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150
windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-security-groups.md
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@ -258,279 +258,286 @@ The following tables provide descriptions of the default groups that are located
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td><p>[Device Owners](#bkmk-device-owners)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td><p>[Distributed COM Users](#bkmk-distributedcomusers)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<tr class="odd">
<td><p>[DnsUpdateProxy](#bkmk-dnsupdateproxy)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<tr class="even">
<td><p>[DnsAdmins](#bkmk-dnsadmins)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<tr class="odd">
<td><p>[Domain Admins](#bkmk-domainadmins)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<tr class="even">
<td><p>[Domain Computers](#bkmk-domaincomputers)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<tr class="odd">
<td><p>[Domain Controllers](#bkmk-domaincontrollers)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<tr class="even">
<td><p>[Domain Guests](#bkmk-domainguests)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<tr class="odd">
<td><p>[Domain Users](#bkmk-domainusers)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<tr class="even">
<td><p>[Enterprise Admins](#bkmk-entadmins)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td><p>[Enterprise Key Admins](#bkmk-enterprise-key-admins)</p></td>
<tr class="odd">
<td><p>[Enterprise Key Admins](#enterprise-key-admins)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p></p></td>
<td><p></p></td>
<td><p></p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<tr class="even">
<td><p>[Enterprise Read-only Domain Controllers](#bkmk-entrodc)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<tr class="odd">
<td><p>[Event Log Readers](#bkmk-eventlogreaders)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<tr class="even">
<td><p>[Group Policy Creator Owners](#bkmk-gpcreatorsowners)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<tr class="odd">
<td><p>[Guests](#bkmk-guests)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<tr class="even">
<td><p>[Hyper-V Administrators](#bkmk-hypervadministrators)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p></p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<tr class="odd">
<td><p>[IIS_IUSRS](#bkmk-iis-iusrs)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<tr class="even">
<td><p>[Incoming Forest Trust Builders](#bkmk-inforesttrustbldrs)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<tr class="odd">
<td><p>[Key Admins](#key-admins)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p></p></td>
<td><p></p></td>
<td><p></p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<tr class="even">
<td><p>[Network Configuration Operators](#bkmk-networkcfgoperators)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<tr class="odd">
<td><p>[Performance Log Users](#bkmk-perflogusers)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<tr class="even">
<td><p>[Performance Monitor Users](#bkmk-perfmonitorusers)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<tr class="odd">
<td><p>[Pre–Windows 2000 Compatible Access](#bkmk-pre-ws2kcompataccess)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<tr class="even">
<td><p>[Print Operators](#bkmk-printoperators)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<tr class="odd">
<td><p>[Protected Users](#bkmk-protectedusers)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p></p></td>
<td><p></p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<tr class="even">
<td><p>[RAS and IAS Servers](#bkmk-rasandias)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<tr class="odd">
<td><p>[RDS Endpoint Servers](#bkmk-rdsendpointservers)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p></p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<tr class="even">
<td><p>[RDS Management Servers](#bkmk-rdsmanagementservers)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p></p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<tr class="odd">
<td><p>[RDS Remote Access Servers](#bkmk-rdsremoteaccessservers)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p></p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<tr class="even">
<td><p>[Read-only Domain Controllers](#bkmk-rodc)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<tr class="odd">
<td><p>[Remote Desktop Users](#bkmk-remotedesktopusers)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<tr class="even">
<td><p>[Remote Management Users](#bkmk-remotemanagementusers)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p></p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<tr class="odd">
<td><p>[Replicator](#bkmk-replicator)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<tr class="even">
<td><p>[Schema Admins](#bkmk-schemaadmins)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<tr class="odd">
<td><p>[Server Operators](#bkmk-serveroperators)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<tr class="even">
<td><p>[Storage Replica Administrators](#storage-replica-administrators)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p></p></td>
<td><p></p></td>
<td><p></p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<tr class="odd">
<td><p>[System Managed Accounts Group](#system-managed-accounts-group)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p></p></td>
<td><p></p></td>
<td><p></p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<tr class="even">
<td><p>[Terminal Server License Servers](#bkmk-terminalserverlic)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<tr class="odd">
<td><p>[Users](#bkmk-users)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<tr class="even">
<td><p>[Windows Authorization Access Group](#bkmk-winauthaccess)</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<tr class="odd">
<td><p>[WinRMRemoteWMIUsers_](#bkmk-winrmremotewmiusers-)</p></td>
<td><p></p></td>
<td><p>Yes</p></td>
@ -1208,6 +1215,68 @@ This security group includes the following changes since Windows Server 2008:
</tbody>
</table>
### <a href="" id="bkmk-device-owners"></a>Device Owners
This group is not currently used in Windows.
Microsoft does not recommend changing the default configuration where this security group has zero members. Changing the default configuration could hinder future scenarios that rely on this group.
The Device Owners group applies to versions of the Windows Server operating system listed in the [Active Directory Default Security Groups table](#bkmk-groupstable).
<table>
<colgroup>
<col width="50%" />
<col width="50%" />
</colgroup>
<thead>
<tr class="header">
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr class="odd">
<td><p>Well-Known SID/RID</p></td>
<td><p>S-1-5-32-583</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td><p>Type</p></td>
<td><p>BuiltIn Local</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td><p>Default container</p></td>
<td><p>CN=BuiltIn, DC=&lt;domain&gt;, DC=</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td><p>Default members</p></td>
<td><p>None</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td><p>Default member of</p></td>
<td><p>None</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td><p>Protected by ADMINSDHOLDER?</p></td>
<td><p>No</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td><p>Safe to move out of default container?</p></td>
<td><p>Can be moved out but it is not recommended</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td><p>Safe to delegate management of this group to non-Service admins?</p></td>
<td><p>No</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td><p>Default User Rights</p></td>
<td><p>[Allow log on locally](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/allow-log-on-locally): SeInteractiveLogonRight</p>
<p>[Access this computer from the network](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/access-this-computer-from-the-network): SeNetworkLogonRight</p>
<p>[Bypass traverse checking](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/bypass-traverse-checking): SeChangeNotifyPrivilege</p>
<p>[Change the time zone](/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/change-the-time-zone): SeTimeZonePrivilege</p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
 
