diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/monitor-the-central-access-policies-that-apply-on-a-file-server.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/monitor-the-central-access-policies-that-apply-on-a-file-server.md index a1780808e5..15c31fb0d2 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/monitor-the-central-access-policies-that-apply-on-a-file-server.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/monitor-the-central-access-policies-that-apply-on-a-file-server.md @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec This article describes how to monitor changes to the central access policies (CAPs) that apply to a file server when using advanced security auditing options to monitor dynamic access control objects. CAPs are created on a domain controller and then applied to file servers through Group Policy management. -Use the following procedures to configure and verify security auditing settings that are used to monitor changes to the set of CAPs on a file server. The following procedures assume that you have configured and deployed dynamic access control, including CAPs and claims, in your network. If you have not yet deployed dynamic access control in your network, see [Deploy a Central Access Policy (Demonstration Steps)](/windows-server/identity/solution-guides/deploy-a-central-access-policy--demonstration-steps-). +Use the following procedures to configure and verify security auditing settings that are used to monitor changes to the set of CAPs on a file server. The following procedures assume that you have configured and deployed dynamic access control, including CAPs and claims, in your network. If you haven't yet deployed dynamic access control in your network, see [Deploy a Central Access Policy (Demonstration Steps)](/windows-server/identity/solution-guides/deploy-a-central-access-policy--demonstration-steps-). **To configure settings to monitor changes to central access policies** diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/monitor-the-resource-attributes-on-files-and-folders.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/monitor-the-resource-attributes-on-files-and-folders.md index 20be28d785..73427802a4 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/monitor-the-resource-attributes-on-files-and-folders.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/monitor-the-resource-attributes-on-files-and-folders.md @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec # Monitor the resource attributes on files and folders -This topic for the IT professional describes how to monitor attempts to change settings to the resource attributes on files when you are using advanced security auditing options to monitor dynamic access control objects. +This topic for the IT professional describes how to monitor attempts to change settings to the resource attributes on files when you're using advanced security auditing options to monitor dynamic access control objects. If your organization has a carefully thought out authorization configuration for resources, changes to these resource attributes can create potential security risks. Examples include: diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/monitor-user-and-device-claims-during-sign-in.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/monitor-user-and-device-claims-during-sign-in.md index 865b1b5aaf..759bc149b4 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/monitor-user-and-device-claims-during-sign-in.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/monitor-user-and-device-claims-during-sign-in.md @@ -21,11 +21,11 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec # Monitor user and device claims during sign-in -This topic for the IT professional describes how to monitor user and device claims that are associated with a user’s security token when you are using advanced security auditing options to monitor dynamic access control objects. +This topic for the IT professional describes how to monitor user and device claims that are associated with a user’s security token when you're using advanced security auditing options to monitor dynamic access control objects. -Device claims are associated with the system that is used to access resources that are protected with Dynamic Access Control. User claims are attributes that are associated with a user. User claims and device claims are included in the user’s security token used at sign-on. For example, information about Department, Company, Project, or Security clearances might be included in the token. +Device claims are associated with the system that is used to access resources that are protected with Dynamic Access Control. User claims are attributes that are associated with a user. User claims and device claims are included in the user’s security token used at the sign-in stage. For example, information about Department, Company, Project, or Security clearances might be included in the token. -Use the following procedures to monitor changes to user claims and device claims in the user’s sign-on token and to verify the changes. These procedures assume that you have configured and deployed Dynamic Access Control, including central access policies, claims, and other components, in your network. If you have not yet deployed Dynamic Access Control in your network, see [Deploy a Central Access Policy (Demonstration Steps)](/windows-server/identity/solution-guides/deploy-a-central-access-policy--demonstration-steps-). +Use the following procedures to monitor changes to user claims and device claims in the user’s sign-in token and to verify the changes. These procedures assume that you have configured and deployed Dynamic Access Control, including central access policies, claims, and other components, in your network. If you haven't yet deployed Dynamic Access Control in your network, see [Deploy a Central Access Policy (Demonstration Steps)](/windows-server/identity/solution-guides/deploy-a-central-access-policy--demonstration-steps-). >**Note:**  Your server might function differently based on the version and edition of the operating system that is installed, your account permissions, and your menu settings. diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/planning-and-deploying-advanced-security-audit-policies.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/planning-and-deploying-advanced-security-audit-policies.md index 4f9f9b93e8..08a07d6718 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/planning-and-deploying-advanced-security-audit-policies.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/planning-and-deploying-advanced-security-audit-policies.md @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec This article for IT professionals explains the options that security policy planners should consider and the tasks they must complete to deploy an effective security audit policy in a network that includes advanced security audit policies. -Organizations invest heavily in security applications and services, such as antimalware software, firewalls, and encryption. But no matter how much security hardware or software you deploy, how tightly you control the rights of users, or how carefully you configure security permissions on your data, the job isn't complete unless you have a well-defined, timely auditing strategy to track the effectiveness of your defenses and identify attempts to circumvent them. +Organizations invest heavily in security applications and services, such as antimalware software, firewalls, and encryption. But no matter how much security hardware or software you deploy, how tightly you control the rights of users, or how carefully you configure security permissions on your data, the job isn't complete unless you've a well-defined, timely auditing strategy to track the effectiveness of your defenses and identify attempts to circumvent them. To be well-defined and timely, an auditing strategy must provide useful tracking data for an organization's most important resources, critical behaviors, and potential risks. In many organizations, it must also provide proof that IT operations comply with corporate and regulatory requirements. @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ To effectively audit user activity, begin by listing the different types of user Also, if external users can access your organization's data, be sure to identify them. Determine whether they're a business partner, customer, or general user; the data they have access to; and the permissions they have to access that data. -The following table illustrates an analysis of users on a network. Our example contains only a single column titled "Possible auditing considerations," but you may want to create additional columns to differentiate between different types of network activity, such as logon hours and permission use. +The following table illustrates an analysis of users on a network. Our example contains only a single column titled "Possible auditing considerations," but you may want to create more columns to differentiate between different types of network activity, such as sign-in hours and permission use. | Groups | Data | Possible auditing considerations | | - | - | - | @@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ By using Group Policy, you can apply your security audit policy to defined group - Decide whether every policy setting that you select should be enforced across the organization or apply only to selected users or computers. You can then combine these audit policy settings into GPOs and link them to the appropriate Active Directory containers. - By default, options set in GPOs that are linked to higher levels of Active Directory sites, domains, and OUs are inherited by all OUs at lower levels. However, a GPO that's linked at a lower level can overwrite inherited policies. - For example, you might use a domain GPO to assign an organization-wide group of audit settings but want a certain OU to get a defined group of additional settings. To do this, you can link a second GPO to that specific lower-level OU. Then, a logon audit setting that's applied at the OU level will override a conflicting logon audit setting that's applied at the domain level, unless you've taken special steps to apply Group Policy loopback processing. + For example, you might use a domain GPO to assign an organization-wide group of audit settings but want a certain OU to get a defined group of extra settings. To do this assignation, you can link a second GPO to that specific lower-level OU. Then, a sign-in audit setting that's applied at the OU level will override a conflicting sign-in audit setting that's applied at the domain level, unless you've taken special steps to apply Group Policy loopback processing. - Audit policies are computer policies. Therefore, they must be applied through GPOs that are applied to *computer* OUs, not to *user* OUs. But in most cases, you can apply audit settings for only specified resources and groups of users by configuring SACLs on the relevant objects. This functionality enables auditing for a security group that contains only the users you specify. @@ -270,12 +270,12 @@ Compromise to an organization's data resources can cause tremendous financial lo The settings in the previous section relate to activity involving the files, folders, and network shares that are stored on a network. The settings in this section focus on the users who may try to access those resources, including employees, partners, and customers. -In most cases, these attempts are legitimate, and the network needs to make data readily available to legitimate users. But in other cases, employees, partners, and others may try to access resources that they have no legitimate reason to access. You can use security auditing to track a variety of user activities on a particular computer to diagnose and resolve problems for legitimate users and to identify and address illegitimate activities. The following are important settings that you should evaluate to track user activity on your network: +In most cases, these attempts are legitimate, and the network needs to make data readily available to legitimate users. But in other cases, employees, partners, and others may try to access resources that they have no legitimate reason to access. You can use security auditing to track various user activities on a particular computer to diagnose and resolve problems for legitimate users and to identify and address illegitimate activities. The following are important settings that you should evaluate to track user activity on your network: -- **Account Logon\\[Audit Credential Validation](audit-credential-validation.md)**: This setting enables you to track all successful and unsuccessful logon attempts. A pattern of unsuccessful attempts may indicate that a user or application is using credentials that are no longer valid. Or the user or app is trying to use a variety of credentials in succession in hope that one of these attempts will eventually succeed. These events occur on the computer that's authoritative for the credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. +- **Account Logon\\[Audit Credential Validation](audit-credential-validation.md)**: This setting enables you to track all successful and unsuccessful sign-in attempts. A pattern of unsuccessful attempts may indicate that a user or application is using credentials that are no longer valid. Or the user or app is trying to use various credentials in succession in hope that one of these attempts will eventually succeed. These events occur on the computer that's authoritative for the credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. - **Detailed Tracking\\[Audit Process Creation](audit-process-creation.md) and Detailed Tracking\\[Audit Process Termination](audit-process-termination.md)**: These policy settings enable you to monitor the applications that a user opens and close on a computer. -- **DS Access\\[Audit Directory Service Access](audit-directory-service-access.md)** and **DS Access\\[Audit Directory Service Changes](audit-directory-service-changes.md)**: These policy settings provide a detailed audit trail of attempts to access, create, modify, delete, move, or undelete objects in Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS). Only domain administrators have permissions to modify AD DS objects, so it's important to identify malicious attempts to modify these objects. Also, although domain administrators should be among an organization's most trusted employees, the use of the **Audit Directory Service Access** and **Audit Directory Service Changes** settings enable you to monitor and verify that only approved changes are made to AD DS. These audit events are logged only on domain controllers. -- **Logon/Logoff\\[Audit Account Lockout](audit-account-lockout.md)**: Another common security scenario occurs when a user attempts to log on with an account that's been locked out. It's important to identify these events and to determine whether the attempt to use an account that was locked out is malicious. +- **DS Access\\[Audit Directory Service Access](audit-directory-service-access.md)** and **DS Access\\[Audit Directory Service Changes](audit-directory-service-changes.md)**: These policy settings provide a detailed audit trail of attempts to access, create, modify, delete, move, or undelete objects in Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS). Only domain administrators have permissions to modify AD DS objects, so it's important to identify malicious attempts to modify these objects. Also, although domain administrators should be among an organization's most trusted employees, the use of the **Audit Directory Service Access** and **Audit Directory Service Changes** settings enables you to monitor and verify that only approved changes are made to AD DS. These audit events are logged only on domain controllers. +- **Logon/Logoff\\[Audit Account Lockout](audit-account-lockout.md)**: Another common security scenario occurs when a user attempts to sign in with an account that's been locked out. It's important to identify these events and to determine whether the attempt to use an account that was locked out is malicious. - **Logon/Logoff\\[Audit Logoff](audit-logoff.md)** and **Logon/Logoff\\[Audit Logon](audit-logon.md)**: Logon and logoff events are essential to tracking user activity and detecting potential attacks. Logon events are related to the creation of logon sessions, and they occur on the computer that was accessed. For an interactive logon, events are generated on the computer that was logged on to. For network logon, such as accessing a shared resource, events are generated on the computer that hosts the resource that was accessed. Logoff events are generated when logon sessions are terminated. > [!NOTE] @@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ The following network activity policy settings enable you to monitor security-re - **Logon/Logoff\\[Audit Network Policy Server](audit-network-policy-server.md)**: Organizations that use RADIUS (IAS) and Network Access Protection (NAP) to set and maintain security requirements for external users can use this policy setting to monitor the effectiveness of these policies and to determine whether anyone is trying to circumvent these protections. - **Policy Change**: These policy settings and events enable you to track changes to important security policies on a local computer or network. Because policies are typically established by administrators to help secure network resources, monitoring any changes or attempted changes to these policies can be an important aspect of security management for a network. - **Policy Change\\[Audit Audit Policy Change](audit-audit-policy-change.md)**: This policy setting allows you to monitor changes to the audit policy. If malicious users obtain domain administrator credentials, they can temporarily disable essential security audit policy settings so that their other activities on the network can't be detected. -- **Policy Change\\[Audit Filtering Platform Policy Change](audit-filtering-platform-policy-change.md)**: This policy setting can be used to monitor a variety of changes to an organization's IPsec policies. +- **Policy Change\\[Audit Filtering Platform Policy Change](audit-filtering-platform-policy-change.md)**: This policy setting can be used to monitor various changes to an organization's IPsec policies. - **Policy Change\\[Audit MPSSVC Rule-Level Policy Change](audit-mpssvc-rule-level-policy-change.md)**: This policy setting determines if the operating system generates audit events when changes are made to policy rules for the Microsoft Protection Service (MPSSVC.exe), which is used by Windows Firewall. Changes to firewall rules are important for understanding the security state of the computer and how well it's protected against network attacks. ### Confirm operating system version compatibility @@ -331,9 +331,9 @@ These settings enable you to exercise much tighter control over which activities ### *Success*, *failure*, or both -Whichever event settings you include in your plan, you also have to decide whether you want to log an event when the activity fails or succeeds or both successes *and* failures. This is an important question. The answer depends on the criticality of the event and the implications of the decision for event volume. +Whichever event settings you include in your plan, you also have to decide whether you want to log an event when the activity fails or succeeds or both successes *and* failures. This question is an important one. The answer depends on the criticality of the event and the implications of the decision for event volume. -For example, on a file server that's accessed frequently by legitimate users, you may want to log an event only when an *unsuccessful* attempt to access data takes place, because this could be evidence of an unauthorized or malicious user. In this case, logging *successful* attempts to access the server would quickly fill the event log with benign events. +For example, on a file server that's accessed frequently by legitimate users, you may want to log an event only when an *unsuccessful* attempt to access data takes place, because this access failure could be evidence of an unauthorized or malicious user. In this case, logging *successful* attempts to access the server would quickly fill the event log with benign events. But if the file share has sensitive information, such as trade secrets, you may want to log every access attempt so that you have an audit trail of every user who tries to access the resource. @@ -341,12 +341,12 @@ But if the file share has sensitive information, such as trade secrets, you may Networks may contain hundreds of servers that run critical services or store critical data, all of which need to be monitored. There may be tens or even hundreds of thousands of computers on the network. These numbers may not be an issue if the ratio of servers or client computers per administrator is low. And even if an administrator who is responsible for auditing security and performance issues has relatively few computers to monitor, you need to decide how the administrator will obtain event data to review. Following are some options for obtaining the event data. -- Will you keep event data on a local computer until an administrator logs on to review this data? If so, the administrator needs to have physical or remote access to the Event Viewer on each client computer or server. And the remote access and firewall settings on each client computer or server need to be configured to enable this access. You also need to decide how often the administrator can visit each computer, and adjust the size of the audit log so that critical information isn't deleted if the log reaches capacity. -- Will you collect event data so that it can be reviewed from a central console? If so, there are a number of computer management products, such as the Audit Collection Services in Microsoft Operations Manager 2007 and 2012, that you can use to collect and filter event data. Presumably this solution enables a single administrator to review larger amounts of data than using the local storage option. But in some cases, this method can make it more difficult to detect clusters of related events that can occur on a single computer. +- Will you keep event data on a local computer until an administrator signs in to review this data? If so, the administrator needs to have physical or remote access to the Event Viewer on each client computer or server. And the remote access and firewall settings on each client computer or server need to be configured to enable this access. You also need to decide how often the administrator can visit each computer, and adjust the size of the audit log so that critical information isn't deleted if the log reaches capacity. +- Will you collect event data so that it can be reviewed from a central console? If so, there are many computer management products, such as the Audit Collection Services in Microsoft Operations Manager 2007 and 2012, that you can use to collect and filter event data. Presumably this solution enables a single administrator to review larger amounts of data than using the local storage option. But in some cases, this method can make it more difficult to detect clusters of related events that can occur on a single computer. In addition, whether you choose to leave audit data on an individual computer or consolidate it at a central location, you need to decide how large the log file should be and what happens when the log reaches its maximum size. To configure these options, open Event Viewer, expand **Windows Logs**, right-click **Security**, and select **Properties**. You can configure the following properties: -- **Overwrite events as needed (oldest events first)**: This is the default option, which is acceptable in most situations. +- **Overwrite events as needed (oldest events first)**: This option is the default one, which is acceptable in most situations. - **Archive the log when full, do not overwrite events**: This option can be used when all log data needs to be saved. But the scenario suggests that you may not be reviewing audit data frequently enough. - **Do not overwrite events (Clear logs manually)**. This option stops the collection of audit data when the log file reaches its maximum size. Older data is retained at the expense of the most recent audit events. Use this option only if you don't want to lose any audit data, don't want to create an archive of the event log, and are committed to reviewing data before the maximum log size is reached. @@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ Configuration\\Administrative Templates\\Windows Components\\Event Log Service\\ - **Retain old events**: This policy setting controls event log behavior when the log file reaches its maximum size. When this policy setting is enabled and a log file reaches its maximum size, new events aren't written to the log and are lost. When this policy setting is disabled and a log file reaches its maximum size, new events overwrite old events. - **Backup log automatically when full**: This policy setting controls event log behavior when the log file reaches its maximum size. It takes effect only if the **Retain old events** policy setting is enabled. If you enable these policy settings, the event log file is automatically closed and renamed when it's full. A new log file is then started. If you disable or don't configure this policy setting and the **Retain old events** policy setting is enabled, new events are discarded, and the old events are retained. -Many organizations are now required to store archived log files for a number of years. Consult with regulatory compliance officers in your organization to determine whether such guidelines apply to your organization. For more information, see the [IT Compliance Management Guide](/previous-versions/tn-archive/dd206732(v=technet.10)). +Many organizations are now required to store archived log files for many years. Consult with regulatory compliance officers in your organization to determine whether such guidelines apply to your organization. For more information, see the [IT Compliance Management Guide](/previous-versions/tn-archive/dd206732(v=technet.10)). ## Deploy the security audit policy @@ -373,4 +373,4 @@ However, unless you can run fairly realistic simulations of network usage patter - A limited set of security audit policy settings, such as **Logon/Logoff** and **Account Logon** - A combination of limited OUs and audit policy settings—for example, targeting servers in only the Accounting OU with **Object Access** policy settings -After you successfully complete one or more limited deployments, you should confirm that the audit data that's collected is manageable with your management tools and administrators. After you confirm that the pilot deployment is effective, you need to ensure that you have the necessary tools and staff to expand the deployment to include additional OUs and sets of audit policy settings until production deployment is complete. \ No newline at end of file +After you successfully complete one or more limited deployments, you should confirm that the audit data that's collected is manageable with your management tools and administrators. After you confirm that the pilot deployment is effective, you need to ensure that you have the necessary tools and staff to expand the deployment to include more OUs and sets of audit policy settings until production deployment is complete. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/security-auditing-overview.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/security-auditing-overview.md index 1c305a4439..7d7e21c1f3 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/security-auditing-overview.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/security-auditing-overview.md @@ -25,14 +25,14 @@ Topics in this section are for IT professionals and describes the security audit ## -Security auditing is one of the most powerful tools that you can use to maintain the integrity of your system. As part of your overall security strategy, you should determine the level of auditing that is appropriate for your environment. Auditing should identify attacks (successful or not) that pose a threat to your network, and attacks against resources that you have determined to be valuable in your risk assessment. +Security auditing is one of the most powerful tools that you can use to maintain the integrity of your system. As part of your overall security strategy, you should determine the level of auditing that is appropriate for your environment. Auditing should identify attacks (successful or not) that pose a threat to your network, and attacks against resources that you've determined to be valuable in your risk assessment. ## In this section | Topic | Description | | - | - | |[Basic security audit policies](basic-security-audit-policies.md) |Before you implement auditing, you must decide on an auditing policy. A basic audit policy specifies categories of security-related events that you want to audit. When this version of Windows is first installed, all auditing categories are disabled. By enabling various auditing event categories, you can implement an auditing policy that suits the security needs of your organization. | -|[Advanced security audit policies](./advanced-security-auditing.md) |Advanced security audit policy settings are found in **Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\System Audit Policies** and appear to overlap with basic security audit policies, but they are recorded and applied differently. | +|[Advanced security audit policies](./advanced-security-auditing.md) |Advanced security audit policy settings are found in **Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\System Audit Policies** and appear to overlap with basic security audit policies, but they're recorded and applied differently. | diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/block-untrusted-fonts-in-enterprise.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/block-untrusted-fonts-in-enterprise.md index 564c7cdfe4..95aa186d93 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/block-untrusted-fonts-in-enterprise.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/block-untrusted-fonts-in-enterprise.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- title: Block untrusted fonts in an enterprise (Windows 10) -description: To help protect your company from attacks which may originate from untrusted or attacker controlled font files, we've created the Blocking Untrusted Fonts feature. +description: To help protect your company from attacks that may originate from untrusted or attacker controlled font files, we've created the Blocking Untrusted Fonts feature. ms.reviewer: manager: dansimp ms.prod: m365-security @@ -19,13 +19,13 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec > Learn more about what features and functionality are supported in each Windows edition at [Compare Windows 10 Editions](https://www.microsoft.com/WindowsForBusiness/Compare). -To help protect your company from attacks which may originate from untrusted or attacker-controlled font files, we’ve created the Blocking Untrusted Fonts feature. Using this feature, you can turn on a global setting that stops your employees from loading untrusted fonts processed using the Graphics Device Interface (GDI) onto your network. Untrusted fonts are any font installed outside of the `%windir%/Fonts` directory. Blocking untrusted fonts helps prevent both remote (web-based or email-based) and local EOP attacks that can happen during the font file-parsing process. +To help protect your company from attacks that may originate from untrusted or attacker-controlled font files, we’ve created the Blocking Untrusted Fonts feature. Using this feature, you can turn on a global setting that stops your employees from loading untrusted fonts processed using the Graphics Device Interface (GDI) onto your network. Untrusted fonts are any font installed outside of the `%windir%/Fonts` directory. Blocking untrusted fonts helps prevent both remote (web-based or email-based) and local EOP attacks that can happen during the font file-parsing process. ## What does this mean for me? -Blocking untrusted fonts helps improve your network and employee protection against font-processing-related attacks. By default, this feature is not turned on. +Blocking untrusted fonts helps improve your network and employee protection against font-processing-related attacks. By default, this feature isn't turned on. ## How does this feature work? -There are 3 ways to use this feature: +There are three ways to use this feature: - **On.** Helps stop any font processed using GDI from loading outside of the `%windir%/Fonts` directory. It also turns on event logging. @@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ There are 3 ways to use this feature: - **Exclude apps to load untrusted fonts.** You can exclude specific apps, allowing them to load untrusted fonts, even while this feature is turned on. For instructions, see [Fix apps having problems because of blocked fonts](#fix-apps-having-problems-because-of-blocked-fonts). ## Potential reductions in functionality -After you turn this feature on, your employees might experience reduced functionality when: +After you turn on this feature, your employees might experience reduced functionality when: -- Sending a print job to a remote printer server that uses this feature and where the spooler process hasn’t been specifically excluded. In this situation, any fonts that aren’t already available in the server’s %windir%/Fonts folder won’t be used. +- Sending a print job to a remote printer server that uses this feature and where the spooler process hasn’t been excluded. In this situation, any fonts that aren’t already available in the server’s %windir%/Fonts folder won’t be used. - Printing using fonts provided by the installed printer’s graphics .dll file, outside of the %windir%/Fonts folder. For more information, see [Introduction to Printer Graphics DLLs](/windows-hardware/drivers/print/introduction-to-printer-graphics-dlls). @@ -55,13 +55,13 @@ Use Group Policy or the registry to turn this feature on, off, or to use audit m **To turn on and use the Blocking Untrusted Fonts feature through Group Policy** 1. Open the Group Policy editor (gpedit.msc) and go to `Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\System\Mitigation Options\Untrusted Font Blocking`. -2. Click **Enabled** to turn the feature on, and then click one of the following **Mitigation Options**: +2. Click **Enabled** to turn on the feature, and then click one of the following **Mitigation Options**: - - **Block untrusted fonts and log events.** Turns the feature on, blocking untrusted fonts and logging installation attempts to the event log. + - **Block untrusted fonts and log events.** Turns on the feature, blocking untrusted fonts and logging installation attempts to the event log. - - **Do not block untrusted fonts.** Turns the feature on, but doesn't block untrusted fonts nor does it log installation attempts to the event log. + - **Do not block untrusted fonts.** Turns on the feature, but doesn't block untrusted fonts nor does it log installation attempts to the event log. - - **Log events without blocking untrusted fonts**. Turns the feature on, logging installation attempts to the event log, but not blocking untrusted fonts. + - **Log events without blocking untrusted fonts**. Turns on the feature, logging installation attempts to the event log, but not blocking untrusted fonts. 3. Click **OK**. @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ To turn this feature on, off, or to use audit mode: 5. Restart your computer. ## View the event log -After you turn this feature on, or start using Audit mode, you can look at your event logs for details. +After you turn on this feature, or start using Audit mode, you can look at your event logs for details. **To look at your event log** @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ After you turn this feature on, or start using Audit mode, you can look at your ## Fix apps having problems because of blocked fonts Your company may still need apps that are having problems because of blocked fonts, so we suggest that you first run this feature in Audit mode to determine which fonts are causing the problems. -After you figure out the problematic fonts, you can try to fix your apps in 2 ways: by directly installing the fonts into the %windir%/Fonts directory or by excluding the underlying processes and letting the fonts load. As the default solution, we highly recommend that you install the problematic font. Installing fonts is safer than excluding apps because excluded apps can load any font, trusted or untrusted. +After you figure out the problematic fonts, you can try to fix your apps in two ways: by directly installing the fonts into the %windir%/Fonts directory or by excluding the underlying processes and letting the fonts load. As the default solution, we highly recommend that you install the problematic font. Installing fonts is safer than excluding apps because excluded apps can load any font, trusted or untrusted. **To fix your apps by installing the problematic fonts (recommended)** @@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ After you figure out the problematic fonts, you can try to fix your apps in 2 wa 1. On each computer with the app installed, open regedit.exe and go to `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\`.

