acrolinx updates

windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/fileless-threats.md

@@ -33,38 +33,38 @@ Next, list the form of entry point. For example, exploits can be based on files
 
 Finally, classify the host of the infection. For example, a Flash application may contain a variety of threats such as an exploit, a simple executable, and malicious firmware from a hardware device.
 
-This helps you divide and categorize the various kinds of fileless threats. Clearly, the categories are not all the same: some are more dangerous but also more difficult to implement, while others are more commonly used despite (or precisely because of) not being very advanced.
+Classifying helps you divide and categorize the various kinds of fileless threats. Some are more dangerous but also more difficult to implement, while others are more commonly used despite (or precisely because of) not being very advanced.
 
 From this categorization, you can glean three main types of fileless threats based on how much fingerprint they may leave on infected machines.
 
 ## Type I: No file activity performed
 
-A completely fileless malware can be considered one that never requires writing a file on the disk. How would such malware infect a machine in the first place? An example scenario could be a target machine receiving malicious network packets that exploit the EternalBlue vulnerability, leading to the installation of the DoublePulsar backdoor, which ends up residing only in the kernel memory. In this case, there is no file or any data written on a file.
+A fully fileless malware can be considered one that never requires writing a file on the disk. How would such malware infect a machine in the first place? One example is where a target machine receives malicious network packets that exploit the EternalBlue vulnerability. The vulnerability allows the installation of the DoublePulsar backdoor, which ends up residing only in the kernel memory. In this case, there's no file or any data written on a file.
 
-Another scenario could involve compromised devices, where malicious code could be hiding in device firmware (such as a BIOS), a USB peripheral (like the BadUSB attack), or even in the firmware of a network card. All these examples do not require a file on the disk to run and can theoretically live only in memory, surviving even reboots, disk reformats, and OS reinstalls.
+A compromised device may also have malicious code hiding in device firmware (such as a BIOS), a USB peripheral (like the BadUSB attack), or in the firmware of a network card. All these examples don't require a file on the disk to run, and can theoretically live only in memory. The malicious code would survive reboots, disk reformats, and OS reinstalls.
 
-Infections of this type can be extra difficult to detect and remediate. Antivirus products usually don’t have the capability to access firmware for inspection; even if they did, it would be extremely challenging to detect and remediate threats at this level. Because this type of fileless malware requires high levels of sophistication and often depend on particular hardware or software configuration, it’s not an attack vector that can be exploited easily and reliably. For this reason, while extremely dangerous, threats of this type tend to be very uncommon and not practical for most attacks.
+Infections of this type can be extra difficult deal with because antivirus products usually don’t have the capability to inspect firmware. Even if they did, it would be extremely challenging to detect and remediate threats at this level. This type of fileless malware requires high levels of sophistication and often depends on particular hardware or software configuration. It’s not an attack vector that can be exploited easily and reliably. While dangerous, threats of this type are uncommon and not practical for most attacks.
 
 ## Type II: Indirect file activity
 
-There are other ways that malware can achieve fileless presence on a machine without requiring significant engineering effort. Fileless malware of this type doesn't directly write files on the file system, but they can end up using files indirectly. This is the case for [Poshspy backdoor](https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html). Attackers installed a malicious PowerShell command within the WMI repository and configured a WMI filter to run such command periodically.
+There are other ways that malware can achieve fileless presence on a machine without requiring significant engineering effort. Fileless malware of this type doesn't directly write files on the file system, but they can end up using files indirectly. For example, with the [Poshspy backdoor](https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html) attackers installed a malicious PowerShell command within the WMI repository and configured a WMI filter to run the command periodically.
 
