mirror of
https://github.com/MicrosoftDocs/windows-itpro-docs.git
synced 2025-05-12 13:27:23 +00:00
Merge branch 'main' into patch-30
This commit is contained in:
Angela Fleischmann
GitHub
commit
b3c6948834
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@ -77,6 +77,16 @@
|
||||
"identity-protection/hello-for-business/*.md": "erikdau",
|
||||
"identity-protection/credential-guard/*.md": "zwhittington",
|
||||
"identity-protection/access-control/*.md": "sulahiri"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"ms.collection":{
|
||||
"identity-protection/hello-for-business/*.md": "tier1",
|
||||
"information-protection/bitlocker/*.md": "tier1",
|
||||
"information-protection/personal-data-encryption/*.md": "tier1",
|
||||
"information-protection/pluton/*.md": "tier1",
|
||||
"information-protection/tpm/*.md": "tier1",
|
||||
"threat-protection/auditing/*.md": "tier3",
|
||||
"threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/*.md": "tier3",
|
||||
"threat-protection/windows-firewall/*.md": "tier3"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"template": [],
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: Encryption and data protection in Windows
|
||||
description: Get an overview encryption and data protection in Windows 11 and Windows 10
|
||||
search.appverid: MET150
|
||||
author: frankroj
|
||||
ms.author: frankroj
|
||||
manager: aaroncz
|
||||
@ -9,9 +8,6 @@ ms.topic: overview
|
||||
ms.date: 09/22/2022
|
||||
ms.prod: windows-client
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
ms.localizationpriority: medium
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
ms.custom:
|
||||
ms.reviewer: rafals
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ description: Learn how to secure and manage access to the resources on a standal
|
||||
ms.date: 12/05/2022
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier2
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
appliesto:
|
||||
- ✅ <a href=https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/release-health/supported-versions-windows-client target=_blank>Windows 10 and later</a>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ description: Learn how to deploy and manage Windows Defender Credential Guard us
|
||||
ms.date: 11/23/2022
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier2
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
appliesto:
|
||||
- ✅ <a href=https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/release-health/supported-versions-windows-client target=_blank>Windows 10 and later</a>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ ms.date: 11/22/2022
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier2
|
||||
appliesto:
|
||||
- ✅ <a href=https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/release-health/supported-versions-windows-client target=_blank>Windows 10 and later</a>
|
||||
- ✅ <a href=https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/release-health/windows-server-release-info target=_blank>Windows Server 2016 and later</a>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ This example configures an IPConfig signal type using Ipv4Prefix, Ipv4DnsServer,
|
||||
<ipv4DnsServer>10.10.0.1</ipv4DnsServer>
|
||||
<ipv4DnsServer>10.10.0.2</ipv4DnsServer>
|
||||
<dnsSuffix>corp.contoso.com</dnsSuffix>
|
||||
</signal>
|
||||
</signal>
|
||||
</rule>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
@ -280,12 +280,12 @@ This example configures an IpConfig signal type using a dnsSuffix element and a
|
||||
|
||||
```xml
|
||||
<rule schemaVersion="1.0">
|
||||
<signal type="ipConfig">
|
||||
<dnsSuffix>corp.contoso.com</dnsSuffix>
|
||||
</signal>
|
||||
<signal type="ipConfig">
|
||||
<dnsSuffix>corp.contoso.com</dnsSuffix>
|
||||
</signal>
|
||||
</rule>,
|
||||
<rule schemaVersion="1.0">
|
||||
<signal type="bluetooth" scenario="Authentication" classOfDevice="512" rssiMin="-10" rssiMaxDelta="-10"/>
|
||||
<signal type="bluetooth" scenario="Authentication" classOfDevice="512" rssiMin="-10" rssiMaxDelta="-10"/>
|
||||
</rule>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ title: Configure Windows Hello for Business Policy settings in an on-premises ce
|
||||
description: Configure Windows Hello for Business Policy settings for Windows Hello for Business in an on-premises certificate trust scenario
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier1
|
||||
ms.date: 12/12/2022
|
||||
appliesto:
|
||||
- ✅ <a href=https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/release-health/supported-versions-windows-client target=_blank>Windows 10 and later</a>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ title: Deploy certificates for remote desktop sign-in
|
||||
description: Learn how to deploy certificates to cloud Kerberos trust and key trust users, to enable remote desktop sign-in with supplied credentials.
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- ContentEngagementFY23
|
||||
- tier1
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
ms.date: 11/15/2022
|
||||
appliesto:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ metadata:
|
||||
description: Use these frequently asked questions (FAQ) to learn important details about Windows Hello for Business.
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier1
|
||||
ms.topic: faq
|
||||
ms.date: 01/06/2023
|
||||
appliesto:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ title: Pin Reset
|
||||
description: Learn how Microsoft PIN reset services enable you to help users recover who have forgotten their PIN.
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier1
|
||||
ms.date: 07/29/2022
|
||||
appliesto:
|
||||
- ✅ <a href=https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/release-health/supported-versions-windows-client target=_blank>Windows 10 and later</a>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ ms.date: 02/24/2021
|
||||
appliesto:
|
||||
- ✅ <a href=https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/release-health/supported-versions-windows-client target=_blank>Windows 10 and later</a>
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- tier1
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Remote Desktop
|
||||
|
||||
@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ title: Windows Hello for Business Deployment Prerequisite Overview
|
||||
description: Overview of all the different infrastructure requirements for Windows Hello for Business deployment models
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier1
|
||||
ms.date: 12/13/2022
|
||||
appliesto:
|
||||
- ✅ <a href=https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/release-health/supported-versions-windows-client target=_blank>Windows 10 and later</a>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ title: Manage Windows Hello in your organization (Windows)
|
||||
description: You can create a Group Policy or mobile device management (MDM) policy that will implement Windows Hello for Business on devices running Windows 10.
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier1
|
||||
ms.date: 2/15/2022
|
||||
appliesto:
|
||||
- ✅ <a href=https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/release-health/supported-versions-windows-client target=_blank>Windows 10 and later</a>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ title: Windows Hello for Business Overview (Windows)
|
||||
description: Learn how Windows Hello for Business replaces passwords with strong two-factor authentication on PCs and mobile devices in Windows 10 and Windows 11.
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier1
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
appliesto:
|
||||
- ✅ <a href=https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/release-health/supported-versions-windows-client target=_blank>Windows 10 and later</a>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ title: Why a PIN is better than an online password (Windows)
|
||||
description: Windows Hello enables users to sign in to their device using a PIN. How is a PIN different from (and better than) an online password.
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier1
|
||||
ms.date: 10/23/2017
|
||||
appliesto:
|
||||
- ✅ <a href=https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/release-health/supported-versions-windows-client target=_blank>Windows 10 and later</a>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ metadata:
|
||||
ms.date: 01/22/2021
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier1
|
||||
|
||||
# linkListType: architecture | concept | deploy | download | get-started | how-to-guide | learn | overview | quickstart | reference | tutorial | whats-new
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ ms.author: paoloma
|
||||
manager: aaroncz
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier2
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
ms.localizationpriority: medium
|
||||
ms.date: 01/12/2018
|
||||
@ -51,12 +52,12 @@ Use the following table to compare different Remote Desktop connection security
|
||||
|
||||
| Feature | Remote Desktop | Windows Defender Remote Credential Guard | Restricted Admin mode |
|
||||
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|
||||
| **Protection benefits** | Credentials on the server are not protected from Pass-the-Hash attacks. | User credentials remain on the client. An attacker can act on behalf of the user *only* when the session is ongoing | User logs on to the server as local administrator, so an attacker cannot act on behalf of the “domain user”. Any attack is local to the server |
|
||||
| **Protection benefits** | Credentials on the server are not protected from Pass-the-Hash attacks. | User credentials remain on the client. An attacker can act on behalf of the user *only* when the session is ongoing | User logs on to the server as local administrator, so an attacker cannot act on behalf of the "domain user". Any attack is local to the server |
|
||||
| **Version support** | The remote computer can run any Windows operating system | Both the client and the remote computer must be running **at least Windows 10, version 1607, or Windows Server 2016**. | The remote computer must be running **at least patched Windows 7 or patched Windows Server 2008 R2**. <br /><br />For more information about patches (software updates) related to Restricted Admin mode, see [Microsoft Security Advisory 2871997](/security-updates/SecurityAdvisories/2016/2871997). |
|
||||
| **Helps prevent** | N/A | <ul><li> Pass-the-Hash</li> <li>Use of a credential after disconnection </li></ul> | <ul><li> Pass-the-Hash</li> <li>Use of domain identity during connection </li></ul> |
|
||||
| **Credentials supported from the remote desktop client device** | <ul><li><b>Signed on</b> credentials <li> <b>Supplied</b> credentials<li> <b>Saved</b> credentials </ul> | <ul><li> <b>Signed on</b> credentials only | <ul><li><b>Signed on</b> credentials<li><b>Supplied</b> credentials<li><b>Saved</b> credentials</ul> |
|
||||
| **Access** | **Users allowed**, that is, members of Remote Desktop Users group of remote host. | **Users allowed**, that is, members of Remote Desktop Users of remote host. | **Administrators only**, that is, only members of Administrators group of remote host. |
|
||||
| **Network identity** | Remote Desktop session **connects to other resources as signed-in user**. | Remote Desktop session **connects to other resources as signed-in user**. | Remote Desktop session **connects to other resources as remote host’s identity**. |
|
||||
| **Network identity** | Remote Desktop session **connects to other resources as signed-in user**. | Remote Desktop session **connects to other resources as signed-in user**. | Remote Desktop session **connects to other resources as remote host's identity**. |
|
||||
| **Multi-hop** | From the remote desktop, **you can connect through Remote Desktop to another computer** | From the remote desktop, you **can connect through Remote Desktop to another computer**. | Not allowed for user as the session is running as a local host account |
|
||||
| **Supported authentication** | Any negotiable protocol. | Kerberos only. | Any negotiable protocol |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -71,7 +72,7 @@ and [How Kerberos works](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-2000-server/c
|
||||
|
||||
## Remote Desktop connections and helpdesk support scenarios
|
||||
|
||||
For helpdesk support scenarios in which personnel require administrative access to provide remote assistance to computer users via Remote Desktop sessions, Microsoft recommends that Windows Defender Remote Credential Guard should not be used in that context. This is because if an RDP session is initiated to a compromised client that an attacker already controls, the attacker could use that open channel to create sessions on the user's behalf (without compromising credentials) to access any of the user’s resources for a limited time (a few hours) after the session disconnects.
|
||||
For helpdesk support scenarios in which personnel require administrative access to provide remote assistance to computer users via Remote Desktop sessions, Microsoft recommends that Windows Defender Remote Credential Guard should not be used in that context. This is because if an RDP session is initiated to a compromised client that an attacker already controls, the attacker could use that open channel to create sessions on the user's behalf (without compromising credentials) to access any of the user's resources for a limited time (a few hours) after the session disconnects.
|
||||
|
||||
Therefore, we recommend instead that you use the Restricted Admin mode option. For helpdesk support scenarios, RDP connections should only be initiated using the /RestrictedAdmin switch. This helps ensure that credentials and other user resources are not exposed to compromised remote hosts. For more information, see [Mitigating Pass-the-Hash and Other Credential Theft v2](https://download.microsoft.com/download/7/7/A/77ABC5BD-8320-41AF-863C-6ECFB10CB4B9/Mitigating-Pass-the-Hash-Attacks-and-Other-Credential-Theft-Version-2.pdf).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -90,7 +91,7 @@ The Remote Desktop client device:
|
||||
|
||||
- Must be running at least Windows 10, version 1703 to be able to supply credentials, which is sent to the remote device. This allows users to run as different users without having to send credentials to the remote machine.
|
||||
|
||||
- Must be running at least Windows 10, version 1607 or Windows Server 2016 to use the user’s signed-in credentials. This requires the user’s account be able to sign in to both the client device and the remote host.
|
||||
- Must be running at least Windows 10, version 1607 or Windows Server 2016 to use the user's signed-in credentials. This requires the user's account be able to sign in to both the client device and the remote host.
|
||||
|
||||
- Must be running the Remote Desktop Classic Windows application. The Remote Desktop Universal Windows Platform application doesn't support Windows Defender Remote Credential Guard.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -100,7 +101,7 @@ The Remote Desktop remote host:
|
||||
|
||||
- Must be running at least Windows 10, version 1607 or Windows Server 2016.
|
||||
- Must allow Restricted Admin connections.
|
||||
- Must allow the client’s domain user to access Remote Desktop connections.
|
||||
- Must allow the client's domain user to access Remote Desktop connections.
|
||||
- Must allow delegation of non-exportable credentials.
|
||||
|
||||
There are no hardware requirements for Windows Defender Remote Credential Guard.
|
||||
@ -182,7 +183,7 @@ mstsc.exe /remoteGuard
|
||||
|
||||
## Considerations when using Windows Defender Remote Credential Guard
|
||||
|
||||
- Windows Defender Remote Credential Guard does not support compound authentication. For example, if you’re trying to access a file server from a remote host that requires a device claim, access will be denied.
|
||||
- Windows Defender Remote Credential Guard does not support compound authentication. For example, if you're trying to access a file server from a remote host that requires a device claim, access will be denied.
|
||||
|
||||
- Windows Defender Remote Credential Guard can be used only when connecting to a device that is joined to a Windows Server Active Directory domain, including AD domain-joined servers that run as Azure virtual machines (VMs). Windows Defender Remote Credential Guard cannot be used when connecting to remote devices joined to Azure Active Directory.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ ms.reviewer: ardenw
|
||||
manager: aaroncz
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier2
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
ms.localizationpriority: medium
|
||||
ms.date: 09/24/2021
|
||||
|
||||
@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ title: How User Account Control works (Windows)
|
||||
description: User Account Control (UAC) is a fundamental component of Microsoft's overall security vision. UAC helps mitigate the impact of malware.
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier2
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
ms.localizationpriority: medium
|
||||
ms.date: 09/23/2021
|
||||
|
||||
@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ title: User Account Control Group Policy and registry key settings (Windows)
|
||||
description: Here's a list of UAC Group Policy and registry key settings that your organization can use to manage UAC.
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier2
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
ms.date: 04/19/2017
|
||||
appliesto:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ title: User Account Control (Windows)
|
||||
description: User Account Control (UAC) helps prevent malware from damaging a PC and helps organizations deploy a better-managed desktop.
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier2
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
ms.date: 09/24/2011
|
||||
appliesto:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ metadata:
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier1
|
||||
ms.topic: faq
|
||||
ms.date: 11/08/2022
|
||||
ms.custom: bitlocker
|
||||
|
||||
@ -90,17 +90,17 @@ To address these issues, [BitLocker Network Unlock](./bitlocker-how-to-enable-ne
|
||||
|
||||
### Protecting Thunderbolt and other DMA ports
|
||||
|
||||
There are a few different options to protect DMA ports, such as Thunderbolt™3. Beginning with Windows 10 version 1803, new Intel-based devices have kernel protection against DMA attacks via Thunderbolt™ 3 ports enabled by default. This Kernel DMA Protection is available only for new systems beginning with Windows 10 version 1803, as it requires changes in the system firmware and/or BIOS.
|
||||
There are a few different options to protect DMA ports, such as Thunderbolt™3. Beginning with Windows 10 version 1803, new Intel-based devices have kernel protection against DMA attacks via Thunderbolt™ 3 ports enabled by default. This Kernel DMA Protection is available only for new systems beginning with Windows 10 version 1803, as it requires changes in the system firmware and/or BIOS.
|
||||
|
||||
You can use the System Information desktop app `MSINFO32.exe` to check if a device has kernel DMA protection enabled:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
If kernel DMA protection isn't enabled, follow these steps to protect Thunderbolt™ 3 enabled ports:
|
||||
If kernel DMA protection isn't enabled, follow these steps to protect Thunderbolt™ 3 enabled ports:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Require a password for BIOS changes
|
||||
|
||||
2. Intel Thunderbolt Security must be set to User Authorization in BIOS settings. Refer to [Intel Thunderbolt™ 3 and Security on Microsoft Windows® 10 Operating System documentation](https://thunderbolttechnology.net/security/Thunderbolt%203%20and%20Security.pdf)
|
||||
2. Intel Thunderbolt Security must be set to User Authorization in BIOS settings. Refer to [Intel Thunderbolt™ 3 and Security on Microsoft Windows® 10 Operating System documentation](https://thunderbolttechnology.net/security/Thunderbolt%203%20and%20Security.pdf)
|
||||
|
||||
3. Additional DMA security may be added by deploying policy (beginning with Windows 10 version 1607 or Windows 11):
|
||||
|
||||
@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ Enable secure boot and mandatorily prompt a password to change BIOS settings. Fo
|
||||
|
||||
### Tricking BitLocker to pass the key to a rogue operating system
|
||||
|
||||
An attacker might modify the boot manager configuration database (BCD) which is stored on a non-encrypted partition and add an entry point to a rogue operating system on a different partition. During the boot process, BitLocker code will make sure that the operating system that the encryption key obtained from the TPM is given to, is cryptographically verified to be the intended recipient. Because this strong cryptographic verification already exists, we don’t recommend storing a hash of a disk partition table in Platform Configuration Register (PCR) 5.
|
||||
An attacker might modify the boot manager configuration database (BCD) which is stored on a non-encrypted partition and add an entry point to a rogue operating system on a different partition. During the boot process, BitLocker code will make sure that the operating system that the encryption key obtained from the TPM is given to, is cryptographically verified to be the intended recipient. Because this strong cryptographic verification already exists, we don't recommend storing a hash of a disk partition table in Platform Configuration Register (PCR) 5.
|
||||
|
||||
An attacker might also replace the entire operating system disk while preserving the platform hardware and firmware and could then extract a protected BitLocker key blob from the metadata of the victim OS partition. The attacker could then attempt to unseal that BitLocker key blob by calling the TPM API from an operating system under their control. This will not succeed because when Windows seals the BitLocker key to the TPM, it does it with a PCR 11 value of 0, and to successfully unseal the blob, PCR 11 in the TPM must have a value of 0. However, when the boot manager passes the control to any boot loader (legitimate or rogue) it always changes PCR 11 to a value of 1. Since the PCR 11 value is guaranteed to be different after exiting the boot manager, the attacker can't unlock the BitLocker key.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ ms.author: frankroj
|
||||
manager: aaroncz
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier1
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 11/08/2022
|
||||
ms.custom: bitlocker
|
||||
|
||||
@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ metadata:
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier1
|
||||
ms.topic: faq
|
||||
ms.date: 11/08/2022
|
||||
ms.custom: bitlocker
|
||||
|
||||
@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ ms.author: frankroj
|
||||
manager: aaroncz
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier1
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 11/08/2022
|
||||
ms.custom: bitlocker
|
||||
|
||||
@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ metadata:
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier1
|
||||
ms.topic: faq
|
||||
ms.date: 11/08/2022
|
||||
ms.custom: bitlocker
|
||||
|
||||
@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ author: frankroj
|
||||
manager: aaroncz
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier1
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 11/08/2022
|
||||
ms.custom: bitlocker
|
||||
|
||||
@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ ms.reviewer: rafals
|
||||
manager: aaroncz
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier1
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 11/08/2022
|
||||
ms.custom: bitlocker
|
||||
|
||||
@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ author: frankroj
|
||||
ms.author: frankroj
|
||||
manager: aaroncz
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- tier1
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 11/08/2022
|
||||
|
||||
@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ ms.author: frankroj
|
||||
manager: aaroncz
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier1
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 11/08/2022
|
||||
ms.custom: bitlocker
|
||||
|
||||
@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ ms.author: frankroj
|
||||
manager: aaroncz
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier1
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 11/08/2022
|
||||
ms.custom: bitlocker
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: Kernel DMA Protection (Windows)
|
||||
description: Kernel DMA Protection protects PCs against drive-by Direct Memory Access (DMA) attacks using PCI hot plug devices connected to Thunderbolt™ 3 ports.
|
||||
description: Kernel DMA Protection protects PCs against drive-by Direct Memory Access (DMA) attacks using PCI hot plug devices connected to Thunderbolt™ 3 ports.
|
||||
ms.prod: windows-client
|
||||
author: vinaypamnani-msft
|
||||
ms.author: vinpa
|
||||
manager: aaroncz
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier1
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 01/05/2023
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
@ -18,7 +19,7 @@ ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
- Windows 10
|
||||
- Windows 11
|
||||
|
||||
In Windows 10 version 1803, Microsoft introduced a new feature called Kernel DMA Protection to protect PCs against drive-by Direct Memory Access (DMA) attacks using PCI hot plug devices connected to externally accessible PCIe ports (for example, Thunderbolt™ 3 ports and CFexpress). In Windows 10 version 1903, Microsoft expanded the Kernel DMA Protection support to cover internal PCIe ports (for example, M.2 slots)
|
||||
In Windows 10 version 1803, Microsoft introduced a new feature called Kernel DMA Protection to protect PCs against drive-by Direct Memory Access (DMA) attacks using PCI hot plug devices connected to externally accessible PCIe ports (for example, Thunderbolt™ 3 ports and CFexpress). In Windows 10 version 1903, Microsoft expanded the Kernel DMA Protection support to cover internal PCIe ports (for example, M.2 slots)
|
||||
|
||||
Drive-by DMA attacks can lead to disclosure of sensitive information residing on a PC, or even injection of malware that allows attackers to bypass the lock screen or control PCs remotely.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -32,9 +33,9 @@ The DMA capability is what makes PCI devices the highest performing devices avai
|
||||
These devices have historically existed only inside the PC chassis, either connected as a card or soldered on the motherboard.
|
||||
Access to these devices required the user to turn off power to the system and disassemble the chassis.
|
||||
|
||||
Today, this is no longer the case with hot plug PCIe ports (for example, Thunderbolt™ and CFexpress).
|
||||
Today, this is no longer the case with hot plug PCIe ports (for example, Thunderbolt™ and CFexpress).
|
||||
|
||||
Hot plug PCIe ports such as Thunderbolt™ technology have provided modern PCs with extensibility that wasn't available before for PCs.
|
||||
Hot plug PCIe ports such as Thunderbolt™ technology have provided modern PCs with extensibility that wasn't available before for PCs.
|
||||
It allows users to attach new classes of external peripherals, such as graphics cards or other PCI devices, to their PCs with a hot plug experience identical to USB.
|
||||
Having PCI hot plug ports externally and easily accessible makes PCs susceptible to drive-by DMA attacks.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -102,15 +103,15 @@ Beginning with Windows 10 version 1809, you can use the Windows Security app to
|
||||
|
||||
4. If the state of **Kernel DMA Protection** remains Off, then the system does not support this feature.
|
||||
|
||||
For systems that do not support Kernel DMA Protection, please refer to the [BitLocker countermeasures](bitlocker/bitlocker-countermeasures.md) or [Thunderbolt™ 3 and Security on Microsoft Windows® 10 Operating system](https://thunderbolttechnology.net/security/Thunderbolt%203%20and%20Security.pdf) for other means of DMA protection.
|
||||
For systems that do not support Kernel DMA Protection, please refer to the [BitLocker countermeasures](bitlocker/bitlocker-countermeasures.md) or [Thunderbolt™ 3 and Security on Microsoft Windows® 10 Operating system](https://thunderbolttechnology.net/security/Thunderbolt%203%20and%20Security.pdf) for other means of DMA protection.
|
||||
|
||||
## Frequently asked questions
|
||||
|
||||
### Do in-market systems support Kernel DMA Protection for Thunderbolt™ 3?
|
||||
In-market systems, released with Windows 10 version 1709 or earlier, will not support Kernel DMA Protection for Thunderbolt™ 3 after upgrading to Windows 10 version 1803, as this feature requires the BIOS/platform firmware changes and guarantees that cannot be backported to previously released devices. For these systems, please refer to the [BitLocker countermeasures](bitlocker/bitlocker-countermeasures.md) or [Thunderbolt™ 3 and Security on Microsoft Windows® 10 Operating system](https://thunderbolttechnology.net/security/Thunderbolt%203%20and%20Security.pdf) for other means of DMA protection.
|
||||
### Do in-market systems support Kernel DMA Protection for Thunderbolt™ 3?
|
||||
In-market systems, released with Windows 10 version 1709 or earlier, will not support Kernel DMA Protection for Thunderbolt™ 3 after upgrading to Windows 10 version 1803, as this feature requires the BIOS/platform firmware changes and guarantees that cannot be backported to previously released devices. For these systems, please refer to the [BitLocker countermeasures](bitlocker/bitlocker-countermeasures.md) or [Thunderbolt™ 3 and Security on Microsoft Windows® 10 Operating system](https://thunderbolttechnology.net/security/Thunderbolt%203%20and%20Security.pdf) for other means of DMA protection.
|
||||
|
||||
### Does Kernel DMA Protection prevent drive-by DMA attacks during Boot?
|
||||
No, Kernel DMA Protection only protects against drive-by DMA attacks after the OS is loaded. It is the responsibility of the system firmware/BIOS to protect against attacks via the Thunderbolt™ 3 ports during boot.
|
||||
No, Kernel DMA Protection only protects against drive-by DMA attacks after the OS is loaded. It is the responsibility of the system firmware/BIOS to protect against attacks via the Thunderbolt™ 3 ports during boot.
