diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-system-guard/how-hardware-based-root-of-trust-helps-protect-windows.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-system-guard/how-hardware-based-root-of-trust-helps-protect-windows.md index 7531187507..03fbaffd0c 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-system-guard/how-hardware-based-root-of-trust-helps-protect-windows.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-system-guard/how-hardware-based-root-of-trust-helps-protect-windows.md @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ As there are thousands of PC vendors that produce numerous models with different Two techniques exist to establish trust here—either maintain a list of known 'bad' SRTM measurements (also known as a blacklist), or a list of known 'good' SRTM measurements (also known as a whitelist). Each option has a drawback: -- A list of known 'bad' SRTM measurements allows a hacker to change just 1 bit in a component to create an entirely new SRTM hash that needs to be listed. +- A list of known 'bad' SRTM measurements allows a hacker to change just 1 bit in a component to create an entirely new SRTM hash that needs to be listed. This means that the SRTM flow is inherently brittle - a minor change can invalidate the entire chain of trust. - A list of known 'good' SRTM measurements requires each new BIOS/PC combination measurement to be carefully added, which is slow. In addition, a bug fix for UEFI code can take a long time to design, build, retest, validate, and redeploy. @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ Secure Launch simplifies management of SRTM measurements because the launch code System Management Mode (SMM) is a special-purpose CPU mode in x86 microcontrollers that handles power management, hardware configuration, thermal monitoring, and anything else the manufacturer deems useful. Whenever one of these system operations is requested, a non-maskable interrupt (SMI) is invoked at runtime, which executes SMM code installed by the BIOS. -SMM code executes in the highest privilege level and is invisible to the OS, which makes it an attractive target for malicious activity. Even if DRTM is used to late launch, SMM code can potentially access hypervisor memory and change the hypervisor. +SMM code executes in the highest privilege level and is invisible to the OS, which makes it an attractive target for malicious activity. Even if System Guard Secure Launch is used to late launch, SMM code can potentially access hypervisor memory and change the hypervisor. To defend against this, two techniques are used: 1. Paging protection to prevent inappropriate access to code and data @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ In the future, Windows 10 will also measure this SMI Handler’s behavior and at While Windows Defender System Guard provides advanced protection that will help protect and maintain the integrity of the platform during boot and at run time, the reality is that we must apply an "assume breach" mentality to even our most sophisticated security technologies. We should be able to trust that the technologies are successfully doing their jobs, but we also need the ability to verify that they were successful in achieving their goals. When it comes to platform integrity, we can’t just trust the platform, which potentially could be compromised, to self-attest to its security state. So Windows Defender System Guard includes a series of technologies that enable remote analysis of the device’s integrity. -As Windows 10 boots, a series of integrity measurements are taken by Windows Defender System Guard using the device’s Trusted Platform Module 2.0 (TPM 2.0). This process and data are hardware-isolated away from Windows to help ensure that the measurement data is not subject to the type of tampering that could happen if the platform was compromised. From here, the measurements can be used to determine the integrity of the device’s firmware, hardware configuration state, and Windows boot-related components, just to name a few. +As Windows 10 boots, a series of integrity measurements are taken by Windows Defender System Guard using the device’s Trusted Platform Module 2.0 (TPM 2.0). System Guard Secure Launch will not support earlier TPM versions, such as TPM 1.2. This process and data are hardware-isolated away from Windows to help ensure that the measurement data is not subject to the type of tampering that could happen if the platform was compromised. From here, the measurements can be used to determine the integrity of the device’s firmware, hardware configuration state, and Windows boot-related components, just to name a few. ![Boot time integrity](images/windows-defender-system-guard-boot-time-integrity.png) diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-system-guard/images/system-guard-secure-launch.png b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-system-guard/images/system-guard-secure-launch.png index 8707d0fba4..b8167afbdc 100644 Binary files a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-system-guard/images/system-guard-secure-launch.png and b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-system-guard/images/system-guard-secure-launch.png differ diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-system-guard/system-guard-secure-launch-and-smm-protection.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-system-guard/system-guard-secure-launch-and-smm-protection.md index 6b0f8c4ebd..1bcaf4a60e 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-system-guard/system-guard-secure-launch-and-smm-protection.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-system-guard/system-guard-secure-launch-and-smm-protection.