-It’s possible to carry out such installation via command line without requiring the presence of the backdoor to be on a file in the first place. The malware can thus be installed and theoretically run without ever touching the file system. However, the WMI repository is stored on a physical file that is a central storage area managed by the CIM Object Manager and usually contains legitimate data. Therefore, while the infection chain does technically use a physical file, for practical purposes it’s considered a fileless attack given that the WMI repository is a multi-purpose data container that cannot be simply detected and removed.
+It’s possible to carry out such installation via command line without requiring a backdoor to already be on the file. The malware can be installed and theoretically run without ever touching the file system. However, the WMI repository is stored on a physical file in a central storage area managed by the CIM Object Manager, and usually contains legitimate data. Even though the infection chain does technically use a physical file, it’s considered a fileless attack because the WMI repository is a multi-purpose data container that can't be detected and removed.
 
 ## Type III: Files required to operate
 
-Some malware can have some sort of fileless persistence but not without using files to operate. An example for this scenario is Kovter, which creates a shell open verb handler in the registry for a random file extension. This action means that opening a file with such extension will lead to the execution of a script through the legitimate tool mshta.exe.
+Some malware can have a sort of fileless persistence, but not without using files to operate. An example for this scenario is Kovter, which creates a shell open verb handler in the registry for a random file extension. Opening a file with such extension will lead to the execution of a script through the legitimate tool mshta.exe.
 
 ![Image of Kovter's registry key](images/kovter-reg-key.png)<br>
 *Figure 2. Kovter’s registry key*
 
-When the open verb is invoked, the associated command from the registry is launched, which results in the execution of a small script. This script reads data from a further registry key and executes it, in turn leading to the loading of the final payload. However, to trigger the open verb in the first place, Kovter has to drop a file with the same extension targeted by the verb (in the example above, the extension is .bbf5590fd). It also has to set an auto-run key configured to open such file when the machine starts.
+When the open verb is invoked, the associated command from the registry is launched, which results in the execution of a small script. This script reads data from a further registry key and executes it, in turn leading to the loading of the final payload. However, to trigger the open verb in the first place, Kovter has to drop a file with the same extension targeted by the verb (in the example above, the extension is .bbf5590fd). It also has to set an autorun key configured to open such file when the machine starts.
 
-Kovter is considered a fileless threat because the file system is of no practical use: the files with random extension contain junk data that is not usable in verifying the presence of the threat, and the files that store the registry are containers that cannot be detected and deleted if malicious content is present.
+Kovter is considered a fileless threat because the file system is of no practical use. The files with random extensions contain junk data that isn't usable in verifying the presence of the threat. The files that store the registry are containers that can't be detected and deleted if malicious content is present.
 
 ## Categorizing fileless threats by infection host
 
-Having described the broad categories, we can now dig into the details and provide a breakdown of the infection hosts. This comprehensive classification covers the panorama of what is usually referred to as fileless malware. It drives our efforts to research and develop new protection features that neutralize classes of attacks and ensure malware does not get the upper hand in the arms race.
+Having described the broad categories, we can now dig into the details and provide a breakdown of the infection hosts. This comprehensive classification covers the panorama of what is usually referred to as fileless malware. It drives our efforts to research and develop new protection features that neutralize classes of attacks and ensure malware doesn't get the upper hand in the arms race.
 
 ### Exploits
 
@@ -76,26 +76,28 @@ Having described the broad categories, we can now dig into the details and provi
 
 **Device-based** (Type I: network card, hard disk): Devices like hard disks and network cards require chipsets and dedicated software to function. Software residing and running in the chipset of a device is called firmware. Although a complex task, the firmware can be infected by malware, as the [Equation espionage group has been caught doing](https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/equation-hdd-malware/7623/).
 