For example, if you want to exclude Microsoft Word processes, you’d use `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\Winword.exe`. -2. Add any additional processes that need to be excluded here, and then turn the Blocking untrusted fonts feature on, using the steps in [Turn on and use the Blocking Untrusted Fonts feature](#turn-on-and-use-the-blocking-untrusted-fonts-feature), earlier in this article. +2. Add other processes that need to be excluded here, and then turn on the Blocking untrusted fonts feature, using the steps in [Turn on and use the Blocking Untrusted Fonts feature](#turn-on-and-use-the-blocking-untrusted-fonts-feature), earlier in this article. ## Related content diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/device-guard/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/device-guard/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md index 4a0981cf1f..b51d3cbf0e 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/device-guard/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/device-guard/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md @@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec This topic covers different ways to enable Hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI) on Windows 10 and Windows 11. Some applications, including device drivers, may be incompatible with HVCI. -This can cause devices or software to malfunction and in rare cases may result in a blue screen. Such issues may occur after HVCI has been turned on or during the enablement process itself. -If this happens, see [Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting) for remediation steps. +This incompatibility can cause devices or software to malfunction and in rare cases may result in a blue screen. Such issues may occur after HVCI has been turned on or during the enablement process itself. +If these issues occur, see [Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting) for remediation steps. > [!NOTE] > Because it makes use of *Mode Based Execution Control*, HVCI works better with Intel Kaby Lake or AMD Zen 2 CPUs and newer. Processors without MBEC will rely on an emulation of this feature, called *Restricted User Mode*, which has a bigger impact on performance. @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ Enabling in Intune requires using the Code Integrity node in the [AppLocker CSP] 3. Double-click **Turn on Virtualization Based Security**. -4. Click **Enabled** and under **Virtualization Based Protection of Code Integrity**, select **Enabled with UEFI lock** to ensure HVCI cannot be disabled remotely or select **Enabled without UEFI lock**. +4. Click **Enabled** and under **Virtualization Based Protection of Code Integrity**, select **Enabled with UEFI lock** to ensure HVCI can't be disabled remotely or select **Enabled without UEFI lock**. ![Enable HVCI using Group Policy.](../images/enable-hvci-gp.png) @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ To apply the new policy on a domain-joined computer, either restart or run `gpup ### Use registry keys to enable virtualization-based protection of code integrity -Set the following registry keys to enable HVCI. This provides exactly the same set of configuration options provided by Group Policy. +Set the following registry keys to enable HVCI. These keys provide exactly the same set of configuration options provided by Group Policy. @@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ Get-CimInstance –ClassName Win32_DeviceGuard –Namespace root\Microsoft\Windo > [!NOTE] > Mode Based Execution Control property will only be listed as available starting with Windows 10 version 1803 and Windows 11 version 21H2. -The output of this command provides details of the available hardware-based security features as well as those features that are currently enabled. +The output of this command provides details of the available hardware-based security features and those features that are currently enabled. #### AvailableSecurityProperties @@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ This field indicates whether the Windows Defender Credential Guard or HVCI servi Value | Description -|- -**0.** | No services configured. +**0.** | No services are configured. **1.** | If present, Windows Defender Credential Guard is configured. **2.** | If present, HVCI is configured. **3.** | If present, System Guard Secure Launch is configured. @@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ This field indicates whether VBS is enabled and running. Value | Description -|- -**0.** | VBS is not enabled. +**0.** | VBS isn't enabled. **1.** | VBS is enabled but not running. **2.** | VBS is enabled and running. @@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ Another method to determine the available and enabled Windows Defender Device Gu A. If a device driver fails to load or crashes at runtime, you may be able to update the driver using **Device Manager**. -B. If you experience software or device malfunction after using the above procedure to turn on HVCI, but you are able to log in to Windows, you can turn off HVCI by renaming or deleting the SIPolicy.p7b file from `\Windows\System32\CodeIntegrity\` and then restart your device. +B. If you experience software or device malfunction after using the above procedure to turn on HVCI, but you're able to sign in to Windows, you can turn off HVCI by renaming or deleting the SIPolicy.p7b file from `\Windows\System32\CodeIntegrity\` and then restart your device. C. If you experience a critical error during boot or your system is unstable after using the above procedure to turn on HVCI, you can recover using the Windows Recovery Environment (Windows RE). To boot to Windows RE, see [Windows RE Technical Reference](/windows-hardware/manufacture/desktop/windows-recovery-environment--windows-re--technical-reference). After logging in to Windows RE, you can turn off HVCI by renaming or deleting the SIPolicy.p7b file from `\Windows\System32\CodeIntegrity\` and then restart your device. @@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ C. If you experience a critical error during boot or your system is unstable aft HVCI can protect a Hyper-V virtual machine, just as it would a physical machine. The steps to enable Windows Defender Application Control are the same from within the virtual machine. -WDAC protects against malware running in the guest virtual machine. It does not provide additional protection from the host administrator. From the host, you can disable WDAC for a virtual machine: +WDAC protects against malware running in the guest virtual machine. It doesn't provide extra protection from the host administrator. From the host, you can disable WDAC for a virtual machine: ```powershell Set-VMSecurity -VMName -VirtualizationBasedSecurityOptOut $true @@ -324,6 +324,6 @@ Set-VMSecurity -VMName -VirtualizationBasedSecurityOptOut $true ### Requirements for running HVCI in Hyper-V virtual machines - The Hyper-V host must run at least Windows Server 2016 or Windows 10 version 1607. - The Hyper-V virtual machine must be Generation 2, and running at least Windows Server 2016 or Windows 10. -- HVCI and [nested virtualization](/virtualization/hyper-v-on-windows/user-guide/nested-virtualization) can be enabled at the same time. To enable the HyperV role on the virtual machine, you must first install the HyperV role in a Windows nested virtualization environment. -- Virtual Fibre Channel adapters are not compatible with HVCI. Before attaching a virtual Fibre Channel Adapter to a virtual machine, you must first opt out of virtualization-based security using `Set-VMSecurity`. -- The AllowFullSCSICommandSet option for pass-through disks is not compatible with HVCI. Before configuring a pass-through disk with AllowFullSCSICommandSet, you must first opt out of virtualization-based security using `Set-VMSecurity`. +- HVCI and [nested virtualization](/virtualization/hyper-v-on-windows/user-guide/nested-virtualization) can be enabled at the same time. To enable the Hyper-V role on the virtual machine, you must first install the Hyper-V role in a Windows nested virtualization environment. +- Virtual Fibre Channel adapters aren't compatible with HVCI. Before attaching a virtual Fibre Channel Adapter to a virtual machine, you must first opt out of virtualization-based security using `Set-VMSecurity`. +- The AllowFullSCSICommandSet option for pass-through disks isn't compatible with HVCI. Before configuring a pass-through disk with AllowFullSCSICommandSet, you must first opt out of virtualization-based security using `Set-VMSecurity`. diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/device-guard/requirements-and-deployment-planning-guidelines-for-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/device-guard/requirements-and-deployment-planning-guidelines-for-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md index bec34fe509..7a99baa345 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/device-guard/requirements-and-deployment-planning-guidelines-for-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/device-guard/requirements-and-deployment-planning-guidelines-for-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- title: Deployment guidelines for Windows Defender Device Guard (Windows 10) -description: Plan your deployment of Hypervisor-Protected Code Integrity (aka Memory Integrity). Learn about hardware requirements, deployment approaches, code signing and code integrity policies. +description: Plan your deployment of Hypervisor-Protected Code Integrity (also known as Memory Integrity). Learn about hardware requirements, deployment approaches, code signing and code integrity policies. keywords: virtualization, security, malware ms.prod: m365-security ms.mktglfcycl: deploy @@ -16,12 +16,12 @@ ms.author: dansimp ms.technology: windows-sec --- -# Baseline protections and additional qualifications for virtualization-based protection of code integrity +# Baseline protections and other qualifications for virtualization-based protection of code integrity **Applies to** - Windows 10 -Computers must meet certain hardware, firmware, and software requirements in order to take advantage of Hypervisor-Protected Code Integrity (HVCI), a virtualization-based security (VBS) feature in Windows. HVCI is referred to as Memory Integrity under the Core Isolation section of the Windows security settings. Computers lacking these requirements can still be protected by Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) policies—the difference is that those computers will not be as hardened against certain threats. +Computers must meet certain hardware, firmware, and software requirements in order to take advantage of Hypervisor-Protected Code Integrity (HVCI), a virtualization-based security (VBS) feature in Windows. HVCI is referred to as Memory Integrity under the Core Isolation section of the Windows security settings. Computers lacking these requirements can still be protected by Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) policies—the difference is that those computers won't be as hardened against certain threats. For example, hardware that includes CPU virtualization extensions and SLAT will be hardened against malware that attempts to gain access to the kernel, but without protected BIOS options such as “Boot only from internal hard drive,” the computer could be booted (by a malicious person who has physical access) into an operating system on bootable media. @@ -38,42 +38,42 @@ The following tables provide more information about the hardware, firmware, and |Baseline Protections | Description | Security benefits | |--------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | Hardware: **64-bit CPU** | A 64-bit computer is required for the Windows hypervisor to provide VBS. | | -| Hardware: **CPU virtualization extensions**,
plus **extended page tables** | These hardware features are required for VBS:
One of the following virtualization extensions:
• VT-x (Intel) or
• AMD-V
And:
• Extended page tables, also called Second Level Address Translation (SLAT). | VBS provides isolation of the secure kernel from the normal operating system. Vulnerabilities and zero-days in the normal operating system cannot be exploited because of this isolation. | -| Firmware: **UEFI firmware version 2.3.1.c or higher with UEFI Secure Boot** | See the System.Fundamentals.Firmware.UEFISecureBoot requirement in the [Windows Hardware Compatibility Specifications for Windows 10, version 1809 and Windows Server 2019 - Systems download](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2027110). You can find previous versions of the Windows Hardware Compatibility Program Specifications and Policies [here](/windows-hardware/design/compatibility/whcp-specifications-policies). | UEFI Secure Boot helps ensure that the device boots only authorized code. This can prevent boot kits and root kits from installing and persisting across reboots. | +| Hardware: **CPU virtualization extensions**,
plus **extended page tables** | These hardware features are required for VBS:
One of the following virtualization extensions:
• VT-x (Intel) or
• AMD-V
And:
• Extended page tables, also called Second Level Address Translation (SLAT). | VBS provides isolation of the secure kernel from the normal operating system. Vulnerabilities and zero-days in the normal operating system can't be exploited because of this isolation. | +| Firmware: **UEFI firmware version 2.3.1.c or higher with UEFI Secure Boot** | See the System.Fundamentals.Firmware.UEFISecureBoot requirement in the [Windows Hardware Compatibility Specifications for Windows 10, version 1809 and Windows Server 2019 - Systems download](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2027110). You can find previous versions of the Windows Hardware Compatibility Program Specifications and Policies [here](/windows-hardware/design/compatibility/whcp-specifications-policies). | UEFI Secure Boot helps ensure that the device boots only authorized code. This guarantee can prevent boot kits and root kits from installing and persisting across reboots. | | Firmware: **Secure firmware update process** | UEFI firmware must support secure firmware update found under the System.Fundamentals.Firmware.UEFISecureBoot requirement in the [Windows Hardware Compatibility Specifications for Windows 10, version 1809 and Windows Server 2019 - Systems download](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2027110). You can find previous versions of the Windows Hardware Compatibility Program Specifications and Policies [here](/windows-hardware/design/compatibility/whcp-specifications-policies). | UEFI firmware just like software can have security vulnerabilities that, when found, need to be patched through firmware updates. Patching helps prevent root kits from getting installed. | -| Software: **HVCI compatible drivers** | See the Filter.Driver.DeviceGuard.DriverCompatibility requirement in the [Windows Hardware Compatibility Specifications for Windows 10, version 1809 and Windows Server 2019 - Filter driver download](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2027110). You can find previous versions of the Windows Hardware Compatibility Program Specifications and Policies [here](/windows-hardware/design/compatibility/whcp-specifications-policies). | [HVCI Compatible](https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/windows_hardware_certification/2015/05/22/driver-compatibility-with-device-guard-in-windows-10/) drivers help ensure that VBS can maintain appropriate memory permissions. This increases resistance to bypassing vulnerable kernel drivers and helps ensure that malware cannot run in kernel. Only code verified through code integrity can run in kernel mode. | +| Software: **HVCI compatible drivers** | See the Filter.Driver.DeviceGuard.DriverCompatibility requirement in the [Windows Hardware Compatibility Specifications for Windows 10, version 1809 and Windows Server 2019 - Filter driver download](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2027110). You can find previous versions of the Windows Hardware Compatibility Program Specifications and Policies [here](/windows-hardware/design/compatibility/whcp-specifications-policies). | [HVCI Compatible](https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/windows_hardware_certification/2015/05/22/driver-compatibility-with-device-guard-in-windows-10/) drivers help ensure that VBS can maintain appropriate memory permissions. This increases resistance to bypassing vulnerable kernel drivers and helps ensure that malware can't run in kernel. Only code verified through code integrity can run in kernel mode. | | Software: Qualified **Windows operating system** | Windows 10 Enterprise, Windows 10 Pro, Windows 10 Education, Windows Server 2016, or Windows 10 IoT Enterprise

Important:
Windows Server 2016 running as a domain controller does not support Windows Defender Credential Guard. Only virtualization-based protection of code integrity is supported in this configuration.

