defender Application Control policy. Blocking kernel drivers without sufficient testing can result in devices or software to malfunction, and in rare cases, blue screen. It is recommended to first validate this policy in [audit mode](audit-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md) and review the audit block events.
> [!Note]
> This application list will be updated with the latest vendor information as application vulnerabilities are resolved and new issues are discovered. It is recommended that this policy be first validated in audit mode before rolling the rules into enforcement mode.
@@ -127,6 +126,40 @@ Microsoft recommends enabling [HVCI](../device-guard/enable-virtualization-based
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## More information
-- [Merge Windows Defender Application Control policies](merge-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md)
\ No newline at end of file
+- [Merge Windows Defender Application Control policies](merge-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md)
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/plan-windows-defender-application-control-management.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/plan-windows-defender-application-control-management.md
index 7924b31d89..a9cd8c8585 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/plan-windows-defender-application-control-management.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/plan-windows-defender-application-control-management.md
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ In addition, we recommend using the [Set-CIPolicyVersion](/powershell/module/con
### Policy rule updates
-As new apps are deployed or existing apps are updated by the software publisher, you may need to make revisions to your rules to ensure that these apps run correctly. Whether policy rule updates are required will depend significantly on the types of rules your policy includes. Rules based on codesigning certificates provide the most resiliency against app changes while rules based on file attributes or hash are most likely to require updates when apps change. Alternatively, if you leverage WDAC [managed installer](use-windows-defender-application-control-with-managed-installer.md) functionality and consistently deploy all apps and their updates through your managed installer, then you are less likely to need policy updates.
+As new apps are deployed or existing apps are updated by the software publisher, you may need to make revisions to your rules to ensure that these apps run correctly. Whether policy rule updates are required will depend significantly on the types of rules your policy includes. Rules based on codesigning certificates provide the most resiliency against app changes while rules based on file attributes or hash are most likely to require updates when apps change. Alternatively, if you leverage WDAC [managed installer](configure-authorized-apps-deployed-with-a-managed-installer.md) functionality and consistently deploy all apps and their updates through your managed installer, then you are less likely to need policy updates.
## WDAC event management
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/select-types-of-rules-to-create.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/select-types-of-rules-to-create.md
index 1314fa6e21..ee556ecef8 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/select-types-of-rules-to-create.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/select-types-of-rules-to-create.md
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ You can set several rule options within a WDAC policy. Table 1 describes each ru
| **10 Enabled:Boot Audit on Failure** | Used when the WDAC policy is in enforcement mode. When a driver fails during startup, the WDAC policy will be placed in audit mode so that Windows will load. Administrators can validate the reason for the failure in the CodeIntegrity event log. |
| **11 Disabled:Script Enforcement** | This option disables script enforcement options. Unsigned PowerShell scripts and interactive PowerShell are no longer restricted to [Constrained Language Mode](/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_language_modes). NOTE: This option is supported on 1709, 1803, and 1809 builds with the 2019 10C LCU or higher, and on devices with the Windows 10 May 2019 Update (1903) and higher. Using it on versions of Windows 10 without the proper update may have unintended results. |
| **12 Required:Enforce Store Applications** | If this rule option is enabled, WDAC policies will also apply to Universal Windows applications. |
-| **13 Enabled:Managed Installer** | Use this option to automatically allow applications installed by a managed installer. For more information, see [Authorize apps deployed with a WDAC managed installer](use-windows-defender-application-control-with-managed-installer.md) |
+| **13 Enabled:Managed Installer** | Use this option to automatically allow applications installed by a managed installer. For more information, see [Authorize apps deployed with a WDAC managed installer](configure-authorized-apps-deployed-with-a-managed-installer.md) |
| **14 Enabled:Intelligent Security Graph Authorization** | Use this option to automatically allow applications with "known good" reputation as defined by Microsoft’s Intelligent Security Graph (ISG). |
| **15 Enabled:Invalidate EAs on Reboot** | When the Intelligent Security Graph option (14) is used, WDAC sets an extended file attribute that indicates that the file was authorized to run. This option will cause WDAC to periodically revalidate the reputation for files that were authorized by the ISG.|
| **16 Enabled:Update Policy No Reboot** | Use this option to allow future WDAC policy updates to apply without requiring a system reboot. NOTE: This option is only supported on Windows 10, version 1709, and above.|
@@ -71,6 +71,17 @@ You can set several rule options within a WDAC policy. Table 1 describes each ru
| **18 Disabled:Runtime FilePath Rule Protection** | This option disables the default runtime check that only allows FilePath rules for paths that are only writable by an administrator. NOTE: This option is only supported on Windows 10, version 1903, and above. |
| **19 Enabled:Dynamic Code Security** | Enables policy enforcement for .NET applications and dynamically loaded libraries. NOTE: This option is only supported on Windows 10, version 1803, and above. |
+The following options are valid for supplemental policies. However, option 5 is not implemented as it is reserved for future work, and option 7 is not supported.
+
+| Rule option | Description |
+|------------ | ----------- |
+| 5 | Enabled: Inherit Default Policy |
+| **6** | **Enabled: Unsigned System Integrity Policy** |
+| 7 | Allowed: Debug Policy Augmented |
+| **13** | **Enabled: Managed Installer** |
+| **14** | **Enabled: Intelligent Security Graph Authorization** |
+| **18** | **Disabled: Runtime FilePath Rule Protection** |
+
## Windows Defender Application Control file rule levels
File rule levels allow administrators to specify the level at which they want to trust their applications. This level of trust could be as granular as the hash of each binary or as general as a CA certificate. You specify file rule levels when using WDAC PowerShell cmdlets to create and modify policies.
@@ -98,7 +109,8 @@ Each file rule level has its benefit and disadvantage. Use Table 2 to select the
> When you create WDAC policies with [New-CIPolicy](/powershell/module/configci/new-cipolicy), you can specify a primary file rule level by including the **-Level** parameter. For discovered binaries that cannot be trusted based on the primary file rule criteria, use the **-Fallback** parameter. For example, if the primary file rule level is PCACertificate but you would like to trust the unsigned applications as well, using the Hash rule level as a fallback adds the hash values of binaries that did not have a signing certificate.
> [!NOTE]
-> WDAC only supports signer rules for RSA certificate signing keys with a maximum of 4096 bits.
+> - WDAC only supports signer rules for RSA certificate signing keys with a maximum of 4096 bits.
+> - The code uses CN for the CertSubject and CertIssuer fields in the policy. You can use the inbox certutil to look at the underlying format to ensure UTF-8 is not being used for the CN. For example, you can use printable string, IA5, or BMP.
## Example of file rule levels in use
@@ -108,6 +120,10 @@ To create the WDAC policy, they build a reference server on their standard hardw
As part of normal operations, they will eventually install software updates, or perhaps add software from the same software providers. Because the "Publisher" remains the same on those updates and software, they will not need to update their WDAC policy. If the unsigned, internal application is updated, they must also update the WDAC policy to allow the new version.
+## File rule precedence order
+
+WDAC has a built-in file rule conflict logic that translates to precedence order. It will first processes all explicit deny rules it finds. Then, it will process all explicit allow rules. If no deny or allow rule exists, WDAC will check for [Managed Installer EA](deployment/deploy-wdac-policies-with-memcm.md). Lastly, if none of these exists, WDAC will fall back on [ISG](use-windows-defender-application-control-with-intelligent-security-graph.md).
+
## More information about filepath rules
Filepath rules do not provide the same security guarantees that explicit signer rules do, as they are based on mutable access permissions. Filepath rules are best suited for environments where most users are running as standard rather than admin. Path rules are best suited to allow paths that you expect will remain admin-writeable only. You may want to avoid path rules for directories where standard users can modify ACLs on the folder.
@@ -126,6 +142,22 @@ Wildcards can be used at the beginning or end of a path rule; only one wildcard
You can also use the following macros when the exact volume may vary: `%OSDRIVE%`, `%WINDIR%`, `%SYSTEM32%`.
+> [!NOTE]
+> For others to better understand the WDAC policies that has been deployed, we recommend maintaining separate ALLOW and DENY policies on Windows 10, version 1903 and later.
+
+## More information about hashes
+
+### Why does scan create four hash rules per XML file?
+
+The PowerShell cmdlet will produce an Authenticode Sha1 Hash, Sha256 Hash, Sha1 Page Hash, Sha256 Page Hash.
+During validation CI will choose which hashes to calculate depending on how the file is signed. For example, if the file is page-hash signed the entire file would not get paged in to do a full sha256 authenticode and we would just match using the first page hash.
+
+In the cmdlets, rather than try to predict which hash CI will use, we pre-calculate and use the four hashes (sha1/sha2 authenticode, and sha1/sha2 of first page). This is also resilient, if the signing status of the file changes and necessary for deny rules to ensure that changing/stripping the signature doesn’t result in a different hash than what was in the policy being used by CI.
+
+### Why does scan create eight hash rules for certain XML files?
+
+Separate rules are created for UMCI and KMCI. In some cases, files which are purely user-mode or purely kernel-mode may still generate both sets, as CI cannot always precisely determine what is purely user vs. kernel mode and errs on the side of caution.
+
## Windows Defender Application Control filename rules
File name rule levels let you specify file attributes to base a rule on. File name rules provide the same security guarantees that explicit signer rules do, as they are based on non-mutable file attributes. Specification of the file name level occurs when creating new policy rules.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/understand-windows-defender-application-control-policy-design-decisions.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/understand-windows-defender-application-control-policy-design-decisions.md
index 9443134723..7640970646 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/understand-windows-defender-application-control-policy-design-decisions.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/understand-windows-defender-application-control-policy-design-decisions.md
@@ -40,13 +40,13 @@ You should consider using WDAC as part of your organization's application contro
## Decide what policies to create
-Beginning with Windows 10, version 1903, WDAC allows [multiple simultaneous policies](deploy-multiple-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md) to be applied to each device. While this opens up many new use cases for organizations, your policy management can easily become unwieldy without a well-thought-out plan for the number and types of policies to create.
+Beginning with Windows 10, version 1903, WDAC allows [multiple simultaneous policies](deploy-multiple-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md) to be applied to each device. This opens up many new use cases for organizations, but your policy management can easily become unwieldy without a well-thought-out plan for the number and types of policies to create.
The first step is to define the desired "circle-of-trust" for your WDAC policies. By "circle-of-trust", we mean a description of the business intent of the policy expressed in natural language. This "circle-of-trust" definition will guide you as you create the actual policy rules for your policy XML.
For example, the DefaultWindows policy, which can be found under %OSDrive%\Windows\schemas\CodeIntegrity\ExamplePolicies, establishes a "circle-of-trust" that allows Windows, 3rd-party hardware and software kernel drivers, and applications from the Microsoft Store.
-Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager, previously known as System Center Configuration Manager, uses the DefaultWindows policy as the basis for its policy but then modifies the policy rules to allow Configuration Manager and its dependencies, sets the managed installer policy rule, and additionally configures Configuration Manager as a managed installer. It also can optionally authorize apps with positive reputation and perform a one-time scan of folder paths specified by the Configuration Manager administrator which adds rules for any apps found in the specified paths on the managed endpoint. This establishes the "circle-of-trust" for Configuration Manager's native WDAC integration.
+Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager, previously known as System Center Configuration Manager, uses the DefaultWindows policy as the basis for its policy but then modifies the policy rules to allow Configuration Manager and its dependencies, sets the managed installer policy rule, and additionally configures Configuration Manager as a managed installer. It also can optionally authorize apps with positive reputation and perform a one-time scan of folder paths specified by the Configuration Manager administrator, which adds rules for any apps found in the specified paths on the managed endpoint. This establishes the "circle-of-trust" for Configuration Manager's native WDAC integration.
The following questions can help you plan your WDAC deployment and determine the right "circle-of-trust" for your policies. They are not in priority or sequential order and are not meant to be an exhaustive set of design considerations.
@@ -54,31 +54,31 @@ The following questions can help you plan your WDAC deployment and determine the
### How are apps managed and deployed in your organization?
-Organizations with well-defined, centrally-managed app management and deployment processes can create more restrictive, more secure policies. Other organizations may be able to deploy WDAC with more relaxed rules or may choose to deploy WDAC in audit mode to gain better visibility to the apps being used in their organization.
+Organizations with well-defined, centrally managed app management and deployment processes can create more restrictive, more secure policies. Other organizations may be able to deploy WDAC with more relaxed rules or may choose to deploy WDAC in audit mode to gain better visibility to the apps being used in their organization.
| Possible answers | Design considerations|
| - | - |
-| All apps are centrally managed and deployed using endpoint management tools like [Microsoft Endpoint Manager](https://www.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/microsoft-endpoint-manager). | Organizations that centrally manage all apps are best-suited for application control. WDAC options like [managed installer](use-windows-defender-application-control-with-managed-installer.md) can make it easy to authorize apps that are deployed by the organization's app distribution management solution. |
-| Some apps are centrally managed and deployed, but teams can install additional apps for their members. | [Supplemental policies](deploy-multiple-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md) can be used to allow team-specific exceptions to your core organization-wide WDAC policy. Alternatively, teams can leverage managed installers to install their team-specific apps or admin-only file path rules can be used to allow apps installed by admin users. |
+| All apps are centrally managed and deployed using endpoint management tools like [Microsoft Endpoint Manager](https://www.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/microsoft-endpoint-manager). | Organizations that centrally manage all apps are best-suited for application control. WDAC options like [managed installer](configure-authorized-apps-deployed-with-a-managed-installer.md) can make it easy to authorize apps that are deployed by the organization's app distribution management solution. |
+| Some apps are centrally managed and deployed, but teams can install other apps for their members. | [Supplemental policies](deploy-multiple-windows-defender-application-control-policies.md) can be used to allow team-specific exceptions to your core organization-wide WDAC policy. Alternatively, teams can use managed installers to install their team-specific apps or admin-only file path rules can be used to allow apps installed by admin users. |
| Users and teams are free to download and install apps but the organization wants to restrict that right to prevalent and reputable apps only. | WDAC can integrate with Microsoft's [Intelligent Security Graph](use-windows-defender-application-control-with-intelligent-security-graph.md) (the same source of intelligence that powers Microsoft Defender Antivirus and Windows Defender SmartScreen) to allow only apps and binaries that have positive reputation. |
| Users and teams are free to download and install apps without restriction. | WDAC policies can be deployed in audit mode to gain insight into the apps and binaries running in your organization without impacting user and team productivity.|
-### Are internally-developed line-of-business (LOB) apps and apps developed by 3rd parties digitally signed?
+### Are internally developed line-of-business (LOB) apps and apps developed by third-party companies digitally signed?
Traditional Win32 apps on Windows can run without being digitally signed. This practice can expose Windows devices to malicious or tampered code and presents a security vulnerability to your Windows devices. Adopting code-signing as part of your organization's app development practices or augmenting apps with signed catalog files as part of your app ingestion and distribution can greatly improve the integrity and security of apps used.
| Possible answers | Design considerations |
| - | - |
| All apps used in your organization must be signed. | Organizations that enforce [codesigning](use-code-signing-to-simplify-application-control-for-classic-windows-applications.md) for all executable code are best-positioned to protect their Windows computers from malicious code execution. WDAC rules can be created to authorize apps and binaries from the organization's internal development teams and from trusted independent software vendors (ISV). |
-| Apps used in your organization do not need to meet any codesigning requirements. | Organizations can [use built-in Windows 10 tools](deploy-catalog-files-to-support-windows-defender-application-control.md) to add organization-specific App Catalog signatures to existing apps as a part of the app deployment process which can be used to authorize code execution. Solutions like Microsoft Endpoint Manager offer multiple ways to distribute signed App Catalogs. |
+| Apps used in your organization do not need to meet any codesigning requirements. | Organizations can [use built-in Windows 10 tools](deploy-catalog-files-to-support-windows-defender-application-control.md) to add organization-specific App Catalog signatures to existing apps as a part of the app deployment process, which can be used to authorize code execution. Solutions like Microsoft Endpoint Manager offer multiple ways to distribute signed App Catalogs. |
### Are there specific groups in your organization that need customized application control policies?
-Most business teams or departments have specific security requirements that pertain to data access and the applications used to access that data. You should consider the scope of the project for each group and the group’s priorities before you deploy application control policies for the entire organization. There is overhead in managing policies which may lead you to choose between broad, organization-wide policies and multiple team-specific policies.
+Most business teams or departments have specific security requirements that pertain to data access and the applications used to access that data. Consider the scope of the project for each group and the group’s priorities before you deploy application control policies for the entire organization. There is overhead in managing policies that might lead you to choose between broad, organization-wide policies and multiple team-specific policies.
| Possible answers | Design considerations |
| - | - |
-| Yes | WDAC policies can be created unique per team, or team-specific supplemental policies can be used to expand what is allowed by a common, centrally-defined base policy.|
+| Yes | WDAC policies can be created unique per team, or team-specific supplemental policies can be used to expand what is allowed by a common, centrally defined base policy.|
| No | WDAC policies can be applied globally to applications that are installed on PCs running Windows 10. Depending on the number of apps you need to control, managing all the rules and exceptions might be challenging.|
### Does your IT department have resources to analyze application usage, and to design and manage the policies?
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ The time and resources that are available to you to perform the research and ana
| Possible answers | Design considerations |
| - | - |
-| Yes | Invest the time to analyze your organization's application control requirements, and plan a complete deployment that uses rules that are as simply constructed as possible.|
+| Yes | Invest the time to analyze your organization's application control requirements, and plan a complete deployment that uses rules that are constructed as simply as possible.|
| No | Consider a focused and phased deployment for specific groups by using a small number of rules. As you apply controls to applications in a specific group, learn from that deployment to plan your next deployment. Alternatively, you can create a policy with a broad trust profile to authorize as many apps as possible. |
### Does your organization have Help Desk support?
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/use-signed-policies-to-protect-windows-defender-application-control-against-tampering.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/use-signed-policies-to-protect-windows-defender-application-control-against-tampering.md
index a654d57870..498c736696 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/use-signed-policies-to-protect-windows-defender-application-control-against-tampering.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/use-signed-policies-to-protect-windows-defender-application-control-against-tampering.md
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Before signing WDAC policies for the first time, be sure to enable rule options
To sign a WDAC policy with SignTool.exe, you need the following components:
-- SignTool.exe, found in the Windows SDK (Windows 7 or later)
+- SignTool.exe, found in the [Windows SDK](https://developer.microsoft.com/windows/downloads/windows-10-sdk/) (Windows 7 or later)
- The binary format of the WDAC policy that you generated in [Create a Windows Defender Application Control policy from a reference computer](create-initial-default-policy.md) or another WDAC policy that you have created
@@ -47,26 +47,29 @@ If you do not have a code signing certificate, see [Optional: Create a code sign
1. Initialize the variables that will be used:
- `$CIPolicyPath=$env:userprofile+"\Desktop\"`
-
- `$InitialCIPolicy=$CIPolicyPath+"InitialScan.xml"`
-
- `$CIPolicyBin=$CIPolicyPath+"DeviceGuardPolicy.bin"`
+ ```powershell
+ $CIPolicyPath=$env:userprofile+"\Desktop\"
+ $InitialCIPolicy=$CIPolicyPath+"InitialScan.xml"
+ ```
> [!NOTE]
- > This example uses the WDAC policy that you created in the [Create a Windows Defender Application Control policy from a reference computer](create-initial-default-policy.md) section. If you are signing another policy, be sure to update the **$CIPolicyPath** and **$CIPolicyBin** variables with the correct information.
+ > This example uses the WDAC policy that you created in the [Create a Windows Defender Application Control policy from a reference computer](create-initial-default-policy.md) section. If you are signing another policy, be sure to update the **$CIPolicyPath** variable with the correct information.
2. Import the .pfx code signing certificate. Import the code signing certificate that you will use to sign the WDAC policy into the signing user’s personal store on the computer that will be doing the signing. In this example, you use the certificate that was created in [Optional: Create a code signing certificate for Windows Defender Application Control](create-code-signing-cert-for-windows-defender-application-control.md).
3. Export the .cer code signing certificate. After the code signing certificate has been imported, export the .cer version to your desktop. This version will be added to the policy so that it can be updated later.
4. Navigate to your desktop as the working directory:
-
- `cd $env:USERPROFILE\Desktop`
+
+ ```powershell
+ cd $env:USERPROFILE\Desktop
+ ```
5. Use [Add-SignerRule](/powershell/module/configci/add-signerrule) to add an update signer certificate to the WDAC policy:
- `Add-SignerRule -FilePath $InitialCIPolicy -CertificatePath -Kernel -User –Update`
+ ```powershell
+ Add-SignerRule -FilePath $InitialCIPolicy -CertificatePath -Kernel -User –Update
+ ```
> [!NOTE]
> *<Path to exported .cer certificate>* should be the full path to the certificate that you exported in step 3.
@@ -74,17 +77,30 @@ If you do not have a code signing certificate, see [Optional: Create a code sign
6. Use [Set-RuleOption](/powershell/module/configci/set-ruleoption) to remove the unsigned policy rule option:
- `Set-RuleOption -FilePath $InitialCIPolicy -Option 6 -Delete`
+ ```powershell
+ Set-RuleOption -FilePath $InitialCIPolicy -Option 6 -Delete
+ ```
-7. Use [ConvertFrom-CIPolicy](/powershell/module/configci/convertfrom-cipolicy) to convert the policy to binary format:
+7. Reset the policy ID and use [ConvertFrom-CIPolicy](/powershell/module/configci/convertfrom-cipolicy) to convert the policy to binary format:
- `ConvertFrom-CIPolicy $InitialCIPolicy $CIPolicyBin`
+ ```powershell
+ $PolicyID= Set-CIPolicyIdInfo -FilePath $InitialCIPolicy -ResetPolicyID
+ $PolicyID = $PolicyID.Substring(11)
+ $CIPolicyBin = $env:userprofile + "\Desktop\" + $PolicyID + ".cip"
+ ConvertFrom-CIPolicy $InitialCIPolicy $CIPolicyBin
+ ```
8. Sign the WDAC policy by using SignTool.exe:
- ` sign -v /n "ContosoDGSigningCert" -p7 . -p7co 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.79.1 -fd sha256 $CIPolicyBin`
+ ```powershell
+ sign -v /n "ContosoDGSigningCert" -p7 . -p7co 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.79.1 -fd sha256 $CIPolicyBin
+ ```
> [!NOTE]
> The *<Path to signtool.exe>* variable should be the full path to the SignTool.exe utility. **ContosoDGSigningCert** is the subject name of the certificate that will be used to sign the WDAC policy. You should import this certificate to your personal certificate store on the computer you use to sign the policy.