|
||||
|
||||
### How can I check if a certain driver supports DMA-remapping?
|
||||
DMA-remapping is supported for specific device drivers, and is not universally supported by all devices and drivers on a platform. To check if a specific driver is opted into DMA-remapping, check the values corresponding to the DMA Remapping Policy property in the Details tab of a device in Device Manager*. A value of 0 or 1 means that the device driver does not support DMA-remapping. A value of two means that the device driver supports DMA-remapping. If the property is not available, then the policy is not set by the device driver (that is, the device driver does not support DMA-remapping).
|
||||
@ -122,7 +123,7 @@ Check the driver instance for the device you are testing. Some drivers may have
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### When the drivers for PCI or Thunderbolt™ 3 peripherals do not support DMA-remapping?
|
||||
### When the drivers for PCI or Thunderbolt™ 3 peripherals do not support DMA-remapping?
|
||||
|
||||
If the peripherals do have class drivers provided by Windows, use these drivers on your systems. If there are no class drivers provided by Windows for your peripherals, contact your peripheral vendor/driver vendor to update the driver to support [DMA Remapping](/windows-hardware/drivers/pci/enabling-dma-remapping-for-device-drivers).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ author: dansimp
|
||||
manager: aaroncz
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier1
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 05/12/2022
|
||||
ms.author: dansimp
|
||||
@ -91,13 +92,13 @@ To trust and boot operating systems, like Linux, and components signed by the UE
|
||||
|
||||
1. Open the firmware menu, either:
|
||||
|
||||
- Boot the PC, and press the manufacturer’s key to open the menus. Common keys used: Esc, Delete, F1, F2, F10, F11, or F12. On tablets, common buttons are Volume up or Volume down. During startup, there’s often a screen that mentions the key. If there’s not one, or if the screen goes by too fast to see it, check your manufacturer’s site.
|
||||
- Boot the PC, and press the manufacturer's key to open the menus. Common keys used: Esc, Delete, F1, F2, F10, F11, or F12. On tablets, common buttons are Volume up or Volume down. During startup, there's often a screen that mentions the key. If there's not one, or if the screen goes by too fast to see it, check your manufacturer's site.
|
||||
|
||||
- Or, if Windows is already installed, from either the Sign on screen or the Start menu, select Power ( ) > hold Shift while selecting Restart. Select Troubleshoot > Advanced options > UEFI Firmware settings.
|
||||
|
||||
2. From the firmware menu navigate to Security > Secure Boot and select the option to trust the “3rd Party CA”.
|
||||
2. From the firmware menu navigate to Security > Secure Boot and select the option to trust the "3rd Party CA".
|
||||
|
||||
3. Save changes and exit.
|
||||
3. Save changes and exit.
|
||||
|
||||
Microsoft continues to collaborate with Linux and IHV ecosystem partners to design least privileged features to help you stay secure and opt-in trust for only the publishers and components you trust.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
# Back up the TPM recovery information to AD DS
|
||||
|
||||
**Applies to**
|
||||
- Windows 10
|
||||
- Windows 10
|
||||
- Windows 11
|
||||
- Windows Server 2016 and above
|
||||
|
||||
@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
|
||||
- Windows 10, version 1607 or later
|
||||
|
||||
With Windows 10, versions 1511 and 1507, or Windows 11, you can back up a computer’s Trusted Platform Module (TPM) information to Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS). By doing this, you can use AD DS to administer the TPM from a remote computer. The procedure is the same as it was for Windows 8.1. For more information, see [Backup the TPM Recovery Information to AD DS](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-8.1-and-8/dn466534(v=ws.11)).
|
||||
With Windows 10, versions 1511 and 1507, or Windows 11, you can back up a computer's Trusted Platform Module (TPM) information to Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS). By doing this, you can use AD DS to administer the TPM from a remote computer. The procedure is the same as it was for Windows 8.1. For more information, see [Backup the TPM Recovery Information to AD DS](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-8.1-and-8/dn466534(v=ws.11)).
|
||||
|
||||
## Related topics
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -30,9 +30,9 @@ The Windows operating system improves most existing security features in the ope
|
||||
|
||||
The TPM is a cryptographic module that enhances computer security and privacy. Protecting data through encryption and decryption, protecting authentication credentials, and proving which software is running on a system are basic functionalities associated with computer security. The TPM helps with all these scenarios and more.
|
||||
|
||||
Historically, TPMs have been discrete chips soldered to a computer’s motherboard. Such implementations allow the computer’s original equipment manufacturer (OEM) to evaluate and certify the TPM separate from the rest of the system. Although discrete TPM implementations are still common, they can be problematic for integrated devices that are small or have low power consumption. Some newer TPM implementations integrate TPM functionality into the same chipset as other platform components while still providing logical separation similar to discrete TPM chips.
|
||||
Historically, TPMs have been discrete chips soldered to a computer's motherboard. Such implementations allow the computer's original equipment manufacturer (OEM) to evaluate and certify the TPM separate from the rest of the system. Although discrete TPM implementations are still common, they can be problematic for integrated devices that are small or have low power consumption. Some newer TPM implementations integrate TPM functionality into the same chipset as other platform components while still providing logical separation similar to discrete TPM chips.
|
||||
|
||||
TPMs are passive: they receive commands and return responses. To realize the full benefit of a TPM, the OEM must carefully integrate system hardware and firmware with the TPM to send it commands and react to its responses. TPMs were originally designed to provide security and privacy benefits to a platform’s owner and users, but newer versions can provide security and privacy benefits to the system hardware itself. Before it can be used for advanced scenarios, a TPM must be provisioned. Windows automatically provisions a TPM, but if the user reinstalls the operating system, user may need to tell the operating system to explicitly provision the TPM again before it can use all the TPM’s features.
|
||||
TPMs are passive: they receive commands and return responses. To realize the full benefit of a TPM, the OEM must carefully integrate system hardware and firmware with the TPM to send it commands and react to its responses. TPMs were originally designed to provide security and privacy benefits to a platform's owner and users, but newer versions can provide security and privacy benefits to the system hardware itself. Before it can be used for advanced scenarios, a TPM must be provisioned. Windows automatically provisions a TPM, but if the user reinstalls the operating system, user may need to tell the operating system to explicitly provision the TPM again before it can use all the TPM's features.
|
||||
|
||||
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is the nonprofit organization that publishes and maintains the TPM specification. The TCG exists to develop, define, and promote vendor-neutral, global industry standards that support a hardware-based root of trust for interoperable trusted computing platforms. The TCG also publishes the TPM specification as the international standard ISO/IEC 11889, using the Publicly Available Specification Submission Process that the Joint Technical Committee 1 defines between the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ OEMs implement the TPM as a component in a trusted computing platform, such as a
|
||||
|
||||
The TCG designed the TPM as a low-cost, mass-market security solution that addresses the requirements of different customer segments. There are variations in the security properties of different TPM implementations just as there are variations in customer and regulatory requirements for different sectors. In public-sector procurement, for example, some governments have clearly defined security requirements for TPMs, whereas others do not.
|
||||
|
||||
Certification programs for TPMs—and technology in general—continue to evolve as the speed of innovation increases. Although having a TPM is clearly better than not having a TPM, Microsoft’s best advice is to determine your organization’s security needs and research any regulatory requirements associated with procurement for your industry. The result is a balance between scenarios used, assurance level, cost, convenience, and availability.
|
||||
Certification programs for TPMs—and technology in general—continue to evolve as the speed of innovation increases. Although having a TPM is clearly better than not having a TPM, Microsoft's best advice is to determine your organization's security needs and research any regulatory requirements associated with procurement for your industry. The result is a balance between scenarios used, assurance level, cost, convenience, and availability.
|
||||
|
||||
## TPM in Windows
|
||||
|
||||
@ -58,15 +58,15 @@ The Platform Crypto Provider, introduced in the Windows 8 operating system, expo
|
||||
|
||||
- **Dictionary attack protection**. Keys that a TPM protects can require an authorization value such as a PIN. With dictionary attack protection, the TPM can prevent attacks that attempt a large number of guesses to determine the PIN. After too many guesses, the TPM simply returns an error saying no more guesses are allowed for a period of time. Software solutions might provide similar features, but they cannot provide the same level of protection, especially if the system restarts, the system clock changes, or files on the hard disk that count failed guesses are rolled back. In addition, with dictionary attack protection, authorization values such as PINs can be shorter and easier to remember while still providing the same level of protection as more complex values when using software solutions.
|
||||
|
||||
These TPM features give Platform Crypto Provider distinct advantages over software-based solutions. A practical way to see these benefits in action is when using certificates on a Windows device. On platforms that include a TPM, Windows can use the Platform Crypto Provider to provide certificate storage. Certificate templates can specify that a TPM use the Platform Crypto Provider to protect the key associated with a certificate. In mixed environments, where some computers might not have a TPM, the certificate template could prefer the Platform Crypto Provider over the standard Windows software provider. If a certificate is configured as not able to be exported, the private key for the certificate is restricted and cannot be exported from the TPM. If the certificate requires a PIN, the PIN gains the TPM’s dictionary attack protection automatically.
|
||||
These TPM features give Platform Crypto Provider distinct advantages over software-based solutions. A practical way to see these benefits in action is when using certificates on a Windows device. On platforms that include a TPM, Windows can use the Platform Crypto Provider to provide certificate storage. Certificate templates can specify that a TPM use the Platform Crypto Provider to protect the key associated with a certificate. In mixed environments, where some computers might not have a TPM, the certificate template could prefer the Platform Crypto Provider over the standard Windows software provider. If a certificate is configured as not able to be exported, the private key for the certificate is restricted and cannot be exported from the TPM. If the certificate requires a PIN, the PIN gains the TPM's dictionary attack protection automatically.
|
||||
|
||||
## Virtual Smart Card
|
||||
|
||||
Smart cards are highly secure physical devices that typically store a single certificate and the corresponding private key. Users insert a smart card into a built-in or USB card reader and enter a PIN to unlock it. Windows can then access the card’s certificate and use the private key for authentication or to unlock BitLocker protected data volumes. Smart cards are popular because they provide two-factor authentication that requires both something the user has (that is, the smart card) and something the user knows (such as the smart card PIN). Smart cards are difficult to use, however, because they require purchase and deployment of both smart cards and smart card readers.
|
||||
Smart cards are highly secure physical devices that typically store a single certificate and the corresponding private key. Users insert a smart card into a built-in or USB card reader and enter a PIN to unlock it. Windows can then access the card's certificate and use the private key for authentication or to unlock BitLocker protected data volumes. Smart cards are popular because they provide two-factor authentication that requires both something the user has (that is, the smart card) and something the user knows (such as the smart card PIN). Smart cards are difficult to use, however, because they require purchase and deployment of both smart cards and smart card readers.
|
||||
|
||||
In Windows, the Virtual Smart Card feature allows the TPM to mimic a permanently inserted smart card. The TPM becomes “something the user has” but still requires a PIN. Although physical smart cards limit the number of PIN attempts before locking the card and requiring a reset, a virtual smart card relies on the TPM’s dictionary attack protection to prevent too many PIN guesses.
|
||||
In Windows, the Virtual Smart Card feature allows the TPM to mimic a permanently inserted smart card. The TPM becomes "something the user has" but still requires a PIN. Although physical smart cards limit the number of PIN attempts before locking the card and requiring a reset, a virtual smart card relies on the TPM's dictionary attack protection to prevent too many PIN guesses.
|
||||
|
||||
For TPM-based virtual smart cards, the TPM protects the use and storage of the certificate private key so that it cannot be copied when it is in use or stored and used elsewhere. Using a component that is part of the system rather than a separate physical smart card can reduce total cost of ownership because it eliminates “lost card” and “card left at home” scenarios while still delivering the benefits of smart card–based multifactor authentication. For users, virtual smart cards are simple to use, requiring only a PIN to unlock. Virtual smart cards support the same scenarios that physical smart cards support, including signing in to Windows or authenticating for resource access.
|
||||
For TPM-based virtual smart cards, the TPM protects the use and storage of the certificate private key so that it cannot be copied when it is in use or stored and used elsewhere. Using a component that is part of the system rather than a separate physical smart card can reduce total cost of ownership because it eliminates "lost card" and "card left at home" scenarios while still delivering the benefits of smart card–based multifactor authentication. For users, virtual smart cards are simple to use, requiring only a PIN to unlock. Virtual smart cards support the same scenarios that physical smart cards support, including signing in to Windows or authenticating for resource access.
|
||||
|
||||
## Windows Hello for Business
|
||||
|
||||
@ -87,21 +87,21 @@ For Windows Hello for Business, Microsoft can fill the role of the identity CA.
|
||||
|
||||
## BitLocker Drive Encryption
|
||||
|
||||
BitLocker provides full-volume encryption to protect data at rest. The most common device configuration splits the hard drive into several volumes. The operating system and user data reside on one volume that holds confidential information, and other volumes hold public information such as boot components, system information and recovery tools. (These other volumes are used infrequently enough that they do not need to be visible to users.) Without more protections in place, if the volume containing the operating system and user data is not encrypted, someone can boot another operating system and easily bypass the intended operating system’s enforcement of file permissions to read any user data.
|
||||
BitLocker provides full-volume encryption to protect data at rest. The most common device configuration splits the hard drive into several volumes. The operating system and user data reside on one volume that holds confidential information, and other volumes hold public information such as boot components, system information and recovery tools. (These other volumes are used infrequently enough that they do not need to be visible to users.) Without more protections in place, if the volume containing the operating system and user data is not encrypted, someone can boot another operating system and easily bypass the intended operating system's enforcement of file permissions to read any user data.
|
||||
|
||||
In the most common configuration, BitLocker encrypts the operating system volume so that if the computer or hard disk is lost or stolen when powered off, the data on the volume remains confidential. When the computer is turned on, starts normally, and proceeds to the Windows logon prompt, the only path forward is for the user to log on with his or her credentials, allowing the operating system to enforce its normal file permissions. If something about the boot process changes, however—for example, a different operating system is booted from a USB device—the operating system volume and user data cannot be read and are not accessible. The TPM and system firmware collaborate to record measurements of how the system started, including loaded software and configuration details such as whether boot occurred from the hard drive or a USB device. BitLocker relies on the TPM to allow the use of a key only when startup occurs in an expected way. The system firmware and TPM are carefully designed to work together to provide the following capabilities:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Hardware root of trust for measurement**. A TPM allows software to send it commands that record measurements of software or configuration information. This information can be calculated using a hash algorithm that essentially transforms a lot of data into a small, statistically unique hash value. The system firmware has a component called the Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM) that is implicitly trusted. The CRTM unconditionally hashes the next software component and records the measurement value by sending a command to the TPM. Successive components, whether system firmware or operating system loaders, continue the process by measuring any software components they load before running them. Because each component’s measurement is sent to the TPM before it runs, a component cannot erase its measurement from the TPM. (However, measurements are erased when the system is restarted.) The result is that at each step of the system startup process, the TPM holds measurements of boot software and configuration information. Any changes in boot software or configuration yield different TPM measurements at that step and later steps. Because the system firmware unconditionally starts the measurement chain, it provides a hardware-based root of trust for the TPM measurements. At some point in the startup process, the value of recording all loaded software and configuration information diminishes and the chain of measurements stops. The TPM allows for the creation of keys that can be used only when the platform configuration registers that hold the measurements have specific values.
|
||||
- **Hardware root of trust for measurement**. A TPM allows software to send it commands that record measurements of software or configuration information. This information can be calculated using a hash algorithm that essentially transforms a lot of data into a small, statistically unique hash value. The system firmware has a component called the Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM) that is implicitly trusted. The CRTM unconditionally hashes the next software component and records the measurement value by sending a command to the TPM. Successive components, whether system firmware or operating system loaders, continue the process by measuring any software components they load before running them. Because each component's measurement is sent to the TPM before it runs, a component cannot erase its measurement from the TPM. (However, measurements are erased when the system is restarted.) The result is that at each step of the system startup process, the TPM holds measurements of boot software and configuration information. Any changes in boot software or configuration yield different TPM measurements at that step and later steps. Because the system firmware unconditionally starts the measurement chain, it provides a hardware-based root of trust for the TPM measurements. At some point in the startup process, the value of recording all loaded software and configuration information diminishes and the chain of measurements stops. The TPM allows for the creation of keys that can be used only when the platform configuration registers that hold the measurements have specific values.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Key used only when boot measurements are accurate**. BitLocker creates a key in the TPM that can be used only when the boot measurements match an expected value. The expected value is calculated for the step in the startup process when Windows Boot Manager runs from the operating system volume on the system hard drive. Windows Boot Manager, which is stored unencrypted on the boot volume, needs to use the TPM key so that it can decrypt data read into memory from the operating system volume and startup can proceed using the encrypted operating system volume. If a different operating system is booted or the configuration is changed, the measurement values in the TPM will be different, the TPM will not let Windows Boot Manager use the key, and the startup process cannot proceed normally because the data on the operating system cannot be decrypted. If someone tries to boot the system with a different operating system or a different device, the software or configuration measurements in the TPM will be wrong and the TPM will not allow use of the key needed to decrypt the operating system volume. As a failsafe, if measurement values change unexpectedly, the user can always use the BitLocker recovery key to access volume data. Organizations can configure BitLocker to store the recovery key-in Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS).
|
||||
|
||||
Device hardware characteristics are important to BitLocker and its ability to protect data. One consideration is whether the device provides attack vectors when the system is at the logon screen. For example, if the Windows device has a port that allows direct memory access so that someone can plug in hardware and read memory, an attacker can read the operating system volume’s decryption key from memory while at the Windows logon screen. To mitigate this risk, organizations can configure BitLocker so that the TPM key requires both the correct software measurements and an authorization value. The system startup process stops at Windows Boot Manager, and the user is prompted to enter the authorization value for the TPM key or insert a USB device with the value. This process stops BitLocker from automatically loading the key into memory where it might be vulnerable, but has a less desirable user experience.
|
||||
Device hardware characteristics are important to BitLocker and its ability to protect data. One consideration is whether the device provides attack vectors when the system is at the logon screen. For example, if the Windows device has a port that allows direct memory access so that someone can plug in hardware and read memory, an attacker can read the operating system volume's decryption key from memory while at the Windows logon screen. To mitigate this risk, organizations can configure BitLocker so that the TPM key requires both the correct software measurements and an authorization value. The system startup process stops at Windows Boot Manager, and the user is prompted to enter the authorization value for the TPM key or insert a USB device with the value. This process stops BitLocker from automatically loading the key into memory where it might be vulnerable, but has a less desirable user experience.
|
||||
|
||||
Newer hardware and Windows work better together to disable direct memory access through ports and reduce attack vectors. The result is that organizations can deploy more systems without requiring users to enter additional authorization information during the startup process. The right hardware allows BitLocker to be used with the “TPM-only” configuration giving users a single sign-on experience without having to enter a PIN or USB key during boot.
|
||||
Newer hardware and Windows work better together to disable direct memory access through ports and reduce attack vectors. The result is that organizations can deploy more systems without requiring users to enter additional authorization information during the startup process. The right hardware allows BitLocker to be used with the "TPM-only" configuration giving users a single sign-on experience without having to enter a PIN or USB key during boot.
|
||||
|
||||
## Device Encryption
|
||||
|
||||
Device Encryption is the consumer version of BitLocker, and it uses the same underlying technology. How it works is if a customer logs on with a Microsoft account and the system meets Modern Standby hardware requirements, BitLocker Drive Encryption is enabled automatically in Windows. The recovery key is backed up in the Microsoft cloud and is accessible to the consumer through his or her Microsoft account. The Modern Standby hardware requirements inform Windows that the hardware is appropriate for deploying Device Encryption and allows use of the “TPM-only” configuration for a simple consumer experience. In addition, Modern Standby hardware is designed to reduce the likelihood that measurement values change and prompt the customer for the recovery key.
|
||||
Device Encryption is the consumer version of BitLocker, and it uses the same underlying technology. How it works is if a customer logs on with a Microsoft account and the system meets Modern Standby hardware requirements, BitLocker Drive Encryption is enabled automatically in Windows. The recovery key is backed up in the Microsoft cloud and is accessible to the consumer through his or her Microsoft account. The Modern Standby hardware requirements inform Windows that the hardware is appropriate for deploying Device Encryption and allows use of the "TPM-only" configuration for a simple consumer experience. In addition, Modern Standby hardware is designed to reduce the likelihood that measurement values change and prompt the customer for the recovery key.
|
||||
|
||||
For software measurements, Device Encryption relies on measurements of the authority providing software components (based on code signing from manufacturers such as OEMs or Microsoft) instead of the precise hashes of the software components themselves. This permits servicing of components without changing the resulting measurement values. For configuration measurements, the values used are based on the boot security policy instead of the numerous other configuration settings recorded during startup. These values also change less frequently. The result is that Device Encryption is enabled on appropriate hardware in a user-friendly way while also protecting data.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Windows 8 introduced Measured Boot as a way for the operating system to record t
|
||||
|
||||
The Windows boot process happens in stages and often involves third-party drivers to communicate with vendor-specific hardware or implement antimalware solutions. For software, Measured Boot records measurements of the Windows kernel, Early-Launch Anti-Malware drivers, and boot drivers in the TPM. For configuration settings, Measured Boot records security-relevant information such as signature data that antimalware drivers use and configuration data about Windows security features (e.g., whether BitLocker is on or off).
|
||||
|
||||
Measured Boot ensures that TPM measurements fully reflect the starting state of Windows software and configuration settings. If security settings and other protections are set up correctly, they can be trusted to maintain the security of the running operating system thereafter. Other scenarios can use the operating system’s starting state to determine whether the running operating system should be trusted.
|
||||
Measured Boot ensures that TPM measurements fully reflect the starting state of Windows software and configuration settings. If security settings and other protections are set up correctly, they can be trusted to maintain the security of the running operating system thereafter. Other scenarios can use the operating system's starting state to determine whether the running operating system should be trusted.
|
||||
|
||||
TPM measurements are designed to avoid recording any privacy-sensitive information as a measurement. As an additional privacy protection, Measured Boot stops the measurement chain at the initial starting state of Windows. Therefore, the set of measurements does not include details about which applications are in use or how Windows is being used. Measurement information can be shared with external entities to show that the device is enforcing adequate security policies and did not start with malware.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ Mobile device management (MDM) solutions can receive simple security assertions
|
||||
|
||||
## Credential Guard
|
||||
|
||||
Credential Guard is a new feature in Windows that helps protect Windows credentials in organizations that have deployed AD DS. Historically, a user’s credentials (e.g., logon password) were hashed to generate an authorization token. The user employed the token to access resources that he or she was permitted to use. One weakness of the token model is that malware that had access to the operating system kernel could look through the computer’s memory and harvest all the access tokens currently in use. The attacker could then use harvested tokens to log on to other machines and collect more credentials. This kind of attack is called a “pass the hash” attack, a malware technique that infects one machine to infect many machines across an organization.
|
||||
Credential Guard is a new feature in Windows that helps protect Windows credentials in organizations that have deployed AD DS. Historically, a user's credentials (such as a logon password) were hashed to generate an authorization token. The user employed the token to access resources that he or she was permitted to use. One weakness of the token model is that malware that had access to the operating system kernel could look through the computer's memory and harvest all the access tokens currently in use. The attacker could then use harvested tokens to log on to other machines and collect more credentials. This kind of attack is called a "pass the hash" attack, a malware technique that infects one machine to infect many machines across an organization.
|
||||
|
||||
Similar to the way Microsoft Hyper-V keeps virtual machines (VMs) separate from one another, Credential Guard uses virtualization to isolate the process that hashes credentials in a memory area that the operating system kernel cannot access. This isolated memory area is initialized and protected during the boot process so that components in the larger operating system environment cannot tamper with it. Credential Guard uses the TPM to protect its keys with TPM measurements, so they are accessible only during the boot process step when the separate region is initialized; they are not available for the normal operating system kernel. The local security authority code in the Windows kernel interacts with the isolated memory area by passing in credentials and receiving single-use authorization tokens in return.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -141,17 +141,17 @@ The resulting solution provides defense in depth, because even if malware runs i
|
||||
|
||||
## Conclusion
|
||||
|
||||
The TPM adds hardware-based security benefits to Windows. When installed on hardware that includes a TPM, Window delivers remarkably improved security benefits. The following table summarizes the key benefits of the TPM’s major features.
|
||||
The TPM adds hardware-based security benefits to Windows. When installed on hardware that includes a TPM, Window delivers remarkably improved security benefits. The following table summarizes the key benefits of the TPM's major features.