| Support for VBS and for management features. | > **Important**  The following tables list additional qualifications for improved security. You can use WDAC and HVCI with hardware, firmware, and software that support baseline protections, even if they do not support protections for improved security. However, we strongly recommend meeting these additional qualifications to significantly strengthen the level of security that WDAC and HVCI can provide. -## Additional qualifications for improved security +## Other qualifications for improved security -The following tables describe additional hardware and firmware qualifications, and the improved security that is available when these qualifications are met. +The following tables describe other hardware and firmware qualifications, and the improved security that is available when these qualifications are met. -### Additional security qualifications starting with Windows 10, version 1507, and Windows Server 2016, Technical Preview 4 +### More security qualifications starting with Windows 10, version 1507, and Windows Server 2016, Technical Preview 4 | Protections for Improved Security | Description | Security benefits | |---------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|------| -| Firmware: **Securing Boot Configuration and Management** | • BIOS password or stronger authentication must be supported.
• In the BIOS configuration, BIOS authentication must be set.
• There must be support for protected BIOS option to configure list of permitted boot devices (for example, “Boot only from internal hard drive”) and boot device order, overriding BOOTORDER modification made by operating system.
• In the BIOS configuration, BIOS options related to security and boot options (list of permitted boot devices, boot order) must be secured to prevent other operating systems from starting and to prevent changes to the BIOS settings. | • BIOS password or stronger authentication helps ensure that only authenticated Platform BIOS administrators can change BIOS settings. This helps protect against a physically present user with BIOS access.
• Boot order when locked provides protection against the computer being booted into WinRE or another operating system on bootable media. | +| Firmware: **Securing Boot Configuration and Management** | • BIOS password or stronger authentication must be supported.
• In the BIOS configuration, BIOS authentication must be set.
• There must be support for protected BIOS option to configure list of permitted boot devices (for example, “Boot only from internal hard drive”) and boot device order, overriding BOOTORDER modification made by operating system.
• In the BIOS configuration, BIOS options related to security and boot options (list of permitted boot devices, boot order) must be secured to prevent other operating systems from starting and to prevent changes to the BIOS settings. | • BIOS password or stronger authentication helps ensure that only authenticated Platform BIOS administrators can change BIOS settings. This guarantee helps protect against a physically present user with BIOS access.
• Boot order when locked provides protection against the computer being booted into WinRE or another operating system on bootable media. |
-### Additional security qualifications starting with Windows 10, version 1607, and Windows Server 2016 +### More security qualifications starting with Windows 10, version 1607, and Windows Server 2016 | Protections for Improved Security | Description | Security benefits | |---------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|-----| -| Firmware: **Hardware Rooted Trust Platform Secure Boot** | • Boot Integrity (Platform Secure Boot) must be supported. See the System.Fundamentals.Firmware.CS.UEFISecureBoot.ConnectedStandby requirement in the [Windows Hardware Compatibility Specifications for Windows 10, version 1809 and Windows Server 2019 - Systems download](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2027110). You can find previous versions of the Windows Hardware Compatibility Program Specifications and Policies [here](/windows-hardware/design/compatibility/whcp-specifications-policies).
• The Hardware Security Test Interface (HSTI) 1.1.a must be implemented. See [Hardware Security Testability Specification](/windows-hardware/test/hlk/testref/hardware-security-testability-specification). | • Boot Integrity (Platform Secure Boot) from Power-On provides protections against physically present attackers, and defense-in-depth against malware.
• HSTI 1.1.a provides additional security assurance for correctly secured silicon and platform. | +| Firmware: **Hardware Rooted Trust Platform Secure Boot** | • Boot Integrity (Platform Secure Boot) must be supported. See the System.Fundamentals.Firmware.CS.UEFISecureBoot.ConnectedStandby requirement in the [Windows Hardware Compatibility Specifications for Windows 10, version 1809 and Windows Server 2019 - Systems download](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2027110). You can find previous versions of the Windows Hardware Compatibility Program Specifications and Policies [here](/windows-hardware/design/compatibility/whcp-specifications-policies).
• The Hardware Security Test Interface (HSTI) 1.1.a must be implemented. See [Hardware Security Testability Specification](/windows-hardware/test/hlk/testref/hardware-security-testability-specification). | • Boot Integrity (Platform Secure Boot) from Power-On provides protections against physically present attackers, and defense-in-depth against malware.
• HSTI 1.1.a provides extra security assurance for correctly secured silicon and platform. | | Firmware: **Firmware Update through Windows Update** | Firmware must support field updates through Windows Update and UEFI encapsulation update. | Helps ensure that firmware updates are fast, secure, and reliable. | -| Firmware: **Securing Boot Configuration and Management** | • Required BIOS capabilities: Ability of OEM to add ISV, OEM, or Enterprise Certificate in Secure Boot DB at manufacturing time.
• Required configurations: Microsoft UEFI CA must be removed from Secure Boot DB. Support for 3rd-party UEFI modules is permitted but should leverage ISV-provided certificates or OEM certificate for the specific UEFI software.| • Enterprises can choose to allow proprietary EFI drivers/applications to run.
• Removing Microsoft UEFI CA from Secure Boot DB provides full control to enterprises over software that runs before the operating system boots. | +| Firmware: **Securing Boot Configuration and Management** | • Required BIOS capabilities: Ability of OEM to add ISV, OEM, or Enterprise Certificate in Secure Boot DB at manufacturing time.
• Required configurations: Microsoft UEFI CA must be removed from Secure Boot DB. Support for 3rd-party UEFI modules is permitted but should use ISV-provided certificates or OEM certificate for the specific UEFI software.| • Enterprises can choose to allow proprietary EFI drivers/applications to run.
• Removing Microsoft UEFI CA from Secure Boot DB provides full control to enterprises over software that runs before the operating system boots. |
-### Additional security qualifications starting with Windows 10, version 1703 +### More security qualifications starting with Windows 10, version 1703 | Protections for Improved Security | Description | Security benefits | |---------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|------| -| Firmware: **VBS enablement of NX protection for UEFI runtime services** | • VBS will enable No-Execute (NX) protection on UEFI runtime service code and data memory regions. UEFI runtime service code must support read-only page protections, and UEFI runtime service data must not be executable.
• UEFI runtime service must meet these requirements:
    • Implement UEFI 2.6 EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE. All UEFI runtime service memory (code and data) must be described by this table.
    • PE sections need to be page-aligned in memory (not required for in non-volitile storage).
    • The Memory Attributes Table needs to correctly mark code and data as RO/NX for configuration by the OS:
        • All entries must include attributes EFI_MEMORY_RO, EFI_MEMORY_XP, or both
        • No entries may be left with neither of the above attributes, indicating memory that is both executable and writable. Memory must be either readable and executable or writeable and non-executable.

Notes:
• This only applies to UEFI runtime service memory, and not UEFI boot service memory.
• This protection is applied by VBS on OS page tables.


Please also note the following:
• Do not use sections that are both writeable and executable
• Do not attempt to directly modify executable system memory
• Do not use dynamic code | • Vulnerabilities in UEFI runtime, if any, will be blocked from compromising VBS (such as in functions like UpdateCapsule and SetVariable)
• Reduces the attack surface to VBS from system firmware. | -| Firmware: **Firmware support for SMM protection** | The [Windows SMM Security Mitigations Table (WSMT) specification](https://download.microsoft.com/download/1/8/A/18A21244-EB67-4538-BAA2-1A54E0E490B6/WSMT.docx) contains details of an Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI) table that was created for use with Windows operating systems that support Windows virtualization-based security (VBS) features.| • Protects against potential vulnerabilities in UEFI runtime services, if any, will be blocked from compromising VBS (such as in functions like UpdateCapsule and SetVariable)
• Reduces the attack surface to VBS from system firmware.
• Blocks additional security attacks against SMM. | +| Firmware: **VBS enablement of NX protection for UEFI runtime services** | • VBS will enable No-Execute (NX) protection on UEFI runtime service code and data memory regions. UEFI runtime service code must support read-only page protections, and UEFI runtime service data must not be executable.
• UEFI runtime service must meet these requirements:
    • Implement UEFI 2.6 EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE. All UEFI runtime service memory (code and data) must be described by this table.
    • PE sections need to be page-aligned in memory (not required for in non-volitile storage).
    • The Memory Attributes Table needs to correctly mark code and data as RO/NX for configuration by the OS:
        • All entries must include attributes EFI_MEMORY_RO, EFI_MEMORY_XP, or both
        • No entries may be left with neither of the above attributes, indicating memory that is both executable and writable. Memory must be either readable and executable or writeable and non-executable.

Notes:
• This only applies to UEFI runtime service memory, and not UEFI boot service memory.
• This protection is applied by VBS on OS page tables.


Also note the following guidelines:
• Don't use sections that are both writeable and executable
• Don't attempt to directly modify executable system memory
• Don't use dynamic code | • Vulnerabilities in UEFI runtime, if any, will be blocked from compromising VBS (such as in functions like UpdateCapsule and SetVariable)
• Reduces the attack surface to VBS from system firmware. | +| Firmware: **Firmware support for SMM protection** | The [Windows SMM Security Mitigations Table (WSMT) specification](https://download.microsoft.com/download/1/8/A/18A21244-EB67-4538-BAA2-1A54E0E490B6/WSMT.docx) contains details of an Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI) table that was created for use with Windows operating systems that support Windows virtualization-based security (VBS) features.| • Protects against potential vulnerabilities in UEFI runtime services, if any, will be blocked from compromising VBS (such as in functions like UpdateCapsule and SetVariable)
• Reduces the attack surface to VBS from system firmware.
• Blocks other security attacks against SMM. | diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/get-support-for-security-baselines.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/get-support-for-security-baselines.md index 2159488c70..deb5111821 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/get-support-for-security-baselines.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/get-support-for-security-baselines.md @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec **What is the Microsoft Security Compliance Manager (SCM)?** -The Security Compliance Manager (SCM) is now retired and is no longer supported. The reason is that SCM was an incredibly complex and large program that needed to be updated for every Windows release. It has been replaced by the Security Compliance Toolkit (SCT). To provide a better service for our customers, we have moved to SCT with which we can publish baselines through the Microsoft Download Center in a lightweight .zip file that contains GPO backups, GPO reports, Excel spreadsheets, WMI filters, and scripts to apply the settings to local policy. +The Security Compliance Manager (SCM) is now retired and is no longer supported. The reason is that SCM was an incredibly complex and large program that needed to be updated for every Windows release. It has been replaced by the Security Compliance Toolkit (SCT). To provide a better service for our customers, we've moved to SCT with which we can publish baselines through the Microsoft Download Center in a lightweight .zip file that contains GPO backups, GPO reports, Excel spreadsheets, WMI filters, and scripts to apply the settings to local policy. More information about this change can be found on the [Microsoft Security Guidance blog](/archive/blogs/secguide/security-compliance-manager-scm-retired-new-tools-and-procedures). @@ -32,11 +32,11 @@ Any version of Windows baseline before Windows 10 1703 can still be downloaded u **What file formats are supported by the new SCT?** -The toolkit supports formats created by the Windows GPO backup feature (.pol, .inf, and .csv). Policy Analyzer saves its data in XML files with a .PolicyRules file extension. LGPO also supports its own LGPO text file format as a text-based analog for the binary registry.pol file format. See the LGPO documentation for more information. Keep in mind that SCM’s .cab files are no longer supported. +The toolkit supports formats created by the Windows GPO backup feature (.pol, .inf, and .csv). Policy Analyzer saves its data in XML files with a .PolicyRules file extension. LGPO also supports its own LGPO text file format as a text-based analog for the binary registry.pol file format. For more information, see the LGPO documentation. Keep in mind that SCMs' .cab files are no longer supported. **Does SCT support Desired State Configuration (DSC) file format?** -Not yet. PowerShell-based DSC is rapidly gaining popularity, and more DSC tools are coming online to convert GPOs and DSC and to validate system configuration. We are currently developing a tool to provide customers with these features. +Not yet. PowerShell-based DSC is rapidly gaining popularity, and more DSC tools are coming online to convert GPOs and DSC and to validate system configuration. We're currently developing a tool to provide customers with these features. **Does SCT support the creation of Microsoft Endpoint Manager DCM packs?** @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ No. A potential alternative is Desired State Configuration (DSC), a feature of t **Does SCT support the creation of Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP)-format policies?** -No. SCM supported only SCAP 1.0, which was not updated as SCAP evolved. The new toolkit likewise does not include SCAP support. +No. SCM supported only SCAP 1.0, which wasn't updated as SCAP evolved. The new toolkit likewise doesn't include SCAP support.
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/mbsa-removal-and-guidance.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/mbsa-removal-and-guidance.md index c8fafe64a7..b38ebe2069 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/mbsa-removal-and-guidance.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/mbsa-removal-and-guidance.md @@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec # What is Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer and its uses? -Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer (MBSA) is used to verify patch compliance. MBSA also performed several other security checks for Windows, IIS, and SQL Server. Unfortunately, the logic behind these additional checks had not been actively maintained since Windows XP and Windows Server 2003. Changes in the products since then rendered many of these security checks obsolete and some of their recommendations counterproductive. +Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer (MBSA) is used to verify patch compliance. MBSA also performed several other security checks for Windows, IIS, and SQL Server. Unfortunately, the logic behind these extra checks hadn't been actively maintained since Windows XP and Windows Server 2003. Changes in the products since then rendered many of these security checks obsolete and some of their recommendations counterproductive. -MBSA was largely used in situations where neither Microsoft Update nor a local WSUS or Configuration Manager server was available, or as a compliance tool to ensure that all security updates were deployed to a managed environment. While MBSA version 2.3 introduced support for Windows Server 2012 R2 and Windows 8.1, it has since been deprecated and no longer developed. MBSA 2.3 is not updated to fully support Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016. +MBSA was largely used in situations where Microsoft Update a local WSUS or Configuration Manager server wasn't available, or as a compliance tool to ensure that all security updates were deployed to a managed environment. While MBSA version 2.3 introduced support for Windows Server 2012 R2 and Windows 8.1, it has since been deprecated and no longer developed. MBSA 2.3 isn't updated to fully support Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016. > [!NOTE] > In accordance with our [SHA-1 deprecation initiative](https://aka.ms/sha1deprecation), the Wsusscn2.cab file is no longer dual-signed using both SHA-1 and the SHA-2 suite of hash algorithms (specifically SHA-256). This file is now signed using only SHA-256. Administrators who verify digital signatures on this file should now expect only single SHA-256 signatures. Starting with the August 2020 Wsusscn2.cab file, MBSA will return the following error "The catalog file is damaged or an invalid catalog." when attempting to scan using the offline scan file. @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ For example: [![PowerShell script.](images/powershell-example.png)](https://www.powershellgallery.com/packages/Scan-UpdatesOffline/1.0) The preceding scripts use the [WSUS offline scan file](https://support.microsoft.com/help/927745/detailed-information-for-developers-who-use-the-windows-update-offline) (wsusscn2.cab) to perform a scan and get the same information on missing updates as MBSA supplied. MBSA also relied on the wsusscn2.cab to determine which updates were missing from a given system without connecting to any online service or server. The wsusscn2.cab file is still available and there are currently no plans to remove or replace it. -The wsusscn2.cab file contains the metadata of only security updates, update rollups and service packs available from Microsoft Update; it does not contain any information on non-security updates, tools or drivers. +The wsusscn2.cab file contains the metadata of only security updates, update rollups and service packs available from Microsoft Update; it doesn't contain any information on non-security updates, tools or drivers. ## More Information diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/configure-md-app-guard.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/configure-md-app-guard.md index 99819da4d5..6e85b47920 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/configure-md-app-guard.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/configure-md-app-guard.md @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ ms.author: deniseb ms.date: 03/10/2022 ms.reviewer: manager: dansimp -ms.custom: asr +ms.custom: sasr ms.technology: windows-sec --- @@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ These settings, located at `Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Netw |Policy name|Supported versions|Description| |-----------|------------------|-----------| |Private network ranges for apps | At least Windows Server 2012, Windows 8, or Windows RT| A comma-separated list of IP address ranges that are in your corporate network. Included endpoints or endpoints that are included within a specified IP address range, are rendered using Microsoft Edge and won't be accessible from the Application Guard environment.| -|Enterprise resource domains hosted in the cloud| At least Windows Server 2012, Windows 8, or Windows RT|A pipe-separated (`|`) list of your domain cloud resources. Included endpoints are rendered using Microsoft Edge and won't be accessible from the Application Guard environment.

Note that this list supports the wildcards detailed in the [Network isolation settings wildcards](#network-isolation-settings-wildcards) table.| -|Domains categorized as both work and personal| At least Windows Server 2012, Windows 8, or Windows RT|A comma-separated list of domain names used as both work or personal resources. Included endpoints are rendered using Microsoft Edge and will be accessible from the Application Guard and regular Edge environment.

Note that this list supports the wildcards detailed in the [Network isolation settings wildcards](#network-isolation-settings-wildcards) table.| +|Enterprise resource domains hosted in the cloud| At least Windows Server 2012, Windows 8, or Windows RT|A pipe-separated (`|`) list of your domain cloud resources. Included endpoints are rendered using Microsoft Edge and won't be accessible from the Application Guard environment.

This list supports the wildcards detailed in the [Network isolation settings wildcards](#network-isolation-settings-wildcards) table.| +|Domains categorized as both work and personal| At least Windows Server 2012, Windows 8, or Windows RT|A comma-separated list of domain names used as both work or personal resources. Included endpoints are rendered using Microsoft Edge and will be accessible from the Application Guard and regular Edge environment.

This list supports the wildcards detailed in the [Network isolation settings wildcards](#network-isolation-settings-wildcards) table.| ## Network isolation settings wildcards @@ -54,18 +54,18 @@ These settings, located at `Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Wind |Name|Supported versions|Description|Options| |-----------|------------------|-----------|-------| |Configure Microsoft Defender Application Guard clipboard settings|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1709 or higher

Windows 10 Pro, 1803 or higher

Windows 11|Determines whether Application Guard can use the clipboard functionality.|**Enabled.** Turns On the clipboard functionality and lets you choose whether to additionally:
- Disable the clipboard functionality completely when Virtualization Security is enabled.
- Enable copying of certain content from Application Guard into Microsoft Edge.
- Enable copying of certain content from Microsoft Edge into Application Guard. **Important:** Allowing copied content to go from Microsoft Edge into Application Guard can cause potential security risks and isn't recommended.

**Disabled or not configured.** Completely turns Off the clipboard functionality for Application Guard.| -|Configure Microsoft Defender Application Guard print settings|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1709 or higher

Windows 10 Pro, 1803 or higher

Windows 11|Determines whether Application Guard can use the print functionality.|**Enabled.** Turns On the print functionality and lets you choose whether to additionally:
- Enable Application Guard to print into the XPS format.
- Enable Application Guard to print into the PDF format.
- Enable Application Guard to print to locally attached printers.
- Enable Application Guard to print from previously connected network printers. Employees can't search for additional printers.

**Disabled or not configured.** Completely turns Off the print functionality for Application Guard.| +|Configure Microsoft Defender Application Guard print settings|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1709 or higher

Windows 10 Pro, 1803 or higher

Windows 11|Determines whether Application Guard can use the print functionality.|**Enabled.** Turns On the print functionality and lets you choose whether to additionally:
- Enable Application Guard to print into the XPS format.
- Enable Application Guard to print into the PDF format.
- Enable Application Guard to print to locally attached printers.
- Enable Application Guard to print from previously connected network printers. Employees can't search for other printers.

**Disabled or not configured.** Completely turns Off the print functionality for Application Guard.| |Prevent enterprise websites from loading non-enterprise content in Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1709 or higher

Windows 11|Determines whether to allow Internet access for apps not included on the **Allowed Apps** list.|**Enabled.** Prevents network traffic from both Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge to non-enterprise sites that can't render in the Application Guard container.

**NOTE**: This action might also block assets cached by CDNs and references to analytics sites. Add them to the trusted enterprise resources to avoid broken pages.

**Disabled or not configured.** Prevents Microsoft Edge to render network traffic to non-enterprise sites that can't render in Application Guard. | |Allow Persistence|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1709 or higher

Windows 10 Pro, 1803 or higher

Windows 11|Determines whether data persists across different sessions in Microsoft Defender Application Guard.|**Enabled.** Application Guard saves user-downloaded files and other items (such as, cookies, Favorites, and so on) for use in future Application Guard sessions.

**Disabled or not configured.** All user data within Application Guard is reset between sessions.

**NOTE**: If you later decide to stop supporting data persistence for your employees, you can use our Windows-provided utility to reset the container and to discard any personal data.

**To reset the container:**
1. Open a command-line program and navigate to `Windows/System32`.
2. Type `wdagtool.exe cleanup`. The container environment is reset, retaining only the employee-generated data.
3. Type `wdagtool.exe cleanup RESET_PERSISTENCE_LAYER`. The container environment is reset, including discarding all employee-generated data.| -|Turn on Microsoft Defender Application Guard in Managed Mode|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1809 or higher

Windows 11|Determines whether to turn on Application Guard for Microsoft Edge and Microsoft Office.|**Enabled.** Turns on Application Guard for Microsoft Edge and/or Microsoft Office, honoring the network isolation settings, rendering non-enterprise domains in the Application Guard container. Be aware that Application Guard won't actually be turned on unless the required prerequisites and network isolation settings are already set on the device. Available options:
- Enable Microsoft Defender Application Guard only for Microsoft Edge
- Enable Microsoft Defender Application Guard only for Microsoft Office
- Enable Microsoft Defender Application Guard for both Microsoft Edge and Microsoft Office

**Disabled.** Turns off Application Guard, allowing all apps to run in Microsoft Edge and Microsoft Office.| -|Allow files to download to host operating system|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1803 or higher

Windows 11|Determines whether to save downloaded files to the host operating system from the Microsoft Defender Application Guard container.|**Enabled.** Allows users to save downloaded files from the Microsoft Defender Application Guard container to the host operating system. This action creates a share between the host and container that also allows for uploads from the host to the Application Guard container.

**Disabled or not configured.** Users are not able to save downloaded files from Application Guard to the host operating system.| -|Allow hardware-accelerated rendering for Microsoft Defender Application Guard|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1803 or higher

Windows 10 Pro, 1803 or higher

Windows 11|Determines whether Microsoft Defender Application Guard renders graphics using hardware or software acceleration.|**Enabled.** Microsoft Defender Application Guard uses Hyper-V to access supported, high-security rendering graphics hardware (GPUs). These GPUs improve rendering performance and battery life while using Microsoft Defender Application Guard, particularly for video playback and other graphics-intensive use cases. If this setting is enabled without connecting any high-security rendering graphics hardware, Microsoft Defender Application Guard will automatically revert to software-based (CPU) rendering. **Important:** Be aware that enabling this setting with potentially compromised graphics devices or drivers might pose a risk to the host device.

**Disabled or not configured.** Microsoft Defender Application Guard uses software-based (CPU) rendering and won’t load any third-party graphics drivers or interact with any connected graphics hardware.| -|Allow camera and microphone access in Microsoft Defender Application Guard|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1809 or higher

Windows 10 Pro, 1809 or higher

Windows 11|Determines whether to allow camera and microphone access inside Microsoft Defender Application Guard.|**Enabled.** Applications inside Microsoft Defender Application Guard are able to access the camera and microphone on the user's device. **Important:** Be aware that enabling this policy with a potentially compromised container could bypass camera and microphone permissions and access the camera and microphone without the user's knowledge.

**Disabled or not configured.** Applications inside Microsoft Defender Application Guard are unable to access the camera and microphone on the user's device.| -|Allow Microsoft Defender Application Guard to use Root Certificate Authorities from a user's device|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1809 or higher

Windows 10 Pro, 1809 or higher

Windows 11|Determines whether Root Certificates are shared with Microsoft Defender Application Guard.|**Enabled.** Certificates matching the specified thumbprint are transferred into the container. Use a comma to separate multiple certificates.