-9. Validate the signed file. When complete, the commands should output a signed policy file called DeviceGuardPolicy.bin.p7 to your desktop. You can deploy this file the same way you deploy an enforced or non-enforced policy. For information about how to deploy WDAC policies, see [Deploy and manage Windows Defender Application Control with Group Policy](deploy-windows-defender-application-control-policies-using-group-policy.md).
\ No newline at end of file
+9. Validate the signed file. When complete, the commands should output a signed policy file called {PolicyID}.cip to your desktop. You can deploy this file the same way you deploy an enforced or non-enforced policy. For information about how to deploy WDAC policies, see [Deploy and manage Windows Defender Application Control with Group Policy](deploy-windows-defender-application-control-policies-using-group-policy.md).
+
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> The device with the signed policy must be rebooted one time with Secure Boot enabled for the UEFI lock to be set.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/use-windows-defender-application-control-with-intelligent-security-graph.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/use-windows-defender-application-control-with-intelligent-security-graph.md
index 7ad4a8467b..082eb3a3f1 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/use-windows-defender-application-control-with-intelligent-security-graph.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/use-windows-defender-application-control-with-intelligent-security-graph.md
@@ -31,7 +31,9 @@ Beginning with Windows 10, version 1709, you can set an option to automatically
## How does the integration between WDAC and the Intelligent Security Graph work?
-The ISG uses the same vast security intelligence and machine learning analytics that power Microsoft Defender SmartScreen and Microsoft Defender Antivirus to help classify applications as having known good, known bad, or unknown reputation. When a binary runs on a system with WDAC enabled with the ISG option, WDAC checks the file's reputation by sending its hash and signing information to the cloud. If the ISG reports that the file has a known good reputation, the $KERNEL.SMARTLOCKER.ORIGINCLAIM kernel Extended Attribute (EA) is written to the file. Every time the binary runs, it is allowed based on its positive reputation unless there is an explicit deny rule set in the WDAC policy. Conversely, a file that has unknown or known bad reputation will be allowed if your WDAC policy explicitly allows it.
+The ISG uses the same vast security intelligence and machine learning analytics that power Microsoft Defender SmartScreen and Microsoft Defender Antivirus to help classify applications as having "known good," "known bad," or "unknown" reputation. When a binary runs on a system, with WDAC enabled with the ISG option, WDAC checks the file's reputation, by sending its hash and signing information to the cloud. If the ISG reports that the file has a "known good" reputation, the $KERNEL.SMARTLOCKER.ORIGINCLAIM kernel Extended Attribute (EA) is written to the file.
+
+If your WDAC policy does not have an explicit rule to allow or deny a binary to run, then WDAC will make a call to the cloud to determine whether the binary is familiar and safe. However, if your policy already authorizes or denies the binary, then WDAC will not make a call to the cloud.
If the file with good reputation is an application installer, its reputation will pass along to any files that it writes to disk. This way, all the files needed to install and run an app inherit the positive reputation data from the installer.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/use-windows-defender-application-control-with-managed-installer.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/use-windows-defender-application-control-with-managed-installer.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 66afc7f933..0000000000
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/use-windows-defender-application-control-with-managed-installer.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
----
-title: Authorize apps installed by a managed installer (Windows 10)
-description: Explains how to automatically allow applications deployed and installed by a managed installer.
-keywords: security, malware
-ms.assetid: 8d6e0474-c475-411b-b095-1c61adb2bdbb
-ms.prod: m365-security
-ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
-ms.sitesec: library
-ms.pagetype: security
-ms.localizationpriority: medium
-audience: ITPro
-ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
-author: jsuther1974
-ms.reviewer: jogeurte
-ms.author: dansimp
-manager: dansimp
-ms.date: 04/20/2021
-ms.technology: mde
----
-
-# Authorize apps deployed by a managed installer
-
-**Applies to:**
-
-- Windows 10
-- Windows Server 2019
-
-Windows 10, version 1703 introduced a new option for Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC), called managed installer, that helps balance security and manageability when enforcing application control policies. This option lets you automatically allow applications installed by a designated software distribution solution such as Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager.
-
-## How does a managed installer work?
-
-A new rule collection in AppLocker specifies binaries that are trusted by the organization as an authorized source for application deployment. When one of these binaries runs, Windows will monitor the binary's process (and processes it launches) and tag all files it writes as having originated from a managed installer. The managed installer rule collection is configured using Group Policy and can be applied with the Set-AppLockerPolicy PowerShell cmdlet. You can't currently set managed installers with the AppLocker CSP through MDM.
-
-Having defined your managed installers using AppLocker, you can then configure WDAC to trust files installed by a managed installer by adding the Enabled:Managed Installer option to your WDAC policy. Once that option is set, WDAC will check for managed installer origin information when determining whether or not to allow a binary to run. As long as there are no deny rules present for the file, WDAC will allow a file to run based on its managed installer origin.
-
-You should ensure that the WDAC policy allows the system to boot and any other authorized applications that can't be deployed through a managed installer.
-
-For an example of a managed installer use case, see [Creating a WDAC policy for fully managed devices](create-wdac-policy-for-fully-managed-devices.md).
-
-## Security considerations with managed installer
-
-Since managed installer is a heuristic-based mechanism, it doesn't provide the same security guarantees that explicit allow or deny rules do.
-It is best suited for use where each user operates as a standard user and where all software is deployed and installed by a software distribution solution, such as Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager.
-
-Users with administrator privileges or malware running as an administrator user on the system may be able to circumvent the intent of Windows Defender Application Control when the managed installer option is allowed.
-
-If a managed installer process runs in the context of a user with standard privileges, then it is possible that standard users or malware running as standard user may be able to circumvent the intent of Windows Defender Application Control.
-
-Some application installers may automatically run the application at the end of the installation process. If this happens when the installer is run by a managed installer, then the managed installer's heuristic tracking and authorization will extend to all files created during the first run of the application. This could result in over-authorization for executables that were not intended. To avoid that outcome, ensure that the application deployment solution used as a managed installer limits running applications as part of installation.
-
-## Known limitations with managed installer
-
-- Application control based on managed installer does not support applications that self-update. If an application deployed by a managed installer later updates itself, the updated application files won't include the managed installer origin information and may not be able to run. When you rely on managed installers, you must deploy and install all application updates using a managed installer or include rules to authorize the app in the WDAC policy. In some cases, it may be possible to also designate an application binary that performs self-updates as a managed installer. Proper review for functionality and security should be performed for the application before using this method.
-
-- [Packaged apps (MSIX)](/windows/msix/) deployed through a managed installer aren't tracked by the managed installer heuristic and will need to be separately authorized in your WDAC policy. See [Manage packaged apps with WDAC](manage-packaged-apps-with-windows-defender-application-control.md).
-
-- Some applications or installers may extract, download, or generate binaries and immediately attempt to run them. Files run by such a process may not be allowed by the managed installer heuristic. In some cases, it may be possible to also designate an application binary that performs such an operation as a managed installer. Proper review for functionality and security should be performed for the application before using this method.
-
-- The managed installer heuristic doesn't authorize kernel drivers. The WDAC policy must have rules that allow the necessary drivers to run.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/wdac-and-applocker-overview.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/wdac-and-applocker-overview.md
index 03f0eb6f0d..ce2acde0e8 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/wdac-and-applocker-overview.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/wdac-and-applocker-overview.md
@@ -26,36 +26,36 @@ ms.technology: mde
- Windows 10
- Windows Server 2016 and above
-Windows 10 includes two technologies that can be used for application control depending on your organization's specific scenarios and requirements: Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) and AppLocker.
+Windows 10 includes two technologies that can be used for application control, depending on your organization's specific scenarios and requirements: Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) and AppLocker.
## Windows Defender Application Control
-WDAC was introduced with Windows 10 and allows organizations to control which drivers and applications are allowed to run on their Windows 10 clients. WDAC was designed as a security feature under the [servicing criteria](https://www.microsoft.com/msrc/windows-security-servicing-criteria) defined by the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC).
+WDAC was introduced with Windows 10 and allows organizations to control which drivers and applications are allowed to run on their Windows 10 clients. It was designed as a security feature under the [servicing criteria](https://www.microsoft.com/msrc/windows-security-servicing-criteria), defined by the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC).
WDAC policies apply to the managed computer as a whole and affects all users of the device. WDAC rules can be defined based on:
- Attributes of the codesigning certificate(s) used to sign an app and its binaries
- Attributes of the app's binaries that come from the signed metadata for the files, such as Original Filename and version, or the hash of the file
- The reputation of the app as determined by Microsoft's [Intelligent Security Graph](use-windows-defender-application-control-with-intelligent-security-graph.md)
-- The identity of the process that initiated the installation of the app and its binaries ([managed installer](use-windows-defender-application-control-with-managed-installer.md))
+- The identity of the process that initiated the installation of the app and its binaries ([managed installer](configure-authorized-apps-deployed-with-a-managed-installer.md))
- The [path from which the app or file is launched](select-types-of-rules-to-create.md#more-information-about-filepath-rules) (beginning with Windows 10 version 1903)
- The process that launched the app or binary
-Note that prior to Windows 10, version 1709, Windows Defender Application Control was known as configurable code integrity (CCI). WDAC was also one of the features which comprised the now-defunct term 'Device Guard'.
+Note that prior to Windows 10 version 1709, Windows Defender Application Control was known as configurable code integrity (CCI). WDAC was also one of the features that comprised the now-defunct term "Device Guard."
### WDAC System Requirements
-WDAC policies can be created on any client edition of Windows 10 build 1903+ or on Windows Server 2016 and above.
+WDAC policies can be created on any client edition of Windows 10 build 1903+, or on Windows Server 2016 and above.
-WDAC policies can be applied to devices running any edition of Windows 10 or Windows Server 2016 and above via a Mobile Device Management (MDM) solution like Intune, a management interface like Configuration Manager, or a script host like PowerShell. Group Policy can also be used to deploy WDAC policies to Windows 10 Enterprise edition or Windows Server 2016 and above, but cannot deploy policies to devices running non-Enterprise SKUs of Windows 10.
+WDAC policies can be applied to devices running any edition of Windows 10, or Windows Server 2016 and above, via a Mobile Device Management (MDM) solution, for example, Intune; a management interface such as Configuration Manager; or a script host such as PowerShell. Group Policy can also be used to deploy WDAC policies to Windows 10 Enterprise edition, or Windows Server 2016 and above, but cannot deploy policies to devices running non-Enterprise SKUs of Windows 10.
-For more information on which individual WDAC features are available on which WDAC builds, see [WDAC feature availability](feature-availability.md).
+For more information on which individual WDAC features are available on specific WDAC builds, see [WDAC feature availability](feature-availability.md).
## AppLocker
-AppLocker was introduced with Windows 7 and allows organizations to control which applications are allowed to run on their Windows clients. AppLocker helps to prevent end users from running unapproved software on their computers, but it does not meet the servicing criteria for being a security feature.
+AppLocker was introduced with Windows 7, and allows organizations to control which applications are allowed to run on their Windows clients. AppLocker helps to prevent end-users from running unapproved software on their computers but does not meet the servicing criteria for being a security feature.