|
||||
|
||||
<br/>
|
||||
|
||||
|Feature | Benefits when used on a system with a TPM|
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| Platform Crypto Provider | <ul><li>If the machine is compromised, the private key associated with the certificate cannot be copied off the device.</li><li>The TPM’s dictionary attack mechanism protects PIN values to use a certificate.</li></ul> |
|
||||
| Platform Crypto Provider | <ul><li>If the machine is compromised, the private key associated with the certificate cannot be copied off the device.</li><li>The TPM's dictionary attack mechanism protects PIN values to use a certificate.</li></ul> |
|
||||
| Virtual Smart Card | <ul><li>Achieve security similar to that of physical smart cards without deploying physical smart cards or card readers.</li></ul> |
|
||||
| Windows Hello for Business | <ul><li>Credentials provisioned on a device cannot be copied elsewhere.</li><li>Confirm a device’s TPM before credentials are provisioned.</li></ul> |
|
||||
| Windows Hello for Business | <ul><li>Credentials provisioned on a device cannot be copied elsewhere.</li><li>Confirm a device's TPM before credentials are provisioned.</li></ul> |
|
||||
| BitLocker Drive Encryption | <ul><li>Multiple options are available for enterprises to protect data at rest while balancing security requirements with different device hardware.</li></ul> |
|
||||
|Device Encryption | <ul><li>With a Microsoft account and the right hardware, consumers’ devices seamlessly benefit from data-at-rest protection.</li></ul> |
|
||||
|Device Encryption | <ul><li>With a Microsoft account and the right hardware, consumers' devices seamlessly benefit from data-at-rest protection.</li></ul> |
|
||||
| Measured Boot | <ul><li>A hardware root of trust contains boot measurements that help detect malware during remote attestation.</li></ul> |
|
||||
| Health Attestation | <ul><li>MDM solutions can easily perform remote attestation and evaluate client health before granting access to resources or cloud services such as Office 365. </li></ul> |
|
||||
| Credential Guard | <ul><li>Defense in depth increases so that even if malware has administrative rights on one machine, it is significantly more difficult to compromise additional machines in an organization.</li></ul> |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ ms.author: dansimp
|
||||
manager: aaroncz
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier1
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 09/06/2021
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
@ -71,7 +72,7 @@ You can use the Windows Defender Security Center app to clear the TPM as a troub
|
||||
Clearing the TPM resets it to an unowned state. After you clear the TPM, the Windows operating system will automatically re-initialize it and take ownership again.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!WARNING]
|
||||
> Clearing the TPM can result in data loss. For more information, see the next section, “Precautions to take before clearing the TPM.”
|
||||
> Clearing the TPM can result in data loss. For more information, see the next section, "Precautions to take before clearing the TPM."
|
||||
|
||||
### Precautions to take before clearing the TPM
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
# Manage TPM commands
|
||||
|
||||
**Applies to**
|
||||
- Windows 10
|
||||
- Windows 10
|
||||
- Windows 11
|
||||
- Windows Server 2016 and above
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
# Manage TPM lockout
|
||||
|
||||
**Applies to**
|
||||
- Windows 10
|
||||
- Windows 10
|
||||
- Windows 11
|
||||
- Windows Server 2016 and above
|
||||
|
||||
@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ The industry standards from the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) specify that TPM m
|
||||
|
||||
TPM 2.0 devices have standardized lockout behavior, which is configured by Windows. TPM 2.0 devices have a maximum count threshold and a healing time. Windows configures the maximum count to be 32 and the healing time to be 10 minutes. This means that every continuous ten minutes of powered on operation without an event, which increases the counter will cause the counter to decrease by 1.
|
||||
|
||||
If your TPM has entered lockout mode or is responding slowly to commands, you can reset the lockout value by using the following procedures. Resetting the TPM lockout requires the TPM owner’s authorization. This value is no longer retained by default starting with Windows 10 version 1607 and higher.
|
||||
If your TPM has entered lockout mode or is responding slowly to commands, you can reset the lockout value by using the following procedures. Resetting the TPM lockout requires the TPM owner's authorization. This value is no longer retained by default starting with Windows 10 version 1607 and higher.
|
||||
|
||||
## Reset the TPM lockout by using the TPM MMC
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ It is important to note that this binding to PCR values also includes the hashin
|
||||
|
||||
When the PCR banks are switched, the algorithm used to compute the hashed values stored in the PCRs during extend operations is changed. Each hash algorithm will return a different cryptographic signature for the same inputs.
|
||||
|
||||
As a result, if the currently used PCR bank is switched all keys that have been bound to the previous PCR values will no longer work. For example, if you had a key bound to the SHA-1 value of PCR\[12\] and subsequently changed the PCR bank to SHA-256, the banks wouldn’t match, and you would be unable to use that key. The BitLocker key is secured using the PCR banks and Windows will not be able to unseal it if the PCR banks are switched while BitLocker is enabled.
|
||||
As a result, if the currently used PCR bank is switched all keys that have been bound to the previous PCR values will no longer work. For example, if you had a key bound to the SHA-1 value of PCR\[12\] and subsequently changed the PCR bank to SHA-256, the banks wouldn't match, and you would be unable to use that key. The BitLocker key is secured using the PCR banks and Windows will not be able to unseal it if the PCR banks are switched while BitLocker is enabled.
|
||||
|
||||
## What can I do to switch PCRs when BitLocker is already active?
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Computers that incorporate a TPM can create cryptographic keys and encrypt them
|
||||
|
||||
You can specify whether encryption keys that are created by the TPM can be migrated or not. If you specify that they can be migrated, the public and private portions of the key can be exposed to other components, software, processes, or users. If you specify that encryption keys cannot be migrated, the private portion of the key is never exposed outside the TPM.
|
||||
|
||||
Computers that incorporate a TPM can also create a key that is wrapped and tied to certain platform measurements. This type of key can be unwrapped only when those platform measurements have the same values that they had when the key was created. This process is referred to as “sealing the key to the TPM.” Decrypting the key is called unsealing. The TPM can also seal and unseal data that is generated outside the TPM. With this sealed key and software, such as BitLocker Drive Encryption, you can lock data until specific hardware or software conditions are met.
|
||||
Computers that incorporate a TPM can also create a key that is wrapped and tied to certain platform measurements. This type of key can be unwrapped only when those platform measurements have the same values that they had when the key was created. This process is referred to as "sealing the key to the TPM." Decrypting the key is called unsealing. The TPM can also seal and unseal data that is generated outside the TPM. With this sealed key and software, such as BitLocker Drive Encryption, you can lock data until specific hardware or software conditions are met.
|
||||
|
||||
With a TPM, private portions of key pairs are kept separate from the memory that is controlled by the operating system. Keys can be sealed to the TPM, and certain assurances about the state of a system (assurances that define the trustworthiness of a system) can be made before the keys are unsealed and released for use. The TPM uses its own internal firmware and logic circuits to process instructions. Hence, it doesn't rely on the operating system and it isn't exposed to vulnerabilities that might exist in the operating system or application software.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ The Measured Boot feature provides antimalware software with a trusted (resistan
|
||||
|
||||
## TPM-based Virtual Smart Card
|
||||
|
||||
The Virtual Smart Card emulates the functionality of traditional smart cards. Virtual Smart Cards use the TPM chip that is available on an organization’s computers, rather than using a separate physical smart card and reader. This greatly reduces the management and deployment cost of smart cards in an enterprise. To the end user, the Virtual Smart Card is always available on the computer. If a user needs to use more than one computer, a Virtual Smart Card must be issued to the user for each computer. A computer that is shared among multiple users can host multiple Virtual Smart Cards, one for each user.
|
||||
The Virtual Smart Card emulates the functionality of traditional smart cards. Virtual Smart Cards use the TPM chip that is available on an organization's computers, rather than using a separate physical smart card and reader. This greatly reduces the management and deployment cost of smart cards in an enterprise. To the end user, the Virtual Smart Card is always available on the computer. If a user needs to use more than one computer, a Virtual Smart Card must be issued to the user for each computer. A computer that is shared among multiple users can host multiple Virtual Smart Cards, one for each user.
|
||||
|
||||
## TPM-based certificate storage
|
||||
|
||||
@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ When a TPM processes a command, it does so in a protected environment, for examp
|
||||
|
||||
TPMs have anti-hammering protection that is designed to prevent brute force attacks, or more complex dictionary attacks, that attempt to determine authorization values for using a key. The basic approach is for the TPM to allow only a limited number of authorization failures before it prevents more attempts to use keys and locks. Providing a failure count for individual keys is not technically practical, so TPMs have a global lockout when too many authorization failures occur.
|
||||
|
||||
Because many entities can use the TPM, a single authorization success cannot reset the TPM’s anti-hammering protection. This prevents an attacker from creating a key with a known authorization value and then using it to reset the TPM’s protection. TPMs are designed to forget about authorization failures after a period of time so the TPM does not enter a lockout state unnecessarily. A TPM owner password can be used to reset the TPM’s lockout logic.
|
||||
Because many entities can use the TPM, a single authorization success cannot reset the TPM's anti-hammering protection. This prevents an attacker from creating a key with a known authorization value and then using it to reset the TPM's protection. TPMs are designed to forget about authorization failures after a period of time so the TPM does not enter a lockout state unnecessarily. A TPM owner password can be used to reset the TPM's lockout logic.
|
||||
|
||||
### TPM 2.0 anti-hammering
|
||||
|
||||
@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ Beginning with Windows 10, version 1703, the minimum length for the BitLocker PI
|
||||
|
||||
The Windows TPM-based smart card, which is a virtual smart card, can be configured to allow sign in to the system. In contrast with physical smart cards, the sign-in process uses a TPM-based key with an authorization value. The following list shows the advantages of virtual smart cards:
|
||||
|
||||
- Physical smart cards can enforce lockout for only the physical smart card PIN, and they can reset the lockout after the correct PIN is entered. With a virtual smart card, the TPM’s anti-hammering protection is not reset after a successful authentication. The allowed number of authorization failures before the TPM enters lockout includes many factors.
|
||||
- Physical smart cards can enforce lockout for only the physical smart card PIN, and they can reset the lockout after the correct PIN is entered. With a virtual smart card, the TPM's anti-hammering protection is not reset after a successful authentication. The allowed number of authorization failures before the TPM enters lockout includes many factors.
|
||||
|
||||
- Hardware manufacturers and software developers have the option to use the security features of the TPM to meet their requirements.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ ms.author: dansimp
|
||||
manager: aaroncz
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier1
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 09/06/2021
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
@ -28,9 +29,9 @@ For a basic feature description of TPM, see the [Trusted Platform Module Technol
|
||||
|
||||
## TPM design and implementation
|
||||
|
||||
Traditionally, TPMs are discrete chips soldered to a computer’s motherboard. Such implementations allow the computer’s original equipment manufacturer (OEM) to evaluate and certify the TPM separate from the rest of the system. Discrete TPM implementations are common. However, they can be problematic for integrated devices that are small or have low power consumption. Some newer TPM implementations integrate TPM functionality into the same chipset as other platform components while still providing logical separation similar to discrete TPM chips.
|
||||
Traditionally, TPMs are discrete chips soldered to a computer's motherboard. Such implementations allow the computer's original equipment manufacturer (OEM) to evaluate and certify the TPM separate from the rest of the system. Discrete TPM implementations are common. However, they can be problematic for integrated devices that are small or have low power consumption. Some newer TPM implementations integrate TPM functionality into the same chipset as other platform components while still providing logical separation similar to discrete TPM chips.
|
||||
|
||||
TPMs are passive: they receive commands and return responses. To realize the full benefit of a TPM, the OEM must carefully integrate system hardware and firmware with the TPM to send it commands and react to its responses. TPMs were originally designed to provide security and privacy benefits to a platform’s owner and users, but newer versions can provide security and privacy benefits to the system hardware itself. Before it can be used for advanced scenarios, however, a TPM must be provisioned. Windows automatically provisions a TPM, but if the user is planning to reinstall the operating system, he or she may need to clear the TPM before reinstalling so that Windows can take full advantage of the TPM.
|
||||
TPMs are passive: they receive commands and return responses. To realize the full benefit of a TPM, the OEM must carefully integrate system hardware and firmware with the TPM to send it commands and react to its responses. TPMs were originally designed to provide security and privacy benefits to a platform's owner and users, but newer versions can provide security and privacy benefits to the system hardware itself. Before it can be used for advanced scenarios, however, a TPM must be provisioned. Windows automatically provisions a TPM, but if the user is planning to reinstall the operating system, he or she may need to clear the TPM before reinstalling so that Windows can take full advantage of the TPM.
|
||||
|
||||
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is the nonprofit organization that publishes and maintains the TPM specification. The TCG exists to develop, define, and promote vendor-neutral, global industry standards. These standards support a hardware-based root of trust for interoperable trusted computing platforms. The TCG also publishes the TPM specification as the international standard ISO/IEC 11889, using the Publicly Available Specification Submission Process that the Joint Technical Committee 1 defines between the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ ms.author: dansimp
|
||||
manager: aaroncz
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier1
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
adobe-target: true
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
@ -32,7 +33,7 @@ This topic for the IT professional describes the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) a
|
||||
|
||||
- Generate, store, and limit the use of cryptographic keys.
|
||||
|
||||
- Use TPM technology for platform device authentication by using the TPM’s unique RSA key, which is burned into it.
|
||||
- Use TPM technology for platform device authentication by using the TPM's unique RSA key, which is burned into it.
|
||||
|
||||
- Help ensure platform integrity by taking and storing security measurements.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ ms.author: dansimp
|
||||
manager: aaroncz
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier1
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 09/06/2021
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
@ -29,7 +30,7 @@ Trusted Platform Module (TPM) technology is designed to provide hardware-based,
|
||||
| [Trusted Platform Module Overview](trusted-platform-module-overview.md) | Provides an overview of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and how Windows uses it for access control and authentication. |
|
||||
| [TPM fundamentals](tpm-fundamentals.md) | Provides background about how a TPM can work with cryptographic keys. Also describes technologies that work with the TPM, such as TPM-based virtual smart cards. |
|
||||
| [TPM Group Policy settings](trusted-platform-module-services-group-policy-settings.md) | Describes TPM services that can be controlled centrally by using Group Policy settings. |
|
||||
| [Back up the TPM recovery information to AD DS](backup-tpm-recovery-information-to-ad-ds.md) | For Windows 10, version 1511 and Windows 10, version 1507 only, describes how to back up a computer’s TPM information to Active Directory Domain Services. |
|
||||
| [Back up the TPM recovery information to AD DS](backup-tpm-recovery-information-to-ad-ds.md) | For Windows 10, version 1511 and Windows 10, version 1507 only, describes how to back up a computer's TPM information to Active Directory Domain Services. |
|
||||
| [Troubleshoot the TPM](initialize-and-configure-ownership-of-the-tpm.md) | Describes actions you can take through the TPM snap-in, TPM.msc: view TPM status, troubleshoot TPM initialization, and clear keys from the TPM. Also, for TPM 1.2 and Windows 10, version 1507 or 1511, or Windows 11, describes how to turn the TPM on or off. |
|
||||
| [Understanding PCR banks on TPM 2.0 devices](switch-pcr-banks-on-tpm-2-0-devices.md) | Provides background about what happens when you switch PCR banks on TPM 2.0 devices. |
|
||||
| [TPM recommendations](tpm-recommendations.md) | Discusses aspects of TPMs such as the difference between TPM 1.2 and 2.0, and the Windows features for which a TPM is required or recommended. |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ manager: aaroncz
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 09/06/2021
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ manager: aaroncz
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 09/06/2021
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ ms.author: vinpa
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: reference
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
@ -127,7 +128,7 @@ This event generates when a logon session is created (on destination machine). I
|
||||
|
||||
- **Account Name** [Type = UnicodeString]**:** the name of the account that reported information about successful logon.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Account Domain** [Type = UnicodeString]**:** subject’s domain or computer name. Formats vary, and include the following:
|
||||
- **Account Domain** [Type = UnicodeString]**:** subject's domain or computer name. Formats vary, and include the following:
|
||||
|
||||
- Domain NETBIOS name example: CONTOSO
|
||||
|
||||
@ -191,7 +192,7 @@ This event generates when a logon session is created (on destination machine). I
|
||||
|
||||
- **Account Name** [Type = UnicodeString]**:** the name of the account for which logon was performed.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Account Domain** [Type = UnicodeString]**:** subject’s domain or computer name. Formats vary, and include the following:
|
||||
- **Account Domain** [Type = UnicodeString]**:** subject's domain or computer name. Formats vary, and include the following:
|
||||
|
||||
- Domain NETBIOS name example: CONTOSO
|
||||
|
||||
@ -289,7 +290,7 @@ For 4624(S): An account was successfully logged on.
|
||||
| **Accounts of different types**: You might want to ensure that certain actions are performed only by certain account types, for example, local or domain account, machine or user account, vendor or employee account, and so on. | If this event corresponds to an action you want to monitor for certain account types, review the **"New Logon\\Security ID"** to see whether the account type is as expected. |
|
||||
| **External accounts**: You might be monitoring accounts from another domain, or "external" accounts that are not allowed to perform certain actions (represented by certain specific events). | Monitor this event for the **"Subject\\Account Domain"** corresponding to accounts from another domain or "external" accounts. |
|
||||
| **Restricted-use computers or devices**: You might have certain computers, machines, or devices on which certain people (accounts) should not typically perform any actions. | Monitor the target **Computer:** (or other target device) for actions performed by the **"New Logon\\Security ID"** that you are concerned about. |
|
||||
| **Account naming conventions**: Your organization might have specific naming conventions for account names. | Monitor "**Subject\\Account Name"** for names that don’t comply with naming conventions. |
|
||||
| **Account naming conventions**: Your organization might have specific naming conventions for account names. | Monitor "**Subject\\Account Name"** for names that don't comply with naming conventions. |
|
||||
|
||||
- Because this event is typically triggered by the SYSTEM account, we recommend that you report it whenever **"Subject\\Security ID"** is not SYSTEM.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ ms.author: vinpa
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: reference
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ ms.topic: reference
|
||||
|
||||
This event is logged for any logon failure.
|
||||
|
||||
It generates on the computer where logon attempt was made, for example, if logon attempt was made on user’s workstation, then event will be logged on this workstation.
|
||||
It generates on the computer where logon attempt was made, for example, if logon attempt was made on user's workstation, then event will be logged on this workstation.
|
||||
|
||||
This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -107,11 +108,11 @@ This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations.
|
||||
|
||||
- Uppercase full domain name: CONTOSO.LOCAL
|
||||
|
||||
- For some [well-known security principals](/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-identifiers), such as LOCAL SERVICE or ANONYMOUS LOGON, the value of this field is “NT AUTHORITY”.
|
||||
- For some [well-known security principals](/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-identifiers), such as LOCAL SERVICE or ANONYMOUS LOGON, the value of this field is "NT AUTHORITY".
|
||||
|
||||
- For local user accounts, this field will contain the name of the computer or device that this account belongs to, for example: “Win81”.
|
||||
- For local user accounts, this field will contain the name of the computer or device that this account belongs to, for example: "Win81".
|
||||
|
||||
- **Logon Type** \[Type = UInt32\]**:** the type of logon that was performed. “Table 11. Windows Logon Types” contains the list of possible values for this field.
|
||||
- **Logon Type** \[Type = UInt32\]**:** the type of logon that was performed. "Table 11. Windows Logon Types" contains the list of possible values for this field.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
<span id="_Ref433822321" class="anchor"></span>**Table 11: Windows Logon Types**
|
||||
@ -146,17 +147,17 @@ This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations.
|
||||
|
||||
- Uppercase full domain name: CONTOSO.LOCAL
|
||||
|
||||
- For some [well-known security principals](/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-identifiers), such as LOCAL SERVICE or ANONYMOUS LOGON, the value of this field is “NT AUTHORITY”.
|
||||
- For some [well-known security principals](/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-identifiers), such as LOCAL SERVICE or ANONYMOUS LOGON, the value of this field is "NT AUTHORITY".
|
||||
|
||||
- For local user accounts, this field will contain the name of the computer or device that this account belongs to, for example: “Win81”.
|
||||
- For local user accounts, this field will contain the name of the computer or device that this account belongs to, for example: "Win81".
|
||||
|
||||
- **Logon ID** \[Type = HexInt64\]**:** hexadecimal value that can help you correlate this event with recent events that might contain the same Logon ID, for example, “[4624](event-4624.md): An account was successfully logged on.”
|
||||
- **Logon ID** \[Type = HexInt64\]**:** hexadecimal value that can help you correlate this event with recent events that might contain the same Logon ID, for example, "[4624](event-4624.md): An account was successfully logged on."
|
||||
|
||||
**Failure Information:**
|
||||
|
||||
- **Failure Reason** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** textual explanation of **Status** field value. For this event, it typically has “**Account locked out**” value.
|
||||
- **Failure Reason** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** textual explanation of **Status** field value. For this event, it typically has "**Account locked out**" value.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Status** \[Type = HexInt32\]**:** the reason why logon failed. For this event, it typically has “**0xC0000234**” value. The most common status codes are listed in Table 12. Windows logon status codes.
|
||||
- **Status** \[Type = HexInt32\]**:** the reason why logon failed. For this event, it typically has "**0xC0000234**" value. The most common status codes are listed in Table 12. Windows logon status codes.
|
||||
|
||||
<span id="_Ref433822658" class="anchor"></span>**Table 12: Windows logon status codes.**
|
||||
|
||||
@ -189,7 +190,7 @@ This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations.
|
||||
|
||||
More information: <https://dev.windows.com/en-us/downloads>
|
||||
|
||||
- **Sub Status** \[Type = HexInt32\]**:** additional information about logon failure. The most common substatus codes listed in the “Table 12. Windows logon status codes.”.
|
||||
- **Sub Status** \[Type = HexInt32\]**:** additional information about logon failure. The most common substatus codes listed in the "Table 12. Windows logon status codes.".
|
||||
|
||||
**Process Information:**
|
||||
|
||||
@ -199,7 +200,7 @@ More information: <https://dev.windows.com/en-us/downloads>
|
||||
|
||||
If you convert the hexadecimal value to decimal, you can compare it to the values in Task Manager.
|
||||
|
||||
You can also correlate this process ID with a process ID in other events, for example, “[4688](event-4688.md): A new process has been created” **Process Information\\New Process ID**.
|
||||
You can also correlate this process ID with a process ID in other events, for example, "[4688](event-4688.md): A new process has been created" **Process Information\\New Process ID**.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Caller Process Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** full path and the name of the executable for the process.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -219,9 +220,9 @@ More information: <https://dev.windows.com/en-us/downloads>
|
||||
|
||||
**Detailed Authentication Information:**
|
||||
|
||||
- **Logon Process** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** the name of the trusted logon process that was used for the logon attempt. See event “[4611](event-4611.md): A trusted logon process has been registered with the Local Security Authority” description for more information.
|
||||
- **Logon Process** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** the name of the trusted logon process that was used for the logon attempt. See event "[4611](event-4611.md): A trusted logon process has been registered with the Local Security Authority" description for more information.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Authentication Package** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** The name of the authentication package that was used for the logon authentication process. Default packages loaded on LSA startup are located in “HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig” registry key. Other packages can be loaded at runtime. When a new package is loaded a “[4610](event-4610.md): An authentication package has been loaded by the Local Security Authority” (typically for NTLM) or “[4622](event-4622.md): A security package has been loaded by the Local Security Authority” (typically for Kerberos) event is logged to indicate that a new package has been loaded along with the package name. The most common authentication packages are:
|
||||
- **Authentication Package** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** The name of the authentication package that was used for the logon authentication process. Default packages loaded on LSA startup are located in "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig" registry key. Other packages can be loaded at runtime. When a new package is loaded a "[4610](event-4610.md): An authentication package has been loaded by the Local Security Authority" (typically for NTLM) or "[4622](event-4622.md): A security package has been loaded by the Local Security Authority" (typically for Kerberos) event is logged to indicate that a new package has been loaded along with the package name. The most common authentication packages are:
|
||||
|
||||
- **NTLM** – NTLM-family Authentication
|
||||
|
||||
@ -233,15 +234,15 @@ More information: <https://dev.windows.com/en-us/downloads>
|
||||
|
||||
- **Package Name (NTLM only)** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** The name of the LAN Manager subpackage ([NTLM-family](/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-nlmp/c50a85f0-5940-42d8-9e82-ed206902e919) protocol name) that was used during the logon attempt. Possible values are:
|
||||
|
||||
- “NTLM V1”
|
||||
- "NTLM V1"
|
||||
|
||||
- “NTLM V2”
|
||||
- "NTLM V2"
|
||||
|
||||
- “LM”
|
||||
- "LM"
|
||||
|
||||
Only populated if “**Authentication Package” = “NTLM”**.
|
||||
Only populated if "**Authentication Package" = "NTLM"**.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Key Length** \[Type = UInt32\]**:** the length of [NTLM Session Security](/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-nlmp/99d90ff4-957f-4c8a-80e4-5bfe5a9a9832) key. Typically, it has a length of 128 bits or 56 bits. This parameter is always 0 if **"Authentication Package" = "Kerberos"**, because it is not applicable for Kerberos protocol. This field will also have “0” value if Kerberos was negotiated using **Negotiate** authentication package.
|
||||
- **Key Length** \[Type = UInt32\]**:** the length of [NTLM Session Security](/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-nlmp/99d90ff4-957f-4c8a-80e4-5bfe5a9a9832) key. Typically, it has a length of 128 bits or 56 bits. This parameter is always 0 if **"Authentication Package" = "Kerberos"**, because it is not applicable for Kerberos protocol. This field will also have "0" value if Kerberos was negotiated using **Negotiate** authentication package.
|
||||
|
||||
## Security Monitoring Recommendations
|
||||
|
||||
@ -250,19 +251,19 @@ For 4625(F): An account failed to log on.
|
||||
> [!IMPORTANT]
|
||||
> For this event, also see [Appendix A: Security monitoring recommendations for many audit events](appendix-a-security-monitoring-recommendations-for-many-audit-events.md).
|
||||
|
||||
- If you have a pre-defined “**Process Name**” for the process reported in this event, monitor all events with “**Process Name**” not equal to your defined value.
|
||||
- If you have a pre-defined "**Process Name**" for the process reported in this event, monitor all events with "**Process Name**" not equal to your defined value.
|
||||
|
||||
- You can monitor to see if “**Process Name**” is not in a standard folder (for example, not in **System32** or **Program Files**) or is in a restricted folder (for example, **Temporary Internet Files**).
|
||||
- You can monitor to see if "**Process Name**" is not in a standard folder (for example, not in **System32** or **Program Files**) or is in a restricted folder (for example, **Temporary Internet Files**).
