diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/account-lockout-threshold.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/account-lockout-threshold.md
index 55f3b22031..ab09ef2ca5 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/account-lockout-threshold.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/account-lockout-threshold.md
@@ -77,8 +77,11 @@ None. Changes to this policy setting become effective without a computer restart
 ### <a href="" id="bkmk-impleconsiderations"></a>Implementation considerations
 
 Implementation of this policy setting is dependent on your operational environment. You should consider threat vectors, deployed operating systems, and deployed apps, for example:
+
 -   The likelihood of an account theft or a DoS attack is based on the security design for your systems and environment. You should set the account lockout threshold in consideration of the known and perceived risk of those threats.
+
 -   When negotiating encryption types between clients, servers, and domain controllers, the Kerberos protocol can automatically retry account sign-in attempts that count toward the threshold limits that you set in this policy setting. In environments where different versions of the operating system are deployed, encryption type negotiation increases.
+
 -   Not all apps that are used in your environment effectively manage how many times a user can attempt to sign-in. For instance, if a connection drops repeatedly when a user is running the app, all subsequent failed sign-in attempts count toward the account lockout threshold.
 
 For more information about Windows security baseline recommendations for account lockout, see [Configuring Account Lockout](https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/secguide/2014/08/13/configuring-account-lockout/). 
@@ -95,17 +98,23 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat
 Brute force password attacks can use automated methods to try millions of password combinations for any user account. The effectiveness of such attacks can be almost eliminated if you limit the number of failed sign-in attempts that can be performed.
 However, a DoS attack could be performed on a domain that has an account lockout threshold configured. An attacker could programmatically attempt a series of password attacks against all users in the organization. If the number of attempts is greater than the account lockout threshold, the attacker might be able to lock every account without needing any special privileges or being authenticated in the network.
 
-> **Note:** Offline password attacks are not countered by this policy setting.
+> [!NOTE]
+> Offline password attacks are not countered by this policy setting.
+
  
 ### <a href="" id="bkmk-countermeasure"></a>Countermeasure
 
 Because vulnerabilities can exist when this value is configured and when it is not configured, two distinct countermeasures are defined. Organizations should weigh the choice between the two, based on their identified threats and the risks that they want to mitigate. The two countermeasure options are:
+
 -   Configure the **Account lockout threshold** setting to 0. This configuration ensures that accounts will not be locked, and it will prevent a DoS attack that intentionally attempts to lock accounts. This configuration also helps reduce Help Desk calls because users cannot accidentally lock themselves out of their accounts. Because it does not prevent a brute force attack, this configuration should be chosen only if both of the following criteria are explicitly met:
+
     -   The password policy setting requires all users to have complex passwords of 8 or more characters.
     -   A robust audit mechanism is in place to alert administrators when a series of failed sign-ins occur in the environment.
+    
 -   Configure the **Account lockout threshold** policy setting to a sufficiently high value to provide users with the ability to accidentally mistype their password several times before the account is locked, but ensure that a brute force password attack still locks the account.
 
     [Windows security baselines](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-security-baselines) recommend configuring a threshold of 10 invalid sign-in attempts, which prevents accidental account lockouts and reduces the number of Help Desk calls, but does not prevent a DoS attack.
+    
     Using this type of policy must be accompanied by a process to unlock locked accounts. It must be possible to implement this policy whenever it is needed to help mitigate massive lockouts caused by an attack on your systems.
 
 ### Potential impact