@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ If the existing MBR system partition isn't reused for the EFI system partition,
> [!IMPORTANT]
>
-> If the existing MBR system partition is not reused for the EFI system partition, it might be assigned a drive letter. If you do not wish to use this small partition, you must manually hide the drive letter.
+> If the existing MBR system partition isn't reused for the EFI system partition, it might be assigned a drive letter. If this small partition isn't going to be used, its drive letter must be manually hidden.
### Partition type mapping and partition attributes
@@ -290,11 +290,11 @@ For more information about partition types, see:
### Persisting drive letter assignments
-The conversion tool attempts to remap all drive letter assignment information contained in the registry that corresponds to the volumes of the converted disk. If a drive letter assignment can't be restored, an error is displayed at the console and in the log, so that you can manually perform the correct assignment of the drive letter.
+The conversion tool attempts to remap all drive letter assignment information contained in the registry that corresponds to the volumes of the converted disk. If a drive letter assignment can't be restored, an error is displayed at the console and in the log, so that correct assignment of the drive letter can be manually performed.
> [!IMPORTANT]
>
-> This code runs after the layout conversion has taken place, so the operation cannot be undone at this stage.
+> This code runs after the layout conversion takes place, so the operation can't be undone at this stage.
The conversion tool will obtain volume unique ID data before and after the layout conversion, organizing this information into a lookup table. It then iterates through all the entries in **HKLM\SYSTEM\MountedDevices**, and for each entry it does the following:
@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ The partition type can be determined in one of three ways:
#### Windows PowerShell
-You can enter the following command at a Windows PowerShell prompt to display the disk number and partition type:
+The following command can be entered at a Windows PowerShell prompt to display the disk number and partition type:
```powershell
Get-Disk | ft -Auto
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ Number Friendly Name Serial Number HealthStatus OperationalStatus To
#### Disk Management tool
-You can view the partition type of a disk by using the Disk Management tool:
+The partition type of a disk can be viewed by using the Disk Management tool:
1. Right-click on the Start Menu and select **Disk Management**. Alternatively, right-click on the Start Menu and select **Run**. In the **Run** dialog box that appears, enter `diskmgmt.msc` and then select **OK**.
diff --git a/windows/deployment/update/images/waas-active-hours.png b/windows/deployment/update/images/waas-active-hours.png
deleted file mode 100644
index c262c302ed..0000000000
Binary files a/windows/deployment/update/images/waas-active-hours.png and /dev/null differ
diff --git a/windows/deployment/update/media-dynamic-update.md b/windows/deployment/update/media-dynamic-update.md
index 3794cdf447..e5b5cd4a0b 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/update/media-dynamic-update.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/update/media-dynamic-update.md
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ appliesto:
- ✅ Windows 11
- ✅ Windows 10
- ✅ Windows Server
-ms.date: 07/10/2024
+ms.date: 11/11/2024
---
# Update Windows installation media with Dynamic Update
@@ -40,8 +40,49 @@ Devices must be able to connect to the internet to obtain Dynamic Updates. In so
You can obtain Dynamic Update packages from the [Microsoft Update Catalog](https://catalog.update.microsoft.com). At that site, use the search bar in the upper right to find the Dynamic Update packages for a particular release. The various Dynamic Update packages might not all be present in the results from a single search, so you might have to search with different keywords to find all of the updates. Check various parts of the results to be sure you've identified the files needed. The following tables show the key values to search for or look for in the results.
+
+### Windows Server 2025 Dynamic Update packages
+**Title** can distinguish each Dynamic Package. Latest cumulative updates have the servicing stack embedded. The servicing stack is published only if necessary for a given cumulative update.
+
+| Update packages |Title |
+|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+|Safe OS Dynamic Update | YYYY-MM Safe OS Dynamic Update for Microsoft server operating system version 24H2 |
+|Setup Dynamic Update | YYYY-MM Setup Dynamic Update for Microsoft server operating system version 24H2 |
+|Latest cumulative update | YYYY-MM Cumulative Update for Microsoft server operating system version 24H2 |
+|Servicing stack Dynamic Update | YYYY-MM Servicing Stack Update for Microsoft server operating system version 24H2 |
+
+### Windows Server, version 23H2 Dynamic Update packages
+**Title** can distinguish each Dynamic Package. Latest cumulative updates have the servicing stack embedded. The servicing stack is published only if necessary for a given cumulative update. Azure Stack HCI, version 23H2 has a similar format.
+
+| Update packages |Title |
+|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+|Safe OS Dynamic Update | YYYY-MM Safe OS Dynamic Update for Microsoft server operating system version 23H2 |
+|Setup Dynamic Update | YYYY-MM Setup Dynamic Update for Microsoft server operating system version 23H2 |
+|Latest cumulative update | YYYY-MM Cumulative Update for Microsoft server operating system version 23H2 |
+|Servicing stack Dynamic Update | YYYY-MM Servicing Stack Update for Microsoft server operating system version 23H2 |
+
+### Azure Stack HCI, version 22H2 Dynamic Update packages
+**Title**, **Product** and **Description** are required to distinguish each Dynamic Package. Latest cumulative update has the servicing stack embedded. Servicing stack published separately only if necessary as a prerequisite for a given cumulative update.
+
+| Update packages |Title |Product |Description |
+|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|------------------|
+|Safe OS Dynamic Update | YYYY-MM Dynamic Update for Microsoft server operating system, version 22H2 |Windows Safe OS Dynamic Update | ComponentUpdate |
+|Setup Dynamic Update | YYYY-MM Dynamic Update for Microsoft server operating system, version 22H2 |Windows 10 and later Dynamic Update | SetupUpdate |
+|Latest cumulative update | YYYY-MM Cumulative Update for Microsoft server operating system, version 22H2 | | |
+|Servicing stack Dynamic Update | YYYY-MM Servicing Stack Update for Microsoft server operating system, version 22H2 | | |
+
+### Windows Server 2022 later Dynamic Update packages
+**Title**, **Product** and **Description** are required to distinguish each Dynamic Package. Latest cumulative update has the servicing stack embedded. Servicing stack published separately only if necessary as a prerequisite for a given cumulative update.
+
+| Update packages |Title |Product |Description |
+|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|------------------|
+|Safe OS Dynamic Update | YYYY-MM Dynamic Update for Microsoft server operating system, version 21H2 |Windows Safe OS Dynamic Update | ComponentUpdate |
+|Setup Dynamic Update | YYYY-MM Dynamic Update for Microsoft server operating system, version 21H2 |Windows 10 and later Dynamic Update | SetupUpdate |
+|Latest cumulative update | YYYY-MM Cumulative Update for Microsoft server operating system, version 21H2 | | |
+|Servicing stack Dynamic Update | YYYY-MM Servicing Stack Update for Microsoft server operating system, version 21H2 | | |
+
### Windows 11, version 22H2 and later Dynamic Update packages
-**Title** can distinguish each Dynamic Package. Latest cumulative updates have the servicing stack embedded. The servicing stack is published only if necessary for a given cumulative update.Titles below are for Windows 11, version 22H2. Windows 11, version 23H2 and 24H2 have a similar format.
+**Title** can distinguish each Dynamic Package. Latest cumulative updates have the servicing stack embedded. The servicing stack is published only if necessary for a given cumulative update. Titles below are for Windows 11, version 22H2. Windows 11, version 23H2 and 24H2 have a similar format.
| Update packages |Title |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
@@ -50,7 +91,6 @@ You can obtain Dynamic Update packages from the [Microsoft Update Catalog](https
|Latest cumulative update | YYYY-MM Cumulative Update for Windows 11 Version 22H2 |
|Servicing stack Dynamic Update | YYYY-MM Servicing Stack Update for Windows 11 Version 22H2 |
-
### Windows 11, version 21H2 Dynamic Update packages
**Title**, **Product** and **Description** are required to distinguish each Dynamic Package. Latest cumulative update has the servicing stack embedded. Servicing stack published separately only if necessary as a prerequisite for a given cumulative update.
@@ -84,24 +124,24 @@ Properly updating the installation media involves many actions operating on seve
This table shows the correct sequence for applying the various tasks to the files. For example, the full sequence starts with adding the servicing stack update to WinRE (1) and concludes with adding boot manager from WinPE to the new media (28).
-|Task |WinRE (winre.wim) |Operating system (install.wim) | WinPE (boot.wim) | New media |
-|-----------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------|------------------|-----------|
-|Add servicing stack Dynamic Update | 1 | 9 | 17 | |
-|Add language pack | 2 | 10 | 18 | |
-|Add localized optional packages | 3 | | 19 | |
-|Add font support | 4 | | 20 | |
-|Add text-to-speech | 5 | | 21 | |
-|Update Lang.ini | | | 22 | |
-|Add Features on Demand | | 11 | | |
-|Add Safe OS Dynamic Update | 6 | | | |
-|Add Setup Dynamic Update | | | | 26 |
-|Add setup.exe from WinPE | | | | 27 |
-|Add boot manager from WinPE | | | | 28 |
-|Add latest cumulative update | | 12 | 23 | |
-|Clean up the image | 7 | 13 | 24 | |
-|Add Optional Components | | 14 | | |
-|Add .NET and .NET cumulative updates | | 15 | | |
-|Export image | 8 | 16 | 25 | |
+|Task |WinRE (winre.wim) |Operating system (install.wim) | WinPE (boot.wim) | New media |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------|------------------|-----------|
+|Add servicing stack Dynamic Update | 1 | 9 | 17 | |
+|Add language pack | 2 | 10 | 18 | |
+|Add localized optional packages | 3 | | 19 | |
+|Add font support | 4 | | 20 | |
+|Add text-to-speech | 5 | | 21 | |
+|Update Lang.ini | | | 22 | |
+|Add Features on Demand | | 11 | | |
+|Add Safe OS Dynamic Update | 6 | | | |
+|Add Setup Dynamic Update | | | | 26 |
+|Add setup.exe and setuphost.exe from WinPE | | | | 27 |
+|Add boot manager from WinPE | | | | 28 |
+|Add latest cumulative update | | 12 | 23 | |
+|Clean up the image | 7 | 13 | 24 | |
+|Add Optional Components | | 14 | | |
+|Add .NET and .NET cumulative updates | | 15 | | |
+|Export image | 8 | 16 | 25 | |
> [!NOTE]
> Starting in February 2021, the latest cumulative update and servicing stack update will be combined and distributed in the Microsoft Update Catalog as a new combined cumulative update. For Steps 1, 9, and 18 that require the servicing stack update for updating the installation media, you should use the combined cumulative update. For more information on the combined cumulative update, see [Servicing stack updates](./servicing-stack-updates.md).
@@ -121,7 +161,7 @@ Optional Components, along with the .NET feature, can be installed offline, howe
### Checkpoint cumulative updates
-Starting with Windows 11, version 24H2, the latest cumulative update may have a prerequisite cumulative update that is required to be installed first. These are known as checkpoint cumulative updates. In these cases, the cumulative update file level differentials are based on a previous cumulative update instead of the Windows RTM release. The benefit is a smaller update package and faster installation. When you obtain the latest cumulative update from the [Microsoft Update Catalog](https://catalog.update.microsoft.com), checkpoint cumulative updates will be available from the download button. In addition, the knowledge base article for the cumulative update will provide additional information.
+Starting with Windows 11, version 24H2, and Windows Server 2025, the latest cumulative update may have a prerequisite cumulative update that is required to be installed first. These are known as checkpoint cumulative updates. In these cases, the cumulative update file level differentials are based on a previous cumulative update instead of the Windows RTM release. The benefit is a smaller update package and faster installation. When you obtain the latest cumulative update from the [Microsoft Update Catalog](https://catalog.update.microsoft.com), checkpoint cumulative updates will be available from the download button. In addition, the knowledge base article for the cumulative update will provide additional information.
To install the checkpoint(s) when servicing the Windows OS (steps 9 & 12) and WinPE (steps 17 & 23), call `Add-WindowsPackage` with the target cumulative update. The folder from `-PackagePath` will be used to discover and install one or more checkpoints as needed. Only the target cumulative update and checkpoint cumulative updates should be in the `-PackagePath` folder. Cumulative update packages with a revision <= the target cumulative update will be processed. If you are not customizing the image with additional languages and/or optional features, then separate calls to `Add-WindowsPackage` (checkpoint cumulative updates first) can be used for steps 9 & 17 above. Separate calls cannot be used for steps 12 and 23.
@@ -434,7 +474,7 @@ Move-Item -Path $WORKING_PATH"\install2.wim" -Destination $MEDIA_NEW_PATH"\sourc
### Update WinPE
-This script is similar to the one that updates WinRE, but instead it mounts Boot.wim, applies the packages with the latest cumulative update last, and saves. It repeats this for all images inside of Boot.wim, typically two images. It starts by applying the servicing stack Dynamic Update. Since the script is customizing this media with Japanese, it installs the language pack from the WinPE folder on the language pack ISO. Additionally, it adds font support and text to speech (TTS) support. Since the script is adding a new language, it rebuilds lang.ini, used to identify languages installed in the image. For the second image, we'll save setup.exe for later use, to ensure this version matches the \sources\setup.exe version from the installation media. If these binaries aren't identical, Windows Setup will fail during installation. We'll also save the serviced boot manager files for later use in the script. Finally, the script cleans and exports Boot.wim, and copies it back to the new media.
+This script is similar to the one that updates WinRE, but instead it mounts Boot.wim, applies the packages with the latest cumulative update last, and saves. It repeats this for all images inside of Boot.wim, typically two images. It starts by applying the servicing stack Dynamic Update. Since the script is customizing this media with Japanese, it installs the language pack from the WinPE folder on the language pack ISO. Additionally, it adds font support and text to speech (TTS) support. Since the script is adding a new language, it rebuilds lang.ini, used to identify languages installed in the image. For the second image, we'll save setup.exe and setuphost.exe for later use, to ensure these versions matches the \sources\setup.exe and \sources\setuphost.exe version from the installation media. If these binaries aren't identical, Windows Setup will fail during installation. We'll also save the serviced boot manager files for later use in the script. Finally, the script cleans and exports Boot.wim, and copies it back to the new media.
```powershell
#
@@ -586,7 +626,7 @@ Move-Item -Path $WORKING_PATH"\boot2.wim" -Destination $MEDIA_NEW_PATH"\sources\
### Update remaining media files
-This part of the script updates the Setup files. It simply copies the individual files in the Setup Dynamic Update package to the new media. This step brings in updated Setup files as needed, along with the latest compatibility database, and replacement component manifests. This script also does a final replacement of setup.exe and boot manager files using the previously saved versions from WinPE.
+This part of the script updates the Setup files. It simply copies the individual files in the Setup Dynamic Update package to the new media. This step brings in updated Setup files as needed, along with the latest compatibility database, and replacement component manifests. This script also does a final replacement of setup.exe, setuphost.exe and boot manager files using the previously saved versions from WinPE.
```powershell
#
diff --git a/windows/deployment/update/optional-content.md b/windows/deployment/update/optional-content.md
index 9984fc897b..d91a00bbc2 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/update/optional-content.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/update/optional-content.md
@@ -70,9 +70,9 @@ Most commercial organizations understand the pain points outlined above, and dis
Windows Update for Business solves the optional content problem. Optional content is published and available for acquisition by Windows Setup from a nearby Microsoft content delivery network and acquired using the Unified Update Platform. Optional content migration and acquisition scenarios just work when the device is connected to an update service that uses the Unified Update Platform, such as Windows Update or Windows Update for Business. If for some reason a language pack fails to install during the update, the update will automatically roll back.
-The [Unified Update Platform](https://blogs.windows.com/windowsexperience/2016/11/03/introducing-unified-update-platform-uup/) is an improvement in the underlying Windows update technology that results in smaller download sizes and a more efficient protocol for checking for updates, acquiring and installing the packages needed, and getting current in one update step. The technology is *unified* because it brings together the update stack for Windows client, Windows Server, and other products, such as HoloLens.
+The [Unified Update Platform](https://blogs.windows.com/windows-insider/2016/11/03/introducing-unified-update-platform-uup/) is an improvement in the underlying Windows update technology that results in smaller download sizes and a more efficient protocol for checking for updates, acquiring and installing the packages needed, and getting current in one update step. The technology is *unified* because it brings together the update stack for Windows client, Windows Server, and other products, such as HoloLens.
-Consider moving to Windows Update for Business. Not only will the optional content scenario work seamlessly (as it does for consumer devices today), but you also get the full benefits of smaller download sizes. Further, devices are immune to the challenge of upgrading Windows when the operating system installation language is inadvertently changed to a new language. Otherwise, any future media-based feature updates can fail when the installation media has a different installation language. For more information about this issue, see [Upgrading Windows 10 devices with installation media different than the original OS install language](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-it-pro-blog/upgrading-windows-10-devices-with-installation-media-different/ba-p/746126) and the [Ignite 2019 theater session THR4002](https://medius.studios.ms/video/asset/HIGHMP4/IG19-THR4002).
+Consider moving to Windows Update for Business. Not only will the optional content scenario work seamlessly (as it does for consumer devices today), but you also get the full benefits of smaller download sizes. Further, devices are immune to the challenge of upgrading Windows when the operating system installation language is inadvertently changed to a new language. Otherwise, any future media-based feature updates can fail when the installation media has a different installation language. For more information about this issue, see [Upgrading Windows 10 devices with installation media different than the original OS install language](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/windows-itpro-blog/upgrading-windows-10-devices-with-installation-media-different-than-the-original/746126).
### Option 2: Use WSUS with UUP Integration
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ You can customize the Windows image in these ways:
- Adding or removing languages
- Adding or removing Features on Demand
-The benefit of this option is that the Windows image can include those additional languages, language experience features, and other Features on Demand through one-time updates to the image. Then you can use them in an existing task sequence or custom deployment where `Setup.exe` is involved. The downside of this approach is that it requires some preparation of the image in advance, including scripting with DISM to install the additional packages. It also means the image is the same for all devices that consume it and might contain more features than some users need. For more information on customizing your media, see [Updating Windows 10 media with Dynamic Update packages](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-it-pro-blog/updating-windows-10-media-with-dynamic-update-packages/ba-p/982477) and the [Ignite 2019 theater session THR3073](https://medius.studios.ms/video/asset/HIGHMP4/IG19-THR3073). Also like Dynamic Update, you still have a solution for migration of optional content, but not supporting user-initiated optional content acquisition. Also, there's a variation of this option in which media is updated *on the device* just before installation. This option allows for device-specific image customization based on what's currently installed.
+The benefit of this option is that the Windows image can include those additional languages, language experience features, and other Features on Demand through one-time updates to the image. Then you can use them in an existing task sequence or custom deployment where `Setup.exe` is involved. The downside of this approach is that it requires some preparation of the image in advance, including scripting with DISM to install the additional packages. It also means the image is the same for all devices that consume it and might contain more features than some users need. For more information on customizing your media, see [Updating Windows 10 media with Dynamic Update packages](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/windows-itpro-blog/updating-windows-10-media-with-dynamic-update-packages/982477). Also like Dynamic Update, you still have a solution for migration of optional content, but not supporting user-initiated optional content acquisition. Also, there's a variation of this option in which media is updated *on the device* just before installation. This option allows for device-specific image customization based on what's currently installed.
### Option 5: Install language features during deployment
@@ -151,11 +151,9 @@ For more information about the Unified Update Platform and the approaches outlin
- [/DynamicUpdate](/windows-hardware/manufacture/desktop/windows-setup-command-line-options#dynamicupdate)
- [Configure a Windows Repair Source](/windows-hardware/manufacture/desktop/configure-a-windows-repair-source)
- [Run custom actions during feature update](/windows-hardware/manufacture/desktop/windows-setup-enable-custom-actions)
-- [Unified Update Platform](https://blogs.windows.com/windowsexperience/2016/11/03/introducing-unified-update-platform-uup/)
+- [Unified Update Platform](https://blogs.windows.com/windows-insider/2016/11/03/introducing-unified-update-platform-uup/)
- [Updating Windows installation media with Dynamic Update packages](media-dynamic-update.md)
-- [Windows Setup Automation Overview](/windows-hardware/manufacture/desktop/windows-setup-automation-overview)
-- [Ignite 2019 theater session THR3073](https://medius.studios.ms/video/asset/HIGHMP4/IG19-THR3073)
-- [Ignite 2019 theater session THR4002](https://medius.studios.ms/video/asset/HIGHMP4/IG19-THR4002)
+- [Windows Setup Automation Overview](/windows-hardware/manufacture/desktop/windows-setup-automation-overview)
## Sample scripts
diff --git a/windows/deployment/update/update-policies.md b/windows/deployment/update/update-policies.md
index 50b404df35..0e1a4c7d47 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/update/update-policies.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/update/update-policies.md
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ author: mestew
ms.author: mstewart
manager: aaroncz
ms.localizationpriority: medium
-appliesto:
+appliesto:
- ✅ Windows 11
- ✅ Windows 10
ms.date: 12/31/2017
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ ms.date: 12/31/2017
# Policies for update compliance, activity, and user experience
-Keeping devices up to date is the best way to keep them working smoothly and securely.
+Keeping devices up to date is the best way to keep them working smoothly and securely.
## Deadlines for update compliance
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ options must be **Disabled** in order to take advantage of intelligent active ho
If you do set active hours, we recommend setting the following policies to **Disabled** in order to increase update
velocity:
-- [Delay automatic reboot](waas-restart.md#delay-automatic-reboot). While it's possible to set the system to delay restarts for users who are logged in, this setting might delay an update indefinitely if a user is always either logged in or shut down. Instead, we recommend setting the following polices to **Disabled**:
+- [Delay automatic reboot](waas-restart.md#delay-automatic-restart). While it's possible to set the system to delay restarts for users who are logged in, this setting might delay an update indefinitely if a user is always either logged in or shut down. Instead, we recommend setting the following polices to **Disabled**:
- **Turn off auto-restart during active hours**
- **No auto-restart with logged on users for scheduled automatic updates**
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ updates will occur, so we recommend that you set this policy to **Disabled**, to
- [Update/EngagedRestartTransitionSchedule](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-update#update-engagedrestarttransitionschedule)
- [Configure automatic update](waas-wu-settings.md#configure-automatic-updates). By properly setting policies to configure automatic updates, you can increase update velocity by having clients contact a Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) server so it can manage them. We recommend that you set this policy to **Disabled**. However, if you need to provide values, ensure that you set downloads to install automatically by setting the [Group Policy](waas-manage-updates-wsus.md#configure-automatic-updates-and-update-service-location) to **4**. If you're using Microsoft Intune, setting the value to [Reset to Default](/mem/intune/protect/windows-update-settings#user-experience-settings).
-- **Allow auto Windows Update to download over metered networks**. Since more devices primarily use cellular data and don't have wi-fi access, consider allowing users to automatically download updates from a metered network. Though the default setting doesn't allow download over a metered network, setting this value to **1** can increase velocity by enabling users to get updates whether they're connected to the internet or not, provided they have cellular service.
+- **Allow auto Windows Update to download over metered networks**. Since more devices primarily use cellular data and don't have wi-fi access, consider allowing users to automatically download updates from a metered network. Though the default setting doesn't allow download over a metered network, setting this value to **1** can increase velocity by enabling users to get updates whether they're connected to the internet or not, provided they have cellular service.
> [!IMPORTANT]
> Older versions of Windows don't support intelligent active hours. If your device runs a version of Windows prior to Windows 10, version 1903, we recommend setting the following policies:
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ this value to **10**.
>- [Schedule update installation](waas-restart.md#schedule-update-installation). In the **Configure Automatic Updates** settings, there are two ways to control a forced restart after a specified installation time. If you use **schedule update installation**, do not enable both settings because they will most likely conflict.
> - **Specify automatic maintenance time**. This setting lets you set broader maintenance windows for updates and ensures that this schedule does not conflict with active hours. We
recommend setting this value to **3** (corresponding to 3 AM). If 3:00 AM is in the middle of the work shift, pick another time that is at least a couple hours before your scheduled work time begins.
-> - **Schedule the install time**. This setting allows you to schedule an installation time for a restart. We do *not* recommend you set this to **Disabled** as it could conflict with active hours.
+> - **Schedule the install time**. This setting allows you to schedule an installation time for a restart. We do *not* recommend you set this to **Disabled** as it could conflict with active hours.
### Power policies
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ The default timeout on devices that support traditional sleep is set to three ho
## Old or conflicting policies
-Each release of Windows client can introduce new policies to make the experience better for both administrators and their organizations. When we release a new client policy, we either release it purely for that release and later or we backport the policy to make it available on earlier versions.
+Each release of Windows client can introduce new policies to make the experience better for both administrators and their organizations. When we release a new client policy, we either release it purely for that release and later or we backport the policy to make it available on earlier versions.
> [!IMPORTANT]
> If you are using Group Policy, note that we don't update the old ADMX templates and you must use the newer (1903) ADMX template in order to use the newer policy. Also, if you are
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ Each release of Windows client can introduce new policies to make the experience
As administrators, you have set up and expect certain behaviors, so we expressly don't remove older policies since they were set up for your particular use cases. However, if you set a new policy without disabling a similar older policy, you could have conflicting behavior and updates might not perform as expected.
-> [!IMPORTANT]
+> [!IMPORTANT]
> We sometimes find that administrators set devices to get both Group Policy settings and MDM settings from an MDM server such as Microsoft Intune. Policy conflicts are handled differently, depending on how they are ultimately set up:
> - Windows updates: Group Policy settings take precedence over MDM.
> - Microsoft Intune: If you set different values for the same policy on two different groups, you will
@@ -194,4 +194,4 @@ Updates** rather than setting a deferral policy. You can choose a longer period
- **Pause Quality Updates Start Time**. Set to **Disabled** unless there's a known issue requiring time for a resolution.
- **Deadline No Auto Reboot**. Default is **Disabled - Set to 0** . We recommend that devices automatically try to restart when an update is received. Windows uses user interactions to dynamically identify the least disruptive time to restart.
-There are also additional policies are no longer supported or have been superseded.
+There are also additional policies that are no longer supported or have been superseded.
diff --git a/windows/deployment/update/waas-restart.md b/windows/deployment/update/waas-restart.md
index 46c69eb5b6..5b4b486236 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/update/waas-restart.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/update/waas-restart.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
title: Manage device restarts after updates
-description: Use Group Policy settings, mobile device management (MDM), or Registry to configure when devices will restart after a Windows update is installed.
+description: Use group policy settings, mobile device management (MDM), or registry to configure when devices will restart after a Windows update is installed.
ms.service: windows-client
ms.subservice: itpro-updates
ms.topic: how-to
@@ -14,38 +14,42 @@ ms.localizationpriority: medium
appliesto:
- ✅ Windows 11
- ✅ Windows 10
-ms.date: 10/04/2024
+ms.date: 10/25/2024
---
# Manage device restarts after updates
-> **Looking for consumer information?** See [Windows Update: FAQ](https://support.microsoft.com/help/12373/windows-update-faq)
+> **Looking for consumer information?** See [Windows Update: FAQ](https://support.microsoft.com/windows/windows-update-faq-8a903416-6f45-0718-f5c7-375e92dddeb2)
-You can use Group Policy settings, mobile device management (MDM), or Registry (not recommended) to configure when devices will restart after a Windows update is installed. You can schedule update installation and set policies for restart, configure active hours for when restarts won't occur, or you can do both.
+You can use group policy settings, mobile device management (MDM), or the Windows registry to configure when devices will restart after a Windows update is installed. You can schedule update installation and set policies for restart, configure active hours for when restarts shouldn't occur, or you can do both.
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> Directly editing the Windows registry isn't recommended.
## Schedule update installation
-In Group Policy, within **Configure Automatic Updates**, you can configure a forced restart after a specified installation time.
+In group policy, within **Configure Automatic Updates**, you can configure a forced restart after a specified installation time.
-To set the time, you need to go to **Configure Automatic Updates**, select option **4 - Auto download and schedule the install**, and then enter a time in the **Scheduled install time** dropdown. Alternatively, you can specify that installation occurs during the automatic maintenance time (configured using **Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Maintenance Scheduler**).
+To set the time, go to **Configure Automatic Updates**, select option **4 - Auto download and schedule the install**, and then use **Scheduled install time** to enter a time. Alternatively, you can specify that installation occurs during the automatic maintenance time. To configure this alternative method, use **Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Maintenance Scheduler**.
-**Always automatically restart at the scheduled time** forces a restart after the specified installation time and lets you configure a timer to warn a signed-in user that a restart is going to occur.
+The setting to **Always automatically restart at the scheduled time** forces a restart after the specified installation time. It lets you configure a timer to warn a signed-in user that a restart is going to occur.
-While not recommended, the same result can be achieved through Registry. Under **HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU**, set **AuOptions** to **4**, set the install time with **ScheduledInstallTime**, enable **AlwaysAutoRebootAtScheduledTime** and specify the delay in minutes through **AlwaysAutoRebootAtScheduledTimeMinutes**. Similar to Group Policy, **AlwaysAutoRebootAtScheduledTimeMinutes** sets the timer to warn a signed-in user that a restart is going to occur.
+While not recommended, you can achieve the same result with the Windows registry. Under `HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU`, set `AuOptions` to `4` and set the install time with `ScheduledInstallTime`. Enable `AlwaysAutoRebootAtScheduledTime` and specify the delay in minutes through `AlwaysAutoRebootAtScheduledTimeMinutes`. Similar to group policy, `AlwaysAutoRebootAtScheduledTimeMinutes` sets the timer to warn a signed-in user that a restart is going to occur.
For a detailed description of these registry keys, see [Registry keys used to manage restart](#registry-keys-used-to-manage-restart).
-## Delay automatic reboot
+## Delay automatic restart
-When **Configure Automatic Updates** is enabled in Group Policy, you can also enable one of the following policies to delay an automatic reboot after update installation:
+When you enable **Configure Automatic Updates** in group policy, you can also enable one of the following policies to delay an automatic restart after update installation:
- **Turn off auto-restart for updates during active hours** prevents automatic restart during active hours.
-- **No auto-restart with logged on users for scheduled automatic updates installations** prevents automatic restart when a user is signed in. If a user schedules the restart in the update notification, the device restarts at the time the user specifies even if a user is signed in at the time. This policy only applies when **Configure Automatic Updates** is set to option **4-Auto download and schedule the install**.
+
+- **No auto-restart with logged on users for scheduled automatic updates installations** prevents automatic restart when a user is signed in. If a user schedules the restart in the update notification, the device restarts at the time the user specifies even if a user is signed in at the time. This policy only applies when **Configure Automatic Updates** is set to option **4 - Auto download and schedule the install**.
> [!NOTE]
-> When using Remote Desktop Protocol connections, only active RDP sessions are considered as logged on users. Devices that do not have locally logged on users, or active RDP sessions, will be restarted.
+> When using Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connections, only active RDP sessions are considered signed-in users. Devices that don't have locally signed-in users, or active RDP sessions, are restarted.
-You can also use Registry, to prevent automatic restarts when a user is signed in. Under **HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU**, set **AuOptions** to **4** and enable **NoAutoRebootWithLoggedOnUsers**. As with Group Policy, if a user schedules the restart in the update notification, it overrides this setting.
+You can also use the Windows registry, to prevent automatic restarts when a user is signed in. Under `HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU`, set `AuOptions` to `4` and enable `NoAutoRebootWithLoggedOnUsers`. As with group policy, if a user schedules the restart in the update notification, it overrides this setting.
For a detailed description of these registry keys, see [Registry keys used to manage restart](#registry-keys-used-to-manage-restart).
@@ -53,166 +57,177 @@ For a detailed description of these registry keys, see [Registry keys used to ma
*Active hours* identify the period of time when you expect the device to be in use. Automatic restarts after an update occur outside of the active hours.
-By default, active hours are from 8 AM to 5 PM on PCs and from 5 AM to 11 PM on phones. Users can change the active hours manually.
+By default, active hours are from 8 AM to 5 PM on PCs. Users can manually change the active hours.
-Starting with Windows 10, version 1703, you can also specify the max active hours range. The specified range is counted from the active hours start time.
+You can also specify the max active hours range. The specified range is counted from the active hours start time.
-Administrators can use multiple ways to set active hours for managed devices:
+### Configure active hours with group policy
-- You can use Group Policy, as described in the procedure that follows.
-- You can use MDM, as described in [Configuring active hours with MDM](#configuring-active-hours-with-mdm).
-- While not recommended, you can also configure active hours, as described in [Configuring active hours through Registry](#configuring-active-hours-through-registry).
+To configure active hours using group policy, go to **Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Update** and open the **Turn off auto-restart for updates during active hours** policy setting. When the policy is enabled, you can set the start and end times for active hours.
-### Configuring active hours with Group Policy
+:::image type="content" source="images/waas-active-hours-policy.png" alt-text="A screenshot of the group policy setting to 'Turn off auto-restart for updates during active hours' set to Enabled and the default active hours specified." lightbox="images/waas-active-hours-policy.png":::
-To configure active hours using Group Policy, go to **Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Update** and open the **Turn off auto-restart for updates during active hours** policy setting. When the policy is enabled, you can set the start and end times for active hours.
+### Configure active hours with MDM
-
+To configure active hours, MDM uses the following settings in the [Update Policy CSP](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-update):
-### Configuring active hours with MDM
+- [ActiveHoursStart](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-update#activehoursstart)
+- [ActiveHoursEnd](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-update#activehoursend)
+- [ActiveHoursMaxRange](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-update#activehoursmaxrange)
-MDM uses the [Update/ActiveHoursStart and Update/ActiveHoursEnd](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-configuration-service-provider#Update_ActiveHoursEnd) and [Update/ActiveHoursMaxRange](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-configuration-service-provider#update-activehoursmaxrange) settings in the [Policy CSP](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-configuration-service-provider) to configure active hours.
+### Configure active hours through the Windows registry
-### Configuring active hours through Registry
-
-This method isn't recommended, and should only be used when you can't use Group Policy or MDM.
-Any settings configured through Registry may conflict with any existing configuration that uses any of the methods mentioned above.
+This method isn't recommended, and should only be used when you can't use group policy or MDM. Any settings configured through the registry might conflict with any existing configuration that uses any of the other methods.
Configure active hours by setting a combination of the following registry values:
-Under **HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate** use **SetActiveHours** to enable or disable active hours and **ActiveHoursStart** and **ActiveHoursEnd** to specify the range of active hours.
+Under `HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate` use `SetActiveHours` to enable or disable active hours and `ActiveHoursStart` and `ActiveHoursEnd` to specify the range of active hours.
For a detailed description of these registry keys, see [Registry keys used to manage restart](#registry-keys-used-to-manage-restart).
->[!NOTE]
->To configure active hours manually on a single device, go to **Settings** > **Update & security** > **Windows Update** and select **Change active hours**.
->
->
+> [!TIP]
+> To manually configure active hours on a device, go to **Settings** > **Windows Update** > **Advanced options** and select **Active hours**.
-### Configuring active hours max range
+### Configure active hours maximum range
-With Windows 10, version 1703, administrators can specify the max active hours range users can set. This option gives you additional flexibility to leave some of the decision for active hours on the user's side, while making sure you allow enough time for updating. The max range is calculated from active hours start time.
+You can specify the maximum active hours range that users can set. This option gives you flexibility to leave some of the decision for active hours on the user's side, while making sure you allow enough time for updates to install. The maximum range is calculated from the active hours start time.
-To configure active hours max range through Group Policy, go to **Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Update** and open the **Specify active hours range for auto-restarts**.
+To configure the maximum range for active hours through group policy, go to **Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Update** and open the setting to **Specify active hours range for auto-restarts**.
-To configure active hours max range through MDM, use [**Update/ActiveHoursMaxRange**](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-configuration-service-provider#update-activehoursmaxrange).
+To configure the maximum range for active hours through MDM, use [ActiveHoursMaxRange](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-update#activehoursmaxrange).
## Limit restart delays
-After an update is installed, Windows attempts automatic restart outside of active hours. If the restart doesn't succeed after seven days (by default), the user will see a notification that restart is required. You can use the **Specify deadline before auto-restart for update installation** policy to change the delay from seven days to any number of days between 2 and 14.
+After Windows installs an update, it attempts to automatically restart outside of active hours. If the restart doesn't succeed after a default period of seven days, the user sees a notification that a restart is required. To change the delay, use the setting to **Specify deadline before auto-restart for update installation**. The minimum value is two days and the maximum value is two weeks (14 days).
## Control restart notifications
### Display options for update notifications
-Starting in Windows 10 version 1809, you can define which Windows Update notifications are displayed to the user. This policy doesn't control how and when updates are downloaded and installed. You can use **Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Windows Update > Display options for update notifications** with these values:
+You can define which Windows Update notifications are displayed to the user. This policy doesn't control how and when updates are downloaded and installed.
-**0** (default) - Use the default Windows Update notifications
-**1** - Turn off all notifications, excluding restart warnings
-**2** - Turn off all notifications, including restart warnings
+To configure this behavior through group policy, go to **Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Update** and select the policy for **Display options for update notifications**. Configure the following values:
-To configure this behavior through MDM, use [**Update/UpdateNotificationLevel**](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-configuration-service-provider#update-updatenotificationlevel).
+- `0` (default): Use the default Windows Update notifications.
+- `1`: Turn off most notifications but keep restart warnings.
+- `2`: Turn off all notifications including restart warnings.
-Starting in Windows 11, version 22H2, **Apply only during active hours** was added as an additional option for **Display options for update notifications**. When **Apply only during active hours** is selected, the notifications will only be disabled during active hours when options `1` or `2` are used. To ensure that the device stays updated, a notification will still be shown during active hours if **Apply only during active hours** is selected, and once a deadline has been reached when [Specify deadlines for automatic updates and restarts](wufb-compliancedeadlines.md) is configured.
+To configure this behavior through MDM, use [UpdateNotificationLevel](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-update#updatenotificationlevel).
-To configure this behavior through MDM, use [**Update/UpdateNotificationLevel**](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-update#update-NoUpdateNotificationDuringActiveHours).
+Starting in Windows 11, version 22H2, **Apply only during active hours** was added as another option for **Display options for update notifications**. When you select **Apply only during active hours**, the notifications are only disabled during active hours when you use options `1` or `2`. To ensure that the device stays updated, a notification is still shown during active hours if you select **Apply only during active hours**, and once a deadline is reached when you configure [Specify deadlines for automatic updates and restarts](wufb-compliancedeadlines.md).
-### Auto restart notifications
+To configure this behavior through MDM, use [UpdateNotificationLevel](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-update#updatenotificationlevel).
-Administrators can override the default behavior for the auto restart required notification. By default, this notification dismisses automatically. This setting was added in Windows 10, version 1703.
+### Automatic restart notifications
-To configure this behavior through Group Policy, go to **Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Update** and select **Configure auto-restart required notification for updates**. When configured to **2 - User Action**, a user that gets this notification must manually dismiss it.
+You can override the default behavior for the automatic restart required notification. By default, this notification dismisses automatically.
-To configure this behavior through MDM, use [**Update/AutoRestartRequiredNotificationDismissal**](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-configuration-service-provider#update-AutoRestartRequiredNotificationDismissal)
+- To configure this behavior through group policy, go to **Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Update** and select the policy to **Configure auto-restart required notification for updates**. When configured to **2 - User Action**, a user that gets this notification must manually dismiss it.
-You can also configure the period prior to an update that this notification shows up. The default value is 15 minutes.
+- To configure this behavior through MDM, use [AutoRestartRequiredNotificationDismissal](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-update#autorestartrequirednotificationdismissal).
-To change it through Group Policy, select **Configure auto-restart-reminder notifications for updates** under **Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Update** and select the period in minutes.
+You can also configure the period before an update that this notification shows up. The default value is 15 minutes.
-To change it through MDM, use [**Update/AutoRestartNotificationSchedule**](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-configuration-service-provider#update-AutoRestartNotificationSchedule).
+- To change it through group policy, select **Configure auto-restart-reminder notifications for updates** under **Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Update** and select the period in minutes.
+- To change it through MDM, use [AutoRestartNotificationSchedule](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-update#autorestartnotificationschedule).
In some cases, you don't need a notification to show up.
-To do so through Group Policy, go to **Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Update** and select **Turn off auto-restart notifications for update installations**.
+- To do so through group policy, go to **Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Update** and select the setting to **Turn off auto-restart notifications for update installations**.
-To do so through MDM, use [**Update/SetAutoRestartNotificationDisable**](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-configuration-service-provider#update-setautorestartnotificationdisable).
+- To do so through MDM, use [SetAutoRestartNotificationDisable](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-update#setautorestartnotificationdisable).
-### Scheduled auto restart warnings
+### Scheduled automatic restart warnings
-Since users aren't able to postpone a scheduled restart once the deadline has been reached, you can configure a warning reminder prior to the scheduled restart. You can also configure a warning prior to the restart, to notify users once the restart is imminent and allow them to save their work.
+Since users aren't able to postpone a scheduled restart once the deadline is reached, you can configure a warning reminder before the scheduled restart. You can also configure a warning before the restart, to notify users once the restart is imminent and allow them to save their work.
-To configure both through Group Policy, find **Configure auto-restart warning notifications schedule for updates** under **Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Update**. The warning reminder can be configured by **Reminder (hours)** and the warning prior to an imminent auto restart can be configured by **Warning (mins)**.
+To configure both through group policy, find the setting to **Configure auto-restart warning notifications schedule for updates** under **Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Update**. The warning reminder can be configured by **Reminder (hours)** and the warning before an imminent automatic restart can be configured by **Warning (mins)**.
-In MDM, the warning reminder is configured using [**Update/ScheduleRestartWarning**](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-configuration-service-provider#update-ScheduleRestartWarning) and the auto restart imminent warning is configured using [**Update/ScheduleImminentRestartWarning**](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-configuration-service-provider#update-ScheduleImminentRestartWarning).
+In MDM, to configure the warning reminder, use [ScheduleRestartWarning](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-update#schedulerestartwarning). To configure the automatic restart imminent warning, use [ScheduleImminentRestartWarning](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-update#scheduleimminentrestartwarning).
### Engaged restart
-Engaged restart is the period of time when users are required to schedule a restart. Initially, Windows auto-restarts outside of working hours. Once the set period ends (seven days by default), Windows transitions to user scheduled restarts.
+Engaged restart is the period of time when users are required to schedule a restart. Initially, Windows auto-restarts outside of working hours. Once the default seven day period ends, Windows transitions to user scheduled restarts.
-The following settings can be adjusted for engaged restart:
-* Period of time before auto restart transitions to engaged restart.
-* The number of days that users can snooze engaged restart reminder notifications.
-* The number of days before a pending restart automatically executes outside of working hours.
+You can adjust the following settings for engaged restart:
-In Group Policy, go to **Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Update** and pick **Specify Engaged restart transition and notification schedule for updates**.
+- Period of time before automatic restart transitions to engaged restart.
-In MDM, use [**Update/EngagedRestartTransitionSchedule**](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-configuration-service-provider#update-EngagedRestartTransitionSchedule), [**Update/EngagedRestartSnoozeSchedule**](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-configuration-service-provider#update-EngagedRestartSnoozeSchedule) and [**Update/EngagedRestartDeadline**](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-configuration-service-provider#update-EngagedRestartDeadline) respectively.
+- The number of days that users can snooze engaged restart reminder notifications.
-## Group Policy settings for restart
+- The number of days before a pending restart automatically executes outside of working hours.
-In the Group Policy editor, you'll see policy settings that pertain to restart behavior in **Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Update**. The following table shows which policies apply to Windows 10.
+In group policy, go to **Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Update** and use the setting to **Specify engaged restart transition and notification schedule for updates**.
+
+In MDM, use the following policies:
+
+- [EngagedRestartTransitionSchedule](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-update#engagedrestarttransitionschedule)
+- [EngagedRestartSnoozeSchedule](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-update#engagedrestartsnoozeschedule)
+- [EngagedRestartDeadline](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-update#engagedrestartdeadline)
+
+## Group policy settings for restart
+
+In the group policy editor, the policy settings for restart behavior are in **Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Update**. The following table shows which policies apply to Windows 10.
| Policy | Applies to Windows 10 | Notes |
| --- | --- | --- |
-| Turn off auto-restart for updates during active hours | Yes | Use this policy to configure active hours, during which the device won't be restarted. This policy has no effect if the **No auto-restart with logged on users for scheduled automatic updates installations** or **Always automatically restart at the scheduled time** policies are enabled. |
+| Turn off auto-restart for updates during active hours | Yes | Use this policy to configure active hours, during which the device won't restart. This policy has no effect if the **No auto-restart with logged on users for scheduled automatic updates installations** or **Always automatically restart at the scheduled time** policies are enabled. |
| Always automatically restart at the scheduled time | Yes | Use this policy to configure a restart timer (between 15 and 180 minutes) that will start immediately after Windows Update installs important updates. This policy has no effect if the **No auto-restart with logged on users for scheduled automatic updates installations** policy is enabled. |
| Specify deadline before auto-restart for update installation | Yes | Use this policy to specify how many days (between 2 and 14) an automatic restart can be delayed. This policy has no effect if the **No auto-restart with logged on users for scheduled automatic updates installations** or **Always automatically restart at the scheduled time** policies are enabled. |
-| No auto-restart with logged on users for scheduled automatic updates installations | Yes | Use this policy to prevent automatic restart when a user is logged on. This policy applies only when the **Configure Automatic Updates** policy is configured to perform scheduled installations of updates. |
+| No auto-restart with logged on users for scheduled automatic updates installations | Yes | Use this policy to prevent automatic restart when a user is logged on. This policy applies only when you configure the policy to **Configure Automatic Updates** to schedule the installation. |
| Re-prompt for restart with scheduled installations | No | |
| Delay Restart for scheduled installations | No | |
| Reschedule Automatic Updates scheduled installations | No | |
-
->[!NOTE]
->You can only choose one path for restart behavior.
->If you set conflicting restart policies, the actual restart behavior may not be what you expected.
->When using RDP, only active RDP sessions are considered as logged on users.
-
+> [!NOTE]
+>
+> - You can only choose one path for restart behavior.
+> - If you set conflicting restart policies, the actual restart behavior may not be what you expected.
+> - When using RDP, only active RDP sessions are considered as signed-in users.
## Registry keys used to manage restart
-The following tables list registry values that correspond to the Group Policy settings for controlling restarts after updates in Windows 10.
-**HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate**
+The following tables list registry values that correspond to the group policy settings for controlling restarts after updates in Windows 10.
-| Registry key | Key type | Value |
-| --- | --- | --- |
-| ActiveHoursEnd | REG_DWORD | 0-23: set active hours to end at a specific hour starts with 12 AM (0) and ends with 11 PM (23) |
-| ActiveHoursStart | REG_DWORD | 0-23: set active hours to start at a specific hour starts with 12 AM (0) and ends with 11 PM (23) |
-| SetActiveHours | REG_DWORD | 0: disable automatic restart after updates outside of active hours1: enable automatic restart after updates outside of active hours |
-
-**HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU**
+### `HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate`
| Registry key | Key type | Value |
| --- | --- | --- |
-| AlwaysAutoRebootAtScheduledTime | REG_DWORD | 0: disable automatic reboot after update installation at scheduled time1: enable automatic reboot after update installation at a scheduled time |
-| AlwaysAutoRebootAtScheduledTimeMinutes | REG_DWORD | 15-180: set automatic reboot to occur after given minutes |
-| AUOptions | REG_DWORD | 2: notify for download and notify for installation of updates3: automatically download and notify for installation of updates4: Automatically download and schedule installation of updates5: allow the local admin to configure these settings**Note:** To configure restart behavior, set this value to **4** |
-| NoAutoRebootWithLoggedOnUsers | REG_DWORD | 0: disable don't reboot if users are logged on1: don't reboot after an update installation if a user is logged on**Note:** If disabled: Automatic Updates will notify the user that the computer will automatically restart in 5 minutes to complete the installation |
-| ScheduledInstallTime | REG_DWORD | 0-23: schedule update installation time to a specific hour starts with 12 AM (0) and ends with 11 PM (23) |
+| `ActiveHoursEnd` | `REG_DWORD` | `0-23`: Set active hours to end at a specific hour. It starts with 12 AM (`0`) and ends with 11 PM (`23`). |
+| `ActiveHoursStart` | `REG_DWORD` | `0-23`: Set active hours to start at a specific hour. It starts with 12 AM (`0`) and ends with 11 PM (`23`.) |
+| `SetActiveHours` | `REG_DWORD` | `0`: Disable automatic restart after updates outside of active hours. `1`: Enable automatic restart after updates outside of active hours. |
+
+### `HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU`
+
+| Registry key | Key type | Value |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `AlwaysAutoRebootAtScheduledTime` | `REG_DWORD` | `0`: Disable automatic restart after update installation at the scheduled time. `1`: Enable automatic restart after update installation at a scheduled time. |
+| `AlwaysAutoRebootAtScheduledTimeMinutes` | `REG_DWORD` | `15-180`: Set automatic restart to occur after the specified number of minutes. |
+| `AUOptions` | `REG_DWORD` | `2`: Notify for download and notify for installation of updates. `3`: Automatically download and notify for installation of updates. `4`: Automatically download and schedule installation of updates. `5`: Allow the local administrator to configure these settings. **Note:** To configure restart behavior, set this value to `4`. |
+| `NoAutoRebootWithLoggedOnUsers` | `REG_DWORD` | `0`: If users are signed in, automatically restart ("disable don't reboot"). `1`: If a user is signed in, don't restart after an update installation. **Note:** If disabled (`0`), Automatic Updates notifies the user that the computer is scheduled to automatically restart in five minutes to complete the installation. |
+| `ScheduledInstallTime` | `REG_DWORD` | `0-23`: Schedule update installation time to a specific hour. It starts with 12 AM (`0`) and ends with 11 PM (`23`). |
There are three different registry combinations for controlling restart behavior:
-- To set active hours, **SetActiveHours** should be **1**, while **ActiveHoursStart** and **ActiveHoursEnd** should define the time range.
-- To schedule a specific installation and reboot time, **AUOptions** should be **4**, **ScheduledInstallTime** should specify the installation time, and **AlwaysAutoRebootAtScheduledTime** set to **1** and **AlwaysAutoRebootAtScheduledTimeMinutes** should specify number of minutes to wait before rebooting.
-- To delay rebooting if a user is logged on, **AUOptions** should be **4**, while **NoAutoRebootWithLoggedOnUsers** is set to **1**.
+- To set active hours:
+ - `SetActiveHours` should be `1`.
+ - Then to define the time range, use `ActiveHoursStart` and `ActiveHoursEnd`.
+
+- To schedule a specific installation and restart time:
+ - `AUOptions` should be `4`.
+ - `ScheduledInstallTime` should specify the installation time.
+ - Set `AlwaysAutoRebootAtScheduledTime` to `1`.
+ - `AlwaysAutoRebootAtScheduledTimeMinutes` should specify the number of minutes to wait before restarting.
+
+- To delay restarting if a user is signed in:
+ - `AUOptions` should be `4`.
+ - Set `NoAutoRebootWithLoggedOnUsers` to `1`.
## More resources
- [Overview of Windows as a service](waas-overview.md)
- [Configure Delivery Optimization for Windows updates](../do/waas-delivery-optimization.md)
-- [Configure BranchCache for Windows updates](waas-branchcache.md)
- [Configure Windows Update for Business](waas-configure-wufb.md)
-- [Integrate Windows Update for Business with management solutions](waas-integrate-wufb.md)
-- [Walkthrough: use Group Policy to configure Windows Update for Business](waas-wufb-group-policy.md)
-- [Manage Windows 10 and Windows 11 software updates in Intune](/mem/intune/protect/windows-update-for-business-configure)
+- [Walkthrough: use group policy to configure Windows Update for Business](waas-wufb-group-policy.md)
+- [Manage Windows software updates in Microsoft Intune](/mem/intune/protect/windows-update-for-business-configure)
diff --git a/windows/deployment/update/wufb-compliancedeadlines.md b/windows/deployment/update/wufb-compliancedeadlines.md
index 0a90bb71ad..e574086aa8 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/update/wufb-compliancedeadlines.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/update/wufb-compliancedeadlines.md
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ With a current version, it's best to use the new policy introduced in June 2019
| Policy | Location | Quality updates deadline in days | Quality updates grace period in days | Feature updates deadline in days | Feature updates grace period in days |
|-|-|-|-|-|-|
-| Specify deadlines for automatic updates and restarts | GPO: Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Windows Update > Specify deadlines for automatic updates and restarts | 7 | 2 | 2 | 7 |
+| Specify deadlines for automatic updates and restarts | GPO: Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Windows Update > Specify deadlines for automatic updates and restarts | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 |
When **Specify deadlines for automatic updates and restarts** is set:
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ The grace period for both quality and feature updates starts its countdown from
|Policy|Location|Quality update deadline in days|Feature update deadline in days|Grace period in days|
|-|-|-|-|-|
-|(Windows 10, version 1709 and later) Specify deadlines for automatic updates and restarts | GPO: Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Windows Update > Specify deadlines for automatic updates and restarts | 2 | 7 | 2 |
+|(Windows 10, version 1709 and later) Specify deadlines for automatic updates and restarts | GPO: Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Windows Update > Specify deadlines for automatic updates and restarts | 2 | 2 | 3 |
When **Specify deadlines for automatic updates and restarts** is set (Windows 10, version 1709 and later):
diff --git a/windows/deployment/update/wufb-reports-do.md b/windows/deployment/update/wufb-reports-do.md
index c38fa013ab..04291e8ef2 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/update/wufb-reports-do.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/update/wufb-reports-do.md
@@ -42,12 +42,12 @@ Windows Update for Business reports uses the following Delivery Optimization ter
- HTTP Only (0)
- Simple Mode (99)
- Bypass (100), deprecated in Windows 11
-- **Bandwidth savings**: The percentage of bandwidth that was downloaded from alternate sources (Peers or Microsoft Connected Cache (MCC) out of the total amount of data downloaded.
+- **Bandwidth savings**: The percentage of bandwidth that was downloaded from alternate sources (Peers or Microsoft Connected Cache) out of the total amount of data downloaded.
- If bandwidth savings are <= 60%, a *Warning* icon is displayed
- When bandwidth savings are <10%, an *Error* icon is displayed.
- **Configurations**: Based on the DownloadMode configuration set via MDM, Group Policy, or end-user via the user interface.
- **P2P Device Count**: The device count is the number of devices configured to use peering.
-- **Microsoft Connected Cache (MCC)**: Microsoft Connected Cache is a software-only caching solution that delivers Microsoft content. For more information, see [Microsoft Connected Cache overview](../do/waas-microsoft-connected-cache.md).
+- **Microsoft Connected Cache**: Microsoft Connected Cache is a software-only caching solution that delivers Microsoft content. For more information, see [Microsoft Connected Cache overview](../do/waas-microsoft-connected-cache.md).
- **MCC Device Count**: The device count is the number of devices that have received bytes from the cache server, for supported content types.
- **Total # of Devices**: The total number of devices with activity in last 28 days.
- **LAN Bytes**: Bytes delivered from LAN peers.
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ The calculated values used in the Delivery Optimization report are listed below.
- [UCDOAggregatedStatus](wufb-reports-schema-ucdostatus.md) table
- % P2P Efficiency = 100 * (BytesFromPeers + BytesFromGroupPeers) / (BytesFromPeers + BytesFromGroupPeers+BytesFromCDN+BytesFromCache)
- [UCDOStatus](wufb-reports-schema-ucdostatus.md) table
-- % MCC Efficiency = 100 * BytesFromCache / (BytesFromPeers + BytesFromGroupPeers+BytesFromCDN+BytesFromCache)
+- % Connected Cache Efficiency = 100 * BytesFromCache / (BytesFromPeers + BytesFromGroupPeers+BytesFromCDN+BytesFromCache)
- [UCDOStatus](wufb-reports-schema-ucdostatus.md) table
**Bytes Calculations**:
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ The calculated values used in the Delivery Optimization report are listed below.
- Volume by P2P = BytesFromPeers + BytesFromGroupPeers
- [UCDOStatus](wufb-reports-schema-ucdostatus.md) table
-- Volume by MCC = BytesFromCache
+- Volume by Connected Cache = BytesFromCache
- [UCDOStatus](wufb-reports-schema-ucdostatus.md) table
- Volume by CDN = BytesFrom CDN
- [UCDOStatus](wufb-reports-schema-ucdostatus.md) table
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ DeviceCount = count_distinct(GlobalDeviceId) by GroupID | top 10 by DeviceCount
### Delivery Optimization Supported Content Types
-There are many Microsoft [content types](waas-delivery-optimization.md#types-of-download-content-supported-by-delivery-optimization) that are supported by Delivery Optimization. All of these content types show up in the 'Content Distribution' section in the Delivery Optimization report. See the [complete table](waas-delivery-optimization.md#windows-client) for P2P/MCC support types.
+There are many Microsoft [content types](waas-delivery-optimization.md#types-of-download-content-supported-by-delivery-optimization) that are supported by Delivery Optimization. All of these content types show up in the 'Content Distribution' section in the Delivery Optimization report. See the [complete table](waas-delivery-optimization.md#windows-client) for P2P/Connected Cache support types.
| Content Category | Content Types Included |
| --- | --- |
diff --git a/windows/deployment/update/wufb-reports-schema-ucdoaggregatedstatus.md b/windows/deployment/update/wufb-reports-schema-ucdoaggregatedstatus.md
index 834c5a0b29..54de3d5647 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/update/wufb-reports-schema-ucdoaggregatedstatus.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/update/wufb-reports-schema-ucdoaggregatedstatus.md
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ UCDOAggregatedStatus is an aggregation of all individual UDDOStatus records acro
| **AzureADDeviceId** | [string](/azure/kusto/query/scalar-data-types/string) | `71db1a1a-f1a6-4a25-b88f-79c2f513dae0` | Microsoft Entra Device ID |
| **AzureADTenantId** | [string](/azure/kusto/query/scalar-data-types/string) | `69ca04b0-703d-4b3a-9184-c4e3c15d6f5e` | Microsoft Entra tenant ID |
| **BWOptPercent28Days** | [real](/azure/kusto/query/scalar-data-types/real) | `10.61` | Bandwidth optimization (as a percentage of savings of total bandwidth otherwise incurred) for this device. A rolling 28-day basis.|
-| **BytesFromCache** | [long](/azure/kusto/query/scalar-data-types/long) | `285212672` | Total number of bytes that were delivered from Microsoft Connected Cache (MCC). |
+| **BytesFromCache** | [long](/azure/kusto/query/scalar-data-types/long) | `285212672` | Total number of bytes that were delivered from Microsoft Connected Cache. |
| **BytesFromCDN** | [long](/azure/kusto/query/scalar-data-types/long) | `11463008693388` | Total number of bytes that were delivered from a Content Delivery Network (CDN). |
| **BytesFromGroupPeers** | [long](/azure/kusto/query/scalar-data-types/long) | `30830657175` | Total number of bytes that were delivered from Group peers, sharing the same GroupId. |
| **BytesFromIntPeers** | [long](/azure/kusto/query/scalar-data-types/long) | `285212672` | Total number of bytes that were delivered from Internet peers. |
diff --git a/windows/deployment/update/wufb-reports-schema-ucdostatus.md b/windows/deployment/update/wufb-reports-schema-ucdostatus.md
index f6ff2a21b3..ede39f076e 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/update/wufb-reports-schema-ucdostatus.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/update/wufb-reports-schema-ucdostatus.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: UCDOStatus data schema
titleSuffix: Windows Update for Business reports
-description: UCDOStatus schema for Windows Update for Business reports. UCDOStatus provides information, for a single device, on its DO and MCC bandwidth utilization.
+description: UCDOStatus schema for Windows Update for Business reports. UCDOStatus provides information, for a single device, on its DO and Microsoft Connected Cache bandwidth utilization.
ms.service: windows-client
ms.subservice: itpro-updates
ms.topic: reference
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ UCDOStatus provides information, for a single device, on its bandwidth utilizati
| **AzureADTenantId** | [string](/azure/kusto/query/scalar-data-types/string) | `69ca04b0-703d-4b3a-9184-c4e3c15d6f5e` | Microsoft Entra tenant ID |
| **BWOptPercent28Days** | [real](/azure/kusto/query/scalar-data-types/real) | `10.61` | Bandwidth optimization (as a percentage of savings of total bandwidth otherwise incurred) for this device. A rolling 28-day basis.|
| **BWOptPercent7Days** | [real](/azure/kusto/query/scalar-data-types/real) | `10.61` | Bandwidth optimization (as a percentage of savings of total bandwidth otherwise incurred) for this device. A rolling 7-day basis.|
-| **BytesFromCache** | [long](/azure/kusto/query/scalar-data-types/long) | `285212672` | Total number of bytes that were delivered from Microsoft Connected Cache (MCC). |
+| **BytesFromCache** | [long](/azure/kusto/query/scalar-data-types/long) | `285212672` | Total number of bytes that were delivered from Microsoft Connected Cache. |
| **BytesFromCDN** | [long](/azure/kusto/query/scalar-data-types/long) | `11463008693388` | Total number of bytes that were delivered from a Content Delivery Network (CDN). |
| **BytesFromGroupPeers** | [long](/azure/kusto/query/scalar-data-types/long) | `30830657175` | Total number of bytes that were delivered from Group peers, sharing the same GroupId. |
| **BytesFromIntPeers** | [long](/azure/kusto/query/scalar-data-types/long) | `285212672` | Total number of bytes that were delivered from Internet peers. |
diff --git a/windows/deployment/update/wufb-reports-workbook.md b/windows/deployment/update/wufb-reports-workbook.md
index 3d76c81910..cefc7b717e 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/update/wufb-reports-workbook.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/update/wufb-reports-workbook.md
@@ -180,8 +180,8 @@ The **Delivery Optimization** tab provides a summarized view of bandwidth effici
At the top of the report, tiles display the following information:
- Total bandwidth savings percentage
-- The percentage of the saved bandwidth broken down by peer-to-peer and MCC
-- Device counts showing percentages of bytes delivered between peer-to-peer and MCC
+- The percentage of the saved bandwidth broken down by peer-to-peer and Microsoft Connected Cache
+- Device counts showing percentages of bytes delivered between peer-to-peer and Connected Cache
- The breakdown of total downloaded GBs.
The Delivery Optimization tab is further divided into the following groups:
diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/TOC.yml b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/TOC.yml
index 30052f5291..a011e4c21c 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/TOC.yml
+++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/TOC.yml
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@
href: manage/windows-autopatch-windows-update-policies.md
- name: Programmatic controls for expedited Windows quality updates
href: manage/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-update-programmatic-controls.md
+ - name: Hotpatch updates
+ href: manage/windows-autopatch-hotpatch-updates.md
- name: Driver and firmware updates
href: manage/windows-autopatch-manage-driver-and-firmware-updates.md
items:
@@ -116,6 +118,8 @@
href: monitor/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-update-trending-report.md
- name: Reliability report
href: monitor/windows-autopatch-reliability-report.md
+ - name: Hotpatch quality update report
+ href: monitor/windows-autopatch-hotpatch-quality-update-report.md
- name: Windows feature and quality update device alerts
href: monitor/windows-autopatch-device-alerts.md
- name: Policy health and remediation
diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/deploy/windows-autopatch-device-registration-overview.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/deploy/windows-autopatch-device-registration-overview.md
index b65c4701ea..fb561d216a 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/deploy/windows-autopatch-device-registration-overview.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/deploy/windows-autopatch-device-registration-overview.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Device registration overview
description: This article provides an overview on how to register devices in Autopatch.
-ms.date: 09/16/2024
+ms.date: 10/30/2024
ms.service: windows-client
ms.subservice: autopatch
ms.topic: concept-article
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ A role defines the set of permissions granted to users assigned to that role. Yo
To be eligible for Windows Autopatch management, devices must meet a minimum set of required software-based prerequisites. For more information, see [Windows Autopatch prerequisites](../prepare/windows-autopatch-prerequisites.md).
> [!IMPORTANT]
-> Windows Autopatch supports registering [Windows 10 Long-Term Servicing Channel (LTSC)](/windows/whats-new/ltsc/) devices that are being currently serviced by the [Windows LTSC](/windows/release-health/release-information). The service only supports managing the [Windows quality updates](../operate/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-update-overview.md) workload for devices currently serviced by the LTSC. Windows Update for Business service and Windows Autopatch don't offer Windows feature updates for devices that are part of the LTSC. You must either use [LTSC media](https://www.microsoft.com/evalcenter/evaluate-windows-10-enterprise) or the [Configuration Manager Operating System Deployment capabilities to perform an in-place upgrade](/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/upgrade-to-windows-10-with-configuration-manager) for Windows devices that are part of the LTSC.
+> Windows Autopatch supports registering [Windows 10 and Windows 11 Long-Term Servicing Channel (LTSC)](/windows/whats-new/ltsc/overview) devices that are being currently serviced by the [Windows 10 LTSC](/windows/release-health/release-information) or [Windows 11 LTSC](/windows/release-health/windows11-release-information). The service only supports managing the [Windows quality updates](../operate/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-update-overview.md) workload for devices currently serviced by the LTSC. Windows Update for Business service and Windows Autopatch don't offer Windows feature updates for devices that are part of the LTSC. You must either use [LTSC media](https://www.microsoft.com/evalcenter/evaluate-windows-10-enterprise) or the [Configuration Manager Operating System Deployment capabilities to perform an in-place upgrade](/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/upgrade-to-windows-10-with-configuration-manager) for Windows devices that are part of the LTSC.
The Windows Autopatch device registration process is transparent for end-users because it doesn't require devices to be reset.
diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/manage/windows-autopatch-hotpatch-updates.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/manage/windows-autopatch-hotpatch-updates.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f59aeefc45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/manage/windows-autopatch-hotpatch-updates.md
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+---
+title: Hotpatch updates
+description: Use Hotpatch updates to receive security updates without restarting your device
+ms.date: 11/19/2024
+ms.service: windows-client
+ms.subservice: autopatch
+ms.topic: how-to
+ms.localizationpriority: medium
+author: tiaraquan
+ms.author: tiaraquan
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: adnich
+ms.collection:
+ - highpri
+ - tier1
+---
+
+# Hotpatch updates (public preview)
+
+[!INCLUDE [windows-autopatch-applies-to-all-licenses](../includes/windows-autopatch-applies-to-all-licenses.md)]
+
+> [!IMPORTANT]
+> This feature is in public preview. It is being actively developed and might not be complete. They're made available on a "Preview" basis. You can test and use these features in production environments and scenarios and provide feedback.
+
+Hotpatch updates are [Monthly B release security updates](/windows/deployment/update/release-cycle#monthly-security-update-release) that can be installed without requiring you to restart the device. Hotpatch updates are designed to reduce downtime and disruptions. By minimizing the need to restart, these updates help ensure faster compliance, making it easier for organizations to maintain security while keeping workflows uninterrupted.
+
+## Key benefits
+
+- Hotpatch updates streamline the installation process and enhance compliance efficiency.
+- No changes are required to your existing update ring configurations. Your existing ring configurations are honored alongside Hotpatch policies.
+- The [Hotpatch quality update report](../monitor/windows-autopatch-hotpatch-quality-update-report.md) provides a per policy level view of the current update statuses for all devices that receive Hotpatch updates.
+
+## Eligible devices
+
+To benefit from Hotpatch updates, devices must meet the following prerequisites:
+
+- Operating System: Devices must be running Windows 11 24H2 or later.
+- VBS (Virtualization-based security): VBS must be enabled to ensure secure installation of Hotpatch updates.
+- Latest Baseline Release: Devices must be on the latest baseline release version to qualify for Hotpatch updates. Microsoft releases Baseline updates quarterly as standard cumulative updates. For more information on the latest schedule for these releases, see [Release notes for Hotpatch](https://support.microsoft.com/topic/release-notes-for-hotpatch-in-azure-automanage-for-windows-server-2022-4e234525-5bd5-4171-9886-b475dabe0ce8?preview=true).
+
+## Ineligible devices
+
+Devices that don't meet one or more prerequisites automatically receive the Latest Cumulative Update (LCU) instead. Latest Cumulative Update (LCU) contains monthly updates that supersede the previous month's updates containing both security and nonsecurity releases.
+
+LCUs requires you to restart the device, but the LCU ensures that the device remains fully secure and compliant.
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> If devices aren't eligible for Hotpatch updates, these devices are offered the LCU. The LCU keeps your configured Update ring settings, it doesn't change the settings.
+
+## Release cycles
+
+For more information about the release calendar for Hotpatch updates, see [Release notes for Hotpatch](https://support.microsoft.com/topic/release-notes-for-hotpatch-in-azure-automanage-for-windows-server-2022-4e234525-5bd5-4171-9886-b475dabe0ce8?preview=true).
+
+- Baseline Release Months: January, April, July, October
+- Hotpatch Release Months: February, March, May, June, August, September, November, December
+
+## Enroll devices to receive Hotpatch updates
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> If you're using Autopatch groups and want your devices to receive Hotpatch updates, you must create a Hotpatch policy and assign devices to it. Turning on Hotpatch updates doesn't change the deferral setting applied to devices within an Autopatch group.
+
+**To enroll devices to receive Hotpatch updates:**
+
+1. Go to the [Intune admin center](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2109431).
+1. Select **Devices** from the left navigation menu.
+1. Under the **Manage updates** section, select **Windows updates**.
+1. Go to the **Quality updates** tab.
+1. Select **Create**, and select **Windows quality update policy (preview)**.
+1. Under the **Basics** section, enter a name for your new policy and select Next.
+1. Under the **Settings** section, set **"When available, apply without restarting the device ("hotpatch")** to **Allow**. Then, select **Next**.
+1. Select the appropriate Scope tags or leave as Default and select **Next**.
+1. Assign the devices to the policy and select **Next**.
+1. Review the policy and select **Create**.
+
+These steps ensure that targeted devices, which are [eligible](#eligible-devices) to receive Hotpatch updates, are configured properly. [Ineligible devices](#ineligible-devices) are offered the latest cumulative updates (LCU).
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> Turning on Hotpatch updates doesn't change the existing deadline-driven or scheduled install configurations on your managed devices. Deferral and active hour settings will still apply.
diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/manage/windows-autopatch-windows-feature-update-overview.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/manage/windows-autopatch-windows-feature-update-overview.md
index cd90f48781..b5259a8275 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/manage/windows-autopatch-windows-feature-update-overview.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/manage/windows-autopatch-windows-feature-update-overview.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Windows feature updates overview
description: This article explains how Windows feature updates are managed
-ms.date: 09/16/2024
+ms.date: 11/20/2024
ms.service: windows-client
ms.subservice: autopatch
ms.topic: overview
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ ms.collection:
Windows Autopatch provides tools to assist with the controlled roll out of annual Windows feature updates. These policies provide tools to allow version targeting, phased releases, and even Windows 10 to Windows 11 update options. For more information about how to configure feature update profiles, see [Feature updates for Windows 10 and later policy in Intune](/mem/intune/protect/windows-10-feature-updates).
+> [!IMPORTANT]
+> Windows Autopatch supports registering [Windows 10 and Windows 11 Long-Term Servicing Channel (LTSC)](/windows/whats-new/ltsc/overview) devices that are being currently serviced by the [Windows 10 LTSC](/windows/release-health/release-information) or [Windows 11 LTSC](/windows/release-health/windows11-release-information). The service only supports managing the [Windows quality updates](../operate/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-update-overview.md) workload for devices currently serviced by the LTSC. Windows Update for Business service and Windows Autopatch don't offer Windows feature updates for devices that are part of the LTSC. You must either use [LTSC media](https://www.microsoft.com/evalcenter/evaluate-windows-10-enterprise) or the [Configuration Manager Operating System Deployment capabilities to perform an in-place upgrade](/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/upgrade-to-windows-10-with-configuration-manager) for Windows devices that are part of the LTSC.
+
## Multi-phase feature update
Multi-phase feature update allows you to create customizable feature update deployments using multiple phases for your [existing Autopatch groups](../manage/windows-autopatch-manage-autopatch-groups.md). These phased releases can be tailored to meet your organizational unique needs.
@@ -117,6 +120,9 @@ For more information about Windows feature update policies that are created for
## Pause and resume a release
+> [!IMPORTANT]
+> **Due to a recent change, we have identified an issue that prevents the Paused and Pause status columns from being displayed** in reporting. Until a fix is deployed, **you must keep track of your paused releases so you can resume them at a later date**. The team is actively working on resolving this issue and we'll provide an update when a fix is deployed.
+
> [!IMPORTANT]
> **Pausing or resuming an update can take up to eight hours to be applied to devices**. Windows Autopatch uses Microsoft Intune as its device management solution and that's the average frequency Windows devices take to communicate back to Microsoft Intune with new instructions to pause, resume or rollback updates. For more information, see [how long does it take for devices to get a policy, profile, or app after they are assigned from Microsoft Intune](/mem/intune/configuration/device-profile-troubleshoot#how-long-does-it-take-for-devices-to-get-a-policy-profile-or-app-after-they-are-assigned).
diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/manage/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-update-end-user-exp.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/manage/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-update-end-user-exp.md
index 8e56b5f267..90528e17a2 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/manage/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-update-end-user-exp.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/manage/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-update-end-user-exp.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Windows quality update end user experience
description: This article explains the Windows quality update end user experience
-ms.date: 10/07/2024
+ms.date: 11/04/2024
ms.service: windows-client
ms.subservice: autopatch
ms.topic: conceptual
@@ -67,6 +67,11 @@ In the following example:
:::image type="content" source="../media/windows-quality-update-grace-period.png" alt-text="Windows quality update grace period" lightbox="../media/windows-quality-update-grace-period.png":::
+> [!TIP]
+> For optimal end-user experience, the recommeded settings are 2-day Deadline and 3-day Grace Period for update deployments.
+
## Minimize user disruption due to updates
-Windows Autopatch understands the importance of not disrupting end users but also updating the devices quickly. To achieve this goal, updates are automatically downloaded and installed at an optimal time determined by the device. By default, [Active hours](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-update#activehoursstart) are configured dynamically based on device usage patterns. Device restarts occur outside of active hours until the deadline is reached.
+Windows Autopatch understands the importance of not disrupting end users but also updating the devices quickly. To achieve this goal, updates are automatically downloaded and installed at an optimal time determined by the device. By default, [Active hours](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-update#activehoursstart) are configured dynamically based on device usage patterns. Device restarts occur outside of active hours until the deadline is reached.
+
+Windows Autopatch doesn't modify the existing Windows Update notifications. If you wish to modify the end-user update notification experience, see [Use CSPs and MDMs to configure Windows Update for Business](/windows/deployment/update/waas-wufb-csp-mdm).
diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/manage/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-update-overview.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/manage/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-update-overview.md
index 942d898c05..ed17d7438c 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/manage/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-update-overview.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/manage/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-update-overview.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Windows quality updates overview
description: This article explains how Windows quality updates are managed
-ms.date: 09/16/2024
+ms.date: 11/20/2024
ms.service: windows-client
ms.subservice: autopatch
ms.topic: conceptual
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ The service level objective for each of these states is calculated as:
> Targeted deployment ring refers to the deployment ring value of the device in question. If a device has a five day deferral with a two day deadline, and two day grace period, the SLO for the device would be calculated to `5 + 2 + 5 = 12`-day service level objective from the second Tuesday of the month. The five day reporting period is one established by Windows Autopatch to allow enough time for device check-in reporting and data evaluation within the service.
> [!IMPORTANT]
-> Windows Autopatch supports registering [Windows 10 Long-Term Servicing Channel (LTSC)](/windows/whats-new/ltsc/) devices that are being currently serviced by the [Windows LTSC](/windows/release-health/release-information). The service only supports managing the [Windows quality updates](../operate/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-update-overview.md) workload for devices currently serviced by the LTSC. Windows Update for Business service and Windows Autopatch don't offer Windows feature updates for devices that are part of the LTSC. You must either use [LTSC media](https://www.microsoft.com/evalcenter/evaluate-windows-10-enterprise) or the [Configuration Manager Operating System Deployment capabilities to perform an in-place upgrade](/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/upgrade-to-windows-10-with-configuration-manager) for Windows devices that are part of the LTSC.
+> Windows Autopatch supports registering [Windows 10 and Windows 11 Long-Term Servicing Channel (LTSC)](/windows/whats-new/ltsc/overview) devices that are being currently serviced by the [Windows 10 LTSC](/windows/release-health/release-information) or [Windows 11 LTSC](/windows/release-health/windows11-release-information). The service only supports managing the [Windows quality updates](../operate/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-update-overview.md) workload for devices currently serviced by the LTSC. Windows Update for Business service and Windows Autopatch don't offer Windows feature updates for devices that are part of the LTSC. You must either use [LTSC media](https://www.microsoft.com/evalcenter/evaluate-windows-10-enterprise) or the [Configuration Manager Operating System Deployment capabilities to perform an in-place upgrade](/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/upgrade-to-windows-10-with-configuration-manager) for Windows devices that are part of the LTSC.
## Out of Band releases
@@ -62,11 +62,14 @@ The service level objective for each of these states is calculated as:
Windows Autopatch schedules and deploys required Out of Band (OOB) updates released outside of the normal schedule.
-For the deployment rings that pass quality updates deferral date, the OOB release schedule is expedited and deployed on the same day. For the deployment rings that have deferral upcoming, OOBs are released as per the set deferral dates.
+For the deployment rings that pass quality updates deferral date, the OOB release schedule is expedited and deployed on the same day. For the deployment rings that have deferral upcoming, OOBs are released as per the specified deferral dates.
## Pause and resume a release
-The service-level pause is driven by the various software update deployment-related signals Windows Autopatch receives from Windows Update for Business, and several other product groups within Microsoft.
+> [!IMPORTANT]
+> **Due to a recent change, we have identified an issue that prevents the Paused and Pause status columns from being displayed** in reporting. Until a fix is deployed, **you must keep track of your paused releases so you can resume them at a later date**. The team is actively working on resolving this issue and we'll provide an update when a fix is deployed.
+
+The service-level pause is driven by the various software update deployment-related signals. Windows Autopatch receives from Windows Update for Business, and several other product groups within Microsoft.
If Windows Autopatch detects a significant issue with a release, we might decide to pause that release.
@@ -81,10 +84,8 @@ If Windows Autopatch detects a significant issue with a release, we might decide
1. Go to the [Microsoft Intune admin center](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2109431).
1. Select **Devices** from the left navigation menu.
1. Under the **Manage updates** section, select **Windows updates**.
-1. In the **Windows updates** blade, select the **Quality updates** tab.
-1. Select the Autopatch group or deployment ring that you want to pause or resume. Select either: **Pause** or **Resume**. Alternatively, you can select the **horizontal ellipses (...)** of the Autopatch group or deployment ring you want to pause or resume. Select, **Pause, or **Resume** from the dropdown menu.
-1. Optional. Enter the justification about why you're pausing or resuming the selected update.
-1. Optional. Select **This pause is related to Windows Update**. When you select this checkbox, you must provide information about how the pause is related to Windows Update.
+1. In the **Windows updates** blade, select the **Update rings** tab.