### <a href="" id="bkmk-distributedcomusers"></a>Distributed COM Users
@ -3692,6 +3761,7 @@ This security group was introduced in Windows Server 2012, and it has not chang
</tbody>
</table>
## See also
- [Security Principals](security-principals.md)

4
windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/credential-guard-how-it-works.md
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@ -22,8 +22,6 @@ ms.date: 08/17/2017
- Windows Server 2016
Prefer video? See [Windows Defender Credential Guard Design](https://mva.microsoft.com/en-us/training-courses/deep-dive-into-credential-guard-16651?l=mD3geLJyC_8304300474) in the **Deep Dive into Windows Defender Credential Guard** video series.
Kerberos, NTLM, and Credential manager isolate secrets by using virtualization-based security. Previous versions of Windows stored secrets in the Local Security Authority (LSA). Prior to Windows 10, the LSA stored secrets used by the operating system in its process memory. With Windows Defender Credential Guard enabled, the LSA process in the operating system talks to a new component called the isolated LSA process that stores and protects those secrets. Data stored by the isolated LSA process is protected using virtualization-based security and is not accessible to the rest of the operating system. LSA uses remote procedure calls to communicate with the isolated LSA process.
For security reasons, the isolated LSA process doesn't host any device drivers. Instead, it only hosts a small subset of operating system binaries that are needed for security and nothing else. All of these binaries are signed with a certificate that is trusted by virtualization-based security and these signatures are validated before launching the file in the protected environment.
@ -46,4 +44,4 @@ Here's a high-level overview on how the LSA is isolated by using virtualization-
[Virtualization-based security](https://mva.microsoft.com/en-us/training-courses/deep-dive-into-credential-guard-16651?l=1CoELLJyC_6704300474)
[Credentials protected by Windows Defender Credential Guard](https://mva.microsoft.com/en-us/training-courses/deep-dive-into-credential-guard-16651?l=pdc37LJyC_1204300474)
[Credentials protected by Windows Defender Credential Guard](https://mva.microsoft.com/en-us/training-courses/deep-dive-into-credential-guard-16651?l=pdc37LJyC_1204300474)

3
windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/credential-guard-manage.md
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@ -21,10 +21,9 @@ ms.date: 03/01/2019
- Windows 10
- Windows Server 2016
Prefer video? See [Windows Defender Credential Guard Deployment](https://mva.microsoft.com/en-us/training-courses/deep-dive-into-credential-guard-16651?l=sRcyvLJyC_3304300474) in the Deep Dive into Windows Defender Credential Guard video series.
## Enable Windows Defender Credential Guard
Windows Defender Credential Guard can be enabled either by using [Group Policy](#enable-credential-guard-by-using-group-policy), the [registry](#enable-credential-guard-by-using-the-registry), or the Windows Defender Device Guard and Windows Defender Credential Guard [hardware readiness tool](#hardware-readiness-tool). Windows Defender Credential Guard can also protect secrets in a Hyper-V virtual machine, just as it would on a physical machine.
Windows Defender Credential Guard can be enabled either by using [Group Policy](#enable-windows-defender-credential-guard-by-using-group-policy), the [registry](#enable-windows-defender-credential-guard-by-using-the-registry), or the Windows Defender Device Guard and Windows Defender Credential Guard [hardware readiness tool](#hardware-readiness-tool). Windows Defender Credential Guard can also protect secrets in a Hyper-V virtual machine, just as it would on a physical machine.
The same set of procedures used to enable Windows Defender Credential Guard on physical machines applies also to virtual machines.