-AppLocker policies can apply to all users on a computer or to individual users and groups. AppLocker rules can be defined based on:
+AppLocker policies can apply to all users on a computer, or to individual users and groups. AppLocker rules can be defined based on:
- Attributes of the codesigning certificate(s) used to sign an app and its binaries
- Attributes of the app's binaries that come from the signed metadata for the files, such as Original Filename and version, or the hash of the file
@@ -68,13 +68,13 @@ AppLocker policies can be deployed using Group Policy or MDM.
## Choose when to use WDAC or AppLocker
-Generally, it is recommended that customers who are able to implement application control using WDAC rather than AppLocker do so. WDAC is undergoing continual improvements and will be getting added support from Microsoft management platforms. Although AppLocker will continue to receive security fixes, it will not undergo new feature improvements.
+Generally, it is recommended that customers, who are able to implement application control using WDAC rather than AppLocker, do so. WDAC is undergoing continual improvements, and will be getting added support from Microsoft management platforms. Although AppLocker will continue to receive security fixes, it will not undergo new feature improvements.
-In some cases, however, AppLocker may be the more appropriate technology for your organization. AppLocker is best when:
+However, in some cases, AppLocker may be the more appropriate technology for your organization. AppLocker is best when:
- You have a mixed Windows operating system (OS) environment and need to apply the same policy controls to Windows 10 and earlier versions of the OS.
- You need to apply different policies for different users or groups on shared computers.
- You do not want to enforce application control on application files such as DLLs or drivers.
-AppLocker can also be deployed as a complement to WDAC to add user- or group-specific rules for shared device scenarios where it is important to prevent some users from running specific apps.
+AppLocker can also be deployed as a complement to WDAC to add user or group-specific rules for shared device scenarios, where it is important to prevent some users from running specific apps.
As a best practice, you should enforce WDAC at the most restrictive level possible for your organization, and then you can use AppLocker to further fine-tune the restrictions.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-system-guard/system-guard-how-hardware-based-root-of-trust-helps-protect-windows.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-system-guard/system-guard-how-hardware-based-root-of-trust-helps-protect-windows.md
deleted file mode 100644
index bb47f523e4..0000000000
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-system-guard/system-guard-how-hardware-based-root-of-trust-helps-protect-windows.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
----
-title: How Windows Defender System Guard protect Windows 10 from firmware exploits
-description: Windows Defender System Guard in Windows 10 uses a hardware-based root of trust to securely protect systems against firmware exploits.
-ms.assetid: 8d6e0474-c475-411b-b095-1c61adb2bdbb
-ms.reviewer:
-manager: dansimp
-ms.author: deniseb
-author: denisebmsft
-search.appverid: met150
-ms.prod: m365-security
-ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
-ms.sitesec: library
-ms.pagetype: security
-ms.localizationpriority: medium
-ms.date: 03/01/2019
-ms.custom: asr
-ms.technology: mde
----
-
-
-# Windows Defender System Guard: How a hardware-based root of trust helps protect Windows 10
-
-In order to protect critical resources such as the Windows authentication stack, single sign-on tokens, the Windows Hello biometric stack, and the Virtual Trusted Platform Module, a system's firmware and hardware must be trustworthy.
-
-Windows Defender System Guard reorganizes the existing Windows 10 system integrity features under one roof and sets up the next set of investments in Windows security. It's designed to make these security guarantees:
-
-- Protect and maintain the integrity of the system as it starts up
-- Validate that system integrity has truly been maintained through local and remote attestation
-
-## Maintaining the integrity of the system as it starts
-
-### Static Root of Trust for Measurement (SRTM)
-
-With Windows 7, one of the means attackers would use to persist and evade detection was to install what is often referred to as a bootkit or rootkit on the system.
-This malicious software would start before Windows started, or during the boot process itself, enabling it to start with the highest level of privilege.
-
-With Windows 10 running on modern hardware (that is, Windows 8-certified or greater) a hardware-based root of trust helps ensure that no unauthorized firmware or software (such as a bootkit) can start before the Windows bootloader.
-This hardware-based root of trust comes from the device’s Secure Boot feature, which is part of the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI).
-This technique of measuring the static early boot UEFI components is called the Static Root of Trust for Measurement (SRTM).
-
-As there are thousands of PC vendors that produce numerous models with different UEFI BIOS versions, there becomes an incredibly large number of SRTM measurements upon bootup.
-Two techniques exist to establish trust here—either maintain a list of known 'bad' SRTM measurements (also known as a block list), or a list of known 'good' SRTM measurements (also known as an allow list).
-Each option has a drawback:
-
-- A list of known 'bad' SRTM measurements allows a hacker to change just 1 bit in a component to create an entirely new SRTM hash that needs to be listed. This means that the SRTM flow is inherently brittle - a minor change can invalidate the entire chain of trust.
-- A list of known 'good' SRTM measurements requires each new BIOS/PC combination measurement to be carefully added, which is slow.
-In addition, a bug fix for UEFI code can take a long time to design, build, retest, validate, and redeploy.
-
-### Secure Launch—the Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (DRTM)
-
-Windows Defender System Guard Secure Launch, first introduced in Windows 10 version 1809, aims to alleviate these issues by leveraging a technology known as the Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (DRTM).
-DRTM lets the system freely boot into untrusted code initially, but shortly after launches the system into a trusted state by taking control of all CPUs and forcing them down a well-known and measured code path.
-This has the benefit of allowing untrusted early UEFI code to boot the system, but then being able to securely transition into a trusted and measured state.
-
-
-
-
-Secure Launch simplifies management of SRTM measurements because the launch code is now unrelated to a specific hardware configuration. This means the number of valid code measurements is small, and future updates can be deployed more widely and quickly.
-
-### System Management Mode (SMM) protection
-
-System Management Mode (SMM) is a special-purpose CPU mode in x86 microcontrollers that handles power management, hardware configuration, thermal monitoring, and anything else the manufacturer deems useful.
-Whenever one of these system operations is requested, a non-maskable interrupt (SMI) is invoked at runtime, which executes SMM code installed by the BIOS.
-SMM code executes in the highest privilege level and is invisible to the OS, which makes it an attractive target for malicious activity. Even if System Guard Secure Launch is used to late launch, SMM code can potentially access hypervisor memory and change the hypervisor.
-To defend against this, two techniques are used:
-
-1. Paging protection to prevent inappropriate access to code and data
-2. SMM hardware supervision and attestation
-
-Paging protection can be implemented to lock certain code tables to be read-only to prevent tampering.
-This prevents access to any memory that has not been specifically assigned.
-
-A hardware-enforced processor feature known as a supervisor SMI handler can monitor the SMM and make sure it does not access any part of the address space that it is not supposed to.
-
-SMM protection is built on top of the Secure Launch technology and requires it to function.
-In the future, Windows 10 will also measure this SMI Handler’s behavior and attest that no OS-owned memory has been tampered with.
-
-## Validating platform integrity after Windows is running (run time)
-
-While Windows Defender System Guard provides advanced protection that will help protect and maintain the integrity of the platform during boot and at run time, the reality is that we must apply an "assume breach" mentality to even our most sophisticated security technologies. We should be able to trust that the technologies are successfully doing their jobs, but we also need the ability to verify that they were successful in achieving their goals. When it comes to platform integrity, we can’t just trust the platform, which potentially could be compromised, to self-attest to its security state. So Windows Defender System Guard includes a series of technologies that enable remote analysis of the device’s integrity.
-
-As Windows 10 boots, a series of integrity measurements are taken by Windows Defender System Guard using the device’s Trusted Platform Module 2.0 (TPM 2.0). System Guard Secure Launch will not support earlier TPM versions, such as TPM 1.2. This process and data are hardware-isolated away from Windows to help ensure that the measurement data is not subject to the type of tampering that could happen if the platform was compromised. From here, the measurements can be used to determine the integrity of the device’s firmware, hardware configuration state, and Windows boot-related components, just to name a few.
-
-
-
-
-After the system boots, Windows Defender System Guard signs and seals these measurements using the TPM. Upon request, a management system like Intune or Microsoft Endpoint Manager can acquire them for remote analysis. If Windows Defender System Guard indicates that the device lacks integrity, the management system can take a series of actions, such as denying the device access to resources.
-
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-firewall/filter-origin-documentation.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-firewall/filter-origin-documentation.md
index c1121baa73..90d5fd2514 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-firewall/filter-origin-documentation.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-firewall/filter-origin-documentation.md
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ To enable a specific audit event, run the corresponding command in an administra
|**Audit #**|**Enable command**|**Link**|
|:-----|:-----|:-----|
|**5157**|`Auditpol /set /category:"System" /SubCategory:"Filtering Platform Connection" /success:enable /failure:enable`|[5157(F): The Windows Filtering Platform has blocked a connection.](../auditing/event-5157.md)|
-|**5152**|`Auditpol /set /category:"System" /SubCategory:"Filtering Platform Connection" /success:enable /failure:enable`|[5152(F): The Windows Filtering Platform blocked a packet.](../auditing/event-5152.md)|
+|**5152**|`Auditpol /set /category:"System" /SubCategory:"Filtering Platform Packet Drop" /success:enable /failure:enable`|[5152(F): The Windows Filtering Platform blocked a packet.](../auditing/event-5152.md)|
## Example flow of debugging packet drops with filter origin
@@ -168,4 +168,4 @@ For more information on how to debug drops caused by UWP default block filters,
**WSH default**
-Network drops from Windows Service Hardening (WSH) default filters indicate that there wasn’t an explicit Windows Service Hardening allow rule to allow network traffic for the protected service. The service owner will need to configure allow rules for the service if the block is not expected.
\ No newline at end of file
+Network drops from Windows Service Hardening (WSH) default filters indicate that there wasn’t an explicit Windows Service Hardening allow rule to allow network traffic for the protected service. The service owner will need to configure allow rules for the service if the block is not expected.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-security-configuration-framework/security-compliance-toolkit-10.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-security-configuration-framework/security-compliance-toolkit-10.md
index 417dd71e21..dc7c58f214 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-security-configuration-framework/security-compliance-toolkit-10.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-security-configuration-framework/security-compliance-toolkit-10.md
@@ -77,4 +77,16 @@ LGPO.exe can import and apply settings from Registry Policy (Registry.pol) files
It can export local policy to a GPO backup.
It can export the contents of a Registry Policy file to the “LGPO text” format that can then be edited, and can build a Registry Policy file from an LGPO text file.
-Documentation for the LGPO tool can be found on the [Microsoft Security Guidance blog](/archive/blogs/secguide/lgpo-exe-local-group-policy-object-utility-v1-0) or by [downloading the tool](https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=55319).
\ No newline at end of file
+Documentation for the LGPO tool can be found on the [Microsoft Security Guidance blog](/archive/blogs/secguide/lgpo-exe-local-group-policy-object-utility-v1-0) or by [downloading the tool](https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=55319).
+
+## What is the Set Object Security tool?
+
+SetObjectSecurity.exe enables you to set the security descriptor for just about any type of Windows securable object, such as files, directories, registry keys, event logs, services, and SMB shares. For file system and registry objects, you can choose whether to apply inheritance rules. You can also choose to output the security descriptor in a .reg-file-compatible representation of the security descriptor for a REG_BINARY registry value.