**Disabled or not configured.** Certificates are not shared with Microsoft Defender Application Guard.| +|Turn on Microsoft Defender Application Guard in Managed Mode|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1809 or higher

Windows 11|Determines whether to turn on Application Guard for Microsoft Edge and Microsoft Office.|**Enabled.** Turns on Application Guard for Microsoft Edge and/or Microsoft Office, honoring the network isolation settings, rendering non-enterprise domains in the Application Guard container. Application Guard won't actually be turned on unless the required prerequisites and network isolation settings are already set on the device. Available options:
- Enable Microsoft Defender Application Guard only for Microsoft Edge
- Enable Microsoft Defender Application Guard only for Microsoft Office
- Enable Microsoft Defender Application Guard for both Microsoft Edge and Microsoft Office

**Disabled.** Turns off Application Guard, allowing all apps to run in Microsoft Edge and Microsoft Office.| +|Allow files to download to host operating system|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1803 or higher

Windows 11|Determines whether to save downloaded files to the host operating system from the Microsoft Defender Application Guard container.|**Enabled.** Allows users to save downloaded files from the Microsoft Defender Application Guard container to the host operating system. This action creates a share between the host and container that also allows for uploads from the host to the Application Guard container.

**Disabled or not configured.** Users aren't able to save downloaded files from Application Guard to the host operating system.| +|Allow hardware-accelerated rendering for Microsoft Defender Application Guard|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1803 or higher

Windows 10 Pro, 1803 or higher

Windows 11|Determines whether Microsoft Defender Application Guard renders graphics using hardware or software acceleration.|**Enabled.** Microsoft Defender Application Guard uses Hyper-V to access supported, high-security rendering graphics hardware (GPUs). These GPUs improve rendering performance and battery life while using Microsoft Defender Application Guard, particularly for video playback and other graphics-intensive use cases. If this setting is enabled without connecting any high-security rendering graphics hardware, Microsoft Defender Application Guard will automatically revert to software-based (CPU) rendering. **Important:** Enabling this setting with potentially compromised graphics devices or drivers might pose a risk to the host device.

**Disabled or not configured.** Microsoft Defender Application Guard uses software-based (CPU) rendering and won’t load any third-party graphics drivers or interact with any connected graphics hardware.| +|Allow camera and microphone access in Microsoft Defender Application Guard|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1809 or higher

Windows 10 Pro, 1809 or higher

Windows 11|Determines whether to allow camera and microphone access inside Microsoft Defender Application Guard.|**Enabled.** Applications inside Microsoft Defender Application Guard are able to access the camera and microphone on the user's device. **Important:** Enabling this policy with a potentially compromised container could bypass camera and microphone permissions and access the camera and microphone without the user's knowledge.

**Disabled or not configured.** Applications inside Microsoft Defender Application Guard are unable to access the camera and microphone on the user's device.| +|Allow Microsoft Defender Application Guard to use Root Certificate Authorities from a user's device|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1809 or higher

Windows 10 Pro, 1809 or higher

Windows 11|Determines whether Root Certificates are shared with Microsoft Defender Application Guard.|**Enabled.** Certificates matching the specified thumbprint are transferred into the container. Use a comma to separate multiple certificates.

**Disabled or not configured.** Certificates aren't shared with Microsoft Defender Application Guard.| |Allow auditing events in Microsoft Defender Application Guard|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1809 or higher

Windows 10 Pro, 1809 or higher

Windows 11|This policy setting allows you to decide whether auditing events can be collected from Microsoft Defender Application Guard.|**Enabled.** Application Guard inherits auditing policies from your device and logs system events from the Application Guard container to your host.

**Disabled or not configured.** event logs aren't collected from your Application Guard container.| ## Application Guard support dialog settings -These settings are located at `Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Security\Enterprise Customization`. If an error is encountered, you are presented with a dialog box. By default, this dialog box only contains the error information and a button for you to report it to Microsoft via the feedback hub. However, it is possible to provide additional information in the dialog box. +These settings are located at `Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Security\Enterprise Customization`. If an error is encountered, you're presented with a dialog box. By default, this dialog box only contains the error information and a button for you to report it to Microsoft via the feedback hub. However, it's possible to provide additional information in the dialog box. [Use Group Policy to enable and customize contact information](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-security-center/wdsc-customize-contact-information#use-group-policy-to-enable-and-customize-contact-information). diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/faq-md-app-guard.yml b/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/faq-md-app-guard.yml index b641427ea4..a11ce82298 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/faq-md-app-guard.yml +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/faq-md-app-guard.yml @@ -41,16 +41,16 @@ sections: answer: | The manual or PAC server must be a hostname (not IP) that is neutral on the site-list. Additionally, if the PAC script returns a proxy, it must meet those same requirements. - To make sure the FQDNs (Fully Qualified Domain Names) for the “PAC file” and the “proxy servers the PAC file redirects to” are added as Neutral Resources in the Network Isolation policies used by Application Guard, you can: + To ensure the FQDNs (Fully Qualified Domain Names) for the “PAC file” and the “proxy servers the PAC file redirects to” are added as Neutral Resources in the Network Isolation policies used by Application Guard, you can: - - Verify this by going to edge://application-guard-internals/#utilities and entering the FQDN for the pac/proxy in the “check url trust” field and verifying that it says “Neutral”. + - Verify this addition by going to edge://application-guard-internals/#utilities and entering the FQDN for the pac/proxy in the “check url trust” field and verifying that it says “Neutral”. - It must be an FQDN. A simple IP address won't work. - Optionally, if possible, the IP addresses associated with the server hosting the above should be removed from the Enterprise IP Ranges in the Network Isolation policies used by Application Guard. - question: | How do I configure Microsoft Defender Application Guard to work with my network proxy (IP-Literal Addresses)? answer: | - Application Guard requires proxies to have a symbolic name, not just an IP address. IP-Literal proxy settings such as `192.168.1.4:81` can be annotated as `itproxy:81` or using a record such as `P19216810010` for a proxy with an IP address of `192.168.100.10`. This applies to Windows 10 Enterprise edition, version 1709 or higher. These would be for the proxy policies under Network Isolation in Group Policy or Intune. + Application Guard requires proxies to have a symbolic name, not just an IP address. IP-Literal proxy settings such as `192.168.1.4:81` can be annotated as `itproxy:81` or using a record such as `P19216810010` for a proxy with an IP address of `192.168.100.10`. This annotation applies to Windows 10 Enterprise edition, version 1709 or higher. These annotations would be for the proxy policies under Network Isolation in Group Policy or Intune. - question: | Which Input Method Editors (IME) in 19H1 aren't supported? @@ -73,19 +73,19 @@ sections: - question: | I enabled the hardware acceleration policy on my Windows 10 Enterprise, version 1803 deployment. Why are my users still only getting CPU rendering? answer: | - This feature is currently experimental only and isn't functional without an additional registry key provided by Microsoft. If you would like to evaluate this feature on a deployment of Windows 10 Enterprise, version 1803, contact Microsoft and we’ll work with you to enable the feature. + This feature is currently experimental only and isn't functional without an extra registry key provided by Microsoft. If you would like to evaluate this feature on a deployment of Windows 10 Enterprise, version 1803, contact Microsoft and we’ll work with you to enable the feature. - question: | What is the WDAGUtilityAccount local account? answer: | - WDAGUtilityAccount is part of Application Guard, beginning with Windows 10, version 1709 (Fall Creators Update). It remains disabled by default, unless Application Guard is enabled on your device. WDAGUtilityAccount is used to sign in to the Application Guard container as a standard user with a random password. It is NOT a malicious account. It requires *Logon as a service* permissions to be able to function correctly. If this permission is denied, you might see the following error: + WDAGUtilityAccount is part of Application Guard, beginning with Windows 10, version 1709 (Fall Creators Update). It remains disabled by default, unless Application Guard is enabled on your device. WDAGUtilityAccount is used to sign in to the Application Guard container as a standard user with a random password. It's NOT a malicious account. It requires *Logon as a service* permissions to be able to function correctly. If this permission is denied, you might see the following error: **Error: 0x80070569, Ext error: 0x00000001; RDP: Error: 0x00000000, Ext error: 0x00000000 Location: 0x00000000** - question: | How do I trust a subdomain in my site list? answer: | - To trust a subdomain, you must precede your domain with two dots (..). For example: `..contoso.com` ensures that `mail.contoso.com` or `news.contoso.com` are trusted. The first dot represents the strings for the subdomain name (mail or news), and the second dot recognizes the start of the domain name (`contoso.com`). This prevents sites such as `fakesitecontoso.com` from being trusted. + To trust a subdomain, you must precede your domain with two dots (..). For example: `..contoso.com` ensures that `mail.contoso.com` or `news.contoso.com` are trusted. The first dot represents the strings for the subdomain name (mail or news), and the second dot recognizes the start of the domain name (`contoso.com`). These two dots prevent sites such as `fakesitecontoso.com` from being trusted. - question: | Are there differences between using Application Guard on Windows Pro vs Windows Enterprise? @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ sections: - question: | Why am I getting the error message "ERR_NAME_NOT_RESOLVED" after not being able to reach the PAC file? answer: | - This is a known issue. To mitigate this you need to create two firewall rules. For information about creating a firewall rule by using Group Policy, see the following resources: + This issue is a known one. To mitigate this issue, you need to create two firewall rules. For information about creating a firewall rule by using Group Policy, see the following resources: - [Create an inbound icmp rule](../windows-firewall/create-an-inbound-icmp-rule.md) - [Open Group Policy management console for Microsoft Defender Firewall](../windows-firewall/open-the-group-policy-management-console-to-windows-firewall-with-advanced-security.md) @@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ sections: - Port 67 ### Second rule (DHCP Client) - This is the same as the first rule, but scoped to local port 68. In the Microsoft Defender Firewall user interface go through the following steps: + This rule is the same as the first rule, but scoped to local port 68. In the Microsoft Defender Firewall user interface go through the following steps: 1. Right-click on inbound rules, and then create a new rule. @@ -171,17 +171,17 @@ sections: - question: | How can I disable portions of ICS without breaking Application Guard? answer: | - ICS is enabled by default in Windows, and ICS must be enabled in order for Application Guard to function correctly. We do not recommend disabling ICS; however, you can disable ICS in part by using a Group Policy and editing registry keys. + ICS is enabled by default in Windows, and ICS must be enabled in order for Application Guard to function correctly. We don't recommend disabling ICS; however, you can disable ICS in part by using a Group Policy and editing registry keys. 1. In the Group Policy setting, **Prohibit use of Internet Connection Sharing on your DNS domain network**, set it to **Disabled**. 2. Disable IpNat.sys from ICS load as follows:
`System\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\DisableIpNat = 1` - 3. Configure ICS (SharedAccess) to enabled as follows:
+ 3. Configure ICS (SharedAccess) to be enabled as follows:
`HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Start = 3` - 4. (This is optional) Disable IPNAT as follows:
+ 4. (This step is optional) Disable IPNAT as follows:
`HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\IPNat\Start = 4` 5. Reboot the device. @@ -210,9 +210,9 @@ sections: - `{71a27cdd-812a-11d0-bec7-08002be2092f}` - question: | - I'm encountering TCP fragmentation issues, and cannot enable my VPN connection. How do I fix this? + I'm encountering TCP fragmentation issues, and can't enable my VPN connection. How do I fix this issue? answer: | - WinNAT drops ICMP/UDP messages with packets greater than MTU when using Default Switch or Docker NAT network. Support for this has been added in [KB4571744](https://www.catalog.update.microsoft.com/Search.aspx?q=4571744). To fix the issue, install the update and enable the fix by following these steps: + WinNAT drops ICMP/UDP messages with packets greater than MTU when using Default Switch or Docker NAT network. Support for this solution has been added in [KB4571744](https://www.catalog.update.microsoft.com/Search.aspx?q=4571744). To fix the issue, install the update and enable the fix by following these steps: 1. Ensure that the FragmentAware DWORD is set to 1 in this registry setting: `\Registry\Machine\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Winnat`. diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/reqs-md-app-guard.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/reqs-md-app-guard.md index d91da6e81c..ddf7e13d0d 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/reqs-md-app-guard.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/reqs-md-app-guard.md @@ -33,11 +33,11 @@ Your environment must have the following hardware to run Microsoft Defender Appl | Hardware | Description | |--------|-----------| -| 64-bit CPU|A 64-bit computer with minimum 4 cores (logical processors) is required for hypervisor and virtualization-based security (VBS). For more info about Hyper-V, see [Hyper-V on Windows Server 2016](/windows-server/virtualization/hyper-v/hyper-v-on-windows-server) or [Introduction to Hyper-V on Windows 10](/virtualization/hyper-v-on-windows/about/). For more info about hypervisor, see [Hypervisor Specifications](/virtualization/hyper-v-on-windows/reference/tlfs).| +| 64-bit CPU|A 64-bit computer with minimum four cores (logical processors) is required for hypervisor and virtualization-based security (VBS). For more info about Hyper-V, see [Hyper-V on Windows Server 2016](/windows-server/virtualization/hyper-v/hyper-v-on-windows-server) or [Introduction to Hyper-V on Windows 10](/virtualization/hyper-v-on-windows/about/). For more info about hypervisor, see [Hypervisor Specifications](/virtualization/hyper-v-on-windows/reference/tlfs).| | CPU virtualization extensions|Extended page tables, also called _Second Level Address Translation (SLAT)_

**AND**

One of the following virtualization extensions for VBS:
VT-x (Intel)
**OR**
AMD-V | -| Hardware memory | Microsoft requires a minimum of 8GB RAM | -| Hard disk | 5 GB free space, solid state disk (SSD) recommended | -| Input/Output Memory Management Unit (IOMMU) support| Not required, but strongly recommended | +| Hardware memory | Microsoft requires a minimum of 8-GB RAM | +| Hard disk | 5-GB free space, solid state disk (SSD) recommended | +| Input/Output Memory Management Unit (IOMMU) support| Not required, but recommended | ## Software requirements @@ -45,6 +45,6 @@ Your environment must have the following hardware to run Microsoft Defender Appl | Software | Description | |--------|-----------| -| Operating system | Windows 10 Enterprise edition, version 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Professional edition, version 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Professional for Workstations edition, version 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Professional Education edition, version 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Education edition, version 1809 or higher
Professional editions are only supported for non-managed devices; Intune or any other 3rd party mobile device management (MDM) solutions are not supported with MDAG for Professional editions.
Windows 11 | +| Operating system | Windows 10 Enterprise edition, version 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Professional edition, version 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Professional for Workstations edition, version 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Professional Education edition, version 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Education edition, version 1809 or higher
Professional editions are only supported for non-managed devices; Intune or any other third-party mobile device management (MDM) solutions aren't supported with MDAG for Professional editions.
Windows 11 | | Browser | Microsoft Edge | | Management system
(only for managed devices)| [Microsoft Intune](/intune/)

**OR**

[Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager](/configmgr/)

**OR**

[Group Policy](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/cc753298(v=ws.11))

**OR**

Your current, company-wide, non-Microsoft mobile device management (MDM) solution. For info about non-Mirosoft MDM solutions, see the documentation that came with your product. | diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/msft-security-dev-lifecycle.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/msft-security-dev-lifecycle.md index 9be071fa44..e6403fafa5 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/msft-security-dev-lifecycle.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/msft-security-dev-lifecycle.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- title: Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle -description: Download the Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle white paper which covers a security assurance process focused on software development. +description: Download the Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle white paper that covers a security assurance process focused on software development. ms.prod: m365-security author: dansimp ms.author: dansimp @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ The Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) is a security assurance process that is [:::image type="content" source="images/simplified-sdl.png" alt-text="Simplified secure development lifecycle":::](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/securityengineering/sdl) -Combining a holistic and practical approach, the SDL aims to reduce the number and severity of vulnerabilities in software. The SDL introduces security and privacy throughout all phases of the development process. +With the help of the combination of a holistic and practical approach, the SDL aims to reduce the number and severity of vulnerabilities in software. The SDL introduces security and privacy throughout all phases of the development process. The Microsoft SDL is based on three core concepts: - Education diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md index 681a9ae413..c19f67e476 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md @@ -22,14 +22,14 @@ Windows 10 includes Group Policy-configurable “Process Mitigation Options” t > [!IMPORTANT] > We recommend trying these mitigations in a test lab before deploying to your organization, to determine if they interfere with your organization’s required apps. -The Group Policy settings in this topic are related to three types of process mitigations. In Windows 10, all three types are on by default for 64-bit applications, but by using the Group Policy settings described in this topic, you can configure additional protections. The types of process mitigations are: +The Group Policy settings in this topic are related to three types of process mitigations. In Windows 10, all three types are on by default for 64-bit applications, but by using the Group Policy settings described in this topic, you can configure more protections. The types of process mitigations are: - **Data Execution Prevention (DEP)** is a system-level memory protection feature that enables the operating system to mark one or more pages of memory as non-executable, preventing code from being run from that region of memory, to help prevent exploitation of buffer overruns. DEP helps prevent code from being run from data pages such as the default heap, stacks, and memory pools. For more information, see [Data Execution Prevention](overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md#data-execution-prevention). -- **Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP)** is designed to block exploits that use the Structured Exception Handler (SEH) overwrite technique. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps to protect apps regardless of whether they have been compiled with the latest improvements. For more information, see [Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection](overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md#structured-exception-handling-overwrite-protection). +- **Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP)** is designed to block exploits that use the Structured Exception Handler (SEH) overwrite technique. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps to protect apps regardless of whether they've been compiled with the latest improvements. For more information, see [Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection](overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md#structured-exception-handling-overwrite-protection). - **Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)** loads DLLs into random memory addresses at boot time to mitigate against malware that’s designed to attack specific memory locations, where specific DLLs are expected to be loaded. For more information, see [Address Space Layout Randomization](overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md#address-space-layout-randomization). - To find additional ASLR protections in the table below, look for `IMAGES` or `ASLR`. + To find more ASLR protections in the table below, look for `IMAGES` or `ASLR`. The following procedure describes how to use Group Policy to override individual **Process Mitigation Options** settings. diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md index 436d94ab00..804ade53d1 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ This topic provides an overview of some of the software and firmware threats fac |--------------|-------------------------| | [The security threat landscape](#threat-landscape) | Describes the current nature of the security threat landscape, and outlines how Windows 10 is designed to mitigate software exploits and similar threats. | | [Windows 10 mitigations that you can configure](#windows-10-mitigations-that-you-can-configure) | Provides tables of configurable threat mitigations with links to more information. Product features such as Device Guard appear in [Table 1](#windows-10-mitigations-that-you-can-configure), and memory protection options such as Data Execution Prevention appear in [Table 2](#table-2). | -| [Mitigations that are built in to Windows 10](#mitigations-that-are-built-in-to-windows-10) | Provides descriptions of Windows 10 mitigations that require no configuration—they are built into the operating system. For example, heap protections and kernel pool protections are built into Windows 10. | +| [Mitigations that are built in to Windows 10](#mitigations-that-are-built-in-to-windows-10) | Provides descriptions of Windows 10 mitigations that require no configuration—they're built into the operating system. For example, heap protections and kernel pool protections are built into Windows 10. | | [Understanding Windows 10 in relation to the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit](#understanding-windows-10-in-relation-to-the-enhanced-mitigation-experience-toolkit) | Describes how mitigations in the [Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET)](https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=48240) correspond to features built into Windows 10 and how to convert EMET settings into mitigation policies for Windows 10. | This topic focuses on pre-breach mitigations aimed at device protection and threat resistance. These protections work with other security defenses in Windows 10, as shown in the following illustration: @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ Windows 10 mitigations that you can configure are listed in the following two ta | **Device Guard**
helps keep a device
from running malware or
other untrusted apps | Device Guard includes a Code Integrity policy that you create; an allowlist of trusted apps—the only apps allowed to run in your organization. Device Guard also includes a powerful system mitigation called hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI), which uses virtualization-based security (VBS) to protect Windows' kernel-mode code integrity validation process. HVCI has specific hardware requirements, and works with Code Integrity policies to help stop attacks even if they gain access to the kernel.
Device Guard is included in Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows Server 2016.

**More information**: [Introduction to Device Guard](/windows/device-security/device-guard/introduction-to-device-guard-virtualization-based-security-and-code-integrity-policies) | | **Microsoft Defender Antivirus**,
which helps keep devices
free of viruses and other
malware | Windows 10 includes Microsoft Defender Antivirus, a robust inbox anti-malware solution. Microsoft Defender Antivirus has been improved to a considerable extent since it was introduced in Windows 8.

**More information**: [Microsoft Defender Antivirus](#microsoft-defender-antivirus), later in this topic | | **Blocking of untrusted fonts**
helps prevent fonts
from being used in
elevation-of-privilege attacks | Block Untrusted Fonts is a setting that allows you to prevent users from loading fonts that are "untrusted" onto your network, which can mitigate elevation-of-privilege attacks associated with the parsing of font files. However, as of Windows 10, version 1703, this mitigation is less important, because font parsing is isolated in an [AppContainer sandbox](/windows/win32/secauthz/appcontainer-isolation) (for a list describing this and other kernel pool protections, see [Kernel pool protections](#kernel-pool-protections), later in this topic).

**More information**: [Block untrusted fonts in an enterprise](/windows/threat-protection/block-untrusted-fonts-in-enterprise) | -| **Memory protections**
help prevent malware
from using memory manipulation
techniques such as buffer
overruns | These mitigations, listed in [Table 2](#table-2), help to protect against memory-based attacks, where malware or other code manipulates memory to gain control of a system (for example, malware that attempts to use buffer overruns to inject malicious executable code into memory. Note:
A subset of apps will not be able to run if some of these mitigations are set to their most restrictive settings. Testing can help you maximize protection while still allowing these apps to run.