+1. Select the Autopatch group or deployment ring that you want to pause or resume. Select either: **Pause** or **Resume**. Alternatively, you can select the **horizontal ellipses (...)** of the Autopatch group or deployment ring you want to pause or resume. Select, **Pause**, or **Resume** from the dropdown menu.
1. If you're resuming an update, you can select one or more Autopatch groups or deployment rings.
1. Select **Pause or Resume deployment**.
diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/monitor/windows-autopatch-hotpatch-quality-update-report.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/monitor/windows-autopatch-hotpatch-quality-update-report.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..afa0dfe072
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/monitor/windows-autopatch-hotpatch-quality-update-report.md
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+---
+title: Hotpatch quality update report
+description: Use the Hotpatch quality update report to view the current update statuses for all devices that receive Hotpatch updates
+ms.date: 11/19/2024
+ms.service: windows-client
+ms.subservice: autopatch
+ms.topic: how-to
+ms.localizationpriority: medium
+author: tiaraquan
+ms.author: tiaraquan
+manager: aaroncz
+ms.reviewer: adnich
+ms.collection:
+ - highpri
+ - tier1
+---
+
+# Hotpatch quality update report (public preview)
+
+[!INCLUDE [windows-autopatch-applies-to-all-licenses](../includes/windows-autopatch-applies-to-all-licenses.md)]
+
+> [!IMPORTANT]
+> This feature is in public preview. It is being actively developed and might not be complete. They're made available on a "Preview" basis. You can test and use these features in production environments and scenarios and provide feedback.
+
+The Hotpatch quality update report provides a per policy level view of the current update statuses for all devices that receive Hotpatch updates. For more information about Hotpatching, see [Hotpatch updates](../manage/windows-autopatch-hotpatch-updates.md).
+
+**To view the Hotpatch quality update status report:**
+
+1. Go to the [Intune admin center](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2109431).
+1. Navigate to **Reports** > **Windows Autopatch** > **Windows quality updates**.
+1. Select the **Reports** tab.
+1. Select **Hotpatch quality updates (preview)**.
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> The data in this report is refreshed every four hours with data received by your Windows Autopatch managed devices. The last refreshed on date/time can be seen at the top of the page. For more information about how often Windows Autopatch receives data from your managed devices, see [Data latency](../monitor/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-and-feature-update-reports-overview.md#about-data-latency).
+
+## Report information
+
+The Hotpatch quality update report provides a visual representation of the update status trend for all devices over the last 90 days.
+
+### Default columns
+
+> [!IMPORTANT]
+> **Due to a recent change, we have identified an issue that prevents the Paused column from being displayed**. Until a fix is deployed, **you must keep track of your paused releases so you can resume them at a later date**. The team is actively working on resolving this issue and we'll provide an update when a fix is deployed.
+
+The following information is available as default columns in the Hotpatch quality update report:
+
+| Column name | Description |
+| ----- | ----- |
+| Quality update policy | The name of the policy. |
+| Device name | Total number of devices in the policy. |
+| Up to date | Total device count reporting a status of Up to date. For more information, see [Up to Date](../operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-quality-and-feature-update-reports-overview.md#up-to-date-devices). |
+| Hotpatched | Total devices that successfully received a Hotpatch update. |
+| Not up to Date | Total device count reporting a status of Not Up to date. For more information, see [Not Up to Date](../operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-quality-and-feature-update-reports-overview.md#not-up-to-date-devices). |
+| In progress | Total device counts reporting the In progress status. For more information, see [In progress](../operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-quality-and-feature-update-reports-overview.md#up-to-date-sub-statuses). |
+| % with the latest quality update | Percent of [Up to Date](../operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-quality-and-feature-update-reports-overview.md#up-to-date-devices) devices on the most current Windows release and its build number |
+| Not ready | Total device count reporting the Not ready status. For more information, see [Not ready](../operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-quality-and-feature-update-reports-overview.md#not-up-to-date-devices). |
+| Paused | Total device count reporting the status of the pause whether it's Service or Customer initiated. For more information, see [Up to Date](../operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-quality-and-feature-update-reports-overview.md#up-to-date-devices). |
+
+## Report options
+
+The following options are available:
+
+| Option | Description |
+| ----- | ----- |
+| By percentage | Select **By percentage** to show your trending graphs and indicators by percentage. |
+| By device count | Select **By device count** to show your trending graphs and indicators by numeric value. |
diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/monitor/windows-autopatch-windows-feature-update-status-report.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/monitor/windows-autopatch-windows-feature-update-status-report.md
index 4219401d76..c70e5b8f7a 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/monitor/windows-autopatch-windows-feature-update-status-report.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/monitor/windows-autopatch-windows-feature-update-status-report.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Feature update status report
-description: Provides a per device view of the current Windows OS upgrade status for all devices registered with Windows Autopatch.
-ms.date: 09/16/2024
+description: Provides a per device view of the current Windows OS upgrade status for all Intune devices.
+ms.date: 11/20/2024
ms.service: windows-client
ms.subservice: autopatch
ms.topic: how-to
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ ms.collection:
[!INCLUDE [windows-autopatch-enterprise-e3-f3-licenses](../includes/windows-autopatch-enterprise-e3-f3-licenses.md)]
-The Feature update status report provides a per device view of the current Windows OS upgrade status for all devices registered with Windows Autopatch.
+The Feature update status report provides a per device view of the current Windows OS upgrade status for all Intune devices.
**To view the Feature update status report:**
@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ The Feature update status report provides a per device view of the current Windo
### Default columns
+> [!IMPORTANT]
+> **Due to a recent change, we have identified an issue that prevents the Pause status column from being displayed**. Until a fix is deployed, **you must keep track of your paused releases so you can resume them at a later date**. The team is actively working on resolving this issue and we'll provide an update when a fix is deployed.
+
The following information is available as default columns in the Feature update status report:
| Column name | Description |
diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/monitor/windows-autopatch-windows-feature-update-summary-dashboard.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/monitor/windows-autopatch-windows-feature-update-summary-dashboard.md
index 4e65d5e28b..3df6e2730f 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/monitor/windows-autopatch-windows-feature-update-summary-dashboard.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/monitor/windows-autopatch-windows-feature-update-summary-dashboard.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Windows feature update summary dashboard
-description: Provides a broader view of the current Windows OS upgrade status for all devices registered with Windows Autopatch.
-ms.date: 09/16/2024
+description: Provides a broader view of the current Windows OS upgrade status for all Intune devices.
+ms.date: 11/20/2024
ms.service: windows-client
ms.subservice: autopatch
ms.topic: how-to
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ ms.collection:
[!INCLUDE [windows-autopatch-enterprise-e3-f3-licenses](../includes/windows-autopatch-enterprise-e3-f3-licenses.md)]
-The Summary dashboard provides a broader view of the current Windows OS update status for all devices registered with Windows Autopatch.
+The Summary dashboard provides a broader view of the current Windows OS update status for all Intune devices.
The first part of the Summary dashboard provides you with an all-devices trend report where you can follow the deployment trends within your organization. You can view if updates were successfully installed, failing, in progress, not ready or have their Windows feature update paused.
@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ The first part of the Summary dashboard provides you with an all-devices trend r
## Report information
+> [!IMPORTANT]
+> **Due to a recent change, we have identified an issue that prevents the Paused column from being displayed**. Until a fix is deployed, **you must keep track of your paused releases so you can resume them at a later date**. The team is actively working on resolving this issue and we'll provide an update when a fix is deployed.
+
The following information is available in the Summary dashboard:
| Column name | Description |
diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/monitor/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-and-feature-update-reports-overview.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/monitor/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-and-feature-update-reports-overview.md
index b2b2d8bf42..4b2f2596df 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/monitor/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-and-feature-update-reports-overview.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/monitor/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-and-feature-update-reports-overview.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Windows quality and feature update reports overview
description: This article details the types of reports available and info about update device eligibility, device update health, device update trends in Windows Autopatch.
-ms.date: 09/16/2024
+ms.date: 11/20/2024
ms.service: windows-client
ms.subservice: autopatch
ms.topic: overview
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ The Windows quality reports provide you with information about:
- Device update health
- Device update alerts
-Together, these reports provide insight into the quality update state and compliance of Windows devices that are enrolled into Windows Autopatch.
+Together, these reports provide insight into the quality update state and compliance of Intune devices.
The Windows quality report types are organized into the following focus areas:
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ Users with the following permissions can access the reports:
## About data latency
-The data source for these reports is Windows [diagnostic data](../overview/windows-autopatch-privacy.md#microsoft-windows-1011-diagnostic-data). The data typically uploads from enrolled devices once per day. Then, the data is processed in batches before being made available in Windows Autopatch. The maximum end-to-end latency is approximately 48 hours.
+The data source for these reports is Windows [diagnostic data](../overview/windows-autopatch-privacy.md#microsoft-windows-1011-diagnostic-data). The data typically uploads from enrolled devices once per day. Then, the data is processed in batches before being made available in Windows Autopatch. The maximum end-to-end latency is approximately four hours.
## Windows quality and feature update statuses
diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/monitor/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-update-status-report.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/monitor/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-update-status-report.md
index bcd381e6d1..abde6947cc 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/monitor/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-update-status-report.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/monitor/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-update-status-report.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Quality update status report
-description: Provides a per device view of the current update status for all Windows Autopatch managed devices.
-ms.date: 09/16/2024
+description: Provides a per device view of the current update status for all Intune devices.
+ms.date: 11/20/2024
ms.service: windows-client
ms.subservice: autopatch
ms.topic: how-to
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ ms.collection:
[!INCLUDE [windows-autopatch-enterprise-e3-f3-licenses](../includes/windows-autopatch-enterprise-e3-f3-licenses.md)]
-The Quality update status report provides a per device view of the current update status for all Windows Autopatch managed devices.
+The Quality update status report provides a per device view of the current update status for all Intune devices.
**To view the Quality update status report:**
@@ -29,12 +29,15 @@ The Quality update status report provides a per device view of the current updat
1. Select **Quality update status**.
> [!NOTE]
-> The data in this report is refreshed every 24 hours with data received by your Windows Autopatch managed devices. The last refreshed on date/time can be seen at the top of the page. For more information about how often Windows Autopatch receives data from your managed devices, see [Data latency](../operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-quality-and-feature-update-reports-overview.md#about-data-latency).
+> The data in this report is refreshed every four hours with data received by your Windows Autopatch managed devices. The last refreshed on date/time can be seen at the top of the page. For more information about how often Windows Autopatch receives data from your managed devices, see [Data latency](../operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-quality-and-feature-update-reports-overview.md#about-data-latency).
## Report information
### Default columns
+> [!IMPORTANT]
+> **Due to a recent change, we have identified an issue that prevents the Pause status column from being displayed**. Until a fix is deployed, **you must keep track of your paused releases so you can resume them at a later date**. The team is actively working on resolving this issue and we'll provide an update when a fix is deployed.
+
The following information is available as default columns in the Quality update status report:
| Column name | Description |
diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/monitor/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-update-summary-dashboard.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/monitor/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-update-summary-dashboard.md
index c145b09b4c..52bb8e8d65 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/monitor/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-update-summary-dashboard.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/monitor/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-update-summary-dashboard.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Windows quality update summary dashboard
-description: Provides a summary view of the current update status for all Windows Autopatch managed devices.
-ms.date: 09/16/2024
+description: Provides a summary view of the current update status for all Intune devices.
+ms.date: 11/20/2024
ms.service: windows-client
ms.subservice: autopatch
ms.topic: how-to
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ ms.collection:
[!INCLUDE [windows-autopatch-enterprise-e3-f3-licenses](../includes/windows-autopatch-enterprise-e3-f3-licenses.md)]
-The Summary dashboard provides a summary view of the current update status for all Windows Autopatch managed devices.
+The Summary dashboard provides a summary view of the current update status for all Intune devices.
**To view the current update status for all your enrolled devices:**
@@ -27,10 +27,13 @@ The Summary dashboard provides a summary view of the current update status for a
1. Navigate to **Reports** > **Windows Autopatch** > **Windows quality updates**.
> [!NOTE]
-> The data in this report is refreshed every 24 hours with data received by your Windows Autopatch managed devices. The last refreshed on date/time can be seen at the top of the page. For more information about how often Windows Autopatch receives data from your managed devices, see [Data latency](../operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-quality-and-feature-update-reports-overview.md#about-data-latency).
+> The data in this report is refreshed every four hours with data received by your managed devices. The last refreshed on date/time can be seen at the top of the page. For more information about how often Windows Autopatch receives data from your managed devices, see [Data latency](../operate/windows-autopatch-groups-windows-quality-and-feature-update-reports-overview.md#about-data-latency).
## Report information
+> [!IMPORTANT]
+> **Due to a recent change, we have identified an issue that prevents the Paused column from being displayed**. Until a fix is deployed, **you must keep track of your paused releases so you can resume them at a later date**. The team is actively working on resolving this issue and we'll provide an update when a fix is deployed.
+
The following information is available in the Summary dashboard:
| Column name | Description |
diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/overview/windows-autopatch-overview.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/overview/windows-autopatch-overview.md
index 386ec22830..97d26c798d 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/overview/windows-autopatch-overview.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/overview/windows-autopatch-overview.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: What is Windows Autopatch?
description: Details what the service is and shortcuts to articles.
-ms.date: 09/27/2024
+ms.date: 11/20/2024
ms.service: windows-client
ms.subservice: autopatch
ms.topic: overview
@@ -49,7 +49,9 @@ The goal of Windows Autopatch is to deliver software updates to registered devic
| [Windows quality updates](../manage/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-update-overview.md) | With Windows Autopatch, you can manage Windows quality update profiles for Windows 10 and later devices. You can expedite a specific Windows quality update using targeted policies. |
| [Windows feature updates](../manage/windows-autopatch-windows-feature-update-overview.md) | Windows Autopatch provides tools to assist with the controlled roll out of annual Windows feature updates. |
| [Driver and firmware updates](../manage/windows-autopatch-manage-driver-and-firmware-updates.md) | You can manage and control your driver and firmware updates with Windows Autopatch.|
+| [Hotpatch updates](../manage/windows-autopatch-hotpatch-updates.md) | Install [Monthly B release security updates](/windows/deployment/update/release-cycle#monthly-security-update-release) without requiring you to restart the device. |
| [Intune reports](/mem/intune/fundamentals/reports) | Use Intune reports to monitor the health and activity of endpoints in your organization.|
+| [Hotpatch quality update report](../monitor/windows-autopatch-hotpatch-quality-update-report.md) | Hotpatch quality update report provides a per policy level view of the current update statuses for all devices that receive Hotpatch updates. |
> [!IMPORTANT]
> Microsoft 365 Business Premium and Windows 10/11 Education A3 or A5 (included in Microsoft 365 A3 or A5) do **not** have access to all Windows Autopatch features. For more information, see [Features and capabilities](../overview/windows-autopatch-overview.md#features-and-capabilities).
@@ -70,7 +72,7 @@ In addition to the features included in [Business Premium and A3+ licenses](#bus
| [Microsoft Edge updates](../manage/windows-autopatch-edge.md) | Windows Autopatch configures eligible devices to benefit from Microsoft Edge's progressive rollouts on the Stable channel. |
| [Microsoft Teams updates](../manage/windows-autopatch-teams.md) | Windows Autopatch allows eligible devices to benefit from the standard automatic update channel. |
| [Policy health and remediation](../monitor/windows-autopatch-policy-health-and-remediation.md) | When Windows Autopatch detects policies in the tenant are either missing or modified that affects the service, Windows Autopatch raises alerts and detailed recommended actions to ensure healthy operation of the service. |
-| Enhanced [Windows quality and feature update reports](../monitor/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-and-feature-update-reports-overview.md) and [device alerts](../monitor/windows-autopatch-device-alerts.md) | Using Windows quality and feature update reports, you can monitor and remediate Windows Autopatch managed devices that are Not up to Date and resolve any device alerts to bring Windows Autopatch managed devices back into compliance. |
+| Enhanced [Windows quality and feature update reports](../monitor/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-and-feature-update-reports-overview.md) and [device alerts](../monitor/windows-autopatch-device-alerts.md) | Using Windows quality and feature update reports, you can monitor and remediate managed devices that are Not up to Date and resolve any device alerts to bring managed devices back into compliance. |
| [Submit support requests](../manage/windows-autopatch-support-request.md) with the Windows Autopatch Service Engineering Team | When you activate additional Autopatch features, you can submit, manage, and edit support requests. |
## Communications
diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/prepare/windows-autopatch-prerequisites.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/prepare/windows-autopatch-prerequisites.md
index 74379f93b0..5e7b3411e6 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/prepare/windows-autopatch-prerequisites.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/prepare/windows-autopatch-prerequisites.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Prerequisites
description: This article details the prerequisites needed for Windows Autopatch
-ms.date: 09/27/2024
+ms.date: 10/30/2024
ms.service: windows-client
ms.subservice: autopatch
ms.topic: concept-article
@@ -135,12 +135,15 @@ For more information about feature entitlement, see [Features and capabilities](
The following Windows 10/11 editions, build version, and architecture are supported when [devices are registered with Windows Autopatch](../deploy/windows-autopatch-register-devices.md):
- Windows 11 Professional, Education, Enterprise, Pro Education, or Pro for Workstations editions
+- Windows 11 IoT Enterprise edition
- Windows 10 Professional, Education, Enterprise, Pro Education, or Pro for Workstations editions
+- Windows 10 IoT Enterprise edition
Windows Autopatch service supports Windows client devices on the **General Availability Channel**.
-> [!NOTE]
-> Windows Autopatch supports registering [Windows 10 Long-Term Servicing Channel (LTSC)](/windows/whats-new/ltsc/) devices that are being currently serviced by the [Windows LTSC](/windows/release-health/release-information). The service only supports managing the [Windows quality updates](../operate/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-update-overview.md) workload for devices currently serviced by the LTSC. Windows Update for Business service and Windows Autopatch don't offer Windows feature updates for devices that are part of the LTSC. You must either use [LTSC media](https://www.microsoft.com/evalcenter/evaluate-windows-10-enterprise) or the [Configuration Manager Operating System Deployment capabilities to perform an in-place upgrade](/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/upgrade-to-windows-10-with-configuration-manager) for Windows devices that are part of the LTSC.
+
+> [!IMPORTANT]
+> Windows Autopatch supports registering [Windows 10 and Windows 11 Long-Term Servicing Channel (LTSC)](/windows/whats-new/ltsc/overview) devices that are being currently serviced by the [Windows 10 LTSC](/windows/release-health/release-information) or [Windows 11 LTSC](/windows/release-health/windows11-release-information). The service only supports managing the [Windows quality updates](../operate/windows-autopatch-windows-quality-update-overview.md) workload for devices currently serviced by the LTSC. Windows Update for Business service and Windows Autopatch don't offer Windows feature updates for devices that are part of the LTSC. You must either use [LTSC media](https://www.microsoft.com/evalcenter/evaluate-windows-10-enterprise) or the [Configuration Manager Operating System Deployment capabilities to perform an in-place upgrade](/windows/deployment/deploy-windows-cm/upgrade-to-windows-10-with-configuration-manager) for Windows devices that are part of the LTSC.
## Configuration Manager co-management requirements
diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/references/windows-autopatch-changes-made-at-feature-activation.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/references/windows-autopatch-changes-made-at-feature-activation.md
index 822866ede9..a39b3238a9 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/references/windows-autopatch-changes-made-at-feature-activation.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/references/windows-autopatch-changes-made-at-feature-activation.md
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ The following groups target Windows Autopatch configurations to devices and mana
## Microsoft Edge update policies
> [!IMPORTANT]
-> By default, these policies are not deployed. You can opt-in to deploy these policies when you [activate Windows Autopatch features](../prepare/windows-autopatch-feature-activation.md).To update Microsoft Office, you must [create at least one Autopatch group](../manage/windows-autopatch-manage-autopatch-groups.md) and the toggle the must be set to [**Allow**](../manage/windows-autopatch-edge.md#allow-or-block-microsoft-edge-updates).
+> By default, these policies are not deployed. You can opt-in to deploy these policies when you [activate Windows Autopatch features](../prepare/windows-autopatch-feature-activation.md).To update Microsoft Edge, you must [create at least one Autopatch group](../manage/windows-autopatch-manage-autopatch-groups.md) and the toggle the must be set to [**Allow**](../manage/windows-autopatch-edge.md#allow-or-block-microsoft-edge-updates).
- Windows Autopatch - Edge Update Channel Stable
- Windows Autopatch - Edge Update Channel Beta
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ The following groups target Windows Autopatch configurations to devices and mana
## Driver updates for Windows 10 and later
> [!IMPORTANT]
-> By default, these policies are not deployed. You can opt-in to deploy these policies when you [activate Windows Autopatch features](../prepare/windows-autopatch-feature-activation.md).To update Microsoft Office, you must [create at least one Autopatch group](../manage/windows-autopatch-manage-autopatch-groups.md) and the toggle the must be set to [**Allow**](../manage/windows-autopatch-manage-autopatch-groups.md#create-an-autopatch-group).
+> By default, these policies are not deployed. You can opt-in to deploy these policies when you [activate Windows Autopatch features](../prepare/windows-autopatch-feature-activation.md).To update drivers and firmware, you must [create at least one Autopatch group](../manage/windows-autopatch-manage-autopatch-groups.md) and the toggle the must be set to [**Allow**](../manage/windows-autopatch-manage-autopatch-groups.md#create-an-autopatch-group).
- Windows Autopatch - Driver Update Policy [Test]
- Windows Autopatch - Driver Update Policy [First]
diff --git a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/whats-new/windows-autopatch-whats-new-2024.md b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/whats-new/windows-autopatch-whats-new-2024.md
index f7ca1e60c8..815d13a816 100644
--- a/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/whats-new/windows-autopatch-whats-new-2024.md
+++ b/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/whats-new/windows-autopatch-whats-new-2024.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: What's new 2024
description: This article lists the 2024 feature releases and any corresponding Message center post numbers.
-ms.date: 09/27/2024
+ms.date: 11/19/2024
ms.service: windows-client
ms.subservice: autopatch
ms.topic: whats-new
@@ -21,6 +21,14 @@ This article lists new and updated feature releases, and service releases, with
Minor corrections such as typos, style, or formatting issues aren't listed.
+## November 2024
+
+### November feature releases or updates
+
+| Article | Description |
+| ----- | ----- |
+| Hotpatch | [Hotpatch updates](../manage/windows-autopatch-hotpatch-updates.md) [Hotpatch quality update report](../monitor/windows-autopatch-hotpatch-quality-update-report.md) |
+
## September 2024
### September feature releases or updates
diff --git a/windows/security/application-security/application-control/app-control-for-business/appcontrol.md b/windows/security/application-security/application-control/app-control-for-business/appcontrol.md
index 561da483b6..a778ffc2fb 100644
--- a/windows/security/application-security/application-control/app-control-for-business/appcontrol.md
+++ b/windows/security/application-security/application-control/app-control-for-business/appcontrol.md
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Application Control restricts which applications users are allowed
ms.localizationpriority: medium
ms.collection:
- tier3
-ms.date: 09/11/2024
+ms.date: 10/25/2024
ms.topic: overview
---
@@ -30,9 +30,9 @@ Windows 10 and Windows 11 include two technologies that can be used for applicat
## App Control and Smart App Control
-Starting in Windows 11 version 22H2, [Smart App Control](https://support.microsoft.com/topic/what-is-smart-app-control-285ea03d-fa88-4d56-882e-6698afdb7003) provides application control for consumers. Smart App Control is based on App Control, allowing enterprise customers to create a policy that offers the same security and compatibility with the ability to customize it to run line-of-business (LOB) apps. To make it easier to implement this policy, an [example policy](design/example-appcontrol-base-policies.md) is provided. The example policy includes **Enabled:Conditional Windows Lockdown Policy** option that isn't supported for App Control enterprise policies. This rule must be removed before you use the example policy. To use this example policy as a starting point for creating your own policy, see [Create a custom base policy using an example App Control base policy](design/create-appcontrol-policy-for-lightly-managed-devices.md#create-a-custom-base-policy-using-an-example-app-control-base-policy).
+Starting in Windows 11 version 22H2, [Smart App Control](https://support.microsoft.com/topic/what-is-smart-app-control-285ea03d-fa88-4d56-882e-6698afdb7003) provides application control for consumers. Smart App Control is based on App Control. App control enables enterprise customers to create a policy that offers the same security and compatibility as Smart App Control with the capability to customize policies to run line-of-business (LOB) apps. To make it easier to implement policy, an [example policy](design/example-appcontrol-base-policies.md) is provided. The example policy includes **Enabled:Conditional Windows Lockdown Policy** option that isn't supported for App Control enterprise policies. This rule must be removed before you use the example policy. To use this example policy as a starting point for creating your own policy, see [Create a custom base policy using an example App Control base policy](design/create-appcontrol-policy-for-lightly-managed-devices.md#create-a-custom-base-policy-using-an-example-app-control-base-policy).
-Smart App Control is only available on clean installation of Windows 11 version 22H2 or later, and starts in evaluation mode. Smart App Control is automatically turned off for enterprise managed devices unless the user has turned it on first. To turn off Smart App Control across your organization's endpoints, you can set the **VerifiedAndReputablePolicyState** (DWORD) registry value under `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\CI\Policy` as shown in the following table. After you change the registry value, you must either restart the device or use [CiTool.exe -r](operations/citool-commands.md#refresh-the-app-control-policies-on-the-system) for the change to take effect.
+Smart App Control is only available on clean installation of Windows 11 version 22H2 or later, and starts in evaluation mode. Smart App Control is automatically turned off for enterprise managed devices unless the user has turned it on first. To turn off Smart App Control across your organization's endpoints, you can set the **VerifiedAndReputablePolicyState** (DWORD) registry value under `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\CI\Policy` as shown in the following table. After you change the registry value, you must use [CiTool.exe -r](operations/citool-commands.md#refresh-the-app-control-policies-on-the-system) for the change to take effect.
| Value | Description |
|-------|-------------|
@@ -43,15 +43,6 @@ Smart App Control is only available on clean installation of Windows 11 version
> [!IMPORTANT]
> Once you turn Smart App Control off, it can't be turned on without resetting or reinstalling Windows.
-### Smart App Control Enforced Blocks
-
-Smart App Control enforces the [Microsoft Recommended Driver Block rules](design/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules.md) and the [Microsoft Recommended Block Rules](design/applications-that-can-bypass-appcontrol.md), with a few exceptions for compatibility considerations. The following aren't blocked by Smart App Control:
-
-- Infdefaultinstall.exe
-- Microsoft.Build.dll
-- Microsoft.Build.Framework.dll
-- Wslhost.dll
-
[!INCLUDE [windows-defender-application-control-wdac](../../../../../includes/licensing/windows-defender-application-control-wdac.md)]
## Related articles
diff --git a/windows/security/application-security/application-control/app-control-for-business/deployment/deploy-appcontrol-policies-with-script.md b/windows/security/application-security/application-control/app-control-for-business/deployment/deploy-appcontrol-policies-with-script.md
index 369252b993..2d47be74a6 100644
--- a/windows/security/application-security/application-control/app-control-for-business/deployment/deploy-appcontrol-policies-with-script.md
+++ b/windows/security/application-security/application-control/app-control-for-business/deployment/deploy-appcontrol-policies-with-script.md
@@ -16,13 +16,13 @@ This article describes how to deploy App Control for Business policies using scr
You should now have one or more App Control policies converted into binary form. If not, follow the steps described in [Deploying App Control for Business policies](appcontrol-deployment-guide.md).
> [!IMPORTANT]
-> Due to a known issue, you should always activate new **signed** App Control Base policies with a reboot on systems with [**memory integrity**](../../../../hardware-security/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md) enabled. Skip all steps below that use CiTool, RefreshPolicy.exe, or WMI to initiate a policy activation. Instead, copy the policy binary to the correct system32 and EFI locations and then activate the policy with a system restart.
+> Due to a known issue in Windows 11 updates earlier than 2024 (24H2), you should always activate new **signed** App Control Base policies with a reboot on systems with [**memory integrity**](../../../../hardware-security/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md) enabled. Skip all steps below that use CiTool, RefreshPolicy.exe, or WMI to initiate a policy activation. Instead, copy the policy binary to the correct system32 and EFI locations and then activate the policy with a system restart.
>
> This issue does not affect updates to signed Base policies that are already active on the system, deployment of unsigned policies, or deployment of supplemental policies (signed or unsigned). It also does not affect deployments to systems that are not running memory integrity.
-## Deploying policies for Windows 11 22H2 and above
+## Deploying policies for Windows 11 22H2 and above, and Windows Server 2025 and above
-You can use the inbox [CiTool](../operations/citool-commands.md) to apply policies on Windows 11 22H2 with the following commands. Be sure to replace **<Path to policy binary file to deploy>** in the following example with the actual path to your App Control policy binary file.
+You can use the inbox [CiTool](../operations/citool-commands.md) to deploy signed and unsigned policies on Windows 11 22H2 and Windows Server 2025 with the following commands. Be sure to replace `` in the following example with the actual path to your App Control policy binary file.
```powershell
# Policy binary files should be named as {GUID}.cip for multiple policy format files (where {GUID} = from the Policy XML)
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ To use this procedure, download and distribute the [App Control policy refresh t
## Deploying policies for all other versions of Windows and Windows Server
-Use WMI to apply policies on all other versions of Windows and Windows Server.
+Use WMI to deploy policies on all other versions of Windows and Windows Server.
1. Initialize the variables to be used by the script.
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ Use WMI to apply policies on all other versions of Windows and Windows Server.
## Deploying signed policies
-If you're using [signed App Control policies](use-signed-policies-to-protect-appcontrol-against-tampering.md), the policies must be deployed into your device's EFI partition in addition to the locations outlined in the earlier sections. Unsigned App Control policies don't need to be present in the EFI partition.
+If you're using [signed App Control policies](use-signed-policies-to-protect-appcontrol-against-tampering.md), the policies must be deployed into your device's EFI partition.
1. Mount the EFI volume and make the directory, if it doesn't exist, in an elevated PowerShell prompt:
diff --git a/windows/security/application-security/application-control/app-control-for-business/deployment/disable-appcontrol-policies.md b/windows/security/application-security/application-control/app-control-for-business/deployment/disable-appcontrol-policies.md
index c2434abfb4..8e1874bbe3 100644
--- a/windows/security/application-security/application-control/app-control-for-business/deployment/disable-appcontrol-policies.md
+++ b/windows/security/application-security/application-control/app-control-for-business/deployment/disable-appcontrol-policies.md
@@ -15,15 +15,17 @@ ms.topic: how-to
There may come a time when you want to remove one or more App Control policies, or remove all App Control policies you've deployed. This article describes the various ways to remove App Control policies.
> [!IMPORTANT]
-> **Signed App Control policy**
+> **Signed Base App Control policy**
>
-> If the policy you are trying to remove is a signed App Control policy, you must first deploy a signed replacement policy that includes option **6 Enabled:Unsigned System Integrity Policy**.
+> If the base policy you are trying to remove is a signed App Control policy, you must first deploy a signed replacement policy that includes option **6 Enabled:Unsigned System Integrity Policy**.
>
> The replacement policy must have the same PolicyId as the one it's replacing and a version that's equal to or greater than the existing policy. The replacement policy must also include \.
>
> To take effect, this policy must be signed with a certificate included in the \ section of the original policy you want to replace.
>
> You must then restart the computer so that the UEFI protection of the policy is deactivated. ***Failing to do so will result in a boot start failure.***
+>
+> Signed supplemental App Control policies can be removed in the same manner as unsigned policies, without the need to follow the aforementioned steps
Before removing any policy, you must first disable the method used to deploy it (such as Group Policy or MDM). Otherwise, the policy may redeploy to the computer.
@@ -35,9 +37,6 @@ To make a policy effectively inactive before removing it, you can first replace
4. Allow all COM objects. See [Allow COM object registration in an App Control policy](../design/allow-com-object-registration-in-appcontrol-policy.md#examples);
5. If applicable, remove option **0 Enabled:UMCI** to convert the policy to kernel mode only.
-> [!IMPORTANT]
-> After you remove a policy, restart the computer for it to take effect. You can't remove App Control policies without restarting the device.
-
### Remove App Control policies using CiTool.exe
Beginning with the Windows 11 2022 Update, you can remove App Control policies using CiTool.exe. From an elevated command window, run the following command. Be sure to replace the text *PolicyId GUID* with the actual PolicyId of the App Control policy you want to remove:
@@ -46,7 +45,8 @@ Beginning with the Windows 11 2022 Update, you can remove App Control policies u
CiTool.exe -rp "{PolicyId GUID}" -json
```
-Then restart the computer.
+> [!NOTE]
+> Beginning with the Windows 11 2024 update, unsigned policies can be removed using CiTool.exe without requiring a restart. In previous versions of Windows, however, a restart is required to complete the removal process.
### Remove App Control policies using MDM solutions like Intune
diff --git a/windows/security/application-security/application-control/app-control-for-business/operations/event-tag-explanations.md b/windows/security/application-security/application-control/app-control-for-business/operations/event-tag-explanations.md
index 0f5513efc4..f2db0b2d7a 100644
--- a/windows/security/application-security/application-control/app-control-for-business/operations/event-tag-explanations.md
+++ b/windows/security/application-security/application-control/app-control-for-business/operations/event-tag-explanations.md
@@ -72,11 +72,11 @@ Represents why verification failed, or if it succeeded.
| 19 | Binary is revoked based on its file hash. |
| 20 | SHA1 cert hash's timestamp is missing or after valid cutoff as defined by Weak Crypto Policy. |
| 21 | Failed to pass App Control for Business policy. |
-| 22 | Not Isolated User Mode (IUM)) signed; indicates an attempt to load a standard Windows binary into a virtualization-based security (VBS) trustlet. |
+| 22 | Not Isolated User Mode (IUM) signed; indicates an attempt to load a standard Windows binary into a virtualization-based security (VBS) trustlet. |
| 23 | Invalid image hash. This error can indicate file corruption or a problem with the file's signature. Signatures using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), such as ECDSA, return this VerificationError. |
| 24 | Flight root not allowed; indicates trying to run flight-signed code on production OS. |
| 25 | Anti-cheat policy violation. |
-| 26 | Explicitly denied by WADC policy. |
+| 26 | Explicitly denied by App Control policy. |
| 27 | The signing chain appears to be tampered/invalid. |
| 28 | Resource page hash mismatch. |
@@ -127,35 +127,34 @@ Next, use the bit addresses and their values from the following table to determi
| 23 | `Enabled:Advanced Boot Options Menu` |
| 24 | `Disabled:Script Enforcement` |
| 25 | `Required:Enforce Store Applications` |
-| 27 | `Enabled:Managed Installer` |
+| 27 | `Enabled:Managed Installer` |
| 28 | `Enabled:Update Policy No Reboot` |
## Microsoft Root CAs trusted by Windows
-The rule means trust anything signed by a certificate that chains to this root CA.
+The Microsoft Root certificates can be allowed and denied in policy using 'WellKnown' rules. The mapping between the root's ASN1 encoded RSA PKCS#1 public key and the WellKnown values, expressed in hexidecimal, are listed below
-| Root ID | Root Name |
+| Root ID | Root Name | Root Public Key |
|---|----------|
-| 0| None |
-| 1| Unknown |
-| 2 | Self-Signed |
-| 3 | Microsoft Authenticode(tm) Root Authority |
-| 4 | Microsoft Product Root 1997 |
-| 5 | Microsoft Product Root 2001 |
-| 6 | Microsoft Product Root 2010 |
-| 7 | Microsoft Standard Root 2011 |
-| 8 | Microsoft Code Verification Root 2006 |
-| 9 | Microsoft Test Root 1999 |
-| 10 | Microsoft Test Root 2010 |
-| 11 | Microsoft DMD Test Root 2005 |
-| 12 | Microsoft DMDRoot 2005 |
-| 13 | Microsoft DMD Preview Root 2005 |
-| 14 | Microsoft Flight Root 2014 |
-| 15 | Microsoft Third Party Marketplace Root |
-| 16 | Microsoft ECC Testing Root CA 2017 |
-| 17 | Microsoft ECC Development Root CA 2018 |
-| 18 | Microsoft ECC Product Root CA 2018 |
-| 19 | Microsoft ECC Devices Root CA 2017 |
+| 0| None | N/A |
+| 1| Unknown | N/A |
+| 2 | Self-Signed | N/A |
+| 3 | Microsoft Authenticode(tm) Root Authority | `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` |
+| 4 | Microsoft Product Root 1997 | `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` |
+| 5 | Microsoft Product Root 2001 | `3082020A0282020100F35DFA8067D45AA7A90C2C9020D035083C7584CDB707899C89DADECEC360FA91685A9E94712918767CC2E0C82576940E58FA043436E6DFAFF780BAE9580B2B93E59D05E3772291F734643C22911D5EE10990BC14FEFC755819E179B70792A3AE885908D89F07CA0358FC68296D32D7D2A8CB4BFCE10B48324FE6EBB8AD4FE45C6F139499DB95D575DBA81AB79491B4775BF5480C8F6A797D1470047D6DAF90F5DA70D847B7BF9B2F6CE705B7E11160AC7991147CC5D6A6E4E17ED5C37EE592D23C00B53682DE79E16DF3B56EF89F33C9CB527D739836DB8BA16BA295979BA3DEC24D26FF0696672506C8E7ACE4EE1233953199C835084E34CA7953D5B5BE6332594036C0A54E044D3DDB5B0733E458BFEF3F5364D842593557FD0F457C24044D9ED6387411972290CE684474926FD54B6FB086E3C73642A0D0FCC1C05AF9A361B9304771960A16B091C04295EF107F286AE32A1FB1E4CD033F777104C720FC490F1D4588A4D7CB7E88AD8E2DEC45DBC45104C92AFCEC869E9A11975BDECE5388E6E2B7FDAC95C22840DBEF0490DF813339D9B245A5238706A5558931BB062D600E41187D1F2EB597CB11EB15D524A594EF151489FD4B73FA325BFCD13300F95962700732EA2EAB402D7BCADD21671B30998F16AA23A841D1B06E119B36C4DE40749CE15865C1601E7A5B38C88FBB04267CD41640E5B66B6CAA86FD00BFCEC1350203010001`|
+| 6 | Microsoft Product Root 2010 | `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`|
+| 7 | Microsoft Standard Root 2011 | `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`|
+| 8 | Microsoft Code Verification Root 2006 | `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`|
+| 9 | Microsoft Test Root 1999 | `3081DF300D06092A864886F70D01010105000381CD003081C90281C100A9AA83586DB5D30C4B5B8090E5C30F280C7E3D3C24C52956638CEEC7834AD88C25D30ED312B7E1867274A78BFB0F05E965C19BD856C293F0FBE95A48857D95AADF0186B733334656CB5B7AC4AFA096533AE9FB3B78C1430CC76E1C2FD155F119B23FF8D6A0C724953BC845256F453A464FD2278BC75075C6805E0D9978617739C1B30F9D129CC4BB327BB24B26AA4EC032B02A1321BEED24F47D0DEAAA8A7AD28B4D97B54D64BAFB46DD696F9A0ECC5377AA6EAE20D6219869D946B96432D4170203010001`|
+| 0A | Microsoft Test Root 2010 | `3082020A028202010095E3A8C1B99C2654B099EF261FAC1EC73080BBF53FF2E4BBF8FE066A0AA688BCB48C45E070551988B405CBB5C1A1FAD47CC24253079C5456A897E09469BE1324EFE58A299CA6D02B2F8AA6E879442E8BEAC9BEB8548653BE07243454152220017B8A46FBD291079509B05611CC76B2D01F4479523428EC4F49C2CB61D386DCE4A37E559E9FEE106FCFE13DF8B78479A23B8D1CB0817CE44407E4CE46B098838D878FE5F5AE407AF1ED3D9B9A7C4AD1B9C394057BDCDAB8CEDC1E6CCFD99E37EFC35A367B908645DCF62ECADDEEDE27D9749A69F5D95D092D4541CCB7C282D42A8C162592973D944E89337E5B0354CDB083A08E41B7878DD9056352F6EEE64E139D54CD49FEE38B3B509B48BBB2E592D4ABA0C510AF3EB145213490DCADB9F7FE21AEEE50587A3AE5AAD8E382D6CF6D4DC915AC9C3117A516A742F6DA1278A76690ECFCCD0163FFF00EBAE1CDF0DB6B9A0FF60F040109BC9FCEB76C517057081BFF799A525DBAAC14E53B67CF2C52DE279A34036E2548B01974FC4D98C24B8C92E188AE482AABABCD144DB6610EA1098F2CDB45AF7D3B815608C93B41B7649F5D2E127FB969291F52454A23C6AFB6B238729D0833FFD0CF89B6EA6E8544943E9159EBEF9EBD9B9C1A47034EA21796FA620BE853B64EE3E82A7359E213B8F85A7EC6E20ADD4A43CCC3773B7A31040AC184963A636E1A3E0A0C25B87EB5520CB9AB0203010001`|
+| 0B | Microsoft DMD Test Root 2005 | `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`|
+| 0C | Microsoft DMDRoot 2005 | `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`|
+| 0D | Microsoft DMD Preview Root 2005 | `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`|
+| 0E | Microsoft Flight Root 2014 | `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`|
+| 0F | Microsoft Third Party Marketplace Root | `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`|
+| 14 | Microsoft Trusted Root Store | N/A |
+| 15 | Microsoft OEM Root Certificate Authority 2017 | `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`|
+| 16 | Microsoft Identity Verification Root Certificate Authority 2020 | `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`|
For well-known roots, the TBS hashes for the certificates are baked into the code for App Control for Business. For example, they don't need to be listed as TBS hashes in the policy file.
diff --git a/windows/security/application-security/application-control/user-account-control/settings-and-configuration.md b/windows/security/application-security/application-control/user-account-control/settings-and-configuration.md
index 8c81845b7b..68d64ea7fe 100644
--- a/windows/security/application-security/application-control/user-account-control/settings-and-configuration.md
+++ b/windows/security/application-security/application-control/user-account-control/settings-and-configuration.md
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ The registry keys are found under the key: `HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Cur
| Run all administrators in Admin Approval Mode | `EnableLUA` | 0 = Disabled 1 (Default) = Enabled |
| Switch to the secure desktop when prompting for elevation| `PromptOnSecureDesktop` | 0 = Disabled 1 (Default) = Enabled |
| Virtualize file and registry write failures to per-user locations | `EnableVirtualization` | 0 = Disabled 1 (Default) = Enabled |
+| Prioritise network logons over cached logons | `InteractiveLogonFirst` | 0 (Default) = Disabled 1 = Enabled |
[WIN-1]: /windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-localpoliciessecurityoptions
[MEM-1]: /mem/intune/configuration/custom-settings-windows-10
diff --git a/windows/security/application-security/index.md b/windows/security/application-security/index.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 6d2ac65456..0000000000
--- a/windows/security/application-security/index.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
----
-title: Windows application security
-description: Get an overview of application security in Windows
-ms.date: 08/02/2023
-ms.topic: conceptual
----
-
-# Windows application security
-
-Cybercriminals can take advantage of poorly secured applications to access valuable resources. With Windows, IT admins can combat common application attacks from the moment a device is provisioned. For example, IT can remove local admin rights from user accounts, so that PCs run with least privilege to prevent malicious applications from accessing sensitive resources.
-
-Learn more about application security features in Windows.
-
-[!INCLUDE [application](../includes/sections/application.md)]
diff --git a/windows/security/application-security/toc.yml b/windows/security/application-security/toc.yml
index 84c5873b45..c8a80ddfef 100644
--- a/windows/security/application-security/toc.yml
+++ b/windows/security/application-security/toc.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
items:
-- name: Overview
- href: index.md
- name: Application and driver control
href: application-control/toc.yml
- name: Application isolation
diff --git a/windows/security/book/application-security-application-and-driver-control.md b/windows/security/book/application-security-application-and-driver-control.md
index 462cf9cf11..9efc2c0f96 100644
--- a/windows/security/book/application-security-application-and-driver-control.md
+++ b/windows/security/book/application-security-application-and-driver-control.md
@@ -1,68 +1,77 @@
---
-title: Application and driver control
-description: Windows 11 security book - Application and driver control.
+title: Windows 11 security book - Application and driver control
+description: Application and driver control.
ms.topic: overview
-ms.date: 04/09/2024
+ms.date: 11/18/2024
---
# Application and driver control
-:::image type="content" source="images/application-security.png" alt-text="Diagram of containing a list of application security features." lightbox="images/application-security.png" border="false":::
+:::image type="content" source="images/application-security.png" alt-text="Diagram containing a list of application security features." lightbox="images/application-security.png" border="false":::
Windows 11 offers a rich application platform with layers of security like isolation and code integrity that help protect your valuable data. Developers can also take advantage of these
capabilities to build in security from the ground up to protect against breaches and malware.
## Smart App Control
-Smart App Control prevents users from running malicious applications on Windows devices by blocking untrusted or unsigned applications. Smart App Control goes beyond previous built-in browser protections by adding another layer of security that is woven directly into the core of the OS at the process level. Using AI, our new Smart App Control only allows processes to run if they are predicted to be safe based on existing and new intelligence updated daily.
+Smart App Control prevents users from running malicious applications by blocking untrusted or unsigned applications. Smart App Control goes beyond previous built-in browser protections by adding another layer of security that is woven directly into the core of the OS at the process level. Using AI, Smart App Control only allows processes to run if they're predicted to be safe based on existing and new intelligence updated daily.
-Smart App Control builds on top of the same cloud-based AI used in App Control for Business to predict the safety of an application so that users can be confident that their applications are safe and reliable on their new Windows devices. Additionally, Smart App Control blocks unknown script files and macros from the web are blocked, greatly improving security for everyday users.
-Smart App Control will ship with new devices with Windows 11, version 22H2 installed.
+Smart App Control builds on top of the same cloud-based AI used in *App Control for Business* to predict the safety of an application, so that users can be confident that their applications are safe and reliable. Additionally, Smart App Control blocks unknown script files and macros from the web, greatly improving security for everyday users.
-Devices running previous versions of Windows 11 will have to be reset with a clean installation of Windows 11, version 22H2 to take advantage of this feature. Smart App Control will be disabled on devices enrolled in enterprise management. We suggest enterprises running line-of-business applications continue to leverage App Control for Business.
+We've been making significant improvements to Smart App Control to increase the security, usability, and cloud intelligence response for apps in the Windows ecosystem. Users can get the latest and best experience with Smart App Control by keeping their devices up to date via Windows Update every month.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+To ensure that users have a seamless experience with Smart App Control enabled, we ask developers to sign their applications with a code signing certificate from the Microsoft Trusted Root Program. Developers should include all binaries, such as exe, dll, temp installer files, and uninstallers. Trusted Signing makes the process of obtaining, maintaining, and signing with a trusted certificate simple and secure.
-- [Smart App Control](/windows/apps/develop/smart-app-control/overview)
+Smart App Control is disabled on devices enrolled in enterprise management. We suggest enterprises running line-of-business applications continue to use *App Control for Business*.
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Smart App Control][LINK-1]
## App Control for Business
-Your organization is only as secure as the applications that run on your devices. With application control, apps must earn trust to run, in contrast to an application trust model where all code is assumed trustworthy. By helping prevent unwanted or malicious code from running, application control is an important part of an effective security strategy. Many organizations cite application control as one of the most effective means of defending against executable file-based malware.
+Your organization is only as secure as the applications that run on your devices. With *application control*, apps must earn trust to run, in contrast to an application trust model where all code is assumed trustworthy. By helping prevent unwanted or malicious code from running, application control is an important part of an effective security strategy. Many organizations cite application control as one of the most effective means of defending against executable file-based malware.
-Windows 10 and above include App Control for Business (previously called Windows Defender Application Control) as well as AppLocker. App Control for Business is the next-generation app control solution for Windows and provides powerful control over what runs in your environment. Customers who were using AppLocker on previous versions of Windows can continue to use the feature as they consider whether to switch to App Control for Business for stronger protection.
+App Control for Business (previously called *Windows Defender Application Control*) and AppLocker are both included in Windows. App Control for Business is the next-generation app control solution for Windows and provides powerful control over what runs in your environment. Organizations that were using AppLocker on previous versions of Windows, can continue to use the feature as they consider whether to switch to App Control for Business for stronger protection.
-Customers using Microsoft Intune[\[9\]](conclusion.md#footnote9) to manage their devices are now able to configure App Control for Business in the admin console, including setting up Intune as a managed installer.
+Microsoft Intune[\[4\]](conclusion.md#footnote4) can configure App Control for Business in the admin console, including setting up Intune as a managed installer. Intune includes built-in options for App Control for Business and the possibility to upload policies as an XML file for Intune to package and deploy.
-Customers can use some built-in options for App Control for Business or upload their own policy as an XML file for Intune to package and deploy.
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+- [Application Control for Windows][LINK-2]
+- [Automatically allow apps deployed by a managed installer with App Control for Business][LINK-3]
-- [Application Control for Windows](/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/wdac)
+## :::image type="icon" source="images/soon-button-title.svg" border="false"::: Administrator protection
-## User Account Control
+When users sign in with administrative rights to Windows, they have the power to make significant changes to the system, which can impact its overall security. These rights can be a target for malicious software.
-User Account Control (UAC) helps prevent malware from damaging a PC and enables organizations to deploy a better-managed desktop. With UAC, apps and tasks always run in the security context of a non-administrator account unless an administrator specifically authorizes administrator-level access to the system. UAC can block the automatic installation of unauthorized apps and prevent inadvertent changes to system settings.
+Administrator protection is a new security feature in Windows 11 designed to safeguard these administrative rights. It allows administrators to perform all necessary functions with **just-in-time administrative rights**, while running most tasks without administrative privileges. The goal of administrator protection is to provide a secure and seamless experience, ensuring users operate with the least required privileges.
-Organizations can use a modern device management (MDM) solution like Microsoft Intune[\[9\]](conclusion.md#footnote9) to remotely configure UAC settings. Organizations without MDM can change settings directly
-on the device.
+When administrator protection is enabled, if an app needs special permissions like administrative rights, the user is asked for approval. When an approval is needed, Windows Hello provides a secure and easy way to approve or deny these requests.
-Enabling UAC helps prevent malware from altering PC settings and potentially gaining access to networks and sensitive data. UAC can also block the automatic installation of unauthorized
-apps and prevent inadvertent changes to system settings.
-
-Users with standard accounts, or those using administrative accounts with UAC enabled, run most programs with limited access rights. This includes the Windows shell and any apps started from the shell, such as Windows Explorer, a web browser, productivity suite, graphics programs, or games.
-
-Some apps require additional permissions and will not work properly (or at all) when running with limited permissions. When an app needs to run with more than standard user rights, UAC allows users to run apps with a "full" administrator token (with administrative groups and privileges) instead of their default user access token. Users continue to operate in the standard user security context while enabling certain executables to run with elevated privileges if needed.
-
-:::image type="content" source="images/uac-settings.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the UAC settings." border="false":::
-
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
-
-- [How User Account Control works](/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works)
+> [!NOTE]
+> Administrator protection is currently in preview. For devices running previous versions of Windows, refer to [User Account Control (UAC)][LINK-5].
## Microsoft vulnerable driver blocklist
-The Windows kernel is the most privileged software and is therefore a compelling target for malware authors. Since Windows has strict requirements for code running in the kernel, cybercriminals commonly exploit vulnerabilities in kernel drivers to get access. Microsoft works with ecosystem partners to constantly identify and respond to potentially vulnerable kernel drivers. Prior to the Windows 11 2022 Update, Windows enforced a block policy when hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI) was enabled to prevent vulnerable versions of drivers from running. Beginning with the Windows 11 2022 Update, the block policy is now on by default for all new Windows PCs, and users can opt in to enforce the policy from the Windows Security app.
+The Windows kernel is the most privileged software and is therefore a compelling target for malware authors. Since Windows has strict requirements for code running in the kernel, cybercriminals commonly exploit vulnerabilities in kernel drivers to get access. Microsoft works with ecosystem partners to constantly identify and respond to potentially vulnerable kernel drivers. To prevent vulnerable versions of drivers from running, Windows has a *block policy* turned on by default. Users can configure the policy from the Windows Security app.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-- [Microsoft recommended driver block rules](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules)
+- [Microsoft recommended driver block rules][LINK-4]
+
+## :::image type="icon" source="images/new-button-title.svg" border="false"::: Trusted Signing
+
+Trusted Signing is a Microsoft fully managed, end-to-end signing solution that simplifies the signing process and empowers third-party developers to easily build and distribute applications.
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [What is Trusted Signing](/azure/trusted-signing/overview)
+
+
+
+[LINK-1]: /windows/apps/develop/smart-app-control/overview
+[LINK-2]: /windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/wdac
+[LINK-3]: /windows/security/application-security/application-control/app-control-for-business/design/configure-authorized-apps-deployed-with-a-managed-installer
+[LINK-4]: /windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules
+[LINK-5]: /windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works
diff --git a/windows/security/book/application-security-application-isolation.md b/windows/security/book/application-security-application-isolation.md
index 603d0138a4..67465c5c5e 100644
--- a/windows/security/book/application-security-application-isolation.md
+++ b/windows/security/book/application-security-application-isolation.md
@@ -1,46 +1,38 @@
---
-title: Application isolation
-description: Windows 11 security book - Application isolation.
+title: Windows 11 security book - Application isolation
+description: Application isolation.
ms.topic: overview
-ms.date: 04/09/2024
+ms.date: 11/18/2024
---
# Application isolation
-:::image type="content" source="images/application-security.png" alt-text="Diagram of containing a list of application security features." lightbox="images/application-security.png" border="false":::
+:::image type="content" source="images/application-security.png" alt-text="Diagram containing a list of application security features." lightbox="images/application-security.png" border="false":::
-## Win32 app isolation
+## :::image type="icon" source="images/new-button-title.svg" border="false"::: Win32 app isolation
-Win32 app isolation is a new security feature in public preview designed to be the default isolation standard on Windows clients. It's built on [AppContainer](/windows/win32/secauthz/implementing-an-appcontainer), and offers several added security features to help the Windows platform defend against attacks that leverage vulnerabilities in applications or third-party libraries. To isolate their apps, developers can update their applications using the tools provided by Microsoft.
+Win32 app isolation is a security feature designed to be the default isolation standard on Windows clients. It's built on [AppContainer][LINK-1], and offers several added security features to help the Windows platform defend against attacks that use vulnerabilities in applications or third-party libraries. To isolate their applications, developers can update them using Visual Studio.
-Win32 app isolation follows a two-step process. In the first step, the Win32 application is launched as a low-integrity process using AppContainer, which is recognized as a security boundary by Microsoft. Consequently, the process is limited to a specific set of Windows APIs by default and is unable to inject code into any process operating at a higher integrity level.
+Win32 app isolation follows a two-step process:
-In the second step, least privilege is enforced by granting authorized access to Windows securable objects. This access is determined by capabilities that are added to the application manifest through MSIX packaging. Securable objects in this context refer to Windows resources whose access is safeguarded by capabilities. These capabilities enable the implantation of a [Discretionary Access Control List](/windows/win32/secauthz/access-control-lists) on Windows.
+- In the first step, the Win32 application is launched as a low-integrity process using AppContainer, which is recognized as a security boundary by Windows. The process is limited to a specific set of Windows APIs by default and is unable to inject code into any process operating at a higher integrity level
+- In the second step, least privilege is enforced by granting authorized access to Windows securable objects. This access is determined by capabilities that are added to the application manifest through MSIX packaging. *Securable objects* in this context refers to Windows resources whose access is safeguarded by capabilities. These capabilities enable the implantation of a [Discretionary Access Control List][LINK-2] on Windows
-To help ensure that isolated applications run smoothly, developers must define the access requirements for the application via access capability declarations in the application package manifest. The Application Capability Profiler (ACP) simplifies the entire process by allowing the application to run in "learn mode" with low privileges. Instead of denying access if the capability is not present, ACP allows access and logs additional capabilities required for access if the application were to run isolated. For more information on ACP, please refer to the [GitHub documentation page](https://github.com/microsoft/win32-app-isolation/blob/main/docs/profiler/application-capability-profiler.md#stack-tracing---acp-stacktracewpaprofile).
+To help ensuring that isolated applications run smoothly, developers must define the access requirements for the application via access capability declarations in the application package manifest. The *Application Capability Profiler (ACP)* simplifies the entire process by allowing the application to run in *learn mode* with low privileges. Instead of denying access if the capability isn't present, ACP allows access and logs additional capabilities required for access if the application were to run isolated.
To create a smooth user experience that aligns with nonisolated, native Win32 applications, two key factors should be taken into consideration:
- Approaches for accessing data and privacy information
- Integrating Win32 apps for compatibility with other Windows interfaces
-The first factor relates to implementing methods to manage access to files and privacy information within and outside the isolation boundary ([AppContainer](/windows/win32/secauthz/implementing-an-appcontainer)). The second factor involves integrating Win32 apps with other Windows interfaces in a way that helps enable seamless functionality without causing perplexing user consent prompts.
+The first factor relates to implementing methods to manage access to files and privacy information within and outside the isolation boundary AppContainer. The second factor involves integrating Win32 apps with other Windows interfaces in a way that helps enable seamless functionality without causing perplexing user consent prompts.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-- [Win32 app isolation](https://github.com/microsoft/win32-app-isolation)
-
-## Windows Sandbox
-
-Windows Sandbox provides a lightweight desktop environment to safely run untrusted Win32 applications in isolation using the same hardware-based Hyper-V virtualization technology without fear of lasting impact to the PC. Any untrusted Win32 app installed in Windows Sandbox stays only in the sandbox and can't affect the host.
-
-Once Windows Sandbox is closed, nothing persists on the device. All the software with all its files and state are permanently deleted after the untrusted Win32 application is closed.
-
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
-
-- [Windows Sandbox](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-sandbox/windows-sandbox-overview)
-- [Windows Sandbox is a new lightweight desktop environment tailored for safely
-running applications in isolation](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-os-platform-blog/windows-sandbox/ba-p/301849)
+- [Win32 app isolation overview][LINK-4]
+- [Application Capability Profiler (ACP)][LINK-5]
+- [Packaging a Win32 app isolation application with Visual Studio][LINK-6]
+- [Sandboxing Python with Win32 app isolation][LINK-7]
## App containers
@@ -48,6 +40,61 @@ In addition to Windows Sandbox for Win32 apps, Universal Windows Platform (UWP)
Processes that run in app containers operate at a low integrity level, meaning they have limited access to resources they don't own. Because the default integrity level of most resources is medium integrity level, the UWP app can access only a subset of the file system, registry, and other resources. The app container also enforces restrictions on network connectivity. For example, access to a local host isn't allowed. As a result, malware or infected apps have limited footprint for escape.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-- [Windows and app container](/windows/apps/windows-app-sdk/migrate-to-windows-app-sdk/feature-mapping-table?source=recommendations)
+- [Windows and app container][LINK-8]
+
+## Windows Sandbox
+
+Windows Sandbox provides a lightweight desktop environment to safely run untrusted Win32 applications in isolation, using the same hardware-based virtualization technology as Hyper-V. Any untrusted Win32 app installed in Windows Sandbox stays only in the sandbox and can't affect the host.
+
+Once Windows Sandbox is closed, nothing persists on the device. All the software with all its files and state are permanently deleted after the untrusted Win32 application is closed.
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Windows Sandbox][LINK-9]
+
+## Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL)
+
+With Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) you can run a Linux environment on a Windows device, without the need for a separate virtual machine or dual booting. WSL is designed to provide a seamless and productive experience for developers who want to use both Windows and Linux at the same time.
+
+[!INCLUDE [new-24h2](includes/new-24h2.md)]
+
+- **Hyper-V Firewall** is a network firewall solution that enables filtering of inbound and outbound traffic to/from WSL containers hosted by Windows
+- **DNS Tunneling** is a networking setting that improves compatibility in different networking environments, making use of virtualization features to obtain DNS information rather than a networking packet
+- **Auto proxy** is a networking setting that enforces WSL to use Windows' HTTP proxy information. Turn on when using a proxy on Windows, as it makes that proxy automatically apply to WSL distributions
+
+These features can be set up using a device management solution such as Microsoft Intune[\[7\]](conclusion.md#footnote7) . Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) integrates with WSL, allowing it to monitor activities within a WSL distro and report them to the MDE dashboards.
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Hyper-V Firewall][LINK-10]
+- [DNS Tunneling][LINK-11]
+- [Auto proxy][LINK-12]
+- [Intune setting for WSL][LINK-13]
+- [Microsoft Defender for Endpoint plug-in for WSL][LINK-14]
+
+## :::image type="icon" source="images/new-button-title.svg" border="false"::: Virtualization-based security enclaves
+
+A **Virtualization-based security enclave** is a software-based trusted execution environment (TEE) inside a host application. VBS enclaves enable developers to use VBS to protect their application's secrets from admin-level attacks. VBS enclaves are available on Windows 10 onwards on both x64 and ARM64.
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Virtualization-based security enclave][LINK-15]
+
+
+
+[LINK-1]: /windows/win32/secauthz/implementing-an-appcontainer
+[LINK-2]: /windows/win32/secauthz/access-control-lists
+[LINK-4]: /windows/win32/secauthz/app-isolation-overview
+[LINK-5]: /windows/win32/secauthz/app-isolation-capability-profiler
+[LINK-6]: /windows/win32/secauthz/app-isolation-packaging-with-vs
+[LINK-7]: https://blogs.windows.com/windowsdeveloper/2024/03/06/sandboxing-python-with-win32-app-isolation/
+[LINK-8]: /windows/apps/windows-app-sdk/migrate-to-windows-app-sdk/feature-mapping-table?source=recommendations
+[LINK-9]: /windows/security/threat-protection/windows-sandbox/windows-sandbox-overview
+[LINK-10]: /windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/hyper-v-firewall
+[LINK-11]: /windows/wsl/networking#dns-tunneling
+[LINK-12]: /windows/wsl/networking#auto-proxy
+[LINK-13]: /windows/wsl/intune
+[LINK-14]: /defender-endpoint/mde-plugin-wsl
+[LINK-15]: /windows/win32/trusted-execution/vbs-enclaves
diff --git a/windows/security/book/application-security.md b/windows/security/book/application-security.md
index 5b8a5238ab..da054a7d5d 100644
--- a/windows/security/book/application-security.md
+++ b/windows/security/book/application-security.md
@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
---
-title: Application security
-description: Windows 11 security book - Application security chapter.
+title: Windows 11 security book - Application security
+description: Application security chapter.
ms.topic: overview
-ms.date: 04/09/2024
+ms.date: 11/18/2024
---
# Application security
:::image type="content" source="images/application-security-cover.png" alt-text="Cover of the application security chapter." border="false":::
+Applications are prime vectors for cyberattacks due to their frequent usage and access to valuable data. Common attempts include injection attacks that insert malicious code, man-in-the-middle attacks that intercept and potentially alter communication between users and applications, and various methods of tricking users into divulging sensitive information or changing system settings.
+
+Windows 11 protects users, apps, and data with features like Windows App Control for Business and the Microsoft vulnerable driver blocklist, which help ensure that only trusted apps and drivers can run on the device.
+
:::image type="content" source="images/application-security-on.png" alt-text="Diagram of containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/application-security.png" border="false":::
-
-Cybercriminals can take advantage of poorly secured applications to access valuable resources. With Windows 11, IT admins can combat common application attacks from the moment a device is provisioned. For example, IT can remove local admin rights from user accounts so that PCs run with the least amount of privileges to prevent malicious applications from accessing sensitive resources.
-
-In addition, organizations can control which applications run on their devices with App Control for Business (previously called Windows Defender Application Control - WDAC).
diff --git a/windows/security/book/cloud-services-protect-your-personal-information.md b/windows/security/book/cloud-services-protect-your-personal-information.md
index 39b189a20f..36707a697b 100644
--- a/windows/security/book/cloud-services-protect-your-personal-information.md
+++ b/windows/security/book/cloud-services-protect-your-personal-information.md
@@ -1,58 +1,65 @@
---
-title: Cloud services - Protect your personal information
-description: Windows 11 security book - Cloud services chapter - Protect your personal information.
+title: Windows 11 security book - Cloud services - Protect your personal information
+description: Cloud services chapter - Protect your personal information.
ms.topic: overview
-ms.date: 04/09/2024
+ms.date: 11/18/2024
---
# Protect your personal information
-:::image type="content" source="images/cloud-security.png" alt-text="Diagram of containing a list of security features for cloud security." lightbox="images/cloud-security.png" border="false":::
+:::image type="content" source="images/cloud-security.png" alt-text="Diagram containing a list of security features for cloud security." lightbox="images/cloud-security.png" border="false":::
-## Microsoft Account
+## Microsoft account
-Your Microsoft Account (MSA) gives you access to Microsoft products and services with just one login, allowing you to manage everything all in one place. Keep tabs on your subscriptions and order history, update your privacy and security settings, track the health and safety of your devices, and get rewards. Everything stays with you in the cloud, across devices, and between OS ecosystems, including iOS and Android.
+Your Microsoft account (MSA) provides seamless access to Microsoft products and services with just one sign-in, allowing you to manage everything in one place. You can easily keep track of your subscriptions and order history, update your privacy and security settings, monitor the health and safety of your devices, and earn rewards. Your information stays with you in the cloud, accessible across devices and operating systems, including iOS and Android.
-You can even go passwordless with your Microsoft Account by removing the password from your MSA and using the Microsoft Authenticator app on your mobile Android or iOS phone.
+You can even go passwordless with your Microsoft account by removing the password from your MSA:
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+- Use Windows Hello to eliminate the password sign-in method for an even more secure experience
+- Use the Microsoft Authenticator app on your Android or iOS device
-- [What is a Microsoft account?](https://support.microsoft.com/windows/what-is-a-microsoft-account-4a7c48e9-ff5a-e9c6-5a5c-1a57d66c3bfa)
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-## User reauthentication before password disablement
-
-Windows provides greater flexibility for users to balance ease of use with security. Users can choose the interval that the machine remains idle before it automatically signs the user out. To avoid a security breach and prevent users from accidentally making settings changes, Windows reauthenticates the user before they are allowed to change the setting to not sign out the user even after the device remains idle indefinitely.
-
-This setting is available on the Sign-in options page in Settings and is available on Windows 11 and onward for MSA users worldwide.
+- [What is a Microsoft account?][LINK-1]
+- [Go passwordless with your Microsoft account][LINK-5]
## Find my device
-When location services and Find my device settings are turned on, basic system services like time zone and Find my device will be allowed to use the device's location. When enabled, Find my device can be used by the admin on the device to help recover lost or stolen Windows devices to reduce security threats that rely on physical access.
+When location services and *Find my device* settings are turned on, basic system services like time zone and Find my device are allowed to use the device's location. Find my device can be used to help recover lost or stolen Windows devices, reducing the security threats that rely on physical access.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-- [How to set up, find, and lock a lost Windows device using a Microsoft Account](https://support.microsoft.com/account-billing/find-and-lock-a-lost-windows-device-890bf25e-b8ba-d3fe-8253-e98a12f26316)
+- [How to set up, find, and lock a lost Windows device using a Microsoft account][LINK-2]
## OneDrive for personal
-Microsoft OneDrive17 for personal provides additional security, backup, and restore options for important personal files. OneDrive stores and protects files in the cloud, allowing users to access them from laptops, desktops, and mobile devices. Plus, OneDrive provides an excellent solution for backing up folders. If a device is lost or stolen, the user can quickly recover all their important files from the cloud.
+Microsoft OneDrive for personal[\[10\]](conclusion.md#footnote10) offers enhanced security, backup, and restore options for important personal files. Users can access their data from anywhere, since their files are stored and protected in the cloud. OneDrive provides an excellent solution for backing up folders, ensuring that:
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+- If a device is lost or stolen, users can quickly recover all their important files from the cloud
+- If a user is targeted by a ransomware attack, OneDrive enables recovery. With configured backups, users have more options to mitigate and recover from such attacks
-- [OneDrive](/onedrive/plan-onedrive-enterprise)
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-In the event of a ransomware attack, OneDrive can enable recovery. And if backups are configured in OneDrive, users have additional options to mitigate and recover from a ransomware attack.
+- [Get started with OneDrive][LINK-6]
+- [How to recover from a ransomware attack using Microsoft 365][LINK-7]
+- [How to restore from OneDrive][LINK-3]
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+## Personal Vault
-- [How to recover from a ransomware attack using Microsoft 365](/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/recover-from-ransomware)
+Personal Vault offers robust protection for the most important or sensitive files, without sacrificing the convenience of anywhere access. Secure digital copies of crucial documents in Personal Vault, where they're protected by identity verification and are easily accessible across devices.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+Once the Personal Vault is configured, users can access it using a strong authentication method or a second step of identity verification. The second steps of verification include fingerprint, face recognition, PIN, or a code sent via email or text.
-- [How to restore from OneDrive](https://support.microsoft.com/office/restore-your-onedrive-fa231298-759d-41cf-bcd0-25ac53eb8a15)
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-## OneDrive Personal Vault
+- [Protect your OneDrive files in Personal Vault][LINK-4]
-OneDrive Personal Vault[\[9\]](conclusion.md#footnote9) also provides protection for the most important or sensitive files and photos without sacrificing the convenience of anywhere access. Protect digital copies of important documents in OneDrive Personal Vault. Files will be secured by identity verification yet are still easily accessible across devices.
+
-Learn how to [set up a Personal Vault](https://support.microsoft.com/office/protect-your-onedrive-files-in-personal-vault-6540ef37-e9bf-4121-a773-56f98dce78c4) with a strong authentication method or a second step of identity verification, such as fingerprint, face, PIN, or a code sent via email or SMS.
+[LINK-1]: https://support.microsoft.com/topic/4a7c48e9-ff5a-e9c6-5a5c-1a57d66c3bfa
+[LINK-2]: https://support.microsoft.com/topic/890bf25e-b8ba-d3fe-8253-e98a12f26316
+[LINK-3]: https://support.microsoft.com/topic/fa231298-759d-41cf-bcd0-25ac53eb8a15
+[LINK-4]: https://support.microsoft.com/topic/6540ef37-e9bf-4121-a773-56f98dce78c4
+[LINK-5]: https://support.microsoft.com/topic/585a71d7-2295-4878-aeac-a014984df856
+[LINK-6]: https://support.microsoft.com/onedrive
+[LINK-7]: /microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/recover-from-ransomware
diff --git a/windows/security/book/cloud-services-protect-your-work-information.md b/windows/security/book/cloud-services-protect-your-work-information.md
index 97aafdbec1..033200a8f1 100644
--- a/windows/security/book/cloud-services-protect-your-work-information.md
+++ b/windows/security/book/cloud-services-protect-your-work-information.md
@@ -1,138 +1,88 @@
---
-title: Cloud services - Protect your work information
-description: Windows 11 security book - Cloud services chapter - Protect your work information.
+title: Windows 11 security book - Cloud services - Protect your work information
+description: Cloud services chapter - Protect your work information.
ms.topic: overview
-ms.date: 04/09/2024
+ms.date: 11/04/2024
---
# Protect your work information
-:::image type="content" source="images/cloud-security.png" alt-text="Diagram of containing a list of security features for cloud security." lightbox="images/cloud-security.png" border="false":::
+:::image type="content" source="images/cloud-security.png" alt-text="Diagram containing a list of security features for cloud security." lightbox="images/cloud-security.png" border="false":::
-## Microsoft Entra ID
+## :::image type="icon" source="images/microsoft-entra-id.svg" border="false"::: Microsoft Entra ID
-Microsoft Entra ID, formerly Azure Active Directory is a comprehensive cloud-based identity management solution that helps enable secure access to applications, networks, and other resources and guard against threats. Microsoft Entra ID can also be used with Windows Autopilot for zero-touch provisioning of devices preconfigured with corporate security policies.
+Microsoft Entra ID is a comprehensive cloud-based identity management solution that helps enable secure access to applications, networks, and other resources and guard against threats. Microsoft Entra ID can also be used with Windows Autopilot for zero-touch provisioning of devices preconfigured with corporate security policies.
-Organizations can deploy Microsoft Entra ID joined devices to enable access to both cloud and on-premises apps and resources. Access to resources can be controlled based on the Microsoft Entra ID account and Conditional Access policies applied to the device. By registering devices with Microsoft Entra ID - also called Workplace joined - IT admins can support users in bring your own device (BYOD) or mobile device scenarios. Credentials are authenticated and bound to the joined device and cannot be copied to another device without explicit reverification.
+Organizations can deploy Microsoft Entra ID joined devices to enable access to both cloud and on-premises apps and resources. Access to resources can be controlled based on the Microsoft Entra ID account and Conditional Access policies applied to the device. For the most seamless and delightful end to end single sign-on (SSO) experience, we recommend users configure Windows Hello for Business during the out of box experience for easy passwordless sign-in to Entra ID .
-To provide more security and control for IT and a seamless experience for end users, Microsoft Entra ID works with apps and services, including on-premises software and thousands of software-as-a-service (SaaS) applications. Microsoft Entra ID protections include single sign-on, multifactor authentication, conditional access policies, identity protection, identity governance, and privileged identity management.
+:::row:::
+ :::column:::
+ For users wanting to connect to Microsoft Entra on their personal devices, they can do so by adding their work or school account to Windows. This action registers the user's personal device with Microsoft Entra ID, allowing IT admins to support users in bring your own device (BYOD) scenarios. Credentials are authenticated and bound to the joined device, and can't be copied to another device without explicit reverification.
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column:::
+:::image type="content" source="images/device-registration.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the Entra account registration page." border="false" lightbox="images/device-registration.png":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+
+To provide more security and control for IT and a seamless experience for users, Microsoft Entra ID works with apps and services, including on-premises software and thousands of software-as-a-service (SaaS) applications. Microsoft Entra ID protections include single sign-on, multifactor authentication, conditional access policies, identity protection, identity governance, and privileged identity management.
Windows 11 works with Microsoft Entra ID to provide secure access, identity management, and single sign-on to apps and services from anywhere. Windows has built-in settings to add work or school accounts by syncing the device configuration to an Active Directory domain or Microsoft Entra ID tenant.
:::image type="content" source="images/access-work-or-school.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the add work or school account in Settings." border="false":::
-When a device is Microsoft Entra ID joined and managed with Microsoft Intune[\[9\]](conclusion.md#footnote9) , it receives the following security benefits:
+When a device is Microsoft Entra ID joined and managed with Microsoft Intune[\[4\]](conclusion.md#footnote4) , it receives the following security benefits:
- Default managed user and device settings and policies
- Single sign-in to all Microsoft Online Services
- Full suite of authentication management capabilities using Windows Hello for Business
- Single sign-on (SSO) to enterprise and SaaS applications
-- No use of consumer Microsoft Account identity
+- No use of consumer Microsoft account identity
-Organizations and users can join or register their Windows devices with Microsoft Entra ID to get a seamless experience to both native and web applications. In addition, users can setup Windows Hello for Business or FIDO2 security keys with Microsoft Entra ID and benefit from greater security with passwordless authentication.
+Organizations and users can join or register their Windows devices with Microsoft Entra ID to get a seamless experience to both native and web applications. In addition, users can set up Windows Hello for Business or FIDO2 security keys with Microsoft Entra ID and benefit from greater security with passwordless authentication.
In combination with Microsoft Intune, Microsoft Entra ID offers powerful security control through Conditional Access to restrict access to organizational resources to healthy and compliant devices. Note that Microsoft Entra ID is only supported on Windows Pro and Enterprise editions.
Every Windows device has a built-in local administrator account that must be secured and protected to mitigate any Pass-the-Hash (PtH) and lateral traversal attacks. Many customers have been using our standalone, on-premises Windows Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS) to manage their domain-joined Windows machines. We heard from many customers that LAPS support was needed as they modernized their Windows environment to join directly to Microsoft Entra ID.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-- [Windows Local Administrator Password Solution with Microsoft Entra (Azure AD)](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-entra-azure-ad-blog/introducing-windows-local-administrator-password-solution-with/ba-p/1942487)
-- [Microsoft Entra plans and pricing](https://www.microsoft.com/security/business/microsoft-entra-pricing?rtc=1)
+- [Microsoft Entra ID documentation][LINK-1]
+- [Microsoft Entra plans and pricing][LINK-2]
-## Modern device management through (MDM)
+### Microsoft Entra Private Access
-Windows 11 supports modern device management through mobile device management (MDM) protocols so that IT professionals can manage company security policies and business applications without compromising user privacy on corporate or employee-owned devices. With MDM solutions like Microsoft Intune[\[9\]](conclusion.md#footnote9) , IT can manage Windows 11 using industry standard protocols. To simplify setup for users, management features are built directly into Windows, eliminating the need for a separate MDM client.
+Microsoft Entra Private Access provides organizations the ability to manage and give users access to private or internal fully qualified domain names (FQDNs) and IP addresses. With Private Access, you can modernize how your organization's users access private apps and resources. Remote workers don't need to use a VPN to access these resources if they have the Global Secure Access Client installed. The client quietly and seamlessly connects them to the resources they need.
-Windows 11 built-in management features include:
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-- The enrollment client, which enrolls and configures the device to securely communicate with the enterprise device management server
-- The management client, which periodically synchronizes with the management server to check for updates and apply the latest policies set by IT
+- [Microsoft Entra Private Access][LINK-4]
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+### Microsoft Entra Internet Access
-- [Mobile device management overview](/windows/client-management/mdm-overview)
+Microsoft Entra Internet Access provides an identity-centric Secure Web Gateway (SWG) solution for Software as a Service (SaaS) applications and other Internet traffic. It protects users, devices, and data from the Internet's wide threat landscape with best-in-class security controls and visibility through Traffic Logs.
-## Microsoft security baselines
+> [!NOTE]
+> Both Microsoft Entra Private Access and Microsoft Entra Internet Access requires Microsoft Entra ID and Microsoft Entra Joined devices for deployment. The two solutions use the Global Secure Access client for Windows, which secures and controls the features.
-Every organization faces security threats. However, different organizations can be concerned with different types of security threats. For example, an e-commerce company may focus on protecting its internet-facing web apps, while a hospital may focus on protecting confidential patient information. The one thing that all organizations have in common is a need to keep their apps and devices secure. These devices must be compliant with the security standards (or security baselines) defined by the organization.
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-A security baseline is a group of Microsoft-recommended configuration settings that explains their security implications. These settings are based on feedback from Microsoft security engineering teams, product groups, partners, and customers.
+- [Microsoft Entra Internet Access][LINK-3]
+- [Global Secure Access client for Windows][LINK-6]
+- [Microsoft's Security Service Edge Solution Deployment Guide for Microsoft Entra Internet Access Proof of Concept][LINK-5]
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+### Enterprise State Roaming
-- [Windows security baselines you can deploy with Microsoft Intune](/mem/intune/protect/security-baselines)
+Available to any organization with a Microsoft Entra ID Premium[\[4\]](conclusion.md#footnote4) license, Enterprise State Roaming provides users with a unified Windows Settings experience across their Windows devices and reduces the time needed for configuring a new device.