+
+Documentation for the Set Object Security tool can be found on the [Microsoft Security Baselines blog](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-security-baselines/new-amp-updated-security-tools/ba-p/1631613) or by [downloading the tool](https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=55319).
+
+## What is the GPO to Policy Rules tool?
+
+Automate the conversion of GPO backups to Policy Analyzer .PolicyRules files and skip the GUI. GPO2PolicyRules is a command-line tool that is included with the Policy Analyzer download.
+
+Documentation for the GPO to PolicyRules tool can be found on the [Microsoft Security Baselines blog](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-security-baselines/new-amp-updated-security-tools/ba-p/1631613) or by [downloading the tool](https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=55319).
diff --git a/windows/sv/TOC.yml b/windows/sv/TOC.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index b5ef71ac32..0000000000
--- a/windows/sv/TOC.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-- name: Index
- href: index.md
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/sv/breadcrumb/toc.yml b/windows/sv/breadcrumb/toc.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 61d8fca61e..0000000000
--- a/windows/sv/breadcrumb/toc.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-- name: Docs
- tocHref: /
- topicHref: /
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/sv/docfx.json b/windows/sv/docfx.json
deleted file mode 100644
index 7035c4cd69..0000000000
--- a/windows/sv/docfx.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-{
- "build": {
- "content": [
- {
- "files": [
- "**/*.md",
- "**/*.yml"
- ],
- "exclude": [
- "**/obj/**",
- "**/includes/**",
- "_themes/**",
- "_themes.pdf/**",
- "**/docfx.json",
- "_repo.en-us/**",
- "README.md",
- "LICENSE",
- "LICENSE-CODE",
- "ThirdPartyNotices.md"
- ]
- }
- ],
- "resource": [
- {
- "files": [
- "**/*.png",
- "**/*.jpg"
- ],
- "exclude": [
- "**/obj/**",
- "**/includes/**",
- "_themes/**",
- "_themes.pdf/**",
- "**/docfx.json",
- "_repo.en-us/**"
- ]
- }
- ],
- "overwrite": [],
- "externalReference": [],
- "globalMetadata": {
- "breadcrumb_path": "/windows/sv/breadcrumb/toc.json",
- "extendBreadcrumb": true,
- "feedback_system": "None"
- },
- "fileMetadata": {},
- "template": [],
- "dest": "SV",
- "markdownEngineName": "markdig"
- }
-}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/sv/index.md b/windows/sv/index.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 700bfbca0e..0000000000
--- a/windows/sv/index.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
----
-title: No title
-description: No description
-keywords: ["Windows 10"]
-ms.prod: w10
-ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
-ms.sitesec: library
-audience: itpro
-author: greg-lindsay
-ms.author: greglin
-manager: laurawi
-ms.localizationpriority: high
-ms.topic: article
----
-
-# _
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/whats-new/TOC.yml b/windows/whats-new/TOC.yml
index b0d672f68c..a9ae9e12ba 100644
--- a/windows/whats-new/TOC.yml
+++ b/windows/whats-new/TOC.yml
@@ -1,19 +1,33 @@
-- name: What's new in Windows 10
+- name: What's new in Windows
href: index.yml
-- name: What's new in Windows 10, version 21H1
- href: whats-new-windows-10-version-21H1.md
-- name: What's new in Windows 10, version 20H2
- href: whats-new-windows-10-version-20H2.md
-- name: What's new in Windows 10, version 2004
- href: whats-new-windows-10-version-2004.md
-- name: What's new in Windows 10, version 1909
- href: whats-new-windows-10-version-1909.md
-- name: What's new in Windows 10, version 1903
- href: whats-new-windows-10-version-1903.md
-- name: What's new in Windows 10, version 1809
- href: whats-new-windows-10-version-1809.md
+- name: Windows 11
+ expanded: true
+ items:
+ - name: Windows 11 overview
+ href: windows-11.md
+ - name: Windows 11 requirements
+ href: windows-11-requirements.md
+ - name: Plan for Windows 11
+ href: windows-11-plan.md
+ - name: Prepare for Windows 11
+ href: windows-11-prepare.md
+- name: Windows 10
+ expanded: true
+ items:
+ - name: What's new in Windows 10, version 21H1
+ href: whats-new-windows-10-version-21H1.md
+ - name: What's new in Windows 10, version 20H2
+ href: whats-new-windows-10-version-20H2.md
+ - name: What's new in Windows 10, version 2004
+ href: whats-new-windows-10-version-2004.md
+ - name: What's new in Windows 10, version 1909
+ href: whats-new-windows-10-version-1909.md
+ - name: What's new in Windows 10, version 1903
+ href: whats-new-windows-10-version-1903.md
- name: Previous versions
items:
+ - name: What's new in Windows 10, version 1809
+ href: whats-new-windows-10-version-1809.md
- name: What's new in Windows 10, version 1803
href: whats-new-windows-10-version-1803.md
- name: What's new in Windows 10, version 1709
diff --git a/windows/whats-new/docfx.json b/windows/whats-new/docfx.json
index 04908deceb..fe5bc2fe98 100644
--- a/windows/whats-new/docfx.json
+++ b/windows/whats-new/docfx.json
@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
"content": [
{
"files": [
- "**/*.md",
- "**/*.yml"
+ "**/**/*.md",
+ "**/**/*.yml"
],
"exclude": [
"**/obj/**",
@@ -19,9 +19,9 @@
"resource": [
{
"files": [
- "**/*.png",
- "**/*.jpg",
- "**/*.gif"
+ "**/**/*.png",
+ "**/**/*.jpg",
+ "**/**/*.gif"
],
"exclude": [
"**/obj/**",
@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@
"globalMetadata": {
"breadcrumb_path": "/windows/windows-10/breadcrumb/toc.json",
"uhfHeaderId": "MSDocsHeader-M365-IT",
- "ms.technology": "windows",
"ms.topic": "article",
"audience": "ITPro",
"feedback_system": "GitHub",
diff --git a/windows/whats-new/index.yml b/windows/whats-new/index.yml
index 45c6930684..375f946870 100644
--- a/windows/whats-new/index.yml
+++ b/windows/whats-new/index.yml
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
### YamlMime:Landing
-title: What's new in Windows 10 # < 60 chars
-summary: Find out about new features and capabilities in the latest release of Windows 10. # < 160 chars
+title: What's new in Windows # < 60 chars
+summary: Find out about new features and capabilities in the latest release of Windows 10 and Windows 11. # < 160 chars
metadata:
- title: What's new in Windows 10 # Required; page title displayed in search results. Include the brand. < 60 chars.
- description: Find out about new features and capabilities in the latest release of Windows 10. # Required; article description that is displayed in search results. < 160 chars.
+ title: What's new in Windows # Required; page title displayed in search results. Include the brand. < 60 chars.
+ description: Find out about new features and capabilities in the latest release of Windows 10 and Windows 11. # Required; article description that is displayed in search results. < 160 chars.
services: windows-10
ms.service: windows-10 #Required; service per approved list. service slug assigned to your service by ACOM.
ms.subservice: subservice
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ metadata:
ms.collection: windows-10
author: greg-lindsay #Required; your GitHub user alias, with correct capitalization.
ms.author: greglin #Required; microsoft alias of author; optional team alias.
- ms.date: 02/09/2021 #Required; mm/dd/yyyy format.
+ ms.date: 06/24/2021 #Required; mm/dd/yyyy format.
localization_priority: medium
# linkListType: architecture | concept | deploy | download | get-started | how-to-guide | learn | overview | quickstart | reference | tutorial | video | whats-new
@@ -22,7 +22,21 @@ landingContent:
# Cards and links should be based on top customer tasks or top subjects
# Start card title with a verb
# Card (optional)
- - title: What's new in Windows 10
+
+ - title: Windows 11
+ linkLists:
+ - linkListType: overview
+ links:
+ - text: Windows 11 overview
+ url: windows-11.md
+ - text: Windows 11 requirements
+ url: windows-11-requirements.md
+ - text: Plan for Windows 11
+ url: windows-11-plan.md
+ - text: Prepare for Windows 11
+ url: windows-11-prepare.md
+
+ - title: Windows 10
linkLists:
- linkListType: overview
links:
@@ -36,8 +50,6 @@ landingContent:
url: whats-new-windows-10-version-1909.md
- text: What's new in Windows 10, version 1903
url: whats-new-windows-10-version-1903.md
- - text: What's new in Windows 10, version 1809
- url: whats-new-windows-10-version-1809.md
# Card (optional)
@@ -45,11 +57,11 @@ landingContent:
linkLists:
- linkListType: overview
links:
- - text: Windows 10 release information
+ - text: Windows release information
url: /windows/release-health/release-information
- - text: Windows 10 release health dashboard
+ - text: Windows release health dashboard
url: /windows/release-information/
- - text: Windows 10 update history
+ - text: Windows update history
url: https://support.microsoft.com/topic/windows-10-update-history-7dd3071a-3906-fa2c-c342-f7f86728a6e3
- text: Windows 10 features we’re no longer developing
url: /windows/deployment/planning/windows-10-deprecated-features
@@ -57,13 +69,5 @@ landingContent:
url: /windows/deployment/planning/windows-10-removed-features
- text: Compare Windows 10 Editions
url: https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkId=690485
-
- # Card (optional)
- - title: See also
- linkLists:
- - linkListType: overview
- links:
- text: Windows 10 Enterprise LTSC
url: ltsc/index.md
- - text: Edit an existing topic using the Edit link
- url: contribute-to-a-topic.md
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/whats-new/ltsc/whats-new-windows-10-2019.md b/windows/whats-new/ltsc/whats-new-windows-10-2019.md
index 74b961fb89..cd82d2c618 100644
--- a/windows/whats-new/ltsc/whats-new-windows-10-2019.md
+++ b/windows/whats-new/ltsc/whats-new-windows-10-2019.md
@@ -484,9 +484,9 @@ Previously, the customized taskbar could only be deployed using Group Policy or
### Windows Insider for Business
-We recently added the option to download Windows 10 Insider Preview builds using your corporate credentials in Azure Active Directory (AAD). By enrolling devices in AAD, you increase the visibility of feedback submitted by users in your organization – especially on features that support your specific business needs. For details, see [Windows Insider Program for Business](/windows/deployment/update/waas-windows-insider-for-business).
+We recently added the option to download Windows 10 Insider Preview builds using your corporate credentials in Azure Active Directory (Azure AD). By enrolling devices in Azure AD, you increase the visibility of feedback submitted by users in your organization – especially on features that support your specific business needs. For details, see [Windows Insider Program for Business](https://insider.windows.com/for-business).
-You can now register your Azure AD domains to the Windows Insider Program. For more information, see [Windows Insider Program for Business](/windows/deployment/update/waas-windows-insider-for-business#getting-started-with-windows-insider-program-for-business).
+You can now register your Azure AD domains to the Windows Insider Program. For more information, see [Windows Insider Program for Business](https://insider.windows.com/for-business).
### Optimize update delivery
@@ -642,4 +642,4 @@ See the following example:
## See Also
-[Windows 10 Enterprise LTSC](index.md): A short description of the LTSC servicing channel with links to information about each release.