-**CPU-based** (Type I): Modern CPUs are extremely complex and may include subsystems running firmware for management purposes. Such firmware may be vulnerable to hijacking and allow the execution of malicious code that would hence operate from within the CPU. In December 2017, two researchers reported a vulnerability that can allow attackers to execute code inside the [Management Engine (ME)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Management_Engine) present in any modern CPU from Intel. Meanwhile, the attacker group PLATINUM has been observed to have the capability to use Intel's [Active Management Technology (AMT)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Active_Management_Technology) to perform [invisible network communications](https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2017/06/07/platinum-continues-to-evolve-find-ways-to-maintain-invisibility/) bypassing the installed operating system. ME and AMT are essentially autonomous micro-computers that live inside the CPU and that operate at a very low level. Because these technologies’ purpose is to provide remote manageability, they have direct access to hardware, are independent of the operating system, and can run even if the computer is turned off. Besides being vulnerable at the firmware level, CPUs could be manufactured with backdoors inserted directly in the hardware circuitry. This attack has been [researched and proved possible](https://www.emsec.rub.de/media/crypto/veroeffentlichungen/2015/03/19/beckerStealthyExtended.pdf) in the past. Just recently it has been reported that certain models of x86 processors contain a secondary embedded RISC-like CPU core that can [effectively provide a backdoor](https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/08/10/via_c3_x86_processor_backdoor/) through which regular applications can gain privileged execution.
+**CPU-based** (Type I): Modern CPUs are complex and may include subsystems running firmware for management purposes. Such firmware may be vulnerable to hijacking and allow the execution of malicious code that would operate from within the CPU. In December 2017, two researchers reported a vulnerability that can allow attackers to execute code inside the [Management Engine (ME)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Management_Engine) present in any modern CPU from Intel. Meanwhile, the attacker group PLATINUM has been observed to have the capability to use Intel's [Active Management Technology (AMT)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Active_Management_Technology) to perform [invisible network communications](https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2017/06/07/platinum-continues-to-evolve-find-ways-to-maintain-invisibility/), bypassing the installed operating system. ME and AMT are essentially autonomous micro-computers that live inside the CPU and that operate at a very low level. Because these technologies’ purpose is to provide remote manageability, they have direct access to hardware, are independent of the operating system, and can run even if the computer is turned off.
 
-**USB-based** (Type I): USB devices of all kinds can be reprogrammed with malicious firmware capable of interacting with the operating system in nefarious ways. This is the case of the [BadUSB technique](https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/07/this-thumbdrive-hacks-computers-badusb-exploit-makes-devices-turn-evil/), demonstrated few years ago, which allows a reprogrammed USB stick to act as a keyboard that sends commands to machines via keystrokes, or as a network card that can redirect traffic at will.
+Besides being vulnerable at the firmware level, CPUs could be manufactured with backdoors inserted directly in the hardware circuitry. This attack has been [researched and proved possible](https://www.emsec.rub.de/media/crypto/veroeffentlichungen/2015/03/19/beckerStealthyExtended.pdf) in the past. It has been reported that certain models of x86 processors contain a secondary embedded RISC-like CPU core that can [effectively provide a backdoor](https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/08/10/via_c3_x86_processor_backdoor/) through which regular applications can gain privileged execution.
 
-**BIOS-based** (Type I): A BIOS is a firmware running inside a chipset. It executes when a machine is powered on, initializes the hardware, and then transfers control to the boot sector. It’s a very important component that operates at a very low level and executes before the boot sector. It’s possible to reprogram the BIOS firmware with malicious code, as has happened in the past with the [Mebromi rootkit](https://www.webroot.com/blog/2011/09/13/mebromi-the-first-bios-rootkit-in-the-wild/).
+**USB-based** (Type I): USB devices of all kinds can be reprogrammed with malicious firmware capable of interacting with the operating system in nefarious ways. For example, the [BadUSB technique](https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/07/this-thumbdrive-hacks-computers-badusb-exploit-makes-devices-turn-evil/) allows a reprogrammed USB stick to act as a keyboard that sends commands to machines via keystrokes, or as a network card that can redirect traffic at will.
 