**More information**: [Table 2](#table-2), later in this topic | +| **Memory protections**
help prevent malware
from using memory manipulation
techniques such as buffer
overruns | These mitigations, listed in [Table 2](#table-2), help to protect against memory-based attacks, where malware or other code manipulates memory to gain control of a system (for example, malware that attempts to use buffer overruns to inject malicious executable code into memory. Note:
A subset of apps won't be able to run if some of these mitigations are set to their most restrictive settings. Testing can help you maximize protection while still allowing these apps to run.

**More information**: [Table 2](#table-2), later in this topic | | **UEFI Secure Boot**
helps protect
the platform from
boot kits and rootkits | Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Secure Boot is a security standard for firmware built in to PCs by manufacturers beginning with Windows 8. It helps to protect the boot process and firmware against tampering, such as from a physically present attacker or from forms of malware that run early in the boot process or in kernel after startup.

**More information**: [UEFI and Secure Boot](/windows/device-security/bitlocker/bitlocker-countermeasures#uefi-and-secure-boot) | | **Early Launch Antimalware (ELAM)**
helps protect
the platform from
rootkits disguised as drivers | Early Launch Antimalware (ELAM) is designed to enable the anti-malware solution to start before all non-Microsoft drivers and apps. If malware modifies a boot-related driver, ELAM will detect the change, and Windows will prevent the driver from starting, thus blocking driver-based rootkits.

**More information**: [Early Launch Antimalware](/windows/device-security/bitlocker/bitlocker-countermeasures#protection-during-startup) | | **Device Health Attestation**
helps prevent
compromised devices from
accessing an organization's
assets | Device Health Attestation (DHA) provides a way to confirm that devices attempting to connect to an organization's network are in a healthy state, not compromised with malware. When DHA has been configured, a device's actual boot data measurements can be checked against the expected "healthy" boot data. If the check indicates a device is unhealthy, the device can be prevented from accessing the network.

**More information**: [Control the health of Windows 10-based devices](/windows/device-security/protect-high-value-assets-by-controlling-the-health-of-windows-10-based-devices) and [Device Health Attestation](/windows-server/security/device-health-attestation) | @@ -73,8 +73,8 @@ As an IT professional, you can ask application developers and software vendors t | Mitigation and corresponding threat | Description | |---|---| -| **Data Execution Prevention (DEP)**
helps prevent
exploitation of buffer overruns | **Data Execution Prevention (DEP)** is a system-level memory protection feature available in Windows operating systems. DEP enables the operating system to mark one or more pages of memory as non-executable, which prevents code from being run from that region of memory, to help prevent exploitation of buffer overruns.
DEP helps prevent code from being run from data pages such as the default heap, stacks, and memory pools. Although some applications have compatibility problems with DEP, most applications do not.
**More information**: [Data Execution Prevention](#data-execution-prevention), later in this topic.

**Group Policy settings**: DEP is on by default for 64-bit applications, but you can configure more DEP protections by using the Group Policy settings described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). | -| **SEHOP**
helps prevent
overwrites of the
Structured Exception Handler | **Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP)** is designed to help block exploits that use the Structured Exception Handler (SEH) overwrite technique. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps to protect apps regardless of whether they have been compiled with the latest improvements. A few applications have compatibility problems with SEHOP, so be sure to test for your environment.
**More information**: [Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection](#structured-exception-handling-overwrite-protection), later in this topic.

**Group Policy setting**: SEHOP is on by default for 64-bit applications, but you can configure more SEHOP protections by using the Group Policy setting described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). | +| **Data Execution Prevention (DEP)**
helps prevent
exploitation of buffer overruns | **Data Execution Prevention (DEP)** is a system-level memory protection feature available in Windows operating systems. DEP enables the operating system to mark one or more pages of memory as non-executable, which prevents code from being run from that region of memory, to help prevent exploitation of buffer overruns.
DEP helps prevent code from being run from data pages such as the default heap, stacks, and memory pools. Although some applications have compatibility problems with DEP, most applications don't.
**More information**: [Data Execution Prevention](#data-execution-prevention), later in this topic.

**Group Policy settings**: DEP is on by default for 64-bit applications, but you can configure more DEP protections by using the Group Policy settings described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). | +| **SEHOP**
helps prevent
overwrites of the
Structured Exception Handler | **Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP)** is designed to help block exploits that use the Structured Exception Handler (SEH) overwrite technique. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps to protect apps regardless of whether they've been compiled with the latest improvements. A few applications have compatibility problems with SEHOP, so be sure to test for your environment.
**More information**: [Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection](#structured-exception-handling-overwrite-protection), later in this topic.

**Group Policy setting**: SEHOP is on by default for 64-bit applications, but you can configure more SEHOP protections by using the Group Policy setting described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). | | **ASLR**
helps mitigate malware
attacks based on
expected memory locations | **Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)** loads DLLs into random memory addresses at boot time. This loading - of specific DLLs -helps mitigate malware that's designed to attack specific memory locations.
**More information**: [Address Space Layout Randomization](#address-space-layout-randomization), later in this topic.

**Group Policy settings**: ASLR is on by default for 64-bit applications, but you can configure more ASLR protections by using the Group Policy settings described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). | ### Windows Defender SmartScreen @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ You can use Control Panel to view or change DEP settings. - **Turn on DEP for essential Windows programs and services only** - - **Turn on DEP for all programs and services except those I select**. If you choose this option, use the **Add** and **Remove** buttons to create the list of exceptions for which DEP will not be turned on. + - **Turn on DEP for all programs and services except those I select**. If you choose this option, use the **Add** and **Remove** buttons to create the list of exceptions for which DEP won't be turned on. #### To use Group Policy to control DEP settings @@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ You can use the Group Policy setting called **Process Mitigation Options** to co ### Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection -Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP) helps prevent attackers from being able to use malicious code to exploit the [Structured Exception Handling](/windows/win32/debug/structured-exception-handling) (SEH), which is integral to the system and allows (non-malicious) apps to handle exceptions appropriately. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps to protect applications regardless of whether they have been compiled with the latest improvements. +Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP) helps prevent attackers from being able to use malicious code to exploit the [Structured Exception Handling](/windows/win32/debug/structured-exception-handling) (SEH), which is integral to the system and allows (non-malicious) apps to handle exceptions appropriately. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps to protect applications regardless of whether they've been compiled with the latest improvements. You can use the Group Policy setting called **Process Mitigation Options** to control the SEHOP setting. A few applications have compatibility problems with SEHOP, so be sure to test for your environment. To use the Group Policy setting, see [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). @@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ You can use the Group Policy setting called **Process Mitigation Options** to co One of the most common techniques used to gain access to a system is to find a vulnerability in a privileged process that is already running, guess or find a location in memory where important system code and data have been placed, and then overwrite that information with a malicious payload. Any malware that could write directly to the system memory could overwrite it in well-known and predictable locations. -Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) makes that type of attack much more difficult because it randomizes how and where important data is stored in memory. With ASLR, it is more difficult for malware to find the specific location it needs to attack. Figure 3 illustrates how ASLR works by showing how the locations of different critical Windows components can change in memory between restarts. +Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) makes that type of attack much more difficult because it randomizes how and where important data is stored in memory. With ASLR, it's more difficult for malware to find the specific location it needs to attack. Figure 3 illustrates how ASLR works by showing how the locations of different critical Windows components can change in memory between restarts. :::image type="content" alt-text="ASLR at work." source="images/security-fig4-aslr.png" lightbox="images/security-fig4-aslr.png"::: @@ -175,9 +175,9 @@ You can use the Group Policy setting called **Process Mitigation Options** to co ## Mitigations that are built in to Windows 10 -Windows 10 provides many threat mitigations to protect against exploits that are built into the operating system and need no configuration within the operating system. The table that follows describes some of these mitigations. +Windows 10 provides many threat mitigations to protect against exploits that are built into the operating system and need no configuration within the operating system. The subsequent table describes some of these mitigations. -Control Flow Guard (CFG) is a mitigation that does not need configuration within the operating system, but does require an application developer to configure the mitigation into the application when it's compiled. CFG is built into Microsoft Edge, IE11, and other areas in Windows 10, and can be built into many other applications when they are compiled. +Control Flow Guard (CFG) is a mitigation that doesn't need configuration within the operating system, but does require an application developer to configure the mitigation into the application when it's compiled. CFG is built into Microsoft Edge, IE11, and other areas in Windows 10, and can be built into many other applications when they're compiled. ### Table 3   Windows 10 mitigations to protect against memory exploits – no configuration needed @@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ Control Flow Guard (CFG) is a mitigation that does not need configuration within | **Universal Windows apps protections**
screen downloadable
apps and run them in
an AppContainer sandbox | Universal Windows apps are carefully screened before being made available, and they run in an AppContainer sandbox with limited privileges and capabilities.

**More information**: [Universal Windows apps protections](#universal-windows-apps-protections), later in this topic. | | **Heap protections**
help prevent
exploitation of the heap | Windows 10 includes protections for the heap, such as the use of internal data structures that help protect against corruption of memory used by the heap.

**More information**: [Windows heap protections](#windows-heap-protections), later in this topic. | | **Kernel pool protections**
help prevent
exploitation of pool memory
used by the kernel | Windows 10 includes protections for the pool of memory used by the kernel. For example, safe unlinking protects against pool overruns that are combined with unlinking operations that can be used to create an attack.

**More information**: [Kernel pool protections](#kernel-pool-protections), later in this topic. | -| **Control Flow Guard**
helps mitigate exploits
based on
flow between code locations
in memory | Control Flow Guard (CFG) is a mitigation that requires no configuration within the operating system, but instead is built into software when it's compiled. It is built into Microsoft Edge, IE11, and other areas in Windows 10. CFG can be built into applications written in C or C++, or applications compiled using Visual Studio 2015.
For such an application, CFG can detect an attacker's attempt to change the intended flow of code. If this attempt occurs, CFG terminates the application. You can request software vendors to deliver Windows applications compiled with CFG enabled.

**More information**: [Control Flow Guard](#control-flow-guard), later in this topic. | +| **Control Flow Guard**
helps mitigate exploits
based on
flow between code locations
in memory | Control Flow Guard (CFG) is a mitigation that requires no configuration within the operating system, but instead is built into software when it's compiled. It's built into Microsoft Edge, IE11, and other areas in Windows 10. CFG can be built into applications written in C or C++, or applications compiled using Visual Studio 2015.
For such an application, CFG can detect an attacker's attempt to change the intended flow of code. If this attempt occurs, CFG terminates the application. You can request software vendors to deliver Windows applications compiled with CFG enabled.

**More information**: [Control Flow Guard](#control-flow-guard), later in this topic. | | **Protections built into Microsoft Edge** (the browser)
helps mitigate multiple
threats | Windows 10 includes an entirely new browser, Microsoft Edge, designed with multiple security improvements.

**More information**: [Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer 11](#microsoft-edge-and-internet-explorer11), later in this topic. | ### SMB hardening improvements for SYSVOL and NETLOGON shares @@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ With Protected Processes, Windows 10 prevents untrusted processes from interacti ### Universal Windows apps protections -When users download Universal Windows apps from the Microsoft Store, it's unlikely that they will encounter malware because all apps go through a careful screening process before being made available in the store. Apps that organizations build and distribute through sideloading processes will need to be reviewed internally to ensure that they meet organizational security requirements. +When users download Universal Windows apps from the Microsoft Store, it's unlikely that they'll encounter malware because all apps go through a careful screening process before being made available in the store. Apps that organizations build and distribute through sideloading processes will need to be reviewed internally to ensure that they meet organizational security requirements. Regardless of how users acquire Universal Windows apps, they can use them with increased confidence. Universal Windows apps run in an AppContainer sandbox with limited privileges and capabilities. For example, Universal Windows apps have no system-level access, have tightly controlled interactions with other apps, and have no access to data unless the user explicitly grants the application permission. @@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ Windows 10 has several important improvements to the security of the heap: ### Kernel pool protections -The operating system kernel in Windows sets aside two pools of memory, one which remains in physical memory ("nonpaged pool") and one that can be paged in and out of physical memory ("paged pool"). There are many mitigations that have been added over time, such as process quota pointer encoding; lookaside, delay free, and pool page cookies; and PoolIndex bounds checks. Windows 10 adds multiple "pool hardening" protections, such as integrity checks, that help protect the kernel pool against more advanced attacks. +The operating system kernel in Windows sets aside two pools of memory, one that remains in physical memory ("nonpaged pool") and one that can be paged in and out of physical memory ("paged pool"). There are many mitigations that have been added over time, such as process quota pointer encoding; lookaside, delay free, and pool page cookies; and PoolIndex bounds checks. Windows 10 adds multiple "pool hardening" protections, such as integrity checks, that help protect the kernel pool against more advanced attacks. In addition to pool hardening, Windows 10 includes other kernel hardening features: @@ -240,23 +240,23 @@ In addition to pool hardening, Windows 10 includes other kernel hardening featur - **Safe unlinking:** Helps protect against pool overruns that are combined with unlinking operations to create an attack. Windows 10 includes global safe unlinking, which extends heap and kernel pool safe unlinking to all usage of LIST\_ENTRY and includes the "FastFail" mechanism to enable rapid and safe process termination. -- **Memory reservations**: The lowest 64 KB of process memory is reserved for the system. Apps are not allowed to allocate that portion of the memory. This allocation for the system makes it more difficult for malware to use techniques such as "NULL dereference" to overwrite critical system data structures in memory. +- **Memory reservations**: The lowest 64 KB of process memory is reserved for the system. Apps aren't allowed to allocate that portion of the memory. This allocation for the system makes it more difficult for malware to use techniques such as "NULL dereference" to overwrite critical system data structures in memory. ### Control Flow Guard -When applications are loaded into memory, they are allocated space based on the size of the code, requested memory, and other factors. When an application begins to execute code, it calls the other code located in other memory addresses. The relationships between the code locations are well known—they are written in the code itself—but previous to Windows 10, the flow between these locations was not enforced, which gave attackers the opportunity to change the flow to meet their needs. +When applications are loaded into memory, they're allocated space based on the size of the code, requested memory, and other factors. When an application begins to execute code, it calls the other code located in other memory addresses. The relationships between the code locations are well known—they're written in the code itself—but previous to Windows 10, the flow between these locations wasn't enforced, which gave attackers the opportunity to change the flow to meet their needs. -This kind of threat is mitigated in Windows 10 through the Control Flow Guard (CFG) feature. When a trusted application that was compiled to use CFG calls code, CFG verifies that the code location called is trusted for execution. If the location is not trusted, the application is immediately terminated as a potential security risk. +This kind of threat is mitigated in Windows 10 through the Control Flow Guard (CFG) feature. When a trusted application that was compiled to use CFG calls code, CFG verifies that the code location called is trusted for execution. If the location isn't trusted, the application is immediately terminated as a potential security risk. -An administrator cannot configure CFG; rather, an application developer can take advantage of CFG by configuring it when the application is compiled. Consider asking application developers and software vendors to deliver trustworthy Windows applications compiled with CFG enabled. For example, it can be enabled for applications written in C or C++, or applications compiled using Visual Studio 2015. For information about enabling CFG for a Visual Studio 2015 project, see [Control Flow Guard](/windows/win32/secbp/control-flow-guard). +An administrator can't configure CFG; rather, an application developer can take advantage of CFG by configuring it when the application is compiled. Consider asking application developers and software vendors to deliver trustworthy Windows applications compiled with CFG enabled. For example, it can be enabled for applications written in C or C++, or applications compiled using Visual Studio 2015. For information about enabling CFG for a Visual Studio 2015 project, see [Control Flow Guard](/windows/win32/secbp/control-flow-guard). Browsers are a key entry point for attacks, so Microsoft Edge, IE, and other Windows features take full advantage of CFG. ### Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer 11 -Browser security is a critical component of any security strategy, and for good reason: the browser is the user's interface to the Internet, an environment with many malicious sites and content waiting to attack. Most users cannot perform at least part of their job without a browser, and many users are reliant on one. This reality has made the browser the common pathway from which malicious hackers initiate their attacks. +Browser security is a critical component of any security strategy, and for good reason: the browser is the user's interface to the Internet, an environment with many malicious sites and content waiting to attack. Most users can't perform at least part of their job without a browser, and many users are reliant on one. This reality has made the browser the common pathway from which malicious hackers initiate their attacks. -All browsers enable some amount of extensibility to do things beyond the original scope of the browser. Two common examples are Flash and Java extensions that enable their respective applications to run inside a browser. Keeping Windows 10 secure for web browsing and applications, especially for these two content types, is a priority. +All browsers enable some amount of extensibility to do things beyond the original scope of the browser. Two common examples are Flash and Java extensions that enable their respective applications to run inside a browser. The security of Windows 10 for the purposes of web browsing and applications, especially for these two content types, is a priority. Windows 10 includes an entirely new browser, Microsoft Edge. Microsoft Edge is more secure in multiple ways, especially: @@ -270,13 +270,13 @@ Windows 10 includes an entirely new browser, Microsoft Edge. Microsoft Edge is m - **Simplifies security configuration tasks.** Because Microsoft Edge uses a simplified application structure and a single sandbox configuration, there are fewer required security settings. In addition, Microsoft Edge default settings align with security best practices, making it more secure by default. -In addition to Microsoft Edge, Microsoft includes IE11 in Windows 10, primarily for backwards-compatibility with websites and with binary extensions that do not work with Microsoft Edge. You cannot configure it as the primary browser but rather as an optional or automatic switchover. We recommend using Microsoft Edge as the primary web browser because it provides compatibility with the modern web and the best possible security. +In addition to Microsoft Edge, Microsoft includes IE11 in Windows 10, primarily for backwards-compatibility with websites and with binary extensions that don't work with Microsoft Edge. You can't configure it as the primary browser but rather as an optional or automatic switchover. We recommend using Microsoft Edge as the primary web browser because it provides compatibility with the modern web and the best possible security. For sites that require IE11 compatibility, including those sites that require binary extensions and plug-ins, enable Enterprise mode and use the Enterprise Mode Site List to define which sites have the dependency. With this configuration, when Microsoft Edge identifies a site that requires IE11, users will automatically be switched to IE11. ### Functions that software vendors can use to build mitigations into apps -Some of the protections available in Windows 10 are provided through functions that can be called from apps or other software. Such software is less likely to provide openings for exploits. If you are working with a software vendor, you can request that they include these security-oriented functions in the application. The following table lists some types of mitigations and the corresponding security-oriented functions that can be used in apps. +Some of the protections available in Windows 10 are provided through functions that can be called from apps or other software. Such software is less likely to provide openings for exploits. If you're working with a software vendor, you can request that they include these security-oriented functions in the application. The following table lists some types of mitigations and the corresponding security-oriented functions that can be used in apps. > [!NOTE] > Control Flow Guard (CFG) is also an important mitigation that a developer can include in software when it is compiled. For more information, see [Control Flow Guard](#control-flow-guard), earlier in this topic. @@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ Some of the protections available in Windows 10 are provided through functions t ## Understanding Windows 10 in relation to the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit -You might already be familiar with the [Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET)](https://support.microsoft.com/topic/emet-mitigations-guidelines-b529d543-2a81-7b5a-d529-84b30e1ecee0), which has since 2009 offered various exploit mitigations, and an interface for configuring those mitigations. You can use this section to understand how EMET mitigations relate to those mitigations in Windows 10. Many of EMET's mitigations have been built into Windows 10, some with extra improvements. However, some EMET mitigations carry high-performance cost, or appear to be relatively ineffective against modern threats, and therefore have not been brought into Windows 10. +You might already be familiar with the [Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET)](https://support.microsoft.com/topic/emet-mitigations-guidelines-b529d543-2a81-7b5a-d529-84b30e1ecee0), which has since 2009 offered various exploit mitigations, and an interface for configuring those mitigations. You can use this section to understand how EMET mitigations relate to those mitigations in Windows 10. Many of EMET's mitigations have been built into Windows 10, some with extra improvements. However, some EMET mitigations carry high-performance cost, or appear to be relatively ineffective against modern threats, and therefore haven't been brought into Windows 10. Because many of EMET's mitigations and security mechanisms already exist in Windows 10 and have been improved, particularly the ones assessed to have high effectiveness at mitigating known bypasses, version 5.5*x* has been announced as the final major version release for EMET (see [Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit](https://web.archive.org/web/20170928073955/https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/security/jj653751)). @@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ The following table lists EMET features in relation to Windows 10 features. |