-## MDM security baseline
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-Windows 11 can be configured with Microsoft's MDM security baseline backed by ADMX policies, which functions like the Microsoft GP-based security baseline. The security baseline enables IT administrators to easily address security concerns and compliance needs for modern cloud-managed devices.
+- [Enterprise State Roaming in Microsoft Entra ID][LINK-7]
-The security baseline includes policies for:
+## :::image type="icon" source="images/azure-attestation.svg" border="false"::: Azure Attestation service
-- Microsoft inbox security technology such as BitLocker, Microsoft Defender SmartScreen, virtualization-based security, Exploit Guard, Microsoft Defender Antivirus, and Windows Firewall
-- Restricting remote access to devices
-- Setting credential requirements for passwords and PINs
-- Restricting use of legacy technology
+Remote attestation helps ensure that devices are compliant with security policies and are operating in a trusted state before they're allowed to access resources. Microsoft Intune[\[4\]](conclusion.md#footnote4) integrates with Azure Attestation service to review Windows device health comprehensively and connect this information with Microsoft Entra ID[\[4\]](conclusion.md#footnote4) Conditional Access.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
-
-- [MDM security baseline](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-security-configuration-framework/windows-security-baselines)
-
-## Microsoft Intune
-
-Microsoft Intune15 is a comprehensive endpoint management solution that helps secure, deploy, and manage users, apps, and devices. Intune brings together technologies like Microsoft Configuration Manager and Windows Autopilot to simplify provisioning, configuration management, and software updates across the organization.
-
-Intune works with Microsoft Entra ID to manage security features and processes, including multifactor authentication.
-
-Organizations can cut costs while securing and managing remote PCs through the cloud in compliance with company policies.16 For example, organizations save time and money by provisioning preconfigured devices to remote employees using Windows Autopilot for zerotouch deployment.
-
-Windows 11 enables IT professionals to move to the cloud while consistently enforcing security policies. Windows 11 provides expanded support for Group Policy administrative templates (ADMX-backed policies) in MDM solutions like Microsoft Intune, enabling IT professionals to easily apply the same security policies to both on-premises and remote devices.
-
-### Endpoint Privilege Management (EPM)
-
-Intune Endpoint Privilege Management supports organizations' Zero Trust journeys by helping them achieve a broad user base running with least privilege, while still permitting users to run tasks allowed by the organization to remain productive.
-
-### Local Administrator Password (LAPs)
-
-Local Administrator Password solution was a key consideration for many customers when deciding to make the transition from on-premises to cloud-managed devices using Intune. With LAPS (available in preview), organizations can automatically manage and back up the password of a local administrator account on Microsoft Entra ID joined or hybrid Microsoft Entra ID joined devices.
-
-### Mobile Application Management (MAM)
-
-With Intune, organizations can also extend MAM App Config, MAM App Protection, and App Protection Conditional Access capabilities to Windows. This enables people to access protected organizational content without having the device managed by IT. The first application to support MAM for Windows is Microsoft Edge.
-
-Customers have asked for App Control for Business (previously called Windows Defender Application Control) to manage Installer support for a long time. Now customers will be able to enable allowlisting of Win32 apps within their enterprise to proactively reduce the number of malware infections.
-
-Finally, Config Refresh helps organizations move to cloud from on-premises by protecting against settings deviating from the admin's intent.
-
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
-
-- [Windows LAPS overview](/windows-server/identity/laps/laps-overview)
-
-Microsoft Intune also has policies and settings to configure and manage the flow of operating system updates to devices, working with WUfB and WUfB-DS and giving admins great control over their deployments
-
-With Intune, organizations can also extend MAM App Config, MAM App Protection, and App Protection Conditional Access capabilities to Windows. This enables people to access protected organizational content without having the device managed by IT. The first application to support MAM for Windows is Microsoft Edge.
-
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
-
-- [What is Microsoft Intune](/mem/intune/fundamentals/what-is-intune)
-
-## Remote Wipe
-
-When a device is lost or stolen, IT administrators might want to remotely wipe data stored in memory and hard disks. A helpdesk agent might also want to reset devices to fix issues encountered by remote workers. A remote wipe can also be used to prepare a previously used device for a new user.
-
-Windows 11 supports the Remote Wipe configuration service provider (CSP) so that MDM Solutions[\[9\]](conclusion.md#footnote9) can remotely initiate any of the following operations:
-
-- Reset the device and remove user accounts and data
-- Reset the device and clean the drive
-- Reset the device but persist user accounts and data
-
-Learn More: [Remote Wipe CSP](/windows/client-management/mdm/remotewipe-csp)
-
-## Microsoft Azure Attestation Service
-
-Remote attestation helps ensure that devices are compliant with security policies and are operating in a trusted state before they are allowed to access resources. Microsoft Intune[\[9\]](conclusion.md#footnote9) integrates with [Microsoft Azure Attestation Service](/azure/attestation/overview) to review Windows device health comprehensively and connect this information with Microsoft Entra ID[\[9\]](conclusion.md#footnote9) Conditional Access.
-
-**Attestation policies are configured in the Microsoft Azure Attestation Service which can then:**
+**Attestation policies are configured in the Azure Attestation service which can then:**
- Verify the integrity of evidence provided by the Windows Attestation component by validating the signature and ensuring the Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) match the values recomputed by replaying the measured boot log
- Verify that the TPM has a valid Attestation Identity Key issued by the authenticated TPM
@@ -140,130 +90,293 @@ Remote attestation helps ensure that devices are compliant with security policie
Once this verification is complete, the attestation service returns a signed report with the security features state to the relying party - such as Microsoft Intune - to assess the trustworthiness of the platform relative to the admin-configured device compliance specifications. Conditional access is then granted or denied based on the device's compliance.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-- [Azure Attestation overview](/azure/attestation/overview)
+- [Azure Attestation overview][LINK-8]
-## Windows Update for Business deployment service
+## :::image type="icon" source="images/defender-for-endpoint.svg" border="false"::: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint
-The Windows Update for Business deployment service, a core component of the Windows Update for Business product family, is a cloud-based solution that transforms the way update management is handled. Complementing existing [Windows Update for Business](/windows/deployment/update/waas-manage-updates-wufb) policies and [Windows Update for Business reports](/windows/deployment/update/wufb-reports-overview), the service provides control over the approval, scheduling, and safeguarding of updates - delivered straight from Windows Update to managed devices.
+Microsoft Defender for Endpoint[\[4\]](conclusion.md#footnote4) is an enterprise endpoint detection and response solution that helps security teams detect, disrupt, investigate, and respond to advanced threats. Organizations can use the rich event data and attack insights Defender for Endpoint provides to investigate incidents.
-The Windows Update for Business deployment service powers Windows Update management via Microsoft Intune[\[9\]](conclusion.md#footnote9) and Autopatch. The deployment services currently allows the management of [drivers and firmware](/graph/windowsupdates-manage-driver-update), expedited [quality updates](/graph/windowsupdates-deploy-expedited-update) and [feature updates](/graph/windowsupdates-deploy-update).
+Defender for Endpoint brings together the following elements to provide a more complete picture of security incidents:
-For an in-depth understanding of this service, including its benefits and prerequisites for use, practical guides on specific capabilities, Microsoft Graph training, and a behind-the-scenes look at how the deployment service functions, read [here](/windows/deployment/update/waas-manage-updates-wufb)[.](/windows/deployment/update/waas-manage-updates-wufb)
+- Endpoint behavioral sensors: Embedded in Windows, these sensors collect and process behavioral signals from the operating system and send this sensor data to your private, isolated cloud instance of Microsoft Defender for Endpoint
+- With Automatic Attack Disruption uses AI, machine learning, and Microsoft Security Intelligence to analyze the entire attack and respond at the incident level, where it's able to contain a device, and/or a user which reduces the impact of attacks such as ransomware, human-operated attacks, and other advanced attacks.
+- Cloud security analytics: Behavioral signals are translated into insights, detections, and recommended responses to advanced threats. These analytics leverage big data, device learning, and unique Microsoft optics across the Windows ecosystem, enterprise cloud products such as Microsoft 365[\[4\]](conclusion.md#footnote4) , and online assets
+- Threat intelligence: Microsoft processes over 43 trillion security signals every 24 hours, yielding a deep and broad view into the evolving threat landscape. Combined with our global team of security experts and cutting-edge artificial intelligence and machine learning, we can see threats that others miss. This threat intelligence helps provide unparalleled protection for our customers. The protections built into our platforms and products blocked attacks that include 31 billion identity threats and 32 billion email threats
+- Rich response capabilities: Defender for Endpoint empowers SecOps teams to isolate, remediate, and remote into machines to further investigate and stop active threats in their environment, as well as block files, network destinations, and create alerts for them. In addition, Automated Investigation and Remediation can help reduce the load on the SOC by automatically performing otherwise manual steps towards remediation and providing
+detailed investigation outcomes
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+Defender for Endpoint is also part of Microsoft Defender XDR, our end-to-end, cloud-native extended detection and response (XDR) solution that combines best-of-breed endpoint, email, and identity security products. It enables organizations to prevent, detect, investigate, and remediate attacks by delivering deep visibility, granular context, and actionable insights generated from raw signals harnessed across the Microsoft 365 environment and other
+platforms, all synthesized into a single dashboard. This solution offers tremendous value to organizations of any size, especially those that are looking to break away from the added complexity of multiple point solutions, keeping them protected from sophisticated attacks and saving IT and security teams' time and resources.
-- [Windows Update for Business - Windows Deployment](/windows/deployment/update/waas-manage-updates-wufb)
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-## Windows Autopatch
+- [Microsoft Defender for Endpoint](/defender-endpoint/microsoft-defender-endpoint)
+- [Microsoft 365 Defender](/defender-xdr/microsoft-365-defender)
-Cybercriminals often target outdated or unpatched software to gain access to networks. Keeping endpoints up to date is critical in closing existing vulnerabilities, but planning, monitoring, and reporting on update compliance can take IT resources away from other important tasks.
+## Cloud-native device management
-Available as part of Windows Enterprise E3 and E5, Windows Autopatch automates update management for Windows, drivers, firmware, Microsoft 365, Edge, and Teams apps. The service can even manage the upgrade to Windows 11. While the service is designed to be simple by default, admins can customize the service to reflect their business organization with Autopatch groups. This allows custom content or deployment schedules to be applied to different populations of devices.
+Microsoft recommends cloud-based device management so that IT professionals can manage company security policies and business applications without compromising user privacy on corporate or employee-owned devices. With cloud-native device management solutions like Microsoft Intune[\[4\]](conclusion.md#footnote4) , IT can manage Windows 11 using industry standard protocols. To simplify setup for users, management features are built directly into Windows, eliminating the need for a separate device management client.
-From a technical standpoint, Windows Autopatch configures the policies and deployment service of Windows Update for Business to deliver updates, all within Microsoft Intune.[\[9\]](conclusion.md#footnote9) The results for IT admins: up-to-date endpoints and detailed reports to demonstrate compliance or help identify issues. The goal is to help IT teams be more secure and update more efficiently with less effort.
+Windows 11 built-in management features include:
-There's a lot more to learn about Windows Autopatch:
+- The enrollment client, which enrolls and configures the device to securely communicate with the enterprise device management server
+- The management client, which periodically synchronizes with the management server to check for updates and apply the latest policies set by IT
-- This [Forrester study](https://aka.ms/AutopatchProductivity) commissioned by Microsoft, analyzes the impact of Windows Autopatch on real customers
-- [IT pro blogs](https://aka.ms/MoreAboutAutopatch) provide updates and background on Autopatch features and the future of the service
-- The [Windows Autopatch community](https://aka.ms/AutopatchCommunity) allows IT professionals to get answers to questions from their peers and the Autopatch team
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+- [Mobile device management overview][LINK-9]
-- [Windows Autopatch documentation](https://aka.ms/Autopatchdocs)
+### Remote wipe
-## Windows Autopilot and zero-touch deployment
+When a device is lost or stolen, IT administrators might want to remotely wipe data stored in memory and hard disks. A helpdesk agent might also want to reset devices to fix issues encountered by remote workers. A remote wipe can also be used to prepare a previously used device for a new user.
-Traditionally, IT professionals spend significant time building and customizing images that will later be deployed to devices. Windows Autopilot introduces a new approach with a collection of technologies used to set up and preconfigure new devices, getting them ready for productive use and ensuring they are delivered locked down and compliant with corporate security policies.
+Windows 11 supports the Remote Wipe configuration service provider (CSP) so that device management solutions can remotely initiate any of the following operations:
-- From a user perspective, it only takes a few simple operations to get their device ready for use
-- From an IT professional perspective, the only interaction required from the end user is to connect to a network and verify their credentials. Setup is automated after that point
+- Reset the device and remove user accounts and data
+- Reset the device and clean the drive
+- Reset the device but persist user accounts and data
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Remote wipe CSP][LINK-10]
+
+## :::image type="icon" source="images/microsoft-intune.svg" border="false"::: Microsoft Intune
+
+Microsoft Intune[\[4\]](conclusion.md#footnote4) is a comprehensive cloud-native endpoint management solution that helps secure, deploy, and manage users, apps, and devices. Intune brings together technologies like Microsoft Configuration Manager and Windows Autopilot to simplify provisioning, configuration management, and software updates across the organization.
+
+Intune works with Microsoft Entra ID to manage security features and processes, including multifactor authentication and conditional access.
+
+Organizations can cut costs while securing and managing remote devices through the cloud in compliance with company policies[\[11\]](conclusion.md#footnote11) . For example, organizations can save time and money by provisioning preconfigured devices to remote employees using Windows Autopilot.
+
+Windows 11 enables IT professionals to move to the cloud while consistently enforcing security policies. Windows 11 provides expanded support for group policy administrative templates (ADMX-backed policies) in cloud-native device management solutions like Microsoft Intune, enabling IT professionals to easily apply the same security policies to both on-premises and remote devices.
+
+Customers have asked for App Control for Business (previously called *Windows Defender Application Control*) to support manage installer for a long time. Now it's possible to enable allowlisting of Win32 apps to proactively reduce the number of malware infections.
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [What is Microsoft Intune][LINK-12]
+
+### Windows enrollment attestation
+
+When a device enrolls into device management, the administrator expects it to receive the appropriate policies to secure and manage the PC. However, in some cases, malicious actors can remove enrollment certificates and use them on unmanaged PCs, making them appear enrolled but without the intended security and management policies.
+
+With Windows enrollment attestation, Microsoft Entra and Microsoft Intune certificates are bound to a device using the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). This ensures that the certificates can't be transferred from one device to another, maintaining the integrity of the enrollment process.
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Windows enrollment attestation][LINK-13]
+
+### Microsoft Cloud PKI
+
+Microsoft Cloud PKI is a cloud-based service included in the Microsoft Intune Suite[\[4\]](conclusion.md#footnote4) that simplifies and automates the management of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for organizations. It eliminates the need for on-premises servers, hardware, and connectors, making it easier to set up and manage a PKI compared to, for instance, Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) combined with the Certificate Connector for Microsoft Intune.
+
+Key features include:
+
+- Certificate lifecycle management: automates the lifecycle of certificates, including issuance, renewal, and revocation, for all devices managed by Intune
+- Multi-platform support: supports certificate management for Windows, iOS/iPadOS, macOS, and Android devices
+- Enhanced security: enables certificate-based authentication for Wi-Fi, VPN, and other scenarios, improving security over traditional password-based methods. All certificate requests leverage Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP), making sure that the private key never leaves the requesting client
+- Simplified management: provides easy management of certification authorities (CAs), registration authorities (RAs), certificate revocation lists (CRLs), monitoring, and reporting
+
+With Microsoft Cloud PKI, organizations can accelerate their digital transformation and achieve a fully managed cloud PKI service with minimal effort.
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Overview of Microsoft Cloud PKI for Microsoft Intune](/mem/intune/protect/microsoft-cloud-pki-overview)
+
+### Endpoint Privilege Management (EPM)
+
+Intune Endpoint Privilege Management supports organizations' Zero Trust journeys by helping them achieve a broad user base running with least privilege, while still permitting users to run elevated tasks allowed by the organization to remain productive.
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Endpoint Privilege Management][LINK-14]
+
+### Mobile application management (MAM)
+
+With Intune, organizations can also extend MAM App Config, MAM App Protection, and App Protection Conditional Access capabilities to Windows. This enables people to access protected organizational content without having the device managed by IT. The first application to support MAM for Windows is Microsoft Edge.
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Data protection for Windows MAM][LINK-15]
+
+## Security baselines
+
+Every organization faces security threats. However, different organizations can be concerned with different types of security threats. For example, an e-commerce company might focus on protecting its internet-facing web apps, while a hospital on confidential patient information. The one thing that all organizations have in common is a need to keep their apps and devices secure. These devices must be compliant with the security standards (or security baselines) defined by the organization.
+
+A security baseline is a group of Microsoft-recommended configuration settings that explains their security implications. These settings are based on feedback from Microsoft security engineering teams, product groups, partners, and customers.
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Security baselines][LINK-11]
+
+### Security baseline for cloud-based device management solutions
+
+Windows 11 can be configured with Microsoft's security baseline, designed for cloud-based device management solutions like Microsoft Intune[\[4\]](conclusion.md#footnote4) . These security baselines function similarly to group policy-based ones and can be easily integrated into existing device management tools.
+
+The security baseline includes policies for:
+
+- Microsoft inbox security technologies such as BitLocker, Microsoft Defender SmartScreen, Virtualization-based security, Exploit Guard, Microsoft Defender Antivirus, and Windows Firewall
+- Restricting remote access to devices
+- Setting credential requirements for passwords and PINs
+- Restricting the use of legacy technology
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Intune security baseline overview][LINK-16]
+- [List of the settings in the Windows security baseline in Intune][LINK-17]
+
+## Windows Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS)
+
+Windows Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS) is a feature that automatically manages and backs up the password of a local administrator account on Microsoft Entra joined and Active Directory-joined devices. It helps enhance security by regularly rotating and managing local administrator account passwords, protecting against pass-the-hash and lateral-traversal attacks.
+
+Windows LAPS can be configured via group policy or with a device management solution like Microsoft Intune[\[4\]](conclusion.md#footnote4) .
+
+[!INCLUDE [new-24h2](includes/new-24h2.md)]
+
+Several enhancements have been made to improve manageability and security. Administrators can now configure LAPS to automatically create managed local accounts, integrating with existing policies to enhance security and efficiency. Policy settings have been updated to generate more readable passwords by ignoring certain characters and to support the generation of readable passphrases, with options to choose from three separate word source list and control passphrase length. Additionally, LAPS can detect when a computer rolls back to a previous image, ensuring password consistency between the computer and Active Directory.
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Windows LAPS overview][LINK-18]
+
+## Windows Autopilot
+
+Traditionally, IT professionals spend significant time building and customizing images that will later be deployed to devices. If you're purchasing new devices or managing device refresh cycles, you can use Windows Autopilot to set up and preconfigure new devices, getting them ready for productive use. Autopilot helps you ensure your devices are delivered locked down and compliant with corporate security policies. The solution can also be used to reset, repurpose, and recover devices with zero touch by your IT team and no infrastructure to manage, enhancing efficiency with a process that's both easy and simple.
+
+With Windows Autopilot, there's no need to reimage or manually set-up devices before giving them to the users. Your hardware vendor can ship them, ready to go, directly to the users. From a user perspective, they turn on their device, go online, and Windows Autopilot delivers apps and settings.
Windows Autopilot enables you to:
-- Automatically join devices to Microsoft Entra ID[\[9\]](conclusion.md#footnote9) or Active Directory via hybrid Microsoft Entra ID Join. For more information about the differences between these two join options, see [Introduction to device management in Microsoft Entra ID](/azure/active-directory/device-management-introduction).
-- Auto-enroll devices into MDM services such as Microsoft Intune (requires an Microsoft Entra ID Premium subscription for configuration)
-- Automatic upgrade to Enterprise Edition if required
-- Restrict administrator account creation
-- Create and auto-assign devices to configuration groups based on a device's profile
-- Customize Out of Box Experience (OOBE) content specific to the organization
+- Automatically join devices to Microsoft Entra ID or Active Directory via Microsoft Entra hybrid join
+- Autoenroll devices into a device management solution like Microsoft Intune[\[4\]](conclusion.md#footnote4) (requires a Microsoft Entra ID Premium subscription for configuration)
+- Create and autoassignment of devices to configuration groups based on a device's profile
+- Customize of the out-of-box experience (OOBE) content specific to your organization
-Existing devices can also be quickly prepared for a new user with [Windows Autopilot Reset](/mem/autopilot/windows-autopilot-reset). The reset capability is also useful in break/fix scenarios to quickly bring a device back to a business-ready state.
+Existing devices can also be quickly prepared for a new user with Windows Autopilot Reset. The reset capability is also useful in break/fix scenarios to quickly bring a device back to a business-ready state.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-- [Windows Autopilot](https://aka.ms/WindowsAutopilot)
+- [Windows Autopilot][LINK-19]
+- [Windows Autopilot Reset][LINK-20]
-## Enterprise State Roaming with Azure
+## Windows Update for Business
-Available to any organization with a Microsoft Entra ID Premium[\[9\]](conclusion.md#footnote9) or Enterprise Mobility + Security (EMS)[\[9\]](conclusion.md#footnote9) license, Enterprise State Roaming provides users with a unified Windows Settings experience across their Windows devices and reduces the time needed for configuring a new device.
+Windows Update for Business empowers IT administrators to ensure that their organization's Windows client devices are consistently up to date with the latest security updates and features. By directly connecting these systems to the Windows Update service, administrators can maintain a high level of security and functionality.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+Administrators can utilize group policy or a device management solution like Microsoft Intune[\[4\]](conclusion.md#footnote4) , to configure Windows Update for Business settings. These settings control the timing and manner in which updates are applied, allowing for thorough reliability and performance testing on a subset of devices before deploying updates across the entire organization.
-- [Enterprise State Roaming FAQ](/azure/active-directory/devices/enterprise-state-roaming-faqs)
+This approach not only provides control over the update process but also ensures a seamless and positive update experience for all users within the organization. By using Windows Update for Business, organizations can achieve a more secure and efficient operational environment.
-## Universal Print
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-Universal Print eliminates the need for on-premises print servers. It also eliminates the need for print drivers from the users' Windows devices and makes the devices secure, reducing the malware attacks that typically exploit vulnerabilities in driver model. It enables Universal Print-ready printers (with native support) to connect directly to the Microsoft Cloud. All major printer OEMs have these [models](/universal-print/fundamentals/universal-print-partner-integrations). It also supports existing printers by using the connector software that comes with Universal Print.
+- [Windows Update for Business documentation][LINK-21]
-Unlike traditional print solutions that rely on Windows print servers, Universal Print is a Microsoft-hosted cloud subscription service that supports a Zero Trust security model when using the Universal Print-ready printers. Customers can enable network isolation of printers, including the Universal Print connector software, from the rest of the organization's resources. Users and their devices do not need to be on the same local network as the printers or the Universal Print connector.
+## Windows Autopatch
-Universal Print supports Zero Trust security by requiring that:
+Cybercriminals commonly exploit obsolete or unpatched software to infiltrate networks. It's essential to maintain current updates to seal security gaps. Windows Autopatch is a cloud service that automates Windows, Microsoft 365 Apps for enterprise, Microsoft Edge, and Microsoft Teams updates to improve security and productivity across your organization. Autopatch helps you minimize the involvement of your scarce IT resources in the planning and deployment of updates so your IT Admins can focus on other activities and tasks.
-- Each connection and API call to Universal Print cloud service requires authentication validated by Microsoft Entra ID[\[9\]](conclusion.md#footnote9) . A hacker would have to have knowledge of the right credentials to successfully connect to the Universal Print service
-- Every connection established by the user's device (client), the printer, or another cloud service to the Universal Print cloud service uses SSL with TLS 1.2 protection. This protects network snooping of traffic to gain access to sensitive data
-- Each printer registered with Universal Print is created as a device object in the customer's Microsoft Entra ID tenant and issued its own device certificate. Every connection from the printer is authenticated using this certificate. The printer can access only its own data and no other device's data
-- Applications can connect to Universal Print using either user, device, or application authentication. To ensure data security, it is highly recommended that only cloud applications use application authentication
-- Each acting application must register with Microsoft Entra ID and specify the set of permission scopes it requires. Microsoft's own acting applications - for example, the Universal Print connector - are registered with the Microsoft Entra ID service. Customer administrators need to provide their consent to the required permission scopes as part of onboarding the application to their tenant
-- Each authentication with Microsoft Entra ID from an acting application cannot extend the permission scope as defined by the acting client app. This prevents the app from requesting additional permissions if the app is breached
+There's a lot more to learn about Windows Autopatch: this [Forrester Consulting Total Economic Impact™ Study][LINK-22] commissioned by Microsoft, features insights from customers who deployed Windows Autopatch and its impact on their organizations. You can also find out more information about new Autopatch features and the future of the service in the regularly published Windows IT Pro Blog and Windows Autopatch community.
-Additionally, Windows 11 and Windows 10 include MDM support to simplify printer setup for users. With initial support from Microsoft Intune[\[9\]](conclusion.md#footnote9) , admins can now configure policies to provision specific printers onto the user's Windows devices.
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-Universal Print stores the print data in cloud securely in Office Storage, the same storage used by other Microsoft Office products.
+- [Windows Autopatch documentation](/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/)
+- [Windows updates API overview](/graph/windowsupdates-concept-overview)
+- [Windows IT Pro Blog](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-it-pro-blog/bg-p/Windows-ITPro-blog/label-name/Windows%20Autopatch)
+- [Windows Autopatch community](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-autopatch/bd-p/Windows-Autopatch)
-More information about handling of Microsoft 365 data (this includes Universal Print data) can be found [here](/microsoft-365/enterprise/m365-dr-overview).
+## :::image type="icon" source="images/soon-button-title.svg" border="false"::: Windows Hotpatch
-The Universal Print secure release platform ensures user privacy, secures organizational data, and reduces print wastage. It eliminates the need for people to rush to a shared printer as soon as they send a print job to ensure that no one sees the private or confidential content. Sometimes, printed documents are picked up by another person or not picked up at all and discarded. Detailed support and configuration information can be found [here](/universal-print/fundamentals/universal-print-qrcode).
+Windows Hotpatch is a feature designed to enhance security and minimize disruptions. With Windows Hotpatch, organizations can apply critical security updates without requiring a system restart, reducing the time to adopt a security update by 60% from the moment the update is offered. Hotpatch updates streamline the installation process, enhance compliance efficiency, and provide a per-policy level view of update statuses for all devices.
-Universal Print has integrated with Administrative Units in Microsoft Entra ID to enable customers to assign a Printer Administrator role to their local IT team in the same way customers assign User Administrator or Groups Administrator roles. The local IT team can configure only the printers that are part of the same Administrative Unit.
+By utilizing hotpatching through Windows Autopatch, the number of system restarts for Windows updates can be reduced from 12 times a year to just 4, ensuring consistent protection and uninterrupted productivity. This means less downtime, a streamlined experience for users, and a reduction in security risks. This technology, proven in the Azure Server environment, is now expanding to Windows 11, offering immediate security from day one without the need for a restart.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-- [Universal Print](https://www.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/windows/universal-print)
-- [Data handling in Universal Print](/universal-print/data-handling)
-- [Delegate Printer Administration with Administrative Units](/universal-print/portal/delegated-admin)
+- [Windows Autopatch documentation](/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/)
-For customers who want to stay on Print Servers, we recommend using the Microsoft IPP Print driver. For features beyond what's covered in the standard IPP driver, use Print Support Applications (PSA) for Windows from the respective printer OEM.
+## :::image type="icon" source="images/onedrive.svg" border="false"::: OneDrive for work or school
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
-
-- [Print support app design guide](/windows-hardware/drivers/devapps/print-support-app-design-guide)
-
-## OneDrive for work or school
-
-Data in OneDrive for work or school is protected both in transit and at rest.
+OneDrive for work or school is a cloud storage service that allows users to store, share, and collaborate on files. It's a part of Microsoft 365 and is designed to help organizations protect their data and comply with regulations. OneDrive for work or school is protected both in transit and at rest.
When data transits either into the service from clients or between datacenters, it's protected using transport layer security (TLS) encryption. OneDrive only permits secure access.
-Authenticated connections are not allowed over HTTP and instead redirect to HTTPS.
+Authenticated connections aren't allowed over HTTP and instead redirect to HTTPS.
There are several ways that OneDrive for work or school is protected at rest:
-- Physical protection: Microsoft understands the importance of protecting customer data and is committed to securing the datacenters that contain it. Microsoft datacenters are designed, built, and operated to strictly limit physical access to the areas where customer data is stored. Physical security at datacenters is in alignment with the defense-in-depth principle. Multiple security measures are implemented to reduce the risk of unauthorized users accessing data and other datacenter resources. Learn more [here](/compliance/assurance/assurance-datacenter-physical-access-security)
+- Physical protection: Microsoft understands the importance of protecting customer data and is committed to securing the datacenters that contain it. Microsoft datacenters are designed, built, and operated to strictly limit physical access to the areas where customer data is stored. Physical security at datacenters is in alignment with the defense-in-depth principle. Multiple security measures are implemented to reduce the risk of unauthorized users accessing data and other datacenter resources. Learn more [here](/compliance/assurance/assurance-datacenter-physical-access-security).
- Network protection: The networks and identities are isolated from the corporate network. Firewalls limit traffic into the environment from unauthorized locations
- Application security: Engineers who build features follow the security development lifecycle. Automated and manual analyses help identify possible vulnerabilities. The [Microsoft Security Response Center](https://technet.microsoft.com/security/dn440717.aspx) helps triage incoming vulnerability reports and evaluate mitigations. Through the [Microsoft Cloud Bug Bounty Terms](https://technet.microsoft.com/dn800983), people across the world can earn money by reporting vulnerabilities
- Content protection: Each file is encrypted at rest with a unique AES-256 key. These unique keys are encrypted with a set of master keys that are stored in Azure Key Vault
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-- [How OneDrive safeguards data in the cloud](https://support.microsoft.com/office/how-onedrive-safeguards-your-data-in-the-cloud-23c6ea94-3608-48d7-8bf0-80e142edd1e1)
+- [How OneDrive safeguards data in the cloud](https://support.microsoft.com/topic/23c6ea94-3608-48d7-8bf0-80e142edd1e1)
-## MDM enrollment certificate attestation
+## :::image type="icon" source="images/universal-print.svg" border="false"::: Universal Print
-When a device is enrolled into device management, the administrator assumes that the device will enroll and receive appropriate policies to secure and manage the PC as they expect. In some circumstances, enrollment certificates can be removed by malicious actors and then used on unmanaged PCs to appear as though they are enrolled, but without the security and management policies the administrator intended. With MDM enrollment certificate attestation, the certificate and keys are bound to a specific machine through the use of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to ensure that they can't be lifted from one device and applied to another. This capability has existed for physical PCs since Windows 11 22H2 and is now being extended to Windows 11-based Cloud PCs and Azure Virtual Desktop VMs.
+Universal Print eliminates the need for on-premises print servers. It also eliminates the need for print drivers from the users' Windows devices and makes the devices secure, reducing the malware attacks that typically exploit vulnerabilities in driver model. It enables Universal Print-ready printers (with native support) to connect directly to the Microsoft Cloud. All major printer OEMs have these [models][LINK-23]. It also supports existing printers by using the connector software that comes with Universal Print.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+Unlike traditional print solutions that rely on Windows print servers, Universal Print is a Microsoft-hosted cloud subscription service that supports a Zero Trust security model when using the Universal Print-ready printers. Customers can enable network isolation of printers, including the Universal Print connector software, from the rest of the organization's resources. Users and their devices don't need to be on the same local network as the printers or the Universal Print connector.
-- [Configuration Service Provider - Windows Client Management](/windows/client-management/mdm/)
+Universal Print supports Zero Trust security by requiring that:
+
+- Each connection and API call to Universal Print cloud service requires authentication validated by Microsoft Entra ID[\[4\]](conclusion.md#footnote4) . A hacker would have to have knowledge of the right credentials to successfully connect to the Universal Print service
+- Every connection established by the user's device (client), the printer, or another cloud service to the Universal Print cloud service uses SSL with TLS 1.2 protection. This protects network snooping of traffic to gain access to sensitive data
+- Each printer registered with Universal Print is created as a device object in the customer's Microsoft Entra ID tenant and issued its own device certificate. Every connection from the printer is authenticated using this certificate. The printer can access only its own data and no other device's data
+- Applications can connect to Universal Print using either user, device, or application authentication. To ensure data security, it's highly recommended that only cloud applications use application authentication
+- Each acting application must register with Microsoft Entra ID and specify the set of permission scopes it requires. Microsoft's own acting applications - for example, the Universal Print connector - are registered with the Microsoft Entra ID service. Customer administrators need to provide their consent to the required permission scopes as part of onboarding the application to their tenant
+- Each authentication with Microsoft Entra ID from an acting application can't extend the permission scope as defined by the acting client app. This prevents the app from requesting additional permissions if the app is breached
+
+Additionally, Windows 11 includes device management support to simplify printer setup for users. With support from Microsoft Intune[\[4\]](conclusion.md#footnote4) , admins can now configure policy settings to provision specific printers onto the user's Windows devices.
+
+Universal Print stores the print data in cloud securely in Office Storage, the same storage used by other Microsoft 365 products.
+
+More information about handling of Microsoft 365 data (this includes Universal Print data) can be found [here][LINK-24].
+
+The Universal Print secure release platform ensures user privacy, secures organizational data, and reduces print wastage. It eliminates the need for people to rush to a shared printer as soon as they send a print job to ensure that no one sees the private or confidential content. Sometimes, printed documents are picked up by another person or not picked up at all and discarded. Detailed support and configuration information can be found [here][LINK-25].
+
+Universal Print supports Administrative Units in Microsoft Entra ID to enable the assignments of a *Printer Administrator* role to specific teams in the organization. The assigned team can configure only the printers that are part of the same Administrative Unit.
+
+For customers who want to stay on print servers, we recommend using the Microsoft IPP Print driver. For features beyond what's covered in the standard IPP driver, use Print Support Applications (PSA) for Windows from the respective printer OEM.
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Universal Print][LINK-26]
+- [Data handling in Universal Print][LINK-27]
+- [Delegate Printer Administration with Administrative Units][LINK-28]
+- [Print support app design guide][LINK-29]
+
+
+
+[LINK-1]: /entra
+[LINK-2]: https://www.microsoft.com/security/business/microsoft-entra-pricing
+[LINK-3]: /entra/global-secure-access/concept-internet-access
+[LINK-4]: /entra/global-secure-access/concept-private-access
+[LINK-5]: /entra/architecture/sse-deployment-guide-internet-access
+[LINK-6]: /entra/global-secure-access/how-to-install-windows-client
+[LINK-7]: /entra/identity/devices/enterprise-state-roaming-enable
+[LINK-8]: /azure/attestation/overview
+[LINK-9]: /windows/client-management/mdm-overview
+[LINK-10]: /windows/client-management/mdm/remotewipe-csp
+[LINK-11]: /windows/security/operating-system-security/device-management/windows-security-configuration-framework/windows-security-baselines
+[LINK-12]: /mem/intune/fundamentals/what-is-intune
+[LINK-13]: /mem/intune/enrollment/windows-enrollment-attestation
+[LINK-14]: /mem/intune/protect/epm-overview?formCode=MG0AV3
+[LINK-15]: /mem/intune/apps/protect-mam-windows?formCode=MG0AV3
+[LINK-16]: /mem/intune/protect/security-baselines
+[LINK-17]: /mem/intune/protect/security-baseline-settings-mdm-all
+[LINK-18]: /windows-server/identity/laps/laps-overview
+[LINK-19]: /autopilot/overview
+[LINK-20]: /mem/autopilot/windows-autopilot-reset
+[LINK-21]: /windows/deployment/update/waas-manage-updates-wufb
+[LINK-22]: https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RW10vlw
+[LINK-23]: /universal-print/fundamentals/universal-print-partner-integrations
+[LINK-24]: /microsoft-365/enterprise/m365-dr-overview
+[LINK-25]: /universal-print/fundamentals/universal-print-qrcode
+[LINK-26]: https://www.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/windows/universal-print
+[LINK-27]: /universal-print/data-handling
+[LINK-28]: /universal-print/portal/delegated-admin
+[LINK-29]: /windows-hardware/drivers/devapps/print-support-app-design-guide
diff --git a/windows/security/book/cloud-services.md b/windows/security/book/cloud-services.md
index 9c78f4867b..cd8be85df1 100644
--- a/windows/security/book/cloud-services.md
+++ b/windows/security/book/cloud-services.md
@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
---
-title: Cloud services
-description: Windows 11 security book - Cloud services chapter.
+title: Windows 11 security book - Cloud services
+description: Cloud services chapter.
ms.topic: overview
-ms.date: 04/09/2024
+ms.date: 11/18/2024
---
# Cloud services
:::image type="content" source="images/cloud-services-cover.png" alt-text="Cover of the cloud services chapter." border="false":::
-:::image type="content" source="images/cloud-security-on.png" alt-text="Diagram of containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/cloud-security.png" border="false":::
+The workplace is constantly evolving, with many users working outside the office at least some of the time. While remote work and cloud services provide more flexibility, they also result in more endpoints and locations for organizations to worry about.
-Today's workforce has more freedom and mobility than ever before, but the risk of data exposure is also at its highest. At Microsoft, we are focused on getting customers to the cloud to benefit from modern hybrid workstyles while improving security management. Built on Zero Trust principles, Windows 11 works with Microsoft cloud services to safeguard sensitive information while controlling access and mitigating threats.
+Windows 11, combined with Microsoft Entra ID for identity management, and cloud-based device management solutions like Microsoft Intune, can be the foundation of a *Zero Trust* security model that enables flexible workstyles while controlling access, safeguarding sensitive information, and mitigating threats.
-From identity and device management to Office apps and data storage, Windows 11 and integrated cloud services can help improve productivity, security, and resilience anywhere.
+:::image type="content" source="images/cloud-security-on.png" alt-text="Diagram containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/cloud-security.png" border="false":::
diff --git a/windows/security/book/conclusion.md b/windows/security/book/conclusion.md
index c8137e0758..7a9d69992d 100644
--- a/windows/security/book/conclusion.md
+++ b/windows/security/book/conclusion.md
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
---
-title: Conclusion
-description: Conclusion
+title: Windows 11 security book - Conclusion
+description: Windows 11 security book conclusion.
ms.topic: overview
-ms.date: 04/09/2024
+ms.date: 11/18/2024
---
# Conclusion
-We will continue to bring you new features to protect against evolving threats, simplify management, and securely enable new workstyles. With Windows 11 devices, organizations of all sizes can benefit from the security and performance to thrive anywhere.
+We will continue to innovate with security by design and security by default at the heart of every new Windows 11 PC and Windows 11 IoT device. This commitment ensures that our products not only meet, but exceed, the security expectations of our customers by providing robust protection against modern cyber threats while maintaining ease-of-use and performance. By integrating advanced security measures from the ground up, we aim to create a safer digital environment for everyone.
:::image type="content" source="images/chip-to-cloud.png" alt-text="Diagram of chip-to-cloud containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/chip-to-cloud.png" border="false":::
@@ -15,31 +15,30 @@ We will continue to bring you new features to protect against evolving threats,
New:
-- Config Refresh
-- 5G and eSIM
-- Win32 apps in isolation (public preview)
-- Passkey
-- Sign-in Session Token Protection
-- Windows Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS) (public preview)
-- Microsoft Intune Suite Endpoint Privilège Management (EPM)
-- Microsoft Intune Suite Endpoint Privilege Management (EPM)
+- [Administrator protection](application-security-application-and-driver-control.md#-administrator-protection)
+- [Config Refresh](operating-system-security-system-security.md#-config-refresh)
+- [Rust for Windows](operating-system-security-system-security.md#-rust-for-windows)
+- [Trusted Signing](application-security-application-and-driver-control.md#-trusted-signing)
+- [VBS key protection](identity-protection-advanced-credential-protection.md#-vbs-key-protection)
+- [Virtualization-based security enclaves](application-security-application-isolation.md#-virtualization-based-security-enclaves)
+- [Win32 app isolation](application-security-application-isolation.md#-win32-app-isolation)
+- [Windows Hotpatch](cloud-services-protect-your-work-information.md#-windows-hotpatch)
+- [Windows protected print](operating-system-security-system-security.md#-windows-protected-print)
Enhanced:
-- Hardware security user experience
-- BitLocker to go
-- Device encryption
-- Windows Firewall
-- Server Message Block direct
-- Smart App Control (SAC) going into Enforcement mode
-- Application Control for Business
-- Enhanced Sign-in security (ESS)
-- Windows Hello for Business
-- Presence Detection
-- Wake on approach, lock on leave
-- Universal Print
-- Lockout policies for local admin
-- Enhanced Phishing protection
+- [BitLocker](operating-system-security-encryption-and-data-protection.md#bitlocker)
+- [Credential Guard](identity-protection-advanced-credential-protection.md#credential-guard)
+- [Device encryption](operating-system-security-encryption-and-data-protection.md#device-encryption)
+- [Local Security Authority (LSA) protection](identity-protection-advanced-credential-protection.md#local-security-authority-lsa-protection)
+- [Passkeys](identity-protection-passwordless-sign-in.md#passkeys)
+- [Personal data encryption](operating-system-security-encryption-and-data-protection.md#personal-data-encryption)
+- [Secured kernel](hardware-security-silicon-assisted-security.md#secured-kernel)
+- [Server Message Block file services](operating-system-security-network-security.md#server-message-block-file-services)
+- [Windows Hello PIN](identity-protection-passwordless-sign-in.md#windows-hello-pin)
+- [Windows Firewall](operating-system-security-network-security.md#windows-firewall)
+- [Windows Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS)](cloud-services-protect-your-work-information.md#windows-local-administrator-password-solution-laps)
+- [Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL)](application-security-application-isolation.md#windows-subsystem-for-linux-wsl)
## Document revision history
@@ -48,30 +47,27 @@ Enhanced:
|November 2021 |Link updates and formatting.|
|February 2022 |Revisions to Hardware root-of-trust, Virus and threat protection, and Windows Hello for Business content.|
|April 2022| Added Upcoming features section.|
-| September 2022| Updates with Windows 11 2022 Update features and enhancements.|
+|September 2022| Updates with Windows 11, version 22H2, features and enhancements.|
|April 2023| Minor edits and updates to edition availability.|
-|September 2023| Updates with Windows 11 2023 Update features and enhancement.|
-|May 2024| Move form PDF format to web format.|
+|September 2023| Updates with Windows 11, version 23H2, features and enhancements.|
+|May 2024| Move from PDF format to web format.|
+|November 2024| Updates with Windows 11, version 24H2, features and enhancements.|
## Endnotes
- 1 "2023 Data Breach Investigations Report" - Verizon, 2023.\
- 2 "Microsoft Digital Defense Report 2022" - Microsoft, 2022.\
- 3 Compared to Windows 10 devices. "Improve your day-to-day experience with Windows 11 Pro laptops" - Principled Technologies, February 2023.\
- 4 Based on Monthly Active Device data. "Earnings Release FY23 Q3" - Microsoft, April 2023.\
- 5 Windows 11 results are in comparison with Windows 10 devices. "Windows 11 Survey Report," Techaisle, February 2022.\
- 6 Requires developer enablement.\
- 7 Requires Microsoft Entra ID and Microsoft Intune, or other modern device management solution product required; sold separately.\
- 8 Commissioned study delivered by Forrester Consulting. "The Total Economic Impact™ of Windows 11 Pro Devices", December 2022. Note: quantified benefits reflect results over three years combined into a single composite organization that generates $1 billion in annual revenue, has 2,000 employees, refreshes hardware on a four-year cycle, and migrates the entirety of its workforce to Windows 11 devices.\
- 9 Sold separately.\
- 10 Email encryption is supported on products such as Microsoft Exchange Server and Microsoft Exchange Online.\
- 11 Microsoft internal data.\
- 12 Microsoft Entra ID Basic is included with Microsoft Azure and Microsoft 365 subscriptions, and other commercial services subscriptions.\
- 13 Requires Microsoft Entra ID (formerly AAD) Premium; sold separately.\
- 14 Hardware dependent.\
- 15 Microsoft 365 E3 or E5 required; sold separately.\
- 16 The Total Economic Impact™ of Windows Pro Device, Forrester study commissioned by Microsoft, June 2020.\
- 17 All users with a Microsoft Account get 5GB of OneDrive storage free, and all Microsoft 365 subscriptions include 1TB of OneDrive storage. Additional OneDrive storage is sold separately.
+||Details|
+|-|-|
+|** 1 **| [Microsoft digital defense report, CISO executive summary, October 2023](https://www.microsoft.com/security/security-insider/microsoft-digital-defense-report-2023).|
+|** 2 **| Windows 11 Survey Report. Techaisle, September 2024. Windows 11 results are in comparison with Windows 10 devices.|
+|** 3 **| Requires developer enablement.|
+|** 4 **| Sold separately.|
+|** 5 **| The Passkey can be saved locally to the Windows device and authenticated via Windows Hello or Windows Hello for Business. Hardware dependent.|
+|** 6 **| Commissioned study delivered by Forrester Consulting "The Total Economic Impact™ of Windows 11 Pro Devices", December 2022. Note, quantified benefits reflect results over three years combined into a single composite organization that generates $1 billion in annual revenue, has 2,000 employees, refreshes hardware on a four-year cycle, and migrates the entirety of its workforce to Windows 11 devices.|
+|** 7 **| Feature or functionality delivered using [servicing technology](https://support.microsoft.com/topic/b0aa0a27-ea9a-4365-9224-cb155e517f12).|
+|** 8 **| Email encryption is supported on products such as Microsoft Exchange Server and Microsoft Exchange Online.|
+|** 9 **| Hardware dependent.|
+|** 10 **|All users with a Microsoft account get 5GB of OneDrive storage free, and all Microsoft 365 subscriptions include 1TB of OneDrive storage. Additional OneDrive storage is sold separately.|
+|** 11 **|The Total Economic Impact™ of Windows Pro Device, Forrester study commissioned by Microsoft, June 2020.|
---
@@ -89,4 +85,4 @@ Enhanced:
>
> The names of actual companies and products mentioned herein may be the trademarks of their respective owners.
>
-> Part No. May 2024
+> Part No. November 2024
diff --git a/windows/security/book/features-index.md b/windows/security/book/features-index.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..09081404bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/security/book/features-index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+---
+title: Windows 11 security book - Features index
+description: Windows security book features index.
+ms.topic: overview
+ms.date: 11/18/2024
+---
+
+# Features index
+
+[5G and eSIM](operating-system-security-network-security.md#5g-and-esim) [Access management and control](identity-protection-advanced-credential-protection.md#access-management-and-control) [Account lockout policies](identity-protection-advanced-credential-protection.md#account-lockout-policies) [Administrator protection](application-security-application-and-driver-control.md#-administrator-protection) [App containers](application-security-application-isolation.md#app-containers) [App Control for Business](application-security-application-and-driver-control.md#app-control-for-business) [Attack surface reduction rules](operating-system-security-virus-and-threat-protection.md#attack-surface-reduction-rules) [Azure Attestation service](cloud-services-protect-your-work-information.md#-azure-attestation-service) [BitLocker To Go](operating-system-security-encryption-and-data-protection.md#bitlocker-to-go) [BitLocker](operating-system-security-encryption-and-data-protection.md#bitlocker) [Bluetooth protection](operating-system-security-network-security.md#bluetooth-protection) [Certificates](operating-system-security-system-security.md#certificates) [Cloud-native device management](cloud-services-protect-your-work-information.md#cloud-native-device-management) [Code signing and integrity](operating-system-security-system-security.md#code-signing-and-integrity) [Common Criteria (CC)](security-foundation-certification.md#common-criteria-cc) [Config Refresh](operating-system-security-system-security.md#-config-refresh) [Controlled folder access](operating-system-security-virus-and-threat-protection.md#controlled-folder-access) [Credential Guard](identity-protection-advanced-credential-protection.md#credential-guard) [Cryptography](operating-system-security-system-security.md#cryptography) [Device Encryption](operating-system-security-encryption-and-data-protection.md#device-encryption) [Device Health Attestation](operating-system-security-system-security.md#device-health-attestation) [Domain Name System (DNS) security](operating-system-security-network-security.md#domain-name-system-dns-security) [Email encryption](operating-system-security-encryption-and-data-protection.md#email-encryption) [Encrypted hard drive](operating-system-security-encryption-and-data-protection.md#encrypted-hard-drive) [Enhanced phishing protection in Microsoft Defender SmartScreen](identity-protection-passwordless-sign-in.md#enhanced-phishing-protection-in-microsoft-defender-smartscreen) [Enhanced Sign-in Security (ESS)](identity-protection-passwordless-sign-in.md#enhanced-sign-in-security-ess) [Exploit Protection](operating-system-security-virus-and-threat-protection.md#exploit-protection) [Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS)](security-foundation-certification.md#federal-information-processing-standard-fips) [Federated sign-in](identity-protection-passwordless-sign-in.md#federated-sign-in) [FIDO2](identity-protection-passwordless-sign-in.md#fido2) [Find my device](cloud-services-protect-your-personal-information.md#find-my-device) [Kernel direct memory access (DMA) protection](hardware-security-silicon-assisted-security.md#kernel-direct-memory-access-dma-protection) [Kiosk mode](operating-system-security-system-security.md#kiosk-mode) [Local Security Authority (LSA) protection](identity-protection-advanced-credential-protection.md#local-security-authority-lsa-protection) [Microsoft account](cloud-services-protect-your-personal-information.md#microsoft-account) [Microsoft Authenticator](identity-protection-passwordless-sign-in.md#microsoft-authenticator) [Microsoft Cloud PKI](cloud-services-protect-your-work-information.md#microsoft-cloud-pki) [Microsoft Defender Antivirus](operating-system-security-virus-and-threat-protection.md#microsoft-defender-antivirus) [Microsoft Defender for Endpoint](cloud-services-protect-your-work-information.md#-microsoft-defender-for-endpoint) [Microsoft Defender SmartScreen](operating-system-security-virus-and-threat-protection.md#microsoft-defender-smartscreen) [Microsoft Entra ID](cloud-services-protect-your-work-information.md#-microsoft-entra-id) [Microsoft Intune](cloud-services-protect-your-work-information.md#-microsoft-intune) [Microsoft Offensive Research and Security Engineering](security-foundation-offensive-research.md#microsoft-offensive-research-and-security-engineering) [Microsoft Pluton security processor](hardware-security-hardware-root-of-trust.md#microsoft-pluton-security-processor) [Microsoft Privacy Dashboard](privacy-controls.md#microsoft-privacy-dashboard) [Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL)](security-foundation-offensive-research.md#microsoft-security-development-lifecycle-sdl) [Microsoft vulnerable driver blocklist](application-security-application-and-driver-control.md#microsoft-vulnerable-driver-blocklist) [Network protection](operating-system-security-virus-and-threat-protection.md#network-protection) [OneDrive for personal](cloud-services-protect-your-personal-information.md#onedrive-for-personal) [OneDrive for work or school](cloud-services-protect-your-work-information.md#-onedrive-for-work-or-school) [OneFuzz service](security-foundation-offensive-research.md#onefuzz-service) [Personal Data Encryption](operating-system-security-encryption-and-data-protection.md#personal-data-encryption) [Personal Vault](cloud-services-protect-your-personal-information.md#personal-vault) [Privacy resource usage](privacy-controls.md#privacy-resource-usage) [Privacy transparency and controls](privacy-controls.md#privacy-transparency-and-controls) [Remote Credential Guard](identity-protection-advanced-credential-protection.md#remote-credential-guard) [Remote Wipe](cloud-services-protect-your-work-information.md#remote-wipe) [Rust for Windows](operating-system-security-system-security.md#-rust-for-windows) [Secure Future Initiative (SFI)](security-foundation-offensive-research.md#secure-future-initiative-sfi) [Secured kernel](hardware-security-silicon-assisted-security.md#secured-kernel) [Secured-core PC and Edge Secured-Core](hardware-security-silicon-assisted-security.md#secured-core-pc-and-edge-secured-core) [Security baselines](cloud-services-protect-your-work-information.md#security-baselines) [Server Message Block file services](operating-system-security-network-security.md#server-message-block-file-services) [Smart App Control](application-security-application-and-driver-control.md#smart-app-control) [Smart cards](identity-protection-passwordless-sign-in.md#smart-cards) [Software bill of materials (SBOM)](security-foundation-secure-supply-chain.md#software-bill-of-materials-sbom) [Tamper protection](operating-system-security-virus-and-threat-protection.md#tamper-protection) [Token protection (preview)](identity-protection-advanced-credential-protection.md#token-protection-preview) [Transport Layer Security (TLS)](operating-system-security-network-security.md#transport-layer-security-tls) [Trusted Boot (Secure Boot + Measured Boot)](operating-system-security-system-security.md#trusted-boot-secure-boot--measured-boot) [Trusted Platform Module (TPM)](hardware-security-hardware-root-of-trust.md#trusted-platform-module-tpm) [Trusted Signing](application-security-application-and-driver-control.md#-trusted-signing) [Universal Print](cloud-services-protect-your-work-information.md#-universal-print) [VBS key protection](identity-protection-advanced-credential-protection.md#-vbs-key-protection) [Virtual private networks (VPN)](operating-system-security-network-security.md#virtual-private-networks-vpn) [Virtualization-based security enclaves](application-security-application-isolation.md#-virtualization-based-security-enclaves) [Web sign-in](identity-protection-passwordless-sign-in.md#web-sign-in) [Wi-Fi connections](operating-system-security-network-security.md#wi-fi-connections) [Win32 app isolation](application-security-application-isolation.md#-win32-app-isolation) [Windows Autopatch](cloud-services-protect-your-work-information.md#windows-autopatch) [Windows Autopilot](cloud-services-protect-your-work-information.md#windows-autopilot) [Windows diagnostic data processor configuration](privacy-controls.md#windows-diagnostic-data-processor-configuration) [Windows enrollment attestation](cloud-services-protect-your-work-information.md#windows-enrollment-attestation) [Windows Firewall](operating-system-security-network-security.md#windows-firewall) [Windows Hello for Business](identity-protection-passwordless-sign-in.md#windows-hello-for-business) [Windows Hello](identity-protection-passwordless-sign-in.md#windows-hello) [Windows Hotpatch](cloud-services-protect-your-work-information.md#-windows-hotpatch) [Windows Insider and Microsoft Bug Bounty Programs](security-foundation-offensive-research.md#windows-insider-and-microsoft-bug-bounty-programs) [Windows Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS)](cloud-services-protect-your-work-information.md#windows-local-administrator-password-solution-laps) [Windows presence sensing](identity-protection-passwordless-sign-in.md#windows-presence-sensing) [Windows protected print](operating-system-security-system-security.md#-windows-protected-print) [Windows Sandbox](application-security-application-isolation.md#windows-sandbox) [Windows security policy settings and auditing](operating-system-security-system-security.md#windows-security-policy-settings-and-auditing) [Windows Security](operating-system-security-system-security.md#windows-security) [Windows Software Development Kit (SDK)](security-foundation-secure-supply-chain.md#windows-software-development-kit-sdk) [Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL)](application-security-application-isolation.md#windows-subsystem-for-linux-wsl) [Windows Update for Business](cloud-services-protect-your-work-information.md#windows-update-for-business)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/book/hardware-security-hardware-root-of-trust.md b/windows/security/book/hardware-security-hardware-root-of-trust.md
index 871680e2f4..1b2345a22b 100644
--- a/windows/security/book/hardware-security-hardware-root-of-trust.md
+++ b/windows/security/book/hardware-security-hardware-root-of-trust.md
@@ -1,35 +1,47 @@
---
-title: Hardware root-of-trust
-description: Windows 11 security book - Hardware root-of-trust.
+title: Windows 11 security book - Hardware root-of-trust
+description: Hardware root-of-trust.
ms.topic: overview
-ms.date: 04/09/2024
+ms.date: 11/18/2024
---
# Hardware root-of-trust
-:::image type="content" source="images/hardware.png" alt-text="Diagram of containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/hardware.png" border="false":::
+:::image type="content" source="images/hardware.png" alt-text="Diagram containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/hardware.png" border="false":::
## Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
-Trusted Platform Module (TPM) technology is designed to provide hardware-based, security-related functions. TPMs provide security and privacy benefits for system hardware, platform owners, and users. Windows Hello, BitLocker, System Guard (previously called Windows Defender System Guard), and other Windows features rely on the TPM for capabilities such as key generation, secure storage, encryption, boot integrity measurements, and attestation. These capabilities in turn help organizations strengthen the protection of their identities and data. The 2.0 version of TPM includes support for newer algorithms, which provides improvements like support for stronger cryptography. To upgrade to Windows 11, existing Windows 10 devices much meet minimum system requirements for CPU, RAM, storage, firmware, TPM, and more. All new Windows 11 devices come with TPM 2.0 built in. With Windows 11, both new and upgraded devices must have TPM 2.0. The requirement strengthens the security posture across all Windows 11 devices and helps ensure that these devices can benefit from future security capabilities that depend on a hardware root-of-trust.
+Trusted Platform Module (TPM) technology is designed to provide hardware-based, security-related functions. TPMs provide security and privacy benefits for system hardware, platform owners, and users. Windows Hello, BitLocker, System Guard, and other Windows features rely on the TPM for capabilities such as key generation, secure storage, encryption, boot integrity measurements, and attestation. These capabilities in turn help organizations strengthen the protection of their identities and data. The 2.0 version of TPM includes support for newer algorithms, which provides improvements like support for stronger cryptography. To upgrade to Windows 11, existing Windows 10 devices much meet minimum system requirements for CPU, RAM, storage, firmware, TPM, and more. All new Windows 11 devices come with TPM 2.0 built-in. With Windows 11, both new and upgraded devices must have TPM 2.0. The requirement strengthens the security posture across all Windows 11 devices and helps ensure that these devices can benefit from future security capabilities that depend on a hardware root-of-trust.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-- [Windows 11 TPM specifications](https://www.microsoft.com/windows/windows-11-specifications)
-- [Enabling TPM 2.0 on your PC](https://support.microsoft.com/windows/enable-tpm-2-0-on-your-pc-1fd5a332-360d-4f46-a1e7-ae6b0c90645c)
-- [Trusted Platform Module Technology Overview](../hardware-security/tpm/trusted-platform-module-overview.md)
+- [Windows 11 TPM specifications][LINK-1]
+- [Enable TPM 2.0 on your PC][LINK-2]
+- [Trusted Platform Module Technology Overview][LINK-3]
## Microsoft Pluton security processor
-The Microsoft Pluton security processor is the result of Microsoft's close partnership with silicon partners. Pluton enhances the protection of Windows 11 devices, including Secured-core PCs, with a hardware security processor that provides additional protection for cryptographic keys and other secrets. Pluton is designed to reduce the attack surface by integrating the security chip directly into the processor. It can be used as a TPM 2.0 or as a standalone security processor. When a security processor is located on a separate, discrete chip on the motherboard, the communication path between the hardware root-of-trust and the CPU can be vulnerable to physical attack. Embedding Pluton into the CPU makes it harder to exploit the communication path.
+The Microsoft Pluton security processor is the result of Microsoft's close partnership with silicon partners. Pluton enhances the protection of Windows 11 devices with a hardware security processor that provides extra protection for cryptographic keys and other secrets. Pluton is designed to reduce the attack surface by integrating the security chip directly into the processor. It can be used as a TPM 2.0 or as a standalone security processor. When a security processor is located on a separate, discrete chip on the motherboard, the communication path between the hardware root-of-trust and the CPU can be vulnerable to physical attack. Embedding Pluton into the CPU makes it harder to exploit the communication path.
-Pluton supports the TPM 2.0 industry standard, allowing customers to immediately benefit from enhanced security for Windows features that rely on TPMs, including BitLocker, Windows Hello, and System Guard. Pluton can also support other security functionality beyond what is possible with the TPM 2.0 specification. This extensibility allows for additional Pluton firmware and OS features to be delivered over time via Windows Update.
+Pluton supports the TPM 2.0 industry standard, allowing customers to immediately benefit from enhanced security for Windows features that rely on TPMs, including BitLocker, Windows Hello, and System Guard. Pluton can also support other security functionality beyond what is possible with the TPM 2.0 specification. This extensibility allows for more Pluton firmware and OS features to be delivered over time via Windows Update.
-As with other TPMs, credentials, encryption keys, and other sensitive information cannot be easily extracted from Pluton even if an attacker has installed malware or has complete physical possession of the PC. Storing sensitive data like encryption keys securely within the Pluton processor, which is isolated from the rest of the system, helps ensure that attackers cannot access sensitive data - even if attackers use emerging techniques like speculative execution.
+As with other TPMs, credentials, encryption keys, and other sensitive information can't be easily extracted from Pluton even if an attacker installed malware or has physical possession of the PC. Storing sensitive data like encryption keys securely within the Pluton processor, which is isolated from the rest of the system, helps ensure that attackers can't access sensitive data - even if attackers use emerging techniques like speculative execution.
-Pluton also solves the major security challenge of keeping its own security processor firmware up to date across the entire PC ecosystem. Today customers receive updates to their security firmware from a variety of different sources, which may make it difficult for customers to get alerts about security updates, keeping systems in a vulnerable state. Pluton provides a flexible, updateable platform for its firmware that implements end-to-end security functionality authored, maintained, and updated by Microsoft. Pluton is integrated with the Windows Update service, benefiting from over a decade of operational experience in reliably delivering updates across over a billion endpoint systems. Microsoft Pluton is available with select new Windows PCs.
+Pluton also solves the major security challenge of keeping its own security processor firmware up to date across the entire PC ecosystem. Today customers receive security firmware updates from different sources, which might make it difficult to get alerts about security updates, and keeping systems in a vulnerable state. Pluton provides a flexible, updateable platform for its firmware that implements end-to-end security functionality authored, maintained, and updated by Microsoft. Pluton is integrated with the Windows Update service, benefiting from over a decade of operational experience in reliably delivering updates across over a billion endpoint systems. Microsoft Pluton is available with select new Windows PCs.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+Pluton aims to ensure long-term security resilience. With the rising threat landscape influenced by artificial intelligence, memory safety will become ever more critical. To meet these demands, in addition to facilitating reliable updates to security processor firmware, we chose the open-source Tock system as the Rust-based foundation to develop the Pluton security processor firmware and actively contribute back to the Tock community. This collaboration with an open community ensures rigorous security scrutiny, and using Rust mitigates memory safety threats.
-- [Meet the Microsoft Pluton processor - The security chip designed for the future of Windows PCs](https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/11/17/meet-the-microsoft-pluton-processor-the-security-chip-designed-for-the-future-of-windows-pcs/)
-- [Microsoft Pluton security processor](../hardware-security/pluton/microsoft-pluton-security-processor.md)
+Ultimately, Pluton establishes the security backbone for Copilot + PC, thanks to tight partnerships with our silicon collaborators and OEMs. The Qualcomm Snapdragon X, AMD Ryzen AI, and Intel Core Ultra 200V mobile processors (codenamed Lunar Lake) processor platforms all incorporate Pluton as their security subsystem .
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Microsoft Pluton processor - The security chip designed for the future of Windows PCs][LINK-4]
+- [Microsoft Pluton security processor][LINK-5]
+
+
+
+[LINK-1]: https://www.microsoft.com/windows/windows-11-specifications
+[LINK-2]: https://support.microsoft.com/topic/1fd5a332-360d-4f46-a1e7-ae6b0c90645c
+[LINK-3]: /windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/trusted-platform-module-overview
+[LINK-4]: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/11/17/meet-the-microsoft-pluton-processor-the-security-chip-designed-for-the-future-of-windows-pcs/
+[LINK-5]: /windows/security/hardware-security/pluton/microsoft-pluton-security-processor
diff --git a/windows/security/book/hardware-security-silicon-assisted-security.md b/windows/security/book/hardware-security-silicon-assisted-security.md
index 8be924910a..da7cf92de1 100644
--- a/windows/security/book/hardware-security-silicon-assisted-security.md
+++ b/windows/security/book/hardware-security-silicon-assisted-security.md
@@ -1,82 +1,114 @@
---
-title: Silicon assisted security
-description: Windows 11 security book - Silicon assisted security.
+title: Windows 11 security book - Silicon assisted security
+description: Silicon assisted security.
ms.topic: overview
-ms.date: 04/09/2024
+ms.date: 11/18/2024
---
# Silicon assisted security
-:::image type="content" source="images/hardware.png" alt-text="Diagram of containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/hardware.png" border="false":::
+:::image type="content" source="images/hardware.png" alt-text="Diagram containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/hardware.png" border="false":::
-In addition to a modern hardware root-of-trust, there are numerous other capabilities in the latest chips that harden the operating system against threats by protecting the boot process, safeguarding the integrity of memory, isolating security-sensitive compute logic, and more.
+In addition to a modern hardware root-of-trust, there are multiple capabilities in the latest chips that harden the operating system against threats. These capabilities protect the boot process, safeguard the integrity of memory, isolate security-sensitive compute logic, and more.
## Secured kernel
-To secure the kernel we have two key features: virtualization-based security (VBS) and hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI). All Windows 11 devices will support HVCI and most new devices will come with VBS and HVCI protection turned on by default.
+To secure the kernel, we have two key features: Virtualization-based security (VBS) and hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI). All Windows 11 devices support HVCI and come with VBS and HVCI protection turned on by default on most/all devices.
-Virtualization-based security (VBS), also known as core isolation, is a critical building block in a secure system. VBS uses hardware virtualization features to host a secure kernel separated from the operating system. This means that even if the operating system is compromised, the secure kernel is still protected. The isolated VBS environment protects processes, such as security solutions and credential managers, from other processes running in memory. Even if malware gains access to the main OS kernel, the hypervisor and virtualization hardware help prevent the malware from executing unauthorized code or accessing platform secrets in the VBS environment. VBS
-implements virtual trust level 1 (VTL1), which has higher privilege than the virtual trust level 0 (VTL0) implemented in the main kernel.
+### Virtualization-based security (VBS)
-Since more privileged VTLs can enforce their own memory protections, higher VTLs can effectively protect areas of memory from lower VTLs. In practice, this allows a lower VTL to protect isolated memory regions by securing them with a higher VTL. For example, VTL0 could store a secret in VTL1, at which point only VTL1 could access it. Even if VTL0 is compromised, the secret would be safe.
+:::row:::
+ :::column:::
+ Virtualization-based security (VBS), also known as core isolation, is a critical building block in a secure system. VBS uses hardware virtualization features to host a secure kernel separated from the operating system. This means that even if the operating system is compromised, the secure kernel is still protected. The isolated VBS environment protects processes, such as security solutions and credential managers, from other processes running in memory. Even if malware gains access to the main OS kernel, the hypervisor and virtualization hardware help prevent the malware from executing unauthorized code or accessing platform secrets in the VBS environment. VBS implements virtual trust level 1 (VTL1), which has higher privilege than the virtual trust level 0 (VTL0) implemented in the main kernel.
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column:::
+:::image type="content" source="images/vbs-diagram.png" alt-text="Diagram of VBS architecture." lightbox="images/vbs-diagram.png" border="false":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+Since more privileged virtual trust levels (VTLs) can enforce their own memory protections, higher VTLs can effectively protect areas of memory from lower VTLs. In practice, this allows a lower VTL to protect isolated memory regions by securing them with a higher VTL. For example, VTL0 could store a secret in VTL1, at which point only VTL1 could access it. Even if VTL0 is compromised, the secret would be safe.
-- [Virtualization-based security (VBS)](/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-vbs)
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-Hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI), also called memory integrity, uses VBS to run Kernel Mode Code Integrity (KMCI) inside the secure VBS environment instead of the main Windows kernel. This helps prevent attacks that attempt to modify kernel-mode code for things like drivers. The KMCI checks that all kernel code is properly signed and hasn't been tampered with before it is allowed to run. HVCI ensures that only validated code can be executed in kernel mode. The hypervisor leverages processor virtualization extensions to enforce memory protections that prevent kernel-mode software from executing code that has not been first validated by the code integrity subsystem. HVCI protects against common attacks like WannaCry that rely on the ability to inject malicious code into the kernel. HVCI can prevent injection of malicious kernel-mode code even when drivers and other kernel-mode software have bugs.
+- [Virtualization-based security (VBS)][LINK-1]
+
+### Hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI)
+
+Hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI), also called memory integrity, uses VBS to run Kernel Mode Code Integrity (KMCI) inside the secure VBS environment instead of the main Windows kernel. This helps prevent attacks that attempt to modify kernel-mode code for things like drivers. The KMCI checks that all kernel code is properly signed and hasn't been tampered with before it's allowed to run. HVCI ensures that only validated code can be executed in kernel mode. The hypervisor uses processor virtualization extensions to enforce memory protections that prevent kernel-mode software from executing code that hasn't been first validated by the code integrity subsystem. HVCI protects against common attacks like WannaCry that rely on the ability to inject malicious code into the kernel. HVCI can prevent injection of malicious kernel-mode code even when drivers and other kernel-mode software have bugs.
With new installs of Windows 11, OS support for VBS and HVCI is turned on by default for all devices that meet prerequisites.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-- [Enable virtualization-based protection of code integrity](../hardware-security/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md)
-- [Hypervisor-protected Code Integrity (HVCI)](/windows/security/hardware-security/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity)
+- [Enable virtualization-based protection of code integrity][LINK-2]
-## Hardware-enforced stack protection
+### :::image type="icon" source="images/new-button-title.svg" border="false"::: Hypervisor-enforced Paging Translation (HVPT)
-Hardware-enforced stack protection integrates software and hardware for a modern defense against cyberthreats like memory corruption and zero-day exploits. Based on Control- flow Enforcement Technology (CET) from Intel and AMD Shadow Stacks, hardware-enforced stack protection is designed to protect against exploit techniques that try to hijack return addresses on the stack.
+Hypervisor-enforced Paging Translation (HVPT) is a security enhancement to enforce the integrity of guest virtual address to guest physical address translations. HVPT helps protect critical system data from write-what-where attacks where the attacker can write an arbitrary value to an arbitrary location often as the result of a buffer overflow. HVPT helps to protect page tables that configure critical system data structures.
-Application code includes a program processing stack that hackers seek to corrupt or disrupt in a type of attack called stack smashing. When defenses like executable space protection began thwarting such attacks, hackers turned to new methods like return-oriented programming. Return-oriented programming, a form of advanced stack smashing, can bypass defenses, hijack the data stack, and ultimately force a device to perform harmful operations. To guard against these control-flow hijacking attacks, the Windows kernel creates a separate "shadow stack" for return addresses. Windows 11 extends stack protection capabilities to provide both user mode and kernel mode support.
+### Hardware-enforced stack protection
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+Hardware-enforced stack protection integrates software and hardware for a modern defense against cyberthreats like memory corruption and zero-day exploits. Based on Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) from Intel and AMD Shadow Stacks, hardware-enforced stack protection is designed to protect against exploit techniques that try to hijack return addresses on the stack.
-- [Understanding Hardware-enforced Stack Protection](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-os-platform-blog/understanding-hardware-enforced-stack-protection/ba-p/1247815)
-- [Developer Guidance for Hardware-enforced Stack Protection](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-kernel-internals/developer-guidance-for-hardware-enforced-stack-protection/ba-p/2163340)
+Application code includes a program processing stack that hackers seek to corrupt or disrupt in a type of attack called *stack smashing*. When defenses like executable space protection began thwarting such attacks, hackers turned to new methods like return-oriented programming. Return-oriented programming, a form of advanced stack smashing, can bypass defenses, hijack the data stack, and ultimately force a device to perform harmful operations. To guard against these control-flow hijacking attacks, the Windows kernel creates a separate *shadow stack* for return addresses. Windows 11 extends stack protection capabilities to provide both user mode and kernel mode support.
-## Kernel Direct Memory Access (DMA) protection
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-Windows 11 protects against physical threats such as drive-by Direct Memory Access (DMA) attacks. Peripheral Component Interconnect Express (PCIe) hot-pluggable devices such as Thunderbolt, USB4, and CFexpress allow users to attach new classes of external peripherals, including graphics cards or other PCI devices, to their PCs with the plug-and-play ease of USB. Because PCI hot-plug ports are external and easily accessible, PCs are susceptible to drive-by DMA attacks. Memory access protection (also known as Kernel DMA Protection) protects against these attacks by preventing external peripherals from gaining unauthorized access to memory. Drive-by DMA attacks typically happen quickly while the system owner isn't present. The attacks are performed using simple to moderate attacking tools created with affordable, off-the-shelf hardware and software that do not require the disassembly of the PC. For example, a PC owner might leave a device for a quick coffee break. Meanwhile, an attacker plugs an external tool into a port to steal information or inject code that gives the attacker remote control over the PCs, including the ability to bypass the lock screen. With memory access protection built in and enabled, Windows 11 is protected against physical attack wherever people work.
+- [Understanding Hardware-enforced Stack Protection][LINK-3]
+- [Developer Guidance for hardware-enforced stack protection][LINK-4]
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+## Kernel direct memory access (DMA) protection
-- [Kernel Direct Memory Access (DMA) protection](/windows/security/hardware-security/kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt)
+Windows 11 protects against physical threats such as drive-by direct memory access (DMA) attacks. Peripheral Component Interconnect Express (PCIe) hot-pluggable devices, including Thunderbolt, USB4, and CFexpress, enable users to connect a wide variety of external peripherals to their PCs with the same plug-and-play convenience as USB. These devices encompass graphics cards and other PCI components. Since PCI hot-plug ports are external and easily accessible, PCs are susceptible to drive-by DMA attacks. Memory access protection (also known as Kernel DMA Protection) protects against these attacks by preventing external peripherals from gaining unauthorized access to memory. Drive-by DMA attacks typically happen quickly while the system owner isn't present. The attacks are performed using simple to moderate attacking tools created with affordable, off-the-shelf hardware and software that don't require the disassembly of the PC. For example, a PC owner might leave a device for a quick coffee break. Meanwhile, an attacker plugs an external tool into a port to steal information or inject code that gives the attacker remote control over the PCs, including the ability to bypass the lock screen. With memory access protection built in and enabled, Windows 11 is protected against physical attack wherever people work.
-## Secured-core PC
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-The March 2021 Security Signals report found that more than 80% of enterprises have experienced at least one firmware attack in the past two years. For customers in data-sensitive industries like financial services, government, and healthcare, Microsoft has worked with OEM partners to offer a special category of devices called Secured-core PCs (SCPCs). The devices ship with additional security measures enabled at the firmware layer, or device core, that underpins Windows.
+- [Kernel direct memory access (DMA) protection][LINK-5]
-Secured-core PCs help prevent malware attacks and minimize firmware vulnerabilities by launching into a clean and trusted state at startup with a hardware-enforced root-of-trust. Virtualization-based security comes enabled by default. With built-in hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI) shielding system memory, Secured-core PCs ensure that all kernel executable code is signed only by known and approved authorities. Secured-core PCs also protect against physical threats such as drive-by Direct Memory Access (DMA) attacks with kernel DMA protection.
+## Secured-core PC and Edge Secured-Core
-Secured-core PCs provide multiple layers of robust protection against hardware and firmware attacks. Sophisticated malware attacks may commonly attempt to install "bootkits" or "rootkits" on the system to evade detection and achieve persistence. This malicious software may run at the firmware level prior to Windows being loaded or during the Windows boot process itself, enabling the system to start with the highest level of privilege. Because critical subsystems in Windows leverage virtualization-based security, protecting the hypervisor becomes increasingly important. To ensure that no unauthorized firmware or software can start before the Windows bootloader, Windows PCs rely on the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Secure Boot standard, a baseline security feature of all Windows 11 PCs. Secure Boot helps ensure that only authorized firmware and software with trusted digital signatures can execute. In addition, measurements of all boot components are securely stored in the TPM to help establish a non-repudiable audit log of the boot called the Static Root of Trust for Measurement (SRTM).
+The March 2021 Security Signals report found that more than 80% of enterprises have experienced at least one firmware attack in the past two years. For customers in data-sensitive industries like financial services, government, and healthcare, Microsoft has worked with OEM partners to offer a special category of devices called Secured-core PCs (SCPCs), and an equivalent category of embedded IoT devices called Edge Secured-Core (ESc). The devices ship with more security measures enabled at the firmware layer, or device core, that underpins Windows.
-Thousands of PC vendors produce numerous device models with diverse UEFI firmware components, which in turn creates an incredibly large number of SRTM signatures and measurements at bootup. Because these signatures and measurements are inherently trusted by Secure Boot, it can be challenging to constrain trust to only what is needed to boot on any specific device. Traditionally, blocklists and allowlists were the two main techniques used to constrain trust, and they continue to expand if devices rely only on SRTM measurements.
+Secured-core PCs and edge devices help prevent malware attacks and minimize firmware vulnerabilities by launching into a clean and trusted state at startup with a hardware-enforced root-of-trust. Virtualization-based security comes enabled by default. Built-in hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI) shield system memory, ensuring that all kernel executable code is signed only by known and approved authorities. Secured-core PCs and edge devices also protect against physical threats such as drive-by direct memory access (DMA) attacks with kernel DMA protection.
-In Secured-core PCs, [System Guard Secure Launch](/windows/security/hardware-security/system-guard-secure-launch-and-smm-protection) protects bootup with a technology known as the Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (DRTM). With DRTM, the system initially follows the normal UEFI Secure Boot process. However, before launching, the system enters a hardware-controlled trusted state that forces the CPU(s) down a hardware-secured code path. If a malware rootkit or bootkit has bypassed UEFI Secure Boot and resides in memory, DRTM will prevent it from accessing secrets and critical code protected by the virtualization-based security environment. [Firmware Attack Surface Reduction (FASR) technology](/windows-hardware/drivers/bringup/firmware-attack-surface-reduction) can be used instead of DRTM on supported devices, such as Microsoft Surface.
+Secured-core PCs and edge devices provide multiple layers of robust protection against hardware and firmware attacks. Sophisticated malware attacks commonly attempt to install *bootkits* or *rootkits* on the system to evade detection and achieve persistence. This malicious software may run at the firmware level prior to Windows being loaded or during the Windows boot process itself, enabling the system to start with the highest level of privilege. Because critical subsystems in Windows use Virtualization-based security, protecting the hypervisor becomes increasingly important. To ensure that no unauthorized firmware or software can start before the Windows bootloader, Windows PCs rely on the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Secure Boot standard, a baseline security feature of all Windows 11 PCs. Secure Boot helps ensure that only authorized firmware and software with trusted digital signatures can execute. In addition, measurements of all boot components are securely stored in the TPM to help establish a nonrepudiable audit log of the boot called the Static Root of Trust for Measurement (SRTM).
+
+Thousands of OEM vendors produce numerous device models with diverse UEFI firmware components, which in turn creates an incredibly large number of SRTM signatures and measurements at bootup. Because these signatures and measurements are inherently trusted by Secure Boot, it can be challenging to constrain trust to only what is needed to boot on any specific device. Traditionally, blocklists and allowlists were the two main techniques used to constrain trust, and they continue to expand if devices rely only on SRTM measurements.