-**Hypervisor-based** (Type I): Modern CPUs provide hardware hypervisor support, allowing the operating system to create robust virtual machines. A virtual machine runs in a confined, simulated environment, and is in theory unaware of the emulation. A malware taking over a machine may implement a small hypervisor to hide itself outside of the realm of the running operating system. Malware of this kind has been theorized in the past, and eventually real hypervisor rootkits [have been observed](http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2017/Jun/29), although very few are known to date.
+**BIOS-based** (Type I): A BIOS is a firmware running inside a chipset. It executes when a machine is powered on, initializes the hardware, and then transfers control to the boot sector. The BIOS is an important component that operates at a low level and executes before the boot sector. It’s possible to reprogram the BIOS firmware with malicious code, as has happened in the past with the [Mebromi rootkit](https://www.webroot.com/blog/2011/09/13/mebromi-the-first-bios-rootkit-in-the-wild/).
+
+**Hypervisor-based** (Type I): Modern CPUs provide hardware hypervisor support, allowing the operating system to create robust virtual machines. A virtual machine runs in a confined, simulated environment, and is in theory unaware of the emulation. A malware taking over a machine may implement a small hypervisor to hide itself outside of the realm of the running operating system. Malware of this kind has been theorized in the past, and eventually real hypervisor rootkits [have been observed](http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2017/Jun/29), although few are known to date.
 
 ### Execution and injection
 
-**File-based** (Type III: executables, DLLs, LNK files, scheduled tasks): This is the standard execution vector. A simple executable can be launched as a first-stage malware to run an additional payload in memory or inject it into other legitimate running processes.
+**File-based** (Type III: executables, DLLs, LNK files, scheduled tasks): This is the standard execution vector. A simple executable can be launched as a first-stage malware to run an additional payload in memory, or injected into other legitimate running processes.
 
-**Macro-based** (Type III: Office documents): The [VBA language](https://msdn.microsoft.com/vba/office-shared-vba/articles/getting-started-with-vba-in-office) is a flexible and powerful tool designed to automate editing tasks and add dynamic functionality to documents. As such, it can be abused by attackers to carry out malicious operations like decoding, running, or injecting an executable payload, or even implementing an entire ransomware, like in [the case of qkG](https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/qkg-filecoder-self-replicating-document-encrypting-ransomware/). Macros are executed within the context of an Office process (e.g., Winword.exe), and they’re implemented in a scripting language, so there is no binary executable that an antivirus can inspect. While Office apps require explicit consent from the user to execute macros from a document, attackers use social engineering techniques to trick users into allowing macros to execute.
+**Macro-based** (Type III: Office documents): The [VBA language](https://msdn.microsoft.com/vba/office-shared-vba/articles/getting-started-with-vba-in-office) is a flexible and powerful tool designed to automate editing tasks and add dynamic functionality to documents. As such, it can be abused by attackers to carry out malicious operations like decoding, running, or injecting an executable payload, or even implementing an entire ransomware, like in [the case of qkG](https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/qkg-filecoder-self-replicating-document-encrypting-ransomware/). Macros are executed within the context of an Office process (e.g., Winword.exe) and implemented in a scripting language. There's no binary executable that an antivirus can inspect. While Office apps require explicit consent from the user to execute macros from a document, attackers use social engineering techniques to trick users into allowing macros to execute.
 
-**Script-based** (Type II: file, service, registry, WMI repo, shell): The JavaScript, VBScript, and PowerShell scripting languages are available by default on Windows platforms. Scripts have the same advantages as macros: they are textual files (not binary executables) and run within the context of the interpreter (e.g., wscript.exe, powershell.exe, etc.), which is a clean and legitimate component. Scripts are very versatile; they can be run from a file (e.g., by double-clicking them) or, in some cases, executed directly on the command line of an interpreter. Being able to run on the command line can allow malware to encode malicious command-line scripts as auto-start services inside [autorun registry keys](https://www.gdatasoftware.com/blog/2014/07/23947-poweliks-the-persistent-malware-without-a-file) as [WMI event subscriptions](https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html) from the WMI repo. Furthermore, an attacker who has gained access to an infected machine may input the script on the command prompt.
+**Script-based** (Type II: file, service, registry, WMI repo, shell): The JavaScript, VBScript, and PowerShell scripting languages are available by default on Windows platforms. Scripts have the same advantages as macros, they are textual files (not binary executables) and run within the context of the interpreter (like wscript.exe, powershell.exe), which is a clean and legitimate component. Scripts are versatile and can be run from a file (by double-clicking them) or executed directly on the command line of an interpreter. Running on the command line allows malware to encode malicious scripts as autostart services inside [autorun registry keys](https://www.gdatasoftware.com/blog/2014/07/23947-poweliks-the-persistent-malware-without-a-file) as [WMI event subscriptions](https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html) from the WMI repo. Furthermore, an attacker who has gained access to an infected machine may input the script on the command prompt.
 
