diff --git a/devices/hololens/docfx.json b/devices/hololens/docfx.json index 2908606c60..017aa6750e 100644 --- a/devices/hololens/docfx.json +++ b/devices/hololens/docfx.json @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ "ms.date": "04/05/2017", "feedback_system": "GitHub", "feedback_github_repo": "MicrosoftDocs/windows-itpro-docs", - "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/help/4021566/windows-10-send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-feedback-hub-app", + "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/windows/send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-the-feedback-hub-app-f59187f8-8739-22d6-ba93-f66612949332", "_op_documentIdPathDepotMapping": { "./": { "depot_name": "Win.itpro-hololens", diff --git a/devices/surface-hub/docfx.json b/devices/surface-hub/docfx.json index 1e0f65ecc7..a9772d7b8c 100644 --- a/devices/surface-hub/docfx.json +++ b/devices/surface-hub/docfx.json @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ "ms.date": "05/23/2017", "feedback_system": "GitHub", "feedback_github_repo": "MicrosoftDocs/windows-itpro-docs", - "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/help/4021566/windows-10-send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-feedback-hub-app", + "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/windows/send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-the-feedback-hub-app-f59187f8-8739-22d6-ba93-f66612949332", "_op_documentIdPathDepotMapping": { "./": { "depot_name": "Win.surface-hub", diff --git a/devices/surface/docfx.json b/devices/surface/docfx.json index da410e3263..f11706aa9d 100644 --- a/devices/surface/docfx.json +++ b/devices/surface/docfx.json @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ "ms.date": "05/09/2017", "feedback_system": "GitHub", "feedback_github_repo": "MicrosoftDocs/windows-itpro-docs", - "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/help/4021566/windows-10-send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-feedback-hub-app", + "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/windows/send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-the-feedback-hub-app-f59187f8-8739-22d6-ba93-f66612949332", "_op_documentIdPathDepotMapping": { "./": { "depot_name": "Win.surface", diff --git a/education/docfx.json b/education/docfx.json index 38f8413d5f..105c802404 100644 --- a/education/docfx.json +++ b/education/docfx.json @@ -27,15 +27,13 @@ ], "globalMetadata": { "recommendations": true, - "ROBOTS": "INDEX, FOLLOW", - "audience": "windows-education", "ms.topic": "article", "ms.technology": "windows", - "manager": "dansimp", + "manager": "aaroncz", "breadcrumb_path": "/education/breadcrumb/toc.json", - "ms.date": "05/09/2017", - "feedback_system": "None", - "hideEdit": true, + "feedback_system": "GitHub", + "feedback_github_repo": "MicrosoftDocs/windows-itpro-docs", + "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/windows/send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-the-feedback-hub-app-f59187f8-8739-22d6-ba93-f66612949332", "_op_documentIdPathDepotMapping": { "./": { "depot_name": "Win.education", diff --git a/gdpr/docfx.json b/gdpr/docfx.json index eaa6eba4eb..d786f46f58 100644 --- a/gdpr/docfx.json +++ b/gdpr/docfx.json @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ "ms.author": "lizross", "feedback_system": "GitHub", "feedback_github_repo": "MicrosoftDocs/windows-itpro-docs", - "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/help/4021566/windows-10-send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-feedback-hub-app", + "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/windows/send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-the-feedback-hub-app-f59187f8-8739-22d6-ba93-f66612949332", "contributors_to_exclude": [ "rjagiewich", "traya1", diff --git a/mdop/docfx.json b/mdop/docfx.json index dfa58fa007..6ff865c683 100644 --- a/mdop/docfx.json +++ b/mdop/docfx.json @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ "ms.date": "04/05/2017", "feedback_system": "GitHub", "feedback_github_repo": "https://github.com/MicrosoftDocs/mdop-docs", - "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/help/4021566/windows-10-send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-feedback-hub-app", + "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/windows/send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-the-feedback-hub-app-f59187f8-8739-22d6-ba93-f66612949332", "_op_documentIdPathDepotMapping": { "./": { "depot_name": "Win.mdop", diff --git a/windows/client-management/docfx.json b/windows/client-management/docfx.json index 85c108b97e..6c35dc70a8 100644 --- a/windows/client-management/docfx.json +++ b/windows/client-management/docfx.json @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ "manager": "dansimp", "feedback_system": "GitHub", "feedback_github_repo": "MicrosoftDocs/windows-itpro-docs", - "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/help/4021566/windows-10-send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-feedback-hub-app", + "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/windows/send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-the-feedback-hub-app-f59187f8-8739-22d6-ba93-f66612949332", "_op_documentIdPathDepotMapping": { "./": { "depot_name": "MSDN.win-client-management", diff --git a/windows/deployment/do/index.yml b/windows/deployment/do/index.yml index dede7617a5..a2db6aedca 100644 --- a/windows/deployment/do/index.yml +++ b/windows/deployment/do/index.yml @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ landingContent: - text: Delivery Optimization Frequently Asked Questions url: ../update/waas-delivery-optimization-faq.md - text: Submit feedback - url: https://support.microsoft.com/help/4021566/windows-10-send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-feedback-hub-app + url: https://support.microsoft.com/windows/send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-the-feedback-hub-app-f59187f8-8739-22d6-ba93-f66612949332 # Card (optional) - title: Configure Delivery Optimization on Microsoft Endpoint Manager diff --git a/windows/deployment/docfx.json b/windows/deployment/docfx.json index 2af5bf6390..6e2cfcba95 100644 --- a/windows/deployment/docfx.json +++ b/windows/deployment/docfx.json @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ "ms.topic": "article", "feedback_system": "GitHub", "feedback_github_repo": "MicrosoftDocs/windows-itpro-docs", - "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/help/4021566/windows-10-send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-feedback-hub-app", + "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/windows/send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-the-feedback-hub-app-f59187f8-8739-22d6-ba93-f66612949332", "_op_documentIdPathDepotMapping": { "./": { "depot_name": "MSDN.win-development", diff --git a/windows/deployment/planning/windows-10-deprecated-features.md b/windows/deployment/planning/windows-10-deprecated-features.md index e5b7464f6e..76c4a0c066 100644 --- a/windows/deployment/planning/windows-10-deprecated-features.md +++ b/windows/deployment/planning/windows-10-deprecated-features.md @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ The features in this article are no longer being actively developed, and might b **The following list is subject to change and might not include every affected feature or functionality.** > [!NOTE] -> If you have feedback about the proposed replacement of any of these features, you can use the [Feedback Hub app](https://support.microsoft.com/help/4021566/windows-10-send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-feedback-hub-app). +> If you have feedback about the proposed replacement of any of these features, you can use the [Feedback Hub app](https://support.microsoft.com/windows/send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-the-feedback-hub-app-f59187f8-8739-22d6-ba93-f66612949332). |Feature | Details and mitigation | Deprecation announced | | ----------- | --------------------- | ---- | diff --git a/windows/hub/docfx.json b/windows/hub/docfx.json index 228d687717..461e6028a8 100644 --- a/windows/hub/docfx.json +++ b/windows/hub/docfx.json @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ "ms.topic": "article", "feedback_system": "GitHub", "feedback_github_repo": "MicrosoftDocs/windows-itpro-docs", - "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/help/4021566/windows-10-send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-feedback-hub-app", + "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/windows/send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-the-feedback-hub-app-f59187f8-8739-22d6-ba93-f66612949332", "_op_documentIdPathDepotMapping": { "./": { "depot_name": "MSDN.windows-hub", diff --git a/windows/known-issues/docfx.json b/windows/known-issues/docfx.json index d331ee80d1..2119242b44 100644 --- a/windows/known-issues/docfx.json +++ b/windows/known-issues/docfx.json @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ "breadcrumb_path": "/windows/windows-10/breadcrumb/toc.json", "feedback_system": "GitHub", "feedback_github_repo": "MicrosoftDocs/windows-itpro-docs", - "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/help/4021566/windows-10-send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-feedback-hub-app", + "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/windows/send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-the-feedback-hub-app-f59187f8-8739-22d6-ba93-f66612949332", "contributors_to_exclude": [ "rjagiewich", "traya1", diff --git a/windows/privacy/docfx.json b/windows/privacy/docfx.json index 48c27d274d..a0c9217603 100644 --- a/windows/privacy/docfx.json +++ b/windows/privacy/docfx.json @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ "ms.topic": "article", "feedback_system": "GitHub", "feedback_github_repo": "MicrosoftDocs/windows-itpro-docs", - "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/help/4021566/windows-10-send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-feedback-hub-app", + "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/windows/send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-the-feedback-hub-app-f59187f8-8739-22d6-ba93-f66612949332", "_op_documentIdPathDepotMapping": { "./": { "depot_name": "MSDN.privacy", diff --git a/windows/security/docfx.json b/windows/security/docfx.json index 730a2a9252..84eb2da0af 100644 --- a/windows/security/docfx.json +++ b/windows/security/docfx.json @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ "audience": "ITPro", "feedback_system": "GitHub", "feedback_github_repo": "MicrosoftDocs/windows-itpro-docs", - "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/help/4021566/windows-10-send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-feedback-hub-app", + "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/windows/send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-the-feedback-hub-app-f59187f8-8739-22d6-ba93-f66612949332", "_op_documentIdPathDepotMapping": { "./": { "depot_name": "MSDN.security", diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4913.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4913.md index 9c173860f4..dc79e60f50 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4913.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4913.md @@ -77,13 +77,13 @@ This event always generates, regardless of the object’s [SACL](/windows/win32/ **Subject:** -- **Security ID** \[Type = SID\]**:** SID of account that changed the Central Access Policy on the object. Event Viewer automatically tries to resolve SIDs and show the account name. If the SID cannot be resolved, you will see the source data in the event. +- **Security ID** \[Type = SID\]**:** SID of account that changed the Central Access Policy on the object. Event Viewer automatically tries to resolve SIDs and show the account name. If the SID can't be resolved, you'll see the source data in the event. > **Note**  A **security identifier (SID)** is a unique value of variable length used to identify a trustee (security principal). Each account has a unique SID that is issued by an authority, such as an Active Directory domain controller, and stored in a security database. Each time a user logs on, the system retrieves the SID for that user from the database and places it in the access token for that user. The system uses the SID in the access token to identify the user in all subsequent interactions with Windows security. When a SID has been used as the unique identifier for a user or group, it cannot ever be used again to identify another user or group. For more information about SIDs, see [Security identifiers](/windows/access-protection/access-control/security-identifiers). - **Account Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** the name of the account that changed the Central Access Policy on the object. -- **Account Domain** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** subject’s domain or computer name. Formats vary, and include the following: +- **Account Domain** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** subject’s domain or computer name. Formats vary, and include the following ones: - Domain NETBIOS name example: CONTOSO @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ This event always generates, regardless of the object’s [SACL](/windows/win32/ - **Original Security Descriptor** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** the Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) value for the old Central Policy ID (for the policy that was formerly applied to the object). - SDDL contains Central Access Policy SID, here is an example: S:ARAI(SP;ID;;;;S-1-17-1442530252-1178042555-1247349694-2318402534), Central Access Policy SID here is “**S-1-17-1442530252-1178042555-1247349694-2318402534**”. To resolve this SID to the real Central Access Policy name you need to do the following: + SDDL contains Central Access Policy SID, here's an example: S:ARAI(SP;ID;;;;S-1-17-1442530252-1178042555-1247349694-2318402534), Central Access Policy SID here is “**S-1-17-1442530252-1178042555-1247349694-2318402534**”. To resolve this SID to the real Central Access Policy name, you need to do the following steps: 1. Find Central Access Policy Active Directory object in: “CN=Central Access Policies,CN=Claims Configuration,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=XXX,DC=XX” Active Directory container. @@ -166,11 +166,11 @@ This event always generates, regardless of the object’s [SACL](/windows/win32/ |-------|--------------------------------------|-------|---------------------------------| | "AO" | Account operators | "PA" | Group Policy administrators | | "RU" | Alias to allow previous Windows 2000 | "IU" | Interactively logged-on user | -| "AN" | Anonymous logon | "LA" | Local administrator | +| "AN" | Anonymous sign in | "LA" | Local administrator | | "AU" | Authenticated users | "LG" | Local guest | | "BA" | Built-in administrators | "LS" | Local service account | | "BG" | Built-in guests | "SY" | Local system | -| "BO" | Backup operators | "NU" | Network logon user | +| "BO" | Backup operators | "NU" | Network sign-in user | | "BU" | Built-in users | "NO" | Network configuration operators | | "CA" | Certificate server administrators | "NS" | Network service account | | "CG" | Creator group | "PO" | Printer operators | @@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ This event always generates, regardless of the object’s [SACL](/windows/win32/ | "DU" | Domain users | "RC" | Restricted code | | "EA" | Enterprise administrators | "SA" | Schema administrators | | "ED" | Enterprise domain controllers | "SO" | Server operators | -| "WD" | Everyone | "SU" | Service logon user | +| "WD" | Everyone | "SU" | Service sign-in user | - *G*: = Primary Group. - *D*: = DACL Entries. @@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ Example: D:(A;;FA;;;WD) "P” - SDDL\_PROTECTED, Inheritance from containers that are higher in the folder hierarchy are blocked. -"AI" - SDDL\_AUTO\_INHERITED, Inheritance is allowed, assuming that "P" Is not also set. +"AI" - SDDL\_AUTO\_INHERITED, Inheritance is allowed, assuming that "P" isn't also set. "AR" - SDDL\_AUTO\_INHERIT\_REQ, Child objects inherit permissions from this object. @@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ Example: D:(A;;FA;;;WD) "CI" - CONTAINER INHERIT: Child objects that are containers, such as directories, inherit the ACE as an explicit ACE. -"OI" - OBJECT INHERIT: Child objects that are not containers inherit the ACE as an explicit ACE. +"OI" - OBJECT INHERIT: Child objects that aren't containers inherit the ACE as an explicit ACE. "NP" - NO PROPAGATE: only immediate children inherit this ace. @@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ Example: D:(A;;FA;;;WD) "SA" - SUCCESSFUL ACCESS AUDIT "FA" - FAILED ACCESS AUDIT -- rights: A hexadecimal string which denotes the access mask or reserved value, for example: FA (File All Access), FX (File Execute), FW (File Write), etc. +- rights: A hexadecimal string that denotes the access mask or reserved value, for example: FA (File All Access), FX (File Execute), FW (File Write), etc. | Value | Description | Value | Description | |----------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------| @@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ Example: D:(A;;FA;;;WD) - object\_guid: N/A - inherit\_object\_guid: N/A -- account\_sid: SID of specific security principal, or reserved value, for example: AN (Anonymous), WD (Everyone), SY (LOCAL\_SYSTEM), etc. See the table above for more details. +- account\_sid: SID of specific security principal, or reserved value, for example: AN (Anonymous), WD (Everyone), SY (LOCAL\_SYSTEM), etc. For more information, see the table above. For more information about SDDL syntax, see these articles: , . @@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ For 4913(S): Central Access Policy on the object was changed. - If you have a pre-defined “**Process Name**” for the process reported in this event, monitor all events with “**Process Name**” not equal to your defined value. -- You can monitor to see if “**Process Name**” is not in a standard folder (for example, not in **System32** or **Program Files**) or is in a restricted folder (for example, **Temporary Internet Files**). +- You can monitor to see if “**Process Name**” isn't in a standard folder (for example, not in **System32** or **Program Files**) or is in a restricted folder (for example, **Temporary Internet Files**). diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4928.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4928.md index 2899b77a51..64481ef466 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4928.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4928.md @@ -97,12 +97,12 @@ Failure event generates if an error occurs (**Status Code** != 0). Directory Replication Service options in AD Sites and Services -- **Status Code** \[Type = UInt32\]**:** if there are no issues or errors, the status code will be 0. If an error happened, you will receive Failure event and Status Code will not be equal to “**0**”. You can check error code meaning here: +- **Status Code** \[Type = UInt32\]**:** if there are no issues or errors, the status code will be 0. If an error happened, you'll receive Failure event and Status Code won't be equal to “**0**”. You can check error code meaning here: ## Security Monitoring Recommendations For 4928(S, F): An Active Directory replica source naming context was established. -- Monitor for **Source Address** field, because the source of new replication (new DRA) must be authorized for this action. If you find any unauthorized DRA you should trigger an event. +- Monitor for **Source Address** field, because the source of new replication (new DRA) must be authorized for this action. If you find any unauthorized DRA, you should trigger an event. - This event is typically used for Active Directory replication troubleshooting. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4929.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4929.md index 8d4802ca42..bd67b19fac 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4929.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4929.md @@ -89,18 +89,18 @@ Failure event generates if an error occurs (**Status Code** != 0). - **Source Address** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: DNS record of the server from which the “remove” request was received. -- **Naming Context** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** naming context which was removed. +- **Naming Context** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** naming context that was removed. > **Note**  The Directory Tree of Active Directory tree is partitioned to allow sections to be distributed (replicated) to domain controllers in different domains within the forest. Each domain controller stores a copy of a specific part of the directory tree, called a **Naming Context** also known as Directory Partition. **Naming Context** is replicated as a unit to other domain controllers in the forest that contain a replica of the same sub tree. A **Naming Context** is also called a Directory Partition. - **Options** \[Type = UInt32\]: decimal value of [DRS Options](/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-drsr/ac9c8a11-cd46-4080-acbf-9faa86344030). -- **Status Code** \[Type = UInt32\]**:** if there are no issues or errors, the status code will be 0. If an error happened, you will receive Failure event and Status Code will not be equal to “**0**”. You can check error code meaning here: +- **Status Code** \[Type = UInt32\]**:** if there are no issues or errors, the status code will be 0. If an error happened, you'll receive Failure event and Status Code won't be equal to “**0**”. You can check error code meaning here: ## Security Monitoring Recommendations For 4929(S, F): An Active Directory replica source naming context was removed. -- Monitor for **Source Address** field, because the source of the request must be authorized for this action. If you find any unauthorized DRA you should trigger an event. +- Monitor for **Source Address** field, because the source of the request must be authorized for this action. If you find any unauthorized DRA, you should trigger an event. - This event is typically used for Active Directory replication troubleshooting. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4930.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4930.md index ad5d6086a1..c63813a961 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4930.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4930.md @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ This event generates every time Active Directory replica source naming context w Failure event generates if an error occurs (**Status Code** != 0). -It is not possible to understand what exactly was modified from this event. +It isn't possible to understand what exactly was modified from this event. > **Note**  For recommendations, see [Security Monitoring Recommendations](#security-monitoring-recommendations) for this event. @@ -91,18 +91,18 @@ It is not possible to understand what exactly was modified from this event. - **Source Address** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: DNS record of computer from which the modification request was received. -- **Naming Context** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** naming context which was modified. +- **Naming Context** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** naming context that was modified. > **Note**  The Directory Tree of Active Directory tree is partitioned to allow sections to be distributed (replicated) to domain controllers in different domains within the forest. Each domain controller stores a copy of a specific part of the directory tree, called a **Naming Context** also known as Directory Partition. **Naming Context** is replicated as a unit to other domain controllers in the forest that contain a replica of the same sub tree. A **Naming Context** is also called a Directory Partition. - **Options** \[Type = UInt32\]: decimal value of [DRS Options](/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-drsr/ac9c8a11-cd46-4080-acbf-9faa86344030). -- **Status Code** \[Type = UInt32\]**:** if there are no issues or errors, the status code will be 0. If an error happened, you will receive Failure event and Status Code will not be equal to “**0**”. You can check error code meaning here: +- **Status Code** \[Type = UInt32\]**:** if there are no issues or errors, the status code will be 0. If an error happened, you'll receive Failure event and Status Code won't be equal to “**0**”. You can check error code meaning here: ## Security Monitoring Recommendations For 4930(S, F): An Active Directory replica source naming context was modified. -- Monitor for **Source Address** field, because the source of the request must be authorized for this action. If you find any unauthorized DRA you should trigger an event. +- Monitor for **Source Address** field, because the source of the request must be authorized for this action. If you find any unauthorized DRA, you should trigger an event. - This event is typically used for Active Directory replication troubleshooting. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4931.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4931.md index 39a7be5a64..46b91b742c 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4931.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4931.md @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ This event generates every time Active Directory replica destination naming cont Failure event generates if an error occurs (**Status Code** != 0). -It is not possible to understand what exactly was modified from this event. +It isn't possible to understand what exactly was modified from this event. > **Note**  For recommendations, see [Security Monitoring Recommendations](#security-monitoring-recommendations) for this event. @@ -91,13 +91,13 @@ It is not possible to understand what exactly was modified from this event. - **Destination Address** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: DNS record of computer to which the modification request was sent. -- **Naming Context** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** naming context which was modified. +- **Naming Context** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** naming context that was modified. > **Note**  The Directory Tree of Active Directory tree is partitioned to allow sections to be distributed (replicated) to domain controllers in different domains within the forest. Each domain controller stores a copy of a specific part of the directory tree, called a **Naming Context** also known as Directory Partition. **Naming Context** is replicated as a unit to other domain controllers in the forest that contain a replica of the same sub tree. A **Naming Context** is also called a Directory Partition. - **Options** \[Type = UInt32\]: decimal value of [DRS Options](/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-drsr/ac9c8a11-cd46-4080-acbf-9faa86344030). -- **Status Code** \[Type = UInt32\]**:** if there are no issues or errors, the status code will be 0. If an error happened, you will receive Failure event and Status Code will not be equal to “**0**”. You can check error code meaning here: +- **Status Code** \[Type = UInt32\]**:** if there are no issues or errors, the status code will be 0. If an error happened, you'll receive Failure event and Status Code won't be equal to “**0**”. You can check error code meaning here: ## Security Monitoring Recommendations diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4945.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4945.md index f5581407ab..cc7ffb2eec 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4945.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4945.md @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec This event generates every time Windows Firewall service starts. -This event shows the inbound and/or outbound rule which was listed when the Windows Firewall started and applied for “Public” profile. +This event shows the inbound and/or outbound rule that was listed when the Windows Firewall started and applied for “Public” profile. This event generates per rule. @@ -75,11 +75,11 @@ This event generates per rule. - **Rule ID** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the unique firewall rule identifier. - To see the unique ID of the rule you need to navigate to “**HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\FirewallRules”** registry key and you will see the list of Windows Firewall rule IDs (Name column) with parameters: + To see the unique ID of the rule, you need to navigate to “**HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\FirewallRules”** registry key and you'll see the list of Windows Firewall rule IDs (Name column) with parameters: Registry Editor FirewallRules key illustration -- **Rule Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of the rule which was listed when the Windows Firewall started. You can see the name of Windows Firewall rule using Windows Firewall with Advanced Security management console (**wf.msc**), check “Name” column: +- **Rule Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of the rule that was listed when the Windows Firewall started. You can see the name of Windows Firewall rule using Windows Firewall with Advanced Security management console (**wf.msc**), check “Name” column: Windows Firewall with Advanced Security illustration @@ -89,5 +89,5 @@ For 4945(S): A rule was listed when the Windows Firewall started. - Typically this event has an informational purpose. -- Unfortunately this event shows rules only for **Public** profile, but you still can compare this list with your organization's Windows Firewall baseline for Public profile rules on different computers, and trigger an alert if the configuration is not the same. +- Unfortunately this event shows rules only for **Public** profile, but you still can compare this list with your organization's Windows Firewall baseline for Public profile rules on different computers, and trigger an alert if the configuration isn't the same. diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4946.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4946.md index 505cec18fb..5a3a44929a 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4946.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4946.md @@ -71,11 +71,11 @@ This event doesn't generate when new rule was added via Group Policy. - All -- Domain,Public +- Domain, Public -- Domain,Private +- Domain, Private -- Private,Public +- Private, Public - Public @@ -87,11 +87,11 @@ This event doesn't generate when new rule was added via Group Policy. - **Rule ID** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the unique new firewall rule identifier. - To see the unique ID of the rule you need to navigate to “**HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\FirewallRules”** registry key and you will see the list of Windows Firewall rule IDs (Name column) with parameters: + To see the unique ID of the rule, you need to navigate to “**HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\FirewallRules”** registry key and you'll see the list of Windows Firewall rule IDs (Name column) with parameters: Registry Editor FirewallRules key illustration -- **Rule Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of the rule which was added. You can see the name of Windows Firewall rule using Windows Firewall with Advanced Security management console (**wf.msc**), check “Name” column: +- **Rule Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of the rule that was added. You can see the name of Windows Firewall rule using Windows Firewall with Advanced Security management console (**wf.msc**), check “Name” column: Windows Firewall with Advanced Security illustration @@ -99,5 +99,5 @@ This event doesn't generate when new rule was added via Group Policy. For 4946(S): A change has been made to Windows Firewall exception list. A rule was added. -- This event can be helpful in case you want to monitor all creations of new Firewall rules which were done locally. +- This event can be helpful in case you want to monitor all creations of new Firewall rules that were done locally. diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4948.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4948.md index 65c71e3cd4..ecc34d3112 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4948.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4948.md @@ -71,11 +71,11 @@ This event doesn't generate when the rule was deleted via Group Policy. - All -- Domain,Public +- Domain, Public -- Domain,Private +- Domain, Private -- Private,Public +- Private, Public - Public @@ -87,11 +87,11 @@ This event doesn't generate when the rule was deleted via Group Policy. - **Rule ID** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the unique identifier for deleted firewall rule. - To see the unique ID of the rule you need to navigate to “**HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\FirewallRules”** registry key and you will see the list of Windows Firewall rule IDs (Name column) with parameters: + To see the unique ID of the rule, you need to navigate to “**HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\FirewallRules”** registry key and you'll see the list of Windows Firewall rule IDs (Name column) with parameters: Registry Editor FirewallRules key illustration -- **Rule Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of the rule which was deleted. You can see the name of Windows Firewall rule using Windows Firewall with Advanced Security management console (**wf.msc**), check “Name” column: +- **Rule Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of the rule that was deleted. You can see the name of Windows Firewall rule using Windows Firewall with Advanced Security management console (**wf.msc**), check “Name” column: Windows Firewall with Advanced Security illustration @@ -99,5 +99,5 @@ This event doesn't generate when the rule was deleted via Group Policy. For 4948(S): A change has been made to Windows Firewall exception list. A rule was deleted. -- This event can be helpful in case you want to monitor all deletions of Firewall rules which were done locally. +- This event can be helpful in case you want to monitor all deletions of Firewall rules that were done locally. diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4950.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4950.md index 69db4a04e2..8c7148eb98 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4950.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4950.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ This event doesn't generate when Windows Firewall setting was changed via Group **New Setting:** -- **Type** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of the setting which was modified. You can use “**netsh advfirewall**” command to see or set Windows Firewall settings, for example, to see settings for current\\active Windows Firewall profile you need to execute “**netsh advfirewall show currentprofile**” command: +- **Type** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of the setting that was modified. You can use “**netsh advfirewall**” command to see or set Windows Firewall settings, for example, to see settings for current\\active Windows Firewall profile you need to execute “**netsh advfirewall show currentprofile**” command: Netsh advfirewall command illustration @@ -89,5 +89,5 @@ For 4950(S): A Windows Firewall setting has changed. - If you have a standard or baseline for Windows Firewall settings defined, monitor this event and check whether the settings reported by the event are still the same as were defined in your standard or baseline. -- This event can be helpful in case you want to monitor all changes in Windows Firewall settings which were done locally. +- This event can be helpful in case you want to monitor all changes in Windows Firewall settings that were done locally. diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4951.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4951.md index 060b9c4b83..6f7ede1970 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4951.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4951.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- -title: 4951(F) A rule has been ignored because its major version number was not recognized by Windows Firewall. (Windows 10) -description: Describes security event 4951(F) A rule has been ignored because its major version number was not recognized by Windows Firewall. +title: 4951(F) A rule has been ignored because its major version number wasn't recognized by Windows Firewall. (Windows 10) +description: Describes security event 4951(F) A rule has been ignored because its major version number wasn't recognized by Windows Firewall. ms.pagetype: security ms.prod: m365-security ms.mktglfcycl: deploy @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ ms.author: dansimp ms.technology: windows-sec --- -# 4951(F): A rule has been ignored because its major version number was not recognized by Windows Firewall. +# 4951(F): A rule has been ignored because its major version number wasn't recognized by Windows Firewall. Event 4951 illustration @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec When you create or edit a Windows Firewall rule, the settings that you can include depend upon the version of Windows you use when creating the rule. As new settings are added to later versions of Windows or to service packs for existing versions of Windows, the version number of the rules processing engine is updated, and that version number is stamped into rules that are created by using that version of Windows. For example, Windows Vista produces firewall rules that are stamped with version "v2.0". Future versions of Windows might use "v2.1", or "v3.0" to indicate, respectively, minor or major changes and additions. -If you create a firewall rule on a newer version of Windows that references firewall settings that are not available on earlier versions of Windows, and then try to deploy that rule to computers running the earlier version of Windows, the firewall engine produces this error to indicate that it cannot process the rule. +If you create a firewall rule on a newer version of Windows that references firewall settings that aren't available on earlier versions of Windows, and then try to deploy that rule to computers running the earlier version of Windows, the firewall engine produces this error to indicate that it can't process the rule. The only solution is to remove the incompatible rule, and then deploy a compatible rule. @@ -73,11 +73,11 @@ The only solution is to remove the incompatible rule, and then deploy a compatib - All -- Domain,Public +- Domain, Public -- Domain,Private +- Domain, Private -- Private,Public +- Private, Public - Public @@ -89,17 +89,17 @@ The only solution is to remove the incompatible rule, and then deploy a compatib - **ID** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the unique identifier for ignored firewall rule. - To see the unique ID of the rule you need to navigate to “**HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\FirewallRules”** registry key and you will see the list of Windows Firewall rule IDs (Name column) with parameters: + To see the unique ID of the rule, you need to navigate to “**HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\FirewallRules”** registry key and you'll see the list of Windows Firewall rule IDs (Name column) with parameters: Registry Editor FirewallRules key illustration -- **Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of the rule which was ignored. You can see the name of Windows Firewall rule using Windows Firewall with Advanced Security management console (**wf.msc**), check “Name” column: +- **Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of the rule that was ignored. You can see the name of Windows Firewall rule using Windows Firewall with Advanced Security management console (**wf.msc**), check “Name” column: Windows Firewall with Advanced Security illustration ## Security Monitoring Recommendations -For 4951(F): A rule has been ignored because its major version number was not recognized by Windows Firewall. +For 4951(F): A rule has been ignored because its major version number wasn't recognized by Windows Firewall. - This event can be a sign of software issues, Windows Firewall registry errors or corruption, or Group Policy setting misconfigurations. We recommend monitoring this event and investigating the reason for the condition. Typically this event indicates configuration issues, not security issues. diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4953.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4953.md index 2d31faae0c..c327d3a349 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4953.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4953.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- -title: 4953(F) Windows Firewall ignored a rule because it could not be parsed. (Windows 10) -description: Describes security event 4953(F) Windows Firewall ignored a rule because it could not be parsed. +title: 4953(F) Windows Firewall ignored a rule because it couldn't be parsed. (Windows 10) +description: Describes security event 4953(F) Windows Firewall ignored a rule because it couldn't be parsed. ms.pagetype: security ms.prod: m365-security ms.mktglfcycl: deploy @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ ms.author: dansimp ms.technology: windows-sec --- -# 4953(F): Windows Firewall ignored a rule because it could not be parsed. +# 4953(F): Windows Firewall ignored a rule because it couldn't be parsed. Event 4953 illustration @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec ***Event Description:*** -This event generates if Windows Firewall was not able to parse Windows Firewall rule for some reason. +This event generates if Windows Firewall wasn't able to parse Windows Firewall rule for some reason. It can happen if Windows Firewall rule registry entry was corrupted. @@ -72,11 +72,11 @@ It can happen if Windows Firewall rule registry entry was corrupted. - All -- Domain,Public +- Domain, Public -- Domain,Private +- Domain, Private -- Private,Public +- Private, Public - Public @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ It can happen if Windows Firewall rule registry entry was corrupted. - **ID** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the unique identifier for ignored firewall rule. - To see the unique ID of the rule, navigate to the “**HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\FirewallRules”** registry key and you will see the list of Windows Firewall rule IDs (Name column) with parameters: + To see the unique ID of the rule, navigate to the “**HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\FirewallRules”** registry key and you'll see the list of Windows Firewall rule IDs (Name column) with parameters: Registry Editor FirewallRules key illustration @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ It can happen if Windows Firewall rule registry entry was corrupted. ## Security Monitoring Recommendations -For 4953(F): Windows Firewall ignored a rule because it could not be parsed. +For 4953(F): Windows Firewall ignored a rule because it couldn't be parsed. - This event can be a sign of software issues, Windows Firewall registry errors or corruption, or Group Policy setting misconfigurations. We recommend monitoring this event and investigating the reason for the condition. Typically this event indicates configuration issues, not security issues. diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4957.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4957.md index b83701e32b..5abad05870 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4957.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4957.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- title: 4957(F) Windows Firewall did not apply the following rule. (Windows 10) -description: Describes security event 4957(F) Windows Firewall did not apply the following rule. +description: Describes security event 4957(F) Windows Firewall didn't apply the following rule. ms.pagetype: security ms.prod: m365-security ms.mktglfcycl: deploy @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec ***Event Description:*** -This event generates when Windows Firewall starts or apply new rule, and the rule cannot be applied for some reason. +This event generates when Windows Firewall starts or apply new rule, and the rule can't be applied for some reason. > **Note**  For recommendations, see [Security Monitoring Recommendations](#security-monitoring-recommendations) for this event. @@ -69,17 +69,17 @@ This event generates when Windows Firewall starts or apply new rule, and the rul - **ID** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the unique identifier for not applied firewall rule. - To see the unique ID of the rule you need to navigate to “**HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\FirewallRules”** registry key and you will see the list of Windows Firewall rule IDs (Name column) with parameters: + To see the unique ID of the rule, you need to navigate to “**HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\FirewallRules”** registry key and you'll see the list of Windows Firewall rule IDs (Name column) with parameters: Registry Editor FirewallRules key illustration -- **Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of the rule which was not applied. You can see the name of Windows Firewall rule using Windows Firewall with Advanced Security management console (**wf.msc**), check “Name” column: +- **Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of the rule that wasn't applied. You can see the name of Windows Firewall rule using Windows Firewall with Advanced Security management console (**wf.msc**), check “Name” column: Windows Firewall with Advanced Security illustration **Error Information:** -- **Reason** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the reason why the rule was not applied. +- **Reason** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the reason why the rule wasn't applied. ## Security Monitoring Recommendations diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4958.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4958.md index 3fc2c85a83..4bd2da3a99 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4958.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4958.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- title: 4958(F) Windows Firewall did not apply the following rule because the rule referred to items not configured on this computer. (Windows 10) -description: Describes security event 4958(F) Windows Firewall did not apply the following rule because the rule referred to items not configured on this computer. +description: Describes security event 4958(F) Windows Firewall didn't apply the following rule because the rule referred to items not configured on this computer. ms.pagetype: security ms.prod: m365-security ms.mktglfcycl: deploy @@ -17,15 +17,15 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec # 4958(F): Windows Firewall did not apply the following rule because the rule referred to items not configured on this computer. -Windows Firewall with Advanced Security processed a rule that contains parameters that cannot be resolved on the local computer. The rule is therefore not enforceable on the computer and so is excluded from the runtime state of the firewall. This is not necessarily an error. Examine the rule for applicability on the computers to which it was applied. +Windows Firewall with Advanced Security processed a rule that contains parameters that can't be resolved on the local computer. The rule is therefore not enforceable on the computer and so is excluded from the runtime state of the firewall. This exclusion isn't necessarily an error. Examine the rule for applicability on the computers to which it was applied. -There is no example of this event in this document. +There's no example of this event in this document. ***Subcategory:*** [Audit MPSSVC Rule-Level Policy Change](audit-mpssvc-rule-level-policy-change.md) ***Event Schema:*** -*Windows Firewall did not apply the following rule because the rule referred to items not configured on this computer: +*Windows Firewall didn't apply the following rule because the rule referred to items not configured on this computer: Rule Information: %tID:%t%1 %tName:%t%2 diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5030.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5030.md index 9216275f2d..86502afb98 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5030.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5030.md @@ -19,9 +19,9 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec Windows logs this event if the Windows Firewall service fails to start, or if it unexpectedly terminates. The error message indicates the cause of the service failure by including an error code in the text of the message. -This event doesn't generate during Windows Firewall service failures if Windows Firewall policy is incorrect\\corrupted or one of the service dependencies was not started. +This event doesn't generate during Windows Firewall service failures if Windows Firewall policy is incorrect\\corrupted or one of the service dependencies wasn't started. -There is no example of this event in this document. +There's no example of this event in this document. ***Subcategory:*** [Audit Other System Events](audit-other-system-events.md) diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5031.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5031.md index b54933cde7..0e6d81e9ac 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5031.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5031.md @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec This event generates when an application was blocked from accepting incoming connections on the network by [Windows Filtering Platform](/windows/win32/fwp/windows-filtering-platform-start-page). -If you don’t have any firewall rules (Allow or Deny) in Windows Firewall for specific applications, you will get this event from [Windows Filtering Platform](/windows/win32/fwp/windows-filtering-platform-start-page) layer, because by default this layer is denying any incoming connections. +If you don’t have any firewall rules (Allow or Deny) in Windows Firewall for specific applications, you'll get this event from [Windows Filtering Platform](/windows/win32/fwp/windows-filtering-platform-start-page) layer, because by default this layer is denying any incoming connections. > **Note**  For recommendations, see [Security Monitoring Recommendations](#security-monitoring-recommendations) for this event. @@ -82,8 +82,8 @@ For 5031(F): The Windows Firewall Service blocked an application from accepting - You can use this event to detect applications for which no Windows Firewall rules were created. -- If you have a pre-defined application which should be used to perform the operation that was reported by this event, monitor events with “**Application**” not equal to your defined application. +- If you have a pre-defined application that should be used to perform the operation that was reported by this event, monitor events with “**Application**” not equal to your defined application. -- You can monitor to see if “**Application**” is not in a standard folder (for example, not in **System32** or **Program Files**) or is in a restricted folder (for example, **Temporary Internet Files**). +- You can monitor to see if “**Application**” isn't in a standard folder (for example, not in **System32** or **Program Files**) or is in a restricted folder (for example, **Temporary Internet Files**). - If you have a pre-defined list of restricted substrings or words in application names (for example, “**mimikatz**” or “**cain.exe**”), check for these substrings in “**Application**.” \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5038.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5038.md index dbb32f1459..60b2f51b2d 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5038.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5038.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- title: 5038(F) Code integrity determined that the image hash of a file is not valid. (Windows 10) -description: Describes security event 5038(F) Code integrity determined that the image hash of a file is not valid. +description: Describes security event 5038(F) Code integrity determined that the image hash of a file isn't valid. ms.pagetype: security ms.prod: m365-security ms.mktglfcycl: deploy @@ -19,11 +19,11 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec The file could be corrupt due to unauthorized modification or the invalid hash could indicate a potential disk device error. -This event generates by [Code Integrity](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd348642(v=ws.10)) feature, if signature of a file is not valid. +This event generates by [Code Integrity](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd348642(v=ws.10)) feature, if signature of a file isn't valid. -Code Integrity is a feature that improves the security of the operating system by validating the integrity of a driver or system file each time it is loaded into memory. Code Integrity detects whether an unsigned driver or system file is being loaded into the kernel, or whether a system file has been modified by malicious software that is being run by a user account with administrative permissions. On x64-based versions of the operating system, kernel-mode drivers must be digitally signed. +Code Integrity is a feature that improves the security of the operating system by validating the integrity of a driver or system file each time it's loaded into memory. Code Integrity detects whether an unsigned driver or system file is being loaded into the kernel, or whether a system file has been modified by malicious software that is being run by a user account with administrative permissions. On x64-based versions of the operating system, kernel-mode drivers must be digitally signed. -There is no example of this event in this document. +There's no example of this event in this document. ***Subcategory:*** [Audit System Integrity](audit-system-integrity.md) diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5039.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5039.md index 7194197d62..aec25c2291 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5039.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5039.md @@ -19,9 +19,9 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec This event should be generated when registry key was virtualized using [LUAFV](https://blogs.msdn.com/b/alexcarp/archive/2009/06/25/the-deal-with-luafv-sys.aspx). -This event occurs very rarely during standard LUAFV registry key virtualization. +This event occurs rarely during standard LUAFV registry key virtualization. -There is no example of this event in this document. +There's no example of this event in this document. ***Subcategory:*** [Audit Registry](audit-registry.md) @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ There is no example of this event in this document. ## Security Monitoring Recommendations -- There is no recommendation for this event in this document. +- There's no recommendation for this event in this document. diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5051.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5051.md index 67f25e7071..530cebdbe3 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5051.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5051.md @@ -19,9 +19,9 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec This event should be generated when file was virtualized using [LUAFV](https://blogs.msdn.com/b/alexcarp/archive/2009/06/25/the-deal-with-luafv-sys.aspx). -This event occurs very rarely during standard LUAFV file virtualization. +This event occurs rarely during standard LUAFV file virtualization. -There is no example of this event in this document. +There's no example of this event in this document. ***Subcategory:*** [Audit File System](audit-file-system.md) @@ -59,5 +59,5 @@ There is no example of this event in this document. ## Security Monitoring Recommendations -- There is no recommendation for this event in this document. +- There's no recommendation for this event in this document. diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5056.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5056.md index a0be07f3bf..b8d749b9fe 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5056.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5056.md @@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ For more information about Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) visit these pages - -This event is mainly used for CNG troubleshooting. +This event is used for CNG troubleshooting. -There is no example of this event in this document. +There's no example of this event in this document. ***Subcategory:*** [Audit System Integrity](audit-system-integrity.md) diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5057.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5057.md index 8ef262994a..6f251535e5 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5057.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5057.md @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec # 5057(F): A cryptographic primitive operation failed. -This event generates in case of CNG primitive operation failure. +This event generates if there's a CNG primitive operation failure. For more information about Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) visit these pages: @@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ For more information about Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) visit these pages - -This event is mainly used for Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) troubleshooting. +This event is used for Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) troubleshooting. -There is no example of this event in this document. +There's no example of this event in this document. ***Subcategory:*** [Audit System Integrity](audit-system-integrity.md) diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5058.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5058.md index eaa7c1b441..42a31d7a3a 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5058.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5058.md @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec ***Event Description:*** -This event generates when an operation (read, write, delete, and so on) was performed on a file that contains a KSP key by using a [Key Storage Provider](/windows/win32/seccertenroll/cng-key-storage-providers) (KSP). This event generates only if one of the following KSPs were used: +This event generates when an operation (read, write, delete, and so on) was performed on a file that contains a KSP key by using a [Key Storage Provider](/windows/win32/seccertenroll/cng-key-storage-providers) (KSP). This event generates only if one of the following KSPs was used: - Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider @@ -81,13 +81,13 @@ You can see these events, for example, during certificate renewal or export oper **Subject:** -- **Security ID** \[Type = SID\]**:** SID of account that requested key file operation. Event Viewer automatically tries to resolve SIDs and show the account name. If the SID cannot be resolved, you will see the source data in the event. +- **Security ID** \[Type = SID\]**:** SID of account that requested key file operation. Event Viewer automatically tries to resolve SIDs and show the account name. If the SID can't be resolved, you'll see the source data in the event. > **Note**  A **security identifier (SID)** is a unique value of variable length used to identify a trustee (security principal). Each account has a unique SID that is issued by an authority, such as an Active Directory domain controller, and stored in a security database. Each time a user logs on, the system retrieves the SID for that user from the database and places it in the access token for that user. The system uses the SID in the access token to identify the user in all subsequent interactions with Windows security. When a SID has been used as the unique identifier for a user or group, it cannot ever be used again to identify another user or group. For more information about SIDs, see [Security identifiers](/windows/access-protection/access-control/security-identifiers). - **Account Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** the name of the account that requested key file operation. -- **Account Domain** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** subject’s domain or computer name. Formats vary, and include the following: +- **Account Domain** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** subject’s domain or computer name. Formats vary, and include the following ones: - Domain NETBIOS name example: CONTOSO @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ You can see these events, for example, during certificate renewal or export oper - Microsoft Smart Card Key Storage Provider -- **Algorithm Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of cryptographic algorithm through which the key was used or accessed. For “Read persisted key from file” operation, this typically has “**UNKNOWN**” value. Can also have one of the following values: +- **Algorithm Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of cryptographic algorithm through which the key was used or accessed. For “Read persisted key from file” operation, this algorithm has “**UNKNOWN**” value. Can also have one of the following values: - RSA – algorithm created by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman. @@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ You can see these events, for example, during certificate renewal or export oper - ECDSA\_P521 – Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm with 521-bit key length. -- **Key Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of the key (key container) with which operation was performed. For example, to get the list of **Key Names** for certificates for logged in user you can use “**certutil -store -user my**” command and check **Key Container** parameter in the output. Here is an output example: +- **Key Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of the key (key container) with which operation was performed. For example, to get the list of **Key Names** for certificates for logged in user you can use “**certutil -store -user my**” command and check **Key Container** parameter in the output. Here's an output example: Certutil command illustration diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5060.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5060.md index e20a614013..b8f9fb0ef7 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5060.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5060.md @@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ For more information about CNG, visit these pages: - -This event is mainly used for CNG troubleshooting. +This event is used for CNG troubleshooting. -There is no example of this event in this document. +There's no example of this event in this document. ***Subcategory:*** [Audit System Integrity](audit-system-integrity.md) diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5061.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5061.md index af59c9ccb8..58bcd9848d 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5061.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5061.md @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec ***Event Description:*** -This event generates when a cryptographic operation (open key, create key, create key, and so on) was performed using a [Key Storage Provider](/windows/win32/seccertenroll/cng-key-storage-providers) (KSP). This event generates only if one of the following KSPs were used: +This event generates when a cryptographic operation (open key, create key, create key, and so on) was performed using a [Key Storage Provider](/windows/win32/seccertenroll/cng-key-storage-providers) (KSP). This event generates only if one of the following KSPs was used: - Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider @@ -78,13 +78,13 @@ This event generates when a cryptographic operation (open key, create key, creat **Subject:** -- **Security ID** \[Type = SID\]**:** SID of account that requested specific cryptographic operation. Event Viewer automatically tries to resolve SIDs and show the account name. If the SID cannot be resolved, you will see the source data in the event. +- **Security ID** \[Type = SID\]**:** SID of account that requested specific cryptographic operation. Event Viewer automatically tries to resolve SIDs and show the account name. If the SID can't be resolved, you'll see the source data in the event. > **Note**  A **security identifier (SID)** is a unique value of variable length used to identify a trustee (security principal). Each account has a unique SID that is issued by an authority, such as an Active Directory domain controller, and stored in a security database. Each time a user logs on, the system retrieves the SID for that user from the database and places it in the access token for that user. The system uses the SID in the access token to identify the user in all subsequent interactions with Windows security. When a SID has been used as the unique identifier for a user or group, it cannot ever be used again to identify another user or group. For more information about SIDs, see [Security identifiers](/windows/access-protection/access-control/security-identifiers). - **Account Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** the name of the account that requested specific cryptographic operation. -- **Account Domain** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** subject’s domain or computer name. Formats vary, and include the following: +- **Account Domain** \[Type = UnicodeString\]**:** subject’s domain or computer name. Formats vary, and include the following ones: - Domain NETBIOS name example: CONTOSO @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ This event generates when a cryptographic operation (open key, create key, creat - Microsoft Smart Card Key Storage Provider -- **Algorithm Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of cryptographic algorithm through which the key was used or accessed. For “Read persisted key from file” operation, this typically has “**UNKNOWN**” value. Can also have one of the following values: +- **Algorithm Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of cryptographic algorithm through which the key was used or accessed. For “Read persisted key from file” operation, this algorithm has “**UNKNOWN**” value. Can also have one of the following values: - RSA – algorithm created by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman. @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ This event generates when a cryptographic operation (open key, create key, creat - ECDSA\_P521 – Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm with 521-bit key length. -- **Key Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of the key (key container) with which operation was performed. For example, to get the list of **Key Names** for certificates for logged in user you can use “**certutil -store -user my**” command and check **Key Container** parameter in the output. Here is an output example: +- **Key Name** \[Type = UnicodeString\]: the name of the key (key container) with which operation was performed. For example, to get the list of **Key Names** for certificates for logged in user you can use “**certutil -store -user my**” command and check **Key Container** parameter in the output. Here's an output example: Certutil command illustration diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5063.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5063.md index 5038c7efce..ca597eccaf 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5063.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5063.md @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec # 5063(S, F): A cryptographic provider operation was attempted. -This event generates in BCryptUnregisterProvider() and BCryptRegisterProvider() functions. These are Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) functions. +This event generates in BCryptUnregisterProvider() and BCryptRegisterProvider() functions. These functions are Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) functions. This event generates when cryptographic provider was registered or unregistered. @@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ For more information about Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) visit these pages - -This event is mainly used for Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) troubleshooting. +This event is used for Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) troubleshooting. -There is no example of this event in this document. +There's no example of this event in this document. ***Subcategory:*** [Audit Other Policy Change Events](audit-other-policy-change-events.md) diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5064.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5064.md index 58926d7958..ae83f4488b 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5064.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5064.md @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec # 5064(S, F): A cryptographic context operation was attempted. -This event generates in [BCryptCreateContext](/windows/win32/api/bcrypt/nf-bcrypt-bcryptcreatecontext)() and [BCryptDeleteContext](/windows/win32/api/bcrypt/nf-bcrypt-bcryptdeletecontext)() functions. These are Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) functions. +This event generates in [BCryptCreateContext](/windows/win32/api/bcrypt/nf-bcrypt-bcryptcreatecontext)() and [BCryptDeleteContext](/windows/win32/api/bcrypt/nf-bcrypt-bcryptdeletecontext)() functions. These functions are Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) functions. This event generates when cryptographic context was created or deleted. @@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ For more information about Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) visit these pages - -This event is mainly used for Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) troubleshooting. +This event is used for Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) troubleshooting. -There is no example of this event in this document. +There's no example of this event in this document. ***Subcategory:*** [Audit Other Policy Change Events](audit-other-policy-change-events.md) diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5065.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5065.md index 7e24add6fe..e382f07e2f 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5065.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5065.md @@ -16,8 +16,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec # 5065(S, F): A cryptographic context modification was attempted. - -This event generates in [BCryptConfigureContext](/windows/win32/api/bcrypt/nf-bcrypt-bcryptconfigurecontext)() function. This is a Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) function. +This event generates in [BCryptConfigureContext](/windows/win32/api/bcrypt/nf-bcrypt-bcryptconfigurecontext)() function. This function is a Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) function. This event generates when configuration information was changed for existing CNG context. @@ -27,9 +26,9 @@ For more information about Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) visit these pages - -This event is mainly used for Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) troubleshooting. +This event is used for Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) troubleshooting. -There is no example of this event in this document. +There's no example of this event in this document. ***Subcategory:*** [Audit Other Policy Change Events](audit-other-policy-change-events.md) diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5066.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5066.md index 310525c71a..6a40bb0b06 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5066.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5066.md @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec # 5066(S, F): A cryptographic function operation was attempted. -This event generates in [BCryptAddContextFunction](/windows/win32/api/bcrypt/nf-bcrypt-bcryptaddcontextfunction)() and [BCryptRemoveContextFunction](/windows/win32/api/bcrypt/nf-bcrypt-bcryptremovecontextfunction)() functions. These are Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) functions. +This event generates in [BCryptAddContextFunction](/windows/win32/api/bcrypt/nf-bcrypt-bcryptaddcontextfunction)() and [BCryptRemoveContextFunction](/windows/win32/api/bcrypt/nf-bcrypt-bcryptremovecontextfunction)() functions. These functions are Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) functions. This event generates when cryptographic function was added or removed from the list of functions that are supported by an existing CNG context. @@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ For more information about Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) visit these pages - -This event is mainly used for Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) troubleshooting. +This event is used for Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) troubleshooting. -There is no example of this event in this document. +There's no example of this event in this document. ***Subcategory:*** [Audit Other Policy Change Events](audit-other-policy-change-events.md) diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5067.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5067.md index 509b5d140a..02b76446df 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5067.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5067.md @@ -17,19 +17,19 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec # 5067(S, F): A cryptographic function modification was attempted. -This event generates in [BCryptConfigureContextFunction](/windows/win32/api/bcrypt/nf-bcrypt-bcryptconfigurecontextfunction)() function. This is a Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) function. +This event generates in [BCryptConfigureContextFunction](/windows/win32/api/bcrypt/nf-bcrypt-bcryptconfigurecontextfunction)() function. This function is a Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) function. This event generates when configuration information for the cryptographic function of an existing CNG context was changed. -For more information about Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) visit these pages: +For more information about Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG), visit these pages: - - -This event is mainly used for Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) troubleshooting. +This event is used for Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) troubleshooting. -There is no example of this event in this document. +There's no example of this event in this document. ***Subcategory:*** [Audit Other Policy Change Events](audit-other-policy-change-events.md) diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5068.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5068.md index 1214a053db..ed2e8582db 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5068.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5068.md @@ -17,17 +17,17 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec # 5068(S, F): A cryptographic function provider operation was attempted. -This event generates in BCryptAddContextFunctionProvider() and BCryptRemoveContextFunctionProvider() functions. These are Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) functions. +This event generates in BCryptAddContextFunctionProvider() and BCryptRemoveContextFunctionProvider() functions. These functions are Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) functions. -For more information about Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) visit these pages: +For more information about Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG), visit these pages: - - -This event is mainly used for Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) troubleshooting. +This event is used for Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) troubleshooting. -There is no example of this event in this document. +There's no example of this event in this document. ***Subcategory:*** [Audit Other Policy Change Events](audit-other-policy-change-events.md) diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5069.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5069.md index dadbcf3347..fc14219958 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5069.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5069.md @@ -17,19 +17,19 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec # 5069(S, F): A cryptographic function property operation was attempted. -This event generates in [BCryptSetContextFunctionProperty](/windows/win32/api/bcrypt/nf-bcrypt-bcryptsetcontextfunctionproperty)() function. This is a Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) function. +This event generates in [BCryptSetContextFunctionProperty](/windows/win32/api/bcrypt/nf-bcrypt-bcryptsetcontextfunctionproperty)() function. This function is a Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) function. This event generates when named property for a cryptographic function in an existing CNG context was added or removed. -For more information about Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) visit these pages: +For more information about Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG), visit these pages: - - -This event is mainly used for Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) troubleshooting. +This event is used for Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) troubleshooting. -There is no example of this event in this document. +There's no example of this event in this document. ***Subcategory:*** [Audit Other Policy Change Events](audit-other-policy-change-events.md) diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/monitor-the-central-access-policies-that-apply-on-a-file-server.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/monitor-the-central-access-policies-that-apply-on-a-file-server.md index a1780808e5..15c31fb0d2 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/monitor-the-central-access-policies-that-apply-on-a-file-server.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/monitor-the-central-access-policies-that-apply-on-a-file-server.md @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec This article describes how to monitor changes to the central access policies (CAPs) that apply to a file server when using advanced security auditing options to monitor dynamic access control objects. CAPs are created on a domain controller and then applied to file servers through Group Policy management. -Use the following procedures to configure and verify security auditing settings that are used to monitor changes to the set of CAPs on a file server. The following procedures assume that you have configured and deployed dynamic access control, including CAPs and claims, in your network. If you have not yet deployed dynamic access control in your network, see [Deploy a Central Access Policy (Demonstration Steps)](/windows-server/identity/solution-guides/deploy-a-central-access-policy--demonstration-steps-). +Use the following procedures to configure and verify security auditing settings that are used to monitor changes to the set of CAPs on a file server. The following procedures assume that you have configured and deployed dynamic access control, including CAPs and claims, in your network. If you haven't yet deployed dynamic access control in your network, see [Deploy a Central Access Policy (Demonstration Steps)](/windows-server/identity/solution-guides/deploy-a-central-access-policy--demonstration-steps-). **To configure settings to monitor changes to central access policies** diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/monitor-the-resource-attributes-on-files-and-folders.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/monitor-the-resource-attributes-on-files-and-folders.md index 20be28d785..73427802a4 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/monitor-the-resource-attributes-on-files-and-folders.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/monitor-the-resource-attributes-on-files-and-folders.md @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec # Monitor the resource attributes on files and folders -This topic for the IT professional describes how to monitor attempts to change settings to the resource attributes on files when you are using advanced security auditing options to monitor dynamic access control objects. +This topic for the IT professional describes how to monitor attempts to change settings to the resource attributes on files when you're using advanced security auditing options to monitor dynamic access control objects. If your organization has a carefully thought out authorization configuration for resources, changes to these resource attributes can create potential security risks. Examples include: diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/monitor-user-and-device-claims-during-sign-in.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/monitor-user-and-device-claims-during-sign-in.md index 865b1b5aaf..759bc149b4 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/monitor-user-and-device-claims-during-sign-in.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/monitor-user-and-device-claims-during-sign-in.md @@ -21,11 +21,11 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec # Monitor user and device claims during sign-in -This topic for the IT professional describes how to monitor user and device claims that are associated with a user’s security token when you are using advanced security auditing options to monitor dynamic access control objects. +This topic for the IT professional describes how to monitor user and device claims that are associated with a user’s security token when you're using advanced security auditing options to monitor dynamic access control objects. -Device claims are associated with the system that is used to access resources that are protected with Dynamic Access Control. User claims are attributes that are associated with a user. User claims and device claims are included in the user’s security token used at sign-on. For example, information about Department, Company, Project, or Security clearances might be included in the token. +Device claims are associated with the system that is used to access resources that are protected with Dynamic Access Control. User claims are attributes that are associated with a user. User claims and device claims are included in the user’s security token used at the sign-in stage. For example, information about Department, Company, Project, or Security clearances might be included in the token. -Use the following procedures to monitor changes to user claims and device claims in the user’s sign-on token and to verify the changes. These procedures assume that you have configured and deployed Dynamic Access Control, including central access policies, claims, and other components, in your network. If you have not yet deployed Dynamic Access Control in your network, see [Deploy a Central Access Policy (Demonstration Steps)](/windows-server/identity/solution-guides/deploy-a-central-access-policy--demonstration-steps-). +Use the following procedures to monitor changes to user claims and device claims in the user’s sign-in token and to verify the changes. These procedures assume that you have configured and deployed Dynamic Access Control, including central access policies, claims, and other components, in your network. If you haven't yet deployed Dynamic Access Control in your network, see [Deploy a Central Access Policy (Demonstration Steps)](/windows-server/identity/solution-guides/deploy-a-central-access-policy--demonstration-steps-). >**Note:**  Your server might function differently based on the version and edition of the operating system that is installed, your account permissions, and your menu settings. diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/planning-and-deploying-advanced-security-audit-policies.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/planning-and-deploying-advanced-security-audit-policies.md index 4f9f9b93e8..08a07d6718 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/planning-and-deploying-advanced-security-audit-policies.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/planning-and-deploying-advanced-security-audit-policies.md @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec This article for IT professionals explains the options that security policy planners should consider and the tasks they must complete to deploy an effective security audit policy in a network that includes advanced security audit policies. -Organizations invest heavily in security applications and services, such as antimalware software, firewalls, and encryption. But no matter how much security hardware or software you deploy, how tightly you control the rights of users, or how carefully you configure security permissions on your data, the job isn't complete unless you have a well-defined, timely auditing strategy to track the effectiveness of your defenses and identify attempts to circumvent them. +Organizations invest heavily in security applications and services, such as antimalware software, firewalls, and encryption. But no matter how much security hardware or software you deploy, how tightly you control the rights of users, or how carefully you configure security permissions on your data, the job isn't complete unless you've a well-defined, timely auditing strategy to track the effectiveness of your defenses and identify attempts to circumvent them. To be well-defined and timely, an auditing strategy must provide useful tracking data for an organization's most important resources, critical behaviors, and potential risks. In many organizations, it must also provide proof that IT operations comply with corporate and regulatory requirements. @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ To effectively audit user activity, begin by listing the different types of user Also, if external users can access your organization's data, be sure to identify them. Determine whether they're a business partner, customer, or general user; the data they have access to; and the permissions they have to access that data. -The following table illustrates an analysis of users on a network. Our example contains only a single column titled "Possible auditing considerations," but you may want to create additional columns to differentiate between different types of network activity, such as logon hours and permission use. +The following table illustrates an analysis of users on a network. Our example contains only a single column titled "Possible auditing considerations," but you may want to create more columns to differentiate between different types of network activity, such as sign-in hours and permission use. | Groups | Data | Possible auditing considerations | | - | - | - | @@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ By using Group Policy, you can apply your security audit policy to defined group - Decide whether every policy setting that you select should be enforced across the organization or apply only to selected users or computers. You can then combine these audit policy settings into GPOs and link them to the appropriate Active Directory containers. - By default, options set in GPOs that are linked to higher levels of Active Directory sites, domains, and OUs are inherited by all OUs at lower levels. However, a GPO that's linked at a lower level can overwrite inherited policies. - For example, you might use a domain GPO to assign an organization-wide group of audit settings but want a certain OU to get a defined group of additional settings. To do this, you can link a second GPO to that specific lower-level OU. Then, a logon audit setting that's applied at the OU level will override a conflicting logon audit setting that's applied at the domain level, unless you've taken special steps to apply Group Policy loopback processing. + For example, you might use a domain GPO to assign an organization-wide group of audit settings but want a certain OU to get a defined group of extra settings. To do this assignation, you can link a second GPO to that specific lower-level OU. Then, a sign-in audit setting that's applied at the OU level will override a conflicting sign-in audit setting that's applied at the domain level, unless you've taken special steps to apply Group Policy loopback processing. - Audit policies are computer policies. Therefore, they must be applied through GPOs that are applied to *computer* OUs, not to *user* OUs. But in most cases, you can apply audit settings for only specified resources and groups of users by configuring SACLs on the relevant objects. This functionality enables auditing for a security group that contains only the users you specify. @@ -270,12 +270,12 @@ Compromise to an organization's data resources can cause tremendous financial lo The settings in the previous section relate to activity involving the files, folders, and network shares that are stored on a network. The settings in this section focus on the users who may try to access those resources, including employees, partners, and customers. -In most cases, these attempts are legitimate, and the network needs to make data readily available to legitimate users. But in other cases, employees, partners, and others may try to access resources that they have no legitimate reason to access. You can use security auditing to track a variety of user activities on a particular computer to diagnose and resolve problems for legitimate users and to identify and address illegitimate activities. The following are important settings that you should evaluate to track user activity on your network: +In most cases, these attempts are legitimate, and the network needs to make data readily available to legitimate users. But in other cases, employees, partners, and others may try to access resources that they have no legitimate reason to access. You can use security auditing to track various user activities on a particular computer to diagnose and resolve problems for legitimate users and to identify and address illegitimate activities. The following are important settings that you should evaluate to track user activity on your network: -- **Account Logon\\[Audit Credential Validation](audit-credential-validation.md)**: This setting enables you to track all successful and unsuccessful logon attempts. A pattern of unsuccessful attempts may indicate that a user or application is using credentials that are no longer valid. Or the user or app is trying to use a variety of credentials in succession in hope that one of these attempts will eventually succeed. These events occur on the computer that's authoritative for the credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. +- **Account Logon\\[Audit Credential Validation](audit-credential-validation.md)**: This setting enables you to track all successful and unsuccessful sign-in attempts. A pattern of unsuccessful attempts may indicate that a user or application is using credentials that are no longer valid. Or the user or app is trying to use various credentials in succession in hope that one of these attempts will eventually succeed. These events occur on the computer that's authoritative for the credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. - **Detailed Tracking\\[Audit Process Creation](audit-process-creation.md) and Detailed Tracking\\[Audit Process Termination](audit-process-termination.md)**: These policy settings enable you to monitor the applications that a user opens and close on a computer. -- **DS Access\\[Audit Directory Service Access](audit-directory-service-access.md)** and **DS Access\\[Audit Directory Service Changes](audit-directory-service-changes.md)**: These policy settings provide a detailed audit trail of attempts to access, create, modify, delete, move, or undelete objects in Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS). Only domain administrators have permissions to modify AD DS objects, so it's important to identify malicious attempts to modify these objects. Also, although domain administrators should be among an organization's most trusted employees, the use of the **Audit Directory Service Access** and **Audit Directory Service Changes** settings enable you to monitor and verify that only approved changes are made to AD DS. These audit events are logged only on domain controllers. -- **Logon/Logoff\\[Audit Account Lockout](audit-account-lockout.md)**: Another common security scenario occurs when a user attempts to log on with an account that's been locked out. It's important to identify these events and to determine whether the attempt to use an account that was locked out is malicious. +- **DS Access\\[Audit Directory Service Access](audit-directory-service-access.md)** and **DS Access\\[Audit Directory Service Changes](audit-directory-service-changes.md)**: These policy settings provide a detailed audit trail of attempts to access, create, modify, delete, move, or undelete objects in Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS). Only domain administrators have permissions to modify AD DS objects, so it's important to identify malicious attempts to modify these objects. Also, although domain administrators should be among an organization's most trusted employees, the use of the **Audit Directory Service Access** and **Audit Directory Service Changes** settings enables you to monitor and verify that only approved changes are made to AD DS. These audit events are logged only on domain controllers. +- **Logon/Logoff\\[Audit Account Lockout](audit-account-lockout.md)**: Another common security scenario occurs when a user attempts to sign in with an account that's been locked out. It's important to identify these events and to determine whether the attempt to use an account that was locked out is malicious. - **Logon/Logoff\\[Audit Logoff](audit-logoff.md)** and **Logon/Logoff\\[Audit Logon](audit-logon.md)**: Logon and logoff events are essential to tracking user activity and detecting potential attacks. Logon events are related to the creation of logon sessions, and they occur on the computer that was accessed. For an interactive logon, events are generated on the computer that was logged on to. For network logon, such as accessing a shared resource, events are generated on the computer that hosts the resource that was accessed. Logoff events are generated when logon sessions are terminated. > [!NOTE] @@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ The following network activity policy settings enable you to monitor security-re - **Logon/Logoff\\[Audit Network Policy Server](audit-network-policy-server.md)**: Organizations that use RADIUS (IAS) and Network Access Protection (NAP) to set and maintain security requirements for external users can use this policy setting to monitor the effectiveness of these policies and to determine whether anyone is trying to circumvent these protections. - **Policy Change**: These policy settings and events enable you to track changes to important security policies on a local computer or network. Because policies are typically established by administrators to help secure network resources, monitoring any changes or attempted changes to these policies can be an important aspect of security management for a network. - **Policy Change\\[Audit Audit Policy Change](audit-audit-policy-change.md)**: This policy setting allows you to monitor changes to the audit policy. If malicious users obtain domain administrator credentials, they can temporarily disable essential security audit policy settings so that their other activities on the network can't be detected. -- **Policy Change\\[Audit Filtering Platform Policy Change](audit-filtering-platform-policy-change.md)**: This policy setting can be used to monitor a variety of changes to an organization's IPsec policies. +- **Policy Change\\[Audit Filtering Platform Policy Change](audit-filtering-platform-policy-change.md)**: This policy setting can be used to monitor various changes to an organization's IPsec policies. - **Policy Change\\[Audit MPSSVC Rule-Level Policy Change](audit-mpssvc-rule-level-policy-change.md)**: This policy setting determines if the operating system generates audit events when changes are made to policy rules for the Microsoft Protection Service (MPSSVC.exe), which is used by Windows Firewall. Changes to firewall rules are important for understanding the security state of the computer and how well it's protected against network attacks. ### Confirm operating system version compatibility @@ -331,9 +331,9 @@ These settings enable you to exercise much tighter control over which activities ### *Success*, *failure*, or both -Whichever event settings you include in your plan, you also have to decide whether you want to log an event when the activity fails or succeeds or both successes *and* failures. This is an important question. The answer depends on the criticality of the event and the implications of the decision for event volume. +Whichever event settings you include in your plan, you also have to decide whether you want to log an event when the activity fails or succeeds or both successes *and* failures. This question is an important one. The answer depends on the criticality of the event and the implications of the decision for event volume. -For example, on a file server that's accessed frequently by legitimate users, you may want to log an event only when an *unsuccessful* attempt to access data takes place, because this could be evidence of an unauthorized or malicious user. In this case, logging *successful* attempts to access the server would quickly fill the event log with benign events. +For example, on a file server that's accessed frequently by legitimate users, you may want to log an event only when an *unsuccessful* attempt to access data takes place, because this access failure could be evidence of an unauthorized or malicious user. In this case, logging *successful* attempts to access the server would quickly fill the event log with benign events. But if the file share has sensitive information, such as trade secrets, you may want to log every access attempt so that you have an audit trail of every user who tries to access the resource. @@ -341,12 +341,12 @@ But if the file share has sensitive information, such as trade secrets, you may Networks may contain hundreds of servers that run critical services or store critical data, all of which need to be monitored. There may be tens or even hundreds of thousands of computers on the network. These numbers may not be an issue if the ratio of servers or client computers per administrator is low. And even if an administrator who is responsible for auditing security and performance issues has relatively few computers to monitor, you need to decide how the administrator will obtain event data to review. Following are some options for obtaining the event data. -- Will you keep event data on a local computer until an administrator logs on to review this data? If so, the administrator needs to have physical or remote access to the Event Viewer on each client computer or server. And the remote access and firewall settings on each client computer or server need to be configured to enable this access. You also need to decide how often the administrator can visit each computer, and adjust the size of the audit log so that critical information isn't deleted if the log reaches capacity. -- Will you collect event data so that it can be reviewed from a central console? If so, there are a number of computer management products, such as the Audit Collection Services in Microsoft Operations Manager 2007 and 2012, that you can use to collect and filter event data. Presumably this solution enables a single administrator to review larger amounts of data than using the local storage option. But in some cases, this method can make it more difficult to detect clusters of related events that can occur on a single computer. +- Will you keep event data on a local computer until an administrator signs in to review this data? If so, the administrator needs to have physical or remote access to the Event Viewer on each client computer or server. And the remote access and firewall settings on each client computer or server need to be configured to enable this access. You also need to decide how often the administrator can visit each computer, and adjust the size of the audit log so that critical information isn't deleted if the log reaches capacity. +- Will you collect event data so that it can be reviewed from a central console? If so, there are many computer management products, such as the Audit Collection Services in Microsoft Operations Manager 2007 and 2012, that you can use to collect and filter event data. Presumably this solution enables a single administrator to review larger amounts of data than using the local storage option. But in some cases, this method can make it more difficult to detect clusters of related events that can occur on a single computer. In addition, whether you choose to leave audit data on an individual computer or consolidate it at a central location, you need to decide how large the log file should be and what happens when the log reaches its maximum size. To configure these options, open Event Viewer, expand **Windows Logs**, right-click **Security**, and select **Properties**. You can configure the following properties: -- **Overwrite events as needed (oldest events first)**: This is the default option, which is acceptable in most situations. +- **Overwrite events as needed (oldest events first)**: This option is the default one, which is acceptable in most situations. - **Archive the log when full, do not overwrite events**: This option can be used when all log data needs to be saved. But the scenario suggests that you may not be reviewing audit data frequently enough. - **Do not overwrite events (Clear logs manually)**. This option stops the collection of audit data when the log file reaches its maximum size. Older data is retained at the expense of the most recent audit events. Use this option only if you don't want to lose any audit data, don't want to create an archive of the event log, and are committed to reviewing data before the maximum log size is reached. @@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ Configuration\\Administrative Templates\\Windows Components\\Event Log Service\\ - **Retain old events**: This policy setting controls event log behavior when the log file reaches its maximum size. When this policy setting is enabled and a log file reaches its maximum size, new events aren't written to the log and are lost. When this policy setting is disabled and a log file reaches its maximum size, new events overwrite old events. - **Backup log automatically when full**: This policy setting controls event log behavior when the log file reaches its maximum size. It takes effect only if the **Retain old events** policy setting is enabled. If you enable these policy settings, the event log file is automatically closed and renamed when it's full. A new log file is then started. If you disable or don't configure this policy setting and the **Retain old events** policy setting is enabled, new events are discarded, and the old events are retained. -Many organizations are now required to store archived log files for a number of years. Consult with regulatory compliance officers in your organization to determine whether such guidelines apply to your organization. For more information, see the [IT Compliance Management Guide](/previous-versions/tn-archive/dd206732(v=technet.10)). +Many organizations are now required to store archived log files for many years. Consult with regulatory compliance officers in your organization to determine whether such guidelines apply to your organization. For more information, see the [IT Compliance Management Guide](/previous-versions/tn-archive/dd206732(v=technet.10)). ## Deploy the security audit policy @@ -373,4 +373,4 @@ However, unless you can run fairly realistic simulations of network usage patter - A limited set of security audit policy settings, such as **Logon/Logoff** and **Account Logon** - A combination of limited OUs and audit policy settings—for example, targeting servers in only the Accounting OU with **Object Access** policy settings -After you successfully complete one or more limited deployments, you should confirm that the audit data that's collected is manageable with your management tools and administrators. After you confirm that the pilot deployment is effective, you need to ensure that you have the necessary tools and staff to expand the deployment to include additional OUs and sets of audit policy settings until production deployment is complete. \ No newline at end of file +After you successfully complete one or more limited deployments, you should confirm that the audit data that's collected is manageable with your management tools and administrators. After you confirm that the pilot deployment is effective, you need to ensure that you have the necessary tools and staff to expand the deployment to include more OUs and sets of audit policy settings until production deployment is complete. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/security-auditing-overview.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/security-auditing-overview.md index 1c305a4439..7d7e21c1f3 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/security-auditing-overview.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/security-auditing-overview.md @@ -25,14 +25,14 @@ Topics in this section are for IT professionals and describes the security audit ## -Security auditing is one of the most powerful tools that you can use to maintain the integrity of your system. As part of your overall security strategy, you should determine the level of auditing that is appropriate for your environment. Auditing should identify attacks (successful or not) that pose a threat to your network, and attacks against resources that you have determined to be valuable in your risk assessment. +Security auditing is one of the most powerful tools that you can use to maintain the integrity of your system. As part of your overall security strategy, you should determine the level of auditing that is appropriate for your environment. Auditing should identify attacks (successful or not) that pose a threat to your network, and attacks against resources that you've determined to be valuable in your risk assessment. ## In this section | Topic | Description | | - | - | |[Basic security audit policies](basic-security-audit-policies.md) |Before you implement auditing, you must decide on an auditing policy. A basic audit policy specifies categories of security-related events that you want to audit. When this version of Windows is first installed, all auditing categories are disabled. By enabling various auditing event categories, you can implement an auditing policy that suits the security needs of your organization. | -|[Advanced security audit policies](./advanced-security-auditing.md) |Advanced security audit policy settings are found in **Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\System Audit Policies** and appear to overlap with basic security audit policies, but they are recorded and applied differently. | +|[Advanced security audit policies](./advanced-security-auditing.md) |Advanced security audit policy settings are found in **Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\System Audit Policies** and appear to overlap with basic security audit policies, but they're recorded and applied differently. | diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/block-untrusted-fonts-in-enterprise.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/block-untrusted-fonts-in-enterprise.md index 564c7cdfe4..95aa186d93 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/block-untrusted-fonts-in-enterprise.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/block-untrusted-fonts-in-enterprise.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- title: Block untrusted fonts in an enterprise (Windows 10) -description: To help protect your company from attacks which may originate from untrusted or attacker controlled font files, we've created the Blocking Untrusted Fonts feature. +description: To help protect your company from attacks that may originate from untrusted or attacker controlled font files, we've created the Blocking Untrusted Fonts feature. ms.reviewer: manager: dansimp ms.prod: m365-security @@ -19,13 +19,13 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec > Learn more about what features and functionality are supported in each Windows edition at [Compare Windows 10 Editions](https://www.microsoft.com/WindowsForBusiness/Compare). -To help protect your company from attacks which may originate from untrusted or attacker-controlled font files, we’ve created the Blocking Untrusted Fonts feature. Using this feature, you can turn on a global setting that stops your employees from loading untrusted fonts processed using the Graphics Device Interface (GDI) onto your network. Untrusted fonts are any font installed outside of the `%windir%/Fonts` directory. Blocking untrusted fonts helps prevent both remote (web-based or email-based) and local EOP attacks that can happen during the font file-parsing process. +To help protect your company from attacks that may originate from untrusted or attacker-controlled font files, we’ve created the Blocking Untrusted Fonts feature. Using this feature, you can turn on a global setting that stops your employees from loading untrusted fonts processed using the Graphics Device Interface (GDI) onto your network. Untrusted fonts are any font installed outside of the `%windir%/Fonts` directory. Blocking untrusted fonts helps prevent both remote (web-based or email-based) and local EOP attacks that can happen during the font file-parsing process. ## What does this mean for me? -Blocking untrusted fonts helps improve your network and employee protection against font-processing-related attacks. By default, this feature is not turned on. +Blocking untrusted fonts helps improve your network and employee protection against font-processing-related attacks. By default, this feature isn't turned on. ## How does this feature work? -There are 3 ways to use this feature: +There are three ways to use this feature: - **On.** Helps stop any font processed using GDI from loading outside of the `%windir%/Fonts` directory. It also turns on event logging. @@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ There are 3 ways to use this feature: - **Exclude apps to load untrusted fonts.** You can exclude specific apps, allowing them to load untrusted fonts, even while this feature is turned on. For instructions, see [Fix apps having problems because of blocked fonts](#fix-apps-having-problems-because-of-blocked-fonts). ## Potential reductions in functionality -After you turn this feature on, your employees might experience reduced functionality when: +After you turn on this feature, your employees might experience reduced functionality when: -- Sending a print job to a remote printer server that uses this feature and where the spooler process hasn’t been specifically excluded. In this situation, any fonts that aren’t already available in the server’s %windir%/Fonts folder won’t be used. +- Sending a print job to a remote printer server that uses this feature and where the spooler process hasn’t been excluded. In this situation, any fonts that aren’t already available in the server’s %windir%/Fonts folder won’t be used. - Printing using fonts provided by the installed printer’s graphics .dll file, outside of the %windir%/Fonts folder. For more information, see [Introduction to Printer Graphics DLLs](/windows-hardware/drivers/print/introduction-to-printer-graphics-dlls). @@ -55,13 +55,13 @@ Use Group Policy or the registry to turn this feature on, off, or to use audit m **To turn on and use the Blocking Untrusted Fonts feature through Group Policy** 1. Open the Group Policy editor (gpedit.msc) and go to `Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\System\Mitigation Options\Untrusted Font Blocking`. -2. Click **Enabled** to turn the feature on, and then click one of the following **Mitigation Options**: +2. Click **Enabled** to turn on the feature, and then click one of the following **Mitigation Options**: - - **Block untrusted fonts and log events.** Turns the feature on, blocking untrusted fonts and logging installation attempts to the event log. + - **Block untrusted fonts and log events.** Turns on the feature, blocking untrusted fonts and logging installation attempts to the event log. - - **Do not block untrusted fonts.** Turns the feature on, but doesn't block untrusted fonts nor does it log installation attempts to the event log. + - **Do not block untrusted fonts.** Turns on the feature, but doesn't block untrusted fonts nor does it log installation attempts to the event log. - - **Log events without blocking untrusted fonts**. Turns the feature on, logging installation attempts to the event log, but not blocking untrusted fonts. + - **Log events without blocking untrusted fonts**. Turns on the feature, logging installation attempts to the event log, but not blocking untrusted fonts. 3. Click **OK**. @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ To turn this feature on, off, or to use audit mode: 5. Restart your computer. ## View the event log -After you turn this feature on, or start using Audit mode, you can look at your event logs for details. +After you turn on this feature, or start using Audit mode, you can look at your event logs for details. **To look at your event log** @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ After you turn this feature on, or start using Audit mode, you can look at your ## Fix apps having problems because of blocked fonts Your company may still need apps that are having problems because of blocked fonts, so we suggest that you first run this feature in Audit mode to determine which fonts are causing the problems. -After you figure out the problematic fonts, you can try to fix your apps in 2 ways: by directly installing the fonts into the %windir%/Fonts directory or by excluding the underlying processes and letting the fonts load. As the default solution, we highly recommend that you install the problematic font. Installing fonts is safer than excluding apps because excluded apps can load any font, trusted or untrusted. +After you figure out the problematic fonts, you can try to fix your apps in two ways: by directly installing the fonts into the %windir%/Fonts directory or by excluding the underlying processes and letting the fonts load. As the default solution, we highly recommend that you install the problematic font. Installing fonts is safer than excluding apps because excluded apps can load any font, trusted or untrusted. **To fix your apps by installing the problematic fonts (recommended)** @@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ After you figure out the problematic fonts, you can try to fix your apps in 2 wa 1. On each computer with the app installed, open regedit.exe and go to `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\`.