+
+### Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (DRTM)
+
+In secured-core PCs and edge devices, System Guard Secure Launch protects bootup with a technology known as the *Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (DRTM)*. With DRTM, the system initially follows the normal UEFI Secure Boot process. However, before launching, the system enters a hardware-controlled trusted state that forces the CPU down a hardware-secured code path. If a malware rootkit or bootkit bypasses UEFI Secure Boot and resides in memory, DRTM prevents it from accessing secrets and critical code protected by the Virtualization-based security environment. Firmware Attack Surface Reduction (FASR) technology can be used instead of DRTM on supported devices, such as Microsoft Surface.
System Management Mode (SMM) isolation is an execution mode in x86-based processors that runs at a higher effective privilege than the hypervisor. SMM complements the protections provided by DRTM by helping to reduce the attack surface. Relying on capabilities provided by silicon providers like Intel and AMD, SMM isolation enforces policies that implement restrictions such as preventing SMM code from accessing OS memory. The SMM isolation policy is included as part of the DRTM measurements that can be sent to a verifier like Microsoft Azure Remote Attestation.
:::image type="content" source="images/secure-launch.png" alt-text="Diagram of secure launch components." lightbox="images/secure-launch.png" border="false":::
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-- [Dynamic Root of Trust measure and SMM isolation](https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/09/01/force-firmware-code-to-be-measured-and-attested-by-secure-launch-on-windows-10/)
-- [Secured-core PC firmware protection](/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-highly-secure-11)
+- [System Guard Secure Launch][LINK-6]
+- [Firmware Attack Surface Reduction][LINK-7]
+- [Windows 11 secured-core PCs][LINK-8]
+- [Edge Secured-Core][LINK-9]
-## Secured-core configuration lock
+### Configuration lock
-In many organizations, IT administrators enforce policies on their corporate devices to protect the OS and keep devices in a compliant state by preventing users from changing configurations and creating configuration drift. Configuration drift occurs when users with local admin rights change settings and put the device out of sync with security policies. Devices in a non-compliant state can be vulnerable until the next sync, when configuration is reset with the mobile device management (MDM) solution. Secured-core configuration lock (config lock) is a Secured-core PC (SCPC) feature that prevents users from making unwanted changes to security settings. With config lock, the OS monitors the registry keys that are supported and reverts to the IT-desired SCPC state in seconds after detecting a drift.
+In many organizations, IT administrators enforce policies on their corporate devices to protect the OS and keep devices in a compliant state by preventing users from changing configurations and creating configuration drift. Configuration drift occurs when users with local admin rights change settings and put the device out of sync with security policies. Devices in a noncompliant state can be vulnerable until the next sync, when configuration is reset with the device management solution.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+Configuration lock is a secured-core PC and edge device feature that prevents users from making unwanted changes to security settings. With configuration lock, Windows monitors supported registry keys and reverts to the IT-desired state in seconds after detecting a drift.
-- [Windows 11 with config lock](/windows/client-management/mdm/config-lock)
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Secured-core PC configuration lock][LINK-10]
+
+
+
+[LINK-1]: /windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-vbs
+[LINK-2]: /windows/security/hardware-security/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity
+[LINK-3]: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/windowsosplatform/understanding-hardware-enforced-stack-protection/1247815
+[LINK-4]: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/windowsosplatform/developer-guidance-for-hardware-enforced-stack-protection/2163340
+[LINK-5]: /windows/security/hardware-security/kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt
+[LINK-6]: /windows/security/hardware-security/system-guard-secure-launch-and-smm-protection
+[LINK-7]: /windows-hardware/drivers/bringup/firmware-attack-surface-reduction
+[LINK-8]: /windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-highly-secure-11
+[LINK-9]: /en-us/azure/certification/overview
+[LINK-10]: /windows/client-management/mdm/config-lock
diff --git a/windows/security/book/hardware-security.md b/windows/security/book/hardware-security.md
index f6a8137aac..7d1f8669b1 100644
--- a/windows/security/book/hardware-security.md
+++ b/windows/security/book/hardware-security.md
@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
---
-title: Hardware security
-description: Windows 11 security book - Hardware security chapter.
+title: Windows 11 security book - Hardware security
+description: Hardware security chapter.
ms.topic: overview
-ms.date: 04/09/2024
+ms.date: 11/18/2024
---
# Hardware security
:::image type="content" source="images/hardware-security-cover.png" alt-text="Cover of the hardware security chapter." border="false":::
-:::image type="content" source="images/hardware-on.png" alt-text="Diagram of containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/hardware.png" border="false":::
+Today's ever-evolving threats require strong alignment between hardware and software to keep users, data, and devices protected. The operating system and software alone can't defend against the wide range of tools used by cybercriminals to steal credentials, take data, and implant malware.
-Today's ever-evolving threats require strong alignment between hardware and software technologies to keep users, data, and devices protected. The operating system alone cannot defend against the wide range of tools and techniques cybercriminals use to compromise a computer. Once they gain a foothold, intruders can be difficult to detect as they engage in multiple nefarious activities ranging from stealing important data and credentials to implanting malware into low-level device firmware. Once malware is installed in firmware, it becomes difficult to identify and remove. These new threats call for computing hardware that is secure down to the very core, including the hardware chips and processors that store sensitive business information. With hardware-based protection, we can enable strong mitigation against entire classes of vulnerabilities that are difficult to thwart with software alone. Hardware-based protection can also improve the system's overall security without measurably slowing performance, compared to implementing the same capability in software.
+In partnership with our silicon and device manufacturing partners, Windows 11 devices shield software, hardware, and firmware with features like Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 2.0, Microsoft Pluton, and Virtualization-based security (VBS). Windows 11 devices provide hardware-backed protection by default to significantly improve security while maintaining the performance that users expect.
-With Windows 11, Microsoft has raised the hardware security bar to design the most secure version of Windows ever from chip to cloud. We have carefully chosen the hardware requirements and default security features based on threat intelligence, global regulatory requirements, and our own Microsoft Security team's expertise. We have worked with our chip and device manufacturing partners to integrate advanced security capabilities across software, firmware, and hardware. Through a powerful combination of hardware root-of-trust and silicon-assisted security, Windows 11 delivers built-in hardware protection out of the box.
+:::image type="content" source="images/hardware-on.png" alt-text="Diagram containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/hardware.png" border="false":::
diff --git a/windows/security/book/identity-protection-advanced-credential-protection.md b/windows/security/book/identity-protection-advanced-credential-protection.md
index f5b1e3d1a4..0e35e41bc8 100644
--- a/windows/security/book/identity-protection-advanced-credential-protection.md
+++ b/windows/security/book/identity-protection-advanced-credential-protection.md
@@ -1,85 +1,98 @@
---
-title: Identity protection - Advanced credential protection
-description: Windows 11 security book -Identity protection chapter.
+title: Windows 11 security book - Advanced credential protection
+description: Identity protection chapter - Advanced credential protection.
ms.topic: overview
-ms.date: 04/09/2024
+ms.date: 11/18/2024
---
# Advanced credential protection
-:::image type="content" source="images/identity-protection.png" alt-text="Diagram of containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/identity-protection.png" border="false":::
+:::image type="content" source="images/identity-protection.png" alt-text="Diagram containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/identity-protection.png" border="false":::
In addition to adopting passwordless sign-in, organizations can strengthen security for user and domain credentials in Windows 11 with Credential Guard and Remote Credential Guard.
-## Enhanced phishing protection with Microsoft Defender SmartScreen
-
-As malware protection and other safeguards evolve, cybercriminals look for new ways to circumvent security measures. Phishing has emerged as a leading threat, with apps and websites designed to steal credentials by tricking people into voluntarily entering passwords. As a result, many organizations are transitioning to the ease and security of passwordless sign-in with Windows Hello or Windows Hello for Business.
-
-However, people who are still using passwords can also benefit from powerful credential protection in Windows 11. Microsoft Defender SmartScreen now includes enhanced phishing protection to automatically detect when a user's Microsoft password is entered into any app or website. Windows then identifies if the app or site is securely authenticating to Microsoft and warns if the credentials are at risk. Because the user is alerted at the moment of potential credential theft, they can take preemptive action before the password is used against them or their organization.
-
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
-
-- [Enhanced phishing protection in Microsoft Defender SmartScreen](/windows/security/operating-system-security/virus-and-threat-protection/microsoft-defender-smartscreen/enhanced-phishing-protection)
-
## Local Security Authority (LSA) protection
-Windows has several critical processes to verify a user's identity. Verification processes include Local Security Authority (LSA), which is responsible for authenticating users and verifying Windows sign-ins. LSA handles tokens and credentials that are used for single sign-on to a Microsoft account and Azure services.
+Windows has several critical processes to verify a user's identity. Verification processes include Local Security Authority (LSA), which is responsible for authenticating users, and verifying Windows sign-ins. LSA handles tokens and credentials that are used for single sign-on to a Microsoft account and Entra ID account.
-To help keep these credentials safe, additional LSA protection will be enabled by default on new, enterprise-joined Windows 11 devices. By loading only trusted, signed code, LSA provides significant protection against credential theft. LSA protection also now supports configuration using Group Policy and modern device management.
+By loading only trusted, signed code, LSA provides significant protection against credential theft. LSA protection supports configuration using group policy and other device management solutions.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [new-24h2](includes/new-24h2.md)]
-- [Configuring additional LSA protection](/windows-server/security/credentials-protection-and-management/configuring-additional-lsa-protection)
+To help keep these credentials safe, LSA protection is enabled by default on all devices (MSA, Microsoft Entra joined, hybrid, and local). For new installs, it is enabled immediately. For upgrades, it is enabled after rebooting after an evaluation period of 10 days.
+
+Users have the ability to manage the LSA protection state in the Windows Security application under **Device Security** > **Core Isolation** > **Local Security Authority protection**.
+
+To ensure a seamless transition and enhanced security for all users, the enterprise policy for LSA protection takes precedence over enablement on upgrade.
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Configuring additional LSA protection][LINK-2]
## Credential Guard
-Enabled by default in Windows 11 Enterprise, Credential Guard uses hardware-backed, virtualization-based security (VBS) to protect against credential theft. With Credential Guard, the Local Security Authority (LSA) stores and protects Active Directory (AD) secrets in an isolated environment that isn't accessible to the rest of the operating system. LSA uses remote procedure calls to communicate with the isolated LSA process.
+:::row:::
+ :::column:::
+ Credential Guard uses hardware-backed, Virtualization-based security (VBS) to protect against credential theft. With Credential Guard, the Local Security Authority (LSA) stores and protects Active Directory (AD) secrets in an isolated environment that isn't accessible to the rest of the operating system. LSA uses remote procedure calls to communicate with the isolated LSA process.
-By protecting the LSA process with virtualization-based security, Credential Guard shields systems from credential theft attack techniques like Pass-the-Hash or Pass-the-Ticket. It also helps prevent malware from accessing system secrets even if the process is running with admin privileges.
+By protecting the LSA process with Virtualization-based security, Credential Guard shields systems from user credential theft attack techniques like Pass-the-Hash or Pass-the-Ticket. It also helps prevent malware from accessing system secrets even if the process is running with admin privileges.
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column:::
+:::image type="content" source="images/credential-guard-architecture.png" alt-text="Diagram of the Credential Guard's architecture." lightbox="images/credential-guard-architecture.png" border="false":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [new-24h2](includes/new-24h2.md)]
-- [Protect derived domain credentials with Credential Guard](/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/credential-guard)
+Credential Guard protections are expanded to optionally include machine account passwords for Active Directory-joined devices. Administrators can enable audit mode or enforcement of this capability using Credential Guard policy settings.
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Protect derived domain credentials with Credential Guard][LINK-3]
## Remote Credential Guard
Remote Credential Guard helps organizations protect credentials over a Remote Desktop connection by redirecting the Kerberos requests back to the device that is requesting the connection. It also provides single sign-on experiences for Remote Desktop sessions.
-Administrator credentials are highly privileged and must be protected. When Remote Credential Guard is configured and enabled to connect during Remote Desktop sessions, the credential and credential derivatives are never passed over the network to the target device. If the target device is compromised, the credentials aren't exposed.
+Administrator credentials are highly privileged and must be protected. When Remote Credential Guard is configured to connect during Remote Desktop sessions, the credential and credential derivatives are never passed over the network to the target device. If the target device is compromised, the credentials aren't exposed.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-- [Remote Credential Guard - Windows Security | Microsoft Learn](/windows/security/identity-protection/remote-credential-guard?tabs=intune)
+- [Remote Credential Guard][LINK-4]
-## Token protection
+## :::image type="icon" source="images/new-button-title.svg" border="false"::: VBS key protection
-Token protection attempts to reduce attacks using Microsoft Entra ID token theft. Token protection makes tokens usable only from their intended device by cryptographically binding a token with a device secret. When using the token, both the token and proof of the device secret must be provided. Conditional Access policies[\[9\]](conclusion.md#footnote9) can be configured to require token protection when using sign-in tokens for specific services.
+VBS key protection enables developers to secure cryptographic keys using Virtualization-based security (VBS). VBS uses the virtualization extension capability of the CPU to create an isolated runtime outside of the normal OS. When in use, VBS keys are isolated in a secure process, allowing key operations to occur without ever exposing the private key material outside of this space. At rest, private key material is encrypted by a TPM key, which binds VBS keys to the device. Keys protected in this way can't be dumped from process memory or exported in plain text from a user's machine, preventing exfiltration attacks by any admin-level attacker.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-- [Token protection in Entra ID Conditional Access](/azure/active-directory/conditional-access/concept-token-protection)
+- [Advancing key protection in Windows using VBS][LINK-8]
-## Sign-in session token protection policy
+## Token protection (preview)
-At the inaugural Microsoft Secure event in March 2023, we announced the public preview of token protection for sign-ins. This feature allows applications and services to cryptographically bind security tokens to the device, restricting attackers' ability to impersonate users on a different device if tokens are stolen.
+Token protection attempts to reduce attacks using Microsoft Entra ID token theft. Token protection makes tokens usable only from their intended device by cryptographically binding a token with a device secret. When using the token, both the token and proof of the device secret must be provided. Conditional Access policies[\[4\]](conclusion.md#footnote4) can be configured to require token protection when using sign-in tokens for specific services.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-- [Conditional Access: Token protection (preview)](/azure/active-directory/conditional-access/concept-token-protection)
+- [Token protection in Entra ID Conditional Access][LINK-5]
+
+### Sign-in session token protection policy
+
+This feature allows applications and services to cryptographically bind security tokens to the device, restricting attackers' ability to impersonate users on a different device if tokens are stolen.
## Account lockout policies
-New devices with Windows 11 installed will have account lockout policies that are secure by default. These policies will mitigate brute-force attacks such as hackers attempting to access Windows devices via the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP).
+New devices with Windows 11 installed will have account lockout policies that are secure by default. These policies mitigate brute-force attacks such as hackers attempting to access Windows devices via the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP).
-The account lockout threshold policy is now set to 10 failed sign-in attempts by default, with the account lockout duration set to 10 minutes. The Allow Administrator account lockout is now enabled by default. The Reset account lockout counter after is now set to 10 minutes by default as well.
+The account lockout threshold policy is now set to 10 failed sign-in attempts by default, with the account lockout duration set to 10 minutes. The *Allow Administrator account lockout* is now enabled by default. The Reset account lockout counter after is now set to 10 minutes by default as well.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-- [Account lockout policy](/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/account-lockout-policy)
+- [Account lockout policy][LINK-6]
## Access management and control
-Access control in Windows ensures that shared resources are available to users and groups other than the resource's owner and are protected from unauthorized use. IT administrators can manage users', groups', and computers' access to objects and assets on a network or computer. After a user is authenticated, the Windows operating system implements the second phase of protecting resources by using built-in authorization and access control technologies to determine if an authenticated user has the correct permissions.
+Access control in Windows ensures that shared resources are available to users and groups other than the resource's owner and are protected from unauthorized use. IT administrators can manage the access of users, groups, and computers to objects and assets on a network or computer. After a user is authenticated, Windows implements the second phase of protecting resources with built-in authorization and access control technologies. These technologies determine if an authenticated user has the correct permissions.
Access Control Lists (ACLs) describe the permissions for a specific object and can also contain System Access Control Lists (SACLs). SACLs provide a way to audit specific system level events, such as when a user attempts to access file system objects. These events are essential for tracking activity for objects that are sensitive or valuable and require extra monitoring. Being able to audit when a resource attempts to read or write part of the operating system is critical to understanding a potential attack.
@@ -87,10 +100,20 @@ IT administrators can refine the application and management of access to:
- Protect a greater number and variety of network resources from misuse
- Provision users to access resources in a manner that is consistent with organizational policies and the requirements of their jobs. Organizations can implement the principle of least-privilege access, which asserts that users should be granted access only to the data and operations they require to perform their jobs
-- Update users' ability to access resources on a regular basis as an organization's policies change or as users' jobs change
-- Support evolving workplace needs, including access from hybrid or remote locations, or from a rapidly expanding array of devices, including tablets and mobile phones
+- Update users' ability to access resources regularly, as an organization's policies change or as users' jobs change
+- Support evolving workplace needs, including access from hybrid or remote locations, or from a rapidly expanding array of devices, including tablets and phones
- Identify and resolve access issues when legitimate users are unable to access resources that they need to perform their jobs
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-- [Access control](/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/access-control)
+- [Access control][LINK-7]
+
+
+
+[LINK-2]: /windows-server/security/credentials-protection-and-management/configuring-additional-lsa-protection
+[LINK-3]: /windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard
+[LINK-4]: /windows/security/identity-protection/remote-credential-guard
+[LINK-5]: /azure/active-directory/conditional-access/concept-token-protection
+[LINK-6]: /windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/account-lockout-policy
+[LINK-7]: /windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/access-control
+[LINK-8]: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/windows-itpro-blog/advancing-key-protection-in-windows-using-vbs/4050988
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/book/identity-protection-passwordless-sign-in.md b/windows/security/book/identity-protection-passwordless-sign-in.md
index 00ee61f822..5187c49058 100644
--- a/windows/security/book/identity-protection-passwordless-sign-in.md
+++ b/windows/security/book/identity-protection-passwordless-sign-in.md
@@ -1,172 +1,243 @@
---
-title: Identity protection - Passwordless sign-in
-description: Windows 11 security book -Identity protection chapter.
+title: Windows 11 security book - Passwordless sign-in
+description: Identity protection chapter - Passwordless sign-in.
ms.topic: overview
-ms.date: 04/09/2024
+ms.date: 11/18/2024
---
# Passwordless sign-in
-:::image type="content" source="images/identity-protection.png" alt-text="Diagram of containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/identity-protection.png" border="false":::
+:::image type="content" source="images/identity-protection.png" alt-text="Diagram containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/identity-protection.png" border="false":::
-Passwords are inconvenient to use and prime targets for cybercriminals - and they've been an important part of digital security for years. That changes with the passwordless protection available with Windows 11. After a secure authorization process, credentials are protected behind layers of hardware and software security, giving users secure, passwordless access to their apps and cloud services.
+Passwords are a fundamental part of digital security, but they're often inconvenient and vulnerable to cyberattacks. With Windows 11, users can enjoy passwordless protection, which offers a more secure and user-friendly alternative. After a secure authorization process, credentials are safeguarded by multiple layers of hardware and software security, providing users with seamless, passwordless access to their apps and cloud services.
## Windows Hello
-Too often, passwords are weak, stolen, or forgotten. Organizations are moving toward passwordless sign-in to reduce the risk of breaches, lower the cost of managing passwords, and improve productivity and satisfaction for their employees and customers. Microsoft is committed to helping customers move toward a secure, passwordless future with Windows Hello, a cornerstone of Windows security and identity protection.
+Too often, passwords are weak, stolen, or forgotten. Organizations are moving toward passwordless sign-in to reduce the risk of breaches, lower the cost of managing passwords, and improve productivity and satisfaction for their users and customers. Microsoft is committed to helping organizations move toward a secure, passwordless future with Windows Hello, a cornerstone of Windows security and identity protection.
-[Windows Hello](/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/passwordless-strategy) can enable passwordless sign-in using biometric or PIN verification and provides built-in support for the FIDO2 passwordless industry standard. As a result, people no longer need to carry external hardware like a security key for authentication.
+Windows Hello can enable passwordless sign-in using biometric or PIN verification and provides built-in support for the FIDO2 passwordless industry standard. As a result, people no longer need to carry external hardware like a security key for authentication.
The secure, convenient sign-in experience can augment or replace passwords with a stronger authentication model based on a PIN or biometric data such as facial or fingerprint recognition secured by the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). Step-by-step guidance makes setup easy.
Using asymmetric keys provisioned in the TPM, Windows Hello protects authentication by binding a user's credentials to their device. Windows Hello validates the user based on either a PIN or biometrics match and only then allows the use of cryptographic keys bound to that user in the TPM.
-PIN and biometric data stay on the device and cannot be stored or accessed externally. Since the data cannot be accessed by anyone without physical access to the device, credentials are protected against replay attacks, phishing, and spoofing as well as password reuse and leaks.
+PIN and biometric data stay on the device and can't be stored or accessed externally. Since the data can't be accessed by anyone without physical access to the device, credentials are protected against replay attacks, phishing, and spoofing as well as password reuse and leaks.
Windows Hello can authenticate users to a Microsoft account (MSA), identity provider services, or the relying parties that also implement the FIDO2 or WebAuthn standards.
-## Windows Hello for Business
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-Windows Hello for Business extends Windows Hello to work with an organization's Active Directory and Microsoft Entra ID accounts. It provides single sign-on access to work or school resources such as OneDrive for Business, work email, and other business apps. Windows Hello for Business also give IT admins the ability to manage PIN and other sign-in requirements for devices connecting to work or school resources.
+- [Configure Windows Hello][LINK-1]
-## Windows Hello for Business Passwordless
-
-Windows 11 devices with Windows Hello for Business can protect user identities by removing the need to use passwords from day one.
-
-IT can now set a policy for Microsoft Entra ID joined machines so users no longer see the option to enter a password when accessing company resources.12 Once the policy is set, passwords are removed from the Windows user experience, both for device unlock as well as in-session authentication scenarios via CredUI. However, passwords are not eliminated from the identity directory yet. Users are expected to navigate through their core authentication scenarios using strong, phish-resistant, possession-based credentials like Windows Hello for Business and FIDO2 security keys. If necessary, users can leverage passwordless recovery mechanisms such as Windows Hello for Business PIN reset or Web Sign-in.
-
-During a device's lifecycle, a password may only need to be used once during the provisioning process. After that, people can use a PIN, face, or fingerprint to unlock credentials and sign into the device.
-
-Provisioning methods include:
-
-- Temporary Access Pass (TAP), a time-limited passcode with strong authentication requirements issued through Microsoft Entra ID
-- Existing multifactor authentication with Microsoft Entra ID, including authentication methods like the Microsoft Authenticator app
-
-Windows Hello for Business replaces the username and password by combining a security key or certificate with a PIN or biometric data and then mapping the credentials to a user account during setup. There are multiple ways to deploy Windows Hello for Business depending on an organization's needs. Organizations that rely on certificates typically use on-premises public key infrastructure (PKI) to support authentication through Certificate Trust. Organizations using key trust deployment require root-of-trust provided by certificates on domain controllers.
-
-Organizations with hybrid scenarios can eliminate the need for on-premises domain controllers and simplify passwordless adoption by using Windows Hello for Business cloud Kerberos trust.13 This solution uses security keys and replaces on-premises domain controllers with a cloud-based root-of-trust. As a result, organizations can take advantage of Windows Hello for Business and deploy passwordless security keys with minimal additional setup or infrastructure.
-
-Users will authenticate directly with Microsoft Entra ID, helping speed access to on- premises applications and other resources.
-
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
-
-- [Windows Hello for Business overview](/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/)
-
-## Windows Hello PIN
+### Windows Hello PIN
The Windows Hello PIN, which can only be entered by someone with physical access to the device, can be used for strong multifactor authentication. The PIN is protected by the TPM and, like biometric data, never leaves the device. When a user enters their PIN, an authentication key is unlocked and used to sign a request sent to the authenticating server.
The TPM protects against threats including PIN brute-force attacks on lost or stolen devices. After too many incorrect guesses, the device locks. IT admins can set security policies for PINs, such as complexity, length, and expiration requirements.
-## Windows Hello biometric sign-in
+[!INCLUDE [new-24h2](includes/new-24h2.md)]
-Windows Hello biometric sign-in enhances both security and productivity with a quick, convenient sign-in experience. There's no need to enter a password every time when a face or fingerprint is the credential.
+If your device doesn't have built-in biometrics, Windows Hello has been enhanced to use Virtualization-based Security (VBS) by default to isolate credentials. This added layer of protection helps guard against admin-level attacks. Even when you sign in with a PIN, your credentials are stored in a secure container, ensuring protection on devices with or without built-in biometric sensors.
-Windows devices that support biometric hardware such as fingerprint or facial recognition cameras integrate directly with Windows Hello, enabling access to Windows client resources and services. Biometric readers for both face and fingerprint must comply with [Microsoft](/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/windows-hello-biometric-requirements) [Windows Hello biometric requirements](/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/windows-hello-biometric-requirements). Windows Hello facial recognition is designed to only authenticate from trusted cameras used at the time of enrollment.
+### Windows Hello biometric
-If a peripheral camera is attached to the device after enrollment, that camera will only be allowed for facial authentication after it has been validated by signing in with the internal camera. For additional security, external cameras can be disabled for use with Windows Hello facial recognition.
+Windows Hello biometric sign-in enhances both security and productivity with a quick and convenient sign-in experience. There's no need to enter your PIN; just use your biometric data for an easy and delightful sign-in.
-## Windows Hello Enhanced Sign-in Security
+Windows devices that support biometric hardware, such as fingerprint or facial recognition cameras, integrate directly with Windows Hello, enabling access to Windows client resources and services. Biometric readers for both face and fingerprint must comply with Windows Hello biometric requirements. Windows Hello facial recognition is designed to authenticate only from trusted cameras used at the time of enrollment.
-Windows Hello biometrics also supports Enhanced Sign-in Security, which uses specialized hardware and software components to raise the security bar even higher for biometric sign-in.
+If a peripheral camera is attached to the device after enrollment, it can be used for facial authentication once validated by signing in with the internal camera. For added security, external cameras can be disabled for use with Windows Hello facial recognition.
-Enhanced Sign-in Security biometrics uses virtualization-based security (VBS) and the TPM to isolate user authentication processes and data and secure the pathway by which the information is communicated.
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-These specialized components protect against a class of attacks that includes biometric sample injection, replay, and tampering. For example, fingerprint readers must implement Secure Device Connection Protocol, which uses key negotiation and a Microsoft-issued certificate to protect and securely store user authentication data. For facial recognition, components such as the Secure Devices (SDEV) table and process isolation with trustlets help prevent additional attack classes.
-
-Enhanced Sign-in Security is configured by device manufacturers during the manufacturing process and is most typically supported in Secured-core PCs. For facial recognition, Enhanced Sign-in Security is supported by specific silicon and camera combinations - please check with the specific device manufacturer. Fingerprint authentication is available across all processor types. Please reach out to specific OEMs for support details.
-
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
-
-- [Windows Hello Enhanced Sign-in Security](/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/windows-hello-enhanced-sign-in-security)
-
-## Windows Hello for Business multi-factor unlock
-
-For organizations that need an extra layer of sign-in security, multi-factor unlock enables IT admins to configure Windows by requiring a combination of two unique trusted signals to sign in. Trusted signal examples include a PIN or biometric data (face or fingerprint) combined with either a PIN, Bluetooth, IP configuration, or Wi-Fi.
-
-Multi-factor unlock is useful for organizations who need to prevent information workers from sharing credentials or need to comply with regulatory requirements for a two-factor authentication policy.
-
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
-
-- [Multi-factor unlock](/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/feature-multifactor-unlock)
+- [Windows Hello biometric requirements][LINK-4]
## Windows presence sensing
-Windows presence sensing14 provides another layer of data security protection for hybrid workers. Windows 11 devices can intelligently adapt to a user's presence to help them stay secure and productive, whether they're working at home, the office, or a public environment.
+Windows presence sensing[\[9\]](conclusion.md#footnote9) provides another layer of data security protection for hybrid workers. Windows 11 devices can intelligently adapt to a user's presence to help them stay secure and productive, whether they're working at home, the office, or a public environment.
-Windows presence sensing combines presence detection sensors with Windows Hello facial recognition to sign the user in hands-free and automatically locks the device when the user leaves. With adaptive dimming, the PC dims the screen when the user looks away on compatible devices with presence sensors. It's also easier than ever to configure presence sensors on devices, with easy enablement in the out-of-the-box experience and new links in Settings to help find presence sensing features. Device manufacturers will be able to customize and build extensions for the presence sensor.
+Windows presence sensing combines presence detection sensors with Windows Hello facial recognition to sign the user in hands-free and automatically locks the device when the user leaves. With adaptive dimming, the PC dims the screen when the user looks away on compatible devices with presence sensors. It's also easier than ever to configure presence sensors on devices, with easy enablement in the out-of-the-box experience and new links in Settings to help find presence sensing features. Device manufacturers can customize and build extensions for the presence sensor.
-## Developer APIs and app privacy support for presence sensing
+Privacy is top of mind and more important than ever. Customers want to have greater transparency and control over the use of their information. The new app privacy settings enable users to allow or block access to their presence sensor information. Users can decide on these settings during the initial Windows 11 setup.
-Privacy is top of mind and more important than ever. Customers want to have greater transparency and control over the use of their information. We are pleased to announce new app privacy settings that enable users to allow or block access to their presence sensor information. Users can decide on these settings during the initial Windows 11 setup.
+Users can also take advantage of more granular settings to easily enable and disable differentiated presence sensing features like wake on approach, lock on leave, and adaptive dimming. We're also supporting developers with new APIs for presence sensing for third-party applications. Third-party applications can now access user presence information on devices with presence sensors.
-Users can also take advantage of more granular settings to easily enable and disable differentiated presence sensing features like wake on approach, lock on leave, and adaptive dimming. We are also supporting developers with new APIs for presence sensing for thirdparty applications. Third-party applications can now access user presence information on devices with modern presence sensors.
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+- [Presence sensing][LINK-7]
+- [Manage presence sensing settings in Windows 11][LINK-8]
-- [Presence sensing](/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/sensors-presence-sensing)
-- [Manage presence sensing settings in Windows 11](https://support.microsoft.com/windows/managing-presence-sensing-settings-in-windows-11-82285c93-440c-4e15-9081-c9e38c1290bb)
+## Windows Hello for Business
-## FIDO support
+Windows Hello for Business extends Windows Hello to work with an organization's Active Directory and Microsoft Entra ID accounts. It provides single sign-on access to work or school resources such as OneDrive, work email, and other business apps. Windows Hello for Business also gives IT admins the ability to manage PIN and other sign-in requirements for devices connecting to work or school resources.
-The FIDO Alliance, the Fast Identity Online industry standards body, was established to promote authentication technologies and standards that reduce reliance on passwords. FIDO Alliance and World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) have worked together to define the Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP2) and Web Authentication (WebAuthn) specifications, which are the industry standard for providing strong, phishing-resistant, user friendly, and privacy preserving authentication across the web and apps. FIDO standards and certifications are becoming recognized as the leading standard for creating secure authentication solutions across enterprises, governments, and consumer markets.
+After Windows Hello for Business is provisioned, users can use a PIN, face, or fingerprint to unlock credentials and sign into their Windows device.
-Windows 11 can also use passkeys from external FIDO2 security keys for authentication alongside or in addition to Windows Hello and Windows Hello for Business, which is also a FIDO2-certified passwordless solution. As a result, Windows 11 can be used as a FIDO authenticator for many popular identity management services.
+Provisioning methods include:
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+- Passkeys (preview), which provide a seamless way for users to authenticate to Microsoft Entra ID without entering a username or password
+- Temporary Access Pass (TAP), a time-limited passcode with strong authentication requirements issued through Microsoft Entra ID
+- Existing multifactor authentication with Microsoft Entra ID, including the Microsoft Authenticator app
-- [Passwordless security key sign-in](/azure/active-directory/authentication/howto-authentication-passwordless-security-key)
+Windows Hello for Business enhances security by replacing traditional usernames and passwords with a combination of a security key or certificate and a PIN or biometric data. This setup securely maps the credentials to a user account.
-## Passkeys
+There are various deployment models available for Windows Hello for Business, providing flexibility to meet the diverse needs of different organizations. Among these, the *Hybrid cloud Kerberos trust* model is recommended and considered the simplest for organizations operating in hybrid environments.
-Windows 11 makes it much harder for hackers who exploit stolen passwords via phishing attacks by empowering users to replace passwords with passkeys. Passkeys are the crossplatform future of secure sign-in. Microsoft and other technology leaders are supporting passkeys across their platforms and services.
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-A passkey is a unique, unguessable cryptographic secret that is securely stored on the device. Instead of using a username and password to sign in to a website or application, Windows 11 users can create and use a passkey from Windows Hello, an external security provider, or their mobile device.
+- [Windows Hello for Business overview][LINK-2]
+- [Enable passkeys (FIDO2) for your organization][LINK-9]
-Passkeys on Windows 11 are protected by Windows Hello or Windows Hello for Business. This enables users to sign in to the site or app using their face, fingerprint, or device PIN. Passkeys on Windows work in any browser or app that supports them for sign in. Users can manage passkeys on their device on Windows 11 account settings.
+### PIN reset
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+The Microsoft PIN Reset Service allows users to reset their forgotten Windows Hello PINs without requiring re-enrollment. After registering the service in the Microsoft Entra ID tenant, the capability must be enabled on the Windows devices using group policy or a device management solution like Microsoft Intune[\[4\]](conclusion.md#footnote4) .
-- [Passkeys (passkey authentication)](https://fidoalliance.org/passkeys/)
+Users can initiate a PIN reset from the Windows lock screen or from the sign-in options in Settings. The process involves authenticating and completing multifactor authentication to reset the PIN.
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [PIN reset][LINK-15]
+
+### Multi-factor unlock
+
+For organizations that need an extra layer of sign-in security, multi-factor unlock enables IT admins to configure Windows to require a combination of two unique trusted signals to sign in. Trusted signal examples include a PIN or biometric data (face or fingerprint) combined with either a PIN, Bluetooth, IP configuration, or Wi-Fi.
+
+Multi-factor unlock is useful for organizations who need to prevent information workers from sharing credentials or need to comply with regulatory requirements for a two-factor authentication policy.
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Multi-factor unlock][LINK-6]
+
+### Windows passwordless experience
+
+**Windows Hello for Business now support a fully passwordless experience.**
+
+IT admins can configure a policy on Microsoft Entra ID joined machines so users no longer see the option to enter a password when accessing company resources. Once the policy is configured, passwords are removed from the Windows user experience, both for device unlock and in-session authentication scenarios. However, passwords aren't eliminated from the identity directory yet. Users are expected to navigate through their core authentication scenarios using strong, phish-resistant, possession-based credentials like Windows Hello for Business and FIDO2 security keys. If necessary, users can use passwordless recovery mechanisms such as Microsoft PIN reset service or web sign-in.
+
+Users authenticate directly with Microsoft Entra ID, helping speed access to on-premises applications and other resources.
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Windows passwordless experience][LINK-3]
+
+## Enhanced Sign-in Security (ESS)
+
+Windows Hello supports Enhanced Sign-in Security, which uses specialized hardware and software components to raise the security bar even higher for biometric sign-in.
+
+Enhanced Sign-in Security biometrics uses Virtualization-based security (VBS) and the TPM to isolate user authentication processes and data and secure the pathway by which the information is communicated.
+
+These specialized components protect against a class of attacks that includes biometric sample injection, replay, and tampering. For example, fingerprint readers must implement Secure Device Connection Protocol, which uses key negotiation and a Microsoft-issued certificate to protect and securely store user authentication data. For facial recognition, components such as the Secure Devices (SDEV) table and process isolation with trustlets help prevent more attack classes.
+
+Enhanced Sign-in Security is configured by device manufacturers during the manufacturing process and is most typically supported in secured-core PCs. For facial recognition, Enhanced Sign-in Security is supported by specific silicon and camera combinations - check with the specific device manufacturer. Fingerprint authentication is available across all processor types. Reach out to specific OEMs for support details.
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Windows Hello Enhanced Sign-in Security][LINK-5]
+
+## FIDO2
+
+The FIDO Alliance, the Fast Identity Online industry standards body, was established to promote authentication technologies and standards that reduce reliance on passwords. FIDO Alliance and World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) worked together to define the Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP2) and Web Authentication (WebAuthn) specifications. These specifications are the industry standard for providing strong, phishing-resistant, user friendly, and privacy preserving authentication across the web and apps. FIDO standards and certifications are becoming recognized as the leading standard for creating secure authentication solutions across enterprises, governments, and consumer markets.
+
+Windows 11 can also use external FIDO2 security keys for authentication alongside or in addition to Windows Hello and Windows Hello for Business, which is also a FIDO2-certified passwordless solution. As a result, Windows 11 can be used as a FIDO authenticator for many popular identity management services.
+
+### Passkeys
+
+Windows 11 makes it much harder for hackers who exploit stolen passwords via phishing attacks by empowering users to replace passwords with passkeys. Passkeys are the cross-platform future of secure sign-in. Microsoft and other technology leaders are supporting passkeys across their platforms and services.
+
+A passkey is a unique, unguessable cryptographic secret that is securely stored on the device. Instead of using a username and password to sign in to a website or application, Windows 11 users can create and use a passkey with Windows Hello, a third-party passkey provider, an external FIDO2 security key, or their mobile device. Passkeys on Windows work in any browsers or apps that support them for sign in.
+
+Passkeys created and saved with Windows Hello are protected by Windows Hello or Windows Hello for Business. Users can sign in to the site or app using their face, fingerprint, or device PIN. Users can manage their passkeys from **Settings** > **Accounts** > **Passkeys**.
+
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="2":::
+[!INCLUDE [coming-soon](includes/coming-soon.md)]
+
+The plug-in model for third-party passkey providers enables users to manage their passkeys with third-party passkey managers. This model ensures a seamless platform experience, regardless of whether passkeys are managed directly by Windows or by a third-party authenticator. When a third-party passkey provider is used, the passkeys are securely protected and managed by the third-party provider.
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column span="2":::
+:::image type="content" border="false" source="images/passkey-save-3p.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the save passkey dialog box showing third-party providers." lightbox="images/passkey-save-3p.png":::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Support for passkeys in Windows][LINK-10]
+- [Enable passkeys (FIDO2) for your organization][LINK-9]
## Microsoft Authenticator
-The Microsoft Authenticator app, which runs on iOS and Android devices, helps keep
+The Microsoft Authenticator app, which runs on iOS and Android devices, helps keeping Windows 11 users secure and productive. Microsoft Authenticator with Microsoft Entra passkeys can be used as a phish-resistant method to bootstrap Windows Hello for Business.
-Windows 11 users secure and productive. Microsoft Authenticator can be used to bootstrap Windows Hello for Business, which removes the need for a password to get started on Windows 11.
-
-Microsoft Authenticator also enables easy, secure sign-in for all online accounts using multifactor authentication, passwordless phone sign-in, or password autofill. The accounts in the Authenticator app are secured with a public/private key pair in hardware-backed storage such as the Keychain in iOS and Keystore on Android. IT admins can leverage different tools to nudge their users to set up the Authenticator app, provide them with extra context about where the authentication is coming from, and ensure that they are actively using it.
+Microsoft Authenticator also enables easy, secure sign-in for all online accounts using multifactor authentication, passwordless phone sign-in, phishing-resistant authentication (passkeys), or password autofill. The accounts in the Authenticator app are secured with a public/private key pair in hardware-backed storage such as the Keychain in iOS and Keystore on Android. IT admins can use different tools to nudge their users to set up the Authenticator app, provide them with extra context about where the authentication is coming from, and ensure that they're actively using it.
Individual users can back up their credentials to the cloud by enabling the encrypted backup option in settings. They can also see their sign-in history and security settings for Microsoft personal, work, or school accounts.
Using this secure app for authentication and authorization enables people to be in control of how, where, and when their credentials are used. To keep up with an ever-changing security landscape, the app is constantly updated, and new capabilities are added to stay ahead of emerging threat vectors.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-- [Microsoft Authenticator](/azure/active-directory/authentication/concept-authentication-authenticator-app)
+- [Authentication methods in Microsoft Entra ID - Microsoft Authenticator app][LINK-11]
-## Smart cards for Windows service
+## Web sign-in
-Organizations also have the option of using smart cards, an authentication method that predates biometric authentication. Smart cards are tamper-resistant, portable storage devices that can enhance Windows security when authenticating users, signing code, securing e-mail, and signing in with Windows domain accounts.
+With the support of web sign-in, users can sign in without a password using the Microsoft Authenticator app or a Temporary Access Pass (TAP). Web sign in also enables federated sign in with a SAML-P identity provider.
-**Smart cards provide:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-- Ease of use in scenarios such as healthcare where employees need to sign in and out quickly without using their hands or when sharing a workstation
+- [Web sign-in for Windows][LINK-13]
+
+## Federated sign-in
+
+Windows 11 supports federated sign-in with external education identity management services. For students unable to type easily or remember complex passwords, this capability enables secure sign-in through methods like QR codes or pictures.
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Configure federated sign-in for Windows devices][LINK-14]
+
+## Smart cards
+
+Organizations can also opt for smart cards, an authentication method that existed before biometric authentication. These tamper-resistant, portable storage devices enhance Windows security by authenticating users, signing code, securing e-mails, and signing in with Windows domain accounts.
+
+Smart cards provide:
+
+- Ease of use in scenarios such as healthcare, where users need to sign in and out quickly without using their hands or when sharing a workstation
- Isolation of security-critical computations that involve authentication, digital signatures, and key exchange from other parts of the computer. These computations are performed on the smart card
- Portability of credentials and other private information between computers at work, home, or on the road
Smart cards can only be used to sign in to domain accounts or Microsoft Entra ID accounts.
-When a password is used to sign in to a domain account, Windows uses the Kerberos Version 5 (V5) protocol for authentication. If you use a smart card, the operating system uses Kerberos V5 authentication with X.509 V3 certificates. On Microsoft Entra ID joined devices, a smart card can be used with Entra ID certificate-based authentication. Smart cards cannot be used with local accounts.
+When a password is used to sign in to a domain account, Windows uses the Kerberos Version 5 (V5) protocol for authentication. If you use a smart card, the operating system uses Kerberos V5 authentication with X.509 V3 certificates. On Microsoft Entra ID joined devices, a smart card can be used with Microsoft Entra ID certificate-based authentication. Smart cards can't be used with local accounts.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+Windows Hello for Business and FIDO2 security keys are modern, two-factor authentication methods for Windows. Customers using virtual smart cards are encouraged to move to Windows Hello for Business or FIDO2. For new Windows installations, we recommend Windows Hello for Business or FIDO2 security keys.
-- [Smart Card technical reference](/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-windows-smart-card-technical-reference)
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-## Federated sign-in
+- [Smart Card technical reference][LINK-12]
-Windows 11 supports federated sign-in with external education identity management services. For students unable to type easily or remember complex passwords, this capability enables secure sign-in through methods like QR codes or pictures. Additionally, we have added shared device support. It allows multiple students (one at a time) to use the device throughout the school day.
+## Enhanced phishing protection in Microsoft Defender SmartScreen
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+As malware protection and other safeguards evolve, cybercriminals look for new ways to circumvent security measures. Phishing is a leading threat, with apps and websites designed to steal credentials by tricking people into voluntarily entering passwords. As a result, many organizations are transitioning to the ease and security of passwordless sign-in with Windows Hello or Windows Hello for Business.
-- [Configure federated sign-in for Windows devices](/education/windows/federated-sign-in)
+We know that people are in different parts of their passwordless journey. To help on that journey for people still using passwords, Windows 11 offers powerful credential protection. Microsoft Defender SmartScreen now includes enhanced phishing protection to automatically detect when a user's Microsoft password is entered into any app or website. Windows then identifies if the app or site is securely authenticating to Microsoft and warns if the credentials are at risk. Because the user is alerted at the moment of potential credential theft, they can take preemptive action before the password is used against them or their organization.
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Enhanced phishing protection in Microsoft Defender SmartScreen][LINK-16]
+
+
+
+[LINK-1]: https://support.microsoft.com/topic/dae28983-8242-bb2a-d3d1-87c9d265a5f0
+[LINK-2]: /windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business
+[LINK-3]: /windows/security/identity-protection/passwordless-experience
+[LINK-4]: /windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/windows-hello-biometric-requirements
+[LINK-5]: /windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/windows-hello-enhanced-sign-in-security
+[LINK-6]: /windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/feature-multifactor-unlock
+[LINK-7]: /windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/sensors-presence-sensing
+[LINK-8]: https://support.microsoft.com/topic/82285c93-440c-4e15-9081-c9e38c1290bb
+[LINK-9]: /entra/identity/authentication/how-to-enable-passkey-fido2
+[LINK-10]: /windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys
+[LINK-11]: /entra/identity/authentication/concept-authentication-authenticator-app
+[LINK-12]: /windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-windows-smart-card-technical-reference
+[LINK-13]: /windows/security/identity-protection/web-sign-in
+[LINK-14]: /education/windows/federated-sign-in
+[LINK-15]: /windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/pin-reset
+[LINK-16]: /windows/security/operating-system-security/virus-and-threat-protection/microsoft-defender-smartscreen/enhanced-phishing-protection
diff --git a/windows/security/book/identity-protection.md b/windows/security/book/identity-protection.md
index d614925654..41d1b6bca6 100644
--- a/windows/security/book/identity-protection.md
+++ b/windows/security/book/identity-protection.md
@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
---
-title: Identity protection
-description: Windows 11 security book -Identity protection chapter.
+title: Windows 11 security book - Identity protection
+description: Identity protection chapter.
ms.topic: overview
-ms.date: 04/09/2024
+ms.date: 11/18/2024
---
# Identity protection
:::image type="content" source="images/identity-protection-cover.png" alt-text="Cover of the identity protection chapter." border="false":::
-:::image type="content" source="images/identity-protection-on.png" alt-text="Diagram of containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/identity-protection.png" border="false":::
+Employes are increasingly targets for cyberattacks in organizations, making identity protection a priority. Weak or reused passwords, password spraying, social engineering, and phishing are just a few of the risks businesses face today.
-Today's flexible workstyles and the security of your organization depend on secure access to corporate resources, including strong identity protection. Weak or reused passwords, password spraying, social engineering, and phishing are some of the top attack vectors. In the last 12 months, we saw an average of more than 4,000 password attacks per second.11 And phishing threats have increased, making identity a continuous battleground. As Bret Arsenault, Chief Information Security Officer at Microsoft says, *Hackers don't break in, they log in.*
+Identity protection in Windows 11 continuously evolves to provide organizations with the latest defenses, including Windows Hello for Business passwordless and Windows Hello Enhanced Sign-in Security (ESS). By leveraging these powerful identity safeguards, organizations of all sizes can reduce the risk of credential theft and unauthorized access to devices, data, and other company resources.
-Because threats are constantly evolving and often difficult for employees to detect, organizations need proactive protection, including effortlessly secure authentication and features that defend users in real time while they work. Windows 11 is designed with powerful identity protection from chip to cloud, keeping identities and personal and business data safe anywhere people work.
+:::image type="content" source="images/identity-protection-on.png" alt-text="Diagram containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/identity-protection.png" border="false":::
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+---
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.date: 11/18/2024
+ms.topic: include
+ms.service: windows-client
+---
+
+:::image type="icon" source="../images/soon-arrow.svg" border="false"::: **Coming soon[\[7\]](..\conclusion.md#footnote7) **
diff --git a/windows/security/book/includes/learn-more.md b/windows/security/book/includes/learn-more.md
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+---
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.date: 11/18/2024
+ms.topic: include
+ms.service: windows-client
+---
+
+:::image type="icon" source="../images/information.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more**
diff --git a/windows/security/book/includes/new-24h2.md b/windows/security/book/includes/new-24h2.md
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+---
+author: paolomatarazzo
+ms.author: paoloma
+ms.date: 11/18/2024
+ms.topic: include
+ms.service: windows-client
+---
+
+:::image type="icon" source="../images/new-button.svg" border="false"::: **New in Windows 11, version 24H2**
diff --git a/windows/security/book/index.md b/windows/security/book/index.md
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--- a/windows/security/book/index.md
+++ b/windows/security/book/index.md
@@ -1,55 +1,61 @@
---
-title: Windows security book introduction
-description: Windows security book introduction
+title: Windows 11 security book - Windows security book introduction
+description: Windows 11 security book introduction.
ms.topic: overview
-ms.date: 04/09/2024
-ROBOTS:
+ms.date: 11/18/2024
---
# Windows 11 Security Book
-:::image type="content" source="images/cover.png" alt-text="Cover of the Windows 11 security book.":::
+:::image type="content" source="images/cover.png" alt-text="Cover of the Windows 11 security book." border="false":::
## Introduction
-Emerging technologies and evolving business trends bring new opportunities and challenges for organizations of all sizes. As technology and workstyles transform, so does the threat landscape with growing numbers of increasingly sophisticated attacks on organizations and employees.
+Today's organizations face a world of accelerated change, from marketplace fluctuation and sociopolitical events to the rapid adoption of new AI technologies. However, as organizations and industries innovate, so do increasingly sophisticated cybercriminals. Research shows that employees, including their devices, services, and identities, are at the center of attacks on businesses of all sizes. Some leading threats include identity attacks, ransomware, targeted phishing attempts, and business email compromise[\[1\]](conclusion.md#footnote1) .
-To thrive, organizations need security to work anywhere. [Microsoft's 2022 Work Trend Index](https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/04/05/new-security-features-for-windows-11-will-help-protect-hybrid-work/) shows *cybersecurity issues and risks* are top concerns for business decision-makers, who worry about issues like malware, stolen credentials, devices that lack security updates, and physical attacks on lost or stolen devices.
+To address the ever-growing and changing threat landscape, we announced the [Secure Future Initiative (SFI)][LINK-1] in November 2023. The SFI endeavors to advance cybersecurity protection across all our company and products.
-In the past, a corporate network and software-based security were the first lines of defense. With an increasingly distributed and mobile workforce, attention has shifted to hardware-based endpoint security. People are now the top target for cybercriminals, with 74% of all breaches due to human error, privilege misuses, stolen credentials, or social engineering. Most attacks are financially motivated, and credential theft, phishing, and exploitation of vulnerabilities are the primary attack vectors. Credential theft is the most prevalent attack vector, accounting for 50% of breaches [\[1\]](conclusion.md#footnote1) .
+Microsoft is committed to putting security above all else, with products and services that are secure by design and secure by default. We synthesize more than 65 trillion signals daily to understand digital threats and criminal cyberactivity[\[1\]](conclusion.md#footnote1) . Through the SFI initiative, we've dedicated the equivalent of 34,000 full-time engineers to the highest priority security tasks. We continuously apply what we learn from incidents to improve our security and privacy models, security architecture, and technical controls.
-At Microsoft, we work hard to help organizations evolve and stay agile while protecting against modern threats. We're committed to helping businesses and their employees get secure, and stay secure. We [synthesize 43 trillion signals daily](https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RE5bcRe?culture=en-us&country=us) to understand and protect against digital threats. We have more than 8,500 dedicated security professionals across 77 countries and over 15,000 partners in our security ecosystem striving to increase resilience for our customers [\[2\]](conclusion.md#footnote2) .
+### Security by design. Security by default.
-Businesses worldwide are moving toward [secure-by-design and secure-by-default strategies](https://www.cisa.gov/securebydesign). With these models, organizations choose products from manufacturers that consider security as a business requirement, not just a technical feature. With a secure-by-default strategy, businesses can proactively reduce risk and exposure to threats across their organization because products are shipped with security features already built in and enabled.
+Working together with a shared focus is key to improving global security, from individuals and organizations to governments and industries. The world is moving toward a [secure by design and secure by default][LINK-2] approach, where technology producers are tasked with incorporating security during the initial design phase, and offering products that deliver protection right out of the box. As part of our commitment to making the world a safer place, we build security into every innovation. Windows 11 is secure by design and secure by default, with layers of defense enabled on day one to enhance your protection without the need to first configure settings. This secure-by-design approach spans the Windows edition range including Pro, Enterprise, IoT Enterprise, and Education editions. Copilot+ PCs are the fastest, most intelligent Windows devices ever, and they're also the most secure. These groundbreaking AI PCs come with secured-core PC protection and the latest safeguards like Microsoft Pluton and Windows Enhanced Sign-in Security enabled by default.
-To help businesses transform and thrive in a new era, we built Windows 11 to be secure by design and secure by default. Windows 11 devices arrive with more security features enabled out of the box. In contrast, Windows 10 devices came with many safeguards turned off unless enabled by IT or employees. The default security provided by Windows 11 elevates protection without needing to configure settings. In addition, Windows 11 devices have been shown to increase malware resistance without impacting performance [\[3\]](conclusion.md#footnote3) . Windows 11 is the most secure Windows ever, built in deep partnership with original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and silicon manufacturers. Discover why organizations of all sizes, including 90% of Fortune 500 companies, are taking advantage of the powerful default protection of Windows 11 [\[4\]](conclusion.md#footnote4) .
+Except for Windows IoT Long-Term Servicing Channel (LTSC) editions, support for Windows 10 is ending soon on October 14, 2025. Upgrading or replacing outdated devices before Windows 10 support ends is a critical priority for building a strong security posture. Discover why organizations of all sizes, including 90% of Fortune 500 companies, are relying on Windows 11.
-## Security priorities and benefits
+### Security priorities and benefits
-### Security by design and security by default
+Windows 11 enables you to focus on your work, not your security settings. Out-of-the-box features such as credential safeguards, malware shields, and application protection led to a reported 62% drop in security incidents, including a 3.0x reduction in firmware attacks[\[2\]](conclusion.md#footnote2) .
-Windows 11 is designed with layers of security enabled by default, so you can focus on your work, not your security settings. **Out-of-the-box features such as credential safeguards, malware shields, and application protection led to a reported 58% drop in security incidents, including a 3.1x reduction in firmware attacks** [\[5\]](conclusion.md#footnote5) .
+In Windows 11, hardware and software work together to shrink the attack surface, protect system integrity, and shield valuable data. New and enhanced features are designed for security by default. For example, Win32 apps in isolation[\[3\]](conclusion.md#footnote3) , token protection[\[3\]](conclusion.md#footnote3) , passkeys, and Microsoft Intune Endpoint Privilege Management[\[4\]](conclusion.md#footnote4) are some of the latest capabilities that help protect organizations and individual users against attack. Windows Hello and Windows Hello for Business work with hardware-based features like Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 2.0, biometric scanners, and Windows presence sensing to enable easier, secure sign-on and protection of your data and credentials.
-In Windows 11, hardware and software work together to shrink the attack surface, protect system integrity, and shield valuable data. New and enhanced features are designed for security by default. For example, Win32 apps in isolation [\[6\]](conclusion.md#footnote6) , token protection [\[6\]](conclusion.md#footnote6) , and Microsoft Intune Endpoint Privilege Management [\[7\]](conclusion.md#footnote7) are some of the latest capabilities that help protect your organization and employees against attack. Windows Hello and Windows Hello for Business work with hardware-based features like TPM 2.0 and biometric scanners for credential protection and easier, secure sign-on. Existing security features like BitLocker encryption have also been enhanced to optimize both security and performance.
+Existing security features are also continuously enhanced across Windows 11. For example, BitLocker encryption has been optimized for additional security and performance, and is available on more devices.
-### Protect employees against evolving threats
+### Identity protection
-With attackers targeting employees and their devices, organizations need stronger security against increasingly sophisticated cyberthreats. Windows 11 provides proactive protection against credential theft. Windows Hello and TPM 2.0 work together to shield identities. Secure biometric sign-in virtually eliminates the risk of lost or stolen passwords. And enhanced phishing protection increases safety. In fact, **businesses reported 2.8x fewer instances of identity theft with the hardware-backed protection in Windows 11** [\[5\]](conclusion.md#footnote5) .
+Attackers are increasingly targeting employees and their devices, so organizations need stronger security against increasingly sophisticated cyberthreats. Windows 11 provides proactive protection against credential theft. Windows Hello and TPM 2.0 work together to shield identities, and features like passkeys and secure biometric sign-in virtually eliminate the risk of lost or stolen passwords[\[5\]](conclusion.md#footnote5) . Enhanced phishing protection also increases safety; in fact, businesses reported 2.9x fewer instances of identity theft with the hardware-backed protection in Windows 11[\[2\]](conclusion.md#footnote2) .
-### Gain mission-critical application safeguards
+### Application safeguards
-Help keep business data secure and employees productive with robust safeguards and control for applications. Windows 11 has multiple layers of application security that shield critical data and code integrity. Application protection, privacy controls, and least-privilege principles enable developers to build in security by design. This integrated security protects against breaches and malware, helps keep data private, and gives IT administrators the controls they need. As a result, organizations and regulators can be confident that critical data is protected.
+Help keep business data secure and employees productive with robust safeguards and control for applications. Windows 11 has multiple layers of security that shield critical data and defend code integrity. Application protection, privacy controls, and least-privilege principles enable developers to build in security by design. This integrated defense helps protect against breaches and malware, assists in keeping data private, and gives IT administrators the controls they need. As a result, organizations and regulators can be confident that critical data is protected.
-### End-to-end protection with modern management
+With Trusted Signing, developers can effortlessly sign their applications. This process ensures the authenticity and integrity of the applications while enhancing security features to prevent and mitigate the impacts of malware on Windows.
-Increase protection and efficiency with Windows 11 and chip-to-cloud security. Microsoft offers comprehensive cloud services for identity, storage, and access management. In addition, Microsoft also provides the tools needed to attest that Windows 11 devices connecting to your network or accessing your data and resources are trustworthy. You can also enforce compliance and conditional access with modern device management (MDM) solutions such as Microsoft Intune and Microsoft Entra ID. Security by default not only enables people to work securely anywhere, but it also simplifies IT. A streamlined, chip-to-cloud security solution based on Windows 11 has improved productivity for IT and security teams by a reported 25% [\[8\]](conclusion.md#footnote8) .
+### Device health and access control
-## Security by design and default
+Increase protection and efficiency with Windows 11 and chip-to-cloud security. Microsoft provides the tools needed to attest that the devices connecting to your network, or accessing your data and resources, are trustworthy. You can enforce security policies and conditional access with cloud-based device management solutions such as Microsoft Intune, Microsoft Entra ID, and a comprehensive security baseline. Security by default not only enables people to work securely anywhere, but it also simplifies IT. A streamlined, chip-to-cloud security solution based on Windows 11 improves productivity for IT and security teams by a reported 25%[\[6\]](conclusion.md#footnote6) .
-In Windows 11, hardware and software work together to protect sensitive data from the core of your PC all the way to the cloud. Comprehensive protection helps keep your organization secure, no matter where people work. This simple diagram shows the layers of protection in Windows 11, while each chapter provides a layer-by-layer deep dive into features.
+### Chip-to-cloud security
+
+In Windows 11, hardware and software work together to protect sensitive data, from the core of the device all the way to the cloud. Comprehensive protection helps keep organizations secure, no matter where people work. The following diagram shows the layers of protection in Windows 11, while each chapter provides a layer-by-layer deep dive into features.
:::image type="content" source="images/chip-to-cloud.png" alt-text="Diagram of chip-to-cloud containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/chip-to-cloud.png" border="false":::
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-- [Windows security features licensing and edition requirements](/windows/security/licensing-and-edition-requirements?tabs=edition)
+- [Windows security features licensing and edition requirements](../licensing-and-edition-requirements.md)
+
+
+
+[LINK-1]: https://www.microsoft.com/trust-center/security/secure-future-initiative
+[LINK-2]: https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/secure-by-design
diff --git a/windows/security/book/operating-system-security-encryption-and-data-protection.md b/windows/security/book/operating-system-security-encryption-and-data-protection.md
index c574d203f1..d9ab85a02b 100644
--- a/windows/security/book/operating-system-security-encryption-and-data-protection.md
+++ b/windows/security/book/operating-system-security-encryption-and-data-protection.md
@@ -1,74 +1,95 @@
---
-title: Operating System security
-description: Windows 11 security book - Operating System security chapter.
+title: Windows 11 security book - Encryption and data protection
+description: Operating System security chapter - Encryption and data protection.
ms.topic: overview
-ms.date: 04/09/2024
+ms.date: 11/18/2024
---
# Encryption and data protection
-:::image type="content" source="images/operating-system.png" alt-text="Diagram of containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/operating-system.png" border="false":::
+:::image type="content" source="images/operating-system.png" alt-text="Diagram containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/operating-system.png" border="false":::
When people travel with their PCs, their confidential information travels with them. Wherever confidential data is stored, it must be protected against unauthorized access, whether through physical device theft or from malicious applications.
## BitLocker
-BitLocker Drive Encryption is a data protection feature that integrates with the operating system and addresses the threats of data theft or exposure from lost, stolen, or inappropriately decommissioned computers. BitLocker uses the AES algorithm in XTS or CBC mode of operation with 128-bit or 256-bit key length to encrypt data on the volume. Cloud storage on Microsoft OneDrive or Azure[\[9\]](conclusion.md#footnote9) can be used to save recovery key content. BitLocker can be managed by any MDM solution such as Microsoft Intune[\[6\]](conclusion.md#footnote6) > using a configuration service provider (CSP)[\[9\]](conclusion.md#footnote9) . BitLocker provides encryption for the OS, fixed data, and removable data drives (BitLocker To Go), leveraging technologies like Hardware Security Test Interface (HSTI), Modern Standby, UEFI Secure Boot, and TPM. Windows consistently improves data protection by expanding existing options and providing new strategies.
+BitLocker is a data protection feature that integrates with the operating system to address the threats of data theft or exposure from lost, stolen, or improperly decommissioned devices. It uses the AES algorithm in XTS or CBC mode with 128-bit or 256-bit key lengths to encrypt data on the volume. During the initial setup, when BitLocker is enabled during OOBE and the user signs into their Microsoft account for the first time, BitLocker automatically saves its recovery password to the Microsoft account for retrieval if needed. Users also have the option to export the recovery password if they manually enable BitLocker. Recovery key content can be saved to cloud storage on OneDrive or Azure[\[4\]](conclusion.md#footnote4) .
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+For organizations, BitLocker can be managed via group policy or with a device management solution like Microsoft Intune[\[3\]](conclusion.md#footnote3) . It provides encryption for the OS, fixed data, and removable data drives (BitLocker To Go), using technologies such as Hardware Security Test Interface (HSTI), Modern Standby, UEFI Secure Boot, and TPM.
+
+[!INCLUDE [new-24h2](includes/new-24h2.md)]
+
+The BitLocker preboot recovery screen includes the Microsoft account (MSA) hint, if the recovery password is saved to an MSA. This hint helps the user to understand which MSA account was used to store recovery key information.
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
- [BitLocker overview](../operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/index.md)
-## BitLocker To Go
+### BitLocker To Go
-BitLocker To Go refers to BitLocker Drive Encryption on removable data drives. BitLocker To Go includes the encryption of USB flash drives, SD cards, and external hard disk drives. Drives can be unlocked using a password, certificate on a smart card, or recovery password.
+BitLocker To Go refers to BitLocker on removable data drives. BitLocker To Go includes the encryption of USB flash drives, SD cards, and external hard disk drives. Drives can be unlocked using a password, certificate on a smart card, or recovery password.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
- [BitLocker FAQ](../operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/faq.yml)
-## Device Encryption
+## Device encryption
-Device Encryption is consumer-level device encryption that can't be managed. Device Encryption is turned on by default for devices with the right hardware components (for example, TPM 2.0, UEFI Secure Boot, Hardware Security Test Interface, and Modern Standby). However, for a commercial scenario, it's possible for commercial customers to disable Device Encryption in favor of BitLocker Drive Encryption. BitLocker Drive Encryption is manageable through MDM.
+Device encryption is a Windows feature that simplifies the process of enabling BitLocker encryption on certain devices. It ensures that only the OS drive and fixed drives are encrypted, while external/USB drives remain unencrypted. Additionally, devices with externally accessible ports that allow DMA access are not eligible for device encryption. Unlike standard BitLocker implementation, device encryption is enabled automatically to ensure continuous protection. Once a clean installation of Windows is completed and the out-of-box experience is finished, the device is prepared for first use with encryption already in place.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+Organizations have the option to disable device encryption in favor of a full BitLocker implementation. This allows for more granular control over encryption policies and settings, ensuring that the organization's specific security requirements are met.
+
+[!INCLUDE [new-24h2](includes/new-24h2.md)]
+
+The Device encryption prerequisites of DMA and HSTI/Modern Standby are removed. This change makes more devices eligible for both automatic and manual device encryption.
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
- [Device encryption](../operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/index.md#device-encryption)
## Encrypted hard drive
-Encrypted hard drives are a class of hard drives that are self-encrypted at the hardware level and allow for full-disk hardware encryption while being transparent to the device user. These drives combine the security and management benefits provided by BitLocker Drive Encryption with the power of self-encrypting drives.
+Encrypted hard drives are a class of hard drives that are self-encrypted at the hardware level. They allow for full-disk hardware encryption and are transparent to the user. These drives combine the security and management benefits provided by BitLocker, with the power of self-encrypting drives.
By offloading the cryptographic operations to hardware, encrypted hard drives increase BitLocker performance and reduce CPU usage and power consumption. Because encrypted hard drives encrypt data quickly, BitLocker deployment can be expanded across enterprise devices with little to no impact on productivity.
Encrypted hard drives enable:
-- Smooth performance: Encryption hardware integrated into the drive controller allows the drive to operate at full data rate without performance degradation
-- Strong security based in hardware: Encryption is always "on," and the keys for encryption never leave the hard drive. The drive authenticates the user independently from the operating system before it unlocks
-- Ease of use: Encryption is transparent to the user, and the user doesn't need to enable it. Encrypted hard drives are easily erased using an onboard encryption key. There's no need
-to re-encrypt data on the drive
-- Lower cost of ownership: There's no need for new infrastructure to manage encryption keys since BitLocker leverages your existing infrastructure to store recovery information. Your device operates more efficiently because processor cycles do not need to be used for the encryption process
+- Smooth performance: encryption hardware integrated into the drive controller allows the drive to operate at full data rate without performance degradation
+- Strong security based in hardware: encryption is always-on, and the keys for encryption never leave the hard drive. The drive authenticates the user independently from the operating system before it unlocks
+- Ease of use: encryption is transparent to the user, and the user doesn't need to enable it. Encrypted hard drives are easily erased using an onboard encryption key. There's no need to re-encrypt data on the drive
+- Lower cost of ownership: there's no need for new infrastructure to manage encryption keys since BitLocker uses your existing infrastructure to store recovery information. Your device operates more efficiently because processor cycles don't need to be used for the encryption process
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
- [Encrypted hard drive](../operating-system-security/data-protection/encrypted-hard-drive.md)
-## Personal data encryption
+## Personal Data Encryption
-Personal Data Encryption refers to a new user authenticated encryption mechanism used to protect user content. Windows Hello for Business is the modern user authentication mechanism, which is used with PDE. Windows Hello for Business, either with PIN or biometrics (face or fingerprint), is used to protect the container, which houses the encryption keys used by Personal Data Encryption (PDE). When the user logs in (either after bootup or unlocking after a lock screen), the container gets authenticated to release the keys in the container to decrypt user content.
+Personal Data Encryption is a user-authenticated encryption mechanism designed to protect user's content. Personal Data Encryption uses Windows Hello for Business as its modern authentication scheme, with PIN or biometric authentication methods. The encryption keys used by Personal Data Encryption are securely stored within the Windows Hello container. When a user signs in with Windows Hello, the container is unlocked, making the keys available to decrypt the user's content.
-With the first release of PDE (Windows 11 22H2), the PDE API was available, which when adopted by applications can protect data under the purview of the applications. With the platform release of the next Windows version, PDE for Folders will be released, this feature would require no updates to any applications and protects the contents in the Known Windows Folders from bootup till first login. This reduces the barrier for entry for customers and they'll be able to get PDE security as part of the OS.
+The initial release of Personal Data Encryption in Windows 11, version 22H2, introduced a set of public APIs that applications can adopt to safeguard content.
-PDE requires Microsoft Entra ID.
+[!INCLUDE [new-24h2](includes/new-24h2.md)]
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+Personal Data Encryption is further enhanced with *Personal Data Encryption for known folders*, which extends protection to the Windows folders: Documents, Pictures, and Desktop.
-- [Personal Data Encryption (PDE)](../operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/index.md)
+:::image type="content" source="images/pde.png" alt-text="Screenshot of files encrypted with Personal Data Encryption showing a padlock." border="false":::
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Personal Data Encryption](../operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/index.md)
## Email encryption
-Email encryption enables users to encrypt outgoing email messages and attachments so that only intended recipients with a digital identification (ID) - also called a certificate - can read them.10 Users can digitally sign a message, which verifies the identity of the sender and ensures the message has not been tampered with.
+Email encryption allows users to secure email messages and attachments so that only the intended recipients with a digital identification (ID), or certificate, can read them[\[8\]](conclusion.md#footnote8) . Users can also *digitally sign* a message, which verifies the sender's identity and ensures the message hasn't been tampered with.
-These encrypted messages can be sent by a user to people within their organization as well as external contacts who have proper encryption certificates.
+The new Outlook app included in Windows 11 supports various types of email encryption, including Microsoft Purview Message Encryption, S/MIME, and Information Rights Management (IRM).
-However, recipients using Windows 11 Mail app can only read encrypted messages if the message is received on their Exchange account and they have corresponding decryption keys. Encrypted messages can be read only by recipients who have a certificate. If an encrypted message is sent to recipients whose encryption certificates are not available, the app will prompt you to remove these recipients before sending the email.
+When using Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME), users can send encrypted messages to people within their organization and to external contacts who have the proper encryption certificates. Recipients can only read encrypted messages if they have the corresponding decryption keys. If an encrypted message is sent to recipients whose encryption certificates aren't available, Outlook asks you to remove these recipients before sending the email.
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [S/MIME for message signing and encryption in Exchange Online](/exchange/security-and-compliance/smime-exo/smime-exo)
+- [Get started with the new Outlook for Windows](https://support.microsoft.com/topic/656bb8d9-5a60-49b2-a98b-ba7822bc7627)
+- [Email encryption](/purview/email-encryption)
diff --git a/windows/security/book/operating-system-security-network-security.md b/windows/security/book/operating-system-security-network-security.md
index 5638c71bce..fff427b5b2 100644
--- a/windows/security/book/operating-system-security-network-security.md
+++ b/windows/security/book/operating-system-security-network-security.md
@@ -1,58 +1,56 @@
---
-title: Operating System security
-description: Windows 11 security book - Operating System security chapter.
+title: Windows 11 security book - Network security
+description: Operating System security chapter - Network security.
ms.topic: overview
-ms.date: 04/09/2024
+ms.date: 11/18/2024
---
# Network security
-:::image type="content" source="images/operating-system.png" alt-text="Diagram of containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/operating-system.png" border="false":::
+:::image type="content" source="images/operating-system.png" alt-text="Diagram containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/operating-system.png" border="false":::
Windows 11 raises the bar for network security, offering comprehensive protection to help people work with confidence from almost anywhere. To help reduce an organization's attack
surface, network protection in Windows prevents people from accessing dangerous IP addresses and domains that may host phishing scams, exploits, and other malicious content.
Using reputation-based services, network protection blocks access to potentially harmful, low-reputation domains and IP addresses.
-New DNS and TLS protocol versions strengthen the end-to-end protections needed for applications, web services, and Zero Trust networking. File access adds an untrusted network scenario with Server Message Block over QUIC, as well as new encryption and signing capabilities. Wi-Fi and Bluetooth advancements also provide greater trust in connections to other devices. In addition, VPN and Windows Firewall (previously called Windows Defender Firewall) platforms offer new ways to easily configure and debug software.
+New DNS and TLS protocol versions strengthen the end-to-end protections needed for applications, web services, and Zero Trust networking. File access adds an untrusted network scenario with Server Message Block over QUIC, and new encryption and signing capabilities. Wi-Fi and Bluetooth advancements also provide greater trust in connections to other devices. In addition, VPN and Windows Firewall platforms offer new ways to easily configure and debug software.
In enterprise environments, network protection works best with Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, which provides detailed reporting on protection events as part of larger investigation scenarios.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-- [How to protect your network](/defender-endpoint/network-protection)
+- [How to protect your network][LINK-1]
-## Transport layer security (TLS)
+## Transport Layer Security (TLS)
-Transport Layer Security (TLS) is the internet's most deployed security protocol, encrypting data in transit to provide a secure communication channel between two endpoints. Windows defaults to the latest protocol versions and strong cipher suites unless policies are in effect to limit them. There are many extensions available, such as client authentication for enhanced server security and session resumption for improved application performance.
+Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a popular security protocol, encrypting data in transit to help provide a more secure communication channel between two endpoints. Windows enables the latest protocol versions and strong cipher suites by default and offers a full suite of extensions such as client authentication for enhanced server security, or session resumption for improved application performance. TLS 1.3 is the latest version of the protocol and is enabled by default in Windows. This version helps to eliminate obsolete cryptographic algorithms, enhance security over older versions, and aim to encrypt as much of the TLS handshake as possible. The handshake is more performant with one less round trip per connection on average and supports only strong cipher suites which provide perfect forward secrecy and less operational risk. Using TLS 1.3 provides more privacy and lower latencies for encrypted online connections. If the client or server application on either side of the connection doesn't support TLS 1.3, the connection falls back to TLS 1.2. Windows uses the latest Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) 1.2 for UDP communications.
-TLS 1.3 is the latest version of the protocol and is enabled by default starting with Windows 11 and Windows Server 2022. TLS 1.3 eliminates obsolete cryptographic algorithms, enhances security over older versions, and encrypts as much of the TLS handshake as possible. The handshake is more performant, with one fewer round trip per connection on average, and supports only five strong cipher suites, which provide perfect forward secrecy and reduced operational risk.
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-Customers using TLS 1.3 (or Windows components that support it, including HTTP.SYS, WinInet, .NET, MsQuic, and more) will get enhanced privacy and lower latencies for their encrypted online connections. Note that if either the client or server does not support TLS 1.3, Windows will fall back to TLS 1.2.
+- [TLS/SSL overview (Schannel SSP)][LINK-2]
+- [TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 soon to be disabled in Windows][LINK-3]
-Legacy protocol versions TLS 1.0 and 1.1 are officially deprecated and will be disabled by default in future OS versions only. This change will come to Windows Insider Preview in September 2023. Organizations and application developers are strongly encouraged to begin to identify and remove code dependencies on TLS 1.0/1.1 if they have not done so already.
-
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
-
-- [TLS/SSL overview (Schannel SSP)](/windows-server/security/tls/tls-ssl-schannel-ssp-overview)
-- [TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 soon to be disabled in Windows](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-it-pro-blog/tls-1-0-and-tls-1-1-soon-to-be-disabled-in-windows/bc-p/3894928/emcs_t/S2h8ZW1haWx8dG9waWNfc3Vic2NyaXB0aW9ufExMM0hCN0VURDk3OU9OfDM4OTQ5Mjh8U1VCU0NSSVBUSU9OU3xoSw#M6180)
-
-## DNS security
+## Domain Name System (DNS) security
In Windows 11, the Windows DNS client supports DNS over HTTPS and DNS over TLS, two encrypted DNS protocols. These allow administrators to ensure their devices protect their
-name queries from on-path attackers, whether they are passive observers logging browsing behavior or active attackers trying to redirect clients to malicious sites. In a Zero Trust
+name queries from on-path attackers, whether they're passive observers logging browsing behavior or active attackers trying to redirect clients to malicious sites. In a Zero Trust
model where no trust is placed in a network boundary, having a secure connection to a trusted name resolver is required.
-Windows 11 provides Group Policy as well as programmatic controls to configure DNS over HTTPS behavior. As a result, IT administrators can extend existing security to adopt new models such as Zero Trust. IT administrators can mandate DNS over HTTPS protocol, ensuring that devices that use insecure DNS will fail to connect to network resources. IT administrators also have the option not to use DNS over HTTPS or DNS over TLS for legacy deployments where network edge appliances are trusted to inspect plain-text DNS traffic. By default, Windows 11 will defer to the local administrator on which resolvers should use encrypted DNS.
+Windows 11 provides group policy and programmatic controls to configure DNS over HTTPS behavior. As a result, IT administrators can extend existing security to adopt new models such as Zero Trust. IT administrators can mandate DNS over HTTPS protocol, ensuring that devices that use insecure DNS will fail to connect to network resources. IT administrators also have the option not to use DNS over HTTPS or DNS over TLS for legacy deployments where network edge appliances are trusted to inspect plain-text DNS traffic. By default, Windows 11 will defer to the local administrator on which resolvers should use encrypted DNS.
-Support for DNS encryption integrates with existing Windows DNS configurations such as the Name Resolution Policy Table (NRPT) and the system Hosts file, as well as resolvers specified per network adapter or network profile. The integration helps Windows 11 ensure that the benefits of greater DNS security do not regress existing DNS control mechanisms.
+Support for DNS encryption integrates with existing Windows DNS configurations such as the Name Resolution Policy Table (NRPT), the system Hosts file, and resolvers specified per network adapter or network profile. The integration helps Windows 11 ensure that the benefits of greater DNS security do not regress existing DNS control mechanisms.
## Bluetooth protection
The number of Bluetooth devices connected to Windows 11 continues to increase. Windows users connect their Bluetooth headsets, mice, keyboards, and other accessories and improve their day-to-day PC experience by enjoying streaming, productivity, and gaming. Windows supports all standard Bluetooth pairing protocols, including classic and LE Secure connections, secure simple pairing, and classic and LE legacy pairing. Windows also implements host-based LE privacy. Windows updates help users stay current with OS and driver security features in accordance with the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG) and Standard Vulnerability Reports, as well as issues beyond those required by the Bluetooth core industry standards. Microsoft strongly recommends that Bluetooth accessories' firmware and software are kept up to date.
-IT-managed environments have a number of [Bluetooth policies](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-bluetooth) (MDM, Group Policy, and PowerShell) that can be managed through MDM tools such as Microsoft Intune[\[9\]](conclusion.md#footnote9) . You can configure Windows to use Bluetooth technology while supporting the security needs of your organization. For example, you can allow input and audio while blocking file transfer, force encryption standards, limit Windows discoverability, or even disable Bluetooth entirely for the most sensitive environments.
