diff --git a/windows/deployment/TOC.yml b/windows/deployment/TOC.yml index ce71f48060..88851f15ff 100644 --- a/windows/deployment/TOC.yml +++ b/windows/deployment/TOC.yml @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ - name: Plan items: - name: Plan for Windows 11 - href: /windows/whats-new/windows-11-plan?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json + href: /windows/whats-new/windows-11-plan?context=/windows/deployment/context/context - name: Create a deployment plan href: update/create-deployment-plan.md - name: Define readiness criteria @@ -41,12 +41,12 @@ - name: Define your servicing strategy href: update/plan-define-strategy.md - name: Delivery Optimization for Windows client updates - href: do/waas-delivery-optimization.md?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json + href: do/waas-delivery-optimization.md?context=/windows/deployment/context/context items: - name: Using a proxy with Delivery Optimization - href: do/delivery-optimization-proxy.md?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json + href: do/delivery-optimization-proxy.md?context=/windows/deployment/context/context - name: Delivery Optimization client-service communication - href: do/delivery-optimization-workflow.md?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json + href: do/delivery-optimization-workflow.md?context=/windows/deployment/context/context - name: Windows 10 deployment considerations href: planning/windows-10-deployment-considerations.md - name: Windows 10 infrastructure requirements @@ -56,17 +56,17 @@ - name: Features removed or planned for replacement items: - name: Windows client features lifecycle - href: /windows/whats-new/feature-lifecycle?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json + href: /windows/whats-new/feature-lifecycle?context=/windows/deployment/context/context - name: Deprecated features - href: /windows/whats-new/deprecated-features?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json + href: /windows/whats-new/deprecated-features?context=/windows/deployment/context/context - name: Resources for deprecated features - href: /windows/whats-new/deprecated-features-resources?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json + href: /windows/whats-new/deprecated-features-resources?context=/windows/deployment/context/context - name: Removed features - href: /windows/whats-new/removed-features?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json + href: /windows/whats-new/removed-features?context=/windows/deployment/context/context - name: Prepare items: - name: Prepare for Windows 11 - href: /windows/whats-new/windows-11-prepare?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json + href: /windows/whats-new/windows-11-prepare?context=/windows/deployment/context/context - name: Prepare to deploy Windows client updates href: update/prepare-deploy-windows.md - name: Evaluate and update infrastructure @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ - name: Update Baseline href: update/update-baseline.md - name: Set up Delivery Optimization for Windows client updates - href: do/waas-delivery-optimization-setup.md?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json + href: do/waas-delivery-optimization-setup.md?context=/windows/deployment/context/context - name: Configure BranchCache for Windows client updates href: update/waas-branchcache.md - name: Prepare for deployment with Configuration Manager @@ -324,25 +324,25 @@ - name: Resolve Windows upgrade errors href: upgrade/resolve-windows-upgrade-errors.md - name: Quick fixes - href: /troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/windows-10-upgrade-quick-fixes?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json + href: /troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/windows-10-upgrade-quick-fixes?context=/windows/deployment/context/context - name: SetupDiag href: upgrade/setupdiag.md - name: Troubleshooting upgrade errors - href: /troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/windows-10-upgrade-issues-troubleshooting?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json + href: /troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/windows-10-upgrade-issues-troubleshooting?context=/windows/deployment/context/context - name: Windows error reporting href: upgrade/windows-error-reporting.md - name: Upgrade error codes - href: /troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/windows-10-upgrade-error-codes?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json + href: /troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/windows-10-upgrade-error-codes?context=/windows/deployment/context/context - name: Log files href: upgrade/log-files.md - name: Resolution procedures - href: /troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/windows-10-upgrade-resolution-procedures?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json + href: /troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/windows-10-upgrade-resolution-procedures?context=/windows/deployment/context/context - name: Submit Windows client upgrade errors href: upgrade/submit-errors.md - name: Troubleshoot Windows Update items: - name: How to troubleshoot Windows Update - href: /troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/windows-update-issues-troubleshooting?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json + href: /troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/windows-update-issues-troubleshooting?context=/windows/deployment/context/context - name: Opt out of safeguard holds href: update/safeguard-opt-out.md - name: Determine the source of Windows Updates @@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ - name: Windows Update security href: ./update/windows-update-security.md - name: Common Windows Update errors - href: /troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/common-windows-update-errors?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json + href: /troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/common-windows-update-errors?context=/windows/deployment/context/context - name: Windows Update error code reference href: update/windows-update-error-reference.md - name: Troubleshoot the Windows Update for Business deployment service @@ -371,13 +371,13 @@ - name: Servicing stack updates href: update/servicing-stack-updates.md - name: Update CSP policies - href: /windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-update?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json + href: /windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-update?context=/windows/deployment/context/context - name: Additional Windows Update settings href: update/waas-wu-settings.md - name: Update other Microsoft products href: update/update-other-microsoft-products.md - name: Delivery Optimization reference - href: do/waas-delivery-optimization-reference.md?toc=/windows/deployment/toc.json&bc=/windows/deployment/breadcrumb/toc.json + href: do/waas-delivery-optimization-reference.md?context=/windows/deployment/context/context - name: FoD and language packs for WSUS and Configuration Manager href: update/fod-and-lang-packs.md - name: Windows client in S mode diff --git a/windows/security/hardware-security/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md b/windows/security/hardware-security/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md index 1ef34f786a..a5cd24d3c9 100644 --- a/windows/security/hardware-security/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md +++ b/windows/security/hardware-security/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ title: Enable memory integrity description: This article explains the steps to opt in to using memory integrity on Windows devices. ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 03/26/2024 +ms.date: 07/10/2024 appliesto: - "✅ Windows 11" - "✅ Windows 10" diff --git a/windows/security/hardware-security/how-hardware-based-root-of-trust-helps-protect-windows.md b/windows/security/hardware-security/how-hardware-based-root-of-trust-helps-protect-windows.md index e68ce7f0d5..54f9cc0237 100644 --- a/windows/security/hardware-security/how-hardware-based-root-of-trust-helps-protect-windows.md +++ b/windows/security/hardware-security/how-hardware-based-root-of-trust-helps-protect-windows.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ title: How System Guard helps protect Windows description: Learn how System Guard reorganizes the existing Windows system integrity features under one roof. ms.localizationpriority: medium -ms.date: 01/16/2024 +ms.date: 07/10/2024 ms.topic: conceptual --- @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Also, a bug fix for UEFI code can take a long time to design, build, retest, val ### Secure Launch—the Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (DRTM) -[System Guard Secure Launch](system-guard-secure-launch-and-smm-protection.md), first introduced in Windows 10 version 1809, aims to alleviate these issues by leveraging a technology known as the Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (DRTM). DRTM lets the system freely boot into untrusted code initially, but shortly after launches the system into a trusted state by taking control of all CPUs and forcing them down a well-known and measured code path. This has the benefit of allowing untrusted early UEFI code to boot the system, but then being able to securely transition into a trusted and measured state. +[System Guard Secure Launch](system-guard-secure-launch-and-smm-protection.md), first introduced in Windows 10 version 1809, aims to alleviate these issues by using a technology known as the Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (DRTM). DRTM lets the system freely boot into untrusted code initially, but shortly after launches the system into a trusted state by taking control of all CPUs and forcing them down a well-known and measured code path. This has the benefit of allowing untrusted early UEFI code to boot the system, but then being able to securely transition into a trusted and measured state. ![System Guard Secure Launch.](images/system-guard-secure-launch.png) @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ Secure Launch simplifies management of SRTM measurements because the launch code ### System Management Mode (SMM) protection -System Management Mode (SMM) is a special-purpose CPU mode in x86 microcontrollers that handles power management, hardware configuration, thermal monitoring, and anything else the manufacturer deems useful. Whenever one of these system operations is requested, a non-maskable interrupt (SMI) is invoked at runtime, which executes SMM code installed by the BIOS. SMM code executes in the highest privilege level and is invisible to the OS, which makes it an attractive target for malicious activity. Even if System Guard Secure Launch is used to late launch, SMM code can potentially access hypervisor memory and change the hypervisor. +System Management Mode (SMM) is a special-purpose CPU mode in x86 microcontrollers that handles power management, hardware configuration, thermal monitoring, and anything else the manufacturer deems useful. Whenever one of these system operations is requested, a nonmaskable interrupt (SMI) is invoked at runtime, which executes SMM code installed by the BIOS. SMM code executes in the highest privilege level and is invisible to the OS, which makes it an attractive target for malicious activity. Even if System Guard Secure Launch is used to late launch, SMM code can potentially access hypervisor memory and change the hypervisor. To defend against this, two techniques are used: @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ This feature is available for the following processors: |AUX Policy|The required AUX policy must be as follows: | |TPM NV Index|Platform firmware must set up a TPM NV index for use by the OS with: | |Platform firmware|Platform firmware must carry all code required to execute an Intel® Trusted Execution Technology secure launch: | -|Platform firmware update|System firmware is recommended to be updated via UpdateCapsule in Windows Update. | +|Platform firmware update|It's recommended to update System firmware via UpdateCapsule in Windows Update. | ### Requirements for AMD® processors starting with Zen2 or later silicon @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ This feature is available for the following processors: |Modern/Connected Standby|Platforms must support Modern/Connected Standby.| |TPM NV Index|Platform firmware must set up a TPM NV index for use by the OS with: | |Platform firmware|Platform firmware must carry all code required to execute Secure Launch:
Platform must have AMD® Secure Processor Firmware Anti-Rollback protection enabled
Platform must have AMD® Memory Guard enabled.| -|Platform firmware update|System firmware is recommended to be updated via UpdateCapsule in Windows Update. | +|Platform firmware update|It's recommended to update System firmware via UpdateCapsule in Windows Update. | ### Requirements for Qualcomm® processors with SD850 or later chipsets @@ -112,4 +112,4 @@ This feature is available for the following processors: |Monitor Mode Page Tables|All Monitor Mode page tables must: | |Modern/Connected Standby|Platforms must support Modern/Connected Standby.| |Platform firmware|Platform firmware must carry all code required to launch.| -|Platform firmware update|System firmware is recommended to be updated via UpdateCapsule in Windows Update. | +|Platform firmware update|It's recommended to update System firmware via UpdateCapsule in Windows Update. | diff --git a/windows/security/hardware-security/index.md b/windows/security/hardware-security/index.md index dbe8b6153f..e8cfb27d50 100644 --- a/windows/security/hardware-security/index.md +++ b/windows/security/hardware-security/index.