\ No newline at end of file
+[Windows 10 Enterprise LTSC](index.md): A short description of the LTSC servicing channel with links to information about each release.
diff --git a/windows/whats-new/whats-new-windows-10-version-1803.md b/windows/whats-new/whats-new-windows-10-version-1803.md
index 0f28f72c7e..b83bdda9a7 100644
--- a/windows/whats-new/whats-new-windows-10-version-1803.md
+++ b/windows/whats-new/whats-new-windows-10-version-1803.md
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ The new [security baseline for Windows 10 version 1803](/windows/security/threat
### Microsoft Defender Antivirus
-Microsoft Defender Antivirus now shares detection status between M365 services and interoperates with Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. Additional policies have also been implemented to enhance cloud based protection, and new channels are available for emergency protection. For more information, see [Virus and threat protection](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-security-center/wdsc-virus-threat-protection) and [Use next-gen technologies in Microsoft Defender Antivirus through cloud-delivered protection](/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/utilize-microsoft-cloud-protection-microsoft-defender-antivirus).
+Microsoft Defender Antivirus now shares detection status between M365 services and interoperates with Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. Additional policies have also been implemented to enhance cloud based protection, and new channels are available for emergency protection. For more information, see [Virus and threat protection](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-security-center/wdsc-virus-threat-protection) and [Use next-gen technologies in Microsoft Defender Antivirus through cloud-delivered protection](/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/cloud-protection-microsoft-defender-antivirus).
### Windows Defender Exploit Guard
diff --git a/windows/whats-new/whats-new-windows-10-version-21H1.md b/windows/whats-new/whats-new-windows-10-version-21H1.md
index c56c65dac3..70725f4a9b 100644
--- a/windows/whats-new/whats-new-windows-10-version-21H1.md
+++ b/windows/whats-new/whats-new-windows-10-version-21H1.md
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ For a full list of what's new in Microsoft Intune, see [What's new in Microsoft
### Windows Assessment and Deployment Toolkit (ADK)
-There is no new ADK for Windows 10, version 21H1. The ADK for Windows 10, version 2004 will also work with Windows 10, version 20H2. For more information, see [Download and install the Windows ADK](/windows-hardware/get-started/adk-install).
+There is no new ADK for Windows 10, version 21H1. The ADK for Windows 10, version 2004 will also work with Windows 10, version 21H1. For more information, see [Download and install the Windows ADK](/windows-hardware/get-started/adk-install).
## Device management
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Group Policy Service (GPSVC) has a perf
WDAG performance is improved with optimized document opening times:
- An issue is fixed that could cause a one minute or more delay when you open a Microsoft Defender Application Guard (WDAG) Office document. This can occur when you try to open a file using a Universal Naming Convention (UNC) path or Server Message Block (SMB) share link.
-- A memory issue is fixed that could casue a WDAG container to use almost 1 GB of working set memory when the container is idle.
+- A memory issue is fixed that could cause a WDAG container to use almost 1 GB of working set memory when the container is idle.
- The performance of Robocopy is improved when copying files over 400 MB in size.
### Windows Hello
@@ -136,4 +136,4 @@ This release includes the following enhancements and issues fixed:
[What's New in Windows 10](./index.yml): See what’s new in other versions of Windows 10.
[Announcing more ways we’re making app development easier on Windows](https://blogs.windows.com/windowsdeveloper/2020/09/22/kevin-gallo-microsoft-ignite-2020/): Simplifying app development in Windows.
[Features and functionality removed in Windows 10](/windows/deployment/planning/windows-10-removed-features): Removed features.
-[Windows 10 features we’re no longer developing](/windows/deployment/planning/windows-10-deprecated-features): Features that are not being developed.
\ No newline at end of file
+[Windows 10 features we’re no longer developing](/windows/deployment/planning/windows-10-deprecated-features): Features that are not being developed.
diff --git a/windows/whats-new/windows-11-plan.md b/windows/whats-new/windows-11-plan.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..17d61a7125
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/whats-new/windows-11-plan.md
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+---
+title: Plan for Windows 11
+description: Windows 11 deployment planning, IT Pro content.
+keywords: ["get started", "windows 11", "plan"]
+ms.prod: w11
+ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
+ms.sitesec: library
+author: greg-lindsay
+ms.author: greglin
+ms.date: 06/24/2021
+ms.reviewer:
+manager: laurawi
+ms.localizationpriority: high
+ms.topic: article
+---
+
+# Plan for Windows 11
+
+**Applies to**
+
+- Windows 11
+
+## Deployment planning
+
+This article provides guidance to help you plan for Windows 11 in your organization.
+
+Since Windows 11 is built on the same foundation as Windows 10, you can use the same deployment capabilities, scenarios, and tools—as well as the same basic deployment strategy that you use today for Windows 10. You will need to review and update your servicing strategy to adjust for changes in [Servicing and support](#servicing-and-support) for Windows 11.
+
+At a high level, this strategy should include the following steps:
+- [Create a deployment plan](/windows/deployment/update/create-deployment-plan)
+- [Define readiness criteria](/windows/deployment/update/plan-define-readiness)
+- [Evaluate infrastructure and tools](/windows/deployment/update/eval-infra-tools)
+- [Determine application readiness](/windows/deployment/update/plan-determine-app-readiness)
+- [Define your servicing strategy](/windows/deployment/update/plan-define-strategy)
+
+If you are looking for ways to optimize your approach to deploying Windows 11, or if deploying a new version of an operating system is not a familiar process for you, some items to consider are provided below.
+
+## Determine eligibility
+
+As a first step, you will need to know which of your current devices meet the Windows 11 hardware requirements. Most devices purchased in the last 18-24 months will be compatible with Windows 11. Verify that your device meets or exceeds [Windows 11 requirements](windows-11-requirements.md) to ensure it is compatible.
+
+Microsoft is currently developing analysis tools to help you evaluate your devices against the Windows 11 hardware requirements. When Windows 11 reaches general availability, end-users running Windows 10 Home, Pro, and Pro for Workstations will be able to use the **PC Health Check** app to determine their eligibility for Windows 11. end-users running Windows 10 Enterprise and Education editions should rely on their IT administrators to let them know when they are eligible for the upgrade.
+
+Enterprise organizations looking to evaluate device readiness in their environments can expect this capability to be integrated into existing Microsoft tools, such as Endpoint analytics and Update Compliance. This capability will be available when Windows 11 is generally available. Microsoft is also working with software publishing partners to facilitate adding Windows 11 device support into their solutions.
+
+## Windows 11 availability
+
+The availability of Windows 11 will vary according to a device's hardware and whether the device receives updates directly, or from a management solution that is maintained by an IT administrator.
+
+##### Managed devices
+
+Managed devices are devices that are under organization control. Managed devices include those managed by Microsoft Intune, Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager, or other endpoint management solutions.
+
+If you manage devices on behalf of your organization, you will be able to upgrade eligible devices to Windows 11 using your existing deployment and management tools at no cost when the upgrade reaches general availability. Organizations that use Windows Update for Business will have added benefits, such as:
+
+- Ensuring that devices that don't meet the minimum hardware requirements are not automatically offered the Windows 11 upgrade.
+- Additional insight into safeguard holds. While safeguard holds will function for Windows 11 devices just as they do for Windows 10 today, administrators using Windows Update for Business will have access to information on which safeguard holds are preventing individual devices from taking the upgrade to Windows 11.
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> If you use Windows Update for Business to manage feature update deployments today, you will need to leverage the **Target Version** policy rather than **Feature Update deferrals** to move from Windows 10 to Windows 11. Deferrals are great for quality updates or to move to newer version of the same product (from example, from Windows 10, version 20H2 to 21H1), but they cannot migrate a device between products (from Windows 10 to Windows 11).
+> Also, Windows 11 has a new End User License Agreement. If you are deploying with Windows Update for Business **Target Version** or with Windows Server Update Services, you are accepting this new End User License Agreement on behalf of the end-users within your organization.
+
+##### Unmanaged devices
+
+Unmanaged devices are devices that are not managed by an IT administrator on behalf of an organization. For operating system (OS) deployment, these devices are not subject to organizational policies that manage upgrades or updates.
+
+Windows 11 will be offered to eligible Windows 10 devices beginning later in the 2021 calendar year. Messaging on new devices will vary by PC manufacturer, but users will see labels such as **This PC will upgrade to Windows 11 once available** on products that are available for purchase.
+
+The Windows 11 upgrade will be available initially on eligible, unmanaged devices to users who manually seek the upgrade through Windows Update. As with all Windows Update managed devices, the **Windows Update Settings** page will confirm when a device is eligible, and users can upgrade if they choose to.
+
+Just like Windows 10, the machine learning based [intelligent rollout](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-it-pro-blog/using-machine-learning-to-improve-the-windows-10-update/ba-p/877860) process will be used when rolling out upgrades. Machine learning uses a combination of testing, close partner engagement, feedback, diagnostic data, and real-life insights to manage quality. This process improves the update experience, and ensures that devices first nominated for updates are the devices likely to have a seamless experience. Devices that might have compatibility issues with the upgrade get the benefit of resolving these issues before the upgrade is offered.
+
+## Windows 11 readiness considerations
+
+The recommended method to determine if your infrastructure, deployment processes, and management tools are ready for Windows 11 is to join the [Windows Insider Program for Business](https://insider.windows.com/for-business). As a participant in the [Release Preview Channel](/windows-insider/business/validate-Release-Preview-Channel), you can validate that your devices and applications work as expected, and explore new features.
+
+As you plan your endpoint management strategy for Windows 11, consider moving to cloud-based mobile device management (MDM), such as [Microsoft Intune](/mem/intune/fundamentals/what-is-intune). If a cloud-only approach isn't right for your organization just yet, you can still modernize and streamline essential pieces of your endpoint management strategy as follows:
+- Create a [cloud management gateway](/mem/configmgr/core/clients/manage/cmg/overview) (CMG) to manage Configuration Manager clients over the internet.
+- Attach your existing Configuration Management estate to the cloud with [tenant attach](/mem/configmgr/tenant-attach/device-sync-actions) so you can manage all devices from within the Microsoft Endpoint Manager admin center.
+- Use [co-management](/mem/configmgr/comanage/overview) to concurrently manage devices using both Configuration Manager and Microsoft Intune. This allows you to take advantage of cloud-powered capabilities like [Conditional Access](/azure/active-directory/conditional-access/overview).
+
+For more information on the benefits of these approaches, see [Cloud Attach Your Future: The Big 3](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/configuration-manager-blog/cloud-attach-your-future-part-ii-quot-the-big-3-quot/ba-p/1750664).
+
+The introduction of Windows 11 is also a good time to review your hardware refresh plans and prioritize eligible devices to ensure an optimal experience for your users.
+
+## Servicing and support
+
+Along with end-user experience and security improvements, Windows 11 introduces enhancements to Microsoft's servicing approach based on your suggestions and feedback.
+
+**Quality updates**: Windows 11 and Windows 10 devices will receive regular monthly quality updates to provide security updates and bug fixes.
+
+**Feature updates**: Microsoft will provide a single Windows 11 feature update annually, targeted for release in the second half of each calendar year.
+
+**Lifecycle**:
+- Home, Pro, Pro for Workstations, and Pro for Education editions of Windows 11 will receive 24 months of support from the general availability date.
+- Enterprise and Education editions of Windows 11 will be supported for 36 months from the general availability date.