For example, if you want to exclude Microsoft Word processes, you’d use `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\Winword.exe`. -2. Add any additional processes that need to be excluded here, and then turn the Blocking untrusted fonts feature on, using the steps in [Turn on and use the Blocking Untrusted Fonts feature](#turn-on-and-use-the-blocking-untrusted-fonts-feature), earlier in this article. +2. Add other processes that need to be excluded here, and then turn on the Blocking untrusted fonts feature, using the steps in [Turn on and use the Blocking Untrusted Fonts feature](#turn-on-and-use-the-blocking-untrusted-fonts-feature), earlier in this article. ## Related content diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/device-guard/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/device-guard/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md index 5d9db2a678..90770727f0 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/device-guard/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/device-guard/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md @@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec This topic covers different ways to enable Hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI) on Windows 10 and Windows 11. Some applications, including device drivers, may be incompatible with HVCI. -This can cause devices or software to malfunction and in rare cases may result in a blue screen. Such issues may occur after HVCI has been turned on or during the enablement process itself. -If this happens, see [Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting) for remediation steps. +This incompatibility can cause devices or software to malfunction and in rare cases may result in a blue screen. Such issues may occur after HVCI has been turned on or during the enablement process itself. +If these issues occur, see [Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting) for remediation steps. > [!NOTE] > Because it makes use of *Mode Based Execution Control*, HVCI works better with Intel Kaby Lake or AMD Zen 2 CPUs and newer. Processors without MBEC will rely on an emulation of this feature, called *Restricted User Mode*, which has a bigger impact on performance. @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ Enabling in Intune requires using the Code Integrity node in the [AppLocker CSP] 3. Double-click **Turn on Virtualization Based Security**. -4. Click **Enabled** and under **Virtualization Based Protection of Code Integrity**, select **Enabled with UEFI lock** to ensure HVCI cannot be disabled remotely or select **Enabled without UEFI lock**. +4. Click **Enabled** and under **Virtualization Based Protection of Code Integrity**, select **Enabled with UEFI lock** to ensure HVCI can't be disabled remotely or select **Enabled without UEFI lock**. ![Enable HVCI using Group Policy.](../images/enable-hvci-gp.png) @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ To apply the new policy on a domain-joined computer, either restart or run `gpup ### Use registry keys to enable virtualization-based protection of code integrity -Set the following registry keys to enable HVCI. This provides exactly the same set of configuration options provided by Group Policy. +Set the following registry keys to enable HVCI. These keys provide exactly the same set of configuration options provided by Group Policy. @@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ Get-CimInstance –ClassName Win32_DeviceGuard –Namespace root\Microsoft\Windo > [!NOTE] > Mode Based Execution Control property will only be listed as available starting with Windows 10 version 1803 and Windows 11 version 21H2. -The output of this command provides details of the available hardware-based security features as well as those features that are currently enabled. +The output of this command provides details of the available hardware-based security features and those features that are currently enabled. #### AvailableSecurityProperties @@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ This field indicates whether the Windows Defender Credential Guard or HVCI servi Value | Description -|- -**0.** | No services configured. +**0.** | No services are configured. **1.** | If present, Windows Defender Credential Guard is configured. **2.** | If present, HVCI is configured. **3.** | If present, System Guard Secure Launch is configured. @@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ This field indicates whether VBS is enabled and running. Value | Description -|- -**0.** | VBS is not enabled. +**0.** | VBS isn't enabled. **1.** | VBS is enabled but not running. **2.** | VBS is enabled and running. @@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ Another method to determine the available and enabled Windows Defender Device Gu A. If a device driver fails to load or crashes at runtime, you may be able to update the driver using **Device Manager**. -B. If you experience software or device malfunction after using the above procedure to turn on HVCI, but you are able to log in to Windows, you can turn off HVCI by renaming or deleting the SIPolicy.p7b file from `\Windows\System32\CodeIntegrity\` and then restart your device. +B. If you experience software or device malfunction after using the above procedure to turn on HVCI, but you're able to sign in to Windows, you can turn off HVCI by renaming or deleting the SIPolicy.p7b file from `\Windows\System32\CodeIntegrity\` and then restart your device. C. If you experience a critical error during boot or your system is unstable after using the above procedure to turn on HVCI, you can recover using the Windows Recovery Environment (Windows RE). To boot to Windows RE, see [Windows RE Technical Reference](/windows-hardware/manufacture/desktop/windows-recovery-environment--windows-re--technical-reference). After logging in to Windows RE, you can turn off HVCI by renaming or deleting the SIPolicy.p7b file from `\Windows\System32\CodeIntegrity\` and then restart your device. @@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ C. If you experience a critical error during boot or your system is unstable aft HVCI can protect a Hyper-V virtual machine, just as it would a physical machine. The steps to enable Windows Defender Application Control are the same from within the virtual machine. -WDAC protects against malware running in the guest virtual machine. It does not provide additional protection from the host administrator. From the host, you can disable WDAC for a virtual machine: +WDAC protects against malware running in the guest virtual machine. It doesn't provide extra protection from the host administrator. From the host, you can disable WDAC for a virtual machine: ```powershell Set-VMSecurity -VMName -VirtualizationBasedSecurityOptOut $true @@ -324,6 +324,6 @@ Set-VMSecurity -VMName -VirtualizationBasedSecurityOptOut $true ### Requirements for running HVCI in Hyper-V virtual machines - The Hyper-V host must run at least Windows Server 2016 or Windows 10 version 1607. - The Hyper-V virtual machine must be Generation 2, and running at least Windows Server 2016 or Windows 10. -- HVCI and [nested virtualization](/virtualization/hyper-v-on-windows/user-guide/nested-virtualization) can be enabled at the same time. To enable the HyperV role on the virtual machine, you must first install the HyperV role in a Windows nested virtualization environment. -- Virtual Fibre Channel adapters are not compatible with HVCI. Before attaching a virtual Fibre Channel Adapter to a virtual machine, you must first opt out of virtualization-based security using `Set-VMSecurity`. -- The AllowFullSCSICommandSet option for pass-through disks is not compatible with HVCI. Before configuring a pass-through disk with AllowFullSCSICommandSet, you must first opt out of virtualization-based security using `Set-VMSecurity`. +- HVCI and [nested virtualization](/virtualization/hyper-v-on-windows/user-guide/nested-virtualization) can be enabled at the same time. To enable the Hyper-V role on the virtual machine, you must first install the Hyper-V role in a Windows nested virtualization environment. +- Virtual Fibre Channel adapters aren't compatible with HVCI. Before attaching a virtual Fibre Channel Adapter to a virtual machine, you must first opt out of virtualization-based security using `Set-VMSecurity`. +- The AllowFullSCSICommandSet option for pass-through disks isn't compatible with HVCI. Before configuring a pass-through disk with AllowFullSCSICommandSet, you must first opt out of virtualization-based security using `Set-VMSecurity`. diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/device-guard/requirements-and-deployment-planning-guidelines-for-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/device-guard/requirements-and-deployment-planning-guidelines-for-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md index bec34fe509..7a99baa345 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/device-guard/requirements-and-deployment-planning-guidelines-for-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/device-guard/requirements-and-deployment-planning-guidelines-for-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- title: Deployment guidelines for Windows Defender Device Guard (Windows 10) -description: Plan your deployment of Hypervisor-Protected Code Integrity (aka Memory Integrity). Learn about hardware requirements, deployment approaches, code signing and code integrity policies. +description: Plan your deployment of Hypervisor-Protected Code Integrity (also known as Memory Integrity). Learn about hardware requirements, deployment approaches, code signing and code integrity policies. keywords: virtualization, security, malware ms.prod: m365-security ms.mktglfcycl: deploy @@ -16,12 +16,12 @@ ms.author: dansimp ms.technology: windows-sec --- -# Baseline protections and additional qualifications for virtualization-based protection of code integrity +# Baseline protections and other qualifications for virtualization-based protection of code integrity **Applies to** - Windows 10 -Computers must meet certain hardware, firmware, and software requirements in order to take advantage of Hypervisor-Protected Code Integrity (HVCI), a virtualization-based security (VBS) feature in Windows. HVCI is referred to as Memory Integrity under the Core Isolation section of the Windows security settings. Computers lacking these requirements can still be protected by Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) policies—the difference is that those computers will not be as hardened against certain threats. +Computers must meet certain hardware, firmware, and software requirements in order to take advantage of Hypervisor-Protected Code Integrity (HVCI), a virtualization-based security (VBS) feature in Windows. HVCI is referred to as Memory Integrity under the Core Isolation section of the Windows security settings. Computers lacking these requirements can still be protected by Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) policies—the difference is that those computers won't be as hardened against certain threats. For example, hardware that includes CPU virtualization extensions and SLAT will be hardened against malware that attempts to gain access to the kernel, but without protected BIOS options such as “Boot only from internal hard drive,” the computer could be booted (by a malicious person who has physical access) into an operating system on bootable media. @@ -38,42 +38,42 @@ The following tables provide more information about the hardware, firmware, and |Baseline Protections | Description | Security benefits | |--------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | Hardware: **64-bit CPU** | A 64-bit computer is required for the Windows hypervisor to provide VBS. | | -| Hardware: **CPU virtualization extensions**,
plus **extended page tables** | These hardware features are required for VBS:
One of the following virtualization extensions:
• VT-x (Intel) or
• AMD-V
And:
• Extended page tables, also called Second Level Address Translation (SLAT). | VBS provides isolation of the secure kernel from the normal operating system. Vulnerabilities and zero-days in the normal operating system cannot be exploited because of this isolation. | -| Firmware: **UEFI firmware version 2.3.1.c or higher with UEFI Secure Boot** | See the System.Fundamentals.Firmware.UEFISecureBoot requirement in the [Windows Hardware Compatibility Specifications for Windows 10, version 1809 and Windows Server 2019 - Systems download](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2027110). You can find previous versions of the Windows Hardware Compatibility Program Specifications and Policies [here](/windows-hardware/design/compatibility/whcp-specifications-policies). | UEFI Secure Boot helps ensure that the device boots only authorized code. This can prevent boot kits and root kits from installing and persisting across reboots. | +| Hardware: **CPU virtualization extensions**,
plus **extended page tables** | These hardware features are required for VBS:
One of the following virtualization extensions:
• VT-x (Intel) or
• AMD-V
And:
• Extended page tables, also called Second Level Address Translation (SLAT). | VBS provides isolation of the secure kernel from the normal operating system. Vulnerabilities and zero-days in the normal operating system can't be exploited because of this isolation. | +| Firmware: **UEFI firmware version 2.3.1.c or higher with UEFI Secure Boot** | See the System.Fundamentals.Firmware.UEFISecureBoot requirement in the [Windows Hardware Compatibility Specifications for Windows 10, version 1809 and Windows Server 2019 - Systems download](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2027110). You can find previous versions of the Windows Hardware Compatibility Program Specifications and Policies [here](/windows-hardware/design/compatibility/whcp-specifications-policies). | UEFI Secure Boot helps ensure that the device boots only authorized code. This guarantee can prevent boot kits and root kits from installing and persisting across reboots. | | Firmware: **Secure firmware update process** | UEFI firmware must support secure firmware update found under the System.Fundamentals.Firmware.UEFISecureBoot requirement in the [Windows Hardware Compatibility Specifications for Windows 10, version 1809 and Windows Server 2019 - Systems download](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2027110). You can find previous versions of the Windows Hardware Compatibility Program Specifications and Policies [here](/windows-hardware/design/compatibility/whcp-specifications-policies). | UEFI firmware just like software can have security vulnerabilities that, when found, need to be patched through firmware updates. Patching helps prevent root kits from getting installed. | -| Software: **HVCI compatible drivers** | See the Filter.Driver.DeviceGuard.DriverCompatibility requirement in the [Windows Hardware Compatibility Specifications for Windows 10, version 1809 and Windows Server 2019 - Filter driver download](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2027110). You can find previous versions of the Windows Hardware Compatibility Program Specifications and Policies [here](/windows-hardware/design/compatibility/whcp-specifications-policies). | [HVCI Compatible](https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/windows_hardware_certification/2015/05/22/driver-compatibility-with-device-guard-in-windows-10/) drivers help ensure that VBS can maintain appropriate memory permissions. This increases resistance to bypassing vulnerable kernel drivers and helps ensure that malware cannot run in kernel. Only code verified through code integrity can run in kernel mode. | +| Software: **HVCI compatible drivers** | See the Filter.Driver.DeviceGuard.DriverCompatibility requirement in the [Windows Hardware Compatibility Specifications for Windows 10, version 1809 and Windows Server 2019 - Filter driver download](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2027110). You can find previous versions of the Windows Hardware Compatibility Program Specifications and Policies [here](/windows-hardware/design/compatibility/whcp-specifications-policies). | [HVCI Compatible](https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/windows_hardware_certification/2015/05/22/driver-compatibility-with-device-guard-in-windows-10/) drivers help ensure that VBS can maintain appropriate memory permissions. This increases resistance to bypassing vulnerable kernel drivers and helps ensure that malware can't run in kernel. Only code verified through code integrity can run in kernel mode. | | Software: Qualified **Windows operating system** | Windows 10 Enterprise, Windows 10 Pro, Windows 10 Education, Windows Server 2016, or Windows 10 IoT Enterprise

Important:
Windows Server 2016 running as a domain controller does not support Windows Defender Credential Guard. Only virtualization-based protection of code integrity is supported in this configuration.

| Support for VBS and for management features. | > **Important**  The following tables list additional qualifications for improved security. You can use WDAC and HVCI with hardware, firmware, and software that support baseline protections, even if they do not support protections for improved security. However, we strongly recommend meeting these additional qualifications to significantly strengthen the level of security that WDAC and HVCI can provide. -## Additional qualifications for improved security +## Other qualifications for improved security -The following tables describe additional hardware and firmware qualifications, and the improved security that is available when these qualifications are met. +The following tables describe other hardware and firmware qualifications, and the improved security that is available when these qualifications are met. -### Additional security qualifications starting with Windows 10, version 1507, and Windows Server 2016, Technical Preview 4 +### More security qualifications starting with Windows 10, version 1507, and Windows Server 2016, Technical Preview 4 | Protections for Improved Security | Description | Security benefits | |---------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|------| -| Firmware: **Securing Boot Configuration and Management** | • BIOS password or stronger authentication must be supported.
• In the BIOS configuration, BIOS authentication must be set.
• There must be support for protected BIOS option to configure list of permitted boot devices (for example, “Boot only from internal hard drive”) and boot device order, overriding BOOTORDER modification made by operating system.
• In the BIOS configuration, BIOS options related to security and boot options (list of permitted boot devices, boot order) must be secured to prevent other operating systems from starting and to prevent changes to the BIOS settings. | • BIOS password or stronger authentication helps ensure that only authenticated Platform BIOS administrators can change BIOS settings. This helps protect against a physically present user with BIOS access.
• Boot order when locked provides protection against the computer being booted into WinRE or another operating system on bootable media. | +| Firmware: **Securing Boot Configuration and Management** | • BIOS password or stronger authentication must be supported.
• In the BIOS configuration, BIOS authentication must be set.
• There must be support for protected BIOS option to configure list of permitted boot devices (for example, “Boot only from internal hard drive”) and boot device order, overriding BOOTORDER modification made by operating system.
• In the BIOS configuration, BIOS options related to security and boot options (list of permitted boot devices, boot order) must be secured to prevent other operating systems from starting and to prevent changes to the BIOS settings. | • BIOS password or stronger authentication helps ensure that only authenticated Platform BIOS administrators can change BIOS settings. This guarantee helps protect against a physically present user with BIOS access.
• Boot order when locked provides protection against the computer being booted into WinRE or another operating system on bootable media. |
-### Additional security qualifications starting with Windows 10, version 1607, and Windows Server 2016 +### More security qualifications starting with Windows 10, version 1607, and Windows Server 2016 | Protections for Improved Security | Description | Security benefits | |---------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|-----| -| Firmware: **Hardware Rooted Trust Platform Secure Boot** | • Boot Integrity (Platform Secure Boot) must be supported. See the System.Fundamentals.Firmware.CS.UEFISecureBoot.ConnectedStandby requirement in the [Windows Hardware Compatibility Specifications for Windows 10, version 1809 and Windows Server 2019 - Systems download](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2027110). You can find previous versions of the Windows Hardware Compatibility Program Specifications and Policies [here](/windows-hardware/design/compatibility/whcp-specifications-policies).
• The Hardware Security Test Interface (HSTI) 1.1.a must be implemented. See [Hardware Security Testability Specification](/windows-hardware/test/hlk/testref/hardware-security-testability-specification). | • Boot Integrity (Platform Secure Boot) from Power-On provides protections against physically present attackers, and defense-in-depth against malware.
• HSTI 1.1.a provides additional security assurance for correctly secured silicon and platform. | +| Firmware: **Hardware Rooted Trust Platform Secure Boot** | • Boot Integrity (Platform Secure Boot) must be supported. See the System.Fundamentals.Firmware.CS.UEFISecureBoot.ConnectedStandby requirement in the [Windows Hardware Compatibility Specifications for Windows 10, version 1809 and Windows Server 2019 - Systems download](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2027110). You can find previous versions of the Windows Hardware Compatibility Program Specifications and Policies [here](/windows-hardware/design/compatibility/whcp-specifications-policies).
• The Hardware Security Test Interface (HSTI) 1.1.a must be implemented. See [Hardware Security Testability Specification](/windows-hardware/test/hlk/testref/hardware-security-testability-specification). | • Boot Integrity (Platform Secure Boot) from Power-On provides protections against physically present attackers, and defense-in-depth against malware.
• HSTI 1.1.a provides extra security assurance for correctly secured silicon and platform. | | Firmware: **Firmware Update through Windows Update** | Firmware must support field updates through Windows Update and UEFI encapsulation update. | Helps ensure that firmware updates are fast, secure, and reliable. | -| Firmware: **Securing Boot Configuration and Management** | • Required BIOS capabilities: Ability of OEM to add ISV, OEM, or Enterprise Certificate in Secure Boot DB at manufacturing time.
• Required configurations: Microsoft UEFI CA must be removed from Secure Boot DB. Support for 3rd-party UEFI modules is permitted but should leverage ISV-provided certificates or OEM certificate for the specific UEFI software.| • Enterprises can choose to allow proprietary EFI drivers/applications to run.
• Removing Microsoft UEFI CA from Secure Boot DB provides full control to enterprises over software that runs before the operating system boots. | +| Firmware: **Securing Boot Configuration and Management** | • Required BIOS capabilities: Ability of OEM to add ISV, OEM, or Enterprise Certificate in Secure Boot DB at manufacturing time.
• Required configurations: Microsoft UEFI CA must be removed from Secure Boot DB. Support for 3rd-party UEFI modules is permitted but should use ISV-provided certificates or OEM certificate for the specific UEFI software.| • Enterprises can choose to allow proprietary EFI drivers/applications to run.
• Removing Microsoft UEFI CA from Secure Boot DB provides full control to enterprises over software that runs before the operating system boots. |
-### Additional security qualifications starting with Windows 10, version 1703 +### More security qualifications starting with Windows 10, version 1703 | Protections for Improved Security | Description | Security benefits | |---------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|------| -| Firmware: **VBS enablement of NX protection for UEFI runtime services** | • VBS will enable No-Execute (NX) protection on UEFI runtime service code and data memory regions. UEFI runtime service code must support read-only page protections, and UEFI runtime service data must not be executable.
• UEFI runtime service must meet these requirements:
    • Implement UEFI 2.6 EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE. All UEFI runtime service memory (code and data) must be described by this table.
    • PE sections need to be page-aligned in memory (not required for in non-volitile storage).
    • The Memory Attributes Table needs to correctly mark code and data as RO/NX for configuration by the OS:
        • All entries must include attributes EFI_MEMORY_RO, EFI_MEMORY_XP, or both
        • No entries may be left with neither of the above attributes, indicating memory that is both executable and writable. Memory must be either readable and executable or writeable and non-executable.

Notes:
• This only applies to UEFI runtime service memory, and not UEFI boot service memory.
• This protection is applied by VBS on OS page tables.


Please also note the following:
• Do not use sections that are both writeable and executable
• Do not attempt to directly modify executable system memory
• Do not use dynamic code | • Vulnerabilities in UEFI runtime, if any, will be blocked from compromising VBS (such as in functions like UpdateCapsule and SetVariable)
• Reduces the attack surface to VBS from system firmware. | -| Firmware: **Firmware support for SMM protection** | The [Windows SMM Security Mitigations Table (WSMT) specification](https://download.microsoft.com/download/1/8/A/18A21244-EB67-4538-BAA2-1A54E0E490B6/WSMT.docx) contains details of an Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI) table that was created for use with Windows operating systems that support Windows virtualization-based security (VBS) features.| • Protects against potential vulnerabilities in UEFI runtime services, if any, will be blocked from compromising VBS (such as in functions like UpdateCapsule and SetVariable)
• Reduces the attack surface to VBS from system firmware.
• Blocks additional security attacks against SMM. | +| Firmware: **VBS enablement of NX protection for UEFI runtime services** | • VBS will enable No-Execute (NX) protection on UEFI runtime service code and data memory regions. UEFI runtime service code must support read-only page protections, and UEFI runtime service data must not be executable.
• UEFI runtime service must meet these requirements:
    • Implement UEFI 2.6 EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE. All UEFI runtime service memory (code and data) must be described by this table.
    • PE sections need to be page-aligned in memory (not required for in non-volitile storage).
    • The Memory Attributes Table needs to correctly mark code and data as RO/NX for configuration by the OS:
        • All entries must include attributes EFI_MEMORY_RO, EFI_MEMORY_XP, or both
        • No entries may be left with neither of the above attributes, indicating memory that is both executable and writable. Memory must be either readable and executable or writeable and non-executable.

Notes:
• This only applies to UEFI runtime service memory, and not UEFI boot service memory.
• This protection is applied by VBS on OS page tables.


Also note the following guidelines:
• Don't use sections that are both writeable and executable
• Don't attempt to directly modify executable system memory
• Don't use dynamic code | • Vulnerabilities in UEFI runtime, if any, will be blocked from compromising VBS (such as in functions like UpdateCapsule and SetVariable)
• Reduces the attack surface to VBS from system firmware. | +| Firmware: **Firmware support for SMM protection** | The [Windows SMM Security Mitigations Table (WSMT) specification](https://download.microsoft.com/download/1/8/A/18A21244-EB67-4538-BAA2-1A54E0E490B6/WSMT.docx) contains details of an Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI) table that was created for use with Windows operating systems that support Windows virtualization-based security (VBS) features.| • Protects against potential vulnerabilities in UEFI runtime services, if any, will be blocked from compromising VBS (such as in functions like UpdateCapsule and SetVariable)
• Reduces the attack surface to VBS from system firmware.
• Blocks other security attacks against SMM. | diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/mbsa-removal-and-guidance.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/mbsa-removal-and-guidance.md index c8fafe64a7..b38ebe2069 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/mbsa-removal-and-guidance.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/mbsa-removal-and-guidance.md @@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec # What is Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer and its uses? -Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer (MBSA) is used to verify patch compliance. MBSA also performed several other security checks for Windows, IIS, and SQL Server. Unfortunately, the logic behind these additional checks had not been actively maintained since Windows XP and Windows Server 2003. Changes in the products since then rendered many of these security checks obsolete and some of their recommendations counterproductive. +Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer (MBSA) is used to verify patch compliance. MBSA also performed several other security checks for Windows, IIS, and SQL Server. Unfortunately, the logic behind these extra checks hadn't been actively maintained since Windows XP and Windows Server 2003. Changes in the products since then rendered many of these security checks obsolete and some of their recommendations counterproductive. -MBSA was largely used in situations where neither Microsoft Update nor a local WSUS or Configuration Manager server was available, or as a compliance tool to ensure that all security updates were deployed to a managed environment. While MBSA version 2.3 introduced support for Windows Server 2012 R2 and Windows 8.1, it has since been deprecated and no longer developed. MBSA 2.3 is not updated to fully support Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016. +MBSA was largely used in situations where Microsoft Update a local WSUS or Configuration Manager server wasn't available, or as a compliance tool to ensure that all security updates were deployed to a managed environment. While MBSA version 2.3 introduced support for Windows Server 2012 R2 and Windows 8.1, it has since been deprecated and no longer developed. MBSA 2.3 isn't updated to fully support Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016. > [!NOTE] > In accordance with our [SHA-1 deprecation initiative](https://aka.ms/sha1deprecation), the Wsusscn2.cab file is no longer dual-signed using both SHA-1 and the SHA-2 suite of hash algorithms (specifically SHA-256). This file is now signed using only SHA-256. Administrators who verify digital signatures on this file should now expect only single SHA-256 signatures. Starting with the August 2020 Wsusscn2.cab file, MBSA will return the following error "The catalog file is damaged or an invalid catalog." when attempting to scan using the offline scan file. @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ For example: [![PowerShell script.](images/powershell-example.png)](https://www.powershellgallery.com/packages/Scan-UpdatesOffline/1.0) The preceding scripts use the [WSUS offline scan file](https://support.microsoft.com/help/927745/detailed-information-for-developers-who-use-the-windows-update-offline) (wsusscn2.cab) to perform a scan and get the same information on missing updates as MBSA supplied. MBSA also relied on the wsusscn2.cab to determine which updates were missing from a given system without connecting to any online service or server. The wsusscn2.cab file is still available and there are currently no plans to remove or replace it. -The wsusscn2.cab file contains the metadata of only security updates, update rollups and service packs available from Microsoft Update; it does not contain any information on non-security updates, tools or drivers. +The wsusscn2.cab file contains the metadata of only security updates, update rollups and service packs available from Microsoft Update; it doesn't contain any information on non-security updates, tools or drivers. ## More Information diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/configure-md-app-guard.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/configure-md-app-guard.md index 99819da4d5..6e85b47920 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/configure-md-app-guard.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/configure-md-app-guard.md @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ ms.author: deniseb ms.date: 03/10/2022 ms.reviewer: manager: dansimp -ms.custom: asr +ms.custom: sasr ms.technology: windows-sec --- @@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ These settings, located at `Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Netw |Policy name|Supported versions|Description| |-----------|------------------|-----------| |Private network ranges for apps | At least Windows Server 2012, Windows 8, or Windows RT| A comma-separated list of IP address ranges that are in your corporate network. Included endpoints or endpoints that are included within a specified IP address range, are rendered using Microsoft Edge and won't be accessible from the Application Guard environment.| -|Enterprise resource domains hosted in the cloud| At least Windows Server 2012, Windows 8, or Windows RT|A pipe-separated (`|`) list of your domain cloud resources. Included endpoints are rendered using Microsoft Edge and won't be accessible from the Application Guard environment.

Note that this list supports the wildcards detailed in the [Network isolation settings wildcards](#network-isolation-settings-wildcards) table.| -|Domains categorized as both work and personal| At least Windows Server 2012, Windows 8, or Windows RT|A comma-separated list of domain names used as both work or personal resources. Included endpoints are rendered using Microsoft Edge and will be accessible from the Application Guard and regular Edge environment.

Note that this list supports the wildcards detailed in the [Network isolation settings wildcards](#network-isolation-settings-wildcards) table.| +|Enterprise resource domains hosted in the cloud| At least Windows Server 2012, Windows 8, or Windows RT|A pipe-separated (`|`) list of your domain cloud resources. Included endpoints are rendered using Microsoft Edge and won't be accessible from the Application Guard environment.

This list supports the wildcards detailed in the [Network isolation settings wildcards](#network-isolation-settings-wildcards) table.| +|Domains categorized as both work and personal| At least Windows Server 2012, Windows 8, or Windows RT|A comma-separated list of domain names used as both work or personal resources. Included endpoints are rendered using Microsoft Edge and will be accessible from the Application Guard and regular Edge environment.

This list supports the wildcards detailed in the [Network isolation settings wildcards](#network-isolation-settings-wildcards) table.| ## Network isolation settings wildcards @@ -54,18 +54,18 @@ These settings, located at `Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Wind |Name|Supported versions|Description|Options| |-----------|------------------|-----------|-------| |Configure Microsoft Defender Application Guard clipboard settings|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1709 or higher

Windows 10 Pro, 1803 or higher

Windows 11|Determines whether Application Guard can use the clipboard functionality.|**Enabled.** Turns On the clipboard functionality and lets you choose whether to additionally:
- Disable the clipboard functionality completely when Virtualization Security is enabled.
- Enable copying of certain content from Application Guard into Microsoft Edge.
- Enable copying of certain content from Microsoft Edge into Application Guard. **Important:** Allowing copied content to go from Microsoft Edge into Application Guard can cause potential security risks and isn't recommended.

**Disabled or not configured.** Completely turns Off the clipboard functionality for Application Guard.| -|Configure Microsoft Defender Application Guard print settings|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1709 or higher

Windows 10 Pro, 1803 or higher

Windows 11|Determines whether Application Guard can use the print functionality.|**Enabled.** Turns On the print functionality and lets you choose whether to additionally:
- Enable Application Guard to print into the XPS format.
- Enable Application Guard to print into the PDF format.
- Enable Application Guard to print to locally attached printers.
- Enable Application Guard to print from previously connected network printers. Employees can't search for additional printers.

**Disabled or not configured.** Completely turns Off the print functionality for Application Guard.| +|Configure Microsoft Defender Application Guard print settings|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1709 or higher

Windows 10 Pro, 1803 or higher

Windows 11|Determines whether Application Guard can use the print functionality.|**Enabled.** Turns On the print functionality and lets you choose whether to additionally:
- Enable Application Guard to print into the XPS format.
- Enable Application Guard to print into the PDF format.
- Enable Application Guard to print to locally attached printers.
- Enable Application Guard to print from previously connected network printers. Employees can't search for other printers.

**Disabled or not configured.** Completely turns Off the print functionality for Application Guard.| |Prevent enterprise websites from loading non-enterprise content in Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1709 or higher

Windows 11|Determines whether to allow Internet access for apps not included on the **Allowed Apps** list.|**Enabled.** Prevents network traffic from both Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge to non-enterprise sites that can't render in the Application Guard container.

**NOTE**: This action might also block assets cached by CDNs and references to analytics sites. Add them to the trusted enterprise resources to avoid broken pages.

**Disabled or not configured.** Prevents Microsoft Edge to render network traffic to non-enterprise sites that can't render in Application Guard. | |Allow Persistence|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1709 or higher

Windows 10 Pro, 1803 or higher

Windows 11|Determines whether data persists across different sessions in Microsoft Defender Application Guard.|**Enabled.** Application Guard saves user-downloaded files and other items (such as, cookies, Favorites, and so on) for use in future Application Guard sessions.

**Disabled or not configured.** All user data within Application Guard is reset between sessions.

**NOTE**: If you later decide to stop supporting data persistence for your employees, you can use our Windows-provided utility to reset the container and to discard any personal data.

**To reset the container:**
1. Open a command-line program and navigate to `Windows/System32`.
2. Type `wdagtool.exe cleanup`. The container environment is reset, retaining only the employee-generated data.
3. Type `wdagtool.exe cleanup RESET_PERSISTENCE_LAYER`. The container environment is reset, including discarding all employee-generated data.| -|Turn on Microsoft Defender Application Guard in Managed Mode|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1809 or higher

Windows 11|Determines whether to turn on Application Guard for Microsoft Edge and Microsoft Office.|**Enabled.** Turns on Application Guard for Microsoft Edge and/or Microsoft Office, honoring the network isolation settings, rendering non-enterprise domains in the Application Guard container. Be aware that Application Guard won't actually be turned on unless the required prerequisites and network isolation settings are already set on the device. Available options:
- Enable Microsoft Defender Application Guard only for Microsoft Edge
- Enable Microsoft Defender Application Guard only for Microsoft Office
- Enable Microsoft Defender Application Guard for both Microsoft Edge and Microsoft Office

**Disabled.** Turns off Application Guard, allowing all apps to run in Microsoft Edge and Microsoft Office.| -|Allow files to download to host operating system|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1803 or higher

Windows 11|Determines whether to save downloaded files to the host operating system from the Microsoft Defender Application Guard container.|**Enabled.** Allows users to save downloaded files from the Microsoft Defender Application Guard container to the host operating system. This action creates a share between the host and container that also allows for uploads from the host to the Application Guard container.

**Disabled or not configured.** Users are not able to save downloaded files from Application Guard to the host operating system.| -|Allow hardware-accelerated rendering for Microsoft Defender Application Guard|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1803 or higher

Windows 10 Pro, 1803 or higher

Windows 11|Determines whether Microsoft Defender Application Guard renders graphics using hardware or software acceleration.|**Enabled.** Microsoft Defender Application Guard uses Hyper-V to access supported, high-security rendering graphics hardware (GPUs). These GPUs improve rendering performance and battery life while using Microsoft Defender Application Guard, particularly for video playback and other graphics-intensive use cases. If this setting is enabled without connecting any high-security rendering graphics hardware, Microsoft Defender Application Guard will automatically revert to software-based (CPU) rendering. **Important:** Be aware that enabling this setting with potentially compromised graphics devices or drivers might pose a risk to the host device.

**Disabled or not configured.** Microsoft Defender Application Guard uses software-based (CPU) rendering and won’t load any third-party graphics drivers or interact with any connected graphics hardware.| -|Allow camera and microphone access in Microsoft Defender Application Guard|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1809 or higher

Windows 10 Pro, 1809 or higher

Windows 11|Determines whether to allow camera and microphone access inside Microsoft Defender Application Guard.|**Enabled.** Applications inside Microsoft Defender Application Guard are able to access the camera and microphone on the user's device. **Important:** Be aware that enabling this policy with a potentially compromised container could bypass camera and microphone permissions and access the camera and microphone without the user's knowledge.

**Disabled or not configured.** Applications inside Microsoft Defender Application Guard are unable to access the camera and microphone on the user's device.| -|Allow Microsoft Defender Application Guard to use Root Certificate Authorities from a user's device|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1809 or higher

Windows 10 Pro, 1809 or higher

Windows 11|Determines whether Root Certificates are shared with Microsoft Defender Application Guard.|**Enabled.** Certificates matching the specified thumbprint are transferred into the container. Use a comma to separate multiple certificates.

**Disabled or not configured.** Certificates are not shared with Microsoft Defender Application Guard.| +|Turn on Microsoft Defender Application Guard in Managed Mode|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1809 or higher

Windows 11|Determines whether to turn on Application Guard for Microsoft Edge and Microsoft Office.|**Enabled.** Turns on Application Guard for Microsoft Edge and/or Microsoft Office, honoring the network isolation settings, rendering non-enterprise domains in the Application Guard container. Application Guard won't actually be turned on unless the required prerequisites and network isolation settings are already set on the device. Available options:
- Enable Microsoft Defender Application Guard only for Microsoft Edge
- Enable Microsoft Defender Application Guard only for Microsoft Office
- Enable Microsoft Defender Application Guard for both Microsoft Edge and Microsoft Office

**Disabled.** Turns off Application Guard, allowing all apps to run in Microsoft Edge and Microsoft Office.| +|Allow files to download to host operating system|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1803 or higher

Windows 11|Determines whether to save downloaded files to the host operating system from the Microsoft Defender Application Guard container.|**Enabled.** Allows users to save downloaded files from the Microsoft Defender Application Guard container to the host operating system. This action creates a share between the host and container that also allows for uploads from the host to the Application Guard container.

**Disabled or not configured.** Users aren't able to save downloaded files from Application Guard to the host operating system.| +|Allow hardware-accelerated rendering for Microsoft Defender Application Guard|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1803 or higher

Windows 10 Pro, 1803 or higher

Windows 11|Determines whether Microsoft Defender Application Guard renders graphics using hardware or software acceleration.|**Enabled.** Microsoft Defender Application Guard uses Hyper-V to access supported, high-security rendering graphics hardware (GPUs). These GPUs improve rendering performance and battery life while using Microsoft Defender Application Guard, particularly for video playback and other graphics-intensive use cases. If this setting is enabled without connecting any high-security rendering graphics hardware, Microsoft Defender Application Guard will automatically revert to software-based (CPU) rendering. **Important:** Enabling this setting with potentially compromised graphics devices or drivers might pose a risk to the host device.

**Disabled or not configured.** Microsoft Defender Application Guard uses software-based (CPU) rendering and won’t load any third-party graphics drivers or interact with any connected graphics hardware.| +|Allow camera and microphone access in Microsoft Defender Application Guard|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1809 or higher

Windows 10 Pro, 1809 or higher

Windows 11|Determines whether to allow camera and microphone access inside Microsoft Defender Application Guard.|**Enabled.** Applications inside Microsoft Defender Application Guard are able to access the camera and microphone on the user's device. **Important:** Enabling this policy with a potentially compromised container could bypass camera and microphone permissions and access the camera and microphone without the user's knowledge.

**Disabled or not configured.** Applications inside Microsoft Defender Application Guard are unable to access the camera and microphone on the user's device.| +|Allow Microsoft Defender Application Guard to use Root Certificate Authorities from a user's device|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1809 or higher

Windows 10 Pro, 1809 or higher

Windows 11|Determines whether Root Certificates are shared with Microsoft Defender Application Guard.|**Enabled.** Certificates matching the specified thumbprint are transferred into the container. Use a comma to separate multiple certificates.

**Disabled or not configured.** Certificates aren't shared with Microsoft Defender Application Guard.| |Allow auditing events in Microsoft Defender Application Guard|Windows 10 Enterprise, 1809 or higher

Windows 10 Pro, 1809 or higher

Windows 11|This policy setting allows you to decide whether auditing events can be collected from Microsoft Defender Application Guard.|**Enabled.** Application Guard inherits auditing policies from your device and logs system events from the Application Guard container to your host.

**Disabled or not configured.** event logs aren't collected from your Application Guard container.| ## Application Guard support dialog settings -These settings are located at `Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Security\Enterprise Customization`. If an error is encountered, you are presented with a dialog box. By default, this dialog box only contains the error information and a button for you to report it to Microsoft via the feedback hub. However, it is possible to provide additional information in the dialog box. +These settings are located at `Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Security\Enterprise Customization`. If an error is encountered, you're presented with a dialog box. By default, this dialog box only contains the error information and a button for you to report it to Microsoft via the feedback hub. However, it's possible to provide additional information in the dialog box. [Use Group Policy to enable and customize contact information](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-security-center/wdsc-customize-contact-information#use-group-policy-to-enable-and-customize-contact-information). diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/faq-md-app-guard.yml b/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/faq-md-app-guard.yml index 4e72f94860..603c2014c5 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/faq-md-app-guard.yml +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/faq-md-app-guard.yml @@ -41,16 +41,16 @@ sections: answer: | The manual or PAC server must be a hostname (not IP) that is neutral on the site-list. Additionally, if the PAC script returns a proxy, it must meet those same requirements. - To make sure the FQDNs (Fully Qualified Domain Names) for the “PAC file” and the “proxy servers the PAC file redirects to” are added as Neutral Resources in the Network Isolation policies used by Application Guard, you can: + To ensure the FQDNs (Fully Qualified Domain Names) for the “PAC file” and the “proxy servers the PAC file redirects to” are added as Neutral Resources in the Network Isolation policies used by Application Guard, you can: - - Verify this by going to edge://application-guard-internals/#utilities and entering the FQDN for the pac/proxy in the “check url trust” field and verifying that it says “Neutral”. + - Verify this addition by going to edge://application-guard-internals/#utilities and entering the FQDN for the pac/proxy in the “check url trust” field and verifying that it says “Neutral.” - It must be an FQDN. A simple IP address won't work. - Optionally, if possible, the IP addresses associated with the server hosting the above should be removed from the Enterprise IP Ranges in the Network Isolation policies used by Application Guard. - question: | How do I configure Microsoft Defender Application Guard to work with my network proxy (IP-Literal Addresses)? answer: | - Application Guard requires proxies to have a symbolic name, not just an IP address. IP-Literal proxy settings such as `192.168.1.4:81` can be annotated as `itproxy:81` or using a record such as `P19216810010` for a proxy with an IP address of `192.168.100.10`. This applies to Windows 10 Enterprise edition, version 1709 or higher. These would be for the proxy policies under Network Isolation in Group Policy or Intune. + Application Guard requires proxies to have a symbolic name, not just an IP address. IP-Literal proxy settings such as `192.168.1.4:81` can be annotated as `itproxy:81` or using a record such as `P19216810010` for a proxy with an IP address of `192.168.100.10`. This annotation applies to Windows 10 Enterprise edition, version 1709 or higher. These annotations would be for the proxy policies under Network Isolation in Group Policy or Intune. - question: | Which Input Method Editors (IME) in 19H1 aren't supported? @@ -73,19 +73,19 @@ sections: - question: | I enabled the hardware acceleration policy on my Windows 10 Enterprise, version 1803 deployment. Why are my users still only getting CPU rendering? answer: | - This feature is currently experimental only and isn't functional without an additional registry key provided by Microsoft. If you would like to evaluate this feature on a deployment of Windows 10 Enterprise, version 1803, contact Microsoft and we’ll work with you to enable the feature. + This feature is currently experimental only and isn't functional without an extra registry key provided by Microsoft. If you would like to evaluate this feature on a deployment of Windows 10 Enterprise, version 1803, contact Microsoft and we’ll work with you to enable the feature. - question: | What is the WDAGUtilityAccount local account? answer: | - WDAGUtilityAccount is part of Application Guard, beginning with Windows 10, version 1709 (Fall Creators Update). It remains disabled by default, unless Application Guard is enabled on your device. WDAGUtilityAccount is used to sign in to the Application Guard container as a standard user with a random password. It is NOT a malicious account. It requires *Logon as a service* permissions to be able to function correctly. If this permission is denied, you might see the following error: + WDAGUtilityAccount is part of Application Guard, beginning with Windows 10, version 1709 (Fall Creators Update). It remains disabled by default, unless Application Guard is enabled on your device. WDAGUtilityAccount is used to sign in to the Application Guard container as a standard user with a random password. It's NOT a malicious account. It requires *Logon as a service* permissions to be able to function correctly. If this permission is denied, you might see the following error: **Error: 0x80070569, Ext error: 0x00000001; RDP: Error: 0x00000000, Ext error: 0x00000000 Location: 0x00000000** - question: | How do I trust a subdomain in my site list? answer: | - To trust a subdomain, you must precede your domain with two dots (..). For example: `..contoso.com` ensures that `mail.contoso.com` or `news.contoso.com` are trusted. The first dot represents the strings for the subdomain name (mail or news), and the second dot recognizes the start of the domain name (`contoso.com`). This prevents sites such as `fakesitecontoso.com` from being trusted. + To trust a subdomain, you must precede your domain with two dots (..). For example: `..contoso.com` ensures that `mail.contoso.com` or `news.contoso.com` are trusted. The first dot represents the strings for the subdomain name (mail or news), and the second dot recognizes the start of the domain name (`contoso.com`). These two dots prevent sites such as `fakesitecontoso.com` from being trusted. - question: | Are there differences between using Application Guard on Windows Pro vs Windows Enterprise? @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ sections: - question: | Why am I getting the error message "ERR_NAME_NOT_RESOLVED" after not being able to reach the PAC file? answer: | - This is a known issue. To mitigate this you need to create two firewall rules. For information about creating a firewall rule by using Group Policy, see the following resources: + This issue is a known one. To mitigate this issue, you need to create two firewall rules. For information about creating a firewall rule by using Group Policy, see the following resources: - [Create an inbound icmp rule](../windows-firewall/create-an-inbound-icmp-rule.md) - [Open Group Policy management console for Microsoft Defender Firewall](../windows-firewall/open-the-group-policy-management-console-to-windows-firewall-with-advanced-security.md) @@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ sections: - Port 67 ### Second rule (DHCP Client) - This is the same as the first rule, but scoped to local port 68. In the Microsoft Defender Firewall user interface go through the following steps: + This rule is the same as the first rule, but scoped to local port 68. In the Microsoft Defender Firewall user interface go through the following steps: 1. Right-click on inbound rules, and then create a new rule. @@ -171,17 +171,17 @@ sections: - question: | How can I disable portions of Internet Connection Service (ICS) without breaking Application Guard? answer: | - ICS is enabled by default in Windows, and ICS must be enabled for Application Guard to function correctly. We do not recommend disabling ICS, this will stop Application Guard from working; however, you can disable ICS in part by using a Group Policy and editing registry keys. + ICS is enabled by default in Windows, and ICS must be enabled in order for Application Guard to function correctly. We don't recommend disabling ICS; however, you can disable ICS in part by using a Group Policy and editing registry keys. 1. In the Group Policy setting, **Prohibit use of Internet Connection Sharing on your DNS domain network**, set it to **Disabled**. 2. Disable IpNat.sys from ICS load as follows:
`System\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\DisableIpNat = 1` - 3. Configure ICS (SharedAccess) to enabled as follows:
+ 3. Configure ICS (SharedAccess) to be enabled as follows:
`HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Start = 3` - 4. (This is optional) Disable IPNAT as follows:
+ 4. (This step is optional) Disable IPNAT as follows:
`HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\IPNat\Start = 4` 5. Reboot the device. @@ -210,9 +210,9 @@ sections: - `{71a27cdd-812a-11d0-bec7-08002be2092f}` - question: | - I'm encountering TCP fragmentation issues, and cannot enable my VPN connection. How do I fix this? + I'm encountering TCP fragmentation issues, and can't enable my VPN connection. How do I fix this issue? answer: | - WinNAT drops ICMP/UDP messages with packets greater than MTU when using Default Switch or Docker NAT network. Support for this has been added in [KB4571744](https://www.catalog.update.microsoft.com/Search.aspx?q=4571744). To fix the issue, install the update and enable the fix by following these steps: + WinNAT drops ICMP/UDP messages with packets greater than MTU when using Default Switch or Docker NAT network. Support for this solution has been added in [KB4571744](https://www.catalog.update.microsoft.com/Search.aspx?q=4571744). To fix the issue, install the update and enable the fix by following these steps: 1. Ensure that the FragmentAware DWORD is set to 1 in this registry setting: `\Registry\Machine\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Winnat`. diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/reqs-md-app-guard.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/reqs-md-app-guard.md index d91da6e81c..ddf7e13d0d 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/reqs-md-app-guard.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/reqs-md-app-guard.md @@ -33,11 +33,11 @@ Your environment must have the following hardware to run Microsoft Defender Appl | Hardware | Description | |--------|-----------| -| 64-bit CPU|A 64-bit computer with minimum 4 cores (logical processors) is required for hypervisor and virtualization-based security (VBS). For more info about Hyper-V, see [Hyper-V on Windows Server 2016](/windows-server/virtualization/hyper-v/hyper-v-on-windows-server) or [Introduction to Hyper-V on Windows 10](/virtualization/hyper-v-on-windows/about/). For more info about hypervisor, see [Hypervisor Specifications](/virtualization/hyper-v-on-windows/reference/tlfs).| +| 64-bit CPU|A 64-bit computer with minimum four cores (logical processors) is required for hypervisor and virtualization-based security (VBS). For more info about Hyper-V, see [Hyper-V on Windows Server 2016](/windows-server/virtualization/hyper-v/hyper-v-on-windows-server) or [Introduction to Hyper-V on Windows 10](/virtualization/hyper-v-on-windows/about/). For more info about hypervisor, see [Hypervisor Specifications](/virtualization/hyper-v-on-windows/reference/tlfs).| | CPU virtualization extensions|Extended page tables, also called _Second Level Address Translation (SLAT)_

**AND**

One of the following virtualization extensions for VBS:
VT-x (Intel)
**OR**
AMD-V | -| Hardware memory | Microsoft requires a minimum of 8GB RAM | -| Hard disk | 5 GB free space, solid state disk (SSD) recommended | -| Input/Output Memory Management Unit (IOMMU) support| Not required, but strongly recommended | +| Hardware memory | Microsoft requires a minimum of 8-GB RAM | +| Hard disk | 5-GB free space, solid state disk (SSD) recommended | +| Input/Output Memory Management Unit (IOMMU) support| Not required, but recommended | ## Software requirements @@ -45,6 +45,6 @@ Your environment must have the following hardware to run Microsoft Defender Appl | Software | Description | |--------|-----------| -| Operating system | Windows 10 Enterprise edition, version 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Professional edition, version 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Professional for Workstations edition, version 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Professional Education edition, version 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Education edition, version 1809 or higher
Professional editions are only supported for non-managed devices; Intune or any other 3rd party mobile device management (MDM) solutions are not supported with MDAG for Professional editions.
Windows 11 | +| Operating system | Windows 10 Enterprise edition, version 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Professional edition, version 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Professional for Workstations edition, version 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Professional Education edition, version 1809 or higher
Windows 10 Education edition, version 1809 or higher
Professional editions are only supported for non-managed devices; Intune or any other third-party mobile device management (MDM) solutions aren't supported with MDAG for Professional editions.
Windows 11 | | Browser | Microsoft Edge | | Management system
(only for managed devices)| [Microsoft Intune](/intune/)

**OR**

[Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager](/configmgr/)

**OR**

[Group Policy](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/cc753298(v=ws.11))

**OR**

Your current, company-wide, non-Microsoft mobile device management (MDM) solution. For info about non-Mirosoft MDM solutions, see the documentation that came with your product. | diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/msft-security-dev-lifecycle.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/msft-security-dev-lifecycle.md index 9be071fa44..e6403fafa5 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/msft-security-dev-lifecycle.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/msft-security-dev-lifecycle.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- title: Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle -description: Download the Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle white paper which covers a security assurance process focused on software development. +description: Download the Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle white paper that covers a security assurance process focused on software development. ms.prod: m365-security author: dansimp ms.author: dansimp @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ The Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) is a security assurance process that is [:::image type="content" source="images/simplified-sdl.png" alt-text="Simplified secure development lifecycle":::](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/securityengineering/sdl) -Combining a holistic and practical approach, the SDL aims to reduce the number and severity of vulnerabilities in software. The SDL introduces security and privacy throughout all phases of the development process. +With the help of the combination of a holistic and practical approach, the SDL aims to reduce the number and severity of vulnerabilities in software. The SDL introduces security and privacy throughout all phases of the development process. The Microsoft SDL is based on three core concepts: - Education diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md index 681a9ae413..c19f67e476 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md @@ -22,14 +22,14 @@ Windows 10 includes Group Policy-configurable “Process Mitigation Options” t > [!IMPORTANT] > We recommend trying these mitigations in a test lab before deploying to your organization, to determine if they interfere with your organization’s required apps. -The Group Policy settings in this topic are related to three types of process mitigations. In Windows 10, all three types are on by default for 64-bit applications, but by using the Group Policy settings described in this topic, you can configure additional protections. The types of process mitigations are: +The Group Policy settings in this topic are related to three types of process mitigations. In Windows 10, all three types are on by default for 64-bit applications, but by using the Group Policy settings described in this topic, you can configure more protections. The types of process mitigations are: - **Data Execution Prevention (DEP)** is a system-level memory protection feature that enables the operating system to mark one or more pages of memory as non-executable, preventing code from being run from that region of memory, to help prevent exploitation of buffer overruns. DEP helps prevent code from being run from data pages such as the default heap, stacks, and memory pools. For more information, see [Data Execution Prevention](overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md#data-execution-prevention). -- **Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP)** is designed to block exploits that use the Structured Exception Handler (SEH) overwrite technique. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps to protect apps regardless of whether they have been compiled with the latest improvements. For more information, see [Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection](overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md#structured-exception-handling-overwrite-protection). +- **Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP)** is designed to block exploits that use the Structured Exception Handler (SEH) overwrite technique. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps to protect apps regardless of whether they've been compiled with the latest improvements. For more information, see [Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection](overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md#structured-exception-handling-overwrite-protection). - **Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)** loads DLLs into random memory addresses at boot time to mitigate against malware that’s designed to attack specific memory locations, where specific DLLs are expected to be loaded. For more information, see [Address Space Layout Randomization](overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md#address-space-layout-randomization). - To find additional ASLR protections in the table below, look for `IMAGES` or `ASLR`. + To find more ASLR protections in the table below, look for `IMAGES` or `ASLR`. The following procedure describes how to use Group Policy to override individual **Process Mitigation Options** settings. diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md index b4ab4b2171..d9a47da3b6 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10.md @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ This topic provides an overview of some of the software and firmware threats fac |--------------|-------------------------| | [The security threat landscape](#threat-landscape) | Describes the current nature of the security threat landscape, and outlines how Windows 10 is designed to mitigate software exploits and similar threats. | | [Windows 10 mitigations that you can configure](#windows-10-mitigations-that-you-can-configure) | Provides tables of configurable threat mitigations with links to more information. Product features such as Device Guard appear in [Table 1](#windows-10-mitigations-that-you-can-configure), and memory protection options such as Data Execution Prevention appear in [Table 2](#table-2). | -| [Mitigations that are built in to Windows 10](#mitigations-that-are-built-in-to-windows-10) | Provides descriptions of Windows 10 mitigations that require no configuration—they are built into the operating system. For example, heap protections and kernel pool protections are built into Windows 10. | +| [Mitigations that are built in to Windows 10](#mitigations-that-are-built-in-to-windows-10) | Provides descriptions of Windows 10 mitigations that require no configuration—they're built into the operating system. For example, heap protections and kernel pool protections are built into Windows 10. | | [Understanding Windows 10 in relation to the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit](#understanding-windows-10-in-relation-to-the-enhanced-mitigation-experience-toolkit) | Describes how mitigations in the [Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET)](https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=48240) correspond to features built into Windows 10 and how to convert EMET settings into mitigation policies for Windows 10. | This topic focuses on pre-breach mitigations aimed at device protection and threat resistance. These protections work with other security defenses in Windows 10, as shown in the following illustration: @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ Windows 10 mitigations that you can configure are listed in the following two ta | **Device Guard**
helps keep a device
from running malware or
other untrusted apps | Device Guard includes a Code Integrity policy that you create; an allowlist of trusted apps—the only apps allowed to run in your organization. Device Guard also includes a powerful system mitigation called hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI), which uses virtualization-based security (VBS) to protect Windows' kernel-mode code integrity validation process. HVCI has specific hardware requirements, and works with Code Integrity policies to help stop attacks even if they gain access to the kernel.
Device Guard is included in Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows Server 2016.

**More information**: [Introduction to Device Guard](/windows/device-security/device-guard/introduction-to-device-guard-virtualization-based-security-and-code-integrity-policies) | | **Microsoft Defender Antivirus**,
which helps keep devices
free of viruses and other
malware | Windows 10 includes Microsoft Defender Antivirus, a robust inbox anti-malware solution. Microsoft Defender Antivirus has been improved significantly since it was introduced in Windows 8.

**More information**: [Microsoft Defender Antivirus](#microsoft-defender-antivirus), later in this topic | | **Blocking of untrusted fonts**
helps prevent fonts
from being used in
elevation-of-privilege attacks | Block Untrusted Fonts is a setting that allows you to prevent users from loading fonts that are "untrusted" onto your network, which can mitigate elevation-of-privilege attacks associated with the parsing of font files. However, as of Windows 10, version 1703, this mitigation is less important, because font parsing is isolated in an [AppContainer sandbox](/windows/win32/secauthz/appcontainer-isolation) (for a list describing this and other kernel pool protections, see [Kernel pool protections](#kernel-pool-protections), later in this topic).

**More information**: [Block untrusted fonts in an enterprise](/windows/threat-protection/block-untrusted-fonts-in-enterprise) | -| **Memory protections**
help prevent malware
from using memory manipulation
techniques such as buffer
overruns | These mitigations, listed in [Table 2](#table-2), help to protect against memory-based attacks, where malware or other code manipulates memory to gain control of a system (for example, malware that attempts to use buffer overruns to inject malicious executable code into memory. Note:
A subset of apps will not be able to run if some of these mitigations are set to their most restrictive settings. Testing can help you maximize protection while still allowing these apps to run.

**More information**: [Table 2](#table-2), later in this topic | +| **Memory protections**
help prevent malware
from using memory manipulation
techniques such as buffer
overruns | These mitigations, listed in [Table 2](#table-2), help to protect against memory-based attacks, where malware or other code manipulates memory to gain control of a system (for example, malware that attempts to use buffer overruns to inject malicious executable code into memory. Note:
A subset of apps won't be able to run if some of these mitigations are set to their most restrictive settings. Testing can help you maximize protection while still allowing these apps to run.

**More information**: [Table 2](#table-2), later in this topic | | **UEFI Secure Boot**
helps protect
the platform from
boot kits and rootkits | Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Secure Boot is a security standard for firmware built in to PCs by manufacturers beginning with Windows 8. It helps to protect the boot process and firmware against tampering, such as from a physically present attacker or from forms of malware that run early in the boot process or in kernel after startup.

**More information**: [UEFI and Secure Boot](/windows/device-security/bitlocker/bitlocker-countermeasures#uefi-and-secure-boot) | | **Early Launch Antimalware (ELAM)**
helps protect
the platform from
rootkits disguised as drivers | Early Launch Antimalware (ELAM) is designed to enable the anti-malware solution to start before all non-Microsoft drivers and apps. If malware modifies a boot-related driver, ELAM will detect the change, and Windows will prevent the driver from starting, thus blocking driver-based rootkits.

**More information**: [Early Launch Antimalware](/windows/device-security/bitlocker/bitlocker-countermeasures#protection-during-startup) | | **Device Health Attestation**
helps prevent
compromised devices from
accessing an organization's
assets | Device Health Attestation (DHA) provides a way to confirm that devices attempting to connect to an organization's network are in a healthy state, not compromised with malware. When DHA has been configured, a device's actual boot data measurements can be checked against the expected "healthy" boot data. If the check indicates a device is unhealthy, the device can be prevented from accessing the network.

**More information**: [Control the health of Windows 10-based devices](/windows/device-security/protect-high-value-assets-by-controlling-the-health-of-windows-10-based-devices) and [Device Health Attestation](/windows-server/security/device-health-attestation) | @@ -73,8 +73,8 @@ As an IT professional, you can ask application developers and software vendors t | Mitigation and corresponding threat | Description | |---|---| -| **Data Execution Prevention (DEP)**
helps prevent
exploitation of buffer overruns | **Data Execution Prevention (DEP)** is a system-level memory protection feature available in Windows operating systems. DEP enables the operating system to mark one or more pages of memory as non-executable, which prevents code from being run from that region of memory, to help prevent exploitation of buffer overruns.
DEP helps prevent code from being run from data pages such as the default heap, stacks, and memory pools. Although some applications have compatibility problems with DEP, most applications do not.
**More information**: [Data Execution Prevention](#data-execution-prevention), later in this topic.

**Group Policy settings**: DEP is on by default for 64-bit applications, but you can configure more DEP protections by using the Group Policy settings described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). | -| **SEHOP**
helps prevent
overwrites of the
Structured Exception Handler | **Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP)** is designed to help block exploits that use the Structured Exception Handler (SEH) overwrite technique. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps to protect apps regardless of whether they have been compiled with the latest improvements. A few applications have compatibility problems with SEHOP, so be sure to test for your environment.
**More information**: [Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection](#structured-exception-handling-overwrite-protection), later in this topic.