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ --- title: Windows hardware security description: Learn more about hardware security features support in Windows. -ms.date: 07/28/2023 +ms.date: 07/10/2024 ms.topic: overview appliesto: --- diff --git a/windows/security/hardware-security/kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt.md b/windows/security/hardware-security/kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt.md index 6b5201c81c..d010c70d1c 100644 --- a/windows/security/hardware-security/kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt.md +++ b/windows/security/hardware-security/kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Learn how Kernel DMA Protection protects Windows devices against dr ms.collection: - tier1 ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 01/09/2024 +ms.date: 07/10/2024 --- # Kernel DMA Protection @@ -20,16 +20,16 @@ Drive-by DMA attacks are attacks that occur while the owner of the system isn't ## How Windows protects against DMA drive-by attacks -Windows uses the system *Input/Output Memory Management Unit (IOMMU)* to block external peripherals from starting and performing DMA, unless the drivers for these peripherals support memory isolation (such as DMA-remapping). Peripherals with [DMA Remapping compatible drivers][LINK-1] will be automatically enumerated, started, and allowed to perform DMA to their assigned memory regions. +Windows uses the system *Input/Output Memory Management Unit (IOMMU)* to block external peripherals from starting and performing DMA, unless the drivers for these peripherals support memory isolation (such as DMA-remapping). Peripherals with [DMA Remapping compatible drivers][LINK-1] are automatically enumerated, started, and allowed to perform DMA to their assigned memory regions. -By default, peripherals with DMA Remapping incompatible drivers will be blocked from starting and performing DMA until an authorized user signs into the system or unlocks the screen. IT administrators can modify the default behavior applied to devices with DMA Remapping incompatible drivers using MDM or group policies. +By default, peripherals with DMA Remapping incompatible drivers are blocked from starting and performing DMA until an authorized user signs into the system or unlocks the screen. IT administrators can modify the default behavior applied to devices with DMA Remapping incompatible drivers using MDM or group policies. ## User experience When Kernel DMA Protection is enabled: -- Peripherals with DMA Remapping-compatible device drivers will be automatically enumerated and started -- Peripherals with DMA Remapping-incompatible drivers will be blocked from starting if the peripheral was plugged in before an authorized user logs in, or while the screen is locked. Once the system is unlocked, the peripheral driver will be started by the OS, and the peripheral will continue to function normally until the system is rebooted, or the peripheral is unplugged. The peripheral will continue to function normally if the user locks the screen or signs out of the system. +- Peripherals with DMA Remapping-compatible device drivers are automatically enumerated and started +- Peripherals with DMA Remapping-incompatible drivers are blocked from starting if the peripheral was plugged in before an authorized user logs in, or while the screen is locked. Once the system is unlocked, the peripheral driver is started by the OS, and the peripheral continues to function normally until the system is rebooted, or the peripheral is unplugged. The peripheral will continue to function normally if the user locks the screen or signs out of the system. [!INCLUDE [kernel-direct-memory-access-dma-protection](../../../includes/licensing/kernel-direct-memory-access-dma-protection.md)] @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ Kernel DMA Protection isn't compatible with other BitLocker DMA attacks counterm ## Check if Kernel DMA Protection is enabled -Systems that support Kernel DMA Protection will enable the feature automatically, with no user or IT admin configuration required. +Systems that support Kernel DMA Protection enable the feature automatically, with no user or IT admin configuration required. You can use the Windows Security settings to check if Kernel DMA Protection is enabled: @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ You can use the Windows Security settings to check if Kernel DMA Protection is e :::image type="content" source="images/kernel-dma-protection-security-center.png" alt-text="Screenshot of Kernel DMA protection in Windows Security." lightbox="images/kernel-dma-protection-security-center.png" border="true"::: - Alternatively, you can use the System Information desktop app (`msinfo32.exe`). If the system supports Kernel DMA Protection, the **Kernel DMA Protection** value will be set to **ON**. + Alternatively, you can use the System Information desktop app (`msinfo32.exe`). If the system supports Kernel DMA Protection, the **Kernel DMA Protection** value is set to **ON**. :::image type="content" source="images/kernel-dma-protection.png" alt-text="Screenshot of Kernel DMA protection in System Information." lightbox="images/kernel-dma-protection.png" border="true"::: @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ Use the Windows-provided drivers for the peripherals, when available. If there a ### My system's Kernel DMA Protection is off. Can DMA-remapping for a specific device be turned on? -Yes. DMA remapping for a specific device can be turned on independent from Kernel DMA Protection. For example, if the driver opts in and VT-d (Virtualization Technology for Directed I/O) is turned on, then DMA remapping will be enabled for the devices driver even if Kernel DMA Protection is turned off. +Yes. DMA remapping for a specific device can be turned on independent from Kernel DMA Protection. For example, if the driver opts in and VT-d (Virtualization Technology for Directed I/O) is turned on, then DMA remapping is enabled for the devices driver even if Kernel DMA Protection is turned off. Kernel DMA Protection is a policy that allows or blocks devices to perform DMA, based on their remapping state and capabilities. @@ -117,5 +117,4 @@ The policy can be enabled by using: [LINK-1]: /windows-hardware/drivers/pci/enabling-dma-remapping-for-device-drivers [LINK-2]: /windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-dmaguard#dmaguard-policies [LINK-3]: /windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-kernel-dma-protection - [EXT-1]: https://thunderbolttechnology.net/security/Thunderbolt%203%20and%20Security.pdf diff --git a/windows/security/hardware-security/pluton/microsoft-pluton-security-processor.md b/windows/security/hardware-security/pluton/microsoft-pluton-security-processor.md index eb190c2bac..66feedfe73 100644 --- a/windows/security/hardware-security/pluton/microsoft-pluton-security-processor.md +++ b/windows/security/hardware-security/pluton/microsoft-pluton-security-processor.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ title: Microsoft Pluton security processor description: Learn more about Microsoft Pluton security processor ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 02/19/2024 +ms.date: 07/10/2024 --- # Microsoft Pluton security processor @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Microsoft Pluton is currently available on devices with Ryzen 6000 and Qualcomm ## What is Microsoft Pluton? -Designed by Microsoft and built by silicon partners, Microsoft Pluton is a secure crypto-processor built into the CPU for security at the core to ensure code integrity and the latest protection with updates delivered by Microsoft through Windows Update. Pluton protects credentials, identities, personal data and encryption keys. Information is significantly harder to be removed even if an attacker installs malware or has complete physical possession of the PC. +Designed by Microsoft and built by silicon partners, Microsoft Pluton is a secure crypto-processor built into the CPU for security at the core to ensure code integrity and the latest protection with updates delivered by Microsoft through Windows Update. Pluton protects credentials, identities, personal data, and encryption keys. Information is significantly harder to be removed even if an attacker installs malware or has complete physical possession of the PC. Microsoft Pluton is designed to provide the functionality of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and deliver other security functionality beyond what is possible with the TPM 2.0 specification, and allows for other Pluton firmware and OS features to be delivered over time via Windows Update. For more information, see [Microsoft Pluton as TPM](pluton-as-tpm.md). diff --git a/windows/security/hardware-security/pluton/pluton-as-tpm.md b/windows/security/hardware-security/pluton/pluton-as-tpm.md index ccde7ec921..2946f43e11 100644 --- a/windows/security/hardware-security/pluton/pluton-as-tpm.md +++ b/windows/security/hardware-security/pluton/pluton-as-tpm.md @@ -2,12 +2,12 @@ title: Microsoft Pluton as Trusted Platform Module (TPM 2.0) description: Learn more about Microsoft Pluton security processor as Trusted Platform Module (TPM 2.0) ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 02/19/2024 +ms.date: 07/10/2024 --- # Microsoft Pluton as Trusted Platform Module -Microsoft Pluton is designed to provide the functionality of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) thereby establishing the silicon root of trust. Microsoft Pluton supports the TPM 2.0 industry standard allowing customers to immediately benefit from the enhanced security in Windows features that rely on TPM including BitLocker, Windows Hello, and Windows Defender System Guard. +Microsoft Pluton is designed to provide the functionality of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) thereby establishing the silicon root of trust. Microsoft Pluton supports the TPM 2.0 industry standard allowing customers to immediately benefit from the enhanced security in Windows features that rely on TPM including BitLocker, Windows Hello, and System Guard. As with other TPMs, credentials, encryption keys, and other sensitive information can't be easily extracted from Pluton even if an attacker installs malware or has complete physical possession of the device. Storing sensitive data like encryption keys securely within the Pluton processor, which is isolated from the rest of the system, helps ensure that emerging attack techniques such as speculative execution can't access key material. @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ To learn more about the TPM related scenarios that benefit from Pluton, see [TPM ## Microsoft Pluton as a security processor alongside discrete TPM -Microsoft Pluton can be used as a TPM, or in conjunction with a TPM. Although Pluton builds security directly into the CPU, device manufacturers may choose to use discrete TPM as the default TPM, while having Pluton available to the system as a security processor for use cases beyond the TPM. +Microsoft Pluton can be used as a TPM, or with a TPM. Although Pluton builds security directly into the CPU, device manufacturers might choose to use discrete TPM as the default TPM, while having Pluton available to the system as a security processor for use cases beyond the TPM. Pluton is integrated within the SoC subsystem, and provides a flexible, updatable platform for running firmware that implements end-to-end security functionality authored, maintained, and updated by Microsoft. diff --git a/windows/security/hardware-security/system-guard-secure-launch-and-smm-protection.md b/windows/security/hardware-security/system-guard-secure-launch-and-smm-protection.md index 35ef8a1826..153871eba2 100644 --- a/windows/security/hardware-security/system-guard-secure-launch-and-smm-protection.md +++ b/windows/security/hardware-security/system-guard-secure-launch-and-smm-protection.md @@ -1,14 +1,13 @@ --- title: System Guard Secure Launch and SMM protection -description: Explains how to configure System Guard Secure Launch and System Management Mode (SMM protection) to improve the startup security of Windows 10 devices. -ms.localizationpriority: medium -ms.date: 07/31/2023 +description: Explains how to configure System Guard Secure Launch and System Management Mode (SMM protection) to improve the startup security of Windows devices. +ms.date: 07/10/2024 ms.topic: conceptual --- # System Guard Secure Launch and SMM protection -This topic explains how to configure [System Guard Secure Launch and System Management Mode (SMM) protection](how-hardware-based-root-of-trust-helps-protect-windows.md) to improve the startup security of Windows 10 and Windows 11 devices. The information below is presented from a client perspective. +This article explains how to configure [System Guard Secure Launch and System Management Mode (SMM) protection](how-hardware-based-root-of-trust-helps-protect-windows.md) to improve the startup security of Windows 10 and Windows 11 devices. The information below is presented from a client perspective. > [!NOTE] > System Guard Secure Launch feature requires a supported processor. For more information, see [System requirements for System Guard](how-hardware-based-root-of-trust-helps-protect-windows.md#system-requirements-for-system-guard). @@ -28,35 +27,30 @@ System Guard Secure Launch can be configured for Mobile Device Management (MDM) ### Group Policy -1. Click **Start** > type and then click **Edit group policy**. - -2. Click **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **System** > **Device Guard** > **Turn On Virtualization Based Security** > **Secure Launch Configuration**. +1. Select **Start** > type and then select **Edit group policy**. +1. Select **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **System** > **Device Guard** > **Turn On Virtualization Based Security** > **Secure Launch Configuration**. ![Secure Launch Configuration.](images/secure-launch-group-policy.png) ### Windows Security -Click **Start** > **Settings** > **Update & Security** > **Windows Security** > **Open Windows Security** > **Device security** > **Core isolation** > **Firmware protection**. +Select **Start** > **Settings** > **Update & Security** > **Windows Security** > **Open Windows Security** > **Device security** > **Core isolation** > **Firmware protection**. ![Windows Security settings.](images/secure-launch-security-app.png) ### Registry 1. Open Registry editor. - -2. Click **HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE** > **SYSTEM** > **CurrentControlSet** > **Control** > **DeviceGuard** > **Scenarios**. - -3. Right-click **Scenarios** > **New** > **Key** and name the new key **SystemGuard**. - -4. Right-click **SystemGuard** > **New** > **DWORD (32-bit) Value** and name the new DWORD **Enabled**. - -5. Double-click **Enabled**, change the value to **1**, and click **OK**. +1. Select **HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE** > **SYSTEM** > **CurrentControlSet** > **Control** > **DeviceGuard** > **Scenarios**. +1. Right-click **Scenarios** > **New** > **Key** and name the new key **SystemGuard**. +1. Right-click **SystemGuard** > **New** > **DWORD (32-bit) Value** and name the new DWORD **Enabled**. +1. Double-click **Enabled**, change the value to **1**, and click **OK**. ![Secure Launch Registry.](images/secure-launch-registry.png) ## How to verify System Guard Secure Launch is configured and running -To verify that Secure Launch is running, use System Information (MSInfo32). Click **Start**, search for **System Information**, and look under **Virtualization-based Security Services Running** and **Virtualization-based Security Services Configured**. +To verify that Secure Launch is running, use System Information (MSInfo32). Select **Start**, search for **System Information**, and look under **Virtualization-based Security Services Running** and **Virtualization-based Security Services Configured**. ![Verifying Secure Launch is running in the Windows Security settings.](images/secure-launch-msinfo.png) diff --git a/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/backup-tpm-recovery-information-to-ad-ds.md b/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/backup-tpm-recovery-information-to-ad-ds.md index 9be58182e9..7a1c590a9a 100644 --- a/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/backup-tpm-recovery-information-to-ad-ds.md +++ b/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/backup-tpm-recovery-information-to-ad-ds.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ title: Back up TPM recovery information to Active Directory description: Learn how to back up the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) recovery information to Active Directory. ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 11/17/2023 +ms.date: 07/10/2024 --- # Back up the TPM recovery information to AD DS diff --git a/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/change-the-tpm-owner-password.md b/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/change-the-tpm-owner-password.md index 29abbe115b..37025f1eca 100644 --- a/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/change-the-tpm-owner-password.md +++ b/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/change-the-tpm-owner-password.md @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ --- title: Change the TPM owner password -description: This topic for the IT professional describes how to change the password or PIN for the owner of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) that is installed on your system. +description: This article for the IT professional describes how to change the password or PIN for the owner of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) that is installed on your system. ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 11/17/2023 +ms.date: 07/10/2024 --- # Change the TPM owner password @@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ Without the owner password, you can still perform all the preceding actions with Instead of changing your owner password, you can also use the following options to manage your TPM: - **Clear the TPM** - If you want to invalidate all of the existing keys that have been created since you took ownership of the TPM, you can clear it. For important precautions for this process, and instructions for completing it, see [Clear all the keys from the TPM](initialize-and-configure-ownership-of-the-tpm.md#clear-all-the-keys-from-the-tpm). - - **Turn off the TPM** - With TPM 1.2 and Windows 10, versions 1507 and 1511, you can turn off the TPM. Turn off the TPM if you want to keep all existing keys and data intact and disable the services that are provided by the TPM. For more info, see [Turn off the TPM](initialize-and-configure-ownership-of-the-tpm.md#turn-off-the-tpm). ## Changing the TPM owner password @@ -44,7 +43,3 @@ To change to a new TPM owner password, in `TPM.msc`, select **Change Owner Passw ## Use the TPM cmdlets You can manage the TPM using Windows PowerShell. For details, see [TPM Cmdlets in Windows PowerShell](/powershell/module/trustedplatformmodule). - -## Related articles - -- [Trusted Platform Module](trusted-platform-module-overview.md) diff --git a/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm.md b/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm.md index fc6a8fad0f..a4d314ad3f 100644 --- a/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm.md +++ b/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm.md @@ -2,12 +2,12 @@ title: How Windows uses the TPM description: Learn how Windows uses the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to enhance security. ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 11/17/2023 +ms.date: 07/10/2024 --- # How Windows uses the Trusted Platform Module -The Windows operating system places hardware-based security deeper inside many features, maximizing platform security while increasing usability. To achieve many of these security enhancements, Windows makes extensive use of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). This article offers an overview of the TPM, describes how it works, and discusses the benefits that TPM brings to Windows and the cumulative security impact of running Windows on a device with a TPM. +The Windows operating system places hardware-based security deeper inside many features, maximizing platform security while increasing usability. To achieve many of these security enhancements, Windows makes extensive use of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). This article offers an overview of the TPM, describes how it works, and discusses the benefits that TPM brings to Windows and the cumulative security effect of running Windows on a device with a TPM. ## TPM Overview @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is the nonprofit organization that publishes a OEMs implement the TPM as a component in a trusted computing platform, such as a PC, tablet, or phone. Trusted computing platforms use the TPM to support privacy and security scenarios that software alone can't achieve. For example, software alone can't reliably report whether malware is present during the system startup process. The close integration between TPM and platform increases the transparency of the startup process and supports evaluating device health by enabling reliable measuring and reporting of the software that starts the device. Implementation of a TPM as part of a trusted computing platform provides a hardware root of trust-that is, it behaves in a trusted way. For example, if a key stored in a TPM has properties that disallow exporting the key, that key *truly can't leave the TPM*. -The TCG designed the TPM as a low-cost, mass-market security solution that addresses the requirements of different customer segments. There are variations in the security properties of different TPM implementations just as there are variations in customer and regulatory requirements for different sectors. In public-sector procurement, for example, some governments have clearly defined security requirements for TPMs, whereas others don't. +The TCG designed the TPM as a low-cost, mass-market security solution that addresses the requirements of different customer segments. There are variations in the security properties of different TPM implementations just as there are variations in customer and regulatory requirements for different sectors. In public-sector procurement, for example, some governments clearly define security requirements for TPMs, whereas others don't. Certification programs for TPMs-and technology in general-continue to evolve as the speed of innovation increases. Although having a TPM is clearly better than not having a TPM, Microsoft's best advice is to determine your organization's security needs and research any regulatory requirements associated with procurement for your industry. The result is a balance between scenarios used, assurance level, cost, convenience, and availability. @@ -51,11 +51,11 @@ Smart cards are physical devices that typically store a single certificate and t In Windows, the Virtual Smart Card feature allows the TPM to mimic a permanently inserted smart card. The TPM becomes *something the user has* but still requires a PIN. While physical smart cards limit the number of PIN attempts before locking the card and requiring a reset, a virtual smart card relies on the TPM's dictionary attack protection to prevent too many PIN guesses. -For TPM-based virtual smart cards, the TPM protects the use and storage of the certificate private key, so that it can't be copied when it is in use or stored and used elsewhere. Using a component that is part of the system rather than a separate physical smart card, can reduce total cost of ownership. The *lost card* or *card left at home* scenarios are not applicable, and the benefits of smart card-based multifactor authentication is preserved. For users, virtual smart cards are simple to use, requiring only a PIN to unlock. Virtual smart cards support the same scenarios that physical smart cards support, including signing in to Windows or authenticating for resource access. +For TPM-based virtual smart cards, the TPM protects the use and storage of the certificate private key, so that it can't be copied when it is in use or stored and used elsewhere. Using a component that is part of the system rather than a separate physical smart card, can reduce total cost of ownership. The *lost card* or *card left at home* scenarios aren't applicable, and the benefits of smart card-based multifactor authentication is preserved. For users, virtual smart cards are simple to use, requiring only a PIN to unlock. Virtual smart cards support the same scenarios that physical smart cards support, including signing in to Windows or authenticating for resource access. ## Windows Hello for Business -Windows Hello for Business provides authentication methods intended to replace passwords, which can be difficult to remember and easily compromised. In addition, username/password solutions for authentication often reuse the same credential combinations on multiple devices and services. If those credentials are compromised, they are compromised in multiple places. Windows Hello for Business combines the information provisioned on each device (i.e., the cryptographic key) with additional information to authenticate users. On a system that has a TPM, the TPM can protect the key. If a system does not have a TPM, software-based techniques protect the key. The additional information the user supplies can be a PIN value or, if the system has the necessary hardware, biometric information, such as fingerprint or facial recognition. To protect privacy, the biometric information is used only on the provisioned device to access the provisioned key: it is not shared across devices. +Windows Hello for Business provides authentication methods intended to replace passwords, which can be difficult to remember and easily compromised. In addition, username/password solutions for authentication often reuse the same credential combinations on multiple devices and services. If those credentials are compromised, they're compromised in multiple places. Windows Hello for Business combines the information provisioned on each device (that is, the cryptographic key) with additional information to authenticate users. On a system that has a TPM, the TPM can protect the key. If a system doesn't have a TPM, software-based techniques protect the key. The additional information the user supplies can be a PIN value or, if the system has the necessary hardware, biometric information, such as fingerprint or facial recognition. To protect privacy, the biometric information is used only on the provisioned device to access the provisioned key: it isn't shared across devices. The adoption of new authentication technology requires that identity providers and organizations deploy and use that technology. Windows Hello for Business lets users authenticate with their existing Microsoft account, an Active Directory account, a Microsoft Entra account, or even non-Microsoft Identity Provider Services or Relying Party Services that support [Fast ID Online V2.0 authentication](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkId=533889). @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ Identity providers have flexibility in how they provision credentials on client - **Endorsement key**. The TPM manufacturer can create a special key in the TPM called an endorsement key. An endorsement key certificate, signed by the manufacturer, says that the endorsement key is present in a TPM that the manufacturer made. Solutions can use the certificate with the TPM containing the endorsement key to confirm a scenario really involves a TPM from a specific TPM manufacturer (instead of malware acting like a TPM). -- **Attestation identity key**. To protect privacy, most TPM scenarios do not directly use an actual endorsement key. Instead, they use attestation identity keys, and an identity certificate authority (CA) uses the endorsement key and its certificate to prove that one or more attestation identity keys actually exist in a real TPM. The identity CA issues attestation identity key certificates. More than one identity CA will generally see the same endorsement key certificate that can uniquely identify the TPM, but any number of attestation identity key certificates can be created to limit the information shared in other scenarios. +- **Attestation identity key**. To protect privacy, most TPM scenarios don't directly use an actual endorsement key. Instead, they use attestation identity keys, and an identity certificate authority (CA) uses the endorsement key and its certificate to prove that one or more attestation identity keys actually exist in a real TPM. The identity CA issues attestation identity key certificates. More than one identity CA will generally see the same endorsement key certificate that can uniquely identify the TPM, but any number of attestation identity key certificates can be created to limit the information shared in other scenarios. :::image type="content" alt-text="TPM Capabilities." source="images/tpm-capabilities.png" lightbox="images/tpm-capabilities.png"::: *Figure 1: TPM Cryptographic Key Management* @@ -72,15 +72,15 @@ For Windows Hello for Business, Microsoft can fill the role of the identity CA. ## BitLocker Drive Encryption -BitLocker provides full-volume encryption to protect data at rest. The most common device configuration splits the hard drive into several volumes. The operating system and user data reside on one volume that holds confidential information, and other volumes hold public information such as boot components, system information and recovery tools. (These other volumes are used infrequently enough that they do not need to be visible to users.) Without more protections in place, if the volume containing the operating system and user data is not encrypted, someone can boot another operating system and easily bypass the intended operating system's enforcement of file permissions to read any user data. +BitLocker provides full-volume encryption to protect data at rest. The most common device configuration splits the hard drive into several volumes. The operating system and user data reside on one volume that holds confidential information, and other volumes hold public information such as boot components, system information and recovery tools. (These other volumes are used infrequently enough that they don't need to be visible to users.) Without more protections in place, if the volume containing the operating system and user data isn't encrypted, someone can boot another operating system and easily bypass the intended operating system's enforcement of file permissions to read any user data. -In the most common configuration, BitLocker encrypts the operating system volume so that if the computer or hard disk is lost or stolen when powered off, the data on the volume remains confidential. When the computer is turned on, starts normally, and proceeds to the Windows logon prompt, the only path forward is for the user to log on with his or her credentials, allowing the operating system to enforce its normal file permissions. If something about the boot process changes, however-for example, a different operating system is booted from a USB device-the operating system volume and user data can't be read and are not accessible. The TPM and system firmware collaborate to record measurements of how the system started, including loaded software and configuration details such as whether boot occurred from the hard drive or a USB device. BitLocker relies on the TPM to allow the use of a key only when startup occurs in an expected way. The system firmware and TPM are carefully designed to work together to provide the following capabilities: +In the most common configuration, BitLocker encrypts the operating system volume so that if the computer or hard disk is lost or stolen when powered off, the data on the volume remains confidential. When the computer is turned on, starts normally, and proceeds to the Windows sign-in prompt, the only path forward is for the user to sign in with their credentials, allowing the operating system to enforce its normal file permissions. If something about the boot process changes, however-for example, a different operating system is booted from a USB device-the operating system volume and user data can't be read and aren't accessible. The TPM and system firmware collaborate to record measurements of how the system started, including loaded software and configuration details such as whether boot occurred from the hard drive or a USB device. BitLocker relies on the TPM to allow the use of a key only when startup occurs in an expected way. The system firmware and TPM are carefully designed to work together to provide the following capabilities: - **Hardware root of trust for measurement**. A TPM allows software to send it commands that record measurements of software or configuration information. This information can be calculated using a hash algorithm that essentially transforms a lot of data into a small, statistically unique hash value. The system firmware has a component called the Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM) that is implicitly trusted. The CRTM unconditionally hashes the next software component and records the measurement value by sending a command to the TPM. Successive components, whether system firmware or operating system loaders, continue the process by measuring any software components they load before running