  • DEP
  • SEHOP
  • ASLR (Force ASLR, Bottom-up ASLR)|DEP, SEHOP, and ASLR are included in Windows 10 as configurable features. See [Table 2](#table-2), earlier in this topic.You can install the ProcessMitigations PowerShell module to convert your EMET settings for these features into policies that you can apply to Windows 10.| |
  • Load Library Check (LoadLib)
  • Memory Protection Check (MemProt)|LoadLib and MemProt are supported in Windows 10, for all applications that are written to use these functions. See [Table 4](#functions-that-software-vendors-can-use-to-build-mitigations-into-apps), earlier in this topic.| |Null Page|Mitigations for this threat are built into Windows 10, as described in the "Memory reservations" item in [Kernel pool protections](#kernel-pool-protections), earlier in this topic.| -|
  • Heap Spray
  • EAF
  • EAF+|Windows 10 does not include mitigations that map specifically to these EMET features because they have low impact in the current threat landscape, and do not significantly increase the difficulty of exploiting vulnerabilities. Microsoft remains committed to monitoring the security environment as new exploits appear and taking steps to harden the operating system against them.| +|
  • Heap Spray
  • EAF
  • EAF+|Windows 10 doesn't include mitigations that map specifically to these EMET features because they have low impact in the current threat landscape, and don't significantly increase the difficulty of exploiting vulnerabilities. Microsoft remains committed to monitoring the security environment as new exploits appear and taking steps to harden the operating system against them.| |
  • Caller Check
  • Simulate Execution Flow
  • Stack Pivot
  • Deep Hooks (an ROP "Advanced Mitigation")
  • Anti Detours (an ROP "Advanced Mitigation")
  • Banned Functions (an ROP "Advanced Mitigation")|Mitigated in Windows 10 with applications compiled with Control Flow Guard, as described in [Control Flow Guard](#control-flow-guard), earlier in this topic.| ### Converting an EMET XML settings file into Windows 10 mitigation policies diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/protect-high-value-assets-by-controlling-the-health-of-windows-10-based-devices.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/protect-high-value-assets-by-controlling-the-health-of-windows-10-based-devices.md index ed70e30816..36714ba7df 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/protect-high-value-assets-by-controlling-the-health-of-windows-10-based-devices.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/protect-high-value-assets-by-controlling-the-health-of-windows-10-based-devices.md @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Windows 10 is an important component of an end-to-end security solution that foc ## Description of a robust end-to-end security solution -Today’s computing threat landscape is increasing at a speed never encountered before. The sophistication of criminal attacks is growing, and there is no doubt that malware now targets both consumers and professionals in all industries. +Today’s computing threat landscape is increasing at a speed never encountered before. The sophistication of criminal attacks is growing, and there's no doubt that malware now targets both consumers and professionals in all industries. During recent years, one particular category of threat has become prevalent: advanced persistent threats (APTs). The term APT is commonly used to describe any attack that seems to target individual organizations on an on-going basis. In fact, this type of attack typically involves determined adversaries who may use any methods or techniques necessary. @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ The following figure shows a solution built to assess device health from the clo Windows devices can be protected from low-level rootkits and bootkits by using low-level hardware technologies such as Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Secure Boot. -Secure Boot is a firmware validation process that helps prevent rootkit attacks; it is part of the UEFI specification. The intent of UEFI is to define a standard way for the operating system to communicate with modern hardware, which can perform faster and with more efficient input/output (I/O) functions than older, software interrupt-driven BIOS systems. +Secure Boot is a firmware validation process that helps prevent rootkit attacks; it's part of the UEFI specification. The intent of UEFI is to define a standard way for the operating system to communicate with modern hardware, which can perform faster and with more efficient input/output (I/O) functions than older, software interrupt-driven BIOS systems. A device health attestation module can communicate measured boot data that is protected by a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to a remote service. After the device successfully boots, boot process measurement data is sent to a trusted cloud service (Health Attestation Service) using a more secure and tamper-resistant communication channel. @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ Windows 10 supports features to help prevent sophisticated low-level malware lik Windows 10 uses security characteristics of a TPM for measuring boot integrity sequence (and based on that, unlocking automatically BitLocker protected drives), for protecting credentials or for health attestation. - A TPM implements controls that meet the specification described by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG). At the time of this writing, there are two versions of TPM specification produced by TCG that are not compatible with each other: + A TPM implements controls that meet the specification described by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG). At the time of this writing, there are two versions of TPM specification produced by TCG that aren't compatible with each other: - The first TPM specification, version 1.2, was published in February 2005 by the TCG and standardized under ISO / IEC 11889 standard. - The latest TPM specification, referred to as TPM 2.0, was released in April 2014 and has been approved by the ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee (JTC) as ISO/IEC 11889:2015. @@ -149,15 +149,15 @@ Windows 10 supports features to help prevent sophisticated low-level malware lik The most basic protection is the Secure Boot feature, which is a standard part of the UEFI 2.2+ architecture. On a PC with conventional BIOS, anyone who can take control of the boot process can boot by using an alternative OS loader, and potentially gain access to system resources. When Secure Boot is enabled, you can boot using only an OS loader that’s signed using a certificate stored in the UEFI Secure Boot DB. Naturally, the Microsoft certificate used to digitally sign the Windows 10 OS loaders are in that store, which allows UEFI to validate the certificate as part of its security policy. Secure Boot must be enabled by default on all computers that are certified for Windows 10 under the Windows Hardware Compatibility Program. Secure Boot is a UEFI firmware-based feature, which allows for the signing and verification of critical boot files and drivers at boot time. Secure Boot checks signature values of the Windows Boot Manager, BCD store, Windows OS loader file, and other boot critical DLLs at boot time before the system is allowed to fully boot into a usable operating system by using policies that are defined by the OEM at build time. Secure Boot prevents many types of boot-based rootkit, malware, and other security-related attacks against the Windows platform. Secure Boot protects the operating system boot process whether booting from local hard disk, USB, PXE, or DVD, or into full Windows or Windows Recovery Environment (RE). - Secure Boot protects the boot environment of a Windows 10 installation by verifying the signatures of the critical boot components to confirm malicious activity did not compromise them. Secure Boot protection ends after the Windows kernel file (ntoskrnl.exe) has been loaded. + Secure Boot protects the boot environment of a Windows 10 installation by verifying the signatures of the critical boot components to confirm malicious activity didn't compromise them. Secure Boot protection ends after the Windows kernel file (ntoskrnl.exe) has been loaded. > [!NOTE] > Secure Boot protects the platform until the Windows kernel is loaded. Then protections like ELAM take over. - **Secure Boot configuration policy.** Extends Secure Boot functionality to critical Windows 10 configuration. - Examples of protected configuration information include protecting Disable Execute bit (NX option) or ensuring that the test signing policy (code integrity) cannot be enabled. This protective action ensures that the binaries and configuration of the computer can be trusted after the boot process has completed. - Secure Boot configuration policy does this with UEFI policy. These signatures for these policies are signed in the same way that operating system binaries are signed for use with Secure Boot. + Examples of protected configuration information include protecting Disable Execute bit (NX option) or ensuring that the test signing policy (code integrity) can't be enabled. This protective action ensures that the binaries and configuration of the computer can be trusted after the boot process has completed. + Secure Boot configuration policy does this protective action with UEFI policy. These signatures for these policies are signed in the same way that operating system binaries are signed for use with Secure Boot. The Secure Boot configuration policy must be signed by a private key that corresponds to one of the public keys stored in the Key Exchange Key (KEK) list. The Microsoft Certificate Authority (CA) will be present in the KEK list of all Windows certified Secure Boot systems. By default, a policy signed by the Microsoft KEK shall be work on all Secure Boot systems. BootMgr must verify the signature against the KEK list before applying a signed policy. With Windows 10, the default Secure Boot configuration policy is embedded in bootmgr. @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ Windows 10 supports features to help prevent sophisticated low-level malware lik - **Early Launch Antimalware (ELAM).** ELAM tests all drivers before they load and prevents unapproved drivers from loading. - Traditional antimalware apps don’t start until after the boot drivers have been loaded, which gives a rootkit that is disguised as a driver the opportunity to work. ELAM is a Windows mechanism introduced in a previous version of Windows that allows antimalware software to run very early in the boot sequence. Thus, the antimalware component is the first third-party component to run and control the initialization of other boot drivers until the Windows operating system is operational. When the system is started with a complete runtime environment (network access, storage, and so on), then a full-featured antimalware is loaded. + Traditional antimalware apps don’t start until after the boot drivers have been loaded, which gives a rootkit that is disguised as a driver the opportunity to work. ELAM is a Windows mechanism introduced in a previous version of Windows that allows antimalware software to run early in the boot sequence. Thus, the antimalware component is the first third-party component to run and control the initialization of other boot drivers until the Windows operating system is operational. When the system is started with a complete runtime environment (network access, storage, and so on), then a full-featured antimalware is loaded. ELAM can load a Microsoft or non-Microsoft antimalware driver before all non-Microsoft boot drivers and applications, thus continuing the chain of trust established by Secure Boot and Trusted Boot. Because the operating system hasn’t started yet, and because Windows needs to boot as quickly as possible, ELAM has a simple task: Examine every boot driver and determine whether it is on the list of trusted drivers. If it’s not trusted, Windows won’t load it. @@ -174,8 +174,8 @@ Windows 10 supports features to help prevent sophisticated low-level malware lik The ELAM signed driver is loaded before any other third-party drivers or applications, which allows the antimalware software to detect and block any attempts to tamper with the boot process by trying to load unsigned or untrusted code. - The ELAM driver is a small driver with a small policy database that has a very narrow scope, focused on drivers that are loaded early at system launch. The policy database is stored in a registry hive that is also measured to the TPM, to record the operational parameters of the ELAM driver. An ELAM driver must be signed by Microsoft and the associated certificate must contain the complementary EKU (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.61.4.1). -- **Virtualization-based security (Hyper-V + Secure Kernel).** Virtualization-based security is a completely new enforced security boundary that allows you to protect critical parts of Windows 10. + The ELAM driver is a small driver with a small policy database that has a narrow scope, focused on drivers that are loaded early at system launch. The policy database is stored in a registry hive that is also measured to the TPM, to record the operational parameters of the ELAM driver. An ELAM driver must be signed by Microsoft and the associated certificate must contain the complementary EKU (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.61.4.1). +- **Virtualization-based security (Hyper-V + Secure Kernel).** Virtualization-based security is a new enforced security boundary that allows you to protect critical parts of Windows 10. Virtualization-based security isolates sensitive code like Kernel Mode Code Integrity or sensitive corporate domain credentials from the rest of the Windows operating system. For more information, see [Virtualization-based security](#virtual) section. @@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ Windows 10 supports features to help prevent sophisticated low-level malware lik When enabled and configured, Windows 10 can start the Hyper-V virtualization-based security services. HVCI helps protect the system core (kernel), privileged drivers, and system defenses, like antimalware solutions, by preventing malware from running early in the boot process, or after startup. - HVCI uses virtualization-based security to isolate Code Integrity, the only way kernel memory can become executable is through a Code Integrity verification. This dependency on verification means that kernel memory pages can never be Writable and Executable (W+X) and executable code cannot be directly modified. + HVCI uses virtualization-based security to isolate Code Integrity, the only way kernel memory can become executable is through a Code Integrity verification. This dependency on verification means that kernel memory pages can never be Writable and Executable (W+X) and executable code can't be directly modified. > [!NOTE] > Device Guard devices that run Kernel Mode Code Integrity with virtualization-based security must have compatible drivers. For additional information, please read the [Driver compatibility with Device Guard in Windows 10](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkId=691612) blog post. @@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ Windows 10 supports features to help prevent sophisticated low-level malware lik - **Health attestation.** The device’s firmware logs the boot process, and Windows 10 can send it to a trusted server that can check and assess the device’s health. - Windows 10 takes measurements of the UEFI firmware and each of the Windows and antimalware components are made as they load during the boot process. Additionally, they are taken and measured sequentially, not all at once. When these measurements are complete, their values are digitally signed and stored securely in the TPM and cannot be changed unless the system is reset. + Windows 10 takes measurements of the UEFI firmware and each of the Windows and antimalware components are made as they load during the boot process. Additionally, they're taken and measured sequentially, not all at once. When these measurements are complete, their values are digitally signed and stored securely in the TPM and can't be changed unless the system is reset. For more information, see [Secured Boot and Measured Boot: Hardening Early Boot Components Against Malware](/previous-versions/windows/hardware/design/dn653311(v=vs.85)). @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ The following Windows 10 services are protected with virtualization-based securi - **Credential Guard** (LSA Credential Isolation): prevents pass-the-hash attacks and enterprise credential theft that happens by reading and dumping the content of lsass memory - **Device Guard** (Hyper-V Code Integrity): Device Guard uses the new virtualization-based security in Windows 10 to isolate the Code Integrity service from the Windows kernel itself, which lets the service use signatures defined by your enterprise-controlled policy to help determine what is trustworthy. In effect, the Code Integrity service runs alongside the kernel in a Windows hypervisor-protected container. -- **Other isolated services**: for example, on Windows Server 2016, there is the vTPM feature that allows you to have encrypted virtual machines (VMs) on servers. +- **Other isolated services**: for example, on Windows Server 2016, there's the vTPM feature that allows you to have encrypted virtual machines (VMs) on servers. > [!NOTE] > Virtualization-based security is only available with Windows 10 Enterprise. Virtualization-based security requires devices with UEFI (2.3.1 or higher) with Secure Boot enabled, x64 processor with Virtualization Extensions and SLAT enabled. IOMMU, TPM 2.0. and support for Secure Memory overwritten are optional, but recommended. @@ -234,18 +234,18 @@ remote machines, which mitigates many PtH-style attacks. Credential Guard helps protect credentials by encrypting them with either a per-boot or persistent key: -- **The per-boot key** is used for any in-memory credentials that do not require persistence. An example of such a credential would be a ticket-granting ticket (TGT) session key. This key is negotiated with a Key Distribution Center (KDC) every time authentication occurs and is protected with a per-boot key. +- **The per-boot key** is used for any in-memory credentials that don't require persistence. An example of such a credential would be a ticket-granting ticket (TGT) session key. This key is negotiated with a Key Distribution Center (KDC) every time authentication occurs and is protected with a per-boot key. - **The persistent key**, or some derivative, is used to help protect items that are stored and reloaded after a reboot. Such protection is intended for long-term storage, and must be protected with a consistent key. Credential Guard is activated by a registry key and then enabled by using a UEFI variable. This activation is done to protect against remote modifications of the configuration. The use of a UEFI variable implies that physical access is required to change the configuration. When lsass.exe detects that credential isolation is enabled, it then spawns LsaIso.exe as an isolated process, which ensures that it runs within isolated user mode. The startup of LsaIso.exe is performed before initialization of a security support provider, which ensures that the secure mode support routines are ready before any authentication begins. ### Device Guard -Device Guard is a new feature of Windows 10 Enterprise that allows organizations to lock down a device to help protect it from running untrusted software. In this configuration, the only applications allowed to run are those that are trusted by the organization. +Device Guard is a new feature of Windows 10 Enterprise that allows organizations to lock down a device to help protect it from running untrusted software. In this configuration, the only applications allowed to run are those applications that are trusted by the organization. The trust decision to execute code is performed by using Hyper-V Code Integrity, which runs in virtualization-based security, a Hyper-V protected container that runs alongside regular Windows. -Hyper-V Code Integrity is a feature that validates the integrity of a driver or system file each time it is loaded into memory. Code integrity detects whether an unsigned driver or system file is being loaded into the kernel, or whether a system file has been modified by malicious software that is being run by a user account with Administrator privileges. On x64-based versions of Windows 10 kernel-mode drivers must be digitally signed. +Hyper-V Code Integrity is a feature that validates the integrity of a driver or system file each time it's loaded into memory. Code integrity detects whether an unsigned driver or system file is being loaded into the kernel, or whether a system file has been modified by malicious software that is being run by a user account with Administrator privileges. On x64-based versions of Windows 10, kernel-mode drivers must be digitally signed. > [!NOTE] > Independently of activation of Device Guard Policy, [Windows 10 by default raises the bar for what runs in the kernel](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkId=691613). Windows 10 drivers must be signed by Microsoft, and more specifically, by the WHQL (Windows Hardware Quality Labs) portal. Additionally, starting in October 2015, the WHQL portal will only accept driver submissions, including both kernel and user mode driver submissions, that have a valid Extended Validation (“EV”) Code Signing Certificate. @@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ Device Guard needs to be planned and configured to be truly effective. It isn't There are three different parts that make up the Device Guard solution in Windows 10: - The first part is a base **set of hardware security features** introduced with the previous version of Windows. TPM for hardware cryptographic operations and UEFI with modern firmware, along with Secure Boot, allows you to control what the device is running when the systems start. -- After the hardware security feature, there is the code integrity engine. In Windows 10, **Code Integrity is now fully configurable** and now resides in Isolated user mode, a part of the memory that is protected by virtualization-based security. +- After the hardware security feature, there's the code integrity engine. In Windows 10, **Code Integrity is now fully configurable** and now resides in Isolated user mode, a part of the memory that is protected by virtualization-based security. - The last part of Device Guard is **manageability**. Code Integrity configuration is exposed through specific Group Policy Objects, PowerShell cmdlets, and MDM configuration service providers (CSPs). For more information on how to deploy Device Guard in an enterprise, see the [Device Guard deployment guide](/windows/device-security/device-guard/device-guard-deployment-guide). @@ -280,9 +280,9 @@ SAWs are computers that are built to help significantly reduce the risk of compr To protect high-value assets, SAWs are used to make secure connections to those assets. -Similarly, on corporate fully-managed workstations, where applications are installed by using a distribution tool like Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager, Intune, or any third-party device management, then Device Guard is applicable. In that type of scenario, the organization has a good idea of the software that an average user is running. +Similarly, on corporate fully managed workstations, where applications are installed by using a distribution tool like Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager, Intune, or any third-party device management, then Device Guard is applicable. In that type of scenario, the organization has a good idea of the software that an average user is running. -It could be challenging to use Device Guard on corporate, lightly-managed workstations where the user is typically allowed to install software on their own. When an organization offers great flexibility, it’s difficult to run Device Guard in enforcement mode. Nevertheless, Device Guard can be run in Audit mode, and in that case, the event log will contain a record of any binaries that violated the Device Guard policy. When Device Guard is used in Audit mode, organizations can get rich data about drivers and applications that users install and run. +It could be challenging to use Device Guard on corporate, lightly managed workstations where the user is typically allowed to install software on their own. When an organization offers great flexibility, it’s difficult to run Device Guard in enforcement mode. Nevertheless, Device Guard can be run in Audit mode, and in that case, the event log will contain a record of any binaries that violated the Device Guard policy. When Device Guard is used in Audit mode, organizations can get rich data about drivers and applications that users install and run. Before you can benefit from the protection included in Device Guard, Code Integrity policy must be created by using tools provided by Microsoft, but the policy can be deployed with common management tools, like Group Policy. The Code Integrity policy is a binary-encoded XML document that includes configuration settings for both the User and Kernel-modes of Windows 10, along with restrictions on Windows 10 script hosts. Device Guard Code Integrity policy restricts what code can run on a device. @@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ Before you can benefit from the protection included in Device Guard, Code Integr Signed Device Guard policy offers stronger protection against a malicious local administrator trying to defeat Device Guard. -When the policy is signed, the GUID of the policy is stored in a UEFI pre-OS secure variable which offers tampering protection. The only way to update the Device Guard policy subsequently is to provide a new version of the policy signed by the same signer or from a signer specified as part of the +When the policy is signed, the GUID of the policy is stored in a UEFI pre-OS secure variable that offers tampering protection. The only way to update the Device Guard policy later is to provide a new version of the policy signed by the same signer or from a signer specified as part of the Device Guard policy into the UpdateSigner section. ### The importance of signing applications @@ -301,13 +301,13 @@ On computers with Device Guard, Microsoft proposes to move from a world where un With Windows 10, organizations will make line-of-business (LOB) apps available to members of the organization through the Microsoft Store infrastructure. More specifically, LOB apps will be available in a private store within the public Microsoft Store. Microsoft Store signs and distributes Universal Windows apps and Classic Windows apps. All apps downloaded from the Microsoft Store are signed. -In organizations today, many LOB applications are unsigned. Code signing is frequently viewed as a tough problem to solve for a variety of reasons, like the lack of code signing expertise. Even if code signing is a best practice, a lot of internal applications are not signed. +In organizations today, many LOB applications are unsigned. Code signing is frequently viewed as a tough problem to solve for various reasons, like the lack of code signing expertise. Even if code signing is a best practice, many internal applications aren't signed. -Windows 10 includes tools that allow IT pros to take applications that have been already packaged and run them through a process to create additional signatures that can be distributed along with existing applications. +Windows 10 includes tools that allow IT pros to take applications that have been already packaged and run them through a process to create more signatures that can be distributed along with existing applications. ### Why are antimalware and device management solutions still necessary? -Although allow-list mechanisms are efficient at ensuring that only trusted applications can be run, they cannot prevent the compromise of a trusted (but vulnerable) application by malicious content designed to exploit a known vulnerability. Device Guard doesn’t protect against user mode malicious code run by exploiting vulnerabilities. +Although allowlist mechanisms are efficient at ensuring that only trusted applications can be run, they can't prevent the compromise of a trusted (but vulnerable) application by malicious content designed to exploit a known vulnerability. Device Guard doesn’t protect against user mode malicious code run by exploiting vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities are weaknesses in software that could allow an attacker to compromise the integrity, availability, or confidentiality of the device. Some of the worst vulnerabilities allow attackers to exploit the compromised device by causing it to run malicious code without the user’s knowledge. @@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ MDM solutions are becoming prevalent as a light-weight device management technol ### Device health attestation -Device health attestation leverages the TPM to provide cryptographically strong and verifiable measurements of the chain of software used to boot the device. +Device health attestation uses the TPM to provide cryptographically strong and verifiable measurements of the chain of software used to boot the device. For Windows 10-based devices, Microsoft introduces a new public API that will allow MDM software to access a remote attestation service called Windows Health Attestation Service. A health attestation result, in addition with other elements, can be used to allow or deny access to networks, apps, or services, based on whether devices prove to be healthy. @@ -335,21 +335,21 @@ The following table details the hardware requirements for both virtualization-ba |--- |--- | |UEFI 2.3.1 or later firmware with Secure Boot enabled|Required to support UEFI Secure Boot.