+IT-managed environments have a number policy settings available via configuration service providers, group policy, and PowerShell. These settings can be managed through device management solutions like Microsoft Intune[\[4\]](conclusion.md#footnote4) . You can configure Windows to use Bluetooth technology while supporting the security needs of your organization. For example, you can allow input and audio while blocking file transfer, force encryption standards, limit Windows discoverability, or even disable Bluetooth entirely for the most sensitive environments.
-## Securing Wi-Fi connections
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Policy CSP - Bluetooth][LINK-4]
+
+## Wi-Fi connections
Windows Wi-Fi supports industry-standard authentication and encryption methods when connecting to Wi-Fi networks. WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) is a security standard defined by the Wi-Fi Alliance (WFA) to provide sophisticated data encryption and better user authentication.
@@ -66,30 +64,33 @@ Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE), a technology that allows wireless devic
5G networks use stronger encryption and better network segmentation compared to previous generations of cellular protocols. Unlike Wi-Fi, 5G access is always mutually authenticated. Access credentials are stored in an EAL4-certified eSIM that is physically embedded in the device, making it much harder for attackers to tamper with. Together, 5G and eSIM provide a strong foundation for security.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-- [eSIM configuration of a download server](/mem/intune/configuration/esim-device-configuration-download-server)
+- [eSIM configuration of a download server][LINK-5]
## Windows Firewall
-Windows Firewall with Advanced Security (previously called Windows Defender Firewall) is an important part of a layered security model. It provides host-based, two-way network traffic
+Windows Firewall is an important part of a layered security model. It provides host-based, two-way network traffic
filtering, blocking unauthorized traffic flowing into or out of the local device based on the types of networks the device is connected to.
-Windows Firewall in Windows 11 offers the following benefits:
+Windows Firewall offers the following benefits:
-- Reduces the risk of network security threats: Windows Firewall reduces the attack surface of a device with rules that restrict or allow traffic by many properties, such as IP addresses,
-ports, or program paths. This functionality increases manageability and decreases the likelihood of a successful attack
+- Reduces the risk of network security threats: Windows Firewall reduces the attack surface of a device with rules that restrict or allow traffic by many properties, such as IP addresses, ports, or program paths. This functionality increases manageability and decreases the likelihood of a successful attack
- Safeguards sensitive data and intellectual property: By integrating with Internet Protocol Security (IPSec), Windows Firewall provides a simple way to enforce authenticated, end-to-end network communications. It provides scalable, tiered access to trusted network resources, helping to enforce integrity of the data, and optionally helping to protect the confidentiality of the data
-- Extends the value of existing investments: Because Windows Firewall is a host-based firewall that is included with the operating system, there is no additional hardware or software required. Windows Firewall is also designed to complement existing non-Microsoft network security solutions through a documented application programming interface (API)
+- Extends the value of existing investments: Because Windows Firewall is a host-based firewall that is included with the operating system, there's no extra hardware or software required. Windows Firewall is also designed to complement existing non-Microsoft network security solutions through a documented application programming interface (API)
-Windows 11 makes the Windows Firewall easier to analyze and debug. IPSec behavior has been integrated with Packet Monitor (pktmon), an in-box, cross-component network diagnostic tool for Windows. Additionally, the Windows Firewall event logs have been enhanced to ensure an audit can identify the specific filter that was responsible for any given event. This enables analysis of firewall behavior and rich packet capture without relying on third-party tools.
+Windows 11 makes the Windows Firewall easier to analyze and debug. IPSec behavior is integrated with Packet Monitor, an in-box, cross-component network diagnostic tool for Windows. Additionally, the Windows Firewall event logs are enhanced to ensure an audit can identify the specific filter that was responsible for any given event. This enables analysis of firewall behavior and rich packet capture without relying on third-party tools.
-Admins can now configure additional settings through the Firewall and Firewall Rule policy templates in the Endpoint Security node in Microsoft Intune[\[9\]](conclusion.md#footnote9) , leveraging the platform
-support from the Firewall configuration service provider (CSP) and applying these settings to Windows endpoints.
+Admins can configure more settings through the Firewall and Firewall Rule policy templates in the Endpoint Security node in Microsoft Intune[\[4\]](conclusion.md#footnote4) , using the platform support from the Firewall configuration service provider (CSP) and applying these settings to Windows endpoints.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [new-24h2](includes/new-24h2.md)]
-- [Windows Firewall overview](../operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/index.md)
+The Firewall Configuration Service Provider (CSP) in Windows now enforces an all-or-nothing approach to applying firewall rules within each atomic block. Previously, if the CSP encountered an issue with any rule in a block, it would not only stop processing that rule but also cease processing subsequent rules, potentially leaving a security gap with partially deployed rule blocks. Now, if any rule in the block cannot be successfully applied, the CSP stops processing subsequent rules and roll back all rules from that atomic block, eliminating the ambiguity of partially deployed rule blocks.
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Windows Firewall overview][LINK-6]
+- [Firewall CSP][LINK-7]
## Virtual private networks (VPN)
@@ -97,32 +98,42 @@ Organizations have long relied on Windows to provide reliable, secured, and mana
protocols, configuration support, a common VPN user interface, and programming support for custom VPN protocols. VPN apps are available in the Microsoft Store for both enterprise and
consumer VPNs, including apps for the most popular enterprise VPN gateways.
-In Windows 11, we've integrated the most commonly used VPN controls right into the Windows 11 Quick Actions pane. From the Quick Actions pane, users can see the status of their VPN, start and stop the VPN tunnels, and with one click, go to the modern Settings app for more control.
+In Windows 11, we've integrated the most commonly used VPN controls right into the Windows 11 Quick Actions pane. From the Quick Actions pane, users can verify the status of their VPN, start and stop the connection, and easily open Settings for more controls.
-The Windows VPN platform connects to Microsoft Entra ID[\[9\]](conclusion.md#footnote9) and Conditional Access for single sign-on, including multifactor authentication (MFA) through Microsoft Entra ID. The VPN platform also supports classic domain-joined authentication. It's supported by Microsoft Intune and other modern device management (MDM) providers. The flexible VPN profile supports both built-in protocols and custom protocols. It can configure multiple authentication methods and can be automatically started as needed or manually started by the end user. It also supports split-tunnel VPN and exclusive VPN with exceptions for trusted external sites.
+The Windows VPN platform connects to Microsoft Entra ID[\[4\]](conclusion.md#footnote4) and Conditional Access for single sign-on, including multifactor authentication (MFA) through Microsoft Entra ID. The VPN platform also supports classic domain-joined authentication. It's supported by Microsoft Intune[\[4\]](conclusion.md#footnote4) and other device management solutions. The flexible VPN profile supports both built-in protocols and custom protocols. It can configure multiple authentication methods and can be automatically started as needed or manually started by the end user. It also supports split-tunnel VPN and exclusive VPN with exceptions for trusted external sites.
With Universal Windows Platform (UWP) VPN apps, end users never get stuck on an old version of their VPN client. VPN apps from the store will be automatically updated as needed. Naturally, the updates are in the control of your IT admins.
-The Windows VPN platform has been tuned and hardened for cloud-based VPN providers like Azure VPN. Features like Microsoft Entra ID authentication, Windows user interface integration, plumbing IKE traffic selectors, and server support are all built into the Windows VPN platform. The integration into the Windows VPN platform leads to a simpler IT admin experience. User authentication is more consistent, and users can easily find and control their VPN.
+The Windows VPN platform is tuned and hardened for cloud-based VPN providers like Azure VPN. Features like Microsoft Entra ID authentication, Windows user interface integration, plumbing IKE traffic selectors, and server support are all built into the Windows VPN platform. The integration into the Windows VPN platform leads to a simpler IT admin experience. User authentication is more consistent, and users can easily find and control their VPN.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-- [Windows VPN technical guide](../operating-system-security/network-security/vpn/vpn-guide.md)
+- [Windows VPN technical guide][LINK-8]
## Server Message Block file services
-Server Message Block (SMB) and file services are the most common Windows workloads in the commercial and public sector ecosystem. Users and applications rely on SMB to access the files that run organizations of all sizes. In Windows 11, the SMB protocol has significant security updates to meet today's threats, including AES-256 encryption, accelerated SMB signing, Remote Directory Memory Access (RDMA) network encryption, and an entirely new scenario, SMB over QUIC for untrusted networks.
+Server Message Block (SMB) and file services are the most common Windows workloads in the commercial and public sector ecosystem. Users and applications rely on SMB to access the files that run organizations of all sizes.
-SMB encryption provides end-to-end encryption of SMB data and protects data from eavesdropping occurrences on internal networks. Windows 11 introduces AES-256-GCM and AES-256-CCM cryptographic suites for SMB 3.1.1 encryption. Windows administrators can mandate the use of this more advanced security or continue to use the more compatible and still-safe AES-128 encryption.
+Windows 11 introduced significant security updates to meet today's threats, including AES-256 SMB encryption, accelerated SMB signing, Remote Directory Memory Access (RDMA) network encryption, and SMB over QUIC for untrusted networks.
-In Windows 11 Enterprise, Education, Pro, and Pro Workstation, SMB Direct now supports encryption. For demanding workloads like video rendering, data science, or extremely large files, you can now operate with the same safety as traditional Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and the performance of RDMA. Previously, enabling SMB encryption disabled direct data placement, making RDMA as slow as TCP. Now, data is encrypted before placement, leading to relatively minor performance degradation while adding packet privacy with AES-128 and AES-256 protection.
+[!INCLUDE [new-24h2](includes/new-24h2.md)]
-Windows 11 also introduces AES-128-GMAC for SMB signing. Windows will automatically negotiate this better-performing cipher method when connecting to another computer that supports it. Signing prevents common attacks like relay and spoofing, and it is required by default when clients communicate with Active Directory domain controllers.
+New security options include mandatory SMB signing by default, NTLM blocking, authentication rate limiting, and several other enhancements.
-Finally, Windows 11 introduces SMB over QUIC, an alternative to the TCP network transport that provides secure, reliable connectivity to edge file servers over untrusted networks like the internet, as well as highly secure communications on internal networks. QUIC is an Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)-standardized protocol with many benefits when compared with TCP, but most importantly, it always requires TLS 1.3 and encryption. SMB over QUIC offers an SMB VPN for telecommuters, mobile device users, and high-security organizations. All SMB traffic, including authentication and authorization within the tunnel, is never exposed to the underlying network. SMB behaves normally within the QUIC tunnel, meaning the user experience doesn't change. SMB over QUIC will be a game-changing feature for Windows 11 accessing Windows file servers and eventually Azure Files and third parties.
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-Newly installed Windows 11 Home editions that contain the February 2023 cumulative update no longer install the SMB 1.0 client by default, meaning the Home edition now operates like all other editions of Windows 11. SMB 1.0 is an unsafe and deprecated protocol that Microsoft superseded by later versions of SMB starting with Windows Vista. Microsoft began uninstalling SMB 1.0 by default in certain Windows 10 editions in 2017. No versions of Windows 11 now install SMB 1.0 by default.
+- [Server Message Block (SMB) protocol changes in Windows 11, version 24H2][LINK-9]
+- [File sharing using the SMB 3 protocol][LINK-10]
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+
-- [File sharing using the SMB 3 protocol](/windows-server/storage/file-server/file-server-smb-overview)
+[LINK-1]: /defender-endpoint/network-protection
+[LINK-2]: /windows-server/security/tls/tls-ssl-schannel-ssp-overview
+[LINK-3]: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/windows-itpro-blog/tls-1-0-and-tls-1-1-soon-to-be-disabled-in-windows/3887947
+[LINK-4]: /windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-bluetooth
+[LINK-5]: /mem/intune/configuration/esim-device-configuration-download-server
+[LINK-6]: /windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall
+[LINK-7]: /windows/client-management/mdm/firewall-csp
+[LINK-8]: /windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/vpn/vpn-guide
+[LINK-9]: /windows/whats-new/whats-new-windows-11-version-24h2#server-message-block-smb-protocol-changes
+[LINK-10]: /windows-server/storage/file-server/file-server-smb-overview
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/book/operating-system-security-system-security.md b/windows/security/book/operating-system-security-system-security.md
index a3d5e5e95b..dd056f219e 100644
--- a/windows/security/book/operating-system-security-system-security.md
+++ b/windows/security/book/operating-system-security-system-security.md
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
---
-title: Operating System security
-description: Windows 11 security book - Operating System security chapter.
+title: Windows 11 security book - System security
+description: Operating System security chapter - System security.
ms.topic: overview
-ms.date: 04/09/2024
+ms.date: 11/18/2024
---
# System security
-:::image type="content" source="images/operating-system.png" alt-text="Diagram of containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/operating-system.png" border="false":::
+:::image type="content" source="images/operating-system.png" alt-text="Diagram containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/operating-system.png" border="false":::
## Trusted Boot (Secure Boot + Measured Boot)
@@ -15,23 +15,22 @@ Windows 11 requires all PCs to use Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI)'
Secure Boot makes a safe and trusted path from the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) through the Windows kernel's Trusted Boot sequence. Malware attacks on the Windows boot sequence are blocked by the signature-enforcement handshakes throughout the boot sequence between the UEFI, bootloader, kernel, and application environments.
-To reduce the risk of firmware rootkits, the PC verifies that firmware is digitally signed as it begins the boot process. Then Secure Boot checks the OS bootloader's digital signature as well as all code that runs prior to the operating system starting to ensure the signature and code are uncompromised and trusted by the Secure Boot policy.
+To mitigate the risk of firmware rootkits, the PC verifies the digital signature of the firmware at the start of the boot process. Secure Boot then checks the digital signature of the OS bootloader and all code that runs before the operating system starts, ensuring that the signature and code are uncompromised and trusted according to the Secure Boot policy.
Trusted Boot picks up the process that begins with Secure Boot. The Windows bootloader verifies the digital signature of the Windows kernel before loading it. The Windows kernel, in turn, verifies every other component of the Windows startup process, including boot drivers, startup files, and any anti-malware product's early-launch anti-malware (ELAM) driver. If any of these files have been tampered with, the bootloader detects the problem and refuses to load the corrupted component. Often, Windows can automatically repair the corrupted component, restoring the integrity of Windows and allowing the PC to start normally.
-Tampering or malware attacks on the Windows boot sequence are blocked by the signature enforcement handshakes between the UEFI, bootloader, kernel, and application environments.
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-For more information about these features and how they help prevent rootkits and bootkits from loading during the startup process, see [Secure the Windows boot process](../operating-system-security/system-security/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process.md)
-
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
-
-- [Secure Boot and Trusted Boot](../operating-system-security/system-security/trusted-boot.md)
+- [Secure the Windows boot process][LINK-1]
+- [Secure Boot and Trusted Boot][LINK-2]
## Cryptography
Cryptography is designed to protect user and system data. The cryptography stack in Windows 11 extends from the chip to the cloud, enabling Windows, applications, and services to protect system and user secrets. For example, data can be encrypted so that only a specific reader with a unique key can read it. As a basis for data security, cryptography helps prevent anyone except the intended recipient from reading data, performs integrity checks to ensure data is free of tampering, and authenticates identity to ensure that communication is secure. Windows 11 cryptography is certified to meet the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140. FIPS 140 certification ensures that US government-approved algorithms are correctly implemented.
-Learn more: FIPS 140 validation
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- FIPS 140 validation
Windows cryptographic modules provide low-level primitives such as:
@@ -43,7 +42,9 @@ Windows cryptographic modules provide low-level primitives such as:
Application developers can use these cryptographic modules to perform low-level cryptographic operations (Bcrypt), key storage operations (NCrypt), protect static data (DPAPI), and securely share secrets (DPAPI-NG).
-Learn more: Cryptography and certificate management
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- Cryptography and certificate management
Developers can access the modules on Windows through the Cryptography Next Generation API (CNG), which is powered by Microsoft's open-source cryptographic library, SymCrypt. SymCrypt supports complete transparency through its open-source code. In addition, SymCrypt offers performance optimization for cryptographic operations by taking advantage of assembly and hardware acceleration when available.
@@ -52,30 +53,30 @@ exchange, opportunities to engage with technical content about Microsoft's produ
## Certificates
-To help safeguard and authenticate information, Windows provides comprehensive support for certificates and certificate management. The built-in certificate management command-line utility (certmgr.exe) or MMC snap-in (certmgr.msc) can be used to view and manage certificates, certificate trust lists (CTLs), and
-certificate revocation lists (CRLs). Whenever a certificate is used in Windows, we validate that the leaf certificate and all the certificates in its chain of trust have not been revoked or compromised. The CTLs and CRLs on the machine are used as a reference for PKI trust and are updated monthly by the Microsoft Trusted Root program. If a trusted certificate or root is revoked, all global devices will be updated, meaning users can trust that Windows will automatically protect against vulnerabilities in public key infrastructure. For cloud and enterprise deployments, Windows also offers users the ability to autoenroll and renew certificates in Active Directory with Group Policy to reduce the risk of potential outages due to certificate expiration or misconfiguration. Additionally, enterprise certificate pinning can be used to help reduce man-in-the-middle attacks by enabling users to protect their internal domain names from chaining to unwanted certificates. A web application's server authentication certificate chain is checked to ensure it matches a restricted set of certificate authorities. Any web application triggering a name mismatch will start event logging and prevent user access from Microsoft Edge.
+To help safeguard and authenticate information, Windows provides comprehensive support for certificates and certificate management. The built-in certificate management command-line utility (certmgr.exe) or Microsoft Management Console (MMC) snap-in (certmgr.msc) can be used to view and manage certificates, certificate trust lists (CTLs), and certificate revocation lists (CRLs). Whenever a certificate is used in Windows, we validate that the leaf certificate and all the certificates in its chain of trust haven't been revoked or compromised. The trusted root and intermediate certificates and publicly revoked certificates on the machine are used as a reference for Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) trust and are updated monthly by the Microsoft Trusted Root program. If a trusted certificate or root is revoked, all global devices are updated, meaning users can trust that Windows will automatically protect against vulnerabilities in public key infrastructure. For cloud and enterprise deployments, Windows also offers users the ability to autoenroll and renew certificates in Active Directory with group policy to reduce the risk of potential outages due to certificate expiration or misconfiguration.
## Code signing and integrity
To ensure that Windows files haven't been tampered with, the Windows Code Integrity process verifies the signature of each file in Windows. Code signing is core to establishing the integrity of firmware, drivers, and software across the Windows platform. Code signing creates a digital signature by encrypting the hash of the file with the private key portion of a code-signing certificate and embedding the signature into the file. The Windows code integrity process verifies the signed file by decrypting the signature to check the integrity of the file and confirm that it is from a reputable publisher, ensuring that the file hasn't been tampered with.
-The digital signature is evaluated across the Windows environment on Windows boot code, Windows kernel code, and Windows user mode applications. Secure Boot and Code Integrity verify the signature on bootloaders, Option ROMs, and other boot components to ensure that it's trusted and from a reputable publisher. For drivers not published by Microsoft, Kernel Code Integrity verifies the signature on kernel drivers and requires that drivers be signed by Windows or certified by the Windows Hardware Compatibility Program (WHCP). This program ensures that third-party drivers are compatible with various hardware and Windows and that the drivers are from vetted driver developers.
+The digital signature is evaluated across the Windows environment on Windows boot code, Windows kernel code, and Windows user mode applications. Secure Boot and Code Integrity verify the signature on bootloaders, Option ROMs, and other boot components to ensure that it's trusted and from a reputable publisher. For drivers not published by Microsoft, Kernel Code Integrity verifies the signature on kernel drivers and requires that drivers be signed by Windows or certified by the [Windows Hardware Compatibility Program (WHCP)][LINK-3]. This program ensures that third-party drivers are compatible with various hardware and Windows and that the drivers are from vetted driver developers.
-## Device health attestation
+## Device Health Attestation
-The Windows device health attestation process supports a Zero Trust paradigm that shifts the focus from static, network-based perimeters to users, assets, and resources. The attestation process confirms the device, firmware, and boot process are in a good state and haven't been tampered with before they can access corporate resources. These
-determinations are made with data stored in the TPM, which provides a secure root-of-trust. The information is sent to an attestation service such as Azure Attestation to verify that the device is in a trusted state. Then a modern device management (MDM) tool like Microsoft Intune[\[9\]](conclusion.md#footnote9) reviews device health and connects this information with Microsoft Entra ID[\[9\]](conclusion.md#footnote9) for conditional access.
+The Windows Device Health Attestation process supports a Zero Trust paradigm that shifts the focus from static, network-based perimeters to users, assets, and resources. The attestation process confirms the device, firmware, and boot process are in a good state and haven't been tampered with before they can access corporate resources. These determinations are made with data stored in the TPM, which provides a secure root-of-trust. The information is sent to an attestation service such as Azure Attestation to verify that the device is in a trusted state. Then a cloud-native device management solution like Microsoft Intune[\[4\]](conclusion.md#footnote4) reviews device health and connects this information with Microsoft Entra ID[\[4\]](conclusion.md#footnote4) for conditional access.
-Windows includes many security features to help protect users from malware and attacks. However, security components are trustworthy only if the platform boots as expected and isn't tampered with. As noted above, Windows relies on Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Secure Boot, ELAM, DRTM, Trusted Boot, and other low-level hardware and firmware security features to protect your PC from attacks. From the moment you power on your PC until your antimalware starts, Windows is backed with the appropriate hardware configurations that help keep you safe. Measured Boot, implemented by bootloaders and BIOS, verifies and cryptographically records each step of the boot in a chained manner. These events are bound to the TPM, that functions as a hardware root-of-trust. Remote attestation is the mechanism by which these events are read and verified by a service to provide a verifiable, unbiased, and tamper-resilient report. Remote attestation is the trusted auditor of your system's boot, allowing reliant parties to bind trust to the device and its security.
+Windows includes many security features to help protect users from malware and attacks. However, security components are trustworthy only if the platform boots as expected and isn't tampered with. As noted above, Windows relies on Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Secure Boot, ELAM, DRTM, Trusted Boot, and other low-level hardware and firmware security features to protect your PC from attacks. From the moment you power on your PC until your anti-malware starts, Windows is backed with the appropriate hardware configurations that help keep you safe. Measured Boot, implemented by bootloaders and BIOS, verifies and cryptographically records each step of the boot in a chained manner. These events are bound to the TPM, that functions as a hardware root-of-trust. Remote attestation is the mechanism by which these events are read and verified by a service to provide a verifiable, unbiased, and tamper-resilient report. Remote attestation is the trusted auditor of your system's boot, allowing reliant parties to bind trust to the device and its security.
A summary of the steps involved in attestation and Zero-Trust on a Windows device are as follows:
- During each step of the boot process - such as a file load, update of special variables, and more - information such as file hashes and signature(s) are measured in the TPM Platform Configuration Register (PCRs). The measurements are bound by a Trusted Computing Group specification that dictates which events can be recorded and the format of each event. The data provides important information about device security from the moment it powers on
-- Once Windows has booted, the attestor (or verifier) requests the TPM get the measurements stored in its PCRs alongside the Measured Boot log. Together, these form the attestation evidence that's sent to the Microsoft Azure Attestation Service
+- Once Windows has booted, the attestor (or verifier) requests the TPM get the measurements stored in its PCRs alongside the Measured Boot log. Together, these form the attestation evidence that's sent to the Azure Attestation service
- The TPM is verified by using the keys or cryptographic material available on the chipset with an Azure Certificate Service
- The above information is sent to the Azure Attestation Service to verify that the device is in a trusted state.
-Learn more: Control the health of Windows devices
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Control the health of Windows devices][LINK-4]
## Windows security policy settings and auditing
@@ -86,7 +87,7 @@ Security policy settings are a critical part of your overall security strategy.
- Whether to record a user or group's actions in the event log
- Membership in a group
-Security auditing is one of the most powerful tools that you can use to maintain the integrity of your network and assets. Auditing can help identify attacks, network vulnerabilities, and attacks against high-value targets. You can specify categories of security-related events to create an audit policy tailored to the needs of your organization.
+Security auditing is one of the most powerful tools that you can use to maintain the integrity of your network and assets. Auditing can help identify attacks, network vulnerabilities, and attacks against high-value targets. You can specify categories of security-related events to create an audit policy tailored to the needs of your organization using configuration service providers (CSP) or group policies.
All auditing categories are disabled when Windows is first installed. Before enabling them, follow these steps to create an effective security auditing policy:
@@ -96,34 +97,93 @@ All auditing categories are disabled when Windows is first installed. Before ena
1. Test these settings to validate your choices.
1. Develop plans for deploying and managing your audit policy.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-- [Security policy settings](/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/security-policy-settings)
-- [Security auditing](/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/security-auditing-overview)
+- [Security policy settings][LINK-5]
+- [Security auditing][LINK-6]
-## Assigned Access
+## Windows Security
-With Assigned Access, Windows devices restrict functionality to pre-selected applications depending on the user and keep individual identities separate, which is ideal for public-facing or shared devices. Configuring a device in Kiosk Mode is a straightforward process. You can do this locally on the device or remotely using modern device management.
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="2":::
+ Visibility and awareness of device security and health are key to any action taken. The Windows Security app provides an at-a-glance view of the security status and health of your device. These insights help you identify issues and act to make sure you're protected. You can quickly see the status of your virus and threat protection, firewall and network security, device security controls, and more.
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column span="2":::
+:::image type="content" source="images/windows-security.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the Windows Security app." border="false" lightbox="images/windows-security.png" :::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Stay protected with Windows Security][LINK-7]
+- [Windows Security][LINK-8]
+
+## :::image type="icon" source="images/new-button-title.svg" border="false"::: Config Refresh
+
+With traditional group policy, policy settings are refreshed on a PC when a user signs in and every 90 minutes by default. Administrators can adjust that timing to be shorter to ensure that the policy settings are compliant with the management settings set by IT.
+
+By contrast, with a device management solution like Microsoft Intune[\[4\]](conclusion.md#footnote4) , policies are refreshed when a user signs in and then at eight-hours interval by default. But policy settings are migrated from GPO to a device management solution, one remaining gap is the longer period between the reapplication of a changed policy.
+
+Config Refresh allows settings in the Policy configuration service provider (CSP) that drift due to misconfiguration, registry edits, or malicious software on a PC to be reset to the value the administrator intended every 90 minutes by default. It's configurable to refresh every 30 minutes if desired. The Policy CSP covers hundreds of settings that were traditionally set with group policy and are now set through Mobile Device Management (MDM) protocols.
+
+Config Refresh can also be paused for a configurable period of time, after which it will be reenabled. This is to support scenarios where a helpdesk technician might need to reconfigure a device for troubleshooting purposes. It can also be resumed at any time by an administrator.
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Config Refresh][LINK-9]
+
+## Kiosk mode
+
+:::row:::
+ :::column span="2":::
+ Windows allows you to restrict functionality to specific applications using built-in features, making it ideal for public-facing or shared devices like kiosks. You can set up Windows as a kiosk either locally on the device, or through a cloud-based device management solution like Microsoft Intune[\[7\]](conclusion.md#footnote7) . Kiosk mode can be configured to run a single app, multiple apps, or a full-screen web browser. You can also configure the device to automatically sign in and launch the designated kiosk app at startup.
+ :::column-end:::
+ :::column span="2":::
+:::image type="content" source="images/kiosk.png" alt-text="Screenshot of a Windows kiosk." border="false" lightbox="images/kiosk.png" :::
+ :::column-end:::
+:::row-end:::
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
- [Windows kiosks and restricted user experiences](/windows/configuration/assigned-access)
-## Config Refresh
+## :::image type="icon" source="images/new-button-title.svg" border="false"::: Windows protected print
-With traditional Group Policy, policies were refreshed on a PC when a user signed in and every 90 minutes by default. Administrators could adjust that timing to be shorter to ensure that the PC's policies were compliant with the management settings set by IT.
+Windows protected print is built to provide a more modern and secure print system that maximizes compatibility and puts users first. It simplifies the printing experience by allowing devices to exclusively print using the Windows modern print stack.
-By contrast, with an MDM solution like Microsoft Intune[\[9\]](conclusion.md#footnote9) , policies are refreshed when a user signs in and then at eight-hour intervals by default. But as more available group policies were implemented through MDM, one remaining gap was the longer period between the reapplication of a changed policy.
+The benefits of Windows protected print include:
-Config Refresh allows settings in the Policy configuration service provider (CSP) that drift due to misconfiguration, registry edits, or malicious software on a PC to be reset to the value the administrator intended every 90 minutes by default. It is configurable to refresh every 30 minutes if desired. The Policy CSP covers hundreds of settings that were traditionally set with Group Policy and are now set through MDM.
+- Increased PC security
+- Simplified and consistent printing experience, regardless of PC architecture
+- Removes the need to manage print drivers
-Config Refresh can also be *paused* for a configurable period of time, after which it will be reenabled. This is to support scenarios where a helpdesk technician might need to reconfigure a PC for troubleshooting purposes. It can also be resumed at any time by an administrator.
+Windows protected print is designed to work with Mopria certified printers only. Many existing printers are already compatible.
-## Windows security settings
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-Visibility and awareness of device security and health are key to any action taken. The Windows built-in security settings provide an at-a-glance view of the security status and health of your device. These insights help you identify issues and act to make sure you're protected. You can quickly see the status of your virus and threat protection, firewall and network security, device security controls, and more.
+- [Windows protected print][LINK-10]
+- [New, modern, and secure print experience from Windows][LINK-11]
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+## :::image type="icon" source="images/new-button-title.svg" border="false"::: Rust for Windows
-- [Windows security settings](https://support.microsoft.com/windows/stay-protected-with-windows-security-2ae0363d-0ada-c064-8b56-6a39afb6a963)
-- [Windows Security](../operating-system-security/system-security/windows-defender-security-center/windows-defender-security-center.md)
+Rust is a modern programming language known for its focus on safety, performance, and concurrency. It was designed to prevent common programming errors such as null pointer dereferencing and buffer overflows, which can lead to security vulnerabilities and crashes. Rust achieves this through its unique ownership system, which ensures memory safety without needing a garbage collector.
+We're expanding the integration of Rust into the Windows kernel to enhance the safety and reliability of Windows' codebase. This strategic move underscores our commitment to adopting modern technologies to improve the quality and security of Windows.
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Rust for Windows, and the windows crate][LINK-12]
+
+
+
+[LINK-1]: /windows/security/operating-system-security/system-security/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process
+[LINK-2]: /windows/security/operating-system-security/system-security/trusted-boot
+[LINK-3]: /windows-hardware/design/compatibility/
+[LINK-4]: /windows/security/operating-system-security/system-security/protect-high-value-assets-by-controlling-the-health-of-windows-10-based-devices
+[LINK-5]: /windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/security-policy-settings
+[LINK-6]: /windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/security-auditing-overview
+[LINK-7]: https://support.microsoft.com/topic/2ae0363d-0ada-c064-8b56-6a39afb6a963
+[LINK-8]: /windows/security/operating-system-security/system-security/windows-defender-security-center/windows-defender-security-center
+[LINK-9]: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/windows-itpro-blog/intro-to-config-refresh-%e2%80%93-a-refreshingly-new-mdm-feature/4176921
+[LINK-10]: /windows-hardware/drivers/print/modern-print-platform
+[LINK-11]: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/security-compliance-and-identity/a-new-modern-and-secure-print-experience-from-windows/ba-p/4002645
+[LINK-12]: /windows/dev-environment/rust/rust-for-windows
diff --git a/windows/security/book/operating-system-security-virus-and-threat-protection.md b/windows/security/book/operating-system-security-virus-and-threat-protection.md
index c5873bd86f..cb69b30617 100644
--- a/windows/security/book/operating-system-security-virus-and-threat-protection.md
+++ b/windows/security/book/operating-system-security-virus-and-threat-protection.md
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
---
-title: Operating System security
-description: Windows 11 security book - Operating System security chapter.
+title: Windows 11 security book - Virus and threat protection
+description: Operating System security chapter - Virus and threat protection.
ms.topic: overview
-ms.date: 04/09/2024
+ms.date: 11/18/2024
---
-# Virus and threat protection
+# Virus and threat protection in Windows 11
-:::image type="content" source="images/operating-system.png" alt-text="Diagram of containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/operating-system.png" border="false":::
+:::image type="content" source="images/operating-system.png" alt-text="Diagram containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/operating-system.png" border="false":::
Today's threat landscape is more complex than ever. This new world requires a new approach to threat prevention, detection, and response. Microsoft Defender Antivirus, along with many other features that are built into Windows 11, is at the frontlines, protecting customers against current and emerging threats.
@@ -25,29 +25,59 @@ SmartScreen also determines whether a downloaded app or app installer is potenti
- Checking downloaded files against a list of reported malicious software sites and programs known to be unsafe. If it finds a match, SmartScreen warns that the file might be malicious
- Checking downloaded files against a list of well-known files. If the file is of a dangerous type and not well-known, SmartScreen displays a caution alert
-With enhanced phishing protection in Windows 11, SmartScreen also alerts people when they are entering their Microsoft credentials into a potentially risky location, regardless of which application or browser is used. IT can customize which notifications appear through Microsoft Intune[\[9\]](conclusion.md#footnote9) . This protection runs in audit mode by default, giving IT admins full control to make decisions around policy creation and enforcement.
+With enhanced phishing protection in Windows 11, SmartScreen also alerts people when they're entering their Microsoft credentials into a potentially risky location, regardless of which application or browser is used. IT can customize which notifications appear through Microsoft Intune[\[4\]](conclusion.md#footnote4) . This protection runs in audit mode by default, giving IT admins full control to make decisions around policy creation and enforcement.
Because Windows 11 comes with these enhancements already built in and enabled, users have extra security from the moment they turn on their device.
-The app and browser control section contains information and settings for Microsoft Defender SmartScreen. IT administrators and IT pros can get configuration guidance in the [Microsoft Defender SmartScreen documentation library](/windows/threat-protection/windows-defender-smartscreen/windows-defender-smartscreen-overview).
+The app and browser control section contains information and settings for Microsoft Defender SmartScreen. IT administrators and IT pros can get configuration guidance in the [Microsoft Defender SmartScreen documentation library](/windows/security/operating-system-security/virus-and-threat-protection/microsoft-defender-smartscreen/).
+
+## Network protection
+
+While Microsoft Defender Smartscreen works with Microsoft Edge, for third-party browsers and processes, Windows 11 has Network protection that protects against phishing scams, malware websites, and the downloading of potentially malicious files.
+
+When using Network Protection with Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, you'll be able to use Indicators of Compromise to block specific URL's and/or ip addresses.
+Also integrates with Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps to block unsactioned web apps in your organization. Allow or block access to websites based on category with Microsoft Defender for Endpoint's Web Content Filtering.
+
+[Network Protection library](/defender-endpoint/network-protection)
+[Web protection library](/defender-endpoint/web-protection-overview)
+
+## Tamper protection
+
+Attacks like ransomware attempt to disable security features, such as anti-virus protection. Bad actors like to disable security features to get easier access to user's data, to install malware, or otherwise exploit user's data, identity, and devices without fear of being blocked. Tamper protection helps prevent these kinds of activities.
+
+With tamper protection, malware is prevented from taking actions such as:
+
+- Disabling real-time protection
+- Turning off behavior monitoring
+- Disabling antivirus protection, such as Scan all downloaded files and attachments (IOfficeAntivirus (IOAV))
+- Disabling cloud-delivered protection
+- Removing security intelligence updates
+- Disabling automatic actions on detected threats
+- Disabling archived files
+- Altering exclusions
+- Disabling notifications in the Windows Security app
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Tamper protection](/defender-endpoint/prevent-changes-to-security-settings-with-tamper-protection)
## Microsoft Defender Antivirus
-Microsoft Defender Antivirus is a next-generation protection solution included in all versions of Windows 10 and Windows 11. From the moment you turn on Windows, Microsoft Defender Antivirus continually monitors for malware, viruses, and security threats. In addition to real-time protection, updates are downloaded automatically to help keep your device safe and protect it from threats. If you have another antivirus app installed and turned on, Microsoft Defender Antivirus will turn off automatically. If you uninstall the other app, Microsoft Defender Antivirus will turn back on.
+Microsoft Defender Antivirus is a next-generation protection solution included in all versions of Windows 10 and Windows 11. From the moment you turn on Windows, Microsoft Defender Antivirus continually monitors for malware, viruses, and security threats. In addition to real-time protection, updates are downloaded automatically to help keep your device safe and protect it from threats. If you have another antivirus app installed and turned on, Microsoft Defender Antivirus turns off automatically. If you uninstall the other app, Microsoft Defender Antivirus turns back on.
-Microsoft Defender Antivirus includes real-time, behavior-based, and heuristic antivirus protection. This combination of always-on content scanning, file and process behavior monitoring, and other heuristics effectively prevents security threats. Microsoft Defender Antivirus continually scans for malware and threats and also detects and blocks potentially unwanted applications (PUA), applications deemed to negatively impact your device but are not considered malware.
+Microsoft Defender Antivirus includes real-time, behavior-based, and heuristic antivirus protection. This combination of always-on content scanning, file and process behavior monitoring, and other heuristics effectively prevents security threats. Microsoft Defender Antivirus continually scans for malware and threats and also detects and blocks potentially unwanted applications (PUA), applications deemed to negatively impact your device but aren't considered malware.
-Microsoft Defender Antivirus always-on protection is integrated with cloud-delivered protection, which helps ensure near-instant detection and blocking of new and emerging threats. This combination of local and cloud-delivered technologies provides award-winning protection at home and at work.
+Microsoft Defender Antivirus always-on protection is integrated with cloud-delivered protection, which helps ensure near-instant detection and blocking of new and emerging threats. This combination of local and cloud-delivered technologies including advanced memory scanning, behavior monitoring, and machine learning, provides award-winning protection at home and at work.
:::image type="content" source="images/defender-antivirus.png" alt-text="Diagram of the Microsoft Defender Antivirus components." border="false":::
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-- [Next-generation protection with Microsoft Defender Antivirus](/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/microsoft-defender-antivirus-windows).
+- [Microsoft Defender Antivirus in Windows Overview](/defender-endpoint/microsoft-defender-antivirus-windows).
-## Attack surface reduction
+## Attack surface reduction rules
-Attack surface reduction rules help prevent software behaviors that are often abused to compromise devices and networks. By reducing the attack surface, you can reduce the overall vulnerability of your organization. Administrators can configure specific attack surface reduction rules to help block certain behaviors, such as:
+Attack surface reduction rules help prevent actions and applications or scripts that are often abused to compromise devices and networks. By controlling when and how executables and/or script can run, thereby reducing the attack surface, you can reduce the overall vulnerability of your organization. Administrators can configure specific attack surface reduction rules to help block certain behaviors, such as:
- Launching executable files and scripts that attempt to download or run files
- Running obfuscated or otherwise suspicious scripts
@@ -58,69 +88,32 @@ For example, an attacker might try to run an unsigned script from a USB drive or
For Microsoft Edge and reducing the attack surface across applications, folders, device,
network, and firewall.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-- [Attack surface reduction](/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/overview-attack-surface-reduction)
-
-## Tamper protection
-
-Attacks like ransomware attempt to disable security features, such as anti-virus protection. Bad actors like to disable security features to get easier access to user's data, to install malware, or otherwise exploit user's data, identity, and devices without fear of being blocked. Tamper protection helps prevent these kinds of activities.
-
-With tamper protection, malware is prevented from taking actions such as:
-
-- Disabling real-time protection
-- Turning off behavior monitoring
-- Disabling antivirus, such as IOfficeAntivirus (IOAV)
-- Disabling cloud-delivered protection
-- Removing security intelligence updates
-
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
-
-- [Tamper protection](/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/prevent-changes-to-security-settings-with-tamper-protection)
-
-## Exploit protection
-
-Exploit protection automatically applies several exploit mitigation techniques to operating system processes and apps. Exploit protection works best with Microsoft Defender for Endpoint[\[9\]](conclusion.md#footnote9) , which gives organizations detailed reporting into exploit protection events and blocks as part of typical alert investigation scenarios. You can enable exploit protection on an individual device and then use Group Policy in Active Directory or Microsoft Intune[\[9\]](conclusion.md#footnote9) to distribute the configuration XML file to multiple devices simultaneously.
-
-When a mitigation is encountered on the device, a notification will be displayed from the Action Center. You can customize the notification with your company details and contact information. You can also enable the rules individually to customize which techniques the feature monitors.
-
-You can use audit mode to evaluate how exploit protection would impact your organization if it were enabled.
-
-Windows 11 provides configuration options for exploit protection. You can prevent users from modifying these specific options with Group Policy.
-
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
-
-- [Protecting devices from exploits](/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/enable-exploit-protection)
+- [Attack surface reduction](/defender-endpoint/overview-attack-surface-reduction)
## Controlled folder access
You can protect your valuable information in specific folders by managing app access to them. Only trusted apps can access protected folders, which are specified when controlled folder access is configured. Typically, commonly used folders, such as those used for documents, pictures, and downloads, are included in the list of controlled folders.
-Controlled folder access works with a list of trusted apps. Apps that are included in the list of trusted software work as expected. Apps that are not included in the trusted list are prevented from making any changes to files inside protected folders.
+Controlled folder access works with a list of trusted apps. Apps that are included in the list of trusted software work as expected. Apps that aren't included in the trusted list are prevented from making any changes to files inside protected folders.
Controlled folder access helps protect user's valuable data from malicious apps and threats such as ransomware.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-- [Controlled folder access](/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/controlled-folders)
+- [Controlled folder access](/defender-endpoint/controlled-folders)
-## Microsoft Defender for Endpoint
+## Exploit Protection
-Microsoft Defender for Endpoint[\[9\]](conclusion.md#footnote9) is an enterprise endpoint detection and response solution that helps security teams detect, investigate, and respond to advanced threats.
+Exploit Protection automatically applies several exploit mitigation techniques to operating system processes and apps. Exploit Protection works best with Microsoft Defender for Endpoint[\[4\]](conclusion.md#footnote4) , which gives organizations detailed reporting into Exploit Protection events and blocks as part of typical alert investigation scenarios. You can enable Exploit Protection on an individual device and then use policy settings to distribute the configuration XML file to multiple devices simultaneously.
-Organizations can use the rich event data and attack insights Defender for Endpoint provides to investigate incidents. Defender for Endpoint brings together the following elements to provide a more complete picture of security incidents:
+When a mitigation is encountered on the device, a notification will be displayed from the Action Center. You can customize the notification with your company details and contact information. You can also enable the rules individually to customize which techniques the feature monitors.
-- Endpoint behavioral sensors: Embedded in Windows, these sensors collect and process behavioral signals from the operating system and send this sensor data to your private, isolated cloud instance of Microsoft Defender for Endpoint
-- Cloud security analytics: Behavioral signals are translated into insights, detections, and recommended responses to advanced threats. These analytics leverage big data, device learning, and unique Microsoft optics across the Windows ecosystem, enterprise cloud products such as Microsoft 365[\[9\]](conclusion.md#footnote9) , and online assets
-- Threat intelligence: Microsoft processes over 43 trillion security signals every 24 hours, yielding a deep and broad view into the evolving threat landscape. Combined with our global team of security experts and cutting-edge artificial intelligence and machine learning, we can see threats that others miss. This threat intelligence helps provide unparalleled protection for our customers. The protections built into our platforms and products blocked
-attacks that include 31 billion identity threats and 32 billion email threats
-- Rich response capabilities: Defender for Endpoint empowers SecOps teams to isolate, remediate, and remote into machines to further investigate and stop active threats in their environment, as well as block files, network destinations, and create alerts for them. In addition, Automated Investigation and Remediation can help reduce the load on the SOC by automatically performing otherwise manual steps towards remediation and providing
-detailed investigation outcomes
+You can use audit mode to evaluate how Exploit Protection would impact your organization if it were enabled. And go through safe deployment practices (SDP).
-Defender for Endpoint is also part of Microsoft 365 Defender, our end-to-end, cloud-native extended detection and response (XDR) solution that combines best-of-breed endpoint, email, and identity security products. It enables organizations to prevent, detect, investigate, and remediate attacks by delivering deep visibility, granular context, and actionable insights generated from raw signals harnessed across the Microsoft 365 environment and other
-platforms, all synthesized into a single dashboard. This solution offers tremendous value to organizations of any size, especially those that are looking to break away from the added complexity of multiple point solutions, keeping them protected from sophisticated attacks and saving IT and security teams' time and resources.
+Windows 11 provides configuration options for Exploit Protection. You can prevent users from modifying these specific options with device management solutions like Microsoft Intune or group policy.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-- [Microsoft Defender for Endpoint](/defender-endpoint/microsoft-defender-endpoint)
-- [Microsoft 365 Defender](/microsoft-365/security/defender/microsoft-365-defender)
+- [Protecting devices from exploits](/defender-endpoint/enable-exploit-protection)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/book/operating-system-security.md b/windows/security/book/operating-system-security.md
index f5bf82d057..17141c211b 100644
--- a/windows/security/book/operating-system-security.md
+++ b/windows/security/book/operating-system-security.md
@@ -1,14 +1,16 @@
---
-title: Operating System security
-description: Windows 11 security book - Operating System security chapter.
+title: Windows 11 security book - Operating System security
+description: Operating System security chapter.
ms.topic: overview
-ms.date: 04/09/2024
+ms.date: 11/18/2024
---
# Operating System security
:::image type="content" source="images/operating-system-security-cover.png" alt-text="Cover of the operating system security chapter." border="false":::
-:::image type="content" source="images/operating-system-on.png" alt-text="Diagram of containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/operating-system.png" border="false":::
+Operating systems face an onslaught of security threats, from malware and exploits to unauthorized access and privilege escalation. Windows 11 is the most secure Windows yet, with strong operating system safeguards to help keep devices, identities, and data safe.
-Windows 11 is the most secure Windows yet with extensive security measures in the operating system designed to help keep devices, identities, and information safe. These measures include built-in advanced encryption and data protection, robust network system security, and intelligent safeguards against ever-evolving viruses and threats.
+Defenses include a trusted boot process, layers of encryption, network security, and virus and threat protection. These comprehensive security features ensure that Windows 11 provides robust protection against modern cyber threats.
+
+:::image type="content" source="images/operating-system-on.png" alt-text="Diagram containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/operating-system.png" border="false":::
diff --git a/windows/security/book/privacy-controls.md b/windows/security/book/privacy-controls.md
index 01caad195d..9aa5d2bd86 100644
--- a/windows/security/book/privacy-controls.md
+++ b/windows/security/book/privacy-controls.md
@@ -1,17 +1,20 @@
---
-title: Privacy
-description: Windows 11 security book - Privacy chapter.
+title: Windows 11 security book - Privacy controls
+description: Privacy chapter - Privacy controls.
ms.topic: overview
-ms.date: 04/09/2024
+ms.date: 11/18/2024
---
# Privacy controls
-:::image type="content" source="images/privacy.png" alt-text="Diagram of containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/privacy.png" border="false":::
+## Microsoft Privacy Dashboard
-## Privacy dashboard and report
+Customers can use the Microsoft Privacy Dashboard to view, export, and delete their information, giving them further transparency and control. They can also use the Microsoft Privacy Report to learn more about Windows data collection and how to manage it. For organizations, we provide a guide for Windows Privacy Compliance that includes more details on the available controls and transparency.
-Customers can use the [Microsoft Privacy dashboard](https://account.microsoft.com/privacy) to view, export, and delete their information, giving them further transparency and control. They can also use the [Microsoft Privacy Report](https://privacy.microsoft.com/privacy-report) to learn more about Windows data collection and how to manage it. For enterprises we provide a guide for Windows Privacy Compliance that includes additional details on the available controls and transparency.
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Microsoft Privacy Dashboard](https://account.microsoft.com/privacy)
+- [Microsoft Privacy Report](https://privacy.microsoft.com/privacy-report)
## Privacy transparency and controls
@@ -19,7 +22,7 @@ Prominent system tray icons show users when resources and apps like microphones
## Privacy resource usage
-Every Microsoft customer should be able to use our products secure in the knowledge that we will protect their privacy and give them the information and tools they need to easily make privacy decisions with confidence. Accessed in Settings, the new app usage history feature gives users a seven-day history of resource access for Location, Camera, Microphone, Phone Calls, Messaging, Contacts, Pictures, Videos, Music library, Screenshots, and other apps.
+Every Microsoft customer should be able to use our products secure in the knowledge that we protect their privacy, and give them the information and tools they need to easily make privacy decisions with confidence. From Settings, the app usage history feature provides users with a seven-day history of resource access for Location, Camera, Microphone, Phone Calls, Messaging, Contacts, Pictures, Videos, Music library, Screenshots, and other apps.
This information helps you determine if an app is behaving as expected so that you can change the app's access to resources as desired.
@@ -27,6 +30,6 @@ This information helps you determine if an app is behaving as expected so that y
The Windows diagnostic data processor configuration enables the user to be the controller, as defined by the European Union General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), for the Windows diagnostic data collected from Windows devices that meet the configuration requirements.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
- [Windows diagnostic data processor configuration](/windows/privacy/configure-windows-diagnostic-data-in-your-organization#enable-windows-diagnostic-data-processor-configuration)
diff --git a/windows/security/book/privacy.md b/windows/security/book/privacy.md
index 19cae8027a..d4acb2ffed 100644
--- a/windows/security/book/privacy.md
+++ b/windows/security/book/privacy.md
@@ -1,16 +1,14 @@
---
-title: Privacy
-description: Windows 11 security book - Privacy chapter.
+title: Windows 11 security book - Privacy
+description: Privacy chapter.
ms.topic: overview
-ms.date: 04/09/2024
+ms.date: 11/18/2024
---
# Privacy
:::image type="content" source="images/privacy-cover.png" alt-text="Cover of the privacy chapter." border="false":::
-:::image type="content" source="images/privacy-on.png" alt-text="Diagram of containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/privacy.png" border="false":::
+Privacy is an important priority for individuals and organizations, and the rise of AI is bringing it into even sharper focus. Windows provides privacy controls that can be easily accessed in the Settings app or desktop system tray for speech, location, calendar, microphone, call history, and more. Users can also find more information and manage privacy settings for Microsoft apps and services by signing into their [account dashboard](https://privacy.microsoft.com/).
-[Privacy: Your data, powering your experiences, controlled by you](https://privacy.microsoft.com/).
-
-Privacy is becoming top of mind for customers, who want to know who is using their data and why. They also need to know how to control and manage the data that is being collected - so providing transparency and control over this personal data is essential. At Microsoft we are focused on protecting the privacy and confidentiality of your data and will only use it in a way that is consistent with your expectations.
+:::image type="content" source="images/privacy-on.png" alt-text="Diagram containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/privacy.png" border="false":::
diff --git a/windows/security/book/security-foundation-certification.md b/windows/security/book/security-foundation-certification.md
index fe9fa899fc..1f8c8c878d 100644
--- a/windows/security/book/security-foundation-certification.md
+++ b/windows/security/book/security-foundation-certification.md
@@ -1,19 +1,23 @@
---
-title: Security foundation
-description: Windows 11 security book - Security foundation chapter.
+title: Windows 11 security book - Certification
+description: Security foundation chapter - Certification.
ms.topic: overview
-ms.date: 04/09/2024
+ms.date: 11/18/2024
---
# Certification
-:::image type="content" source="images/security-foundation.png" alt-text="Diagram of containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/security-foundation.png" border="false":::
+:::image type="content" source="images/security-foundation.png" alt-text="Diagram containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/security-foundation.png" border="false":::
Microsoft is committed to supporting product security standards and certifications, including FIPS 140 and Common Criteria, as an external validation of security assurance.
## Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS)
-The Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication 140 is a US government standard that defines the minimum security requirements for cryptographic modules in IT products. Microsoft maintains an active commitment to meeting the requirements of the FIPS 140 standard, having validated cryptographic modules against FIPS 140-2 since it was first established. Microsoft products, including Windows 11, Windows 10, Windows Server, and many cloud services, use these cryptographic modules.
+The Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication 140 is a U.S. government standard that specifies the minimum security requirements for cryptographic modules in IT products. Microsoft is dedicated to adhering to the requirements in the FIPS 140 standard, consistently validating its cryptographic modules against FIPS 140 since the standard's inception. Microsoft products, including Windows 11, Windows 10, Windows Server, and many cloud services, use these cryptographic modules.
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Windows FIPS 140 validation][LINK-1]
## Common Criteria (CC)
@@ -21,4 +25,11 @@ Common Criteria (CC) is an international standard currently maintained by nation
Microsoft ensures that products incorporate the features and functions required by relevant Common Criteria Protection Profiles and completes Common Criteria certifications of Microsoft Windows products.
-Microsoft publishes the list of FIPS 140 and Common Criteria certified products at [Federal](/windows/security/security-foundations/certification/fips-140-validation) [Information Processing Standard (FIPS)](/windows/security/security-foundations/certification/fips-140-validation) 140 Validation and [Common Criteria Certifications.](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-platform-common-criteria)
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Common Criteria certifications][LINK-2]
+
+
+
+[LINK-1]: /windows/security/security-foundations/certification/fips-140-validation
+[LINK-2]: /windows/security/threat-protection/windows-platform-common-criteria
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/book/security-foundation-offensive-research.md b/windows/security/book/security-foundation-offensive-research.md
index 965ecba6c0..f40f549653 100644
--- a/windows/security/book/security-foundation-offensive-research.md
+++ b/windows/security/book/security-foundation-offensive-research.md
@@ -1,13 +1,28 @@
---
-title: Security foundation
-description: Windows 11 security book - Security foundation chapter.
+title: Windows 11 security book - Secure Future Initiative and offensive research
+description: Security foundation chapter - Secure Future Initiative and offensive research.
ms.topic: overview
-ms.date: 04/09/2024
+ms.date: 11/18/2024
---
-# Offensive research
+# Secure Future Initiative and offensive research
-:::image type="content" source="images/security-foundation.png" alt-text="Diagram of containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/security-foundation.png" border="false":::
+:::image type="content" source="images/security-foundation.png" alt-text="Diagram containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/security-foundation.png" border="false":::
+
+## Secure Future Initiative (SFI)
+
+Launched in November 2023, the Microsoft Secure Future Initiative (SFI) is a multiyear commitment dedicated to advancing the way we design, build, test, and operate our technology. Our goal is to ensure that our solutions meet the highest possible standards for security.
+
+The increasing scale and high stakes of cyberattacks prompted the launch of SFI. This program brings together every part of Microsoft to enhance cybersecurity protection across our company and products. We carefully considered our internal observations and feedback from customers, governments, and partners to identify the greatest opportunities to impact the future of security.
+
+To maintain accountability and keep our customers, partners, and the security community informed, Microsoft provides regular updates on the progress of SFI.
+
+:::image type="content" source="images/sfi.png" alt-text="Diagram of the SFI initiative." lightbox="images/sfi.png" border="false":::
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Microsoft Secure Future Initiative][LINK-6]
+- [September 2024 progress update on SFI][LINK-5]
## Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL)
@@ -15,28 +30,35 @@ The Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) introduces security best prac
## OneFuzz service
-A range of tools and techniques - such as threat modeling, static analysis, fuzz testing, and code quality checks - enable continued security value to be embedded into Windows by every engineer on the team from day one. Through the SDL practices, Microsoft engineers are continuously provided with actionable and up-to-date methods to improve development workflows and overall product security before the code has been released.
-
-Microsoft is dedicated to working with the community and our customers to continuously improve and tune our platform and products to help defend against the dynamic and sophisticated threat landscape. Project OneFuzz - an extensible fuzz testing framework used by Microsoft Edge, Windows, and teams across Microsoft - is now available to developers around the world through GitHub as an open-source tool.
-
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
-
-- [Project OneFuzz framework, an open source developer tool to find and fix bugs at scale](https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/09/15/microsoft-onefuzz-framework-open-source-developer-tool-fix-bugs/)
-- [OneFuzz on GitHub](https://github.com/microsoft/onefuzz)
+A range of tools and techniques - such as threat modeling, static analysis, fuzz testing, and code quality checks - enable continued security value to be embedded into Windows by every engineer on the team from day one. Through the SDL practices, Microsoft engineers are continuously provided with actionable and up-to-date methods to improve development workflows and overall product security before the code is released.
## Microsoft Offensive Research and Security Engineering
-[Microsoft Offensive Research and Security Engineering](https://github.com/microsoft/WindowsAppSDK-Samples?msclkid=1a6280c6c73d11ecab82868efae04e5c) performs targeted design reviews, audits, and deep penetration testing of Windows features using Microsoft's open-source OneFuzz platform as part of their development and testing cycle.
+Microsoft Offensive Research and Security Engineering (MORSE) performs targeted design reviews, audits, and deep penetration testing of Windows features using Microsoft's open-source OneFuzz platform as part of their development and testing cycle.
-## Windows Insider and Bug Bounty program
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-As part of our secure development process, the Microsoft Windows Insider Preview bounty program invites eligible researchers across the globe to find and submit vulnerabilities that reproduce in the latest Windows Insider Preview (WIP) Dev Channel.
+- [MORSE security team takes proactive approach to finding bugs][LINK-1]
+- [MORSE Blog][LINK-2]
-The goal of the Windows Insider Preview bounty program is to uncover significant vulnerabilities that have a direct and demonstrable impact on the security of customers using the latest version of Windows.
+## Windows Insider and Microsoft Bug Bounty Programs
-Through this collaboration with researchers across the globe, our teams identify critical vulnerabilities that were not previously found during development and quick fix the issues before releasing our final Windows.
+As part of our secure development process, the Windows Insider Preview Program invites eligible researchers across the globe to find and submit vulnerabilities that reproduce in the latest Windows Insider Preview (WIP) Dev Channel.
-:::image type="icon" source="images/learn-more.svg" border="false"::: **Learn more:**
+The goal of the Windows Insider Preview Program is to uncover significant vulnerabilities that have a direct and demonstrable impact on the security of customers using the latest version of Windows.
-- [Windows Insider Program](/windows-insider/get-started)
-- [Microsoft bounty programs](https://www.microsoft.com/msrc/bounty)
+Through this collaboration with researchers across the globe, our teams identify critical vulnerabilities and quickly fix the issues before releasing our final Windows.
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Windows Insider Program][LINK-3]
+- [Microsoft Bug Bounty Programs][LINK-4]
+
+
+
+[LINK-1]: https://news.microsoft.com/source/features/innovation/morse-microsoft-offensive-research-security-engineering
+[LINK-2]: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/author/microsoft-offensive-research-security-engineering-team
+[LINK-3]: /windows-insider/get-started
+[LINK-4]: https://www.microsoft.com/msrc/bounty
+[LINK-5]: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2024/09/23/securing-our-future-september-2024-progress-update-on-microsofts-secure-future-initiative-sfi/
+[LINK-6]: https://www.microsoft.com/trust-center/security/secure-future-initiative
diff --git a/windows/security/book/security-foundation-secure-supply-chain.md b/windows/security/book/security-foundation-secure-supply-chain.md
index ee2f6ef548..9e638bfbc5 100644
--- a/windows/security/book/security-foundation-secure-supply-chain.md
+++ b/windows/security/book/security-foundation-secure-supply-chain.md
@@ -1,22 +1,22 @@
---
-title: Secure supply chain
-description: Windows 11 security book - Security foundation chapter - Secure supply chain.
+title: Windows 11 security book - Secure supply chain
+description: Security foundation chapter - Secure supply chain.
ms.topic: overview
-ms.date: 04/09/2024
+ms.date: 11/18/2024
---
# Secure supply chain
-:::image type="content" source="images/security-foundation.png" alt-text="Diagram of containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/security-foundation.png" border="false":::
+:::image type="content" source="images/security-foundation.png" alt-text="Diagram containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/security-foundation.png" border="false":::
-The end-to-end Windows 11 supply chain is complex, extending from the entire development process to components such as chips, firmware, drivers, operating system, and apps from other organizations, manufacturing, and security updates. Microsoft invests significantly in Windows 11 supply chain security, as well as the security of features and components. In 2021, the United States issued an executive order on enhancing the nation's cybersecurity. The executive order, along with various attacks like SolarWinds and WannaCry, elevated the urgency and importance of ensuring a secure supply chain.
+The end-to-end Windows 11 supply chain is complex. It extends from the entire development process, to components such as chips, firmware, drivers, operating system, and apps from other organizations, manufacturing, and security updates. Microsoft invests significantly in Windows 11 supply chain security, and the security of features and components. In 2021, the United States issued an executive order on enhancing the nation's cybersecurity. The executive order, along with various attacks like SolarWinds and WannaCry, elevated the urgency and importance of ensuring a secure supply chain.
Microsoft requires the Windows 11 supply chain to comply with controls including:
- Identity management and user access control
- Access control
- Principles of least privilege
- - RBAC
+ - Role-based access control (role-based access control)
- Segregation of duties
- MFAs
- Account management
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Microsoft requires the Windows 11 supply chain to comply with controls including
- Manufacturing security
- Physical security monitoring
- Supplier security control
- - SSPA
+ - Supplier Security and Privacy Assurance (SSPA)
- Supplier screening
- Supplier inventory
- Logistics security control
@@ -53,14 +53,22 @@ Microsoft requires the Windows 11 supply chain to comply with controls including
## Software bill of materials (SBOM)
-In addition to following the above supply chain security controls, SBOMs are leveraged to provide the transparency and provenance of the content as it moves through various stages of the Windows supply chain. This enables trust between each supply chain segment, ensures that tampering has not taken place during ingestion and along the way, and provides a provable chain of custody for the product that we ship to customers.
+In the Windows ecosystem, ensuring the integrity and authenticity of software components is paramount. To achieve this, we utilize Software Bill of Materials (SBOMs) and COSE (CBOR Object Signing and Encryption) sign all evidence. SBOMs provide a comprehensive inventory of software components, including their dependencies and associated metadata. Transparency is crucial for vulnerability management and compliance with security standards.
-Code-signing software is the best way to guarantee application integrity and authenticity and helps users distinguish between trusted applications and malware before downloading or installing. Code signing proprietary applications and software from other organizations greatly reduces the complexity of creating and managing application control policies. Code signing enables the creation and deployment of certificate chain-based application control policies, which can then be cryptographically enforced.
+The COSE signing process enhances the trustworthiness of SBOMs by providing cryptographic signatures that verify the integrity and authenticity of the SBOM content. The CoseSignTool, a platform-agnostic command line application, is employed to apply and verify these digital signatures. This tool ensures that all SBOMs and other build evidence are signed and validated, maintaining a high level of security within the software supply chain.
-Traditionally, code signing has been a difficult undertaking due to the complexities involved in obtaining certificates, securely managing those certificates, and integrating a proper signing process into the development and continuous integration and continuous deployment (CI/CD) pipelines.
+By integrating SBOMs and COSE signing evidence, we offer stakeholders visibility into the components they use, ensuring that all software artifacts are trustworthy and secure. This approach aligns with our commitment to end-to-end supply chain security, providing a robust framework for managing and verifying software components across the Windows ecosystem.
-## Windows App software development kit (SDK)
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
-Developers can design highly secure applications that benefit from the latest Windows 11 safeguards using the Windows App SDK. The SDK provides a unified set of APIs and tools for developing secure desktop apps for Windows 11 and Windows 10. To help create apps that are up to date and protected, the SDK follows the same security standards, protocols, and compliance as the core Windows operating system.
+- [SBOM tool](https://github.com/microsoft/sbom-tool)
+- [Code Sign Tool](https://github.com/microsoft/CoseSignTool)
-If you are a developer, you can find security best practices and information at [Windows application development - best practices](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-platform-common-criteria#security-and-privacy). You can get started with [Windows App SDK samples on GitHub](/windows/security/threat-protection/fips-140-validation#windows-app-sdk-samples). For an example of the continuous security process in action with the Windows App SDK, see the [most recent release](https://insider.windows.com/#version-11).
+## Windows Software Development Kit (SDK)
+
+Developers can design highly secure applications that benefit from the latest Windows 11 safeguards using the Windows SDK. The SDK provides a unified set of APIs and tools for developing secure desktop apps for Windows 11 and Windows 10. To help create apps that are up to date and protected, the SDK follows the same security standards, protocols, and compliance as the core Windows operating system.
+
+[!INCLUDE [learn-more](includes/learn-more.md)]
+
+- [Windows application development - best practices](/windows/apps/get-started/best-practices)
+- [Windows SDK samples on GitHub](https://github.com/microsoft/WindowsAppSDK-Samples)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/book/security-foundation.md b/windows/security/book/security-foundation.md
index f0fb340c8a..2748af0a55 100644
--- a/windows/security/book/security-foundation.md
+++ b/windows/security/book/security-foundation.md
@@ -1,18 +1,14 @@
---
-title: Security foundation
-description: Windows 11 security book - Security foundation chapter.
+title: Windows 11 security book - Security foundation
+description: Security foundation chapter.
ms.topic: overview
-ms.date: 04/09/2024
+ms.date: 11/18/2024
---
-# Security foundation
+# Security foundation in Windows 11
:::image type="content" source="images/security-foundation-cover.png" alt-text="Cover of the security foundation chapter." border="false":::
-Microsoft is committed to continuously investing in improving our software development process, building highly secure-by-design software, and addressing security compliance requirements. At Microsoft, we embed security and privacy considerations from the earliest lifecycle phases of all our product design and software development processes. We build in security from the ground up for powerful defense in today's threat environment and have the infrastructure to protect and react quickly to future threats.
+Microsoft is committed to continuously investing in improving the development process, building highly secure-by-design software, and addressing security compliance requirements. Security and privacy considerations informed by offensive research are built into each phase of our product design and software development process. Microsoft's security foundation includes not only our development and certification processes, but also our end-to-end supply chain. The comprehensive Windows 11 security foundation also reflects our deep commitment to principles of security by design and security by default.
-Every component of the Windows 11 technology stack, from chip-to-cloud, is purposefully built secure by design. Windows 11 meets the modern threats of today's flexible work environments by delivering hardware-based isolation, end-to-end encryption, and advanced malware protection.
-
-With Windows 11, organizations can improve productivity and gain intuitive new experiences without compromising security.
-
-:::image type="content" source="images/security-foundation-on.png" alt-text="Diagram of containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/security-foundation.png" border="false":::
+:::image type="content" source="images/security-foundation-on.png" alt-text="Diagram containing a list of security features." lightbox="images/security-foundation.png" border="false":::
diff --git a/windows/security/book/toc.yml b/windows/security/book/toc.yml
index e1135516e9..928d02f50f 100644
--- a/windows/security/book/toc.yml
+++ b/windows/security/book/toc.yml
@@ -55,11 +55,13 @@ items:
items:
- name: Overview
href: security-foundation.md
- - name: Offensive research
+ - name: Secure Future Initiative and offensive research
href: security-foundation-offensive-research.md
- name: Certification
href: security-foundation-certification.md
- name: Secure supply chain
href: security-foundation-secure-supply-chain.md
- name: Conclusion
- href: conclusion.md
\ No newline at end of file
+ href: conclusion.md
+- name: Features index
+ href: features-index.md
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/cloud-services/index.md b/windows/security/cloud-services/index.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 9124be688f..0000000000
--- a/windows/security/cloud-services/index.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
----
-title: Windows and cloud services
-description: Get an overview of cloud-based services in Windows.
-ms.date: 05/06/2024
-ms.topic: overview
-author: paolomatarazzo
-ms.author: paoloma
----
-
-# Windows and cloud services
-
-Today's workforce has more freedom and mobility than ever before, and the risk of data exposure is also at its highest. We're focused on getting customers to the cloud to benefit from modern hybrid workstyles while improving security management. Built on zero-trust principles, Windows works with Microsoft cloud services to safeguard sensitive information while controlling access and mitigating threats.
-
-From identity and device management to Office apps and data storage, Windows and integrated cloud services can help improve productivity, security, and resilience anywhere.
-
-Learn more about cloud-based services in Windows.
-
-[!INCLUDE [cloud-services](../includes/sections/cloud-services.md)]
diff --git a/windows/security/cloud-services/toc.yml b/windows/security/cloud-services/toc.yml
index 4132706858..92d3eaac86 100644
--- a/windows/security/cloud-services/toc.yml
+++ b/windows/security/cloud-services/toc.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
items:
-- name: Overview
- href: index.md
- name: Join Active Directory and Microsoft Entra ID with single sign-on (SSO) 🔗
href: /azure/active-directory/devices/concept-azure-ad-join
- name: Security baselines with Intune 🔗
diff --git a/windows/security/docfx.json b/windows/security/docfx.json
index b2eefb6943..e0cd0064c8 100644
--- a/windows/security/docfx.json
+++ b/windows/security/docfx.json
@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@
"application-security/application-control/user-account-control/**/*.md": [
"✅ Windows 11 ",
"✅ Windows 10 ",
+ "✅ Windows Server 2025 ",
"✅ Windows Server 2022 ",
"✅ Windows Server 2019 ",
"✅ Windows Server 2016 "
@@ -149,7 +150,7 @@
"✅ Windows Server 2016 "
],
"book/**/*.md": [
- "✅ Windows 11 "
+ "Windows 11 "
],
"hardware-security/**/*.md": [
"✅ Windows 11 ",
@@ -172,6 +173,7 @@
"identity-protection/credential-guard/**/*.md": [
"✅ Windows 11 ",
"✅ Windows 10 ",
+ "✅ Windows Server 2025 ",
"✅ Windows Server 2022 ",
"✅ Windows Server 2019 ",
"✅ Windows Server 2016 "
@@ -179,6 +181,7 @@
"identity-protection/smart-cards/**/*.md": [
"✅ Windows 11 ",
"✅ Windows 10 ",
+ "✅ Windows Server 2025 ",
"✅ Windows Server 2022 ",
"✅ Windows Server 2019 ",
"✅ Windows Server 2016 "
@@ -186,6 +189,7 @@
"identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/**/*.md": [
"✅ Windows 11 ",
"✅ Windows 10 ",
+ "✅ Windows Server 2025 ",
"✅ Windows Server 2022 ",
"✅ Windows Server 2019 ",
"✅ Windows Server 2016 "
@@ -197,6 +201,7 @@
"operating-system-security/data-protection/**/*.md": [
"✅ Windows 11 ",
"✅ Windows 10 ",
+ "✅ Windows Server 2025 ",
"✅ Windows Server 2022 ",
"✅ Windows Server 2019 ",
"✅ Windows Server 2016 "
@@ -204,6 +209,7 @@
"operating-system-security/data-protection/**/*.yml": [
"✅ Windows 11 ",
"✅ Windows 10 ",
+ "✅ Windows Server 2025 ",
"✅ Windows Server 2022 ",
"✅ Windows Server 2019 ",
"✅ Windows Server 2016 "
@@ -224,6 +230,7 @@
"operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/**/*.md": [
"✅ Windows 11 ",
"✅ Windows 10 ",
+ "✅ Windows Server 2025 ",
"✅ Windows Server 2022 ",
"✅ Windows Server 2019 ",
"✅ Windows Server 2016 "
@@ -235,7 +242,6 @@
"book/*.md": "paoloma",
"identity-protection/access-control/*.md": "sulahiri",
"identity-protection/credential-guard/*.md": "zwhittington",
- "identity-protection/hello-for-business/*.md": "erikdau",
"identity-protection/smart-cards/*.md": "ardenw",
"identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/*.md": "ardenw",
"operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/*.md": "rhonnegowda",
@@ -245,7 +251,7 @@
"security-foundations/certification/**/*.md": "paoloma"
},
"ms.collection": {
- "book/*.md": "tier3",
+ "book/*.md": "tier1",
"identity-protection/hello-for-business/*.md": "tier1",
"information-protection/pluton/*.md": "tier1",
"information-protection/tpm/*.md": "tier1",
@@ -253,9 +259,6 @@
"operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/*.md": "tier1",
"security-foundations/certification/**/*.md": "tier3",
"threat-protection/auditing/*.md": "tier3"
- },
- "ROBOTS": {
- "book/*.md": "NOINDEX"
}
},
"template": [],
diff --git a/windows/security/hardware-security/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md b/windows/security/hardware-security/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md
index 22b8f3245f..f89ec506b2 100644
--- a/windows/security/hardware-security/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md
+++ b/windows/security/hardware-security/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md
@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ appliesto:
# Enable virtualization-based protection of code integrity
+> [!WARNING]
+> Some applications and hardware device drivers may be incompatible with memory integrity. This incompatibility can cause devices or software to malfunction and in rare cases may result in a boot failure (blue screen). Such issues may occur after memory integrity has been turned on or during the enablement process itself. If compatibility issues occur, see [Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting) for remediation steps.
+
**Memory integrity** is a Virtualization-based security (VBS) feature available in Windows. Memory integrity and VBS improve the threat model of Windows and provide stronger protections against malware trying to exploit the Windows kernel. VBS uses the Windows hypervisor to create an isolated virtual environment that becomes the root of trust of the OS that assumes the kernel can be compromised. Memory integrity is a critical component that protects and hardens Windows by running kernel mode code integrity within the isolated virtual environment of VBS. Memory integrity also restricts kernel memory allocations that could be used to compromise the system.
> [!NOTE]
@@ -20,9 +23,6 @@ appliesto:
> - Memory integrity is sometimes referred to as *hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI)* or *hypervisor enforced code integrity*, and was originally released as part of *Device Guard*. Device Guard is no longer used except to locate memory integrity and VBS settings in Group Policy or the Windows registry.
> - Memory integrity works better with Intel Kabylake and higher processors with *Mode-Based Execution Control*, and AMD Zen 2 and higher processors with *Guest Mode Execute Trap* capabilities. Older processors rely on an emulation of these features, called *Restricted User Mode*, and will have a bigger impact on performance. When nested virtualization is enabled, memory integrity works better when the VM is version >= 9.3.
-> [!WARNING]
-> Some applications and hardware device drivers may be incompatible with memory integrity. This incompatibility can cause devices or software to malfunction and in rare cases may result in a boot failure (blue screen). Such issues may occur after memory integrity has been turned on or during the enablement process itself. If compatibility issues occur, see [Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting) for remediation steps.
-
## Memory integrity features
- Protects modification of the Control Flow Guard (CFG) bitmap for kernel mode drivers.
@@ -32,28 +32,28 @@ appliesto:
To enable memory integrity on Windows devices with supporting hardware throughout an enterprise, use any of these options:
-- [Windows Security settings](#windows-security)
-- [Microsoft Intune (or another MDM provider)](#enable-memory-integrity-using-intune)
-- [Group Policy](#enable-memory-integrity-using-group-policy)
-- [Microsoft Configuration Manager](https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/enterprisemobility/2015/10/30/managing-windows-10-device-guard-with-configuration-manager/)
-- [Registry](#use-registry-keys-to-enable-memory-integrity)
+### [:::image type="icon" source="../images/icons/security-app.svg" border="false"::: **Windows Security**](#tab/security)
-### Windows Security
+### Enable memory integrity using Windows Security
**Memory integrity** can be turned on in **Windows Security** settings and found at **Windows Security** > **Device security** > **Core isolation details** > **Memory integrity**. For more information, see [Device protection in Windows Security](https://support.microsoft.com/help/4096339/windows-10-device-protection-in-windows-defender-security-center).
Beginning with Windows 11 22H2, **Windows Security** shows a warning if memory integrity is turned off. The warning indicator also appears on the Windows Security icon in the Windows Taskbar and in the Windows Notification Center. The user can dismiss the warning from within **Windows Security**.
+### [:::image type="icon" source="../images/icons/intune.svg" border="false"::: **Intune/CSP**](#tab/intune)
+
### Enable memory integrity using Intune
Use the **Virtualization Based Technology** > **Hypervisor Enforced Code Integrity** setting using the [settings catalog](/mem/intune/configuration/settings-catalog) to enable memory integrity. You can also use the HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity node in the [VirtualizationBasedTechnology CSP](/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-virtualizationbasedtechnology).
+### [:::image type="icon" source="../images/icons/group-policy.svg" border="false"::: **GPO**](#tab/gpo)
+
### Enable memory integrity using Group Policy
1. Use Group Policy Editor (gpedit.msc) to either edit an existing GPO or create a new one.
1. Navigate to **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **System** > **Device Guard**.
1. Double-click **Turn on Virtualization Based Security**.
-1. Select **Enabled** and under **Virtualization Based Protection of Code Integrity**, select **Enabled without UEFI lock**. Only select **Enabled with UEFI lock** if you want to prevent memory integrity from being disabled remotely or by policy update. Once enabled with UEFI lock, you must have access to the UEFI BIOS menu to turn off Secure Boot if you want to turn off memory integrity.
+1. Select **Enabled**. Under **Virtualization Based Protection of Code Integrity**, select **Enabled without UEFI lock**. Only select **Enabled with UEFI lock** if you want to prevent memory integrity from being disabled remotely or by policy update. Once enabled with UEFI lock, you must have access to the UEFI BIOS menu to turn off Secure Boot if you want to turn off memory integrity.

@@ -61,7 +61,9 @@ Use the **Virtualization Based Technology** > **Hypervisor Enforced Code Integri
To apply the new policy on a domain-joined computer, either restart or run `gpupdate /force` in an elevated Command Prompt.
-### Use registry keys to enable memory integrity
+### [:::image type="icon" source="../images/icons/registry.svg" border="false"::: **Registry**](#tab/reg)
+
+### Enable memory integrity using registry
Set the following registry keys to enable memory integrity. These keys provide similar set of configuration options provided by Group Policy
@@ -85,74 +87,78 @@ reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorE
If you want to customize the preceding recommended settings, use the following registry keys.
-**To enable VBS only (no memory integrity)**
+- To enable VBS only (no memory integrity):
-```cmd
-reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard" /v "EnableVirtualizationBasedSecurity" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
-```
+ ```cmd
+ reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard" /v "EnableVirtualizationBasedSecurity" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
+ ```
-**To enable VBS and require Secure boot only (value 1)**
+- To enable VBS and require Secure boot only (value 1):
-```cmd
-reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard" /v "RequirePlatformSecurityFeatures" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
-```
+ ```cmd
+ reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard" /v "RequirePlatformSecurityFeatures" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
+ ```
-**To enable VBS with Secure Boot and DMA protection (value 3)**
+- To enable VBS with Secure Boot and DMA protection (value 3):
-```cmd
-reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard" /v "RequirePlatformSecurityFeatures" /t REG_DWORD /d 3 /f
-```
+ ```cmd
+ reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard" /v "RequirePlatformSecurityFeatures" /t REG_DWORD /d 3 /f
+ ```
-**To enable VBS without UEFI lock (value 0)**
+- To enable VBS without UEFI lock (value 0):
-```cmd
-reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard" /v "Locked" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
-```
+ ```cmd
+ reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard" /v "Locked" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
+ ```
-**To enable VBS with UEFI lock (value 1)**
+- To enable VBS with UEFI lock (value 1):
-```cmd
-reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard" /v "Locked" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
-```
+ ```cmd
+ reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard" /v "Locked" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
+ ```
-**To enable memory integrity**
+- To enable memory integrity:
-```cmd
-reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity" /v "Enabled" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
-```
+ ```cmd
+ reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity" /v "Enabled" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
+ ```
-**To enable memory integrity without UEFI lock (value 0)**
+- To enable memory integrity without UEFI lock (value 0):
-```cmd
-reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity" /v "Locked" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
-```
+ ```cmd
+ reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity" /v "Locked" /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
+ ```
-**To enable memory integrity with UEFI lock (value 1)**
+- To enable memory integrity with UEFI lock (value 1):
-```cmd
-reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity" /v "Locked" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
-```
+ ```cmd
+ reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity" /v "Locked" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
+ ```
-**To enable VBS (and memory integrity) in mandatory mode**
+- To enable VBS (and memory integrity) in mandatory mode:
-```cmd
-reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard" /v "Mandatory" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
-```
+ ```cmd
+ reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard" /v "Mandatory" /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
+ ```
-The **Mandatory** setting prevents the OS loader from continuing to boot in case the Hypervisor, Secure Kernel or one of their dependent modules fails to load.