3
windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/credential-guard-requirements.md
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@ -21,9 +21,6 @@ ms.date: 01/12/2018
- Windows 10
- Windows Server 2016
Prefer video? See
[Windows Defender Credential Guard Deployment](https://mva.microsoft.com/en-us/training-courses/deep-dive-into-credential-guard-16651?l=sRcyvLJyC_3304300474)
in the Deep Dive into Windows Defender Credential Guard video series.
For Windows Defender Credential Guard to provide protection, the computers you are protecting must meet certain baseline hardware, firmware, and software requirements which we will refer to as [Hardware and software requirements](#hardware-and-software-requirements). Additionally, Windows Defender Credential Guard blocks specific authentication capabilities, so applications that require such capabilities will break. We will refer to this as [Application requirements](#application-requirements). Beyond that, computers can meet additional hardware and firmware qualifications, and receive additional protections. Those computers will be more hardened against certain threats. For detailed information on baseline protections, plus protections for improved security that are associated with hardware and firmware options available in 2015, 2016, and 2017, refer to the tables in [Security Considerations](#security-considerations).

2
windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-biometrics-in-enterprise.md
View File

@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ To allow fingerprint matching, you must have devices with fingerprint sensors an
### Facial recognition sensors
To allow facial recognition, you must have devices with integrated special infrared (IR) sensors and software. Facial recognition sensors use special cameras that see in IR light, letting them tell the difference between a photo and a living person while scanning an employee’s facial features. These sensors, like the fingerprint sensors, must also include anti-spoofing measures (required) and a way to configure them (optional).
- False Accept Rate (FAR): &lt;0.001
- False Accept Rate (FAR): &lt;0.001%
- False Reject Rate (FRR) without Anti-spoofing or liveness detection: &lt;5%

17
windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-how-it-works-authentication.md
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@ -22,11 +22,11 @@ ms.date: 08/19/2018
Windows Hello for Business authentication is passwordless, two-factor authentication. Authenticating with Windows Hello for Business provides a convenient sign-in experience that authenticates the user to both Azure Active Directory and Active Directory resources.<br>
Azure Active Directory joined devices authenticate to Azure during sign-in and can optional authenticate to Active Directory. Hybrid Azure Active Directory joined devices authenticate to Active Directory during sign-in, and authenticate to Azure Active Directory in the background.<br>
[Azure AD join authentication to Azure Active Directory](#Azure-AD-join-authentication-to-Azure-Active-Directory)<br>
[Azure AD join authentication to Active Directory using a Key](#Azure-AD-join-authentication-to-Active-Directory-using-a-Key)<br>
[Azure AD join authentication to Active Directory using a Certificate](#Azure-AD-join-authentication-to-Active-Directory-using-a-Certificate)<br>
[Hybrid Azure AD join authentication using a Key](#Hybrid-Azure-AD-join-authentication-using-a-Key)<br>
[Hybrid Azure AD join authentication using a Certificate](#Hybrid-Azure-AD-join-authentication-using-a-Certificate)<br>
[Azure AD join authentication to Azure Active Directory](#azure-ad-join-authentication-to-azure-active-directory)<br>
[Azure AD join authentication to Active Directory using a Key](#azure-ad-join-authentication-to-active-directory-using-a-key)<br>
[Azure AD join authentication to Active Directory using a Certificate](#azure-ad-join-authentication-to-active-directory-using-a-certificate)<br>
[Hybrid Azure AD join authentication using a Key](#hybrid-azure-ad-join-authentication-using-a-key)<br>
[Hybrid Azure AD join authentication using a Certificate](#hybrid-azure-ad-join-authentication-using-a-certificate)<br>
## Azure AD join authentication to Azure Active Directory
@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ Azure Active Directory joined devices authenticate to Azure during sign-in and c
|D | The Cloud AP provider receives the encrypted PRT with session key. Using the device's private transport key, the Cloud AP provider decrypt the session key and protects the session key using the device's TPM.|
|E | The Cloud AP provider returns a successful authentication response to lsass. Lsass caches the PRT, and informs winlogon of the success authentication. Winlogon creates a logon session, loads the user's profile, and starts explorer.exe.|
[Return to top](#Windows-Hello-for-Business-and-Authentication)
## Azure AD join authentication to Active Directory using a Key
![Azure AD join authentication to Active Directory using a Key](images/howitworks/auth-aadj-keytrust-kerb.png)
@ -52,7 +51,6 @@ Azure Active Directory joined devices authenticate to Azure during sign-in and c
|C | The Kerberos provider ensures it can trust the response from the domain controller. First, it ensures the KDC certificate chains to a root certificate that is trusted by the device. Next, it ensures the certificate is within its validity period and that it has not be revoked. The Kerberos provider then verifies the certificate has the KDC Authentication present and that the subject alternate name listed in the KDC's certificate matches the domain name to which the user is authenticating. After passing this criteria, Kerberos returns the TGT to lsass, where it is cached and used for subsequent service ticket requests.|
[Return to top](#Windows-Hello-for-Business-and-Authentication)
## Azure AD join authentication to Active Directory using a Certificate
![Azure AD join authentication to Active Directory using a Certificate](images/howitworks/auth-aadj-certtrust-kerb.png)
@ -62,7 +60,6 @@ Azure Active Directory joined devices authenticate to Azure during sign-in and c
|B | The Kerberos provider sends the signed pre-authentication data and user's certificate, which includes the public key, to the Key Distribution Center (KDC) service running on the domain controller in the form of a KERB_AS_REQ.<br>The domain controller determines the certificate is not self-signed certificate. The domain controller ensures the certificate chains to trusted root certificate, is within its validity period, can be used for authentication, and has not been revoked. It retrieves the public key and UPN from the certificate included in the KERB_AS_REQ and searches for the UPN in Active Directory. It validates the signed pre-authentication data using the public key from the certificate. On success, the KDC returns a TGT to the client with its certificate in a KERB_AS_REP.|
|C | The Kerberos provider ensures it can trust the response from the domain controller. First, it ensures the KDC certificate chains to a root certificate that is trusted by the device. Next, it ensures the certificate is within its validity period and that it has not be revoked. The Kerberos provider then verifies the certificate has the KDC Authentication present and that the subject alternate name listed in the KDC's certificate matches the domain name to which the user is authenticating. After passing this criteria, Kerberos returns the TGT to lsass, where it is cached and used for subsequent service ticket requests.|
[Return to top](#Windows-Hello-for-Business-and-Authentication)
## Hybrid Azure AD join authentication using a Key
![Hybrid Azure AD join authentication using a Key](images/howitworks/auth-haadj-keytrust.png)
@ -76,7 +73,6 @@ Azure Active Directory joined devices authenticate to Azure during sign-in and c
|F | While Windows loads the user's desktop, lsass passes the collected credentials to the Cloud Authentication security support provider, referred to as the Cloud AP provider. The Cloud AP provider requests a nonce from Azure Active Directory. Azure AD returns a nonce.|
|G | The Cloud AP provider signs the nonce using the user's private key and returns the signed nonce to the Azure Active Directory. Azure Active Directory validates the signed nonce using the user's securely registered public key against the nonce signature. After validating the signature, Azure AD then validates the returned signed nonce. After validating the nonce, Azure AD creates a PRT with session key that is encrypted to the device's transport key and returns it to the Cloud AP provider.<br>The Cloud AP provider receives the encrypted PRT with session key. Using the device's private transport key, the Cloud AP provider decrypt the session key and protects the session key using the device's TPM.<br>The Cloud AP provider returns a successful authentication response to lsass. Lsass caches the PRT.|
[Return to top](#Windows-Hello-for-Business-and-Authentication)
## Hybrid Azure AD join authentication using a Certificate
![Hybrid Azure AD join authentication using a Certificate](images/howitworks/auth-haadj-certtrust.png)
@ -90,6 +86,3 @@ Azure Active Directory joined devices authenticate to Azure during sign-in and c
|F | While Windows loads the user's desktop, lsass passes the collected credentials to the Cloud Authentication security support provider, referred to as the Cloud AP provider. The Cloud AP provider requests a nonce from Azure Active Directory. Azure AD returns a nonce.|
|G | The Cloud AP provider signs the nonce using the user's private key and returns the signed nonce to the Azure Active Directory. Azure Active Directory validates the signed nonce using the user's securely registered public key against the nonce signature. After validating the signature, Azure AD then validates the returned signed nonce. After validating the nonce, Azure AD creates a PRT with session key that is encrypted to the device's transport key and returns it to the Cloud AP provider.<br>The Cloud AP provider receives the encrypted PRT with session key. Using the device's private transport key, the Cloud AP provider decrypt the session key and protects the session key using the device's TPM.<br>The Cloud AP provider returns a successful authentication response to lsass. Lsass caches the PRT.|
[Return to top](#Windows-Hello-for-Business-and-Authentication)