**Group Policy setting**: SEHOP is on by default for 64-bit applications, but you can configure more SEHOP protections by using the Group Policy setting described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). | +| **Data Execution Prevention (DEP)**
helps prevent
exploitation of buffer overruns | **Data Execution Prevention (DEP)** is a system-level memory protection feature available in Windows operating systems. DEP enables the operating system to mark one or more pages of memory as non-executable, which prevents code from being run from that region of memory, to help prevent exploitation of buffer overruns.
DEP helps prevent code from being run from data pages such as the default heap, stacks, and memory pools. Although some applications have compatibility problems with DEP, most applications don't.
**More information**: [Data Execution Prevention](#data-execution-prevention), later in this topic.

**Group Policy settings**: DEP is on by default for 64-bit applications, but you can configure more DEP protections by using the Group Policy settings described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). | +| **SEHOP**
helps prevent
overwrites of the
Structured Exception Handler | **Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP)** is designed to help block exploits that use the Structured Exception Handler (SEH) overwrite technique. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps to protect apps regardless of whether they've been compiled with the latest improvements. A few applications have compatibility problems with SEHOP, so be sure to test for your environment.
**More information**: [Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection](#structured-exception-handling-overwrite-protection), later in this topic.

**Group Policy setting**: SEHOP is on by default for 64-bit applications, but you can configure more SEHOP protections by using the Group Policy setting described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). | | **ASLR**
helps mitigate malware
attacks based on
expected memory locations | **Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)** loads DLLs into random memory addresses at boot time. This loading - of specific DLLs -helps mitigate malware that's designed to attack specific memory locations.
**More information**: [Address Space Layout Randomization](#address-space-layout-randomization), later in this topic.

**Group Policy settings**: ASLR is on by default for 64-bit applications, but you can configure more ASLR protections by using the Group Policy settings described in [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). | ### Windows Defender SmartScreen @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ You can use Control Panel to view or change DEP settings. - **Turn on DEP for essential Windows programs and services only** - - **Turn on DEP for all programs and services except those I select**. If you choose this option, use the **Add** and **Remove** buttons to create the list of exceptions for which DEP will not be turned on. + - **Turn on DEP for all programs and services except those I select**. If you choose this option, use the **Add** and **Remove** buttons to create the list of exceptions for which DEP won't be turned on. #### To use Group Policy to control DEP settings @@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ You can use the Group Policy setting called **Process Mitigation Options** to co ### Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection -Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP) helps prevent attackers from being able to use malicious code to exploit the [Structured Exception Handling](/windows/win32/debug/structured-exception-handling) (SEH), which is integral to the system and allows (non-malicious) apps to handle exceptions appropriately. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps to protect applications regardless of whether they have been compiled with the latest improvements. +Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP) helps prevent attackers from being able to use malicious code to exploit the [Structured Exception Handling](/windows/win32/debug/structured-exception-handling) (SEH), which is integral to the system and allows (non-malicious) apps to handle exceptions appropriately. Because this protection mechanism is provided at run-time, it helps to protect applications regardless of whether they've been compiled with the latest improvements. You can use the Group Policy setting called **Process Mitigation Options** to control the SEHOP setting. A few applications have compatibility problems with SEHOP, so be sure to test for your environment. To use the Group Policy setting, see [Override Process Mitigation Options to help enforce app-related security policies](override-mitigation-options-for-app-related-security-policies.md). @@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ You can use the Group Policy setting called **Process Mitigation Options** to co One of the most common techniques used to gain access to a system is to find a vulnerability in a privileged process that is already running, guess or find a location in memory where important system code and data have been placed, and then overwrite that information with a malicious payload. Any malware that could write directly to the system memory could overwrite it in well-known and predictable locations. -Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) makes that type of attack much more difficult because it randomizes how and where important data is stored in memory. With ASLR, it is more difficult for malware to find the specific location it needs to attack. Figure 3 illustrates how ASLR works by showing how the locations of different critical Windows components can change in memory between restarts. +Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) makes that type of attack much more difficult because it randomizes how and where important data is stored in memory. With ASLR, it's more difficult for malware to find the specific location it needs to attack. Figure 3 illustrates how ASLR works by showing how the locations of different critical Windows components can change in memory between restarts. :::image type="content" alt-text="ASLR at work." source="images/security-fig4-aslr.png" lightbox="images/security-fig4-aslr.png"::: @@ -175,9 +175,9 @@ You can use the Group Policy setting called **Process Mitigation Options** to co ## Mitigations that are built in to Windows 10 -Windows 10 provides many threat mitigations to protect against exploits that are built into the operating system and need no configuration within the operating system. The table that follows describes some of these mitigations. +Windows 10 provides many threat mitigations to protect against exploits that are built into the operating system and need no configuration within the operating system. The subsequent table describes some of these mitigations. -Control Flow Guard (CFG) is a mitigation that does not need configuration within the operating system, but does require an application developer to configure the mitigation into the application when it's compiled. CFG is built into Microsoft Edge, IE11, and other areas in Windows 10, and can be built into many other applications when they are compiled. +Control Flow Guard (CFG) is a mitigation that doesn't need configuration within the operating system, but does require an application developer to configure the mitigation into the application when it's compiled. CFG is built into Microsoft Edge, IE11, and other areas in Windows 10, and can be built into many other applications when they're compiled. ### Table 3   Windows 10 mitigations to protect against memory exploits – no configuration needed @@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ Control Flow Guard (CFG) is a mitigation that does not need configuration within | **Universal Windows apps protections**
screen downloadable
apps and run them in
an AppContainer sandbox | Universal Windows apps are carefully screened before being made available, and they run in an AppContainer sandbox with limited privileges and capabilities.

**More information**: [Universal Windows apps protections](#universal-windows-apps-protections), later in this topic. | | **Heap protections**
help prevent
exploitation of the heap | Windows 10 includes protections for the heap, such as the use of internal data structures that help protect against corruption of memory used by the heap.

**More information**: [Windows heap protections](#windows-heap-protections), later in this topic. | | **Kernel pool protections**
help prevent
exploitation of pool memory
used by the kernel | Windows 10 includes protections for the pool of memory used by the kernel. For example, safe unlinking protects against pool overruns that are combined with unlinking operations that can be used to create an attack.

**More information**: [Kernel pool protections](#kernel-pool-protections), later in this topic. | -| **Control Flow Guard**
helps mitigate exploits
based on
flow between code locations
in memory | Control Flow Guard (CFG) is a mitigation that requires no configuration within the operating system, but instead is built into software when it's compiled. It is built into Microsoft Edge, IE11, and other areas in Windows 10. CFG can be built into applications written in C or C++, or applications compiled using Visual Studio 2015.
For such an application, CFG can detect an attacker's attempt to change the intended flow of code. If this attempt occurs, CFG terminates the application. You can request software vendors to deliver Windows applications compiled with CFG enabled.

**More information**: [Control Flow Guard](#control-flow-guard), later in this topic. | +| **Control Flow Guard**
helps mitigate exploits
based on
flow between code locations
in memory | Control Flow Guard (CFG) is a mitigation that requires no configuration within the operating system, but instead is built into software when it's compiled. It's built into Microsoft Edge, IE11, and other areas in Windows 10. CFG can be built into applications written in C or C++, or applications compiled using Visual Studio 2015.
For such an application, CFG can detect an attacker's attempt to change the intended flow of code. If this attempt occurs, CFG terminates the application. You can request software vendors to deliver Windows applications compiled with CFG enabled.

**More information**: [Control Flow Guard](#control-flow-guard), later in this topic. | | **Protections built into Microsoft Edge** (the browser)
helps mitigate multiple
threats | Windows 10 includes an entirely new browser, Microsoft Edge, designed with multiple security improvements.

**More information**: [Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer 11](#microsoft-edge-and-internet-explorer11), later in this topic. | ### SMB hardening improvements for SYSVOL and NETLOGON shares @@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ With Protected Processes, Windows 10 prevents untrusted processes from interacti ### Universal Windows apps protections -When users download Universal Windows apps from the Microsoft Store, it's unlikely that they will encounter malware because all apps go through a careful screening process before being made available in the store. Apps that organizations build and distribute through sideloading processes will need to be reviewed internally to ensure that they meet organizational security requirements. +When users download Universal Windows apps from the Microsoft Store, it's unlikely that they'll encounter malware because all apps go through a careful screening process before being made available in the store. Apps that organizations build and distribute through sideloading processes will need to be reviewed internally to ensure that they meet organizational security requirements. Regardless of how users acquire Universal Windows apps, they can use them with increased confidence. Universal Windows apps run in an AppContainer sandbox with limited privileges and capabilities. For example, Universal Windows apps have no system-level access, have tightly controlled interactions with other apps, and have no access to data unless the user explicitly grants the application permission. @@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ Windows 10 has several important improvements to the security of the heap: ### Kernel pool protections -The operating system kernel in Windows sets aside two pools of memory, one which remains in physical memory ("nonpaged pool") and one that can be paged in and out of physical memory ("paged pool"). There are many mitigations that have been added over time, such as process quota pointer encoding; lookaside, delay free, and pool page cookies; and PoolIndex bounds checks. Windows 10 adds multiple "pool hardening" protections, such as integrity checks, that help protect the kernel pool against more advanced attacks. +The operating system kernel in Windows sets aside two pools of memory, one that remains in physical memory ("nonpaged pool") and one that can be paged in and out of physical memory ("paged pool"). There are many mitigations that have been added over time, such as process quota pointer encoding; lookaside, delay free, and pool page cookies; and PoolIndex bounds checks. Windows 10 adds multiple "pool hardening" protections, such as integrity checks, that help protect the kernel pool against more advanced attacks. In addition to pool hardening, Windows 10 includes other kernel hardening features: @@ -240,23 +240,23 @@ In addition to pool hardening, Windows 10 includes other kernel hardening featur - **Safe unlinking:** Helps protect against pool overruns that are combined with unlinking operations to create an attack. Windows 10 includes global safe unlinking, which extends heap and kernel pool safe unlinking to all usage of LIST\_ENTRY and includes the "FastFail" mechanism to enable rapid and safe process termination. -- **Memory reservations**: The lowest 64 KB of process memory is reserved for the system. Apps are not allowed to allocate that portion of the memory. This allocation for the system makes it more difficult for malware to use techniques such as "NULL dereference" to overwrite critical system data structures in memory. +- **Memory reservations**: The lowest 64 KB of process memory is reserved for the system. Apps aren't allowed to allocate that portion of the memory. This allocation for the system makes it more difficult for malware to use techniques such as "NULL dereference" to overwrite critical system data structures in memory. ### Control Flow Guard -When applications are loaded into memory, they are allocated space based on the size of the code, requested memory, and other factors. When an application begins to execute code, it calls the other code located in other memory addresses. The relationships between the code locations are well known—they are written in the code itself—but previous to Windows 10, the flow between these locations was not enforced, which gave attackers the opportunity to change the flow to meet their needs. +When applications are loaded into memory, they're allocated space based on the size of the code, requested memory, and other factors. When an application begins to execute code, it calls the other code located in other memory addresses. The relationships between the code locations are well known—they're written in the code itself—but previous to Windows 10, the flow between these locations wasn't enforced, which gave attackers the opportunity to change the flow to meet their needs. -This kind of threat is mitigated in Windows 10 through the Control Flow Guard (CFG) feature. When a trusted application that was compiled to use CFG calls code, CFG verifies that the code location called is trusted for execution. If the location is not trusted, the application is immediately terminated as a potential security risk. +This kind of threat is mitigated in Windows 10 through the Control Flow Guard (CFG) feature. When a trusted application that was compiled to use CFG calls code, CFG verifies that the code location called is trusted for execution. If the location isn't trusted, the application is immediately terminated as a potential security risk. -An administrator cannot configure CFG; rather, an application developer can take advantage of CFG by configuring it when the application is compiled. Consider asking application developers and software vendors to deliver trustworthy Windows applications compiled with CFG enabled. For example, it can be enabled for applications written in C or C++, or applications compiled using Visual Studio 2015. For information about enabling CFG for a Visual Studio 2015 project, see [Control Flow Guard](/windows/win32/secbp/control-flow-guard). +An administrator can't configure CFG; rather, an application developer can take advantage of CFG by configuring it when the application is compiled. Consider asking application developers and software vendors to deliver trustworthy Windows applications compiled with CFG enabled. For example, it can be enabled for applications written in C or C++, or applications compiled using Visual Studio 2015. For information about enabling CFG for a Visual Studio 2015 project, see [Control Flow Guard](/windows/win32/secbp/control-flow-guard). Browsers are a key entry point for attacks, so Microsoft Edge, IE, and other Windows features take full advantage of CFG. ### Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer 11 -Browser security is a critical component of any security strategy, and for good reason: the browser is the user's interface to the Internet, an environment with many malicious sites and content waiting to attack. Most users cannot perform at least part of their job without a browser, and many users are reliant on one. This reality has made the browser the common pathway from which malicious hackers initiate their attacks. +Browser security is a critical component of any security strategy, and for good reason: the browser is the user's interface to the Internet, an environment with many malicious sites and content waiting to attack. Most users can't perform at least part of their job without a browser, and many users are reliant on one. This reality has made the browser the common pathway from which malicious hackers initiate their attacks. -All browsers enable some amount of extensibility to do things beyond the original scope of the browser. Two common examples are Flash and Java extensions that enable their respective applications to run inside a browser. Keeping Windows 10 secure for web browsing and applications, especially for these two content types, is a priority. +All browsers enable some amount of extensibility to do things beyond the original scope of the browser. Two common examples are Flash and Java extensions that enable their respective applications to run inside a browser. The security of Windows 10 for the purposes of web browsing and applications, especially for these two content types, is a priority. Windows 10 includes an entirely new browser, Microsoft Edge. Microsoft Edge is more secure in multiple ways, especially: @@ -270,13 +270,13 @@ Windows 10 includes an entirely new browser, Microsoft Edge. Microsoft Edge is m - **Simplifies security configuration tasks.** Because Microsoft Edge uses a simplified application structure and a single sandbox configuration, there are fewer required security settings. In addition, Microsoft Edge default settings align with security best practices, making it more secure by default. -In addition to Microsoft Edge, Microsoft includes IE11 in Windows 10, primarily for backwards-compatibility with websites and with binary extensions that do not work with Microsoft Edge. You cannot configure it as the primary browser but rather as an optional or automatic switchover. We recommend using Microsoft Edge as the primary web browser because it provides compatibility with the modern web and the best possible security. +In addition to Microsoft Edge, Microsoft includes IE11 in Windows 10, primarily for backwards-compatibility with websites and with binary extensions that don't work with Microsoft Edge. You can't configure it as the primary browser but rather as an optional or automatic switchover. We recommend using Microsoft Edge as the primary web browser because it provides compatibility with the modern web and the best possible security. For sites that require IE11 compatibility, including those sites that require binary extensions and plug-ins, enable Enterprise mode and use the Enterprise Mode Site List to define which sites have the dependency. With this configuration, when Microsoft Edge identifies a site that requires IE11, users will automatically be switched to IE11. ### Functions that software vendors can use to build mitigations into apps -Some of the protections available in Windows 10 are provided through functions that can be called from apps or other software. Such software is less likely to provide openings for exploits. If you are working with a software vendor, you can request that they include these security-oriented functions in the application. The following table lists some types of mitigations and the corresponding security-oriented functions that can be used in apps. +Some of the protections available in Windows 10 are provided through functions that can be called from apps or other software. Such software is less likely to provide openings for exploits. If you're working with a software vendor, you can request that they include these security-oriented functions in the application. The following table lists some types of mitigations and the corresponding security-oriented functions that can be used in apps. > [!NOTE] > Control Flow Guard (CFG) is also an important mitigation that a developer can include in software when it is compiled. For more information, see [Control Flow Guard](#control-flow-guard), earlier in this topic. @@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ Some of the protections available in Windows 10 are provided through functions t ## Understanding Windows 10 in relation to the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit -You might already be familiar with the [Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET)](https://support.microsoft.com/topic/emet-mitigations-guidelines-b529d543-2a81-7b5a-d529-84b30e1ecee0), which has since 2009 offered various exploit mitigations, and an interface for configuring those mitigations. You can use this section to understand how EMET mitigations relate to those mitigations in Windows 10. Many of EMET's mitigations have been built into Windows 10, some with extra improvements. However, some EMET mitigations carry high-performance cost, or appear to be relatively ineffective against modern threats, and therefore have not been brought into Windows 10. +You might already be familiar with the [Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET)](https://support.microsoft.com/topic/emet-mitigations-guidelines-b529d543-2a81-7b5a-d529-84b30e1ecee0), which has since 2009 offered various exploit mitigations, and an interface for configuring those mitigations. You can use this section to understand how EMET mitigations relate to those mitigations in Windows 10. Many of EMET's mitigations have been built into Windows 10, some with extra improvements. However, some EMET mitigations carry high-performance cost, or appear to be relatively ineffective against modern threats, and therefore haven't been brought into Windows 10. Because many of EMET's mitigations and security mechanisms already exist in Windows 10 and have been improved, particularly the ones assessed to have high effectiveness at mitigating known bypasses, version 5.5*x* has been announced as the final major version release for EMET (see [Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit](https://web.archive.org/web/20170928073955/https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/security/jj653751)). @@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ The following table lists EMET features in relation to Windows 10 features. |

  • DEP
  • SEHOP
  • ASLR (Force ASLR, Bottom-up ASLR)|DEP, SEHOP, and ASLR are included in Windows 10 as configurable features. See [Table 2](#table-2), earlier in this topic.You can install the ProcessMitigations PowerShell module to convert your EMET settings for these features into policies that you can apply to Windows 10.| |
  • Load Library Check (LoadLib)
  • Memory Protection Check (MemProt)|LoadLib and MemProt are supported in Windows 10, for all applications that are written to use these functions. See [Table 4](#functions-that-software-vendors-can-use-to-build-mitigations-into-apps), earlier in this topic.| |Null Page|Mitigations for this threat are built into Windows 10, as described in the "Memory reservations" item in [Kernel pool protections](#kernel-pool-protections), earlier in this topic.| -|
  • Heap Spray
  • EAF
  • EAF+|Windows 10 does not include mitigations that map specifically to these EMET features because they have low impact in the current threat landscape, and do not significantly increase the difficulty of exploiting vulnerabilities. Microsoft remains committed to monitoring the security environment as new exploits appear and taking steps to harden the operating system against them.| +|
  • Heap Spray
  • EAF
  • EAF+|Windows 10 doesn't include mitigations that map specifically to these EMET features because they have low impact in the current threat landscape, and don't significantly increase the difficulty of exploiting vulnerabilities. Microsoft remains committed to monitoring the security environment as new exploits appear and taking steps to harden the operating system against them.| |
  • Caller Check
  • Simulate Execution Flow
  • Stack Pivot
  • Deep Hooks (an ROP "Advanced Mitigation")
  • Anti Detours (an ROP "Advanced Mitigation")
  • Banned Functions (an ROP "Advanced Mitigation")|Mitigated in Windows 10 with applications compiled with Control Flow Guard, as described in [Control Flow Guard](#control-flow-guard), earlier in this topic.| ### Converting an EMET XML settings file into Windows 10 mitigation policies diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/protect-high-value-assets-by-controlling-the-health-of-windows-10-based-devices.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/protect-high-value-assets-by-controlling-the-health-of-windows-10-based-devices.md index ed70e30816..36714ba7df 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/protect-high-value-assets-by-controlling-the-health-of-windows-10-based-devices.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/protect-high-value-assets-by-controlling-the-health-of-windows-10-based-devices.md @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Windows 10 is an important component of an end-to-end security solution that foc ## Description of a robust end-to-end security solution -Today’s computing threat landscape is increasing at a speed never encountered before. The sophistication of criminal attacks is growing, and there is no doubt that malware now targets both consumers and professionals in all industries. +Today’s computing threat landscape is increasing at a speed never encountered before. The sophistication of criminal attacks is growing, and there's no doubt that malware now targets both consumers and professionals in all industries. During recent years, one particular category of threat has become prevalent: advanced persistent threats (APTs). The term APT is commonly used to describe any attack that seems to target individual organizations on an on-going basis. In fact, this type of attack typically involves determined adversaries who may use any methods or techniques necessary. @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ The following figure shows a solution built to assess device health from the clo Windows devices can be protected from low-level rootkits and bootkits by using low-level hardware technologies such as Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Secure Boot. -Secure Boot is a firmware validation process that helps prevent rootkit attacks; it is part of the UEFI specification. The intent of UEFI is to define a standard way for the operating system to communicate with modern hardware, which can perform faster and with more efficient input/output (I/O) functions than older, software interrupt-driven BIOS systems. +Secure Boot is a firmware validation process that helps prevent rootkit attacks; it's part of the UEFI specification. The intent of UEFI is to define a standard way for the operating system to communicate with modern hardware, which can perform faster and with more efficient input/output (I/O) functions than older, software interrupt-driven BIOS systems. A device health attestation module can communicate measured boot data that is protected by a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to a remote service. After the device successfully boots, boot process measurement data is sent to a trusted cloud service (Health Attestation Service) using a more secure and tamper-resistant communication channel. @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ Windows 10 supports features to help prevent sophisticated low-level malware lik Windows 10 uses security characteristics of a TPM for measuring boot integrity sequence (and based on that, unlocking automatically BitLocker protected drives), for protecting credentials or for health attestation. - A TPM implements controls that meet the specification described by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG). At the time of this writing, there are two versions of TPM specification produced by TCG that are not compatible with each other: + A TPM implements controls that meet the specification described by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG). At the time of this writing, there are two versions of TPM specification produced by TCG that aren't compatible with each other: - The first TPM specification, version 1.2, was published in February 2005 by the TCG and standardized under ISO / IEC 11889 standard. - The latest TPM specification, referred to as TPM 2.0, was released in April 2014 and has been approved by the ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee (JTC) as ISO/IEC 11889:2015. @@ -149,15 +149,15 @@ Windows 10 supports features to help prevent sophisticated low-level malware lik The most basic protection is the Secure Boot feature, which is a standard part of the UEFI 2.2+ architecture. On a PC with conventional BIOS, anyone who can take control of the boot process can boot by using an alternative OS loader, and potentially gain access to system resources. When Secure Boot is enabled, you can boot using only an OS loader that’s signed using a certificate stored in the UEFI Secure Boot DB. Naturally, the Microsoft certificate used to digitally sign the Windows 10 OS loaders are in that store, which allows UEFI to validate the certificate as part of its security policy. Secure Boot must be enabled by default on all computers that are certified for Windows 10 under the Windows Hardware Compatibility Program. Secure Boot is a UEFI firmware-based feature, which allows for the signing and verification of critical boot files and drivers at boot time. Secure Boot checks signature values of the Windows Boot Manager, BCD store, Windows OS loader file, and other boot critical DLLs at boot time before the system is allowed to fully boot into a usable operating system by using policies that are defined by the OEM at build time. Secure Boot prevents many types of boot-based rootkit, malware, and other security-related attacks against the Windows platform. Secure Boot protects the operating system boot process whether booting from local hard disk, USB, PXE, or DVD, or into full Windows or Windows Recovery Environment (RE). - Secure Boot protects the boot environment of a Windows 10 installation by verifying the signatures of the critical boot components to confirm malicious activity did not compromise them. Secure Boot protection ends after the Windows kernel file (ntoskrnl.exe) has been loaded. + Secure Boot protects the boot environment of a Windows 10 installation by verifying the signatures of the critical boot components to confirm malicious activity didn't compromise them. Secure Boot protection ends after the Windows kernel file (ntoskrnl.exe) has been loaded. > [!NOTE] > Secure Boot protects the platform until the Windows kernel is loaded. Then protections like ELAM take over. - **Secure Boot configuration policy.** Extends Secure Boot functionality to critical Windows 10 configuration. - Examples of protected configuration information include protecting Disable Execute bit (NX option) or ensuring that the test signing policy (code integrity) cannot be enabled. This protective action ensures that the binaries and configuration of the computer can be trusted after the boot process has completed. - Secure Boot configuration policy does this with UEFI policy. These signatures for these policies are signed in the same way that operating system binaries are signed for use with Secure Boot. + Examples of protected configuration information include protecting Disable Execute bit (NX option) or ensuring that the test signing policy (code integrity) can't be enabled. This protective action ensures that the binaries and configuration of the computer can be trusted after the boot process has completed. + Secure Boot configuration policy does this protective action with UEFI policy. These signatures for these policies are signed in the same way that operating system binaries are signed for use with Secure Boot. The Secure Boot configuration policy must be signed by a private key that corresponds to one of the public keys stored in the Key Exchange Key (KEK) list. The Microsoft Certificate Authority (CA) will be present in the KEK list of all Windows certified Secure Boot systems. By default, a policy signed by the Microsoft KEK shall be work on all Secure Boot systems. BootMgr must verify the signature against the KEK list before applying a signed policy. With Windows 10, the default Secure Boot configuration policy is embedded in bootmgr. @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ Windows 10 supports features to help prevent sophisticated low-level malware lik - **Early Launch Antimalware (ELAM).** ELAM tests all drivers before they load and prevents unapproved drivers from loading. - Traditional antimalware apps don’t start until after the boot drivers have been loaded, which gives a rootkit that is disguised as a driver the opportunity to work. ELAM is a Windows mechanism introduced in a previous version of Windows that allows antimalware software to run very early in the boot sequence. Thus, the antimalware component is the first third-party component to run and control the initialization of other boot drivers until the Windows operating system is operational. When the system is started with a complete runtime environment (network access, storage, and so on), then a full-featured antimalware is loaded. + Traditional antimalware apps don’t start until after the boot drivers have been loaded, which gives a rootkit that is disguised as a driver the opportunity to work. ELAM is a Windows mechanism introduced in a previous version of Windows that allows antimalware software to run early in the boot sequence. Thus, the antimalware component is the first third-party component to run and control the initialization of other boot drivers until the Windows operating system is operational. When the system is started with a complete runtime environment (network access, storage, and so on), then a full-featured antimalware is loaded. ELAM can load a Microsoft or non-Microsoft antimalware driver before all non-Microsoft boot drivers and applications, thus continuing the chain of trust established by Secure Boot and Trusted Boot. Because the operating system hasn’t started yet, and because Windows needs to boot as quickly as possible, ELAM has a simple task: Examine every boot driver and determine whether it is on the list of trusted drivers. If it’s not trusted, Windows won’t load it. @@ -174,8 +174,8 @@ Windows 10 supports features to help prevent sophisticated low-level malware lik The ELAM signed driver is loaded before any other third-party drivers or applications, which allows the antimalware software to detect and block any attempts to tamper with the boot process by trying to load unsigned or untrusted code. - The ELAM driver is a small driver with a small policy database that has a very narrow scope, focused on drivers that are loaded early at system launch. The policy database is stored in a registry hive that is also measured to the TPM, to record the operational parameters of the ELAM driver. An ELAM driver must be signed by Microsoft and the associated certificate must contain the complementary EKU (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.61.4.1). -- **Virtualization-based security (Hyper-V + Secure Kernel).** Virtualization-based security is a completely new enforced security boundary that allows you to protect critical parts of Windows 10. + The ELAM driver is a small driver with a small policy database that has a narrow scope, focused on drivers that are loaded early at system launch. The policy database is stored in a registry hive that is also measured to the TPM, to record the operational parameters of the ELAM driver. An ELAM driver must be signed by Microsoft and the associated certificate must contain the complementary EKU (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.61.4.1). +- **Virtualization-based security (Hyper-V + Secure Kernel).** Virtualization-based security is a new enforced security boundary that allows you to protect critical parts of Windows 10. Virtualization-based security isolates sensitive code like Kernel Mode Code Integrity or sensitive corporate domain credentials from the rest of the Windows operating system. For more information, see [Virtualization-based security](#virtual) section. @@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ Windows 10 supports features to help prevent sophisticated low-level malware lik When enabled and configured, Windows 10 can start the Hyper-V virtualization-based security services. HVCI helps protect the system core (kernel), privileged drivers, and system defenses, like antimalware solutions, by preventing malware from running early in the boot process, or after startup. - HVCI uses virtualization-based security to isolate Code Integrity, the only way kernel memory can become executable is through a Code Integrity verification. This dependency on verification means that kernel memory pages can never be Writable and Executable (W+X) and executable code cannot be directly modified. + HVCI uses virtualization-based security to isolate Code Integrity, the only way kernel memory can become executable is through a Code Integrity verification. This dependency on verification means that kernel memory pages can never be Writable and Executable (W+X) and executable code can't be directly modified. > [!NOTE] > Device Guard devices that run Kernel Mode Code Integrity with virtualization-based security must have compatible drivers. For additional information, please read the [Driver compatibility with Device Guard in Windows 10](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkId=691612) blog post. @@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ Windows 10 supports features to help prevent sophisticated low-level malware lik - **Health attestation.** The device’s firmware logs the boot process, and Windows 10 can send it to a trusted server that can check and assess the device’s health. - Windows 10 takes measurements of the UEFI firmware and each of the Windows and antimalware components are made as they load during the boot process. Additionally, they are taken and measured sequentially, not all at once. When these measurements are complete, their values are digitally signed and stored securely in the TPM and cannot be changed unless the system is reset. + Windows 10 takes measurements of the UEFI firmware and each of the Windows and antimalware components are made as they load during the boot process. Additionally, they're taken and measured sequentially, not all at once. When these measurements are complete, their values are digitally signed and stored securely in the TPM and can't be changed unless the system is reset. For more information, see [Secured Boot and Measured Boot: Hardening Early Boot Components Against Malware](/previous-versions/windows/hardware/design/dn653311(v=vs.85)). @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ The following Windows 10 services are protected with virtualization-based securi - **Credential Guard** (LSA Credential Isolation): prevents pass-the-hash attacks and enterprise credential theft that happens by reading and dumping the content of lsass memory - **Device Guard** (Hyper-V Code Integrity): Device Guard uses the new virtualization-based security in Windows 10 to isolate the Code Integrity service from the Windows kernel itself, which lets the service use signatures defined by your enterprise-controlled policy to help determine what is trustworthy. In effect, the Code Integrity service runs alongside the kernel in a Windows hypervisor-protected container. -- **Other isolated services**: for example, on Windows Server 2016, there is the vTPM feature that allows you to have encrypted virtual machines (VMs) on servers. +- **Other isolated services**: for example, on Windows Server 2016, there's the vTPM feature that allows you to have encrypted virtual machines (VMs) on servers. > [!NOTE] > Virtualization-based security is only available with Windows 10 Enterprise. Virtualization-based security requires devices with UEFI (2.3.1 or higher) with Secure Boot enabled, x64 processor with Virtualization Extensions and SLAT enabled. IOMMU, TPM 2.0. and support for Secure Memory overwritten are optional, but recommended. @@ -234,18 +234,18 @@ remote machines, which mitigates many PtH-style attacks. Credential Guard helps protect credentials by encrypting them with either a per-boot or persistent key: -- **The per-boot key** is used for any in-memory credentials that do not require persistence. An example of such a credential would be a ticket-granting ticket (TGT) session key. This key is negotiated with a Key Distribution Center (KDC) every time authentication occurs and is protected with a per-boot key. +- **The per-boot key** is used for any in-memory credentials that don't require persistence. An example of such a credential would be a ticket-granting ticket (TGT) session key. This key is negotiated with a Key Distribution Center (KDC) every time authentication occurs and is protected with a per-boot key. - **The persistent key**, or some derivative, is used to help protect items that are stored and reloaded after a reboot. Such protection is intended for long-term storage, and must be protected with a consistent key. Credential Guard is activated by a registry key and then enabled by using a UEFI variable. This activation is done to protect against remote modifications of the configuration. The use of a UEFI variable implies that physical access is required to change the configuration. When lsass.exe detects that credential isolation is enabled, it then spawns LsaIso.exe as an isolated process, which ensures that it runs within isolated user mode. The startup of LsaIso.exe is performed before initialization of a security support provider, which ensures that the secure mode support routines are ready before any authentication begins. ### Device Guard -Device Guard is a new feature of Windows 10 Enterprise that allows organizations to lock down a device to help protect it from running untrusted software. In this configuration, the only applications allowed to run are those that are trusted by the organization. +Device Guard is a new feature of Windows 10 Enterprise that allows organizations to lock down a device to help protect it from running untrusted software. In this configuration, the only applications allowed to run are those applications that are trusted by the organization. The trust decision to execute code is performed by using Hyper-V Code Integrity, which runs in virtualization-based security, a Hyper-V protected container that runs alongside regular Windows. -Hyper-V Code Integrity is a feature that validates the integrity of a driver or system file each time it is loaded into memory. Code integrity detects whether an unsigned driver or system file is being loaded into the kernel, or whether a system file has been modified by malicious software that is being run by a user account with Administrator privileges. On x64-based versions of Windows 10 kernel-mode drivers must be digitally signed. +Hyper-V Code Integrity is a feature that validates the integrity of a driver or system file each time it's loaded into memory. Code integrity detects whether an unsigned driver or system file is being loaded into the kernel, or whether a system file has been modified by malicious software that is being run by a user account with Administrator privileges. On x64-based versions of Windows 10, kernel-mode drivers must be digitally signed. > [!NOTE] > Independently of activation of Device Guard Policy, [Windows 10 by default raises the bar for what runs in the kernel](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkId=691613). Windows 10 drivers must be signed by Microsoft, and more specifically, by the WHQL (Windows Hardware Quality Labs) portal. Additionally, starting in October 2015, the WHQL portal will only accept driver submissions, including both kernel and user mode driver submissions, that have a valid Extended Validation (“EV”) Code Signing Certificate. @@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ Device Guard needs to be planned and configured to be truly effective. It isn't There are three different parts that make up the Device Guard solution in Windows 10: - The first part is a base **set of hardware security features** introduced with the previous version of Windows. TPM for hardware cryptographic operations and UEFI with modern firmware, along with Secure Boot, allows you to control what the device is running when the systems start. -- After the hardware security feature, there is the code integrity engine. In Windows 10, **Code Integrity is now fully configurable** and now resides in Isolated user mode, a part of the memory that is protected by virtualization-based security. +- After the hardware security feature, there's the code integrity engine. In Windows 10, **Code Integrity is now fully configurable** and now resides in Isolated user mode, a part of the memory that is protected by virtualization-based security. - The last part of Device Guard is **manageability**. Code Integrity configuration is exposed through specific Group Policy Objects, PowerShell cmdlets, and MDM configuration service providers (CSPs). For more information on how to deploy Device Guard in an enterprise, see the [Device Guard deployment guide](/windows/device-security/device-guard/device-guard-deployment-guide). @@ -280,9 +280,9 @@ SAWs are computers that are built to help significantly reduce the risk of compr To protect high-value assets, SAWs are used to make secure connections to those assets. -Similarly, on corporate fully-managed workstations, where applications are installed by using a distribution tool like Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager, Intune, or any third-party device management, then Device Guard is applicable. In that type of scenario, the organization has a good idea of the software that an average user is running. +Similarly, on corporate fully managed workstations, where applications are installed by using a distribution tool like Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager, Intune, or any third-party device management, then Device Guard is applicable. In that type of scenario, the organization has a good idea of the software that an average user is running. -It could be challenging to use Device Guard on corporate, lightly-managed workstations where the user is typically allowed to install software on their own. When an organization offers great flexibility, it’s difficult to run Device Guard in enforcement mode. Nevertheless, Device Guard can be run in Audit mode, and in that case, the event log will contain a record of any binaries that violated the Device Guard policy. When Device Guard is used in Audit mode, organizations can get rich data about drivers and applications that users install and run. +It could be challenging to use Device Guard on corporate, lightly managed workstations where the user is typically allowed to install software on their own. When an organization offers great flexibility, it’s difficult to run Device Guard in enforcement mode. Nevertheless, Device Guard can be run in Audit mode, and in that case, the event log will contain a record of any binaries that violated the Device Guard policy. When Device Guard is used in Audit mode, organizations can get rich data about drivers and applications that users install and run. Before you can benefit from the protection included in Device Guard, Code Integrity policy must be created by using tools provided by Microsoft, but the policy can be deployed with common management tools, like Group Policy. The Code Integrity policy is a binary-encoded XML document that includes configuration settings for both the User and Kernel-modes of Windows 10, along with restrictions on Windows 10 script hosts. Device Guard Code Integrity policy restricts what code can run on a device. @@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ Before you can benefit from the protection included in Device Guard, Code Integr Signed Device Guard policy offers stronger protection against a malicious local administrator trying to defeat Device Guard. -When the policy is signed, the GUID of the policy is stored in a UEFI pre-OS secure variable which offers tampering protection. The only way to update the Device Guard policy subsequently is to provide a new version of the policy signed by the same signer or from a signer specified as part of the +When the policy is signed, the GUID of the policy is stored in a UEFI pre-OS secure variable that offers tampering protection. The only way to update the Device Guard policy later is to provide a new version of the policy signed by the same signer or from a signer specified as part of the Device Guard policy into the UpdateSigner section. ### The importance of signing applications @@ -301,13 +301,13 @@ On computers with Device Guard, Microsoft proposes to move from a world where un With Windows 10, organizations will make line-of-business (LOB) apps available to members of the organization through the Microsoft Store infrastructure. More specifically, LOB apps will be available in a private store within the public Microsoft Store. Microsoft Store signs and distributes Universal Windows apps and Classic Windows apps. All apps downloaded from the Microsoft Store are signed. -In organizations today, many LOB applications are unsigned. Code signing is frequently viewed as a tough problem to solve for a variety of reasons, like the lack of code signing expertise. Even if code signing is a best practice, a lot of internal applications are not signed. +In organizations today, many LOB applications are unsigned. Code signing is frequently viewed as a tough problem to solve for various reasons, like the lack of code signing expertise. Even if code signing is a best practice, many internal applications aren't signed. -Windows 10 includes tools that allow IT pros to take applications that have been already packaged and run them through a process to create additional signatures that can be distributed along with existing applications. +Windows 10 includes tools that allow IT pros to take applications that have been already packaged and run them through a process to create more signatures that can be distributed along with existing applications. ### Why are antimalware and device management solutions still necessary? -Although allow-list mechanisms are efficient at ensuring that only trusted applications can be run, they cannot prevent the compromise of a trusted (but vulnerable) application by malicious content designed to exploit a known vulnerability. Device Guard doesn’t protect against user mode malicious code run by exploiting vulnerabilities. +Although allowlist mechanisms are efficient at ensuring that only trusted applications can be run, they can't prevent the compromise of a trusted (but vulnerable) application by malicious content designed to exploit a known vulnerability. Device Guard doesn’t protect against user mode malicious code run by exploiting vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities are weaknesses in software that could allow an attacker to compromise the integrity, availability, or confidentiality of the device. Some of the worst vulnerabilities allow attackers to exploit the compromised device by causing it to run malicious code without the user’s knowledge. @@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ MDM solutions are becoming prevalent as a light-weight device management technol ### Device health attestation -Device health attestation leverages the TPM to provide cryptographically strong and verifiable measurements of the chain of software used to boot the device. +Device health attestation uses the TPM to provide cryptographically strong and verifiable measurements of the chain of software used to boot the device. For Windows 10-based devices, Microsoft introduces a new public API that will allow MDM software to access a remote attestation service called Windows Health Attestation Service. A health attestation result, in addition with other elements, can be used to allow or deny access to networks, apps, or services, based on whether devices prove to be healthy. @@ -335,21 +335,21 @@ The following table details the hardware requirements for both virtualization-ba |--- |--- | |UEFI 2.3.1 or later firmware with Secure Boot enabled|Required to support UEFI Secure Boot.

    UEFI Secure Boot ensures that the device boots only authorized code.

    Additionally, Boot Integrity (Platform Secure Boot) must be supported following the requirements in Hardware Compatibility Specification for Systems for Windows 10 under the subsection: “System.Fundamentals.Firmware.CS.UEFISecureBoot.ConnectedStandby”| |Virtualization extensions, such as Intel VT-x, AMD-V, and SLAT must be enabled|Required to support virtualization-based security.

    **Note:** Device Guard can be enabled without using virtualization-based security.
    | -|X64 processor|Required to support virtualization-based security that uses Windows Hypervisor. Hyper-V is supported only on x64 processor (and not on x86).

    Direct Memory Access (DMA) protection can be enabled to provide additional memory protection but requires processors to include DMA protection technologies.| +|X64 processor|Required to support virtualization-based security that uses Windows Hypervisor. Hyper-V is supported only on x64 processor (and not on x86).

    Direct Memory Access (DMA) protection can be enabled to provide extra memory protection but requires processors to include DMA protection technologies.| |IOMMU, such as Intel VT-d, AMD-Vi|Support for the IOMMU in Windows 10 enhances system resiliency against DMA attacks.| -|Trusted Platform Module (TPM)|Required to support health attestation and necessary for additional key protections for virtualization-based security. TPM 2.0 is supported. Support for TPM 1.2 was added beginning in Windows 10, version 1607 (RS1)| +|Trusted Platform Module (TPM)|Required to support health attestation and necessary for other key protections for virtualization-based security. TPM 2.0 is supported. Support for TPM 1.2 was added beginning in Windows 10, version 1607 (RS1)| -This section presented information about several closely related controls in Windows 10. The multi-layer defenses and in-depth approach helps to eradicate low-level malware during boot sequence. Virtualization-based security is a fundamental operating system architecture change that adds a new security boundary. Device Guard and Credential Guard respectively help to block untrusted code and protect corporate domain credentials from theft and reuse. This section also briefly discussed the importance of managing devices and patching vulnerabilities. All these technologies can be used to harden and lock down devices while limiting the risk of attackers compromising them. +This section presented information about several closely related controls in Windows 10. The multi-layer defenses and in-depth approach help to eradicate low-level malware during boot sequence. Virtualization-based security is a fundamental operating system architecture change that adds a new security boundary. Device Guard and Credential Guard respectively help to block untrusted code and protect corporate domain credentials from theft and reuse. This section also briefly discussed the importance of managing devices and patching vulnerabilities. All these technologies can be used to harden and lock down devices while limiting the risk of attackers compromising them. ## Detect an unhealthy Windows 10-based device -As of today, many organizations only consider devices to be compliant with company policy after they’ve passed a variety of checks that show, for example, that the operating system is in the correct state, properly configured, and has security protection enabled. Unfortunately, with today’s systems, this form of reporting isn't entirely reliable because malware can spoof a software statement about system health. A rootkit, or a similar low-level exploit, can report a false healthy state to traditional compliance tools. +As of today, many organizations only consider devices to be compliant with company policy after they’ve passed various checks that show, for example, that the operating system is in the correct state, properly configured, and has security protection enabled. Unfortunately, with today’s systems, this form of reporting isn't entirely reliable because malware can spoof a software statement about system health. A rootkit, or a similar low-level exploit, can report a false healthy state to traditional compliance tools. The biggest challenge with rootkits is that they can be undetectable to the client. Because they start before antimalware, and they have system-level privileges, they can completely disguise themselves while continuing to access system resources. As a result, traditional computers infected with rootkits appear to be healthy, even with antimalware running. -As previously discussed, the health attestation feature of Windows 10 uses the TPM hardware component to securely record a measurement of every boot-related component, including firmware, Windows 10 kernel, and even early boot drivers. Because, health attestation leverages the hardware-based security capabilities of TPM, the log of all boot measured components remains out of the reach of any malware. +As previously discussed, the health attestation feature of Windows 10 uses the TPM hardware component to securely record a measurement of every boot-related component, including firmware, Windows 10 kernel, and even early boot drivers. Because health attestation uses the hardware-based security capabilities of TPM, the log of all boot measured components remains out of the reach of any malware. -By attesting a trusted boot state, devices can prove that they are not running low-level malware that could spoof later compliance checks. TPM-based health attestation provides a reliable anchor of trust for assets that contain high-value data. +After the devices attest a trusted boot state, they can prove that they aren't running low-level malware that could spoof later compliance checks. TPM-based health attestation provides a reliable anchor of trust for assets that contain high-value data. ### What is the concept of device health? @@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ However, the use of traditional malware prevention technologies like antimalware The definition of device compliance will vary based on an organization’s installed antimalware, device configuration settings, patch management baseline, and other security requirements. But health of the device is part of the overall device compliance policy. -The health of the device isn't binary and depends on the organization’s security implementation. The Health Attestation Service provides information back to the MDM on which security features are enabled during the boot of the device by leveraging trustworthy hardware TPM. +The health of the device isn't binary and depends on the organization’s security implementation. The Health Attestation Service provides information back to the MDM on which security features are enabled during the boot of the device by using trustworthy hardware TPM. But health attestation only provides information, which is why an MDM solution is needed to take and enforce a decision. @@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ But health attestation only provides information, which is why an MDM solution i In Windows 10, health attestation refers to a feature where Measured Boot data generated during the boot process is sent to a remote device health attestation service operated by Microsoft. -This is the most secure approach available for Windows 10-based devices to detect when security defenses are down. During the boot process, the TCG log and PCRs values are sent to a remote Microsoft cloud service. Logs are then checked by the Health Attestation Service to determine what changes have occurred on the device. +This approach is the most secure one available for Windows 10-based devices to detect when security defenses are down. During the boot process, the TCG log and PCRs' values are sent to a remote Microsoft cloud service. Logs are then checked by the Health Attestation Service to determine what changes have occurred on the device. A relying party like an MDM can inspect the report generated by the remote health attestation service. @@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ Windows 10 supports health attestation scenarios by allowing applications access Remote device health attestation combined with an MDM provides a hardware-rooted method for reporting the current security status and detecting any changes, without having to trust the software running on the system. -In the case where malicious code is running on the device, the use of a remote server is required. If a rootkit is present on the device, the antimalware is no longer reliable, and its behavior can be hijacked by a malicious code running early in the startup sequence. That's why it's important to use Secure Boot and Device Guard, to control which code is loaded during the boot sequence. +In the case where malicious code is running on the device, the use of a remote server is required. If a rootkit is present on the device, the antimalware is no longer reliable, and its behavior can be hijacked by a malicious code running early in the startup sequence. This reason is what makes it important to use Secure Boot and Device Guard, to control which code is loaded during the boot sequence. The antimalware software can search to determine whether the boot sequence contains any signs of malware, such as a rootkit. It can also send the TCG log and the PCRs to a remote health attestation server to provide a separation between the measurement component and the verification component. @@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ Health attestation logs the measurements in various TPM Platform Configuration R :::image type="content" alt-text="figure 6." source="images/hva-fig6-logs.png"::: -When starting a device equipped with TPM, a measurement of different components is performed. This includes firmware, UEFI drivers, CPU microcode, and also all the Windows 10 drivers whose type is Boot Start. The raw measurements are stored in the TPM PCR registers while the details of all events (executable path, authority certification, and so on) are available in the TCG log. +When you start a device equipped with TPM, a measurement of different components is performed. These components include firmware, UEFI drivers, CPU microcode, and also all the Windows 10 drivers whose type is Boot Start. The raw measurements are stored in the TPM PCR registers while the details of all events (executable path, authority certification, and so on) are available in the TCG log. :::image type="content" alt-text="figure 7." source="images/hva-fig7-measurement.png"::: @@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ The health attestation process works as follows: 4. Windows kernel is measured. 5. Antivirus software is started as the first kernel mode driver. 6. Boot start drivers are measured. -7. MDM server through the MDM agent issues a health check command by leveraging the Health Attestation CSP. +7. MDM server through the MDM agent issues a health check command by using the Health Attestation CSP. 8. Boot measurements are validated by the Health Attestation Service > [!NOTE] @@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ In a simplified manner, the TPM is a passive component with limited resources. I A TPM incorporates in a single component: -- A RSA 2048-bit key generator +- An RSA 2048-bit key generator - A random number generator - Nonvolatile memory for storing EK, SRK, and AIK keys - A cryptographic engine to encrypt, decrypt, and sign @@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ A TPM incorporates in a single component: The TPM has an embedded unique cryptographic key called the endorsement key. The TPM endorsement key is a pair of asymmetric keys (RSA size 2048 bits). -The endorsement key public key is generally used for sending securely sensitive parameters, such as when taking possession of the TPM that contains the defining hash of the owner password. The EK private key is used when creating secondary keys like AIKs. +The endorsement key public key is used for sending securely sensitive parameters, such as when taking possession of the TPM that contains the defining hash of the owner password. The EK private key is used when creating secondary keys like AIKs. The endorsement key acts as an identity card for the TPM. For more information, see [Understand the TPM endorsement key](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/cc770443(v=ws.11)). @@ -467,16 +467,16 @@ Because the endorsement certificate is unique for each device and doesn't change The AIK is an asymmetric (public/private) key pair that is used as a substitute for the EK as an identity for the TPM for privacy purposes. The private portion of an AIK is never revealed or used outside the TPM and can only be used inside the TPM for a limited set of operations. Furthermore, it can only be used for signing, and only for limited, TPM-defined operations. -Windows 10 creates AIKs protected by the TPM, if available, that are 2048-bit RSA signing keys. Microsoft is hosting a cloud service called Microsoft Cloud CA to establish cryptographically that it is communicating with a real TPM and that the TPM possesses the presented AIK. After the Microsoft +Windows 10 creates AIKs protected by the TPM, if available, that are 2048-bit RSA signing keys. Microsoft is hosting a cloud service called Microsoft Cloud CA to establish cryptographically that it's communicating with a real TPM and that the TPM possesses the presented AIK. After the Microsoft Cloud CA service has established these facts, it will issue an AIK certificate to the Windows 10-based device. -Many existing devices that will upgrade to Windows 10 won't have a TPM, or the TPM won't contain an endorsement certificate. **To accommodate those devices, Windows 10 allows the issuance of AIK certificates without the presence of an endorsement certificate.** Such AIK certificates are not issued by Microsoft Cloud CA. Note that this isn't as trustworthy as an endorsement certificate that is burned into the device during manufacturing, but it will provide compatibility for advanced scenarios like Windows Hello for Business without TPM. +Many existing devices that will upgrade to Windows 10 won't have a TPM, or the TPM won't contain an endorsement certificate. **To accommodate those devices, Windows 10 allows the issuance of AIK certificates without the presence of an endorsement certificate.** Such AIK certificates aren't issued by Microsoft Cloud CA. These certificates aren't as trustworthy as an endorsement certificate that is burned into the device during manufacturing, but it will provide compatibility for advanced scenarios like Windows Hello for Business without TPM. -In the issued AIK certificate, a special OID is added to attest that endorsement certificate was used during the attestation process. This information can be leveraged by a relying party to decide whether to reject devices that are attested using AIK certificates without an endorsement certificate or accept them. Another scenario can be to not allow access to high-value assets from devices that are attested by an AIK certificate that isn't backed by an endorsement certificate. +In the issued AIK certificate, a special OID is added to attest that endorsement certificate was used during the attestation process. This information can be used by a relying party to decide whether to reject devices that are attested using AIK certificates without an endorsement certificate or accept them. Another scenario can be to not allow access to high-value assets from devices that are attested by an AIK certificate that isn't backed by an endorsement certificate. ### Storage root key -The storage root key (SRK) is also an asymmetric key pair (RSA with a minimum of 2048 bits length). The SRK has a major role and is used to protect TPM keys, so that these keys cannot be used without the TPM. The SRK key is created when the ownership of the TPM is taken. +The storage root key (SRK) is also an asymmetric key pair (RSA with a minimum of 2048-bits length). The SRK has a major role and is used to protect TPM keys, so that these keys can't be used without the TPM. The SRK key is created when the ownership of the TPM is taken. ### Platform Configuration Registers @@ -484,19 +484,19 @@ The TPM contains a set of registers that are designed to provide a cryptographic The measurement of the boot sequence is based on the PCR and TCG log. To establish a static root of trust, when the device is starting, the device must be able to measure the firmware code before execution. In this case, the Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM) is executed from the boot, calculates the hash of the firmware, then stores it by expanding the register PCR\[0\] and transfers execution to the firmware. -PCRs are set to zero when the platform is booted, and it is the job of the firmware that boots the platform to measure components in the boot chain and to record the measurements in the PCRs. Typically, boot components take the hash of the next component that is to be run and record the measurements in the PCRs. The initial component that starts the measurement chain is implicitly trusted. This is the CRTM. Platform manufacturers are required to have a secure update process for the CRTM or not permit updates to it. The PCRs record a cumulative hash of the components that have been measured. +PCRs are set to zero when the platform is booted, and it's the job of the firmware that boots the platform to measure components in the boot chain and to record the measurements in the PCRs. Typically, boot components take the hash of the next component that is to be run and record the measurements in the PCRs. The initial component that starts the measurement chain is implicitly trusted. This component is the CRTM. Platform manufacturers are required to have a secure update process for the CRTM or not permit updates to it. The PCRs record a cumulative hash of the components that have been measured. -The value of a PCR on its own is hard to interpret (it is just a hash value), but platforms typically keep a log with details of what has been measured, and the PCRs merely ensure that the log hasn't been tampered with. The logs are referred as a TCG log. Each time a register PCR is extended, an entry is added to the TCG log. Thus, throughout the boot process, a trace of the executable code and configuration data is created in the TCG log. +The value of a PCR on its own is hard to interpret (it's just a hash value), but platforms typically keep a log with details of what has been measured, and the PCRs merely ensure that the log hasn't been tampered with. The logs are referred as a TCG log. Each time a register PCR is extended, an entry is added to the TCG log. Thus, throughout the boot process, a trace of the executable code and configuration data is created in the TCG log. ### TPM provisioning -For the TPM of a Windows 10-based device to be usable, it must first be provisioned. The process of provisioning differs somewhat based on TPM versions, but, when successful, it results in the TPM being usable and the owner authorization data (ownerAuth) for the TPM being stored locally on the registry. +For the TPM of a Windows 10-based device to be usable, it must first be provisioned. The process of provisioning differs based on TPM versions, but, when successful, it results in the TPM being usable and the owner authorization data (ownerAuth) for the TPM being stored locally on the registry. When the TPM is provisioned, Windows 10 will first attempt to determine the EK and locally stored **ownerAuth** values by looking in the registry at the following location: **HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\TPM\\WMI\\Endorsement** During the provisioning process, the device may need to be restarted. -Note that the **Get-TpmEndorsementKeyInfo PowerShell** cmdlet can be used with administrative privilege to get information about the endorsement key and certificates of the TPM. +The **Get-TpmEndorsementKeyInfo PowerShell** cmdlet can be used with administrative privilege to get information about the endorsement key and certificates of the TPM. If the TPM ownership isn't known but the EK exists, the client library will provision the TPM and will store the resulting **ownerAuth** value into the registry if the policy allows it will store the SRK public portion at the following location: **HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\TPM\\WMI\\Admin\\SRKPub** @@ -510,16 +510,16 @@ As part of the provisioning process, Windows 10 will create an AIK with the TPM. Windows 10 contains a configuration service provider (CSP) specialized for interacting with the health attestation feature. A CSP is a component that plugs into the Windows MDM client and provides a published protocol for how MDM servers can configure settings and manage Windows-based devices. The management protocol is represented as a tree structure that can be specified as URIs with functions to perform on the URIs such as “get”, “set”, “delete”, and so on. -The following is a list of functions performed by the Windows 10 Health Attestation CSP: +The following list is that of the functions performed by the Windows 10 Health Attestation CSP: - Collects data that is used to verify a device’s health status - Forwards the data to the Health Attestation Service - Provisions the Health Attestation Certificate that it receives from the Health Attestation Service - Upon request, forwards the Health Attestation Certificate (received from the Health Attestation Service) and related runtime information to the MDM server for verification -During a health attestation session, the Health Attestation CSP forwards the TCG logs and PCRs values that are measured during the boot, by using a secure communication channel to the Health Attestation Service. +During a health attestation session, the Health Attestation CSP forwards the TCG logs and PCRs' values that are measured during the boot, by using a secure communication channel to the Health Attestation Service. -When an MDM server validates that a device has attested to the Health Attestation Service, it will be given a set of statements and claims about how that device booted, with the assurance that the device did not reboot between the time that it attested its health and the time that the MDM server validated it. +When an MDM server validates that a device has attested to the Health Attestation Service, it will be given a set of statements and claims about how that device booted, with the assurance that the device didn't reboot between the time that it attested its health and the time that the MDM server validated it. ### Windows Health Attestation Service @@ -530,8 +530,8 @@ The role of Windows Health Attestation Service is essentially to evaluate a set Checking that a TPM attestation and the associated log are valid takes several steps: -1. First, the server must check that the reports are signed by **trustworthy AIKs**. This might be done by checking that the public part of the AIK is listed in a database of assets, or perhaps that a certificate has been checked. -2. After the key has been checked, the signed attestation (a quote structure) should be checked to see whether it is a **valid signature over PCR values**. +1. First, the server must check that the reports are signed by **trustworthy AIKs**. This verification might be done by checking that the public part of the AIK is listed in a database of assets, or perhaps that a certificate has been checked. +2. After the key has been checked, the signed attestation (a quote structure) should be checked to see whether it's a **valid signature over PCR values**. 3. Next the logs should be checked to ensure that they match the PCR values reported. 4. Finally, the logs themselves should be examined by an MDM solution to see whether they represent **known or valid security configurations**. For example, a simple check might be to see whether the measured early OS components are known to be good, that the ELAM driver is as expected, and that the ELAM driver policy file is up to date. If all of these checks succeed, an attestation statement can be issued that later can be used to determine whether or not the client should be granted access to a resource. @@ -554,15 +554,15 @@ The following table presents some key items that can be reported back to MDM dep |--- |--- | |Windows 10 for desktop editions|