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ ms.date: 02/14/2019 # System Guard Secure Launch and SMM protection -This topic explains how to configure System Guard Secure Launch and System Management Mode (SMM) protection to improve the startup security of Windows 10 devices. +This topic explains how to configure System Guard Secure Launch and System Management Mode (SMM) protection to improve the startup security of Windows 10 devices. The information below is presented from a client perspective. ## How to enable System Guard Secure Launch @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ You can enable System Guard Secure Launch by using any of these options: - [Mobile Device Management (MDM)](#mobile-device-management) - [Group Policy](#group-policy) -- [Windows Security app](#windows-security-app) +- [Windows Security Center](#windows-security-center) - [Registry](#registry) ### Mobile Device Management @@ -35,11 +35,11 @@ System Guard Secure Launch can be configured for Mobile Device Management (MDM) ![Secure Launch Group Policy](images/secure-launch-group-policy.png) -### Windows Security app +### Windows Security Center Click **Start** > **Settings** > **Update & Security** > **Windows Security** > **Open Windows Security** > **Device security** > **Core isolation** > **Firmware protection**. -![Secure Launch Security App](images/secure-launch-security-app.png) +![Windows Security Center](images/secure-launch-security-app.png) ### Registry @@ -55,12 +55,69 @@ Click **Start** > **Settings** > **Update & Security** > **Windows Security** > To verify that Secure Launch is running, use System Information (MSInfo32). Click **Start**, search for **System Information**, and look under **Virtualization-based Security Services Running** and **Virtualization-based Security Services Configured**. -![Secure Launch Security App](images/secure-launch-msinfo.png) +![Windows Security Center](images/secure-launch-msinfo.png) +>[!NOTE] +>To enable System Guard Secure launch, the platform must meet all the baseline requirements for [Device Guard](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/device-guard/introduction-to-device-guard-virtualization-based-security-and-windows-defender-application-control), [Credential Guard](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/credential-guard-requirements), and [Virtualization Based Security](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity). +## For Intel® vPro™ processors starting with Intel® Coffeelake, Whiskeylake, or later silicon requirements +Your environment needs the following hardware to run System Guard Secure Launch. +|Intel® Hardware requirement|Description| +|--------|-----------| +|64-bit CPU|A 64-bit computer with minimum 4 cores (logical processors) is required for hypervisor and virtualization-based security (VBS). For more info about Hyper-V, see [Hyper-V on Windows Server 2016](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/virtualization/hyper-v/hyper-v-on-windows-server) or [Introduction to Hyper-V on Windows 10](https://docs.microsoft.com/virtualization/hyper-v-on-windows/about/). For more info about hypervisor, see [Hypervisor Specifications](https://docs.microsoft.com/virtualization/hyper-v-on-windows/reference/tlfs).| +|Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 2.0|Platforms must support a discrete TPM 2.0. Integrated/firmware TPMs are not supported.| +|Windows DMA Protection|Platforms must meet the Windows DMA Protection Specification (all external DMA ports must be off by default until the OS explicitly powers them)| +|SMM communication buffers| All SMM communication buffers must be implemented in EfiRuntimeServicesData ,EfiRuntimeServicesCode , EfiACPIMemoryNVS, or EfiReservedMemoryType memory types. | +|SMM Page Tables| Must NOT contain any mappings to EfiConventionalMemory (e.g. no OS/VMM owned memory),
NOT contain any mappings to code sections within EfiRuntimeServicesCode,
NOT have execute and write permissions for the same page
Platforms must allow ONLY that TSEG pages can be marked executable and the memory map must report TSEG EfiReservedMemoryType
BIOS SMI handler must be implemented such that SMM page tables are locked on every SMM entry | +|Modern/Connected Standby|Platforms must support Modern/Connected Standby| +|TPM AUX Index|Platform must set up a AUX index with index, attributes, and policy that exactly corresponds to the AUX index specified in the TXT DG with a data size of exactly 104 bytes (for SHA256 AUX data). (NameAlg = SHA256) +Platforms must set up a PS (Platform Supplier) index with:
+Exactly the “TXT PS2” style Attributes on creation as follows:
+AuthWrite
+PolicyDelete
+WriteLocked
+ +WriteDefine
+ +AuthRead
+ +NoDa
+ +Written
+ +PlatformCreate
+ +A policy of exactly PolicyCommandCode(CC = TPM2_CC_UndefineSpaceSpecial) (SHA256 NameAlg and Policy)
+ +Size of exactly 70 bytes
+ +NameAlg = SHA256
+ +In addition, it must have been initialized and locked (TPMA_NV_WRITTEN = 1, TPMA_NV_WRITELOCKED = 1) at time of OS launch. + +PS index data DataRevocationCounters, SINITMinVersion, and PolicyControl must all be 0x00 | +|AUX Policy|The required AUX policy must be as follows:
A = TPM2_PolicyLocality (Locality 3 & Locality 4)
+ +B = TPM2_PolicyCommandCode (TPM_CC_NV_UndefineSpecial)
+ +authPolicy = {A} OR {{A} AND {B}}
+ +authPolicy digest = 0xef, 0x9a, 0x26, 0xfc, 0x22, 0xd1, 0xae, 0x8c, 0xec, 0xff, 0x59, 0xe9, 0x48, 0x1a, 0xc1, 0xec, 0x53, 0x3d, 0xbe, 0x22, 0x8b, 0xec, 0x6d, 0x17, 0x93, 0x0f, 0x4c, 0xb2, 0xcc, 0x5b, 0x97, 0x24 | +|Platform firmware|Platform firmware must carry all code required to execute an Intel® Trusted Execution Technology secure launch:
+ +Intel SINIT ACM must be carried in the OEM BIOS
+ +Platforms must ship with a production ACM signed by the correct production Intel ACM signer for the platform | +|System firmware update|System firmware is recommended to be updated via UpdateCapsule in Windows Update | +## Software requirements +Your environment needs the following software to run Windows Defender Application Guard. + +|Software|Description| +|--------|-----------| +|Operating system|Windows 10 Enterprise edition, version 1709 or higher
Windows 10 Professional edition, version 1803| \ No newline at end of file