+ The **Mandatory** setting prevents the OS loader from continuing to boot in case the Hypervisor, Secure Kernel or one of their dependent modules fails to load.
-> [!IMPORTANT]
-> Special care should be used before enabling this mode, since, in case of any failure of the virtualization modules, the system will refuse to boot.
+ > [!IMPORTANT]
+ > Special care should be used before enabling this mode, since, in case of any failure of the virtualization modules, the system will refuse to boot.
-**To gray out the memory integrity UI and display the message "This setting is managed by your administrator"**
-```cmd
-reg delete HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity /v "WasEnabledBy" /f
-```
+- To gray out the memory integrity UI and display the message `This setting is managed by your administrator`:
-**To let memory integrity UI behave normally (Not grayed out)**
-```cmd
-reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity /v "WasEnabledBy" /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f
-```
+ ```cmd
+ reg delete HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity /v "WasEnabledBy" /f
+ ```
+
+- To let memory integrity UI behave normally (Not grayed out):
+
+ ```cmd
+ reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity /v "WasEnabledBy" /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f
+ ```
+
+### [:::image type="icon" source="../images/icons/app-control.svg" border="false"::: **App Control**](#tab/appcontrol)
### Enable memory integrity using App Control for Business
@@ -165,6 +171,8 @@ You can use App Control policy to turn on memory integrity using any of the foll
> [!NOTE]
> If your App Control policy is set to turn memory integrity on, it will be turned on even if the policy is in audit mode.
+---
+
### Validate enabled VBS and memory integrity features
#### Use Win32_DeviceGuard WMI class
@@ -180,82 +188,98 @@ Get-CimInstance -ClassName Win32_DeviceGuard -Namespace root\Microsoft\Windows\D
The output of this command provides details of the available hardware-based security features and those features that are currently enabled.
-##### AvailableSecurityProperties
+- **InstanceIdentifier**: A string that is unique to a particular device and set by WMI.
-This field helps to enumerate and report state on the relevant security properties for VBS and memory integrity.
+- **Version**: This field lists the version of this WMI class. The only valid value now is **1.0**.
-| Value | Description |
-|-------|---------------------------------------------------------|
-| **0** | If present, no relevant properties exist on the device. |
-| **1** | If present, hypervisor support is available. |
-| **2** | If present, Secure Boot is available. |
-| **3** | If present, DMA protection is available. |
-| **4** | If present, Secure Memory Overwrite is available. |
-| **5** | If present, NX protections are available. |
-| **6** | If present, SMM mitigations are available. |
-| **7** | If present, MBEC/GMET is available. |
-| **8** | If present, APIC virtualization is available. |
+- **AvailableSecurityProperties**: This field helps to enumerate and report state on the relevant security properties for VBS and memory integrity.
-##### InstanceIdentifier
+ | Value | Description |
+ |-------|---------------------------------------------------------|
+ | **0** | If present, no relevant properties exist on the device. |
+ | **1** | If present, hypervisor support is available. |
+ | **2** | If present, Secure Boot is available. |
+ | **3** | If present, DMA protection is available. |
+ | **4** | If present, Secure Memory Overwrite is available. |
+ | **5** | If present, NX protections are available. |
+ | **6** | If present, SMM mitigations are available. |
+ | **7** | If present, MBEC/GMET is available. |
+ | **8** | If present, APIC virtualization is available. |
-A string that is unique to a particular device and set by WMI.
+- **CodeIntegrityPolicyEnforcementStatus**: This field indicates the code integrity policy enforcement status.
-##### RequiredSecurityProperties
+ | Value | Description |
+ |-------|-------------|
+ | **0** | Off |
+ | **1** | Audit. |
+ | **2** | Enforced. |
-This field describes the required security properties to enable VBS.
+- **RequiredSecurityProperties**: This field describes the required security properties to enable VBS.
-| Value | Description |
-|-------|------------------------------------------------|
-| **0** | Nothing is required. |
-| **1** | If present, hypervisor support is needed. |
-| **2** | If present, Secure Boot is needed. |
-| **3** | If present, DMA protection is needed. |
-| **4** | If present, Secure Memory Overwrite is needed. |
-| **5** | If present, NX protections are needed. |
-| **6** | If present, SMM mitigations are needed. |
-| **7** | If present, MBEC/GMET is needed. |
+ | Value | Description |
+ |-------|------------------------------------------------|
+ | **0** | Nothing is required. |
+ | **1** | If present, hypervisor support is needed. |
+ | **2** | If present, Secure Boot is needed. |
+ | **3** | If present, DMA protection is needed. |
+ | **4** | If present, Secure Memory Overwrite is needed. |
+ | **5** | If present, NX protections are needed. |
+ | **6** | If present, SMM mitigations are needed. |
+ | **7** | If present, MBEC/GMET is needed. |
-##### SecurityServicesConfigured
+- **SecurityServicesConfigured**: This field indicates whether Credential Guard or memory integrity is configured.
-This field indicates whether Credential Guard or memory integrity is configured.
+ | Value | Description |
+ |-------|-------------------------------------------------------|
+ | **0** | No services are configured. |
+ | **1** | If present, Credential Guard is configured. |
+ | **2** | If present, memory integrity is configured. |
+ | **3** | If present, System Guard Secure Launch is configured. |
+ | **4** | If present, SMM Firmware Measurement is configured. |
+ | **5** | If present, Kernel-mode Hardware-enforced Stack Protection is configured. |
+ | **6** | If present, Kernel-mode Hardware-enforced Stack Protection is configured in Audit mode. |
+ | **7** | If present, Hypervisor-Enforced Paging Translation is configured. |
-| Value | Description |
-|-------|-------------------------------------------------------|
-| **0** | No services are configured. |
-| **1** | If present, Credential Guard is configured. |
-| **2** | If present, memory integrity is configured. |
-| **3** | If present, System Guard Secure Launch is configured. |
-| **4** | If present, SMM Firmware Measurement is configured. |
+- **SecurityServicesRunning**: This field indicates whether Credential Guard or memory integrity is running.
-##### SecurityServicesRunning
+ | Value | Description |
+ |-------|----------------------------------------------------|
+ | **0** | No services running. |
+ | **1** | If present, Credential Guard is running. |
+ | **2** | If present, memory integrity is running. |
+ | **3** | If present, System Guard Secure Launch is running. |
+ | **4** | If present, SMM Firmware Measurement is running. |
+ | **5** | If present, Kernel-mode Hardware-enforced Stack Protection is running. |
+ | **6** | If present, Kernel-mode Hardware-enforced Stack Protection is running in Audit mode. |
+ | **7** | If present, Hypervisor-Enforced Paging Translation is running. |
-This field indicates whether Credential Guard or memory integrity is running.
+- **SmmIsolationLevel**: This field indicates the SMM isolation level.
-| Value | Description |
-|-------|----------------------------------------------------|
-| **0** | No services running. |
-| **1** | If present, Credential Guard is running. |
-| **2** | If present, memory integrity is running. |
-| **3** | If present, System Guard Secure Launch is running. |
-| **4** | If present, SMM Firmware Measurement is running. |
+- **UsermodeCodeIntegrityPolicyEnforcementStatus**: This field indicates the user mode code integrity policy enforcement status.
-##### Version
+ | Value | Description |
+ |-------|-------------|
+ | **0** | Off |
+ | **1** | Audit. |
+ | **2** | Enforced. |
-This field lists the version of this WMI class. The only valid value now is **1.0**.
+- **VirtualizationBasedSecurityStatus**: This field indicates whether VBS is enabled and running.
-##### VirtualizationBasedSecurityStatus
+ | Value | Description |
+ |-------|---------------------------------|
+ | **0** | VBS isn't enabled. |
+ | **1** | VBS is enabled but not running. |
+ | **2** | VBS is enabled and running. |
-This field indicates whether VBS is enabled and running.
+- **VirtualMachineIsolation**: This field indicates whether virtual machine isolation is enabled.
-| Value | Description |
-|-------|---------------------------------|
-| **0** | VBS isn't enabled. |
-| **1** | VBS is enabled but not running. |
-| **2** | VBS is enabled and running. |
+- **VirtualMachineIsolationProperties**: This field indicates the set of virtual machine isolation properties that are available.
-##### PSComputerName
-
-This field lists the computer name. All valid values for computer name.
+ | Value | Description |
+ |-------|-------------------------------|
+ | **1** | AMD SEV-SNP |
+ | **2** | Virtualization-based Security |
+ | **3** | Intel TDX |
#### Use msinfo32.exe
diff --git a/windows/security/hardware-security/index.md b/windows/security/hardware-security/index.md
deleted file mode 100644
index e8cfb27d50..0000000000
--- a/windows/security/hardware-security/index.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
----
-title: Windows hardware security
-description: Learn more about hardware security features support in Windows.
-ms.date: 07/10/2024
-ms.topic: overview
-appliesto:
----
-
-# Windows hardware security
-
-:::image type="content" source="..\book\images\hardware.png" alt-text="Diagram of containing a list of security features." lightbox="..\book\images\hardware.png" border="false":::
-
-Learn more about hardware security features support in Windows.
-
-[!INCLUDE [hardware](../includes/sections/hardware.md)]
diff --git a/windows/security/hardware-security/toc.yml b/windows/security/hardware-security/toc.yml
index 92e9f40c56..7cacd9e8a8 100644
--- a/windows/security/hardware-security/toc.yml
+++ b/windows/security/hardware-security/toc.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
items:
- - name: Overview
- href: index.md
- - name: Hardware root of trust
+ - name: Hardware root-of-trust
items:
- name: System Guard
href: how-hardware-based-root-of-trust-helps-protect-windows.md
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/access-control.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/access-control.md
index 20731a876a..12fe65bda4 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/access-control.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/access-control.md
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ ms.topic: overview
appliesto:
- ✅ Windows 11
- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows Server 2025
- ✅ Windows Server 2022
- ✅ Windows Server 2019
- ✅ Windows Server 2016
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts.md
index 70dbff7388..102e723645 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts.md
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ ms.topic: concept-article
appliesto:
- ✅ Windows 11
- ✅ Windows 10
+- ✅ Windows Server 2025
- ✅ Windows Server 2022
- ✅ Windows Server 2019
- ✅ Windows Server 2016
@@ -230,27 +231,27 @@ The following table shows the Group Policy and registry settings that are used t
1. In the details pane, right-click <**gpo\_name**>, and > **Edit**
1. Ensure that UAC is enabled and that UAC restrictions apply to the default Administrator account by following these steps:
- - Navigate to the Computer Configuration\\Windows Settings\\Security Settings\\Local Policies\\, and > **Security Options**
- - Double-click **User Account Control: Run all administrators in Admin Approval Mode** > **Enabled** > **OK**
- - Double-click **User Account Control: Admin Approval Mode for the Built-in Administrator account** > **Enabled** > **OK**
+ - Navigate to the Computer Configuration\\Windows Settings\\Security Settings\\Local Policies\\, and > **Security Options**
+ - Double-click **User Account Control: Run all administrators in Admin Approval Mode** > **Enabled** > **OK**
+ - Double-click **User Account Control: Admin Approval Mode for the Built-in Administrator account** > **Enabled** > **OK**
1. Ensure that the local account restrictions are applied to network interfaces by following these steps:
- - Navigate to *Computer Configuration\Preferences and Windows Settings*, and > **Registry**
- - Right-click **Registry**, and > **New** > **Registry Item**
- - In the **New Registry Properties** dialog box, on the **General** tab, change the setting in the **Action** box to **Replace**
- - Ensure that the **Hive** box is set to **HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE**
- - Select (**…**), browse to the following location for **Key Path** > **Select** for: `SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System`
- - In the **Value name** area, type `LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy`
- - In the **Value type** box, from the drop-down list, select **REG_DWORD** to change the value
- - In the **Value data** box, ensure that the value is set to **0**
- - Verify this configuration, and > **OK**
+ - Navigate to *Computer Configuration\Preferences and Windows Settings*, and > **Registry**
+ - Right-click **Registry**, and > **New** > **Registry Item**
+ - In the **New Registry Properties** dialog box, on the **General** tab, change the setting in the **Action** box to **Replace**
+ - Ensure that the **Hive** box is set to **HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE**
+ - Select (**…**), browse to the following location for **Key Path** > **Select** for: `SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System`
+ - In the **Value name** area, type `LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy`
+ - In the **Value type** box, from the drop-down list, select **REG_DWORD** to change the value
+ - In the **Value data** box, ensure that the value is set to **0**
+ - Verify this configuration, and > **OK**
1. Link the GPO to the first **Workstations** organizational unit (OU) by doing the following:
- - Navigate to the `*Forest*\\*Domain*\*OU*` path
- - Right-click the **Workstations > Link an existing GPO**
- - Select the GPO that you created, and > **OK**
+ - Navigate to the `*Forest*\\*Domain*\*OU*` path
+ - Right-click the **Workstations > Link an existing GPO**
+ - Select the GPO that you created, and > **OK**
1. Test the functionality of enterprise applications on the workstations in that first OU and resolve any issues caused by the new policy
1. Create links to all other OUs that contain workstations
@@ -291,9 +292,9 @@ The following table shows the Group Policy settings that are used to deny networ
1. Select **Add User or Group**, type **Local account and member of Administrators group**, and > **OK**
1. Link the GPO to the first **Workstations** OU as follows:
- - Navigate to the <*Forest*>\\Domains\\<*Domain*>\\OU path
- - Right-click the **Workstations** OU, and > **Link an existing GPO**
- - Select the GPO that you created, and > **OK**
+ - Navigate to the <*Forest*>\\Domains\\<*Domain*>\\OU path
+ - Right-click the **Workstations** OU, and > **Link an existing GPO**
+ - Select the GPO that you created, and > **OK**
1. Test the functionality of enterprise applications on the workstations in that first OU and resolve any issues caused by the new policy
1. Create links to all other OUs that contain workstations
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/configure.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/configure.md
index b965f14e38..192b60aca0 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/configure.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/configure.md
@@ -11,9 +11,7 @@ This article describes how to configure Credential Guard using Microsoft Intune,
## Default enablement
-[!INCLUDE [windows-server-2025-preview](../../includes/windows-server-2025-preview.md)]
-
-Starting in Windows 11, 22H2 and Windows Server 2025 (preview), Credential Guard is [enabled by default on devices which meet the requirements](index.md#default-enablement).
+Starting in Windows 11, 22H2 and Windows Server 2025, Credential Guard is [enabled by default on devices which meet the requirements](index.md#default-enablement).
System administrators can explicitly [enable](#enable-credential-guard) or [disable](#disable-credential-guard) Credential Guard using one of the methods described in this article. Explicitly configured values overwrite the default enablement state after a reboot.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/considerations-known-issues.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/considerations-known-issues.md
index 71298d9a5b..e4531d1f84 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/considerations-known-issues.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/considerations-known-issues.md
@@ -11,13 +11,11 @@ Microsoft recommends that in addition to deploying Credential Guard, organizatio
## Upgrade considerations
-[!INCLUDE [windows-server-2025-preview](../../includes/windows-server-2025-preview.md)]
-
As Credential Guard evolves and enhances its security features, newer versions of Windows running Credential Guard might affect previously functional scenarios. For instance, Credential Guard could restrict the use of certain credentials or components to thwart malware exploiting vulnerabilities.
It's advisable to thoroughly test operational scenarios within an organization before updating devices that utilize Credential Guard.
-Upgrades to Windows 11, version 22H2, and Windows Server 2025 (preview) have Credential Guard [enabled by default](index.md#default-enablement) unless explicitly disabled.
+Upgrades to Windows 11, version 22H2, and Windows Server 2025 have Credential Guard [enabled by default](index.md#default-enablement) unless explicitly disabled.
## Wi-fi and VPN considerations
@@ -120,25 +118,23 @@ Credential Guard blocks certain authentication capabilities. Applications that r
This article describes known issues when Credential Guard is enabled.
-### Live migration with Hyper-V breaks when upgrading to Windows Server 2025 (preview)
+### Live migration with Hyper-V breaks when upgrading to Windows Server 2025
-[!INCLUDE [windows-server-2025-preview](../../includes/windows-server-2025-preview.md)]
-
-Devices that use CredSSP-based Delegation might no longer be able to use [Live Migration with Hyper-V](/windows-server/virtualization/hyper-v/manage/live-migration-overview) after upgrading to Windows Server 2025 (preview). Applications and services that rely on live migration (such as [SCVMM](/system-center/vmm/overview)) might also be affected. CredSSP-based delegation is the default for Windows Server 2022 and earlier for live migration.
+Devices that use CredSSP-based Delegation might no longer be able to use [Live Migration with Hyper-V](/windows-server/virtualization/hyper-v/manage/live-migration-overview) after upgrading to Windows Server 2025. Applications and services that rely on live migration (such as [SCVMM](/system-center/vmm/overview)) might also be affected. CredSSP-based delegation is the default for Windows Server 2022 and earlier for live migration.
||Description|
|-|-|
-| **Affected devices**|Any server with Credential Guard enabled might encounter this issue. Starting in Windows Server 2025 (preview), [Credential Guard is enabled by default](index.md#default-enablement-on-windows-server) on all domain-joined servers that aren't domain controllers. Default enablement of Credential Guard can be [preemptively blocked](configure.md#default-enablement) before upgrade.|
+| **Affected devices**|Any server with Credential Guard enabled might encounter this issue. Starting in Windows Server 2025, [Credential Guard is enabled by default](index.md#default-enablement-on-windows-server) on all domain-joined servers that aren't domain controllers. Default enablement of Credential Guard can be [preemptively blocked](configure.md#default-enablement) before upgrade.|
| **Cause of the issue**|Live Migration with Hyper-V, and applications and services that rely on it, are affected by the issue if one or both ends of a given connection try to use CredSSP with Credential Guard enabled. With Credential Guard enabled, CredSSP can only utilize supplied credentials, not saved or SSO credentials. If the source machine of a Live Migration uses CredSSP for delegation with Credential Guard enabled, the Live Migration fails. In most cases, Credential Guard's enablement state on the destination machine won't impact Live Migration. Live Migration also fails in cluster scenarios (for example, SCVMM), since any device might act as a source machine.|
| **Resolution**|Instead of CredSSP Delegation, [Kerberos Constrained Delegation and Resource-Based Kerberos Constrained Delegation](/windows-server/security/kerberos/kerberos-constrained-delegation-overview) are recommended. These forms of delegation provide greater credential protections, in addition to being compatible with Credential Guard. Administrators of Hyper-V can [configure these types of delegation](/windows-server/virtualization/hyper-v/deploy/set-up-hosts-for-live-migration-without-failover-clustering#BKMK_Step1) manually or with the help of automated scripts.|
-### Single sign-on for Network services breaks after upgrading to Windows 11, version 22H2 or Windows Server 2025 (preview)
+### Single sign-on for Network services breaks after upgrading to Windows 11, version 22H2 or Windows Server 2025
Devices that use 802.1x wireless or wired network, RDP, or VPN connections that rely on insecure protocols with password-based authentication are unable to use SSO to sign in and are forced to manually reauthenticate in every new Windows session when Credential Guard is running.
||Description|
|-|-|
-| **Affected devices**|Any device with Credential Guard enabled might encounter the issue. Starting in Windows 11, version 22H2, and Windows Server 2025 (preview), eligible devices that didn't disable Credential Guard, have it [enabled by default](index.md#default-enablement). This affects all devices on Enterprise (E3 and E5) and Education licenses, and some Pro licenses, as long as they meet the [minimum hardware requirements](index.md#hardware-and-software-requirements). All Windows Pro devices that previously ran Credential Guard on an eligible license and later downgraded to Pro, and which still meet the [minimum hardware requirements](index.md#hardware-and-software-requirements), receive default enablement.|
+| **Affected devices**|Any device with Credential Guard enabled might encounter the issue. Starting in Windows 11, version 22H2, and Windows Server 2025, eligible devices that didn't disable Credential Guard, have it [enabled by default](index.md#default-enablement). This affects all devices on Enterprise (E3 and E5) and Education licenses, and some Pro licenses, as long as they meet the [minimum hardware requirements](index.md#hardware-and-software-requirements). All Windows Pro devices that previously ran Credential Guard on an eligible license and later downgraded to Pro, and which still meet the [minimum hardware requirements](index.md#hardware-and-software-requirements), receive default enablement.|
| **Cause of the issue**|Applications and services are affected by the issue when they rely on insecure protocols that use password-based authentication. Such protocols are considered insecure because they can lead to password disclosure on the client or the server, and Credential Guard blocks them. Affected protocols include: - Kerberos unconstrained delegation (both SSO and supplied credentials are blocked) - Kerberos when PKINIT uses RSA encryption instead of Diffie-Hellman (both SSO and supplied credentials are blocked) - MS-CHAP (only SSO is blocked) - WDigest (only SSO is blocked) - NTLM v1 (only SSO is blocked) **Note**: Since only SSO is blocked for MS-CHAP, WDigest, and NTLM v1, these protocols can still be used by prompting the user to supply credentials.|
| **Resolution**|Microsoft recommends moving away from MSCHAPv2-based connections (for example, PEAP-MSCHAPv2 and EAP-MSCHAPv2), to certificate-based authentication (for example, PEAP-TLS or EAP-TLS). Credential Guard doesn't block certificate-based authentication. For a more immediate, but less secure fix, [disable Credential Guard](configure.md#disable-credential-guard). Credential Guard doesn't have per-protocol or per-application policies, and it can either be turned on or off. If you disable Credential Guard, you leave stored domain credentials vulnerable to theft.|
@@ -148,7 +144,7 @@ Devices that use 802.1x wireless or wired network, RDP, or VPN connections that
> If Credential Guard is explicitly disabled, the device won't automatically enable Credential Guard after the update.
> [!NOTE]
-> To determine if a Windows Pro device receives default enablement when upgraded to **Windows 11, version 22H2** or **Windows Server 2025 (preview)**, check if the registry key `IsolatedCredentialsRootSecret` is present in `Computer\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\MSV1_0`.
+> To determine if a Windows Pro device receives default enablement when upgraded to **Windows 11, version 22H2** or **Windows Server 2025**, check if the registry key `IsolatedCredentialsRootSecret` is present in `Computer\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\MSV1_0`.
> If it's present, the device enables Credential Guard after the update.
>
> Credential Guard can be disabled after upgrade by following the [disablement instructions](configure.md#disable-credential-guard).
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/index.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/index.md
index fcbe9884bb..386e6883e1 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/index.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/index.md
@@ -22,16 +22,14 @@ When enabled, Credential Guard provides the following benefits:
## Default enablement
-[!INCLUDE [windows-server-2025-preview](../../includes/windows-server-2025-preview.md)]
-
-Starting in **Windows 11, 22H2** and **Windows Server 2025 (preview)**, VBS and Credential Guard are enabled by default on devices that meet the requirements.
+Starting in **Windows 11, 22H2** and **Windows Server 2025**, VBS and Credential Guard are enabled by default on devices that meet the requirements.
The default enablement is **without UEFI Lock**, thus allowing administrators to disable Credential Guard remotely if needed.
When Credential Guard is enabled, [VBS](#system-requirements) is automatically enabled too.
> [!NOTE]
-> If Credential Guard is explicitly [disabled](configure.md#disable-credential-guard) *before* a device is updated to Windows 11, version 22H2 / Windows Server 2025 (preview) or later, default enablement does not overwrite the existing settings. That device will continue to have Credential Guard disabled even after updating to a version of Windows that enables Credential Guard by default.
+> If Credential Guard is explicitly [disabled](configure.md#disable-credential-guard) *before* a device is updated to Windows 11, version 22H2 / Windows Server 2025 or later, default enablement does not overwrite the existing settings. That device will continue to have Credential Guard disabled even after updating to a version of Windows that enables Credential Guard by default.
### Default enablement on Windows
@@ -48,7 +46,7 @@ Devices running Windows 11, 22H2 or later have Credential Guard enabled by defau
### Default enablement on Windows Server
-Devices running Windows Server 2025 (preview) or later have Credential Guard enabled by default if they:
+Devices running Windows Server 2025 or later have Credential Guard enabled by default if they:
- Meet the [license requirements](#windows-edition-and-licensing-requirements)
- Meet the [hardware and software requirements](#system-requirements)
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/configure.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/configure.md
index 901fa618d2..29cb37b8e0 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/configure.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/configure.md
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
title: Configure Windows Hello for Business
description: Learn about the configuration options for Windows Hello for Business and how to implement them in your organization.
ms.topic: how-to
-ms.date: 04/23/2024
+ms.date: 11/05/2024
---
# Configure Windows Hello for Business
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ To check the Windows Hello for Business policy settings applied at enrollment ti
1. Select **Windows Hello for Business**
1. Verify the status of **Configure Windows Hello for Business** and any settings that might be configured
-:::image type="content" source="deploy/images/whfb-intune-disable.png" alt-text="Disablement of Windows Hello for Business from Microsoft Intune admin center." lightbox="deploy/images/whfb-intune-disable.png":::
+ :::image type="content" source="deploy/images/whfb-intune-disable.png" alt-text="Disablement of Windows Hello for Business from Microsoft Intune admin center." lightbox="deploy/images/whfb-intune-disable.png":::
## Policy conflicts from multiple policy sources
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ Configuration type| Details |
| CSP (user)|**Key path**: `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Policies\PassportForWork\\UserSid\Policies` **Key name**: `UsePassportForWork` **Type**: `REG_DWORD` **Value**: `1` to enable `0` to disable |
| CSP (device)|**Key path**: `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Policies\PassportForWork\\Device\Policies` **Key name**: `UsePassportForWork` **Type**: `REG_DWORD` **Value**: `1` to enable `0` to disable |
| GPO (user)|**Key path**: `HKEY_USERS\\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\PassportForWork` **Key name**: `Enabled` **Type**: `REG_DWORD` **Value**: `1` to enable `0` to disable |
-| GPO (user)|**Key path**: `KEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\PassportForWork` **Key name**: `Enabled` **Type**: `REG_DWORD` **Value**: `1` to enable `0` to disable |
+| GPO (device)|**Key path**: `KEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\PassportForWork` **Key name**: `Enabled` **Type**: `REG_DWORD` **Value**: `1` to enable `0` to disable |
> [!NOTE]
> If there's a conflicting device policy and user policy, the user policy takes precedence. It's not recommended to create Local GPO or registry settings that could conflict with an MDM policy. This conflict could lead to unexpected results.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/cloud-only.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/cloud-only.md
index 553251974a..f2c4e29919 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/cloud-only.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/cloud-only.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Windows Hello for Business cloud-only deployment guide
description: Learn how to deploy Windows Hello for Business in a cloud-only deployment scenario.
-ms.date: 03/12/2024
+ms.date: 11/22/2024
ms.topic: tutorial
---
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/hybrid-cloud-kerberos-trust.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/hybrid-cloud-kerberos-trust.md
index c547b535eb..e4312d8684 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/hybrid-cloud-kerberos-trust.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/hybrid-cloud-kerberos-trust.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Windows Hello for Business cloud Kerberos trust deployment guide
description: Learn how to deploy Windows Hello for Business in a cloud Kerberos trust scenario.
-ms.date: 03/12/2024
+ms.date: 11/22/2024
ms.topic: tutorial
---
@@ -41,13 +41,13 @@ If you haven't deployed Microsoft Entra Kerberos, follow the instructions in the
When Microsoft Entra Kerberos is enabled in an Active Directory domain, an *AzureADKerberos* computer object is created in the domain. This object:
-- Appears as a Read Only Domain Controller (RODC) object, but isn't associated with any physical servers
+- Appears as a read only domain controller (RODC) object, but isn't associated with any physical servers
- Is only used by Microsoft Entra ID to generate TGTs for the Active Directory domain
> [!NOTE]
> Similar rules and restrictions used for RODCs apply to the AzureADKerberos computer object. For example, users that are direct or indirect members of priviliged built-in security groups won't be able to use cloud Kerberos trust.
-:::image type="content" source="images/azuread-kerberos-object.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the Active Directory Users and Computers console, showing the computer object representing the Microsoft Entra Kerberos server.":::
+:::image type="content" source="images/azuread-kerberos-object.png" alt-text="Screenshot of the Active Directory Users and Computers console, showing the computer object representing the Microsoft Entra Kerberos server." lightbox="images/azuread-kerberos-object.png":::
For more information about how Microsoft Entra Kerberos works with Windows Hello for Business cloud Kerberos trust, see [Windows Hello for Business authentication technical deep dive](../how-it-works-authentication.md#microsoft-entra-hybrid-join-authentication-using-cloud-kerberos-trust).
@@ -169,8 +169,8 @@ If you deployed Windows Hello for Business using the key trust model, and want t
1. [Enable cloud Kerberos trust via Group Policy or Intune](#configure-windows-hello-for-business-policy-settings)
1. For Microsoft Entra joined devices, sign out and sign in to the device using Windows Hello for Business
-> [!NOTE]
-> For Microsoft Entra hybrid joined devices, users must perform the first sign in with new credentials while having line of sight to a DC.
+ > [!NOTE]
+ > For Microsoft Entra hybrid joined devices, users must perform the first sign in with new credentials while having line of sight to a DC.
## Migrate from certificate trust deployment model to cloud Kerberos trust
@@ -179,11 +179,11 @@ If you deployed Windows Hello for Business using the key trust model, and want t
If you deployed Windows Hello for Business using the certificate trust model, and want to use the cloud Kerberos trust model, you must redeploy Windows Hello for Business by following these steps:
-1. Disable the certificate trust policy
-1. [Enable cloud Kerberos trust via Group Policy or Intune](#configure-windows-hello-for-business-policy-settings)
-1. Remove the certificate trust credential using the command `certutil.exe -deletehellocontainer` from the user context
-1. Sign out and sign back in
-1. Provision Windows Hello for Business using a method of your choice
+1. Disable the certificate trust policy.
+1. [Enable cloud Kerberos trust via Group Policy or Intune](#configure-windows-hello-for-business-policy-settings).
+1. Remove the certificate trust credential using the command `certutil.exe -deletehellocontainer` from the user context.
+1. Sign out and sign back in.
+1. Provision Windows Hello for Business using a method of your choice.
> [!NOTE]
> For Microsoft Entra hybrid joined devices, users must perform the first sign-in with new credentials while having line of sight to a DC.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/hybrid-key-trust-enroll.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/hybrid-key-trust-enroll.md
index c97ec8cde9..742939bf9d 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/hybrid-key-trust-enroll.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/hybrid-key-trust-enroll.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Configure and enroll in Windows Hello for Business in a hybrid key trust model
description: Learn how to configure devices and enroll them in Windows Hello for Business in a hybrid key trust scenario.
-ms.date: 03/12/2024
+ms.date: 11/22/2024
ms.topic: tutorial
---
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/hybrid-key-trust.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/hybrid-key-trust.md
index 2b775003f0..ce6526f4a7 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/hybrid-key-trust.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/hybrid-key-trust.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Windows Hello for Business hybrid key trust deployment guide
description: Learn how to deploy Windows Hello for Business in a hybrid key trust scenario.
-ms.date: 03/12/2024
+ms.date: 11/22/2024
ms.topic: tutorial
---
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/includes/adfs-mfa.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/includes/adfs-mfa.md
index 6adbe43c94..11af1ac31c 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/includes/adfs-mfa.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/includes/adfs-mfa.md
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
---
-ms.date: 06/23/2024
+ms.date: 11/22/2024
ms.topic: include
---
@@ -19,3 +19,6 @@ Windows Hello for Business requires users perform multifactor authentication (MF
For information on available non-Microsoft authentication methods see [Configure Additional Authentication Methods for AD FS](/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/operations/configure-additional-authentication-methods-for-ad-fs). For creating a custom authentication method see [Build a Custom Authentication Method for AD FS in Windows Server](/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/development/ad-fs-build-custom-auth-method)
Follow the integration and deployment guide for the authentication provider you select to integrate and deploy it to AD FS. Make sure that the authentication provider is selected as a multifactor authentication option in the AD FS authentication policy. For information on configuring AD FS authentication policies see [Configure Authentication Policies](/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/operations/configure-authentication-policies).
+
+> [!TIP]
+> When you validate the AD FS configuration, verify if you need to update the configuration of user agent strings to support Windows Integrated Authentication (WIA). For more information, see [Change WIASupportedUserAgent settings](/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/operations/configure-ad-fs-browser-wia#change-wiasupporteduseragent-settings).
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/includes/tooltip-trust-cloud-kerberos.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/includes/tooltip-trust-cloud-kerberos.md
index 58bad86a1c..7975aad95b 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/includes/tooltip-trust-cloud-kerberos.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/includes/tooltip-trust-cloud-kerberos.md
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
---
-ms.date: 12/08/2022
+ms.date: 10/30/2024
ms.topic: include
---
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/includes/tooltip-trust-key.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/includes/tooltip-trust-key.md
index 41d9b6cdf9..67e1f2fa05 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/includes/tooltip-trust-key.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/includes/tooltip-trust-key.md
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
---
-ms.date: 12/08/2022
+ms.date: 10/30/2024
ms.topic: include
---
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/index.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/index.md
index 09c8d47a70..fb262a5ee4 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/index.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/index.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Plan a Windows Hello for Business Deployment
description: Learn about the role of each component within Windows Hello for Business and how certain deployment decisions affect other aspects of your infrastructure.
-ms.date: 05/16/2024
+ms.date: 10/30/2024
ms.topic: concept-article
---
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ Windows Hello for Business authentication to Microsoft Entra ID always uses the
The trust type determines whether you issue authentication certificates to your users. One trust model isn't more secure than the other.
-The deployment of certificates to users and Domain Controllers requires more configuration and infrastructure, which could also be a factor to consider in your decision. More infrastructure needed for certificate-trust deployments includes a certificate registration authority. In a federated environment, you must activate the Device Writeback option in Microsoft Entra Connect.
+The deployment of certificates to users and domain controllers requires more configuration and infrastructure, which could also be a factor to consider in your decision. More infrastructure needed for certificate-trust deployments includes a certificate registration authority. In a federated environment, you must activate the Device Writeback option in Microsoft Entra Connect.
There are three trust types from which you can choose:
@@ -264,12 +264,12 @@ All supported Windows versions can be used with Windows Hello for Business. Howe
### Windows Server requirements
-All supported Windows Server versions can be used with Windows Hello for Business as Domain Controller. However, cloud Kerberos trust requires minimum versions:
+Windows Hello for Business can be used to authenticate against all supported Windows Server versions as a domain controller. However, cloud Kerberos trust requires minimum versions:
-| | Deployment model | Trust type | Domain Controller OS version |
+| | Deployment model | Trust type | Domain controller OS version |
|--|--|--|--|
| **🔲** | **Cloud-only** | n/a | All supported versions |
-| **🔲** | **Hybrid** | Cloud Kerberos | - Windows Server 2016, with [KB3534307][KB-3] and later - Windows Server 2019, with [KB4534321][KB-4] and later - Windows Server 2022 |
+| **🔲** | **Hybrid** | Cloud Kerberos | - Windows Server 2016, with [KB3534307][KB-3] and later - Windows Server 2019, with [KB4534321][KB-4] and later - Windows Server 2022 - Windows Server 2025|
| **🔲** | **Hybrid** | Key | All supported versions |
| **🔲** | **Hybrid** | Certificate | All supported versions |
| **🔲** | **On-premises** | Key | All supported versions |
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/on-premises-cert-trust-adfs.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/on-premises-cert-trust-adfs.md
index 7446d01e92..73dd0d6cbf 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/on-premises-cert-trust-adfs.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/on-premises-cert-trust-adfs.md
@@ -33,14 +33,14 @@ Windows Hello for Business works exclusively with the Active Directory Federatio
Sign in to the CA or management workstations with **Enterprise Admin** equivalent credentials.
-1. Open the **Certification Authority** management console
-1. Expand the parent node from the navigation pane
-1. Select **Certificate Templates** in the navigation pane
-1. Right-click the **Certificate Templates** node. Select **New > Certificate Template** to issue
-1. In the **Enable Certificates Templates** window, select the *WHFB Enrollment Agent* template you created in the previous step. Select **OK** to publish the selected certificate templates to the certification authority
-1. If you published the *Domain Controller Authentication (Kerberos)* certificate template, then unpublish the certificate templates you included in the superseded templates list
- - To unpublish a certificate template, right-click the certificate template you want to unpublish and select **Delete**. Select **Yes** to confirm the operation
-1. Close the console
+1. Open the **Certification Authority** management console.
+1. Expand the parent node from the navigation pane.
+1. Select **Certificate Templates** in the navigation pane.
+1. Right-click the **Certificate Templates** node. Select **New > Certificate Template** to issue.
+1. In the **Enable Certificates Templates** window, select the *WHFB Enrollment Agent* template you created in the previous step. Select **OK** to publish the selected certificate templates to the certification authority.
+1. If you published the *Domain Controller Authentication (Kerberos)* certificate template, then unpublish the certificate templates you included in the superseded templates list.
+ - To unpublish a certificate template, right-click the certificate template you want to unpublish and select **Delete**. Select **Yes** to confirm the operation.
+1. Close the console.
## Configure the certificate registration authority
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ Set-AdfsCertificateAuthority -EnrollmentAgent -EnrollmentAgentCertificateTemplat
```
>[!NOTE]
-> If you gave your Windows Hello for Business Enrollment Agent and Windows Hello for Business Authentication certificate templates different names, then replace *WHFBEnrollmentAgent* and *WHFBAuthentication* in the above command with the name of your certificate templates. It's important that you use the template name rather than the template display name. You can view the template name on the **General** tab of the certificate template by using the **Certificate Template** management console (certtmpl.msc). Or, you can view the template name by using the `Get-CATemplate` PowerShell cmdlet on a CA.
+> If you gave your Windows Hello for Business Enrollment Agent and Windows Hello for Business Authentication certificate templates different names, then replace *WHFBEnrollmentAgent* and *WHFBAuthentication* in the above command with the name of your certificate templates. It's important that you use the template name rather than the template display name. You can view the template name on the **General** tab of the certificate template by using the **Certificate Template** management console (_certtmpl.msc_). Or, you can view the template name by using the `Get-CATemplate` PowerShell cmdlet on a CA.
### Enrollment agent certificate lifecycle management
@@ -89,18 +89,18 @@ For detailed information about the certificate, use `Certutil -q -v [!div class="checklist"]
> Before you continue with the deployment, validate your deployment progress by reviewing the following items:
>
-> - Configure an enrollment agent certificate template
-> - Confirm only the AD FS service account has the allow enroll permission for the enrollment agent certificate template
-> - Consider using an HSM to protect the enrollment agent certificate; however, understand the frequency and quantity of signature operations the enrollment agent server makes and understand the impact it has on overall performance
-> - Confirm you properly configured the Windows Hello for Business authentication certificate template
-> - Confirm all certificate templates were properly published to the appropriate issuing certificate authorities
-> - Confirm the AD FS service account has the allow enroll permission for the Windows Hello Business authentication certificate template
-> - Confirm the AD FS certificate registration authority is properly configured using the `Get-AdfsCertificateAuthority` Windows PowerShell cmdlet
-> Confirm you restarted the AD FS service
-> - Confirm you properly configured load-balancing (hardware or software)
-> - Confirm you created a DNS A Record for the federation service and the IP address used is the load-balanced IP address
-> - Confirm you created and deployed the Intranet Zone settings to prevent double authentication to the federation server
-> - Confirm you have deployed a MFA solution for AD FS
+> - Configure an enrollment agent certificate template.
+> - Confirm only the AD FS service account has the allow enroll permission for the enrollment agent certificate template.
+> - Consider using an HSM to protect the enrollment agent certificate; however, understand the frequency and quantity of signature operations the enrollment agent server makes and understand the impact it has on overall performance.
+> - Confirm you properly configured the Windows Hello for Business authentication certificate template.
+> - Confirm all certificate templates were properly published to the appropriate issuing certificate authorities.
+> - Confirm the AD FS service account has the allow enroll permission for the Windows Hello Business authentication certificate template.
+> - Confirm the AD FS certificate registration authority is properly configured using the `Get-AdfsCertificateAuthority` Windows PowerShell cmdlet.
+> - Confirm you restarted the AD FS service.
+> - Confirm you properly configured load-balancing (hardware or software).
+> - Confirm you created a DNS A Record for the federation service and the IP address used is the load-balanced IP address.
+> - Confirm you created and deployed the Intranet Zone settings to prevent double authentication to the federation server.
+> - Confirm you have deployed a MFA solution for AD FS.
> [!div class="nextstepaction"]
> [Next: configure and enroll in Windows Hello for Business >](on-premises-cert-trust-enroll.md)
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/on-premises-key-trust-adfs.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/on-premises-key-trust-adfs.md
index d9e217575b..123d35b434 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/on-premises-key-trust-adfs.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/on-premises-key-trust-adfs.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Configure Active Directory Federation Services in an on-premises key trust model
description: Learn how to configure Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) to support the Windows Hello for Business key trust model.
-ms.date: 03/12/2024
+ms.date: 11/22/2024
ms.topic: tutorial
---
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/prepare-users.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/prepare-users.md
index 0aeded8941..efbea47423 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/prepare-users.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/deploy/prepare-users.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Prepare users to provision and use Windows Hello for Business
description: Learn how to prepare users to enroll and to use Windows Hello for Business.
-ms.date: 03/12/2024
+ms.date: 11/22/2024
ms.topic: end-user-help
---
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/dual-enrollment.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/dual-enrollment.md
index 7dd1507298..0d5f859326 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/dual-enrollment.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/dual-enrollment.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Dual enrollment
description: Learn how to configure Windows Hello for Business dual enrollment and how to configure Active Directory to support Domain Administrator enrollment.
-ms.date: 05/06/2024
+ms.date: 11/22/2024
ms.topic: how-to
---
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Active Directory Domain Services uses `AdminSDHolder` to secure privileged users
Sign in to a domain controller or management workstation with access equivalent to *domain administrator*.
-1. Type the following command to add the **allow** read and write property permissions for msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute for the `Key Admins` group on the `AdminSDHolder` object
+1. Type the following command to add the **allow** read and write property permissions for msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute for the `Key Admins` group on the `AdminSDHolder` object.
```cmd
dsacls "CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=domain,DC=com" /g "[domainName\keyAdminGroup]":RPWP;msDS-KeyCredentialLink
@@ -52,21 +52,21 @@ Sign in to a domain controller or management workstation with access equivalent
dsacls "CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=corp,DC=mstepdemo,DC=net" /g "mstepdemo\Key Admins":RPWP;msDS-KeyCredentialLink
```
-1. To trigger security descriptor propagation, open `ldp.exe`
-1. Select **Connection** and select **Connect...** Next to **Server**, type the name of the domain controller that holds the PDC role for the domain. Next to **Port**, type **389** and select **OK**
-1. Select **Connection** and select **Bind...** Select **OK** to bind as the currently signed-in user
-1. Select **Browser** and select **Modify**. Leave the **DN** text box blank. Next to **Attribute**, type **RunProtectAdminGroupsTask**. Next to **Values**, type `1`. Select **Enter** to add this to the **Entry List**
-1. Select **Run** to start the task
-1. Close LDP
+1. To trigger security descriptor propagation, open `ldp.exe`.
+1. Select **Connection** and select **Connect...** Next to **Server**, type the name of the domain controller that holds the PDC role for the domain. Next to **Port**, type **389** and select **OK**.
+1. Select **Connection** and select **Bind...** Select **OK** to bind as the currently signed-in user.
+1. Select **Browser** and select **Modify**. Leave the **DN** text box blank. Next to **Attribute**, type **RunProtectAdminGroupsTask**. Next to **Values**, type `1`. Select **Enter** to add this to the **Entry List**.
+1. Select **Run** to start the task.
+1. Close LDP.
### Configure dual enrollment with group policy
You configure Windows to support dual enrollment using the computer configuration portion of a Group Policy object:
-1. Using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC), create a new domain-based Group Policy object and link it to an organizational Unit that contains Active Directory computer objects used by privileged users
-1. Edit the Group Policy object from step 1
+1. Using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC), create a new domain-based Group Policy object and link it to an organizational Unit that contains Active Directory computer objects used by privileged users.
+1. Edit the Group Policy object from step 1.
1. Enable the **Allow enumeration of emulated smart cards for all users** policy setting located under **Computer Configuration->Administrative Templates->Windows Components->Windows Hello for Business**
-1. Close the Group Policy Management Editor to save the Group Policy object. Close the GPMC
-1. Restart computers targeted by this Group Policy object
+1. Close the Group Policy Management Editor to save the Group Policy object. Close the GPMC.
+1. Restart computers targeted by this Group Policy object.
-The computer is ready for dual enrollment. Sign in as the privileged user first and enroll for Windows Hello for Business. Once completed, sign out and sign in as the nonprivileged user and enroll for Windows Hello for Business. You can now use your privileged credential to perform privileged tasks without using your password and without needing to switch users.
+ The computer is ready for dual enrollment. Sign in as the privileged user first and enroll for Windows Hello for Business. Once completed, sign out and sign in as the nonprivileged user and enroll for Windows Hello for Business. You can now use your privileged credential to perform privileged tasks without using your password and without needing to switch users.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-deployment-issues.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-deployment-issues.md
index e6b79420ad..aaed7b870d 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-deployment-issues.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-deployment-issues.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Windows Hello for Business known deployment issues
description: This article is a troubleshooting guide for known Windows Hello for Business deployment issues.
-ms.date: 03/12/2024
+ms.date: 11/22/2024
ms.topic: troubleshooting
---
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation.md
index ef8e864841..8524027332 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation.md
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
title: Windows Hello errors during PIN creation
description: Learn about the Windows Hello error codes that might happen during PIN creation.
ms.topic: troubleshooting
-ms.date: 03/12/2024
+ms.date: 11/22/2024
---
# Windows Hello errors during PIN creation
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-feature-dynamic-lock.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-feature-dynamic-lock.md
index e1845d9363..8c46258086 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-feature-dynamic-lock.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-feature-dynamic-lock.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Dynamic lock
description: Learn how to configure dynamic lock on Windows devices via group policies. This feature locks a device when a Bluetooth signal falls below a set value.
-ms.date: 04/23/2024
+ms.date: 11/22/2024
ms.topic: how-to
---
@@ -19,33 +19,33 @@ You can configure Windows devices to use the **dynamic lock** using a Group Poli
1. Enable the **Configure dynamic lock factors** policy setting located under **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **Windows Components** > **Windows Hello for Business**.
1. Close the Group Policy Management Editor to save the Group Policy object.
-The Group Policy Editor, when the policy is enabled, creates a default signal rule policy with the following value:
+ The Group Policy Editor, when the policy is enabled, creates a default signal rule policy with the following value:
-```xml
-
-
-
-```
+ ```xml
+
+
+
+ ```
->[!IMPORTANT]
->Microsoft recommends using the default values for this policy settings. Measurements are relative based on the varying conditions of each environment. Therefore, the same values may produce different results. Test policy settings in each environment prior to broadly deploying the setting.
+ >[!IMPORTANT]
+ >Microsoft recommends using the default values for this policy settings. Measurements are relative based on the varying conditions of each environment. Therefore, the same values may produce different results. Test policy settings in each environment prior to broadly deploying the setting.
-For this policy setting, the `type` and `scenario` attribute values are static and can't change. The `classofDevice` is configurable but Phone is the only currently supported configuration. The attribute defaults to Phone and uses the values from the following table:
+ For this policy setting, the `type` and `scenario` attribute values are static and can't change. The `classofDevice` is configurable but Phone is the only currently supported configuration. The attribute defaults to Phone and uses the values from the following table:
-|Description|Value|
-|:-------------|:-------:|
-|Miscellaneous|0|
-|Computer|256|
-|Phone|512|
-|LAN/Network Access Point|768|
-|Audio/Video|1024|
-|Peripheral|1280|
-|Imaging|1536|
-|Wearable|1792|
-|Toy|2048|
-|Health|2304|
-|Uncategorized|7936|
+ |Description|Value|
+ |:-------------|:-------:|
+ |Miscellaneous|0|
+ |Computer|256|
+ |Phone|512|
+ |LAN/Network Access Point|768|
+ |Audio/Video|1024|
+ |Peripheral|1280|
+ |Imaging|1536|
+ |Wearable|1792|
+ |Toy|2048|
+ |Health|2304|
+ |Uncategorized|7936|
-The `rssiMin` attribute value signal indicates the strength needed for the device to be considered *in-range*. The default value of `-10` enables a user to move about an average size office or cubicle without triggering Windows to lock the device. The `rssiMaxDelta` has a default value of `-10`, which instruct Windows to lock the device once the signal strength weakens by more than measurement of 10.
+ The `rssiMin` attribute value signal indicates the strength needed for the device to be considered *in-range*. The default value of `-10` enables a user to move about an average size office or cubicle without triggering Windows to lock the device. The `rssiMaxDelta` has a default value of `-10`, which instruct Windows to lock the device once the signal strength weakens by more than measurement of 10.
-RSSI measurements are relative and lower as the bluetooth signals between the two paired devices reduces. Therefore a measurement of 0 is stronger than -10, which is stronger than -60, which is an indicator the devices are moving further apart from each other.
+ RSSI measurements are relative and lower as the bluetooth signals between the two paired devices reduces. Therefore a measurement of 0 is stronger than -10, which is stronger than -60, which is an indicator the devices are moving further apart from each other.
diff --git a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-aadj-sso-cert.md b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-aadj-sso-cert.md
index 3d2908e78a..613da4d993 100644
--- a/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-aadj-sso-cert.md
+++ b/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-hybrid-aadj-sso-cert.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Use Certificates to enable SSO for Microsoft Entra join devices
description: If you want to use certificates for on-premises single-sign on for Microsoft Entra joined devices, then follow these additional steps.
-ms.date: 04/24/2024
+ms.date: 11/22/2024
ms.topic: how-to
---
@@ -62,21 +62,21 @@ To include the on-premises distinguished name in the certificate's subject, Micr
Sign-in to computer running Microsoft Entra Connect with access equivalent to *local administrator*.
-1. Open **Synchronization Services** from the **Microsoft Entra Connect** folder
-1. In the **Synchronization Service Manager**, select **Help** and then select **About**
-1. If the version number isn't **1.1.819** or later, then upgrade Microsoft Entra Connect to the latest version
+1. Open **Synchronization Services** from the **Microsoft Entra Connect** folder.
+1. In the **Synchronization Service Manager**, select **Help** and then select **About**.
+1. If the version number isn't **1.1.819** or later, then upgrade Microsoft Entra Connect to the latest version.
### Verify the onPremisesDistinguishedName attribute is synchronized
The easiest way to verify that the onPremisesDistingushedNamne attribute is synchronized is to use the Graph Explorer for Microsoft Graph.
-1. Open a web browser and navigate to [Graph Explorer](https://developer.microsoft.com/graph/graph-explorer)
-1. Select **Sign in to Graph Explorer** and provide Microsoft Entra ID credentials
+1. Open a web browser and navigate to [Graph Explorer](https://developer.microsoft.com/graph/graph-explorer).
+1. Select **Sign in to Graph Explorer** and provide Microsoft Entra ID credentials.
> [!NOTE]
> To successfully query the Graph API, adequate [permissions](/graph/api/user-get?) must be granted
1. Select **Modify permissions (Preview)**. Scroll down and locate **User.Read.All** (or any other required permission) and select **Consent**. You'll now be prompted for delegated permissions consent
-1. In the Graph Explorer URL, enter `https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/[userid]?$select=displayName,userPrincipalName,onPremisesDistinguishedName`, where **[userid]** is the user principal name of a user in Microsoft Entra ID. Select **Run query**
+1. In the Graph Explorer URL, enter `https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/[userid]?$select=displayName,userPrincipalName,onPremisesDistinguishedName`, where **[userid]** is the user principal name of a user in Microsoft Entra ID. Select **Run query**.
> [!NOTE]
> Because the v1.0 endpoint of the Graph API only provides a limited set of parameters, we will use the $select [Optional OData query parameter](/graph/api/user-get?). For convenience, it is possible to switch the API version selector from **v1.0** to **beta** before performing the query. This will provide all available user information, but remember, **beta** endpoint queries should not be used in production scenarios.
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ The easiest way to verify that the onPremisesDistingushedNamne attribute is sync
GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/{id | userPrincipalName}?$select=displayName,userPrincipalName,onPremisesDistinguishedName
```
-1. In the returned results, review the JSON data for the **onPremisesDistinguishedName** attribute. Ensure the attribute has a value and that the value is accurate for the given user. If the **onPremisesDistinguishedName** attribute isn't synchronized the value will be **null**
+1. In the returned results, review the JSON data for the **onPremisesDistinguishedName** attribute. Ensure the attribute has a value and that the value is accurate for the given user. If the **onPremisesDistinguishedName** attribute isn't synchronized the value will be **null**.
#### Response
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/includes/sections/application.md b/windows/security/includes/sections/application.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 75e29b9470..0000000000
--- a/windows/security/includes/sections/application.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
----
-author: paolomatarazzo
-ms.author: paoloma
-ms.date: 09/18/2023
-ms.topic: include
----
-
-## Application and driver control
-
-| Feature name | Description |
-|:---|:---|
-| **[Smart App Control](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/windows-defender-application-control)** | Smart App Control prevents users from running malicious applications on Windows devices by blocking untrusted or unsigned applications. Smart App Control goes beyond previous built-in browser protections, by adding another layer of security that is woven directly into the core of the OS at the process level. Using AI, our new Smart App Control only allows processes to run that are predicted to be safe based on existing and new intelligence processed daily. Smart App Control builds on top of the same cloud-based AI used in App Control for Business to predict the safety of an application, so people can be confident they're using safe and reliable applications on their new Windows 11 devices, or Windows 11 devices that have been reset. |
-| **[App Control for Business](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/windows-defender-application-control)** | Your organization is only as secure as the applications that run on your devices. With application control, apps must earn trust to run, in contrast to an application trust model where all code is assumed trustworthy. By helping prevent unwanted or malicious code from running, application control is an important part of an effective security strategy. Many organizations cite application control as one of the most effective means for addressing the threat of executable file-based malware. Windows 10 and above include App Control for Business and AppLocker. App Control is the next generation app control solution for Windows and provides powerful control over what runs in your environment. Customers who were using AppLocker on previous versions of Windows can continue to use the feature as they consider whether to switch to App Control for the stronger protection. |
-| **[AppLocker](/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/applocker-overview)** | |
-| **[User Account Control (UAC)](/windows/security/application-security/application-control/user-account-control/)** | User Account Control (UAC) helps prevent malware from damaging a device. With UAC, apps and tasks always run in the security context of a non-administrator account, unless an administrator authorizes administrator-level access to the system. UAC can block the automatic installation of unauthorized apps and prevents inadvertent changes to system settings. Enabling UAC helps to prevent malware from altering device settings and potentially gaining access to networks and sensitive data. UAC can also block the automatic installation of unauthorized apps and prevent inadvertent changes to system settings. |
-| **[Microsoft vulnerable driver blocklist](/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/design/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules)** | The Windows kernel is the most privileged software and is therefore a compelling target for malware authors. Since Windows has strict requirements for code running in the kernel, cybercriminals commonly exploit vulnerabilities in kernel drivers to get access. Microsoft works with the ecosystem partners to constantly identify and respond to potentially vulnerable kernel drivers. Prior to Windows 11, version 22H2, the operating system enforced a block policy when HVCI is enabled to prevent vulnerable versions of drivers from running. Starting in Windows 11, version 22H2, the block policy is enabled by default for all new Windows devices, and users can opt-in to enforce the policy from the Windows Security app. |
-
-## Application isolation
-
-| Feature name | Description |
-|:---|:---|
-| **[Microsoft Defender Application Guard (MDAG) for Edge standalone mode](/windows/security/application-security/application-isolation/microsoft-defender-application-guard/md-app-guard-overview)** | Standalone mode allows Windows users to use hardware-isolated browsing sessions without any administrator or management policy configuration. In this mode, user must manually start Microsoft Edge in Application Guard from Edge menu for browsing untrusted sites. |
-| **[Microsoft Defender Application Guard (MDAG) for Edge enterprise mode and enterprise management](/windows/security/application-security/application-isolation/microsoft-defender-application-guard/configure-md-app-guard)** | Microsoft Defender Application Guard protects users' desktop while they browse the Internet using Microsoft Edge browser. Application Guard in enterprise mode automatically redirects untrusted website navigation in an anonymous and isolated Hyper-V based container, which is separate from the host operating system. With Enterprise mode, you can define your corporate boundaries by explicitly adding trusted domains and can customizing the Application Guard experience to meet and enforce your organization needs on Windows devices. |
-| **Microsoft Defender Application Guard (MDAG) public APIs** | Enable applications using them to be isolated Hyper-V based container, which is separate from the host operating system. |
-| **[Microsoft Defender Application Guard (MDAG) for Microsoft Office](https://support.microsoft.com/office/application-guard-for-office-9e0fb9c2-ffad-43bf-8ba3-78f785fdba46)** | Application Guard protects Office files including Word, PowerPoint, and Excel. Application icons have a small shield if Application Guard has been enabled and they are under protection. |
-| **[Microsoft Defender Application Guard (MDAG) configure via MDM](/windows/client-management/mdm/windowsdefenderapplicationguard-csp)** | The WindowsDefenderApplicationGuard configuration service provider (CSP) is used by the enterprise to configure the settings in Microsoft Defender Application Guard. |
-| **[App containers](/virtualization/windowscontainers/about/)** | Universal Windows Platform (UWP) applications run in Windows containers known as app containers. Processes that run in app containers operate with low integrity level, meaning they have limited access to resources they don't own. Because the default integrity level of most resources is medium integrity level, the UWP app can access only a subset of the filesystem, registry, and other resources. The app container also enforces restrictions on network connectivity; for example, access to a local host isn't allowed. As a result, malware or infected apps have limited footprint for escape. |
-| **[Windows Sandbox](/windows/security/application-security/application-isolation/windows-sandbox/windows-sandbox-overview)** | Windows Sandbox provides a lightweight desktop environment to safely run untrusted Win32 applications in isolation, using the same hardware-based Hyper-V virtualization technology to isolate apps without fear of lasting impact to your PC. |
diff --git a/windows/security/includes/sections/cloud-services.md b/windows/security/includes/sections/cloud-services.md
deleted file mode 100644
index efde3a725d..0000000000
--- a/windows/security/includes/sections/cloud-services.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
----
-author: paolomatarazzo
-ms.author: paoloma
-ms.date: 09/18/2023
-ms.topic: include
----
-
-## Protect your work information
-
-| Feature name | Description |
-|:---|:---|
-| **[Active Directory domain join, Microsoft Entra join, and Microsoft Entra hybrid join with single sign-on (SSO)](/azure/active-directory/devices/concept-directory-join)** | Microsoft Entra ID is a comprehensive cloud-based identity management solution that helps enable secure access to applications, networks, and other resources and guard against threats. |
-| **[Security baselines](/windows/security/operating-system-security/device-management/windows-security-configuration-framework/windows-security-baselines)** | Windows 11 supports modern device management so that IT pros can manage company security policies and business applications without compromising user privacy on corporate or employee-owned devices. With MDM solutions, IT can manage Windows 11 using industry-standard protocols. To simplify setup for users, management features are built directly into Windows, eliminating the need for a separate MDM client. Windows 11 can be configured with Microsoft's MDM security baseline backed by ADMX policies, which functions like the Microsoft GP-based security baseline. The security baseline enables IT administrators to easily address security concerns and compliance needs for modern cloud-managed devices. |
-| **[Remote wipe](/windows/client-management/mdm/remotewipe-csp)** | When a device is lost or stolen, IT administrators may want to remotely wipe data stored on the device. A helpdesk agent may also want to reset devices to fix issues encountered by remote workers. With the Remote Wipe configuration service provider (CSP), an MDM solution can remotely initiate any of the following operations on a Windows device: reset the device and remove user accounts and data, reset the device and clean the drive, reset the device but persist user accounts and data. |
-| **[Modern device management through (MDM)](/windows/client-management/mdm-overview)** | Windows 11 supports modern device management through mobile device management (MDM) protocols. IT pros can manage company security policies and business applications without compromising user privacy on corporate or employee-owned devices. With MDM solutions, IT can manage Windows 11 using industry-standard protocols. To simplify setup for users, management features are built directly into Windows, eliminating the need for a separate MDM client. |
-| **[Universal Print](/universal-print/)** | Unlike traditional print solutions that rely on Windows print servers, Universal Print is a Microsoft hosted cloud subscription service that supports a zero-trust security model by enabling network isolation of printers, including the Universal Print connector software, from the rest of the organization's resources. |
-| **[Windows Autopatch](/windows/deployment/windows-autopatch/)** | With the Autopatch service, IT teams can delegate management of updates to Windows 10/11, Microsoft Edge, and Microsoft 365 apps to Microsoft. Under the hood, Autopatch takes over configuration of the policies and deployment service of Windows Update for Business. What the customer gets are endpoints that are up to date, thanks to dynamically generated rings for progressive deployment that will pause and/or roll back updates (where possible) when issues arise. The goal is to provide peace of mind to IT pros, encourage rapid adoption of updates, and to reduce bandwidth required to deploy them successfully, thereby closing gaps in protection that may have been open to exploitation by malicious actors. |
-| **[Windows Autopilot](/autopilot/)** | Windows Autopilot simplifies the way devices get deployed, reset, and repurposed, with an experience that is zero touch for IT. |
diff --git a/windows/security/includes/sections/hardware.md b/windows/security/includes/sections/hardware.md
deleted file mode 100644
index fa6c065293..0000000000
--- a/windows/security/includes/sections/hardware.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
----
-author: paolomatarazzo
-ms.author: paoloma
-ms.date: 09/18/2023
-ms.topic: include
----
-
-## Hardware root-of-trust
-
-| Feature name | Description |
-|:---|:---|
-| **[Windows Defender System Guard](/windows/security/hardware-security/how-hardware-based-root-of-trust-helps-protect-windows)** | In Secured-core PCs, Windows Defender System Guard Secure Launch protects bootup with a technology known as the Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (DRTM). With DRTM, the system initially follows the normal UEFI Secure Boot process. However, before launching, the system enters a hardware-controlled trusted state that forces the CPU(s) down a hardware-secured code path. If a malware rootkit/bootkit has bypassed UEFI Secure Boot and resides in memory, DRTM will prevent it from accessing secrets and critical code protected by the virtualization-based security environment. Firmware Attack Surface Reduction technology can be used instead of DRTM on supporting devices such as Microsoft Surface. |
-| **[Trusted Platform Module (TPM)](/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/trusted-platform-module-overview)** | TPMs provide security and privacy benefits for system hardware, platform owners, and users. Windows Hello, BitLocker, Windows Defender System Guard, and other Windows features rely on the TPM for capabilities such as key generation, secure storage, encryption, boot integrity measurements, and attestation. The 2.0 version of the specification includes support for newer algorithms, which can improve driver signing and key generation performance. Starting with Windows 10, Microsoft's hardware certification requires all new Windows PCs to include TPM 2.0 built in and enabled by default. With Windows 11, both new and upgraded devices must have TPM 2.0. |
-| **[Microsoft Pluton](/windows/security/hardware-security/pluton/microsoft-pluton-security-processor)** | Microsoft Pluton security processors are designed by Microsoft in partnership with silicon partners. Pluton enhances the protection of Windows devices with a hardware root-of-trust that provides additional protection for cryptographic keys and other secrets. Pluton is designed to reduce the attack surface as it integrates the security chip directly into the processor. It can be used with a discreet TPM 2.0, or as a standalone security processor. When root of trust is located on a separate, discrete chip on the motherboard, the communication path between the root-of-trust and the CPU can be vulnerable to physical attack. Pluton supports the TPM 2.0 industry standard, allowing customers to immediately benefit from the enhanced security in Windows features that rely on TPMs including BitLocker, Windows Hello, and Windows Defender System Guard. In addition to providing root-of trust, Pluton also supports other security functionality beyond what is possible with the TPM 2.0 specification, and this extensibility allows for additional Pluton firmware and OS features to be delivered over time via Windows Update. Pluton-enabled Windows 11 devices are available and the selection of options with Pluton is growing. |
-
-## Silicon assisted security
-
-| Feature name | Description |
-|:---|:---|
-| **[Virtualization-based security (VBS)](/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-vbs)** | In addition to a modern hardware root-of-trust, there are numerous other capabilities in the latest chips that harden the operating system against threats, such as by protecting the boot process, safeguarding the integrity of memory, isolating security sensitive compute logic, and more. Two examples include Virtualization-based security (VBS) and Hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI). Virtualization-based security (VBS), also known as core isolation, is a critical building block in a secure system. VBS uses hardware virtualization features to host a secure kernel separated from the operating system. This means that even if the operating system is compromised, the secure kernel remains protected. Starting with Windows 10, all new devices are required to ship with firmware support for VBS and HCVI enabled by default in the BIOS. Customers can then enable the OS support in Windows. With new installs of Windows 11, OS support for VBS and HVCI is turned on by default for all devices that meet prerequisites. |
-| **[Hypervisor-protected Code Integrity (HVCI)](/windows/security/hardware-security/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity)** | Hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI), also called memory integrity, uses VBS to run Kernel Mode Code Integrity (KMCI) inside the secure VBS environment instead of the main Windows kernel. This helps to prevent attacks that attempt to modify kernel mode code, such as drivers. The KMCI role is to check that all kernel code is properly signed and hasn't been tampered with before it is allowed to run. HVCI helps to ensure that only validated code can be executed in kernel-mode. Starting with Windows 10, all new devices are required to ship with firmware support for VBS and HCVI enabled by default in the BIOS. Customers can then enable the OS support in Windows. With new installs of Windows 11, OS support for VBS and HVCI is turned on by default for all devices that meet prerequisites. |
-| **[Hardware-enforced stack protection](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-os-platform-blog/understanding-hardware-enforced-stack-protection/ba-p/1247815)** | Hardware-enforced stack protection integrates software and hardware for a modern defense against cyberthreats such as memory corruption and zero-day exploits. Based on Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) from Intel and AMD Shadow Stacks, hardware-enforced stack protection is designed to protect against exploit techniques that try to hijack return addresses on the stack. |
-| **[Kernel Direct Memory Access (DMA) protection](/windows/security/hardware-security/kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt)** | Kernel DMA Protection protects against external peripherals from gaining unauthorized access to memory. Physical threats such as drive-by Direct Memory Access (DMA) attacks typically happen quickly while the system owner isn't present. PCIe hot plug devices such as Thunderbolt, USB4, and CFexpress allow users to attach new classes of external peripherals, including graphics cards or other PCI devices, to their PCs with the plug-and-play ease of USB. Because PCI hot plug ports are external and easily accessible, devices are susceptible to drive-by DMA attacks. |
-
-## Secured-core PC
-
-| Feature name | Description |
-|:---|:---|
-| **[Secured-core PC firmware protection](/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-highly-secure-11)** | Microsoft has worked with OEM partners to offer a special category of devices called Secured-core PCs. The devices ship with additional security measures enabled at the firmware layer, or device core, that underpins Windows. Secured-core PCs help prevent malware attacks and minimize firmware vulnerabilities by launching into a clean and trusted state at startup with a hardware-enforced root of trust. Virtualization-based security comes enabled by default. And with built-in hypervisor protected code integrity (HVCI) shielding system memory, Secured-core PCs ensure that all executables are signed by known and approved authorities only. Secured-core PCs also protect against physical threats such as drive-by Direct Memory Access (DMA) attacks. |
-| **[Secured-core configuration lock](/windows/client-management/config-lock)** | Secured-core configuration lock is a Secured-core PC (SCPC) feature that prevents users from making unwanted changes to security settings. With config lock, the OS monitors the registry keys that configure each feature and when it detects a drift, reverts to the IT-desired SCPC state in seconds. |
diff --git a/windows/security/includes/sections/identity.md b/windows/security/includes/sections/identity.md
deleted file mode 100644
index f50a087c3c..0000000000
--- a/windows/security/includes/sections/identity.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
----
-author: paolomatarazzo
-ms.author: paoloma
-ms.date: 09/18/2023
-ms.topic: include
----
-
-## Passwordless sign in
-
-| Feature name | Description |
-|:---|:---|
-| **[Windows Hello for Business](/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/)** | Windows 11 devices can protect user identities by removing the need to use passwords from day one. It's easy to get started with the method that's right for your organization. A password may only need to be used once during the provisioning process, after which people use a PIN, face, or fingerprint to unlock credentials and sign into the device. Windows Hello for Business replaces the username and password by combining a security key or certificate with a PIN or biometrics data, and then mapping the credentials to a user account during setup. There are multiple ways to deploy Windows Hello for Business, depending on your organization's needs. Organizations that rely on certificates typically use on-premises public key infrastructure (PKI) to support authentication through Certificate Trust. Organizations using key trust deployment require root-of-trust provided by certificates on domain controllers. |
-| **[Windows presence sensing](https://support.microsoft.com/windows/managing-presence-sensing-settings-in-windows-11-82285c93-440c-4e15-9081-c9e38c1290bb)** | Windows presence sensing provides another layer of data security protection for hybrid workers. Windows 11 devices can intelligently adapt to your presence to help you stay secure and productive, whether you're working at home, the office, or a public environment. Windows presence sensing combines presence detection sensors with Windows Hello facial recognition to automatically lock your device when you leave, and then unlock your device and sign you in using Windows Hello facial recognition when you return. Requires OEM supporting hardware. |
-| **[Windows Hello for Business Enhanced Security Sign-in (ESS)](/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/windows-hello-enhanced-sign-in-security)** | Windows Hello biometrics also supports enhanced sign-in security, which uses specialized hardware and software components to raise the security bar even higher for biometric sign in. Enhanced sign-in security biometrics uses VBS and the TPM to isolate user authentication processes and data and secure the pathway by which the information is communicated. These specialized components protect against a class of attacks that include biometric sample injection, replay, tampering, and more. For example, fingerprint readers must implement Secure Device Connection Protocol, which uses key negotiation and a Microsoft-issued certificate to protect and securely store user authentication data. For facial recognition, components such as the Secure Devices (SDEV) table and process isolation with trustlets help prevent additional class of attacks. |
-| **[Windows passwordless experience](/windows/security/identity-protection/passwordless-experience)** | Windows passwordless experience is a security policy that aims to create a more user-friendly experience for Microsoft Entra joined devices by eliminating the need for passwords in certain authentication scenarios. By enabling this policy, users will not be given the option to use a password in these scenarios, which helps organizations transition away from passwords over time. |
-| **[Passkeys](/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys)** | Passkeys provide a more secure and convenient method to logging into websites and applications compared to passwords. Unlike passwords, which users must remember and type, passkeys are stored as secrets on a device and can use a device's unlock mechanism (such as biometrics or a PIN). Passkeys can be used without the need for other sign in challenges, making the authentication process faster, secure, and more convenient. |
-| **[FIDO2 security key](/azure/active-directory/authentication/howto-authentication-passwordless-security-key)** | Fast Identity Online (FIDO) defined CTAP and WebAuthN specifications are becoming the open standard for providing strong authentication that is non-phishable, user-friendly, and privacy-respecting with implementations from major platform providers and relying parties. FIDO standards and certifications are becoming recognized as the leading standard for creating secure authentication solutions across enterprises, governments, and consumer markets. Windows 11 can use external FIDO2 security keys for authentication alongside or in addition to Windows Hello which is also a FIDO2 certified passwordless solution. Windows 11 can be used as a FIDO authenticator for many popular identity management services. |
-| **[Smart Cards for Windows Service](/windows/security/identity-protection/smart-cards/smart-card-smart-cards-for-windows-service)** | Organizations also have the option of using smart cards, an authentication method that pre-dates biometric sign in. Smart cards are tamper-resistant, portable storage devices that can enhance Windows security when authenticating clients, signing code, securing e-mail, and signing in with Windows domain accounts. Smart cards can only be used to sign into domain accounts, not local accounts. When a password is used to sign into a domain account, Windows uses the Kerberos version 5 (v5) protocol for authentication. If you use a smart card, the operating system uses Kerberos v5 authentication with X.509 v3 certificates. |
-
-## Advanced credential protection
-
-| Feature name | Description |
-|:---|:---|
-| **[Web sign-in](/windows/security/identity-protection/web-sign-in)** | Web sign-in is a credential provider initially introduced in Windows 10 with support for Temporary Access Pass (TAP) only. With the release of Windows 11, the supported scenarios and capabilities of Web sign-in have been expanded. For example, users can sign-in to Windows using the Microsoft Authenticator app or with a federated identity. |
-| **[Federated sign-in](/education/windows/federated-sign-in)** | Windows 11 Education editions support federated sign-in with non-Microsoft identity providers. Federated sign-in enables secure sign in through methods like QR codes or pictures. |
-| **[Windows LAPS](/windows-server/identity/laps/laps-overview)** | Windows Local Administrator Password Solution (Windows LAPS) is a Windows feature that automatically manages and backs up the password of a local administrator account on your Microsoft Entra joined or Windows Server Active Directory-joined devices. You also can use Windows LAPS to automatically manage and back up the Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM) account password on your Windows Server Active Directory domain controllers. An authorized administrator can retrieve the DSRM password and use it. |
-| **[Account Lockout Policy](/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/account-lockout-policy)** | Account Lockout Policy settings control the response threshold for failed logon attempts and the actions to be taken after the threshold is reached. |
-| **[Enhanced phishing protection with SmartScreen](/windows/security/operating-system-security/virus-and-threat-protection/microsoft-defender-smartscreen/enhanced-phishing-protection)** | Users who are still using passwords can benefit from powerful credential protection. Microsoft Defender SmartScreen includes enhanced phishing protection to automatically detect when a user enters their Microsoft password into any app or website. Windows then identifies if the app or site is securely authenticating to Microsoft and warns if the credentials are at risk. Since users are alerted at the moment of potential credential theft, they can take preemptive action before their password is used against them or their organization. |
-| **[Access Control (ACL/SACL)](/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/access-control)** | Access control in Windows ensures that shared resources are available to users and groups other than the resource's owner and are protected from unauthorized use. IT administrators can manage users', groups', and computers' access to objects and assets on a network or computer. After a user is authenticated, the Windows operating system implements the second phase of protecting resources by using built-in authorization and access control technologies to determine if an authenticated user has the correct permissions. Access Control Lists (ACL) describe the permissions for a specific object and can also contain System Access Control Lists (SACL). SACLs provide a way to audit specific system level events, such as when a user attempt to access file system objects. These events are essential for tracking activity for objects that are sensitive or valuable and require extra monitoring. Being able to audit when a resource attempts to read or write part of the operating system is critical to understanding a potential attack. |
-| **[Credential Guard](/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/)** | Enabled by default in Windows 11 Enterprise, Credential Guard uses hardware-backed, Virtualization-based security (VBS) to protect against credential theft. With Credential Guard, the Local Security Authority (LSA) stores and protects secrets in an isolated environment that isn't accessible to the rest of the operating system. LSA uses remote procedure calls to communicate with the isolated LSA process. By protecting the LSA process with Virtualization-based security, Credential Guard shields systems from credential theft attack techniques like pass-the-hash or pass-the-ticket. It also helps prevent malware from accessing system secrets even if the process is running with admin privileges. |
-| **[Remote Credential Guard](/windows/security/identity-protection/remote-credential-guard)** | Remote Credential Guard helps you protect your credentials over a Remote Desktop connection by redirecting the Kerberos requests back to the device that is requesting the connection. It also provides single sign-on experiences for Remote Desktop sessions. Administrator credentials are highly privileged and must be protected. When you use Remote Credential Guard to connect during Remote Desktop sessions, your credential and credential derivatives are never passed over the network to the target device. If the target device is compromised, your credentials aren't exposed. |
diff --git a/windows/security/includes/sections/operating-system-security.md b/windows/security/includes/sections/operating-system-security.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 4fa55308cf..0000000000
--- a/windows/security/includes/sections/operating-system-security.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
----
-author: paolomatarazzo
-ms.author: paoloma
-ms.date: 11/21/2023
-ms.topic: include
----
-
-## System security
-
-| Feature name | Description |
-|:---|:---|
-| **[Secure Boot and Trusted Boot](/windows/security/operating-system-security/system-security/trusted-boot)** | Secure Boot and Trusted Boot help to prevent malware and corrupted components from loading when a device starts. Secure Boot starts with initial boot-up protection, and then Trusted Boot picks up the process. Together, Secure Boot and Trusted Boot help to ensure the system boots up safely and securely. |
-| **[Measured boot](/windows/compatibility/measured-boot)** | Measured Boot measures all important code and configuration settings during the boot of Windows. This includes: the firmware, boot manager, hypervisor, kernel, secure kernel and operating system. Measured Boot stores the measurements in the TPM on the machine, and makes them available in a log that can be tested remotely to verify the boot state of the client. The Measured Boot feature provides anti-malware software with a trusted (resistant to spoofing and tampering) log of all boot components that started before it. The anti-malware software can use the log to determine whether components that ran before it are trustworthy, or if they're infected with malware. The anti-malware software on the local machine can send the log to a remote server for evaluation. The remote server may initiate remediation actions, either by interacting with software on the client, or through out-of-band mechanisms, as appropriate. |
-| **[Device health attestation service](/windows/security/operating-system-security/system-security/protect-high-value-assets-by-controlling-the-health-of-windows-10-based-devices)** | The Windows device health attestation process supports a zero-trust paradigm that shifts the focus from static, network-based perimeters, to users, assets, and resources. The attestation process confirms the device, firmware, and boot process are in a good state and haven't been tampered with before they can access corporate resources. The determinations are made with data stored in the TPM, which provides a secure root of trust. The information is sent to an attestation service, such as Azure Attestation, to verify the device is in a trusted state. Then, an MDM tool like Microsoft Intune reviews device health and connects this information with Microsoft Entra ID for conditional access. |
-| **[Windows security policy settings and auditing](/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/security-policy-settings)** | Microsoft provides a robust set of security settings policies that IT administrators can use to protect Windows devices and other resources in their organization. |
-| **[Assigned Access](/windows/configuration/)** | Some desktop devices in an enterprise serve a special purpose. For example, a PC in the lobby that customers use to see your product catalog. Or, a PC displaying visual content as a digital sign. Windows client offers two different locked-down experiences for public or specialized use: A single-app kiosk that runs a single Universal Windows Platform (UWP) app in full screen above the lock screen, or A multi-app kiosk that runs one or more apps from the desktop. Kiosk configurations are based on Assigned Access, a feature in Windows that allows an administrator to manage the user's experience by limiting the application entry points exposed to the user. |
-
-## Virus and threat protection
-
-| Feature name | Description |
-|:---|:---|
-| **[Microsoft Defender Antivirus](/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/microsoft-defender-antivirus-windows)** | Microsoft Defender Antivirus is a protection solution included in all versions of Windows. From the moment you boot Windows, Microsoft Defender Antivirus continually monitors for malware, viruses, and security threats. Updates are downloaded automatically to help keep your device safe and protect it from threats. Microsoft Defender Antivirus includes real-time, behavior-based, and heuristic antivirus protection. The combination of always-on content scanning, file and process behavior monitoring, and other heuristics effectively prevents security threats. Microsoft Defender Antivirus continually scans for malware and threats and also detects and blocks potentially unwanted applications (PUA) which are applications that are deemed to negatively impact your device but aren't considered malware. |
-| **[Local Security Authority (LSA) Protection](/windows-server/security/credentials-protection-and-management/configuring-additional-lsa-protection)** | Windows has several critical processes to verify a user's identity. Verification processes include Local Security Authority (LSA), which is responsible for authenticating users and verifying Windows logins. LSA handles tokens and credentials such as passwords that are used for single sign-on to a Microsoft account and Azure services. To help protect these credentials, additional LSA protection only allows loading of trusted, signed code and provides significant protection against Credential theft. LSA protection is enabled by default on new, enterprise joined Windows 11 devices with added support for non-UEFI lock and policy management controls via MDM and group policy. |
-| **[Attack surface reduction (ASR)](/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/overview-attack-surface-reduction)** | Attack surface reduction (ASR) rules help to prevent software behaviors that are often abused to compromise your device or network. By reducing the number of attack surfaces, you can reduce the overall vulnerability of your organization. Administrators can configure specific ASR rules to help block certain behaviors, such as launching executable files and scripts that attempt to download or run files, running obfuscated or otherwise suspicious scripts, performing behaviors that apps don't usually initiate during normal day-to-day work. |
-| **[Tamper protection settings for MDE](/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/prevent-changes-to-security-settings-with-tamper-protection)** | Tamper protection is a capability in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint that helps protect certain security settings, such as virus and threat protection, from being disabled or changed. During some kinds of cyber attacks, bad actors try to disable security features on devices. Disabling security features provides bad actors with easier access to your data, the ability to install malware, and the ability to exploit your data, identity, and devices. Tamper protection helps guard against these types of activities. |
-| **[Controlled folder access](/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/controlled-folders)** | You can protect your valuable information in specific folders by managing app access to specific folders. Only trusted apps can access protected folders, which are specified when controlled folder access is configured. Commonly used folders, such as those used for documents, pictures, downloads, are typically included in the list of controlled folders. Controlled folder access works with a list of trusted apps. Apps that are included in the list of trusted software work as expected. Apps that aren't included in the trusted list are prevented from making any changes to files inside protected folders. Controlled folder access helps to protect user's valuable data from malicious apps and threats, such as ransomware. |
-| **[Exploit protection](/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/exploit-protection)** | Exploit protection automatically applies several exploit mitigation techniques to operating system processes and apps. Exploit protection works best with Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, which gives organizations detailed reporting into exploit protection events and blocks as part of typical alert investigation scenarios. You can enable exploit protection on an individual device, and then use MDM or group policy to distribute the configuration file to multiple devices. When a mitigation is encountered on the device, a notification will be displayed from the Action Center. You can customize the notification with your company details and contact information. You can also enable the rules individually to customize which techniques the feature monitors. |
-| **[Microsoft Defender SmartScreen](/windows/security/operating-system-security/virus-and-threat-protection/microsoft-defender-smartscreen/)** | Microsoft Defender SmartScreen protects against phishing, malware websites and applications, and the downloading of potentially malicious files. For enhanced phishing protection, SmartScreen also alerts people when they're entering their credentials into a potentially risky location. IT can customize which notifications appear via MDM or group policy. The protection runs in audit mode by default, giving IT admins full control to make decisions around policy creation and enforcement. |
-| **[Microsoft Defender for Endpoint](/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint)** | Microsoft Defender for Endpoint is an enterprise endpoint detection and response solution that helps security teams to detect, investigate, and respond to advanced threats. Organizations can use the rich event data and attack insights Defender for Endpoint provides to investigate incidents. Defender for Endpoint brings together the following elements to provide a more complete picture of security incidents: endpoint behavioral sensors, cloud security analytics, threat intelligence and rich response capabilities. |
-
-## Network security
-
-| Feature name | Description |
-|:---|:---|
-| **[Transport Layer Security (TLS)](/windows-server/security/tls/tls-ssl-schannel-ssp-overview)** | Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a cryptographic protocol designed to provide communications security over a network. TLS 1.3 is the latest version of the protocol and is enabled by default in Windows 11. This version eliminates obsolete cryptographic algorithms, enhances security over older versions, and aims to encrypt as much of the TLS handshake as possible. The handshake is more performant with one fewer round trip per connection on average, and supports only five strong cipher suites which provide perfect forward secrecy and less operational risk. |
-| **[Domain Name System (DNS) security](/windows-server/networking/dns/doh-client-support)** | Starting in Windows 11, the Windows DNS client supports DNS over HTTPS (DoH), an encrypted DNS protocol. This allows administrators to ensure their devices protect DNS queries from on-path attackers, whether they're passive observers logging browsing behavior or active attackers trying to redirect clients to malicious sites. In a zero-trust model where there is no trust placed in a network boundary, having a secure connection to a trusted name resolver is required. |
-| **Bluetooth pairing and connection protection** | The number of Bluetooth devices connected to Windows continues to increase. Windows supports all standard Bluetooth pairing protocols, including classic and LE Secure connections, secure simple pairing, and classic and LE legacy pairing. Windows also implements host based LE privacy. Windows updates help users stay current with OS and driver security features in accordance with the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG), Standard Vulnerability Reports, and issues beyond those required by the Bluetooth core industry standards. Microsoft strongly recommends that users ensure their firmware and/ or software of their Bluetooth accessories are kept up to date. |
-| **[WiFi Security](https://support.microsoft.com/windows/faster-and-more-secure-wi-fi-in-windows-26177a28-38ed-1a8e-7eca-66f24dc63f09)** | Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) is a security certification program designed to secure wireless networks. WPA3 is the latest version of the certification and provides a more secure and reliable connection method as compared to WPA2 and older security protocols. Windows supports three WPA3 modes: WPA3 personal with the Hash-to-Element (H2E) protocol, WPA3 Enterprise, and WPA3 Enterprise 192-bit Suite B. Windows 11 also supports WFA defined WPA3 Enterprise that includes enhanced Server Cert validation and TLS 1.3 for authentication using EAP-TLS Authentication. |
-| **Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE)** | Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE) is a technology that allows wireless devices to establish encrypted connections to public Wi-Fi hotspots. |
-| **[Windows Firewall](/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall)** | Windows Firewall provides host-based, two-way network traffic filtering, blocking unauthorized traffic flowing into or out of the local device based on the types of networks to which the device is connected. Windows Firewall reduces the attack surface of a device with rules to restrict or allow traffic by many properties such as IP addresses, ports, or program paths. Reducing the attack surface of a device increases manageability and decreases the likelihood of a successful attack. With its integration with Internet Protocol Security (IPsec), Windows Firewall provides a simple way to enforce authenticated, end-to-end network communications. It provides scalable, tiered access to trusted network resources, helping to enforce integrity of the data, and optionally helping to protect the confidentiality of the data. Windows Firewall is a host-based firewall that is included with the operating system, there's no additional hardware or software required. Windows Firewall is also designed to complement existing non-Microsoft network security solutions through a documented application programming interface (API). |
-| **[Virtual private network (VPN)](/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/vpn/vpn-guide)** | The Windows VPN client platform includes built in VPN protocols, configuration support, a common VPN user interface, and programming support for custom VPN protocols. VPN apps are available in the Microsoft Store for both enterprise and consumer VPNs, including apps for the most popular enterprise VPN gateways. In Windows 11, the most commonly used VPN controls are integrated right into the Quick Actions pane. From the Quick Actions pane, users can see the status of their VPN, start and stop the VPN tunnels, and access the Settings app for more controls. |
-| **[Always On VPN (device tunnel)](/Windows-server/remote/remote-access/overview-always-on-vpn)** | With Always On VPN, you can create a dedicated VPN profile for the device. Unlike User Tunnel, which only connects after a user logs on to the device, Device Tunnel allows the VPN to establish connectivity before a user sign-in. Both Device Tunnel and User Tunnel operate independently with their VPN profiles, can be connected at the same time, and can use different authentication methods and other VPN configuration settings as appropriate. |
-| **[Direct Access](/windows-server/remote/remote-access/directaccess/directaccess)** | DirectAccess allows connectivity for remote users to organization network resources without the need for traditional Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections. With DirectAccess connections, remote devices are always connected to the organization and there's no need for remote users to start and stop connections. |
-| **[Server Message Block (SMB) file service](/windows-server/storage/file-server/file-server-smb-overview)** | SMB Encryption provides end-to-end encryption of SMB data and protects data from eavesdropping occurrences on internal networks. In Windows 11, the SMB protocol has significant security updates, including AES-256 bits encryption, accelerated SMB signing, Remote Directory Memory Access (RDMA) network encryption, and SMB over QUIC for untrusted networks. Windows 11 introduces AES-256-GCM and AES-256-CCM cryptographic suites for SMB 3.1.1 encryption. Windows administrators can mandate the use of more advanced security or continue to use the more compatible, and still-safe, AES-128 encryption. |
-| **[Server Message Block Direct (SMB Direct)](/windows-server/storage/file-server/smb-direct)** | SMB Direct (SMB over remote direct memory access) is a storage protocol that enables direct memory-to-memory data transfers between device and storage, with minimal CPU usage, while using standard RDMA-capable network adapters. SMB Direct supports encryption, and now you can operate with the same safety as traditional TCP and the performance of RDMA. Previously, enabling SMB encryption disabled direct data placement, making RDMA as slow as TCP. Now data is encrypted before placement, leading to relatively minor performance degradation while adding AES-128 and AES-256 protected packet privacy. |
-
-## Encryption and data protection
-
-| Feature name | Description |
-|:---|:---|
-| **[BitLocker management](/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-management-for-enterprises)** | The BitLocker CSP allows an MDM solution, like Microsoft Intune, to manage the BitLocker encryption features on Windows devices. This includes OS volumes, fixed drives and removeable storage, and recovery key management into Microsoft Entra ID. |
-| **[BitLocker enablement](/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/)** | BitLocker Drive Encryption is a data protection feature that integrates with the operating system and addresses the threats of data theft or exposure from lost, stolen, or inappropriately decommissioned computers. BitLocker uses AES algorithm in XTS or CBC mode of operation with 128-bit or 256-bit key length to encrypt data on the volume. Cloud storage on Microsoft OneDrive or Azure can be used to save recovery key content. BitLocker can be managed by any MDM solution such as Microsoft Intune, using a configuration service provider (CSP). BitLocker provides encryption for the OS, fixed data, and removable data drives leveraging technologies like hardware security test interface (HSTI), Modern Standby, UEFI Secure Boot and TPM. |
-| **[Encrypted hard drive](/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/encrypted-hard-drive)** | Encrypted hard drives are a class of hard drives that are self-encrypted at the hardware level and allow for full disk hardware encryption while being transparent to the device user. These drives combine the security and management benefits provided by BitLocker Drive Encryption with the power of self-encrypting drives. By offloading the cryptographic operations to hardware, encrypted hard drives increase BitLocker performance and reduce CPU usage and power consumption. Because encrypted hard drives encrypt data quickly, BitLocker deployment can be expanded across enterprise devices with little to no impact on productivity. |
-| **[Personal data encryption (PDE)](/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/)** | Personal data encryption (PDE) works with BitLocker and Windows Hello for Business to further protect user documents and other files, including when the device is turned on and locked. Files are encrypted automatically and seamlessly to give users more security without interrupting their workflow. Windows Hello for Business is used to protect the container, which houses the encryption keys used by PDE. When the user signs in, the container gets authenticated to release the keys in the container to decrypt user content. |
-| **[Email Encryption (S/MIME)](/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/configure-s-mime)** | Email encryption enables users to encrypt outgoing email messages and attachments, so only intended recipients with a digital ID (certificate) can read them. Users can digitally sign a message, which verifies the identity of the sender and confirms the message hasn't been tampered with. The encrypted messages can be sent by a user to other users within their organization or external contacts if they have proper encryption certificates. |
diff --git a/windows/security/includes/sections/security-foundations.md b/windows/security/includes/sections/security-foundations.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 905fb63998..0000000000
--- a/windows/security/includes/sections/security-foundations.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
----
-author: paolomatarazzo
-ms.author: paoloma
-ms.date: 09/18/2023
-ms.topic: include
----
-
-## Offensive research
-
-| Feature name | Description |
-|:---|:---|
-| **[Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL)](/windows/security/security-foundations/msft-security-dev-lifecycle)** | The Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) introduces security best practices, tools, and processes throughout all phases of engineering and development. |
-| **[OneFuzz service](https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/09/15/microsoft-onefuzz-framework-open-source-developer-tool-fix-bugs/)** | A range of tools and techniques - such as threat modeling, static analysis, fuzz testing, and code quality checks - enable continued security value to be embedded into Windows by every engineer on the team from day one. Through the SDL practices, Microsoft engineers are continuously provided with actionable and up-to-date methods to improve development workflows and overall product security before the code has been released. |
-| **[Microsoft Windows Insider Preview bounty program](https://www.microsoft.com/msrc/bounty-windows-insider-preview)** | As part of our secure development process, the Microsoft Windows Insider Preview bounty program invites eligible researchers across the globe to find and submit vulnerabilities that reproduce in the latest Windows Insider Preview (WIP) Dev Channel. The goal of the Windows Insider Preview bounty program is to uncover significant vulnerabilities that have a direct and demonstrable impact on the security of customers using the latest version of Windows. Through this collaboration with researchers across the globe, our teams identify critical vulnerabilities that were not previously found during development and quicky fix the issues before releasing the final Windows. |
-
-## Certification
-
-| Feature name | Description |
-|:---|:---|
-| **[Common Criteria certifications](/windows/security/security-foundations/certification/windows-platform-common-criteria)** | Common Criteria (CC) is an international standard currently maintained by national governments who participate in the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement. CC defines a common taxonomy for security functional requirements, security assurance requirements, and an evaluation methodology used to ensure products undergoing evaluation satisfy the functional and assurance requirements. Microsoft ensures that products incorporate the features and functions required by relevant Common Criteria Protection Profiles and completes Common Criteria certifications of Microsoft Windows products. |
-| **[Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140 validation](/windows/security/security-foundations/certification/fips-140-validation)** | The Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication 140 is a U.S. government standard that defines the minimum security requirements for cryptographic modules in IT products. Microsoft maintains an active commitment to meeting the requirements of the FIPS 140 standard, having validated cryptographic modules against FIPS 140-2 since it was first established in 2001. Multiple Microsoft products, including Windows 11, Windows 10, Windows Server, and many cloud services, use these cryptographic modules. |
-
-## Secure supply chain
-
-| Feature name | Description |
-|:---|:---|
-| **Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)** | SBOMs are leveraged to provide the transparency and provenance of the content as it moves through various stages of the Windows supply chain. This enables trust between each supply chain segment, ensures that tampering has not taken place during ingestion and along the way, and provides a provable chain of custody for the product that we ship to customers. |
-| **[Azure Code Signing](/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/deployment/use-code-signing-for-better-control-and-protection)** | App Control for Business enables customers to define policies for controlling what is allowed to run on their devices. App Control policies can be remotely applied to devices using an MDM solution like Microsoft Intune. To simplify App Control enablement, organizations can take advantage of Azure Code Signing, a secure and fully managed service for signing App Control policies and apps. Azure Code Signing minimizes the complexity of code signing with a turnkey service backed by a Microsoft managed certificate authority, eliminating the need to procure and self-manage any signing certificates. The service is managed just as any other Azure resource and integrates easily with the leading development and CI/CD toolsets. |
-| **[Windows application software development kit (SDK)](https://developer.microsoft.com/windows/downloads/windows-sdk/)** | Developers have an opportunity to design highly secure applications that benefit from the latest Windows safeguards. The Windows App SDK provides a unified set of APIs and tools for developing secure desktop apps for Windows. To help create apps that are up-to-date and protected, the SDK follows the same security standards, protocols, and compliance as the core Windows operating system. |
diff --git a/windows/security/index.yml b/windows/security/index.yml
index 9738ace595..43817f6227 100644
--- a/windows/security/index.yml
+++ b/windows/security/index.yml
@@ -10,15 +10,36 @@ metadata:
author: paolomatarazzo
ms.author: paoloma
manager: aaroncz
- ms.date: 03/12/2024
+ ms.date: 10/18/2024
# linkListType: architecture | concept | deploy | download | get-started | how-to-guide | tutorial | overview | quickstart | reference | sample | tutorial | video | whats-new
landingContent:
- - title: Learn about hardware security
+ - title: Windows 11 security book
linkLists:
- linkListType: overview
+ links:
+ - text: Introduction
+ url: /windows/security/book
+ - text: Hardware security
+ url: /windows/security/book/hardware-security
+ - text: Operating system security
+ url: /windows/security/book/operating-system-security
+ - text: Application security
+ url: /windows/security/book/application-security
+ - text: Identity protection
+ url: /windows/security/book/identity-protection
+ - text: Privacy
+ url: /windows/security/book/privacy
+ - text: Cloud services
+ url: /windows/security/book/cloud-services
+ - text: Security foundation
+ url: /windows/security/book/security-foundation
+
+ - title: Learn about hardware security
+ linkLists:
+ - linkListType: get-started
links:
- text: Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
url: /windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/trusted-platform-module-overview
@@ -33,7 +54,7 @@ landingContent:
- title: Learn about OS security
linkLists:
- - linkListType: overview
+ - linkListType: get-started
links:
- text: Trusted boot
url: /windows/security/operating-system-security
@@ -41,7 +62,7 @@ landingContent:
url: /windows/security/operating-system-security/system-security/windows-defender-security-center/windows-defender-security-center
- text: BitLocker
url: /windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/
- - text: Personal Data Encryption (PDE)
+ - text: Personal Data Encryption
url: /windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption
- text: Windows security baselines
url: /windows/security/operating-system-security/device-management/windows-security-configuration-framework/windows-security-baselines
@@ -57,7 +78,7 @@ landingContent:
links:
- text: Configure BitLocker
url: /windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/configure
- - text: Configure PDE
+ - text: Configure Personal Data Encryption
url: /windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/configure
- linkListType: whats-new
links:
@@ -66,7 +87,7 @@ landingContent:
- title: Learn about identity protection
linkLists:
- - linkListType: overview
+ - linkListType: get-started
links:
- text: Passwordless strategy
url: /windows/security/identity-protection/passwordless-strategy
@@ -99,7 +120,7 @@ landingContent:
- title: Learn about application security
linkLists:
- - linkListType: overview
+ - linkListType: get-started
links:
- text: App Control for Business
url: /windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/
@@ -118,7 +139,7 @@ landingContent:
- title: Learn about security foundations
linkLists:
- - linkListType: overview
+ - linkListType: get-started
links:
- text: Zero trust
url: /windows/security/security-foundations/zero-trust-windows-device-health
@@ -141,7 +162,7 @@ landingContent:
- title: Learn about cloud security
linkLists:
- - linkListType: overview
+ - linkListType: get-started
links:
- text: Security baselines with Intune
url: /mem/intune/protect/security-baselines
diff --git a/windows/security/introduction.md b/windows/security/introduction.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 53edc2cc2c..0000000000
--- a/windows/security/introduction.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
----
-title: Introduction to Windows security
-description: System security book.