-**Disk-based** (Type II: Boot Record): The [Boot Record](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boot_sector) is the first sector of a disk or volume and contains executable code required to start the boot process of the operating system. Threats like [Petya](https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2017/06/27/new-ransomware-old-techniques-petya-adds-worm-capabilities/?source=mmpc) are capable of infecting the Boot Record by overwriting it with malicious code, so that when the machine is booted the malware immediately gains control (and in the case of Petya, with disastrous consequences). The Boot Record resides outside the file system, but it’s accessible by the operating system, and modern antivirus products have the capability to scan and restore it.
+**Disk-based** (Type II: Boot Record): The Boot Record is the first sector of a disk or volume, and contains executable code required to start the boot process of the operating system. Threats like [Petya](https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2017/06/27/new-ransomware-old-techniques-petya-adds-worm-capabilities/?source=mmpc) are capable of infecting the Boot Record by overwriting it with malicious code. When the machine is booted, the malware immediately gains control. The Boot Record resides outside the file system, but it’s accessible by the operating system. Modern antivirus products have the capability to scan and restore it.
 
 ## Defeating fileless malware
 
-At Microsoft, we actively monitor the security landscape to identify new threat trends and develop solutions that continuously enhance Windows security and mitigate classes of threats. We instrument durable protections that are effective against a wide range of threats. Through AntiMalware Scan Interface (AMSI), behavior monitoring, memory scanning, and boot sector protection, Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection [(Microsoft Defender ATP)](https://www.microsoft.com/windowsforbusiness?ocid=docs-fileless) can inspect fileless threats even with heavy obfuscation. Machine learning technologies in the cloud allow us to scale these protections against new and emerging threats.
+At Microsoft, we actively monitor the security landscape to identify new threat trends and develop solutions to mitigate classes of threats. We instrument durable protections that are effective against a wide range of threats. Through AntiMalware Scan Interface (AMSI), behavior monitoring, memory scanning, and boot sector protection, Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection [(Microsoft Defender ATP)](https://www.microsoft.com/windowsforbusiness?ocid=docs-fileless) can inspect fileless threats even with heavy obfuscation. Machine learning technologies in the cloud allow us to scale these protections against new and emerging threats.
 
 To learn more, read: [Out of sight but not invisible: Defeating fileless malware with behavior monitoring, AMSI, and next-gen AV](https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2018/09/27/out-of-sight-but-not-invisible-defeating-fileless-malware-with-behavior-monitoring-amsi-and-next-gen-av/)

windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/macro-malware.md

@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@ Macros are a powerful way to automate common tasks in Microsoft Office and can m
 
 ## How macro malware works
 
-Macro malware hides in Microsoft Office files and are delivered as email attachments or inside ZIP files. These files use names that are intended to entice or scare people into opening them. They often look like invoices, receipts, legal documents, and more.
+Macro malware hides in Microsoft Office files and is delivered as email attachments or inside ZIP files. These files use names that are intended to entice or scare people into opening them. They often look like invoices, receipts, legal documents, and more.
 
-Macro malware was fairly common several years ago because macros ran automatically whenever a document was opened. However, in recent versions of Microsoft Office, macros are disabled by default. This means malware authors need to convince users to turn on macros so that their malware can run. They do this by showing fake warnings when a malicious document is opened.
+Macro malware was fairly common several years ago because macros ran automatically whenever a document was opened. In recent versions of Microsoft Office, macros are disabled by default. Now, malware authors need to convince users to turn on macros so that their malware can run. They try to scare users by showing fake warnings when a malicious document is opened.
 