them. Because each component's measurement is sent to the TPM before it runs, a component can't erase its measurement from the TPM. (However, measurements are erased when the system is restarted.) The result is that at each step of the system startup process, the TPM holds measurements of boot software and configuration information. Any changes in boot software or configuration yield different TPM measurements at that step and later steps. Because the system firmware unconditionally starts the measurement chain, it provides a hardware-based root of trust for the TPM measurements. At some point in the startup process, the value of recording all loaded software and configuration information diminishes and the chain of measurements stops. The TPM allows for the creation of keys that can be used only when the platform configuration registers that hold the measurements have specific values. -- **Key used only when boot measurements are accurate**. BitLocker creates a key in the TPM that can be used only when the boot measurements match an expected value. The expected value is calculated for the step in the startup process when Windows Boot Manager runs from the operating system volume on the system hard drive. Windows Boot Manager, which is stored unencrypted on the boot volume, needs to use the TPM key so that it can decrypt data read into memory from the operating system volume and startup can proceed using the encrypted operating system volume. If a different operating system is booted or the configuration is changed, the measurement values in the TPM will be different, the TPM will not let Windows Boot Manager use the key, and the startup process can't proceed normally because the data on the operating system can't be decrypted. If someone tries to boot the system with a different operating system or a different device, the software or configuration measurements in the TPM will be wrong and the TPM will not allow use of the key needed to decrypt the operating system volume. As a failsafe, if measurement values change unexpectedly, the user can always use the BitLocker recovery key to access volume data. Organizations can configure BitLocker to store the recovery key-in Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS). +- **Key used only when boot measurements are accurate**. BitLocker creates a key in the TPM that can be used only when the boot measurements match an expected value. The expected value is calculated for the step in the startup process when Windows Boot Manager runs from the operating system volume on the system hard drive. Windows Boot Manager, which is stored unencrypted on the boot volume, needs to use the TPM key so that it can decrypt data read into memory from the operating system volume and startup can proceed using the encrypted operating system volume. If a different operating system is booted or the configuration is changed, the measurement values in the TPM will be different, the TPM won't let Windows Boot Manager use the key, and the startup process can't proceed normally because the data on the operating system can't be decrypted. If someone tries to boot the system with a different operating system or a different device, the software or configuration measurements in the TPM will be wrong and the TPM won't allow use of the key needed to decrypt the operating system volume. As a failsafe, if measurement values change unexpectedly, the user can always use the BitLocker recovery key to access volume data. Organizations can configure BitLocker to store the recovery key-in Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS). -Device hardware characteristics are important to BitLocker and its ability to protect data. One consideration is whether the device provides attack vectors when the system is at the logon screen. For example, if the Windows device has a port that allows direct memory access so that someone can plug in hardware and read memory, an attacker can read the operating system volume's decryption key from memory while at the Windows logon screen. To mitigate this risk, organizations can configure BitLocker so that the TPM key requires both the correct software measurements and an authorization value. The system startup process stops at Windows Boot Manager, and the user is prompted to enter the authorization value for the TPM key or insert a USB device with the value. This process stops BitLocker from automatically loading the key into memory where it might be vulnerable, but has a less desirable user experience. +Device hardware characteristics are important to BitLocker and its ability to protect data. One consideration is whether the device provides attack vectors when the system is at the sign-in screen. For example, if the Windows device has a port that allows direct memory access so that someone can plug in hardware and read memory, an attacker can read the operating system volume's decryption key from memory while at the Windows sign-in screen. To mitigate this risk, organizations can configure BitLocker so that the TPM key requires both the correct software measurements and an authorization value. The system startup process stops at Windows Boot Manager, and the user is prompted to enter the authorization value for the TPM key or insert a USB device with the value. This process stops BitLocker from automatically loading the key into memory where it might be vulnerable, but has a less desirable user experience. Newer hardware and Windows work better together to disable direct memory access through ports and reduce attack vectors. The result is that organizations can deploy more systems without requiring users to enter additional authorization information during the startup process. The right hardware allows BitLocker to be used with the "TPM-only" configuration giving users a single sign-on experience without having to enter a PIN or USB key during boot. @@ -92,17 +92,17 @@ For software measurements, Device Encryption relies on measurements of the autho ## Measured Boot -Windows 8 introduced Measured Boot as a way for the operating system to record the chain of measurements of software components and configuration information in the TPM through the initialization of the Windows operating system. In previous Windows versions, the measurement chain stopped at the Windows Boot Manager component itself, and the measurements in the TPM were not helpful for understanding the starting state of Windows. +Windows 8 introduced Measured Boot as a way for the operating system to record the chain of measurements of software components and configuration information in the TPM through the initialization of the Windows operating system. In previous Windows versions, the measurement chain stopped at the Windows Boot Manager component itself, and the measurements in the TPM weren't helpful for understanding the starting state of Windows. -The Windows boot process happens in stages and often involves non-Microsoft drivers to communicate with vendor-specific hardware or implement antimalware solutions. For software, Measured Boot records measurements of the Windows kernel, Early-Launch Anti-Malware drivers, and boot drivers in the TPM. For configuration settings, Measured Boot records security-relevant information such as signature data that antimalware drivers use and configuration data about Windows security features (e.g., whether BitLocker is on or off). +The Windows boot process happens in stages and often involves non-Microsoft drivers to communicate with vendor-specific hardware or implement anti-malware solutions. For software, Measured Boot records measurements of the Windows kernel, Early-Launch anti-malware drivers, and boot drivers in the TPM. For configuration settings, Measured Boot records security-relevant information such as signature data that anti-malware drivers use and configuration data about Windows security features (for example, whether BitLocker is on or off). Measured Boot ensures that TPM measurements fully reflect the starting state of Windows software and configuration settings. If security settings and other protections are set up correctly, they can be trusted to maintain the security of the running operating system thereafter. Other scenarios can use the operating system's starting state to determine whether the running operating system should be trusted. -TPM measurements are designed to avoid recording any privacy-sensitive information as a measurement. As an additional privacy protection, Measured Boot stops the measurement chain at the initial starting state of Windows. Therefore, the set of measurements does not include details about which applications are in use or how Windows is being used. Measurement information can be shared with external entities to show that the device is enforcing adequate security policies and did not start with malware. +TPM measurements are designed to avoid recording any privacy-sensitive information as a measurement. As an additional privacy protection, Measured Boot stops the measurement chain at the initial starting state of Windows. Therefore, the set of measurements doesn't include details about which applications are in use or how Windows is being used. Measurement information can be shared with external entities to show that the device is enforcing adequate security policies and didn't start with malware. The TPM provides the following way for scenarios to use the measurements recorded in the TPM during boot: -- **Remote Attestation**. Using an attestation identity key, the TPM can generate and cryptographically sign a statement (or*quote*) of the current measurements in the TPM. Windows can create unique attestation identity keys for various scenarios to prevent separate evaluators from collaborating to track the same device. Additional information in the quote is cryptographically scrambled to limit information sharing and better protect privacy. By sending the quote to a remote entity, a device can attest which software and configuration settings were used to boot the device and initialize the operating system. An attestation identity key certificate can provide further assurance that the quote is coming from a real TPM. Remote attestation is the process of recording measurements in the TPM, generating a quote, and sending the quote information to another system that evaluates the measurements to establish trust in a device. Figure 2 illustrates this process. +- **Remote Attestation**. Using an attestation identity key, the TPM can generate and cryptographically sign a statement (or *quote*) of the current measurements in the TPM. Windows can create unique attestation identity keys for various scenarios to prevent separate evaluators from collaborating to track the same device. Additional information in the quote is cryptographically scrambled to limit information sharing and better protect privacy. By sending the quote to a remote entity, a device can attest which software and configuration settings were used to boot the device and initialize the operating system. An attestation identity key certificate can provide further assurance that the quote is coming from a real TPM. Remote attestation is the process of recording measurements in the TPM, generating a quote, and sending the quote information to another system that evaluates the measurements to establish trust in a device. Figure 2 illustrates this process. When new security features are added to Windows, Measured Boot adds security-relevant configuration information to the measurements recorded in the TPM. Measured Boot enables remote attestation scenarios that reflect the system firmware and the Windows initialization state. @@ -111,24 +111,22 @@ When new security features are added to Windows, Measured Boot adds security-rel ## Health Attestation -Some Windows improvements help security solutions implement remote attestation scenarios. Microsoft provides a Health Attestation service, which can create attestation identity key certificates for TPMs from different manufacturers as well as parse measured boot information to extract simple security assertions, such as whether BitLocker is on or off. The simple security assertions can be used to evaluate device health. +Some Windows improvements help security solutions implement remote attestation scenarios. Microsoft provides a Health Attestation service, which can create attestation identity key certificates for TPMs from different manufacturers and parse measured boot information to extract simple security assertions, such as whether BitLocker is on or off. The simple security assertions can be used to evaluate device health. Mobile device management (MDM) solutions can receive simple security assertions from the Microsoft Health Attestation service for a client without having to deal with the complexity of the quote or the detailed TPM measurements. MDM solutions can act on the security information by quarantining unhealthy devices or blocking access to cloud services such as Microsoft Office 365. ## Credential Guard -Credential Guard is a new feature in Windows that helps protect Windows credentials in organizations that have deployed AD DS. Historically, a user's credentials (such as a logon password) were hashed to generate an authorization token. The user employed the token to access resources that he or she was permitted to use. One weakness of the token model is that malware that had access to the operating system kernel could look through the computer's memory and harvest all the access tokens currently in use. The attacker could then use harvested tokens to log on to other machines and collect more credentials. This kind of attack is called a "pass the hash" attack, a malware technique that infects one machine to infect many machines across an organization. +Credential Guard is a new feature in Windows that helps protect Windows credentials in organizations that have deployed AD DS. Historically, a user's credentials (such as a sign-in password) were hashed to generate an authorization token. The user employed the token to access resources that they were permitted to use. One weakness of the token model is that malware that had access to the operating system kernel could look through the computer's memory and harvest all the access tokens currently in use. The attacker could then use harvested tokens to sign in to other machines and collect more credentials. This kind of attack is called a "pass the hash" attack, a malware technique that infects one machine to infect many machines across an organization. -Similar to the way Microsoft Hyper-V keeps virtual machines (VMs) separate from one another, Credential Guard uses virtualization to isolate the process that hashes credentials in a memory area that the operating system kernel can't access. This isolated memory area is initialized and protected during the boot process so that components in the larger operating system environment can't tamper with it. Credential Guard uses the TPM to protect its keys with TPM measurements, so they are accessible only during the boot process step when the separate region is initialized; they are not available for the normal operating system kernel. The local security authority code in the Windows kernel interacts with the isolated memory area by passing in credentials and receiving single-use authorization tokens in return. +Similar to the way Microsoft Hyper-V keeps virtual machines (VMs) separate from one another, Credential Guard uses virtualization to isolate the process that hashes credentials in a memory area that the operating system kernel can't access. This isolated memory area is initialized and protected during the boot process so that components in the larger operating system environment can't tamper with it. Credential Guard uses the TPM to protect its keys with TPM measurements, so they're accessible only during the boot process step when the separate region is initialized; they aren't available for the normal operating system kernel. The local security authority code in the Windows kernel interacts with the isolated memory area by passing in credentials and receiving single-use authorization tokens in return. -The resulting solution provides defense in depth, because even if malware runs in the operating system kernel, it can't access the secrets inside the isolated memory area that actually generates authorization tokens. The solution does not solve the problem of key loggers because the passwords such loggers capture actually pass through the normal Windows kernel, but when combined with other solutions, such as smart cards for authentication, Credential Guard greatly enhances the protection of credentials in Windows. +The resulting solution provides defense in depth, because even if malware runs in the operating system kernel, it can't access the secrets inside the isolated memory area that actually generates authorization tokens. The solution doesn't solve the problem of key loggers because the passwords such loggers capture actually pass through the normal Windows kernel, but when combined with other solutions, such as smart cards for authentication, Credential Guard greatly enhances the protection of credentials in Windows. ## Conclusion The TPM adds hardware-based security benefits to Windows. When installed on hardware that includes a TPM, Window delivers remarkably improved security benefits. The following table summarizes the key benefits of the TPM's major features. -