    UEFI Secure Boot ensures that the device boots only authorized code.

    Additionally, Boot Integrity (Platform Secure Boot) must be supported following the requirements in Hardware Compatibility Specification for Systems for Windows 10 under the subsection: “System.Fundamentals.Firmware.CS.UEFISecureBoot.ConnectedStandby”| |Virtualization extensions, such as Intel VT-x, AMD-V, and SLAT must be enabled|Required to support virtualization-based security.

    **Note:** Device Guard can be enabled without using virtualization-based security.
    | -|X64 processor|Required to support virtualization-based security that uses Windows Hypervisor. Hyper-V is supported only on x64 processor (and not on x86).

    Direct Memory Access (DMA) protection can be enabled to provide additional memory protection but requires processors to include DMA protection technologies.| +|X64 processor|Required to support virtualization-based security that uses Windows Hypervisor. Hyper-V is supported only on x64 processor (and not on x86).

    Direct Memory Access (DMA) protection can be enabled to provide extra memory protection but requires processors to include DMA protection technologies.| |IOMMU, such as Intel VT-d, AMD-Vi|Support for the IOMMU in Windows 10 enhances system resiliency against DMA attacks.| -|Trusted Platform Module (TPM)|Required to support health attestation and necessary for additional key protections for virtualization-based security. TPM 2.0 is supported. Support for TPM 1.2 was added beginning in Windows 10, version 1607 (RS1)| +|Trusted Platform Module (TPM)|Required to support health attestation and necessary for other key protections for virtualization-based security. TPM 2.0 is supported. Support for TPM 1.2 was added beginning in Windows 10, version 1607 (RS1)| -This section presented information about several closely related controls in Windows 10. The multi-layer defenses and in-depth approach helps to eradicate low-level malware during boot sequence. Virtualization-based security is a fundamental operating system architecture change that adds a new security boundary. Device Guard and Credential Guard respectively help to block untrusted code and protect corporate domain credentials from theft and reuse. This section also briefly discussed the importance of managing devices and patching vulnerabilities. All these technologies can be used to harden and lock down devices while limiting the risk of attackers compromising them. +This section presented information about several closely related controls in Windows 10. The multi-layer defenses and in-depth approach help to eradicate low-level malware during boot sequence. Virtualization-based security is a fundamental operating system architecture change that adds a new security boundary. Device Guard and Credential Guard respectively help to block untrusted code and protect corporate domain credentials from theft and reuse. This section also briefly discussed the importance of managing devices and patching vulnerabilities. All these technologies can be used to harden and lock down devices while limiting the risk of attackers compromising them. ## Detect an unhealthy Windows 10-based device -As of today, many organizations only consider devices to be compliant with company policy after they’ve passed a variety of checks that show, for example, that the operating system is in the correct state, properly configured, and has security protection enabled. Unfortunately, with today’s systems, this form of reporting isn't entirely reliable because malware can spoof a software statement about system health. A rootkit, or a similar low-level exploit, can report a false healthy state to traditional compliance tools. +As of today, many organizations only consider devices to be compliant with company policy after they’ve passed various checks that show, for example, that the operating system is in the correct state, properly configured, and has security protection enabled. Unfortunately, with today’s systems, this form of reporting isn't entirely reliable because malware can spoof a software statement about system health. A rootkit, or a similar low-level exploit, can report a false healthy state to traditional compliance tools. The biggest challenge with rootkits is that they can be undetectable to the client. Because they start before antimalware, and they have system-level privileges, they can completely disguise themselves while continuing to access system resources. As a result, traditional computers infected with rootkits appear to be healthy, even with antimalware running. -As previously discussed, the health attestation feature of Windows 10 uses the TPM hardware component to securely record a measurement of every boot-related component, including firmware, Windows 10 kernel, and even early boot drivers. Because, health attestation leverages the hardware-based security capabilities of TPM, the log of all boot measured components remains out of the reach of any malware. +As previously discussed, the health attestation feature of Windows 10 uses the TPM hardware component to securely record a measurement of every boot-related component, including firmware, Windows 10 kernel, and even early boot drivers. Because health attestation uses the hardware-based security capabilities of TPM, the log of all boot measured components remains out of the reach of any malware. -By attesting a trusted boot state, devices can prove that they are not running low-level malware that could spoof later compliance checks. TPM-based health attestation provides a reliable anchor of trust for assets that contain high-value data. +After the devices attest a trusted boot state, they can prove that they aren't running low-level malware that could spoof later compliance checks. TPM-based health attestation provides a reliable anchor of trust for assets that contain high-value data. ### What is the concept of device health? @@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ However, the use of traditional malware prevention technologies like antimalware The definition of device compliance will vary based on an organization’s installed antimalware, device configuration settings, patch management baseline, and other security requirements. But health of the device is part of the overall device compliance policy. -The health of the device isn't binary and depends on the organization’s security implementation. The Health Attestation Service provides information back to the MDM on which security features are enabled during the boot of the device by leveraging trustworthy hardware TPM. +The health of the device isn't binary and depends on the organization’s security implementation. The Health Attestation Service provides information back to the MDM on which security features are enabled during the boot of the device by using trustworthy hardware TPM. But health attestation only provides information, which is why an MDM solution is needed to take and enforce a decision. @@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ But health attestation only provides information, which is why an MDM solution i In Windows 10, health attestation refers to a feature where Measured Boot data generated during the boot process is sent to a remote device health attestation service operated by Microsoft. -This is the most secure approach available for Windows 10-based devices to detect when security defenses are down. During the boot process, the TCG log and PCRs values are sent to a remote Microsoft cloud service. Logs are then checked by the Health Attestation Service to determine what changes have occurred on the device. +This approach is the most secure one available for Windows 10-based devices to detect when security defenses are down. During the boot process, the TCG log and PCRs' values are sent to a remote Microsoft cloud service. Logs are then checked by the Health Attestation Service to determine what changes have occurred on the device. A relying party like an MDM can inspect the report generated by the remote health attestation service. @@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ Windows 10 supports health attestation scenarios by allowing applications access Remote device health attestation combined with an MDM provides a hardware-rooted method for reporting the current security status and detecting any changes, without having to trust the software running on the system. -In the case where malicious code is running on the device, the use of a remote server is required. If a rootkit is present on the device, the antimalware is no longer reliable, and its behavior can be hijacked by a malicious code running early in the startup sequence. That's why it's important to use Secure Boot and Device Guard, to control which code is loaded during the boot sequence. +In the case where malicious code is running on the device, the use of a remote server is required. If a rootkit is present on the device, the antimalware is no longer reliable, and its behavior can be hijacked by a malicious code running early in the startup sequence. This reason is what makes it important to use Secure Boot and Device Guard, to control which code is loaded during the boot sequence. The antimalware software can search to determine whether the boot sequence contains any signs of malware, such as a rootkit. It can also send the TCG log and the PCRs to a remote health attestation server to provide a separation between the measurement component and the verification component. @@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ Health attestation logs the measurements in various TPM Platform Configuration R :::image type="content" alt-text="figure 6." source="images/hva-fig6-logs.png"::: -When starting a device equipped with TPM, a measurement of different components is performed. This includes firmware, UEFI drivers, CPU microcode, and also all the Windows 10 drivers whose type is Boot Start. The raw measurements are stored in the TPM PCR registers while the details of all events (executable path, authority certification, and so on) are available in the TCG log. +When you start a device equipped with TPM, a measurement of different components is performed. These components include firmware, UEFI drivers, CPU microcode, and also all the Windows 10 drivers whose type is Boot Start. The raw measurements are stored in the TPM PCR registers while the details of all events (executable path, authority certification, and so on) are available in the TCG log. :::image type="content" alt-text="figure 7." source="images/hva-fig7-measurement.png"::: @@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ The health attestation process works as follows: 4. Windows kernel is measured. 5. Antivirus software is started as the first kernel mode driver. 6. Boot start drivers are measured. -7. MDM server through the MDM agent issues a health check command by leveraging the Health Attestation CSP. +7. MDM server through the MDM agent issues a health check command by using the Health Attestation CSP. 8. Boot measurements are validated by the Health Attestation Service > [!NOTE] @@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ In a simplified manner, the TPM is a passive component with limited resources. I A TPM incorporates in a single component: -- A RSA 2048-bit key generator +- An RSA 2048-bit key generator - A random number generator - Nonvolatile memory for storing EK, SRK, and AIK keys - A cryptographic engine to encrypt, decrypt, and sign @@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ A TPM incorporates in a single component: The TPM has an embedded unique cryptographic key called the endorsement key. The TPM endorsement key is a pair of asymmetric keys (RSA size 2048 bits). -The endorsement key public key is generally used for sending securely sensitive parameters, such as when taking possession of the TPM that contains the defining hash of the owner password. The EK private key is used when creating secondary keys like AIKs. +The endorsement key public key is used for sending securely sensitive parameters, such as when taking possession of the TPM that contains the defining hash of the owner password. The EK private key is used when creating secondary keys like AIKs. The endorsement key acts as an identity card for the TPM. For more information, see [Understand the TPM endorsement key](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/cc770443(v=ws.11)). @@ -467,16 +467,16 @@ Because the endorsement certificate is unique for each device and doesn't change The AIK is an asymmetric (public/private) key pair that is used as a substitute for the EK as an identity for the TPM for privacy purposes. The private portion of an AIK is never revealed or used outside the TPM and can only be used inside the TPM for a limited set of operations. Furthermore, it can only be used for signing, and only for limited, TPM-defined operations. -Windows 10 creates AIKs protected by the TPM, if available, that are 2048-bit RSA signing keys. Microsoft is hosting a cloud service called Microsoft Cloud CA to establish cryptographically that it is communicating with a real TPM and that the TPM possesses the presented AIK. After the Microsoft +Windows 10 creates AIKs protected by the TPM, if available, that are 2048-bit RSA signing keys. Microsoft is hosting a cloud service called Microsoft Cloud CA to establish cryptographically that it's communicating with a real TPM and that the TPM possesses the presented AIK. After the Microsoft Cloud CA service has established these facts, it will issue an AIK certificate to the Windows 10-based device. -Many existing devices that will upgrade to Windows 10 won't have a TPM, or the TPM won't contain an endorsement certificate. **To accommodate those devices, Windows 10 allows the issuance of AIK certificates without the presence of an endorsement certificate.** Such AIK certificates are not issued by Microsoft Cloud CA. Note that this isn't as trustworthy as an endorsement certificate that is burned into the device during manufacturing, but it will provide compatibility for advanced scenarios like Windows Hello for Business without TPM. +Many existing devices that will upgrade to Windows 10 won't have a TPM, or the TPM won't contain an endorsement certificate. **To accommodate those devices, Windows 10 allows the issuance of AIK certificates without the presence of an endorsement certificate.** Such AIK certificates aren't issued by Microsoft Cloud CA. These certificates aren't as trustworthy as an endorsement certificate that is burned into the device during manufacturing, but it will provide compatibility for advanced scenarios like Windows Hello for Business without TPM. -In the issued AIK certificate, a special OID is added to attest that endorsement certificate was used during the attestation process. This information can be leveraged by a relying party to decide whether to reject devices that are attested using AIK certificates without an endorsement certificate or accept them. Another scenario can be to not allow access to high-value assets from devices that are attested by an AIK certificate that isn't backed by an endorsement certificate. +In the issued AIK certificate, a special OID is added to attest that endorsement certificate was used during the attestation process. This information can be used by a relying party to decide whether to reject devices that are attested using AIK certificates without an endorsement certificate or accept them. Another scenario can be to not allow access to high-value assets from devices that are attested by an AIK certificate that isn't backed by an endorsement certificate. ### Storage root key -The storage root key (SRK) is also an asymmetric key pair (RSA with a minimum of 2048 bits length). The SRK has a major role and is used to protect TPM keys, so that these keys cannot be used without the TPM. The SRK key is created when the ownership of the TPM is taken. +The storage root key (SRK) is also an asymmetric key pair (RSA with a minimum of 2048-bits length). The SRK has a major role and is used to protect TPM keys, so that these keys can't be used without the TPM. The SRK key is created when the ownership of the TPM is taken. ### Platform Configuration Registers @@ -484,19 +484,19 @@ The TPM contains a set of registers that are designed to provide a cryptographic The measurement of the boot sequence is based on the PCR and TCG log. To establish a static root of trust, when the device is starting, the device must be able to measure the firmware code before execution. In this case, the Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM) is executed from the boot, calculates the hash of the firmware, then stores it by expanding the register PCR\[0\] and transfers execution to the firmware. -PCRs are set to zero when the platform is booted, and it is the job of the firmware that boots the platform to measure components in the boot chain and to record the measurements in the PCRs. Typically, boot components take the hash of the next component that is to be run and record the measurements in the PCRs. The initial component that starts the measurement chain is implicitly trusted. This is the CRTM. Platform manufacturers are required to have a secure update process for the CRTM or not permit updates to it. The PCRs record a cumulative hash of the components that have been measured. +PCRs are set to zero when the platform is booted, and it's the job of the firmware that boots the platform to measure components in the boot chain and to record the measurements in the PCRs. Typically, boot components take the hash of the next component that is to be run and record the measurements in the PCRs. The initial component that starts the measurement chain is implicitly trusted. This component is the CRTM. Platform manufacturers are required to have a secure update process for the CRTM or not permit updates to it. The PCRs record a cumulative hash of the components that have been measured. -The value of a PCR on its own is hard to interpret (it is just a hash value), but platforms typically keep a log with details of what has been measured, and the PCRs merely ensure that the log hasn't been tampered with. The logs are referred as a TCG log. Each time a register PCR is extended, an entry is added to the TCG log. Thus, throughout the boot process, a trace of the executable code and configuration data is created in the TCG log. +The value of a PCR on its own is hard to interpret (it's just a hash value), but platforms typically keep a log with details of what has been measured, and the PCRs merely ensure that the log hasn't been tampered with. The logs are referred as a TCG log. Each time a register PCR is extended, an entry is added to the TCG log. Thus, throughout the boot process, a trace of the executable code and configuration data is created in the TCG log. ### TPM provisioning -For the TPM of a Windows 10-based device to be usable, it must first be provisioned. The process of provisioning differs somewhat based on TPM versions, but, when successful, it results in the TPM being usable and the owner authorization data (ownerAuth) for the TPM being stored locally on the registry. +For the TPM of a Windows 10-based device to be usable, it must first be provisioned. The process of provisioning differs based on TPM versions, but, when successful, it results in the TPM being usable and the owner authorization data (ownerAuth) for the TPM being stored locally on the registry. When the TPM is provisioned, Windows 10 will first attempt to determine the EK and locally stored **ownerAuth** values by looking in the registry at the following location: **HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\TPM\\WMI\\Endorsement** During the provisioning process, the device may need to be restarted. -Note that the **Get-TpmEndorsementKeyInfo PowerShell** cmdlet can be used with administrative privilege to get information about the endorsement key and certificates of the TPM. +The **Get-TpmEndorsementKeyInfo PowerShell** cmdlet can be used with administrative privilege to get information about the endorsement key and certificates of the TPM. If the TPM ownership isn't known but the EK exists, the client library will provision the TPM and will store the resulting **ownerAuth** value into the registry if the policy allows it will store the SRK public portion at the following location: **HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\TPM\\WMI\\Admin\\SRKPub** @@ -510,16 +510,16 @@ As part of the provisioning process, Windows 10 will create an AIK with the TPM. Windows 10 contains a configuration service provider (CSP) specialized for interacting with the health attestation feature. A CSP is a component that plugs into the Windows MDM client and provides a published protocol for how MDM servers can configure settings and manage Windows-based devices. The management protocol is represented as a tree structure that can be specified as URIs with functions to perform on the URIs such as “get”, “set”, “delete”, and so on. -The following is a list of functions performed by the Windows 10 Health Attestation CSP: +The following list is that of the functions performed by the Windows 10 Health Attestation CSP: - Collects data that is used to verify a device’s health status - Forwards the data to the Health Attestation Service - Provisions the Health Attestation Certificate that it receives from the Health Attestation Service - Upon request, forwards the Health Attestation Certificate (received from the Health Attestation Service) and related runtime information to the MDM server for verification -During a health attestation session, the Health Attestation CSP forwards the TCG logs and PCRs values that are measured during the boot, by using a secure communication channel to the Health Attestation Service. +During a health attestation session, the Health Attestation CSP forwards the TCG logs and PCRs' values that are measured during the boot, by using a secure communication channel to the Health Attestation Service. -When an MDM server validates that a device has attested to the Health Attestation Service, it will be given a set of statements and claims about how that device booted, with the assurance that the device did not reboot between the time that it attested its health and the time that the MDM server validated it. +When an MDM server validates that a device has attested to the Health Attestation Service, it will be given a set of statements and claims about how that device booted, with the assurance that the device didn't reboot between the time that it attested its health and the time that the MDM server validated it. ### Windows Health Attestation Service @@ -530,8 +530,8 @@ The role of Windows Health Attestation Service is essentially to evaluate a set Checking that a TPM attestation and the associated log are valid takes several steps: -1. First, the server must check that the reports are signed by **trustworthy AIKs**. This might be done by checking that the public part of the AIK is listed in a database of assets, or perhaps that a certificate has been checked. -2. After the key has been checked, the signed attestation (a quote structure) should be checked to see whether it is a **valid signature over PCR values**. +1. First, the server must check that the reports are signed by **trustworthy AIKs**. This verification might be done by checking that the public part of the AIK is listed in a database of assets, or perhaps that a certificate has been checked. +2. After the key has been checked, the signed attestation (a quote structure) should be checked to see whether it's a **valid signature over PCR values**. 3. Next the logs should be checked to ensure that they match the PCR values reported. 4. Finally, the logs themselves should be examined by an MDM solution to see whether they represent **known or valid security configurations**. For example, a simple check might be to see whether the measured early OS components are known to be good, that the ELAM driver is as expected, and that the ELAM driver policy file is up to date. If all of these checks succeed, an attestation statement can be issued that later can be used to determine whether or not the client should be granted access to a resource. @@ -554,15 +554,15 @@ The following table presents some key items that can be reported back to MDM dep |--- |--- | |Windows 10 for desktop editions|

