Merge pull request #9942 from rathbuna/patch-2

Update event-4776.md
This commit is contained in:
Denise Vangel-MSFT
2021-09-16 08:45:12 -07:00
committed by GitHub

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@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
ms.sitesec: library
ms.localizationpriority: none
author: dansimp
ms.date: 04/19/2017
ms.date: 09/13/2021
ms.reviewer:
manager: dansimp
ms.author: dansimp
@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ This event does *not* generate when a domain account logs on locally to a domain
| 0xC0000193 | Account logon with expired account. |
| 0xC0000224 | Account logon with "Change Password at Next Logon" flagged. |
| 0xC0000234 | Account logon with account locked. |
| 0xc0000371 | The local account store does not contain secret material for the specified account. |
| 0xC0000371 | The local account store does not contain secret material for the specified account. |
| 0x0 | No errors. |
> Table 1. Winlogon Error Codes.
@ -125,14 +125,14 @@ This event does *not* generate when a domain account logs on locally to a domain
For 4776(S, F): The computer attempted to validate the credentials for an account.
| **Type of monitoring required** | **Recommendation** |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **High-value accounts**: You might have high-value domain or local accounts for which you need to monitor each action.<br>Examples of high-value accounts are database administrators, built-in local administrator account, domain administrators, service accounts, domain controller accounts and so on. | Monitor this event with the **“Logon Account”** that corresponds to the high-value account or accounts. |
| **Type of monitoring required** | **Recommendation** |
|-----------------|---------|
| **High-value accounts**: You might have high-value domain or local accounts for which you need to monitor each action.<br>Examples of high-value accounts are database administrators, built-in local administrator account, domain administrators, service accounts, domain controller accounts and so on. | Monitor this event with the **“Logon Account”** that corresponds to the high-value account or accounts. |
| **Anomalies or malicious actions**: You might have specific requirements for detecting anomalies or monitoring potential malicious actions. For example, you might need to monitor for use of an account outside of working hours. | When you monitor for anomalies or malicious actions, use the **“Logon Account”** value (with other information) to monitor how or when a particular account is being used.<br>To monitor activity of specific user accounts outside of working hours, monitor the appropriate **Logon Account + Source Workstation** pairs. |
| **Non-active accounts**: You might have non-active, disabled, or guest accounts, or other accounts that should never be used. | Monitor this event with the **“Logon Account”** that should never be used. |
| **Account allow list**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “allow list-only” action, review the **“Logon Account”** for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
| **Restricted-use computers**: You might have certain computers from which certain people (accounts) should not log on. | Monitor the target **Source Workstation** for credential validation requests from the **“Logon Account”** that you are concerned about. |
| **Account naming conventions**: Your organization might have specific naming conventions for account names. | Monitor “**Logon Account”** for names that dont comply with naming conventions. |
| **Non-active accounts**: You might have non-active, disabled, or guest accounts, or other accounts that should never be used. | Monitor this event with the **“Logon Account”** that should never be used. |
| **Account allow list**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “allow list-only” action, review the **“Logon Account”** for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
| **Restricted-use computers**: You might have certain computers from which certain people (accounts) should not log on. | Monitor the target **Source Workstation** for credential validation requests from the **“Logon Account”** that you are concerned about. |
| **Account naming conventions**: Your organization might have specific naming conventions for account names. | Monitor “**Logon Account”** for names that dont comply with naming conventions. |
- If NTLM authentication should not be used for a specific account, monitor for that account. Dont forget that local logon will always use NTLM authentication if an account logs on to a device where its user account is stored.
@ -142,12 +142,12 @@ For 4776(S, F): The computer attempted to validate the credentials for an accoun
- Consider tracking the following errors for the reasons listed:
| **Error to track** | **What the error might indicate** |
|-----------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Error to track** | **What the error might indicate** |
|----------|----------------|
| **User logon with misspelled or bad user account** | For example, N events in the last N minutes can be an indicator of an account enumeration attack, especially relevant for highly critical accounts. |
| **User logon with misspelled or bad password** | For example, N events in the last N minutes can be an indicator of a brute-force password attack, especially relevant for highly critical accounts. |
| **User logon outside authorized hours** | Can indicate a compromised account; especially relevant for highly critical accounts. |
| **User logon from unauthorized workstation** | Can indicate a compromised account; especially relevant for highly critical accounts. |
| **User logon outside authorized hours** | Can indicate a compromised account; especially relevant for highly critical accounts. |
| **User logon from unauthorized workstation** | Can indicate a compromised account; especially relevant for highly critical accounts. |
| **User logon to account disabled by administrator** | For example, N events in last N minutes can be an indicator of an account compromise attempt, especially relevant for highly critical accounts. |
| **User logon with expired account** | Can indicate an account compromise attempt; especially relevant for highly critical accounts. |
| **User logon with account locked** | Can indicate a brute-force password attack; especially relevant for highly critical accounts. |
| **User logon with expired account** | Can indicate an account compromise attempt; especially relevant for highly critical accounts. |
| **User logon with account locked** | Can indicate a brute-force password attack; especially relevant for highly critical accounts. |