3
windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-how-it-works-provisioning.md
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@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ Windows Hello for Business provisioning enables a user to enroll a new, strong,
[Azure AD joined provisioning in a Federated environment](#azure-ad-joined-provisioning-in-a-federated-environment)<br>
[Hybrid Azure AD joined provisioning in a Key Trust deployment in a Managed environment](#hybrid-azure-ad-joined-provisioning-in-a-key-trust-deployment-in-a-managed-environment)<br>
[Hybrid Azure AD joined provisioning in a Certificate Trust deployment in a Managed environment](#hybrid-azure-ad-joined-provisioning-in-a-certificate-trust-deployment-in-a-managed-environment)<br>
[Hybrid Azure AD joined provisioning in a Certificate Trust deployment in a Federated environment](#hybrid-azure-ad-joined-provisioning-in-a-certificate-trust-deployment-in-a-managed-environment)<br>
[Hybrid Azure AD joined provisioning in a synchronous Certificate Trust deployment in a Managed environment](#hybrid-azure-ad-joined-provisioning-in-a-synchronous-certificate-trust-deployment-in-a-managed-environment)<br>
[Hybrid Azure AD joined provisioning in a synchronous Certificate Trust deployment in a Federated environment](#hybrid-azure-ad-joined-provisioning-in-a-synchronous-certificate-trust-deployment-in-a-federated-environment)<br>
[Domain joined provisioning in an On-premises Key Trust deployment](#domain-joined-provisioning-in-an-on-premises-key-trust-deployment)<br>
@ -56,7 +57,7 @@ Windows Hello for Business provisioning enables a user to enroll a new, strong,
|C | The application sends the ADRS token, ukpub, attestation data, and device information to ADRS for user key registration. Azure DRS validates MFA claim remains current. On successful validation, Azure DRS locates the user's object in Azure Active Directory, writes the key information to a multi-values attribute. The key information includes a reference to the device from which it was created. Azure Active Directory returns key ID to the application which signals the end of user provisioning and the application exits.|
[Return to top](#windows-hello-for-business-provisioning)
## Hybrid Azure AD joined provisioning in a Key Trust deployment in a Managed envrionment
## Hybrid Azure AD joined provisioning in a Key Trust deployment in a Managed environment
![Hybrid Azure AD joined provisioning in a Key Trust deployment in a Managed ennvironment](images/howitworks/prov-haadj-keytrust-managed.png)
| Phase | Description |