  • PCR0 measurement
  • Secure Boot Enabled
  • Secure Boot db matches Expected
  • Secure Boot dbx is up to date
  • Secure Boot policy GUID matches Expected
  • BitLocker enabled
  • Virtualization-based security enabled
  • ELAM was loaded
  • Code Integrity version is up to date
  • Code Integrity policy hash matches Expected| -### Leverage MDM and the Health Attestation Service +### Use MDM and the Health Attestation Service To make device health relevant, the MDM solution evaluates the device health report and is configured to the organization’s device health requirements. -A solution that leverages MDM and the Health Attestation Service consists of three main parts: +A solution that uses MDM and the Health Attestation Service consists of three main parts: -1. A device with health attestation enabled. This will usually be done as a part of enrollment with an MDM provider (health attestation will be disabled by default). -2. After this is enabled, and every boot thereafter, the device will send health measurements to the Health Attestation Service hosted by Microsoft, and it will receive a health attestation blob in return. -3. At any point after this, an MDM server can request the health attestation blob from the device and ask Health Attestation Service to decrypt the content and validate that it’s been attested. +1. A device with health attestation enabled. This enablement will be done as a part of enrollment with an MDM provider (health attestation will be disabled by default). +2. After this service is enabled, and every boot thereafter, the device will send health measurements to the Health Attestation Service hosted by Microsoft, and it will receive a health attestation blob in return. +3. At any point after this cycle, an MDM server can request the health attestation blob from the device and ask Health Attestation Service to decrypt the content and validate that it’s been attested. :::image type="content" alt-text="figure 9." source="images/hva-fig8-evaldevicehealth8.png"::: @@ -587,14 +587,14 @@ Interaction between a Windows 10-based device, the Health Attestation Service, a > [!NOTE] > The MDM server (relying party) never performs the quote or boot counter validation itself. It gets the quoted data and the health blob (which is encrypted) and sends the data to the Health Attestation Service for validation. This way, the AIK is never visible to the MDM, which thereby addresses privacy concerns. -Setting the requirements for device compliance is the first step to ensure that registered devices that do not meet health and compliance requirements are detected, tracked, and have actions enforced by the MDM solution. +Setting the requirements for device compliance is the first step to ensure that registered devices that don't meet health and compliance requirements are detected, tracked, and have actions enforced by the MDM solution. Devices that attempt to connect to resources must have their health evaluated so that unhealthy and noncompliant devices can be detected and reported. To be fully efficient, an end-to-end security solution must impose a consequence for unhealthy devices like refusing access to high-value assets. -That is the purpose of conditional access control, which is detailed in the next section. +That consequence for an unhealthy device is the purpose of conditional access control, which is detailed in the next section. ## Control the security of a Windows 10-based device before access is granted -Today’s access control technology, in most cases, focuses on ensuring that the right people get access to the right resources. If users can authenticate, they get access to resources using a device that the organization’s IT staff and systems know very little about. Perhaps there is some check such as ensuring that a device is encrypted before giving access to email, but what if the device is infected with malware? +Today’s access control technology, in most cases, focuses on ensuring that the right people get access to the right resources. If users can authenticate, they get access to resources using a device that the organization’s IT staff and systems know little about. Perhaps there's some check such as ensuring that a device is encrypted before giving access to email, but what if the device is infected with malware? The remote device health attestation process uses measured boot data to verify the health status of the device. The health of the device is then available for an MDM solution like Intune. @@ -605,18 +605,18 @@ The figure below shows how the Health Attestation Service is expected to work wi :::image type="content" alt-text="figure 10." source="images/hva-fig9-intune.png"::: -An MDM solution can then leverage health state statements and take them to the next level by coupling with client policies that will enable conditional access to be granted based on the device’s ability to prove that it’s malware free, its antimalware system is functional and up to date, the +An MDM solution can then use health state statements and take them to the next level by coupling with client policies that will enable conditional access to be granted based on the device’s ability to prove that it’s malware free, its antimalware system is functional and up to date, the firewall is running, and the devices patch state is compliant. Finally, resources can be protected by denying access to endpoints that are unable to prove they’re healthy. This feature is much needed for BYOD devices that need to access organizational resources. ### Built-in support of MDM in Windows 10 -Windows 10 has an MDM client that ships as part of the operating system. This enables MDM servers to manage Windows 10-based devices without requiring a separate agent. +Windows 10 has an MDM client that ships as part of the operating system. This MDM client enables MDM servers to manage Windows 10-based devices without requiring a separate agent. ### Third-party MDM server support -Third-party MDM servers can manage Windows 10 by using the MDM protocol. The built-in management client is able to communicate with a compatible server that supports the OMA-DM protocol to perform enterprise management tasks. For additional information, see [Azure Active Directory integration with MDM](/windows/client-management/mdm/azure-active-directory-integration-with-mdm). +Third-party MDM servers can manage Windows 10 by using the MDM protocol. The built-in management client is able to communicate with a compatible server that supports the OMA-DM protocol to perform enterprise management tasks. For more information, see [Azure Active Directory integration with MDM](/windows/client-management/mdm/azure-active-directory-integration-with-mdm). > [!NOTE] > MDM servers do not need to create or download a client to manage Windows 10. For more information, see [Mobile device management](/windows/client-management/mdm/). @@ -625,7 +625,7 @@ The third-party MDM server will have the same consistent first-party user experi ### Management of Windows Defender by third-party MDM -This management infrastructure makes it possible for IT pros to use MDM-capable products like Intune, to manage health attestation, Device Guard, or Windows Defender on Windows 10-based devices, including BYODs that aren’t domain joined. IT pros will be able to manage and configure all of the actions and settings they are familiar with customizing by using Intune with Intune Endpoint Protection on down-level operating systems. Admins that currently only manage domain joined devices through Group Policy will find it easy to transition to managing Windows 10-based devices by using MDM because many of the settings and actions are shared across both mechanisms. +This management infrastructure makes it possible for IT pros to use MDM-capable products like Intune, to manage health attestation, Device Guard, or Windows Defender on Windows 10-based devices, including BYODs that aren’t domain joined. IT pros will be able to manage and configure all of the actions and settings they're familiar with customizing by using Intune with Intune Endpoint Protection on down-level operating systems. Admins that currently only manage domain joined devices through Group Policy will find it easy to transition to managing Windows 10-based devices by using MDM because many of the settings and actions are shared across both mechanisms. For more information on how to manage Windows 10 security and system settings with an MDM solution, see [Custom URI settings for Windows 10 devices](/mem/intune/configuration/custom-settings-windows-10). @@ -641,10 +641,10 @@ If the device isn't registered, the user will get a message with instructions on ### Office 365 conditional access control -Azure AD enforces conditional access policies to secure access to Office 365 services. A tenant admin can create a conditional access policy that blocks a user on a non-compliant device from accessing an Office 365 service. The user must conform to the company’s device policies before access can be granted to the service. Alternately, the admin can also create a policy that requires users to just enroll their devices to gain access to an Office 365 service. Policies may be applied to all users of an organization, or limited to a few target groups and enhanced over time to include additional +Azure AD enforces conditional access policies to secure access to Office 365 services. A tenant admin can create a conditional access policy that blocks a user on a non-compliant device from accessing an Office 365 service. The user must conform to the company’s device policies before access can be granted to the service. Alternately, the admin can also create a policy that requires users to just enroll their devices to gain access to an Office 365 service. Policies may be applied to all users of an organization, or limited to a few target groups and enhanced over time to include more target groups. -When a user requests access to an Office 365 service from a supported device platform, Azure AD authenticates the user and device from which the user launches the request; and grants access to the service only when the user conforms to the policy set for the service. Users that do not have their device enrolled are given remediation instructions on how to enroll and become compliant to access corporate Office 365 services. +When a user requests access to an Office 365 service from a supported device platform, Azure AD authenticates the user and device from which the user launches the request; and grants access to the service only when the user conforms to the policy set for the service. Users that don't have their device enrolled are given remediation instructions on how to enroll and become compliant to access corporate Office 365 services. When a user enrolls, the device is registered with Azure AD, and enrolled with a compatible MDM solution like Intune. @@ -676,9 +676,9 @@ To get to a compliant state, the Windows 10-based device needs to: ### Cloud and on-premises apps conditional access control -Conditional access control is a powerful policy evaluation engine built into Azure AD. It gives IT pros an easy way to create access rules beyond Office 365 that evaluate the context of a user's logon to make real-time decisions about which applications they should be allowed to access. +Conditional access control is a powerful policy evaluation engine built into Azure AD. It gives IT pros an easy way to create access rules beyond Office 365 that evaluate the context of a user's sign in to make real-time decisions about which applications they should be allowed to access. -IT pros can configure conditional access control policies for cloud SaaS applications secured by Azure AD and even on-premises applications. Access rules in Azure AD leverage the conditional access engine to check device health and compliance state reported by a compatible MDM solution like Intune in order to determine whether to allow access. +IT pros can configure conditional access control policies for cloud SaaS applications secured by Azure AD and even on-premises applications. Access rules in Azure AD use the conditional access engine to check device health and compliance state reported by a compatible MDM solution like Intune in order to determine whether to allow access. For more information about conditional access, see [Azure Conditional Access Preview for SaaS Apps.](/azure/active-directory/authentication/tutorial-enable-azure-mfa) @@ -694,14 +694,14 @@ For on-premises applications there are two options to enable conditional access The following process describes how Azure AD conditional access works: -1. User has already enrolled with MDM through Workplace Access/Azure AD join which registers device with Azure AD. +1. User has already enrolled with MDM through Workplace Access/Azure AD join, which registers device with Azure AD. 2. When the device boots or resumes from hibernate, a task “Tpm-HASCertRetr” is triggered to request in background a health attestation blob. Device sends TPM boot measurements to the Health Attestation Service. 3. Health Attestation Service validates device state and issues an encrypted blob to the device based on the health state with details on failed checks (if any). 4. User logs on and the MDM agent contacts the Intune/MDM server. 5. MDM server pushes down new policies if available and queries health blob state and other inventory state. 6. Device sends a health attestation blob previously acquired and also the value of the other state inventory requested by the Intune/MDM server. 7. Intune/MDM server sends the health attestation blob to Health Attestation Service to be validated. -8. Health Attestation Service validates that the device which sent the health attestation blob is healthy, and returns this result to Intune/MDM server. +8. Health Attestation Service validates that the device that sent the health attestation blob is healthy, and returns this result to Intune/MDM server. 9. Intune/MDM server evaluates compliance based on the compliance and the queried inventory/health attestation state from device. 10. Intune/MDM server updates compliance state against device object in Azure AD. 11. User opens app, attempts to access a corporate managed asset. @@ -711,11 +711,11 @@ The following process describes how Azure AD conditional access works: For more information about Azure AD join, see [Azure AD & Windows 10: Better Together for Work or School](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkId=691619), a white paper. -Conditional access control is a topic that many organizations and IT pros may not know and they should. The different attributes that describe a user, a device, compliance, and context of access are very powerful when used with a conditional access engine. Conditional access control is an essential step that helps organizations secure their environment. +Conditional access control is a topic that many organizations and IT pros may not know and they should. The different attributes that describe a user, a device, compliance, and context of access are powerful when used with a conditional access engine. Conditional access control is an essential step that helps organizations secure their environment. ## Takeaways and summary -The following list contains high-level key take-aways to improve the security posture of any organization. However, the few take-aways presented in this section should not be interpreted as an exhaustive list of security best practices. +The following list contains high-level key takeaways to improve the security posture of any organization. However, the few takeaways presented in this section shouldn't be interpreted as an exhaustive list of security best practices. - **Understand that no solution is 100 percent secure** @@ -735,7 +735,7 @@ The following list contains high-level key take-aways to improve the security po - **Sign Device Guard policy** - Signed Device Guard policy helps protect against a user with administrator privileges trying to defeat the current policy. When a policy is signed, the only way to modify Device Guard subsequently is to provide a new version of the policy signed by the same signer or from a signer specify as part of the Device Guard policy. + Signed Device Guard policy helps protect against a user with administrator privileges trying to defeat the current policy. When a policy is signed, the only way to modify Device Guard later is to provide a new version of the policy signed by the same signer or from a signer specify as part of the Device Guard policy. - **Use virtualization-based security** @@ -751,11 +751,11 @@ The following list contains high-level key take-aways to improve the security po - **Use AppLocker when it makes sense** - Although AppLocker isn't considered a new Device Guard feature, it complements Device Guard functionality for some scenarios like being able to deny a specific Universal Windows apps for a specific user or a group of users. + Although AppLocker isn't considered a new Device Guard feature, it complements Device Guard functionality for some scenarios like being able to deny a specific Universal Windows application for a specific user or a group of users. - **Lock down firmware and configuration** - After Windows 10 is installed, lock down firmware boot options access. This prevents a user with physical access from modifying UEFI settings, disabling Secure Boot, or booting other operating systems. Also, in order to protect against an administrator trying to disable Device Guard, add a rule in the current Device Guard policy that will deny and block execution of the **C:\\Windows\\System32\\SecConfig.efi** tool. + After Windows 10 is installed, lock down firmware boot options access. This lockdown prevents a user with physical access from modifying UEFI settings, disabling Secure Boot, or booting other operating systems. Also, in order to protect against an administrator trying to disable Device Guard, add a rule in the current Device Guard policy that will deny and block execution of the **C:\\Windows\\System32\\SecConfig.efi** tool. Health attestation is a key feature of Windows 10 that includes client and cloud components to control access to high-value assets based on a user and their device’s identity and compliance with corporate governance policy. Organizations can choose to detect and report unhealthy devices, or to configure health enforcement rules based on their needs. Health attestation provides an end-to-end security model and integration points, which vendors and software developers can use to build and integrate a customized solution. diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/access-this-computer-from-the-network.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/access-this-computer-from-the-network.md index da17209420..1948922041 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/access-this-computer-from-the-network.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/access-this-computer-from-the-network.md @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security ## Reference -The **Access this computer from the network** policy setting determines which users can connect to the device from the network. This capability is required by a number of network protocols, including Server Message Block (SMB)-based protocols, NetBIOS, Common Internet File System (CIFS), and Component Object Model Plus (COM+). +The **Access this computer from the network** policy setting determines which users can connect to the device from the network. This capability is required by many network protocols, including Server Message Block (SMB)-based protocols, NetBIOS, Common Internet File System (CIFS), and Component Object Model Plus (COM+). Users, devices, and service accounts gain or lose the **Access this computer from network** user right by being explicitly or implicitly added or removed from a security group that has been granted this user right. For example, a user account or a machine account may be explicitly added to a custom security group or a built-in security group, or it may be implicitly added by Windows to a computed security group such as Domain Users, Authenticated Users, or Enterprise Domain Controllers. By default, user accounts and machine accounts are granted the **Access this computer from network** user right when computed groups such as Authenticated Users, and for domain controllers, the Enterprise Domain Controllers group, are defined in the default domain controllers Group Policy Object (GPO). @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ Constant: SeNetworkLogonRight - On desktop devices or member servers, grant this right only to users and administrators. - On domain controllers, grant this right only to authenticated users, enterprise domain controllers, and administrators. - On failover clusters, make sure this right is granted to authenticated users. -- This setting includes the **Everyone** group to ensure backward compatibility. Upon Windows upgrade, after you have verified that all users and groups are correctly migrated, you should remove the **Everyone** group and use the **Authenticated Users** group instead. +- This setting includes the **Everyone** group to ensure backward compatibility. Upon Windows upgrade, after you've verified that all users and groups are correctly migrated, you should remove the **Everyone** group and use the **Authenticated Users** group instead. ### Location @@ -68,13 +68,13 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values for the ## Policy management -When modifying this user right, the following actions might cause users and services to experience network access issues: +When you modify this user right, the following actions might cause users and services to experience network access issues: - Removing the Enterprise Domain Controllers security group - Removing the Authenticated Users group or an explicit group that allows users, computers, and service accounts the user right to connect to computers over the network - Removing all user and machine accounts -A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to be effective. +A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to be effective. Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on. @@ -95,20 +95,20 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -Users who can connect from their device to the network can access resources on target devices for which they have permission. For example, the **Access this computer from the network** user right is required for users to connect to shared printers and folders. If this user right is assigned to the **Everyone** group, anyone in the group can read the files in those shared folders. This situation is unlikely because the groups created by a default installation of at least Windows Server 2008 R2 or Windows 7 do not include the **Everyone** group. However, if a device is upgraded and the original device includes the **Everyone** group as part of its defined users and groups, that group is transitioned as part of the upgrade process and is present on the device. +Users who can connect from their device to the network can access resources on target devices for which they have permission. For example, the **Access this computer from the network** user right is required for users to connect to shared printers and folders. If this user right is assigned to the **Everyone** group, anyone in the group can read the files in those shared folders. This situation is unlikely because the groups created by a default installation of at least Windows Server 2008 R2 or Windows 7 don't include the **Everyone** group. However, if a device is upgraded and the original device includes the **Everyone** group as part of its defined users and groups, that group is transitioned as part of the upgrade process and is present on the device. ### Countermeasure -Restrict the **Access this computer from the network** user right to only those users and groups who require access to the computer. For example, if you configure this policy setting to the **Administrators** and **Users** groups, users who log on to the domain can access resources that are shared +Restrict the **Access this computer from the network** user right to only those users and groups who require access to the computer. For example, if you configure this policy setting to the **Administrators** and **Users** groups, users who sign in to the domain can access resources that are shared from servers in the domain if members of the **Domain Users** group are included in the local **Users** group. > **Note** If you are using IPsec to help secure network communications in your organization, ensure that a group that includes machine accounts is given this right. This right is required for successful computer authentication. Assigning this right to **Authenticated Users** or **Domain Computers** meets this requirement. ### Potential impact -If you remove the **Access this computer from the network** user right on domain controllers for all users, no one can log on to the domain or use network resources. If you remove this user right on member servers, users cannot connect to those servers through the network. If you have installed optional components such as ASP.NET or Internet Information Services (IIS), you may need to assign this user right to additional accounts that are required by those components. It is important to verify that authorized users are assigned this user right for the devices that they need to access the network. +If you remove the **Access this computer from the network** user right on domain controllers for all users, no one can sign in to the domain or use network resources. If you remove this user right on member servers, users can't connect to those servers through the network. If you have installed optional components such as ASP.NET or Internet Information Services (IIS), you may need to assign this user right to other accounts that are required by those components. It's important to verify that authorized users are assigned this user right for the devices that they need to access the network. -If running Windows Server or Azure Stack HCI Failover Clustering, do not remove Authenticated Users from the Access this computer from the network policy setting. Doing so may induce an unexpected production outage. This is due to the local user account CLIUSR that is used to run the cluster service. CLIUSR is not a member of the local Administrators group and if the Authenticated Users group is removed, the cluster service will not have sufficient rights to function or start properly. +If running Windows Server or Azure Stack HCI Failover Clustering, don't remove Authenticated Users from the Access this computer from the network policy setting. Doing so may induce an unexpected production outage. This outage is due to the local user account CLIUSR that is used to run the cluster service. CLIUSR isn't a member of the local Administrators group and if the Authenticated Users group is removed, the cluster service won't have sufficient rights to function or start properly. ## Related topics [User Rights Assignment](user-rights-assignment.md) diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/account-lockout-duration.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/account-lockout-duration.md index 5111f06fe9..3aff3ac62f 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/account-lockout-duration.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/account-lockout-duration.md @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ This policy setting is dependent on the **Account lockout threshold** policy set If [Account lockout threshold](account-lockout-threshold.md) is configured, after the specified number of failed attempts, the account will be locked out. If the **Account lockout duration** is set to 0, the account will remain locked until an administrator unlocks it manually. -It is advisable to set **Account lockout duration** to approximately 15 minutes. To specify that the account will never be locked out, set the **Account lockout threshold** value to 0. +It's advisable to set **Account lockout duration** to approximately 15 minutes. To specify that the account will never be locked out, set the **Account lockout threshold** value to 0. ### Location @@ -58,11 +58,11 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Defaul ## Security considerations -More than a few unsuccessful password submissions during an attempt to log on to a computer might represent an attacker's attempts to determine an account password by trial and error. The Windows and Windows Server operating systems can track logon attempts, and you can configure the operating system to disable the account for a preset period of time after a specified number of failed attempts. Account lockout policy settings control the threshold for this response and what action to take after the threshold is reached. +More than a few unsuccessful password submissions during an attempt to sign in to a computer might represent an attacker's attempts to determine an account password by trial and error. The Windows and Windows Server operating systems can track sign-in attempts, and you can configure the operating system to disable the account for a preset period of time after a specified number of failed attempts. Account lockout policy settings control the threshold for this response and what action to take after the threshold is reached. ### Vulnerability -A denial-of-service (DoS) condition can be created if an attacker abuses the [Account lockout threshold](account-lockout-threshold.md) policy setting and repeatedly attempts to log on with a specific account. After you configure the Account lockout threshold policy setting, the account will be locked out after the specified number of failed attempts. If you configure the **Account lockout duration** policy setting to 0, the account remains locked until you unlock it manually. +A denial-of-service (DoS) condition can be created if an attacker abuses the [Account lockout threshold](account-lockout-threshold.md) policy setting and repeatedly attempts to sign in with a specific account. After you configure the Account lockout threshold policy setting, the account will be locked out after the specified number of failed attempts. If you configure the **Account lockout duration** policy setting to 0, the account remains locked until you unlock it manually. ### Countermeasure @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ Configure the **Account lockout duration** policy setting to an appropriate valu ### Potential impact -Configuring the **Account lockout duration** policy setting to 0 so that accounts cannot be automatically unlocked can increase the number of requests that your organization's Help Desk receives to unlock accounts that were locked by mistake. +Configuring the **Account lockout duration** policy setting to 0 so that accounts can't be automatically unlocked can increase the number of requests that your organization's Help Desk receives to unlock accounts that were locked by mistake. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/account-lockout-threshold.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/account-lockout-threshold.md index fdbdef8e1e..7140cd3752 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/account-lockout-threshold.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/account-lockout-threshold.md @@ -27,26 +27,26 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for ## Reference -The **Account lockout threshold** policy setting determines the number of failed sign-in attempts that will cause a user account to be locked. A locked account cannot be used until you reset it or until the number of minutes specified by the [Account lockout duration](account-lockout-duration.md) policy setting expires. You can set a value from 1 through 999 failed sign-in attempts, or you can specify that the account will never be locked by setting the value to 0. If **Account lockout threshold** is set to a number greater than zero, **Account lockout duration** must be greater than or equal to the value of [Reset account lockout counter after](reset-account-lockout-counter-after.md). +The **Account lockout threshold** policy setting determines the number of failed sign-in attempts that will cause a user account to be locked. A locked account can't be used until you reset it or until the number of minutes specified by the [Account lockout duration](account-lockout-duration.md) policy setting expires. You can set a value from 1 through 999 failed sign-in attempts, or you can specify that the account will never be locked by setting the value to 0. If **Account lockout threshold** is set to a number greater than zero, **Account lockout duration** must be greater than or equal to the value of [Reset account lockout counter after](reset-account-lockout-counter-after.md). Brute force password attacks can be automated to try thousands or even millions of password combinations for any or all user accounts. Limiting the number of failed sign-ins that can be performed nearly eliminates the effectiveness of such attacks. -However, it is important to note that a denial-of-service (DoS) attack could be performed on a domain that has an account lockout threshold configured. A malicious user could programmatically attempt a series of password attacks against all users in the organization. If the number of attempts is greater than the value of **Account lockout threshold**, the attacker could potentially lock every account. +However, it's important to note that a denial-of-service (DoS) attack could be performed on a domain that has an account lockout threshold configured. A malicious user could programmatically attempt a series of password attacks against all users in the organization. If the number of attempts is greater than the value of **Account lockout threshold**, the attacker could potentially lock every account. Failed attempts to unlock a workstation can cause account lockout even if the [Interactive logon: Require Domain Controller authentication to unlock workstation](interactive-logon-require-domain-controller-authentication-to-unlock-workstation.md) security option is disabled. Windows doesn’t need to contact a domain controller for an unlock if you enter the same password that you logged on with, but if you enter a different password, Windows has to contact a domain controller in case you had changed your password from another machine. ### Possible values -It is possible to configure the following values for the **Account lockout threshold** policy setting: +It's possible to configure the following values for the **Account lockout threshold** policy setting: - A user-defined number from 0 through 999 - Not defined -Because vulnerabilities can exist when this value is configured and when it is not, organizations should weigh their identified threats and the risks that they are trying to mitigate. For information these settings, see [Countermeasure](#bkmk-countermeasure) in this article. +Because vulnerabilities can exist when this value is configured and when it's not, organizations should weigh their identified threats and the risks that they're trying to mitigate. For information these settings, see [Countermeasure](#bkmk-countermeasure) in this article. ### Best practices The threshold that you select is a balance between operational efficiency and security, and it depends on your organization's risk level. To allow for user error and to thwart brute force attacks, [Windows security baselines](../windows-security-baselines.md) recommend a value of 10 could be an acceptable starting point for your organization. -As with other account lockout settings, this value is more of a guideline than a rule or best practice because there is no "one size fits all." For more information, see [Configuring Account Lockout](/archive/blogs/secguide/configuring-account-lockout). +As with other account lockout settings, this value is more of a guideline than a rule or best practice because there's no "one size fits all." For more information, see [Configuring Account Lockout](/archive/blogs/secguide/configuring-account-lockout). Implementation of this policy setting is dependent on your operational environment; threat vectors, deployed operating systems, and deployed apps. For more information, see [Implementation considerations](#bkmk-impleconsiderations) in this article. @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirements -None. Changes to this policy setting become effective without a computer restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy setting become effective without a computer restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ### Implementation considerations @@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ Implementation of this policy setting depends on your operational environment. C - The likelihood of an account theft or a DoS attack is based on the security design for your systems and environment. Set the account lockout threshold in consideration of the known and perceived risk of those threats. -- When negotiating encryption types between clients, servers, and domain controllers, the Kerberos protocol can automatically retry account sign-in attempts that count toward the threshold limits that you set in this policy setting. In environments where different versions of the operating system are deployed, encryption type negotiation increases. +- When there's a negotiation of encryption types between clients, servers, and domain controllers, the Kerberos protocol can automatically retry account sign-in attempts that count toward the threshold limits that you set in this policy setting. In environments where different versions of the operating system are deployed, encryption type negotiation increases. - Not all apps that are used in your environment effectively manage how many times a user can attempt to sign in. For instance, if a connection drops repeatedly when a user is running the app, all subsequent failed sign-in attempts count toward the account lockout threshold. @@ -105,24 +105,24 @@ However, a DoS attack could be performed on a domain that has an account lockout ### Countermeasure -Because vulnerabilities can exist when this value is configured and when it is not configured, two distinct countermeasures are defined. Organizations should weigh the choice between the two, based on their identified threats and the risks that they want to mitigate. The two countermeasure options are: +Because vulnerabilities can exist when this value is configured and when it's not configured, two distinct countermeasures are defined. Organizations should weigh the choice between the two, based on their identified threats and the risks that they want to mitigate. The two countermeasure options are: -- Configure the **Account lockout threshold** setting to 0. This configuration ensures that accounts will not be locked, and it will prevent a DoS attack that intentionally attempts to lock accounts. This configuration also helps reduce Help Desk calls because users cannot accidentally lock themselves out of their accounts. Because it does not prevent a brute force attack, this configuration should be chosen only if both of the following criteria are explicitly met: +- Configure the **Account lockout threshold** setting to 0. This configuration ensures that accounts won't be locked, and it will prevent a DoS attack that intentionally attempts to lock accounts. This configuration also helps reduce Help Desk calls because users can't accidentally lock themselves out of their accounts. Because it doesn't prevent a brute force attack, this configuration should be chosen only if both of the following criteria are explicitly met: - The password policy setting requires all users to have complex passwords of eight or more characters. - A robust audit mechanism is in place to alert administrators when a series of failed sign-ins occurs in the environment. - Configure the **Account lockout threshold** policy setting to a sufficiently high value to provide users with the ability to accidentally mistype their password several times before the account is locked, but ensure that a brute force password attack still locks the account. - [Windows security baselines](../windows-security-baselines.md) recommend configuring a threshold of 10 invalid sign-in attempts, which prevents accidental account lockouts and reduces the number of Help Desk calls, but does not prevent a DoS attack. + [Windows security baselines](../windows-security-baselines.md) recommend configuring a threshold of 10 invalid sign-in attempts, which prevents accidental account lockouts and reduces the number of Help Desk calls, but doesn't prevent a DoS attack. - Using this type of policy must be accompanied by a process to unlock locked accounts. It must be possible to implement this policy whenever it is needed to help mitigate massive lockouts caused by an attack on your systems. + Using this type of policy must be accompanied by a process to unlock locked accounts. It must be possible to implement this policy whenever it's needed to help mitigate massive lockouts caused by an attack on your systems. ### Potential impact -If this policy setting is enabled, a locked account is not usable until it is reset by an administrator or until the account lockout duration expires. Enabling this setting will likely generate a number of additional Help Desk calls. +If this policy setting is enabled, a locked account isn't usable until it's reset by an administrator or until the account lockout duration expires. Enabling this setting will likely generate many more Help Desk calls. -If you configure the **Account lockout threshold** policy setting to 0, there is a possibility that a malicious user's attempt to discover passwords with a brute force password attack might go undetected if a robust audit mechanism is not in place. +If you configure the **Account lockout threshold** policy setting to 0, there's a possibility that a malicious user's attempt to discover passwords with a brute force password attack might go undetected if a robust audit mechanism isn't in place. If you configure this policy setting to a number greater than 0, an attacker can easily lock any accounts for which the account name is known. This situation is especially dangerous considering that no credentials other than access to the network are necessary to lock the accounts. diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/account-policies.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/account-policies.md index d3f03a9e97..6fe7c4fe77 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/account-policies.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/account-policies.md @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ All account policies settings applied by using Group Policy are applied at the d > [!NOTE] > Each domain can have only one account policy. The account policy must be defined in the default domain policy or in a new policy that is linked to the root of the domain and given precedence over the default domain policy, which is enforced by the domain controllers in the domain. These domain-wide account policy settings (Password Policy, Account Lockout Policy, and Kerberos Policy) are enforced by the domain controllers in the domain; therefore, domain controllers always retrieve the values of these account policy settings from the default domain policy Group Policy Object (GPO). -The only exception is when another account policy is defined for an organizational unit (OU). The account policy settings for the OU affect the local policy on any computers that are contained in the OU. For example, if an OU policy defines a maximum password age that differs from the domain-level account policy, the OU policy will be applied and enforced only when users log on to the local computer. The default local computer policies apply only to computers that are in a workgroup or in a domain where neither an OU account policy nor a domain policy applies. +The only exception is when another account policy is defined for an organizational unit (OU). The account policy settings for the OU affect the local policy on any computers that are contained in the OU. For example, if an OU policy defines a maximum password age that differs from the domain-level account policy, the OU policy will be applied and enforced only when users sign in to the local computer. The default local computer policies apply only to computers that are in a workgroup or in a domain where both an OU account policy and a domain policy don't apply. ## In this section diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/accounts-administrator-account-status.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/accounts-administrator-account-status.md index 132ecaa9be..09a0d041d9 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/accounts-administrator-account-status.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/accounts-administrator-account-status.md @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ The following conditions prevent disabling the Administrator account, even if th 1. Disabled 2. Listed in the [Deny log on locally](deny-log-on-locally.md) User Rights Assignment -If the Administrator account is disabled, you cannot enable it if the password does not meet requirements. In this case, another member of the Administrators group must reset the password. +If the Administrator account is disabled, you can't enable it if the password doesn't meet requirements. In this case, another member of the Administrators group must reset the password. ### Possible values - Enabled @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ By default, this setting is **Not defined** on domain controllers and **Enabled* ### Best practices -- Disabling the administrator account can become a maintenance issue under certain circumstances. For example, in a domain environment, if the secure channel that constitutes your connection fails for any reason, and there is no other local administrator account, you must restart the computer in safe mode to fix the problem that broke your connection status. +- Disabling the administrator account can become a maintenance issue under certain circumstances. For example, in a domain environment, if the secure channel that constitutes your connection fails for any reason, and there's no other local administrator account, you must restart the computer in safe mode to fix the problem that broke your connection status. ### Location @@ -73,16 +73,16 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default values for this polic Disabling the administrator account can become a maintenance issue under certain circumstances. Reasons that an organization might consider disabling the built-in administrator account include: - For some organizations, periodically changing the passwords for local accounts can be a daunting management challenge. -- By default, the administrator account cannot be locked—no matter how many failed attempts to sign in a user accrues. This makes it a prime target for brute-force, password-guessing attacks. -- This account has a well-known security identifier (SID). Some non-Microsoft tools allow you to authenticate over the network by specifying the SID rather than the account name. This means that even if you rename the administrator account, a malicious user could start a brute-force attack by using the SID. +- By default, the administrator account can't be locked—no matter how many failed attempts to sign in a user accrue. This open state of the account makes it a prime target for brute-force, password-guessing attacks. +- This account has a well-known security identifier (SID). Some non-Microsoft tools allow you to authenticate over the network by specifying the SID rather than the account name. This authentication approach means that even if you rename the administrator account, a malicious user could start a brute-force attack by using the SID. ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ### Safe mode considerations -When you start a device in safe mode, the disabled administrator account is enabled only if the computer is non-domain joined and there are no other active local administrator accounts. In this case, you can access the computer by using safe mode with the current administrative credentials. If the computer is joined to a domain, the disabled administrator account is not enabled. +When you start a device in safe mode, the disabled administrator account is enabled only if the computer is non-domain joined and there are no other active local administrator accounts. In this case, you can access the computer by using safe mode with the current administrative credentials. If the computer is joined to a domain, the disabled administrator account isn't enabled. ### How to access a disabled Administrator account @@ -96,17 +96,17 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -The built-in administrator account cannot be locked out no matter how many failed logons it accrues, which makes it a prime target for brute-force attacks that attempt to guess passwords. Also, this account has a well-known security identifier (SID), and there are non-Microsoft tools that allow authentication by using the SID rather than the account name. Therefore, even if you rename the Administrator account, an attacker could launch a brute-force attack by using the SID to log on. All other accounts that are members of the Administrator's group have the safeguard of locking out the account if the number of failed logons exceeds its configured maximum. +The built-in administrator account can't be locked out no matter how many failed logons it accrues, which makes it a prime target for brute-force attacks that attempt to guess passwords. Also, this account has a well-known security identifier (SID), and there are non-Microsoft tools that allow authentication by using the SID rather than the account name. Therefore, even if you rename the Administrator account, an attacker could launch a brute-force attack by using the SID to sign in. All other accounts that are members of the Administrator's group have the safeguard of locking out the account if the number of failed logons exceeds its configured maximum. ### Countermeasure -Disable the **Accounts: Administrator account status** setting so that the built-in Administrator account cannot be used in a normal system startup. -If it is very difficult to maintain a regular schedule for periodic password changes for local accounts, you can disable the built-in administrator account instead of relying on regular password changes to protect it from attack. +Disable the **Accounts: Administrator account status** setting so that the built-in Administrator account can't be used in a normal system startup. +If it's difficult to maintain a regular schedule for periodic password changes for local accounts, you can disable the built-in administrator account instead of relying on regular password changes to protect it from attack. ### Potential impact -Maintenance issues can arise under certain circumstances if you disable the administrator account. For example, if the secure channel between a member computer and the domain controller fails in a domain environment for any reason and there is no other local administrator account, you must restart in safe mode to fix the problem that caused the secure channel to fail. -If the current administrator password does not meet the password requirements, you cannot enable the administrator account after it is disabled. If this situation occurs, another member of the administrators group must set the password on the administrator account. +Maintenance issues can arise under certain circumstances if you disable the administrator account. For example, if the secure channel between a member computer and the domain controller fails in a domain environment for any reason and there's no other local administrator account, you must restart in safe mode to fix the problem that caused the secure channel to fail. +If the current administrator password doesn't meet the password requirements, you can't enable the administrator account after it's disabled. If this situation occurs, another member of the administrators' group must set the password on the administrator account. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/accounts-block-microsoft-accounts.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/accounts-block-microsoft-accounts.md index d390220428..0712c6d50d 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/accounts-block-microsoft-accounts.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/accounts-block-microsoft-accounts.md @@ -27,27 +27,27 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, management, and security conside ## Reference -This setting prevents using the **Settings** app to add a Microsoft account for single sign-on (SSO) authentication for Microsoft services and some background services, or using a Microsoft account for single sign-on to other applications or services. For more details, see [Microsoft Accounts](../../identity-protection/access-control/microsoft-accounts.md). +This setting prevents using the **Settings** app to add a Microsoft account for single sign-on (SSO) authentication for Microsoft services and some background services, or using a Microsoft account for single sign-on to other applications or services. For more information, see [Microsoft Accounts](../../identity-protection/access-control/microsoft-accounts.md). There are two options if this setting is enabled: -- **Users can’t add Microsoft accounts** means that existing connected accounts can still sign in to the device (and appear on the Sign in screen). However, users cannot use the **Settings** app to add new connected accounts (or connect local accounts to Microsoft accounts). +- **Users can’t add Microsoft accounts** means that existing connected accounts can still sign in to the device (and appear on the sign-in screen). However, users can't use the **Settings** app to add new connected accounts (or connect local accounts to Microsoft accounts). -- **Users can’t add or log on with Microsoft accounts** means that users cannot add new connected accounts (or connect local accounts to Microsoft accounts) or use existing connected accounts through **Settings**. +- **Users can’t add or log on with Microsoft accounts** means that users can't add new connected accounts (or connect local accounts to Microsoft accounts) or use existing connected accounts through **Settings**. -If you disable or do not configure this policy (recommended), users will be able to use Microsoft accounts with Windows. +If you disable or don't configure this policy (recommended), users will be able to use Microsoft accounts with Windows. ### Possible values - This policy is disabled - Users can’t add Microsoft accounts -- Users can’t add or log on with Microsoft accounts +- Users can’t add or sign in with Microsoft accounts -By default, this setting is not defined on domain controllers and disabled on stand-alone servers. +By default, this setting isn't defined on domain controllers and disabled on stand-alone servers. ### Best practices -- By disabling or not configuring this policy setting on the client computer, users will be able to use their Microsoft account, local account, or domain account for their sign-in session to Windows. It also enables the user to connect a local or domain account to a Microsoft account. This provides a convenient option for your users. -- If you need to limit the use of Microsoft accounts in your organization, click the **Users can’t add Microsoft accounts** setting option so that users will not be able to use the **Settings** app to add new connected accounts. +- If this policy setting is disabled or isn't configured on the client computer, users will be able to use their Microsoft account, local account, or domain account for their sign-in session to Windows. It also enables the user to connect a local or domain account to a Microsoft account. This ability to connect provides a convenient option for your users. +- If you need to limit the use of Microsoft accounts in your organization, click the **Users can’t add Microsoft accounts** setting option so that users won't be able to use the **Settings** app to add new connected accounts. ### Location @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ## Security considerations @@ -80,11 +80,11 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -Although Microsoft accounts are password-protected, they also have the potential of greater exposure outside of the enterprise. Additionally, if the owner of a Microsoft account is not easily distinguishable, auditing and forensics become more difficult. +Although Microsoft accounts are password-protected, they also have the potential of greater exposure outside of the enterprise. Additionally, if the owner of a Microsoft account isn't easily distinguishable, auditing and forensics become more difficult. ### Countermeasure -Require only domain accounts in your enterprise by limiting the use of Microsoft accounts. Click the **Users can’t add Microsoft accounts** setting option so that users will not be able to create new Microsoft accounts on a device, switch a local account to a Microsoft account, or connect a domain account to a Microsoft account. +Require only domain accounts in your enterprise by limiting the use of Microsoft accounts. Click the **Users can’t add Microsoft accounts** setting option so that users won't be able to create new Microsoft accounts on a device, switch a local account to a Microsoft account, or connect a domain account to a Microsoft account. ### Potential impact diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/accounts-guest-account-status.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/accounts-guest-account-status.md index 6f785de269..a08a78b36e 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/accounts-guest-account-status.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/accounts-guest-account-status.md @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for ## Reference The **Accounts: Guest account status** policy setting determines whether the Guest account is enabled or disabled. -This account allows unauthenticated network users to gain access to the system by logging on as a Guest with no password. Unauthorized users can access any resources that are accessible to the Guest account over the network. This means that any network shared folders with permissions that allow access to the Guest account, the Guests group, or the Everyone group will be accessible over the network. This can lead to the exposure or corruption of data. +This account allows unauthenticated network users to gain access to the system by signing in as a Guest with no password. Unauthorized users can access any resources that are accessible to the Guest account over the network. This privilege means that any network shared folders with permissions that allow access to the Guest account, the Guests group, or the Everyone group will be accessible over the network. This accessibility can lead to the exposure or corruption of data. ### Possible values @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ This account allows unauthenticated network users to gain access to the system b ### Best practices -Set **Accounts: Guest account status** to Disabled so that the built-in Guest account is no longer usable. All network users will have to authenticate before they can access shared resources on the system. If the Guest account is disabled and [Network access: Sharing and security model for local accounts](network-access-sharing-and-security-model-for-local-accounts.md) is set to **Guest only**, network logons—such as those performed by the SMB Service—will fail. +Set **Accounts: Guest account status** to Disabled so that the built-in Guest account is no longer usable. All network users will have to authenticate before they can access shared resources on the system. If the Guest account is disabled and [Network access: Sharing and security model for local accounts](network-access-sharing-and-security-model-for-local-accounts.md) is set to **Guest only**, network logons—such as those logons performed by the SMB Service—will fail. ### Location @@ -63,15 +63,15 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -The default Guest account allows unauthenticated network users to log on as a Guest with no password. These unauthorized users could access any resources that are accessible to the Guest account over the network. This capability means that any shared folders with permissions that allow access to the Guest account, the Guests group, or the Everyone group are accessible over the network, which could lead to the exposure or corruption of data. +The default Guest account allows unauthenticated network users to sign in as a Guest with no password. These unauthorized users could access any resources that are accessible to the Guest account over the network. This capability means that any shared folders with permissions that allow access to the Guest account, the Guests group, or the Everyone group are accessible over the network, which could lead to the exposure or corruption of data. ### Countermeasure -Disable the **Accounts: Guest account status** setting so that the built-in Guest account cannot be used. +Disable the **Accounts: Guest account status** setting so that the built-in Guest account can't be used. ### Potential impact -All network users must be authenticated before they can access shared resources. If you disable the Guest account and the **Network Access: Sharing and Security Model** option is set to **Guest Only**, network logons, such as those performed by the Microsoft Network Server (SMB Service), fail. This policy setting should have little impact on most organizations because it is the default setting starting with Windows Vista and Windows Server 2003. +All network users must be authenticated before they can access shared resources. If you disable the Guest account and the **Network Access: Sharing and Security Model** option is set to **Guest Only**, network logons, such as those performed by the Microsoft Network Server (SMB Service), fail. This policy setting should have little impact on most organizations because it's the default setting starting with Windows Vista and Windows Server 2003. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/accounts-limit-local-account-use-of-blank-passwords-to-console-logon-only.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/accounts-limit-local-account-use-of-blank-passwords-to-console-logon-only.md index b630cc0ce5..cde8f45d22 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/accounts-limit-local-account-use-of-blank-passwords-to-console-logon-only.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/accounts-limit-local-account-use-of-blank-passwords-to-console-logon-only.md @@ -29,12 +29,12 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for The **Accounts: Limit local account use of blank passwords to console logon only** policy setting determines whether remote interactive logons by network services such as Remote Desktop Services, Telnet, and File Transfer Protocol (FTP) are allowed for local accounts that have blank passwords. If this policy setting is enabled, a local account must have a nonblank password to be used to perform an interactive or network logon from a remote client. -This policy setting does not affect interactive logons that are performed physically at the console or logons that use domain accounts. It is possible for non-Microsoft applications that use remote interactive logons to bypass this policy setting. -Blank passwords are a serious threat to computer security and they should be forbidden through both corporate policy and suitable technical measures. Nevertheless, if a user with the ability to create new accounts creates one that has bypassed your domain-based password policy settings, that account might have a blank password. For example, a user could build a stand-alone system, create one or more accounts with blank passwords, and then join the computer to the domain. The local accounts with blank passwords would still function. Anyone who knows the account name can then use accounts with blank passwords to log on to systems. +This policy setting doesn't affect interactive logons that are performed physically at the console or logons that use domain accounts. It's possible for non-Microsoft applications that use remote interactive logons to bypass this policy setting. +Blank passwords are a serious threat to computer security and they should be forbidden through both corporate policy and suitable technical measures. Nevertheless, if a user with the ability to create new accounts creates one that has bypassed your domain-based password policy settings, that account might have a blank password. For example, a user could build a stand-alone system, create one or more accounts with blank passwords, and then join the computer to the domain. The local accounts with blank passwords would still function. Anyone who knows the account name can then use accounts with blank passwords to sign in to systems. -Devices that are not in physically secure locations should always enforce strong password policies for all local user accounts. Otherwise, anyone with physical access to the device can log on by using a user account that does not have a password. This is especially important for portable devices. +Devices that aren't in physically secure locations should always enforce strong password policies for all local user accounts. Otherwise, anyone with physical access to the device can sign in by using a user account that doesn't have a password. This policy is especially important for portable devices. -If you apply this security policy to the Everyone group, no one will be able to log on through Remote Desktop Services. +If you apply this security policy to the Everyone group, no one will be able to sign in through Remote Desktop Services. ### Possible values @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ If you apply this security policy to the Everyone group, no one will be able to ### Best practices -- It is advisable to set **Accounts: Limit local account use of blank passwords to console logon only** to Enabled. +- It's advisable to set **Accounts: Limit local account use of blank passwords to console logon only** to Enabled. ### Location @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ### Policy conflict considerations @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ The policy as distributed through the GPO takes precedence over the locally conf ### Group Policy -This policy setting can be configured by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to be distributed through Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If this policy is not contained in a distributed GPO, this policy can be configured on the local device by using the Local Security Policy snap-in. +This policy setting can be configured by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to be distributed through Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If this policy isn't contained in a distributed GPO, this policy can be configured on the local device by using the Local Security Policy snap-in. ## Security considerations @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -Blank passwords are a serious threat to computer security, and they should be forbidden through organizational policy and suitable technical measures. Starting with Windows Server 2003, the default settings for Active Directory domains require complex passwords of at least seven characters, and eight characters starting with Windows Server 2008. However, if users with the ability to create new accounts bypass your domain-based password policies, they could create accounts with blank passwords. For example, a user could build a stand-alone computer, create one or more accounts with blank passwords, and then join the computer to the domain. The local accounts with blank passwords would still function. Anyone who knows the name of one of these unprotected accounts could then use it to log on. +Blank passwords are a serious threat to computer security, and they should be forbidden through organizational policy and suitable technical measures. From Windows Server 2003, the default settings for Active Directory domains require complex passwords of at least seven characters, and eight characters starting with Windows Server 2008. However, if users with the ability to create new accounts bypass your domain-based password policies, they could create accounts with blank passwords. For example, a user could build a stand-alone computer, create one or more accounts with blank passwords, and then join the computer to the domain. The local accounts with blank passwords would still function. Anyone who knows the name of one of these unprotected accounts could then use it to sign in. ### Countermeasure @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ Enable the **Accounts: Limit local account use of blank passwords to console log ### Potential impact -None. This is the default configuration. +None. This non-impact behavior is the default configuration. ## Related topics [Security Options](security-options.md) diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/accounts-rename-administrator-account.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/accounts-rename-administrator-account.md index d865644cf8..4c849e7de5 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/accounts-rename-administrator-account.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/accounts-rename-administrator-account.md @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ### Policy conflict considerations @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ None. ### Group Policy -This policy setting can be configured by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to be distributed through Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If this policy is not contained in a distributed GPO, this policy can be configured on the local device by using the Local Security Policy snap-in. +This policy setting can be configured by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to be distributed through Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If this policy isn't contained in a distributed GPO, this policy can be configured on the local device by using the Local Security Policy snap-in. ## Security considerations @@ -78,9 +78,9 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -The Administrator account exists on all versions Windows 10 for desktop editions. If you rename this account, it is slightly more difficult for unauthorized persons to guess this privileged user name and password combination. Beginning with Windows Vista, the person who installs the operating system specifies an account that is the first member of the Administrator group and has full rights to configure the computer so this countermeasure is applied by default on new installations. If a device is upgraded from a previous version of Windows, the account with the name administrator is retained with all the rights and privileges that were defined for the account in the previous installation. +The Administrator account exists on all versions Windows 10 for desktop editions. If you rename this account, it's slightly more difficult for unauthorized persons to guess this privileged user name and password combination. Beginning with Windows Vista, the person who installs the operating system specifies an account that is the first member of the Administrator group and has full rights to configure the computer so this countermeasure is applied by default on new installations. If a device is upgraded from a previous version of Windows, the account with the name administrator is retained with all the rights and privileges that were defined for the account in the previous installation. -The built-in administrator account cannot be locked out, regardless of how many times an attacker might use a bad password. This capability makes the administrator account a popular target for brute-force attacks that attempt to guess passwords. The value of this countermeasure is lessened because this account has a well-known SID, and there are non-Microsoft tools that allow authentication by using the SID rather than the account name. Therefore, even if you rename the Administrator account, an attacker could launch a brute-force attack by using the SID to log on. +The built-in administrator account can't be locked out, regardless of how many times an attacker might use a bad password. This capability makes the administrator account a popular target for brute-force attacks that attempt to guess passwords. The value of this countermeasure is lessened because this account has a well-known SID, and there are non-Microsoft tools that allow authentication by using the SID rather than the account name. Therefore, even if you rename the Administrator account, an attacker could launch a brute-force attack by using the SID to sign in. ### Countermeasure @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ Specify a new name in the **Accounts: Rename administrator account** setting to ### Potential impact -You must provide users who are authorized to use this account with the new account name. (The guidance for this setting assumes that the Administrator account was not disabled.) +You must provide users who are authorized to use this account with the new account name. (The guidance for this setting assumes that the Administrator account wasn't disabled.) ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/accounts-rename-guest-account.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/accounts-rename-guest-account.md index 7ce4a682bc..1162ff5210 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/accounts-rename-guest-account.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/accounts-rename-guest-account.md @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ### Policy conflict considerations @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ None. ### Group Policy -This policy setting can be configured by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to be distributed through Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If this policy is not contained in a distributed GPO, this policy can be configured on the local device by using the Local Security Policy snap-in. +This policy setting can be configured by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to be distributed through Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If this policy isn't contained in a distributed GPO, this policy can be configured on the local device by using the Local Security Policy snap-in. ## Security considerations @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ or install software that could be used for a later attack on your system. ### Countermeasure -Specify a new name in the **Accounts: Rename guest account** setting to rename the Guest account. If you rename this account, it is slightly more difficult for unauthorized persons to guess this privileged user name and password combination. +Specify a new name in the **Accounts: Rename guest account** setting to rename the Guest account. If you rename this account, it's slightly more difficult for unauthorized persons to guess this privileged user name and password combination. ### Potential impact diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/act-as-part-of-the-operating-system.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/act-as-part-of-the-operating-system.md index 4c794419c1..5850036933 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/act-as-part-of-the-operating-system.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/act-as-part-of-the-operating-system.md @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security ## Reference -The **Act as part of the operating system** policy setting determines whether a process can assume the identity of any user and thereby gain access to the resources that the user is authorized to access. Typically, only low-level authentication services require this user right. Potential access is not limited to what is associated with the user by default. The calling process may request that arbitrary additional privileges be added to the access token. The calling process may also build an access token that does not provide a primary identity for auditing in the system event logs. +The **Act as part of the operating system** policy setting determines whether a process can assume the identity of any user and thereby gain access to the resources that the user is authorized to access. Typically, only low-level authentication services require this user right. Potential access isn't limited to what is associated with the user by default. The calling process may request that arbitrary extra privileges be added to the access token. The calling process may also build an access token that doesn't provide a primary identity for auditing in the system event logs. Constant: SeTcbPrivilege ### Possible values @@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ Constant: SeTcbPrivilege - Not defined ### Best practices -- Do not assign this right to any user accounts. Only assign this user right to trusted users. -- If a service requires this user right, configure the service to log on by using the local System account, which inherently includes this user right. Do not create a separate account and assign this user right to it. +- Don't assign this right to any user accounts. Only assign this user right to trusted users. +- If a service requires this user right, configure the service to sign in by using the local System account, which inherently includes this user right. Don't create a separate account and assign this user right to it. ### Location @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values for the ## Policy management -A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to be effective. +A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to be effective. Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on. @@ -77,11 +77,11 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -The **Act as part of the operating system** user right is extremely powerful. Users with this user right can take complete control of the device and erase evidence of their activities. +The **Act as part of the operating system** user right is powerful. Users with this user right can take complete control of the device and erase evidence of their activities. ### Countermeasure -Restrict the **Act as part of the operating system** user right to as few accounts as possible—it should not even be assigned to the Administrators group under typical circumstances. When a service requires this user right, configure the service to log on with the Local System account, which inherently includes this privilege. Do not create a separate account and assign this user right to it. +Restrict the **Act as part of the operating system** user right to as few accounts as possible—it shouldn't even be assigned to the Administrators group under typical circumstances. When a service requires this user right, configure the service to sign in with the Local System account, which inherently includes this privilege. Don't create a separate account and assign this user right to it. ### Potential impact diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/add-workstations-to-domain.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/add-workstations-to-domain.md index 8e6a02b8ef..471d8a40ba 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/add-workstations-to-domain.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/add-workstations-to-domain.md @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management and security c ## Reference -This policy setting determines which users can add a device to a specific domain. For it to take effect, it must be assigned so that it applies to at least one domain controller. A user who is assigned this user right can add up to ten workstations to the domain. +This policy setting determines which users can add a device to a specific domain. For it to take effect, it must be assigned so that it applies to at least one domain controller. A user who is assigned this user right can add up to 10 workstations to the domain. Adding a machine account to the domain allows the device to participate in Active Directory-based networking. Constant: SeMachineAccountPrivilege @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ Computer Configuration\\Windows Settings\\Security Settings\\User Rights Assignm ### Default values -By default, this setting allows access for Authenticated Users on domain controllers, and it is not defined on stand-alone servers. +By default, this setting allows access for Authenticated Users on domain controllers, and it isn't defined on stand-alone servers. The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values for the most recent supported versions of Windows. Default values are also listed on the policy’s property page. @@ -62,11 +62,11 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values for the ## Policy management -Users can also join a computer to a domain if they have the Create Computer Objects permission for an organizational unit (OU) or for the Computers container in the directory. Users who are assigned this permission can add an unlimited number of devices to the domain regardless of whether they have the **Add workstations to domain** user right. +Users can also join a computer to a domain if they've the Create Computer Objects permission for an organizational unit (OU) or for the Computers container in the directory. Users who are assigned this permission can add an unlimited number of devices to the domain regardless of whether they've the **Add workstations to domain** user right. -Furthermore, machine accounts that are created by means of the **Add workstations to domain** user right have Domain Administrators as the owner of the machine account. Machine accounts that are created by means of permissions on the computer’s container use the creator as the owner of the machine account. If a user has permissions on the container and also has the **Add workstation to domain** user right, the device is added based on the computer container permissions rather than the user right. +Furthermore, machine accounts that are created through the **Add workstations to domain** user right have Domain Administrators as the owner of the machine account. Machine accounts that are created through permissions on the computer’s container use the creator as the owner of the machine account. If a user has permissions on the container and also has the **Add workstation to domain** user right, the device is added based on the computer container permissions rather than the user right. -A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to be effective. +A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to be effective. Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on. @@ -87,8 +87,8 @@ This policy has the following security considerations: ### Vulnerability -The **Add workstations to domain** user right presents a moderate vulnerability. Users with this right could add a device to the domain that is configured in a way that violates organizational security policies. For example, if your organization does not want its users to have administrative -privileges on their devices, users could install Windows on their computers and then add the computers to the domain. The user would know the password for the local administrator account, could log on with that account, and then add a personal domain account to the local Administrators group. +The **Add workstations to domain** user right presents a moderate vulnerability. Users with this right could add a device to the domain that is configured in a way that violates organizational security policies. For example, if your organization doesn't want its users to have administrative +privileges on their devices, users could install Windows on their computers and then add the computers to the domain. The user would know the password for the local administrator account, could sign in with that account, and then add a personal domain account to the local Administrators group. ### Countermeasure @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ Configure this setting so that only authorized members of the IT team are allowe ### Potential impact -For organizations that have never allowed users to set up their own computers and add them to the domain, this countermeasure has no impact. For those that have allowed some or all users to configure their own devices, this countermeasure forces the organization to establish a formal process for these procedures going forward. It does not affect existing computers unless they are removed from and then added to the domain. +For organizations that have never allowed users to set up their own computers and add them to the domain, this countermeasure has no impact. For those organizations that have allowed some or all users to configure their own devices, this countermeasure forces the organization to establish a formal process for these procedures going forward. It doesn't affect existing computers unless they're removed from and then added to the domain. ## Related topics - [User Rights Assignment](user-rights-assignment.md) diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/administer-security-policy-settings.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/administer-security-policy-settings.md index 297de36841..f60583b08c 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/administer-security-policy-settings.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/administer-security-policy-settings.md @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ This article discusses different methods to administer security policy settings Security policy settings should be used as part of your overall security implementation to help secure domain controllers, servers, client devices, and other resources in your organization. -Security settings policies are rules that you can configure on a device, or multiple devices, for the purpose of protecting resources on a device or network. The Security Settings extension of the Local Group Policy Editor snap-in (Gpedit.msc) allows you to define security configurations as part of a Group Policy Object (GPO). The GPOs are linked to Active Directory containers such as sites, domains, and organizational units, and they enable administrators to manage security settings for multiple computers from any device joined to the domain. +Security settings policies are rules that you can configure on a device, or multiple devices, for protecting resources on a device or network. The Security Settings extension of the Local Group Policy Editor snap-in (Gpedit.msc) allows you to define security configurations as part of a Group Policy Object (GPO). The GPOs are linked to Active Directory containers such as sites, domains, and organizational units, and they enable administrators to manage security settings for multiple computers from any device joined to the domain. Security settings can control: @@ -83,10 +83,10 @@ The secedit command-line tool works with security templates and provides six pri - The **Configure** parameter helps you resolve security discrepancies between devices by applying the correct security template to the errant server. - The **Analyze** parameter compares the server's security configuration with the selected template. -- The **Import** parameter allows you to create a database from an existing template. The Security Configuration and Analysis tool does this also. +- The **Import** parameter allows you to create a database from an existing template. The Security Configuration and Analysis tool does this cloning also. - The **Export** parameter allows you to export the settings from a database into a security settings template. -- The **Validate** parameter allows you to validate the syntax of each or any lines of text that you created or added to a security template. This ensures that if the template fails to apply syntax, the template will not be the issue. -- The **Generate Rollback** parameter saves the server's current security settings into a security template so it can be used to restore most of the server's security settings to a known state. The exceptions are that, when applied, the rollback template will not change access control list entries on files or registry entries that were changed by the most recently applied template. +- The **Validate** parameter allows you to validate the syntax of each or any lines of text that you created or added to a security template. This validation ensures that if the template fails to apply syntax, the template won't be the issue. +- The **Generate Rollback** parameter saves the server's current security settings into a security template so it can be used to restore most of the server's security settings to a known state. The exceptions are that, when applied, the rollback template won't change access control list entries on files or registry entries that were changed by the most recently applied template. ## Using the Security Compliance Manager @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ SCW is a role-based tool: You can use it to create a policy that enables service The following are considerations for using SCW: - SCW disables unnecessary services and provides Windows Firewall with Advanced Security support. -- Security policies that are created with SCW are not the same as security templates, which are files with an .inf extension. Security templates contain more security settings than those that can be set with SCW. However, it is possible to include a security template in an SCW security policy file. +- Security policies that are created with SCW aren't the same as security templates, which are files with an .inf extension. Security templates contain more security settings than those settings that can be set with SCW. However, it's possible to include a security template in an SCW security policy file. - You can deploy security policies that you create with SCW by using Group Policy. -- SCW does not install or uninstall the features necessary for the server to perform a role. You can install server role-specific features through Server Manager. +- SCW doesn't install or uninstall the features necessary for the server to perform a role. You can install server role-specific features through Server Manager. - SCW detects server role dependencies. If you select a server role, it automatically selects dependent server roles. - All apps that use the IP protocol and ports must be running on the server when you run SCW. - In some cases, you must be connected to the Internet to use the links in the SCW help. @@ -149,20 +149,19 @@ Security Configuration and Analysis is an MMC snap-in for analyzing and configur ### Security analysis -The state of the operating system and apps on a device is dynamic. For example, you may need to temporarily change security levels so that you can immediately resolve an administration or network issue. However, this change can often go unreversed. This means that a computer may no longer meet the requirements for enterprise security. +The state of the operating system and apps on a device is dynamic. For example, you may need to temporarily change security levels so that you can immediately resolve an administration or network issue. However, this change can often go unreversed. This unreversed state of the changes means that a computer may no longer meet the requirements for enterprise security. Regular analysis enables you to track and ensure an adequate level of security on each computer as part of an enterprise risk management program. You can tune the security levels and, most importantly, detect any security flaws that may occur in the system over time. -Security Configuration and Analysis enables you to quickly review security analysis results. It presents recommendations alongside of current system settings and uses visual flags or remarks to highlight any areas where the current settings do not match the proposed level of security. Security -Configuration and Analysis also offers the ability to resolve any discrepancies that analysis reveals. +Security Configuration and Analysis enables you to quickly review security analysis results. It presents recommendations alongside of current system settings and uses visual flags or remarks to highlight any areas where the current settings don't match the proposed level of security. Security Configuration and Analysis also offers the ability to resolve any discrepancies that analysis reveals. ### Security configuration -Security Configuration and Analysis can also be used to directly configure local system security. Through its use of personal databases, you can import security templates that have been created with Security Templates and apply these templates to the local computer. This immediately configures the system security with the levels specified in the template. +Security Configuration and Analysis can also be used to directly configure local system security. Through its use of personal databases, you can import security templates that have been created with Security Templates and apply these templates to the local computer. These security templates immediately configure the system security with the levels specified in the template. ### Security templates -With the Security Templates snap-in for Microsoft Management Console, you can create a security policy for your device or for your network. It is a single point of entry where the full range of system security can be taken into account. The Security Templates snap-in does not introduce new security parameters, it simply organizes all existing security attributes into one place to ease security administration. +With the Security Templates snap-in for Microsoft Management Console, you can create a security policy for your device or for your network. It's a single point of entry where the full range of system security can be taken into account. The Security Templates snap-in doesn't introduce new security parameters, it simply organizes all existing security attributes into one place to ease security administration. Importing a security template to a Group Policy Object eases domain administration by configuring security for a domain or organizational unit at once. @@ -184,18 +183,18 @@ Security templates can be used to define: - Registry: Permissions for registry keys - File System: Permissions for folders and files -Each template is saved as a text-based .inf file. This enables you to copy, paste, import, or export some or all of the template attributes. With the exceptions of Internet Protocol security and public key policies, all security attributes can be contained in a security template. +Each template is saved as a text-based .inf file. This file enables you to copy, paste, import, or export some or all of the template attributes. With the exceptions of Internet Protocol security and public key policies, all security attributes can be contained in a security template. ### Security settings extension to Group Policy -Organizational units, domains, and sites are linked to Group Policy Objects. The security settings tool allows you change the security configuration of the Group Policy Object, in turn, affecting multiple computers. With security settings, you can modify the security settings of many devices, depending on the Group Policy Object you modify, from just one device joined to a domain. +Organizational units, domains, and sites are linked to Group Policy Objects. The security settings tool allows you to change the security configuration of the Group Policy Object, in turn, affecting multiple computers. With security settings, you can modify the security settings of many devices, depending on the Group Policy Object you modify, from just one device joined to a domain. -Security settings or security policies are rules that are configured on a device or multiple device for protecting resources on a device or network. Security settings can control: +Security settings or security policies are rules that are configured on a device or multiple devices for protecting resources on a device or network. Security settings can control: - How users are authenticated to a network or device -- What resources users are authorized to use. -- Whether or not a user's or group's actions are recorded in the event log. -- Group membership. +- What resources users are authorized to use +- Whether or not a user's or group's actions are recorded in the event log +- Group membership You can change the security configuration on multiple computers in two ways: @@ -208,18 +207,18 @@ A security policy is a combination of security settings that affect the security With the local security policy, you can control: -- Who accesses your device. -- What resources users are authorized to use on your device. -- Whether or not a user's or group's actions are recorded in the event log. +- Who accesses your device +- What resources users are authorized to use on your device +- Whether or not a user's or group's actions are recorded in the event log -If your local device is joined to a domain, you are subject to obtaining a security policy from the domain's policy or from the policy of any organizational unit that you are a member of. If you are getting a policy from more than one source, conflicts are resolved in the following order of precedence. +If your local device is joined to a domain, you're subject to obtaining a security policy from the domain's policy or from the policy of any organizational unit that you're a member of. If you're getting a policy from more than one source, conflicts are resolved in the following order of precedence. 1. Organizational unit policy 1. Domain policy 1. Site policy 1. Local computer policy -If you modify the security settings on your local device by using the local security policy, then you are directly modifying the settings on your device. Therefore, the settings take effect immediately, but this may only be temporary. The settings will actually remain in effect on your local device until the next refresh of Group Policy security settings, when the security settings that are received from Group Policy will override your local settings wherever there are conflicts. +If you modify the security settings on your local device by using the local security policy, then you're directly modifying the settings on your device. Therefore, the settings take effect immediately, but this effect may only be temporary. The settings will actually remain in effect on your local device until the next refresh of Group Policy security settings, when the security settings that are received from Group Policy will override your local settings wherever there are conflicts. ### Using the Security Configuration Manager @@ -233,10 +232,10 @@ For procedures on how to use the Security Configuration Manager, see [Security C ### Applying security settings -Once you have edited the security settings, the settings are refreshed on the computers in the organizational unit linked to your Group Policy Object: +Once you've edited the security settings, the settings are refreshed on the computers in the organizational unit linked to your Group Policy Object: - When a device is restarted, the settings on that device will be refreshed. -- To force a device to refresh its security settings as well as all Group Policy settings, use gpupdate.exe. +- To force a device to refresh its security settings and all Group Policy settings, use gpupdate.exe. **Precedence of a policy when more than one policy is applied to a computer** @@ -247,7 +246,7 @@ For security settings that are defined by more than one policy, the following or 1. Site Policy 1. Local computer Policy -For example, a workstation that is joined to a domain will have its local security settings overridden by the domain policy wherever there is a conflict. Likewise, if the same workstation is a member of an Organizational Unit, the settings applied from the Organizational Unit's policy will override +For example, a workstation that is joined to a domain will have its local security settings overridden by the domain policy wherever there's a conflict. Likewise, if the same workstation is a member of an Organizational Unit, the settings applied from the Organizational Unit's policy will override both the domain and local settings. If the workstation is a member of more than one Organizational Unit, then the Organizational Unit that immediately contains the workstation has the highest order of precedence. > [!NOTE] @@ -260,23 +259,23 @@ Security settings may still persist even if a setting is no longer defined in th Persistence in security settings occurs when: -- The setting has not been previously defined for the device. +- The setting hasn't been previously defined for the device. - The setting is for a registry object. - The setting is for a file system object. -All settings applied through local policy or a Group Policy Object are stored in a local database on your device. Whenever a security setting is modified, the computer saves the security setting value to the local database, which retains a history of all the settings that have been applied to the device. If a policy first defines a security setting and then no longer defines that setting, then the setting takes on the previous value in the database. If a previous value does not exist in the database, then the setting does not revert to anything and remains defined as is. This behavior is sometimes called "tattooing." +All settings applied through local policy or a Group Policy Object are stored in a local database on your device. Whenever a security setting is modified, the computer saves the security setting value to the local database, which retains a history of all the settings that have been applied to the device. If a policy first defines a security setting and then no longer defines that setting, then the setting takes on the previous value in the database. If a previous value doesn't exist in the database, then the setting doesn't revert to anything and remains defined as is. This behavior is sometimes called "tattooing." Registry and file settings will maintain the values applied through policy until that setting is set to other values. **Filtering security settings based on group membership** -You can also decide what users or groups will or will not have a Group Policy Object applied to them regardless of what computer they have logged onto by denying them either the Apply Group Policy or Read permission on that Group Policy Object. Both of these permissions are needed to apply Group Policy. +You can also decide what users or groups will or won't have a Group Policy Object applied to them regardless of what computer they've signed into by denying them either the Apply Group Policy or Read permission on that Group Policy Object. Both of these permissions are needed to apply Group Policy. ### Importing and exporting security templates -Security Configuration and Analysis provides the ability to import and export security templates into or from a database. +Security Configuration and Analysis enables import and export of security templates into or from a database. -If you have made any changes to the analysis database, you can save those settings by exporting them into a template. The export feature provides the ability to save the analysis database settings as a new template file. This template file can then be used to analyze or configure a system, or it can be imported to a Group Policy Object. +If you have made any changes to the analysis database, you can save those settings by exporting them into a template. The export feature enables saving the analysis database settings as a new template file. This template file can then be used to analyze or configure a system, or it can be imported to a Group Policy Object. ### Analyzing security and viewing results @@ -286,26 +285,26 @@ Security Configuration and Analysis displays the analysis results by security ar |Visual flag |Meaning | |---------|---------| -|Red X |The entry is defined in the analysis database and on the system, but the security setting values do not match.| +|Red X |The entry is defined in the analysis database and on the system, but the security setting values don't match.| |Green check mark |The entry is defined in the analysis database and on the system and the setting values match.| -|Question mark |The entry is not defined in the analysis database and, therefore, was not analyzed.
    If an entry is not analyzed, it may be that it was not defined in the analysis database or that the user who is running the analysis may not have sufficient permission to perform analysis on a specific object or area.| -|Exclamation point |This item is defined in the analysis database, but does not exist on the actual system. For example, there may be a restricted group that is defined in the analysis database but does not actually exist on the analyzed system.| -|No highlight |The item is not defined in the analysis database or on the system.| +|Question mark |The entry isn't defined in the analysis database and, therefore, wasn't analyzed.
    If an entry isn't analyzed, it may be that it wasn't defined in the analysis database or that the user who is running the analysis may not have sufficient permission to perform analysis on a specific object or area.| +|Exclamation point |This item is defined in the analysis database, but doesn't exist on the actual system. For example, there may be a restricted group that is defined in the analysis database but doesn't actually exist on the analyzed system.| +|No highlight |The item isn't defined in the analysis database or on the system.| If you choose to accept the current settings, the corresponding value in the base configuration is modified to match them. If you change the system setting to match the base configuration, the change will be reflected when you configure the system with Security Configuration and Analysis. -To avoid continued flagging of settings that you have investigated and determined to be reasonable, you can modify the base configuration. The changes are made to a copy of the template. +To avoid continued flagging of settings that you've investigated and determined to be reasonable, you can modify the base configuration. The changes are made to a copy of the template. ### Resolving security discrepancies You can resolve discrepancies between analysis database and system settings by: - Accepting or changing some or all of the values that are flagged or not included in the configuration, if you determine that the local system security levels are valid due to the context (or role) of that computer. These attribute values are then updated in the database and applied to the system when you click **Configure Computer Now**. -- Configuring the system to the analysis database values, if you determine the system is not in compliance with valid security levels. +- Configuring the system to the analysis database values, if you determine the system isn't in compliance with valid security levels. - Importing a more appropriate template for the role of that computer into the database as the new base configuration and applying it to the system. Changes to the analysis database are made to the stored template in the database, not to the security template file. The security template file will only be modified if you either return to Security Templates and edit that template or export the stored configuration to the same template file. You should use **Configure Computer Now** only to modify security areas *not* affected by Group Policy settings, such as security on local files and folders, registry keys, and system services. Otherwise, when the Group Policy settings are applied, it will take precedence over local settings—such as account policies. -In general, do not use **Configure Computer Now** when you are analyzing security for domain-based clients, since you will have to configure each client individually. In this case, you should return to Security Templates, modify the template, and reapply it to the appropriate Group Policy Object. +In general, don't use **Configure Computer Now** when you're analyzing security for domain-based clients, since you'll have to configure each client individually. In this case, you should return to Security Templates, modify the template, and reapply it to the appropriate Group Policy Object. ### Automating security configuration tasks diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/allow-log-on-through-remote-desktop-services.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/allow-log-on-through-remote-desktop-services.md index 1ad9f2883f..595d9b29e8 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/allow-log-on-through-remote-desktop-services.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/allow-log-on-through-remote-desktop-services.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- title: Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services (Windows 10) -description: Best practices, location, values, policy management, and security considerations for the security policy setting, Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services. +description: Best practices, location, values, policy management, and security considerations for the security policy setting. Allow a sign-in through Remote Desktop Services. ms.assetid: 6267c376-8199-4f2b-ae56-9c5424e76798 ms.reviewer: ms.author: dansimp @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security ## Reference -This policy setting determines which users or groups can access the logon screen of a remote device through a Remote Desktop Services connection. It is possible for a user to establish a Remote Desktop Services connection to a particular server but not be able to log on to the console of that same server. +This policy setting determines which users or groups can access the sign-in screen of a remote device through a Remote Desktop Services connection. It's possible for a user to establish a Remote Desktop Services connection to a particular server but not be able to sign in to the console of that same server. Constant: SeRemoteInteractiveLogonRight @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ Constant: SeRemoteInteractiveLogonRight ### Best practices -- To control who can open a Remote Desktop Services connection and log on to the device, add users to or remove users from the Remote Desktop Users group. +- To control who can open a Remote Desktop Services connection and sign in to the device, add users to or remove users from the Remote Desktop Users group. ### Location @@ -66,13 +66,13 @@ This section describes different features and tools available to help you manage ### Group Policy -To use Remote Desktop Services to successfully log on to a remote device, the user or group must be a member of the Remote Desktop Users or Administrators group and be granted the **Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services** right. It is possible for a user to establish an Remote Desktop Services session to a particular server, but not be able to log on to the console of that same server. +To use Remote Desktop Services to successfully sign in to a remote device, the user or group must be a member of the Remote Desktop Users or Administrators group and be granted the **Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services** right. It's possible for a user to establish a Remote Desktop Services session to a particular server, but not be able to sign in to the console of that same server. To exclude users or groups, you can assign the **Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services** user right to those users or groups. However, be careful when you use this method because you could create conflicts for legitimate users or groups that have been allowed access through the **Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services** user right. For more information, see [Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services](deny-log-on-through-remote-desktop-services.md). -A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to be effective. +A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to be effective. Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on. @@ -89,11 +89,11 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -Any account with the **Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services** user right can log on to the remote console of the device. If you do not restrict this user right to legitimate users who must log on to the console of the computer, unauthorized users could download and run malicious software to elevate their privileges. +Any account with the **Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services** user right can sign in to the remote console of the device. If you don't restrict this user right to legitimate users who must sign in to the console of the computer, unauthorized users could download and run malicious software to elevate their privileges. ### Countermeasure -For domain controllers, assign the **Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services** user right only to the Administrators group. For other server roles and devices, add the Remote Desktop Users group. For servers that have the Remote Desktop (RD) Session Host role service enabled and do not run in Application Server mode, ensure that only authorized IT personnel who must manage the computers remotely belong to these groups. +For domain controllers, assign the **Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services** user right only to the Administrators group. For other server roles and devices, add the Remote Desktop Users group. For servers that have the Remote Desktop (RD) Session Host role service enabled and don't run in Application Server mode, ensure that only authorized IT personnel who must manage the computers remotely belong to these groups. > **Caution:**  For RD Session Host servers that run in Application Server mode, ensure that only users who require access to the server have accounts that belong to the Remote Desktop Users group because this built-in group has this logon right by default. @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ Alternatively, you can assign the **Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services* ### Potential impact -Removal of the **Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services** user right from other groups (or membership changes in these default groups) could limit the abilities of users who perform specific administrative roles in your environment. You should confirm that delegated activities are not adversely affected. +Removal of the **Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services** user right from other groups (or membership changes in these default groups) could limit the abilities of users who perform specific administrative roles in your environment. You should confirm that delegated activities aren't adversely affected. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-audit-the-use-of-backup-and-restore-privilege.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-audit-the-use-of-backup-and-restore-privilege.md index 39535992d7..6b5311ba25 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-audit-the-use-of-backup-and-restore-privilege.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-audit-the-use-of-backup-and-restore-privilege.md @@ -62,11 +62,11 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ### Auditing -Enabling this policy setting in conjunction with the **Audit privilege use** policy setting records any instance of user rights that are being exercised in the security log. If **Audit privilege use** is enabled but **Audit: Audit the use of Backup and Restore privilege** is disabled, when users back up or restore user rights, those events will not be audited. +Enabling this policy setting in conjunction with the **Audit privilege use** policy setting records any instance of user rights that are being exercised in the security log. If **Audit privilege use** is enabled but **Audit: Audit the use of Backup and Restore privilege** is disabled, when users back up or restore user rights, those events won't be audited. Enabling this policy setting when the **Audit privilege use** policy setting is also enabled generates an audit event for every file that is backed up or restored. This setup can help you to track down an administrator who is accidentally or maliciously restoring data in an unauthorized manner. diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-force-audit-policy-subcategory-settings-to-override.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-force-audit-policy-subcategory-settings-to-override.md index cc93c278b5..d4f0fd8113 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-force-audit-policy-subcategory-settings-to-override.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-force-audit-policy-subcategory-settings-to-override.md @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ There are over 40 auditing subcategories that provide precise details about acti ### Best practices -- Leave the setting enabled. This provides the ability to audit events at the category level without revising a policy. +- Leave the setting enabled. This "enabled" state helps audit events at the category level without revising a policy. ### Location @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ### Group Policy @@ -71,9 +71,9 @@ All auditing capabilities are integrated in Group Policy. You can configure, dep ### Auditing -To manage an audit policy by using subcategories without requiring a change to Group Policy, the SCENoApplyLegacyAuditPolicy registry value , prevents the application of category-level audit policy from Group Policy and from the Local Security Policy administrative tool. +To manage an audit policy by using subcategories without requiring a change to Group Policy, the SCENoApplyLegacyAuditPolicy registry value prevents the application of category-level audit policy from Group Policy and from the Local Security Policy administrative tool. -If the category level audit policy that is set here is not consistent with the events that are currently being generated, the cause might be that this registry key is set. +If the category level audit policy that is set here isn't consistent with the events that are currently being generated, the cause might be that this registry key is set. ### Command-line tools diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-shut-down-system-immediately-if-unable-to-log-security-audits.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-shut-down-system-immediately-if-unable-to-log-security-audits.md index 7cc7a09a81..867e169424 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-shut-down-system-immediately-if-unable-to-log-security-audits.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-shut-down-system-immediately-if-unable-to-log-security-audits.md @@ -27,13 +27,13 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, management practices, and securi ## Reference -The **Audit: Shut down system immediately if unable to log security audits** policy setting determines whether the system shuts down if it is unable to log security events. This policy setting is a requirement for Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC)-C2 and Common Criteria certification to prevent auditable events from occurring if the audit system is unable to log those events. Microsoft has chosen to meet this requirement by halting the system and displaying a Stop message in the case of a failure of the auditing system. Enabling this policy setting stops the system if a security audit cannot be logged for any reason. Typically, an event fails to be logged when the security audit log is full and the value of **Retention method for security log** is **Do not overwrite events (clear log manually)** or **Overwrite events by days**. +The **Audit: Shut down system immediately if unable to log security audits** policy setting determines whether the system shuts down if it's unable to log security events. This policy setting is a requirement for Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC)-C2 and Common Criteria certification to prevent auditable events from occurring if the audit system is unable to log those events. Microsoft has chosen to meet this requirement by halting the system and displaying a Stop message if there's a failure of the auditing system. Enabling this policy setting stops the system if a security audit can't be logged for any reason. Typically, an event fails to be logged when the security audit log is full and the value of **Retention method for security log** is **Do not overwrite events (clear log manually)** or **Overwrite events by days**. -With **Audit: Shut down system immediately if unable to log security audits** set to **Enabled**, if the security log is full and an existing entry cannot be overwritten, the following Stop message appears: +With **Audit: Shut down system immediately if unable to log security audits** set to **Enabled**, if the security log is full and an existing entry can't be overwritten, the following Stop message appears: **STOP: C0000244 {Audit Failed}**: An attempt to generate a security audit failed. -To recover, you must log on, archive the log (optional), clear the log, and reset this option as desired. +To recover, you must sign in, archive the log (optional), clear the log, and reset this option as desired. If the computer is unable to record events to the security log, critical evidence or important troubleshooting information might not be available for review after a security incident. @@ -67,11 +67,11 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default values for this polic ## Policy management This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage this policy. -The administrative burden of enabling this policy setting can be very high, especially if you also set the **Retention method for security log** to **Do not overwrite events (clear log manually)**. This setting turns a repudiation threat (a backup operator could deny that they backed up or restored data) into a denial-of-service threat, because a server can be forced to shut down if it is overwhelmed with logon events and other security events that are written to the security log. Additionally, because the shutdown is not graceful, it is possible that irreparable damage to the operating system, applications, or data could result. Although the NTFS file system will guarantee that the file system's integrity will be maintained during a sudden system shutdown, it cannot guarantee that every data file for every application will still be in a usable form when the system is restarted. +The administrative burden of enabling this policy setting can be high, especially if you also set the **Retention method for security log** to **Do not overwrite events (clear log manually)**. This setting turns a repudiation threat (a backup operator could deny that they backed up or restored data) into a denial-of-service threat, because a server can be forced to shut down if it's overwhelmed with sign-in events and other security events that are written to the security log. Additionally, because the shutdown isn't graceful, it's possible that irreparable damage to the operating system, applications, or data could result. Although the NTFS file system will guarantee that the file system's integrity will be maintained during a sudden system shutdown, it can't guarantee that every data file for every application will still be in a usable form when the system is restarted. ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ### Group Policy @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ Enable the **Audit: Shut down system immediately if unable to log security audit ### Potential impact -If you enable this policy setting, the administrative burden can be significant, especially if you also configure the **Retention method for the Security log** to **Do not overwrite events** (clear log manually). This configuration causes a repudiation threat (a backup operator could deny that they backed up or restored data) to become a denial of service (DoS) vulnerability because a server could be forced to shut down if it is overwhelmed with logon events and other security events that are written to the security event log. Also, because the shutdown is abrupt, it is possible that irreparable damage to the operating system, applications, or data could result. Although the NTFS file system maintains its integrity when this type of computer shutdown occurs, there is no guarantee that every data file for every application will still be in a usable form when the device restarts. +If you enable this policy setting, the administrative burden can be significant, especially if you also configure the **Retention method for the Security log** to **Do not overwrite events** (clear log manually). This configuration causes a repudiation threat (a backup operator could deny that they backed up or restored data) to become a denial of service (DoS) vulnerability because a server could be forced to shut down if it's overwhelmed with sign-in events and other security events that are written to the security event log. Also, because the shutdown is abrupt, it's possible that irreparable damage to the operating system, applications, or data could result. Although the NTFS file system maintains its integrity when this type of computer shutdown occurs, there's no guarantee that every data file for every application will still be in a usable form when the device restarts. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/bypass-traverse-checking.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/bypass-traverse-checking.md index 239a32f7b1..f41f877de5 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/bypass-traverse-checking.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/bypass-traverse-checking.md @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security ## Reference -This policy setting determines which users (or a process that acts on behalf of the user’s account) have permission to navigate an object path in the NTFS file system or in the registry without being checked for the Traverse Folder special access permission. This user right does not allow the user to list the contents of a folder. It only allows the user to traverse folders to access permitted files or subfolders. +This policy setting determines which users (or a process that acts on behalf of the user’s account) have permission to navigate an object path in the NTFS file system or in the registry without being checked for the Traverse Folder special access permission. This user right doesn't allow the user to list the contents of a folder. It only allows the user to traverse folders to access permitted files or subfolders. Constant: SeChangeNotifyPrivilege @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Constant: SeChangeNotifyPrivilege ### Best practices -1. Use access–based enumeration when you want to prevent users from seeing any folder or file to which they do not have access. +1. Use access–based enumeration when you want to prevent users from seeing any folder or file to which they don't have access. 2. Use the default settings of this policy in most cases. If you change the settings, verify your intent through testing. ### Location @@ -62,9 +62,9 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Defaul ## Policy management -Permissions to files and folders are controlled though the appropriate configuration of file system access control lists (ACLs).The ability to traverse the folder does not provide any Read or Write permissions to the user. +Permissions to files and folders are controlled through the appropriate configuration of file system access control lists (ACLs). The ability to traverse the folder doesn't provide any Read or Write permissions to the user. -A restart of the computer is not required for this policy setting to be effective. +A restart of the computer isn't required for this policy setting to be effective. Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on. @@ -85,11 +85,11 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -The default configuration for the **Bypass traverse checking** setting is to allow all users to bypass traverse checking. Permissions to files and folders are controlled though the appropriate configuration of file system access control lists (ACLs) because the ability to traverse the folder does not provide any Read or Write permissions to the user. The only scenario in which the default configuration could lead to a mishap would be if the administrator who configures permissions does not understand how this policy setting works. For example, the administrator might expect that users who are unable to access a folder are unable to access the contents of any child folders. Such a situation is unlikely, and, therefore, this vulnerability presents little risk. +The default configuration for the **Bypass traverse checking** setting is to allow all users to bypass traverse checking. Permissions to files and folders are controlled through the appropriate configuration of file system access control lists (ACLs) because the ability to traverse the folder doesn't provide any Read or Write permissions to the user. The only scenario in which the default configuration could lead to a mishap would be if the administrator who configures permissions doesn't understand how this policy setting works. For example, the administrator might expect that users who are unable to access a folder are unable to access the contents of any child folders. Such a situation is unlikely, and, therefore, this vulnerability presents little risk. ### Countermeasure -Organizations that are extremely concerned about security may want to remove the Everyone group, and perhaps the Users group, from the list of groups that have the **Bypass traverse checking** user right. Taking explicit control over traversal assignments can be an effective way to limit access to sensitive information. Access–based enumeration can also be used. If you use access–based enumeration, users cannot see any folder or file to which they do not have access. For more info about this feature, see [Access-based Enumeration](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc784710(v=ws.10)). +Organizations that are concerned about security may want to remove the Everyone group, and perhaps the Users group, from the list of groups that have the **Bypass traverse checking** user right. Taking explicit control over traversal assignments can be an effective way to limit access to sensitive information. Access–based enumeration can also be used. If you use access–based enumeration, users can't see any folder or file to which they don't have access. For more info about this feature, see [Access-based Enumeration](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc784710(v=ws.10)). ### Potential impact diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/change-the-system-time.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/change-the-system-time.md index c3d5940ecc..bd9df622f1 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/change-the-system-time.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/change-the-system-time.md @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security ## Reference -This policy setting determines which users can adjust the time on the device's internal clock. This right allows the computer user to change the date and time associated with records in the event logs, database transactions, and the file system. This right is also required by the process that performs time synchronization. This setting does not impact the user’s ability to change the time zone or other display characteristics of the system time. For info about assigning the right to change the time zone, see [Change the time zone](change-the-time-zone.md). +This policy setting determines which users can adjust the time on the device's internal clock. This right allows the computer user to change the date and time associated with records in the event logs, database transactions, and the file system. This right is also required by the process that performs time synchronization. This setting doesn't impact the user’s ability to change the time zone or other display characteristics of the system time. For info about assigning the right to change the time zone, see [Change the time zone](change-the-time-zone.md). Constant: SeSystemtimePrivilege @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Defaul This section describes features, tools and guidance to help you manage this policy. -A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to be effective. +A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to be effective. Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on. @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ Users who can change the time on a computer could cause several problems. For ex - Time stamps on event log entries could be made inaccurate - Time stamps on files and folders that are created or modified could be incorrect - Computers that belong to a domain might not be able to authenticate themselves -- Users who try to log on to the domain from devices with inaccurate time might not be able to authenticate. +- Users who try to sign in to the domain from devices with inaccurate time might not be able to authenticate. Also, because the Kerberos authentication protocol requires that the requester and authenticator have their clocks synchronized within an administrator-defined skew period, an attacker who changes a device's time may cause that computer to be unable to obtain or grant Kerberos protocol tickets. @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ The risk from these types of events is mitigated on most domain controllers, mem - All PDC emulator operations masters follow the hierarchy of domains in the selection of their inbound time partner. - The PDC emulator operations master at the root of the domain is authoritative for the organization. Therefore, we recommend that you configure this computer to synchronize with a reliable external time server. -This vulnerability becomes much more serious if an attacker is able to change the system time and then stop the Windows Time Service or reconfigure it to synchronize with a time server that is not accurate. +This vulnerability becomes much more serious if an attacker is able to change the system time and then stop the Windows Time Service or reconfigure it to synchronize with a time server that isn't accurate. ### Countermeasure @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ Restrict the **Change the system time** user right to users with a legitimate ne ### Potential impact -There should be no impact because time synchronization for most organizations should be fully automated for all computers that belong to the domain. Computers that do not belong to the domain should be configured to synchronize with an external source, such as a web service. +There should be no impact because time synchronization for most organizations should be fully automated for all computers that belong to the domain. Computers that don't belong to the domain should be configured to synchronize with an external source, such as a web service. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-a-pagefile.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-a-pagefile.md index c5a8a0a8e1..a5669229ef 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-a-pagefile.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-a-pagefile.md @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security ## Reference -Windows designates a section of the hard drive as virtual memory known as the page file, or more specifically, as pagefile.sys. It is used to supplement the computer’s Random Access Memory (RAM) to improve performance for frequently used programs and data. Although the file is hidden from browsing, you can manage it using the system settings. +Windows designates a section of the hard drive as virtual memory known as the page file, or more specifically, as pagefile.sys. It's used to supplement the computer’s Random Access Memory (RAM) to improve performance for frequently used programs and data. Although the file is hidden from browsing, you can manage it using the system settings. This policy setting determines which users can create and change the size of a page file. It determines whether users can specify a page file size for a particular drive in the **Performance Options** box located on the **Advanced** tab of the **System Properties** dialog box or through using internal application interfaces (APIs). @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values for the ## Policy management -A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to be effective. +A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to be effective. Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on. @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -Users who can change the page file size could make it extremely small or move the file to a highly fragmented storage volume, which could cause reduced device performance. +Users who can change the page file size could make it small or move the file to a highly fragmented storage volume, which could cause reduced device performance. ### Countermeasure diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-a-token-object.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-a-token-object.md index b506e0c131..718a99a7bd 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-a-token-object.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-a-token-object.md @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security This policy setting determines which accounts a process can use to create a token, and which accounts it can then use to gain access to local resources when the process uses NtCreateToken() or other token-creation APIs. -When a user logs on to the local device or connects to a remote device through a network, Windows builds the user’s access token. Then the system examines the token to determine the level of the user's privileges. When you revoke a privilege, the change is immediately recorded, but the change is not reflected in the user's access token until the next time the user logs on or connects. +When a user signs in to the local device or connects to a remote device through a network, Windows builds the user’s access token. Then the system examines the token to determine the level of the user's privileges. When you revoke a privilege, the change is immediately recorded, but the change isn't reflected in the user's access token until the next time the user logs on or connects. Constant: SeCreateTokenPrivilege @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Constant: SeCreateTokenPrivilege ### Best practices -- This user right is used internally by the operating system. Unless it is necessary, do not assign this user right to a user, group, or process other than Local System. +- This user right is used internally by the operating system. Unless it's necessary, don't assign this user right to a user, group, or process other than Local System. ### Location @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Computer Configuration\\Windows Settings\\Security Settings\\Local Policies\\Use ### Default values -This user right is used internally by the operating system. By default, it is not assigned to any user groups. +This user right is used internally by the operating system. By default, it isn't assigned to any user groups. The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Default values are also listed on the policy’s property page. @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Defaul ## Policy management -A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to be effective. +A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to be effective. Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on. @@ -86,11 +86,11 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat >**Caution:**  A user account that is given this user right has complete control over the system, and it can lead to the system being compromised. We highly recommend that you do not assign this right to any user accounts. -Windows examines a user's access token to determine the level of the user's privileges. Access tokens are built when users log on to the local device or connect to a remote device over a network. When you revoke a privilege, the change is immediately recorded, but the change is not reflected in the user's access token until the next time the user logs on or connects. Users with the ability to create or modify tokens can change the level of access for any account on a computer if they are currently logged on. They could escalate their privileges or create a DoS condition. +Windows examines a user's access token to determine the level of the user's privileges. Access tokens are built when users sign in to the local device or connect to a remote device over a network. When you revoke a privilege, the change is immediately recorded, but the change isn't reflected in the user's access token until the next time the user logs on or connects. Users with the ability to create or modify tokens can change the level of access for any account on a computer if they're currently logged on. They could escalate their privileges or create a DoS condition. ### Countermeasure -Do not assign the **Create a token object** user right to any users. Processes that require this user right should use the Local System account, which already includes it, instead of a separate user account that has this user right assigned. +Don't assign the **Create a token object** user right to any users. Processes that require this user right should use the Local System account, which already includes it, instead of a separate user account that has this user right assigned. ### Potential impact diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-global-objects.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-global-objects.md index fd0acee762..b4f0048aa0 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-global-objects.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-global-objects.md @@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security ## Reference -This policy setting determines which users can create global objects that are available to all sessions. Users can still create objects that are specific to their own session if they do not have this user right. +This policy setting determines which users can create global objects that are available to all sessions. Users can still create objects that are specific to their own session if they don't have this user right. -A global object is an object that is created to be used by any number of processes or threads, even those not started within the user’s session. Remote Desktop Services uses global objects in its processes to facilitate connections and access. +A global object is an object that can be used by any number of processes or threads, even those processes or threads not started within the user’s session. Remote Desktop Services uses global objects in its processes to facilitate connections and access. Constant: SeCreateGlobalPrivilege @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Constant: SeCreateGlobalPrivilege ### Best practices -- Do not assign any user accounts this right. +- Don't assign any user accounts this right. ### Location @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Defaul ## Policy management -A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to take effect. +A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to take effect. Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on. @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ By default, members of the **Administrators** group, the System account, and ser ### Countermeasure -When non-administrators need to access a server using Remote Desktop, add the users to the **Remote Desktop Users** group rather than assining them this user right. +When non-administrators need to access a server using Remote Desktop, add the users to the **Remote Desktop Users** group rather than assigning them this user right. ### Potential impact diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-symbolic-links.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-symbolic-links.md index d5d9820efd..3302b6c613 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-symbolic-links.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/create-symbolic-links.md @@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security ## Reference -This user right determines if users can create a symbolic link from the device they are logged on to. +This user right determines if users can create a symbolic link from the device they're logged on to. -A symbolic link is a file-system object that points to another file-system object. The object that's pointed to is called the target. Symbolic links are transparent to users. The links appear as normal files or directories, and they can be acted upon by the user or application in exactly the same manner. Symbolic links are designed to aid in migration and application compatibility with UNIX operating systems. Microsoft has implemented symbolic links to function just like UNIX links. +A symbolic link is a file-system object that points to another file-system object that is called the target. Symbolic links are transparent to users. The links appear as normal files or directories, and they can be acted upon by the user or application in exactly the same manner. Symbolic links are designed to aid in migration and application compatibility with UNIX operating systems. Microsoft has implemented symbolic links to function just like UNIX links. >**Warning:**   This privilege should only be given to trusted users. Symbolic links can expose security vulnerabilities in applications that aren't designed to handle them. Constant: SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ Constant: SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege ### Best practices -- Only trusted users should get this user right. Symbolic links can expose security vulnerabilities in applications that are not designed to handle them. +- Only trusted users should get this user right. Symbolic links can expose security vulnerabilities in applications that aren't designed to handle them. ### Location @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Defaul This section describes different features and tools available to help you manage this policy. -A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to be effective. +A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to be effective. Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on. @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ Users who have the **Create symbolic links** user right could inadvertently or m ### Countermeasure -Do not assign the **Create symbolic links** user right to standard users. Restrict this right to trusted administrators. You can use the **fsutil** command to establish a symbolic link file system setting that controls the kind of symbolic links that can be created on a computer. +Don't assign the **Create symbolic links** user right to standard users. Restrict this right to trusted administrators. You can use the **fsutil** command to establish a symbolic link file system setting that controls the kind of symbolic links that can be created on a computer. ### Potential impact diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/dcom-machine-access-restrictions-in-security-descriptor-definition-language-sddl-syntax.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/dcom-machine-access-restrictions-in-security-descriptor-definition-language-sddl-syntax.md index cfed5fd439..22eda320a1 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/dcom-machine-access-restrictions-in-security-descriptor-definition-language-sddl-syntax.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/dcom-machine-access-restrictions-in-security-descriptor-definition-language-sddl-syntax.md @@ -27,13 +27,13 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for ## Reference -This policy setting allows you to define additional computer-wide controls that govern access to all Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM)–based applications on a device. These controls restrict call, activation, or launch requests on the device. A simple way to think about these access controls is as an additional access check that is performed against a device-wide access control list (ACL) on each call, activation, or launch of any COM-based server. If the access check fails, the call, activation, or launch request is denied. (This check is in addition to any access check that is run against the server-specific ACLs.) In effect, it provides a minimum authorization standard that must be passed to access any COM-based server. This policy setting controls access permissions to cover call rights. +This policy setting allows you to define other computer-wide controls that govern access to all Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM)–based applications on a device. These controls restrict call, activation, or launch requests on the device. A simple way to think about these access controls is as an extra access check that is performed against a device-wide access control list (ACL) on each call, activation, or launch of any COM-based server. If the access check fails, the call, activation, or launch request is denied. (This check is in addition to any access check that is run against the server-specific ACLs.) In effect, it provides a minimum authorization standard that must be passed to access any COM-based server. This policy setting controls access permissions to cover call rights. These device-wide ACLs provide a way to override weak security settings that are specified by an application through the CoInitializeSecurity function or application-specific security settings. They provide a minimum security standard that must be passed, regardless of the settings of the specific server. These ACLs also provide a centralized location for an administrator to set a general authorization policy that applies to all COM-based servers on the device. -This policy setting allows you to specify an ACL in two different ways. You can type the security descriptor in SDDL, or you can grant or deny Local Access and Remote Access permissions to users and groups. We recommend that you use the built-in user interface to specify the ACL contents that you want to apply with this setting. The default ACL settings vary, depending on the version of Windows you are running. +This policy setting allows you to specify an ACL in two different ways. You can type the security descriptor in SDDL, or you can grant or deny Local Access and Remote Access permissions to users and groups. We recommend that you use the built-in user interface to specify the ACL contents that you want to apply with this setting. The default ACL settings vary, depending on the version of Windows you're running. ### Possible values @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ This policy setting allows you to specify an ACL in two different ways. You can - Blank - This represents how the local security policy deletes the policy enforcement key. This value deletes the policy and then sets it as Not defined. The Blank value is set by using the ACL editor to empty the list, and then pressing OK. + This value represents how the local security policy deletes the policy enforcement key. This value deletes the policy and then sets it as Not defined. The Blank value is set by using the ACL editor to empty the list, and then pressing OK. ### Location @@ -67,14 +67,14 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default values for this polic This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage this policy. ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ### Group Policy -The registry settings that are created as a result of enabling the **DCOM: Machine Access Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) syntax** policy setting take precedence over the previous registry settings when this policy setting was configured. The Remote Procedure Call (RPC) service checks the new registry keys in the Policies section for the computer restrictions, and these registry entries take precedence over the existing registry keys under OLE. This means that previously existing registry settings are no longer effective, and if you make changes to the existing settings, device access permissions for users are not changed. Use care in configuring the list of users and groups. +The registry settings that are created as a result of enabling the **DCOM: Machine Access Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) syntax** policy setting take precedence over the previous registry settings when this policy setting was configured. The Remote Procedure Call (RPC) service checks the new registry keys in the Policies section for the computer restrictions, and these registry entries take precedence over the existing registry keys under OLE. This precedence means that previously existing registry settings are no longer effective, and if you make changes to the existing settings, device access permissions for users aren't changed. Use care in configuring the list of users and groups. -If the administrator is denied permission to access DCOM applications due to the changes made to DCOM in the Windows operating system, the administrator can use the **DCOM: Machine Access Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) syntax** policy setting to manage DCOM access to the computer. The administrator can use this setting to specify which users and groups can access the DCOM application on the computer locally and remotely. This will restore control of the DCOM application to the administrator and users. To do this, open the **DCOM: Machine Access Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) syntax** setting, and click -**Edit Security**. Specify the users or groups you want to include and the computer access permissions for those users or groups. This defines the setting and sets the appropriate SDDL value. +If the administrator is denied permission to access DCOM applications due to the changes made to DCOM in the Windows operating system, the administrator can use the **DCOM: Machine Access Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) syntax** policy setting to manage DCOM access to the computer. The administrator can use this setting to specify which users and groups can access the DCOM application on the computer locally and remotely. This setting will restore control of the DCOM application to the administrator and users. To define this setting, open the **DCOM: Machine Access Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) syntax** setting, and click +**Edit Security**. Specify the users or groups you want to include and the computer access permissions for those users or groups. This information defines the setting and sets the appropriate SDDL value. ## Security considerations @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -Many COM applications include some security-specific code (for example, to call CoInitializeSecurity), but they use weak settings that allow unauthenticated access to the process. Administrators cannot override these settings to force stronger security in earlier versions of Windows without modifying the application. An attacker could attempt to exploit weak security in an individual application by attacking it through COM calls. +Many COM applications include some security-specific code (for example, to call CoInitializeSecurity), but they use weak settings that allow unauthenticated access to the process. Administrators can't override these settings to force stronger security in earlier versions of Windows without modifying the application. An attacker could attempt to exploit weak security in an individual application by attacking it through COM calls. Also, the COM infrastructure includes the Remote Procedure Call Services (RPCSS), a system service that runs during and after computer startup. This service manages activation of COM objects and the running object table and provides helper services to DCOM remoting. It exposes RPC interfaces that can be called remotely. Because some COM-based servers allow unauthenticated remote access, these interfaces can be called by anyone, including unauthenticated users. As a result, RPCSS can be attacked by malicious users who use remote, unauthenticated computers. @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ To protect individual COM-based applications or services, set the **DCOM: Machin ### Potential impact -Windows implements default COM ACLs when they are installed. Modifying these ACLs from the default may cause some applications or components that communicate by using DCOM to fail. If you implement a COM-based server and you override the default security settings, confirm that the application-specific call permissions that ACL assigns are the correct permissions for appropriate users. If it does not, you must change your application-specific permission ACL to provide appropriate users with activation rights so that applications and Windows components that use DCOM do not fail. +Windows implements default COM ACLs when they're installed. Modifying these ACLs from the default may cause some applications or components that communicate by using DCOM to fail. If you implement a COM-based server and you override the default security settings, confirm that the application-specific call permissions that ACL assigns are the correct permissions for appropriate users. If it doesn't, you must change your application-specific permission ACL to provide appropriate users with activation rights so that applications and Windows components that use DCOM don't fail. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/dcom-machine-launch-restrictions-in-security-descriptor-definition-language-sddl-syntax.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/dcom-machine-launch-restrictions-in-security-descriptor-definition-language-sddl-syntax.md index 7142b1773f..e5bb3b3aec 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/dcom-machine-launch-restrictions-in-security-descriptor-definition-language-sddl-syntax.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/dcom-machine-launch-restrictions-in-security-descriptor-definition-language-sddl-syntax.md @@ -27,17 +27,17 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for ## Reference -This policy setting is similar to the [DCOM: Machine Access Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) syntax](dcom-machine-access-restrictions-in-security-descriptor-definition-language-sddl-syntax.md) setting in that it allows you to define additional computer-wide controls that govern access to all DCOM–based applications on a device. However, the ACLs that are specified in this policy setting control local and remote COM launch requests (not access requests) on the device. A simple way to think about this access control is as an additional access check that is performed against a device-wide ACL on each launch of any COM-based server. If the access check fails, the call, activation, or launch request is denied. (This check is in addition to any access check that is run against the server-specific ACLs.) In effect, it provides a minimum authorization standard that must be passed to launch any COM-based server. The DCOM: Machine Access Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) syntax policy setting differs in that it provides a minimum access check that is applied to attempts to access an already launched COM-based server. +This policy setting is similar to the [DCOM: Machine Access Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) syntax](dcom-machine-access-restrictions-in-security-descriptor-definition-language-sddl-syntax.md) setting in that it allows you to define more computer-wide controls that govern access to all DCOM–based applications on a device. However, the ACLs that are specified in this policy setting control local and remote COM launch requests (not access requests) on the device. A simple way to think about this access control is as an extra access check that is performed against a device-wide ACL on each launch of any COM-based server. If the access check fails, the call, activation, or launch request is denied. (This check is in addition to any access check that is run against the server-specific ACLs.) In effect, it provides a minimum authorization standard that must be passed to launch any COM-based server. The DCOM: Machine Access Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) syntax policy setting differs in that it provides a minimum access check that is applied to attempts to access an already launched COM-based server. These device-wide ACLs provide a way to override weak security settings that are specified by an application through CoInitializeSecurity or application-specific security settings. They provide a minimum security standard that must be passed, regardless of the settings of the specific COM-based server. These ACLs provide a centralized location for an administrator to set a general authorization policy that applies to all COM-based servers. The **DCOM: Machine Launch Restrictions in the Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) syntax** setting allows you to specify an ACL in two ways. You can type the security descriptor in SDDL, or you can grant or deny Local -Access and Remote Access permissions to users and groups. We recommend that you use the built-in user interface to specify the ACL contents that you want to apply with this setting. The default ACL settings vary, depending on the version of Windows you are running. +Access and Remote Access permissions to users and groups. We recommend that you use the built-in user interface to specify the ACL contents that you want to apply with this setting. The default ACL settings vary, depending on the version of Windows you're running. ### Possible values - Blank - This represents how the local security policy deletes the policy enforcement key. This value deletes the policy and then sets it to Not defined. The Blank value is set by using the ACL editor to empty the list, and then pressing OK. + This value represents how the local security policy deletes the policy enforcement key. This value deletes the policy and then sets it to Not defined. The Blank value is set by using the ACL editor to empty the list, and then pressing OK. - *User-defined input* of the SDDL representation of the groups and privileges @@ -66,15 +66,15 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ### Group Policy The registry settings that are created as a result of this policy take precedence over the previous registry settings in this area. The Remote Procedure Call (RPC) service (RpcSs) checks the new registry keys in the Policies section for the computer restrictions; these entries take precedence over the existing registry keys under OLE. -If you are denied access to activate and launch DCOM applications due to the changes made to DCOM in the Windows operating system, this policy setting can be used to control the DCOM activation and launch to the device. +If you're denied access to activate and launch DCOM applications due to the changes made to DCOM in the Windows operating system, this policy setting can be used to control the DCOM activation and launch to the device. -You can specify which users and groups can launch and activate DCOM applications on the device locally and remotely by using the **DCOM: Machine Launch Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) syntax** policy setting. This restores control of the DCOM application to the administrator and specified users. To do this, open the **DCOM: Machine Launch Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) syntax** setting, and click **Edit Security**. Specify the groups that you want to include and the device launch permissions for those groups. This defines the setting and sets the appropriate SDDL value. +You can specify which users and groups can launch and activate DCOM applications on the device locally and remotely by using the **DCOM: Machine Launch Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) syntax** policy setting. This setting restores control of the DCOM application to the administrator and specified users. To define this setting, open the **DCOM: Machine Launch Restrictions in Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) syntax** setting, and click **Edit Security**. Specify the groups that you want to include and the device launch permissions for those groups. This information defines the setting and sets the appropriate SDDL value. ## Security considerations @@ -82,9 +82,9 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -Many COM applications include some security-specific code (for example, to call CoInitializeSecurity), but they use weak settings that allow unauthenticated access to the process. You cannot override these settings to force stronger security in earlier versions of Windows without modifying the application. An attacker could attempt to exploit weak security in an individual application by attacking it through COM calls. +Many COM applications include some security-specific code (for example, to call CoInitializeSecurity), but they use weak settings that allow unauthenticated access to the process. You can't override these settings to force stronger security in earlier versions of Windows without modifying the application. An attacker could attempt to exploit weak security in an individual application by attacking it through COM calls. -Also, the COM infrastructure includes the Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCSS), a system service that runs during computer startup and always runs after that. This service manages activation of COM objects and the running object table and provides helper services to DCOM remoting. It exposes RPC interfaces that can be called remotely. Because some COM-based servers allow unauthenticated remote component activation, these interfaces can be called by anyone, including unauthenticated users. As a result, RPCSS can be attacked by malicious users using remote, unauthenticated computers. +Also, the COM infrastructure includes the Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCSS), a system service that runs during computer startup and always runs after the startup. This service manages activation of COM objects and the running object table and provides helper services to DCOM remoting. It exposes RPC interfaces that can be called remotely. Because some COM-based servers allow unauthenticated remote component activation, these interfaces can be called by anyone, including unauthenticated users. As a result, RPCSS can be attacked by malicious users using remote, unauthenticated computers. ### Countermeasure @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ To protect individual COM-based applications or services, set this policy settin ### Potential impact -Windows implements default COM ACLs when they are installed. Modifying these ACLs from the default may cause some applications or components that communicate by using DCOM to fail. If you implement a COM-based server and you override the default security settings, confirm that the application-specific launch permissions ACL assigns include activation permissions to appropriate users. If it does not, you must change your application-specific launch permission ACL to provide appropriate users with activation rights so that applications and Windows components that use DCOM do not fail. +Windows implements default COM ACLs when they're installed. Modifying these ACLs from the default may cause some applications or components that communicate by using DCOM to fail. If you implement a COM-based server and you override the default security settings, confirm that the application-specific launch permissions ACL assigns include activation permissions to appropriate users. If it doesn't, you must change your application-specific launch permission ACL to provide appropriate users with activation rights so that applications and Windows components that use DCOM don't fail. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-access-to-this-computer-from-the-network.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-access-to-this-computer-from-the-network.md index 269c9d78ab..4b02ab14cd 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-access-to-this-computer-from-the-network.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-access-to-this-computer-from-the-network.md @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Defaul This section describes features and tools available to help you manage this policy. -A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to be effective. +A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to be effective. This policy setting supersedes the **Access this computer from the network** policy setting if a user account is subject to both policies. @@ -87,25 +87,25 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -Users who can log on to the device over the network can enumerate lists of account names, group names, and shared resources. Users with permission to access shared folders and files can connect over the network and possibly view or modify data. +Users who can sign in to the device over the network can enumerate lists of account names, group names, and shared resources. Users with permission to access shared folders and files can connect over the network and possibly view or modify data. ### Countermeasure Assign the **Deny access to this computer from the network** user right to the following accounts: -- Anonymous logon +- Anonymous sign in - Built-in local Administrator account - Local Guest account - All service accounts -An important exception to this list is any service accounts that are used to start services that must connect to the device over the network. For example, let’s say you have configured a shared folder for web servers to access, and you present content within that folder through a website. You may need to allow the account that runs IIS to log on to the server with the shared folder from the network. This user right is particularly effective when you must configure servers and workstations on which sensitive information is handled because of regulatory compliance concerns. +An important exception to this list is any service accounts that are used to start services that must connect to the device over the network. For example, let’s say you've configured a shared folder for web servers to access, and you present content within that folder through a website. You may need to allow the account that runs IIS to sign in to the server with the shared folder from the network. This user right is effective when you must configure servers and workstations on which sensitive information is handled because of regulatory compliance concerns. > [!NOTE] > If the service account is configured in the logon properties of a Windows service, it requires network logon rights to the domain controllers to start properly. ### Potential impact -If you configure the **Deny access to this computer from the network** user right for other accounts, you could limit the abilities of users who are assigned to specific administrative roles in your environment. You should verify that delegated tasks are not negatively affected. +If you configure the **Deny access to this computer from the network** user right for other accounts, you could limit the abilities of users who are assigned to specific administrative roles in your environment. You should verify that delegated tasks aren't negatively affected. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-as-a-batch-job.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-as-a-batch-job.md index 3065d91365..a1f85a8494 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-as-a-batch-job.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-as-a-batch-job.md @@ -27,8 +27,7 @@ This article describes the recommended practices, location, values, policy manag ## Reference -This policy setting determines which accounts are prevented from logging on by using a batch-queue tool to schedule and start jobs automatically in the future. The ability to log on by using a batch-queue tool is needed for any account that is used to start scheduled jobs by means of the Task -Scheduler. +This policy setting determines which accounts are prevented from logging on by using a batch-queue tool to schedule and start jobs automatically in the future. The ability to sign in by using a batch-queue tool is needed for any account that is used to start scheduled jobs with the Task Scheduler. Constant: SeDenyBatchLogonRight diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-as-a-service.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-as-a-service.md index 3b48755935..6085f264bd 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-as-a-service.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-as-a-service.md @@ -89,12 +89,12 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -Accounts that can log on to a service application could be used to configure and start new unauthorized services, such as a keylogger or other malware. The benefit of the specified countermeasure is somewhat reduced by the fact that only users with administrative rights can install and configure +Accounts that can sign in to a service application could be used to configure and start new unauthorized services, such as a keylogger or other malware. The benefit of the specified countermeasure is reduced by the fact that only users with administrative rights can install and configure services, and an attacker who already has that level of access could configure the service to run by using the System account. ### Countermeasure -We recommend that you don't assign the **Deny log on as a service** user right to any accounts. This configuration is the default. Organizations that have strong concerns about security might assign this user right to groups and accounts when they're certain that they'll never need to log on to a service application. +We recommend that you don't assign the **Deny log on as a service** user right to any accounts. This configuration is the default. Organizations that have strong concerns about security might assign this user right to groups and accounts when they're certain that they'll never need to sign in to a service application. ### Potential impact diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-locally.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-locally.md index e3663ffda4..7363da3bbc 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-locally.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-locally.md @@ -62,11 +62,11 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values for the This section describes features, tools, and guidance to help you manage this policy. -A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to be effective. +A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to be effective. Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on. -If you apply this policy setting to the Everyone group, no one will be able to log on locally. +If you apply this policy setting to the Everyone group, no one will be able to sign in locally. ### Group Policy @@ -87,15 +87,15 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -Any account with the ability to log on locally could be used to log on at the console of the device. If this user right is not restricted to legitimate users who must log on to the console of the device, unauthorized users might download and run malicious software that elevates their user rights. +Any account with the ability to sign in locally could be used to sign in at the console of the device. If this user right isn't restricted to legitimate users who must sign in to the console of the device, unauthorized users might download and run malicious software that elevates their user rights. ### Countermeasure -Assign the **Deny log on locally** user right to the local Guest account. If you have installed optional components such as ASP.NET, you may want to assign this user right to additional accounts that are required by those components. +Assign the **Deny log on locally** user right to the local Guest account. If you have installed optional components such as ASP.NET, you may want to assign this user right to other accounts that are required by those components. ### Potential impact -If you assign the **Deny log on locally** user right to additional accounts, you could limit the abilities of users who are assigned to specific roles in your environment. However, this user right should explicitly be assigned to the ASPNET account on device that are configured with the Web Server role. You should confirm that delegated activities are not adversely affected. +If you assign the **Deny log on locally** user right to other accounts, you could limit the abilities of users who are assigned to specific roles in your environment. However, this user right should explicitly be assigned to the ASPNET account on devices that are configured with the Web Server role. You should confirm that delegated activities aren't adversely affected. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-through-remote-desktop-services.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-through-remote-desktop-services.md index ea9ba0f63a..288922a996 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-through-remote-desktop-services.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/deny-log-on-through-remote-desktop-services.md @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security ## Reference -This policy setting determines which users are prevented from logging on to the device through a Remote Desktop connection through Remote Desktop Services. It is possible for a user to establish a Remote Desktop connection to a particular server, but not be able to log on to the console of that server. +This policy setting determines which users are prevented from logging on to the device through a Remote Desktop connection through Remote Desktop Services. It's possible for a user to establish a Remote Desktop connection to a particular server, but not be able to sign in to the console of that server. Constant: SeDenyRemoteInteractiveLogonRight @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ Constant: SeDenyRemoteInteractiveLogonRight ### Best practices -- To control who can open a Remote Desktop connection and log on to the device, add the user account to or remove user accounts from the Remote Desktop Users group. +- To control who can open a Remote Desktop connection and sign in to the device, add the user account to or remove user accounts from the Remote Desktop Users group. ### Location @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values for the This section describes features, tools, and guidance to help you manage this policy. -A restart of the computer is not required for this policy setting to be effective. +A restart of the computer isn't required for this policy setting to be effective. Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on. @@ -86,15 +86,15 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -Any account with the right to log on through Remote Desktop Services could be used to log on to the remote console of the device. If this user right is not restricted to legitimate users who need to log on to the console of the computer, malicious users might download and run software that elevates their user rights. +Any account with the right to sign in through Remote Desktop Services could be used to sign in to the remote console of the device. If this user right isn't restricted to legitimate users who need to sign in to the console of the computer, malicious users might download and run software that elevates their user rights. ### Countermeasure -Assign the **Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services** user right to the built-in local guest account and all service accounts. If you have installed optional components, such as ASP.NET, you may want to assign this user right to additional accounts that are required by those components. +Assign the **Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services** user right to the built-in local guest account and all service accounts. If you have installed optional components, such as ASP.NET, you may want to assign this user right to other accounts that are required by those components. ### Potential impact -If you assign the **Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services** user right to other groups, you could limit the abilities of users who are assigned to specific administrative roles in your environment. Accounts that have this user right cannot connect to the device through Remote Desktop Services or Remote Assistance. You should confirm that delegated tasks are not negatively affected. +If you assign the **Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services** user right to other groups, you could limit the abilities of users who are assigned to specific administrative roles in your environment. Accounts that have this user right can't connect to the device through Remote Desktop Services or Remote Assistance. You should confirm that delegated tasks aren't negatively affected. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-allow-undock-without-having-to-log-on.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-allow-undock-without-having-to-log-on.md index 6f6a4ddb5f..c0aaf647df 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-allow-undock-without-having-to-log-on.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-allow-undock-without-having-to-log-on.