From b0273ae8a6e96341887a7ca0a79f85c976d7ab51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stephanie Savell <101299710+v-stsavell@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 13:27:15 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] Update
 windows/security/information-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-countermeasures.md

---
 .../bitlocker/bitlocker-countermeasures.md                      | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/windows/security/information-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-countermeasures.md b/windows/security/information-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-countermeasures.md
index 813daa0b78..03c95bbdde 100644
--- a/windows/security/information-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-countermeasures.md
+++ b/windows/security/information-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-countermeasures.md
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ For customers requiring protection against these advanced attacks, configure a T
 
 An attacker might modify the boot manager configuration database (BCD) which is stored on a non-encrypted partition and add an entry point to a rogue operating system on a different partition. During the boot process, BitLocker code will make sure that the operating system that the encryption key obtained from the TPM is given to, is cryptographically verified to be the intended recipient. Because this strong cryptographic verification already exists, we don’t recommend storing a hash of a disk partition table in Platform Configuration Register (PCR) 5.
  
-An attacker might also replace the entire operating system disk while preserving the platform hardware and firmware and could then extract a protected BitLocker key blob from the metadata of the victim OS partition. The attacker could then attempt to unseal that BitLocker key blob by calling the TPM API from an operating system under their control. This will not succeed because when Windows seals the BitLocker key to the TPM, it does it with a PCR 11 value of 0, and to successfully unseal the blob, PCR 11 in the TPM must have a value of 0. However, when the boot manager passes the control to any boot loader (legitimate or rogue) it always changes PCR 11 to a value of 1. Since the PCR 11 value is guaranteed to be different after exiting the boot manager, the attacker can't unlock the Bitlocker key.
+An attacker might also replace the entire operating system disk while preserving the platform hardware and firmware and could then extract a protected BitLocker key blob from the metadata of the victim OS partition. The attacker could then attempt to unseal that BitLocker key blob by calling the TPM API from an operating system under their control. This will not succeed because when Windows seals the BitLocker key to the TPM, it does it with a PCR 11 value of 0, and to successfully unseal the blob, PCR 11 in the TPM must have a value of 0. However, when the boot manager passes the control to any boot loader (legitimate or rogue) it always changes PCR 11 to a value of 1. Since the PCR 11 value is guaranteed to be different after exiting the boot manager, the attacker can't unlock the BitLocker key.
 
 ## Attacker countermeasures