2
windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-cert-trust-prereqs.md
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@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ The minimum required enterprise certificate authority that can be used with Wind
## Directory Synchronization ##
The two directories used in hybrid deployments must be synchronized. You need Azure Active Directory Connect to synchronize user accounts in the on-premises Active Directory with Azure Active Directory.
Organizations using older directory synchronization technology, such as DirSync or Azure AD sync need to upgrade to Azure AD Connect
Organizations using older directory synchronization technology, such as DirSync or Azure AD sync, need to upgrade to Azure AD Connect. In case the schema of your local AD DS was changed since the last directory synchronization, you may need to [refresh directory schema](https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/hybrid/how-to-connect-installation-wizard#refresh-directory-schema).
### Section Review
> [!div class="checklist"]

10
windows/security/information-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-management-for-enterprises.md
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@ -29,12 +29,14 @@ Enterprises can use [Microsoft BitLocker Administration and Monitoring (MBAM)](h
## Managing devices joined to Azure Active Directory
Devices joined to Azure AD are managed using Mobile Device Management (MDM) policy from an MDM solution such as Microsoft Intune. [BitLocker Device Encryption](bitlocker-device-encryption-overview-windows-10.md#bitlocker-device-encryption) status can be queried from managed machines via the [Policy Configuration Settings Provider (CSP)](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-configuration-service-provider), which reports on whether BitLocker Device Encryption is enabled on the device. Compliance with BitLocker Device Encryption policy can be a requirement for [Conditional Access](https://www.microsoft.com/cloud-platform/conditional-access) to services like Exchange Online and SharePoint Online.
Devices joined to Azure AD are managed using Mobile Device Management (MDM) policy from an MDM solution such as Microsoft Intune. Without Windows 10, version 1809, only local administrators can enable BitLocker via Intune policy. Starting with Windows 10, version 1809, Intune can enable BitLocker for standard users. [BitLocker Device Encryption](bitlocker-device-encryption-overview-windows-10.md#bitlocker-device-encryption) status can be queried from managed machines via the [Policy Configuration Settings Provider (CSP)](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-configuration-service-provider), which reports on whether BitLocker Device Encryption is enabled on the device. Compliance with BitLocker Device Encryption policy can be a requirement for [Conditional Access](https://www.microsoft.com/cloud-platform/conditional-access) to services like Exchange Online and SharePoint Online.
Starting with Windows 10 version 1703 (also known as the Windows Creators Update), the enablement of BitLocker can be triggered over MDM either by the [Policy CSP](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-configuration-service-provider) or the [BitLocker CSP](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp). The BitLocker CSP adds policy options that go beyond ensuring that encryption has occurred, and is available on computers that run Windows 10 Business or Enterprise editions and on Windows Phones.
Starting with Windows 10 version 1703 (also known as the Windows Creators Update), the enablement of BitLocker can be triggered over MDM either by the [Policy CSP](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-configuration-service-provider) or the [BitLocker CSP](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp). The BitLocker CSP adds policy options that go beyond ensuring that encryption has occurred, and is available on computers that run Windows 10 and on Windows phones.
For hardware that is compliant with Modern Standby and HSTI, when using either of these features, [BitLocker Device Encryption](bitlocker-device-encryption-overview-windows-10.md#bitlocker-device-encryption) is automatically turned on whenever the user joins a device to Azure AD. Azure AD provides a portal where recovery keys are also backed up, so users can retrieve their own recovery key for self-service, if required. For older devices that are not yet encrypted, beginning with Windows 10 version 1703 (the Windows 10 Creators Update), admins can use the [BitLocker CSP](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp) to trigger encryption and store the recovery key in Azure AD.
This is applicable to Azure Hybrid AD as well.
## Managing workplace-joined PCs and phones
@ -51,7 +53,7 @@ If you are installing a server manually, such as a stand-alone server, then choo
Additionally, lights out data centers can take advantage of the enhanced security of a second factor while avoiding the need for user intervention during reboots by optionally using a combination of BitLocker (TPM+PIN) and BitLocker Network Unlock. BitLocker Network Unlock brings together the best of hardware protection, location dependence, and automatic unlock, while in the trusted location. For the configuration steps, see [BitLocker: How to enable Network Unlock](bitlocker-how-to-enable-network-unlock.md).
For more information, see the Bitlocker FAQs article and other useful links in [Related Articles](#articles).
For more information, see the Bitlocker FAQs article and other useful links in [Related Articles](#related-articles).
 