- | Feature | Benefits when used on a system with a TPM | |----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Platform Crypto Provider | - If the machine is compromised, the private key associated with the certificate can't be copied off the device.
- The TPM's dictionary attack mechanism protects PIN values to use a certificate. | @@ -138,8 +136,6 @@ The TPM adds hardware-based security benefits to Windows. When installed on hard | Device Encryption | With a Microsoft account and the right hardware, consumers' devices seamlessly benefit from data-at-rest protection. | | Measured Boot | A hardware root of trust contains boot measurements that help detect malware during remote attestation. | | Health Attestation | MDM solutions can easily perform remote attestation and evaluate client health before granting access to resources or cloud services such as Office 365. | -| Credential Guard | Defense in depth increases so that even if malware has administrative rights on one machine, it is significantly more difficult to compromise additional machines in an organization. | +| Credential Guard | Defense in depth increases so that even if malware has administrative rights on one machine, it's significantly more difficult to compromise additional machines in an organization. | -
- -Although some of the aforementioned features have additional hardware requirements (e.g., virtualization support), the TPM is a cornerstone of Windows security. Microsoft and other industry stakeholders continue to improve the global standards associated with TPM and find more and more applications that use it to provide tangible benefits to customers. Microsoft has included support for most TPM features in its version of Windows for the Internet of Things (IoT) called [Windows IoT Core](/windows/iot-core/windows-iot-core). IoT devices that might be deployed in insecure physical locations and connected to cloud services like [Azure IoT Hub](https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/services/iot-hub/) for management can use the TPM in innovative ways to address their emerging security requirements. +Although some of the aforementioned features have more hardware requirements (for example, virtualization support), the TPM is a cornerstone of Windows security. Microsoft and other industry stakeholders continue to improve the global standards associated with TPM and find more applications that use it to provide tangible benefits to customers. Microsoft has included support for most TPM features in its version of Windows for the Internet of Things (IoT) called [Windows IoT Core](/windows/iot-core/windows-iot-core). IoT devices that might be deployed in insecure physical locations and connected to cloud services like [Azure IoT Hub](https://azure.microsoft.com/documentation/services/iot-hub/) for management can use the TPM in innovative ways to address their emerging security requirements. diff --git a/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/initialize-and-configure-ownership-of-the-tpm.md b/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/initialize-and-configure-ownership-of-the-tpm.md index 9e08708019..bede99fdbe 100644 --- a/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/initialize-and-configure-ownership-of-the-tpm.md +++ b/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/initialize-and-configure-ownership-of-the-tpm.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ title: Troubleshoot the TPM description: Learn how to view and troubleshoot the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 11/17/2023 +ms.date: 07/10/2024 ms.collection: - tier1 --- @@ -13,9 +13,6 @@ This article provides information how to troubleshoot the Trusted Platform Modul - [Troubleshoot TPM initialization](#tpm-initialization) - [Clear all the keys from the TPM](#clear-all-the-keys-from-the-tpm) - -With TPM 1.2 and Windows 11, you can also take the following actions: - - [Turn on or turn off the TPM](#turn-on-or-turn-off-the-tpm) For information about the TPM cmdlets, see [TPM Cmdlets in Windows PowerShell](/powershell/module/trustedplatformmodule/?view=win10-ps&preserve-view=true). @@ -28,17 +25,17 @@ Windows automatically initializes and takes ownership of the TPM. There's no nee If you find that Windows isn't able to initialize the TPM automatically, review the following information: -- You can try clearing the TPM to the factory default values, allowing Windows to reinitialize it. For important precautions for this process, and instructions for completing it, see [Clear all the keys from the TPM](#clear-all-the-keys-from-the-tpm) -- If the TPM is a TPM 2.0 and isn't detected by Windows, verify that your computer hardware contains a Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) that is Trusted Computing Group-compliant. Also, ensure that in the UEFI settings, the TPM hasn't been disabled or hidden from the operating system -- If you have TPM 1.2 with Windows 11, the TPM might be turned off, and need to be turned back on, as described in [Turn on the TPM](#turn-on-the-tpm). When it's turned back on, Windows will reinitialize it -- If you're attempting to set up BitLocker with the TPM, check which TPM driver is installed on the computer. We recommend always using one of the TPM drivers that is provided by Microsoft and is protected with BitLocker. If a non-Microsoft TPM driver is installed, it may prevent the default TPM driver from loading and cause BitLocker to report that a TPM isn't present on the computer. If you have a non-Microsoft driver installed, remove it, and then allow the operating system to initialize the TPM +- You can try clearing the TPM to the factory default values, allowing Windows to reinitialize it. For important precautions for this process, and instructions for completing it, see [Clear all the keys from the TPM](#clear-all-the-keys-from-the-tpm). +- If the TPM is a TPM 2.0 and isn't detected by Windows, verify that your computer hardware contains a Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) that is Trusted Computing Group-compliant. Also, ensure that in the UEFI settings, the TPM hasn't been disabled or hidden from the operating system. +- If you have TPM 1.2 with Windows 11, the TPM might be turned off, and need to be turned back on, as described in [Turn on the TPM](#turn-on-the-tpm). When it's turned back on, Windows reinitializes it. +- If you're attempting to set up BitLocker with the TPM, check which TPM driver is installed on the computer. We recommend always using one of the TPM drivers that is provided by Microsoft and is protected with BitLocker. If a non-Microsoft TPM driver is installed, it may prevent the default TPM driver from loading and cause BitLocker to report that a TPM isn't present on the computer. If you have a non-Microsoft driver installed, remove it, and then allow the operating system to initialize the TPM. ### Network connection issues for domain-joined Windows 11 devices If you have Windows 11, the initialization of the TPM can't complete when your computer has network connection issues and both of the following conditions exist: -- An administrator has configured your computer to require that TPM recovery information be saved in Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS). This requirement can be configured through group policy -- A domain controller can't be reached. This scenario may occur on a device that is currently disconnected from the internal network, separated from the domain by a firewall, or experiencing a network component failure (such as an unplugged cable or a faulty network adapter) +- An administrator has configured your computer to require that TPM recovery information be saved in Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS). This requirement can be configured through group policy. +- A domain controller can't be reached. This scenario may occur on a device that is currently disconnected from the internal network, separated from the domain by a firewall, or experiencing a network component failure (such as an unplugged cable or a faulty network adapter). If these issues occur, an error message appears, and you can't complete the initialization process. To avoid the issue, allow Windows to initialize the TPM while you're connected to the corporate network, and you can contact a domain controller. @@ -46,7 +43,7 @@ If these issues occur, an error message appears, and you can't complete the init Some systems may have multiple TPMs and the active TPM may be toggled in UEFI. Windows doesn't support this configuration. If you switch TPMs, Windows might not properly detect or interact with the new TPM. If you plan to switch TPMs, you should toggle to the new TPM, clear it, and reinstall Windows. For more information, see [Clear all the keys from the TPM](#clear-all-the-keys-from-the-tpm). -For example, toggling TPMs will cause BitLocker to enter recovery mode. We strongly recommend that, on systems with two TPMs, one TPM is selected to be used and the selection isn't changed. +For example, toggling TPMs cause BitLocker to enter recovery mode. We strongly recommend that, on systems with two TPMs, one TPM is selected for use and the selection isn't changed. ## Clear all the keys from the TPM @@ -61,11 +58,11 @@ Clearing the TPM resets it to an unowned state. After you clear the TPM, the Win Clearing the TPM can result in data loss. To protect against such loss, review the following precautions: -- Clearing the TPM causes you to lose all created keys associated with the TPM, and data protected by those keys, such as a virtual smart card or a sign-in PIN. Make sure that you have a backup and recovery method for any data that is protected or encrypted by the TPM -- Don't clear the TPM on a device you don't own, such as a work or school PC, without being instructed to do so by your IT administrator -- If you want to temporarily suspend TPM operations on Windows 11, you can turn off the TPM. For more information, see [Turn off the TPM](#turn-off-the-tpm) -- Always use functionality in the operating system (such as TPM.msc) to the clear the TPM. Don't clear the TPM directly from UEFI -- Because your TPM security hardware is a physical part of your computer, before clearing the TPM, you might want to read the manuals or instructions that came with your computer, or search the manufacturer's website +- Clearing the TPM causes you to lose all created keys associated with the TPM, and data protected by those keys, such as a virtual smart card or a sign-in PIN. Make sure that you have a backup and recovery method for any data that is protected or encrypted by the TPM. +- Don't clear the TPM on a device you don't own, such as a work or school PC, without being instructed to do so by your IT administrator. +- If you want to temporarily suspend TPM operations on Windows 11, you can turn off the TPM. For more information, see [Turn off the TPM](#turn-off-the-tpm). +- Always use functionality in the operating system (such as TPM.msc) to clear the TPM. Don't clear the TPM directly from UEFI. +- Because your TPM security hardware is a physical part of your computer, before clearing the TPM, you might want to read the manuals or instructions that came with your computer, or search the manufacturer's website. Membership in the local Administrators group, or equivalent, is the minimum required to complete this procedure. @@ -76,7 +73,7 @@ Membership in the local Administrators group, or equivalent, is the minimum requ 1. Select **Security processor details**. 1. Select **Security processor troubleshooting**. 1. Select **Clear TPM**. - - You'll be prompted to restart the computer. During the restart, you might be prompted by the UEFI to press a button to confirm that you wish to clear the TPM. + - You'll be prompted to restart the computer. During the restart, you might be prompted to press a button to confirm that you wish to clear the TPM. - After the device restarts, your TPM will be automatically prepared for use by Windows. ## Turn on or turn off the TPM @@ -100,7 +97,7 @@ If you want to stop using the services that are provided by the TPM, you can use 1. Open the TPM MMC (`tpm.msc`). 1. In the **Action** pane, select **Turn TPM Off** to display the **Turn off the TPM security hardware** page. 1. In the **Turn off the TPM security hardware** dialog box, select a method to enter your owner password and turning off the TPM: - - If you saved your TPM owner password on a removable storage device, insert it, and then select **I have the owner password file**. In the **Select backup file with the TPM owner password** dialog box, select **Browse** to locate the *.tpm* file that is saved on your removable storage device, select **Open**, and then select **Turn TPM Off**. + - If you saved your TPM owner password on a removable storage device, insert it, and then select **I have the owner password file**. In the **Select backup file with the TPM owner password** dialog box, select **Browse** to locate the `.tpm` file that is saved on your removable storage device, select **Open**, and then select **Turn TPM Off**. - If you don't have the removable storage device with your saved TPM owner password, select **I want to enter the password**. In the **Type your TPM owner password** dialog box, type your password (including hyphens), and then select **Turn TPM Off**. - If you didn't save your TPM owner password or no longer know it, select **I do not have the TPM owner password**, and follow the instructions that are provided in the dialog box and subsequent UEFI screens to turn off the TPM without entering the password. diff --git a/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/manage-tpm-commands.md b/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/manage-tpm-commands.md index d309758d11..fc2bcfb404 100644 --- a/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/manage-tpm-commands.md +++ b/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/manage-tpm-commands.md @@ -2,14 +2,14 @@ title: Manage TPM commands description: This article for the IT professional describes how to manage which Trusted Platform Module (TPM) commands are available to domain users and to local users. ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 11/17/2023 +ms.date: 07/10/2024 --- # Manage TPM commands This article for the IT professional describes how to manage which Trusted Platform Module (TPM) commands are available to domain users and to local users. -After a computer user takes ownership of the TPM, the TPM owner can limit which TPM commands can be run by creating a list of blocked TPM commands. The list can be created and applied to all computers in a domain by using Group Policy, or a list can be created for individual computers by using the TPM MMC. Because some hardware vendors might provide additional commands or the Trusted Computing Group may decide to add commands in the future, the TPM MMC also supports the ability to block new commands. +After a computer user takes ownership of the TPM, the TPM owner can limit which TPM commands can be run by creating a list of blocked TPM commands. The list can be created and applied to all computers in a domain by using Group Policy, or a list can be created for individual computers by using the TPM MMC. Because some hardware vendors might provide more commands or the Trusted Computing Group might decide to add commands in the future, the TPM MMC also supports the ability to block new commands. The following procedures describe how to manage the TPM command lists. You must be a member of the local Administrators group. @@ -33,34 +33,24 @@ The following procedures describe how to manage the TPM command lists. You must > [!NOTE] > For a list of commands, see links in the [TPM Specification](https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/tpm-main-specification/). -1. After you have added numbers for each command that you want to block, select **OK** twice. +1. After adding numbers for each command that you want to block, select **OK** twice. 1. Close the Local Group Policy Editor. ## Block or allow TPM commands by using the TPM MMC 1. Open the TPM MMC (`tpm.msc`). If the **User Account Control** dialog box appears, confirm that the action it displays is what you want, and then select **Yes**. - 1. In the console tree, select **Command Management**. A list of TPM commands is displayed. - 1. In the list, select a command that you want to block or allow. - 1. Under **Actions**, select **Block Selected Command** or **Allow Selected Command** as needed. If **Allow Selected Command** is unavailable, that command is currently blocked by Group Policy. ## Block new commands 1. Open the TPM MMC (`tpm.msc`). If the **User Account Control** dialog box appears, confirm that the action it displays is what you want, and then select **Yes**. - 1. In the console tree, select **Command Management**. A list of TPM commands is displayed. - 1. In the **Action** pane, select **Block New Command**. The **Block New Command** dialog box is displayed. - 1. In the **Command Number** text box, type the number of the new command that you want to block, and then select **OK**. The command number you entered is added to the blocked list. ## Use the TPM cmdlets You can manage the TPM using Windows PowerShell. For details, see [TrustedPlatformModule PowerShell cmdlets](/powershell/module/trustedplatformmodule/?view=win10-ps&preserve-view=true). - -## Related articles - -- [Trusted Platform Module](trusted-platform-module-overview.md) diff --git a/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/manage-tpm-lockout.md b/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/manage-tpm-lockout.md index abf6374e8f..7dfa150354 100644 --- a/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/manage-tpm-lockout.md +++ b/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/manage-tpm-lockout.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ title: Manage TPM lockout description: This article for the IT professional describes how to manage the lockout feature for the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) in Windows. ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 11/17/2023 +ms.date: 07/10/2024 --- # Manage TPM lockout @@ -21,11 +21,11 @@ In some cases, encryption keys are protected by a TPM by requiring a valid autho TPM 2.0 devices have standardized lockout behavior which Windows configures. TPM 2.0 devices have a maximum count threshold and a healing time. Windows configures the maximum count to be 32 and the healing time to be 10 minutes. This configuration means that every continuous 10 minutes of powered on operation without an event causes the counter to decrease by 1. -If your TPM has entered lockout mode or is responding slowly to commands, you can reset the lockout value by using the following procedures. Resetting the TPM lockout requires the TPM owner's authorization. This value is no longer retained by default starting with Windows 10 version 1607 and higher. +If your TPM is in lockout mode or is responding slowly to commands, you can reset the lockout value by using the following procedures. Resetting the TPM lockout requires the TPM owner's authorization. This value is no longer retained by default starting with Windows 10 version 1607 and higher. ### TPM 1.2 -The industry standards from the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) specify that TPM manufacturers must implement some form of protection logic in TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 chips. TPM 1.2 devices implement different protection mechanisms and behavior. In general, the TPM chip takes exponentially longer to respond if incorrect authorization values are sent to the TPM. Some TPM chips may not store failed attempts over time. Other TPM chips may store every failed attempt indefinitely. Therefore, some users may experience increasingly longer delays when they mistype an authorization value that is sent to the TPM. These delays can prevent them from using the TPM for a period of time. +The industry standards from the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) specify that TPM manufacturers must implement some form of protection logic in TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 chips. TPM 1.2 devices implement different protection mechanisms and behavior. In general, the TPM chip takes exponentially longer to respond if incorrect authorization values are sent to the TPM. Some TPM chips might not store failed attempts over time. Other TPM chips might store every failed attempt indefinitely. Therefore, some users might experience increasingly longer delays when they mistype an authorization value that is sent to the TPM. These delays can prevent them from using the TPM for some time. ## Reset the TPM lockout by using the TPM MMC @@ -73,7 +73,3 @@ For information about mitigating dictionary attacks that use the lockout setting ## Use the TPM cmdlets You can manage the TPM using Windows PowerShell. For details, see [TPM Cmdlets in Windows PowerShell](/powershell/module/trustedplatformmodule/). - -## Related articles - -- [Trusted Platform Module](trusted-platform-module-overview.md) diff --git a/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/switch-pcr-banks-on-tpm-2-0-devices.md b/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/switch-pcr-banks-on-tpm-2-0-devices.md index 281201247a..c3cd7b4d47 100644 --- a/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/switch-pcr-banks-on-tpm-2-0-devices.md +++ b/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/switch-pcr-banks-on-tpm-2-0-devices.md @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ --- -title: UnderstandPCR banks on TPM 2.0 devices +title: Understand PCR banks on TPM 2.0 devices description: Learn about what happens when you switch PCR banks on TPM 2.0 devices. ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 11/17/2023 +ms.date: 07/10/2024 --- # PCR banks on TPM 2.0 devices @@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ It's important to note that this binding to PCR values also includes the hashing ## What happens when PCR banks are switched? -When the PCR banks are switched, the algorithm used to compute the hashed values stored in the PCRs during extend operations is changed. Each hash algorithm will return a different cryptographic signature for the same inputs. +When the PCR banks are switched, the algorithm used to compute the hashed values stored in the PCRs during extend operations is changed. Each hash algorithm returns a different cryptographic signature for the same inputs. -As a result, if the currently used PCR bank is switched all keys that have been bound to the previous PCR values will no longer work. For example, if you had a key bound to the SHA-1 value of PCR[12] and subsequently changed the PCR bank to SHA-256, the banks wouldn't match, and you would be unable to use that key. The BitLocker key is secured using the PCR banks and Windows won't be able to unseal it if the PCR banks are switched while BitLocker is enabled. +As a result, if the currently used PCR bank is switched, all keys that are bound to the previous PCR values no longer work. For example, if you had a key bound to the SHA-1 value of PCR[12] and later changed the PCR bank to SHA-256, the banks wouldn't match, and you would be unable to use that key. The BitLocker key is secured using the PCR banks and Windows can't unseal it if the PCR banks are switched while BitLocker is enabled. ## What can I do to switch PCRs when BitLocker is already active? @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ You can configure a TPM to have multiple PCR banks active. When BIOS performs me - DWORD: `TPMActivePCRBanks` - Defines which PCR banks are currently active. This value should be interpreted as a bitmap for which the bits are defined in the [TCG Algorithm Registry](https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tcg-algorithm-registry/) Table 21 of Revision 1.27. -Windows checks which PCR banks are active and supported by the BIOS. Windows also checks if the measured boot log supports measurements for all active PCR banks. Windows will prefer the use of the SHA-256 bank for measurements and will fall back to SHA1 PCR bank if one of the pre-conditions isn't met. +Windows checks which PCR banks are active and supported by the BIOS. Windows also checks if the measured boot log supports measurements for all active PCR banks. Windows prefers the use of the SHA-256 bank for measurements and falls back to SHA1 PCR bank if one of the preconditions isn't met. You can identify which PCR bank is currently used by Windows by looking at the registry: @@ -51,4 +51,4 @@ You can identify which PCR bank is currently used by Windows by looking at the r - DWORD: `TPMDigestAlgID` - Algorithm ID of the PCR bank that Windows is currently using. This value represents an algorithm identifier as defined in the [TCG Algorithm Registry](https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tcg-algorithm-registry/) Table 3 of Revision 1.27. -Windows only uses one PCR bank to continue boot measurements. All other active PCR banks will be extended with a separator to indicate that they aren't used by Windows and measurements that appear to be from Windows shouldn't be trusted. +Windows only uses one PCR bank to continue boot measurements. All other active PCR banks are extended with a separator to indicate that they aren't used by Windows and measurements that appear to be from Windows shouldn't be trusted. diff --git a/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/tpm-fundamentals.md b/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/tpm-fundamentals.md index d4612701db..a6b202ab80 100644 --- a/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/tpm-fundamentals.md +++ b/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/tpm-fundamentals.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ title: Trusted Platform Module (TPM) fundamentals description: Learn about the components of the Trusted Platform Module and how they're used to mitigate dictionary attacks. ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 11/17/2023 +ms.date: 07/10/2024 --- # TPM fundamentals @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ TPM 2.0 allows some keys to be created without an authorization value associated Originally, BitLocker allowed from 4 to 20 characters for a PIN. Windows Hello has its own PIN for sign-in, which can be 4 to 127 characters. Both BitLocker and Windows Hello use the TPM to prevent PIN brute-force attacks. -Windows 10, version 1607 and earlier used Dictionary Attack Prevention parameters. The Dictionary Attack Prevention Parameters provide a way to balance security needs with usability. For example, when BitLocker is used with a TPM + PIN configuration, the number of PIN guesses is limited over time. A TPM 2.0 in this example could be configured to allow only 32 PIN guesses immediately, and then only one more guess every two hours. This totals a maximum of about 4415 guesses per year. If the PIN is four digits, all 9999 possible PIN combinations could be attempted in a little over two years. +Windows 10, version 1607 and earlier used Dictionary Attack Prevention parameters. The Dictionary Attack Prevention Parameters provide a way to balance security needs with usability. For example, when BitLocker is used with a TPM + PIN configuration, the number of PIN guesses is limited over time. A TPM 2.0 in this example could be configured to allow only 32 PIN guesses immediately, and then only one more guess every two hours. This totals a maximum of about 4,415 guesses per year. If the PIN is four digits, all 9999 possible PIN combinations could be attempted in a little over two years. Starting in Windows 10, version 1703, the minimum length for the BitLocker PIN was increased to six characters, to better align with other Windows features that use TPM 2.0, including Windows Hello. Increasing the PIN length requires a greater number of guesses for an attacker. Therefore, the lockout duration between each guess was shortened to allow legitimate users to retry a failed attempt sooner while maintaining a similar level of protection. In case the legacy parameters for lockout threshold and recovery time need to be used, make sure that GPO is enabled and [configure the system to use legacy Dictionary Attack Prevention Parameters setting for TPM 2.0](/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/trusted-platform-module-services-group-policy-settings#configure-the-system-to-use-legacy-dictionary-attack-prevention-parameters-setting-for-tpm-20). diff --git a/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/tpm-recommendations.md b/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/tpm-recommendations.md index 4471400a65..ae731d1f10 100644 --- a/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/tpm-recommendations.md +++ b/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/tpm-recommendations.md @@ -1,15 +1,15 @@ --- title: TPM recommendations -description: This topic provides recommendations for Trusted Platform Module (TPM) technology for Windows. +description: This article provides recommendations for Trusted Platform Module (TPM) technology for Windows. ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 11/17/2023 +ms.date: 07/10/2024 ms.collection: - tier1 --- # TPM recommendations -This topic provides recommendations for Trusted Platform Module (TPM) technology for Windows. +This article provides recommendations for Trusted Platform Module (TPM) technology for Windows. For a basic feature description of TPM, see the [Trusted Platform Module Technology Overview](trusted-platform-module-overview.md). @@ -17,24 +17,24 @@ For a basic feature description of TPM, see the [Trusted Platform Module Technol Traditionally, TPMs are discrete chips soldered to a computer's motherboard. Such implementations allow the computer's original equipment manufacturer (OEM) to evaluate and certify the TPM separate from the rest of the system. Discrete TPM implementations are common. However, they can be problematic for integrated devices that are small or have low power consumption. Some newer TPM implementations integrate TPM functionality into the same chipset as other platform components while still providing logical separation similar to discrete TPM chips. -TPMs are passive: they receive commands and return responses. To realize the full benefit of a TPM, the OEM must carefully integrate system hardware and firmware with the TPM to send it commands and react to its responses. TPMs were originally designed to provide security and privacy benefits to a platform's owner and users, but newer versions can provide security and privacy benefits to the system hardware itself. Before it can be used for advanced scenarios, however, a TPM must be provisioned. Windows automatically provisions a TPM, but if the user is planning to reinstall the operating system, he or she may need to clear the TPM before reinstalling so that Windows can take full advantage of the TPM. +TPMs are passive: they receive commands and return responses. To realize the full benefit of a TPM, the OEM must carefully integrate system hardware and firmware with the TPM to send it commands and react to its responses. TPMs were originally designed to provide security and privacy benefits to a platform's owner and users, but newer versions can provide security and privacy benefits to the system hardware itself. Before it can be used for advanced scenarios, however, a TPM must be provisioned. Windows automatically provisions a TPM, but if the user is planning to reinstall the operating system, they may need to clear the TPM before reinstalling so that Windows can take full advantage of the TPM. The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is the nonprofit organization that publishes and maintains the TPM specification. The TCG exists to develop, define, and promote vendor-neutral, global industry standards. These standards support a hardware-based root of trust for interoperable trusted computing platforms. The TCG also publishes the TPM specification as the international standard ISO/IEC 11889, using the Publicly Available Specification Submission Process that the Joint Technical Committee 1 defines between the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). -OEMs implement the TPM as a component in a trusted computing platform, such as a PC, tablet, or phone. Trusted computing platforms use the TPM to support privacy and security scenarios that software alone cannot achieve. For example, software alone cannot reliably report whether malware is present during the system startup process. The close integration between TPM and platform increases the transparency of the startup process and supports evaluating device health by enabling reliable measuring and reporting of the software that starts the device. Implementation of a TPM as part of a trusted computing platform provides a hardware root of trust-that is, it behaves in a trusted way. For example, if a key stored in a TPM has properties that disallow exporting the key, that key truly cannot leave the TPM. +OEMs implement the TPM as a component in a trusted computing platform, such as a PC, tablet, or phone. Trusted computing platforms use the TPM to support privacy and security scenarios that software alone can't achieve. For example, software alone can't reliably report whether malware is present during the system startup process. The close integration between TPM and platform increases the transparency of the startup process and supports evaluating device health by enabling reliable measuring and reporting of the software that starts the device. Implementation of a TPM as part of a trusted computing platform provides a hardware root of trust-that is, it behaves in a trusted way. For example, if a key stored in a TPM has properties that disallow exporting the key, that key truly can't leave the TPM. -The TCG designed the TPM as a low-cost, mass-market security solution that addresses the requirements of different customer segments. There are variations in the security properties of different TPM implementations just as there are variations in customer and regulatory requirements for different sectors. In public-sector procurement, for example, some governments have clearly defined security requirements for TPMs whereas others do not. +The TCG designed the TPM as a low-cost, mass-market security solution that addresses the requirements of different customer segments. There are variations in the security properties of different TPM implementations just as there are variations in customer and regulatory requirements for different sectors. In public-sector procurement, for example, some governments clearly define security requirements for TPMs whereas others don't. ## TPM 1.2 vs. 2.0 comparison -From an industry standard, Microsoft has been an industry leader in moving and standardizing on TPM 2.0, which has many key realized benefits across algorithms, crypto, hierarchy, root keys, authorization and NV RAM. +From an industry standard, Microsoft has been an industry leader in moving and standardizing on TPM 2.0, which has many key realized benefits across algorithms, crypto, hierarchy, root keys, authorization, and NV RAM. ## Why TPM 2.0? TPM 2.0 products and systems have important security advantages over TPM 1.2, including: - The TPM 1.2 spec only allows for the use of RSA and the SHA-1 hashing algorithm. -- For security reasons, some entities are moving away from SHA-1. Notably, NIST has required many federal agencies to move to SHA-256 as of 2014, and technology leaders, including Microsoft and Google have announced they will remove support for SHA-1 based signing or certificates in 2017. +- For security reasons, some entities are moving away from SHA-1. Notably, NIST requires many federal agencies to move to SHA-256 as of 2014, and technology leaders, including Microsoft and Google have removed support for SHA-1 based signing or certificates in 2017. - TPM 2.0 **enables greater crypto agility** by being more flexible with respect to cryptographic algorithms. - TPM 2.0 supports newer algorithms, which can improve drive signing and key generation performance. For the full list of supported algorithms, see the [TCG Algorithm Registry](http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/tcg-algorithm-registry/). Some TPMs don't support all algorithms. - For the list of algorithms that Windows supports in the platform cryptographic storage provider, see [CNG Cryptographic Algorithm Providers](/windows/win32/seccertenroll/cng-cryptographic-algorithm-providers). @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ There are three implementation options for TPMs: - Integrated TPM solution, using dedicated hardware integrated into one or more semiconductor packages alongside, but logically separate from, other components. - Firmware TPM solution, running the TPM in firmware in a Trusted Execution mode of a general purpose computation unit. -Windows uses any compatible TPM in the same way. Microsoft does not take a position on which way a TPM should be implemented and there is a wide ecosystem of available TPM solutions, which should suit all needs. +Windows uses any compatible TPM in the same way. Microsoft doesn't take a position on which way a TPM should be implemented and there's a wide ecosystem of available TPM solutions, which should suit all needs. ## Is there any importance for TPM for consumers? @@ -84,25 +84,21 @@ The following table defines which Windows features require TPM support. | Windows Features | TPM Required | Supports TPM 1.2 | Supports TPM 2.0 | Details | |--|--|--|--|--| -| Measured Boot | Yes | Yes | Yes | Measured Boot requires TPM 1.2 or 2.0 and UEFI Secure Boot. TPM 2.0 is recommended since it supports newer cryptographic algorithms. TPM 1.2 only supports the SHA-1 algorithm which is being deprecated. | +| Measured Boot | Yes | Yes | Yes | Measured Boot requires TPM 1.2 or 2.0 and UEFI Secure Boot. TPM 2.0 is recommended since it supports newer cryptographic algorithms. TPM 1.2 only supports the SHA-1 algorithm, which is being deprecated. | | BitLocker | No | Yes | Yes | TPM 1.2 or 2.0 are supported but TPM 2.0 is recommended. [Device Encryption requires Modern Standby](../../operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/index.md#device-encryption) including TPM 2.0 support | | Device Encryption | Yes | N/A | Yes | Device Encryption requires Modern Standby/Connected Standby certification, which requires TPM 2.0. | | Windows Defender Application Control (Device Guard) | No | Yes | Yes | -| Windows Defender System Guard (DRTM) | Yes | No | Yes | TPM 2.0 and UEFI firmware is required. | -| Credential Guard | No | Yes | Yes | Windows 10, version 1507 (End of Life as of May 2017) only supported TPM 2.0 for Credential Guard. Beginning with Windows 10, version 1511, TPM 1.2 and 2.0 are supported. Paired with Windows Defender System Guard, TPM 2.0 provides enhanced security for Credential Guard. Windows 11 requires TPM 2.0 by default to facilitate easier enablement of this enhanced security for customers. | -| Device Health Attestation | Yes | Yes | Yes | TPM 2.0 is recommended since it supports newer cryptographic algorithms. TPM 1.2 only supports the SHA-1 algorithm which is being deprecated. | -| Windows Hello/Windows Hello for Business | No | Yes | Yes | Microsoft Entra join supports both versions of TPM, but requires TPM with keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC) and Endorsement Key (EK) certificate for key attestation support. TPM 2.0 is recommended over TPM 1.2 for better performance and security. Windows Hello as a FIDO platform authenticator will take advantage of TPM 2.0 for key storage. | +| System Guard (DRTM) | Yes | No | Yes | TPM 2.0 and UEFI firmware is required. | +| Credential Guard | No | Yes | Yes | Windows 10, version 1507 (End of Life as of May 2017) only supported TPM 2.0 for Credential Guard. Beginning with Windows 10, version 1511, TPM 1.2 and 2.0 are supported. Paired with System Guard, TPM 2.0 provides enhanced security for Credential Guard. Windows 11 requires TPM 2.0 by default to facilitate easier enablement of this enhanced security for customers. | +| Device Health Attestation | Yes | Yes | Yes | TPM 2.0 is recommended since it supports newer cryptographic algorithms. TPM 1.2 only supports the SHA-1 algorithm, which is being deprecated. | +| Windows Hello/Windows Hello for Business | No | Yes | Yes | Microsoft Entra join supports both versions of TPM, but requires TPM with keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC) and Endorsement Key (EK) certificate for key attestation support. TPM 2.0 is recommended over TPM 1.2 for better performance and security. Windows Hello as a FIDO platform authenticator takes advantage of TPM 2.0 for key storage. | | UEFI Secure Boot | No | Yes | Yes | | TPM Platform Crypto Provider Key Storage Provider | Yes | Yes | Yes | | Virtual Smart Card | Yes | Yes | Yes | | Certificate storage | No | Yes | Yes | TPM is only required when the certificate is stored in the TPM. | -| Autopilot | No | N/A | Yes | If you intend to deploy a scenario which requires TPM (such as white glove and self-deploying mode), then TPM 2.0 and UEFI firmware are required. | +| Autopilot | No | N/A | Yes | If you intend to deploy a scenario, which requires TPM (such as white glove and self-deploying mode), then TPM 2.0 and UEFI firmware are required. | | SecureBIO | Yes | No | Yes | TPM 2.0 and UEFI firmware is required. | ## OEM Status on TPM 2.0 system availability and certified parts Government customers and enterprise customers in regulated industries may have acquisition standards that require use of common certified TPM parts. As a result, OEMs, who provide the devices, may be required to use only certified TPM components on their commercial class systems. For more information, contact your OEM or hardware vendor. - -## Related topics - -- [Trusted Platform Module](trusted-platform-module-overview.md) diff --git a/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/trusted-platform-module-overview.md b/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/trusted-platform-module-overview.md index 46a0c61d51..372d8ad9ee 100644 --- a/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/trusted-platform-module-overview.md +++ b/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/trusted-platform-module-overview.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ title: Trusted Platform Module Technology Overview description: Learn about the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and how Windows uses it for access control and authentication. ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 11/17/2023 +ms.date: 07/10/2024 ms.collection: - tier1 --- diff --git a/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/trusted-platform-module-services-group-policy-settings.md b/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/trusted-platform-module-services-group-policy-settings.md index 4ea0c0f2d7..fdc858bcd3 100644 --- a/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/trusted-platform-module-services-group-policy-settings.md +++ b/windows/security/hardware-security/tpm/trusted-platform-module-services-group-policy-settings.md @@ -1,13 +1,52 @@ --- title: TPM Group Policy settings -description: This topic describes the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Services that can be controlled centrally by using Group Policy settings. +description: This article describes the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Services that can be controlled centrally by using Group Policy settings. ms.topic: conceptual -ms.date: 11/17/2023 +ms.date: 07/10/2024 --- # TPM Group Policy settings -This topic describes the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Services that can be controlled centrally by using Group Policy settings. The Group Policy settings for TPM services are located under **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **System** > **Trusted Platform Module Services**. +This article describes the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Services that can be controlled centrally by using Group Policy settings. The Group Policy settings for TPM services are located under **Computer Configuration** > **Administrative Templates** > **System** > **Trusted Platform Module Services**. + +## Configure the list of blocked TPM commands + +This policy setting allows you to manage the Group Policy list of Trusted Platform Module (TPM) commands blocked by Windows. + +If you enable this policy setting, Windows blocks the specified commands from being sent to the TPM on the computer. TPM commands are referenced by a command number. For example, command number `129` is `TPM_OwnerReadInternalPub`, and command number `170` is `TPM_FieldUpgrade`. + +If you disable or don't configure this policy setting, only those TPM commands specified through the default or local lists may be blocked by Windows. The default list of blocked TPM commands is preconfigured by Windows. You can view the default list by running `tpm.msc`, navigating to the "Command Management" section, and making visible the "On Default Block List" column. The local list of blocked TPM commands is configured outside of Group Policy by running `tpm.msc` or through scripting against the Win32_Tpm interface. + +## Configure the system to clear the TPM if it is not in a ready state + +This policy setting configures the system to prompt the user to clear the TPM if the TPM is detected to be in any state other than Ready. This policy takes effect only if the system's TPM is in a state other than Ready, including if the TPM is "Ready, with reduced functionality". The prompt to clear the TPM will start occurring after the next reboot, upon user sign-in only