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- title: Devices Allow undock without having to log on (Windows 10) -description: Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for the Devices Allow undock without having to log on security policy setting. +description: Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for the Devices Allow undock without having to sign in security policy setting. ms.assetid: 1d403f5d-ad41-4bb4-9f4a-0779c1c14b8c ms.reviewer: ms.author: dansimp @@ -27,11 +27,11 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for ## Reference -This policy setting enables or disables the ability of a user to remove a portable device from a docking station without logging on. If you enable this policy setting, users can press a docked portable device's physical eject button to safely undock the device. If you disable this policy setting, the user must log on to receive permission to undock the device. Only users who have the **Remove Computer from Docking Station** privilege can obtain this permission. +This policy setting enables or disables the ability of a user to remove a portable device from a docking station without logging on. If you enable this policy setting, users can press a docked portable device's physical eject button to safely undock the device. If you disable this policy setting, the user must sign in to receive permission to undock the device. Only users who have the **Remove Computer from Docking Station** privilege can obtain this permission. >**Note:**  Disabling this policy setting only reduces theft risk for portable devices that cannot be mechanically undocked. Devices that can be mechanically undocked can be physically removed by the user whether or not they use the Windows undocking functionality. -Enabling this policy setting means that anyone with physical access to a device that has been placed in its docking station can remove the computer and possibly tamper with it. For devices that do not have docking stations, this policy setting has no impact. However, for users with a mobile computer that is normally docked while they are in the office, this policy setting will help lower the risk of equipment theft or a malicious user gaining physical access to these devices +Enabling this policy setting means that anyone with physical access to a device that has been placed in its docking station can remove the computer and possibly tamper with it. For devices that don't have docking stations, this policy setting has no impact. However, for users with a mobile computer that is normally docked while they are in the office, this policy setting will help lower the risk of equipment theft or a malicious user gaining physical access to these devices ### Possible values @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ Enabling this policy setting means that anyone with physical access to a device ### Best practices -It is advisable to disable the **Devices: Allow undock without having to log on** policy setting. Users who have docked their devices will have to log on to the local console before they can undock their systems. +It's advisable to disable the **Devices: Allow undock without having to log on** policy setting. Users who have docked their devices will have to sign in to the local console before they can undock their systems. ### Location @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ## Security considerations @@ -79,9 +79,10 @@ If this policy setting is enabled, anyone with physical access to portable compu ### Countermeasure Disable the **Devices: Allow undock without having to log on** setting. + ### Potential impact -Users who have docked their device must log on to the local console before they can undock their computers. For devices that do not have docking stations, this policy setting has no impact. +Users who have docked their device must sign in to the local console before they can undock their computers. For devices that don't have docking stations, this policy setting has no impact. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-allowed-to-format-and-eject-removable-media.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-allowed-to-format-and-eject-removable-media.md index fccacdc413..3acbde1af2 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-allowed-to-format-and-eject-removable-media.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-allowed-to-format-and-eject-removable-media.md @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Users can move removable disks to a different device where they have administrat ### Best practices -- It is advisable to set **Allowed to format and eject removable media** to **Administrators**. Only administrators will be able to eject NTFS-formatted removable media. +- It's advisable to set **Allowed to format and eject removable media** to **Administrators**. Only administrators will be able to eject NTFS-formatted removable media. ### Location @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ## Security considerations diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-prevent-users-from-installing-printer-drivers.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-prevent-users-from-installing-printer-drivers.md index 5b2bfdf5aa..baf3de195a 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-prevent-users-from-installing-printer-drivers.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-prevent-users-from-installing-printer-drivers.md @@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for For a device to print to a network printer, the driver for that network printer must be installed locally. The **Devices: Prevent users from installing printer drivers** policy setting determines who can install a printer driver as part of adding a network printer. When you set the value to **Enabled**, only Administrators and Power Users can install a printer driver as part of adding a network printer. Setting the value to **Disabled** allows any user to install a printer driver as part of adding a network printer. This setting prevents unprivileged users from downloading and installing an untrusted printer driver. -This setting has no impact if you have configured a trusted path for downloading drivers. When using trusted paths, the print subsystem attempts to use the trusted path to download the driver. If the trusted path download succeeds, the driver is installed on behalf of any user. If the trusted path download fails, the driver is not installed and the network printer is not added. +This setting has no impact if you've configured a trusted path for downloading drivers. If trusted paths are being used, the print subsystem attempts to use the trusted path to download the driver. If the trusted path download succeeds, the driver is installed on behalf of any user. If the trusted path download fails, the driver isn't installed and the network printer isn't added. -Although it might be appropriate in some organizations to allow users to install printer drivers on their own workstations, this is not suitable for servers. Installing a printer driver on a server can cause the system to become less stable. Only administrators should have this user right on servers. A malicious user might deliberately try to damage the system by installing inappropriate printer drivers. +Although it might be appropriate in some organizations to allow users to install printer drivers on their own workstations, this idea isn't suitable for servers. Installing a printer driver on a server can cause the system to become less stable. Only administrators should have this user right on servers. A malicious user might deliberately try to damage the system by installing inappropriate printer drivers. ### Possible values @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ Although it might be appropriate in some organizations to allow users to install ### Best practices -- It is advisable to set **Devices: Prevent users from installing printer drivers** to Enabled. Only users in the Administrative, Power User, or Server Operator groups will be able to install printers on servers. If this policy setting is enabled, but the driver for a network printer already exists on the local computer, users can still add the network printer. This policy setting does not affect a user's ability to add a local printer. +- It's advisable to set **Devices: Prevent users from installing printer drivers** to Enabled. Only users in the Administrative, Power User, or Server Operator groups will be able to install printers on servers. If this policy setting is enabled, but the driver for a network printer already exists on the local computer, users can still add the network printer. This policy setting doesn't affect a user's ability to add a local printer. > [!NOTE] > After applying the [July 6, 2021 updates](https://support.microsoft.com/topic/kb5005010-restricting-installation-of-new-printer-drivers-after-applying-the-july-6-2021-updates-31b91c02-05bc-4ada-a7ea-183b129578a7), non-administrators, including delegated admin groups like printer operators, cannot install signed and unsigned printer drivers to a print server. By default, only administrators can install both signed and unsigned printer drivers to a print server. @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ## Security considerations diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-restrict-cd-rom-access-to-locally-logged-on-user-only.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-restrict-cd-rom-access-to-locally-logged-on-user-only.md index 1bc52f9b73..18e750e462 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-restrict-cd-rom-access-to-locally-logged-on-user-only.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-restrict-cd-rom-access-to-locally-logged-on-user-only.md @@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for This policy setting determines whether a CD is accessible to local and remote users simultaneously. If you enable this policy setting, only the interactively logged-on user is allowed to access removable CDs. If this policy setting is enabled and no one is logged on interactively, the CD can be accessed over the network. -The security benefit of enabling this policy setting is small because it only prevents network users from accessing the drive when someone is logged on to the local console of the system at the same time. Additionally, CD drives are not automatically made available as network shared drives; you must deliberately choose to share the drive. This is important when administrators are installing software or copying data from a CD-ROM, and they do not want network users to be able to execute the applications or view the data. +The security benefit of enabling this policy setting is small because it only prevents network users from accessing the drive when someone is logged on to the local console of the system at the same time. Additionally, CD drives aren't automatically made available as network shared drives; you must deliberately choose to share the drive. This setting to share is important when administrators are installing software or copying data from a CD-ROM, and they don't want network users to be able to execute the applications or view the data. -If this policy setting is enabled, users who connect to the server over the network will not be able to use any CD drives that are installed on the server when anyone is logged on to the local console of the server. Enabling this policy setting is not suitable for a system that serves as a CD jukebox for network users. +If this policy setting is enabled, users who connect to the server over the network won't be able to use any CD drives that are installed on the server when anyone is logged on to the local console of the server. Enabling this policy setting isn't suitable for a system that serves as a CD jukebox for network users. ### Possible values @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ## Security considerations @@ -75,14 +75,14 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -A remote user could potentially access a mounted CD that contains sensitive information. This risk is small because CD drives are not automatically made available as shared drives; you must deliberately choose to share the drive. However, you can deny network users the ability to view data or run +A remote user could potentially access a mounted CD that contains sensitive information. This risk is small because CD drives aren't automatically made available as shared drives; you must deliberately choose to share the drive. However, you can deny network users the ability to view data or run applications from removable media on the server. ### Countermeasure Enable the **Devices: Restrict CD-ROM drive access to locally logged-on user only** setting. ### Potential impact -Users who connect to the server over the network cannot use any CD drives that are installed on the server when anyone is logged on to the local console of the server. System tools that require access to the CD drive will fail. For example, the Volume Shadow Copy service attempts to access all CD and floppy disk drives that are present on the computer when it initializes, and if the service cannot access one of these drives, it fails. This condition causes the Windows Backup tool to fail if volume shadow copies were specified for the backup job. Any non-Microsoft backup products that use volume shadow copies also fail. This policy setting would not be suitable for a computer that serves as a CD jukebox for network users. +Users who connect to the server over the network can't use any CD drives that are installed on the server when anyone is logged on to the local console of the server. System tools that require access to the CD drive will fail. For example, the Volume Shadow Copy service attempts to access all CD and floppy disk drives that are present on the computer when it initializes, and if the service can't access one of these drives, it fails. This condition causes the Windows Backup tool to fail if volume shadow copies were specified for the backup job. Any non-Microsoft backup products that use volume shadow copies also fail. This policy setting wouldn't be suitable for a computer that serves as a CD jukebox for network users. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-restrict-floppy-access-to-locally-logged-on-user-only.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-restrict-floppy-access-to-locally-logged-on-user-only.md index 2591b45b42..cd1c68ffef 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-restrict-floppy-access-to-locally-logged-on-user-only.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/devices-restrict-floppy-access-to-locally-logged-on-user-only.md @@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for This policy setting determines whether removable floppy disks are accessible to local and remote users simultaneously. Enabling this policy setting allows only the interactively logged-on user to access removable floppy disks. If this policy setting is enabled and no one is logged on interactively, the floppy disk can be accessed over the network. -The security benefit of enabling this policy setting is small because it only prevents network users from accessing the floppy disk drive when someone is logged on to the local console of the system at the same time. Additionally, floppy disk drives are not automatically made available as network shared drives; you must deliberately choose to share the drive. This becomes important when you are installing software or copying data from a floppy disk and they do not want network users to be able to execute the applications or view the data. +The security benefit of enabling this policy setting is small because it only prevents network users from accessing the floppy disk drive when someone is logged on to the local console of the system at the same time. Additionally, floppy disk drives aren't automatically made available as network shared drives; you must deliberately choose to share the drive. This setting to share becomes important when you're installing software or copying data from a floppy disk and they don't want network users to be able to execute the applications or view the data. -If this policy setting is enabled, users who connect to the server over the network will not be able to use any floppy disk drives that are installed on the server when anyone is logged on to the local console of the server. +If this policy setting is enabled, users who connect to the server over the network won't be able to use any floppy disk drives that are installed on the server when anyone is logged on to the local console of the server. ### Possible values @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ## Security considerations @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -A remote user could potentially access a mounted floppy disk that contains sensitive information. This risk is small because floppy disk drives are not automatically shared; administrators must deliberately choose to share the drive. However, you can deny network users the ability to view data or run applications from removable media on the server. +A remote user could potentially access a mounted floppy disk that contains sensitive information. This risk is small because floppy disk drives aren't automatically shared; administrators must deliberately choose to share the drive. However, you can deny network users the ability to view data or run applications from removable media on the server. ### Countermeasure @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ Enable the **Devices: Restrict floppy access to locally logged-on user only** se ### Potential impact -Users who connect to the server over the network cannot use any floppy disk drives that are installed on the device when anyone is logged on to the local console of the server. System tools that require access to floppy disk drives fail. For example, the Volume Shadow Copy service attempts to access all CD-ROM and floppy disk drives that are present on the computer when it initializes, and if the service cannot access one of these drives, it fails. This condition causes the Windows Backup tool to fail if volume shadow copies were specified for the backup job. Any non-Microsoft backup products that use volume shadow copies also fail. +Users who connect to the server over the network can't use any floppy disk drives that are installed on the device when anyone is logged on to the local console of the server. System tools that require access to floppy disk drives fail. For example, the Volume Shadow Copy service attempts to access all CD-ROM and floppy disk drives that are present on the computer when it initializes, and if the service can't access one of these drives, it fails. This condition causes the Windows Backup tool to fail if volume shadow copies were specified for the backup job. Any non-Microsoft backup products that use volume shadow copies also fail. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-controller-allow-server-operators-to-schedule-tasks.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-controller-allow-server-operators-to-schedule-tasks.md index 4d00465fda..e3159ed429 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-controller-allow-server-operators-to-schedule-tasks.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-controller-allow-server-operators-to-schedule-tasks.md @@ -31,9 +31,9 @@ This policy setting determines whether server operators can use the **at** comma >**Note:**  This security option setting affects only the scheduler tool for the **at** command. It does not affect the Task Scheduler tool. -Enabling this policy setting means jobs that are created by server operators through the **at** command will be executed in the context of the account that is running that service—by default, that is the Local System account. This means that server operators can perform tasks that the Local System account is able to do, but server operators would normally not be able to do, such as add their account to the local Administrators group. +Enabling this policy setting means jobs that are created by server operators through the **at** command will be executed in the context of the account that is running that service—by default, that is, the Local System account. This synchronization with the local account means that server operators can perform tasks that the Local System account is able to do, but server operators would normally not be able to do, such as add their account to the local Administrators group. -The impact of enabling this policy setting should be small for most organizations. Users, including those in the Server Operators group, will still be able to create jobs by using the Task Scheduler Wizard, but those jobs will run in the context of the account that the user authenticates with when setting up the job. +The impact of enabling this policy setting should be small for most organizations. Users, including those users in the Server Operators group, will still be able to create jobs by using the Task Scheduler Wizard, but those jobs will run in the context of the account that the user authenticates with when setting up the job. ### Possible values @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ### Command-line tools @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ Disable the **Domain controller: Allow server operators to schedule tasks** sett ### Potential impact -The impact should be small for most organizations. Users (including those in the Server Operators group) can still create jobs by means of the Task Scheduler snap-in. However, those jobs run in the context of the account that the user authenticates with when setting up the job. +The impact should be small for most organizations. Users (including those users in the Server Operators group) can still create jobs through the Task Scheduler snap-in. However, those jobs run in the context of the account that the user authenticates with when setting up the job. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-controller-ldap-server-signing-requirements.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-controller-ldap-server-signing-requirements.md index 3c4bd32092..d9e51b120c 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-controller-ldap-server-signing-requirements.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-controller-ldap-server-signing-requirements.md @@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ This article describes the best practices, location, values, and security consid This policy setting determines whether the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) server requires LDAP clients to negotiate data signing. -Unsigned network traffic is susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks, where an intruder captures packets between the server and the client device and modifies them before forwarding them to the client device. In the case of an LDAP server, a malicious user can cause a client device to make decisions based on false records from the LDAP directory. You can lower this risk in a corporate network by implementing strong physical security measures to protect the network infrastructure. Furthermore, implementing Internet Protocol security (IPsec) Authentication Header mode, which provides mutual authentication and packet integrity for IP traffic, can make all types of man-in-the-middle attacks difficult. +Unsigned network traffic is susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks, where an intruder captures packets between the server and the client device and modifies them before forwarding them to the client device. In the example of an LDAP server, a malicious user can cause a client device to make decisions based on false records from the LDAP directory. You can lower this risk in a corporate network by implementing strong physical security measures to protect the network infrastructure. Furthermore, implementing Internet Protocol security (IPsec) Authentication Header mode, which provides mutual authentication and packet integrity for IP traffic, can make all types of man-in-the-middle attacks difficult. -This setting does not have any impact on LDAP simple bind through SSL (LDAP TCP/636). +This setting doesn't have any impact on LDAP simple bind through SSL (LDAP TCP/636). If signing is required, then LDAP simple binds not using SSL are rejected (LDAP TCP/389). @@ -39,13 +39,13 @@ If signing is required, then LDAP simple binds not using SSL are rejected (LDAP ### Possible values -- None. Data signatures are not required to bind with the server. If the client computer requests data signing, the server supports it. +- None. Data signatures aren't required to bind with the server. If the client computer requests data signing, the server supports it. - Require signature. The LDAP data-signing option must be negotiated unless Transport Layer Security/Secure Sockets Layer (TLS/SSL) is in use. - Not defined. ### Best practices -- We recommend that you set **Domain controller: LDAP server signing requirements** to **Require signature**. Clients that do not support LDAP signing will be unable to execute LDAP queries against the domain controllers. +- We recommend that you set **Domain controller: LDAP server signing requirements** to **Require signature**. Clients that don't support LDAP signing will be unable to execute LDAP queries against the domain controllers. ### Location @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ## Security considerations @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -Unsigned network traffic is susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks. In such attacks, an intruder captures packets between the server and the client device, modifies them, and then forwards them to the client device. Where LDAP servers are concerned, an attacker could cause a client device to make decisions that are based on false records from the LDAP directory. To lower the risk of such an intrusion in an organization's network, you can implement strong physical security measures to protect the network infrastructure. You could also implement Internet Protocol security (IPsec) Authentication Header mode, which performs mutual authentication and packet integrity for IP traffic to make all types of man-in-the-middle attacks difficult. +Unsigned network traffic is susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks. In such attacks, an intruder captures packets between the server and the client device, modifies them, and then forwards them to the client device. Regarding LDAP servers, an attacker could cause a client device to make decisions that are based on false records from the LDAP directory. To lower the risk of such an intrusion in an organization's network, you can implement strong physical security measures to protect the network infrastructure. You could also implement Internet Protocol security (IPsec) Authentication Header mode, which performs mutual authentication and packet integrity for IP traffic to make all types of man-in-the-middle attacks difficult. ### Countermeasure @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ Configure the **Domain controller: LDAP server signing requirements** setting to ### Potential impact -Client devices that do not support LDAP signing cannot run LDAP queries against the domain controllers. +Client devices that don't support LDAP signing can't run LDAP queries against the domain controllers. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-controller-refuse-machine-account-password-changes.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-controller-refuse-machine-account-password-changes.md index d0b2f91db5..4b6f851944 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-controller-refuse-machine-account-password-changes.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-controller-refuse-machine-account-password-changes.md @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ This policy setting enables or disables blocking a domain controller from accept ### Possible values -- **Enabled** When enabled, this setting does not allow a domain controller to accept any changes to a machine account's password. +- **Enabled** When enabled, this setting doesn't allow a domain controller to accept any changes to a machine account's password. - **Disabled** When disabled, this setting allows a domain controller to accept any changes to a machine account's password. @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ This policy setting enables or disables blocking a domain controller from accept ### Best practices -- Enabling this policy setting on all domain controllers in a domain prevents domain members from changing their machine account passwords. This, in turn, leaves those passwords susceptible to attack. Make sure that this conforms to your overall security policy for the domain. +- Enabling this policy setting on all domain controllers in a domain prevents domain members from changing their machine account passwords. This prevention, in turn, leaves those passwords susceptible to attack. Ensure that this setting conforms to your overall security policy for the domain. ### Location @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ## Security considerations @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -If you enable this policy setting on all domain controllers in a domain, domain members cannot change their machine account passwords, and those passwords are more susceptible to attack. +If you enable this policy setting on all domain controllers in a domain, domain members can't change their machine account passwords, and those passwords are more susceptible to attack. ### Countermeasure @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ Disable the **Domain controller: Refuse machine account password changes** setti ### Potential impact -None. This is the default configuration. +None. This non-impact state is the default configuration. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-digitally-encrypt-or-sign-secure-channel-data-always.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-digitally-encrypt-or-sign-secure-channel-data-always.md index c48680bf77..f5fe43b200 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-digitally-encrypt-or-sign-secure-channel-data-always.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-digitally-encrypt-or-sign-secure-channel-data-always.md @@ -27,30 +27,29 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for ## Reference -This setting determines whether all secure channel traffic that is initiated by the domain member meets minimum security requirements. Specifically, it determines whether all secure channel traffic that is initiated by the domain member must be signed or encrypted. Logon information that is -transmitted over the secure channel is always encrypted regardless of whether the encryption of all other secure channel traffic is negotiated. +This setting determines whether all secure channel traffic that is initiated by the domain member meets minimum security requirements. Specifically, it determines whether all secure channel traffic that is initiated by the domain member must be signed or encrypted. Sign-in information that is transmitted over the secure channel is always encrypted regardless of whether the encryption of all other secure channel traffic is negotiated. -The following policy settings determine whether a secure channel can be established with a domain controller that is not capable of signing or encrypting secure channel traffic: +The following policy settings determine whether a secure channel can be established with a domain controller that isn't capable of signing or encrypting secure channel traffic: - Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always) - [Domain member: Digitally encrypt secure channel data (when possible)](domain-member-digitally-encrypt-secure-channel-data-when-possible.md) - [Domain member: Digitally sign secure channel data (when possible)](domain-member-digitally-sign-secure-channel-data-when-possible.md) -Setting **Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)** to **Enabled** prevents establishing a secure channel with any domain controller that cannot sign or encrypt all secure channel data. +Setting **Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)** to **Enabled** prevents establishing a secure channel with any domain controller that can't sign or encrypt all secure channel data. -To protect authentication traffic from man-in-the-middle, replay, and other types of network attacks, Windows-based computers create a communication channel through NetLogon called secure channels. These channels authenticate machine accounts. They also authenticate user accounts when a remote user connects to a network resource and the user account exists in a trusted domain. This is called pass-through authentication, and it allows a device running Windows that has joined a domain to have access to the user account database in its domain and in any trusted domains. +To protect authentication traffic from man-in-the-middle, replay, and other types of network attacks, Windows-based computers create a communication channel through NetLogon called secure channels. These channels authenticate machine accounts. They also authenticate user accounts when a remote user connects to a network resource and the user account exists in a trusted domain. This authentication is called pass-through authentication, and it allows a device running Windows that has joined a domain to have access to the user account database in its domain and in any trusted domains. To enable the **Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)** policy setting on a member workstation or server, all domain controllers in the domain that the member belongs to must be capable of signing or encrypting all secure-channel data. Enabling the **Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)** policy setting automatically enables the [Domain member: Digitally sign secure channel data (when possible)](domain-member-digitally-sign-secure-channel-data-when-possible.md) policy setting. -When a device joins a domain, a machine account is created. After joining the domain, the device uses the password for that account to create a secure channel with the domain controller for its domain every time it restarts. This secure channel is used to perform operations such as NTLM pass-through authentication and LSA SID/name Lookup. Requests that are sent on the secure channel are authenticated—and sensitive information such as passwords are encrypted—but the integrity of the channel is not checked, and not all information is encrypted. If a system is set to always encrypt or sign secure channel data, a secure channel cannot be established with a domain controller that is not capable of signing or encrypting all secure channel traffic. If the computer is configured to encrypt or sign secure channel data when possible, a secure channel can be established, but the level of encryption and signing is negotiated. +When a device joins a domain, a machine account is created. After being connected to the domain, the device uses the password for that account to create a secure channel with the domain controller for its domain every time it restarts. This secure channel is used to perform operations such as NTLM pass-through authentication and LSA SID/name Lookup. Requests that are sent on the secure channel are authenticated—and sensitive information such as passwords are encrypted—but the integrity of the channel isn't checked, and not all information is encrypted. If a system is set to always encrypt or sign secure channel data, a secure channel can't be established with a domain controller that isn't capable of signing or encrypting all secure channel traffic. If the computer is configured to encrypt or sign secure channel data when possible, a secure channel can be established, but the level of encryption and signing is negotiated. ### Possible values - Enabled - The policy [Domain member: Digitally sign secure channel data (when possible)](domain-member-digitally-sign-secure-channel-data-when-possible.md) is assumed to be enabled regardless of its current setting. This ensures that the domain member attempts to negotiate at least signing of the secure + The policy [Domain member: Digitally sign secure channel data (when possible)](domain-member-digitally-sign-secure-channel-data-when-possible.md) is assumed to be enabled regardless of its current setting. This enablement ensures that the domain member attempts to negotiate at least signing of the secure channel traffic. - Disabled @@ -92,7 +91,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ### Group Policy @@ -104,8 +103,8 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -When a device joins a domain, a machine account is created. After it joins the domain, the device uses the password for that account to create a secure channel with the domain controller for its domain every time it restarts. Requests that are sent on the secure channel are authenticated—and -sensitive information such as passwords are encrypted—but the channel is not integrity-checked, and not all information is encrypted. If a device is configured to always encrypt or sign secure channel data but the domain controller cannot sign or encrypt any portion of the secure channel data, the computer and domain controller cannot establish a secure channel. If the device is configured to encrypt or sign secure channel data, when possible, a secure channel can be established, but the level of encryption and signing is negotiated. +When a device joins a domain, a machine account is created. After the device is joined with the domain, it uses the password for that account to create a secure channel with the domain controller for its domain every time it restarts. Requests that are sent on the secure channel are authenticated—and +sensitive information such as passwords are encrypted—but the channel isn't integrity-checked, and not all information is encrypted. If a device is configured to always encrypt or sign secure channel data but the domain controller can't sign or encrypt any portion of the secure channel data, the computer and domain controller can't establish a secure channel. If the device is configured to encrypt or sign secure channel data, when possible, a secure channel can be established, but the level of encryption and signing is negotiated. ### Countermeasure @@ -117,7 +116,7 @@ Select one of the following settings as appropriate for your environment to conf ### Potential impact -Digital encryption and signing of the secure channel is a good idea because the secure channel protects domain credentials as they are sent to the domain controller. +Digital encryption and signing of the secure channel is a good idea because the secure channel protects domain credentials as they're sent to the domain controller. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-digitally-encrypt-secure-channel-data-when-possible.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-digitally-encrypt-secure-channel-data-when-possible.md index f07984917f..920aba71a4 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-digitally-encrypt-secure-channel-data-when-possible.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-digitally-encrypt-secure-channel-data-when-possible.md @@ -27,31 +27,31 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for ## Reference -This setting determines whether all secure channel traffic that is initiated by the domain member meets minimum security requirements. Specifically, it determines whether all secure channel traffic that is initiated by the domain member must be encrypted. Logon information that is transmitted over +This setting determines whether all secure channel traffic that is initiated by the domain member meets minimum security requirements. Specifically, it determines whether all secure channel traffic that is initiated by the domain member must be encrypted. Sign-in information that is transmitted over the secure channel is always encrypted regardless of whether the encryption of all other secure channel traffic is negotiated. -In addition to this policy setting, the following policy settings determine whether a secure channel can be established with a domain controller that is not capable of signing or encrypting secure channel traffic: +In addition to this policy setting, the following policy settings determine whether a secure channel can be established with a domain controller that isn't capable of signing or encrypting secure channel traffic: - [Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)](domain-member-digitally-encrypt-or-sign-secure-channel-data-always.md) - [Domain member: Digitally sign secure channel data (when possible)](domain-member-digitally-sign-secure-channel-data-when-possible.md) -Setting **Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)** to **Enabled** prevents establishing a secure channel with any domain controller that cannot sign or encrypt all secure channel data. +Setting **Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)** to **Enabled** prevents establishing a secure channel with any domain controller that can't sign or encrypt all secure channel data. -To protect authentication traffic from man-in-the-middle, replay, and other types of network attacks, Windows-based computers create a communication channel through NetLogon called secure channels. These channels authenticate machine accounts. They also authenticate user accounts when a remote user connects to a network resource and the user account exists in a trusted domain. This is called pass-through authentication, and it allows a computer running the Windows operating system that has joined a domain to have access to the user account database in its domain and in any trusted domains. +To protect authentication traffic from man-in-the-middle, replay, and other types of network attacks, Windows-based computers create a communication channel through NetLogon called secure channels. These channels authenticate machine accounts. They also authenticate user accounts when a remote user connects to a network resource and the user account exists in a trusted domain. This authentication is called pass-through authentication, and it allows a computer running the Windows operating system that has joined a domain to have access to the user account database in its domain and in any trusted domains. Enabling the [Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)](domain-member-digitally-encrypt-or-sign-secure-channel-data-always.md) policy setting automatically enables the **Domain member: Digitally sign secure channel data (when possible)** policy setting. -When a device joins a domain, a machine account is created. After joining the domain, the device uses the password for that account to create a secure channel with the domain controller for its domain every time it restarts. This secure channel is used to perform operations such as NTLM pass through authentication and LSA SID/name Lookup. Requests that are sent on the secure channel are authenticated—and sensitive information such as passwords are encrypted—but the integrity of the channel is not checked, and not all information is encrypted. If a system is set to always encrypt or sign secure channel data, a secure channel cannot be established with a domain controller that is not capable of signing or encrypting all secure channel traffic. If the computer is configured to encrypt or sign secure channel data when possible, a secure channel can be established, but the level of encryption and signing is negotiated. +When a device joins a domain, a machine account is created. After the device is joined with the domain, it uses the password for that account to create a secure channel with the domain controller for its domain every time it restarts. This secure channel is used to perform operations such as NTLM pass through authentication and LSA SID/name Lookup. Requests that are sent on the secure channel are authenticated—and sensitive information such as passwords are encrypted—but the integrity of the channel isn't checked, and not all information is encrypted. If a system is set to always encrypt or sign secure channel data, a secure channel can't be established with a domain controller that isn't capable of signing or encrypting all secure channel traffic. If the computer is configured to encrypt or sign secure channel data when possible, a secure channel can be established, but the level of encryption and signing is negotiated. ### Possible values - Enabled - The domain member will request encryption of all secure channel traffic. If the domain controller supports encryption of all secure channel traffic, then all secure channel traffic will be encrypted. Otherwise, only logon information that is transmitted over the secure channel will be encrypted. + The domain member will request encryption of all secure channel traffic. If the domain controller supports encryption of all secure channel traffic, then all secure channel traffic will be encrypted. Otherwise, only sign-in information that is transmitted over the secure channel will be encrypted. - Disabled - The domain member will not attempt to negotiate secure channel encryption. + The domain member won't attempt to negotiate secure channel encryption. >**Note:**  If the security policy setting [Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)](domain-member-digitally-encrypt-or-sign-secure-channel-data-always.md) is enabled, this setting will be overwritten. @@ -86,11 +86,11 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ### Group Policy -Distribution of this policy through Group Policy does not override the Local Security Policy setting. +Distribution of this policy through Group Policy doesn't override the Local Security Policy setting. ## Security considerations @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -When a device joins a domain, a machine account is created. After it joins the domain, the device uses the password for that account to create a secure channel with the domain controller for its domain every time it restarts. Requests that are sent on the secure channel are authenticated—and sensitive information such as passwords are encrypted—but the channel is not integrity-checked, and not all information is encrypted. If a device is configured to always encrypt or sign secure channel data but the domain controller cannot sign or encrypt any portion of the secure channel data, the computer and domain controller cannot establish a secure channel. If the computer is configured to encrypt or sign secure channel data when possible, a secure channel can be established, but the level of encryption and signing is negotiated. +When a device joins a domain, a machine account is created. After it joins the domain, the device uses the password for that account to create a secure channel with the domain controller for its domain every time it restarts. Requests that are sent on the secure channel are authenticated—and sensitive information such as passwords are encrypted—but the channel isn't integrity-checked, and not all information is encrypted. If a device is configured to always encrypt or sign secure channel data but the domain controller can't sign or encrypt any portion of the secure channel data, the computer and domain controller can't establish a secure channel. If the computer is configured to encrypt or sign secure channel data when possible, a secure channel can be established, but the level of encryption and signing is negotiated. ### Countermeasure @@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ Select one of the following settings as appropriate for your environment to conf ### Potential impact -Digital signing of the secure channel is a good idea because it protects domain credentials as they are sent to the domain controller. +Digital signing of the secure channel is a good idea because it protects domain credentials as they're sent to the domain controller. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-digitally-sign-secure-channel-data-when-possible.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-digitally-sign-secure-channel-data-when-possible.md index b75a8767d9..2083e899a8 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-digitally-sign-secure-channel-data-when-possible.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-digitally-sign-secure-channel-data-when-possible.md @@ -27,30 +27,30 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for ## Reference -This setting determines whether all secure channel traffic that is initiated by the domain member meets minimum security requirements. Specifically, it determines whether all secure channel traffic that is initiated by the domain member must be signed. Logon information that is transmitted over the +This setting determines whether all secure channel traffic that is initiated by the domain member meets minimum security requirements. Specifically, it determines whether all secure channel traffic that is initiated by the domain member must be signed. Sign-in information that is transmitted over the secure channel is always encrypted regardless of whether the encryption of all other secure channel traffic is negotiated. -The following policy settings determine whether a secure channel can be established with a domain controller that is not capable of signing or encrypting secure channel traffic: +The following policy settings determine whether a secure channel can be established with a domain controller that isn't capable of signing or encrypting secure channel traffic: - [Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)](domain-member-digitally-encrypt-or-sign-secure-channel-data-always.md) - [Domain member: Digitally encrypt secure channel data (when possible)](domain-member-digitally-encrypt-secure-channel-data-when-possible.md) - Domain member: Digitally sign secure channel data (when possible) -Setting [Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)](domain-member-digitally-encrypt-or-sign-secure-channel-data-always.md) to **Enabled** prevents establishing a secure channel with any domain controller that cannot sign or encrypt all secure channel data. +Setting [Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)](domain-member-digitally-encrypt-or-sign-secure-channel-data-always.md) to **Enabled** prevents establishing a secure channel with any domain controller that can't sign or encrypt all secure channel data. -To protect authentication traffic from man-in-the-middle, replay, and other types of network attacks, Windows-based computers create a communication channel through NetLogon called secure channels. These channels authenticate computer accounts. They also authenticate user accounts when a remote user connects to a network resource and the user account exists in a trusted domain. This is called pass-through authentication, and it allows a computer running the Windows operating system that has joined a domain to have access to the user account database in its domain and in any trusted domains. +To protect authentication traffic from man-in-the-middle, replay, and other types of network attacks, Windows-based computers create a communication channel through NetLogon called secure channels. These channels authenticate computer accounts. They also authenticate user accounts when a remote user connects to a network resource and the user account exists in a trusted domain. This authentication is called pass-through authentication, and it allows a computer running the Windows operating system that has joined a domain to have access to the user account database in its domain and in any trusted domains. Enabling the [Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)](domain-member-digitally-encrypt-or-sign-secure-channel-data-always.md) policy setting automatically enables the **Domain member: Digitally sign secure channel data (when possible)** policy setting. -When a device joins a domain, a machine account is created. After joining the domain, the device uses the password for that account to create a secure channel with the domain controller for its domain every time it restarts. This secure channel is used to perform operations such as NTLM pass through authentication and LSA SID/name Lookup. Requests that are sent on the secure channel are authenticated—and sensitive information such as passwords are encrypted—but the integrity of the channel is not checked, and not all information is encrypted. If a system is set to always encrypt or sign secure channel data, a secure channel cannot be established with a domain controller that is not capable of signing or encrypting all secure channel traffic. If the computer is configured to encrypt or sign secure channel data when possible, a secure channel can be established, but the level of encryption and signing is negotiated. +When a device joins a domain, a machine account is created. After the device is joined with the domain, it uses the password for that account to create a secure channel with the domain controller for its domain every time it restarts. This secure channel is used to perform operations such as NTLM pass through authentication and LSA SID/name Lookup. Requests that are sent on the secure channel are authenticated—and sensitive information such as passwords are encrypted—but the integrity of the channel isn't checked, and not all information is encrypted. If a system is set to always encrypt or sign secure channel data, a secure channel can't be established with a domain controller that isn't capable of signing or encrypting all secure channel traffic. If the computer is configured to encrypt or sign secure channel data when possible, a secure channel can be established, but the level of encryption and signing is negotiated. ### Possible values - Enabled - The domain member will request signing of all secure channel traffic. If the domain controller supports signing of all secure channel traffic, then all secure channel traffic will be signed which ensures that it cannot be tampered with in transit. + The domain member will request to sign all secure channel traffic. If the domain controller supports signing of all secure channel traffic, then all secure channel traffic will be signed which ensures that it can't be tampered with in transit. - Disabled - Signing will not be negotiated unless the policy [Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)](domain-member-digitally-encrypt-or-sign-secure-channel-data-always.md) is enabled. + Signing won't be negotiated unless the policy [Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always)](domain-member-digitally-encrypt-or-sign-secure-channel-data-always.md) is enabled. - Not defined @@ -84,11 +84,11 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ### Group Policy -Distribution of this policy through Group Policy does not override the Local Security Policy setting. +Distribution of this policy through Group Policy doesn't override the Local Security Policy setting. ## Security considerations @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -When a device joins a domain, a machine account is created. After it joins the domain, the device uses the password for that account to create a secure channel with the domain controller for its domain every time it restarts. Requests that are sent on the secure channel are authenticated—and sensitive information such as passwords are encrypted—but the channel is not integrity-checked, and not all information is encrypted. If a device is configured to always encrypt or sign secure channel data but the domain controller cannot sign or encrypt any portion of the secure channel data, the computer and domain controller cannot establish a secure channel. If the computer is configured to encrypt or sign secure channel data when possible, a secure channel can be established, but the level of encryption and signing is negotiated. +When a device joins a domain, a machine account is created. After it joins the domain, the device uses the password for that account to create a secure channel with the domain controller for its domain every time it restarts. Requests that are sent on the secure channel are authenticated—and sensitive information such as passwords are encrypted—but the channel isn't integrity-checked, and not all information is encrypted. If a device is configured to always encrypt or sign secure channel data but the domain controller can't sign or encrypt any portion of the secure channel data, the computer and domain controller can't establish a secure channel. If the computer is configured to encrypt or sign secure channel data when possible, a secure channel can be established, but the level of encryption and signing is negotiated. ### Countermeasure @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ Because these policies are closely related and useful depending on your environm ### Potential impact -Digital signing of the secure channel is a good idea because the secure channel protects domain credentials as they are sent to the domain controller. +Digital signing of the secure channel is a good idea because the secure channel protects domain credentials as they're sent to the domain controller. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-disable-machine-account-password-changes.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-disable-machine-account-password-changes.md index 8c85b1ecee..6127a9b87f 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-disable-machine-account-password-changes.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-disable-machine-account-password-changes.md @@ -39,12 +39,12 @@ Verify that the **Domain member: Disable machine account password changes** opti ### Best practices -1. Do not enable this policy setting. Machine account passwords are used to establish secure channel communications between members and domain controllers and between the domain controllers within the domain. After it is established, the secure channel transmits sensitive information that is necessary for making authentication and authorization decisions. -2. Do not use this policy setting to try to support dual-boot scenarios that use the same machine account. If you want to configure dual-boot installations that are joined to the same domain, give the two installations different computer names. This policy setting was added to the Windows operating system to help organizations that stockpile pre-built computers that are put into production months later. Those devices do not have to be rejoined to the domain. -3. You may want to consider using this policy setting in specific environments, such as the following: +1. Don't enable this policy setting. Machine account passwords are used to establish secure channel communications between members and domain controllers and between the domain controllers within the domain. After it's established, the secure channel transmits sensitive information that is necessary for making authentication and authorization decisions. +2. Don't use this policy setting to try to support dual-boot scenarios that use the same machine account. If you want to configure dual-boot installations that are joined to the same domain, give the two installations different computer names. This policy setting was added to the Windows operating system to help organizations that stockpile pre-built computers that are put into production months later. Those devices don't have to be rejoined to the domain. +3. You may want to consider using this policy setting in specific environments, such as the following ones: - Non-persistent Virtual Desktop Infrastructure implementations. In such implementations, each session starts from a read-only base image. - - Embedded devices that do not have write access to the OS volume. + - Embedded devices that don't have write access to the OS volume. In either case, a password change that was made during normal operations would be lost as soon as the session ends. We strongly recommend that you plan password changes for maintenance windows. Add the password changes to the updates and modifications that Windows performs during maintenance windows. To trigger a password update on a specific OS volume, run the following command: @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ## Security considerations @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability By default, devices running Windows Server that belong to a domain automatically change their passwords for their accounts every certain number of days, typically 30. If you disable this policy setting, devices that run Windows Server retain the same passwords as their machine accounts. Devices -that cannot automatically change their account password are at risk from an attacker who could determine the password for the machine's domain account. +that can't automatically change their account password are at risk from an attacker who could determine the password for the machine's domain account. ### Countermeasure @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ Verify that the **Domain member: Disable machine account password changes** sett ### Potential impact -None. This is the default configuration. +None. This non-impact state is the default configuration. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-maximum-machine-account-password-age.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-maximum-machine-account-password-age.md index 7a5f2b3e94..7eb431cb17 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-maximum-machine-account-password-age.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-maximum-machine-account-password-age.md @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ For more information, see [Machine Account Password Process](https://techcommuni ### Best practices -We recommend that you set **Domain member: Maximum machine account password age** to about 30 days. Setting the value to fewer days can increase replication and affect domain controllers. For example, in Windows NT domains, machine passwords were changed every 7 days. The additional replication churn would affect domain controllers in large organizations that have many computers or slow links between sites. +We recommend that you set **Domain member: Maximum machine account password age** to about 30 days. Setting the value to fewer days can increase replication and affect domain controllers. For example, in Windows NT domains, machine passwords were changed every 7 days. The extra replication churn would affect domain controllers in large organizations that have many computers or slow links between sites. ### Location @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ## Security considerations @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -By default, the domain members submit a password change every 30 days. If you increase this interval significantly so that the computers no longer submit a password change, an attacker has more time to undertake a brute-force attack to guess the password of one or more computer accounts. +By default, the domain members submit a password change every 30 days. If you increase this interval so that the computers no longer submit a password change, an attacker has more time to undertake a brute-force attack to guess the password of one or more computer accounts. ### Countermeasure @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ Configure the **Domain member: Maximum machine account password age** setting to ### Potential impact -None. This is the default configuration. +None. This non-impact state is the default configuration. ## Related topics - [Security Options](security-options.md) diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-require-strong-windows-2000-or-later-session-key.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-require-strong-windows-2000-or-later-session-key.md index 24cdd01bd2..1d7f2049d2 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-require-strong-windows-2000-or-later-session-key.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/domain-member-require-strong-windows-2000-or-later-session-key.md @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for ## Reference -The **Domain member: Require strong (Windows 2000 or later) session key** policy setting determines whether a secure channel can be established with a domain controller that is not capable of encrypting secure channel traffic with a strong, 128-bit session key. Enabling this policy setting prevents establishing a secure channel with any domain controller that cannot encrypt secure channel data with a strong key. Disabling this policy setting allows 64-bit session keys. +The **Domain member: Require strong (Windows 2000 or later) session key** policy setting determines whether a secure channel can be established with a domain controller that isn't capable of encrypting secure channel traffic with a strong, 128-bit session key. Enabling this policy setting prevents establishing a secure channel with any domain controller that can't encrypt secure channel data with a strong key. Disabling this policy setting allows 64-bit session keys. Whenever possible, you should take advantage of these stronger session keys to help protect secure channel communications from eavesdropping and session-hijacking network attacks. Eavesdropping is a form of hacking in which network data is read or altered in transit. The data can be modified to hide or change the name of the sender, or it can be redirected. @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Whenever possible, you should take advantage of these stronger session keys to h - Enabled - When enabled on a member workstation or server, all domain controllers in the domain that the member belongs to must be capable of encrypting secure channel data with a strong, 128-bit key. This means that all such domain controllers must be running at least Windows 2000 Server. + When enabled on a member workstation or server, all domain controllers in the domain that the member belongs to must be capable of encrypting secure channel data with a strong, 128-bit key. This capability means that all such domain controllers must be running at least Windows 2000 Server. - Disabled @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ Whenever possible, you should take advantage of these stronger session keys to h ### Best practices -- It is advisable to set **Domain member: Require strong (Windows 2000 or later) session key** to Enabled. Enabling this policy setting ensures that all outgoing secure channel traffic will require a strong encryption key. Disabling this policy setting requires that key strength be negotiated. Only enable this option if the domain controllers in all trusted domains support strong keys. By default, this value is disabled. +- It's advisable to set **Domain member: Require strong (Windows 2000 or later) session key** to Enabled. Enabling this policy setting ensures that all outgoing secure channel traffic will require a strong encryption key. Disabling this policy setting requires that key strength be negotiated. Only enable this option if the domain controllers in all trusted domains support strong keys. By default, this value is disabled. ### Location @@ -73,13 +73,13 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ### Group Policy Misuse of this policy setting is a common error that can cause data loss or problems with data access or security. -You will you be able to join devices that do not support this policy setting to domains where the domain controllers have this policy setting enabled. +You'll you be able to join devices that don't support this policy setting to domains where the domain controllers have this policy setting enabled. ## Security considerations @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ If you enable this policy setting, all outgoing secure channel traffic requires ### Potential impact -Devices that do not support this policy setting cannot join domains in which the domain controllers have this policy setting enabled. +Devices that don't support this policy setting can't join domains in which the domain controllers have this policy setting enabled. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/enable-computer-and-user-accounts-to-be-trusted-for-delegation.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/enable-computer-and-user-accounts-to-be-trusted-for-delegation.md index d60d7b9568..464033d694 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/enable-computer-and-user-accounts-to-be-trusted-for-delegation.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/enable-computer-and-user-accounts-to-be-trusted-for-delegation.md @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security ## Reference This policy setting determines which users can set the **Trusted for Delegation** setting on a user or computer object. -Security account delegation provides the ability to connect to multiple servers, and each server change retains the authentication credentials of the original client. Delegation of authentication is a capability that client and server applications use when they have multiple tiers. It allows a public-facing service to use client credentials to authenticate to an application or database service. For this configuration to be possible, the client and the server must run under accounts that are trusted for delegation. +Security account delegation enables connection to multiple servers, and each server change retains the authentication credentials of the original client. Delegation of authentication is a capability that client and server applications use when they have multiple tiers. It allows a public-facing service to use client credentials to authenticate to an application or database service. For this configuration to be possible, the client and the server must run under accounts that are trusted for delegation. Only administrators who have the **Enable computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation** credential can set up delegation. Domain admins and Enterprise admins have this credential. The procedure to allow a user to be trusted for delegation depends on the functionality level of the domain. @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Constant: SeEnableDelegationPrivilege ### Best practices -- There is no reason to assign this user right to anyone on member servers and workstations that belong to a domain because it has no meaning in those contexts. It is only relevant on domain controllers and stand-alone devices. +- There's no reason to assign this user right to anyone on member servers and workstations that belong to a domain because it has no meaning in those contexts. It's only relevant on domain controllers and stand-alone devices. ### Location @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ This section describes features, tools and guidance to help you manage this poli Modifying this setting might affect compatibility with clients, services, and applications. -A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to be effective. +A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to be effective. Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on. @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ after a security incident. ### Countermeasure -The **Enable computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation** user right should be assigned only if there is a clear need for its functionality. When you assign this right, you should investigate the use of constrained delegation to control what the delegated accounts can do. On domain controllers, this right is assigned to the Administrators group by default. +The **Enable computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation** user right should be assigned only if there's a clear need for its functionality. When you assign this right, you should investigate the use of constrained delegation to control what the delegated accounts can do. On domain controllers, this right is assigned to the Administrators group by default. >**Note:**  There is no reason to assign this user right to anyone on member servers and workstations that belong to a domain because it has no meaning in those contexts. It is only relevant on domain controllers and stand-alone computers. diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/enforce-password-history.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/enforce-password-history.md index e32f558d6c..97d3791815 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/enforce-password-history.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/enforce-password-history.md @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security The **Enforce password history** policy setting determines the number of unique new passwords that must be associated with a user account before an old password can be reused. Password reuse is an important concern in any organization. Many users want to reuse the same password for their account over a long period of time. The longer the same password is used for a particular account, the greater the chance that an attacker will be able to determine the password through brute force attacks. If users are required to change their password, but they can reuse an old password, the effectiveness of a good password policy is greatly reduced. -Specifying a low number for **Enforce password history** allows users to continually use the same small number of passwords repeatedly. If you do not also set [Minimum password age](minimum-password-age.md), users can change their password as many times in a row as necessary to reuse their original password. +Specifying a low number for **Enforce password history** allows users to continually use the same small number of passwords repeatedly. If you don't also set [Minimum password age](minimum-password-age.md), users can change their password as many times in a row as necessary to reuse their original password. ### Possible values @@ -39,9 +39,9 @@ Specifying a low number for **Enforce password history** allows users to continu ### Best practices -- Set **Enforce password history** to 24. This will help mitigate vulnerabilities that are caused by password reuse. +- Set **Enforce password history** to 24. This setting will help mitigate vulnerabilities that are caused by password reuse. - Set [Maximum password age](maximum-password-age.md) to expire passwords between 60 and 90 days. Try to expire the passwords between major business cycles to prevent work loss. -- Configure [Minimum password age](minimum-password-age.md) so that you do not allow passwords to be changed immediately. +- Configure [Minimum password age](minimum-password-age.md) so that you don't allow passwords to be changed immediately. ### Location @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ This section describes features, tools, and guidance to help you manage this pol ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ## Security considerations @@ -74,9 +74,9 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -The longer a user uses the same password, the greater the chance that an attacker can determine the password through brute force attacks. Also, any accounts that may have been compromised remain exploitable for as long as the password is left unchanged. If password changes are required but password reuse is not prevented, or if users continually reuse a small number of passwords, the effectiveness of a good password policy is greatly reduced. +The longer a user uses the same password, the greater the chance that an attacker can determine the password through brute force attacks. Also, any accounts that may have been compromised remain exploitable for as long as the password is left unchanged. If password changes are required but password reuse isn't prevented, or if users continually reuse a few passwords, the effectiveness of a good password policy is greatly reduced. -If you specify a low number for this policy setting, users can use the same small number of passwords repeatedly. If you do not also configure the [Minimum password age](minimum-password-age.md) policy setting, users might repeatedly change their passwords until they can reuse their original password. +If you specify a low number for this policy setting, users can use the same small number of passwords repeatedly. If you don't also configure the [Minimum password age](minimum-password-age.md) policy setting, users might repeatedly change their passwords until they can reuse their original password. >**Note:**  After an account has been compromised, a simple password reset might not be enough to restrict a malicious user because the malicious user might have modified the user's environment so that the password is changed back to a known value automatically at a certain time. If an account has been compromised, it is best to delete the account and assign the user a new account after all affected systems have been restored to normal operations and verified that they are no longer compromised. @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ For this policy setting to be effective, you should also configure effective val ### Potential impact -The major impact of configuring the **Enforce password history** setting to 24 is that users must create a new password every time they are required to change their old one. If users are required to change their passwords to new unique values, there is an increased risk of users who write their passwords somewhere so that they do not forget them. Another risk is that users may create passwords that change incrementally (for example, password01, password02, and so on) to facilitate memorization, but this makes them easier for an attacker to guess. Also, an excessively low value for the [Maximum password age](maximum-password-age.md) policy setting is likely to increase administrative overhead because users who forget their passwords might ask the Help Desk to reset them frequently. +The major impact of configuring the **Enforce password history** setting to 24 is that users must create a new password every time they're required to change their old one. If users are required to change their passwords to new unique values, there's an increased risk of users who write their passwords somewhere so that they don't forget them. Another risk is that users may create passwords that change incrementally (for example, password01, password02, and so on) to facilitate memorization, but these passwords make it easier for an attacker to guess. Also, an excessively low value for the [Maximum password age](maximum-password-age.md) policy setting is likely to increase administrative overhead because users who forget their passwords might ask the Help Desk to reset them frequently. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/enforce-user-logon-restrictions.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/enforce-user-logon-restrictions.md index c1b6e0c09e..5198399434 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/enforce-user-logon-restrictions.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/enforce-user-logon-restrictions.md @@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ The possible values for this Group Policy setting are: ### Best practices -- If this policy setting is disabled, users might be granted session tickets for services that they do not have the right to use. +- If this policy setting is disabled, users might be granted session tickets for services that they don't have the right to use. - We recommend to set **Enforce user logon restrictions** to Enabled. + We recommend setting **Enforce user logon restrictions** to Enabled. ### Location @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Defaul This section describes features, tools, and guidance to help you manage this policy. -A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to be effective. +A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to be effective. ### Group Policy @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ Enable the **Enforce user logon restrictions** setting. ### Potential impact -None. This is the default configuration. +None. This non-impact state is the default configuration. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/increase-a-process-working-set.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/increase-a-process-working-set.md index f6eda6e23e..c9c6d11852 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/increase-a-process-working-set.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/increase-a-process-working-set.md @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security ## Reference -This policy setting determines which users can increase or decrease the size of the working set of a process. The working set of a process is the set of memory pages currently visible to the process in physical RAM. These pages are resident, and they are available for an application to use without triggering a page fault. The minimum and maximum working set sizes affect the virtual memory paging behavior of a process. +This policy setting determines which users can increase or decrease the size of the working set of a process. The working set of a process is the set of memory pages currently visible to the process in physical RAM. These pages are resident, and they're available for an application to use without triggering a page fault. The minimum and maximum working set sizes affect the virtual memory paging behavior of a process. Constant: SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Defaul This section describes features, tools, and guidance to help you manage this policy. -A restart of the computer is not required for this policy setting to be effective. +A restart of the computer isn't required for this policy setting to be effective. Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on. diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-display-user-information-when-the-session-is-locked.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-display-user-information-when-the-session-is-locked.md index 7c5ca6c4a7..a54c5e93d9 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-display-user-information-when-the-session-is-locked.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-display-user-information-when-the-session-is-locked.md @@ -44,9 +44,9 @@ This setting has these possible values: - **User display name, domain and user names** - For a local logon, the user's full name is displayed. + For a local sign in, the user's full name is displayed. If the user signed in using a Microsoft account, the user's email address is displayed. - For a domain logon, the domain\username is displayed. + For a domain sign in, the domain\username is displayed. This setting has the same effect as turning on the **Privacy** setting. - **User display name only** @@ -57,30 +57,30 @@ This setting has these possible values: - **Do not display user information** No names are displayed. - Beginning with Windows 10 version 1607, this option is not supported. + Beginning with Windows 10 version 1607, this option isn't supported. If this option is chosen, the full name of the user who locked the session is displayed instead. This change makes this setting consistent with the functionality of the new **Privacy** setting. To display no user information, enable the Group Policy setting **Interactive logon: Don't display last signed-in**. - **Domain and user names only** - For a domain logon only, the domain\username is displayed. + For a domain sign in only, the domain\username is displayed. The **Privacy** setting is automatically on and grayed out. - **Blank** Default setting. This setting translates to “Not defined,” but it will display the user's full name in the same manner as the option **User display name only**. - When an option is set, you cannot reset this policy to blank, or not defined. + When an option is set, you can't reset this policy to blank, or not defined. ### Hotfix for Windows 10 version 1607 -Clients that run Windows 10 version 1607 will not show details on the sign-in screen even if the **User display name, domain and user names** option is chosen because the **Privacy** setting is off. +Clients that run Windows 10 version 1607 won't show details on the sign-in screen even if the **User display name, domain and user names** option is chosen because the **Privacy** setting is off. If the **Privacy** setting is turned on, details will show. -The **Privacy** setting cannot be changed for clients in bulk. +The **Privacy** setting can't be changed for clients in bulk. Instead, apply [KB 4013429](https://www.catalog.update.microsoft.com/Search.aspx?q=KB4013429) to clients that run Windows 10 version 1607 so they behave similarly to previous versions of Windows. -Clients that run later versions of Windows 10 do not require a hotfix. +Clients that run later versions of Windows 10 don't require a hotfix. There are related Group Policy settings: @@ -93,19 +93,19 @@ There are related Group Policy settings: For all versions of Windows 10, only the user display name is shown by default. If **Block user from showing account details on sign-in** is enabled, then only the user display name is shown regardless of any other Group Policy settings. -Users will not be able to show details. +Users won't be able to show details. -If **Block user from showing account details on sign-in** is not enabled, then you can set **Interactive logon: Display user information when the session is locked** to **User display name, domain and user names** or **Domain and user names only** to show additional details such as domain\username. +If **Block user from showing account details on sign-in** isn't enabled, then you can set **Interactive logon: Display user information when the session is locked** to **User display name, domain and user names** or **Domain and user names only** to show other details such as domain\username. In this case, clients that run Windows 10 version 1607 need [KB 4013429](https://www.catalog.update.microsoft.com/Search.aspx?q=KB4013429) applied. -Users will not be able to hide additional details. +Users won't be able to hide other details. -If **Block user from showing account details on sign-in** is not enabled and **Don’t display last signed-in** is enabled, the username will not be shown. +If **Block user from showing account details on sign-in** isn't enabled and **Don’t display last signed-in** is enabled, the username won't be shown. ### Best practices -Your implementation of this policy depends on your security requirements for displayed logon information. If you run computers that store sensitive data, with monitors displayed in unsecured locations, or if you have computers with sensitive data that are remotely accessed, revealing logged on user’s full names or domain account names might contradict your overall security policy. +Your implementation of this policy depends on your security requirements for displayed sign-in information. If you run computers that store sensitive data, with monitors displayed in unsecured locations, or if you have computers with sensitive data that are remotely accessed, revealing logged on user’s full names or domain account names might contradict your overall security policy. -Depending on your security policy, you might also want to enable the [Interactive logon: Do not display last user name](interactive-logon-do-not-display-last-user-name.md) policy. +Depending on your security policy, you might also want to enable the [Interactive logon: Don't display last user name](interactive-logon-do-not-display-last-user-name.md) policy. ### Location @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ### Policy conflict considerations @@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ None ### Group Policy -This policy setting can be configured by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to be distributed through Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If this policy is not contained in a distributed GPO, this policy can be configured on the local computer by using the Local Security Policy snap-in. +This policy setting can be configured by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to be distributed through Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If this policy isn't contained in a distributed GPO, this policy can be configured on the local computer by using the Local Security Policy snap-in. ## Security considerations @@ -148,9 +148,9 @@ When a computer displays the Secure Desktop in an unsecured area, certain user i ### Countermeasure -Enabling this policy setting allows the operating system to hide certain user information from being displayed on the Secure Desktop (after the device has been booted or when the session has been locked by using CTRL+ALT+DEL). However, user information is displayed if the **Switch user** feature is used so that the logon tiles are displayed for each logged on user. +Enabling this policy setting allows the operating system to hide certain user information from being displayed on the Secure Desktop (after the device has been booted or when the session has been locked by using CTRL+ALT+DEL). However, user information is displayed if the **Switch user** feature is used so that the sign-in tiles are displayed for each signed-in user. -You might also want to enable the [Interactive logon: Do not display last signed-in](interactive-logon-do-not-display-last-user-name.md) policy, which will prevent the Windows operating system from displaying the logon name and logon tile of the last user to log on. +You might also want to enable the [Interactive logon: Don't display last signed-in](interactive-logon-do-not-display-last-user-name.md) policy, which will prevent the Windows operating system from displaying the sign-in name and sign-in tile of the last user to sign in. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-do-not-display-last-user-name.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-do-not-display-last-user-name.md index 9994a60f7e..47bac4e4cc 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-do-not-display-last-user-name.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-do-not-display-last-user-name.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- title: Interactive logon Don't display last signed-in (Windows 10) -description: Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for the Interactive logon Do not display last user name security policy setting. +description: Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for the Interactive logon Don't display last user name security policy setting. ms.prod: m365-security ms.mktglfcycl: deploy ms.sitesec: library @@ -26,11 +26,11 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for ## Reference -This security policy setting determines whether the name of the last user to log on to the device is displayed on the Secure Desktop. +This security policy setting determines whether the name of the last user to sign in to the device is displayed on the Secure Desktop. -If this policy is enabled, the full name of the last user to successfully log on is not displayed on the Secure Desktop, nor is the user’s logon tile displayed. Additionally, if the **Switch user** feature is used, the full name and logon tile are not displayed. The logon screen requests a qualified domain account name (or local user name) and password. +If this policy is enabled, the full name of the last user to successfully sign in isn't displayed on the Secure Desktop, nor is the user’s sign-in tile displayed. Additionally, if the **Switch user** feature is used, the full name and sign-in tile aren't displayed. The sign-in screen requests a qualified domain account name (or local user name) and password. -If this policy is disabled, the full name of the last user to log on is displayed, and the user’s logon tile is displayed. This behavior is the same when the **Switch user** feature is used. +If this policy is disabled, the full name of the last user to sign in is displayed, and the user’s sign-in tile is displayed. This behavior is the same when the **Switch user** feature is used. ### Possible values @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ If this policy is disabled, the full name of the last user to log on is displaye ### Best practices -Your implementation of this policy depends on your security requirements for displayed logon information. If you have devices that store sensitive data, with monitors displayed in unsecured locations, or if you have devices with sensitive data that are remotely accessed, revealing logged on user’s full names or domain account names might contradict your overall security policy. +Your implementation of this policy depends on your security requirements for displayed sign-in information. If you have devices that store sensitive data, with monitors displayed in unsecured locations, or if you have devices with sensitive data that are remotely accessed, revealing logged on user’s full names or domain account names might contradict your overall security policy. ### Location @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ### Policy conflict considerations @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ None. ### Group Policy -This policy setting can be configured by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to be distributed through Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If this policy is not contained in a distributed GPO, this policy can be configured on the local computer by using the Local Security Policy snap-in. +This policy setting can be configured by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to be distributed through Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If this policy isn't contained in a distributed GPO, this policy can be configured on the local computer by using the Local Security Policy snap-in. ## Security considerations @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -An attacker with access to the console (for example, someone with physical access or someone who can connect to the device through Remote Desktop Session Host) could view the name of the last user who logged on. The attacker could then try to guess the password, use a dictionary, or use a brute-force attack to try to log on. +An attacker with access to the console (for example, someone with physical access or someone who can connect to the device through Remote Desktop Session Host) could view the name of the last user who logged on. The attacker could then try to guess the password, use a dictionary, or use a brute-force attack to try to sign in. ### Countermeasure @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ Enable the **Interactive logon: Do not display last user name** setting. ### Potential impact -Users must always type their user names and passwords when they log on locally or to the domain. The logon tiles of all logged on users are not displayed. +Users must always type their user names and passwords when they sign in locally or to the domain. The sign-in tiles of all logged on users aren't displayed. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-do-not-require-ctrl-alt-del.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-do-not-require-ctrl-alt-del.md index 028bd47b3f..0284f2bb14 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-do-not-require-ctrl-alt-del.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-do-not-require-ctrl-alt-del.md @@ -26,15 +26,15 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for ## Reference -This security setting determines whether pressing CTRL+ALT+DEL is required before a user can log on. +This security setting determines whether pressing CTRL+ALT+DEL is required before a user can sign in. -If this policy setting is enabled on a device, a user is not required to press CTRL+ALT+DEL to log on. +If this policy setting is enabled on a device, a user isn't required to press CTRL+ALT+DEL to sign in. -If this policy is disabled, any user is required to press CTRL+ALT+DEL before logging on to the Windows operating system (unless they are using a smart card for logon). +If this policy is disabled, any user is required to press CTRL+ALT+DEL before logging on to the Windows operating system (unless they're using a smart card for signing in). -Microsoft developed this feature to make it easier for users with certain types of physical impairments to log on to device running the Windows operating system; however, not having to press the CTRL+ALT+DELETE key combination leaves users susceptible to attacks that attempt to intercept their passwords. Requiring CTRL+ALT+DELETE before users log on ensures that users are communicating by means of a trusted path when entering their passwords. +Microsoft developed this feature to make it easier for users with certain types of physical impairments to sign in to a device running the Windows operating system; however, not having to press the CTRL+ALT+DELETE key combination leaves users susceptible to attacks that attempt to intercept their passwords. Requiring CTRL+ALT+DELETE before users sign in ensures that users are communicating through a trusted path when entering their passwords. -A malicious user might install malware that looks like the standard logon dialog box for the Windows operating system, and capture a user's password. The attacker can then log on to the compromised account with whatever level of user rights that user has. +A malicious user might install malware that looks like the standard sign-in dialog box for the Windows operating system, and capture a user's password. The attacker can then sign in to the compromised account with whatever level of user rights that user has. > [!NOTE] > When the policy is defined, registry value **DisableCAD** located in **HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System** is created. To revert the changes made by this policy, it is not enough to set its value to **Not defined**, this registry value needs to be removed as well. @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ### Policy conflict considerations @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ Beginning with Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista, the CTRL+ALT+DELETE key ### Group Policy -This policy setting can be configured by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to be distributed through Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If this policy is not contained in a distributed GPO, this policy can be configured on the local computer by using the Local Security Policy snap-in. +This policy setting can be configured by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to be distributed through Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If this policy isn't contained in a distributed GPO, this policy can be configured on the local computer by using the Local Security Policy snap-in. ## Security considerations @@ -88,9 +88,9 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -This setting makes it easier for users with certain types of physical impairments to log on to devices that run the Windows operating system. However, if users are not required to press CTRL+ALT+DEL, they are susceptible to attacks that attempt to intercept their passwords. If CTRL+ALT+DEL is required before logon, user passwords are communicated by means of a trusted path. +This setting makes it easier for users with certain types of physical impairments to sign in to devices that run the Windows operating system. However, if users aren't required to press CTRL+ALT+DEL, they're susceptible to attacks that attempt to intercept their passwords. If CTRL+ALT+DEL is required before signing in, user passwords are communicated through a trusted path. -If this setting is enabled, an attacker could install malware that looks like the standard logon dialog box in the Windows operating system, and capture the user's password. The attacker would then be able to log on to the compromised account with whatever level of privilege that user has. +If this setting is enabled, an attacker could install malware that looks like the standard sign-in dialog box in the Windows operating system, and capture the user's password. The attacker would then be able to sign in to the compromised account with whatever level of privilege that user has. ### Countermeasure @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ Disable the **Interactive logon: Do not require CTRL+ALT+DEL** setting. ### Potential impact -Unless they use a smart card to log on, users must simultaneously press the three keys before the logon dialog box is displayed. +Unless they use a smart card to sign in, users must simultaneously press the three keys before the sign-in dialog box is displayed. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-dont-display-username-at-sign-in.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-dont-display-username-at-sign-in.md index e0431252ef..2fd2510de4 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-dont-display-username-at-sign-in.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-dont-display-username-at-sign-in.md @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, and security considerations for A new policy setting has been introduced in Windows 10 starting with Windows 10 version 1703. This security policy setting determines whether the username is displayed during sign in. This setting only affects the **Other user** tile. -If the policy is enabled and a user signs in as **Other user**, the full name of the user is not displayed during sign-in. In the same context, if users type their email address and password at the sign in screen and press **Enter**, the displayed text “Other user” remains unchanged, and is no longer replaced by the user’s first and last name, as in previous versions of Windows 10. Additionally,if users enter their domain user name and password and click **Submit**, their full name is not shown until the Start screen displays. +If the policy is enabled and a user signs in as **Other user**, the full name of the user isn't displayed during sign-in. In the same context, if users type their email address and password at the sign-in screen and press **Enter**, the displayed text “Other user” remains unchanged, and is no longer replaced by the user’s first and last name, as in previous versions of Windows 10. Additionally,if users enter their domain user name and password and click **Submit**, their full name isn't shown until the Start screen displays. If the policy is disabled and a user signs in as **Other user**, the “Other user” text is replaced by the user’s first and last name during sign-in. @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ### Policy conflict considerations @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ None. ### Group Policy -This policy setting can be configured by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to be distributed through Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If this policy is not contained in a distributed GPO, this policy can be configured on the local computer by using the Local Security Policy snap-in. +This policy setting can be configured by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to be distributed through Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If this policy isn't contained in a distributed GPO, this policy can be configured on the local computer by using the Local Security Policy snap-in. ## Security considerations @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -An attacker with access to the console (for example, someone with physical access or someone who can connect to the device through Remote Desktop Session Host) could view the name of the last user who logged on. The attacker could then try to guess the password, use a dictionary, or use a brute-force attack to try to log on. +An attacker with access to the console (for example, someone with physical access or someone who can connect to the device through Remote Desktop Session Host) could view the name of the last user who logged on. The attacker could then try to guess the password, use a dictionary, or use a brute-force attack to try to sign in. ### Countermeasure @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ Enable the **Interactive logon: Don't display user name at sign-in** setting. ### Potential impact -Users must always type their usernames and passwords when they log on locally or to the domain. The logon tiles of all logged on users are not displayed. +Users must always type their usernames and passwords when they log on locally or to the domain. The sign in tiles of all logged on users aren't displayed. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-machine-account-lockout-threshold.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-machine-account-lockout-threshold.md index e9a1fea0ae..148956b0f3 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-machine-account-lockout-threshold.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-machine-account-lockout-threshold.md @@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, management, and security conside Beginning with Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8, the **Interactive logon: Machine account threshold** security policy setting enforces the lockout policy on those computers that have BitLocker enabled to protect operating system volumes. -The security setting allows you to set a threshold for the number of failed logon attempts that causes the device to be locked by using BitLocker. This means, if the specified maximum number of failed logon attempts is exceeded, the device will invalidate the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) protector and any other protector except the 48-digit recovery password, and then reboot. During Device Lockout mode, the computer or device only boots into the touch-enabled Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) until an authorized user enters the recovery password to restore full access. +The security setting allows you to set a threshold for the number of failed sign-in attempts that causes the device to be locked by using BitLocker. This threshold means, if the specified maximum number of failed sign-in attempts is exceeded, the device will invalidate the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) protector and any other protector except the 48-digit recovery password, and then reboot. During Device Lockout mode, the computer or device only boots into the touch-enabled Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) until an authorized user enters the recovery password to restore full access. -Failed password attempts on workstations or member servers that have been locked by using either Ctrl+Alt+Delete or password-protected screen savers count as failed logon attempts. +Failed password attempts on workstations or member servers that have been locked by using either Ctrl+Alt+Delete or password-protected screen savers count as failed sign-in attempts. ### Possible values @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ You can set the **invalid logon attempts** value between 1 and 999. Values from ### Best practices -Use this policy setting in conjunction with your other failed account logon attempts policy. For example, if the [Account lockout threshold](account-lockout-threshold.md) policy setting is set at 4, then setting **Interactive logon: Machine account lockout threshold** at 6 allows the user to restore access to resources without having to restore access to the device resulting from a BitLocker lock out. +Use this policy setting in conjunction with your other failed account sign-in attempts policy. For example, if the [Account lockout threshold](account-lockout-threshold.md) policy setting is set at 4, then setting **Interactive logon: Machine account lockout threshold** at 6 allows the user to restore access to resources without having to restore access to the device resulting from a BitLocker lock out. ### Location @@ -64,13 +64,13 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -A restart is required for changes to this policy to become effective when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +A restart is required for changes to this policy to become effective when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ### Group Policy Because this policy setting was introduced in Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8, it can only be set locally on those devices that contain this policy setting, but it can be set and distributed through Group Policy to any computer running the Windows operating system that supports Group Policy and is BitLocker-enabled. -When setting this policy, consider the [Account lockout threshold](account-lockout-threshold.md) policy setting, which determines the number of failed logon attempts that will cause a user account to be locked out. +When setting this policy, consider the [Account lockout threshold](account-lockout-threshold.md) policy setting, which determines the number of failed sign-in attempts that will cause a user account to be locked out. ## Security considerations @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ This policy setting helps protect a BitLocker-encrypted device from attackers at ### Countermeasure -Use this policy setting in conjunction with your other failed account logon attempts policy. For example, if the [Account lockout threshold](account-lockout-threshold.md) policy setting is set at 4, then setting **Interactive logon: Machine account lockout threshold** at 6 allows the user to restore access to resources without having to restore access to the device resulting from a BitLocker lock out. +Use this policy setting in conjunction with your other failed account sign-in attempts policy. For example, if the [Account lockout threshold](account-lockout-threshold.md) policy setting is set at 4, then setting **Interactive logon: Machine account lockout threshold** at 6 allows the user to restore access to resources without having to restore access to the device resulting from a BitLocker lock out. ### Potential impact diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-machine-inactivity-limit.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-machine-inactivity-limit.md index 737bfddba3..01524c765c 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-machine-inactivity-limit.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-machine-inactivity-limit.md @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -Restart is required for changes to this policy to become effective when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +Restart is required for changes to this policy to become effective when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ### Group Policy diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-message-text-for-users-attempting-to-log-on.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-message-text-for-users-attempting-to-log-on.md index 8fdc5659f9..2f384a46fc 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-message-text-for-users-attempting-to-log-on.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-message-text-for-users-attempting-to-log-on.md @@ -30,10 +30,13 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, management, and security conside The **Interactive logon: Message text for users attempting to log on** and [Interactive logon: Message title for users attempting to log on](interactive-logon-message-title-for-users-attempting-to-log-on.md) policy settings are closely related. -- **Interactive logon: Message text for users attempting to log on** specifies a text message to be displayed to users when they log on. -- **Interactive logon: Message title for users attempting to log on** specifies a title to appear in the title bar of the window that contains the text message. +**Interactive logon: Message text for users attempting to log on** specifies a text message to be displayed to users when they sign in. -This text is often used for legal reasons, for example, to warn users about the ramifications of misusing company information or to warn them that their actions may be audited. When these policy settings are configured, users will see a dialog box before they can log on to the server console. +**Interactive logon: Message title for users attempting to log on** specifies a title to appear in the title bar of the window that contains the text message. This text is often used for legal reasons—for example, to warn users about the ramifications of misusing company information, or to warn them that their actions might be audited. + +Not using this warning-message policy setting leaves your organization legally vulnerable to trespassers who unlawfully penetrate your network. Legal precedents have established that organizations that display warnings to users who connect to their servers over a network have a higher rate of successfully prosecuting trespassers. + +When these policy settings are configured, users will see a dialog box before they can sign in to the server console. ### Possible values @@ -44,15 +47,12 @@ The possible values for this setting are: ### Best practices -It is advisable to set **Interactive logon: Message text for users attempting to log on** to a value similar to one of the following: +- It's advisable to set **Interactive logon: Message text for users attempting to log on** to a value similar to one of the following: -```text -1. IT IS AN OFFENSE TO CONTINUE WITHOUT PROPER AUTHORIZATION. -2. This system is restricted to authorized users. Individuals who attempt unauthorized access will be prosecuted. If you are unauthorized, terminate access now. Click OK to indicate your acceptance of this information. -``` - -> [!NOTE] -> Any warning that you display in the title or text should be approved by representatives from your organization's legal and human resources departments. + 1. IT IS AN OFFENSE TO CONTINUE WITHOUT PROPER AUTHORIZATION. + 2. This system is restricted to authorized users. Individuals who attempt unauthorized access will be prosecuted. If you're unauthorized, terminate access now. Click OK to indicate your acceptance of this information. + > [!IMPORTANT] + > Any warning that you display in the title or text should be approved by representatives from your organization's legal and human resources departments. ### Location @@ -77,22 +77,22 @@ This section describes different requirements to help you manage this policy. ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ## Security considerations This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configuration, how to implement the countermeasure, and the possible negative consequences of countermeasure implementation. -There are two policy settings that relate to logon displays: +There are two policy settings that relate to sign-in displays: - **Interactive logon: Message text for users attempting to log on** - [Interactive logon: Message title for users attempting to log on](interactive-logon-message-title-for-users-attempting-to-log-on.md) -The first policy setting specifies a text message that displays to users when they log on, and the second policy setting specifies a title for the title bar of the text message window. Many organizations use this text for legal purposes; for example, to warn users about the ramifications of misuse of company information, or to warn them that their actions may be audited. +The first policy setting specifies a text message that displays to users when they sign in, and the second policy setting specifies a title for the title bar of the text message window. Many organizations use this text for legal purposes; for example, to warn users about the ramifications of misuse of company information, or to warn them that their actions may be audited. ### Vulnerability -Users often do not understand the importance of security practices. However, the display of a warning message before logon may help prevent an attack by warning malicious or uninformed users about the consequences of their misconduct before it happens. It may also help reinforce corporate policies by notifying employees of appropriate policies during the logon process. +Users often don't understand the importance of security practices. However, the display of a warning message before signing in may help prevent an attack by warning malicious or uninformed users about the consequences of their misconduct before it happens. It may also help reinforce corporate policies by notifying employees of appropriate policies during the sign-in process. ### Countermeasure @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ Configure the **Interactive logon: Message text for users attempting to log on** ### Potential impact -Users see a message in a dialog box before they can log on to the server console. +Users see a message in a dialog box before they can sign in to the server console. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-message-title-for-users-attempting-to-log-on.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-message-title-for-users-attempting-to-log-on.md index e69e4bd287..ab20a8f979 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-message-title-for-users-attempting-to-log-on.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-message-title-for-users-attempting-to-log-on.md @@ -30,7 +30,11 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management and security c This security setting allows you to specify a title that appears in the title bar of the window that contains the **Interactive logon: Message title for users attempting to log on**. This text is often used for legal reasons—for example, to warn users about the ramifications of misusing company information, or to warn them that their actions might be audited. -The **Interactive logon: Message title for users attempting to log on** and [Interactive logon: Message text for users attempting to log on](interactive-logon-message-text-for-users-attempting-to-log-on.md) policy settings are closely related. When these policy settings are configured, users will see a dialog box before they can log on to the server console. +The **Interactive logon: Message title for users attempting to log on** and [Interactive logon: Message text for users attempting to log on](interactive-logon-message-text-for-users-attempting-to-log-on.md) policy settings are closely related. **Interactive logon: Message title for users attempting to log on** specifies a message title to be displayed to users when they log on. + +Not using this warning-message policy setting leaves your organization legally vulnerable to trespassers who unlawfully penetrate your network. Legal precedents have established that organizations that display warnings to users who connect to their servers over a network have a higher rate of successfully prosecuting trespassers. + +When these policy settings are configured, users will see a dialog box before they can sign in the server console. ### Possible values @@ -39,7 +43,7 @@ The **Interactive logon: Message title for users attempting to log on** and [Int ### Best practices -1. It is advisable to set **Interactive logon: Message title for users attempting to log on** to a value similar to one the following: +1. It's advisable to set **Interactive logon: Message title for users attempting to log on** to a value similar to one of the following values: - RESTRICTED SYSTEM @@ -72,22 +76,22 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ## Security considerations This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configuration, how to implement the countermeasure, and the possible negative consequences of countermeasure implementation. -There are two policy settings that relate to logon displays: +There are two policy settings that relate to sign-in displays: - [Interactive logon: Message text for users attempting to log on](interactive-logon-message-text-for-users-attempting-to-log-on.md) - **Interactive logon: Message title for users attempting to log on** -The first policy setting specifies a text message that displays to users when they log on, and the second policy setting specifies a title for the title bar of the text message window. Many organizations use this text for legal purposes; for example, to warn users about the ramifications of misuse of company information, or to warn them that their actions may be audited. +The first policy setting specifies a text message that displays to users when they sign in, and the second policy setting specifies a title for the title bar of the text message window. Many organizations use this text for legal purposes; for example, to warn users about the ramifications of misuse of company information, or to warn them that their actions may be audited. ### Vulnerability -Users often do not understand the importance of security practices. However, the display of a warning message with an appropriate title before logon may help prevent an attack by warning malicious or uninformed users about the consequences of their misconduct before it happens. It may also help reinforce corporate policies by notifying employees of appropriate policies during the logon process. +Users often don't understand the importance of security practices. However, the display of a warning message with an appropriate title before signing in may help prevent an attack by warning malicious or uninformed users about the consequences of their misconduct before it happens. It may also help reinforce corporate policies by notifying employees of appropriate policies during the sign-in process. ### Countermeasure @@ -98,7 +102,7 @@ Configure the [Interactive logon: Message text for users attempting to log on](i ### Potential impact -Users see a message in a dialog box before they can log on to the server console. +Users see a message in a dialog box before they can sign in to the server console. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-number-of-previous-logons-to-cache-in-case-domain-controller-is-not-available.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-number-of-previous-logons-to-cache-in-case-domain-controller-is-not-available.md index 90773e0b18..966a3f3c4e 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-number-of-previous-logons-to-cache-in-case-domain-controller-is-not-available.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-number-of-previous-logons-to-cache-in-case-domain-controller-is-not-available.md @@ -27,19 +27,19 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security ## Reference -The **Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain controller is not available**) policy setting determines whether a user can log on to a Windows domain by using cached account information. Logon information for domain accounts can be cached locally so that, if a domain controller cannot be contacted on subsequent logons, a user can still log on. This policy setting determines the number of unique users whose logon information is cached locally. +The **Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain controller is not available**) policy setting determines whether a user can sign in to a Windows domain by using cached account information. Sign-in information for domain accounts can be cached locally so that, if a domain controller can't be contacted on subsequent logons, a user can still sign in. This policy setting determines the number of unique users whose sign-in information is cached locally. -If a domain controller is unavailable and a user's logon information is cached, the user is prompted with the following message: +If a domain controller is unavailable and a user's sign-in information is cached, the user is prompted with the following message: -A domain controller for your domain could not be contacted. You have been logged on using cached account information. Changes to your profile since you last logged on might not be available. +A domain controller for your domain couldn't be contacted. You've been logged on using cached account information. Changes to your profile since you last logged on might not be available. -If a domain controller is unavailable and a user's logon information is not cached, the user is prompted with this message: +If a domain controller is unavailable and a user's sign-in information isn't cached, the user is prompted with this message: -The system cannot log you on now because the domain *DOMAIN NAME* is not available. +The system can't log you on now because the domain *DOMAIN NAME* isn't available. -The value of this policy setting indicates the number of users whose logon information the server caches locally. If the value is 10, the server caches logon information for 10 users. When an 11th user logs on to the device, the server overwrites the oldest cached logon session. +The value of this policy setting indicates the number of users whose sign-in information the server caches locally. If the value is 10, the server caches sign-in information for 10 users. When an 11th user signs in to the device, the server overwrites the oldest cached sign-in session. -Users who access the server console will have their logon credentials cached on that server. A malicious user who is able to access the file system of the server can locate this cached information and use a brute-force attack to determine user passwords. Windows mitigates this type of attack by +Users who access the server console will have their sign-in credentials cached on that server. A malicious user who is able to access the file system of the server can locate this cached information and use a brute-force attack to determine user passwords. Windows mitigates this type of attack by encrypting the information and keeping the cached credentials in the system's registries, which are spread across numerous physical locations. > [!NOTE] @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ encrypting the information and keeping the cached credentials in the system's re ### Best practices -The [Windows security baselines](../windows-security-baselines.md) do not recommend configuring this setting. +The [Windows security baselines](../windows-security-baselines.md) don't recommend configuring this setting. ### Location @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ### Policy conflict considerations @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ None ### Group Policy -This policy setting can be configured by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to be distributed through Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If this policy is not contained in a distributed GPO, this policy can be configured on the local computer by using the Local Security Policy snap-in. +This policy setting can be configured by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to be distributed through Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If this policy isn't contained in a distributed GPO, this policy can be configured on the local computer by using the Local Security Policy snap-in. ## Security considerations @@ -93,20 +93,20 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -The number that is assigned to this policy setting indicates the number of users whose logon information is cache locally by the servers. If the number is set to 10, the server caches logon information for 10 users. When an 11th user logs on to the device, the server overwrites the oldest cached logon session. +The number that is assigned to this policy setting indicates the number of users whose sign-in information is cached locally by the servers. If the number is set to 10, the server caches sign-in information for 10 users. When an 11th user signs in to the device, the server overwrites the oldest cached sign-in session. -Users who access the server console have their logon credentials cached on that server. An attacker who is able to access the file system of the server could locate this cached information and use a brute force attack to attempt to determine user passwords. +Users who access the server console have their sign-in credentials cached on that server. An attacker who is able to access the file system of the server could locate this cached information and use a brute force attack to attempt to determine user passwords. To mitigate this type of attack, Windows encrypts the information and obscures its physical location. ### Countermeasure -Configure the **Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain controller is not available)** setting to 0, which disables the local caching of logon information. Additional countermeasures include enforcement of strong password policies and physically secure locations for the computers. +Configure the **Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain controller is not available)** setting to 0, which disables the local caching of sign-in information. Other countermeasures include enforcement of strong password policies and physically secure locations for the computers. ### Potential impact -Users cannot log on to any devices if there is no domain controller available to authenticate them. Organizations can configure this value to 2 for end-user computers, especially for mobile users. A configuration value of 2 means that the user's logon information is still in the cache, even if a -member of the IT department has recently logged on to the device to perform system maintenance. This method allows users to log on to their computers when they are not connected to the organization's network. +Users can't sign in to any devices if there's no domain controller available to authenticate them. Organizations can configure this value to 2 for end-user computers, especially for mobile users. A configuration value of 2 means that the user's sign-in information is still in the cache, even if a +member of the IT department has recently logged on to the device to perform system maintenance. This method allows users to sign in to their computers when they aren't connected to the organization's network. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-require-domain-controller-authentication-to-unlock-workstation.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-require-domain-controller-authentication-to-unlock-workstation.md index 88948dcc4f..be5146c636 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-require-domain-controller-authentication-to-unlock-workstation.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/interactive-logon-require-domain-controller-authentication-to-unlock-workstation.md @@ -27,13 +27,13 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security ## Reference -Unlocking a locked device requires logon information. For domain accounts, the **Interactive logon: Require Domain Controller authentication to unlock workstation** policy setting determines whether it is necessary to contact a domain controller to unlock a device. Enabling this policy setting requires a domain controller to authenticate the domain account that is being used to unlock the device. Disabling this policy setting allows a user to unlock the device without the computer verifying the logon information with a domain controller. However, if [Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain controller is not available)](interactive-logon-number-of-previous-logons-to-cache-in-case-domain-controller-is-not-available.md) is set to a value greater than zero, the user's cached credentials will be used to unlock the system. +Unlocking a locked device requires sign-in information. For domain accounts, the **Interactive logon: Require Domain Controller authentication to unlock workstation** policy setting determines whether it's necessary to contact a domain controller to unlock a device. Enabling this policy setting requires a domain controller to authenticate the domain account that is being used to unlock the device. Disabling this policy setting allows a user to unlock the device without the computer verifying the sign-in information with a domain controller. However, if [Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain controller is not available)](interactive-logon-number-of-previous-logons-to-cache-in-case-domain-controller-is-not-available.md) is set to a value greater than zero, the user's cached credentials will be used to unlock the system. The device caches (locally in memory) the credentials of any users who have been authenticated. The device uses these cached credentials to authenticate anyone who attempts to unlock the console. -When cached credentials are used, any changes that have recently been made to the account (such as user rights assignments, account lockout, or the account being disabled) are not considered or applied after this authentication process. This means not only that user rights are not updated, but more importantly that disabled accounts are still able to unlock the console of the system. +When cached credentials are used, any changes that have recently been made to the account (such as user rights assignments, account lockout, or the account being disabled) aren't considered or applied after this authentication process. This result means not only that user rights aren't updated, but more importantly that disabled accounts are still able to unlock the console of the system. -It is advisable to set **Interactive logon: Require Domain Controller authentication to unlock workstation** to Enabled and set [Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain controller is not available)](interactive-logon-number-of-previous-logons-to-cache-in-case-domain-controller-is-not-available.md) to 0. When the console of a device is locked by a user or automatically by a screen saver time-out, the console can only be unlocked if the user is able to re-authenticate to the domain controller. If no domain controller is available, users cannot unlock their devices. +It's advisable to set **Interactive logon: Require Domain Controller authentication to unlock workstation** to Enabled and set [Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain controller is not available)](interactive-logon-number-of-previous-logons-to-cache-in-case-domain-controller-is-not-available.md) to 0. When the console of a device is locked by a user or automatically by a screen saver time-out, the console can only be unlocked if the user is able to reauthenticate to the domain controller. If no domain controller is available, users can't unlock their devices. ### Possible values @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ It is advisable to set **Interactive logon: Require Domain Controller authentica ### Best practices -- Set **Interactive logon: Require Domain Controller authentication to unlock workstation** to Enabled and set [Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain controller is not available)](interactive-logon-number-of-previous-logons-to-cache-in-case-domain-controller-is-not-available.md) to 0. When the console of a device is locked by a user or automatically by a screen saver time-out, the console can only be unlocked if the user is able to re-authenticate to the domain controller. If no domain controller is available, users cannot unlock their devices. +- Set **Interactive logon: Require Domain Controller authentication to unlock workstation** to Enabled and set [Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain controller is not available)](interactive-logon-number-of-previous-logons-to-cache-in-case-domain-controller-is-not-available.md) to 0. When the console of a device is locked by a user or automatically by a screen saver time-out, the console can only be unlocked if the user is able to reauthenticate to the domain controller. If no domain controller is available, users can't unlock their devices. ### Location @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ### Policy conflict considerations @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ None ### Group Policy -This policy setting can be configured by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to be distributed through Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If this policy is not contained in a distributed GPO, this policy can be configured on the local computer by using the Local Security Policy snap-in. +This policy setting can be configured by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to be distributed through Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If this policy isn't contained in a distributed GPO, this policy can be configured on the local computer by using the Local Security Policy snap-in. ## Security considerations @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -By default, the device caches locally in memory the credentials of any users who are authenticated. The device uses these cached credentials to authenticate anyone who attempts to unlock the console. When cached credentials are used, any changes that have recently been made to the account—such as user rights assignments, account lockout, or the account being disabled—are not considered or applied after the account is authenticated. User privileges are not updated, and disabled accounts are still able to unlock the console of the device +By default, the device caches locally in memory the credentials of any users who are authenticated. The device uses these cached credentials to authenticate anyone who attempts to unlock the console. When cached credentials are used, any changes that have recently been made to the account—such as user rights assignments, account lockout, or the account being disabled—aren't considered or applied after the account is authenticated. User privileges aren't updated, and disabled accounts are still able to unlock the console of the device ### Countermeasure @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ Configure the **Interactive logon: Require Domain Controller authentication to u ### Potential impact -When the console on a device is locked by a user or automatically by a screen-saver timeout, the console can be unlocked only if the user can re-authenticate to the domain controller. If no domain controller is available, users cannot unlock their workstations. If you configure the [Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain controller is not available)](interactive-logon-number-of-previous-logons-to-cache-in-case-domain-controller-is-not-available.md) setting to 0, users whose domain controllers are unavailable (such as mobile or remote users) cannot log on. +When the console on a device is locked by a user or automatically by a screen-saver timeout, the console can be unlocked only if the user can reauthenticate to the domain controller. If no domain controller is available, users can't unlock their workstations. If you configure the [Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain controller is not available)](interactive-logon-number-of-previous-logons-to-cache-in-case-domain-controller-is-not-available.md) setting to 0, users whose domain controllers are unavailable (such as mobile or remote users) can't sign in. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/kerberos-policy.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/kerberos-policy.md index 50e612ee9a..959ced7fdc 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/kerberos-policy.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/kerberos-policy.md @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec Describes the Kerberos Policy settings and provides links to policy setting descriptions. -The Kerberos version 5 authentication protocol provides the default mechanism for authentication services and the authorization data necessary for a user to access a resource and perform a task on that resource. By reducing the lifetime of Kerberos tickets, you reduce the risk of a legitimate user's credentials being stolen and successfully used by an attacker. However, this also increases the authorization overhead. In most environments, these settings should not need to be changed. +The Kerberos version 5 authentication protocol provides the default mechanism for authentication services and the authorization data necessary for a user to access a resource and perform a task on that resource. By reducing the lifetime of Kerberos tickets, you reduce the risk of a legitimate user's credentials being stolen and successfully used by an attacker. However, this ticket lifetime reduction also increases the authorization overhead. In most environments, these settings shouldn't need to be changed. These policy settings are located in **\\Computer Configuration\\Windows Settings\\Security Settings\\Account Policies\\Kerberos Policy**. diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/load-and-unload-device-drivers.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/load-and-unload-device-drivers.md index a0534994d0..9a7f5f87d4 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/load-and-unload-device-drivers.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/load-and-unload-device-drivers.md @@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security ## Reference -This policy setting determines which users can dynamically load and unload device drivers. This user right is not required if a signed driver for the new hardware already exists in the driver.cab file on the device. Device drivers run as highly privileged code. +This policy setting determines which users can dynamically load and unload device drivers. This user right isn't required if a signed driver for the new hardware already exists in the driver.cab file on the device. Device drivers run as highly privileged code. Windows supports the Plug and Play specifications that define how a computer can detect and configure newly added hardware, and then automatically install the device driver. Prior to Plug and Play, users needed to manually configure devices before attaching them to the device. This model allows a user to plug in the hardware, then Windows searches for an appropriate device driver package and automatically configures it to work without interfering with other devices. -Because device driver software runs as if it is a part of the operating system with unrestricted access to the entire computer, it is critical that only known and authorized device drivers be permitted. +Because device driver software runs as if it's a part of the operating system with unrestricted access to the entire computer, it's critical that only known and authorized device drivers be permitted. Constant: SeLoadDriverPrivilege @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Constant: SeLoadDriverPrivilege ### Best practices -- Because of the potential security risk, do not assign this user right to any user, group, or process that you do not want to take over the system. +- Because of the potential security risk, don't assign this user right to any user, group, or process that you don't want to take over the system. ### Location @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Defaul This section describes features, tools, and guidance to help you manage this policy. -A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to be effective. +A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to be effective. Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on. @@ -94,11 +94,11 @@ Device drivers run as highly privileged code. A user who has the **Load and unlo ### Countermeasure -Do not assign the **Load and unload device drivers** user right to any user or group other than Administrators on member servers. On domain controllers, do not assign this user right to any user or group other than Domain Admins. +Don't assign the **Load and unload device drivers** user right to any user or group other than Administrators on member servers. On domain controllers, don't assign this user right to any user or group other than Domain Admins. ### Potential impact -If you remove the **Load and unload device drivers** user right from the Print Operators group or other accounts, you could limit the abilities of users who are assigned to specific administrative roles in your environment. You should ensure that delegated tasks are not negatively affected. +If you remove the **Load and unload device drivers** user right from the Print Operators group or other accounts, you could limit the abilities of users who are assigned to specific administrative roles in your environment. You should ensure that delegated tasks aren't negatively affected. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/lock-pages-in-memory.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/lock-pages-in-memory.md index 17b2d7d0e6..5aae309524 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/lock-pages-in-memory.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/lock-pages-in-memory.md @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ This policy setting determines which accounts can use a process to keep data in Normally, an application running on Windows can negotiate for more physical memory, and in response to the request, the application begins to move the data from RAM (such as the data cache) to a disk. When the pageable memory is moved to a disk, more RAM is free for the operating system to use. -Enabling this policy setting for a specific account (a user account or a process account for an application) prevents paging of the data. Thereby, the amount of memory that Windows can reclaim under pressure is limited. This could lead to performance degradation. +Enabling this policy setting for a specific account (a user account or a process account for an application) prevents paging of the data. Thereby, the amount of memory that Windows can reclaim under pressure is limited. This limitation could lead to performance degradation. >**Note:**  By configuring this policy setting, the performance of the Windows operating system will differ depending on if applications are running on 32-bit or 64-bit systems, and if they are virtualized images. Performance will also differ between earlier and later versions of the Windows operating system. @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values for the This section describes features, tools, and guidance to help you manage this policy. -A restart of the computer is not required for this policy setting to be effective. +A restart of the computer isn't required for this policy setting to be effective. Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on. @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ Users with the **Lock pages in memory** user right could assign physical memory ### Countermeasure -Do not assign the **Lock pages in memory** user right to any accounts. +Don't assign the **Lock pages in memory** user right to any accounts. ### Potential impact diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/log-on-as-a-batch-job.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/log-on-as-a-batch-job.md index db982227ad..39c6bc3b10 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/log-on-as-a-batch-job.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/log-on-as-a-batch-job.md @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ This article describes the recommended practices, location, values, policy manag ## Reference -This policy setting determines which accounts can log on by using a batch-queue tool such as the Task Scheduler service. When you use the Add Scheduled Task Wizard to schedule a task to run under a particular user name and password, that user is automatically assigned the **Log on as a batch job** user right. When the scheduled time arrives, the Task Scheduler service logs on the user as a batch job instead of as an interactive user, and the task runs in the user's security context. +This policy setting determines which accounts can sign in by using a batch-queue tool such as the Task Scheduler service. When you use the Add Scheduled Task Wizard to schedule a task to run under a particular user name and password, that user is automatically assigned the **Log on as a batch job** user right. When the scheduled time arrives, the Task Scheduler service logs on the user as a batch job instead of as an interactive user, and the task runs in the user's security context. Constant: SeBatchLogonRight @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ For IIS servers, configure this policy locally instead of through domain–based ### Potential impact -If you configure the **Log on as a batch job** setting by using domain-based Group Policy settings, the computer can't assign the user right to accounts that are used for scheduled jobs in the Task Scheduler. If you install optional components such as ASP.NET or IIS, you might need to assign this user right to additional accounts that those components require. For example, IIS requires assignment of this user right to the IIS\_WPG group and the IUSR\_*<ComputerName>*, ASPNET, and IWAM\_*<ComputerName>* accounts. If this user right isn't assigned to this group and these accounts, IIS can't run some COM objects that are necessary for proper functionality. +If you configure the **Log on as a batch job** setting by using domain-based Group Policy settings, the computer can't assign the user right to accounts that are used for scheduled jobs in the Task Scheduler. If you install optional components such as ASP.NET or IIS, you might need to assign this user right to other accounts that those components require. For example, IIS requires assignment of this user right to the IIS\_WPG group and the IUSR\_*<ComputerName>*, ASPNET, and IWAM\_*<ComputerName>* accounts. If this user right isn't assigned to this group and these accounts, IIS can't run some COM objects that are necessary for proper functionality. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/manage-auditing-and-security-log.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/manage-auditing-and-security-log.md index 5da39ee708..4566dfbf15 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/manage-auditing-and-security-log.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/manage-auditing-and-security-log.md @@ -27,8 +27,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security ## Reference -This policy setting determines which users can specify object access audit options for individual resources such as files, Active Directory objects, and registry keys. These objects specify their system access control lists (SACL). A user who is assigned this user right can also view and clear the -Security log in Event Viewer. For more info about the Object Access audit policy, see [Audit object access](../auditing/basic-audit-object-access.md). +This policy setting determines which users can specify object access audit options for individual resources such as files, Active Directory objects, and registry keys. These objects specify their system access control lists (SACL). A user who is assigned this user right can also view and clear the Security log in Event Viewer. For more information about the Object Access audit policy, see [Audit object access](../auditing/basic-audit-object-access.md). Constant: SeSecurityPrivilege @@ -40,7 +39,7 @@ Constant: SeSecurityPrivilege ### Best practices 1. Before removing this right from a group, investigate whether applications are dependent on this right. -2. Generally, assigning this user right to groups other than Administrators is not necessary. +2. Generally, assigning this user right to groups other than Administrators isn't necessary. ### Location @@ -65,11 +64,11 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values for the This section describes features, tools, and guidance to help you manage this policy. -A restart of the computer is not required for this policy setting to be effective. +A restart of the computer isn't required for this policy setting to be effective. Any change to the user rights assignment for an account becomes effective the next time the owner of the account logs on. -Audits for object access are not performed unless you enable them by using the Local Group Policy Editor, the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC), or the Auditpol command-line tool. +Audits for object access aren't performed unless you enable them by using the Local Group Policy Editor, the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC), or the Auditpol command-line tool. For more information about the Object Access audit policy, see [Audit object access](../auditing/basic-audit-object-access.md). diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-lifetime-for-service-ticket.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-lifetime-for-service-ticket.md index e3ed6c49c4..3dbb0c258d 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-lifetime-for-service-ticket.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-lifetime-for-service-ticket.md @@ -31,16 +31,16 @@ The **Maximum lifetime for service ticket** policy setting determines the maximu The possible values for this Group Policy setting are: -- A user-defined number of minutes from 10 through 99,999, or 0 (in which case service tickets do not expire). +- A user-defined number of minutes from 10 through 99,999, or 0 (in which case service tickets don't expire). - Not defined. -If a client presents an expired session ticket when it requests a connection to a server, the server returns an error message. The client must request a new session ticket from the Kerberos V5 KDC. After a connection is authenticated, however, it no longer matters whether the session ticket remains valid. Session tickets are used only to authenticate new connections with servers. Ongoing operations are not interrupted if the session ticket that authenticated the connection expires during the connection. +If a client presents an expired session ticket when it requests a connection to a server, the server returns an error message. The client must request a new session ticket from the Kerberos V5 KDC. After a connection is authenticated, however, it no longer matters whether the session ticket remains valid. Session tickets are used only to authenticate new connections with servers. Ongoing operations aren't interrupted if the session ticket that authenticated the connection expires during the connection. -If the value for this policy setting is too high, users might be able to access network resources outside of their logon hours. In addition, users whose accounts have been disabled might be able to continue accessing network services by using valid service tickets that were issued before their account was disabled. If the value is set to 0, service tickets never expire. +If the value for this policy setting is too high, users might be able to access network resources outside of their sign-in hours. In addition, users whose accounts have been disabled might be able to continue accessing network services by using valid service tickets that were issued before their account was disabled. If the value is set to 0, service tickets never expire. ### Best practices -- It is advisable to set **Maximum lifetime for service ticket** to **600** minutes. +- It's advisable to set **Maximum lifetime for service ticket** to **600** minutes. ### Location @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Defaul This section describes features, tools, and guidance to help you manage this policy. -A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to be effective. +A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to be effective. This policy setting is configured on the domain controller. @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -If you configure the value for the **Maximum lifetime for service ticket** setting too high, users might be able to access network resources outside of their logon hours. Also, users whose accounts were disabled might continue to have access to network services with valid service tickets that were issued before their accounts were disabled. +If you configure the value for the **Maximum lifetime for service ticket** setting too high, users might be able to access network resources outside of their sign-in hours. Also, users whose accounts were disabled might continue to have access to network services with valid service tickets that were issued before their accounts were disabled. ### Countermeasure @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ Configure the **Maximum lifetime for service ticket** setting to 600 minutes. ### Potential impact -None. This is the default configuration. +None. This non-impact state is the default configuration. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-lifetime-for-user-ticket-renewal.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-lifetime-for-user-ticket-renewal.md index 0b5fddd3cd..4807321a05 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-lifetime-for-user-ticket-renewal.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-lifetime-for-user-ticket-renewal.md @@ -36,9 +36,9 @@ The possible values for this Group Policy setting are: ### Best practices -- If the value for this policy setting is too high, users may be able to renew very old user ticket-granting tickets. If the value is 0, ticket-granting tickets never expire. +- If the value for this policy setting is too high, users may be able to renew old user ticket-granting tickets. If the value is 0, ticket-granting tickets never expire. - It is advisable to set **Maximum lifetime for user ticket renewal** to **7** days. + It's advisable to set **Maximum lifetime for user ticket renewal** to **7** days. ### Location @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Defaul This section describes features, tools, and guidance to help you manage this policy. -A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to be effective. +A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to be effective. This policy setting is configured on the domain controller. @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -If the value for the **Maximum lifetime for user ticket renewal** setting is too high, users might be able to renew very old user tickets. +If the value for the **Maximum lifetime for user ticket renewal** setting is too high, users might be able to renew old user tickets. ### Countermeasure diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-lifetime-for-user-ticket.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-lifetime-for-user-ticket.md index b189dda660..53e36fa838 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-lifetime-for-user-ticket.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-lifetime-for-user-ticket.md @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ The possible values for this Group Policy setting are: - A user-defined number of hours from 0 through 99,999 - Not defined -If the value for this policy setting is too high, users might be able to access network resources outside of their logon hours, or users whose accounts have been disabled might be able to continue to access network services by using valid service tickets that were issued before their account was disabled. If the value is set to 0, ticket-granting tickets never expire. +If the value for this policy setting is too high, users might be able to access network resources outside of their sign-in hours, or users whose accounts have been disabled might be able to continue to access network services by using valid service tickets that were issued before their account was disabled. If the value is set to 0, ticket-granting tickets never expire. ### Best practices @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Defaul This section describes features, tools, and guidance to help you manage this policy. -A restart of the computer is not required for this policy setting to be effective. +A restart of the computer isn't required for this policy setting to be effective. This policy setting is configured on the domain controller. @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -If you configure the value for the **Maximum lifetime for user ticket** setting too high, users might be able to access network resources outside of their logon hours. Also, users whose accounts were disabled might continue to have access to network services with valid user tickets that were issued before their accounts were disabled. If you configure this value too low, ticket requests to the KDC may affect the performance of your KDC and present an opportunity for a DoS attack. +If you configure the value for the **Maximum lifetime for user ticket** setting too high, users might be able to access network resources outside of their sign-in hours. Also, users whose accounts were disabled might continue to have access to network services with valid user tickets that were issued before their accounts were disabled. If you configure this value too low, ticket requests to the KDC may affect the performance of your KDC and present an opportunity for a DoS attack. ### Countermeasure @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ Configure the **Maximum lifetime for user ticket** setting with a value between ### Potential impact -Reducing this setting from the default value reduces the likelihood that the ticket-granting ticket will be used to access resources that the user does not have rights to. However, it requires more frequent requests to the KDC for ticket-granting tickets on behalf of users. Most KDCs can support a value of four hours without too much additional burden. +Reducing this setting from the default value reduces the likelihood that the ticket-granting ticket will be used to access resources that the user doesn't have rights to. However, it requires more frequent requests to the KDC for ticket-granting tickets on behalf of users. Most KDCs can support a value of 4 hours without any extra burden. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-password-age.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-password-age.md index 546b7de4f2..e63f28edde 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-password-age.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-password-age.md @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security ## Reference -The **Maximum password age** policy setting determines the period of time (in days) that a password can be used before the system requires the user to change it. You can set passwords to expire after a number of days between 1 and 999, or you can specify that passwords never expire by setting the number of days to 0. If **Maximum password age** is between 1 and 999 days, the minimum password age must be less than the maximum password age. If **Maximum password age** is set to 0, [Minimum password age](minimum-password-age.md) can be any value between 0 and 998 days. +The **Maximum password age** policy setting determines the period of time (in days) that a password can be used before the system requires the user to change it. You can set passwords to expire after a certain number of days between 1 and 999, or you can specify that passwords never expire by setting the number of days to 0. If **Maximum password age** is between 1 and 999 days, the minimum password age must be less than the maximum password age. If **Maximum password age** is set to 0, [Minimum password age](minimum-password-age.md) can be any value between 0 and 998 days. >**Note:**  Setting **Maximum password age** to -1 is equivalent to 0, which means it never expires. Setting it to any other negative number is equivalent to setting it to **Not Defined**. @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ This section describes features, tools, and guidance to help you manage this pol ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a computer restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ## Security considerations @@ -78,13 +78,13 @@ The longer a password exists, the higher the likelihood that it will be compromi ### Considerations -Mandated password changes are a long-standing security practice, but current research strongly indicates that password expiration has a negative effect. See [Microsoft Password Guidance](https://www.microsoft.com/research/publication/password-guidance/) for further information. +Mandated password changes are a long-standing security practice, but current research strongly indicates that password expiration has a negative effect. For more information, see [Microsoft Password Guidance](https://www.microsoft.com/research/publication/password-guidance/). -Configure the **Maximum password age** policy setting to a value that is suitable for your organization's business requirements. For example, many organisations have compliance or insurance mandates requiring a short lifespan on passwords. Where such a requirement exists, the **Maximum password age** policy setting can be used to meet business requirements. +Configure the **Maximum password age** policy setting to a value that is suitable for your organization's business requirements. For example, many organizations have compliance or insurance mandates requiring a short lifespan on passwords. Where such a requirement exists, the **Maximum password age** policy setting can be used to meet business requirements. ### Potential impact -If the **Maximum password age** policy setting is too low, users are required to change their passwords very often. Such a configuration can reduce security in the organization because users might keep their passwords in an unsecured location or lose them. If the value for this policy setting is too high, the level of security within an organization is reduced because it allows potential attackers more time in which to discover user passwords or to use compromised accounts. +If the **Maximum password age** policy setting is too low, users are required to change their passwords often. Such a configuration can reduce security in the organization because users might keep their passwords in an unsecured location or lose them. If the value for this policy setting is too high, the level of security within an organization is reduced because it allows potential attackers more time in which to discover user passwords or to use compromised accounts. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-tolerance-for-computer-clock-synchronization.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-tolerance-for-computer-clock-synchronization.md index fe607f246f..e010602641 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-tolerance-for-computer-clock-synchronization.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/maximum-tolerance-for-computer-clock-synchronization.md @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management, and security This security setting determines the maximum time difference (in minutes) that Kerberos V5 tolerates between the time on the client clock and the time on the domain controller that provides Kerberos authentication. To prevent "replay attacks," the Kerberos v5 protocol uses time stamps as part of its protocol definition. For time stamps to work properly, the clocks of the client and the domain controller need to be in sync as much as possible. In other words, both devices must be set to the same time and date. -Because the clocks of two computers are often out of sync, you can use this policy setting to establish the maximum acceptable difference to the Kerberos protocol between a client clock and domain controller clock. If the difference between a client computer clock and the domain controller clock is less than the maximum time difference that is specified in this policy, any time stamp that is used in a session between the two devices is considered to be authentic. +Because the clocks of two computers are often out of sync, you can use this policy setting to establish the maximum acceptable difference to the Kerberos protocol between a client clock and domain controller clock. If the difference between a client computer clock and the domain controller clock is less than the maximum time difference that is specified in this policy, any timestamp that's used in a session between the two devices is considered to be authentic. The possible values for this Group Policy setting are: @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ The possible values for this Group Policy setting are: ### Best practices -- It is advisable to set **Maximum tolerance for computer clock synchronization** to a value of 5 minutes. +- It's advisable to set **Maximum tolerance for computer clock synchronization** to a value of 5 minutes. ### Location @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ The following table lists the actual and effective default policy values. Defaul This section describes features, tools, and guidance to help you manage this policy. -A restart of the device is not required for this policy setting to be effective. +A restart of the device isn't required for this policy setting to be effective. This policy setting is configured on the domain controller. @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -To prevent "replay attacks" (which are attacks in which an authentication credential is resubmitted by a malicious user or program to gain access to a protected resource), the Kerberos protocol uses time stamps as part of its definition. For time stamps to work properly, the clocks of the client computer and the domain controller need to be closely synchronized. Because the clocks of two computers are often not synchronized, administrators can use this policy to establish the maximum acceptable difference to the Kerberos protocol between a client computer clock and a domain controller clock. If the difference between the client computer clock and the domain controller clock is less than the maximum time difference specified in this setting, any time stamp that is used in a session between the two computers is considered to be authentic. +To prevent "replay attacks" (which are attacks in which an authentication credential is resubmitted by a malicious user or program to gain access to a protected resource), the Kerberos protocol uses time stamps as part of its definition. For time stamps to work properly, the clocks of the client computer and the domain controller need to be closely synchronized. Because the clocks of two computers are often not synchronized, administrators can use this policy to establish the maximum acceptable difference to the Kerberos protocol between a client computer clock and a domain controller clock. If the difference between the client computer clock and the domain controller clock is less than the maximum time difference specified in this setting, any timestamp that's used in a session between the two computers is considered to be authentic. ### Countermeasure @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ Configure the **Maximum tolerance for computer clock synchronization** setting t ### Potential impact -None. This is the default configuration. +None. This non-impact state is the default configuration. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-client-send-unencrypted-password-to-third-party-smb-servers.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-client-send-unencrypted-password-to-third-party-smb-servers.md index 0cc87e361e..c17a0e599f 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-client-send-unencrypted-password-to-third-party-smb-servers.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-client-send-unencrypted-password-to-third-party-smb-servers.md @@ -28,23 +28,23 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, policy management and security c ## Reference -The Server Message Block (SMB) protocol provides the basis for file and print sharing and many other networking operations, such as remote Windows administration. This policy setting allows or prevents the SMB redirector to send plaintext passwords to a non-Microsoft server service that does not support password encryption during authentication. +The Server Message Block (SMB) protocol provides the basis for file and print sharing and many other networking operations, such as remote Windows administration. This policy setting allows or prevents the SMB redirector to send plaintext passwords to a non-Microsoft server service that doesn't support password encryption during authentication. ### Possible values - Enabled - The Server Message Block (SMB) redirector is allowed to send plaintext passwords to a non-Microsoft server service that does not support password encryption during authentication. + The Server Message Block (SMB) redirector is allowed to send plaintext passwords to a non-Microsoft server service that doesn't support password encryption during authentication. - Disabled - The Server Message Block (SMB) redirector only sends encrypted passwords to non-Microsoft SMB server services. If those server services do not support password encryption, the authentication request will fail. + The Server Message Block (SMB) redirector only sends encrypted passwords to non-Microsoft SMB server services. If those server services don't support password encryption, the authentication request will fail. - Not defined ### Best practices -- It is advisable to set **Microsoft network client: Send unencrypted password to connect to third-party SMB servers** to Disabled. +- It's advisable to set **Microsoft network client: Send unencrypted password to connect to third-party SMB servers** to Disabled. ### Location @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ## Security considerations @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ Disable the **Microsoft network client: Send unencrypted password to connect to ### Potential impact -Some older applications may not be able to communicate with the servers in your organization by means of the SMB protocol. +Some older applications may not be able to communicate with the servers in your organization through the SMB protocol. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-server-amount-of-idle-time-required-before-suspending-session.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-server-amount-of-idle-time-required-before-suspending-session.md index abe6db2b33..5a14605d54 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-server-amount-of-idle-time-required-before-suspending-session.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-server-amount-of-idle-time-required-before-suspending-session.md @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ The **Microsoft network server: Amount of idle time required before suspending s ### Best practices -- It is advisable to set this policy to 15 minutes. There will be little impact because SMB sessions will be reestablished automatically if the client resumes activity. +- It's advisable to set this policy to 15 minutes. There will be little impact because SMB sessions will be reestablished automatically if the client resumes activity. ### Location @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ## Security considerations @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ The default behavior on a server mitigates this threat by design. ### Potential impact -There is little impact because SMB sessions are reestablished automatically if the client computer resumes activity. +There's little impact because SMB sessions are reestablished automatically if the client computer resumes activity. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-server-attempt-s4u2self-to-obtain-claim-information.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-server-attempt-s4u2self-to-obtain-claim-information.md index 1ef73b3a59..f4ddaa9d5a 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-server-attempt-s4u2self-to-obtain-claim-information.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-server-attempt-s4u2self-to-obtain-claim-information.md @@ -30,9 +30,9 @@ Describes the best practices, location, values, management, and security conside This security setting supports client devices running a version of Windows prior to Windows 8 that are trying to access a file share that requires user claims. This setting determines whether the local file server will attempt to use Kerberos Service-for-User-to-Self (S4U2Self) functionality to obtain a network client principal’s claims from the client’s account domain. This setting should only be enabled if the file server is using user claims to control access to files, and if the file server will support client principals whose accounts might be in a domain that has client computers and domain controllers running a version of Windows prior to Windows 8 or Windows Server 2012. -When enabled, this security setting causes the Windows file server to examine the access token of an authenticated network client principal and determines if claim information is present. If claims are not present, the file server will then use the Kerberos S4U2Self feature to attempt to contact a Windows Server 2012 domain controller in the client’s account domain and obtain a claims-enabled access token for the client principal. A claims-enabled token might be needed to access files or folders that have claim-based access control policy applied. +When enabled, this security setting causes the Windows file server to examine the access token of an authenticated network client principal and determines if claim information is present. If claims aren't present, the file server will then use the Kerberos S4U2Self feature to attempt to contact a Windows Server 2012 domain controller in the client’s account domain and obtain a claims-enabled access token for the client principal. A claims-enabled token might be needed to access files or folders that have claim-based access control policy applied. -If this setting is disabled, the Windows file server will not attempt to obtain a claim-enabled access token for the client principal. +If this setting is disabled, the Windows file server won't attempt to obtain a claim-enabled access token for the client principal. ### Possible values @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ### Group Policy @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat ### Vulnerability -None. Enabling this policy setting allows you take advantage of features in Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8 and later for specific scenarios to use claims-enabled tokens to access files or folders that have claim-based access control policy applied on Windows operating systems prior to Windows Server 2012 +None. Enabling this policy setting allows you to take advantage of features in Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8 and later for specific scenarios to use claims-enabled tokens to access files or folders that have claim-based access control policy applied on Windows operating systems prior to Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8. ### Countermeasure diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-server-digitally-sign-communications-always.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-server-digitally-sign-communications-always.md index afb7ddfe20..080f186f03 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-server-digitally-sign-communications-always.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-server-digitally-sign-communications-always.md @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Implementation of digital signatures in high-security networks helps prevent the Beginning with SMBv2 clients and servers, signing can be either required or not required. If this policy setting is enabled, SMBv2 clients will digitally sign all packets. Another policy setting determines whether signing is required for SMBv3 and SMBv2 server communications: [Microsoft network client: Digitally sign communications (always)](microsoft-network-client-digitally-sign-communications-always.md). -There is a negotiation done between the SMB client and the SMB server to decide whether signing will effectively be used. The following table has the effective behavior for SMBv3 and SMBv2. +There's a negotiation done between the SMB client and the SMB server to decide whether signing will effectively be used. The following table has the effective behavior for SMBv3 and SMBv2. | | Server – Required | Server – Not Required | @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ There is a negotiation done between the SMB client and the SMB server to decide 1 Default for domain controller SMB traffic
    2 Default for all other SMB traffic -Performance of SMB signing is improved in SMBv2. For more details, see [Potential impact](#potential-impact). +Performance of SMB signing is improved in SMBv2. For more information, see [Potential impact](#potential-impact). ### Possible values @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ This section describes features and tools that are available to help you manage ### Restart requirement -None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they are saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. +None. Changes to this policy become effective without a device restart when they're saved locally or distributed through Group Policy. ## Security considerations @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ This section describes how an attacker might exploit a feature or its configurat Session hijacking uses tools that allow attackers who have access to the same network as the client device or server to interrupt, end, or steal a session in progress. Attackers can potentially intercept and modify unsigned Server Message Block (SMB) packets and then modify the traffic and forward it so that the server might perform objectionable actions. Alternatively, the attacker could pose as the server or client device after legitimate authentication and gain unauthorized access to data. -SMB is the resource-sharing protocol that is supported by many Windows operating systems. It is the basis of many modern features like Storage Spaces Direct, Storage Replica, and SMB Direct, as well as many legacy protocols and tools. If either side fails the authentication process, data transmission does not take place. +SMB is the resource-sharing protocol that is supported by many Windows operating systems. It's the basis of many modern features like Storage Spaces Direct, Storage Replica, and SMB Direct, as well as many legacy protocols and tools. If either side fails the authentication process, data transmission doesn't take place. ### Countermeasure @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ Enable **Microsoft network server: Digitally sign communications (always)**. ### Potential impact -Storage speeds impact performance. A faster drive on the source and destination allows more throughput, which causes more CPU usage of signing. If you are using a 1 Gb Ethernet network or slower storage speed with a modern CPU, there is limited degradation in performance. If you are using a faster network (such as 10 Gb), the performance impact of signing may be greater. +Storage speeds impact performance. A faster drive on the source and destination allows more throughput, which causes more CPU usage of signing. If you're using a 1-GB Ethernet network or slower storage speed with a modern CPU, there's limited degradation in performance. If you're using a faster network (such as 10 Gb), the performance impact of signing may be greater. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/document-group-policy-structure-and-applocker-rule-enforcement.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/document-group-policy-structure-and-applocker-rule-enforcement.md index f21a48c714..24d9b339a4 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/document-group-policy-structure-and-applocker-rule-enforcement.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/document-group-policy-structure-and-applocker-rule-enforcement.md @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ To complete this AppLocker planning document, you should first complete the foll 3. [Select the types of rules to create](select-types-of-rules-to-create.md) 4. [Determine the Group Policy structure and rule enforcement](determine-group-policy-structure-and-rule-enforcement.md) -After you determine how to structure your Group Policy Objects (GPOs) so that you can apply AppLocker policies, you should record your findings. You can use the following table to determine how many GPOs to create (or edit) and which objects they are linked to. If you decided to create custom rules to allow system files to run, note the high-level rule configuration in the **Use default rule or define new rule condition** column. +After you determine how to structure your Group Policy Objects (GPOs) so that you can apply AppLocker policies, you should record your findings. You can use the following table to determine how many GPOs to create (or edit) and which objects they're linked to. If you decided to create custom rules to allow system files to run, note the high-level rule configuration in the **Use default rule or define new rule condition** column. The following table includes the sample data that was collected when you determined your enforcement settings and the GPO structure for your AppLocker policies. @@ -49,13 +49,13 @@ The following table includes the sample data that was collected when you determi |Bank Tellers|Teller-East and Teller-West|Yes|Teller Software|C:\Program Files\Woodgrove\Teller.exe|File is signed; create a publisher condition|Allow|Tellers-AppLockerTellerRules| ||||Windows files|C:\Windows|Create a path exception to the default rule to exclude \Windows\Temp|Allow|| |Human Resources|HR-All|Yes|Check Payout|C:\Program Files\Woodgrove\HR\Checkcut.exe|File is signed; create a publisher condition|Allow|HR-AppLockerHRRules| -||||Time Sheet Organizer|C:\Program Files\Woodgrove\HR\Timesheet.exe|File is not signed; create a file hash condition|Allow|| +||||Time Sheet Organizer|C:\Program Files\Woodgrove\HR\Timesheet.exe|File isn't signed; create a file hash condition|Allow|| ||||Internet Explorer 7|C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer

    |File is signed; create a publisher condition|Deny|| ||||Windows files|C:\Windows|Use a default rule for the Windows path|Allow|| ## Next steps -After you have determined the Group Policy structure and rule enforcement strategy for each business group's apps, the following tasks remain: +After you've determined the Group Policy structure and rule enforcement strategy for each business group's apps, the following tasks remain: - [Plan for AppLocker policy management](plan-for-applocker-policy-management.md) diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/edit-an-applocker-policy.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/edit-an-applocker-policy.md index b96a2525dd..d23ab33e4b 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/edit-an-applocker-policy.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/edit-an-applocker-policy.md @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec This topic for IT professionals describes the steps required to modify an AppLocker policy. -You can edit an AppLocker policy by adding, changing, or removing rules. However, you cannot create a new version of the policy by importing additional rules. To modify an AppLocker policy that is in production, you should use Group Policy management software that allows you to version Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If you have created multiple AppLocker policies and need to merge them to create one AppLocker policy, you can either manually merge the policies or use the Windows PowerShell cmdlets for AppLocker. You cannot automatically merge policies by using the AppLocker snap-in. You must create one rule collection from two or more policies. The AppLocker policy is saved in XML format, and the exported policy can be edited with any text or XML editor. For info about merging policies, see [Merge AppLocker policies manually](merge-applocker-policies-manually.md) or [Merge AppLocker policies by using Set-ApplockerPolicy](merge-applocker-policies-by-using-set-applockerpolicy.md). +You can edit an AppLocker policy by adding, changing, or removing rules. However, you can't create a new version of the policy by importing more rules. To modify an AppLocker policy that is in production, you should use Group Policy management software that allows you to version Group Policy Objects (GPOs). If you have created multiple AppLocker policies and need to merge them to create one AppLocker policy, you can either manually merge the policies or use the Windows PowerShell cmdlets for AppLocker. You can't automatically merge policies by using the AppLocker snap-in. You must create one rule collection from two or more policies. The AppLocker policy is saved in XML format, and the exported policy can be edited with any text or XML editor. For info about merging policies, see [Merge AppLocker policies manually](merge-applocker-policies-manually.md) or [Merge AppLocker policies by using Set-ApplockerPolicy](merge-applocker-policies-by-using-set-applockerpolicy.md). There are three methods you can use to edit an AppLocker policy: @@ -46,16 +46,15 @@ For more information, see the [AppLocker CSP](/windows/client-management/mdm/app ## Editing an AppLocker policy by using Group Policy -The steps to edit an AppLocker policy distributed by Group Policy include the following: +The steps to edit an AppLocker policy distributed by Group Policy include: ### Step 1: Use Group Policy management software to export the AppLocker policy from the GPO -AppLocker provides a feature to export and import AppLocker policies as an XML file. This allows you to modify an AppLocker policy outside your production environment. Because updating an AppLocker policy in a deployed GPO could have unintended consequences, you should first export the AppLocker -policy to an XML file. For the procedure to do this, see [Export an AppLocker policy from a GPO](export-an-applocker-policy-from-a-gpo.md). +AppLocker provides a feature to export and import AppLocker policies as an XML file. This feature allows you to modify an AppLocker policy outside your production environment. Because updating an AppLocker policy in a deployed GPO could have unintended consequences, you should first export the AppLocker policy to an XML file. For information on the procedure to export this policy, see [Export an AppLocker policy from a GPO](export-an-applocker-policy-from-a-gpo.md). ### Step 2: Import the AppLocker policy into the AppLocker reference PC or the PC you use for policy maintenance -After exporting the AppLocker policy to an XML file, you should import the XML file onto a reference PC so that you can edit the policy. For the procedure to import an AppLocker policy, see [Import an AppLocker policy from another computer](import-an-applocker-policy-from-another-computer.md). +After exporting the AppLocker policy to an XML file, you should import the XML file onto a reference PC so that you can edit the policy. For information on the procedure to import an AppLocker policy, see [Import an AppLocker policy from another computer](import-an-applocker-policy-from-another-computer.md). >**Caution:**  Importing a policy onto another PC will overwrite the existing policy on that PC.   @@ -63,8 +62,8 @@ After exporting the AppLocker policy to an XML file, you should import the XML f AppLocker provides ways to modify, delete, or add rules to a policy by modifying the rules within the collection. -- For the procedure to modify a rule, see [Edit AppLocker rules](edit-applocker-rules.md). -- For the procedure to delete a rule, see [Delete an AppLocker rule](delete-an-applocker-rule.md). +- For information on the procedure to modify a rule, see [Edit AppLocker rules](edit-applocker-rules.md). +- For information on the procedure to delete a rule, see [Delete an AppLocker rule](delete-an-applocker-rule.md). - For procedures to create rules, see: - [Create a rule that uses a publisher condition](create-a-rule-that-uses-a-publisher-condition.md) @@ -72,7 +71,7 @@ AppLocker provides ways to modify, delete, or add rules to a policy by modifying - [Create a rule that uses a file hash condition](create-a-rule-that-uses-a-file-hash-condition.md) - [Enable the DLL rule collection](enable-the-dll-rule-collection.md) -- For steps to test an AppLocker policy, see [Test and update an AppLocker policy](test-and-update-an-applocker-policy.md). +- For information on the steps to test an AppLocker policy, see [Test and update an AppLocker policy](test-and-update-an-applocker-policy.md). - For procedures to export the updated policy from the reference computer back into the GPO, see [Export an AppLocker policy to an XML file](export-an-applocker-policy-to-an-xml-file.md) and [Import an AppLocker policy into a GPO](import-an-applocker-policy-into-a-gpo.md). ### Step 4: Use AppLocker and Group Policy to import the AppLocker policy back into the GPO @@ -91,7 +90,7 @@ The steps to edit an AppLocker policy distributed by using the Local Security Po On the PC where you maintain policies, open the AppLocker snap-in from the Local Security Policy snap-in (secpol.msc). If you exported the AppLocker policy from another PC, use AppLocker to import it onto the PC. -After exporting the AppLocker policy to an XML file, you should import the XML file onto a reference PC so that you can edit the policy. For the procedure to import an AppLocker policy, see [Import an AppLocker policy from another computer](import-an-applocker-policy-from-another-computer.md). +After exporting the AppLocker policy to an XML file, you should import the XML file onto a reference PC so that you can edit the policy. For information on the procedure to import an AppLocker policy, see [Import an AppLocker policy from another computer](import-an-applocker-policy-from-another-computer.md). >**Caution:**  Importing a policy onto another PC will overwrite the existing policy on that PC.   @@ -99,8 +98,8 @@ After exporting the AppLocker policy to an XML file, you should import the XML f AppLocker provides ways to modify, delete, or add rules to a policy by modifying the rules within the collection. -- For the procedure to modify a rule, see [Edit AppLocker rules](edit-applocker-rules.md). -- For the procedure to delete a rule, see [Delete an AppLocker rule](delete-an-applocker-rule.md). +- For information on the procedure to modify a rule, see [Edit AppLocker rules](edit-applocker-rules.md). +- For information on the procedure to delete a rule, see [Delete an AppLocker rule](delete-an-applocker-rule.md). - For procedures to create rules, see: - [Create a rule that uses a publisher condition](create-a-rule-that-uses-a-publisher-condition.md) @@ -116,6 +115,6 @@ For steps to test an AppLocker policy, see [Test and update an AppLocker policy] For procedures to export the updated policy from the reference computer to targeted computers, see [Export an AppLocker policy to an XML file](export-an-applocker-policy-to-an-xml-file.md) and [Import an AppLocker policy from another computer](import-an-applocker-policy-from-another-computer.md). -## Additional resources +## Other resources - For steps to perform other AppLocker policy tasks, see [Administer AppLocker](administer-applocker.md). diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/maintain-applocker-policies.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/maintain-applocker-policies.md index 04db4a506d..97c6d66e6c 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/maintain-applocker-policies.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/maintain-applocker-policies.md @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ For every scenario, the steps to maintain an AppLocker policy distributed by Gro As new apps are deployed or existing apps are removed by your organization or updated by the software publisher, you might need to make revisions to your rules and update the Group Policy Object (GPO) to ensure that your policy is current. -You can edit an AppLocker policy by adding, changing, or removing rules. However, you cannot specify a version for the AppLocker policy by importing additional rules. To ensure version control when modifying an AppLocker policy, use Group Policy management software that allows you to create +You can edit an AppLocker policy by adding, changing, or removing rules. However, you can't specify a version for the AppLocker policy by importing more rules. To ensure version control when modifying an AppLocker policy, use Group Policy management software that allows you to create versions of GPOs. >**Caution:**  You should not edit an AppLocker rule collection while it is being enforced in Group Policy. Because AppLocker controls what files are allowed to run, making changes to a live policy can create unexpected behavior. @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ Updating an AppLocker policy that is currently enforced in your production envir After the AppLocker policy has been exported from the GPO into the AppLocker reference or test computer, or has been accessed on the local computer, the specific rules can be modified as required. -To modify AppLocker rules, see the following: +To modify AppLocker rules, see the following articles: - [Edit AppLocker rules](edit-applocker-rules.md) - [Merge AppLocker policies by using Set-ApplockerPolicy](merge-applocker-policies-by-using-set-applockerpolicy.md) or [Merge AppLocker policies manually](merge-applocker-policies-manually.md) @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ Before modifying a policy, evaluate how the policy is currently implemented. ### Step 2: Update the AppLocker policy by modifying the appropriate AppLocker rule -Rules are grouped into a collection, which can have the policy enforcement setting applied to it. By default, AppLocker rules do not allow users to open or run any files that are not specifically allowed. +Rules are grouped into a collection, which can have the policy enforcement setting applied to it. By default, AppLocker rules don't allow users to open or run any files that aren't allowed. To modify AppLocker rules, see the appropriate topic listed on [Administer AppLocker](administer-applocker.md). @@ -117,6 +117,6 @@ You can export and then import AppLocker policies to deploy the policy to other After deploying a policy, evaluate the policy's effectiveness. -## Additional resources +## Other resources - For steps to perform other AppLocker policy tasks, see [Administer AppLocker](administer-applocker.md). \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/manage-packaged-apps-with-applocker.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/manage-packaged-apps-with-applocker.md index 6c12bd897b..477f41380a 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/manage-packaged-apps-with-applocker.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/manage-packaged-apps-with-applocker.md @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ This topic for IT professionals describes concepts and lists procedures to help ## Understanding Packaged apps and Packaged app installers for AppLocker Packaged apps, also known as Universal Windows apps, are based on a model that ensures all the files within an app package share the same identity. With classic Windows apps, each file within the app could have a unique identity. -With packaged apps, it is possible to control the entire app by using a single AppLocker rule. +With packaged apps, it's possible to control the entire app by using a single AppLocker rule. > [!NOTE] > AppLocker supports only publisher rules for packaged apps. All packaged apps must be signed by the software publisher because Windows does not support unsigned packaged apps. @@ -46,8 +46,8 @@ Typically, an app consists of multiple components: the installer that is used to AppLocker policies for packaged apps can only be applied to apps installed on computers running at least Windows Server 2012 or Windows 8, but classic Windows apps can be controlled on devices running at least Windows Server 2008 R2 or Windows 7. The rules for classic Windows apps and packaged apps can be enforced in tandem. The differences between packaged apps and classic Windows apps that you should consider include: -- **Installing the apps**   All packaged apps can be installed by a standard user, whereas a number of classic Windows apps require administrative privileges to install. In an environment where most of the users are standard users, you might not have numerous exe rules (because classic Windows apps require administrative privileges to install), but you might want to have more explicit policies for packaged apps. -- **Changing the system state**   Classic Windows apps can be written to change the system state if they are run with administrative privileges. Most packaged apps cannot change the system state because they run with limited privileges. When you design your AppLocker policies, it is important to understand whether an app that you are allowing can make system-wide changes. +- **Installing the apps**   All packaged apps can be installed by a standard user, whereas many classic Windows apps require administrative privileges to install. In an environment where most of the users are standard users, you might not have numerous exe rules (because classic Windows apps require administrative privileges to install), but you might want to have more explicit policies for packaged apps. +- **Changing the system state**   Classic Windows apps can be written to change the system state if they're run with administrative privileges. Most packaged apps can't change the system state because they run with limited privileges. When you design your AppLocker policies, it's important to understand whether an app that you're allowing can make system-wide changes. - **Acquiring the apps**   Packaged apps can be acquired through the Store, or by loading using Windows PowerShell cmdlets (which requires a special enterprise license). Classic Windows apps can be acquired through traditional means. AppLocker uses different rule collections to control packaged apps and classic Windows apps. You have the choice to control one type, the other type, or both. @@ -67,12 +67,12 @@ For info about how to use the **Get-AppxPackage** Windows PowerShell cmdlet, see For info about creating rules for Packaged apps, see [Create a rule for packaged apps](create-a-rule-for-packaged-apps.md). -Consider the following info when you are designing and deploying apps: +Consider the following info when you're designing and deploying apps: -- Because AppLocker supports only publisher rules for packaged apps, collecting the installation path information for packaged apps is not necessary. -- You cannot create hash- or path-based rules for packaged apps because all packaged apps and packaged app installers are signed by the software publisher of the package. Classic Windows apps were not always consistently signed; therefore, AppLocker has to support hash- or path-based rules. -- By default, if there are no rules in a particular rule collection, AppLocker allows every file that is included in that rule collection. For example, if there are no Windows Installer rules, AppLocker allows all .msi, .msp, and .mst files to run. An existing AppLocker policy that was targeted at computers running Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7 would not have rules for Packaged apps. Therefore, when a computer running at least Windows Server 2012 or -Windows 8 joins a domain where an AppLocker policy is already configured, users would be allowed to run any packaged app. This might be contrary to your design. +- Because AppLocker supports only publisher rules for packaged apps, collecting the installation path information for packaged apps isn't necessary. +- You can't create hash- or path-based rules for packaged apps because all packaged apps and packaged app installers are signed by the software publisher of the package. Classic Windows apps weren't always consistently signed; therefore, AppLocker has to support hash- or path-based rules. +- By default, if there are no rules in a particular rule collection, AppLocker allows every file that is included in that rule collection. For example, if there are no Windows Installer rules, AppLocker allows all .msi, .msp, and .mst files to run. An existing AppLocker policy that was targeted at computers running Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7 wouldn't have rules for Packaged apps. Therefore, when a computer running at least Windows Server 2012 or +Windows 8 joins a domain where an AppLocker policy is already configured, users would be allowed to run any packaged app, which is contrary to your design. To prevent all packaged apps from running on a newly domain-joined computer, by default AppLocker blocks all packaged apps on a computer running at least Windows Server 2012 or Windows 8 if the existing domain policy has rules configured in the exe rule collection. You must take explicit action to allow packaged apps in your enterprise. You can allow only a select set of packaged apps. Or if you want to allow all packaged apps, you can create a default rule for the packaged apps collection. @@ -80,10 +80,10 @@ Windows 8 joins a domain where an AppLocker policy is already configured, users Just as there are differences in managing each rule collection, you need to manage the packaged apps with the following strategy: -1. Gather information about which Packaged apps are running in your environment. For information about how to do this, see [Create list of apps deployed to each business group](create-list-of-applications-deployed-to-each-business-group.md). +1. Gather information about which Packaged apps are running in your environment. For information about how to gather this information, see [Create list of apps deployed to each business group](create-list-of-applications-deployed-to-each-business-group.md). 2. Create AppLocker rules for specific packaged apps based on your policy strategies. For more information, see [Create a rule for packaged apps](create-a-rule-for-packaged-apps.md) and [Understanding AppLocker default rules](./understanding-applocker-default-rules.md). -3. Continue to update the AppLocker policies as new package apps are introduced into your environment. To do this, see [Add rules for packaged apps to existing AppLocker rule-set](add-rules-for-packaged-apps-to-existing-applocker-rule-set.md). +3. Continue to update the AppLocker policies as new package apps are introduced into your environment. To do this update, see [Add rules for packaged apps to existing AppLocker rule-set](add-rules-for-packaged-apps-to-existing-applocker-rule-set.md). -4. Continue to monitor your environment to verify the effectiveness of the rules that are deployed in AppLocker policies. To do this, see [Monitor app usage with AppLocker](monitor-application-usage-with-applocker.md). \ No newline at end of file +4. Continue to monitor your environment to verify the effectiveness of the rules that are deployed in AppLocker policies. To do this monitoring, see [Monitor app usage with AppLocker](monitor-application-usage-with-applocker.md). \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/merge-applocker-policies-by-using-set-applockerpolicy.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/merge-applocker-policies-by-using-set-applockerpolicy.md index 7737b4399b..6d553816d9 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/merge-applocker-policies-by-using-set-applockerpolicy.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/merge-applocker-policies-by-using-set-applockerpolicy.md @@ -31,13 +31,13 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec This topic for IT professionals describes the steps to merge AppLocker policies by using Windows PowerShell. -The **Set-AppLockerPolicy** cmdlet sets the specified Group Policy Object (GPO) to contain the specified AppLocker policy. If no Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is specified, the local GPO is the default. When the Merge parameter is used, rules in the specified AppLocker policy will be merged with the AppLocker rules in the target GPO specified in the LDAP path. The merging of policies will remove rules with duplicate rule IDs, and the enforcement setting specified by the AppLocker policy in the target GPO will be preserved. If the Merge parameter is not specified, then the new policy will overwrite the existing policy. +The **Set-AppLockerPolicy** cmdlet sets the specified Group Policy Object (GPO) to contain the specified AppLocker policy. If no Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is specified, the local GPO is the default. When the Merge parameter is used, rules in the specified AppLocker policy will be merged with the AppLocker rules in the target GPO specified in the LDAP path. The merging of policies will remove rules with duplicate rule IDs, and the enforcement setting specified by the AppLocker policy in the target GPO will be preserved. If the Merge parameter isn't specified, then the new policy will overwrite the existing policy. For info about using **Set-AppLockerPolicy**, including syntax descriptions and parameters, see [Set-AppLockerPolicy](/powershell/module/applocker/set-applockerpolicy). For info about using Windows PowerShell for AppLocker, including how to import the AppLocker cmdlets into Windows PowerShell, see [Use the AppLocker Windows PowerShell cmdlets](use-the-applocker-windows-powershell-cmdlets.md). -You can also manually merge AppLocker policies. For the procedure to do this, see [Merge AppLocker policies manually](merge-applocker-policies-manually.md). +You can also manually merge AppLocker policies. For information on the procedure to do this merging, see [Merge AppLocker policies manually](merge-applocker-policies-manually.md). **To merge a local AppLocker policy with another AppLocker policy by using LDAP paths** 1. Open the PowerShell command window. For info about performing Windows PowerShell commands for AppLocker, see [Use the AppLocker Windows PowerShell cmdlets](use-the-applocker-windows-powershell-cmdlets.md). diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/merge-applocker-policies-manually.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/merge-applocker-policies-manually.md index 4063ae1e66..de6eab6cab 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/merge-applocker-policies-manually.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/merge-applocker-policies-manually.md @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec This topic for IT professionals describes the steps to manually merge AppLocker policies to update the Group Policy Object (GPO). -If you have created multiple AppLocker policies and need to merge them to create one AppLocker policy, you can either manually merge the policies or use the Windows PowerShell cmdlets for AppLocker. You cannot automatically merge policies by using the AppLocker console. You must create one rule collection from two or more policies. For info about merging policies by using the cmdlet, see [Merge AppLocker policies by using Set-ApplockerPolicy](merge-applocker-policies-by-using-set-applockerpolicy.md). +If you have created multiple AppLocker policies and need to merge them to create one AppLocker policy, you can either manually merge the policies or use the Windows PowerShell cmdlets for AppLocker. You can't automatically merge policies by using the AppLocker console. You must create one rule collection from two or more policies. For info about merging policies by using the cmdlet, see [Merge AppLocker policies by using Set-ApplockerPolicy](merge-applocker-policies-by-using-set-applockerpolicy.md). The AppLocker policy is saved in XML format, and the exported policy can be edited with any text or XML editor. Rule collections are specified within the **RuleCollection Type** element. The XML schema includes five attributes for the different rule collections, as shown in the following table: @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ Rule enforcement is specified with the **EnforcementMode** element. The three en | AuditOnly | Audit only| | Enabled | Enforce rules| -Each of the three condition types use specific elements. For XML examples of the different rule types, see Merge AppLocker policies manually. +Each of the three condition types uses specific elements. For XML examples of the different rule types, see Merge AppLocker policies manually. Membership in the local **Administrators** group, or equivalent, is the minimum required to complete this procedure. @@ -63,4 +63,4 @@ Membership in the local **Administrators** group, or equivalent, is the minimum 4. Open the policy where you want to add the copied rules. 5. Select and expand the rule collection where you want to add the rules. 6. At the bottom of the rule list for the collection, after the closing element, paste the rules that you copied from the first policy file. Verify that the opening and closing elements are intact, and then save the policy. -7. Upload the policy to a reference computer to ensure that it is functioning properly within the GPO. +7. Upload the policy to a reference computer to ensure that it's functioning properly within the GPO. diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/monitor-application-usage-with-applocker.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/monitor-application-usage-with-applocker.md index a19c80618b..2a7f113724 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/monitor-application-usage-with-applocker.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/monitor-application-usage-with-applocker.md @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec This topic for IT professionals describes how to monitor app usage when AppLocker policies are applied. -Once you set rules and deploy the AppLocker policies, it is good practice to determine if the policy implementation is what you expected. +Once you set rules and deploy the AppLocker policies, it's a good practice to determine if the policy implementation is what you expected. ### Discover the effect of an AppLocker policy @@ -39,27 +39,27 @@ You can evaluate how the AppLocker policy is currently implemented for documenta - **Analyze the AppLocker logs in Event Viewer** - When AppLocker policy enforcement is set to **Enforce rules**, rules are enforced for the rule collection and all events are audited. When AppLocker policy enforcement is set to **Audit only**, rules are not enforced but are still evaluated to generate audit event data that is written to the AppLocker logs. + When AppLocker policy enforcement is set to **Enforce rules**, rules are enforced for the rule collection and all events are audited. When AppLocker policy enforcement is set to **Audit only**, rules aren't enforced but are still evaluated to generate audit event data that is written to the AppLocker logs. - For the procedure to access the log, see [View the AppLocker Log in Event Viewer](#bkmk-applkr-view-log). + For more information on the procedure to access the log, see [View the AppLocker Log in Event Viewer](#bkmk-applkr-view-log). - **Enable the Audit only AppLocker enforcement setting** By using the **Audit only** enforcement setting, you can ensure that the AppLocker rules are properly configured for your organization. When AppLocker policy enforcement is set to **Audit only**, rules are only evaluated but all events generated from that evaluation are written to the AppLocker log. - For the procedure to do this, see [Configure an AppLocker policy for audit only](configure-an-applocker-policy-for-audit-only.md). + For more information on the procedure to do this configuration, see [Configure an AppLocker policy for audit only](configure-an-applocker-policy-for-audit-only.md). - **Review AppLocker events with Get-AppLockerFileInformation** - For both event subscriptions and local events, you can use the **Get-AppLockerFileInformation** Windows PowerShell cmdlet to determine which files have been blocked or would have been blocked (if you are using the audit-only enforcement mode) and how many times the event has occurred for each file. + For both event subscriptions and local events, you can use the **Get-AppLockerFileInformation** Windows PowerShell cmdlet to determine which files have been blocked or would have been blocked (if you're using the audit-only enforcement mode) and how many times the event has occurred for each file. - For the procedure to do this, see [Review AppLocker Events with Get-AppLockerFileInformation](#bkmk-applkr-review-events). + For more information on the procedure to do this verification, see [Review AppLocker Events with Get-AppLockerFileInformation](#bkmk-applkr-review-events). - **Review AppLocker events with Test-AppLockerPolicy** You can use the **Test-AppLockerPolicy** Windows PowerShell cmdlet to determine whether any of the rules in your rule collections will be blocked on your reference device or the device on which you maintain policies. - For the procedure to do this, see [Test an AppLocker policy by using Test-AppLockerPolicy](test-an-applocker-policy-by-using-test-applockerpolicy.md). + For more information on the procedure to do this testing, see [Test an AppLocker policy by using Test-AppLockerPolicy](test-an-applocker-policy-by-using-test-applockerpolicy.md). ### Review AppLocker events with Get-AppLockerFileInformation @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ Membership in the local **Administrators** group, or equivalent, is the minimum **To view events in the AppLocker log by using Event Viewer** -1. Open Event Viewer. To do this, click **Start**, type **eventvwr.msc**, and then press ENTER. +1. To open Event Viewer, go to the **Start** menu, type **eventvwr.msc**, and then select ENTER. 2. In the console tree under **Application and Services Logs\\Microsoft\\Windows**, double-click **AppLocker**. AppLocker events are listed in either the **EXE and DLL** log, the **MSI and Script** log, or the **Packaged app-Deployment** or **Packaged app-Execution** log. Event information includes the enforcement setting, file name, date and time, and user name. The logs can be exported to other file diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/packaged-apps-and-packaged-app-installer-rules-in-applocker.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/packaged-apps-and-packaged-app-installer-rules-in-applocker.md index c79be76e77..0ee1ed1988 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/packaged-apps-and-packaged-app-installer-rules-in-applocker.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/packaged-apps-and-packaged-app-installer-rules-in-applocker.md @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec This topic explains the AppLocker rule collection for packaged app installers and packaged apps. Universal Windows apps can be installed through the Microsoft Store or can be sideloaded using the Windows PowerShell cmdlets. Universal Windows apps can be installed by a standard user unlike some Classic Windows applications that sometimes require administrative privileges for installation. -Typically, an app consists of multiple components – the installer used to install the app and one or more exes, dlls or scripts. With Classic Windows applications, not all those components always share common attributes such as the publisher name, product name and product version. Therefore, AppLocker has to control each of these components separately through different rule collections – exe, dll, script and Windows Installers. In contrast, all the components of a Universal Windows app share the same attributes: Publisher name, Package name and Package version. It is therefore possible to control an entire app with a single rule. +Typically, an app consists of multiple components – the installer used to install the app and one or more exes, dlls or scripts. With Classic Windows applications, not all those components always share common attributes such as the publisher name, product name and product version. Therefore, AppLocker has to control each of these components separately through different rule collections – exe, dll, script and Windows Installers. In contrast, all the components of a Universal Windows app share the same attributes: Publisher name, Package name and Package version. It's therefore possible to control an entire app with a single rule. AppLocker enforces rules for Universal Windows apps separately from Classic Windows applications. A single AppLocker rule for a Universal Windows app can control both the installation and the running of an app. Because all Universal Windows apps are signed, AppLocker supports only publisher rules for Universal Windows apps. A publisher rule for a Universal Windows app is based on the following attributes of the app: diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/plan-for-applocker-policy-management.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/plan-for-applocker-policy-management.md index 2f5df9dc7c..65214802ff 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/plan-for-applocker-policy-management.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/plan-for-applocker-policy-management.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- title: Plan for AppLocker policy management (Windows) -description: This topic for describes the decisions you need to make to establish the processes for managing and maintaining AppLocker policies. +description: This topic describes the decisions you need to make to establish the processes for managing and maintaining AppLocker policies. ms.assetid: dccc196f-6ae0-4ae4-853a-a3312b18751b ms.reviewer: ms.author: dansimp @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec >[!NOTE] >Some capabilities of Windows Defender Application Control are only available on specific Windows versions. Learn more about the [Windows Defender Application Control feature availability](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/feature-availability). -This topic for describes the decisions you need to make to establish the processes for managing and maintaining AppLocker policies. +This topic describes the decisions you need to make to establish the processes for managing and maintaining AppLocker policies. ## Policy management @@ -46,23 +46,23 @@ Developing a process for managing AppLocker rules helps assure that AppLocker co **Help desk support** -If your organization has an established help desk support department in place, consider the following when deploying AppLocker policies: +If your organization has an established help desk support department in place, consider the following points when deploying AppLocker policies: - What documentation does your support department require for new policy deployments? - What are the critical processes in each business group both in work flow and timing that will be affected by application control policies and how could they affect your support department's workload? - Who are the contacts in the support department? -- How will the support department resolve application control issues between the end user and those who maintain the AppLocker rules? +- How will the support department resolve application control issues between the end user and those resources who maintain the AppLocker rules? **End-user support** -Because AppLocker is preventing unapproved apps from running, it is important that your organization carefully plan how to provide end-user support. Considerations include: +Because AppLocker is preventing unapproved apps from running, it's important that your organization carefully plans how to provide end-user support. Considerations include: - Do you want to use an intranet site as a first line of support for users who have tried to run a blocked app? - How do you want to support exceptions to the policy? Will you allow users to run a script to temporarily allow access to a blocked app? **Using an intranet site** -AppLocker can be configured to display the default message but with a custom URL. You can use this URL to redirect users to a support site that contains information about why the user received the error and which applications are allowed. If you do not display a custom URL for the message when an app is blocked, the default URL is used. +AppLocker can be configured to display the default message but with a custom URL. You can use this URL to redirect users to a support site that contains information about why the user received the error and which applications are allowed. If you don't display a custom URL for the message when an app is blocked, the default URL is used. The following image shows an example of the error message for a blocked app. You can use the **Set a support web link** policy setting to customize the **More information** link. @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ For steps to display a custom URL for the message, see [Display a custom URL mes **AppLocker event management** -Each time that a process requests permission to run, AppLocker creates an event in the AppLocker event log. The event details which file tried to run, the attributes of that file, the user that initiated the request, and the rule GUID that was used to make the AppLocker execution decision. The +Each time that a process requests permission to run, AppLocker creates an event in the AppLocker event log. The event details which was the file that tried to run, the attributes of that file, the user that initiated the request, and the rule GUID that was used to make the AppLocker execution decision. The AppLocker event log is located in the following path: **Applications and Services Logs\\Microsoft\\Windows\\AppLocker**. The AppLocker log includes three logs: 1. **EXE and DLL**. Contains events for all files affected by the executable and DLL rule collections (.exe, .com, .dll, and .ocx). @@ -83,22 +83,22 @@ Collecting these events in a central location can help you maintain your AppLock ### Policy maintenance -As new apps are deployed or existing apps are updated by the software publisher, you will need to make revisions to your rule collections to ensure that the policy is current. +As new apps are deployed or existing apps are updated by the software publisher, you'll need to make revisions to your rule collections to ensure that the policy is current. -You can edit an AppLocker policy by adding, changing, or removing rules. However, you cannot specify a version for the policy by importing additional rules. To ensure version control when modifying an AppLocker policy, use Group Policy management software that allows you to create versions of Group Policy Objects (GPOs). An example of this type of software is the Advanced Group Policy Management feature from the Microsoft Desktop Optimization Pack. For more info about Advanced Group Policy Management, see [Advanced Group Policy Management Overview](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkId=145013) (https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkId=145013). +You can edit an AppLocker policy by adding, changing, or removing rules. However, you can't specify a version for the policy by importing more rules. To ensure version control when modifying an AppLocker policy, use Group Policy management software that allows you to create versions of Group Policy Objects (GPOs). An example of this type of software is the Advanced Group Policy Management feature from the Microsoft Desktop Optimization Pack. For more info about Advanced Group Policy Management, see [Advanced Group Policy Management Overview](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkId=145013) (https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkId=145013). > [!IMPORTANT] > You should not edit an AppLocker rule collection while it is being enforced in Group Policy. Because AppLocker controls what files are allowed to run, making changes to a live policy can create unexpected behavior. **New version of a supported app** -When a new version of an app is deployed in the organization, you need to determine whether to continue to support the previous version of that app. To add the new version, you might only need to create a new rule for each file that is associated with the app. If you are using publisher conditions and the version is not specified, then the existing rule or rules might be sufficient to allow the updated file to run. You must ensure, however, that the updated app has not altered the file names or added files to support new functionality. If so, then you must modify the existing rules or create new rules. To continue to reuse a publisher-based rule without a specific file version, you must also ensure that the file's digital signature is still identical to the previous version—the publisher, product name, and file name (if configured in your rule) must all match for the rule to be correctly applied. +When a new version of an app is deployed in the organization, you need to determine whether to continue to support the previous version of that app. To add the new version, you might only need to create a new rule for each file that is associated with the app. If you're using publisher conditions and the version isn't specified, then the existing rule or rules might be sufficient to allow the updated file to run. You must ensure, however, that the updated app hasn't altered the file names or added files to support new functionality. If so, then you must modify the existing rules or create new rules. To continue to reuse a publisher-based rule without a specific file version, you must also ensure that the file's digital signature is still identical to the previous version—the publisher, product name, and file name (if configured in your rule) must all match for the rule to be correctly applied. To determine whether a file has been modified during an app update, review the publisher's release details provided with the update package. You can also review the publisher's web page to retrieve this information. Each file can also be inspected to determine the version. For files that are allowed or denied with file hash conditions, you must retrieve the new file hash. To add support for a new version and maintain support for the older version, you can either create a new file hash rule for the new version or edit the existing rule and add the new file hash to the list of conditions. -For files with path conditions, you should verify that the installation path has not changed from what is stated in the rule. If the path has changed, you need to update the rule before installing the new version of the app +For files with path conditions, you should verify that the installation path hasn't changed from what is stated in the rule. If the path has changed, you need to update the rule before installing the new version of the app **Recently deployed app** @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ A file could be blocked for three reasons: - The most common reason is that no rule exists to allow the app to run. - There may be an existing rule that was created for the file that is too restrictive. -- A deny rule, which cannot be overridden, is explicitly blocking the file. +- A deny rule, which can't be overridden, is explicitly blocking the file. Before editing the rule collection, first determine what rule is preventing the file from running. You can troubleshoot the problem by using the **Test-AppLockerPolicy** Windows PowerShell cmdlet. For more info about troubleshooting an AppLocker policy, see [Testing and Updating an AppLocker Policy](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/ee791793(v=ws.10)) (https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkId=160269). @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ The three key areas to determine for AppLocker policy management are: 1. Support policy - Document the process that you will use for handling calls from users who have attempted to run a blocked app, and ensure that support personnel know recommended troubleshooting steps and escalation points for your policy. + Document the process that you'll use for handling calls from users who have attempted to run a blocked app, and ensure that support personnel know recommended troubleshooting steps and escalation points for your policy. 2. Event processing @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ The following table contains the added sample data that was collected when deter |Bank Tellers|Teller-East and Teller-West|Yes|Teller Software|C:\Program Files\Woodgrove\Teller.exe|File is signed; create a publisher condition|Allow|Tellers-AppLockerTellerRules|Web help| ||||Windows files|C:\Windows|Create a path exception to the default rule to exclude \Windows\Temp|Allow||Help desk| |Human Resources|HR-All|Yes|Check Payout|C:\Program Files\Woodgrove\HR\Checkcut.exe|File is signed; create a publisher condition|Allow|HR-AppLockerHRRules|Web help| -||||Time Sheet Organizer|C:\Program Files\Woodgrove\HR\Timesheet.exe|File is not signed; create a file hash condition|Allow||Web help| +||||Time Sheet Organizer|C:\Program Files\Woodgrove\HR\Timesheet.exe|File isn't signed; create a file hash condition|Allow||Web help| ||||Internet Explorer 7|C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer

    |File is signed; create a publisher condition|Deny||Web help| ||||Windows files|C:\Windows|Use the default rule for the Windows path|Allow||Help desk| @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ The following two tables illustrate examples of documenting considerations to ma **Event processing policy** -One discovery method for app usage is to set the AppLocker enforcement mode to **Audit only**. This will write events to the AppLocker logs, which can be managed and analyzed like other Windows logs. After apps have been identified, you can begin to develop policies regarding the processing and access to AppLocker events. +One discovery method for app usage is to set the AppLocker enforcement mode to **Audit only**. This setting will write events to the AppLocker logs, which can be managed and analyzed like other Windows logs. After apps have been identified, you can begin to develop policies regarding the processing and access to AppLocker events. The following table is an example of what to consider and record. diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/refresh-an-applocker-policy.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/refresh-an-applocker-policy.md index e4d36fb82e..9d554232ef 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/refresh-an-applocker-policy.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/refresh-an-applocker-policy.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ To complete this procedure, you must have Edit Setting permission to edit a GPO **To manually refresh the AppLocker policy by using Group Policy** 1. From a command prompt, type **gpupdate /force**, and then press ENTER. -2. When the command finishes, close the command prompt window, and then verify that the intended rule behavior is correct. You can do this by checking the AppLocker event logs for events that include "policy applied." +2. When the command finishes, close the command prompt window, and then verify that the intended rule behavior is correct. You can do this verification by checking the AppLocker event logs for events that include "policy applied." To change a policy on an individual computer, or to implement that policy on other computers, without using Group Policy, you first need to update the rule within the rule collection. For information about updating existing rules, see [Edit AppLocker rules](edit-applocker-rules.md). For information about creating a new rule for an existing policy, see: @@ -64,8 +64,8 @@ When finished, the policy is in effect. To make the same change on another device, you can use any of the following methods: -- From the device that you made the change on, export the AppLocker policy, and then import the policy onto the other device. To do this, use the AppLocker **Export Policy** and **Import Policy** features to copy the rules from the changed computer. +- From the device that you made the change on, export the AppLocker policy, and then import the policy onto the other device. To do these tasks, use the AppLocker **Export Policy** and **Import Policy** features to copy the rules from the changed computer. >**Caution:**  When importing rules from another computer, all the rules will be applied, not just the one that was updated. Merging policies allows both existing and updated (or new) rules to be applied.   -- Merge AppLocker policies. For procedures to do this, see [Merge AppLocker policies manually](merge-applocker-policies-manually.md) and [Merge AppLocker policies by using Set-ApplockerPolicy](merge-applocker-policies-by-using-set-applockerpolicy.md). +- Merge AppLocker policies. For information on the procedures to do this merging, see [Merge AppLocker policies manually](merge-applocker-policies-manually.md) and [Merge AppLocker policies by using Set-ApplockerPolicy](merge-applocker-policies-by-using-set-applockerpolicy.md). diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/run-the-automatically-generate-rules-wizard.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/run-the-automatically-generate-rules-wizard.md index b45234c1a0..807313b37d 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/run-the-automatically-generate-rules-wizard.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/run-the-automatically-generate-rules-wizard.md @@ -40,15 +40,15 @@ You can perform this task by using the Group Policy Management Console for an Ap 1. Open the AppLocker console. 2. Right-click the appropriate rule type for which you want to automatically generate rules. You can automatically generate rules for executable, Windows Installer, script and packaged app rules. 3. Click **Automatically Generate Rules**. -4. On the **Folder and Permissions** page, click **Browse** to choose the folder to be analyzed. By default, this is the Program Files folder. -5. Click **Select** to choose the security group in which the default rules should be applied. By default, this is the **Everyone** group. -6. The wizard provides a name in the **Name to identify this set of rules** box based on the name of the folder that you have selected. Accept the provided name or type a different name, and then click **Next**. +4. On the **Folder and Permissions** page, click **Browse** to choose the folder to be analyzed. By default, this folder is the Program Files folder. +5. Click **Select** to choose the security group in which the default rules should be applied. By default, this group is the **Everyone** group. +6. The wizard provides a name in the **Name to identify this set of rules** box based on the name of the folder that you've selected. Accept the provided name or type a different name, and then click **Next**. 7. On the **Rule Preferences** page, choose the conditions that you want the wizard to use while creating rules, and then click **Next**. For more info about rule conditions, see [Understanding AppLocker rule condition types](understanding-applocker-rule-condition-types.md). >**Note:** The **Reduce the number of rules created by grouping similar files** check box is selected by default. This helps you organize AppLocker rules and reduce the number of rules that you create by performing the following operations for the rule condition that you select: - One publisher condition is created for all files that have the same publisher and product name. - - One path condition is created for the folder that you select. For example, if you select *C:\\Program Files\\ProgramName\\* and the files in that folder are not signed, the wizard creates a rule for *%programfiles%\\ProgramName\\\**. + - One path condition is created for the folder that you select. For example, if you select *C:\\Program Files\\ProgramName\\* and the files in that folder aren't signed, the wizard creates a rule for *%programfiles%\\ProgramName\\\**. - One file hash condition is created that contains all of the file hashes. When rule grouping is disabled, the wizard creates a file hash rule for each file. 8. Review the files that were analyzed and the rules that will be automatically created. To make changes, click **Previous** to return to the page where you can change your selections. After reviewing the rules, click **Create**. diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/security-considerations-for-applocker.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/security-considerations-for-applocker.md index 3b58e12ab7..8aebe54030 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/security-considerations-for-applocker.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/security-considerations-for-applocker.md @@ -34,26 +34,26 @@ This topic for the IT professional describes the security considerations you nee The purpose of AppLocker is to restrict the access to software, and therefore, the data accessed by the software, to a specific group of users or within a defined business group. The following are security considerations for AppLocker: -AppLocker is deployed within an enterprise and administered centrally by those in IT with trusted credentials. This makes its policy creation and deployment conform to similar policy deployment processes and security restrictions. +AppLocker is deployed within an enterprise and administered centrally by those resources in IT with trusted credentials. This system makes its policy creation and deployment conform to similar policy deployment processes and security restrictions. -AppLocker policies are distributed through known processes and by known means within the domain through Group Policy. But AppLocker policies can also be set on individual computers if the person has administrator privileges, and those policies might be contrary to the organization's written security policy. The enforcement settings for local policies are overridden by the same AppLocker policies in a Group Policy Object (GPO). However, because AppLocker rules are additive, a local policy that is not in a GPO will still be evaluated for that computer. +AppLocker policies are distributed through known processes and by known means within the domain through Group Policy. But AppLocker policies can also be set on individual computers if the person has administrator privileges, and those policies might be contrary to the organization's written security policy. The enforcement settings for local policies are overridden by the same AppLocker policies in a Group Policy Object (GPO). However, because AppLocker rules are additive, a local policy that isn't in a GPO will still be evaluated for that computer. -Microsoft does not provide a way to develop any extensions to AppLocker. The interfaces are not public. A user with administrator credentials can automate some AppLocker processes by using Windows PowerShell cmdlets. For info about the Windows PowerShell cmdlets for AppLocker, see the [AppLocker Cmdlets in Windows PowerShell](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/ee460962(v=technet.10)). +Microsoft doesn't provide a way to develop any extensions to AppLocker. The interfaces aren't public. A user with administrator credentials can automate some AppLocker processes by using Windows PowerShell cmdlets. For info about the Windows PowerShell cmdlets for AppLocker, see the [AppLocker Cmdlets in Windows PowerShell](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/ee460962(v=technet.10)). -AppLocker runs in the context of Administrator or LocalSystem, which is the highest privilege set. This security context has the potential of misuse. If a user with administrative credentials makes changes to an AppLocker policy on a local device that is joined to a domain, those changes could be overwritten or disallowed by the GPO that contains the AppLocker rule for the same file (or path) that was changed on the local device. However, because AppLocker rules are additive, a local policy that is not in a GPO will still be evaluated for that computer. If the local computer is not joined to a domain and is not administered by Group Policy, a person with administrative credentials can alter the AppLocker policy. +AppLocker runs in the context of Administrator or LocalSystem, which is the highest privilege set. This security context has the potential of misuse. If a user with administrative credentials makes changes to an AppLocker policy on a local device that is joined to a domain, those changes could be overwritten or disallowed by the GPO that contains the AppLocker rule for the same file (or path) that was changed on the local device. However, because AppLocker rules are additive, a local policy that isn't in a GPO will still be evaluated for that computer. If the local computer isn't joined to a domain and isn't administered by Group Policy, a person with administrative credentials can alter the AppLocker policy. -When securing files in a directory with a rule of the path condition type, whether using the allow or deny action on the rule, it is still necessary and good practice to restrict access to those files by setting the access control lists (ACLs) according to your security policy. +When files are being secured in a directory with a rule of the path condition type, whether using the allow or deny action on the rule, it's still necessary and good practice to restrict access to those files by setting the access control lists (ACLs) according to your security policy. -AppLocker does not protect against running 16-bit DOS binaries in the Virtual DOS Machine (NTVDM). This technology allows running legacy DOS and 16-bit Windows programs on computers that are using Intel 80386 or later when there is already another operating system running and controlling the hardware. The result is that 16-bit binaries can still run on Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7 when AppLocker is configured to otherwise block binaries and libraries. If it is a requirement to prevent 16-bit applications from running, you must configure the Deny rule in the executable rule collection for NTVDM.exe. +AppLocker doesn't protect against running 16-bit DOS binaries in the Virtual DOS Machine (NTVDM). This technology allows running legacy DOS and 16-bit Windows programs on computers that are using Intel 80386 or later when there's already another operating system running and controlling the hardware. The result is that 16-bit binaries can still run on Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7 when AppLocker is configured to otherwise block binaries and libraries. If it's a requirement to prevent 16-bit applications from running, you must configure the Deny rule in the executable rule collection for NTVDM.exe. -You cannot use AppLocker (or Software Restriction Policies) to prevent code from running outside the Win32 subsystem. In particular, this applies to the (POSIX) subsystem in Windows NT. If it is a requirement to prevent applications from running in the POSIX subsystem, you must disable the subsystem. +You can't use AppLocker (or Software Restriction Policies) to prevent code from running outside the Win32 subsystem. In particular, this rule applies to the (POSIX) subsystem in Windows NT. If it's a requirement to prevent applications from running in the POSIX subsystem, you must disable the subsystem. -AppLocker can only control VBScript, JScript, .bat files, .cmd files, and Windows PowerShell scripts. It does not control all interpreted code that runs within a host process, for example, Perl scripts and macros. Interpreted code is a form of executable code that runs within a host process. For example, Windows batch files (\*.bat) run within the context of the Windows Command Host (cmd.exe). To control interpreted code by using AppLocker, the host process must call AppLocker before it runs the interpreted code, and then enforce the decision returned by AppLocker. Not all host processes call into AppLocker and, therefore, AppLocker cannot control every kind of interpreted code, such as Microsoft Office macros. +AppLocker can only control VBScript, JScript, .bat files, .cmd files, and Windows PowerShell scripts. It doesn't control all interpreted code that runs within a host process, for example, Perl scripts and macros. Interpreted code is a form of executable code that runs within a host process. For example, Windows batch files (\*.bat) run within the context of the Windows Command Host (cmd.exe). To control interpreted code by using AppLocker, the host process must call AppLocker before it runs the interpreted code, and then enforce the decision returned by AppLocker. Not all host processes call into AppLocker and, therefore, AppLocker can't control every kind of interpreted code, such as Microsoft Office macros. > [!IMPORTANT] > You should configure the appropriate security settings of these host processes if you must allow them to run. For example, configure the security settings in Microsoft Office to ensure that only signed and trusted macros are loaded. -AppLocker rules either allow or prevent an application from launching. AppLocker does not control the behavior of applications after they are launched. Applications could contain flags passed to functions that signal AppLocker to circumvent the rules and allow another .exe or .dll to be loaded. In practice, an application that is allowed by AppLocker could use these flags to bypass AppLocker rules and launch child processes. You must thoroughly examine each application before allowing them to run by using AppLocker rules. +AppLocker rules either allow or prevent an application from launching. AppLocker doesn't control the behavior of applications after they're launched. Applications could contain flags passed to functions that signal AppLocker to circumvent the rules and allow another .exe or .dll to be loaded. In practice, an application that is allowed by AppLocker could use these flags to bypass AppLocker rules and launch child processes. You must thoroughly examine each application before allowing them to run by using AppLocker rules. > [!NOTE] > Two flags that illustrate this condition are `SANDBOX_INERT`, which can be passed to `CreateRestrictedToken`, and `LOAD_IGNORE_CODE_AUTHZ_LEVEL`, which can be passed to `LoadLibraryEx`. Both of these flags signal AppLocker to circumvent the rules and allow a child .exe or .dll to be loaded. diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/select-types-of-rules-to-create.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/select-types-of-rules-to-create.md index 0e46c32873..a8f29966da 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/select-types-of-rules-to-create.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/select-types-of-rules-to-create.md @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ The rules you create will be in one of the following rule collections: - Packaged apps and packaged app installers: .appx - DLLs: .dll and .ocx -By default, the rules will allow a file to run based upon user or group privilege. If you use DLL rules, a DLL allow rule has to be created for each DLL that is used by all of the allowed apps. The DLL rule collection is not enabled by default. +By default, the rules will allow a file to run based upon user or group privilege. If you use DLL rules, a DLL allow rule has to be created for each DLL that is used by all of the allowed apps. The DLL rule collection isn't enabled by default. In the Woodgrove Bank example, the line-of-business app for the Bank Tellers business group is C:\\Program Files\\Woodgrove\\Teller.exe, and this app needs to be included in a rule. In addition, because this rule is part of a list of allowed applications, all the Windows files under C:\\Windows must be included as well. @@ -66,13 +66,13 @@ A rule condition is criteria upon which an AppLocker rule is based and can only | Path| Any file can be assigned this rule condition; however, because path rules specify locations within the file system, any subdirectory will also be affected by the rule (unless explicitly exempted).| For more info about this rule condition, see [Understanding the path rule condition in AppLocker](understanding-the-path-rule-condition-in-applocker.md). | | File hash | Any file can be assigned this rule condition; however, the rule must be updated each time a new version of the file is released because the hash value is based in part upon the version.| For more info about this rule condition, see [Understanding the file hash rule condition in AppLocker](understanding-the-file-hash-rule-condition-in-applocker.md). | -In the Woodgrove Bank example, the line-of-business app for the Bank Tellers business group is signed and is located at C:\\Program Files\\Woodgrove\\Teller.exe. Therefore, the rule can be defined with a publisher condition. If the rule is defined to a specific version and above (for example, Teller.exe version 8.0 and above), then this will allow any updates to this app to occur without interruption of access to the users if the app's name and signed attributes stay the same. +In the Woodgrove Bank example, the line-of-business app for the Bank Tellers business group is signed and is located at C:\\Program Files\\Woodgrove\\Teller.exe. Therefore, the rule can be defined with a publisher condition. If the rule is defined to a specific version and above (for example, Teller.exe version 8.0 and above), then this rule will allow any updates to this app to occur without interruption of access to the users if the app's name and signed attributes stay the same. ### Determine how to allow system files to run -Because AppLocker rules build a list of allowed apps, a rule or rules must be created to allow all Windows files to run. AppLocker provides a means to ensure system files are properly considered in your rule collection by generating the default rules for each rule collection. You can use the default rules (listed in [AppLocker default rules](working-with-applocker-rules.md#applocker-default-rules)) as a template when creating your own rules. However, these rules are only meant to function as a starter policy when you are first testing AppLocker rules so that the system files in the Windows folders will be allowed to run. When a default rule is created, it is denoted with "(Default rule)" in its name as it appears in the rule collection. +Because AppLocker rules build a list of allowed apps, a rule or rules must be created to allow all Windows files to run. AppLocker provides a means to ensure system files are properly considered in your rule collection by generating the default rules for each rule collection. You can use the default rules (listed in [AppLocker default rules](working-with-applocker-rules.md#applocker-default-rules)) as a template when creating your own rules. However, these rules are only meant to function as a starter policy when you're first testing AppLocker rules so that the system files in the Windows folders will be allowed to run. When a default rule is created, it's denoted with "(Default rule)" in its name as it appears in the rule collection. -You can also create a rule for the system files based on the path condition. In the preceding example, for the Bank Tellers group, all Windows files reside under C:\\Windows and can be defined with the path rule condition type. This will permit access to these files whenever updates are applied and the files change. If you require additional application security, you might need to modify the rules created from the built-in default rule collection. For example, the default rule to allow all users to run .exe files in the Windows folder is based on a path condition that allows all files within the Windows folder to run. The Windows folder contains a Temp subfolder to which the Users group is given the following permissions: +You can also create a rule for the system files based on the path condition. In the preceding example, for the Bank Tellers group, all Windows files reside under C:\\Windows and can be defined with the path rule condition type. This rule will permit access to these files whenever updates are applied and the files change. If you require more application security, you might need to modify the rules created from the built-in default rule collection. For example, the default rule to allow all users to run .exe files in the Windows folder is based on a path condition that allows all files within the Windows folder to run. The Windows folder contains a Temp subfolder to which the Users group is given the following permissions: - Traverse Folder/Execute File - Create Files/Write Data @@ -82,6 +82,6 @@ These permissions settings are applied to this folder for application compatibil ## Next steps -After you have selected the types of rules to create, record your findings as explained in [Document your AppLocker rules](document-your-applocker-rules.md). +After you've selected the types of rules to create, record your findings as explained in [Document your AppLocker rules](document-your-applocker-rules.md). -After recording your findings for the AppLocker rules to create, you will need to consider how to enforce the rules. For info about how to do this, see [Determine Group Policy structure and rule enforcement](determine-group-policy-structure-and-rule-enforcement.md). +After recording your findings for the AppLocker rules to create, you'll need to consider how to enforce the rules. For information about how to do this enforcement, see [Determine Group Policy structure and rule enforcement](determine-group-policy-structure-and-rule-enforcement.md). diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/test-and-update-an-applocker-policy.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/test-and-update-an-applocker-policy.md index e94dd7e02a..7767e8d4db 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/test-and-update-an-applocker-policy.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/test-and-update-an-applocker-policy.md @@ -35,42 +35,42 @@ You should test each set of rules to ensure that the rules perform as intended. ## Step 1: Enable the Audit only enforcement setting -By using the **Audit only** enforcement setting, you can ensure that the AppLocker rules that you have created are properly configured for your organization. This setting can be enabled on the **Enforcement** tab of the **AppLocker Properties** dialog box. For the procedure to do this, see [Configure an AppLocker policy for audit only](configure-an-applocker-policy-for-audit-only.md). +By using the **Audit only** enforcement setting, you can ensure that the AppLocker rules that you have created are properly configured for your organization. This setting can be enabled on the **Enforcement** tab of the **AppLocker Properties** dialog box. For information on the procedure to do this configuration, see [Configure an AppLocker policy for audit only](configure-an-applocker-policy-for-audit-only.md). ## Step 2: Configure the Application Identity service to start automatically -Because AppLocker uses the Application Identity service to verify the attributes of a file, you must configure it to start automatically in any one GPO that applies AppLocker rules. For the procedure to do this, see [Configure the Application Identity Service](configure-the-application-identity-service.md). For AppLocker policies that are not managed by a GPO, you must ensure that the service is running on each PC in order for the policies to be applied. +Because AppLocker uses the Application Identity service to verify the attributes of a file, you must configure it to start automatically in any one GPO that applies AppLocker rules. For information on the procedure to do this configuration, see [Configure the Application Identity Service](configure-the-application-identity-service.md). For AppLocker policies that aren't managed by a GPO, you must ensure that the service is running on each PC in order for the policies to be applied. ## Step 3: Test the policy -Test the AppLocker policy to determine if your rule collection needs to be modified. Because you have created AppLocker rules, enabled the Application Identity service, and enabled the **Audit only** enforcement setting, the AppLocker policy should be present on all client PC that are configured to receive your AppLocker policy. +Test the AppLocker policy to determine if your rule collection needs to be modified. Because you have created AppLocker rules, enabled the Application Identity service, and enabled the **Audit only** enforcement setting, the AppLocker policy should be present on all client PCs that are configured to receive your AppLocker policy. -The **Test-AppLockerPolicy** Windows PowerShell cmdlet can be used to determine whether any of the rules in your rule collection will be blocked on your reference PCs. For the procedure to do this, see [Test an AppLocker policy by using Test-AppLockerPolicy](test-an-applocker-policy-by-using-test-applockerpolicy.md). +The **Test-AppLockerPolicy** Windows PowerShell cmdlet can be used to determine whether any of the rules in your rule collection will be blocked on your reference PCs. For information on the procedure to do this testing, see [Test an AppLocker policy by using Test-AppLockerPolicy](test-an-applocker-policy-by-using-test-applockerpolicy.md). ## Step 4: Analyze AppLocker events You can either manually analyze AppLocker events or use the **Get-AppLockerFileInformation** Windows PowerShell cmdlet to automate the analysis. **To manually analyze AppLocker events** -You can view the events either in Event Viewer or a text editor and then sort those events to perform an analysis, such as looking for patterns in application usage events, access frequencies, or access by user groups. If you have not configured an event subscription, then you will have to review the logs on a sampling of computers in your organization. For more information about using Event Viewer, see [Monitor application usage with AppLocker](monitor-application-usage-with-applocker.md). +You can view the events either in Event Viewer or a text editor and then sort those events to perform an analysis, such as looking for patterns in application usage events, access frequencies, or access by user groups. If you haven't configured an event subscription, then you'll have to review the logs on a sampling of computers in your organization. For more information about using Event Viewer, see [Monitor application usage with AppLocker](monitor-application-usage-with-applocker.md). **To analyze AppLocker events by using Get-AppLockerFileInformation** You can use the **Get-AppLockerFileInformation** Windows PowerShell cmdlet to analyze AppLocker events from a remote computer. If an app is being blocked and should be allowed, you can use the AppLocker cmdlets to help troubleshoot the problem. -For both event subscriptions and local events, you can use the **Get-AppLockerFileInformation** cmdlet to determine which files have been blocked or would have been blocked (if you are using the **Audit only** enforcement mode) and how many times the event has occurred for each file. For the procedure to do this, see [Monitor Application Usage with AppLocker](monitor-application-usage-with-applocker.md). +For both event subscriptions and local events, you can use the **Get-AppLockerFileInformation** cmdlet to determine which files have been blocked or would have been blocked (if you're using the **Audit only** enforcement mode) and how many times the event has occurred for each file. For information on the procedure to do this monitoring, see [Monitor Application Usage with AppLocker](monitor-application-usage-with-applocker.md). -After using **Get-AppLockerFileInformation** to determine how many times that a file would have been blocked from running, you should review your rule list to determine whether a new rule should be created for the blocked file or whether an existing rule is too strictly defined. Ensure that you check which GPO is currently preventing the file from running. To determine this, you can use the Group Policy Results Wizard to view rule names. +After using **Get-AppLockerFileInformation** to determine how many times that a file would have been blocked from running, you should review your rule list to determine whether a new rule should be created for the blocked file or whether an existing rule is too strictly defined. Ensure that you check which GPO is currently preventing the file from running. To determine this blocker GPO, you can use the Group Policy Results Wizard to view rule names. ## Step 5: Modify the AppLocker policy -After you have identified which rules need to be edited or added to the policy, you can use the Group Policy Management Console to modify the AppLocker rules in the relevant GPOs. For AppLocker policies that are not managed by a GPO, you can use the Local Security Policy snap-in (secpol.msc). For info how to modify an AppLocker policy, see, [Edit an AppLocker policy](edit-an-applocker-policy.md). +After you've identified which rules need to be edited or added to the policy, you can use the Group Policy Management Console to modify the AppLocker rules in the relevant GPOs. For AppLocker policies that aren't managed by a GPO, you can use the Local Security Policy snap-in (secpol.msc). For info how to modify an AppLocker policy, see, [Edit an AppLocker policy](edit-an-applocker-policy.md). ## Step 6: Repeat policy testing, analysis, and policy modification Repeat the previous steps 3–5 until all the rules perform as intended before applying enforcement. -## Additional resources +## Other resources - For steps to perform other AppLocker policy tasks, see [Administer AppLocker](administer-applocker.md).   diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/tools-to-use-with-applocker.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/tools-to-use-with-applocker.md index 25bb78c4e1..fd88f08362 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/tools-to-use-with-applocker.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/tools-to-use-with-applocker.md @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ The following tools can help you administer the application control policies cre You can edit an AppLocker policy by adding, changing, or removing rules by using the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC). - If you want additional features to manage AppLocker policies, such as version control, use Group Policy management software that allows you to create versions of Group Policy Objects (GPOs). An example of this type of software is the Advanced Group Policy Management feature from the Microsoft Desktop Optimization Pack. + If you want more features to manage AppLocker policies, such as version control, use Group Policy management software that allows you to create versions of Group Policy Objects (GPOs). An example of this type of software is the Advanced Group Policy Management feature from the Microsoft Desktop Optimization Pack. - **Remote Server Administration Tools (RSAT)** diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understand-applocker-enforcement-settings.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understand-applocker-enforcement-settings.md index 9b7c321d4e..f99766832e 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understand-applocker-enforcement-settings.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understand-applocker-enforcement-settings.md @@ -31,11 +31,11 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec This topic describes the AppLocker enforcement settings for rule collections. -Rule enforcement is applied only to a collection of rules, not to individual rules. AppLocker divides the rules into four collections: executable files, Windows Installer files, scripts, and DLL files. For more info about rule collections, see [Understanding AppLocker rule collections](understanding-applocker-rule-collections.md). By default, if enforcement is not configured and rules are present in a rule collection, those rules are enforced. The following table details the three AppLocker rule enforcement settings in Group Policy for each rule collection. +Rule enforcement is applied only to a collection of rules, not to individual rules. AppLocker divides the rules into four collections: executable files, Windows Installer files, scripts, and DLL files. For more info about rule collections, see [Understanding AppLocker rule collections](understanding-applocker-rule-collections.md). By default, if enforcement isn't configured and rules are present in a rule collection, those rules are enforced. The following table details the three AppLocker rule enforcement settings in Group Policy for each rule collection. | Enforcement setting | Description | | - | - | -| Not configured | By default, enforcement is not configured in a rule collection. If rules are present in the corresponding rule collection, they are enforced. If rule enforcement is configured in a higher-level linked Group Policy object (GPO), that enforcement value overrides the **Not configured** value.| +| Not configured | By default, enforcement isn't configured in a rule collection. If rules are present in the corresponding rule collection, they're enforced. If rule enforcement is configured in a higher-level linked Group Policy object (GPO), that enforcement value overrides the **Not configured** value.| | Enforce rules | Rules are enforced for the rule collection, and all rule events are audited.| | Audit only | Rule events are audited only. Use this value when planning and testing AppLocker rules.| diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understand-applocker-policy-design-decisions.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understand-applocker-policy-design-decisions.md index c14abfaefc..fb22ebb52e 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understand-applocker-policy-design-decisions.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understand-applocker-policy-design-decisions.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- title: Understand AppLocker policy design decisions (Windows) -description: Review some common considerations while you are planning to use AppLocker to deploy application control policies within a Windows environment. +description: Review some common considerations while you're planning to use AppLocker to deploy application control policies within a Windows environment. ms.assetid: 3475def8-949a-4b51-b480-dc88b5c1e6e6 ms.reviewer: ms.author: macapara @@ -42,34 +42,34 @@ You should consider using AppLocker as part of your organization's application c - You have resources to involve Help Desk or to build a self-help process for end-user application access issues. - The group's requirements for productivity, manageability, and security can be controlled by restrictive policies. -The following questions are not in priority or sequential order. They should be considered when you deploy application control policies (as appropriate for your targeted environment). +The following questions aren't in priority or sequential order. They should be considered when you deploy application control policies (as appropriate for your targeted environment). ### Which apps do you need to control in your organization? -You might need to control a limited number of apps because they access sensitive data, or you might have to exclude all applications except those that are sanctioned for business purposes. There might be certain business groups that require strict control, and others that promote independent application usage. +You might need to control a limited number of applications because they access sensitive data, or you might have to exclude all applications except those applications that are sanctioned for business purposes. There might be certain business groups that require strict control, and others that promote independent application usage. | Possible answers | Design considerations| | - | - | | Control all apps | AppLocker policies control applications by creating an allowed list of applications by file type. Exceptions are also possible. AppLocker policies can only be applied to applications installed on computers running one of the supported versions of Windows. For specific operating system version requirements, see [Requirements to use AppLocker](requirements-to-use-applocker.md).| -| Control specific apps | When you create AppLocker rules, a list of allowed apps is created. All apps on that list will be allowed to run (except those on the exception list). Apps that are not on the list will be prevented from running. AppLocker policies can only be applied to apps installed on computers running any of the supported versions of Windows. For specific operating system version requirements, see [Requirements to use AppLocker](requirements-to-use-applocker.md).| +| Control specific apps | When you create AppLocker rules, a list of allowed apps is created. All applications on that list will be allowed to run (except those applications on the exception list). Applications that aren't on the list will be prevented from running. AppLocker policies can only be applied to apps installed on computers running any of the supported versions of Windows. For specific operating system version requirements, see [Requirements to use AppLocker](requirements-to-use-applocker.md).| |Control only Classic Windows applications, only Universal Windows apps, or both| AppLocker policies control apps by creating an allowed list of apps by file type. Because Universal Windows apps are categorized under the Publisher condition, Classic Windows applications and Universal Windows apps can be controlled together. AppLocker policies for Universal Windows apps can be applied only to apps that are installed on PCs that support the Microsoft Store, but Classic Windows applications can be controlled with AppLocker on all supported versions of Windows. The rules you currently have configured for Classic Windows applications can remain, and you can create new ones for Universal Windows apps.
    For a comparison of Classic Windows applications and Universal Windows apps, see [Comparing Classic Windows applications and Universal Windows apps for AppLocker policy design decisions](#bkmk-compareclassicmetro) in this topic.| | Control apps by business group and user | AppLocker policies can be applied through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to computer objects within an organizational unit (OU). Individual AppLocker rules can be applied to individual users or to groups of users.| -| Control apps by computer, not user | AppLocker is a computer-based policy implementation. If your domain or site organizational structure is not based on a logical user structure, such as an OU, you might want to set up that structure before you begin your AppLocker planning. Otherwise, you will have to identify users, their computers, and their app access requirements.| -|Understand app usage, but there is no need to control any apps yet | AppLocker policies can be set to audit app usage to help you track which apps are used in your organization. You can then use the AppLocker event log to create AppLocker policies.| +| Control apps by computer, not user | AppLocker is a computer-based policy implementation. If your domain or site organizational structure isn't based on a logical user structure, such as an OU, you might want to set up that structure before you begin your AppLocker planning. Otherwise, you'll have to identify users, their computers, and their app access requirements.| +|Understand app usage, but there's no need to control any apps yet | AppLocker policies can be set to audit app usage to help you track which apps are used in your organization. You can then use the AppLocker event log to create AppLocker policies.| > [!IMPORTANT] > The following list contains files or types of files that cannot be managed by AppLocker: -- AppLocker does not protect against running 16-bit DOS binaries in an NT Virtual DOS Machine (NTVDM). This technology allows running legacy DOS and 16-bit Windows programs on computers that are using Intel 80386 or higher when there is already another operating system running and controlling the hardware. The result is that 16-bit binaries can still run on Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7 when AppLocker is configured to otherwise block binaries and libraries. If it is a requirement to prevent 16-bit applications from running, you must configure the Deny rule in the Executable rule collection for NTVDM.exe. +- AppLocker doesn't protect against running 16-bit DOS binaries in an NT Virtual DOS Machine (NTVDM). This technology allows running legacy DOS and 16-bit Windows programs on computers that are using Intel 80386 or higher when there's already another operating system running and controlling the hardware. The result is that 16-bit binaries can still run on Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7 when AppLocker is configured to otherwise block binaries and libraries. If it's a requirement to prevent 16-bit applications from running, you must configure the Deny rule in the Executable rule collection for NTVDM.exe. -- You cannot use AppLocker to prevent code from running outside the Win32 subsystem. In particular, this applies to the (POSIX) subsystem in Windows NT. If it is a requirement to prevent applications from running in the POSIX subsystem, you must disable the subsystem. +- You can't use AppLocker to prevent code from running outside the Win32 subsystem. In particular, this rule applies to the (POSIX) subsystem in Windows NT. If it's a requirement to prevent applications from running in the POSIX subsystem, you must disable the subsystem. -- AppLocker can only control VBScript, JScript, .bat files, .cmd files and Windows PowerShell scripts. It does not control all interpreted code that runs within a host process, for example Perl scripts and macros. Interpreted code is a form of executable code that runs within a host process. For example, Windows batch files (\*.bat) run within the context of the Windows Command Host (cmd.exe). To use AppLocker to control interpreted code, the host process must call AppLocker before it runs the interpreted code, and then enforce the decision that is returned by AppLocker. Not all host processes call into AppLocker. Therefore, AppLocker cannot control every kind of interpreted code, for example Microsoft Office macros. +- AppLocker can only control VBScript, JScript, .bat files, .cmd files and Windows PowerShell scripts. It doesn't control all interpreted code that runs within a host process, for example Perl scripts and macros. Interpreted code is a form of executable code that runs within a host process. For example, Windows batch files (\*.bat) run within the context of the Windows Command Host (cmd.exe). To use AppLocker to control interpreted code, the host process must call AppLocker before it runs the interpreted code, and then enforce the decision that is returned by AppLocker. Not all host processes call into AppLocker. Therefore, AppLocker can't control every kind of interpreted code, for example Microsoft Office macros. > [!IMPORTANT] > You should configure the appropriate security settings of these host processes if you must allow them to run. For example, configure the security settings in Microsoft Office to ensure that only signed and trusted macros are loaded. -- AppLocker rules allow or prevent an app from launching. AppLocker does not control the behavior of apps after they are launched. Applications could contain flags that are passed to functions that signal AppLocker to circumvent the rules and allow another .exe or .dll file to be loaded. In practice, an app that is allowed by AppLocker could use these flags to bypass AppLocker rules and launch child processes. You must follow a process that best suits your needs to thoroughly vet each app before allowing them to run using AppLocker rules. +- AppLocker rules allow or prevent an app from launching. AppLocker doesn't control the behavior of apps after they're launched. Applications could contain flags that are passed to functions that signal AppLocker to circumvent the rules and allow another .exe or .dll file to be loaded. In practice, an app that is allowed by AppLocker could use these flags to bypass AppLocker rules and launch child processes. You must follow a process that best suits your needs to thoroughly vet each app before allowing them to run using AppLocker rules. For more info, see [Security considerations for AppLocker](security-considerations-for-applocker.md). @@ -77,8 +77,8 @@ You might need to control a limited number of apps because they access sensitive AppLocker policies for Universal Windows apps can only be applied to apps that are installed on computers running Windows operating systems that support Microsoft Store apps. However, Classic Windows applications can be controlled in Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7, in addition to those computers that support Universal Windows apps. The rules for Classic Windows applications and Universal Windows apps can be enforced together. The differences you should consider for Universal Windows apps are: -- All Universal Windows apps can be installed by a standard user, whereas a number of Classic Windows applications require administrative credentials to install. So in an environment where most of the users are standard users, you might not need numerous exe rules, but you might want more explicit policies for packaged apps. -- Classic Windows applications can be written to change the system state if they run with administrative credentials. Most Universal Windows apps cannot change the system state because they run with limited permissions. When you design your AppLocker policies, it is important to understand whether an app that you are allowing can make system-wide changes. +- All Universal Windows apps can be installed by a standard user, whereas many Classic Windows applications require administrative credentials to install. So in an environment where most of the users are standard users, you might not need numerous exe rules, but you might want more explicit policies for packaged apps. +- Classic Windows applications can be written to change the system state if they run with administrative credentials. Most Universal Windows apps can't change the system state because they run with limited permissions. When you design your AppLocker policies, it's important to understand whether an app that you're allowing can make system-wide changes. - Universal Windows apps can be acquired through the Store, or they can be side-loaded by using Windows PowerShell cmdlets. If you use Windows PowerShell cmdlets, a special Enterprise license is required to acquire Universal Windows apps. Classic Windows applications can be acquired through traditional means, such as through software vendors or retail distribution. AppLocker controls Universal Windows apps and Classic Windows applications by using different rule collections. You have the choice to control Universal Windows apps, Classic Windows applications, or both. @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ Most organizations have evolved app control policies and methods over time. With | Possible answers | Design considerations | | - | - | -| Security polices (locally set or through Group Policy) | Using AppLocker requires increased effort in planning to create correct policies, but this results in a simpler distribution method.| +| Security policies (locally set or through Group Policy) | Using AppLocker requires increased effort in planning to create correct policies, but this policy creation results in a simpler distribution method.| | Non-Microsoft app control software | Using AppLocker requires a complete app control policy evaluation and implementation.| | Managed usage by group or OU | Using AppLocker requires a complete app control policy evaluation and implementation.| | Authorization Manager or other role-based access technologies | Using AppLocker requires a complete app control policy evaluation and implementation.| @@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ If your organization supports multiple Windows operating systems, app control po |Possible answers|Design considerations| |--- |--- | -|Your organization's computers are running a combination of the following operating systems:
  • Windows 11
  • Windows 10
  • Windows 8
  • Windows 7
  • Windows Vista
  • Windows XP
  • Windows Server 2012
  • Windows Server 2008 R2
  • Windows Server 2008
  • Windows Server 2003|AppLocker rules are only applied to computers running the supported versions of Windows, but SRP rules can be applied to all versions of Windows beginning with Windows XP and Windows Server 2003. For specific operating system version requirements, see [Requirements to use AppLocker](requirements-to-use-applocker.md).