-ms.date: 07/22/2024
-ms.topic: overview
-ms.author: paoloma
-author: paolomatarazzo
----
-
-# Introduction to Windows security
-
-The acceleration of digital transformation and the expansion of both remote and hybrid work brings new opportunities to organizations, communities, and individuals. This expansion introduces new threats and risks.
-
-Organizations worldwide are adopting a **Zero Trust** security model based on the premise that no person or device anywhere can have access until safety and integrity is proven. Windows 11 is built on Zero Trust principles to enable hybrid productivity and new experiences anywhere, without compromising security. Windows 11 raises the security baselines with new requirements for advanced hardware and software protection that extends from chip to cloud.
-
-## How Windows 11 enables Zero Trust protection
-
-A Zero Trust security model gives the right people the right access at the right time. Zero Trust security is based on three principles:
-
-1. Reduce risk by explicitly verifying data points such as user identity, location, and device health for every access request, without exception
-1. When verified, give people and devices access to only necessary resources for the necessary amount of time
-1. Use continuous analytics to drive threat detection and improve defenses
-
-For Windows 11, the Zero Trust principle of *verify explicitly* applies to risks introduced by both devices and people. Windows 11 provides *chip-to-cloud security*, enabling IT administrators to implement strong authorization and authentication processes with features like [Windows Hello for Business](identity-protection/hello-for-business/index.md). IT administrators also gain attestation and measurements for determining if a device meets requirements and can be trusted. Windows 11 works out-of-the-box with Microsoft Intune and Microsoft Entra ID, which enables timely and seamless access decisions. Furthermore, IT administrators can easily customize Windows to meet specific user and policy requirements for access, privacy, compliance, and more.
-
-### Security, by default
-
-Windows 11 is a natural evolution of its predecessor, Windows 10. We have collaborated with our manufacturer and silicon partners to incorporate extra hardware security measures that address the increasingly complex security threats of today. These measures not only enable the hybrid work and learning that many organizations now embrace but also help bolster our already strong foundation and resilience against attacks.
-
-### Enhanced hardware and operating system security
-
-With hardware-based isolation security that begins at the chip, Windows 11 stores sensitive data behind other barriers separated from the operating system. As a result, information including encryption keys and user credentials are protected from unauthorized access and tampering.
-
-In Windows 11, hardware and software work together to protect the operating system. For example, new devices come with [Virtualization-based security (VBS)](/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-vbs) and [Secure Boot](operating-system-security/system-security/trusted-boot.md) built-in and enabled by default to contain and limit malware exploits.
-
-### Robust application security and privacy controls
-
-To help keep personal and business information protected and private, Windows 11 has multiple layers of application security that safeguard critical data and code integrity. Application isolation and controls, code integrity, privacy controls, and least-privilege principles enable developers to build in security and privacy from the ground up. This integrated security protects against breaches and malware, helps keep data private, and gives IT administrators the controls they need.
-
-In Windows 11, [Microsoft Defender Application Guard](application-security/application-isolation/microsoft-defender-application-guard/md-app-guard-overview.md) uses Hyper-V virtualization technology to isolate untrusted websites and Microsoft Office files in containers, separate from and unable to access the host operating system and enterprise data. To protect privacy, Windows 11 also provides more controls over which apps and features can collect and use data such as the device's location, or access resources like camera and microphone.
-
-### Secured identities
-
-Passwords have been an important part of digital security for a long time, and they're also a top target for cybercriminals. Windows 11 provides powerful protection against credential theft with chip-level hardware security. Credentials are protected by layers of hardware and software security such as [TPM 2.0](information-protection/tpm/trusted-platform-module-overview.md), [VBS](/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-vbs), and/or [Credential Guard](identity-protection/credential-guard/index.md), making it harder for attackers to steal credentials from a device. With [Windows Hello for Business](identity-protection/hello-for-business/index.md), users can quickly sign in with face, fingerprint, or PIN for passwordless protection. Windows 11 also supports [FIDO2 security keys](/azure/active-directory/authentication/howto-authentication-passwordless-security-key) and [passkeys](identity-protection/passkeys/index.md) for passwordless authentication.
-
-### Connecting to cloud services
-
-Microsoft offers comprehensive cloud services for identity, storage, and access management in addition to the tools needed to attest that Windows devices connecting to your network are trustworthy. You can also enforce compliance and conditional access with a modern device management (MDM) service such as Microsoft Intune, which works with Microsoft Entra ID and Microsoft Azure Attestation to control access to applications and data through the cloud.
-
-## Next steps
-
-To learn more about the security features included in Windows 11, read the [Windows 11 Security Book](book/index.md).
-
-
diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/csv-san.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/csv-san.md
index 15db660036..80b74ed970 100644
--- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/csv-san.md
+++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/csv-san.md
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ description: Learn how to protect cluster shared volumes (CSV) and storage area
ms.topic: how-to
ms.date: 06/18/2024
appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows Server 2025
- ✅ Windows Server 2022
- ✅ Windows Server 2019
- ✅ Windows Server 2016
diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/choose-how-bitlocker-protected-operating-system-drives-can-be-recovered.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/choose-how-bitlocker-protected-operating-system-drives-can-be-recovered.md
index 8cfee0617e..b0ff6c39b5 100644
--- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/choose-how-bitlocker-protected-operating-system-drives-can-be-recovered.md
+++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/includes/choose-how-bitlocker-protected-operating-system-drives-can-be-recovered.md
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ This policy setting allows you to control how BitLocker-protected operating syst
If this policy setting is disabled or not configured, the default recovery options are supported for BitLocker recovery. By default a DRA is allowed, the recovery options can be specified by the user including the recovery password and recovery key, and recovery information is not backed up to AD DS.
+For Microsoft Entra hybrid joined devices, the BitLocker recovery password is backed up to both Active Directory and Entra ID.
+
| | Path |
|--|--|
| **CSP** | `./Device/Vendor/MSFT/BitLocker/`[SystemDrivesRecoveryOptions](/windows/client-management/mdm/bitlocker-csp#systemdrivesrecoveryoptions)|
diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/install-server.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/install-server.md
index a1b63ed90b..1e9c124e9c 100644
--- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/install-server.md
+++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/install-server.md
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ description: Learn how to install BitLocker on Windows Server.
ms.topic: how-to
ms.date: 06/18/2024
appliesto:
+- ✅ Windows Server 2025
- ✅ Windows Server 2022
- ✅ Windows Server 2019
- ✅ Windows Server 2016
diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/network-unlock.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/network-unlock.md
index 39be442f55..15119bdf05 100644
--- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/network-unlock.md
+++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/network-unlock.md
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ ms.date: 06/18/2024
# Network Unlock
-Network Unlock is a BitLocker *key protector* for operating system volumes. Network Unlock enables easier management for BitLocker-enabled desktops and servers in a domain environment by providing automatic unlock of operating system volumes at system reboot when connected to a wired corporate network. Network Unlock requires the client hardware to have a DHCP driver implemented in its UEFI firmware. Without Network Unlock, operating system volumes protected by `TPM+PIN` protectors require a PIN to be entered when a device reboots or resumes from hibernation (for example, by Wake on LAN). Requiring a PIN after a reboot can make it difficult to enterprises to roll out software patches to unattended desktops and remotely administered servers.
+Network Unlock is a BitLocker *key protector* for operating system volumes. Network Unlock enables easier management for BitLocker-enabled desktops and servers in a domain environment by providing automatic unlock of operating system volumes at system reboot when connected to a wired corporate network. Network Unlock requires the client hardware to have a DHCP driver implemented in its UEFI firmware. Without Network Unlock, operating system volumes protected by `TPM+PIN` protectors require a PIN to be entered when a device reboots or resumes from hibernation (for example, by Wake on LAN). Requiring a PIN after a reboot can make it difficult for enterprises to roll out software patches to unattended desktops and remotely administered servers.
Network Unlock allows BitLocker-enabled systems that have a `TPM+PIN` and that meet the hardware requirements to boot into Windows without user intervention. Network Unlock works in a similar fashion to the `TPM+StartupKey` at boot. Rather than needing to read the StartupKey from USB media, however, the Network Unlock feature needs the key to be composed from a key stored in the TPM and an encrypted network key that is sent to the server, decrypted and returned to the client in a secure session.
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ The following steps describe how to deploy the required group policy setting:
By default, all clients with the correct Network Unlock certificate and valid Network Unlock protectors that have wired access to a Network Unlock-enabled WDS server via DHCP are unlocked by the server. A subnet policy configuration file on the WDS server can be created to limit which are the subnet(s) the Network Unlock clients can use to unlock.
-The configuration file, called `bde-network-unlock.ini`, must be located in the same directory as the Network Unlock provider DLL (`%windir%\System32\Nkpprov.dll`) and it applies to both IPv6 and IPv4 DHCP implementations. If the subnet configuration policy becomes corrupted, the provider fails and stops responding to requests.
+The configuration file called `bde-network-unlock.ini`, must be located in the same directory as the Network Unlock provider DLL (`%windir%\System32\Nkpprov.dll`) and it applies to both IPv6 and IPv4 DHCP implementations. If the subnet configuration policy becomes corrupted, the provider fails and stops responding to requests.
The subnet policy configuration file must use a `[SUBNETS]` section to identify the specific subnets. The named subnets may then be used to specify restrictions in certificate subsections. Subnets are defined as simple name-value pairs, in the common INI format, where each subnet has its own line, with the name on the left of the equal-sign, and the subnet identified on the right of the equal-sign as a Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) address or range. The key word `ENABLED` is disallowed for subnet names.
@@ -299,6 +299,8 @@ To update the certificates used by Network Unlock, administrators need to import
Troubleshooting Network Unlock issues begins by verifying the environment. Many times, a small configuration issue can be the root cause of the failure. Items to verify include:
- Verify that the client hardware is UEFI-based and is on firmware version 2.3.1 and that the UEFI firmware is in native mode without a Compatibility Support Module (CSM) for BIOS mode enabled. Verification can be done by checking that the firmware doesn't have an option enabled such as "Legacy mode" or "Compatibility mode" or that the firmware doesn't appear to be in a BIOS-like mode
+- If client hardware is a Secure Core device, you may need to disable Secure Core functionality
+
- All required roles and services are installed and started
- Public and private certificates have been published and are in the proper certificate containers. The presence of the Network Unlock certificate can be verified in the Microsoft Management Console (MMC.exe) on the WDS server with the certificate snap-ins for the local computer enabled. The client certificate can be verified by checking the registry key **`HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\FVE_NKP`** on the client computer
- Group policy for Network Unlock is enabled and linked to the appropriate domains
diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/configure.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/configure.md
index 34c2ed5f4a..c39add4606 100644
--- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/configure.md
+++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/configure.md
@@ -1,42 +1,42 @@
---
-title: PDE settings and configuration
-description: Learn about the available options to configure Personal Data Encryption (PDE) and how to configure them via Microsoft Intune or Configuration Service Providers (CSP).
+title: Personal Data Encryption settings and configuration
+description: Learn about the available options to configure Personal Data Encryption (Personal Data Encryption) and how to configure them via Microsoft Intune or Configuration Service Providers (CSP).
ms.topic: how-to
ms.date: 09/24/2024
---
-# PDE settings and configuration
+# Personal Data Encryption settings and configuration
-This article describes the Personal Data Encryption (PDE) settings and how to configure them via Microsoft Intune or Configuration Service Providers (CSP).
+This article describes the Personal Data Encryption settings and how to configure them via Microsoft Intune or Configuration Service Providers (CSP).
> [!NOTE]
-> PDE can be configured using MDM policies. The content to be protected by PDE can be specified using [PDE APIs](/uwp/api/windows.security.dataprotection.userdataprotectionmanager). There is no user interface in Windows to either enable PDE or protect content using PDE.
+> Personal Data Encryption can be configured using MDM policies. The content to be protected by Personal Data Encryption can be specified using [Personal Data Encryption APIs](/uwp/api/windows.security.dataprotection.userdataprotectionmanager). There is no user interface in Windows to either enable Personal Data Encryption or protect content using Personal Data Encryption.
>
-> The PDE APIs can be used to create custom applications and scripts to specify which content to protect and at what level to protect the content. Additionally, the PDE APIs can't be used to protect content until the PDE policy has been enabled.
+> The Personal Data Encryption APIs can be used to create custom applications and scripts to specify which content to protect and at what level to protect the content. Additionally, the Personal Data Encryption APIs can't be used to protect content until the Personal Data Encryption policy has been enabled.
-## PDE settings
+## Personal Data Encryption settings
-The following table lists the required settings to enable PDE.
+The following table lists the required settings to enable Personal Data Encryption.
| Setting name | Description |
|-|-|
-|Enable Personal Data Encryption|PDE isn't enabled by default. Before PDE can be used, you must enable it.|
-|Sign-in and lock last interactive user automatically after a restart| Winlogon automatic restart sign-on (ARSO) isn't supported for use with PDE. To use PDE, ARSO must be disabled.|
+|Enable Personal Data Encryption|Personal Data Encryption isn't enabled by default. Before Personal Data Encryption can be used, you must enable it.|
+|Sign-in and lock last interactive user automatically after a restart| Winlogon automatic restart sign-on (ARSO) isn't supported for use with Personal Data Encryption. To use Personal Data Encryption, ARSO must be disabled.|
-## PDE hardening recommendations
+## Personal Data Encryption hardening recommendations
-The following table lists the recommended settings to improve PDE's security.
+The following table lists the recommended settings to improve Personal Data Encryption's security.
| Setting name | Description |
|-|-|
-|Kernel-mode crash dumps and live dumps|Kernel-mode crash dumps and live dumps can potentially cause the keys used by PDE to protect content to be exposed. For greatest security, disable kernel-mode crash dumps and live dumps.|
-|Windows Error Reporting (WER)/user-mode crash dumps|Disabling Windows Error Reporting prevents user-mode crash dumps. User-mode crash dumps can potentially cause the keys used by PDE to protect content to be exposed. For greatest security, disable user-mode crash dumps.|
-|Hibernation|Hibernation files can potentially cause the keys used by Personal Data Encryption (PDE) to protect content to be exposed. For greatest security, disable hibernation.|
-|Allow users to select when a password is required when resuming from connected standby |When this policy isn't configured on Microsoft Entra joined devices, users on a Connected Standby device can change the amount of time after the device´s screen turns off before a password is required to wake the device. During the time when the screen turns off but a password isn't required, the keys used by PDE to protect content could potentially be exposed. It's recommended to explicitly disable this policy on Microsoft Entra joined devices.|
+|Kernel-mode crash dumps and live dumps|Kernel-mode crash dumps and live dumps can potentially cause the keys used by Personal Data Encryption to protect content to be exposed. For greatest security, disable kernel-mode crash dumps and live dumps.|
+|Windows Error Reporting (WER)/user-mode crash dumps|Disabling Windows Error Reporting prevents user-mode crash dumps. User-mode crash dumps can potentially cause the keys used by Personal Data Encryption to protect content to be exposed. For greatest security, disable user-mode crash dumps.|
+|Hibernation|Hibernation files can potentially cause the keys used by Personal Data Encryption to protect content to be exposed. For greatest security, disable hibernation.|
+|Allow users to select when a password is required when resuming from connected standby |When this policy isn't configured on Microsoft Entra joined devices, users on a Connected Standby device can change the amount of time after the device´s screen turns off before a password is required to wake the device. During the time when the screen turns off but a password isn't required, the keys used by Personal Data Encryption to protect content could potentially be exposed. It's recommended to explicitly disable this policy on Microsoft Entra joined devices.|
-## Configure PDE with Microsoft Intune
+## Configure Personal Data Encryption with Microsoft Intune
-If you use Microsoft Intune to manage your devices, you can configure PDE using a disk encryption policy, a settings catalog policy, or a custom profile.
+If you use Microsoft Intune to manage your devices, you can configure Personal Data Encryption using a disk encryption policy, a settings catalog policy, or a custom profile.
### Disk encryption policy
@@ -77,9 +77,9 @@ Content-Type: application/json
{ "id": "00-0000-0000-0000-000000000000", "name": "_MSLearn_PDE", "description": "", "platforms": "windows10", "technologies": "mdm", "roleScopeTagIds": [ "0" ], "settings": [ { "@odata.type": "#microsoft.graph.deviceManagementConfigurationSetting", "settingInstance": { "@odata.type": "#microsoft.graph.deviceManagementConfigurationChoiceSettingInstance", "settingDefinitionId": "device_vendor_msft_policy_config_admx_credentialproviders_allowdomaindelaylock", "choiceSettingValue": { "@odata.type": "#microsoft.graph.deviceManagementConfigurationChoiceSettingValue", "value": "device_vendor_msft_policy_config_admx_credentialproviders_allowdomaindelaylock_0", "children": [] } } }, { "@odata.type": "#microsoft.graph.deviceManagementConfigurationSetting", "settingInstance": { "@odata.type": "#microsoft.graph.deviceManagementConfigurationChoiceSettingInstance", "settingDefinitionId": "device_vendor_msft_policy_config_errorreporting_disablewindowserrorreporting", "choiceSettingValue": { "@odata.type": "#microsoft.graph.deviceManagementConfigurationChoiceSettingValue", "value": "device_vendor_msft_policy_config_errorreporting_disablewindowserrorreporting_1", "children": [] } } }, { "@odata.type": "#microsoft.graph.deviceManagementConfigurationSetting", "settingInstance": { "@odata.type": "#microsoft.graph.deviceManagementConfigurationChoiceSettingInstance", "settingDefinitionId": "device_vendor_msft_policy_config_windowslogon_allowautomaticrestartsignon", "choiceSettingValue": { "@odata.type": "#microsoft.graph.deviceManagementConfigurationChoiceSettingValue", "value": "device_vendor_msft_policy_config_windowslogon_allowautomaticrestartsignon_0", "children": [] } } }, { "@odata.type": "#microsoft.graph.deviceManagementConfigurationSetting", "settingInstance": { "@odata.type": "#microsoft.graph.deviceManagementConfigurationChoiceSettingInstance", "settingDefinitionId": "device_vendor_msft_policy_config_memorydump_allowcrashdump", "choiceSettingValue": { "@odata.type": "#microsoft.graph.deviceManagementConfigurationChoiceSettingValue", "value": "device_vendor_msft_policy_config_memorydump_allowcrashdump_0", "children": [] } } }, { "@odata.type": "#microsoft.graph.deviceManagementConfigurationSetting", "settingInstance": { "@odata.type": "#microsoft.graph.deviceManagementConfigurationChoiceSettingInstance", "settingDefinitionId": "device_vendor_msft_policy_config_memorydump_allowlivedump", "choiceSettingValue": { "@odata.type": "#microsoft.graph.deviceManagementConfigurationChoiceSettingValue", "value": "device_vendor_msft_policy_config_memorydump_allowlivedump_0", "children": [] } } }, { "@odata.type": "#microsoft.graph.deviceManagementConfigurationSetting", "settingInstance": { "@odata.type": "#microsoft.graph.deviceManagementConfigurationChoiceSettingInstance", "settingDefinitionId": "user_vendor_msft_pde_enablepersonaldataencryption", "choiceSettingValue": { "@odata.type": "#microsoft.graph.deviceManagementConfigurationChoiceSettingValue", "value": "user_vendor_msft_pde_enablepersonaldataencryption_1", "children": [] } } }, { "@odata.type": "#microsoft.graph.deviceManagementConfigurationSetting", "settingInstance": { "@odata.type": "#microsoft.graph.deviceManagementConfigurationChoiceSettingInstance", "settingDefinitionId": "device_vendor_msft_policy_config_power_allowhibernate", "choiceSettingValue": { "@odata.type": "#microsoft.graph.deviceManagementConfigurationChoiceSettingValue", "value": "device_vendor_msft_policy_config_power_allowhibernate_0", "children": [] } } } ] }
```
-## Configure PDE with CSP
+## Configure Personal Data Encryption with CSP
-Alternatively, you can configure devices using the [Policy CSP][CSP-1] and [PDE CSP][CSP-2].
+Alternatively, you can configure devices using the [Policy CSP][CSP-1] and [Personal Data Encryption CSP][CSP-2].
|OMA-URI|Format|Value|
|-|-|-|
@@ -91,13 +91,13 @@ Alternatively, you can configure devices using the [Policy CSP][CSP-1] and [PDE
|`./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/Power/AllowHibernate` |int| `0`|
|`./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/ADMX_CredentialProviders/AllowDomainDelayLock`|string|` `|
-## Disable PDE
+## Disable Personal Data Encryption
-Once PDE is enabled, it isn't recommended to disable it. However if you need to disable PDE, you can do so using the following steps.
+Once Personal Data Encryption is enabled, it isn't recommended to disable it. However if you need to disable Personal Data Encryption, you can do so using the following steps.
-### Disable PDE with a disk encryption policy
+### Disable Personal Data Encryption with a disk encryption policy
-To disable PDE devices using a [disk encryption policy](/mem/intune/protect/endpoint-security-disk-encryption-policy), go to **Endpoint security** > **Disk encryption** and select **Create policy**:
+To disable Personal Data Encryption devices using a [disk encryption policy](/mem/intune/protect/endpoint-security-disk-encryption-policy), go to **Endpoint security** > **Disk encryption** and select **Create policy**:
- **Platform** > **Windows**
- **Profile** > **Personal Data Encryption**
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ Provide a name, and select **Next**. In the **Configuration settings** page, sel
Assign the policy to a group that contains as members the devices or users that you want to configure.
-### Disable PDE with a settings catalog policy in Intune
+### Disable Personal Data Encryption with a settings catalog policy in Intune
[!INCLUDE [intune-settings-catalog-1](../../../../../includes/configure/intune-settings-catalog-1.md)]
@@ -116,24 +116,24 @@ Assign the policy to a group that contains as members the devices or users that
[!INCLUDE [intune-settings-catalog-2](../../../../../includes/configure/intune-settings-catalog-2.md)]
-### Disable PDE with CSP
+### Disable Personal Data Encryption with CSP
-You can disable PDE with CSP using the following setting:
+You can disable Personal Data Encryption with CSP using the following setting:
|OMA-URI|Format|Value|
|-|-|-|
|`./User/Vendor/MSFT/PDE/EnablePersonalDataEncryption`|int|`0`|
-## Decrypt PDE-encrypted content
+## Decrypt encrypted content
-Disabling PDE doesn't decrypt any PDE protected content. It only prevents the PDE API from being able to protect any additional content. PDE-protected files can be manually decrypted using the following steps:
+Disabling Personal Data Encryption doesn't decrypt any Personal Data Encryption protected content. It only prevents the Personal Data Encryption API from being able to protect any additional content. Pprotected files can be manually decrypted using the following steps:
1. Open the properties of the file
1. Under the **General** tab, select **Advanced...**
1. Uncheck the option **Encrypt contents to secure data**
1. Select **OK**, and then **OK** again
-PDE-protected files can also be decrypted using [`cipher.exe`][WINS-1], which can be helpful in the following scenarios:
+Protected files can also be decrypted using [`cipher.exe`][WINS-1], which can be helpful in the following scenarios:
- Decrypting a large number of files on a device
- Decrypting files on multiple of devices
@@ -153,11 +153,11 @@ To decrypt files on a device using `cipher.exe`:
```
> [!IMPORTANT]
-> Once a user selects to manually decrypt a file, the user won't be able to manually protect the file again using PDE.
+> Once a user selects to manually decrypt a file, the user won't be able to manually protect the file again using Personal Data Encryption.
## Next steps
-- Review the [Personal Data Encryption (PDE) FAQ](faq.yml)
+- Review the [Personal Data Encryption FAQ](faq.yml)
diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/faq.yml b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/faq.yml
index 8aeed21090..2be94a9a24 100644
--- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/faq.yml
+++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/faq.yml
@@ -1,51 +1,51 @@
### YamlMime:FAQ
metadata:
- title: Frequently asked questions for Personal Data Encryption (PDE)
- description: Answers to common questions regarding Personal Data Encryption (PDE).
+ title: Frequently asked questions for Personal Data Encryption
+ description: Answers to common questions regarding Personal Data Encryption.
ms.topic: faq
ms.date: 09/24/2024
-title: Frequently asked questions for Personal Data Encryption (PDE)
+title: Frequently asked questions for Personal Data Encryption
summary: |
- Here are some answers to common questions regarding Personal Data Encryption (PDE)
+ Here are some answers to common questions regarding Personal Data Encryption
sections:
- name: General
questions:
- - question: Can PDE encrypt entire volumes or drives?
+ - question: Can Personal Data Encryption encrypt entire volumes or drives?
answer: |
- No, PDE only encrypts specified files and content.
- - question: How are files and content protected by PDE selected?
+ No, Personal Data Encryption only encrypts specified files and content.
+ - question: How are files and content protected by Personal Data Encryption selected?
answer: |
- [PDE APIs](/uwp/api/windows.security.dataprotection.userdataprotectionmanager) are used to select which files and content are protected using PDE.
- - question: Can users manually encrypt and decrypt files with PDE?
+ [Personal Data Encryption APIs](/uwp/api/windows.security.dataprotection.userdataprotectionmanager) are used to select which files and content are protected using Personal Data Encryption.
+ - question: Can users manually encrypt and decrypt files with Personal Data Encryption?
answer: |
- Currently users can decrypt files manually but they can't encrypt files manually. For information on how a user can manually decrypt a file, see the section [Decrypt PDE-encrypted content](configure.md#decrypt-pde-encrypted-content).
- - question: Can PDE protected content be accessed after signing on via a Remote Desktop connection (RDP)?
+ Currently users can decrypt files manually but they can't encrypt files manually. For information on how a user can manually decrypt a file, see the section [Decrypt encrypted content](configure.md#decrypt-encrypted-content).
+ - question: Can Personal Data Encryption protected content be accessed after signing on via a Remote Desktop connection (RDP)?
answer: |
- No, it's not supported to access PDE-protected content over RDP.
- - question: Can PDE protected content be accessed via a network share?
+ No, it's not supported to access protected content over RDP.
+ - question: Can Personal Data Encryption protected content be accessed via a network share?
answer: |
- No, PDE protected content can only be accessed after signing on locally to Windows with Windows Hello for Business credentials.
- - question: What encryption method and strength does PDE use?
+ No, Personal Data Encryption protected content can only be accessed after signing on locally to Windows with Windows Hello for Business credentials.
+ - question: What encryption method and strength does Personal Data Encryption use?
answer: |
- PDE uses AES-CBC with a 256-bit key to encrypt content.
+ Personal Data Encryption uses AES-CBC with a 256-bit key to encrypt content.
- - name: PDE and other Windows features
+ - name: Personal Data Encryption and other Windows features
questions:
- - question: What is the relation between Windows Hello for Business and PDE?
+ - question: What is the relation between Windows Hello for Business and Personal Data Encryption?
answer: |
- During user sign-on, Windows Hello for Business unlocks the keys that PDE uses to protect content.
- - question: If a user signs into Windows with a password instead of Windows Hello for Business, will they be able to access their PDE protected content?
+ During user sign-on, Windows Hello for Business unlocks the keys that Personal Data Encryption uses to protect content.
+ - question: If a user signs into Windows with a password instead of Windows Hello for Business, will they be able to access their Personal Data Encryption protected content?
answer: |
- No, the keys used by PDE to protect content are protected by Windows Hello for Business credentials and will only be unlocked when signing on with Windows Hello for Business PIN or biometrics.
- - question: Can a file be protected with both PDE and EFS at the same time?
+ No, the keys used by Personal Data Encryption to protect content are protected by Windows Hello for Business credentials and will only be unlocked when signing on with Windows Hello for Business PIN or biometrics.
+ - question: Can a file be protected with both Personal Data Encryption and EFS at the same time?
answer: |
- No, PDE and EFS are mutually exclusive.
- - question: Is PDE a replacement for BitLocker?
+ No, Personal Data Encryption and EFS are mutually exclusive.
+ - question: Is Personal Data Encryption a replacement for BitLocker?
answer: |
No, it's recommended to encrypt all volumes with BitLocker Drive Encryption for increased security.
- question: Do I need to use OneDrive in Microsoft 365 as my backup provider?
answer: |
- No, PDE doesn't have a requirement for a backup provider, including OneDrive in Microsoft 365. However, backups are recommended in case the keys used by PDE to protect files are lost. OneDrive in Microsoft 365 is a recommended backup provider.
+ No, Personal Data Encryption doesn't have a requirement for a backup provider, including OneDrive in Microsoft 365. However, backups are recommended in case the keys used by Personal Data Encryption to protect files are lost. OneDrive in Microsoft 365 is a recommended backup provider.
diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/index.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/index.md
index 7e28595993..03607ce506 100644
--- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/index.md
+++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/index.md
@@ -1,104 +1,104 @@
---
-title: Personal Data Encryption (PDE)
+title: Personal Data Encryption
description: Personal Data Encryption unlocks user encrypted files at user sign-in instead of at boot.
ms.topic: how-to
ms.date: 09/24/2024
---
-# Personal Data Encryption (PDE)
+# Personal Data Encryption
-Starting in Windows 11, version 22H2, Personal Data Encryption (PDE) is a security feature that provides file-based data encryption capabilities to Windows.
+Starting in Windows 11, version 22H2, Personal Data Encryption is a security feature that provides file-based data encryption capabilities to Windows.
-PDE utilizes Windows Hello for Business to link *data encryption keys* with user credentials. When a user signs in to a device using Windows Hello for Business, decryption keys are released, and encrypted data is accessible to the user.\
+Personal Data Encryption utilizes Windows Hello for Business to link *data encryption keys* with user credentials. When a user signs in to a device using Windows Hello for Business, decryption keys are released, and encrypted data is accessible to the user.\
When a user logs off, decryption keys are discarded and data is inaccessible, even if another user signs into the device.
The use of Windows Hello for Business offers the following advantages:
- It reduces the number of credentials to access encrypted content: users only need to sign-in with Windows Hello for Business
-- The accessibility features available when using Windows Hello for Business extend to PDE protected content
+- The accessibility features available when using Windows Hello for Business extend to Personal Data Encryption protected content
-PDE differs from BitLocker in that it encrypts files instead of whole volumes and disks. PDE occurs in addition to other encryption methods such as BitLocker.\
-Unlike BitLocker that releases data encryption keys at boot, PDE doesn't release data encryption keys until a user signs in using Windows Hello for Business.
+Personal Data Encryption differs from BitLocker in that it encrypts files instead of whole volumes and disks. Personal Data Encryption occurs in addition to other encryption methods such as BitLocker.\
+Unlike BitLocker that releases data encryption keys at boot, Personal Data Encryption doesn't release data encryption keys until a user signs in using Windows Hello for Business.
## Prerequisites
-To use PDE, the following prerequisites must be met:
+To use Personal Data Encryption, the following prerequisites must be met:
- Windows 11, version 22H2 and later
- The devices must be [Microsoft Entra joined][AAD-1]. Domain-joined and Microsoft Entra hybrid joined devices aren't supported
- Users must sign in using [Windows Hello for Business](../../../identity-protection/hello-for-business/index.md)
> [!IMPORTANT]
-> If you sign in with a password or a [security key][AAD-2], you can't access PDE protected content.
+> If you sign in with a password or a [security key][AAD-2], you can't access Personal Data Encryption protected content.
[!INCLUDE [personal-data-encryption-pde](../../../../../includes/licensing/personal-data-encryption-pde.md)]
-## PDE protection levels
+## Personal Data Encryption protection levels
-PDE uses *AES-CBC* with a *256-bit key* to protect content and offers two levels of protection. The level of protection is determined based on the organizational needs. These levels can be set via the [PDE APIs](/uwp/api/windows.security.dataprotection.userdataprotectionmanager).
+Personal Data Encryption uses *AES-CBC* with a *256-bit key* to protect content and offers two levels of protection. The level of protection is determined based on the organizational needs. These levels can be set via the [Personal Data Encryption APIs](/uwp/api/windows.security.dataprotection.userdataprotectionmanager).
| Item | Level 1 | Level 2 |
|---|---|---|
-| PDE protected data accessible when user has signed in via Windows Hello for Business | Yes | Yes |
-| PDE protected data is accessible at Windows lock screen | Yes | Data is accessible for one minute after lock, then it's no longer available |
-| PDE protected data is accessible after user signs out of Windows | No | No |
-| PDE protected data is accessible when device is shut down | No | No |
-| PDE protected data is accessible via UNC paths | No | No |
-| PDE protected data is accessible when signing with Windows password instead of Windows Hello for Business | No | No |
-| PDE protected data is accessible via Remote Desktop session | No | No |
-| Decryption keys used by PDE discarded | After user signs out of Windows | One minute after Windows lock screen is engaged or after user signs out of Windows |
+| Protected data accessible when user has signed in via Windows Hello for Business | Yes | Yes |
+| Protected data is accessible at Windows lock screen | Yes | Data is accessible for one minute after lock, then it's no longer available |
+| Protected data is accessible after user signs out of Windows | No | No |
+| Protected data is accessible when device is shut down | No | No |
+| Protected data is accessible via UNC paths | No | No |
+| Protected data is accessible when signing with Windows password instead of Windows Hello for Business | No | No |
+| Protected data is accessible via Remote Desktop session | No | No |
+| Decryption keys used by Personal Data Encryption discarded | After user signs out of Windows | One minute after Windows lock screen is engaged or after user signs out of Windows |
-## PDE protected content accessibility
+## Personal Data Encryption protected content accessibility
-When a file is protected with PDE, its icon will show a padlock. If the user hasn't signed in locally with Windows Hello for Business or an unauthorized user attempts to access PDE protected content, they'll be denied access to the content.
+When a file is protected with Personal Data Encryption, its icon will show a padlock. If the user hasn't signed in locally with Windows Hello for Business or an unauthorized user attempts to access Personal Data Encryption protected content, they'll be denied access to the content.
-Scenarios where a user will be denied access to PDE protected content include:
+Scenarios where a user will be denied access to Personal Data Encryption protected content include:
- User has signed into Windows via a password instead of signing in with Windows Hello for Business biometric or PIN
- If protected via level 2 protection, when the device is locked
- When trying to access content on the device remotely. For example, UNC network paths
- Remote Desktop sessions
-- Other users on the device who aren't owners of the content, even if they're signed in via Windows Hello for Business and have permissions to navigate to the PDE protected content
+- Other users on the device who aren't owners of the content, even if they're signed in via Windows Hello for Business and have permissions to navigate to the Personal Data Encryption protected content
-## Differences between PDE and BitLocker
+## Differences between Personal Data Encryption and BitLocker
-PDE is meant to work alongside BitLocker. PDE isn't a replacement for BitLocker, nor is BitLocker a replacement for PDE. Using both features together provides better security than using either BitLocker or PDE alone. However there are differences between BitLocker and PDE and how they work. These differences are why using them together offers better security.
+Personal Data Encryption is meant to work alongside BitLocker. Personal Data Encryption isn't a replacement for BitLocker, nor is BitLocker a replacement for Personal Data Encryption. Using both features together provides better security than using either BitLocker or Personal Data Encryption alone. However there are differences between BitLocker and Personal Data Encryption and how they work. These differences are why using them together offers better security.
-| Item | PDE | BitLocker |
+| Item | Personal Data Encryption | BitLocker |
|--|--|--|
| Release of decryption key | At user sign-in via Windows Hello for Business | At boot |
| Decryption keys discarded | When user signs out of Windows or one minute after Windows lock screen is engaged | At shutdown |
| Protected content | All files in protected folders | Entire volume/drive |
| Authentication to access protected content | Windows Hello for Business | When BitLocker with TPM + PIN is enabled, BitLocker PIN plus Windows sign-in |
-## Differences between PDE and EFS
+## Differences between Personal Data Encryption and EFS
-The main difference between protecting files with PDE instead of EFS is the method they use to protect the file. PDE uses Windows Hello for Business to secure the keys that protect the files. EFS uses certificates to secure and protect the files.
+The main difference between protecting files with Personal Data Encryption instead of EFS is the method they use to protect the file. Personal Data Encryption uses Windows Hello for Business to secure the keys that protect the files. EFS uses certificates to secure and protect the files.
-To see if a file is protected with PDE or with EFS:
+To see if a file is protected with Personal Data Encryption or with EFS:
1. Open the properties of the file
1. Under the **General** tab, select **Advanced...**
1. In the **Advanced Attributes** windows, select **Details**
-For PDE protected files, under **Protection status:** there will be an item listed as **Personal Data Encryption is:** and it will have the attribute of **On**.
+For Personal Data Encryption protected files, under **Protection status:** there will be an item listed as **Personal Data Encryption is:** and it will have the attribute of **On**.
For EFS protected files, under **Users who can access this file:**, there will be a **Certificate thumbprint** next to the users with access to the file. There will also be a section at the bottom labeled **Recovery certificates for this file as defined by recovery policy:**.
Encryption information including what encryption method is being used to protect the file can be obtained with the [`cipher.exe /c`](/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/cipher) command.
-## Recommendations for using PDE
+## Recommendations for using Personal Data Encryption
-The following are recommendations for using PDE:
+The following are recommendations for using Personal Data Encryption:
-- Enable [BitLocker Drive Encryption](../bitlocker/index.md). Although PDE works without BitLocker, it's recommended to enable BitLocker. PDE is meant to work alongside BitLocker for increased security at it isn't a replacement for BitLocker
-- Backup solution such as [OneDrive in Microsoft 365](/sharepoint/onedrive-overview). In certain scenarios, such as TPM resets or destructive PIN resets, the keys used by PDE to protect content will be lost making any PDE-protected content inaccessible. The only way to recover such content is from a backup. If the files are synced to OneDrive, to regain access you must re-sync OneDrive
-- [Windows Hello for Business PIN reset service](../../../identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-feature-pin-reset.md). Destructive PIN resets will cause keys used by PDE to protect content to be lost, making any content protected with PDE inaccessible. After a destructive PIN reset, content protected with PDE must be recovered from a backup. For this reason, Windows Hello for Business PIN reset service is recommended since it provides non-destructive PIN resets
+- Enable [BitLocker Drive Encryption](../bitlocker/index.md). Although Personal Data Encryption works without BitLocker, it's recommended to enable BitLocker. Personal Data Encryption is meant to work alongside BitLocker for increased security at it isn't a replacement for BitLocker
+- Backup solution such as [OneDrive in Microsoft 365](/sharepoint/onedrive-overview). In certain scenarios, such as TPM resets or destructive PIN resets, the keys used by Personal Data Encryption to protect content will be lost making any protected content inaccessible. The only way to recover such content is from a backup. If the files are synced to OneDrive, to regain access you must re-sync OneDrive
+- [Windows Hello for Business PIN reset service](../../../identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-feature-pin-reset.md). Destructive PIN resets will cause keys used by Personal Data Encryption to protect content to be lost, making any content protected with Personal Data Encryption inaccessible. After a destructive PIN reset, content protected with Personal Data Encryption must be recovered from a backup. For this reason, Windows Hello for Business PIN reset service is recommended since it provides non-destructive PIN resets
- [Windows Hello Enhanced Sign-in Security](/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/windows-hello-enhanced-sign-in-security) offers additional security when authenticating with Windows Hello for Business via biometrics or PIN
-## Windows out of box applications that support PDE
+## Windows out of box applications that support Personal Data Encryption
-Certain Windows applications support PDE out of the box. If PDE is enabled on a device, these applications will utilize PDE:
+Certain Windows applications support Personal Data Encryption out of the box. If Personal Data Encryption is enabled on a device, these applications will utilize Personal Data Encryption:
| App name | Details |
|-|-|
@@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ Certain Windows applications support PDE out of the box. If PDE is enabled on a
## Next steps
-- Learn about the available options to configure Personal Data Encryption (PDE) and how to configure them via Microsoft Intune or configuration Service Provider (CSP): [PDE settings and configuration](configure.md)
-- Review the [Personal Data Encryption (PDE) FAQ](faq.yml)
+- Learn about the available options to configure Personal Data Encryption and how to configure them via Microsoft Intune or configuration Service Provider (CSP): [Personal Data Encryption settings and configuration](configure.md)
+- Review the [Personal Data Encryption FAQ](faq.yml)
diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/toc.yml b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/toc.yml
index f526600bd4..ac20c878c3 100644
--- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/toc.yml
+++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/toc.yml
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
items:
-- name: PDE overview
+- name: Overview
href: index.md
-- name: Configure PDE
+- name: Configure Personal Data Encryption
href: configure.md
-- name: PDE frequently asked questions (FAQ)
+- name: Frequently asked questions (FAQ)
href: faq.yml
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/toc.yml b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/toc.yml
index 81f918fba2..ee4a57ab27 100644
--- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/toc.yml
+++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/toc.yml
@@ -3,9 +3,7 @@ items:
href: bitlocker/toc.yml
- name: Encrypted hard drives
href: encrypted-hard-drive.md
-- name: Personal data encryption (PDE)
+- name: Personal data encryption
href: personal-data-encryption/toc.yml
- name: Email Encryption (S/MIME)
href: configure-s-mime.md
-- name: Windows Information Protection (WIP)
- href: /previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/information-protection/windows-information-protection/protect-enterprise-data-using-wip
diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/index.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/index.md
deleted file mode 100644
index e8c0197c75..0000000000
--- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/index.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
----
-title: Windows operating system security
-description: Securing the operating system includes system security, encryption, network security, and threat protection.
-ms.date: 07/10/2024
-ms.topic: overview
----
-
-# Windows operating system security
-
-Security and privacy depend on an operating system that guards your system and information from the moment it starts up, providing fundamental chip-to-cloud protection. Windows 11 is the most secure Windows yet with extensive security measures designed to help keep you safe. These measures include built-in advanced encryption and data protection, robust network and system security, and intelligent safeguards against ever-evolving threats.
-
-Watch the latest [Microsoft Mechanics Windows 11 security](https://youtu.be/tg9QUrnVFho) video that shows off some of the latest Windows 11 security technology.
-
-Use the links in the following sections to learn more about the operating system security features and capabilities in Windows.
-
-[!INCLUDE [operating-system-security](../includes/sections/operating-system-security.md)]
diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/configure-with-command-line.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/configure-with-command-line.md
index b1b37ca008..61084f5184 100644
--- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/configure-with-command-line.md
+++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/configure-with-command-line.md
@@ -53,19 +53,14 @@ netsh advfirewall set allprofiles logging filename %SystemRoot%\System32\LogFile
### Disable Windows Firewall
-Microsoft recommends that you don't disable Windows Firewall because you lose other benefits provided by the service, such as the ability to use Internet Protocol security (IPsec) connection security rules, network protection from attacks that employ network fingerprinting, [Windows Service Hardening](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=104976), and [boot time filters](https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/networking/2009/03/24/stopping-the-windows-authenticating-firewall-service-and-the-boot-time-policy/).
-Disabling Windows Firewall can also cause problems, including:
+Microsoft recommends that you don't disable Windows Firewall because you lose other benefits, such as the ability to use Internet Protocol security (IPsec) connection security rules, network protection from attacks that employ network fingerprinting, Windows Service Hardening, and [boot time filters][BTF]. Non-Microsoft firewall software can programmatically disable only the [rule types][FWRC] of Windows Firewall that need to be disabled for compatibility. You shouldn't disable the firewall yourself for this purpose.
+If disabling Windows Firewall is required, don't disable it by stopping the Windows Firewall service (in the Services snap-in, the display name is Windows Defender Firewall and the service name is MpsSvc). Stopping the Windows Firewall service isn't supported by Microsoft and can cause problems, including:
- Start menu can stop working
- Modern applications can fail to install or update
- Activation of Windows via phone fails
- Application or OS incompatibilities that depend on Windows Firewall
-Microsoft recommends disabling Windows Firewall only when installing a non-Microsoft firewall, and resetting Windows Firewall back to defaults when the non-Microsoft software is disabled or removed.
-If disabling Windows Firewall is required, don't disable it by stopping the Windows Firewall service (in the **Services** snap-in, the display name is Windows Firewall and the service name is MpsSvc).
-Stopping the Windows Firewall service isn't supported by Microsoft.
-Non-Microsoft firewall software can programmatically disable only the parts of Windows Firewall that need to be disabled for compatibility.
-You shouldn't disable the firewall yourself for this purpose.
The proper method to disable the Windows Firewall is to disable the Windows Firewall Profiles and leave the service running.
Use the following procedure to turn off the firewall, or disable the Group Policy setting **Computer Configuration|Administrative Templates|Network|Network Connections|Windows Firewall|Domain Prolfile|Windows Firewall:Protect all network connections**.
For more information, see [Windows Firewall deployment guide](windows-firewall-with-advanced-security-deployment-guide.md).
@@ -569,3 +564,6 @@ netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="Inbound Secure Bypass Rule" dir=in sec
```
---
+[BTF]: /windows/win32/fwp/basic-operation
+[MFWC]: /windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/configure-with-command-line
+[FWRC]: /windows/win32/api/icftypes/ne-icftypes-net_fw_rule_category
diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/configure.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/configure.md
index b8e9d793fc..f6540ef8df 100644
--- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/configure.md
+++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/configure.md
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ This article contains examples how to configure Windows Firewall rules using the
## Access the Windows Firewall with Advanced Security console
-If you're configuring devices joined to an Active Directory domain, to complete these procedures you must be a member of the Domain Administrators group, or otherwise have delegated permissions to modify the GPOs in the domain. To access the *Windows Firewall with Advanced Security* console, [create or edit](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-r2-and-2008/cc754740(v=ws.11)) a group policy object (GPO) and expand the nodes **Computer Configuration** > **Policies** > **Windows Settings** > **Security Settings** > **Windows Firewall with Advanced Security**.
+If you're configuring devices joined to an Active Directory domain, to complete these procedures you must be a member of the Domain Administrators group, or otherwise have delegated permissions to modify the GPOs in the domain. To access the *Windows Firewall with Advanced Security* console, [create or edit](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-r2-and-2008/cc754740(v=ws.11)) a group policy object (GPO) and expand the nodes **Computer Configuration** > **Policies** > **Windows Settings** > **Security Settings** > **Windows Firewall with Advanced Security**. Pay attention to the [Group policy processing considerations][GPPC] when using Group Policy.
If you are configuring a single device, you must have administrative rights on the device. In which case, to access the *Windows Firewall with Advanced Security* console, select START , type `wf.msc`, and press ENTER .
@@ -176,3 +176,5 @@ Using the two rules configured as described in this topic helps to protect your
1. On the **Action** page, select **Allow the connection**, and then select **Next**
1. On the **Profile** page, select the network location types to which this rule applies, and then select **Next**
1. On the **Name** page, type a name and description for your rule, and then select **Finish**
+
+[GPPC]: /windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/tools#group-policy-processing-considerations
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/index.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/index.md
index 8952b535cf..4de85b91d4 100644
--- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/index.md
+++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/index.md
@@ -73,6 +73,18 @@ The *public network* profile is designed with higher security in mind for public
> [!TIP]
> Use the PowerShell cmdlet `Get-NetConnectionProfile` to retrieve the active network category (`NetworkCategory`). Use the PowerShell cmdlet `Set-NetConnectionProfile` to switch the category between *private* and *public*.
+## Disable Windows Firewall
+
+Microsoft recommends that you don't disable Windows Firewall because you lose other benefits, such as the ability to use Internet Protocol security (IPsec) connection security rules, network protection from attacks that employ network fingerprinting, Windows Service Hardening, and [boot time filters][BTF]. Non-Microsoft firewall software can programmatically disable only the [rule types][FWRC] of Windows Firewall that need to be disabled for compatibility. You shouldn't disable the firewall yourself for this purpose.
+If disabling Windows Firewall is required, don't disable it by stopping the Windows Firewall service (in the Services snap-in, the display name is Windows Defender Firewall and the service name is MpsSvc). Stopping the Windows Firewall service isn't supported by Microsoft and can cause problems, including:
+
+- Start menu can stop working
+- Modern applications can fail to install or update
+- Activation of Windows via phone fails
+- Application or OS incompatibilities that depend on Windows Firewall
+
+The proper method to disable the Windows Firewall is to disable the Windows Firewall Profiles and leave the service running. See [Manage Windows Firewall with the command line][MFWC] for detailed steps.
+
## Next steps
> [!div class="nextstepaction"]
@@ -89,3 +101,6 @@ To provide feedback for Windows Firewall, open [**Feedback Hub**][FHUB] (WI
[FHUB]: feedback-hub:?tabid=2&newFeedback=true
[NLA]: /windows/win32/winsock/network-location-awareness-service-provider-nla--2
[CSP-1]: /windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-networklistmanager
+[BTF]: /windows/win32/fwp/basic-operation
+[MFWC]: /windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/configure-with-command-line
+[FWRC]: /windows/win32/api/icftypes/ne-icftypes-net_fw_rule_category
diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/system-security/cryptography-certificate-mgmt.md b/windows/security/operating-system-security/system-security/cryptography-certificate-mgmt.md
index 5cff1aedaa..0d9d62c33e 100644
--- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/system-security/cryptography-certificate-mgmt.md
+++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/system-security/cryptography-certificate-mgmt.md
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ title: Cryptography and Certificate Management
description: Get an overview of cryptography and certificate management in Windows
ms.topic: conceptual
ms.date: 07/10/2024
-ms.reviewer: skhadeer, raverma
+ms.reviewer: skhadeer, aathipsa
---
# Cryptography and Certificate Management
@@ -17,13 +17,19 @@ Cryptography in Windows is Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140 c
Windows cryptographic modules provide low-level primitives such as:
- Random number generators (RNG)
-- Symmetric and asymmetric encryption (support for AES 128/256 and RSA 512 to 16384, in 64-bit increments and ECDSA over NIST-standard prime curves P-256, P-384, P-521)
-- Hashing (support for SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512)
+- Symmetric and asymmetric encryption (support for AES 128/256 and RSA 512 to 16384, in 64-bit increments and ECDSA over NIST-standard prime curves P-256, P-384, P-521)
+- Hashing (support for SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, and SHA-3*)
- Signing and verification (padding support for OAEP, PSS, PKCS1)
- Key agreement and key derivation (support for ECDH over NIST-standard prime curves P-256, P-384, P-521, and HKDF)
These modules are natively exposed on Windows through the Crypto API (CAPI) and the Cryptography Next Generation API (CNG) which is powered by Microsoft's open-source cryptographic library SymCrypt. Application developers can use these APIs to perform low-level cryptographic operations (BCrypt), key storage operations (NCrypt), protect static data (DPAPI), and securely share secrets (DPAPI-NG).
+*With this release we added support for the SHA-3 family of hash functions and SHA-3 derived functions (SHAKE, cSHAKE, and KMAC). These are the latest standardized hash functions by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and can be leveraged through the Windows CNG library. Below is a list of the supported SHA-3 functions:
+
+Supported SHA-3 hash functions: SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512 (SHA3-224 is not supported)
+Supported SHA-3 HMAC algorithms: HMAC-SHA3-256, HMAC-SHA3-384, HMAC-SHA3-512
+Supported SHA-3 derived algorithms: extendable-output functions (XOF) (SHAKE128, SHAKE256), customizable XOFs (cSHAKE128, cSHAKE256), and KMAC (KMAC128, KMAC256, KMACXOF128, KMACXOF256).
+
## Certificate management
Windows offers several APIs to operate and manage certificates. Certificates are crucial to public key infrastructure (PKI) as they provide the means for safeguarding and authenticating information. Certificates are electronic documents used to claim ownership of a public key. Public keys are used to prove server and client identity, validate code integrity, and used in secure emails. Windows offers users the ability to autoenroll and renew certificates in Active Directory with Group Policy to reduce the risk of potential outages due to certificate expiration or misconfiguration. Windows validates certificates through an automatic update mechanism that downloads certificate trust lists (CTL) daily. Trusted root certificates are used by applications as a reference for trustworthy PKI hierarchies and digital certificates. The list of trusted and untrusted certificates are stored in the CTL and can be updated by administrators. In the case of certificate revocation, a certificate is added as an untrusted certificate in the CTL causing it to be revoked globally across user devices immediately.
diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/system-security/toc.yml b/windows/security/operating-system-security/system-security/toc.yml
index 657b99e5df..0309711be5 100644
--- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/system-security/toc.yml
+++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/system-security/toc.yml
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ items:
href: ../../threat-protection/security-policy-settings/security-policy-settings.md
- name: Security auditing
href: ../../threat-protection/auditing/security-auditing-overview.md
-- name: Assigned Access 🔗
+- name: Kiosks and restricted user experiences 🔗
href: /windows/configuration/assigned-access
- name: Windows Security settings
href: windows-defender-security-center/windows-defender-security-center.md
diff --git a/windows/security/operating-system-security/toc.yml b/windows/security/operating-system-security/toc.yml
index 1e8df2650f..5c37753d30 100644
--- a/windows/security/operating-system-security/toc.yml
+++ b/windows/security/operating-system-security/toc.yml
@@ -1,13 +1,11 @@
items:
-- name: Overview
- href: index.md
- name: System security
href: system-security/toc.yml
- name: Encryption and data protection
href: data-protection/toc.yml
-- name: Device management
- href: device-management/toc.yml
- name: Network security
href: network-security/toc.yml
- name: Virus and threat protection
- href: virus-and-threat-protection/toc.yml
\ No newline at end of file
+ href: virus-and-threat-protection/toc.yml
+- name: Device management
+ href: device-management/toc.yml
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/windows/security/security-foundations/certification/fips-140-validation.md b/windows/security/security-foundations/certification/fips-140-validation.md
index 739b778e25..af7736d41e 100644
--- a/windows/security/security-foundations/certification/fips-140-validation.md
+++ b/windows/security/security-foundations/certification/fips-140-validation.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Windows FIPS 140 validation
description: Learn how Microsoft products and cryptographic modules follow the U.S. Federal government standard FIPS 140.
-ms.date: 2/1/2024
+ms.date: 11/13/2024
ms.topic: reference
---
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ The Windows client releases listed below include cryptographic modules that have
#### Windows 10 releases
+- [Windows 10, version 21H1 (May 2021 Update)](validations/fips-140-windows10.md#windows-10-version-21h1-may-2021-update)
+- [Windows 10, version 20H2 (October 2020 Update)](validations/fips-140-windows10.md#windows-10-version-20h2-october-2020-update)
- [Windows 10, version 2004 (May 2020 Update)](validations/fips-140-windows10.md#windows-10-version-2004-may-2020-update)
- [Windows 10, version 1909 (November 2019 Update)](validations/fips-140-windows10.md#windows-10-version-1909-november-2019-update)
- [Windows 10, version 1903 (May 2019 Update)](validations/fips-140-windows10.md#windows-10-version-1903-may-2019-update)
@@ -60,16 +62,18 @@ The Windows client releases listed below include cryptographic modules that have
The Windows Server releases listed below include cryptographic modules that have completed FIPS 140 validation. Click on the release for details, including the CMVP certificate, Security Policy document, and algorithm scope for each module. When the CMVP certificate validation label includes the note *When operated in FIPS mode*, specific configuration and security rules outlined in the Security Policy must be followed.
-#### Windows Server 2019 and 2016 releases
+#### Windows Server 2022, 2019, and 2016 releases
+- [Windows Server 2022](validations/fips-140-windows-server-2022.md#windows-server-2022)
- [Windows Server 2019](validations/fips-140-windows-server-2019.md#windows-server-2019)
- [Windows Server 2016](validations/fips-140-windows-server-2016.md#windows-server-2016)
#### Windows Server semi-annual releases
-- [Windows Server, version 2004](validations/fips-140-windows-server-semi-annual.md#windows-server-version-2004-may-2020-update)
-- [Windows Server, version 1909](validations/fips-140-windows-server-semi-annual.md#windows-server-version-1909-november-2019-update)
-- [Windows Server, version 1903](validations/fips-140-windows-server-semi-annual.md#windows-server-version-1903-may-2019-update)
+- [Windows Server, version 20H2](validations/fips-140-windows-server-semi-annual.md#windows-server-version-20h2)
+- [Windows Server, version 2004](validations/fips-140-windows-server-semi-annual.md#windows-server-version-2004)
+- [Windows Server, version 1909](validations/fips-140-windows-server-semi-annual.md#windows-server-version-1909)
+- [Windows Server, version 1903](validations/fips-140-windows-server-semi-annual.md#windows-server-version-1903)
- [Windows Server, version 1809](validations/fips-140-windows-server-semi-annual.md#windows-server-version-1809)
- [Windows Server, version 1803](validations/fips-140-windows-server-semi-annual.md#windows-server-version-1803)
- [Windows Server, version 1709](validations/fips-140-windows-server-semi-annual.md#windows-server-version-1709)
diff --git a/windows/security/security-foundations/certification/toc.yml b/windows/security/security-foundations/certification/toc.yml
index 33099035c3..98c1522666 100644
--- a/windows/security/security-foundations/certification/toc.yml
+++ b/windows/security/security-foundations/certification/toc.yml
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ items:
href: validations/fips-140-windows10.md
- name: Previous Windows releases
href: validations/fips-140-windows-previous.md
+ - name: Windows Server 2022
+ href: validations/fips-140-windows-server-2022.md
- name: Windows Server 2019
href: validations/fips-140-windows-server-2019.md
- name: Windows Server 2016
@@ -32,4 +34,4 @@ items:
- name: Windows Server semi-annual releases
href: validations/cc-windows-server-semi-annual.md
- name: Previous Windows Server releases
- href: validations/cc-windows-server-previous.md
\ No newline at end of file
+ href: validations/cc-windows-server-previous.md
diff --git a/windows/security/security-foundations/certification/validations/fips-140-windows-server-2022.md b/windows/security/security-foundations/certification/validations/fips-140-windows-server-2022.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..828e85d5b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/security/security-foundations/certification/validations/fips-140-windows-server-2022.md
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+---
+title: FIPS 140 validated modules for Windows Server 2022
+description: This topic lists the completed FIPS 140 cryptographic module validations for Windows Server 2022.
+ms.date: 11/13/2024
+ms.topic: reference
+---
+
+# FIPS 140 validated modules in Windows Server 2022
+
+The following tables list the completed FIPS 140 validations of cryptographic modules used in Windows Server 2022, organized by major release of the operating system. The linked Security Policy document for each module provides details on the module capabilities and the policies the operator must follow to use the module in its FIPS approved mode of operation. For information on using the overall operating system in its FIPS approved mode, see [Use Windows in a FIPS approved mode of operation](../fips-140-validation.md#use-windows-in-a-fips-approved-mode-of-operation). For details on the FIPS approved algorithms used by each module, see its linked Security Policy document or module certificate.
+
+## Windows Server 2022
+
+Build: 10.0.20348. Validated Editions: Standard, Datacenter, and Datacenter: Azure.
+
+|Cryptographic Module (linked to Security Policy document)|CMVP Certificate #|Validated Algorithms|
+|--- |--- |--- |
+|[Cryptographic Primitives Library][sp-4825]|[#4825][certificate-4825]|FIPS Approved: AES, CKG, CVL, DRBG, DSA, ECDSA, ENT (P), HMAC, KAS, KAS-SSC, KBKDF, KTS, PBKDF, RSA, SHS, and Triple-DES|
+|[Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library][sp-4766]|[#4766][certificate-4766]|FIPS Approved: AES, CKG, CVL, DRBG, DSA, ECDSA, ENT (P), HMAC, KAS, KAS-SSC, KBKDF, KTS, PBKDF, RSA, SHS, and Triple-DES|
+
+---
+
+
+
+
+
+[certificate-4766]: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/certificate/4766
+[certificate-4825]: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/certificate/4825
+
+
+
+[sp-4766]: https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/security-policies/140sp4766.pdf
+[sp-4825]: https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/security-policies/140sp4825.pdf
diff --git a/windows/security/security-foundations/certification/validations/fips-140-windows-server-semi-annual.md b/windows/security/security-foundations/certification/validations/fips-140-windows-server-semi-annual.md
index d1d1724b36..5ca0829279 100644
--- a/windows/security/security-foundations/certification/validations/fips-140-windows-server-semi-annual.md
+++ b/windows/security/security-foundations/certification/validations/fips-140-windows-server-semi-annual.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: FIPS 140 validated modules for Windows Server Semi-Annual Releases
description: This topic lists the completed FIPS 140 cryptographic module validations for Windows Server semi-annual releases.