  • PCR0 measurement
  • Secure Boot Enabled
  • Secure Boot db matches Expected
  • Secure Boot dbx is up to date
  • Secure Boot policy GUID matches Expected
  • BitLocker enabled
  • Virtualization-based security enabled
  • ELAM was loaded
  • Code Integrity version is up to date
  • Code Integrity policy hash matches Expected| -### Leverage MDM and the Health Attestation Service +### Use MDM and the Health Attestation Service To make device health relevant, the MDM solution evaluates the device health report and is configured to the organization’s device health requirements. -A solution that leverages MDM and the Health Attestation Service consists of three main parts: +A solution that uses MDM and the Health Attestation Service consists of three main parts: -1. A device with health attestation enabled. This will usually be done as a part of enrollment with an MDM provider (health attestation will be disabled by default). -2. After this is enabled, and every boot thereafter, the device will send health measurements to the Health Attestation Service hosted by Microsoft, and it will receive a health attestation blob in return. -3. At any point after this, an MDM server can request the health attestation blob from the device and ask Health Attestation Service to decrypt the content and validate that it’s been attested. +1. A device with health attestation enabled. This enablement will be done as a part of enrollment with an MDM provider (health attestation will be disabled by default). +2. After this service is enabled, and every boot thereafter, the device will send health measurements to the Health Attestation Service hosted by Microsoft, and it will receive a health attestation blob in return. +3. At any point after this cycle, an MDM server can request the health attestation blob from the device and ask Health Attestation Service to decrypt the content and validate that it’s been attested. :::image type="content" alt-text="figure 9." source="images/hva-fig8-evaldevicehealth8.png"::: @@ -587,14 +587,14 @@ Interaction between a Windows 10-based device, the Health Attestation Service, a > [!NOTE] > The MDM server (relying party) never performs the quote or boot counter validation itself. It gets the quoted data and the health blob (which is encrypted) and sends the data to the Health Attestation Service for validation. This way, the AIK is never visible to the MDM, which thereby addresses privacy concerns. -Setting the requirements for device compliance is the first step to ensure that registered devices that do not meet health and compliance requirements are detected, tracked, and have actions enforced by the MDM solution. +Setting the requirements for device compliance is the first step to ensure that registered devices that don't meet health and compliance requirements are detected, tracked, and have actions enforced by the MDM solution. Devices that attempt to connect to resources must have their health evaluated so that unhealthy and noncompliant devices can be detected and reported. To be fully efficient, an end-to-end security solution must impose a consequence for unhealthy devices like refusing access to high-value assets. -That is the purpose of conditional access control, which is detailed in the next section. +That consequence for an unhealthy device is the purpose of conditional access control, which is detailed in the next section. ## Control the security of a Windows 10-based device before access is granted -Today’s access control technology, in most cases, focuses on ensuring that the right people get access to the right resources. If users can authenticate, they get access to resources using a device that the organization’s IT staff and systems know very little about. Perhaps there is some check such as ensuring that a device is encrypted before giving access to email, but what if the device is infected with malware? +Today’s access control technology, in most cases, focuses on ensuring that the right people get access to the right resources. If users can authenticate, they get access to resources using a device that the organization’s IT staff and systems know little about. Perhaps there's some check such as ensuring that a device is encrypted before giving access to email, but what if the device is infected with malware? The remote device health attestation process uses measured boot data to verify the health status of the device. The health of the device is then available for an MDM solution like Intune. @@ -605,18 +605,18 @@ The figure below shows how the Health Attestation Service is expected to work wi :::image type="content" alt-text="figure 10." source="images/hva-fig9-intune.png"::: -An MDM solution can then leverage health state statements and take them to the next level by coupling with client policies that will enable conditional access to be granted based on the device’s ability to prove that it’s malware free, its antimalware system is functional and up to date, the +An MDM solution can then use health state statements and take them to the next level by coupling with client policies that will enable conditional access to be granted based on the device’s ability to prove that it’s malware free, its antimalware system is functional and up to date, the firewall is running, and the devices patch state is compliant. Finally, resources can be protected by denying access to endpoints that are unable to prove they’re healthy. This feature is much needed for BYOD devices that need to access organizational resources. ### Built-in support of MDM in Windows 10 -Windows 10 has an MDM client that ships as part of the operating system. This enables MDM servers to manage Windows 10-based devices without requiring a separate agent. +Windows 10 has an MDM client that ships as part of the operating system. This MDM client enables MDM servers to manage Windows 10-based devices without requiring a separate agent. ### Third-party MDM server support -Third-party MDM servers can manage Windows 10 by using the MDM protocol. The built-in management client is able to communicate with a compatible server that supports the OMA-DM protocol to perform enterprise management tasks. For additional information, see [Azure Active Directory integration with MDM](/windows/client-management/mdm/azure-active-directory-integration-with-mdm). +Third-party MDM servers can manage Windows 10 by using the MDM protocol. The built-in management client is able to communicate with a compatible server that supports the OMA-DM protocol to perform enterprise management tasks. For more information, see [Azure Active Directory integration with MDM](/windows/client-management/mdm/azure-active-directory-integration-with-mdm). > [!NOTE] > MDM servers do not need to create or download a client to manage Windows 10. For more information, see [Mobile device management](/windows/client-management/mdm/). @@ -625,7 +625,7 @@ The third-party MDM server will have the same consistent first-party user experi ### Management of Windows Defender by third-party MDM -This management infrastructure makes it possible for IT pros to use MDM-capable products like Intune, to manage health attestation, Device Guard, or Windows Defender on Windows 10-based devices, including BYODs that aren’t domain joined. IT pros will be able to manage and configure all of the actions and settings they are familiar with customizing by using Intune with Intune Endpoint Protection on down-level operating systems. Admins that currently only manage domain joined devices through Group Policy will find it easy to transition to managing Windows 10-based devices by using MDM because many of the settings and actions are shared across both mechanisms. +This management infrastructure makes it possible for IT pros to use MDM-capable products like Intune, to manage health attestation, Device Guard, or Windows Defender on Windows 10-based devices, including BYODs that aren’t domain joined. IT pros will be able to manage and configure all of the actions and settings they're familiar with customizing by using Intune with Intune Endpoint Protection on down-level operating systems. Admins that currently only manage domain joined devices through Group Policy will find it easy to transition to managing Windows 10-based devices by using MDM because many of the settings and actions are shared across both mechanisms. For more information on how to manage Windows 10 security and system settings with an MDM solution, see [Custom URI settings for Windows 10 devices](/mem/intune/configuration/custom-settings-windows-10). @@ -641,10 +641,10 @@ If the device isn't registered, the user will get a message with instructions on ### Office 365 conditional access control -Azure AD enforces conditional access policies to secure access to Office 365 services. A tenant admin can create a conditional access policy that blocks a user on a non-compliant device from accessing an Office 365 service. The user must conform to the company’s device policies before access can be granted to the service. Alternately, the admin can also create a policy that requires users to just enroll their devices to gain access to an Office 365 service. Policies may be applied to all users of an organization, or limited to a few target groups and enhanced over time to include additional +Azure AD enforces conditional access policies to secure access to Office 365 services. A tenant admin can create a conditional access policy that blocks a user on a non-compliant device from accessing an Office 365 service. The user must conform to the company’s device policies before access can be granted to the service. Alternately, the admin can also create a policy that requires users to just enroll their devices to gain access to an Office 365 service. Policies may be applied to all users of an organization, or limited to a few target groups and enhanced over time to include more target groups. -When a user requests access to an Office 365 service from a supported device platform, Azure AD authenticates the user and device from which the user launches the request; and grants access to the service only when the user conforms to the policy set for the service. Users that do not have their device enrolled are given remediation instructions on how to enroll and become compliant to access corporate Office 365 services. +When a user requests access to an Office 365 service from a supported device platform, Azure AD authenticates the user and device from which the user launches the request; and grants access to the service only when the user conforms to the policy set for the service. Users that don't have their device enrolled are given remediation instructions on how to enroll and become compliant to access corporate Office 365 services. When a user enrolls, the device is registered with Azure AD, and enrolled with a compatible MDM solution like Intune. @@ -676,9 +676,9 @@ To get to a compliant state, the Windows 10-based device needs to: ### Cloud and on-premises apps conditional access control -Conditional access control is a powerful policy evaluation engine built into Azure AD. It gives IT pros an easy way to create access rules beyond Office 365 that evaluate the context of a user's logon to make real-time decisions about which applications they should be allowed to access. +Conditional access control is a powerful policy evaluation engine built into Azure AD. It gives IT pros an easy way to create access rules beyond Office 365 that evaluate the context of a user's sign in to make real-time decisions about which applications they should be allowed to access. -IT pros can configure conditional access control policies for cloud SaaS applications secured by Azure AD and even on-premises applications. Access rules in Azure AD leverage the conditional access engine to check device health and compliance state reported by a compatible MDM solution like Intune in order to determine whether to allow access. +IT pros can configure conditional access control policies for cloud SaaS applications secured by Azure AD and even on-premises applications. Access rules in Azure AD use the conditional access engine to check device health and compliance state reported by a compatible MDM solution like Intune in order to determine whether to allow access. For more information about conditional access, see [Azure Conditional Access Preview for SaaS Apps.](/azure/active-directory/authentication/tutorial-enable-azure-mfa) @@ -694,14 +694,14 @@ For on-premises applications there are two options to enable conditional access The following process describes how Azure AD conditional access works: -1. User has already enrolled with MDM through Workplace Access/Azure AD join which registers device with Azure AD. +1. User has already enrolled with MDM through Workplace Access/Azure AD join, which registers device with Azure AD. 2. When the device boots or resumes from hibernate, a task “Tpm-HASCertRetr” is triggered to request in background a health attestation blob. Device sends TPM boot measurements to the Health Attestation Service. 3. Health Attestation Service validates device state and issues an encrypted blob to the device based on the health state with details on failed checks (if any). 4. User logs on and the MDM agent contacts the Intune/MDM server. 5. MDM server pushes down new policies if available and queries health blob state and other inventory state. 6. Device sends a health attestation blob previously acquired and also the value of the other state inventory requested by the Intune/MDM server. 7. Intune/MDM server sends the health attestation blob to Health Attestation Service to be validated. -8. Health Attestation Service validates that the device which sent the health attestation blob is healthy, and returns this result to Intune/MDM server. +8. Health Attestation Service validates that the device that sent the health attestation blob is healthy, and returns this result to Intune/MDM server. 9. Intune/MDM server evaluates compliance based on the compliance and the queried inventory/health attestation state from device. 10. Intune/MDM server updates compliance state against device object in Azure AD. 11. User opens app, attempts to access a corporate managed asset. @@ -711,11 +711,11 @@ The following process describes how Azure AD conditional access works: For more information about Azure AD join, see [Azure AD & Windows 10: Better Together for Work or School](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkId=691619), a white paper. -Conditional access control is a topic that many organizations and IT pros may not know and they should. The different attributes that describe a user, a device, compliance, and context of access are very powerful when used with a conditional access engine. Conditional access control is an essential step that helps organizations secure their environment. +Conditional access control is a topic that many organizations and IT pros may not know and they should. The different attributes that describe a user, a device, compliance, and context of access are powerful when used with a conditional access engine. Conditional access control is an essential step that helps organizations secure their environment. ## Takeaways and summary -The following list contains high-level key take-aways to improve the security posture of any organization. However, the few take-aways presented in this section should not be interpreted as an exhaustive list of security best practices. +The following list contains high-level key takeaways to improve the security posture of any organization. However, the few takeaways presented in this section shouldn't be interpreted as an exhaustive list of security best practices. - **Understand that no solution is 100 percent secure** @@ -735,7 +735,7 @@ The following list contains high-level key take-aways to improve the security po - **Sign Device Guard policy** - Signed Device Guard policy helps protect against a user with administrator privileges trying to defeat the current policy. When a policy is signed, the only way to modify Device Guard subsequently is to provide a new version of the policy signed by the same signer or from a signer specify as part of the Device Guard policy. + Signed Device Guard policy helps protect against a user with administrator privileges trying to defeat the current policy. When a policy is signed, the only way to modify Device Guard later is to provide a new version of the policy signed by the same signer or from a signer specify as part of the Device Guard policy. - **Use virtualization-based security** @@ -751,11 +751,11 @@ The following list contains high-level key take-aways to improve the security po - **Use AppLocker when it makes sense** - Although AppLocker isn't considered a new Device Guard feature, it complements Device Guard functionality for some scenarios like being able to deny a specific Universal Windows apps for a specific user or a group of users. + Although AppLocker isn't considered a new Device Guard feature, it complements Device Guard functionality for some scenarios like being able to deny a specific Universal Windows application for a specific user or a group of users. - **Lock down firmware and configuration** - After Windows 10 is installed, lock down firmware boot options access. This prevents a user with physical access from modifying UEFI settings, disabling Secure Boot, or booting other operating systems. Also, in order to protect against an administrator trying to disable Device Guard, add a rule in the current Device Guard policy that will deny and block execution of the **C:\\Windows\\System32\\SecConfig.efi** tool. + After Windows 10 is installed, lock down firmware boot options access. This lockdown prevents a user with physical access from modifying UEFI settings, disabling Secure Boot, or booting other operating systems. Also, in order to protect against an administrator trying to disable Device Guard, add a rule in the current Device Guard policy that will deny and block execution of the **C:\\Windows\\System32\\SecConfig.efi** tool. Health attestation is a key feature of Windows 10 that includes client and cloud components to control access to high-value assets based on a user and their device’s identity and compliance with corporate governance policy. Organizations can choose to detect and report unhealthy devices, or to configure health enforcement rules based on their needs. Health attestation provides an end-to-end security model and integration points, which vendors and software developers can use to build and integrate a customized solution. diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/access-this-computer-from-the-network.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/access-this-computer-from-the-network.md index da17209420..1948922041 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/access-this-computer-from-the-network.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/access-this-computer-from-the-network.md @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security ## Reference -The **Access this computer from the network** policy setting determines which users can connect to the device from the network. This capability is required by a number of network protocols, including Server Message Block (SMB)-based protocols, NetBIOS, Common Internet File System (CIFS), and Component Object Model Plus (COM+). +The **Access this computer from the network** policy setting determines which users can connect to the device from the network. This capability is required by many network protocols, including Server Message Block (SMB)-based protocols, NetBIOS, Common Internet File System (CIFS), and Component Object Model Plus (COM+). Users, devices, and service accounts gain or lose the **Access this computer from network** user right by being explicitly or implicitly added or removed from a security group that has been granted this user right. For example, a user account or a machine account may be explicitly added to a custom security group or a built-in security group, or it may be implicitly added by Windows to a computed security group such as Domain Users, Authenticated Users, or Enterprise Domain Controllers. By default, user accounts and machine accounts are granted the **Access this computer from network** user right when computed groups such as Authenticated Users, and for domain controllers, the Enterprise Domain Controllers group, are defined in the default domain controllers Group Policy Object (GPO). @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ Constant: SeNetworkLogonRight - On desktop devices or member servers, grant this right only to users and administrators. - On domain controllers, grant this right only to authenticated users, enterprise domain controllers, and administrators. - On failover clusters, make sure this right is granted to authenticated users. -- This setting includes the **Everyone** group to ensure backward compatibility. Upon Windows upgrade, after you have verified that all users and groups are correctly migrated, you should remove the **Everyone** group and use the **Authenticated Users** group instead. +- This setting includes the **Everyone** group to ensure backward compatibility. Upon Windows upgrade, after you've verified that all users and groups are correctly migrated, you should remove the **Everyone** group and use the **Authenticated Users** group instead. ### Location @@ -68,13 +68,13 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values for the ## Policy management -When modifying this user right, the following actions might cause users and services to experience network access issues: +When you modify this user right, the following actions might cause users and services to experience network access issues: - Removing the Enterprise Domain Controllers security group - Removing the Authenticated Users group or an explicit group that allows users, computers, and service accounts the user right to connect to computers over the network - Removing all user and machine accounts -A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to be effective. +A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to be effective. Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on. @@ -95,20 +95,20 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -Users who can connect from their device to the network can access resources on target devices for which they have permission. For example, the **Access this computer from the network** user right is required for users to connect to shared printers and folders. If this user right is assigned to the **Everyone** group, anyone in the group can read the files in those shared folders. This situation is unlikely because the groups created by a default installation of at least Windows Server 2008 R2 or Windows 7 do not include the **Everyone** group. However, if a device is upgraded and the original device includes the **Everyone** group as part of its defined users and groups, that group is transitioned as part of the upgrade process and is present on the device. +Users who can connect from their device to the network can access resources on target devices for which they have permission. For example, the **Access this computer from the network** user right is required for users to connect to shared printers and folders. If this user right is assigned to the **Everyone** group, anyone in the group can read the files in those shared folders. This situation is unlikely because the groups created by a default installation of at least Windows Server 2008 R2 or Windows 7 don't include the **Everyone** group. However, if a device is upgraded and the original device includes the **Everyone** group as part of its defined users and groups, that group is transitioned as part of the upgrade process and is present on the device. ### Countermeasure -Restrict the **Access this computer from the network** user right to only those users and groups who require access to the computer. For example, if you configure this policy setting to the **Administrators** and **Users** groups, users who log on to the domain can access resources that are shared +Restrict the **Access this computer from the network** user right to only those users and groups who require access to the computer. For example, if you configure this policy setting to the **Administrators** and **Users** groups, users who sign in to the domain can access resources that are shared from servers in the domain if members of the **Domain Users** group are included in the local **Users** group. > **Note** If you are using IPsec to help secure network communications in your organization, ensure that a group that includes machine accounts is given this right. This right is required for successful computer authentication. Assigning this right to **Authenticated Users** or **Domain Computers** meets this requirement. ### Potential impact -If you remove the **Access this computer from the network** user right on domain controllers for all users, no one can log on to the domain or use network resources. If you remove this user right on member servers, users cannot connect to those servers through the network. If you have installed optional components such as ASP.NET or Internet Information Services (IIS), you may need to assign this user right to additional accounts that are required by those components. It is important to verify that authorized users are assigned this user right for the devices that they need to access the network. +If you remove the **Access this computer from the network** user right on domain controllers for all users, no one can sign in to the domain or use network resources. If you remove this user right on member servers, users can't connect to those servers through the network. If you have installed optional components such as ASP.NET or Internet Information Services (IIS), you may need to assign this user right to other accounts that are required by those components. It's important to verify that authorized users are assigned this user right for the devices that they need to access the network. -If running Windows Server or Azure Stack HCI Failover Clustering, do not remove Authenticated Users from the Access this computer from the network policy setting. Doing so may induce an unexpected production outage. This is due to the local user account CLIUSR that is used to run the cluster service. CLIUSR is not a member of the local Administrators group and if the Authenticated Users group is removed, the cluster service will not have sufficient rights to function or start properly. +If running Windows Server or Azure Stack HCI Failover Clustering, don't remove Authenticated Users from the Access this computer from the network policy setting. Doing so may induce an unexpected production outage. This outage is due to the local user account CLIUSR that is used to run the cluster service. CLIUSR isn't a member of the local Administrators group and if the Authenticated Users group is removed, the cluster service won't have sufficient rights to function or start properly. ## Related topics [User Rights Assignment](user-rights-assignment.md) diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/account-lockout-duration.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/account-lockout-duration.md index 5111f06fe9..3aff3ac62f 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/account-lockout-duration.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/account-lockout-duration.md @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ This policy setting is dependent on the **Account lockout threshold** policy set If [Account lockout threshold](account-lockout-threshold.md) is configured, after the specified number of failed attempts, the account will be locked out. If the **Account lockout duration** is set to 0, the account will remain locked until an administrator unlocks it manually. -It is advisable to set **Account lockout duration** to approximately 15 minutes. To specify that the account will never be locked out, set the **Account lockout threshold** value to 0. +It's advisable to set **Account lockout duration** to approximately 15 minutes. To specify that the account will never be locked out, set the **Account lockout threshold** value to 0. ### Location @@ -58,11 +58,11 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Defaul ## Security considerations -More than a few unsuccessful password submissions during an attempt to log on to a computer might represent an attacker's attempts to determine an account password by trial and error. The Windows and Windows Server operating systems can track logon attempts, and you can configure the operating system to disable the account for a preset period of time after a specified number of failed attempts. Account lockout policy settings control the threshold for this response and what action to take after the threshold is reached. +More than a few unsuccessful password submissions during an attempt to sign in to a computer might represent an attacker's attempts to determine an account password by trial and error. The Windows and Windows Server operating systems can track sign-in attempts, and you can configure the operating system to disable the account for a preset period of time after a specified number of failed attempts. Account lockout policy settings control the threshold for this response and what action to take after the threshold is reached. ### Vulnerability -A denial-of-service (DoS) condition can be created if an attacker abuses the [Account lockout threshold](account-lockout-threshold.md) policy setting and repeatedly attempts to log on with a specific account. After you configure the Account lockout threshold policy setting, the account will be locked out after the specified number of failed attempts. If you configure the **Account lockout duration** policy setting to 0, the account remains locked until you unlock it manually. +A denial-of-service (DoS) condition can be created if an attacker abuses the [Account lockout threshold](account-lockout-threshold.md) policy setting and repeatedly attempts to sign in with a specific account. After you configure the Account lockout threshold policy setting, the account will be locked out after the specified number of failed attempts. If you configure the **Account lockout duration** policy setting to 0, the account remains locked until you unlock it manually. ### Countermeasure @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ Configure the **Account lockout duration** policy setting to an appropriate valu ### Potential impact -Configuring the **Account lockout duration** policy setting to 0 so that accounts cannot be automatically unlocked can increase the number of requests that your organization's Help Desk receives to unlock accounts that were locked by mistake. +Configuring the **Account lockout duration** policy setting to 0 so that accounts can't be automatically unlocked can increase the number of requests that your organization's Help Desk receives to unlock accounts that were locked by mistake. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-security-configuration-framework/security-compliance-toolkit-10.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-security-configuration-framework/security-compliance-toolkit-10.md index f1ca17ad61..1a2434ffeb 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-security-configuration-framework/security-compliance-toolkit-10.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-security-configuration-framework/security-compliance-toolkit-10.md @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ The Security Compliance Toolkit consists of: - GPO to Policy Rules -You can [download the tools](https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=55319) along with the baselines for the relevant Windows versions. For more details about security baseline recommendations, see the [Microsoft Security Guidance blog](/archive/blogs/secguide/). +You can [download the tools](https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=55319) along with the baselines for the relevant Windows versions. For more information about security baseline recommendations, see the [Microsoft Security Guidance blog](/archive/blogs/secguide/). ## What is the Policy Analyzer tool? @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ The Policy Analyzer is a utility for analyzing and comparing sets of Group Polic - Compare GPOs against current local policy and local registry settings - Export results to a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet -Policy Analyzer lets you treat a set of GPOs as a single unit. This makes it easy to determine whether particular settings are duplicated across the GPOs or are set to conflicting values. Policy Analyzer also lets you capture a baseline and then compare it to a snapshot taken at a later time to identify changes anywhere across the set. +Policy Analyzer lets you treat a set of GPOs as a single unit. This treatment makes it easy to determine whether particular settings are duplicated across the GPOs or are set to conflicting values. Policy Analyzer also lets you capture a baseline and then compare it to a snapshot taken at a later time to identify changes anywhere across the set. More information on the Policy Analyzer tool can be found on the [Microsoft Security Guidance blog](/archive/blogs/secguide/new-tool-policy-analyzer) or by [downloading the tool](https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=55319). @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ More information on the Policy Analyzer tool can be found on the [Microsoft Secu LGPO.exe is a command-line utility that is designed to help automate management of Local Group Policy. Using local policy gives administrators a simple way to verify the effects of Group Policy settings, and is also useful for managing non-domain-joined systems. -LGPO.exe can import and apply settings from Registry Policy (Registry.pol) files, security templates, Advanced Auditing backup files, as well as from formatted “LGPO text” files. +LGPO.exe can import and apply settings from Registry Policy (Registry.pol) files, security templates, Advanced Auditing backup files, and from formatted “LGPO text” files. It can export local policy to a GPO backup. It can export the contents of a Registry Policy file to the “LGPO text” format that can then be edited, and can build a Registry Policy file from an LGPO text file.