 We've seen macro malware download threats from the following families:
 

windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/malware-naming.md

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ We name the malware and unwanted software that we detect according to the Comput
 
 ![coordinated-malware-eradication](images/NamingMalware1.png)
 
-When our analysts research a particular threat, they will determine what each of the components of the name will be.
+When our analysts research a particular threat, they'll determine what each of the components of the name will be.
 
 ## Type
 
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ Describes what the malware does on your computer. Worms, viruses, trojans, backd
 
 ## Platforms
 
-Indicates the operating system (such as Windows, Mac OS X, and Android) that the malware is designed to work on. The platform is also used to indicate programming languages and file formats.
+Platforms indicate the operating system (such as Windows, masOS X, and Android) the malware is designed to work on. The platform is also used to indicate programming languages and file formats.
 
 ### Operating systems
 
@@ -71,8 +71,8 @@ Indicates the operating system (such as Windows, Mac OS X, and Android) that the
 * FreeBSD: FreeBSD platform
 * iPhoneOS: iPhone operating system
 * Linux: Linux platform
-* MacOS: MAC 9.x platform or earlier
-* MacOS_X: MacOS X or later
+* macOS: MAC 9.x platform or earlier
+* macOS_X: MacOS X or later
 * OS2: OS2 platform
 * Palm: Palm operating system
 * Solaris: System V-based Unix platforms
@@ -105,11 +105,11 @@ Indicates the operating system (such as Windows, Mac OS X, and Android) that the
 * INF: Install scripts
 * IRC: mIRC/pIRC scripts
 * Java: Java binaries (classes)
-* JS: Javascript scripts
+* JS: JavaScript scripts
 * LOGO: LOGO scripts
 * MPB: MapBasic scripts
 * MSH: Monad shell scripts
-* MSIL: .Net intermediate language scripts
+* MSIL: .NET intermediate language scripts
 * Perl: Perl scripts
 * PHP: Hypertext Preprocessor scripts
 * Python: Python scripts
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ Indicates the operating system (such as Windows, Mac OS X, and Android) that the
 
 * A97M: Access 97, 2000, XP, 2003, 2007, and 2010 macros
 * HE: macro scripting
-* O97M: Office 97, 2000, XP, 2003, 2007, and 2010 macros - those that affect Word, Excel, and Powerpoint
+* O97M: Office 97, 2000, XP, 2003, 2007, and 2010 macros - those that affect Word, Excel, and PowerPoint
 * PP97M: PowerPoint 97, 2000, XP, 2003, 2007, and 2010 macros
 * V5M: Visio5 macros
 * W1M: Word1Macro

windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/ransomware-malware.md

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Most ransomware infections start with:
 
 Once ransomware infects a device, it starts encrypting files, folders, entire hard drive partitions using encryption algorithms like RSA or RC4.
 
-Ransomware is one of the most lucrative revenue channels for cybercriminals, so malware authors continually improve their malware code to better target enterprise environments. Ransomware-as-a-service is a cybercriminal business model in which malware creators sell their ransomware and other services to cybercriminals, who then operate the ransomware attacks. The business model also defines profit sharing between the malware creators, ransomware operators, and other parties that may be involved. For cybercriminals, ransomware is a big business, at the expense of individuals and businesses.
+Ransomware is one of the most lucrative revenue channels for cybercriminals, so malware authors continually improve their malware code to better target enterprise environments. Ransomware-as-a-service is a cybercriminal business model where malware creators sell their ransomware and other services to cybercriminals, who then operate the ransomware attacks. The business model also defines profit sharing between the malware creators, ransomware operators, and other parties that may be involved. For cybercriminals, ransomware is big business at the expense of individuals and businesses.
 
 ### Examples
 
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Sophisticated ransomware like **Spora**, **WannaCrypt** (also known as WannaCry)
 
 * A Petya variant exploits the same vulnerability, in addition to CVE-2017-0145 (also known as EternalRomance), and uses stolen credentials to move laterally across networks.
 