+
+When Windows 11 reaches general availability, a consolidated Windows 11 update history will be available on support.microsoft.com, similar to what is [available today for Windows 10](https://support.microsoft.com/topic/windows-10-update-history-1b6aac92-bf01-42b5-b158-f80c6d93eb11). Similarly, the [Windows release health](/windows/release-health/) hub will offer quick access to Windows 11 servicing announcements, known issues, and safeguard holds.
+
+It is important that organizations have adequate time to plan for Windows 11. Microsoft also recognizes that many organizations will have a mix of Windows 11 and Windows 10 devices across their ecosystem. Devices on in-service versions of Windows 10 will continue to receive monthly Windows 10 security updates through 2025, as well as incremental improvements to Windows 10 to support ongoing Microsoft 365 deployments. For more information, see the [Windows 10 release information](/windows/release-health/release-information) page, which offers information about the Windows 10 Semi-Annual Channel and Long-term Servicing Channel (LTSC) releases.
+
+## Application compatibility
+
+Microsoft's compatibility promise for Windows 10 is maintained for Windows 11. Data from the App Assure program shows that Windows 10 compatibility rates are over 99.7% for enterprise organizations, including line of business (LOB) apps. Microsoft remains committed to ensuring that the apps you rely upon continue to work as expected when you upgrade. Windows 11 is subject to the same app compatibility validation requirements that are in place for Windows 10 today, for both feature and quality updates.
+
+#### App Assure and Test Base for Microsoft 365
+
+If you run into compatibility issues or want to ensure that your organization's applications are compatible from day one, App Assure and Test Base for Microsoft 365 can help.
+
+**App Assure**: With enrollment in the [App Assure](/windows/compatibility/app-assure) service, any app compatibility issues that you find with Windows 11 can be resolved. Microsoft will help you remedy application issues at no cost. Since 2018, App Assure has evaluated almost 800,000 apps, and subscriptions are free for eligible customers with 150+ seats.
+
+**Test Base for Microsoft 365**: For software publishers, systems integrators, and IT administrators, [Test Base for Microsoft 365](https://aka.ms/testbase) (currently in private preview) is a service that allows you to validate your apps across a variety of Windows feature and quality updates and environments in a Microsoft-managed Azure environment. Enterprise organizations can also nominate their software publishers for participation by completing a short form.
+
+You might already be using App Assure and Test Base in your Windows 10 environment. Both of these tools will continue to function with Windows 11.
+
+## Next steps
+
+[Prepare for Windows 11](windows-11-prepare.md)
+
+## Also see
+
+[Plan to deploy updates for Windows 10 and Microsoft 365 Apps](/learn/modules/windows-plan/)
diff --git a/windows/whats-new/windows-11-prepare.md b/windows/whats-new/windows-11-prepare.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5ccbff2c5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/whats-new/windows-11-prepare.md
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+---
+title: Prepare for Windows 11
+description: Prepare your infrastructure and tools to deploy Windows 11, IT Pro content.
+keywords: ["get started", "windows 11"]
+ms.prod: w11
+ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
+ms.sitesec: library
+author: greg-lindsay
+ms.author: greglin
+ms.date: 06/24/2021
+ms.reviewer:
+manager: laurawi
+ms.localizationpriority: high
+ms.topic: article
+---
+
+# Prepare for Windows 11
+
+**Applies to**
+
+- Windows 11
+
+Windows 10 and Windows 11 are designed to coexist, so that you can use the same familiar tools and process to manage both operating systems. Using a single management infrastructure that supports common applications across both Windows 10 and Windows 11 helps to simplify the migration process. You can analyze endpoints, determine application compatibility, and manage Windows 11 deployments in the same way that you do with Windows 10.
+
+After you evaluate your hardware to see if it meets [requirements](windows-11-requirements.md) for Windows 11, it's a good time to review your deployment infrastructure, tools, and overall endpoint and update management processes and look for opportunities to simplify and optimize. This article provides some helpful guidance to accomplish these tasks.
+
+## Infrastructure and tools
+
+The tools that you use for core workloads during Windows 10 deployments can still be used for Windows 11. A few nuanced differences are described below.
+
+ > [!IMPORTANT]
+ > Be sure to check with the providers of any non-Microsoft solutions that you use. Verify compatibility of these tools with Windows 11, particularly if they provide security or data loss prevention capabilities.
+
+#### On-premises solutions
+
+- If you use Windows Server Update Service (WSUS), you will need to sync the new **Windows 11** product category. After you sync the product category, you will see Windows 11 offered as an option. If you would like to validate Windows 11 prior to release, you can sync the **Windows Insider Pre-release** category as well.
+
+ > [!NOTE]
+ > During deployment, you will be prompted to agree to the End User License Agreement on behalf of your users. Additionally, you will not see an x86 option because Windows 11 is not supported on 32-bit architecture.
+
+- If you use Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager, you can sync the new **Windows 11** product category and begin upgrading eligible devices. If you would like to validate Windows 11 prior to release, you can sync the **Windows Insider Pre-release** category as well.
+
+ > [!NOTE]
+ > Configuration Manager will prompt you to accept the End User License Agreement on behalf of the users in your organization.
+
+#### Cloud-based solutions
+
+- If you use Windows Update for Business Group Policy or Configuration Service Provider (CSP) policies, you will need to use the **Target Version** capability rather than feature update deferrals to upgrade from Windows 10 to Windows 11. Feature update deferrals are great to move to newer versions of your current product (for example, Windows 10, version 20H2 to 21H1), but do not enable you to move between products (Windows 10 to Windows 11).
+- Quality update deferrals will continue to work the same across both Windows 10 and Windows 11. This is true regardless of which management tool you use to configure Windows Update for Business policies.
+- If you use Microsoft Intune and have a Microsoft 365 E3 license, you will be able to use feature update deployments to easily update devices from one release of Windows 10 to another, or to upgrade Windows 10 devices to Windows 11. You can also continue using the same update experience controls to manage Windows 10 and Windows 11.
+
+## Cloud-based management
+
+If you aren’t already taking advantage of cloud-based management capabilities, like those available in [Microsoft Endpoint Manager](/mem/endpoint-manager-overview), it's worth considering. In addition to consolidating device management and endpoint security into a single platform, Microsoft Endpoint Manager can better support the diverse bring-your-own-device (BYOD) ecosystem that is increasingly the norm with hybrid work scenarios. It can also enable you to track your progress against compliance and business objectives, while protecting end-user privacy.
+
+The following are some common use cases and the corresponding Microsoft Endpoint Manager capabilities that support them:
+
+- **Provision and pre-configure new Windows 11 devices**: [Windows Autopilot](/mem/autopilot/windows-autopilot) enables you to deploy new Windows 11 devices in a “business-ready” state that includes your desired applications, settings, and policies. It can also be used to change the edition of Windows. For example, you can upgrade from Pro to Enterprise edition and gain the use of advanced features.
+- **Configure rules and control settings for users, apps, and devices**: When you enroll devices in [Microsoft Intune](/mem/intune/fundamentals/what-is-intune), administrators have full control over apps, settings, features, and security for both Windows 11 and Windows 10. You can also use app protection policies to require multi-factor authentication (MFA) for specific apps.
+- **Streamline device management for frontline, remote, and onsite workers**: Introduced with Windows 10, [cloud configuration](/mem/intune/fundamentals/cloud-configuration) is a standard, easy-to-manage, device configuration that is cloud-optimized for users with specific workflow needs. It can be deployed to devices running the Pro, Enterprise, and Education editions of Windows 11 by using Microsoft Endpoint Manager.
+
+If you are exclusively using an on-premises device management solution (for example, Configuration Manager), you can still use the [cloud management gateway](/mem/configmgr/core/clients/manage/cmg/overview), enable [tenant attach](/mem/configmgr/tenant-attach/device-sync-actions), or enable [co-management](/mem/configmgr/comanage/overview) with Microsoft Intune. These solutions can make it easier to keep devices secure and up-to-date.
+
+## Review servicing approach and policies
+
+Every organization will transition to Windows 11 at its own pace. Microsoft is committed to supporting you through your migration to Windows 11, whether you are a fast adopter or will make the transition over the coming months or years.
+
+When you think of operating system updates as an ongoing process, you will automatically improve your ability to deploy updates. This approach enables you to stay current with less effort, and less impact on productivity. To begin, think about how you roll out Windows feature updates today: which devices, and at what pace.
+
+Next, craft a deployment plan for Windows 11 that includes deployment groups, rings, users, or devices. There are no absolute rules for exactly how many rings to have for your deployments, but a common structure is:
+- Preview (first or canary): Planning and development
+- Limited (fast or early adopters): Pilot and validation
+- Broad (users or critical): Wide deployment
+
+For detailed information, see [Create a deployment plan](/windows/deployment/update/create-deployment-plan).
+
+#### Review policies
+
+Review deployment-related policies, taking into consideration your organization's security objectives, update compliance deadlines, and device activity. Apply changes where you can gain a clear improvement, particularly with regard to the speed of the update process or security.
+
+#### Validate apps and infrastructure
+
+To validate that your apps, infrastructure, and deployment processes are ready for Windows 11, join the [Windows Insider Program for Business](https://insider.windows.com/for-business-getting-started), and opt in to the [Release Preview Channel](/windows-insider/business/validate-Release-Preview-Channel).
+
+If you use Windows Server Update Services, you can deploy directly from the Windows Insider Pre-release category using one of the following processes:
+
+- Set **Manage Preview Builds** to **Release Preview** in Windows Update for Business.
+- Leverage Azure Virtual Desktop and Azure Marketplace images.
+- Download and deploy ISOs from Microsoft’s Windows Insider Program ISO Download page.
+
+Regardless of the method you choose, you have the benefit of free Microsoft support when validating pre-release builds. Free support is available to any commercial customer deploying Windows 10 or Windows 11 Preview Builds, once they become available through the Windows Insider Program.
+
+#### Analytics and assessment tools
+
+If you use Microsoft Endpoint Manager and have onboarded devices to Endpoint analytics, you will have access to a hardware readiness assessment later this year. This tool enables you to quickly identify which of your managed devices are eligible for the Windows 11 upgrade.
+
+## Prepare a pilot deployment
+
+A pilot deployment is a proof of concept that rolls out an upgrade to a select number of devices in production, before deploying it broadly across the organization.
+
+At a high level, the tasks involved are:
+
+1. Assign a group of users or devices to receive the upgrade.
+2. Implement baseline updates.
+3. Implement operational updates.
+4. Validate the deployment process.
+5. Deploy the upgrade to devices.
+6. Test and support the pilot devices.
+7. Determine broad deployment readiness based on the results of the pilot.
+
+## End-user readiness
+
+Do not overlook the importance of end-user readiness to deliver an effective, enterprise-wide deployment of Windows 11. Windows 11 has a familiar design, but your users will see several enhancements to the overall user interface. They will also need to adapt to changes in menus and settings pages. Therefore, consider the following tasks to prepare users and your IT support staff Windows 11:
+- Create a communications schedule to ensure that you provide the right message at the right time to the right groups of users, based on when they will see the changes.
+- Draft concise emails that inform users of what changes they can expect to see. Offer tips on how to use or customize their experience. Include information about support and help desk options.
+- Update help desk manuals with screenshots of the new user interface, the out-of-box experience for new devices, and the upgrade experience for existing devices.