## PowerShell examples
@ -134,4 +136,4 @@ PS C:\> Enable-BitLocker -MountPoint "C:" -EncryptionMethod XtsAes256 -UsedSpace
[BitLocker cmdlets for Windows PowerShell](bitlocker-use-bitlocker-drive-encryption-tools-to-manage-bitlocker.md#a-href-idbkmk-blcmdletsabitlocker-cmdlets-for-windows-powershell)
[Surface Pro Specifications](https://www.microsoft.com/surface/support/surface-pro-specs)
[Surface Pro Specifications](https://www.microsoft.com/surface/support/surface-pro-specs)

18
windows/security/information-protection/tpm/switch-pcr-banks-on-tpm-2-0-devices.md
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@ -50,6 +50,24 @@ As a result, if the currently used PCR bank is switched all keys that have been
Before switching PCR banks you should suspend or disable BitLocker – or have your recovery key ready. For steps on how to switch PCR banks on your PC, you should contact your OEM or UEFI vendor.
## How can I identify which PCR bank is being used?
A TPM can be configured to have multiple PCR banks active. When BIOS is performing measurements it will do so into all active PCR banks, depending on its capability to make these measurements. BIOS may chose to deactivate PCR banks that it does not support or "cap" PCR banks that it does not support by extending a separator. The following registry value identifies which PCR banks are active.
- Registry key: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\IntegrityServices<br>
- DWORD: TPMActivePCRBanks<br>
- Defines which PCR banks are currently active. This is a bitmap defined in the TCG Algorithm Registry.<br>
Windows checks which PCR banks are active and supported by the BIOS. Windows also checks if the measured boot log supports measurements for all active PCR banks. Windows will prefer the use of the SHA-256 bank for measurements and will fall back to SHA1 PCR bank if one of the pre-conditions is not met.
You can identify which PCR bank is currently used by Windows by looking at the registry.
- Registry key: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\IntegrityServices<br>
- DWORD: TPMDigestAlgID<br>
- Algorithm ID of the PCR bank that Windows is currently using. (For the full list of supported algorithms, see the TCG Algorithm Registry.)<br>
Windows only uses one PCR bank to continue boot measurements. All other active PCR banks will be extended with a separator to indicate that they are not used by Windows and measurements that appear to be from Windows should not be trusted.
## Related topics
- [Trusted Platform Module](trusted-platform-module-top-node.md) (list of topics)