-Older ransomware like **Reveton** locks screens instead of encrypting files. They display a full screen image and then disable Task Manager. The files are safe, but they are effectively inaccessible. The image usually contains a message claiming to be from law enforcement that says the computer has been used in illegal cybercriminal activities and fine needs to be paid. Because of this, Reveton is nicknamed "Police Trojan" or "Police ransomware".
+Older ransomware like **Reveton** (nicknamed "Police Trojan" or "Police ransomware") locks screens instead of encrypting files. They display a full screen image and then disable Task Manager. The files are safe, but they're effectively inaccessible. The image usually contains a message claiming to be from law enforcement that says the computer has been used in illegal cybercriminal activities and a fine needs to be paid.
 
 Ransomware like **Cerber** and **Locky** search for and encrypt specific file types, typically document and media files. When the encryption is complete, the malware leaves a ransom note using text, image, or an HTML file with instructions to pay a ransom to recover files.
 

windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/rootkits-malware.md

@@ -17,15 +17,15 @@ search.appverid: met150
 ---
 # Rootkits
 
-Malware authors use rootkits to hide malware on your device, allowing malware to persist as long as possible. A successful rootkit can potentially remain in place for years if it is undetected. During this time it will steal information and resources.
+Malware authors use rootkits to hide malware on your device, allowing malware to persist as long as possible. A successful rootkit can potentially remain in place for years if it's undetected. During this time, it will steal information and resources.
 
 ## How rootkits work
 
 Rootkits intercept and change standard operating system processes. After a rootkit infects a device, you can’t trust any information that device reports about itself.
 
-For example, if you were to ask a device to list all of the programs that are running, the rootkit might stealthily remove any programs it doesn’t want you to know about. Rootkits are all about hiding things. They want to hide both themselves and their malicious activity on a device.
+If you were to ask a device to list all of the programs that are running, the rootkit might stealthily remove any programs it doesn’t want you to know about. Rootkits are all about hiding things. They want to hide both themselves and their malicious activity on a device.
 
-Many modern malware families use rootkits to try and avoid detection and removal, including:
+Many modern malware families use rootkits to try to avoid detection and removal, including:
 
 * [Alureon](https://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/threat/encyclopedia/Entry.aspx?Name=Win32%2fAlureon)
 
@@ -53,12 +53,12 @@ For more general tips, see [prevent malware infection](prevent-malware-infection
 
 ### What if I think I have a rootkit on my device?
 
-Microsoft security software includes a number of technologies designed specifically to remove rootkits. If you think you might have a rootkit on your device and your antimalware software isn’t detecting it, you might need an extra tool that lets you boot to a known trusted environment.
+Microsoft security software includes a number of technologies designed specifically to remove rootkits. If you think you have a rootkit that your antimalware software isn’t detecting, you may need an extra tool that lets you boot to a known trusted environment.
 
-[Microsoft Defender Offline](https://support.microsoft.com/help/17466/microsoft-defender-offline-help-protect-my-pc) can be launched from Windows Security Center and has the latest anti-malware updates from Microsoft. It’s designed to be used on devices that aren't working correctly due to a possible malware infection.
+[Microsoft Defender Offline](https://support.microsoft.com/help/17466/microsoft-defender-offline-help-protect-my-pc) can be launched from Windows Security Center and has the latest anti-malware updates from Microsoft. It’s designed to be used on devices that aren't working correctly because of a possible malware infection.
 
 [System Guard](https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2017/10/23/hardening-the-system-and-maintaining-integrity-with-windows-defender-system-guard/) in Windows 10 protects against rootkits and threats that impact system integrity.
 
 ### What if I can’t remove a rootkit?
 
-If the problem persists, we strongly recommend reinstalling the operating system and security software. You should then restore your data from a backup.
+If the problem persists, we strongly recommend reinstalling the operating system and security software. Then restore your data from a backup.