-ms.date: 2/1/2024
+ms.date: 11/13/2024
ms.topic: reference
---
@@ -9,7 +9,16 @@ ms.topic: reference
The following tables list the completed FIPS 140 validations of cryptographic modules used in Windows Server semi-annual releases, organized by major release of the operating system. The linked Security Policy document for each module provides details on the module capabilities and the policies the operator must follow to use the module in its FIPS approved mode of operation. For information on using the overall operating system in its FIPS approved mode, see [Use Windows in a FIPS approved mode of operation](../fips-140-validation.md#use-windows-in-a-fips-approved-mode-of-operation). For details on the FIPS approved algorithms used by each module, including CAVP algorithm certificates, see the module's linked Security Policy document or CMVP module certificate.
-## Windows Server, version 2004 (May 2020 Update)
+## Windows Server, version 20H2
+
+Build: 10.0.19042. Validated Editions: Standard Core, Datacenter Core
+
+|Cryptographic Module (linked to Security Policy document)|CMVP Certificate #|Validated Algorithms|
+|--- |--- |--- |
+|[Cryptographic Primitives Library][sp-4825]|[#4825][certificate-4825]|FIPS Approved: AES, CKG, CVL, DRBG, DSA, ECDSA, ENT (P), HMAC, KAS, KAS-SSC, KBKDF, KTS, PBKDF, RSA, SHS, and Triple-DES|
+|[Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library][sp-4766]|[#4766][certificate-4766]|FIPS Approved: AES, CKG, CVL, DRBG, DSA, ECDSA, ENT (P), HMAC, KAS, KAS-SSC, KBKDF, KTS, PBKDF, RSA, SHS, and Triple-DES|
+
+## Windows Server, version 2004
Build: 10.0.19041. Validated Editions: Standard Core, Datacenter Core
@@ -24,7 +33,7 @@ Build: 10.0.19041. Validated Editions: Standard Core, Datacenter Core
|[Virtual TPM][sp-4537]|[#4537][certificate-4537]|FIPS Approved: AES, CKG, CVL, DRBG, ECDSA, HMAC, KAS, KBKDF, KTS, RSA, and SHS; Other Allowed: NDRNG|
|[Windows OS Loader][sp-4339]|[#4339][certificate-4339]|FIPS Approved: AES, CKG, DRBG, RSA, and SHS; Other Allowed: NDRNG|
-## Windows Server, version 1909 (November 2019 Update)
+## Windows Server, version 1909
Build: 10.0.18363. Validated Editions: Standard Core, Datacenter Core
@@ -39,7 +48,7 @@ Build: 10.0.18363. Validated Editions: Standard Core, Datacenter Core
|[Virtual TPM][sp-4537]|[#4537][certificate-4537]|FIPS Approved: AES, CKG, CVL, DRBG, ECDSA, HMAC, KAS, KBKDF, KTS, RSA, and SHS; Other Allowed: NDRNG|
|[Windows OS Loader][sp-4339]|[#4339][certificate-4339]|FIPS Approved: AES, CKG, DRBG, RSA, and SHS; Other Allowed: NDRNG|
-## Windows Server, version 1903 (May 2019 Update)
+## Windows Server, version 1903
Build: 10.0.18362. Validated Editions: Standard Core, Datacenter Core
@@ -123,6 +132,8 @@ Build: 10.0.16299. Validated Editions: Standard Core, Datacenter Core
[certificate-4536]: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/certificate/4536
[certificate-4537]: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/certificate/4537
[certificate-4538]: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/certificate/4538
+[certificate-4766]: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/certificate/4766
+[certificate-4825]: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/certificate/4825
@@ -146,3 +157,5 @@ Build: 10.0.16299. Validated Editions: Standard Core, Datacenter Core
[sp-4536]: https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/security-policies/140sp4536.pdf
[sp-4537]: https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/security-policies/140sp4537.pdf
[sp-4538]: https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/security-policies/140sp4537.pdf
+[sp-4766]: https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/security-policies/140sp4766.pdf
+[sp-4825]: https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/security-policies/140sp4825.pdf
diff --git a/windows/security/security-foundations/certification/validations/fips-140-windows10.md b/windows/security/security-foundations/certification/validations/fips-140-windows10.md
index e555337cb5..9bf64e0084 100644
--- a/windows/security/security-foundations/certification/validations/fips-140-windows10.md
+++ b/windows/security/security-foundations/certification/validations/fips-140-windows10.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: FIPS 140 validated modules for Windows 10
description: This topic lists the completed FIPS 140 cryptographic module validations for Windows 10.
-ms.date: 2/1/2024
+ms.date: 11/13/2024
ms.topic: reference
---
@@ -9,6 +9,24 @@ ms.topic: reference
The following tables list the completed FIPS 140 validations of cryptographic modules used in Windows 10, organized by major release of the operating system. The linked Security Policy document for each module provides details on the module capabilities and the policies the operator must follow to use the module in its FIPS approved mode of operation. For information on using the overall operating system in its FIPS approved mode, see [Use Windows in a FIPS approved mode of operation](../fips-140-validation.md#use-windows-in-a-fips-approved-mode-of-operation). For details on the FIPS approved algorithms used by each module, including CAVP algorithm certificates, see the module's linked Security Policy document or CMVP module certificate.
+## Windows 10, version 21H1 (May 2021 Update)
+
+Build: 10.0.19043. Validated Editions: Pro, Enterprise
+
+|Cryptographic Module (linked to Security Policy document)|CMVP Certificate #|Validated Algorithms|
+|--- |--- |--- |
+|[Cryptographic Primitives Library][sp-4825]|[#4825][certificate-4825]|FIPS Approved: AES, CKG, CVL, DRBG, DSA, ECDSA, ENT (P), HMAC, KAS, KAS-SSC, KBKDF, KTS, PBKDF, RSA, SHS, and Triple-DES|
+|[Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library][sp-4766]|[#4766][certificate-4766]|FIPS Approved: AES, CKG, CVL, DRBG, DSA, ECDSA, ENT (P), HMAC, KAS, KAS-SSC, KBKDF, KTS, PBKDF, RSA, SHS, and Triple-DES|
+
+## Windows 10, version 20H2 (October 2020 Update)
+
+Build: 10.0.19042. Validated Editions: Pro, Enterprise
+
+|Cryptographic Module (linked to Security Policy document)|CMVP Certificate #|Validated Algorithms|
+|--- |--- |--- |
+|[Cryptographic Primitives Library][sp-4825]|[#4825][certificate-4825]|FIPS Approved: AES, CKG, CVL, DRBG, DSA, ECDSA, ENT (P), HMAC, KAS, KAS-SSC, KBKDF, KTS, PBKDF, RSA, SHS, and Triple-DES|
+|[Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library][sp-4766]|[#4766][certificate-4766]|FIPS Approved: AES, CKG, CVL, DRBG, DSA, ECDSA, ENT (P), HMAC, KAS, KAS-SSC, KBKDF, KTS, PBKDF, RSA, SHS, and Triple-DES|
+
## Windows 10, version 2004 (May 2020 Update)
Build: 10.0.19041. Validated Editions: Home, Pro, Enterprise, Education
@@ -257,6 +275,8 @@ Build: 10.0.10240. Validated Editions: Home, Pro, Enterprise, Enterprise LTSB, M
[certificate-4536]: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/certificate/4536
[certificate-4537]: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/certificate/4537
[certificate-4538]: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/certificate/4538
+[certificate-4766]: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/certificate/4766
+[certificate-4825]: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/certificate/4825
@@ -320,3 +340,5 @@ Build: 10.0.10240. Validated Editions: Home, Pro, Enterprise, Enterprise LTSB, M
[sp-4536]: https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/security-policies/140sp4536.pdf
[sp-4537]: https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/security-policies/140sp4537.pdf
[sp-4538]: https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/security-policies/140sp4537.pdf
+[sp-4766]: https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/security-policies/140sp4766.pdf
+[sp-4825]: https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/security-policies/140sp4825.pdf
diff --git a/windows/security/security-foundations/certification/validations/fips-140-windows11.md b/windows/security/security-foundations/certification/validations/fips-140-windows11.md
index bf551c22b5..f9b596134b 100644
--- a/windows/security/security-foundations/certification/validations/fips-140-windows11.md
+++ b/windows/security/security-foundations/certification/validations/fips-140-windows11.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: FIPS 140 validated modules for Windows 11
description: This topic lists the completed FIPS 140 cryptographic module validations for Windows 11.
-ms.date: 2/1/2024
+ms.date: 11/12/2024
ms.topic: reference
---
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ Build: 10.0.22000. Validated Edition: Windows 11
|Cryptographic Module (linked to Security Policy document)|CMVP Certificate #|Validated Algorithms|
|--- |--- |--- |
|[Boot Manager][sp-4546]|[#4546][certificate-4546]|FIPS Approved: AES, CKG, HMAC, PBKDF, RSA, and SHS|
+|[Cryptographic Primitives Library][sp-4825]|[#4825][certificate-4825]|FIPS Approved: AES, CKG, CVL, DRBG, DSA, ECDSA, ENT (P), HMAC, KAS, KAS-SSC, KBKDF, KTS, PBKDF, RSA, SHS, and Triple-DES|
+|[Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library][sp-4766]|[#4766][certificate-4766]|FIPS Approved: AES, CKG, CVL, DRBG, DSA, ECDSA, ENT (P), HMAC, KAS, KAS-SSC, KBKDF, KTS, PBKDF, RSA, SHS, and Triple-DES|
---
@@ -24,7 +26,11 @@ Build: 10.0.22000. Validated Edition: Windows 11
[certificate-4546]: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/certificate/4546
+[certificate-4766]: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/certificate/4766
+[certificate-4825]: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/certificate/4825
[sp-4546]: https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/security-policies/140sp4546.pdf
+[sp-4766]: https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/security-policies/140sp4766.pdf
+[sp-4825]: https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/security-policies/140sp4825.pdf
diff --git a/windows/security/security-foundations/index.md b/windows/security/security-foundations/index.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0275431b52..0000000000
--- a/windows/security/security-foundations/index.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
----
-title: Windows security foundations
-description: Get an overview of security foundations, including the security development lifecycle, common criteria, and the bug bounty program.
-ms.topic: overview
-ms.date: 04/10/2024
-author: paolomatarazzo
-ms.author: paoloma
----
-
-# Windows security foundations
-
-Microsoft is committed to continuously invest in improving our software development process, building highly secure-by-design software, and addressing security compliance requirements. At Microsoft, we embed security and privacy considerations from the earliest life-cycle phases of all our software development processes. We build in security from the ground for powerful defense in today's threat environment.
-
-Our strong security foundation uses Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) Bug Bounty, support for product security standards and certifications, and Azure Code signing. As a result, we improve security by producing software with fewer defects and vulnerabilities instead of relying on applying updates after vulnerabilities have been identified.
-
-Use the links in the following table to learn more about the security foundations:
-
-[!INCLUDE [security-foundations](../includes/sections/security-foundations.md)]
diff --git a/windows/security/security-foundations/toc.yml b/windows/security/security-foundations/toc.yml
index 7fc4c3adff..e8439d170b 100644
--- a/windows/security/security-foundations/toc.yml
+++ b/windows/security/security-foundations/toc.yml
@@ -1,8 +1,4 @@
items:
-- name: Overview
- href: index.md
-- name: Zero Trust and Windows
- href: zero-trust-windows-device-health.md
- name: Offensive research
items:
- name: Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle 🔗
diff --git a/windows/security/security-foundations/zero-trust-windows-device-health.md b/windows/security/security-foundations/zero-trust-windows-device-health.md
deleted file mode 100644
index cacb76f47d..0000000000
--- a/windows/security/security-foundations/zero-trust-windows-device-health.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
----
-title: Zero Trust and Windows device health
-description: Describes the process of Windows device health attestation
-ms.topic: concept-article
-manager: aaroncz
-ms.author: paoloma
-author: paolomatarazzo
-ms.date: 09/06/2024
----
-
-# Zero Trust and Windows device health
-
-Organizations need a security model that more effectively adapts to the complexity of the modern work environment. IT admins need to embrace the hybrid workplace, while protecting people, devices, apps, and data wherever they're located. Implementing a Zero Trust model for security helps address today's complex environments.
-
-The [Zero Trust](https://www.microsoft.com/security/business/zero-trust) principles are:
-
-- **Verify explicitly**. Always authenticate and authorize based on all available data points, including user identity, location, device health, service or workload, data classification, and monitor anomalies
-- **Use least-privileged access**. Limit user access with just-in-time and just-enough-access, risk-based adaptive policies, and data protection to help secure data and maintain productivity
-- **Assume breach**. Prevent attackers from obtaining access to minimize potential damage to data and systems. Protect privileged roles, verify end-to-end encryption, use analytics to get visibility, and drive threat detection to improve defenses
-
-The Zero Trust concept of **verify explicitly** applies to the risks introduced by both devices and users. Windows enables **device health attestation** and **conditional access** capabilities, which are used to grant access to corporate resources.
-
-[Conditional access](/azure/active-directory/conditional-access/overview) evaluates identity signals to confirm that users are who they say they are before they're granted access to corporate resources.
-
-Windows 11 supports device health attestation, helping to confirm that devices are in a good state and haven't been tampered with. This capability helps users access corporate resources whether they're in the office, at home, or when they're traveling.
-
-Attestation helps verify the identity and status of essential components and that the device, firmware, and boot process haven't been altered. Information about the firmware, boot process, and software, is used to validate the security state of the device. This information is cryptographically stored in the security co-processor Trusted Platform Module (TPM). Once the device is attested, it can be granted access to resources.
-
-## Device health attestation on Windows
-
- Many security risks can emerge during the boot process as this process can be the most privileged component of the whole system. The verification process uses remote attestation as the secure channel to determine and present the device's health. Remote attestation determines:
-
-- If the device can be trusted
-- If the operating system booted correctly
-- If the OS has the right set of security features enabled
-
-These determinations are made with the help of a secure root of trust using the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). Devices can attest that the TPM is enabled, and that the device hasn't been tampered with.
-
-Windows includes many security features to help protect users from malware and attacks. However, trusting the Windows security components can only be achieved if the platform boots as expected and wasn't tampered with. Windows relies on Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Secure Boot, Early-launch antimalware (ELAM), Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (DRTM), Trusted Boot, and other low-level hardware and firmware security features. When you power on your PC until your anti-malware starts, Windows is backed with the appropriate hardware configuration to help keep you safe. [Measured and Trusted boot](../operating-system-security/system-security/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process.md), implemented by bootloaders and BIOS, verifies and cryptographically records each step of the boot in a chained manner. These events are bound to a security coprocessor (TPM) that acts as the Root of Trust. Remote Attestation is the mechanism by which these events are read and verified by a service to provide a verifiable, unbiased, and tamper resilient report. Remote attestation is the trusted auditor of your system's boot, allowing specific entities to trust the device.
-
-A summary of the steps involved in attestation and Zero Trust on the device side are as follows:
-
-1. During each step of the boot process, such as a file load, update of special variables, and more, information such as file hashes and signature are measured in the TPM PCRs. The measurements are bound by a [Trusted Computing Group specification](https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/pc-client-platform-tpm-profile-ptp-specification/) (TCG) that dictates what events can be recorded and the format of each event
-1. Once Windows has booted, the attestor/verifier requests the TPM to fetch the measurements stored in its Platform Configuration Register (PCR) alongside a TCG log. The measurements in both these components together form the attestation evidence that is then sent to the attestation service
-1. The TPM is verified by using the keys/cryptographic material available on the chipset with an [Azure Certificate Service](/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/tpm-key-attestation)
-1. This information is then sent to the attestation service in the cloud to verify that the device is safe. Microsoft Endpoint Manger integrates with Microsoft Azure Attestation to review device health comprehensively and connect this information with Microsoft Entra Conditional Access. This integration is key for Zero Trust solutions that help bind trust to an untrusted device
-1. The attestation service does the following tasks:
-
- - Verify the integrity of the evidence. This verification is done by validating the PCRs that match the values recomputed by replaying the TCG log
- - Verify that the TPM has a valid Attestation Identity Key issued by the authenticated TPM
- - Verify that the security features are in the expected states
-
-1. The attestation service returns an attestation report that contains information about the security features based on the policy configured in the attestation service
-1. The device then sends the report to the Microsoft Intune cloud to assess the trustworthiness of the platform according to the admin-configured device compliance rules
-1. Conditional access, along with device-compliance state then decides to allow or deny access
-
-## Other Resources
-
-Learn more about Microsoft Zero Trust solutions in the [Zero Trust Guidance Center](/security/zero-trust/).
diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md
index 5b5fb3e06e..327b1336ab 100644
--- a/windows/security/threat-protection/overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md
+++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ Windows 10 mitigations that you can configure are listed in the following two ta
| **Windows Defender SmartScreen** helps prevent malicious applications from being downloaded | Windows Defender SmartScreen can check the reputation of a downloaded application by using a service that Microsoft maintains. The first time a user runs an app that originates from the Internet (even if the user copied it from another PC), SmartScreen checks to see if the app lacks a reputation or is known to be malicious, and responds accordingly. **More information**: [Windows Defender SmartScreen](#windows-defender-smartscreen), later in this topic |
| **Credential Guard** helps keep attackers from gaining access through Pass-the-Hash or Pass-the-Ticket attacks | Credential Guard uses virtualization-based security to isolate secrets, such as NTLM password hashes and Kerberos Ticket Granting Tickets, so that only privileged system software can access them. Credential Guard is included in Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows Server 2016. **More information**: [Protect derived domain credentials with Credential Guard](/windows/access-protection/credential-guard/credential-guard) |
| **Enterprise certificate pinning** helps prevent man-in-the-middle attacks that use PKI | Enterprise certificate pinning enables you to protect your internal domain names from chaining to unwanted certificates or to fraudulently issued certificates. With enterprise certificate pinning, you can "pin" (associate) an X.509 certificate and its public key to its Certification Authority, either root or leaf. **More information**: [Enterprise Certificate Pinning](/windows/access-protection/enterprise-certificate-pinning) |
-| **Device Guard** helps keep a device from running malware or other untrusted apps | Device Guard includes a Code Integrity policy that you create; an allowlist of trusted apps—the only apps allowed to run in your organization. Device Guard also includes a powerful system mitigation called hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI), which uses virtualization-based security (VBS) to protect Windows' kernel-mode code integrity validation process. HVCI has specific hardware requirements, and works with Code Integrity policies to help stop attacks even if they gain access to the kernel. Device Guard is included in Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows Server 2016. **More information**: [Introduction to Device Guard](/windows/device-security/device-guard/introduction-to-device-guard-virtualization-based-security-and-code-integrity-policies) |
+| **Device Guard** helps keep a device from running malware or other untrusted apps | Device Guard includes a Code Integrity policy that you create; an allowlist of trusted apps—the only apps allowed to run in your organization. Device Guard also includes a powerful system mitigation called hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI), which uses virtualization-based security (VBS) to protect Windows' kernel-mode code integrity validation process. HVCI has specific hardware requirements, and works with Code Integrity policies to help stop attacks even if they gain access to the kernel. Device Guard is included in Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows Server 2016. **More information**: [Introduction to Device Guard](/windows/security/application-security/application-control/introduction-to-virtualization-based-security-and-appcontrol) |
| **Microsoft Defender Antivirus**, which helps keep devices free of viruses and other malware | Windows 10 includes Microsoft Defender Antivirus, a robust inbox anti-malware solution. Microsoft Defender Antivirus has been improved significantly since it was introduced in Windows 8. **More information**: [Microsoft Defender Antivirus](#microsoft-defender-antivirus), later in this topic |
| **Blocking of untrusted fonts** helps prevent fonts from being used in elevation-of-privilege attacks | Block Untrusted Fonts is a setting that allows you to prevent users from loading fonts that are "untrusted" onto your network, which can mitigate elevation-of-privilege attacks associated with the parsing of font files. However, as of Windows 10, version 1703, this mitigation is less important, because font parsing is isolated in an [AppContainer sandbox](/windows/win32/secauthz/appcontainer-isolation) (for a list describing this and other kernel pool protections, see [Kernel pool protections](#kernel-pool-protections), later in this topic). **More information**: [Block untrusted fonts in an enterprise](/windows/threat-protection/block-untrusted-fonts-in-enterprise) |
| **Memory protections** help prevent malware from using memory manipulation techniques such as buffer overruns | These mitigations, listed in [Table 2](#table-2), help to protect against memory-based attacks, where malware or other code manipulates memory to gain control of a system (for example, malware that attempts to use buffer overruns to inject malicious executable code into memory. Note: A subset of apps won't be able to run if some of these mitigations are set to their most restrictive settings. Testing can help you maximize protection while still allowing these apps to run. **More information**: [Table 2](#table-2), later in this topic |
@@ -88,14 +88,14 @@ For more information, see [Microsoft Defender SmartScreen overview](/windows/sec
Microsoft Defender Antivirus in Windows 10 uses a multi-pronged approach to improve anti-malware:
+- **Tamper proofing** helps guard Microsoft Defender Antivirus itself against malware attacks. For example, Microsoft Defender Antivirus uses Protected Processes, which prevents untrusted processes from attempting to tamper with Microsoft Defender Antivirus components, its registry keys, and so on. ([Protected Processes](#protected-processes) is described later in this topic.)
+
- **Cloud-delivered protection** helps detect and block new malware within seconds, even if the malware has never been seen before. The service, available as of Windows 10, version 1703, uses distributed resources and machine learning to deliver protection to endpoints at a rate that is far faster than traditional signature updates.
-- **Rich local context** improves how malware is identified. Windows 10 informs Microsoft Defender Antivirus not only about content like files and processes but also where the content came from, where it has been stored, and more. The information about source and history enables Microsoft Defender Antivirus to apply different levels of scrutiny to different content.
+- **Rich local context** improves how malware is identified. Windows 11 informs Microsoft Defender Antivirus not only about content like files and processes but also where the content came from, where it has been stored, and more. The information about source and history enables Microsoft Defender Antivirus to apply different levels of scrutiny to different content.
- **Extensive global sensors** help keep Microsoft Defender Antivirus current and aware of even the newest malware. This up-to-date status is accomplished in two ways: by collecting the rich local context data from end points and by centrally analyzing that data.
-- **Tamper proofing** helps guard Microsoft Defender Antivirus itself against malware attacks. For example, Microsoft Defender Antivirus uses Protected Processes, which prevents untrusted processes from attempting to tamper with Microsoft Defender Antivirus components, its registry keys, and so on. ([Protected Processes](#protected-processes) is described later in this topic.)
-
- **Enterprise-level features** give IT pros the tools and configuration options necessary to make Microsoft Defender Antivirus an enterprise-class anti-malware solution.
diff --git a/windows/security/toc.yml b/windows/security/toc.yml
index 6fbbd83941..bb89fd8728 100644
--- a/windows/security/toc.yml
+++ b/windows/security/toc.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
items:
-- name: Introduction to Windows security
- href: introduction.md
- name: Windows 11 security book 🔗
href: book/index.md
- name: Security features licensing and edition requirements
diff --git a/windows/whats-new/deprecated-features.md b/windows/whats-new/deprecated-features.md
index a12c5b5eb4..386b0a681f 100644
--- a/windows/whats-new/deprecated-features.md
+++ b/windows/whats-new/deprecated-features.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
title: Deprecated features in the Windows client
description: Review the list of features that Microsoft is no longer actively developing in Windows 10 and Windows 11.
-ms.date: 10/01/2024
+ms.date: 11/14/2024
ms.service: windows-client
ms.subservice: itpro-fundamentals
ms.localizationpriority: medium
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ The features in this article are no longer being actively developed, and might b
| TLS server authentication certificates using RSA keys with key lengths shorter than 2048 bits | Support for certificates using RSA keys with key lengths shorter than 2048 bits will be deprecated. Internet standards and regulatory bodies disallowed the use of 1024-bit keys in 2013, recommending specifically that RSA keys should have a key length of 2048 bits or longer. For more information, see [Transitioning of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes - Discussion Paper (nist.gov)](https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/Key-Management/documents/transitions/Transitioning_CryptoAlgos_070209.pdf). This deprecation focuses on ensuring that all RSA certificates used for TLS server authentication must have key lengths greater than or equal to 2048 bits to be considered valid by Windows. TLS certificates issued by enterprise or test certification authorities (CA) aren't impacted with this change. However, we recommend that they be updated to RSA keys greater than or equal to 2048 bits as a security best practice. This change is necessary to preserve security of Windows customers using certificates for authentication and cryptographic purposes.| March 2024|
| Test Base | [Test Base for Microsoft 365](/microsoft-365/test-base/overview), an Azure cloud service for application testing, is deprecated. The service will be retired in the future and will be no longer available for use after retirement. | March 2024 |
| Windows Mixed Reality | [Windows Mixed Reality](/windows/mixed-reality/enthusiast-guide/before-you-start) is deprecated and will be removed in Windows 11, version 24H2. This deprecation includes the [Mixed Reality Portal](/windows/mixed-reality/enthusiast-guide/install-windows-mixed-reality) app, [Windows Mixed Reality for SteamVR](/windows/mixed-reality/enthusiast-guide/using-steamvr-with-windows-mixed-reality), and Steam VR Beta. Existing Windows Mixed Reality devices will continue to work with Steam through November 2026, if users remain on their current released version of Windows 11, version 23H2. After November 2026, Windows Mixed Reality will no longer receive security updates, nonsecurity updates, bug fixes, technical support, or online technical content updates. This deprecation doesn't affect HoloLens. We remain committed to HoloLens and our enterprise customers. | December 2023 |
-| Microsoft Defender Application Guard for Edge | [Microsoft Defender Application Guard](/windows/security/application-security/application-isolation/microsoft-defender-application-guard/md-app-guard-overview), including the [Windows Isolated App Launcher APIs](/windows/win32/api/isolatedapplauncher/), is being deprecated for Microsoft Edge for Business and [will no longer be updated](feature-lifecycle.md). To learn more about Edge for Business security capabilities, see [Microsoft Edge security for your business](/deployedge/ms-edge-security-for-business). **[Update - April 2024]**: Because Application Guard is deprecated there will not be a migration to Edge Manifest V3. The corresponding extensions and associated Windows Store app will not be available after May 2024. This affects the following browsers: *Application Guard Extension - Chrome* and *Application Guard Extension - Firefox*. If you want to block unprotected browsers until you are ready to retire MDAG usage in your enterprise, we recommend using AppLocker policies or [Microsoft Edge management service](/deployedge/microsoft-edge-management-service). For more information, see [Microsoft Edge and Microsoft Defender Application Guard](/deployedge/microsoft-edge-security-windows-defender-application-guard). | December 2023 |
+| Microsoft Defender Application Guard for Edge | [Microsoft Defender Application Guard](/windows/security/application-security/application-isolation/microsoft-defender-application-guard/md-app-guard-overview), including the [Windows Isolated App Launcher APIs](/windows/win32/api/isolatedapplauncher/), is deprecated for Microsoft Edge for Business and [will no longer be updated](feature-lifecycle.md). To learn more about Edge for Business security capabilities, see [Microsoft Edge security for your business](/deployedge/ms-edge-security-for-business). **[Update - October 2024]**: Starting with Windows 11, version 24H2, Microsoft Defender Application Guard, including the [Windows Isolated App Launcher APIs](/windows/win32/api/isolatedapplauncher/), is no longer available. **[Update - April 2024]**: Because Application Guard is deprecated there will not be a migration to Edge Manifest V3. The corresponding extensions and associated Windows Store app will not be available after May 2024. This affects the following browsers: *Application Guard Extension - Chrome* and *Application Guard Extension - Firefox*. If you want to block unprotected browsers until you are ready to retire MDAG usage in your enterprise, we recommend using AppLocker policies or [Microsoft Edge management service](/deployedge/microsoft-edge-management-service). For more information, see [Microsoft Edge and Microsoft Defender Application Guard](/deployedge/microsoft-edge-security-windows-defender-application-guard). | December 2023 |
| Legacy console mode | The [legacy console mode](/windows/console/legacymode) is deprecated and no longer being updated. In future Windows releases, it will be available as an optional [Feature on Demand](/windows-hardware/manufacture/desktop/features-on-demand-v2--capabilities). This feature won't be installed by default. | December 2023 |
| Windows speech recognition | [Windows speech recognition](https://support.microsoft.com/windows/83ff75bd-63eb-0b6c-18d4-6fae94050571) is deprecated and is no longer being developed. This feature is being replaced with [voice access](https://support.microsoft.com/topic/4dcd23ee-f1b9-4fd1-bacc-862ab611f55d). Voice access is available for Windows 11, version 22H2, or later devices. Currently, voice access supports five English locales: English - US, English - UK, English - India, English - New Zealand, English - Canada, and English - Australia. For more information, see [Setup voice access](https://support.microsoft.com/topic/set-up-voice-access-9fc44e29-12bf-4d86-bc4e-e9bb69df9a0e). | December 2023 |
| Microsoft Defender Application Guard for Office | [Microsoft Defender Application Guard for Office](/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/app-guard-for-office-install), including the [Windows Isolated App Launcher APIs](/windows/win32/api/isolatedapplauncher/), is being deprecated and will no longer be updated. We recommend transitioning to Microsoft Defender for Endpoint [attack surface reduction rules](/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/overview-attack-surface-reduction) along with [Protected View](/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/recommended-settings-for-eop-and-office365#global-settings-for-safe-attachments) and [Windows Defender Application Control](/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/wdac). | November 2023 |
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ The features in this article are no longer being actively developed, and might b
| Microsoft Edge | The legacy version of Microsoft Edge is no longer being developed.| 2004 |
| Companion Device Framework | The [Companion Device Framework](/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/windows-hello-companion-device-framework) is no longer under active development.| 2004 |
| Dynamic Disks | The [Dynamic Disks](/windows/win32/fileio/basic-and-dynamic-disks#dynamic-disks) feature is no longer being developed. This feature will be fully replaced by [Storage Spaces](/windows-server/storage/storage-spaces/overview) in a future release.| 2004 |
-| Microsoft BitLocker Administration and Monitoring (MBAM)| [Microsoft BitLocker Administration and Monitoring (MBAM)](/microsoft-desktop-optimization-pack/mbam-v25/), part of the [Microsoft Desktop Optimization Pack (MDOP)](/lifecycle/announcements/mdop-extended) is no longer being developed. | September 2019 |
+| Microsoft Desktop Optimization Pack (MDOP) | The [Microsoft Desktop Optimization Pack (MDOP)](/lifecycle/announcements/mdop-extended) is no longer being developed. End of extended support is April 14, 2026. This end of support includes the [User Experience Virtualization (UE-V) client in Windows](/microsoft-desktop-optimization-pack/ue-v/uev-for-windows). As of November 2024, the [Application Virtualization (App-V) client in Windows](/microsoft-desktop-optimization-pack/app-v/appv-support-policy) is no longer deprecated and persists with a fixed extended support lifecycle. | September 2019 |
| Language Community tab in Feedback Hub | The Language Community tab will be removed from the Feedback Hub. The standard feedback process: [Feedback Hub - Feedback](feedback-hub://?newFeedback=true&feedbackType=2) is the recommended way to provide translation feedback. | 1909 |
| My People / People in the Shell | My People is no longer being developed. It may be removed in a future update. | 1909 |
| Package State Roaming (PSR) | PSR will be removed in a future update. PSR allows non-Microsoft developers to access roaming data on devices, enabling developers of UWP applications to write data to Windows and synchronize it to other instantiations of Windows for that user. The recommended replacement for PSR is [Azure App Service](/azure/app-service/). Azure App Service is widely supported, well documented, reliable, and supports cross-platform/cross-ecosystem scenarios such as iOS, Android and web. PSR was removed in Windows 11.| 1909 |
diff --git a/windows/whats-new/ltsc/whats-new-windows-11-2024.md b/windows/whats-new/ltsc/whats-new-windows-11-2024.md
index 3fbb4a3529..2e098597d2 100644
--- a/windows/whats-new/ltsc/whats-new-windows-11-2024.md
+++ b/windows/whats-new/ltsc/whats-new-windows-11-2024.md
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ appliesto:
This article lists some of the new and updated features and content that is of interest to IT Pros for Windows 11 Enterprise long-term servicing channel (LTSC) 2024, compared to Windows 10 Enterprise LTSC 2021. For a brief description of the LTSC servicing channel and associated support, see [Windows Enterprise LTSC](overview.md).
-Windows 11 Enterprise LTSC 2024 builds on Windows 10 Enterprise LTSC 2021, adding premium features such as advanced protection against modern security threats and comprehensive device management, app management, and control capabilities.
+Windows 11 Enterprise LTSC 2024 builds on Windows 10 Enterprise LTSC 2021, adding premium features such as advanced protection against modern security threats and comprehensive device management, app management, and control capabilities.
The Windows 11 Enterprise LTSC 2024 release includes the cumulative enhancements provided in Windows 11 versions 21H2, 22H2, 23H2, and 24H2. Details about these enhancements are provided below.
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Windows 11 Enterprise LTSC 2024 was first available on October 1, 2024. Features
| Feature [Release] | Description |
| --- | --- |
-| **Windows accessibility** [22H2][22H2] | Improvements for people with disabilities: system-wide live captions, Focus sessions, voice access, and more natural voices for Narrator. For more information, see: • [New accessibility features coming to Windows 11](https://blogs.windows.com/windowsexperience/2022/05/10/new-accessibility-features-coming-to-windows-11/) • [How inclusion drives innovation in Windows 11](https://blogs.windows.com/windowsexperience/?p=177554) • [Accessibility information for IT professionals](/windows/configuration/windows-10-accessibility-for-itpros). |
+| **Windows accessibility** [22H2][22H2] | Improvements for people with disabilities: system-wide live captions, Focus sessions, voice access, and more natural voices for Narrator. For more information, see: * [New accessibility features coming to Windows 11](https://blogs.windows.com/windowsexperience/2022/05/10/new-accessibility-features-coming-to-windows-11/) * [How inclusion drives innovation in Windows 11](https://blogs.windows.com/windowsexperience/?p=177554) * [Accessibility information for IT professionals](/windows/configuration/windows-10-accessibility-for-itpros). |
| **Braille displays** [23H2][23H2] | Braille displays work seamlessly and reliably across multiple screen readers, improving the end user experience. We also added support for new braille displays and new braille input and output languages in Narrator. For more information, see [Accessibility information for IT professionals](/windows/configuration/windows-accessibility-for-ITPros). |
| **Narrator improvements** [23H2][23H2] | Scripting functionality was added to Narrator. Narrator includes more natural voices. For more information, see [Complete guide to Narrator](https://support.microsoft.com/topic/e4397a0d-ef4f-b386-d8ae-c172f109bdb1). |
| **Bluetooth ® LE audio support for assistive devices** [24H2][24H2] | Windows has taken a significant step forward in accessibility by supporting the use of assistive hearing devices equipped with the latest Bluetooth ® Low Energy Audio technology. For more information, see [Using hearing devices with your Windows 11 PC](https://support.microsoft.com/topic/fcb566e7-13c3-491a-ad5b-8219b098d647). |
@@ -95,15 +95,15 @@ The security and privacy features in Windows 11 are similar to Windows 10. Secur
| --- | --- |
| **Windows Security app** [21H2][21H2] | Windows Security app is an easy-to-use interface, and combines commonly used security features. For example, your get access to virus & threat protection, firewall & network protection, account protection, and more. For more information, see [the Windows Security app](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-security-center/windows-defender-security-center). |
| **Security baselines** [21H2][21H2] | Security baselines include security settings that are already configured, and ready to be deployed to your devices. If you don't know where to start, or it's too time consuming to go through all the settings, then you should look at Security Baselines. For more information, see [Windows security baselines](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-security-configuration-framework/windows-security-baselines). |
-| **Microsoft Defender Antivirus** [21H2][21H2] | Microsoft Defender Antivirus helps protect devices using next-generation security. When used with Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, your organization gets strong endpoint protection, and advanced endpoint protection & response. If you use Intune to manage devices, then you can create policies based on threat levels in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. For more information, see: • [Microsoft Defender Antivirus](/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/microsoft-defender-antivirus-windows) • [Microsoft Defender for Endpoint](/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/microsoft-defender-endpoint) • [Enforce compliance for Microsoft Defender for Endpoint](/mem/intune/protect/advanced-threat-protection) |
+| **Microsoft Defender Antivirus** [21H2][21H2] | Microsoft Defender Antivirus helps protect devices using next-generation security. When used with Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, your organization gets strong endpoint protection, and advanced endpoint protection & response. If you use Intune to manage devices, then you can create policies based on threat levels in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. For more information, see: * [Microsoft Defender Antivirus](/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/microsoft-defender-antivirus-windows) * [Microsoft Defender for Endpoint](/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/microsoft-defender-endpoint) * [Enforce compliance for Microsoft Defender for Endpoint](/mem/intune/protect/advanced-threat-protection) |
| **Application Security** [21H2][21H2] | The Application Security features help prevent unwanted or malicious code from running, isolate untrusted websites & untrusted Office files, protect against phishing or malware websites, and more. For more information, see [Windows application security](/windows/security/apps). |
| **Microsoft Pluton** [22H2][22H2] | Pluton, designed by Microsoft and built by silicon partners, is a secure crypto-processor built into the CPU. Pluton provides security at the core to ensure code integrity and the latest protection with updates delivered by Microsoft through Windows Update. Pluton protects credentials, identities, personal data, and encryption keys. Information is harder to be removed even if an attacker installed malware or has complete physical possession. For more information, see [Microsoft Pluton security processor](/windows/security/information-protection/pluton/microsoft-pluton-security-processor). |
-| **Enhanced Phishing Protection** [22H2][22H2] | Enhanced Phishing Protection in Microsoft Defender SmartScreen helps protect Microsoft passwords against phishing and unsafe usage. Enhanced Phishing Protection works alongside Windows security protections to help protect sign-in passwords. For more information, see: • [Enhanced Phishing Protection in Microsoft Defender SmartScreen](/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-smartscreen/phishing-protection-microsoft-defender-smartscreen) • [Protect passwords with enhanced phishing protection](https://aka.ms/EnhancedPhishingProtectionBlog) in the Windows IT Pro blog. |
+| **Enhanced Phishing Protection** [22H2][22H2] | Enhanced Phishing Protection in Microsoft Defender SmartScreen helps protect Microsoft passwords against phishing and unsafe usage. Enhanced Phishing Protection works alongside Windows security protections to help protect sign-in passwords. For more information, see: * [Enhanced Phishing Protection in Microsoft Defender SmartScreen](/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-smartscreen/phishing-protection-microsoft-defender-smartscreen) * [Protect passwords with enhanced phishing protection](https://aka.ms/EnhancedPhishingProtectionBlog) in the Windows IT Pro blog. |
| **Smart App Control** [22H2][22H2] | Smart App Control adds significant protection from malware, including new and emerging threats, by blocking apps that are malicious or untrusted. Smart App Control helps block unwanted apps that affect performance, display unexpected ads, offer extra software you didn't want, and other things you don't expect. For more information, see [Smart App Control](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/windows-defender-application-control#wdac-and-smart-app-control). |
| **Credential Guard** [22H2][22H2] | Credential Guard, enabled by default, uses Virtualization-based security (VBS) to isolate secrets so that only privileged system software can access them. Unauthorized access to these secrets can lead to credential theft attacks like pass the hash and pass the ticket. For more information, see [Configure Credential Guard](/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/configure).|
| **Malicious and vulnerable driver blocking** [22H2][22H2] | The vulnerable driver blocklist is automatically enabled on devices when Smart App Control is enabled and for clean installs of Windows. For more information, see [recommended block rules](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-block-rules#microsoft-vulnerable-driver-blocklist).|
| **Security hardening and threat protection** [22H2][22H2] | Enhanced support with Local Security Authority (LSA) to prevent code injection that could compromise credentials. For more information, see [Configuring Additional LSA Protection](/windows-server/security/credentials-protection-and-management/configuring-additional-lsa-protection?toc=/windows/security/toc.json&bc=/windows/security/breadcrumb/toc.json). |
-| **Personal Data Encryption (PDE)** [22H2][22H2] | [Personal Data Encryption (PDE)](/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/) is a security feature that provides file-based data encryption capabilities to Windows. PDE utilizes Windows Hello for Business to link data encryption keys with user credentials. When a user signs in to a device using Windows Hello for Business, decryption keys are released, and encrypted data is accessible to the user. |
+| **Personal Data Encryption** [22H2][22H2] | [Personal Data Encryption](/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption/) is a security feature that provides file-based data encryption capabilities to Windows. Personal Data Encryption utilizes Windows Hello for Business to link data encryption keys with user credentials. When a user signs in to a device using Windows Hello for Business, decryption keys are released, and encrypted data is accessible to the user. |
| **Passkeys in Windows** [23H2][23H2] | Windows provides a native experience for passkey management. You can use the Settings app to view and manage passkeys saved for apps or websites. For more information, see [Support for passkeys in Windows](/windows/security/identity-protection/passkeys). |
| **Windows passwordless experience** [23H2][23H2] | Windows passwordless experience is a security policy that promotes a user experience without passwords on [Microsoft Entra](https://www.microsoft.com/security/business/microsoft-entra?ef_id=_k_910ee369e9a812f6048b86296a6a402c_k_&OCID=AIDcmmdamuj0pc_SEM__k_910ee369e9a812f6048b86296a6a402c_k_&msclkid=910ee369e9a812f6048b86296a6a402c) joined devices. When the policy is enabled, certain Windows authentication scenarios don't offer users the option to use a password, helping organizations and preparing users to gradually move away from passwords. For more information, see [Windows passwordless experience](/windows/security/identity-protection/passwordless-experience/). |
| **Web sign-in for Windows** [23H2][23H2] | You can enable a web-based sign-in experience on [Microsoft Entra](https://www.microsoft.com/security/business/microsoft-entra?ef_id=_k_910ee369e9a812f6048b86296a6a402c_k_&OCID=AIDcmmdamuj0pc_SEM__k_910ee369e9a812f6048b86296a6a402c_k_&msclkid=910ee369e9a812f6048b86296a6a402c) joined devices, unlocking new sign-in options, and capabilities. For more information, see [Web sign-in for Windows](/windows/security/identity-protection/web-sign-in). |
@@ -112,10 +112,10 @@ The security and privacy features in Windows 11 are similar to Windows 10. Secur
| **App Control for Business** [24H2][24H2] | Customers can now use App Control for Business (formerly called Windows Defender Application Control) and its next-generation capabilities to protect their digital property from malicious code. With App Control for Business, IT teams can configure what runs in a business environment through Microsoft Intune or other MDMs in the admin console, including setting up Intune as a managed installer. For more information, see [Application Control for Windows](/windows/security/application-security/application-control/app-control-for-business/appcontrol).|
| **Local Security Authority (LSA) protection enablement** [24H2][24H2]| An audit occurs for incompatibilities with [LSA protection](/windows-server/security/credentials-protection-and-management/configuring-additional-lsa-protection) for a period of time, starting with this upgrade. If incompatibilities aren't detected, LSA protection is automatically enabled. You can check and change the enablement state of LSA protection in the Windows Security application under the **Device Security** > **Core Isolation** page. In the event log, [LSA protection logs](/windows-server/security/credentials-protection-and-management/configuring-additional-lsa-protection#identify-plug-ins-and-drivers-that-lsassexe-fails-to-load) whether programs are blocked from loading into LSA. |
| **Rust in the Windows kernel** [24H2][24H2] | There's a new implementation of [GDI region](/windows/win32/gdi/regions) in `win32kbase_rs.sys`. Since Rust offers advantages in reliability and security over traditional programs written in C/C++, you'll continue to see more use of it in the kernel. |
-| **SHA-3 support** [24H2][24H2] | Support for the SHA-3 family of hash functions and SHA-3 derived functions (SHAKE, cSHAKE, KMAC) was added. The SHA-3 family of algorithms is the latest standardized hash functions by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Support for these functions is enabled through the Windows [CNG](/windows/win32/seccng/cng-portal) library. |
+| **SHA-3 support** [24H2][24H2] | Support for the SHA-3 family of hash functions and SHA-3 derived functions (SHAKE, cSHAKE, KMAC) was added. The SHA-3 family of algorithms is the latest standardized hash functions by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Support for these functions is enabled through the Windows [CNG](/windows/win32/seccng/cng-portal) library. |
| **Windows Local Admin Password Solution (LAPS)** [24H2][24H2] | Windows Local Administrator Password Solution (Windows LAPS) is a Windows feature that automatically manages and backs up the password of a local administrator account on your Microsoft Entra joined or Windows Server Active Directory-joined devices. Windows LAPS is the successor for the now deprecated legacy Microsoft LAPS product. For more information, see [What is Windows LAPS?](/windows-server/identity/laps/laps-overview)|
-| **Windows LAPS** Automatic account management [24H2][24H2] | [Windows Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS)](/windows-server/identity/laps/laps-overview) has a new automatic account management feature. Admins can configure Windows LAPS to: • Automatically create the managed local account • Configure name of account • Enable or disable the account • Randomize the name of the account |
-| **Windows LAPS** Policy improvements [24H2][24H2]| • Added passphrase settings for the [PasswordComplexity](/windows/client-management/mdm/laps-csp#policiespasswordcomplexity) policy • Use [PassphraseLength](/windows/client-management/mdm/laps-csp#policiespassphraselength) to control the number of words in a new passphrase • Added an improved readability setting for the [PasswordComplexity](/windows/client-management/mdm/laps-csp#policiespasswordcomplexity) policy, which generates passwords without using characters that are easily confused with another character. For example, the number 0 and the letter O aren't used in the password since the characters can be confused. • Added the `Reset the password, logoff the managed account, and terminate any remaining processes` setting to the [PostAuthenticationActions](/windows/client-management/mdm/laps-csp#policiespostauthenticationactions) policy. The event logging messages that are emitted during post-authentication-action execution were also expanded, to give insights into exactly what was done during the operation. |
+| **Windows LAPS** Automatic account management [24H2][24H2] | [Windows Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS)](/windows-server/identity/laps/laps-overview) has a new automatic account management feature. Admins can configure Windows LAPS to: * Automatically create the managed local account * Configure name of account * Enable or disable the account * Randomize the name of the account |
+| **Windows LAPS** Policy improvements [24H2][24H2]| * Added passphrase settings for the [PasswordComplexity](/windows/client-management/mdm/laps-csp#policiespasswordcomplexity) policy * Use [PassphraseLength](/windows/client-management/mdm/laps-csp#policiespassphraselength) to control the number of words in a new passphrase * Added an improved readability setting for the [PasswordComplexity](/windows/client-management/mdm/laps-csp#policiespasswordcomplexity) policy, which generates passwords without using characters that are easily confused with another character. For example, the number 0 and the letter O aren't used in the password since the characters can be confused. * Added the `Reset the password, logoff the managed account, and terminate any remaining processes` setting to the [PostAuthenticationActions](/windows/client-management/mdm/laps-csp#policiespostauthenticationactions) policy. The event logging messages that are emitted during post-authentication-action execution were also expanded, to give insights into exactly what was done during the operation. |
| **Windows LAPS** Image rollback detection [24H2][24H2] | Image rollback detection was introduced for LAPS. LAPS can detect when a device was rolled back to a previous image. When a device is rolled back, the password in Active Directory might not match the password on the device that was rolled back. This new feature adds an Active Directory attribute, `msLAPS-CurrentPasswordVersion`, to the [Windows LAPS schema](/windows-server/identity/laps/laps-technical-reference#mslaps-currentpasswordversion). This attribute contains a random GUID that Windows LAPS writes every time a new password is persisted in Active Directory, followed by saving a local copy. During every processing cycle, the GUID stored in `msLAPS-CurrentPasswordVersion` is queried and compared to the locally persisted copy. If the GUIDs are different, the password is immediately rotated. To enable this feature, you need to run the latest version of the [Update-LapsADSchema PowerShell cmdlet](/powershell/module/laps/update-lapsadschema). |
| **Windows protected print mode** [24H2][24H2] | Windows protected print mode (WPP) enables a modern print stack which is designed to work exclusively with [Mopria certified printers](https://mopria.org/certified-products). For more information, see [What is Windows protected print mode (WPP)](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/security-compliance-and-identity/a-new-modern-and-secure-print-experience-from-windows/ba-p/4002645) and [Windows Insider WPP announcement](https://blogs.windows.com/windows-insider/2023/12/13/announcing-windows-11-insider-preview-build-26016-canary-channel/). |
| **SMB signing requirement changes** [24H2][24H2] | [SMB signing is now required](/windows-server/storage/file-server/smb-signing) by default for all connections. SMB signing ensures every message contains a signature generated using session key and cipher suite. The client puts a hash of the entire message into the signature field of the SMB header. If anyone changes the message itself later on the wire, the hash won't match and SMB knows that someone tampered with the data. It also confirms to sender and receiver that they are who they say they are, breaking relay attacks. For more information about SMB signing being required by default, see [https://aka.ms/SMBSigningOBD](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/storage-at-microsoft/smb-signing-required-by-default-in-windows-insider/ba-p/3831704). |
@@ -123,8 +123,8 @@ The security and privacy features in Windows 11 are similar to Windows 10. Secur
| **SMB signing and encryption auditing** [24H2][24H2] | Administrators can now [enable auditing](/windows-server/storage/file-server/smb-signing-overview#smb-signing-and-encryption-auditing) of the SMB server and client for support of SMB signing and encryption. This shows if a third-party client or server doesn't support SMB encryption or signing. The SMB signing and encryption auditing settings can be modified in Group Policy or through PowerShell. |
| **SMB alternative client and server ports** [24H2][24H2] | The SMB client now supports connecting to an SMB server over TCP, QUIC, or RDMA using [alternative network ports](/windows-server/storage/file-server/smb-ports) to the hardcoded defaults. However, you can only connect to alternative ports if the SMB server is configured to support listening on that port. Starting in [Windows Server Insider build 26040](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-server-insiders/announcing-windows-server-preview-build-26040/m-p/4040858), the SMB server now supports listening on an alternative network port for SMB over QUIC. Windows Server doesn't support configuring alternative SMB server TCP ports, but some third parties do. For more information about this change, see [https://aka.ms/SMBAlternativePorts](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/storage-at-microsoft/smb-alternative-ports-now-supported-in-windows-insider/ba-p/3974509). |
| **SMB NTLM blocking exception list** [24H2][24H2] |The SMB client now supports [blocking NTLM](/windows-server/storage/file-server/smb-ntlm-blocking) for remote outbound connections. With this new option, administrators can intentionally block Windows from offering NTLM via SMB and specify exceptions for NTLM usage. An attacker who tricks a user or application into sending NTLM challenge responses to a malicious server will no longer receive any NTLM data and can't brute force, crack, or pass hashes. This change adds a new level of protection for enterprises without a requirement to entirely disable NTLM usage in the OS. For more information about this change, see [https://aka.ms/SmbNtlmBlock](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/storage-at-microsoft/smb-ntlm-blocking-now-supported-in-windows-insider/ba-p/3916206). |
-| **SMB dialect management** [24H2][24H2] | The SMB server now supports controlling which [SMB 2 and 3 dialects](/windows-server/storage/file-server/manage-smb-dialects) it negotiates. With this new option, an administrator can remove specific SMB protocols from use in the organization, blocking older, less secure, and less capable Windows devices and third parties from connecting. For example, admins can specify to only use SMB 3.1.1, the most secure dialect of the protocol. For more information about this change, see [https://aka.ms/SmbDialectManage](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/storage-at-microsoft/smb-dialect-management-now-supported-in-windows-insider/ba-p/3916368).|
-| **SMB over QUIC client access control** [24H2][24H2] | [SMB over QUIC](/windows-server/storage/file-server/smb-over-quic), which introduced an alternative to TCP and RDMA, supplies secure connectivity to edge file servers over untrusted networks like the Internet. QUIC has significant advantages, the largest being mandatory certificate-based encryption instead of relying on passwords. SMB over QUIC [client access control](/windows-server/storage/file-server/configure-smb-over-quic-client-access-control) improves the existing SMB over QUIC feature. Administrators now have more options for SMB over QUIC such as: • [Specifying which clients](/windows-server/storage/file-server/configure-smb-over-quic-client-access-control#grant-individual-clients) can access SMB over QUIC servers. This gives organizations more protection but doesn't change the Windows authentication used to make the SMB connection or the end user experience. • [Disabling SMB over QUIC](/windows-server/storage/file-server/configure-smb-over-quic-client-access-control#disable-smb-over-quic) for client with Group Policy and PowerShell • [Auditing client connection events](/windows-server/storage/file-server/smb-over-quic#smb-over-quic-client-auditing) for SMB over QUIC For more information about these changes, see [https://aka.ms/SmbOverQUICCAC](/windows-server/storage/file-server/configure-smb-over-quic-client-access-control). |
+| **SMB dialect management** [24H2][24H2] | The SMB server now supports controlling which [SMB 2 and 3 dialects](/windows-server/storage/file-server/manage-smb-dialects) it negotiates. With this new option, an administrator can remove specific SMB protocols from use in the organization, blocking older, less secure, and less capable Windows devices and third parties from connecting. For example, admins can specify to only use SMB 3.1.1, the most secure dialect of the protocol. For more information about this change, see [https://aka.ms/SmbDialectManage](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/storage-at-microsoft/smb-dialect-management-now-supported-in-windows-insider/ba-p/3916368).|
+| **SMB over QUIC client access control** [24H2][24H2] | [SMB over QUIC](/windows-server/storage/file-server/smb-over-quic), which introduced an alternative to TCP and RDMA, supplies secure connectivity to edge file servers over untrusted networks like the Internet. QUIC has significant advantages, the largest being mandatory certificate-based encryption instead of relying on passwords. SMB over QUIC [client access control](/windows-server/storage/file-server/configure-smb-over-quic-client-access-control) improves the existing SMB over QUIC feature. Administrators now have more options for SMB over QUIC such as: * [Specifying which clients](/windows-server/storage/file-server/configure-smb-over-quic-client-access-control#grant-individual-clients) can access SMB over QUIC servers. This gives organizations more protection but doesn't change the Windows authentication used to make the SMB connection or the end user experience. * [Disabling SMB over QUIC](/windows-server/storage/file-server/configure-smb-over-quic-client-access-control#disable-smb-over-quic) for client with Group Policy and PowerShell * [Auditing client connection events](/windows-server/storage/file-server/smb-over-quic#smb-over-quic-client-auditing) for SMB over QUIC For more information about these changes, see [https://aka.ms/SmbOverQUICCAC](/windows-server/storage/file-server/configure-smb-over-quic-client-access-control). |
| **SMB firewall rule changes** [24H2][24H2] | The Windows Firewall [default behavior has changed](/windows-server/storage/file-server/smb-secure-traffic#updated-firewall-rules-preview). Previously, creating an SMB share automatically configured the firewall to enable the rules in the **File and Printer Sharing** group for the given firewall profiles. Now, Windows automatically configures the new **File and Printer Sharing (Restrictive)** group, which no longer contains inbound NetBIOS ports 137-139. This change enforces a higher degree of default of network security and brings SMB firewall rules closer to the Windows Server **File Server** role behavior, which only opens the minimum ports needed to connect and manage sharing. Administrators can still configure the **File and Printer Sharing** group if necessary as well as modify this new firewall group, these are just default behaviors. For more information about this change, see [https://aka.ms/SMBfirewall](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/storage-at-microsoft/smb-firewall-rule-changes-in-windows-insider/ba-p/3974496). For more information about SMB network security, see [Secure SMB Traffic in Windows Server](/windows-server/storage/file-server/smb-secure-traffic). |
## Servicing
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ The security and privacy features in Windows 11 are similar to Windows 10. Secur
| Feature [Release] | Description |
| --- | --- |
-| **Windows Updates and Delivery optimization** [21H2][21H2] | Delivery optimization helps reduce bandwidth consumption. It shares the work of downloading the update packages with multiple devices in your deployment. Windows 11 updates are smaller, as they only pull down source files that are different. You can create policies that configure delivery optimization settings. For example, set the maximum upload and download bandwidth, set caching sizes, and more. For more information, see: • [Delivery Optimization for Windows updates](/windows/deployment/update/waas-delivery-optimization) • [Installation & updates](https://support.microsoft.com/topic/2f9c1819-310d-48a7-ac12-25191269903c#PickTab=Windows_11) • [Manage updates in Windows](https://support.microsoft.com/topic/643e9ea7-3cf6-7da6-a25c-95d4f7f099fe)|
+| **Windows Updates and Delivery optimization** [21H2][21H2] | Delivery optimization helps reduce bandwidth consumption. It shares the work of downloading the update packages with multiple devices in your deployment. Windows 11 updates are smaller, as they only pull down source files that are different. You can create policies that configure delivery optimization settings. For example, set the maximum upload and download bandwidth, set caching sizes, and more. For more information, see: * [Delivery Optimization for Windows updates](/windows/deployment/update/waas-delivery-optimization) * [Installation & updates](https://support.microsoft.com/topic/2f9c1819-310d-48a7-ac12-25191269903c#PickTab=Windows_11) * [Manage updates in Windows](https://support.microsoft.com/topic/643e9ea7-3cf6-7da6-a25c-95d4f7f099fe)|
| **Control Windows Update notifications** [22H2][22H2] | You can now block user notifications for Windows Updates during active hours. This setting is especially useful for organizations that want to prevent Windows Update notifications from occurring during business hours. For more information, see [Control restart notifications](/windows/deployment/update/waas-restart#control-restart-notifications).|
| **Organization name in update notifications** |The organization name now appears in the Windows Update notifications when Windows clients are associated with a Microsoft Entra ID tenant. For more information, see [Display organization name in Windows Update notifications](/windows/deployment/update/waas-wu-settings#bkmk_display-name). |
| **Checkpoint cumulative updates** [24H2][24H2] | Windows quality updates are provided as cumulative updates throughout the life cycle of a Windows release. Checkpoint cumulative updates introduce periodic baselines that reduce the size of future cumulative updates making the distribution of monthly quality updates more efficient. For more information, see [https://aka.ms/CheckpointCumulativeUpdates](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-it-pro-blog/introducing-windows-11-checkpoint-cumulative-updates/ba-p/4182552). |
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ The security and privacy features in Windows 11 are similar to Windows 10. Secur
## Features Removed
-Each version of Windows client adds new features and functionality. Occasionally, [features and functionality are removed](/windows/whats-new/removed-features), often because a newer option was added. For a list of features no longer in active development that might be removed in a future release, see [deprecated features](/windows/whats-new/deprecated-features). The following features are removed in Windows 11 Enterprise LTSC 2024:
+Each version of Windows client adds new features and functionality. Occasionally, [features and functionality are removed](/windows/whats-new/removed-features), often because a newer option was added. For a list of features no longer in active development that might be removed in a future release, see [deprecated features](/windows/whats-new/deprecated-features). The following features are removed in Windows 11 Enterprise LTSC 2024:
| Feature | Description |
|---------|-------------|
@@ -170,5 +170,5 @@ Each version of Windows client adds new features and functionality. Occasionally
[21H2]: ..\windows-11-overview.md
[22H2]: ..\whats-new-windows-11-version-22H2.md
-[23H2]: ..\whats-new-windows-11-version-23h2.md
+[23H2]: ..\whats-new-windows-11-version-23h2.md
[24H2]: ..\whats-new-windows-11-version-24H2.md
diff --git a/windows/whats-new/removed-features.md b/windows/whats-new/removed-features.md
index 7d8297fb4a..461b15d644 100644
--- a/windows/whats-new/removed-features.md
+++ b/windows/whats-new/removed-features.md
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ manager: aaroncz
ms.topic: reference
ms.subservice: itpro-fundamentals
ms.date: 08/23/2024
-ms.collection:
+ms.collection:
- highpri
- tier1
appliesto:
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ The following features and functionalities have been removed from the installed
|Feature | Details and mitigation | Support removed |
| ----------- | --------------------- | ------ |
+| Microsoft Defender Application Guard for Edge | [Microsoft Defender Application Guard](/windows/security/application-security/application-isolation/microsoft-defender-application-guard/md-app-guard-overview), including the [Windows Isolated App Launcher APIs](/windows/win32/api/isolatedapplauncher/), is deprecated for Microsoft Edge for Business and is no longer available starting with Windows 11, version 24H2. | 24H2 |
| WordPad | WordPad is removed from all editions of Windows starting in Windows 11, version 24H2 and Windows Server 2025. We recommend Microsoft Word for rich text documents like .doc and .rtf and Windows Notepad for plain text documents like .txt. If you're a developer and need information about the affected binaries, see [Resources for deprecated features](deprecated-features-resources.md#wordpad). | October 1, 2024 |
| Alljoyn | Microsoft's implementation of AllJoyn, which included the [Windows.Devices.AllJoyn API namespace](/uwp/api/windows.devices.alljoyn), a [Win32 API](/windows/win32/api/_alljoyn/), a [management configuration service provider (CSP)](/windows/client-management/mdm/alljoynmanagement-csp), and an [Alljoyn Router Service](/windows-server/security/windows-services/security-guidelines-for-disabling-system-services-in-windows-server#alljoyn-router-service) is retired. [AllJoyn](https://openconnectivity.org/technology/reference-implementation/alljoyn/), sponsored by AllSeen Alliance, was an open source discovery and communication protocol for Internet of Things scenarios such as turning on/off lights or reading temperatures. AllSeen Alliance promoted the AllJoyn project from 2013 until 2016 when it merged with the Open Connectivity Foundation (OCF), the sponsors of [Iotivity.org](https://iotivity.org/), another protocol for Internet of Things scenarios. Customers should refer to the [Iotivity.org](https://iotivity.org/) website for alternatives such as [Iotivity Lite](https://github.com/iotivity/iotivity-lite) or [Iotivity](https://github.com/iotivity/iotivity). | October 1, 2024 |
| Update Compliance | Update Compliance, a cloud-based service for the Windows client, is retired. This service has been replaced with [Windows Update for Business reports](/windows/deployment/update/wufb-reports-overview), which provides reporting on client compliance with Microsoft updates from the Azure portal. | March 31, 2023 |
diff --git a/windows/whats-new/whats-new-windows-11-version-22H2.md b/windows/whats-new/whats-new-windows-11-version-22H2.md
index a76a1b6abb..3b1f47426d 100644
--- a/windows/whats-new/whats-new-windows-11-version-22H2.md
+++ b/windows/whats-new/whats-new-windows-11-version-22H2.md
@@ -70,9 +70,9 @@ For more information, see [Configuring Additional LSA Protection](/windows-serve
## Personal Data Encryption
-Personal data encryption (PDE) is a security feature introduced in Windows 11, version 22H2 that provides additional encryption features to Windows. PDE differs from BitLocker in that it encrypts individual files instead of whole volumes and disks. PDE occurs in addition to other encryption methods such as BitLocker.
+Personal Data Encryption is a security feature introduced in Windows 11, version 22H2 that provides additional encryption features to Windows. Personal Data Encryption differs from BitLocker in that it encrypts individual files instead of whole volumes and disks. Personal Data Encryption occurs in addition to other encryption methods such as BitLocker.
-PDE utilizes Windows Hello for Business to link data encryption keys with user credentials. This feature can minimize the number of credentials the user has to remember to gain access to files. For example, when using BitLocker with PIN, a user would need to authenticate twice - once with the BitLocker PIN and a second time with Windows credentials. This requirement requires users to remember two different credentials. With PDE, users only need to enter one set of credentials via Windows Hello for Business.
+Personal Data Encryption utilizes Windows Hello for Business to link data encryption keys with user credentials. This feature can minimize the number of credentials the user has to remember to gain access to files. For example, when using BitLocker with PIN, a user would need to authenticate twice - once with the BitLocker PIN and a second time with Windows credentials. This requirement requires users to remember two different credentials. With Personal Data Encryption, users only need to enter one set of credentials via Windows Hello for Business.
For more information, see [Personal Data Encryption](/windows/security/information-protection/personal-data-encryption/overview-pde).
diff --git a/windows/whats-new/whats-new-windows-11-version-24h2.md b/windows/whats-new/whats-new-windows-11-version-24h2.md
index 5c492a24d8..a812a10180 100644
--- a/windows/whats-new/whats-new-windows-11-version-24h2.md
+++ b/windows/whats-new/whats-new-windows-11-version-24h2.md
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ appliesto:
# What's new in Windows 11, version 24H2
-Windows 11, version 24H2 is a feature update for Windows 11. It includes all features and fixes in previous cumulative updates to Windows 11, version 23H2. This article lists the new and updated features IT Pros should know.
+Windows 11, version 24H2 is a feature update for Windows 11. It includes all features and fixes in previous cumulative updates to Windows 11, version 23H2. This article lists the new and updated features IT Pros should know.
>**Looking for consumer information?** See [Windows 11 2024 update](https://support.microsoft.com/topic/93c5c27c-f96e-43c2-a08e-5812d92f220d#windowsupdate=26100).
@@ -42,21 +42,21 @@ To learn more about the status of the update rollout, known issues, and new info
There aren't any features under temporary enterprise control between Windows 11, version 23H2 and Windows 11, version 24H2. For a list of features that were under temporary enterprise control between Windows 11, version 22H2 and Windows 11, version 23H2, see, [Windows 11 features behind temporary enterprise feature control](temporary-enterprise-feature-control.md).
## Checkpoint cumulative updates
-
+
Microsoft is introducing checkpoint cumulative updates, a new servicing model that enables devices running Windows 11, version 24H2 or later to save time, bandwidth and hard drive space when getting features and security enhancements via the latest cumulative update. Previously, the cumulative updates contained all changes to the binaries since the last release to manufacturing (RTM) version. The size of the cumulative updates could grow large over time since RTM was used as the baseline for each update.
With checkpoint cumulative updates, the update file level differentials are based on a previous cumulative update instead of the RTM release. Cumulative updates that serve as a checkpoint will be released periodically. Using a checkpoint rather than RTM means the subsequent update packages are smaller, which makes downloads and installations faster. Using a checkpoint also means that in order for a device to install the latest cumulative update, the installation of a prerequisite cumulative update might be required. For more information about checkpoint cumulative updates, see [https://aka.ms/CheckpointCumulativeUpdates](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-it-pro-blog/introducing-windows-11-checkpoint-cumulative-updates/ba-p/4182552).
## Features exclusive to Copilot+ PCs in 24H2
-Copilot+ PCs are a new class of Windows 11 AI PCs that are powered by a neural processing unit (NPU) that can perform more than 40 trillion operations per second (TOPS). The following features are exclusive to [Copilot+ PCs](https://www.microsoft.com/windows/copilot-plus-pcs) in Windows 11, version 24H2:
+Copilot+ PCs are a new class of Windows 11 AI PCs that are powered by a neural processing unit (NPU) that can perform more than 40 trillion operations per second (TOPS). The following features are exclusive to [Copilot+ PCs](https://www.microsoft.com/windows/copilot-plus-pcs) in Windows 11, version 24H2:
- Live Captions allow you to translate audio and video content into English subtitles from 44 languages. For more information, see [Use live captions to better understand audio](https://support.microsoft.com/topic/b52da59c-14b8-4031-aeeb-f6a47e6055df).
- Windows Studio Effects is the collective name of AI-powered video call and audio effects that are available on Copilot+ PCs and select Windows 11 devices with compatible NPUs. Windows Studio Effects automatically improves lighting and cancels noises during video calls. For more information, see [Windows Studio Effects](https://support.microsoft.com/topic/273c1fa8-2b3f-41b1-a587-7cc7a24b62d8).
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ The following changes were made for SMB signing and encryption:
- **SMB client encryption**: SMB now supports [requiring encryption](/windows-server/storage/file-server/configure-smb-client-require-encryption) on all outbound SMB client connections. Encryption of all outbound SMB client connections enforces the highest level of network security and brings management parity to SMB signing, which allows both client and server requirements. With this new option, administrators can mandate that all destination servers use SMB 3 and encryption, and if missing those capabilities, the client won't connect. For more information about this change, see [https://aka.ms/SmbClientEncrypt](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/storage-at-microsoft/smb-client-encryption-mandate-now-supported-in-windows-insider/ba-p/3964037).
-- **SMB signing and encryption auditing**: Administrators can now [enable auditing](/windows-server/storage/file-server/smb-signing-overview#smb-signing-and-encryption-auditing) of the SMB server and client for support of SMB signing and encryption. This shows if a third-party client or server doesn't support SMB encryption or signing. The SMB signing and encryption auditing settings can be modified in Group Policy or through PowerShell.
+- **SMB signing and encryption auditing**: Administrators can now [enable auditing](/windows-server/storage/file-server/smb-signing-overview#smb-signing-and-encryption-auditing) of the SMB server and client for support of SMB signing and encryption. This shows if a third-party client or server doesn't support SMB encryption or signing. The SMB signing and encryption auditing settings can be modified in Group Policy or through PowerShell.
#### SMB alternative client and server ports
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ For more information about this change, see [https://aka.ms/SmbDialectManage](ht
[SMB over QUIC](/windows-server/storage/file-server/smb-over-quic), which introduced an alternative to TCP and RDMA, supplies secure connectivity to edge file servers over untrusted networks like the Internet. QUIC has significant advantages, the largest being mandatory certificate-based encryption instead of relying on passwords. SMB over QUIC [client access control](/windows-server/storage/file-server/configure-smb-over-quic-client-access-control) improves the existing SMB over QUIC feature.
-Administrators now have more options for SMB over QUIC such as:
+Administrators now have more options for SMB over QUIC such as:
- [Specifying which clients](/windows-server/storage/file-server/configure-smb-over-quic-client-access-control#grant-individual-clients) can access SMB over QUIC servers. This gives organizations more protection but doesn't change the Windows authentication used to make the SMB connection or the end user experience.
- [Disabling SMB over QUIC](/windows-server/storage/file-server/configure-smb-over-quic-client-access-control#disable-smb-over-quic) for client with Group Policy and PowerShell
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ For more information about this change, see [https://aka.ms/SMBfirewall](https:/
[LSA protection](/windows-server/security/credentials-protection-and-management/configuring-additional-lsa-protection) helps protect against theft of secrets and credentials used for logon by preventing unauthorized code from running in the LSA process and by preventing dumping of process memory. An audit occurs for incompatibilities with LSA protection for a period of time, starting with this upgrade. If incompatibilities aren't detected, LSA protection is automatically enabled. You can check and change the enablement state of LSA protection in the Windows Security application under the **Device Security** > **Core Isolation** page. In the event log, LSA protection records whether programs are blocked from loading into LSA. If you would like to check if something was blocked, review the [logging](/windows-server/security/credentials-protection-and-management/configuring-additional-lsa-protection#identify-plug-ins-and-drivers-that-lsassexe-fails-to-load).
-
+
### Remote Mailslot protocol disabled by default
[Remote Mailslot protocol](/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-mail/47ac910f-1dec-4791-8486-9b3e8fd542da) was [deprecated](deprecated-features.md#deprecated-features) in November 2023 and is now disabled by default starting in Windows 11, version 24H2. For more information on Remote Mailslots, see [About Mailslots](/windows/win32/ipc/about-mailslots).
@@ -144,18 +144,18 @@ LAPS has the following policy improvements:
- Added an improved readability setting for the [PasswordComplexity](/windows/client-management/mdm/laps-csp#policiespasswordcomplexity) policy, which generates passwords without using characters that are easily confused with another character. For example, the zero and the letter O aren't used in the password since the characters can be confused.
- Added the `Reset the password, logoff the managed account, and terminate any remaining processes` setting to the [PostAuthenticationActions](/windows/client-management/mdm/laps-csp#policiespostauthenticationactions) policy. The event logging messages that are emitted during post-authentication-action execution were also expanded, to give insights into exactly what was done during the operation.
-Image rollback detection was introduced for LAPS. LAPS can detect when a device was rolled back to a previous image. When a device is rolled back, the password in Active Directory might not match the password on the device that was rolled back. This new feature adds an Active Directory attribute, `msLAPS-CurrentPasswordVersion`, to the [Windows LAPS schema](/windows-server/identity/laps/laps-technical-reference#mslaps-currentpasswordversion). This attribute contains a random GUID that Windows LAPS writes every time a new password is persisted in Active Directory, followed by saving a local copy. During every processing cycle, the GUID stored in `msLAPS-CurrentPasswordVersion` is queried and compared to the locally persisted copy. If the GUIDs are different, the password is immediately rotated. To enable this feature, you need to run the latest version of the [Update-LapsADSchema PowerShell cmdlet](/powershell/module/laps/update-lapsadschema).
+Image rollback detection was introduced for LAPS. LAPS can detect when a device was rolled back to a previous image. When a device is rolled back, the password in Active Directory might not match the password on the device that was rolled back. This new feature adds an Active Directory attribute, `msLAPS-CurrentPasswordVersion`, to the [Windows LAPS schema](/windows-server/identity/laps/laps-technical-reference#mslaps-currentpasswordversion). This attribute contains a random GUID that Windows LAPS writes every time a new password is persisted in Active Directory, followed by saving a local copy. During every processing cycle, the GUID stored in `msLAPS-CurrentPasswordVersion` is queried and compared to the locally persisted copy. If the GUIDs are different, the password is immediately rotated. To enable this feature, you need to run the latest version of the [Update-LapsADSchema PowerShell cmdlet](/powershell/module/laps/update-lapsadschema).
### Rust in the Windows kernel
There's a new implementation of [GDI region](/windows/win32/gdi/regions) in `win32kbase_rs.sys`. Since Rust offers advantages in reliability and security over traditional programs written in C/C++, you'll continue to see more use of it in the kernel.
-### Personal Data Encryption (PDE) for folders
+### Personal Data Encryption for folders
-PDE for folders is a security feature where the contents of the known Windows folders (Documents, Desktop and Pictures) are protected using a user authenticated encryption mechanism. Windows Hello is the user authentication used to provide the keys for encrypting user data in the folders. PDE for folders can be [enabled from a policy in Intune](/mem/intune/protect/endpoint-security-disk-encryption-policy). IT admins can select all of the folders, or a subset, then apply the policy to a group of users in their organization.
-PDE for Folders settings is available on Intune under **Endpoint Security** > **Disk encryption**.
+Personal Data Encryption for folders is a security feature where the contents of the known Windows folders (Documents, Desktop and Pictures) are protected using a user authenticated encryption mechanism. Windows Hello is the user authentication used to provide the keys for encrypting user data in the folders. Personal Data Encryption for folders can be [enabled from a policy in Intune](/mem/intune/protect/endpoint-security-disk-encryption-policy). IT admins can select all of the folders, or a subset, then apply the policy to a group of users in their organization.
+Personal Data Encryption for Folders settings is available on Intune under **Endpoint Security** > **Disk encryption**.
-For more information about PDE, see [PDE overview](/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption)
+For more information about Personal Data Encryption, see [Personal Data Encryption overview](/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/personal-data-encryption)
### Windows protected print mode
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ Support for Wi-Fi 7 was added for consumer access points. Wi-Fi 7, also known a
### Bluetooth ® LE audio support for assistive devices
-Customers who use these assistive hearing devices are now able to directly pair, stream audio, take calls, and control audio presets when they use an LE Audio-compatible PC. Users who have Bluetooth LE Audio capable assistive hearing devices can determine if their PC is LE Audio-compatible, set up, and manage their devices via **Settings** > **Accessibility** > **Hearing devices**. For more information, see [Using hearing devices with your Windows 11 PC](https://support.microsoft.com/topic/fcb566e7-13c3-491a-ad5b-8219b098d647).
+Customers who use these assistive hearing devices are now able to directly pair, stream audio, take calls, and control audio presets when they use an LE Audio-compatible PC. Users who have Bluetooth LE Audio capable assistive hearing devices can determine if their PC is LE Audio-compatible, set up, and manage their devices via **Settings** > **Accessibility** > **Hearing devices**. For more information, see [Using hearing devices with your Windows 11 PC](https://support.microsoft.com/topic/fcb566e7-13c3-491a-ad5b-8219b098d647).
### Windows location improvements
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ In addition to the monthly cumulative update, optional updates are available to
### Remote Desktop Connection improvements
Remote Desktop Connection has the following improvements:
-- The Remote Desktop Connection setup window (mstsc.exe) follows the text scaling settings under **Settings** > **Accessibility** > **Text size**.
+- The Remote Desktop Connection setup window (mstsc.exe) follows the text scaling settings under **Settings** > **Accessibility** > **Text size**.
- Remote Desktop Connection supports zoom options of 350, 400, 450, and 500%
- Improvements to the connection bar design
@@ -223,11 +223,11 @@ Remote Desktop Connection has the following improvements:
- **File Explorer**: The following changes were made to File Explorer context menu:
- Support for creating 7-zip and TAR archives
- - **Compress to** > **Additional options** allows you to compress individual files with gzip, BZip2, xz, or Zstandard
+ - **Compress to** > **Additional options** allows you to compress individual files with gzip, BZip2, xz, or Zstandard
- Labels were added to the context menu icons for actions like copy, paste, delete, and rename
- **OOBE improvement**: when you need to connect to a network and there's no Wi-Fi drivers, you're given an *Install drivers* option to install drivers that are already downloaded
- **Registry Editor**: The Registry Editor supports limiting a search to the currently selected key and its descendants
-- **Task Manager**: The Task Manager settings page has [Mica material](/windows/apps/design/style/mica) and a redesigned icon
+- **Task Manager**: The Task Manager settings page has [Mica material](/windows/apps/design/style/mica) and a redesigned icon
### Developer APIs
diff --git a/windows/whats-new/windows-licensing.md b/windows/whats-new/windows-licensing.md
index 40e15cb0a2..fef13ecd5b 100644
--- a/windows/whats-new/windows-licensing.md
+++ b/windows/whats-new/windows-licensing.md
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ The following table lists the Windows 11 Enterprise features and their Windows e
|**[Credential Guard][WIN-1]**|❌|Yes|
|**[Microsoft Defender Application Guard (MDAG) for Microsoft Edge][WIN-11]**|Yes|Yes|
|**[Modern BitLocker Management][WIN-2]**|Yes|Yes|
-|**[Personal data encryption (PDE)][WIN-3]**|❌|Yes|
+|**[Personal Data Encryption][WIN-3]**|❌|Yes|
|**[Direct Access][WINS-1]**|Yes|Yes|
|**[Always On VPN][WINS-2]**|Yes|Yes|
|**[Windows Experience customization][WIN-4]**|❌|Yes|