47
windows/security/information-protection/windows-information-protection/wip-learning.md
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@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ ms.date: 02/26/2019
- Windows 10, version 1703 and later
- Windows 10 Mobile, version 1703 and later
With WIP Learning, you can intelligently tune which apps and websites are included in your WIP policy to help reduce disruptive prompts and keep it accurate and relevant. WIP Learning generates two reports: The **App learning report** and the **Website learning report**. Both reports are accessed from Microsoft Azure Intune, and you can alternately access the App learning report from Microsoft Operations Management Suite (OMS).
With WIP Learning, you can intelligently tune which apps and websites are included in your WIP policy to help reduce disruptive prompts and keep it accurate and relevant. WIP Learning generates two reports: The **App learning report** and the **Website learning report**. Both reports can be accessed from Microsoft Azure Intune.
The **App learning report** monitors your apps, not in policy, that attempt to access work data. You can identify these apps using the report and add them to your WIP policies to avoid productivity disruption before fully enforcing WIP with [“Block”](protect-enterprise-data-using-wip.md#bkmk-modes) mode. Frequent monitoring of the report will help you continuously identify access attempts so you can update your policy accordingly.
@ -44,59 +44,42 @@ In the **Website learning report**, you can view a summary of the devices that h
![Image showing the UI with for app and website learning reports](images/wip-learning-select-report.png)
Once you have the apps and websites showing up in the WIP Learning logging reports, you can decide whether to add them to your app protection policies. Next, we'll look at how to do that in Operations Management Suite (OMS).
Once you have the apps and websites showing up in the WIP Learning logging reports, you can decide whether to add them to your app protection policies.
## View the WIP app learning report in Microsoft Operations Management Suite
## Use the WIP section of Device Health
From Intune, you can open OMS by choosing **WIP in the OMS console**. Then you can view the WIP App learning blade to monitor access events per app, and devices that have reported WIP access events:
You can use Device Health to adjust your WIP protection policy. See [Using Device Health](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/deployment/update/device-health-using#windows-information-protection) to learn more.
![View in Intune of the link to OMS](images/wip-in-oms-console-link.png)
If you don't have OMS linked to your Microsoft Azure Account, and want to configure your environment for Windows Analytics: Device Health, see [Get Started with Device Health](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/deployment/update/device-health-get-started) for more information.
>[!NOTE]
>Intune has a 14 day data retention capacity, while OMS offers better querying capabilities and longer data retention.
If you want to configure your environment for Windows Analytics: Device Health, see [Get Started with Device Health](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/deployment/update/device-health-get-started) for more information.
Once you have WIP policies in place, by using the WIP section of Device Health, you can:
- Reduce disruptive prompts by adding rules to allow data sharing from approved apps.
- Tune WIP rules by confirming that certain apps are allowed or denied by current policy.
![Main Windows Information Protection view](images/oms-wip-app-learning-tile.png)
## Use Device Health and Intune to adjust WIP protection policy
The **APP LEARNING** tile shows details of app statistics that you can use to evaluate each incident and update app policies by using WIP AppIDs.
The information needed for the following steps can be found using Device Health, which you will first have to set up. Learn more about how you can [Monitor the health of devices with Device Health](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/deployment/update/device-health-monitor).
![Details view](images/WIPNEW1-chart-selected-sterile.png)
1. In **Device Health** click the app you want to add to your policy and copy the publisher information.
In this chart view, you can see apps that have been used on connected devices which, when clicked on, will open additional details on the app, including details you need to adjust your WIP Policy:
![Details view for a specific app](images/WIPappID-sterile.png)
2. In Intune, click **App protection policies** and then choose the app policy you want to add an application to.
Here, you can copy the **WipAppid** and use it to adjust your WIP protection policies.
3. Click **Protected apps**, and then click **Add Apps**.
## Use OMS and Intune to adjust WIP protection policy
1. Click the **APP LEARNING** tile in OMS, as described above, to determine which apps are being used for work so you can add those you choose to your WIP policy.
2. Click the app you want to add to your policy and copy the publisher information from the app details screen.
3. Back in Intune, click **App protection policies** and then choose the app policy you want to add an application to.
4. Click **Protected apps**, and then click **Add Apps**.
5. In the **Recommended apps** drop down menu, choose either **Store apps** or **Desktop apps**, depending on the app you've chosen (for example, an executable (EXE) is a desktop app).
4. In the **Recommended apps** drop down menu, choose either **Store apps** or **Desktop apps**, depending on the app you've chosen (for example, an executable (EXE) is a desktop app).
![View of drop down menu for Store or desktop apps](images/wip-learning-choose-store-or-desktop-app.png)
6. In **NAME** (optional), type the name of the app, and then in **PUBLISHER** (required), paste the publisher information that you copied in step 2 above.
5. In **NAME** (optional), type the name of the app, and then in **PUBLISHER** (required), paste the publisher information that you copied in step 1 above.
![View of Add Apps app info entry boxes](images/wip-learning-app-info.png)
7. Type the name of the product in **PRODUCT NAME** (required) (this will probably be the same as what you typed for **NAME**).
6. Type the name of the product in **PRODUCT NAME** (required) (this will probably be the same as what you typed for **NAME**).
8. Back in OMS, copy the name of the executable (for example, snippingtool.exe) and then go back to Intune and paste it in **FILE** (required).
7. Copy the name of the executable (for example, snippingtool.exe) and paste it in **FILE** (required).
9. Go back to OMS one more time and note the version number of the app and type it in **MIN VERSION** in Intune (alternately, you can specify the max version, but one or the other is required), and then select the **ACTION**: **Allow** or **Deny**
8. Type the version number of the app into **MIN VERSION** in Intune (alternately, you can specify the max version, but one or the other is required), and then select the **ACTION**: **Allow** or **Deny**
When working with WIP-enabled apps and WIP-unknown apps, it is recommended that you start with **Silent** or **Allow overrides** while verifying with a small group that you have the right apps on your allowed apps list. After you're done, you can change to your final enforcement policy, **Block**. For more information about WIP modes, see: [Protect enterprise data using WIP: WIP-modes](protect-enterprise-data-using-wip.md#bkmk-modes)

2
windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4769.md
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@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ The most common values:
| 0x18 | KDC\_ERR\_PREAUTH\_FAILED | Pre-authentication information was invalid | The wrong password was provided.<br>This error code cannot occur in event “[4768](event-4768.md). A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested”. It occurs in “[4771](event-4771.md). Kerberos pre-authentication failed” event. |
| 0x19 | KDC\_ERR\_PREAUTH\_REQUIRED | Additional pre-authentication required | This error often occurs in UNIX interoperability scenarios. MIT-Kerberos clients do not request pre-authentication when they send a KRB\_AS\_REQ message. If pre-authentication is required (the default), Windows systems will send this error. Most MIT-Kerberos clients will respond to this error by giving the pre-authentication, in which case the error can be ignored, but some clients might not respond in this way. |
| 0x1A | KDC\_ERR\_SERVER\_NOMATCH | KDC does not know about the requested server | No information. |
| 0x1B | KDC\_ERR\_SVC\_UNAVAILABLE | KDC is unavailable | No information. |
| 0x1B | KDC\_ERR\_MUST\_USE\_USER2USER | Server principal valid for user2user only | This error occurs because the service is missing an SPN. |
| 0x1F | KRB\_AP\_ERR\_BAD\_INTEGRITY | Integrity check on decrypted field failed | The authenticator was encrypted with something other than the session key. The result is that the client cannot decrypt the resulting message. The modification of the message could be the result of an attack or it could be because of network noise. |
| 0x20 | KRB\_AP\_ERR\_TKT\_EXPIRED | The ticket has expired | The smaller the value for the “Maximum lifetime for user ticket” Kerberos policy setting, the more likely it is that this error will occur. Because ticket renewal is automatic, you should not have to do anything if you get this message. |
| 0x21 | KRB\_AP\_ERR\_TKT\_NYV | The ticket is not yet valid | The ticket presented to the server is not yet valid (in relationship to the server time). The most probable cause is that the clocks on the KDC and the client are not synchronized.<br>If cross-realm Kerberos authentication is being attempted, then you should verify time synchronization between the KDC in the target realm and the KDC in the client realm, as well. |