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- -->
|
||||
|
||||
- If you have a pre-defined list of restricted substrings or words in process names (for example, “**mimikatz**” or “**cain.exe**”), check for these substrings in “**Process Name**.”
|
||||
- If you have a pre-defined list of restricted substrings or words in process names (for example, "**mimikatz**" or "**cain.exe**"), check for these substrings in "**Process Name**."
|
||||
|
||||
- If **Subject\\Account Name** is a name of service account or user account, it may be useful to investigate whether that account is allowed (or expected) to request logon for **Account For Which Logon Failed\\Security ID**.
|
||||
|
||||
- To monitor for a mismatch between the logon type and the account that uses it (for example, if **Logon Type** 4-Batch or 5-Service is used by a member of a domain administrative group), monitor **Logon Type** in this event.
|
||||
|
||||
- If you have a high-value domain or local account for which you need to monitor every lockout, monitor all [4625](event-4625.md) events with the **“Subject\\Security ID”** that corresponds to the account.
|
||||
- If you have a high-value domain or local account for which you need to monitor every lockout, monitor all [4625](event-4625.md) events with the **"Subject\\Security ID"** that corresponds to the account.
|
||||
|
||||
- We recommend monitoring all [4625](event-4625.md) events for local accounts, because these accounts typically should not be locked out. Monitoring is especially relevant for critical servers, administrative workstations, and other high-value assets.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -270,7 +271,7 @@ For 4625(F): An account failed to log on.
|
||||
|
||||
- If your organization restricts logons in the following ways, you can use this event to monitor accordingly:
|
||||
|
||||
- If the **“Account For Which Logon Failed \\Security ID”** should never be used to log on from the specific **Network Information\\Workstation Name**.
|
||||
- If the **"Account For Which Logon Failed \\Security ID"** should never be used to log on from the specific **Network Information\\Workstation Name**.
|
||||
|
||||
- If a specific account, such as a service account, should only be used from your internal IP address list (or some other list of IP addresses). In this case, you can monitor for **Network Information\\Source Network Address** and compare the network address with your list of IP addresses.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -286,14 +287,14 @@ For 4625(F): An account failed to log on.
|
||||
|
||||
| Field | Value to monitor for |
|
||||
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|
||||
| **Failure Information\\Status** or <br>**Failure Information\\Sub Status** | 0XC000005E – “There are currently no logon servers available to service the logon request.” <br>This issue is typically not a security issue, but it can be an infrastructure or availability issue. |
|
||||
| **Failure Information\\Status** or <br>**Failure Information\\Sub Status** | 0xC0000064 – “User logon with misspelled or bad user account”. <br>Especially if you get several of these events in a row, it can be a sign of a user enumeration attack. |
|
||||
| **Failure Information\\Status** or <br>**Failure Information\\Sub Status** | 0xC000006A – “User logon with misspelled or bad password” for critical accounts or service accounts. <br>Especially watch for a number of such events in a row. |
|
||||
| **Failure Information\\Status** or <br>**Failure Information\\Sub Status** | 0XC000006D – “This is either due to a bad username or authentication information” for critical accounts or service accounts. <br>Especially watch for a number of such events in a row. |
|
||||
| **Failure Information\\Status** or <br>**Failure Information\\Sub Status** | 0xC000006F – “User logon outside authorized hours”. |
|
||||
| **Failure Information\\Status** or <br>**Failure Information\\Sub Status** | 0xC0000070 – “User logon from unauthorized workstation”. |
|
||||
| **Failure Information\\Status** or <br>**Failure Information\\Sub Status** | 0xC0000072 – “User logon to account disabled by administrator”. |
|
||||
| **Failure Information\\Status** or <br>**Failure Information\\Sub Status** | 0XC000015B – “The user has not been granted the requested logon type (aka logon right) at this machine”. |
|
||||
| **Failure Information\\Status** or <br>**Failure Information\\Sub Status** | 0XC0000192 – “An attempt was made to logon, but the Netlogon service was not started”. <br>This issue is typically not a security issue but it can be an infrastructure or availability issue. |
|
||||
| **Failure Information\\Status** or <br>**Failure Information\\Sub Status** | 0xC0000193 – “User logon with expired account”. |
|
||||
| **Failure Information\\Status** or <br>**Failure Information\\Sub Status** | 0XC0000413 – “Logon Failure: The machine you are logging onto is protected by an authentication firewall. The specified account is not allowed to authenticate to the machine”. |
|
||||
| **Failure Information\\Status** or <br>**Failure Information\\Sub Status** | 0XC000005E – "There are currently no logon servers available to service the logon request." <br>This issue is typically not a security issue, but it can be an infrastructure or availability issue. |
|
||||
| **Failure Information\\Status** or <br>**Failure Information\\Sub Status** | 0xC0000064 – "User logon with misspelled or bad user account". <br>Especially if you get several of these events in a row, it can be a sign of a user enumeration attack. |
|
||||
| **Failure Information\\Status** or <br>**Failure Information\\Sub Status** | 0xC000006A – "User logon with misspelled or bad password" for critical accounts or service accounts. <br>Especially watch for a number of such events in a row. |
|
||||
| **Failure Information\\Status** or <br>**Failure Information\\Sub Status** | 0XC000006D – "This is either due to a bad username or authentication information" for critical accounts or service accounts. <br>Especially watch for a number of such events in a row. |
|
||||
| **Failure Information\\Status** or <br>**Failure Information\\Sub Status** | 0xC000006F – "User logon outside authorized hours". |
|
||||
| **Failure Information\\Status** or <br>**Failure Information\\Sub Status** | 0xC0000070 – "User logon from unauthorized workstation". |
|
||||
| **Failure Information\\Status** or <br>**Failure Information\\Sub Status** | 0xC0000072 – "User logon to account disabled by administrator". |
|
||||
| **Failure Information\\Status** or <br>**Failure Information\\Sub Status** | 0XC000015B – "The user has not been granted the requested logon type (aka logon right) at this machine". |
|
||||
| **Failure Information\\Status** or <br>**Failure Information\\Sub Status** | 0XC0000192 – "An attempt was made to logon, but the Netlogon service was not started". <br>This issue is typically not a security issue but it can be an infrastructure or availability issue. |
|
||||
| **Failure Information\\Status** or <br>**Failure Information\\Sub Status** | 0xC0000193 – "User logon with expired account". |
|
||||
| **Failure Information\\Status** or <br>**Failure Information\\Sub Status** | 0XC0000413 – "Logon Failure: The machine you are logging onto is protected by an authentication firewall. The specified account is not allowed to authenticate to the machine". |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ ms.author: vinpa
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: reference
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
@ -26,11 +27,11 @@ ms.topic: reference
|
||||
|
||||
***Event Description:***
|
||||
|
||||
This event generates every time the Key Distribution Center fails to issue a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). This problem can occur when a domain controller doesn’t have a certificate installed for smart card authentication (for example, with a “Domain Controller” or “Domain Controller Authentication” template), the user’s password has expired, or the wrong password was provided.
|
||||
This event generates every time the Key Distribution Center fails to issue a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). This problem can occur when a domain controller doesn't have a certificate installed for smart card authentication (for example, with a "Domain Controller" or "Domain Controller Authentication" template), the user's password has expired, or the wrong password was provided.
|
||||
|
||||
This event generates only on domain controllers.
|
||||
|
||||
This event is not generated if “Do not require Kerberos preauthentication” option is set for the account.
|
||||
This event is not generated if "Do not require Kerberos preauthentication" option is set for the account.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Note** For recommendations, see [Security Monitoring Recommendations](#security-monitoring-recommendations) for this event.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -127,7 +128,7 @@ This event is not generated if “Do not require Kerberos preauthentication” o
|
||||
|
||||
- Using **MSB 0**-bit numbering, we have bit 1, 8, 15 and 27 set = Forwardable, Renewable, Canonicalize, Renewable-ok.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Note** In the table below **“MSB 0”** bit numbering is used, because RFC documents use this style. In “MSB 0” style bit numbering begins from left.<br><img src="images/msb.png" alt="MSB illustration" width="224" height="57" />
|
||||
> **Note** In the table below **"MSB 0"** bit numbering is used, because RFC documents use this style. In "MSB 0" style bit numbering begins from left.<br><img src="images/msb.png" alt="MSB illustration" width="224" height="57" />
|
||||
|
||||
The most common values:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -185,14 +186,14 @@ The most common values:
|
||||
| 0xd | KDC\_ERR\_BADOPTION | KDC cannot accommodate requested option |
|
||||
| 0xe | KDC\_ERR\_ETYPE\_NOSUPP | KDC has no support for encryption type |
|
||||
| 0xf | KDC\_ERR\_SUMTYPE\_NOSUPP | KDC has no support for checksum type |
|
||||
| 0x10 | KDC\_ERR\_PADATA\_TYPE\_NOSUPP | KDC has no support for PADATA type (pre-authentication data)|Smart card logon is being attempted and the proper certificate cannot be located. This problem can happen because the wrong certification authority (CA) is being queried or the proper CA cannot be contacted in order to get Domain Controller or Domain Controller Authentication certificates for the domain controller.<br>It can also happen when a domain controller doesn’t have a certificate installed for smart cards (Domain Controller or Domain Controller Authentication templates).
|
||||
| 0x10 | KDC\_ERR\_PADATA\_TYPE\_NOSUPP | KDC has no support for PADATA type (pre-authentication data)|Smart card logon is being attempted and the proper certificate cannot be located. This problem can happen because the wrong certification authority (CA) is being queried or the proper CA cannot be contacted in order to get Domain Controller or Domain Controller Authentication certificates for the domain controller.<br>It can also happen when a domain controller doesn't have a certificate installed for smart cards (Domain Controller or Domain Controller Authentication templates).
|
||||
| 0x11 | KDC\_ERR\_TRTYPE\_NOSUPP | KDC has no support for transited type |
|
||||
| 0x12 | KDC\_ERR\_CLIENT\_REVOKED | Clients credentials have been revoked |
|
||||
| 0x13 | KDC\_ERR\_SERVICE\_REVOKED | Credentials for server have been revoked |
|
||||
| 0x14 | KDC\_ERR\_TGT\_REVOKED | TGT has been revoked |
|
||||
| 0x15 | KDC\_ERR\_CLIENT\_NOTYET | Client not yet valid; try again later |
|
||||
| 0x16 | KDC\_ERR\_SERVICE\_NOTYET | Server not yet valid; try again later |
|
||||
| 0x17 | KDC\_ERR\_KEY\_EXPIRED | Password has expired—change password to reset |The user’s password has expired.
|
||||
| 0x17 | KDC\_ERR\_KEY\_EXPIRED | Password has expired—change password to reset |The user's password has expired.
|
||||
| 0x18 | KDC\_ERR\_PREAUTH\_FAILED | Pre-authentication information was invalid |The wrong password was provided.
|
||||
| 0x19 | KDC\_ERR\_PREAUTH\_REQUIRED | Additional pre-authentication required |
|
||||
| 0x1a | KDC\_ERR\_SERVER\_NOMATCH | Requested server and ticket don't match |
|
||||
@ -260,9 +261,9 @@ The most common values:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Certificate Issuer Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** the name of Certification Authority that issued smart card certificate. Populated in **Issued by** field in certificate. Always empty for [4771](event-4771.md) events.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Certificate Serial Number** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** smart card certificate’s serial number. Can be found in **Serial number** field in the certificate. Always empty for [4771](event-4771.md) events.
|
||||
- **Certificate Serial Number** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** smart card certificate's serial number. Can be found in **Serial number** field in the certificate. Always empty for [4771](event-4771.md) events.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Certificate Thumbprint** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** smart card certificate’s thumbprint. Can be found in **Thumbprint** field in the certificate. Always empty for [4771](event-4771.md) events.
|
||||
- **Certificate Thumbprint** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** smart card certificate's thumbprint. Can be found in **Thumbprint** field in the certificate. Always empty for [4771](event-4771.md) events.
|
||||
|
||||
## Security Monitoring Recommendations
|
||||
|
||||
@ -270,11 +271,11 @@ For 4771(F): Kerberos pre-authentication failed.
|
||||
|
||||
| **Type of monitoring required** | **Recommendation** |
|
||||
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|
||||
| **High-value accounts**: You might have high-value domain or local accounts for which you need to monitor each action.<br>Examples of high-value accounts are database administrators, built-in local administrator account, domain administrators, service accounts, domain controller accounts and so on. | Monitor this event with the **“Security ID”** that corresponds to the high-value account or accounts. |
|
||||
| **Anomalies or malicious actions**: You might have specific requirements for detecting anomalies or monitoring potential malicious actions. For example, you might need to monitor for use of an account outside of working hours. | When you monitor for anomalies or malicious actions, use the **“Security ID”** (with other information) to monitor how or when a particular account is being used. |
|
||||
| **Non-active accounts**: You might have non-active, disabled, or guest accounts, or other accounts that should never be used. | Monitor this event with the **“Security ID”** that corresponds to the accounts that should never be used. |
|
||||
| **Account allow list**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “allow list-only” action, review the **“Security ID”** for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
|
||||
| **Account naming conventions**: Your organization might have specific naming conventions for account names. | Monitor “**Subject\\Account Name”** for names that don’t comply with naming conventions. |
|
||||
| **High-value accounts**: You might have high-value domain or local accounts for which you need to monitor each action.<br>Examples of high-value accounts are database administrators, built-in local administrator account, domain administrators, service accounts, domain controller accounts and so on. | Monitor this event with the **"Security ID"** that corresponds to the high-value account or accounts. |
|
||||
| **Anomalies or malicious actions**: You might have specific requirements for detecting anomalies or monitoring potential malicious actions. For example, you might need to monitor for use of an account outside of working hours. | When you monitor for anomalies or malicious actions, use the **"Security ID"** (with other information) to monitor how or when a particular account is being used. |
|
||||
| **Non-active accounts**: You might have non-active, disabled, or guest accounts, or other accounts that should never be used. | Monitor this event with the **"Security ID"** that corresponds to the accounts that should never be used. |
|
||||
| **Account allow list**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a "allow list-only" action, review the **"Security ID"** for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
|
||||
| **Account naming conventions**: Your organization might have specific naming conventions for account names. | Monitor "**Subject\\Account Name"** for names that don't comply with naming conventions. |
|
||||
|
||||
- You can track all [4771](event-4771.md) events where the **Client Address** is not from your internal IP range or not from private IP ranges.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ ms.author: vinpa
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: reference
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
@ -34,11 +35,11 @@ It shows successful and unsuccessful credential validation attempts.
|
||||
|
||||
It shows only the computer name (**Source Workstation**) from which the authentication attempt was performed (authentication source). For example, if you authenticate from CLIENT-1 to SERVER-1 using a domain account you'll see CLIENT-1 in the **Source Workstation** field. Information about the destination computer (SERVER-1) isn't presented in this event.
|
||||
|
||||
If a credential validation attempt fails, you'll see a Failure event with **Error Code** parameter value not equal to “**0x0**”.
|
||||
If a credential validation attempt fails, you'll see a Failure event with **Error Code** parameter value not equal to "**0x0**".
|
||||
|
||||
The main advantage of this event is that on domain controllers you can see all authentication attempts for domain accounts when NTLM authentication was used.
|
||||
|
||||
For monitoring local account logon attempts, it's better to use event “[4624](event-4624.md): An account was successfully logged on” because it contains more details and is more informative.
|
||||
For monitoring local account logon attempts, it's better to use event "[4624](event-4624.md): An account was successfully logged on" because it contains more details and is more informative.
|
||||
|
||||
This event also generates when a workstation unlock event occurs.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -85,7 +86,7 @@ This event does *not* generate when a domain account logs on locally to a domain
|
||||
|
||||
***Field Descriptions:***
|
||||
|
||||
- **Authentication Package** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of [Authentication Package](/windows/win32/secauthn/authentication-packages) that was used for credential validation. It's always “**MICROSOFT\_AUTHENTICATION\_PACKAGE\_V1\_0**” for [4776](event-4776.md) event.
|
||||
- **Authentication Package** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of [Authentication Package](/windows/win32/secauthn/authentication-packages) that was used for credential validation. It's always "**MICROSOFT\_AUTHENTICATION\_PACKAGE\_V1\_0**" for [4776](event-4776.md) event.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Note** **Authentication package** is a DLL that encapsulates the authentication logic used to determine whether to permit a user to log on. [Local Security Authority](/windows/win32/secgloss/l-gly#_security_local_security_authority_gly) (LSA) authenticates a user logon by sending the request to an authentication package. The authentication package then examines the logon information and either authenticates or rejects the user logon attempt.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -101,7 +102,7 @@ This event does *not* generate when a domain account logs on locally to a domain
|
||||
|
||||
- **Source Workstation** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of the computer from which the logon attempt originated.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Error Code** \[Type = HexInt32\]: contains error code for Failure events. For Success events this parameter has “**0x0**” value. The table below contains most common error codes for this event:
|
||||
- **Error Code** \[Type = HexInt32\]: contains error code for Failure events. For Success events this parameter has "**0x0**" value. The table below contains most common error codes for this event:
|
||||
|
||||
| Error Code | Description |
|
||||
|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|
||||
@ -126,16 +127,16 @@ For 4776(S, F): The computer attempted to validate the credentials for an accoun
|
||||
|
||||
| **Type of monitoring required** | **Recommendation** |
|
||||
|-----------------|---------|
|
||||
| **High-value accounts**: You might have high-value domain or local accounts for which you need to monitor each action.<br>Examples of high-value accounts are database administrators, built-in local administrator account, domain administrators, service accounts, domain controller accounts and so on. | Monitor this event with the **“Logon Account”** that corresponds to the high-value account or accounts. |
|
||||
| **Anomalies or malicious actions**: You might have specific requirements for detecting anomalies or monitoring potential malicious actions. For example, you might need to monitor for use of an account outside of working hours. | When you monitor for anomalies or malicious actions, use the **“Logon Account”** value (with other information) to monitor how or when a particular account is being used.<br>To monitor activity of specific user accounts outside of working hours, monitor the appropriate **Logon Account + Source Workstation** pairs. |
|
||||
| **Non-active accounts**: You might have non-active, disabled, or guest accounts, or other accounts that should never be used. | Monitor this event with the **“Logon Account”** that should never be used. |
|
||||
| **Account allow list**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a “allow list-only” action, review the **“Logon Account”** for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
|
||||
| **Restricted-use computers**: You might have certain computers from which certain people (accounts) shouldn't log on. | Monitor the target **Source Workstation** for credential validation requests from the **“Logon Account”** that you're concerned about. |
|
||||
| **Account naming conventions**: Your organization might have specific naming conventions for account names. | Monitor “**Logon Account”** for names that don’t comply with naming conventions. |
|
||||
| **High-value accounts**: You might have high-value domain or local accounts for which you need to monitor each action.<br>Examples of high-value accounts are database administrators, built-in local administrator account, domain administrators, service accounts, domain controller accounts and so on. | Monitor this event with the **"Logon Account"** that corresponds to the high-value account or accounts. |
|
||||
| **Anomalies or malicious actions**: You might have specific requirements for detecting anomalies or monitoring potential malicious actions. For example, you might need to monitor for use of an account outside of working hours. | When you monitor for anomalies or malicious actions, use the **"Logon Account"** value (with other information) to monitor how or when a particular account is being used.<br>To monitor activity of specific user accounts outside of working hours, monitor the appropriate **Logon Account + Source Workstation** pairs. |
|
||||
| **Non-active accounts**: You might have non-active, disabled, or guest accounts, or other accounts that should never be used. | Monitor this event with the **"Logon Account"** that should never be used. |
|
||||
| **Account allow list**: You might have a specific allow list of accounts that are the only ones allowed to perform actions corresponding to particular events. | If this event corresponds to a "allow list-only" action, review the **"Logon Account"** for accounts that are outside the allow list. |
|
||||
| **Restricted-use computers**: You might have certain computers from which certain people (accounts) shouldn't log on. | Monitor the target **Source Workstation** for credential validation requests from the **"Logon Account"** that you're concerned about. |
|
||||
| **Account naming conventions**: Your organization might have specific naming conventions for account names. | Monitor "**Logon Account"** for names that don't comply with naming conventions. |
|
||||
|
||||
- If NTLM authentication shouldn't be used for a specific account, monitor for that account. Don’t forget that local logon will always use NTLM authentication if an account logs on to a device where its user account is stored.
|
||||
- If NTLM authentication shouldn't be used for a specific account, monitor for that account. Don't forget that local logon will always use NTLM authentication if an account logs on to a device where its user account is stored.
|
||||
|
||||
- You can use this event to collect all NTLM authentication attempts in the domain, if needed. Don’t forget that local logon will always use NTLM authentication if the account logs on to a device where its user account is stored.
|
||||
- You can use this event to collect all NTLM authentication attempts in the domain, if needed. Don't forget that local logon will always use NTLM authentication if the account logs on to a device where its user account is stored.
|
||||
|
||||
- If a local account should be used only locally (for example, network logon or terminal services logon isn't allowed), you need to monitor for all events where **Source Workstation** and **Computer** (where the event was generated and where the credentials are stored) have different values.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ manager: aaroncz
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 09/09/2021
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
|
||||
@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ manager: aaroncz
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier2
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 12/16/2021
|
||||
ms.reviewer:
|
||||
@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ Set the following registry keys to enable HVCI. These keys provide exactly the s
|
||||
|
||||
> [!IMPORTANT]
|
||||
>
|
||||
> - Among the commands that follow, you can choose settings for **Secure Boot** and **Secure Boot with DMA**. In most situations, we recommend that you choose **Secure Boot**. This option provides Secure Boot with as much protection as is supported by a given computer’s hardware. A computer with input/output memory management units (IOMMUs) will have Secure Boot with DMA protection. A computer without IOMMUs will simply have Secure Boot enabled.
|
||||
> - Among the commands that follow, you can choose settings for **Secure Boot** and **Secure Boot with DMA**. In most situations, we recommend that you choose **Secure Boot**. This option provides Secure Boot with as much protection as is supported by a given computer's hardware. A computer with input/output memory management units (IOMMUs) will have Secure Boot with DMA protection. A computer without IOMMUs will simply have Secure Boot enabled.
|
||||
>
|
||||
> - In contrast, with **Secure Boot with DMA**, the setting will enable Secure Boot—and VBS itself—only on a computer that supports DMA, that is, a computer with IOMMUs. With this setting, any computer without IOMMUs will not have VBS or HVCI protection, although it can still have Windows Defender Application Control enabled.