+
+## Learn more
+
+See the [Stay current with Windows 10 and Microsoft 365 Apps](/learn/paths/m365-stay-current/) learning path on Microsoft Learn.
+- The learning path was created for Windows 10, but the basic principles and tasks outlined for the plan, prepare, and deploy phases also apply to your deployment of Windows 11.
+
+## See also
+
+[Plan for Windows 11](windows-11-plan.md)
+[Windows help & learning](https://support.microsoft.com/windows)
diff --git a/windows/whats-new/windows-11-requirements.md b/windows/whats-new/windows-11-requirements.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8c87b2c454
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/whats-new/windows-11-requirements.md
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+---
+title: Windows 11 requirements
+description: Hardware requirements to deploy Windows 11
+ms.reviewer:
+manager: laurawi
+ms.audience: itpro
+author: greg-lindsay
+ms.author: greglin
+ms.prod: w10
+ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
+ms.sitesec: library
+ms.localizationpriority: medium
+audience: itpro
+ms.topic: article
+ms.custom: seo-marvel-apr2020
+---
+
+# Windows 11 requirements
+
+**Applies to**
+
+- Windows 11
+
+This article lists the system requirements for Windows 11. Windows 11 is also supported on a virtual machine (VM).
+
+## Hardware requirements
+
+To install or upgrade to Windows 11, devices must meet the following minimum hardware requirements:
+
+- Processor: 1 gigahertz (GHz) or faster with two or more cores on a [compatible 64-bit processor](https://aka.ms/CPUlist) or system on a chip (SoC).
+- RAM: 4 gigabytes (GB) or greater.
+- Storage: 64 GB\* or greater available storage is required to install Windows 11.
+ - Additional storage space might be required to download updates and enable specific features.
+- Graphics card: Compatible with DirectX 12 or later, with a WDDM 2.0 driver.
+- System firmware: UEFI, Secure Boot capable.
+- TPM: [Trusted Platform Module](/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/trusted-platform-module-overview) (TPM) version 2.0.
+- Display: High definition (720p) display, 9" or greater monitor, 8 bits per color channel.
+- Internet connection: Internet connectivity is necessary to perform updates, and to download and use some features.
+ - Windows 11 Home edition requires an Internet connection and a Microsoft Account to complete device setup on first use.
+
+\* There might be additional requirements over time for updates, and to enable specific features within the operating system. For more information, see [Keeping Windows 11 up-to-date](https://www.microsoft.com/windows/windows-10-specifications#primaryR5).
+
+For information about tools to evaluate readiness, see [Determine eligibility](windows-11-plan.md#determine-eligibility).
+
+## Operating system requirements
+
+For the best Windows 11 upgrade experience, eligible devices should be running Windows 10, version 20H1 or later.
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> S mode is only supported on the Home edition of Windows 11.
+> If you are running a different edition of Windows in S mode, you will need to first [switch out of S mode](/windows/deployment/windows-10-pro-in-s-mode) prior to upgrading.
+> Switching a device out of Windows 10 in S mode also requires internet connectivity. If you switch out of S mode, you cannot switch back to S mode later.
+
+## Feature-specific requirements
+
+Some features in Windows 11 have requirements beyond those listed above. See the following list of features and associated requirements.
+
+- **5G support**: requires 5G capable modem.
+- **Auto HDR**: requires an HDR monitor.
+- **BitLocker to Go**: requires a USB flash drive. This feature is available in Windows Pro and above editions.
+- **Client Hyper-V**: requires a processor with second-level address translation (SLAT) capabilities. This feature is available in Windows Pro editions and above.
+- **Cortana**: requires a microphone and speaker and is currently available on Windows 11 for Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Spain, United Kingdom, and United States.
+- **DirectStorage**: requires an NVMe SSD to store and run games that use the Standard NVM Express Controller driver and a DirectX12 GPU with Shader Model 6.0 support.
+- **DirectX 12 Ultimate**: available with supported games and graphics chips.
+- **Presence**: requires sensor that can detect human distance from device or intent to interact with device.
+- **Intelligent Video Conferencing**: requires video camera, microphone, and speaker (audio output)
+- **Multiple Voice Assistant**: requires a microphone and speaker.
+- **Snap**: three-column layouts require a screen that is 1920 effective pixels or greater in width.
+- **Mute** and **unmute**: from Taskbar requires video camera, microphone, and speaker (audio output). App must be compatible with feature to enable global mute/unmute.
+- **Spatial Sound**: requires supporting hardware and software.
+- **Microsoft Teams**: requires video camera, microphone, and speaker (audio output).
+- **Touch**: requires a screen or monitor that supports multi-touch.
+- **Two-factor authentication**: requires use of PIN, biometric (fingerprint reader or illuminated infrared camera), or a phone with Wi-Fi or Bluetooth capabilities.
+- **Voice Typing**: requires a PC with a microphone.
+- **Wake on Voice**: requires Modern Standby power model and microphone.
+- **Wi-Fi 6E**: requires new WLAN IHV hardware and driver and a Wi-Fi 6E capable AP/router.
+- **Windows Hello**: requires a camera configured for near infrared (IR) imaging or fingerprint reader for biometric authentication. Devices without biometric sensors can use Windows Hello with a PIN or portable Microsoft compatible security key. For more information, see [IT tools to support Windows 10, version 21H1](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-it-pro-blog/it-tools-to-support-windows-10-version-21h1/ba-p/2365103).
+- **Windows Projection**: requires a display adapter that supports Windows Display Driver Model (WDDM) 2.0 and a Wi-Fi adapter that supports Wi-Fi Direct.
+- **Xbox app**: requires an Xbox Live account, which is not available in all regions. Please go to the Xbox Live Countries and Regions page for the most up-to-date information on availability. Some features in the Xbox app will require an active [Xbox Game Pass](https://www.xbox.com/xbox-game-pass) subscription.
+
+
+## Next steps
+
+[Plan for Windows 11](windows-11-plan.md)
+[Prepare for Windows 11](windows-11-prepare.md)
+
+## See also
+
+[Windows 11 overview](windows-11.md)
+
diff --git a/windows/whats-new/windows-11.md b/windows/whats-new/windows-11.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..260967a467
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/whats-new/windows-11.md
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+---
+title: Windows 11 overview
+description: Overview of Windows 11
+ms.assetid: E9E2DED5-DBA7-4300-B411-BA0FD39BE18C
+ms.reviewer:
+manager: laurawi
+ms.audience: itpro
+author: greg-lindsay
+ms.author: greglin
+ms.prod: w10
+ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
+ms.sitesec: library
+ms.localizationpriority: medium
+audience: itpro
+ms.topic: article
+ms.custom: seo-marvel-apr2020
+---
+
+# Windows 11 overview
+
+**Applies to**
+
+- Windows 11
+
+This article provides an introduction to Windows 11, and answers some frequently asked questions.
+
+Also see the following articles to learn more about Windows 11:
+
+- [Windows 11 requirements](windows-11-requirements.md): Requirements to deploy Windows 11.
+- [Plan for Windows 11](windows-11-plan.md): Information to help you plan for Windows 11 in your organization.
+- [Prepare for Windows 11](windows-11-prepare.md): Procedures to ensure readiness to deploy Windows 11.
+
+## Introduction
+
+Windows 11 is the next evolution of Windows; it is the most significant update to the Windows operating system since Windows 10. It offers many innovations focused on enhancing end-user productivity in a fresh experience that is flexible and fluid. Windows 11 is designed to support today's hybrid work environment, and intended to be the most reliable, secure, connected, and performant Windows operating system ever.
+
+Windows 11 is built on the same foundation as Windows 10, so the investments you have made in tools for update and device management are carried forward. Windows 11 also sustains the application compatibility promise made with Windows 10, supplemented by programs like App Assure. For Microsoft 365 customers seeking further assistance, FastTrack will continue to be available to support your efforts to adopt Windows 11.
+
+## How to get Windows 11
+
+Windows 11 will be delivered as an upgrade to eligible devices running Windows 10, beginning later in the 2021 calendar year. Windows 11 will also be available on eligible new devices.
+
+For administrators managing devices on behalf of their organization, Windows 11 will be available through the same, familiar channels that you use today for Windows 10 feature updates. You will be able to use existing deployment and management tools, such as Windows Update for Business, Microsoft Endpoint Manager, and Windows Autopilot. For more information, see [Plan for Windows 11](windows-11-plan.md).
+
+For devices that are not managed by an organization, the Windows 11 upgrade will be offered to eligible Windows 10 devices through Windows Update using Microsoft's intelligent rollout process to ensure a smooth upgrade experience.
+
+For more information about device eligibility, see [Windows 11 requirements](windows-11-requirements.md).
+
+If you are interested in testing Windows 11 before general availability, you can join the [Windows Insider Program](https://insider.windows.com) or [Windows Insider Program for Business](https://insider.windows.com/for-business). You can also preview Windows 11 by enabling pre-release Windows 10 feature updates in [Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager](/mem/configmgr/core/servers/manage/pre-release-features) or [Windows Server Update Services](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-it-pro-blog/publishing-pre-release-windows-10-feature-updates-to-wsus/ba-p/845054) (WSUS).
+
+## Before you begin
+
+The following sections provide a quick summary of licensing, compatibility, management, and servicing considerations to help you get started with Windows 11.
+
+#### Licensing
+
+There are no unique licensing requirements for Windows 11 beyond what is required for Windows 10 devices.
+
+Microsoft 365 licenses that include Windows 10 licenses will permit you to run Windows 11 on supported devices. If you have a volume license, it will equally cover Windows 11 and Windows 10 devices before and after upgrade.
+
+#### Compatibility
+
+Most accessories and associated drivers that work with Windows 10 are expected to work with Windows 11. Check with your accessory manufacturer for specific details.
+
+Windows 11 preserves the application compatibility promise made with Windows 10, and does not require changes to existing support processes or tooling to sustain the currency of applications and devices. Microsoft 365 customers can continue to use programs such as App Assure and FastTrack to support IT efforts to adopt and maintain Windows 11. For more information, see [Application compatibility](windows-11-plan.md#application-compatibility).
+
+#### Familiar processes
+
+Windows 11 is built on the same foundation as Windows 10. Typically, you can use the same tools and solutions you use today to deploy, manage, and secure Windows 11. Your current management tools and processes will also work to manage monthly quality updates for both Windows 10 and Windows 11.
+
+> [!IMPORTANT]
+> Check with the providers of any non-Microsoft security and management solutions that you use to ensure compatibility with Windows 11, particularly those providing security or data loss prevention capabilities.
+
+For more information, see [Prepare for Windows 11](windows-11-prepare.md).
+
+#### Servicing Windows 11
+
+Like Windows 10, Windows 11 will receive monthly quality updates. However, it will have a new feature update cadence. Windows 11 feature updates will be released once per year.
+
+When Windows 11 reaches general availability, important servicing-related announcements and information about known issues and safeguard holds can be found on the [Windows release health](https://aka.ms/windowsreleasehealth) hub. Monthly release notes will also be available from a consolidated Windows 11 update history page at that time. For more information, see [Servicing and support](windows-11-plan.md#servicing-and-support).
+
+## Next steps
+
+[Windows 11 requirements](windows-11-requirements.md)
+[Plan for Windows 11](windows-11-plan.md)
+[Prepare for Windows 11](windows-11-prepare.md)
\ No newline at end of file