20
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@ -20,9 +20,9 @@ ms.date: 10/02/2018
- [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Windows Defender ATP)](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?linkid=2069559)
The potentially unwanted application (PUA) protection feature in Windows Defender Antivirus can identify and block PUAs from downloading and installing on endpoints in your network.
The potentially unwanted application (PUA) protection feature in Windows Defender Antivirus can detect and block PUAs on endpoints in your network.
These applications are not considered viruses, malware, or other types of threats, but might perform actions on endpoints that adversely affect their performance or use. PUA can also refer to applications that are considered to have a poor reputation.
These applications are not considered viruses, malware, or other types of threats, but might perform actions on endpoints that adversely affect their performance or use. PUA can also refer to applications that are considered to have poor reputation.
Typical PUA behavior includes:
@ -37,25 +37,17 @@ These applications can increase the risk of your network being infected with mal
## How it works
PUAs are blocked when a user attempts to download or install the detected file, and if the file meets one of the following conditions:
Windows Defender Antivirus blocks detected PUA files and attempts to download, move, run, or install them. Blocked PUA files are then moved to quarantined.
- The file is being scanned from the browser
- The file is in a folder with "**downloads**" in the path
- The file is in a folder with "**temp**" in the path
- The file is on the user's desktop
- The file does not meet one of these conditions and is not under *%programfiles%*, *%appdata%*, or *%windows%*
The file is placed in the quarantine section so it won't run.
When a PUA is detected on an endpoint, the endpoint will present a notification to the user ([unless notifications have been disabled](configure-notifications-windows-defender-antivirus.md)) in the same format as normal threat detections (prefaced with "PUA:").
When a PUA is detected on an endpoint, Windows Defender Antivirus presents a notification to the user ([unless notifications have been disabled](configure-notifications-windows-defender-antivirus.md)) in the same format as normal threat detections (prefaced with "PUA:").
They will also appear in the usual [quarantine list in the Windows Security app](windows-defender-security-center-antivirus.md#detection-history).
## View PUA events
PUA events are reported in the Windows Event Viewer and not in System Center Configuration Manager or Intune.
PUA events are reported in the Windows Event Viewer, but not in System Center Configuration Manager or Intune.
Hoever, PUA detections will be reported if you have set up email notifications for detections.
You can turn on email notifications for PUA detections.
See [Troubleshoot event IDs](troubleshoot-windows-defender-antivirus.md) for details on viewing Windows Defender Antivirus events. PUA events are recorded under event ID 1160.

4
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@ -27,7 +27,9 @@ You might want to do this when testing how the features will work in your organi
While the features will not block or prevent apps, scripts, or files from being modified, the Windows Event Log will record events as if the features were fully enabled. This means you can enable audit mode and then review the event log to see what impact the feature would have had were it enabled.
You can use Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection to get greater deatils for each event, especially for investigating attack surface reduction rules. Using the Windows Defender ATP console lets you [investigate issues as part of the alert timeline and investigation scenarios](../windows-defender-atp/investigate-alerts-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md).
To find the audited entries, go to **Applications and Services** > **Microsoft** > **Windows** > **Windows Defender** > **Operational**.
You can use Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection to get greater details for each event, especially for investigating attack surface reduction rules. Using the Windows Defender ATP console lets you [investigate issues as part of the alert timeline and investigation scenarios](../windows-defender-atp/investigate-alerts-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md).
This topic provides links that describe how to enable the audit functionality for each feature and how to view events in the Windows Event Viewer.

4
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@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ ms.mktglfcycl: manage
ms.sitesec: library
ms.pagetype: security
ms.localizationpriority: medium
author: andreabichsel
ms.author: v-anbic
author: Justinha
ms.author: justinha
ms.date: 04/02/2019
---

4
windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/troubleshoot-np.md
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@ -72,11 +72,11 @@ If you've tested the feature with the demo site and with audit mode, and network
When you report a problem with network protection, you are asked to collect and submit diagnostic data that can be used by Microsoft support and engineering teams to help troubleshoot issues.
1. Open an elevated command prompt and change to the Windows Defender directory:
```console
```
cd c:\program files\windows defender
```
2. Run this command to generate the diagnostic logs:
```console
```
mpcmdrun -getfiles
```
3. By default, they are saved to C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Support\MpSupportFiles.cab. Attach the file to the submission form.