|
||||
>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ ms.author: paoloma
|
||||
author: paolomatarazzo
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
ms.localizationpriority: medium
|
||||
ms.reviewer:
|
||||
@ -133,7 +134,7 @@ Validated Editions: Home, Pro, Enterprise, Education, S, Surface Hub, Mobile
|
||||
|Boot Manager|[10.0.15063][sp-3089]|[#3089][certificate-3089]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#4624][aes-4624] and [#4625][aes-4625]); CKG (vendor affirmed); HMAC (Cert. [#3061][hmac-3061]); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); RSA (Cert. [#2523][rsa-2523]); SHS (Cert. [#3790][shs-3790]<p>Other algorithms: PBKDF (vendor affirmed); VMK KDF (vendor affirmed)|
|
||||
|Windows OS Loader|[10.0.15063][sp-3090]|[#3090][certificate-3090]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#4624][aes-4624] and [#4625][aes-4625]); RSA (Cert. [#2523][rsa-2523]); SHS (Cert. [#3790][shs-3790]<p>[Other algorithms: NDRNG][certificate-3090]|
|
||||
|Windows Resume <sup>[1]</sup>|[10.0.15063][sp-3091]|[#3091][certificate-3091]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#4624][aes-4624] and [#4625][aes-4625]); RSA (Cert. [#2523][rsa-2523]); SHS (Cert. [#3790][shs-3790])|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Dump Filter <sup>[2]</sup>|[10.0.15063][sp-3092]|[#3092][certificate-3092]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#4624][aes-4624] and [#4625][aes-4625]); RSA (Cert. [#2522][rsa-2522]); SHS (Cert. [#3790][shs-3790])|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Dump Filter <sup>[2]</sup>|[10.0.15063][sp-3092]|[#3092][certificate-3092]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#4624][aes-4624] and [#4625][aes-4625]); RSA (Cert. [#2522][rsa-2522]); SHS (Cert. [#3790][shs-3790])|
|
||||
|Code Integrity (ci.dll)|[10.0.15063][sp-3093]|[#3093][certificate-3093]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#4624][aes-4624]); RSA (Certs. [#2522][rsa-2522] and [#2523][rsa-2523]); SHS (Cert. [#3790][shs-3790]<p>Validated Component Implementations: FIPS186-4 RSA; PKCS#1 v1.5 - RSASP1 Signature Primitive (Cert. [#1282][component-1282])|
|
||||
|Secure Kernel Code Integrity (skci.dll)<sup>[3]</sup>|[10.0.15063][sp-3096]|[#3096][certificate-3096]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#4624][aes-4624]); RSA (Certs. [#2522][rsa-2522] and [#2523][rsa-2523]); SHS (Cert. [#3790][shs-3790]<p>Validated Component Implementations: FIPS186-4 RSA; PKCS#1 v1.5 - RSASP1 Signature Primitive (Cert. [#1282][component-1282])|
|
||||
|
||||
@ -156,9 +157,9 @@ Validated Editions: Home, Pro, Enterprise, Enterprise LTSB, Mobile
|
||||
|Cryptographic Primitives Library (bcryptprimitives.dll and ncryptsslp.dll)|[10.0.14393][sp-2937]|[#2937][certificate-2937]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#4064][aes-4064]); DRBG (Cert. [#1217][drbg-1217]); DSA (Cert. [#1098][dsa-1098]); ECDSA (Cert. [#911][ecdsa-911]); HMAC (Cert. [#2651][hmac-2651]); KAS (Cert. [#92][kas-92]); KBKDF (Cert. [#101][kdf-101]); KTS (AES Cert. [#4062][aes-4062]; key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); RSA (Certs. [#2192][rsa-2192], [#2193, and #2195][rsa-2193]); SHS (Cert. [#3347][shs-3347]); Triple-DES (Cert. [#2227][tdes-2227])<p>Other algorithms: HMAC-MD5; MD5; DES; Legacy CAPI KDF; MD2; MD4; RC2; RC4; RSA (encrypt/decrypt)<p>Validated Component Implementations: FIPS186-4 ECDSA - Signature Generation of hash sized messages (Cert. [#922][component-922]); FIPS186-4 RSA; PKCS#1 v2.1 - RSASP1 Signature Primitive (Cert. [#888][component-888]); FIPS186-4 RSA; RSADP - RSADP Primitive (Cert. [#887][component-887]); SP800-135 - Section 4.1.1, IKEv1 Section 4.1.2, IKEv2 Section 4.2, TLS (Cert. [#886][component-886])|
|
||||
|Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library (cng.sys)|[10.0.14393][sp-2936]|[#2936][certificate-2936]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#4064][aes-4064]); DRBG (Cert. [#1217][drbg-1217]); DSA (Cert. [#1098][dsa-1098]); ECDSA (Cert. [#911][ecdsa-911]); HMAC (Cert. [#2651][hmac-2651]); KAS (Cert. [#92][kas-92]); KBKDF (Cert. [#101][kdf-101]); KTS (AES Cert. [#4062][aes-4062]; key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); RSA (Certs. [#2192][rsa-2192], [#2193, and #2195][rsa-2193]); SHS (Cert. [#3347][shs-3347]); Triple-DES (Cert. [#2227][tdes-2227])<p>Other algorithms: HMAC-MD5; MD5; NDRNG; DES; Legacy CAPI KDF; MD2; MD4; RC2; RC4; RSA (encrypt/decrypt)<p>Validated Component Implementations: FIPS186-4 ECDSA - Signature Generation of hash sized messages (Cert. [#922][component-922]); FIPS186-4 RSA; PKCS#1 v2.1 - RSASP1 Signature Primitive (Cert. [#888][component-888]); FIPS186-4 RSA; RSADP - RSADP Primitive (Cert. [#887][component-887])|
|
||||
|Boot Manager|[10.0.14393][sp-2931]|[#2931][certificate-2931]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#4061][aes-4061] and [#4064][aes-4064]); HMAC (Cert. [#2651][hmac-2651]); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); RSA (Cert. [#2193][rsa-2193]); SHS (Cert. [#3347][shs-3347])<p>Other algorithms: MD5; PBKDF (non-compliant); VMK KDF|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows OS Loader (winload)|[10.0.14393][sp-2932]|[#2932][certificate-2932]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#4061][aes-4061] and [#4064][aes-4064]); RSA (Cert. [#2193][rsa-2193]); SHS (Cert. [#3347][shs-3347])<p>Other algorithms: NDRNG; MD5|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows Resume (winresume)<sup>[1]</sup>|[10.0.14393][sp-2933]|[#2933][certificate-2933]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#4061][aes-4061] and [#4064][aes-4064]); RSA (Cert. [#2193][rsa-2193]); SHS (Cert. [#3347][shs-3347])<p>Other algorithms: MD5|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Dump Filter (dumpfve.sys)<sup>[2]</sup>|[10.0.14393][sp-2934]|[#2934][certificate-2934]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#4061][aes-4061] and [#4064][aes-4064])|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows OS Loader (winload)|[10.0.14393][sp-2932]|[#2932][certificate-2932]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#4061][aes-4061] and [#4064][aes-4064]); RSA (Cert. [#2193][rsa-2193]); SHS (Cert. [#3347][shs-3347])<p>Other algorithms: NDRNG; MD5|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows Resume (winresume)<sup>[1]</sup>|[10.0.14393][sp-2933]|[#2933][certificate-2933]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#4061][aes-4061] and [#4064][aes-4064]); RSA (Cert. [#2193][rsa-2193]); SHS (Cert. [#3347][shs-3347])<p>Other algorithms: MD5|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Dump Filter (dumpfve.sys)<sup>[2]</sup>|[10.0.14393][sp-2934]|[#2934][certificate-2934]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#4061][aes-4061] and [#4064][aes-4064])|
|
||||
|Code Integrity (ci.dll)|[10.0.14393][sp-2935]|[#2935][certificate-2935]|FIPS approved algorithms: RSA (Cert. [#2193][rsa-2193]); SHS (Cert. [#3347][shs-3347])<p>Other algorithms: AES (non-compliant); MD5<p>Validated Component Implementations: FIPS186-4 RSA; PKCS#1 v2.1 - RSASP1 Signature Primitive (Cert. [#888][component-888])|
|
||||
|Secure Kernel Code Integrity (skci.dll)<sup>[3]</sup>|[10.0.14393][sp-2938]|[#2938][certificate-2938]|FIPS approved algorithms: RSA (Certs. [#2193][rsa-2193]); SHS (Certs. [#3347][shs-3347])<p>Other algorithms: MD5<p>Validated Component Implementations: FIPS186-4 RSA; PKCS#1 v2.1 - RSASP1 Signature Primitive (Cert. [#888][component-888])|
|
||||
|
||||
@ -180,9 +181,9 @@ Validated Editions: Home, Pro, Enterprise, Enterprise LTSB, Mobile, Surface Hub
|
||||
|Cryptographic Primitives Library (bcryptprimitives.dll and ncryptsslp.dll)|[10.0.10586][sp-2605]|[#2606][certificate-2606]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#3629][aes-3629]); DRBG (Certs. [#955][drbg-955]); DSA (Certs. [#1024][dsa-1024]); ECDSA (Certs. [#760][ecdsa-760]); HMAC (Certs. [#2381][hmac-2381]); KAS (Certs. [#72][kas-72]; key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength); KBKDF (Certs. [#72][kdf-72]); KTS (AES Certs. [#3653][aes-3653]; key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); RSA (Certs. [#1887][rsa-1887], [#1888, and #1889][rsa-1888]); SHS (Certs. [#3047][shs-3047]); Triple-DES (Certs. [#2024][tdes-2024])<p>Other algorithms: DES; HMAC-MD5; Legacy CAPI KDF; MD2; MD4; MD5; RC2; RC4; RSA (encrypt/decrypt)<p>Validated Component Implementations: FIPS186-4 ECDSA - Signature Generation of hash sized messages (Cert. [#666][component-666]); FIPS186-4 RSA; PKCS#1 v2.1 - RSASP1 Signature Primitive (Cert. [#665][component-665]); FIPS186-4 RSA; RSADP - RSADP Primitive (Cert. [#663][component-663]); SP800-135 - Section 4.1.1, IKEv1 Section 4.1.2, IKEv2 Section 4.2, TLS (Cert. [#664][component-664])|
|
||||
|Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library (cng.sys)|[10.0.10586][sp-2605]|[#2605][certificate-2605]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#3629][aes-3629]); DRBG (Certs. [#955][drbg-955]); DSA (Certs. [#1024][dsa-1024]); ECDSA (Certs. [#760][ecdsa-760]); HMAC (Certs. [#2381][hmac-2381]); KAS (Certs. [#72][kas-72]; key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength); KBKDF (Certs. [#72][kdf-72]); KTS (AES Certs. [#3653][aes-3653]; key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); RSA (Certs. [#1887][rsa-1887], [#1888, and #1889][rsa-1888]); SHS (Certs. [#3047][shs-3047]); Triple-DES (Certs. [#2024][tdes-2024])<p>Other algorithms: DES; HMAC-MD5; Legacy CAPI KDF; MD2; MD4; MD5; RC2; RC4; RSA (encrypt/decrypt)<p>Validated Component Implementations: FIPS186-4 ECDSA - Signature Generation of hash sized messages (Cert. [#666][component-666]); FIPS186-4 RSA; PKCS#1 v2.1 - RSASP1 Signature Primitive (Cert. [#665][component-665]); FIPS186-4 RSA; RSADP - RSADP Primitive (Cert. [#663][component-663])|
|
||||
|Boot Manager <sup>[4]</sup>|[10.0.10586][sp-2700]|[#2700][certificate-2700]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#3653][aes-3653]); HMAC (Cert. [#2381][hmac-2381]); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); RSA (Cert. [#1871][rsa-1871]); SHS (Certs. [#3047][shs-3047] and [#3048][shs-3048])<p>Other algorithms: MD5; KDF (non-compliant); PBKDF (non-compliant)|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows OS Loader (winload)<sup>[5]</sup>|[10.0.10586][sp-2701]|[#2701][certificate-2701]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#3629][aes-3629] and [#3653][aes-3653]); RSA (Cert. [#1871][rsa-1871]); SHS (Cert. [#3048][shs-3048])<p>Other algorithms: MD5; NDRNG|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows Resume (winresume)<sup>[6]</sup>|[10.0.10586][sp-2702]|[#2702][certificate-2702]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#3653][aes-3653]); RSA (Cert. [#1871][rsa-1871]); SHS (Cert. [#3048][shs-3048])<p>Other algorithms: MD5|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Dump Filter (dumpfve.sys)<sup>[7]</sup>|[10.0.10586][sp-2703]|[#2703][certificate-2703]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#3653][aes-3653])|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows OS Loader (winload)<sup>[5]</sup>|[10.0.10586][sp-2701]|[#2701][certificate-2701]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#3629][aes-3629] and [#3653][aes-3653]); RSA (Cert. [#1871][rsa-1871]); SHS (Cert. [#3048][shs-3048])<p>Other algorithms: MD5; NDRNG|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows Resume (winresume)<sup>[6]</sup>|[10.0.10586][sp-2702]|[#2702][certificate-2702]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#3653][aes-3653]); RSA (Cert. [#1871][rsa-1871]); SHS (Cert. [#3048][shs-3048])<p>Other algorithms: MD5|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Dump Filter (dumpfve.sys)<sup>[7]</sup>|[10.0.10586][sp-2703]|[#2703][certificate-2703]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#3653][aes-3653])|
|
||||
|Code Integrity (ci.dll)|[10.0.10586][sp-2604]|[#2604][certificate-2604]|FIPS approved algorithms: RSA (Certs. [#1871][rsa-1871]); SHS (Certs. [#3048][shs-3048])<p>Other algorithms: AES (non-compliant); MD5<p>Validated Component Implementations: FIPS186-4 RSA; PKCS#1 v2.1 - RSASP1 Signature Primitive (Cert. [#665][component-665])|
|
||||
|Secure Kernel Code Integrity (skci.dll)<sup>[8]</sup>|[10.0.10586][sp-2607]|[#2607][certificate-2607]|FIPS approved algorithms: RSA (Certs. [#1871][rsa-1871]); SHS (Certs. [#3048][shs-3048])<p>Other algorithms: MD5<p>Validated Component Implementations: FIPS186-4 RSA; PKCS#1 v2.1 - RSASP1 Signature Primitive (Cert. [#665][component-665])|
|
||||
|
||||
@ -208,9 +209,9 @@ Validated Editions: Home, Pro, Enterprise, Enterprise LTSB, Mobile, and Surface
|
||||
|Cryptographic Primitives Library (bcryptprimitives.dll and ncryptsslp.dll)|[10.0.10240][sp-2605]|#[2606][certificate-2606]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#3497][aes-3497]); DRBG (Certs. [#868][drbg-868]); DSA (Certs. [#983][dsa-983]); ECDSA (Certs. [#706][ecdsa-706]); HMAC (Certs. [#2233][hmac-2233]); KAS (Certs. [#64][kas-64]; key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength); KBKDF (Certs. [#66][kdf-66]); KTS (AES Certs. [#3507][aes-3507]; key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); RSA (Certs. [#1783][rsa-1783], [#1798][rsa-1798], and [#1802][rsa-1802]); SHS (Certs. [#2886][shs-2886]); Triple-DES (Certs. [#1969][tdes-1969])<p>Other algorithms: DES; HMAC-MD5; Legacy CAPI KDF; MD2; MD4; MD5; RC2; RC4; RSA (encrypt/decrypt)<p>Validated Component Implementations: FIPS186-4 RSA; PKCS#1 v2.1 - RSASP1 Signature Primitive (Cert. [#572][component-572]); FIPS186-4 RSA; RSADP - RSADP Primitive (Cert. [#576][component-576]); SP800-135 - Section 4.1.1, IKEv1 Section 4.1.2, IKEv2 Section 4.2, TLS (Cert. [#575][component-575])|
|
||||
|Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library (cng.sys)|[10.0.10240][sp-2605]|[#2605][certificate-2605]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#3497][aes-3497]); DRBG (Certs. [#868][drbg-868]); DSA (Certs. [#983][dsa-983]); ECDSA (Certs. [#706][ecdsa-706]); HMAC (Certs. [#2233][hmac-2233]); KAS (Certs. [#64][kas-64]; key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength); KBKDF (Certs. [#66][kdf-66]); KTS (AES Certs. [#3507][aes-3507]; key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); RSA (Certs. [#1783][rsa-1783], [#1798][rsa-1798], and [#1802][rsa-1802]); SHS (Certs. [#2886][shs-2886]); Triple-DES (Certs. [#1969][tdes-1969])<p>Other algorithms: DES; HMAC-MD5; Legacy CAPI KDF; MD2; MD4; MD5; RC2; RC4; RSA (encrypt/decrypt)<p>Validated Component Implementations: FIPS186-4 RSA; PKCS#1 v2.1 - RSASP1 Signature Primitive (Cert. [#572][component-572]); FIPS186-4 RSA; RSADP - RSADP Primitive (Cert. [#576][component-576])|
|
||||
|Boot Manager<sup>[9]</sup>|[10.0.10240][sp-2600]|[#2600][certificate-2600]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#3497][aes-3497]); HMAC (Cert. [#2233][hmac-2233]); KTS (AES Cert. [#3498][aes-3498]); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); RSA (Cert. [#1784][rsa-1784]); SHS (Certs. [#2871][shs-2871] and [#2886][shs-2886])<p>Other algorithms: MD5; KDF (non-compliant); PBKDF (non-compliant)|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows OS Loader (winload)<sup>[10]</sup>|[10.0.10240][sp-2601]|[#2601][certificate-2601]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#3497][aes-3497] and [#3498][aes-3498]); RSA (Cert. [#1784][rsa-1784]); SHS (Cert. [#2871][shs-2871])<p>Other algorithms: MD5; NDRNG|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows Resume (winresume)<sup>[11]</sup>|[10.0.10240][sp-2602]|[#2602][certificate-2602]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#3497][aes-3497] and [#3498][aes-3498]); RSA (Cert. [#1784][rsa-1784]); SHS (Cert. [#2871][shs-2871])<p>Other algorithms: MD5|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Dump Filter (dumpfve.sys)<sup>[12]</sup>|[10.0.10240][sp-2603]|[#2603][certificate-2603]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#3497][aes-3497] and [#3498][aes-3498])|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows OS Loader (winload)<sup>[10]</sup>|[10.0.10240][sp-2601]|[#2601][certificate-2601]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#3497][aes-3497] and [#3498][aes-3498]); RSA (Cert. [#1784][rsa-1784]); SHS (Cert. [#2871][shs-2871])<p>Other algorithms: MD5; NDRNG|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows Resume (winresume)<sup>[11]</sup>|[10.0.10240][sp-2602]|[#2602][certificate-2602]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#3497][aes-3497] and [#3498][aes-3498]); RSA (Cert. [#1784][rsa-1784]); SHS (Cert. [#2871][shs-2871])<p>Other algorithms: MD5|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Dump Filter (dumpfve.sys)<sup>[12]</sup>|[10.0.10240][sp-2603]|[#2603][certificate-2603]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#3497][aes-3497] and [#3498][aes-3498])|
|
||||
|Code Integrity (ci.dll)|[10.0.10240][sp-2604]|[#2604][certificate-2604]|FIPS approved algorithms: RSA (Certs. [#1784][rsa-1784]); SHS (Certs. [#2871][shs-2871])<p>Other algorithms: AES (non-compliant); MD5<p>Validated Component Implementations: FIPS186-4 RSA; PKCS#1 v2.1 - RSASP1 Signature Primitive (Cert. [#572][component-572])|
|
||||
|Secure Kernel Code Integrity (skci.dll)<sup>[13]</sup>|[10.0.10240][sp-2607]|[#2607][certificate-2607]|FIPS approved algorithms: RSA (Certs. [#1784][rsa-1784]); SHS (Certs. [#2871][shs-2871])<p>Other algorithms: MD5<p>Validated Component Implementations: FIPS186-4 RSA; PKCS#1 v2.1 - RSASP1 Signature Primitive (Cert. [#572][component-572])|
|
||||
|
||||
@ -237,9 +238,9 @@ Validated Editions: RT, Pro, Enterprise, Phone, Embedded
|
||||
|Cryptographic Primitives Library (bcryptprimitives.dll and ncryptsslp.dll)|[6.3.9600 6.3.9600.17031][sp-2357]|[#2357][certificate-2357]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2832][aes-2832]); DRBG (Certs. [#489][drbg-489]); DSA (Cert. [#855][dsa-855]); ECDSA (Cert. [#505][ecdsa-505]); HMAC (Cert. [#1773][hmac-1773]); KAS (Cert. [#47][kas-47]); KBKDF (Cert. [#30][kdf-30]); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); RSA (Certs. [#1487][rsa-1487], [#1493, and #1519][rsa-1493]); SHS (Cert. [#2373][shs-2373]); Triple-DES (Cert. [#1692][tdes-1692])<p>Other algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2832][aes-2832], key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength); AES-GCM encryption (non-compliant); DES; HMAC MD5; Legacy CAPI KDF; MD2; MD4; MD5; NDRNG; RC2; RC4; RSA (encrypt/decrypt)#2832, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength); AES-GCM encryption (non-compliant); DES; HMAC MD5; Legacy CAPI KDF; MD2; MD4; MD5; NDRNG; RC2; RC4; RSA (encrypt/decrypt)<p>Validated Component Implementations: FIPS186-4 ECDSA - Signature Generation of hash sized messages (Cert. [#288][component-288]); FIPS186-4 RSA; PKCS#1 v2.1 - RSASP1 Signature Primitive (Cert. [#289][component-289]); SP800-135 - Section 4.1.1, IKEv1 Section 4.1.2, IKEv2 Section 4.2, TLS (Cert. [#323][component-323])|
|
||||
|Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library (cng.sys)|[6.3.9600 6.3.9600.17042][sp-2356]|[#2356][certificate-2356]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2832][aes-2832]); DRBG (Certs. [#489][drbg-489]); ECDSA (Cert. [#505][ecdsa-505]); HMAC (Cert. [#1773][hmac-1773]); KAS (Cert. [#47][kas-47]); KBKDF (Cert. [#30][kdf-30]); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); RSA (Certs. [#1487][rsa-1487], [#1493, and #1519][rsa-1493]); SHS (Cert. [# 2373][shs-2373]); Triple-DES (Cert. [#1692][tdes-1692])<p>Other algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2832][aes-2832], key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength); AES-GCM encryption (non-compliant); DES; HMAC MD5; Legacy CAPI KDF; MD2; MD4; MD5; NDRNG; RC2; RC4; RSA (encrypt/decrypt)<p>Validated Component Implementations: FIPS186-4 ECDSA - Signature Generation of hash sized messages (Cert. [#288][component-288]); FIPS186-4 RSA; PKCS#1 v2.1 - RSASP1 Signature Primitive (Cert. [#289][component-289])|
|
||||
|Boot Manager|[6.3.9600 6.3.9600.17031][sp-2351]|[#2351][certificate-2351]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2832][aes-2832]); HMAC (Cert. [#1773][hmac-1773]); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); RSA (Cert. [#1494][rsa-1494]); SHS (Certs. [# 2373][shs-2373] and [#2396][shs-2396])<p>Other algorithms: MD5; KDF (non-compliant); PBKDF (non-compliant)|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows OS Loader (winload)|[6.3.9600 6.3.9600.17031][sp-2352]|[#2352][certificate-2352]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2832][aes-2832]); RSA (Cert. [#1494][rsa-1494]); SHS (Cert. [#2396][shs-2396])<p>Other algorithms: MD5; NDRNG|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows Resume (winresume)<sup>[14]</sup>|[6.3.9600 6.3.9600.17031][sp-2353]|[#2353][certificate-2353]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2832][aes-2832]); RSA (Cert. [#1494][rsa-1494]); SHS (Certs. [# 2373][shs-2373] and [#2396][shs-2396])<p>Other algorithms: MD5|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Dump Filter (dumpfve.sys)|[6.3.9600 6.3.9600.17031][sp-2354]|[#2354][certificate-2354]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2832][aes-2832])<p>Other algorithms: N/A|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows OS Loader (winload)|[6.3.9600 6.3.9600.17031][sp-2352]|[#2352][certificate-2352]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2832][aes-2832]); RSA (Cert. [#1494][rsa-1494]); SHS (Cert. [#2396][shs-2396])<p>Other algorithms: MD5; NDRNG|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows Resume (winresume)<sup>[14]</sup>|[6.3.9600 6.3.9600.17031][sp-2353]|[#2353][certificate-2353]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2832][aes-2832]); RSA (Cert. [#1494][rsa-1494]); SHS (Certs. [# 2373][shs-2373] and [#2396][shs-2396])<p>Other algorithms: MD5|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Dump Filter (dumpfve.sys)|[6.3.9600 6.3.9600.17031][sp-2354]|[#2354][certificate-2354]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2832][aes-2832])<p>Other algorithms: N/A|
|
||||
|Code Integrity (ci.dll)|[6.3.9600 6.3.9600.17031][sp-2355]|[#2355][certificate-2355]|FIPS approved algorithms: RSA (Cert. [#1494][rsa-1494]); SHS (Cert. [# 2373][shs-2373])<p>Other algorithms: MD5<p>Validated Component Implementations: PKCS#1 v2.1 - RSASP1 Signature Primitive (Cert. [#289][component-289])|
|
||||
|
||||
<sup>\[14\]</sup> Applies only to Pro, Enterprise, and Embedded 8.