if the logged in user is part of the Administrators group for the system. The prompt can be dismissed, but will reappear after every reboot and sign-in until the policy is disabled or until the TPM is in a Ready state. + +## Ignore the default list of blocked TPM commands + +This policy setting allows you to enforce or ignore the computer's local list of blocked Trusted Platform Module (TPM) commands. + +If you enable this policy setting, Windows ignores the computer's local list of blocked TPM commands and will only block those TPM commands specified by Group Policy or the default list. + +The local list of blocked TPM commands is configured outside of Group Policy by running `tpm.msc` or through scripting against the `Win32_Tpm` interface. The default list of blocked TPM commands is preconfigured by Windows. See the related policy setting to configure the Group Policy list of blocked TPM commands. + +If you disable or don't configure this policy setting, Windows blocks the TPM commands found in the local list, in addition to commands in the Group Policy and default lists of blocked TPM commands. + +## Ignore the local list of blocked TPM commands + +This policy setting configures how much of the TPM owner authorization information is stored in the registry of the local computer. Depending on the amount of TPM owner authorization information stored locally, the operating system and TPM-based applications can perform certain TPM actions, which require TPM owner authorization without requiring the user to enter the TPM owner password. + +You can choose to have the operating system store either the full TPM owner authorization value, the TPM administrative delegation blob plus the TPM user delegation blob, or none. + +If you enable this policy setting, Windows stores the TPM owner authorization in the registry of the local computer according to the operating system managed TPM authentication setting you choose. + +Choose the operating system managed TPM authentication setting of "Full" to store the full TPM owner authorization, the TPM administrative delegation blob and the TPM user delegation blob in the local registry. This setting allows use of the TPM without requiring remote or external storage of the TPM owner authorization value. This setting is appropriate for scenarios, which don't depend on preventing reset of the TPM anti-hammering logic or changing the TPM owner authorization value. Some TPM-based applications may require this setting be changed before features, which depend on the TPM anti-hammering logic can be used. + +Choose the operating system managed TPM authentication setting of "Delegated" to store only the TPM administrative delegation blob and the TPM user delegation blob in the local registry. This setting is appropriate for use with TPM-based applications that depend on the TPM anti-hammering logic. + +Choose the operating system managed TPM authentication setting of "None" for compatibility with previous operating systems and applications or for use with scenarios that require TPM owner authorization not be stored locally. Using this setting might cause issues with some TPM-based applications. + +> [!NOTE] +> If the operating system managed TPM authentication setting is changed from "Full" to "Delegated", the full TPM owner authorization value is regenerated and any copies of the original TPM owner authorization value are invalidated. ## Configure the level of TPM owner authorization information available to the operating system @@ -24,11 +63,11 @@ This policy setting configured which TPM authorization values are stored in the There are three TPM owner authentication settings that are managed by the Windows operating system. You can choose a value of **Full**, **Delegate**, or **None**. -- **Full**: This setting stores the full TPM owner authorization, the TPM administrative delegation blob, and the TPM user delegation blob in the local registry. With this setting, you can use the TPM without requiring remote or external storage of the TPM owner authorization value. This setting is appropriate for scenarios that do not require you to reset the TPM anti-hammering logic or change the TPM owner authorization value. Some TPM-based applications may require that this setting is changed before features that depend on the TPM anti-hammering logic can be used. Full owner authorization in TPM 1.2 is similar to lockout authorization in TPM 2.0. Owner authorization has a different meaning for TPM 2.0. +- **Full**: This setting stores the full TPM owner authorization, the TPM administrative delegation blob, and the TPM user delegation blob in the local registry. With this setting, you can use the TPM without requiring remote or external storage of the TPM owner authorization value. This setting is appropriate for scenarios that don't require you to reset the TPM anti-hammering logic or change the TPM owner authorization value. Some TPM-based applications may require that this setting is changed before features that depend on the TPM anti-hammering logic can be used. Full owner authorization in TPM 1.2 is similar to lockout authorization in TPM 2.0. Owner authorization has a different meaning for TPM 2.0. - **Delegated**: This setting stores only the TPM administrative delegation blob and the TPM user delegation blob in the local registry. This setting is appropriate for use with TPM-based applications that depend on the TPM antihammering logic. This is the default setting in Windows prior to version 1703. -- **None**: This setting provides compatibility with previous operating systems and applications. You can also use it for scenarios when TPM owner authorization cannot be stored locally. Using this setting might cause issues with some TPM-based applications. +- **None**: This setting provides compatibility with previous operating systems and applications. You can also use it for scenarios when TPM owner authorization can't be stored locally. Using this setting might cause issues with some TPM-based applications. > [!NOTE] > If the operating system managed TPM authentication setting is changed from **Full** to **Delegated**, the full TPM owner authorization value will be regenerated, and any copies of the previously set TPM owner authorization value will be invalid. @@ -46,31 +85,31 @@ The following table shows the TPM owner authorization values in the registry. | 2 | Delegated | | 4 | Full | -If you enable this policy setting, the Windows operating system will store the TPM owner authorization in the registry of the local computer according to the TPM authentication setting you choose. +If you enable this policy setting, the Windows operating system stores the TPM owner authorization in the registry of the local computer according to the TPM authentication setting you choose. -On Windows 10 prior to version 1607, if you disable or do not configure this policy setting, and the **Turn on TPM backup to Active Directory Domain Services** policy setting is also disabled or not configured, the default setting is to store the full TPM authorization value in the local registry. If this policy is disabled or not configured, and the **Turn on TPM backup to Active Directory Domain Services** policy setting is enabled, only the administrative delegation and the user delegation blobs are stored in the local registry. +On Windows 10 prior to version 1607, if you disable or don't configure this policy setting, and the **Turn on TPM backup to Active Directory Domain Services** policy setting is also disabled or not configured, the default setting is to store the full TPM authorization value in the local registry. If this policy is disabled or not configured, and the **Turn on TPM backup to Active Directory Domain Services** policy setting is enabled, only the administrative delegation and the user delegation blobs are stored in the local registry. ## Standard User Lockout Duration This policy setting allows you to manage the duration in minutes for counting standard user authorization failures for Trusted Platform Module (TPM) commands requiring authorization. An authorization failure occurs each time a standard user sends a command to the TPM and receives an error response that indicates an authorization failure occurred. Authorization failures that are older than the duration you set are ignored. If the number of TPM commands with an authorization failure within the lockout duration equals a threshold, a standard user is prevented from sending commands that require authorization to the TPM. -The TPM is designed to protect itself against password guessing attacks by entering a hardware lockout mode when it receives too many commands with an incorrect authorization value. When the TPM enters a lockout mode, it is global for all users (including administrators) and for Windows features such as BitLocker Drive Encryption. +The TPM is designed to protect itself against password guessing attacks by entering a hardware lockout mode when it receives too many commands with an incorrect authorization value. When the TPM enters a lockout mode, it's global for all users (including administrators) and for Windows features such as BitLocker Drive Encryption. This setting helps administrators prevent the TPM hardware from entering a lockout mode by slowing the speed at which standard users can send commands that require authorization to the TPM. For each standard user, two thresholds apply. Exceeding either threshold prevents the user from sending a command that requires authorization to the TPM. Use the following policy settings to set the lockout duration: -- [Standard User Individual Lockout Threshold](#standard-user-individual-lockout-threshold): This value is the maximum number of authorization failures that each standard user can have before the user is not allowed to send commands that require authorization to the TPM. -- [Standard User Total Lockout Threshold](#standard-user-total-lockout-threshold): This value is the maximum total number of authorization failures that all standard users can have before all standard users are not allowed to send commands that require authorization to the TPM. +- [Standard User Individual Lockout Threshold](#standard-user-individual-lockout-threshold): This value is the maximum number of authorization failures that each standard user can have before the user isn't allowed to send commands that require authorization to the TPM. +- [Standard User Total Lockout Threshold](#standard-user-total-lockout-threshold): This value is the maximum total number of authorization failures that all standard users can have before all standard users aren't allowed to send commands that require authorization to the TPM. An administrator with the TPM owner password can fully reset the TPM's hardware lockout logic by using the Windows Defender Security Center. Each time an administrator resets the TPM's hardware lockout logic, all prior standard user TPM authorization failures are ignored. This allows standard users to immediately use the TPM normally. -If you do not configure this policy setting, a default value of 480 minutes (8 hours) is used. +If you don't configure this policy setting, a default value of 480 minutes (8 hours) is used. ## Standard User Individual Lockout Threshold -This policy setting allows you to manage the maximum number of authorization failures for each standard user for the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). This value is the maximum number of authorization failures that each standard user can have before the user is not allowed to send commands that require authorization to the TPM. If the number of authorization failures for the user within the duration that is set for the **Standard User Lockout Duration** policy setting equals this value, the standard user is prevented from sending commands that require authorization to the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). +This policy setting allows you to manage the maximum number of authorization failures for each standard user for the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). This value is the maximum number of authorization failures that each standard user can have before the user isn't allowed to send commands that require authorization to the TPM. If the number of authorization failures for the user within the duration that is set for the **Standard User Lockout Duration** policy setting equals this value, the standard user is prevented from sending commands that require authorization to the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). This setting helps administrators prevent the TPM hardware from entering a lockout mode by slowing the speed at which standard users can send commands that require authorization to the TPM. @@ -78,7 +117,7 @@ An authorization failure occurs each time a standard user sends a command to the An administrator with the TPM owner password can fully reset the TPM's hardware lockout logic by using the Windows Defender Security Center. Each time an administrator resets the TPM's hardware lockout logic, all prior standard user TPM authorization failures are ignored. This allows standard users to immediately use the TPM normally. -If you do not configure this policy setting, a default value of 4 is used. A value of zero means that the operating system will not allow standard users to send commands to the TPM, which might cause an authorization failure. +If you don't configure this policy setting, a default value of 4 is used. A value of zero means that the operating system won't allow standard users to send commands to the TPM, which might cause an authorization failure. ## Standard User Total Lockout Threshold @@ -90,7 +129,7 @@ An authorization failure occurs each time a standard user sends a command to the An administrator with the TPM owner password can fully reset the TPM's hardware lockout logic by using the Windows Defender Security Center. Each time an administrator resets the TPM's hardware lockout logic, all prior standard user TPM authorization failures are ignored. This allows standard users to immediately use the TPM normally. -If you do not configure this policy setting, a default value of 9 is used. A value of zero means that the operating system will not allow standard users to send commands to the TPM, which might cause an authorization failure. +If you don't configure this policy setting, a default value of 9 is used. A value of zero means that the operating system won't allow standard users to send commands to the TPM, which might cause an authorization failure. ## Configure the system to use legacy Dictionary Attack Prevention Parameters setting for TPM 2.0 @@ -114,14 +153,13 @@ You can change what users see about TPM in **Windows Security**. The Group Polic ### Disable the Clear TPM button -If you don't want users to be able to click the **Clear TPM** button in **Windows Security**, you can disable it with this Group Policy setting. Select **Enabled** to make the **Clear TPM** button unavailable for use. +If you don't want users to be able to select the **Clear TPM** button in **Windows Security**, you can disable it with this Group Policy setting. Select **Enabled** to make the **Clear TPM** button unavailable for use. ### Hide the TPM Firmware Update recommendation If you don't want users to see the recommendation to update TPM firmware, you can disable it with this setting. Select **Enabled** to prevent users from seeing a recommendation to update their TPM firmware when a vulnerable firmware is detected. -## Related topics +## Related articles -- [Trusted Platform Module](trusted-platform-module-overview.md) - [TPM Cmdlets in Windows PowerShell](/powershell/module/trustedplatformmodule/?view=win10-ps&preserve-view=true) - [BitLocker planning guide](../../operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/planning-guide.md)