|
||||
@ -256,9 +257,9 @@ Validated Editions: RT, Home, Pro, Enterprise, Phone
|
||||
|Cryptographic Primitives Library (BCRYPTPRIMITIVES.DLL)|[6.2.9200][sp-1892]|[#1892][sp-1892]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#2197][aes-2197] and [#2216][aes-2216]); DRBG (Certs. [#258][drbg-258]); DSA (Cert. [#687][dsa-687]); ECDSA (Cert. [#341][ecdsa-341]); HMAC (Cert. [#1345][hmac-1345]); KAS (Cert. [#36][kas-36]); KBKDF (Cert. [#3][kdf-3]); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); RSA (Certs. [#1133][rsa-1133] and [#1134][rsa-1134]); SHS (Cert. [#1903][shs-1903]); Triple-DES (Cert. [#1387][tdes-1387])<p>Other algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2197][aes-2197], key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength); DES; Legacy CAPI KDF; MD2; MD4; MD5; HMAC MD5; RC2; RC4; RSA (encrypt/decrypt)#258); DSA (Cert.); ECDSA (Cert.); HMAC (Cert.); KAS (Cert); KBKDF (Cert.); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); RSA (Certs. and); SHS (Cert.); Triple-DES (Cert.)|
|
||||
|Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library (cng.sys)|[6.2.9200][sp-1891]|[#1891][certificate-1891]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#2197][aes-2197] and [#2216][aes-2216]); DRBG (Certs. [#258][drbg-258] and [#259][drbg-259]); ECDSA (Cert. [#341][ecdsa-341]); HMAC (Cert. [#1345][hmac-1345]); KAS (Cert. [#36][kas-36]); KBKDF (Cert. [#3][kdf-3]); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); RNG (Cert. [#1110][rng-1110]); RSA (Certs. [#1133][rsa-1133] and [#1134][rsa-1134]); SHS (Cert. [#1903][shs-1903]); Triple-DES (Cert. [#1387][tdes-1387])<p>Other algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2197][aes-2197], key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength); DES; Legacy CAPI KDF; MD2; MD4; MD5; HMAC MD5; RC2; RC4; RSA (encrypt/decrypt)#258 and); ECDSA (Cert.); HMAC (Cert.); KAS (Cert.); KBKDF (Cert.); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); RNG (Cert.); RSA (Certs. and); SHS (Cert.); Triple-DES (Cert.)<p>Other algorithms: AES (Certificate, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength); DES; Legacy CAPI KDF; MD2; MD4; MD5; HMAC MD5; RC2; RC4; RSA (encrypt/decrypt)|
|
||||
|Boot Manager|[6.2.9200][sp-1895]|[#1895][sp-1895]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#2196][aes-2196] and [#2198][aes-2198]); HMAC (Cert. #[1347][hmac-1347]); RSA (Cert. [#1132][rsa-1132]); SHS (Cert. [#1903][shs-1903])<p>Other algorithms: MD5|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows OS Loader (WINLOAD)|[6.2.9200][sp-1896]|[#1896][sp-1896]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#2196][aes-2196] and [#2198][aes-2198]); RSA (Cert. [#1132][rsa-1132]); SHS (Cert. [#1903][shs-1903])<p>Other algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2197][aes-2197]; non-compliant); MD5; Non-Approved RNG|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows Resume (WINRESUME)<sup>[15]</sup>|[6.2.9200][sp-1898]|[#1898][sp-1898]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#2196][aes-2196] and [#2198][aes-2198]); RSA (Cert. [#1132][rsa-1132]); SHS (Cert. [#1903][shs-1903])<p>Other algorithms: MD5|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Dump Filter (DUMPFVE.SYS)|[6.2.9200][sp-1899]|[#1899][sp-1899]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#2196][aes-2196] and [#2198][aes-2198])<p>Other algorithms: N/A|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows OS Loader (WINLOAD)|[6.2.9200][sp-1896]|[#1896][sp-1896]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#2196][aes-2196] and [#2198][aes-2198]); RSA (Cert. [#1132][rsa-1132]); SHS (Cert. [#1903][shs-1903])<p>Other algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2197][aes-2197]; non-compliant); MD5; Non-Approved RNG|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows Resume (WINRESUME)<sup>[15]</sup>|[6.2.9200][sp-1898]|[#1898][sp-1898]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#2196][aes-2196] and [#2198][aes-2198]); RSA (Cert. [#1132][rsa-1132]); SHS (Cert. [#1903][shs-1903])<p>Other algorithms: MD5|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Dump Filter (DUMPFVE.SYS)|[6.2.9200][sp-1899]|[#1899][sp-1899]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#2196][aes-2196] and [#2198][aes-2198])<p>Other algorithms: N/A|
|
||||
|Code Integrity (CI.DLL)|[6.2.9200][sp-1897]|[#1897][sp-1897]|FIPS approved algorithms: RSA (Cert. [#1132][rsa-1132]); SHS (Cert. [#1903][shs-1903])<p>Other algorithms: MD5|
|
||||
|Enhanced DSS and Diffie-Hellman Cryptographic Provider (DSSENH.DLL)|[6.2.9200][sp-1893]|[#1893][sp-1893]|FIPS approved algorithms: DSA (Cert. [#686][dsa-686]); SHS (Cert. [#1902][shs-1902]); Triple-DES (Cert. [#1386][tdes-1386]); Triple-DES MAC (Triple-DES Cert. [#1386][tdes-1386], vendor affirmed)<p>Other algorithms: DES; DES MAC; DES40; DES40 MAC; Diffie-Hellman; MD5; RC2; RC2 MAC; RC4; Triple-DES (Cert. [#1386][tdes-1386], key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)#1902); Triple-DES (Cert.); Triple-DES MAC (Triple-DES Certificate, vendor affirmed)<p>Other algorithms: DES; DES MAC; DES40; DES40 MAC; Diffie-Hellman; MD5; RC2; RC2 MAC; RC4; Triple-DES (Certificate, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)|
|
||||
|Enhanced Cryptographic Provider (RSAENH.DLL)|[6.2.9200][sp-1894]|[#1894][sp-1894]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2196][aes-2196]); HMAC (Cert. #1346); RSA (Cert. [#1132][rsa-1132]); SHS (Cert. [#1902][shs-1902]); Triple-DES (Cert. [#1386][tdes-1386])<p>Other algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2196][aes-2196], key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength); DES; MD2; MD4; MD5; RC2; RC4; RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 112 bits and 150 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength); Triple-DES (Cert. [#1386][tdes-1386], key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)|
|
||||
@ -278,7 +279,7 @@ Validated Editions: Windows 7, Windows 7 SP1
|
||||
|Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library (cng.sys)|[6.1.7600.16385][sp-1328]<p>[6.1.7600.16915][sp-1328]<p>[6.1.7600.21092][sp-1328]<p>[6.1.7601.17514][sp-1328]<p>[6.1.7601.17725][sp-1328]<p>[6.1.7601.17919][sp-1328]<p>[6.1.7601.21861][sp-1328]<p>[6.1.7601.22076][sp-1328]|[1328][certificate-1328]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#1168][aes-1168] and [#1178][aes-1178]); AES GCM (Cert. [#1168][aes-1168], vendor-affirmed); AES GMAC (Cert. [#1168][aes-1168], vendor-affirmed); DRBG (Certs. [#23][drbg-23] and [#24][drbg-24]); ECDSA (Cert. [#141][ecdsa-141]); HMAC (Cert. [#677][hmac-677]); KAS (SP 800-56A, vendor affirmed, key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 80 bits to 256 bits of encryption strength); RNG (Cert. [#649][rng-649]); RSA (Certs. [#559][rsa-559] and [#560][rsa-560]); SHS (Cert. [#1081][shs-1081]); Triple-DES (Cert. [#846][tdes-846])<p>Other algorithms: AES (Cert. [#1168][aes-1168], key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength); DES; Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 bits and 150 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength); MD2; MD4; MD5; HMAC MD5; RC2; RC4|
|
||||
|Boot Manager|[6.1.7600.16385][sp-1319]<p>[6.1.7601.17514][sp-1319]|[1319][certificate-1319]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#1168][aes-1168] and [#1177][aes-1177]); HMAC (Cert. [#675][hmac-675]); RSA (Cert. [#557][rsa-557]); SHS (Cert. [#1081][shs-1081])<p>Other algorithms: MD5#1168 and); HMAC (Cert.); RSA (Cert.); SHS (Cert.)<p>Other algorithms: MD5|
|
||||
|Winload OS Loader (winload.exe)|[6.1.7600.16385][sp-1326]<p>[6.1.7600.16757][sp-1326]<p>[6.1.7600.20897][sp-1326]<p>[6.1.7600.20916][sp-1326]<p>[6.1.7601.17514][sp-1326]<p>[6.1.7601.17556][sp-1326]<p>[6.1.7601.21655][sp-1326]<p>[6.1.7601.21675][sp-1326]|[1326][certificate-1326]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#1168][aes-1168] and [#1177][aes-1177]); RSA (Cert. [#557][rsa-557]); SHS (Cert. [#1081][shs-1081])<p>Other algorithms: MD5|
|
||||
|BitLocker™ Drive Encryption|[6.1.7600.16385][sp-1332]<p>[6.1.7600.16429][sp-1332]<p>[6.1.7600.16757][sp-1332]<p>[6.1.7600.20536][sp-1332]<p>[6.1.7600.20873][sp-1332]<p>[6.1.7600.20897][sp-1332]<p>[6.1.7600.20916][sp-1332]<p>[6.1.7601.17514][sp-1332]<p>[6.1.7601.17556][sp-1332]<p>[6.1.7601.21634][sp-1332]<p>[6.1.7601.21655][sp-1332]<p>[6.1.7601.21675][sp-1332]|[1332][certificate-1332]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#1168][aes-1168] and [#1177][aes-1177]); HMAC (Cert. [#675][hmac-675]); SHS (Cert. [#1081][shs-1081])<p>Other algorithms: Elephant Diffuser|
|
||||
|BitLocker™ Drive Encryption|[6.1.7600.16385][sp-1332]<p>[6.1.7600.16429][sp-1332]<p>[6.1.7600.16757][sp-1332]<p>[6.1.7600.20536][sp-1332]<p>[6.1.7600.20873][sp-1332]<p>[6.1.7600.20897][sp-1332]<p>[6.1.7600.20916][sp-1332]<p>[6.1.7601.17514][sp-1332]<p>[6.1.7601.17556][sp-1332]<p>[6.1.7601.21634][sp-1332]<p>[6.1.7601.21655][sp-1332]<p>[6.1.7601.21675][sp-1332]|[1332][certificate-1332]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#1168][aes-1168] and [#1177][aes-1177]); HMAC (Cert. [#675][hmac-675]); SHS (Cert. [#1081][shs-1081])<p>Other algorithms: Elephant Diffuser|
|
||||
|Code Integrity (CI.DLL)|[6.1.7600.16385][sp-1327]<p>[6.1.7600.17122][sp-1327]v[6.1.7600.21320][sp-1327]<p>[6.1.7601.17514][sp-1327]<p>[6.1.7601.17950][sp-1327]v[6.1.7601.22108][sp-1327]|[1327][certificate-1327]|FIPS approved algorithms: RSA (Cert. [#557][rsa-557]); SHS (Cert. [#1081][shs-1081])<p>Other algorithms: MD5|
|
||||
|Enhanced DSS and Diffie-Hellman Cryptographic Provider (DSSENH.DLL)|[6.1.7600.16385][sp-1331]<p>(no change in SP1)|[1331][certificate-1331]|FIPS approved algorithms: DSA (Cert. [#385][dsa-385]); RNG (Cert. [#649][rng-649]); SHS (Cert. [#1081][shs-1081]); Triple-DES (Cert. [#846][tdes-846]); Triple-DES MAC (Triple-DES Cert. [#846][tdes-846], vendor affirmed)<p>Other algorithms: DES; DES MAC; DES40; DES40 MAC; Diffie-Hellman; MD5; RC2; RC2 MAC; RC4|
|
||||
|Enhanced Cryptographic Provider (RSAENH.DLL)|[6.1.7600.16385][sp-1330]<p>(no change in SP1)|[1330][certificate-1330]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#1168][aes-1168]); DRBG (Cert. [#23][drbg-23]); HMAC (Cert. [#673][hmac-673]); SHS (Cert. [#1081][shs-1081]); RSA (Certs. [#557][rsa-557] and [#559][rsa-559]); Triple-DES (Cert. [#846][tdes-846])<p>Other algorithms: DES; MD2; MD4; MD5; RC2; RC4; RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 112 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)|
|
||||
@ -312,7 +313,7 @@ Validated Editions: Ultimate Edition
|
||||
|--- |--- |--- |--- |
|
||||
|Enhanced Cryptographic Provider (RSAENH) | [6.0.6000.16386][sp-893] | [893][certificate-893] | FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#553][aes-553]); HMAC (Cert. [#297][hmac-297]); RNG (Cert. [#321][rng-321]); RSA (Certs. [#255][rsa-255] and [#258][rsa-258]); SHS (Cert. [#618][shs-618]); Triple-DES (Cert. [#549][tdes-549])<br/><br/>Other algorithms: DES; MD2; MD4; MD5; RC2; RC4; RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 112 bits and 150 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)|
|
||||
|Enhanced DSS and Diffie-Hellman Cryptographic Provider (DSSENH)|[6.0.6000.16386][sp-894]|[894][certificate-894]|FIPS approved algorithms: DSA (Cert. [#226][dsa-226]); RNG (Cert. [#321][rng-321]); SHS (Cert. [#618][shs-618]); Triple-DES (Cert. [#549][tdes-549]); Triple-DES MAC (Triple-DES Cert. [#549][tdes-549], vendor affirmed)<br/><br/>Other algorithms: DES; DES MAC; DES40; DES40 MAC; Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 bits and 150 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength); MD5; RC2; RC2 MAC; RC4|
|
||||
|BitLocker™ Drive Encryption|[6.0.6000.16386][sp-947]|[947][certificate-947]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#715][aes-715]); HMAC (Cert. [#386][hmac-386]); SHS (Cert. [#737][shs-737])<br/><br/>Other algorithms: Elephant Diffuser|
|
||||
|BitLocker™ Drive Encryption|[6.0.6000.16386][sp-947]|[947][certificate-947]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#715][aes-715]); HMAC (Cert. [#386][hmac-386]); SHS (Cert. [#737][shs-737])<br/><br/>Other algorithms: Elephant Diffuser|
|
||||
|Kernel Mode Security Support Provider Interface (ksecdd.sys)|[6.0.6000.16386, 6.0.6000.16870 and 6.0.6000.21067][sp-891]|[891][certificate-891]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #553); ECDSA (Cert. #60); HMAC (Cert. #298); RNG (Cert. #321); RSA (Certs. #257 and #258); SHS (Cert. #618); Triple-DES (Cert. #549)<br/><br/>Other algorithms: DES; Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 bits and 150 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength); EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 128 bits to 256 bits of encryption strength); MD2; MD4; MD5; RC2; RC4; HMAC MD5|
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
@ -481,9 +482,9 @@ Validated Editions: Standard, Datacenter, Storage Server
|
||||
|Cryptographic Primitives Library (bcryptprimitives.dll and ncryptsslp.dll)|[10.0.14393][sp-2937]|[2937][certificate-2937]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#4064][aes-4064]); DRBG (Cert. [#1217][drbg-1217]); DSA (Cert. [#1098][dsa-1098]); ECDSA (Cert. [#911][ecdsa-911]); HMAC (Cert. [#2651][hmac-2651]); KAS (Cert. [#92][kas-92]); KBKDF (Cert. [#101][kdf-101]); KTS (AES Cert. [#4062][aes-4062]; key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); RSA (Certs. [#2192][rsa-2192], [#2193, and #2195][rsa-2193]); SHS (Cert. [#3347][shs-3347]); Triple-DES (Cert. [#2227][tdes-2227])<p>Other algorithms: HMAC-MD5; MD5; DES; Legacy CAPI KDF; MD2; MD4; RC2; RC4; RSA (encrypt/decrypt)|
|
||||
|Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library (cng.sys)|[10.0.14393][sp-2936]|[2936][certificate-2936]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#4064][aes-4064]); DRBG (Cert. [#1217][drbg-1217]); DSA (Cert. [#1098][dsa-1098]); ECDSA (Cert. [#911][ecdsa-911]); HMAC (Cert. [#2651][hmac-2651]); KAS (Cert. [#92][kas-92]); KBKDF (Cert. [#101][kdf-101]); KTS (AES Cert. [#4062][aes-4062]; key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); RSA (Certs. [#2192][rsa-2192], [#2193, and #2195][rsa-2193]); SHS (Cert. [#3347][shs-3347]); Triple-DES (Cert. [#2227][tdes-2227])<p>Other algorithms: HMAC-MD5; MD5; NDRNG; DES; Legacy CAPI KDF; MD2; MD4; RC2; RC4; RSA (encrypt/decrypt)|
|
||||
|Boot Manager|[10.0.14393][sp-2931]|[2931][certificate-2931]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#4061][aes-4061] and [#4064][aes-4064]); HMAC (Cert. [#2651][hmac-2651]); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); RSA (Cert. [#2193][rsa-2193]); SHS (Cert. [#3347][shs-3347])<p>Other algorithms: MD5; PBKDF (non-compliant); VMK KDF|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows OS Loader (winload)|[10.0.14393][sp-2932]|[2932][certificate-2932]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#4061][aes-4061] and [#4064][aes-4064]); RSA (Cert. [#2193][rsa-2193]); SHS (Cert. [#3347][shs-3347])<p>Other algorithms: NDRNG; MD5|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows Resume (winresume)|[10.0.14393][sp-2933]|[2933][certificate-2934]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#4061][aes-4061] and [#4064][aes-4064]); RSA (Cert. [#2193][rsa-2193]); SHS (Cert. [#3347][shs-3347])<p>Other algorithms: MD5|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Dump Filter (dumpfve.sys)|[10.0.14393][sp-2934]|[2934][certificate-2934]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#4061][aes-4061] and [#4064][aes-4064])|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows OS Loader (winload)|[10.0.14393][sp-2932]|[2932][certificate-2932]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#4061][aes-4061] and [#4064][aes-4064]); RSA (Cert. [#2193][rsa-2193]); SHS (Cert. [#3347][shs-3347])<p>Other algorithms: NDRNG; MD5|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows Resume (winresume)|[10.0.14393][sp-2933]|[2933][certificate-2934]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#4061][aes-4061] and [#4064][aes-4064]); RSA (Cert. [#2193][rsa-2193]); SHS (Cert. [#3347][shs-3347])<p>Other algorithms: MD5|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Dump Filter (dumpfve.sys)|[10.0.14393][sp-2934]|[2934][certificate-2934]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#4061][aes-4061] and [#4064][aes-4064])|
|
||||
|Code Integrity (ci.dll)|[10.0.14393][sp-2935]|[2935][certificate-2935]|FIPS approved algorithms: RSA (Cert. [#2193][rsa-2193]); SHS (Cert. [#3347][shs-3347])<p>Other algorithms: AES (non-compliant); MD5|
|
||||
|Secure Kernel Code Integrity (skci.dll)|[10.0.14393][sp-2938]|[2938][certificate-2938]|FIPS approved algorithms: RSA (Certs. [#2193][rsa-2193]); SHS (Certs. [#3347][shs-3347])<p>Other algorithms: MD5|
|
||||
|
||||
@ -501,9 +502,9 @@ Validated Editions: Server, Storage Server,
|
||||
|Cryptographic Primitives Library (bcryptprimitives.dll and ncryptsslp.dll)|[6.3.9600 6.3.9600.17031][sp-2357]|[2357][certificate-2357]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2832][aes-2832]); DRBG (Certs. [#489][drbg-489]); DSA (Cert. [#855][dsa-855]); ECDSA (Cert. [#505][ecdsa-505]); HMAC (Cert. [#1773][hmac-1773]); KAS (Cert. [#47][kas-47]); KBKDF (Cert. [#30][kdf-30]); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); RSA (Certs. [#1487][rsa-1487], [#1493, and #1519][rsa-1493]); SHS (Cert. [#2373][shs-2373]); Triple-DES (Cert. [#1692][tdes-1692])<p>Other algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2832][aes-2832], key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength); AES-GCM encryption (non-compliant); DES; HMAC MD5; Legacy CAPI KDF; MD2; MD4; MD5; NDRNG; RC2; RC4; RSA (encrypt/decrypt)|
|
||||
|Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library (cng.sys)|[6.3.9600 6.3.9600.17042][sp-2356]|[2356][certificate-2356]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2832][aes-2832]); DRBG (Certs. [#489][drbg-489]); ECDSA (Cert. [#505][ecdsa-505]); HMAC (Cert. [#1773][hmac-1773]); KAS (Cert. [#47][kas-47]); KBKDF (Cert. [#30][kdf-30]); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); RSA (Certs. [#1487][rsa-1487], [#1493, and #1519][rsa-1493]); SHS (Cert. [# 2373][shs-2373]); Triple-DES (Cert. [#1692][tdes-1692])<p>Other algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2832][aes-2832], key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength); AES-GCM encryption (non-compliant); DES; HMAC MD5; Legacy CAPI KDF; MD2; MD4; MD5; NDRNG; RC2; RC4; RSA (encrypt/decrypt)|
|
||||
|Boot Manager|[6.3.9600 6.3.9600.17031][sp-2351]|[2351][certificate-2351]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2832][aes-2832]); HMAC (Cert. [#1773][hmac-1773]); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); RSA (Cert. [#1494][rsa-1494]); SHS (Certs. [# 2373][shs-2373] and [#2396][shs-2396])<p>Other algorithms: MD5; KDF (non-compliant); PBKDF (non-compliant)|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows OS Loader (winload)|[6.3.9600 6.3.9600.17031][sp-2352]|[2352][certificate-2352]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2832][aes-2832]); RSA (Cert. [#1494][rsa-1494]); SHS (Cert. [#2396][shs-2396])<p>Other algorithms: MD5; NDRNG|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows Resume (winresume)<sup>[16]</sup>|[6.3.9600 6.3.9600.17031][sp-2353]|[2353][certificate-2353]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2832][aes-2832]); RSA (Cert. [#1494][rsa-1494]); SHS (Certs. [# 2373][shs-2373] and [#2396][shs-2396])<p>Other algorithms: MD5|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Dump Filter (dumpfve.sys)<sup>[17]</sup>|[6.3.9600 6.3.9600.17031][sp-2354]|[2354][certificate-2354]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2832][aes-2832])<p>Other algorithms: N/A|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows OS Loader (winload)|[6.3.9600 6.3.9600.17031][sp-2352]|[2352][certificate-2352]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2832][aes-2832]); RSA (Cert. [#1494][rsa-1494]); SHS (Cert. [#2396][shs-2396])<p>Other algorithms: MD5; NDRNG|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows Resume (winresume)<sup>[16]</sup>|[6.3.9600 6.3.9600.17031][sp-2353]|[2353][certificate-2353]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2832][aes-2832]); RSA (Cert. [#1494][rsa-1494]); SHS (Certs. [# 2373][shs-2373] and [#2396][shs-2396])<p>Other algorithms: MD5|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Dump Filter (dumpfve.sys)<sup>[17]</sup>|[6.3.9600 6.3.9600.17031][sp-2354]|[2354][certificate-2354]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2832][aes-2832])<p>Other algorithms: N/A|
|
||||
|Code Integrity (ci.dll)|[6.3.9600 6.3.9600.17031][sp-2355]|[2355][certificate-2355]|FIPS approved algorithms: RSA (Cert. [#1494][rsa-1494]); SHS (Cert. [# 2373][shs-2373])<p>Other algorithms: MD5|
|
||||
|
||||
<sup>\[16\]</sup> Doesn't apply to **Azure StorSimple Virtual Array Windows Server 2012 R2**
|
||||
@ -522,9 +523,9 @@ Validated Editions: Server, Storage Server
|
||||
|Cryptographic Primitives Library (BCRYPTPRIMITIVES.DLL)|[6.2.9200][sp-1892]|[1892]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#2197][aes-2197] and [#2216][aes-2216]); DRBG (Certs. [#258][drbg-258]); DSA (Cert. [#687][dsa-687]); ECDSA (Cert. [#341][ecdsa-341]); HMAC (Cert. #[1345][hmac-1345]); KAS (Cert. [#36][kas-36]); KBKDF (Cert. [#3][kdf-3]); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); RSA (Certs. [#1133][rsa-1133] and [#1134][rsa-1134]); SHS (Cert. [#1903][shs-1903]); Triple-DES (Cert. [#1387][tdes-1387])<p>Other algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2197][aes-2197], key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength); DES; Legacy CAPI KDF; MD2; MD4; MD5; HMAC MD5; RC2; RC4; RSA (encrypt/decrypt)#687); ECDSA (Cert.); HMAC (Cert. #); KAS (Cert.); KBKDF (Cert.); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); RSA (Certs. and); SHS (Cert.); Triple-DES (Cert.)<p>Other algorithms: AES (Certificate, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength); DES; Legacy CAPI KDF; MD2; MD4; MD5; HMAC MD5; RC2; RC4; RSA (encrypt/decrypt)|
|
||||
|Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library (cng.sys)|[6.2.9200][sp-1891]|[1891][certificate-1891]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#2197][aes-2197] and [#2216][aes-2216]); DRBG (Certs. [#258][drbg-258] and [#259][drbg-259]); ECDSA (Cert. [#341][ecdsa-341]); HMAC (Cert. [#1345][hmac-1345]); KAS (Cert. [#36][kas-36]); KBKDF (Cert. [#3][kdf-3]); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); RNG (Cert. [#1110][rng-1110]); RSA (Certs. [#1133][rsa-1133] and [#1134][rsa-1134]); SHS (Cert. [#1903][shs-1903]); Triple-DES (Cert. [#1387][tdes-1387])<p>Other algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2197][aes-2197], key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength); DES; Legacy CAPI KDF; MD2; MD4; MD5; HMAC MD5; RC2; RC4; RSA (encrypt/decrypt)#1110); RSA (Certs. and); SHS (Cert.); Triple-DES (Cert.)<p>Other algorithms: AES (Certificate, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength); DES; Legacy CAPI KDF; MD2; MD4; MD5; HMAC MD5; RC2; RC4; RSA (encrypt/decrypt)|
|
||||
|Boot Manager|[6.2.9200][sp-1895]|[1895][sp-1895]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#2196][aes-2196] and [#2198][aes-2198]); HMAC (Cert. #[1347][hmac-1347]); RSA (Cert. [#1132][rsa-1132]); SHS (Cert. [#1903][shs-1903])<p>Other algorithms: MD5|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows OS Loader (WINLOAD)|[6.2.9200][sp-1896]|[1896][sp-1896]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#2196][aes-2196] and [#2198][aes-2198]); RSA (Cert. [#1132][rsa-1132]); SHS (Cert. [#1903][shs-1903])<p>Other algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2197][aes-2197]; non-compliant); MD5; Non-Approved RNG|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows Resume (WINRESUME)|[6.2.9200][sp-1898]|[1898][sp-1898]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#2196][aes-2196] and [#2198][aes-2198]); RSA (Cert. [#1132][rsa-1132]); SHS (Cert. [#1903][shs-1903])<p>Other algorithms: MD5|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Dump Filter (DUMPFVE.SYS)|[6.2.9200][sp-1899]|[1899][sp-1899]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#2196][aes-2196] and [#2198][aes-2198])<p>Other algorithms: N/A|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows OS Loader (WINLOAD)|[6.2.9200][sp-1896]|[1896][sp-1896]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#2196][aes-2196] and [#2198][aes-2198]); RSA (Cert. [#1132][rsa-1132]); SHS (Cert. [#1903][shs-1903])<p>Other algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2197][aes-2197]; non-compliant); MD5; Non-Approved RNG|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Windows Resume (WINRESUME)|[6.2.9200][sp-1898]|[1898][sp-1898]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#2196][aes-2196] and [#2198][aes-2198]); RSA (Cert. [#1132][rsa-1132]); SHS (Cert. [#1903][shs-1903])<p>Other algorithms: MD5|
|
||||
|BitLocker® Dump Filter (DUMPFVE.SYS)|[6.2.9200][sp-1899]|[1899][sp-1899]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#2196][aes-2196] and [#2198][aes-2198])<p>Other algorithms: N/A|
|
||||
|Code Integrity (CI.DLL)|[6.2.9200][sp-1897]|[1897][sp-1897]|FIPS approved algorithms: RSA (Cert. [#1132][rsa-1132]); SHS (Cert. [#1903][shs-1903])<p>Other algorithms: MD5|
|
||||
|Enhanced DSS and Diffie-Hellman Cryptographic Provider (DSSENH.DLL)|[6.2.9200][sp-1893]|[1893][sp-1893]|FIPS approved algorithms: DSA (Cert. [#686][dsa-686]); SHS (Cert. [#1902][shs-1902]); Triple-DES (Cert. [#1386][tdes-1386]); Triple-DES MAC (Triple-DES Cert. [#1386][tdes-1386], vendor affirmed)<p>Other algorithms: DES; DES MAC; DES40; DES40 MAC; Diffie-Hellman; MD5; RC2; RC2 MAC; RC4; Triple-DES (Cert. [#1386][tdes-1386], key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)|
|
||||
|Enhanced Cryptographic Provider (RSAENH.DLL)|[6.2.9200][sp-1894]|[1894][sp-1894]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2196][aes-2196]); HMAC (Cert. [#1346][hmac-1346]); RSA (Cert. [#1132][rsa-1132]); SHS (Cert. [#1902][shs-1902]); Triple-DES (Cert. [#1386][tdes-1386])<p>Other algorithms: AES (Cert. [#2196][aes-2196], key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength); DES; MD2; MD4; MD5; RC2; RC4; RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 112 bits and 150 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength); Triple-DES (Cert. [#1386][tdes-1386], key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)|
|
||||
@ -542,7 +543,7 @@ Validated Editions: Server, Storage Server
|
||||
|Cryptographic Primitives Library (bcryptprimitives.dll)|[66.1.7600.16385 or 6.1.7601.17514][sp-1336]|[1336][certificate-1336]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#1168][aes-1168] and [#1177][aes-1177]); AES GCM (Cert. [#1168][aes-1168], vendor-affirmed); AES GMAC (Cert. [#1168][aes-1168], vendor-affirmed); DRBG (Certs. [#23][drbg-23] and [#27][drbg-27]); DSA (Cert. [#391][dsa-391]); ECDSA (Cert. [#142][ecdsa-142]); HMAC (Cert. [#686][hmac-686]); KAS (SP 800-56A, vendor affirmed, key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 80 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength); RNG (Cert. [#649][rng-649]); RSA (Certs. [#559][rsa-559] and [#567][rsa-567]); SHS (Cert. [#1081][shs-1081]); Triple-DES (Cert. [#846][tdes-846])<p>Other algorithms: AES (Cert. [#1168][aes-1168], key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength); DES; HMAC MD5; MD2; MD4; MD5; RC2; RC4|
|
||||
|Enhanced Cryptographic Provider (RSAENH)|[6.1.7600.16385][sp-1337]|[1337][certificate-1337]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Cert. [#1168][aes-1168]); DRBG (Cert. [#23][drbg-23]); HMAC (Cert. [#687][hmac-687]); SHS (Cert. [#1081][shs-1081]); RSA (Certs. [#559][rsa-559] and [#568][rsa-568]); Triple-DES (Cert. [#846][tdes-846])<p>Other algorithms: DES; MD2; MD4; MD5; RC2; RC4; RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 112 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)|
|
||||
|Enhanced DSS and Diffie-Hellman Cryptographic Provider (DSSENH)|[6.1.7600.16385][sp-1338]|[1338][certificate-1338]|FIPS approved algorithms: DSA (Cert. [#390][dsa-390]); RNG (Cert. [#649][rng-649]); SHS (Cert. [#1081][shs-1081]); Triple-DES (Cert. [#846][tdes-846]); Triple-DES MAC (Triple-DES Cert. [#846][tdes-846], vendor affirmed)<p>Other algorithms: DES; DES MAC; DES40; DES40 MAC; Diffie-Hellman; MD5; RC2; RC2 MAC; RC4|
|
||||
|BitLocker™ Drive Encryption|[6.1.7600.16385, 6.1.7600.16429, 6.1.7600.16757, 6.1.7600.20536, 6.1.7600.20873, 6.1.7600.20897, 6.1.7600.20916, 6.1.7601.17514, 6.1.7601.17556, 6.1.7601.21634, 6.1.7601.21655 or 6.1.7601.21675][sp-1339]|[1339][certificate-1339]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#1168][aes-1168] and [#1177][aes-1177]); HMAC (Cert. [#675][hmac-675]); SHS (Cert. [#1081][shs-1081])<p>Other algorithms: Elephant Diffuser|
|
||||
|BitLocker™ Drive Encryption|[6.1.7600.16385, 6.1.7600.16429, 6.1.7600.16757, 6.1.7600.20536, 6.1.7600.20873, 6.1.7600.20897, 6.1.7600.20916, 6.1.7601.17514, 6.1.7601.17556, 6.1.7601.21634, 6.1.7601.21655 or 6.1.7601.21675][sp-1339]|[1339][certificate-1339]|FIPS approved algorithms: AES (Certs. [#1168][aes-1168] and [#1177][aes-1177]); HMAC (Cert. [#675][hmac-675]); SHS (Cert. [#1081][shs-1081])<p>Other algorithms: Elephant Diffuser|
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -661,20 +662,20 @@ For more details, expand each algorithm section.
|
||||
|**ECB** (e/d; 128, 192, 256); **CBC** (e/d; 128, 192, 256); **CFB8** (e/d; 128, 192, 256);<p>**CFB128** (e/d; 128, 192, 256); **CTR** (int only; 128, 192, 256)<p>**CCM** (KS: 128, 192, 256) (Assoc. Data Len Range: 0-0, 2^16) (Payload Length Range: 0 - 32 (Nonce Length(s): 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 (Tag Length(s): 4 6 8 10 12 14 16)<p>**CMAC (Generation/Verification)** (KS: 128; Block Size(s): Full/Partial; Msg Len(s) Min: 0 Max: 2^16; Tag Len(s) Min: 0 Max: 16) (KS: 192; Block Size(s): Full/Partial; Msg Len(s) Min: 0 Max: 2^16; Tag Len(s) Min: 0 Max: 16) (KS: 256; Block Size(s): Full/Partial; Msg Len(s) Min: 0 Max: 2^16; Tag Len(s) Min: 0 Max: 16)<p>**GCM** (KS: AES_128(e/d) Tag Length(s): 128 120 112 104 96) (KS: AES_192(e/d) Tag Length(s): 128 120 112 104 96)<p>(KS: AES_256(e/d) Tag Length(s): 128 120 112 104 96)<p>**IV Generated:** (Externally); PT Lengths Tested: (0, 1024, 8, 1016); Additional authenticated data lengths tested: (0, 1024, 8, 1016); IV Lengths Tested: (0, 0); 96 bit IV supported<p>GMAC supported<p>**XTS((KS: XTS_128**((e/d)(f)) **KS: XTS_256**((e/d)(f))|Microsoft Windows 10 Anniversary Update, Windows Server 2016, Windows Storage Server 2016; Microsoft Surface Book, Surface Pro 4, Surface Pro 3 and Surface 3 w/ Windows 10 Anniversary Update; Microsoft Lumia 950 and Lumia 650 w/ Windows 10 Mobile Anniversary Update SymCrypt Cryptographic Implementations [#4064][aes-4064]<p>Version 10.0.14393|
|
||||
|**ECB** (e/d; 128, 192, 256);<p>**CBC** (e/d; 128, 192, 256);<p>**CFB8** (e/d; 128, 192, 256);|Microsoft Windows 10 Anniversary Update, Windows Server 2016, Windows Storage Server 2016; Microsoft Surface Book, Surface Pro 4, Surface Pro 3 and Surface 3 w/ Windows 10 Anniversary Update; Microsoft Lumia 950 and Lumia 650 w/ Windows 10 Mobile Anniversary Update RSA32 Algorithm Implementations [#4063][aes-4063]<p>Version 10.0.14393|
|
||||
|**KW** (AE, AD, AES-128, AES-192, AES-256, FWD, 128, 192, 256, 320, 2048)<p>AES [validation number 4064][aes-4064]|Microsoft Windows 10 Anniversary Update, Windows Server 2016, Windows Storage Server 2016; Microsoft Surface Book, Surface Pro 4, Surface Pro 3 and Surface 3 w/ Windows 10 Anniversary Update; Microsoft Lumia 950 and Lumia 650 w/ Windows 10 Mobile Anniversary Update Cryptography Next Generation (CNG) Implementations [#4062][aes-4062]<p>Version 10.0.14393|
|
||||
|**CCM** (KS: 256) (Assoc. Data Len Range: 0-0, 2^16) (Payload Length Range: 0 - 32 (Nonce Length(s): 12 (Tag Length(s): 16)<p>AES [validation number 4064][aes-4064]|Microsoft Windows 10 Anniversary Update, Windows Server 2016, Windows Storage Server 2016; Microsoft Surface Book, Surface Pro 4, Surface Pro 3 and Surface 3 w/ Windows 10 Anniversary Update; Microsoft Lumia 950 and Lumia 650 w/ Windows 10 Mobile Anniversary Update BitLocker® Cryptographic Implementations [#4061][aes-4061]<p>Version 10.0.14393|
|
||||
|**CCM** (KS: 256) (Assoc. Data Len Range: 0-0, 2^16) (Payload Length Range: 0 - 32 (Nonce Length(s): 12 (Tag Length(s): 16)<p>AES [validation number 4064][aes-4064]|Microsoft Windows 10 Anniversary Update, Windows Server 2016, Windows Storage Server 2016; Microsoft Surface Book, Surface Pro 4, Surface Pro 3 and Surface 3 w/ Windows 10 Anniversary Update; Microsoft Lumia 950 and Lumia 650 w/ Windows 10 Mobile Anniversary Update BitLocker® Cryptographic Implementations [#4061][aes-4061]<p>Version 10.0.14393|
|
||||
|**KW** (AE, AD, AES-128, AES-192, AES-256, FWD, 128, 256, 192, 320, 2048)<p>AES [validation number 3629][aes-3629]|Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update; Microsoft Surface Book, Surface Pro 4, Surface Pro 3, Surface 3, Surface Pro 2, and Surface Pro w/ Windows 10 November 2015 Update; Windows 10 Mobile for Microsoft Lumia 950 and Microsoft Lumia 635; Windows 10 for Microsoft Surface Hub 84" and Surface Hub 55" Cryptography Next Generation (CNG) Implementations [#3652][aes-3652]<p>Version 10.0.10586|
|
||||
|**CCM** (KS: 256) (Assoc. Data Len Range: 0-0, 2^16) (Payload Length Range: 0 - 32 (Nonce Length(s): 12 (Tag Length(s): 16)<p>AES [validation number 3629][aes-3629]|Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update; Microsoft Surface Book, Surface Pro 4, Surface Pro 3, Surface 3, Surface Pro 2, and Surface Pro w/ Windows 10 November 2015 Update; Windows 10 Mobile for Microsoft Lumia 950 and Microsoft Lumia 635; Windows 10 for Microsoft Surface Hub 84" and Surface Hub 55" BitLocker® Cryptographic Implementations [#3653][aes-3653]<p>Version 10.0.10586|
|
||||
|**CCM** (KS: 256) (Assoc. Data Len Range: 0-0, 2^16) (Payload Length Range: 0 - 32 (Nonce Length(s): 12 (Tag Length(s): 16)<p>AES [validation number 3629][aes-3629]|Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update; Microsoft Surface Book, Surface Pro 4, Surface Pro 3, Surface 3, Surface Pro 2, and Surface Pro w/ Windows 10 November 2015 Update; Windows 10 Mobile for Microsoft Lumia 950 and Microsoft Lumia 635; Windows 10 for Microsoft Surface Hub 84" and Surface Hub 55" BitLocker® Cryptographic Implementations [#3653][aes-3653]<p>Version 10.0.10586|
|
||||
|**ECB** (e/d; 128, 192, 256);<p>**CBC** (e/d; 128, 192, 256);<p>**CFB8** (e/d; 128, 192, 256);|Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update; Microsoft Surface Book, Surface Pro 4, Surface Pro 3, Surface 3, Surface Pro 2, and Surface Pro w/ Windows 10 November 2015 Update; Windows 10 Mobile for Microsoft Lumia 950 and Microsoft Lumia 635; Windows 10 for Microsoft Surface Hub 84" and Surface Hub 55" RSA32 Algorithm Implementations [#3630][aes-3630]<p>Version 10.0.10586|
|
||||
|**ECB** (e/d; 128, 192, 256); **CBC** (e/d; 128, 192, 256); **CFB8** (e/d; 128, 192, 256);<p>**CFB128** (e/d; 128, 192, 256); **CTR** (int only; 128, 192, 256)<p>**CCM** (KS: 128, 192, 256) (Assoc. Data Len Range: 0-0, 2^16) (Payload Length Range: 0 - 32 (Nonce Length(s): 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 (Tag Length(s): 4 6 8 10 12 14 16)<p>**CMAC (Generation/Verification)** (KS: 128; Block Size(s): Full/Partial; Msg Len(s) Min: 0 Max: 2^16; Tag Len(s) Min: 0 Max: 16) (KS: 192; Block Size(s): Full/Partial; Msg Len(s) Min: 0 Max: 2^16; Tag Len(s) Min: 0 Max: 16) (KS: 256; Block Size(s): Full/Partial; Msg Len(s) Min: 0 Max: 2^16; Tag Len(s) Min: 0 Max: 16)<p>**GCM** (KS: AES_128(e/d) Tag Length(s): 128 120 112 104 96) (KS: AES_192(e/d) Tag Length(s): 128 120 112 104 96)<p>(KS: AES_256(e/d) Tag Length(s): 128 120 112 104 96)v**IV Generated:** (Externally); PT Lengths Tested: (0, 1024, 8, 1016); Additional authenticated data lengths tested: (0, 1024, 8, 1016); IV Lengths Tested: (0, 0); 96 bit IV supported<p>GMAC supported<p>**XTS((KS: XTS_128**((e/d) (f)) **KS: XTS_256**((e/d) (f))|Microsoft Windows 10 November 2015 Update; Microsoft Surface Book, Surface Pro 4, Surface Pro 3, Surface 3, Surface Pro 2, and Surface Pro w/ Windows 10 November 2015 Update; Windows 10 Mobile for Microsoft Lumia 950 and Microsoft Lumia 635; Windows 10 for Microsoft Surface Hub 84" and Surface Hub 55" SymCrypt Cryptographic Implementations [#3629][aes-3629]<p>Version 10.0.10586|
|
||||
|**KW** (AE, AD, AES-128, AES-192, AES-256, FWD, 128, 256, 192, 320, 2048)<p>AES [validation number 3497][aes-3497]|Microsoft Windows 10 Anniversary Update, Windows Server 2016, Windows Storage Server 2016; Microsoft Surface Book, Surface Pro 4, Surface Pro 3 and Surface 3 w/ Windows 10 Anniversary Update; Microsoft Lumia 950 and Lumia 650 w/ Windows 10 Mobile Anniversary Update Cryptography Next Generation (CNG) Implementations [#3507][aes-3507]<p>Version 10.0.10240|
|
||||
|**CCM** (KS: 256) (Assoc. Data Len Range: 0-0, 2^16) (Payload Length Range: 0 - 32 (Nonce Length(s): 12 (Tag Length(s): 16)<p>AES [validation number 3497][aes-3497]|Microsoft Windows 10, Microsoft Surface Pro 3 with Windows 10, Microsoft Surface 3 with Windows 10, Microsoft Surface Pro 2 with Windows 10, Microsoft Surface Pro with Windows 10 BitLocker® Cryptographic Implementations [#3498][aes-3498]<p>Version 10.0.10240|
|
||||
|**CCM** (KS: 256) (Assoc. Data Len Range: 0-0, 2^16) (Payload Length Range: 0 - 32 (Nonce Length(s): 12 (Tag Length(s): 16)<p>AES [validation number 3497][aes-3497]|Microsoft Windows 10, Microsoft Surface Pro 3 with Windows 10, Microsoft Surface 3 with Windows 10, Microsoft Surface Pro 2 with Windows 10, Microsoft Surface Pro with Windows 10 BitLocker® Cryptographic Implementations [#3498][aes-3498]<p>Version 10.0.10240|
|
||||
|**ECB** (e/d; 128, 192, 256); **CBC** (e/d; 128, 192, 256); **CFB8** (e/d; 128, 192, 256);<p>**CFB128** (e/d; 128, 192, 256); **CTR** (int only; 128, 192, 256)<p>**CCM** (KS: 128, 192, 256) (Assoc. Data Len Range: 0-0, 2^16) (Payload Length Range: 0 - 32 (Nonce Length(s): 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 (Tag Length(s): 4 6 8 10 12 14 16)<p>**CMAC(Generation/Verification)** (KS: 128; Block Size(s): Full/Partial; Msg Len(s) Min: 0 Max: 2^16; Tag Len(s) Min: 0 Max: 16) (KS: 192; Block Size(s): Full/Partial; Msg Len(s) Min: 0 Max: 2^16; Tag Len(s) Min: 0 Max: 16) (KS: 256; Block Size(s): Full/Partial; Msg Len(s) Min: 0 Max: 2^16; Tag Len(s) Min: 0 Max: 16)<p>**GCM** (KS: AES_128(e/d) Tag Length(s): 128 120 112 104 96) (KS: AES_192(e/d) Tag Length(s): 128 120 112 104 96)<p>(KS: AES_256(e/d) Tag Length(s): 128 120 112 104 96)<p>**IV Generated:** (Externally); PT Lengths Tested: (0, 1024, 8, 1016); Additional authenticated data lengths tested: (0, 1024, 8, 1016); IV Lengths Tested: (0, 0); 96 bit IV supported<p>GMAC supported<p>**XTS((KS: XTS_128**((e/d)(f)) **KS: XTS_256**((e/d)(f))|Microsoft Windows 10, Microsoft Surface Pro 3 with Windows 10, Microsoft Surface 3 with Windows 10, Microsoft Surface Pro 2 with Windows 10, Microsoft Surface Pro with Windows 10 SymCrypt Cryptographic Implementations [#3497][aes-3497]<p>Version 10.0.10240|
|
||||
|**ECB** (e/d; 128, 192, 256);<p>**CBC** (e/d; 128, 192, 256);<p>**CFB8** (e/d; 128, 192, 256);|Microsoft Windows 10, Microsoft Surface Pro 3 with Windows 10, Microsoft Surface 3 with Windows 10, Microsoft Surface Pro 2 with Windows 10, Microsoft Surface Pro with Windows 10 RSA32 Algorithm Implementations [#3476][aes-3476]<p>Version 10.0.10240|
|
||||
|**ECB** (e/d; 128, 192, 256);<p>**CBC** (e/d; 128, 192, 256);<p>**CFB8** (e/d; 128, 192, 256);|Microsoft Windows 8.1, Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2, Microsoft Windows Storage Server 2012 R2, Microsoft Windows RT 8.1, Microsoft Surface with Windows RT 8.1, Microsoft Surface Pro with Windows 8.1, Microsoft Surface 2, Microsoft Surface Pro 2, Microsoft Surface Pro 3, Microsoft Windows Phone 8.1, Microsoft Windows Embedded 8.1 Industry RSA32 Algorithm Implementations [#2853][aes-2853]<p>Version 6.3.9600|
|
||||
|**CCM (KS: 256)** (Assoc. Data Len Range: 0-0, 2^16) (Payload Length Range: 0 - 32 (Nonce Length(s): 12 (Tag Length(s): 16)<p>AES [validation number 2832][aes-2832]|Microsoft Windows 8.1, Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2, Microsoft Windows Storage Server 2012 R2, Microsoft Windows RT 8.1, Microsoft Surface with Windows RT 8.1, Microsoft Surface Pro with Windows 8.1, Microsoft Surface 2, Microsoft Surface Pro 2, Microsoft Surface Pro 3, Microsoft Windows Phone 8.1, Microsoft Windows Embedded 8.1 Industry, and Microsoft StorSimple 8100 BitLocker Cryptographic Implementations [#2848][aes-2848]<p>Version 6.3.9600|
|
||||
|**CCM (KS: 128, 192, 256)** (Assoc. Data Len Range: 0-0, 2^16) (Payload Length Range: 0 - 0 (Nonce Length(s): 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 (Tag Length(s): 4 6 8 10 12 14 16)<p>**CMAC (Generation/Verification) (KS: 128**; Block Size(s): Full/Partial; Msg Len(s) Min: 0 Max: 2^16; Tag Len(s) Min: 0 Max: 16) (KS: 192; Block Size(s): Full/Partial; Msg Len(s) Min: 0 Max: 2^16; Tag Len(s) Min: 0 Max: 16) (KS: 256; Block Size(s): Full/Partial; Msg Len(s) Min: 0 Max: 2^16; Tag Len(s) Min: 0 Max: 16)<p>**GCM (KS: AES_128**(e/d) Tag Length(s): 128 120 112 104 96) (KS: AES_192(e/d) Tag Length(s): 128 120 112 104 96)<p>**(KS: AES_256**(e/d) Tag Length(s): 128 120 112 104 96)<p>**IV Generated:** (Externally); PT Lengths Tested: (0, 128, 1024, 8, 1016); Additional authenticated data lengths tested: (0, 128, 1024, 8, 1016); IV Lengths Tested: (8, 1024); 96 bit IV supported;<p>**OtherIVLen_Supported<p>GMAC supported**|Windows Storage Server 2012 R2, Microsoft Windows RT 8.1, Microsoft Surface with Windows RT 8.1, Microsoft Surface Pro with Windows 8.1, Microsoft Surface 2, Microsoft Surface Pro 2, Microsoft Surface Pro 3, Microsoft Windows Phone 8.1, Microsoft Windows Embedded 8.1 Industry, and Microsoft StorSimple 8100 SymCrypt Cryptographic Implementations #[2832][aes-2832]<p>Version 6.3.9600|
|
||||
|**CCM (KS: 128, 192, 256**) **(Assoc. Data Len Range**: 0-0, 2^16) **(Payload Length Range**: 0 - 32 (**Nonce Length(s)**: 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 **(Tag Length(s)**: 4 6 8 10 12 14 16)<p>AES [validation number 2197][aes-2197]<p>**CMAC** (Generation/Verification) **(KS: 128;** Block Size(s); **Msg Len(s)** Min: 0 Max: 2^16; **Tag Len(s)** Min: 16 Max: 16) **(KS: 192**; Block Size(s); **Msg Len(s)** Min: 0 Max: 2^16; **Tag Len(s)** Min: 16 Max: 16) **(KS: 256**; Block Size(s); **Msg Len(s)** Min: 0 Max: 2^16; **Tag Len(s)** Min: 16 Max: 16)<p>AES [validation number 2197][aes-2197]<p>**GCM(KS: AES_128**(e/d) Tag Length(s): 128 120 112 104 96) **(KS: AES_192**(e/d) Tag Length(s): 128 120 112 104 96)<p>**(KS: AES_256**(e/d) Tag Length(s): 128 120 112 104 96)<p>**IV Generated:** (Externally); **PT Lengths Tested:** (0, 128, 1024, 8, 1016); **Additional authenticated data lengths tested:** (0, 128, 1024, 8, 1016); **IV Lengths Tested:** (8, 1024); **96 bit IV supported<p>GMAC supported**|Windows 8, Windows RT, Windows Server 2012, Surface Windows RT, Surface Windows 8 Pro, and Windows Phone 8 Cryptography Next Generation (CNG) Implementations [#2216][aes-2216]|
|
||||
|**CCM (KS: 256) (Assoc. Data Len Range: **0 - 0, 2^16**) (Payload Length Range:** 0 - 32 (**Nonce Length(s)**: 12 **(Tag Length(s)**: 16)<p>AES [validation number 2196][aes-2196]|Windows 8, Windows RT, Windows Server 2012, Surface Windows RT, Surface Windows 8 Pro, and Windows Phone 8 BitLocker® Cryptographic Implementations [#2198][aes-2198]|
|
||||
|**CCM (KS: 256) (Assoc. Data Len Range: **0 - 0, 2^16**) (Payload Length Range:** 0 - 32 (**Nonce Length(s)**: 12 **(Tag Length(s)**: 16)<p>AES [validation number 2196][aes-2196]|Windows 8, Windows RT, Windows Server 2012, Surface Windows RT, Surface Windows 8 Pro, and Windows Phone 8 BitLocker® Cryptographic Implementations [#2198][aes-2198]|
|
||||
|**ECB** (e/d; 128, 192, 256);<p>**CBC** (e/d; 128, 192, 256);<p>**CFB8** (e/d; 128, 192, 256);<p>**CFB128** (e/d; 128, 192, 256);<p>**CTR** (int only; 128, 192, 256)|Windows 8, Windows RT, Windows Server 2012, Surface Windows RT, Surface Windows 8 Pro, and Windows Phone 8 Next Generation Symmetric Cryptographic Algorithms Implementations (SYMCRYPT) [#2197][aes-2197]|
|
||||
|**ECB** (e/d; 128, 192, 256);<p>**CBC** (e/d; 128, 192, 256);<p>**CFB8** (e/d; 128, 192, 256);|Windows 8, Windows RT, Windows Server 2012, Surface Windows RT, Surface Windows 8 Pro, and Windows Phone 8 Symmetric Algorithm Implementations (RSA32) [#2196][aes-2196]|
|
||||
|**CCM (KS: 128, 192, 256) (Assoc. Data Len Range: **0 - 0, 2^16**) (Payload Length Range:** 0 - 32 **(Nonce Length(s):** 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 **(Tag Length(s): **4 6 8 10 12 14 16**)**<p>AES [validation number 1168][aes-1168]|Windows Server 2008 R2 and SP1 CNG algorithms [#1187][aes-1187]<p>Windows 7 Ultimate and SP1 CNG algorithms [#1178][aes-1178]|
|
||||
@ -842,7 +843,7 @@ For more details, expand each algorithm section.
|
||||
|<p> **HMAC-SHA1** (Key Sizes Ranges Tested: KSBS)<br>SHS[validation number 2886][shs-2886]<p> **HMAC-SHA256** (Key Size Ranges Tested: KSBS)<br>SHS[validation number 2886][shs-2886]<p> **HMAC-SHA384** (Key Size Ranges Tested: KSBS)<br>[ SHSvalidation number 2886][shs-2886]<p> **HMAC-SHA512** (Key Size Ranges Tested: KSBS)<br>SHS[validation number 2886][shs-2886]|Microsoft Windows 10, Microsoft Surface Pro 3 with Windows 10, Microsoft Surface 3 with Windows 10, Microsoft Surface Pro 2 with Windows 10, Microsoft Surface Pro with Windows 10 SymCrypt Cryptographic Implementations [#2233][hmac-2233]<p>Version 10.0.10240|
|
||||
|<p> **HMAC-SHA1** (Key Sizes Ranges Tested: KSBS)<br>SHS [validation number 2373][shs-2373]<p> **HMAC-SHA256** (Key Size Ranges Tested: KSBS)<br>SHS [validation number 2373][shs-2373]<p> **HMAC-SHA384** (Key Size Ranges Tested: KSBS)<br>SHS [validation number 2373][shs-2373]<p> **HMAC-SHA512** (Key Size Ranges Tested: KSBS)<br>SHS [validation number 2373][shs-2373]|Windows Storage Server 2012 R2, Microsoft Windows RT 8.1, Microsoft Surface with Windows RT 8.1, Microsoft Surface Pro with Windows 8.1, Microsoft Surface 2, Microsoft Surface Pro 2, Microsoft Surface Pro 3, Microsoft Windows Phone 8.1, Microsoft Windows Embedded 8.1 Industry, and Microsoft StorSimple 8100 SymCrypt Cryptographic Implementations [#1773][hmac-1773]<p>Version 6.3.9600|
|
||||
|<p> **HMAC-SHA1** (Key Sizes Ranges Tested: KSBS) SHS [validation number 2764][shs-2764]<p> **HMAC-SHA256** (Key Size Ranges Tested: KSBS) SHS [validation number 2764][shs-2764]<p> **HMAC-SHA384** (Key Size Ranges Tested: KSBS) SHS [validation number 2764][shs-2764]<p> **HMAC-SHA512** (Key Size Ranges Tested: KSBS) SHS [validation number 2764][shs-2764]|Windows CE and Windows Mobile, and Windows Embedded Handheld Enhanced Cryptographic Provider (RSAENH) [#2122][hmac-2122]<p>Version 5.2.29344|
|
||||
|<p> **HMAC-SHA1 (Key Sizes Ranges Tested: KS**[#1902][shs-1902]<p> **HMAC-SHA256 (Key Size Ranges Tested: KS**[#1902][shs-1902]|Windows 8, Windows RT, Windows Server 2012, Surface Windows RT, Surface Windows 8 Pro, and Windows Phone 8 BitLocker® Cryptographic Implementations #[1347][hmac-1347]|
|
||||
|<p> **HMAC-SHA1 (Key Sizes Ranges Tested: KS**[#1902][shs-1902]<p> **HMAC-SHA256 (Key Size Ranges Tested: KS**[#1902][shs-1902]|Windows 8, Windows RT, Windows Server 2012, Surface Windows RT, Surface Windows 8 Pro, and Windows Phone 8 BitLocker® Cryptographic Implementations #[1347][hmac-1347]|
|
||||
|<p> **HMAC-SHA1 (Key Sizes Ranges Tested: KSBS) SHS**[#1902][shs-1902]<p> **HMAC-SHA256 (Key Size Ranges Tested: KSBS) SHS**[#1902][shs-1902]<p> **HMAC-SHA384 (Key Size Ranges Tested: KSBS) SHS**[#1902][shs-1902]<p> **HMAC-SHA512 (Key Size Ranges Tested: KSBS) SHS**[#1902][shs-1902]|Windows 8, Windows RT, Windows Server 2012, Surface Windows RT, Surface Windows 8 Pro, and Windows Phone 8 Enhanced Cryptographic Provider (RSAENH) #[1346][hmac-1346]|
|
||||
|<p> **HMAC-SHA1 (Key Sizes Ranges Tested: KSBS)**<br>**SHS**[#1903][shs-1903]<p> **HMAC-SHA256 (Key Size Ranges Tested: KSBS)**<br>**SHS**[#1903][shs-1903]<p> **HMAC-SHA384 (Key Size Ranges Tested: KSBS)**<br>**SHS**[#1903][shs-1903]<p> **HMAC-SHA512 (Key Size Ranges Tested: KSBS)**<br>**SHS**[#1903][shs-1903]|Windows 8, Windows RT, Windows Server 2012, Surface Windows RT, Surface Windows 8 Pro, and Windows Phone 8 Next Generation Symmetric Cryptographic Algorithms Implementations (SYMCRYPT) #[1345][hmac-1345]|
|
||||
|<p> **HMAC-SHA1 (Key Sizes Ranges Tested: KSBS) SHS** [validation number 1773][shs-1773]<p> **HMAC-SHA256 (Key Size Ranges Tested: KSBS) SHS** [validation number 1773][shs-1773]<br>**Tinker HMAC-SHA384 (Key Size Ranges Tested: KSBS) SHS** [validation number 1773][shs-1773]<p> **HMAC-SHA512 (Key Size Ranges Tested: KSBS) SHS** [validation number 1773][shs-1773]|Windows Embedded Compact 7 Cryptographic Primitives Library (bcrypt.dll), [#1364][hmac-1364]|
|
||||
|
||||
@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ ms.custom: asr
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier2
|
||||
ms.topic: how-to
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ ms.custom: asr
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier2
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ manager: aaroncz
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
adobe-target: true
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- tier2
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
ms.date: 12/31/2017
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ manager: aaroncz
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 08/16/2021
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
|
||||
**Applies to**
|
||||
- Windows 11
|
||||
- Windows 10
|
||||
- Windows 10
|
||||
|
||||
Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for the **Account lockout duration** security policy setting.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -47,7 +48,7 @@ It's advisable to set **Account lockout duration** to approximately 15 minutes.
|
||||
|
||||
### Default values
|
||||
|
||||
The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Default values are also listed on the policy’s property page.
|
||||
The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Default values are also listed on the policy's property page.
|
||||
|
||||
| Server type or Group Policy Object (GPO) | Default value |
|
||||
| - | - |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ manager: aaroncz
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 11/02/2018
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
@ -34,7 +35,7 @@ The **Account lockout threshold** policy setting determines the number of failed
|
||||
Brute force password attacks can be automated to try thousands or even millions of password combinations for any or all user accounts. Limiting the number of failed sign-ins that can be performed nearly eliminates the effectiveness of such attacks.
|
||||
However, it's important to note that a denial-of-service (DoS) attack could be performed on a domain that has an account lockout threshold configured. A malicious user could programmatically attempt a series of password attacks against all users in the organization. If the number of attempts is greater than the value of **Account lockout threshold**, the attacker could potentially lock every account.
|
||||
|
||||
Failed attempts to unlock a workstation can cause account lockout even if the [Interactive logon: Require Domain Controller authentication to unlock workstation](interactive-logon-require-domain-controller-authentication-to-unlock-workstation.md) security option is disabled. Windows doesn’t need to contact a domain controller for an unlock if you enter the same password that you logged on with, but if you enter a different password, Windows has to contact a domain controller in case you had changed your password from another machine.
|
||||
Failed attempts to unlock a workstation can cause account lockout even if the [Interactive logon: Require Domain Controller authentication to unlock workstation](interactive-logon-require-domain-controller-authentication-to-unlock-workstation.md) security option is disabled. Windows doesn't need to contact a domain controller for an unlock if you enter the same password that you logged on with, but if you enter a different password, Windows has to contact a domain controller in case you had changed your password from another machine.
|
||||
|
||||
### Possible values
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ manager: aaroncz
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 04/19/2017
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ manager: aaroncz
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 09/18/2018
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
@ -29,7 +30,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, management, and security conside
|
||||
|
||||
## Reference
|
||||
|
||||
Beginning with Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8, Windows detects user-input inactivity of a sign-in (logon) session by using the security policy setting **Interactive logon: Machine inactivity limit**. If the amount of inactive time exceeds the inactivity limit set by this policy, then the user’s session locks by invoking the screen saver (screen saver should be active on the destination machine). You can activate the screen saver by enabling the Group Policy **User Configuration\Administrative Templates\Control Panel\Personalization\Enable screen saver**. This policy setting allows you to control the locking time by using Group Policy.
|
||||
Beginning with Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8, Windows detects user-input inactivity of a sign-in (logon) session by using the security policy setting **Interactive logon: Machine inactivity limit**. If the amount of inactive time exceeds the inactivity limit set by this policy, then the user's session locks by invoking the screen saver (screen saver should be active on the destination machine). You can activate the screen saver by enabling the Group Policy **User Configuration\Administrative Templates\Control Panel\Personalization\Enable screen saver**. This policy setting allows you to control the locking time by using Group Policy.
|
||||
|
||||
> [!NOTE]
|
||||
> If the **Interactive logon: Machine inactivity limit** security policy setting is configured, the device locks not only when inactive time exceeds the inactivity limit, but also when the screensaver activates or when the display turns off because of power settings.
|
||||
@ -42,7 +43,7 @@ If **Machine will be locked after** is set to zero (0) or has no value (blank),
|
||||
|
||||
### Best practices
|
||||
|
||||
Set the time for elapsed user-input inactivity based on the device’s usage and location requirements. For example, if the device or device is in a public area, you might want to have the device automatically lock after a short period of inactivity to prevent unauthorized access. However, if the device is used by an individual or group of trusted individuals, such as in a restricted manufacturing area, automatically locking the device might hinder productivity.
|
||||
Set the time for elapsed user-input inactivity based on the device's usage and location requirements. For example, if the device or device is in a public area, you might want to have the device automatically lock after a short period of inactivity to prevent unauthorized access. However, if the device is used by an individual or group of trusted individuals, such as in a restricted manufacturing area, automatically locking the device might hinder productivity.
|
||||
|
||||
### Location
|
||||
|
||||
@ -52,7 +53,7 @@ Computer Configuration\\Policies\\Windows Settings\\Security Settings\\Local Pol
|
||||
|
||||
### Default values
|
||||
|
||||
The following table lists the actual and effective default values for this policy. Default values are also listed on the policy’s property page.
|
||||
The following table lists the actual and effective default values for this policy. Default values are also listed on the policy's property page.
|
||||
|
||||
| Server type or GPO | Default value |
|
||||
| - | - |
|
||||
@ -85,7 +86,7 @@ This policy setting helps you prevent unauthorized access to devices under your
|
||||
|
||||
### Countermeasure
|
||||
|
||||
Set the time for elapsed user-input inactivity time by using the security policy setting **Interactive logon: Machine inactivity limit** based on the device’s usage and location requirements.
|
||||
Set the time for elapsed user-input inactivity time by using the security policy setting **Interactive logon: Machine inactivity limit** based on the device's usage and location requirements.
|
||||
|
||||
### Potential impact
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ manager: aaroncz
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 04/19/2017
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ manager: aaroncz
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 03/30/2022
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
@ -50,7 +51,7 @@ In addition, requiring long passwords can actually decrease the security of an o
|
||||
|
||||
### Default values
|
||||
|
||||
The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Default values are also listed on the policy’s property page.
|
||||
The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Default values are also listed on the policy's property page.
|
||||
|
||||
| Server type or Group Policy Object (GPO) | Default value |
|
||||
| - | - |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ ms.reviewer:
|
||||
manager: aaroncz
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ author: vinaypamnani-msft
|
||||
manager: aaroncz
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 04/19/2017
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ manager: aaroncz
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 04/19/2017
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
@ -75,7 +76,7 @@ HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\LmCompatibilityLevel
|
||||
|
||||
### Default values
|
||||
|
||||
The following table lists the actual and effective default values for this policy. Default values are also listed on the policy’s property page.
|
||||
The following table lists the actual and effective default values for this policy. Default values are also listed on the policy's property page.
|
||||
|
||||
| Server type or GPO | Default value |
|
||||
| - | - |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ manager: aaroncz
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
ms.date: 12/31/2017
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ manager: aaroncz
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 04/19/2017
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ manager: aaroncz
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 04/19/2017
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ manager: aaroncz
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 12/16/2021
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ manager: aaroncz
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 10/16/2017
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
|
||||
@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ ms.localizationpriority: medium
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
author: jgeurten
|
||||
ms.reviewer: jsuther
|
||||
ms.author: vinpa
|
||||
|
||||
@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ ms.localizationpriority: medium
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
author: vinaypamnani-msft
|
||||
ms.reviewer: isbrahm
|
||||
ms.author: vinpa
|
||||
@ -38,7 +39,7 @@ In most organizations, information is the most valuable asset, and ensuring that
|
||||
|
||||
Application control can help mitigate these types of security threats by restricting the applications that users are allowed to run and the code that runs in the System Core (kernel). Application control policies can also block unsigned scripts and MSIs, and restrict Windows PowerShell to run in [Constrained Language Mode](/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_language_modes).
|
||||
|
||||
Application control is a crucial line of defense for protecting enterprises given today’s threat landscape, and it has an inherent advantage over traditional antivirus solutions. Specifically, application control moves away from an application trust model where all applications are assumed trustworthy to one where applications must earn trust in order to run. Many organizations, like the Australian Signals Directorate, understand the significance of application control and frequently cite application control as one of the most effective means for addressing the threat of executable file-based malware (.exe, .dll, etc.).
|
||||
Application control is a crucial line of defense for protecting enterprises given today's threat landscape, and it has an inherent advantage over traditional antivirus solutions. Specifically, application control moves away from an application trust model where all applications are assumed trustworthy to one where applications must earn trust in order to run. Many organizations, like the Australian Signals Directorate, understand the significance of application control and frequently cite application control as one of the most effective means for addressing the threat of executable file-based malware (.exe, .dll, etc.).
|
||||
|
||||
> [!NOTE]
|
||||
> Although application control can significantly harden your computers against malicious code, we recommend that you continue to maintain an enterprise antivirus solution for a well-rounded enterprise security portfolio.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ manager: aaroncz
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier2
|
||||
ms.date: 12/31/2017
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ manager: aaroncz
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 09/07/2021
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ manager: aaroncz
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
appliesto:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ manager: aaroncz
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 09/07/2021
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ manager: aaroncz
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 09/07/2021
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
@ -51,11 +52,13 @@ This topic describes how to create a standard port rule for a specified protocol
|
||||
|
||||
4. On the **Rule Type** page of the New Inbound Rule Wizard, click **Custom**, and then click **Next**.
|
||||
|
||||
>**Note:** Although you can create rules by selecting **Program** or **Port**, those choices limit the number of pages presented by the wizard. If you select **Custom**, you see all of the pages, and have the most flexibility in creating your rules.
|
||||
> [!Note]
|
||||
> Although you can create rules by selecting **Program** or **Port**, those choices limit the number of pages presented by the wizard. If you select **Custom**, you see all of the pages, and have the most flexibility in creating your rules.
|
||||
|
||||
5. On the **Program** page, click **All programs**, and then click **Next**.
|
||||
|
||||
>**Note:** This type of rule is often combined with a program or service rule. If you combine the rule types, you get a firewall rule that limits traffic to a specified port and allows the traffic only when the specified program is running. The specified program cannot receive network traffic on other ports, and other programs cannot receive network traffic on the specified port. If you choose to do this, follow the steps in the [Create an Inbound Program or Service Rule](create-an-inbound-program-or-service-rule.md) procedure in addition to the steps in this procedure to create a single rule that filters network traffic using both program and port criteria.
|
||||
> [!Note]
|
||||
> This type of rule is often combined with a program or service rule. If you combine the rule types, you get a firewall rule that limits traffic to a specified port and allows the traffic only when the specified program is running. The specified program cannot receive network traffic on other ports, and other programs cannot receive network traffic on the specified port. If you choose to do this, follow the steps in the [Create an Inbound Program or Service Rule](create-an-inbound-program-or-service-rule.md) procedure in addition to the steps in this procedure to create a single rule that filters network traffic using both program and port criteria.
|
||||
|
||||
6. On the **Protocol and Ports** page, select the protocol type that you want to allow. To restrict the rule to a specified port number, you must select either **TCP** or **UDP**. Because this is an incoming rule, you typically configure only the local port number.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -71,6 +74,7 @@ This topic describes how to create a standard port rule for a specified protocol
|
||||
|
||||
9. On the **Profile** page, select the network location types to which this rule applies, and then click **Next**.
|
||||
|
||||
>**Note:** If this GPO is targeted at server computers running Windows Server 2008 that never move, consider modifying the rules to apply to all network location type profiles. This prevents an unexpected change in the applied rules if the network location type changes due to the installation of a new network card or the disconnection of an existing network card’s cable. A disconnected network card is automatically assigned to the Public network location type.
|
||||
> [!Note]
|
||||
> If this GPO is targeted at server computers running Windows Server 2008 that never move, consider modifying the rules to apply to all network location type profiles. This prevents an unexpected change in the applied rules if the network location type changes due to the installation of a new network card or the disconnection of an existing network card's cable. A disconnected network card is automatically assigned to the Public network location type.
|
||||
|
||||
10. On the **Name** page, type a name and description for your rule, and then click **Finish**.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ author: paolomatarazzo
|
||||
manager: aaroncz
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 09/07/2021
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
|
||||
@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ author: paolomatarazzo
|
||||
manager: aaroncz
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 09/08/2021
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
|
||||
@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ ms.author: paoloma
|
||||
manager: aaroncz
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 09/08/2021
|
||||
ms.reviewer: jekrynit
|
||||
@ -36,7 +37,7 @@ The Windows Defender Firewall with Advanced Security MMC snap-in is more flexibl
|
||||
|
||||
## Feature description
|
||||
|
||||
Windows Defender Firewall with Advanced Security is an important part of a layered security model. By providing host-based, two-way network traffic filtering for a device, Windows Defender Firewall blocks unauthorized network traffic flowing into or out of the local device. Windows Defender Firewall also works with Network Awareness so that it can apply security settings appropriate to the types of networks to which the device is connected. Windows Defender Firewall and Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) configuration settings are integrated into a single Microsoft Management Console (MMC) named Windows Defender Firewall, so Windows Defender Firewall is also an important part of your network’s isolation strategy.
|
||||
Windows Defender Firewall with Advanced Security is an important part of a layered security model. By providing host-based, two-way network traffic filtering for a device, Windows Defender Firewall blocks unauthorized network traffic flowing into or out of the local device. Windows Defender Firewall also works with Network Awareness so that it can apply security settings appropriate to the types of networks to which the device is connected. Windows Defender Firewall and Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) configuration settings are integrated into a single Microsoft Management Console (MMC) named Windows Defender Firewall, so Windows Defender Firewall is also an important part of your network's isolation strategy.
|
||||
|
||||
## Practical applications
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ ms.localizationpriority: medium
|
||||
ms.date: 11/4/2022
|
||||
ms.reviewer: paoloma
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Common Criteria certifications
|
||||
|
||||
@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ ms.author: vinpa
|
||||
manager: aaroncz
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier2
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
ms.date: 6/30/2022
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
|
||||
@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ ms.author: vinpa
|
||||
manager: aaroncz
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier2
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
ms.date: 6/30/2022
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
|
||||
@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ author: vinaypamnani-msft
|
||||
manager: aaroncz
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 02/14/2022
|
||||
ms.reviewer: rmunck
|
||||
@ -20,7 +21,7 @@ ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
|
||||
The Security Compliance Toolkit (SCT) is a set of tools that allows enterprise security administrators to download, analyze, test, edit, and store Microsoft-recommended security configuration baselines for Windows and other Microsoft products.
|
||||
|
||||
The SCT enables administrators to effectively manage their enterprise’s Group Policy Objects (GPOs). Using the toolkit, administrators can compare their current GPOs with Microsoft-recommended GPO baselines or other baselines, edit them, store them in GPO backup file format, and apply them broadly through Active Directory or individually through local policy.
|
||||
The SCT enables administrators to effectively manage their enterprise's Group Policy Objects (GPOs). Using the toolkit, administrators can compare their current GPOs with Microsoft-recommended GPO baselines or other baselines, edit them, store them in GPO backup file format, and apply them broadly through Active Directory or individually through local policy.
|
||||
<p></p>
|
||||
|
||||
The Security Compliance Toolkit consists of:
|
||||
@ -74,9 +75,9 @@ More information on the Policy Analyzer tool can be found on the [Microsoft Secu
|
||||
|
||||
LGPO.exe is a command-line utility that is designed to help automate management of Local Group Policy.
|
||||
Using local policy gives administrators a simple way to verify the effects of Group Policy settings, and is also useful for managing non-domain-joined systems.
|
||||
LGPO.exe can import and apply settings from Registry Policy (Registry.pol) files, security templates, Advanced Auditing backup files, and from formatted “LGPO text” files.
|
||||
LGPO.exe can import and apply settings from Registry Policy (Registry.pol) files, security templates, Advanced Auditing backup files, and from formatted "LGPO text" files.
|
||||
It can export local policy to a GPO backup.
|
||||
It can export the contents of a Registry Policy file to the “LGPO text” format that can then be edited, and can build a Registry Policy file from an LGPO text file.
|
||||
It can export the contents of a Registry Policy file to the "LGPO text" format that can then be edited, and can build a Registry Policy file from an LGPO text file.
|
||||
|
||||
Documentation for the LGPO tool can be found on the [Microsoft Security Guidance blog](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-security-baselines/new-amp-updated-security-tools/ba-p/1631613) or by [downloading the tool](https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=55319).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ author: vinaypamnani-msft
|
||||
manager: aaroncz
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
- highpri
|
||||
- tier3
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 01/26/2022
|
||||
ms.reviewer: jmunck
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: Secure Boot and Trusted Boot
|
||||
description: Trusted Boot prevents corrupted components from loading during the boot-up process in Windows 11
|
||||
search.appverid: MET150
|
||||
author: vinaypamnani-msft
|
||||
ms.author: vinpa
|
||||
manager: aaroncz
|
||||
@ -9,9 +8,6 @@ ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 09/21/2021
|
||||
ms.prod: windows-client
|
||||
ms.technology: itpro-security
|
||||
ms.localizationpriority: medium
|
||||
ms.collection:
|
||||
ms.custom:
|
||||
ms.reviewer: jsuther
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
@ -25,11 +21,11 @@ Secure Boot and Trusted Boot help prevent malware and corrupted components from
|
||||
|
||||
The first step in protecting the operating system is to ensure that it boots securely after the initial hardware and firmware boot sequences have safely finished their early boot sequences. Secure Boot makes a safe and trusted path from the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) through the Windows kernel's Trusted Boot sequence. Malware attacks on the Windows boot sequence are blocked by the signature-enforcement handshakes throughout the boot sequence between the UEFI, bootloader, kernel, and application environments.
|
||||
|
||||
As the PC begins the boot process, it will first verify that the firmware is digitally signed, reducing the risk of firmware rootkits. Secure Boot then checks all code that runs before the operating system and checks the OS bootloader’s digital signature to ensure that it's trusted by the Secure Boot policy and hasn’t been tampered with.
|
||||
As the PC begins the boot process, it will first verify that the firmware is digitally signed, reducing the risk of firmware rootkits. Secure Boot then checks all code that runs before the operating system and checks the OS bootloader's digital signature to ensure that it's trusted by the Secure Boot policy and hasn't been tampered with.
|
||||
|
||||
## Trusted Boot
|
||||
|
||||
Trusted Boot picks up the process that started with Secure Boot. The Windows bootloader verifies the digital signature of the Windows kernel before loading it. The Windows kernel, in turn, verifies every other component of the Windows startup process, including boot drivers, startup files, and your antimalware product’s early-launch antimalware (ELAM) driver. If any of these files were tampered, the bootloader detects the problem and refuses to load the corrupted component. Tampering or malware attacks on the Windows boot sequence are blocked by the signature-enforcement handshakes between the UEFI, bootloader, kernel, and application environments.
|
||||
Trusted Boot picks up the process that started with Secure Boot. The Windows bootloader verifies the digital signature of the Windows kernel before loading it. The Windows kernel, in turn, verifies every other component of the Windows startup process, including boot drivers, startup files, and your antimalware product's early-launch antimalware (ELAM) driver. If any of these files were tampered, the bootloader detects the problem and refuses to load the corrupted component. Tampering or malware attacks on the Windows boot sequence are blocked by the signature-enforcement handshakes between the UEFI, bootloader, kernel, and application environments.
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Often, Windows can automatically repair the corrupted component, restoring the integrity of Windows and allowing the Windows 11 device to start normally.
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user