    **Note:** If you are using the Basic User security level as assigned in SRP, those privileges are not supported on computers running that support AppLocker.

    AppLocker policies as applied through a GPO take precedence over SRP policies in the same or linked GPO. SRP policies can be created and maintained the same way.| +|Your organization's computers are running a combination of the following operating systems:
  • Windows 11
  • Windows 10
  • Windows 8
  • Windows 7
  • Windows Vista
  • Windows XP
  • Windows Server 2012
  • Windows Server 2008 R2
  • Windows Server 2008
  • Windows Server 2003|AppLocker rules are only applied to computers running the supported versions of Windows, but SRP rules can be applied to all versions of Windows beginning with Windows XP and Windows Server 2003. For specific operating system version requirements, see [Requirements to use AppLocker](requirements-to-use-applocker.md).

    **Note:** If you're using the Basic User security level as assigned in SRP, those privileges aren't supported on computers running that support AppLocker.

    AppLocker policies as applied through a GPO take precedence over SRP policies in the same or linked GPO. SRP policies can be created and maintained the same way.| |Your organization's computers are running only the following operating systems:
  • Windows 11
  • Windows 10
  • Windows 8.1
  • Windows 8
  • Windows 7
  • Windows Server 2012 R2
  • Windows Server 2012
  • Windows Server 2008 R2|Use AppLocker to create your application control policies.| ### Are there specific groups in your organization that need customized application control policies? @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ Most business groups or departments have specific security requirements that per | Possible answers | Design considerations | | - | - | -| Yes | For each group, you need to create a list that includes their application control requirements. Although this may increase the planning time, it will most likely result in a more effective deployment.
    If your GPO structure is not currently configured so that you can apply different policies to specific groups, you can alternatively apply AppLocker rules in a GPO to specific user groups.| +| Yes | For each group, you need to create a list that includes their application control requirements. Although this consideration may increase the planning time, it will most likely result in a more effective deployment.
    If your GPO structure isn't currently configured so that you can apply different policies to specific groups, you can alternatively apply AppLocker rules in a GPO to specific user groups.| | No | AppLocker policies can be applied globally to applications that are installed on PCs running the supported versions of Windows as listed in [Requirements to use AppLocker](requirements-to-use-applocker.md). Depending on the number of apps you need to control, managing all the rules and exceptions might be challenging.| ### Does your IT department have resources to analyze application usage, and to design and manage the policies? @@ -121,12 +121,12 @@ The time and resources that are available to you to perform the research and ana | Possible answers | Design considerations | | - | - | -| Yes | Invest the time to analyze your organization's application control requirements, and plan a complete deployment that uses rules that are as simply constructed as possible.| -| No | Consider a focused and phased deployment for specific groups by using a small number of rules. As you apply controls to applications in a specific group, learn from that deployment to plan your next deployment. | +| Yes | Invest the time to analyze your organization's application control requirements, and plan a complete deployment that uses rules that are as constructed as possible.| +| No | Consider a focused and phased deployment for specific groups by using a few rules. As you apply controls to applications in a specific group, learn from that deployment to plan your next deployment. | ### Does your organization have Help Desk support? -Preventing your users from accessing known, deployed, or personal applications will initially cause an increase in end-user support. It will be necessary to address the various support issues in your organization so security policies are followed and business workflow is not hampered. +Preventing your users from accessing known, deployed, or personal applications will initially cause an increase in end-user support. It will be necessary to address the various support issues in your organization so security policies are followed and business workflow isn't hampered. | Possible answers | Design considerations | | - | - | @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ Any successful application control policy implementation is based on your knowle | Possible answers | Design considerations | | - | - | | Yes | You should determine the application control priorities for a business group and then attempt to design the simplest scheme for their application control policies. | -| No | You will have to perform an audit and requirements gathering project to discover the application usage. AppLocker provides the means to deploy policies in **Audit only** mode, and tools to view the event logs.| +| No | You'll have to perform an audit and requirements gathering project to discover the application usage. AppLocker provides the means to deploy policies in **Audit only** mode, and tools to view the event logs.| ### How do you deploy or sanction applications (upgraded or new) in your organization? @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ Although SRP and AppLocker have the same goal, AppLocker is a major revision of | Possible answers | Design considerations | | - | - | -| Yes | You cannot use AppLocker to manage SRP settings, but you can use SRP to manage application control policies on computers running on any of the supported operating systems listed in [Requirements to use AppLocker](requirements-to-use-applocker.md). In addition, if AppLocker and SRP settings are configured in the same GPO, only the AppLocker settings will be enforced on computers running those supported operating systems.

    **Note:** If you are using the Basic User security level as assigned in SRP, those permissions are not supported on computers running the supported operating systems.| +| Yes | You can't use AppLocker to manage SRP settings, but you can use SRP to manage application control policies on computers running on any of the supported operating systems listed in [Requirements to use AppLocker](requirements-to-use-applocker.md). In addition, if AppLocker and SRP settings are configured in the same GPO, only the AppLocker settings will be enforced on computers running those supported operating systems.

    **Note:** If you're using the Basic User security level as assigned in SRP, those permissions aren't supported on computers running the supported operating systems.| | No | Policies that are configured for AppLocker can only be applied to computers running the supported operating systems, but SRP is also available on those operating systems. | ### What are your organization's priorities when implementing application control policies? @@ -168,19 +168,19 @@ Some organizations will benefit from application control policies as shown by an | Possible answers | Design considerations | | - | - | -| Productivity: The organization assures that tools work and required applications can be installed. | To meet innovation and productivity goals, some groups require the ability to install and run a variety of software from different sources, including software that they developed. Therefore, if innovation and productivity is a high priority, managing application control policies through an allowed list might be time consuming and an impediment to progress. | -| Management: The organization is aware of and controls the apps it supports. | In some business groups, application usage can be managed from a central point of control. AppLocker policies can be built into a GPO for that purpose. This shifts the burden of app access to the IT department, but it also has the benefit of controlling the number of apps that can be run and controlling the versions of those apps| +| Productivity: The organization assures that tools work and required applications can be installed. | To meet innovation and productivity goals, some groups require the ability to install and run various softwares from different sources, including software that they developed. Therefore, if innovation and productivity are a high priority, managing application control policies through an allowed list might be time consuming and an impediment to progress. | +| Management: The organization is aware of and controls the applications it supports. | In some business groups, application usage can be managed from a central point of control. AppLocker policies can be built into a GPO for that purpose. This GPO shifts the burden of application access to the IT department, but it also has the benefit of controlling the number of applications that can be run and controlling the versions of those applications| | Security: The organization must protect data in part by ensuring that only approved apps are used. | AppLocker can help protect data by allowing a defined set of users access to apps that access the data. If security is the top priority, the application control policies will be the most restrictive.| ### How are apps currently accessed in your organization? -AppLocker is very effective for organizations that have application restriction requirements if they have environments with a simple topography and application control policy goals that are straightforward. For example, AppLocker can benefit an environment where non-employees have access to computers that are connected to the organizational network, such as a school or library. Large organizations also benefit from AppLocker policy deployment when the goal is to achieve a detailed level of control on the desktop computers with a relatively small number of applications to manage, or when the applications are manageable with a small number of rules. +AppLocker is effective for organizations that have application restriction requirements if they have environments with a simple topography and application control policy goals that are straightforward. For example, AppLocker can benefit an environment where non-employees have access to computers that are connected to the organizational network, such as a school or library. Large organizations also benefit from AppLocker policy deployment when the goal is to achieve a detailed level of control on the desktop computers with a relatively small number of applications to manage, or when the applications are manageable with a few rules. | Possible answers | Design considerations | | - | - | | Users run without administrative rights. | Apps are installed by using an installation deployment technology.| -| AppLocker can help reduce the total cost of ownership for business groups that typically use a finite set of apps, such as human resources and finance departments. At the same time, these departments access highly sensitive information, much of which contains confidential and proprietary information. By using AppLocker to create rules for specific apps that are allowed to run, you can help limit unauthorized applications from accessing this information.

    **Note:** AppLocker can also be effective in helping create standardized desktops in organizations where users run as administrators. However, it is important to note that users with administrative credentials can add new rules to the local AppLocker policy.| Users must be able to install applications as needed. -| Users currently have administrator access, and it would be difficult to change this.|Enforcing AppLocker rules is not suited for business groups that must be able to install apps as needed and without approval from the IT department. If one or more OUs in your organization has this requirement, you can choose not to enforce application rules in those OUs by using AppLocker or to implement the **Audit only** enforcement setting through AppLocker.| +| AppLocker can help reduce the total cost of ownership for business groups that typically use a finite set of apps, such as human resources and finance departments. At the same time, these departments access highly sensitive information, much of which contains confidential and proprietary information. By using AppLocker to create rules for specific apps that are allowed to run, you can help limit unauthorized applications from accessing this information.

    **Note:** AppLocker can also be effective in helping create standardized desktops in organizations where users run as administrators. However, it's important to note that users with administrative credentials can add new rules to the local AppLocker policy.| Users must be able to install applications as needed. +| Users currently have administrator access, and it would be difficult to change this privilege.|Enforcing AppLocker rules isn't suited for business groups that must be able to install apps as needed and without approval from the IT department. If one or more OUs in your organization has this requirement, you can choose not to enforce application rules in those OUs by using AppLocker or to implement the **Audit only** enforcement setting through AppLocker.| ### Is the structure in Active Directory Domain Services based on the organization's hierarchy? diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-applocker-rule-behavior.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-applocker-rule-behavior.md index 92bd84efc4..5afe6be646 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-applocker-rule-behavior.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-applocker-rule-behavior.md @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ If no AppLocker rules for a specific rule collection exist, all files with that A rule can be configured to use either an allow or deny action: - **Allow**. You can specify which files are allowed to run in your environment and for which users or groups of users. You can also configure exceptions to identify files that are excluded from the rule. -- **Deny**. You can specify which files are not allowed to run in your environment and for which users or groups of users. You can also configure exceptions to identify files that are excluded from the rule. +- **Deny**. You can specify which files aren't allowed to run in your environment and for which users or groups of users. You can also configure exceptions to identify files that are excluded from the rule. >**Important:**  You can use a combination of allow actions and deny actions. However, we recommend using allow actions with exceptions because deny actions override allow actions in all cases. Deny actions can also be circumvented. For example, if you configure a deny action for a file or folder path, the user can still run the file from any other path.   diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-applocker-rule-exceptions.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-applocker-rule-exceptions.md index 295497d103..d4eab6bcf6 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-applocker-rule-exceptions.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-applocker-rule-exceptions.md @@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ This topic describes the result of applying AppLocker rule exceptions to rule co You can apply AppLocker rules to individual users or a group of users. If you apply a rule to a group of users, all users in that group are affected by that rule. If you need to allow a subset of a user group to use an app, you can create a special rule for that subset. -For example, the rule "Allow Everyone to run Windows except Registry Editor" allows Everyone to run Windows binaries, but does not allow anyone to run Registry Editor (by adding %WINDIR%\regedit.exe as a Path Exception of the rule). +For example, the rule "Allow Everyone to run Windows except Registry Editor" allows Everyone to run Windows binaries, but doesn't allow anyone to run Registry Editor (by adding %WINDIR%\regedit.exe as a Path Exception for the rule). The effect of this rule would prevent users such as Helpdesk personnel from running the Registry Editor, a program that is necessary for their support tasks. -To resolve this problem, create a second rule that applies to the Helpdesk user group: "Allow Helpdesk to run Registry Editor" and add %WINDIR%\regedit.exe as an allowed path. If you create a deny rule that does not allow any users to run Registry Editor, the deny rule will override the second rule that allows the Helpdesk user group to run Registry Editor. +To resolve this problem, create a second rule that applies to the Helpdesk user group: "Allow Helpdesk to run Registry Editor" and add %WINDIR%\regedit.exe as an allowed path. If you create a deny rule that doesn't allow any users to run Registry Editor, the deny rule will override the second rule that allows the Helpdesk user group to run Registry Editor. ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-the-file-hash-rule-condition-in-applocker.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-the-file-hash-rule-condition-in-applocker.md index 2a8b980f8f..9e63783239 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-the-file-hash-rule-condition-in-applocker.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-the-file-hash-rule-condition-in-applocker.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- title: Understanding the file hash rule condition in AppLocker (Windows) -description: This topic explains the AppLocker file hash rule condition, the advantages and disadvantages, and how it is applied. +description: This topic explains the AppLocker file hash rule condition, the advantages and disadvantages, and how it's applied. ms.assetid: 4c6d9af4-2b1a-40f4-8758-1a6f9f147756 ms.reviewer: ms.author: macapara @@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec >[!NOTE] >Some capabilities of Windows Defender Application Control are only available on specific Windows versions. Learn more about the [Windows Defender Application Control feature availability](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/feature-availability). -This topic explains the AppLocker file hash rule condition, the advantages and disadvantages, and how it is applied. +This topic explains the AppLocker file hash rule condition, the advantages and disadvantages, and how it's applied. -File hash rules use a system-computed cryptographic hash of the identified file. For files that are not digitally signed, file hash rules are more secure than path rules. The following table describes the advantages and disadvantages of the file hash condition. +File hash rules use a system-computed cryptographic hash of the identified file. For files that aren't digitally signed, file hash rules are more secure than path rules. The following table describes the advantages and disadvantages of the file hash condition. | File hash condition advantages | File hash condition disadvantages | | - | - | diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-the-path-rule-condition-in-applocker.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-the-path-rule-condition-in-applocker.md index 4aa28b9f43..e47540ebc1 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-the-path-rule-condition-in-applocker.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-the-path-rule-condition-in-applocker.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- title: Understanding the path rule condition in AppLocker (Windows) -description: This topic explains the AppLocker path rule condition, the advantages and disadvantages, and how it is applied. +description: This topic explains the AppLocker path rule condition, the advantages and disadvantages, and how it's applied. ms.assetid: 3fa54ded-4466-4f72-bea4-2612031cad43 ms.reviewer: ms.author: macapara @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec >[!NOTE] >Some capabilities of Windows Defender Application Control are only available on specific Windows versions. Learn more about the [Windows Defender Application Control feature availability](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/feature-availability). -This topic explains the AppLocker path rule condition, the advantages and disadvantages, and how it is applied. +This topic explains the AppLocker path rule condition, the advantages and disadvantages, and how it's applied. The path condition identifies an application by its location in the file system of the computer or on the network. @@ -39,11 +39,11 @@ When creating a rule that uses a deny action, path conditions are less secure th |--- |--- | |
  • You can easily control many folders or a single file.
  • You can use the asterisk (*) as a wildcard character within path rules.|
  • It might be less secure if a rule that is configured to use a folder path contains subfolders that are writable by non-administrators.
  • You must specify the full path to a file or folder when creating path rules so that the rule will be properly enforced.| -AppLocker does not enforce rules that specify paths with short names. You should always specify the full path to a file or folder when creating path rules so that the rule will be properly enforced. +AppLocker doesn't enforce rules that specify paths with short names. You should always specify the full path to a file or folder when creating path rules so that the rule will be properly enforced. The asterisk (\*) wildcard character can be used within **Path** field. The asterisk (\*) character used by itself represents any path. When combined with any string value, the rule is limited to the path of the file and all the files under that path. For example, %ProgramFiles%\\Internet Explorer\\\* indicates that all files and subfolders within the Internet Explorer folder will be affected by the rule. -AppLocker uses path variables for well-known directories in Windows. Path variables are not environment variables. The AppLocker engine can only interpret AppLocker path variables. The following table details these path variables. +AppLocker uses path variables for well-known directories in Windows. Path variables aren't environment variables. The AppLocker engine can only interpret AppLocker path variables. The following table details these path variables. | Windows directory or drive | AppLocker path variable | Windows environment variable | diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-the-publisher-rule-condition-in-applocker.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-the-publisher-rule-condition-in-applocker.md index 55d9299a0f..22ab048b3b 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-the-publisher-rule-condition-in-applocker.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/understanding-the-publisher-rule-condition-in-applocker.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- title: Understanding the publisher rule condition in AppLocker (Windows) -description: This topic explains the AppLocker publisher rule condition, what controls are available, and how it is applied. +description: This topic explains the AppLocker publisher rule condition, what controls are available, and how it's applied. ms.assetid: df61ed8f-a97e-4644-9d0a-2169f18c1c4f ms.reviewer: ms.author: macapara @@ -29,25 +29,25 @@ ms.technology: windows-sec >[!NOTE] >Some capabilities of Windows Defender Application Control are only available on specific Windows versions. Learn more about the [Windows Defender Application Control feature availability](/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/feature-availability). -This topic explains the AppLocker publisher rule condition, what controls are available, and how it is applied. +This topic explains the AppLocker publisher rule condition, what controls are available, and how it's applied. Publisher conditions can be made only for files that are digitally signed; this condition identifies an app based on its digital signature and extended attributes. The digital signature contains information about the company that created the app (the publisher). The extended attributes, which are obtained from the binary resource, contain the name of the product that the app is part of and the version number of the app. The publisher may be a software development company, such as Microsoft, or the Information Technology department of your organization. -Publisher conditions are easier to maintain than file hash conditions and are generally more secure than path conditions. Rules that are specified to the version level might have to be updated when a new version of the file is released. The following table describes the advantages and disadvantages +Publisher conditions are easier to maintain than file hash conditions and are more secure than path conditions. Rules that are specified to the version level might have to be updated when a new version of the file is released. The following table describes the advantages and disadvantages of the publisher condition. |Publisher condition advantages|Publisher condition disadvantages| |--- |--- | -|
  • Frequent updating is not required.
  • You can apply different values within a certificate.
  • A single rule can be used to allow an entire product suite.
  • You can use the asterisk (*) wildcard character within a publisher rule to specify that any value should be matched.|
  • The file must be signed.
  • Although a single rule can be used to allow an entire product suite, all files in the suite must be signed uniformly.| +|
  • Frequent updating isn't required.
  • You can apply different values within a certificate.
  • A single rule can be used to allow an entire product suite.
  • You can use the asterisk (*) wildcard character within a publisher rule to specify that any value should be matched.|
  • The file must be signed.
  • Although a single rule can be used to allow an entire product suite, all files in the suite must be signed uniformly.| Wildcard characters can be used as values in the publisher rule fields according to the following specifications: - **Publisher** - The asterisk (\*) character used by itself represents any publisher. When combined with any string value, the rule is limited to the publisher with a value in the signed certificate that matches the character string. In other words, the asterisk is not treated as a wildcard character if used with other characters in this field. For example, using the characters "M\*" limits the publisher name to only a publisher with the name "M\*." Using the characters "\*x\*" limits the publisher name only to the name “\*x\*”. A question mark (?) is not a valid wildcard character in this field. + The asterisk (\*) character used by itself represents any publisher. When combined with any string value, the rule is limited to the publisher with a value in the signed certificate that matches the character string. In other words, the asterisk isn't treated as a wildcard character if used with other characters in this field. For example, using the characters "M\*" limits the publisher name to only a publisher with the name "M\*." Using the characters "\*x\*" limits the publisher name only to the name “\*x\*”. A question mark (?) isn't a valid wildcard character in this field. - **Product name** - The asterisk (\*) character used by itself represents any product name. When combined with any string value, the rule is limited to the product of the publisher with a value in the signed certificate that matches the character string. In other words, the asterisk is not treated as a wildcard character if used with other characters in this field. A question mark (?) is not a valid wildcard character in this field. + The asterisk (\*) character used by itself represents any product name. When combined with any string value, the rule is limited to the product of the publisher with a value in the signed certificate that matches the character string. In other words, the asterisk isn't treated as a wildcard character if used with other characters in this field. A question mark (?) isn't a valid wildcard character in this field. - **File name** diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/use-a-reference-computer-to-create-and-maintain-applocker-policies.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/use-a-reference-computer-to-create-and-maintain-applocker-policies.md index e054f32aa9..a5ef9054dc 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/use-a-reference-computer-to-create-and-maintain-applocker-policies.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/use-a-reference-computer-to-create-and-maintain-applocker-policies.md @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ This topic for the IT professional describes the steps to create and maintain Ap ## Background and prerequisites -An AppLocker reference device is a baseline device you can use to configure policies and can subsequently be used to maintain AppLocker policies. For the procedure to configure a reference device, see [Configure the AppLocker reference device](configure-the-appLocker-reference-device.md). +An AppLocker reference device is a baseline device you can use to configure policies and can then be used to maintain AppLocker policies. For the procedure to configure a reference device, see [Configure the AppLocker reference device](configure-the-appLocker-reference-device.md). An AppLocker reference device that is used to create and maintain AppLocker policies should contain the corresponding apps for each organizational unit (OU) to mimic your production environment. @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ You can perform AppLocker policy testing on the reference device by using the ** ## Step 1: Automatically generate rules on the reference device -With AppLocker, you can automatically generate rules for all files within a folder. AppLocker scans the specified folder and creates the condition types that you choose for each file in that folder. For the procedure to do this, see [Run the Automatically Generate Rules wizard](run-the-automatically-generate-rules-wizard.md). +With AppLocker, you can automatically generate rules for all files within a folder. AppLocker scans the specified folder and creates the condition types that you choose for each file in that folder. For information on how to automatically generate rules, see [Run the Automatically Generate Rules wizard](run-the-automatically-generate-rules-wizard.md). >**Note:**  If you run this wizard to create your first rules for a Group Policy Object (GPO), after you complete the wizard, you will be prompted to create the default rules, which allow critical system files to run. You can edit the default rules at any time. If your organization has decided to edit the default rules or create custom rules to allow the Windows system files to run, ensure that you delete the default rules after you replace them with your custom rules. @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ AppLocker includes default rules for each rule collection. These rules are inten ## Step 3: Modify rules and the rule collection on the reference device -If AppLocker policies are currently running in your production environment, export the policies from the corresponding GPOs and save them to the reference device. For the procedure to do this, see [Export an AppLocker policy from a GPO](export-an-applocker-policy-from-a-gpo.md). If no AppLocker policies have been deployed, create the rules and develop the policies by using the following procedures: +If AppLocker policies are currently running in your production environment, export the policies from the corresponding GPOs and save them to the reference device. For information on how to export and save the policies, see [Export an AppLocker policy from a GPO](export-an-applocker-policy-from-a-gpo.md). If no AppLocker policies have been deployed, create the rules and develop the policies by using the following procedures: - [Create a rule that uses a publisher condition](create-a-rule-that-uses-a-publisher-condition.md) - [Create a rule that uses a file hash condition](create-a-rule-that-uses-a-file-hash-condition.md) @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ If AppLocker policies are currently running in your production environment, expo ## Step 4: Test and update AppLocker policy on the reference device -You should test each set of rules to ensure that they perform as intended. The **Test-AppLockerPolicy** Windows PowerShell cmdlet can be used to determine whether any of the rules in your rule collection will be blocked on your reference device. Perform the steps on each reference device that you used to define the AppLocker policy. Ensure that the reference device is joined to the domain and that it is receiving the AppLocker policy from the appropriate GPO. Because AppLocker rules are inherited from linked GPOs, you should deploy all of the rules to simultaneously test all of your test GPOs. Use the following procedures to complete this step: +You should test each set of rules to ensure that they perform as intended. The **Test-AppLockerPolicy** Windows PowerShell cmdlet can be used to determine whether any of the rules in your rule collection will be blocked on your reference device. Perform the steps on each reference device that you used to define the AppLocker policy. Ensure that the reference device is joined to the domain and that it's receiving the AppLocker policy from the appropriate GPO. Because AppLocker rules are inherited from linked GPOs, you should deploy all of the rules to simultaneously test all of your test GPOs. Use the following procedures to complete this step: - [Test an AppLocker Policy with Test-AppLockerPolicy](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/ee791772(v=ws.10)) - [Discover the Effect of an AppLocker Policy](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/ee791823(v=ws.10)) @@ -77,17 +77,17 @@ You should test each set of rules to ensure that they perform as intended. The * ## Step 5: Export and import the policy into production -When the AppLocker policy has been tested successfully, it can be imported into the GPO (or imported into individual computers that are not managed by Group Policy) and checked for its intended effectiveness. To do this, perform the following procedures: +When the AppLocker policy has been tested successfully, it can be imported into the GPO (or imported into individual computers that aren't managed by Group Policy) and checked for its intended effectiveness. To do these tasks, perform the following procedures: - [Export an AppLocker policy to an XML file](export-an-applocker-policy-to-an-xml-file.md) - [Import an AppLocker policy into a GPO](import-an-applocker-policy-into-a-gpo.md) or - [Discover the Effect of an AppLocker Policy](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/ee791823(v=ws.10)) -If the AppLocker policy enforcement setting is **Audit only** and you are satisfied that the policy is fulfilling your intent, you can change it to **Enforce rules**. For info about how to change the enforcement setting, see [Configure an AppLocker policy for enforce rules](configure-an-applocker-policy-for-enforce-rules.md). +If the AppLocker policy enforcement setting is **Audit only** and you're satisfied that the policy is fulfilling your intent, you can change it to **Enforce rules**. For info about how to change the enforcement setting, see [Configure an AppLocker policy for enforce rules](configure-an-applocker-policy-for-enforce-rules.md). ## Step 6: Monitor the effect of the policy in production -If additional refinements or updates are necessary after a policy is deployed, use the appropriate following procedures to monitor and update the policy: +If more refinements or updates are necessary after a policy is deployed, use the appropriate following procedures to monitor and update the policy: - [Monitor app usage with AppLocker](monitor-application-usage-with-applocker.md) - [Edit an AppLocker policy](edit-an-applocker-policy.md) diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/use-applocker-and-software-restriction-policies-in-the-same-domain.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/use-applocker-and-software-restriction-policies-in-the-same-domain.md index 40d68279fe..37a691a28f 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/use-applocker-and-software-restriction-policies-in-the-same-domain.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/use-applocker-and-software-restriction-policies-in-the-same-domain.md @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ This topic for IT professionals describes concepts and procedures to help you ma ## Using AppLocker and Software Restriction Policies in the same domain AppLocker is supported on systems running Windows 7 and above. Software Restriction Policies (SRP) is supported on systems running Windows Vista or earlier. You can continue to use SRP for application control on your pre-Windows 7 computers, but use AppLocker for computers running -Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 7 and later. It is recommended that you author AppLocker and SRP rules in separate GPOs and target the GPO with SRP policies to systems running Windows Vista or earlier. When both SRP and AppLocker policies are applied to computers running Windows Server 2008 R2, +Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 7 and later. It's recommended that you author AppLocker and SRP rules in separate GPOs and target the GPO with SRP policies to systems running Windows Vista or earlier. When both SRP and AppLocker policies are applied to computers running Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 7 and later, the SRP policies are ignored. The following table compares the features and functions of Software Restriction Policies (SRP) and AppLocker. @@ -45,15 +45,15 @@ The following table compares the features and functions of Software Restriction |Policy creation|SRP policies are maintained through Group Policy and only the administrator of the GPO can update the SRP policy. The administrator on the local computer can modify the SRP policies defined in the local GPO.|AppLocker policies are maintained through Group Policy and only the administrator of the GPO can update the policy. The administrator on the local computer can modify the AppLocker policies defined in the local GPO.

    AppLocker permits customization of error messages to direct users to a Web page for help.| |Policy maintenance|SRP policies must be updated by using the Local Security Policy snap-in (if the policies are created locally) or the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC).|AppLocker policies can be updated by using the Local Security Policy snap-in (if the policies are created locally), or the GPMC, or the Windows PowerShell AppLocker cmdlets.| |Policy application|SRP policies are distributed through Group Policy.|AppLocker policies are distributed through Group Policy.| -|Enforcement mode|SRP works in the “deny list mode” where administrators can create rules for files that they do not want to allow in this Enterprise whereas the rest of the file is allowed to run by default.

    SRP can also be configured in the “allowlist mode” so that by default all files are blocked and administrators need to create allow rules for files that they want to allow.|AppLocker by default works in the “allowlist mode” where only those files are allowed to run for which there is a matching allow rule.| -|File types that can be controlled|SRP can control the following file types:
  • Executables
  • Dlls
  • Scripts
  • Windows Installers

    SRP cannot control each file type separately. All SRP rules are in a single rule collection.|AppLocker can control the following file types:
  • Executables
  • Dlls
  • Scripts
  • Windows Installers
  • Packaged apps and installers

    AppLocker maintains a separate rule collection for each of the five file types.| +|Enforcement mode|SRP works in the “blocklist mode” where administrators can create rules for files that they don't want to allow in this Enterprise whereas the rest of the file is allowed to run by default.

    SRP can also be configured in the “allowlist mode” so that by default all files are blocked and administrators need to create allow rules for files that they want to allow.|AppLocker by default works in the “allowlist mode” where only those files are allowed to run for which there's a matching allow rule.| +|File types that can be controlled|SRP can control the following file types:
  • Executables
  • Dlls
  • Scripts
  • Windows Installers

    SRP can't control each file type separately. All SRP rules are in a single rule collection.|AppLocker can control the following file types:
  • Executables
  • Dlls
  • Scripts
  • Windows Installers
  • Packaged apps and installers

    AppLocker maintains a separate rule collection for each of the five file types.| |Designated file types|SRP supports an extensible list of file types that are considered executable. Administrators can add extensions for files that should be considered executable.|AppLocker currently supports the following file extensions:
  • Executables (.exe, .com)
  • Dlls (.ocx, .dll)
  • Scripts (.vbs, .js, .ps1, .cmd, .bat)
  • Windows Installers (.msi, .mst, .msp)
  • Packaged app installers (.appx)| |Rule types|SRP supports four types of rules:
  • Hash
  • Path
  • Signature
  • Internet zone|AppLocker supports three types of rules:
  • File hash
  • Path
  • Publisher| -|Editing the hash value|In Windows XP, you could use SRP to provide custom hash values.

    Beginning with Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2, you can only select the file to hash, not provide the hash value.|AppLocker computes the hash value itself. Internally, it uses the SHA2 Authenticode hash for Portable Executables (exe and dll) and Windows Installers and an SHA2 flat file hash for the rest.| -|Support for different security levels|With SRP, you can specify the permissions with which an app can run. So, you can configure a rule such that Notepad always runs with restricted permissions and never with administrative privileges.

    SRP on Windows Vista and earlier supported multiple security levels. On Windows 7, that list was restricted to just two levels: Disallowed and Unrestricted (Basic User translates to Disallowed).|AppLocker does not support security levels.| +|Editing the hash value|In Windows XP, you could use SRP to provide custom hash values.

    Beginning with Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2, you can only select the file to hash, and not provide the hash value.|AppLocker computes the hash value itself. Internally, it uses the SHA2 Authenticode hash for Portable Executables (exe and dll) and Windows Installers and an SHA2 flat file hash for the rest.| +|Support for different security levels|With SRP, you can specify the permissions with which an app can run. So, you can configure a rule such that Notepad always runs with restricted permissions and never with administrative privileges.

    SRP on Windows Vista and earlier supported multiple security levels. On Windows 7, that list was restricted to just two levels: Disallowed and Unrestricted (Basic User translates to Disallowed).|AppLocker doesn't support security levels.| |Manage Packaged apps and Packaged app installers.|Not supported|.appx is a valid file type which AppLocker can manage.| |Targeting a rule to a user or a group of users|SRP rules apply to all users on a particular computer.|AppLocker rules can be targeted to a specific user or a group of users.| -|Support for rule exceptions|SRP does not support rule exceptions.|AppLocker rules can have exceptions, which allow you to create rules such as “Allow everything from Windows except for regedit.exe”.| -|Support for audit mode|SRP does not support audit mode. The only way to test SRP policies is to set up a test environment and run a few experiments.|AppLocker supports audit mode, which allows you to test the effect of their policy in the real production environment without impacting the user experience. Once you are satisfied with the results, you can start enforcing the policy.| -|Support for exporting and importing policies|SRP does not support policy import/export.|AppLocker supports the importing and exporting of policies. This allows you to create AppLocker policy on a sample device, test it out and then export that policy and import it back into the desired GPO.| +|Support for rule exceptions|SRP doesn't support rule exceptions.|AppLocker rules can have exceptions, which allow you to create rules such as “Allow everything from Windows except for regedit.exe”.| +|Support for audit mode|SRP doesn't support audit mode. The only way to test SRP policies is to set up a test environment and run a few experiments.|AppLocker supports audit mode, which allows you to test the effect of their policy in the real production environment without impacting the user experience. Once you're satisfied with the results, you can start enforcing the policy.| +|Support for exporting and importing policies|SRP doesn't support policy import/export.|AppLocker supports the importing and exporting of policies. This support by AppLocker allows you to create AppLocker policy on a sample device, test it out and then export that policy and import it back into the desired GPO.| |Rule enforcement|Internally, SRP rules enforcement happens in the user-mode, which is less secure.|Internally, AppLocker rules for .exe and .dll files are enforced in the kernel-mode, which is more secure than enforcing them in the user-mode.| diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/use-the-applocker-windows-powershell-cmdlets.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/use-the-applocker-windows-powershell-cmdlets.md index 636ea5f18b..2751109b02 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/use-the-applocker-windows-powershell-cmdlets.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/use-the-applocker-windows-powershell-cmdlets.md @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Local Security policy snap-in, you must be a member of the local **Administrator The [Get-AppLockerFileInformation](/powershell/module/applocker/get-applockerfileinformation) cmdlet retrieves the AppLocker file information from a list of files or from an event log. File information that is retrieved can include publisher information, file hash information, and file path information. -File information from an event log may not contain all of these fields. Files that are not signed do not have any publisher information. +File information from an event log may not contain all of these fields. Files that aren't signed don't have any publisher information. ### Set AppLocker policy @@ -62,6 +62,6 @@ list of file information. The [Test-AppLockerPolicy](/powershell/module/applocker/test-applockerpolicy) cmdlet uses the specified AppLocker policy to test whether a specified list of files are allowed to run or not on the local device for a specific user. -## Additional resources +## Other resources - For steps to perform other AppLocker policy tasks, see [Administer AppLocker](administer-applocker.md). \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/using-event-viewer-with-applocker.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/using-event-viewer-with-applocker.md index 0274a768dd..59111cd93d 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/using-event-viewer-with-applocker.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/using-event-viewer-with-applocker.md @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ The AppLocker log contains information about applications that are affected by A - The rule name - The security identifier (SID) for the user or group identified in the rule -Review the entries in the Event Viewer to determine if any applications are not included in the rules that you automatically generated. For instance, some line-of-business apps are installed to non-standard locations, such as the root of the active drive (for example: %SystemDrive%). +Review the entries in the Event Viewer to determine if any applications aren't included in the rules that you automatically generated. For instance, some line-of-business apps are installed to non-standard locations, such as the root of the active drive (for example: %SystemDrive%). For info about what to look for in the AppLocker event logs, see [Monitor app usage with AppLocker](monitor-application-usage-with-applocker.md). @@ -52,14 +52,14 @@ The following table contains information about the events that you can use to de | Event ID | Level | Event message | Description | | - | - | - | - | -| 8000 | Error| Application Identity Policy conversion failed. Status *<%1> *| Indicates that the policy was not applied correctly to the computer. The status message is provided for troubleshooting purposes.| +| 8000 | Error| Application Identity Policy conversion failed. Status *<%1> *| Indicates that the policy wasn't applied correctly to the computer. The status message is provided for troubleshooting purposes.| | 8001 | Information| The AppLocker policy was applied successfully to this computer.| Indicates that the AppLocker policy was successfully applied to the computer.| | 8002 | Information| *<File name> * was allowed to run.| Specifies that the .exe or .dll file is allowed by an AppLocker rule.| -| 8003 | Warning| *<File name> * was allowed to run but would have been prevented from running if the AppLocker policy were enforced.| Applied only when the **Audit only** enforcement mode is enabled. Specifies that the .exe or .dll file would be blocked if the **Enforce rules** enforcement mode were enabled. | -| 8004 | Error| *<File name> * was not allowed to run.| Access to *<file name>* is restricted by the administrator. Applied only when the **Enforce rules** enforcement mode is set either directly or indirectly through Group Policy inheritance. The .exe or .dll file cannot run.| +| 8003 | Warning| *<File name> * was allowed to run but would have been prevented from running if the AppLocker policy was enforced.| Applied only when the **Audit only** enforcement mode is enabled. Specifies that the .exe or .dll file would be blocked if the **Enforce rules** enforcement mode were enabled. | +| 8004 | Error| *<File name> * was not allowed to run.| Access to *<file name>* is restricted by the administrator. Applied only when the **Enforce rules** enforcement mode is set either directly or indirectly through Group Policy inheritance. The .exe or .dll file can't run.| | 8005| Information| *<File name> * was allowed to run.| Specifies that the script or .msi file is allowed by an AppLocker rule.| -| 8006 | Warning| *<File name> * was allowed to run but would have been prevented from running if the AppLocker policy were enforced.| Applied only when the **Audit only** enforcement mode is enabled. Specifies that the script or .msi file would be blocked if the **Enforce rules** enforcement mode were enabled. | -| 8007 | Error| *<File name> * was not allowed to run.| Access to *<file name>* is restricted by the administrator. Applied only when the **Enforce rules** enforcement mode is set either directly or indirectly through Group Policy inheritance. The script or .msi file cannot run.| +| 8006 | Warning| *<File name> * was allowed to run but would have been prevented from running if the AppLocker policy was enforced.| Applied only when the **Audit only** enforcement mode is enabled. Specifies that the script or .msi file would be blocked if the **Enforce rules** enforcement mode were enabled. | +| 8007 | Error| *<File name> * was not allowed to run.| Access to *<file name>* is restricted by the administrator. Applied only when the **Enforce rules** enforcement mode is set either directly or indirectly through Group Policy inheritance. The script or .msi file can't run.| | 8008| Error| AppLocker disabled on the SKU.| Added in Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8.| | 8020| Information| Packaged app allowed.| Added in Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8.| | 8021| Information| Packaged app audited.| Added in Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8.| @@ -68,12 +68,12 @@ The following table contains information about the events that you can use to de | 8024 | Information| Packaged app installation audited.| Added in Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8.| | 8025 | Warning| Packaged app installation disabled.| Added in Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8.| | 8027 | Warning| No Packaged app rule configured.| Added in Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8.| -| 8028 | Warning | * was allowed to run but would have been prevented if the Config CI policy were enforced.| Added in Windows Server 2016 and Windows 10.| +| 8028 | Warning | * was allowed to run but would have been prevented if the Config CI policy was enforced.| Added in Windows Server 2016 and Windows 10.| | 8029 | Error | * was prevented from running due to Config CI policy.| Added in Windows Server 2016 and Windows 10.| | 8030 | Information | ManagedInstaller check SUCCEEDED during Appid verification of * | Added in Windows Server 2016 and Windows 10.| | 8031 | Information | SmartlockerFilter detected file * being written by process * | Added in Windows Server 2016 and Windows 10.| | 8032 | Error | ManagedInstaller check FAILED during Appid verification of * | Added in Windows Server 2016 and Windows 10.| -| 8033 | Warning | ManagedInstaller check FAILED during Appid verification of * . Allowed to run due to Audit Applocker Policy. | Added in Windows Server 2016 and Windows 10.| +| 8033 | Warning | ManagedInstaller check FAILED during Appid verification of * . Allowed to run due to Audit AppLocker Policy. | Added in Windows Server 2016 and Windows 10.| | 8034 | Information | ManagedInstaller Script check FAILED during Appid verification of * | Added in Windows Server 2016 and Windows 10.| | 8035 | Error | ManagedInstaller Script check SUCCEEDED during Appid verification of * | Added in Windows Server 2016 and Windows 10.| | 8036 | Error | * was prevented from running due to Config CI policy | Added in Windows Server 2016 and Windows 10.| diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/using-software-restriction-policies-and-applocker-policies.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/using-software-restriction-policies-and-applocker-policies.md index 47f5faeacd..96c1644d3a 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/using-software-restriction-policies-and-applocker-policies.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/using-software-restriction-policies-and-applocker-policies.md @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ You might want to deploy application control policies in Windows operating syste ## Use SRP and AppLocker in the same domain -SRP and AppLocker use Group Policy for domain management. However, when policies are generated by SRP and AppLocker exist in the same domain, and they are applied through Group Policy, AppLocker policies take precedence over policies generated by SRP on computers that are running an operating system that supports AppLocker. For info about how inheritance in Group Policy applies to AppLocker policies and policies generated by SRP, see [Understand AppLocker rules and enforcement setting inheritance in Group Policy](understand-applocker-rules-and-enforcement-setting-inheritance-in-group-policy.md). +SRP and AppLocker use Group Policy for domain management. However, when policies are generated by SRP and AppLocker exist in the same domain, and they're applied through Group Policy, AppLocker policies take precedence over policies generated by SRP on computers that are running an operating system that supports AppLocker. For info about how inheritance in Group Policy applies to AppLocker policies and policies generated by SRP, see [Understand AppLocker rules and enforcement setting inheritance in Group Policy](understand-applocker-rules-and-enforcement-setting-inheritance-in-group-policy.md). >**Important:**  As a best practice, use separate Group Policy Objects to implement your SRP and AppLocker policies. To reduce troubleshooting issues, do not combine them in the same GPO. @@ -45,15 +45,15 @@ The following scenario provides an example of how each type of policy would affe | Operating system | Tellers GPO with AppLocker policy | Tellers GPO with SRP | Tellers GPO with AppLocker policy and SRP | | - | - | - | - | -| Windows 10, Windows 8.1, Windows 8,and Windows 7 | AppLocker policies in the GPO are applied, and they supersede any local AppLocker policies.| Local AppLocker policies supersede policies generated by SRP that are applied through the GPO. | AppLocker policies in the GPO are applied, and they supersede the policies generated by SRP in the GPO and local AppLocker policies or policies generated by SRP.| -| Windows Vista| AppLocker policies are not applied.| Policies generated by SRP in the GPO are applied, and they supersede local policies generated by SRP.AppLocker policies are not applied.| Policies generated by SRP in the GPO are applied, and they supersede local policies generated by SRP. AppLocker policies not applied.| -| Windows XP| AppLocker policies are not applied.| Policies generated by SRP in the GPO are applied, and they supersede local policies generated by SRP. AppLocker policies are not applied.| Policies generated by SRP in the GPO are applied, and they supersede local policies generated by SRP. AppLocker policies not applied.| +| Windows 10, Windows 8.1, Windows 8, and Windows 7 | AppLocker policies in the GPO are applied, and they supersede any local AppLocker policies.| Local AppLocker policies supersede policies generated by SRP that are applied through the GPO. | AppLocker policies in the GPO are applied, and they supersede the policies generated by SRP in the GPO and local AppLocker policies or policies generated by SRP.| +| Windows Vista| AppLocker policies aren't applied.| Policies generated by SRP in the GPO are applied, and they supersede local policies generated by SRP.AppLocker policies aren't applied.| Policies generated by SRP in the GPO are applied, and they supersede local policies generated by SRP. AppLocker policies not applied.| +| Windows XP| AppLocker policies aren't applied.| Policies generated by SRP in the GPO are applied, and they supersede local policies generated by SRP. AppLocker policies aren't applied.| Policies generated by SRP in the GPO are applied, and they supersede local policies generated by SRP. AppLocker policies not applied.| >**Note:**  For info about supported versions and editions of the Windows operating system, see [Requirements to use AppLocker](requirements-to-use-applocker.md). ## Test and validate SRPs and AppLocker policies that are deployed in the same environment -Because SRPs and AppLocker policies function differently, they should not be implemented in the same GPO. This makes testing the result of the policy straightforward, which is critical to successfully controlling application usage in the organization. Configuring a testing and policy distribution system can help you understand the result of a policy. The effects of policies generated by SRP and AppLocker policies need to be tested separately and by using different tools. +Because SRPs and AppLocker policies function differently, they shouldn't be implemented in the same GPO. This rule, when implemented, makes testing the result of the policy straightforward, which is critical to successfully controlling application usage in the organization. Configuring a testing and policy distribution system can help you understand the result of a policy. The effects of policies generated by SRP and AppLocker policies need to be tested separately and by using different tools. ### Step 1: Test the effect of SRPs diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/what-is-applocker.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/what-is-applocker.md index 1196a83dee..dc46fa241d 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/what-is-applocker.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/what-is-applocker.md @@ -76,10 +76,10 @@ The following table compares the application control functions of Software Restr |User support|SRP allows users to install applications as an administrator.|AppLocker policies are maintained through Group Policy, and only the administrator of the device can update an AppLocker policy.

    AppLocker permits customization of error messages to direct users to a Web page for help.| |Policy maintenance|SRP policies are updated by using the Local Security Policy snap-in or the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC).|AppLocker policies are updated by using the Local Security Policy snap-in or the GPMC.

    AppLocker supports a small set of PowerShell cmdlets to aid in administration and maintenance.| |Policy management infrastructure|To manage SRP policies, SRP uses Group Policy within a domain and the Local Security Policy snap-in for a local computer.|To manage AppLocker policies, AppLocker uses Group Policy within a domain and the Local Security Policy snap-in for a local computer.| -|Block malicious scripts|Rules for blocking malicious scripts prevents all scripts associated with the Windows Script Host from running, except those that are digitally signed by your organization.|AppLocker rules can control the following file formats: .ps1, .bat, .cmd, .vbs, and .js. In addition, you can set exceptions to allow specific files to run.| +|Block malicious scripts|Rules for blocking malicious scripts prevent all scripts associated with the Windows Script Host from running, except those scripts that are digitally signed by your organization.|AppLocker rules can control the following file formats: .ps1, .bat, .cmd, .vbs, and .js. In addition, you can set exceptions to allow specific files to run.| |Manage software installation|SRP can prevent all Windows Installer packages from installing. It allows .msi files that are digitally signed by your organization to be installed.|The Windows Installer rule collection is a set of rules created for Windows Installer file types (.mst, .msi and .msp) to allow you to control the installation of files on client computers and servers.| |Manage all software on the computer|All software is managed in one rule set. By default, the policy for managing all software on a device disallows all software on the user's device, except software that is installed in the Windows folder, Program Files folder, or subfolders.|Unlike SRP, each AppLocker rule collection functions as an allowed list of files. Only the files that are listed within the rule collection will be allowed to run. This configuration makes it easier for administrators to determine what will occur when an AppLocker rule is applied.| -|Different policies for different users|Rules are applied uniformly to all users on a particular device.|On a device that is shared by multiple users, an administrator can specify the groups of users who can access the installed software. Using AppLocker, an administrator can specify the user to whom a specific rule should apply.| +|Different policies for different users|Rules are applied uniformly to all users on a particular device.|On a device that is shared by multiple users, an administrator can specify the groups of users who can access the installed software. An administrator uses AppLocker to specify the user to whom a specific rule should apply.| ## Related topics diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/working-with-applocker-rules.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/working-with-applocker-rules.md index 4379162473..4ad45cf9e0 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/working-with-applocker-rules.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/working-with-applocker-rules.md @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ This topic for IT professionals describes AppLocker rule types and how to work w | [Create a rule that uses a path condition](create-a-rule-that-uses-a-path-condition.md) | This topic for IT professionals shows how to create an AppLocker rule with a path condition.| | [Create a rule that uses a publisher condition](create-a-rule-that-uses-a-publisher-condition.md) | This topic for IT professionals shows how to create an AppLocker rule with a publisher condition.| | [Create AppLocker default rules](create-applocker-default-rules.md) | This topic for IT professionals describes the steps to create a standard set of AppLocker rules that will allow Windows system files to run.| -| [Add exceptions for an AppLocker rule](configure-exceptions-for-an-applocker-rule.md) | This topic for IT professionals describes the steps to specify which apps can or cannot run as exceptions to an AppLocker rule.| +| [Add exceptions for an AppLocker rule](configure-exceptions-for-an-applocker-rule.md) | This topic for IT professionals describes the steps to specify which apps can or can't run as exceptions to an AppLocker rule.| | [Create a rule for packaged apps](create-a-rule-for-packaged-apps.md) | This topic for IT professionals shows how to create an AppLocker rule for packaged apps with a publisher condition.| | [Delete an AppLocker rule](delete-an-applocker-rule.md) | This topic for IT professionals describes the steps to delete an AppLocker rule.| | [Edit AppLocker rules](edit-applocker-rules.md) | This topic for IT professionals describes the steps to edit a publisher rule, path rule, and file hash rule in AppLocker.| @@ -49,11 +49,11 @@ The three AppLocker enforcement modes are described in the following table. The | Enforcement mode | Description | | - | - | -| **Not configured** | This is the default setting which means that the rules defined here will be enforced unless a linked GPO with a higher precedence has a different value for this setting.| +| **Not configured** | This is the default setting, which means that the rules defined here will be enforced unless a linked GPO with a higher precedence has a different value for this setting.| | **Enforce rules** | Rules are enforced.| -| **Audit only** | Rules are audited but not enforced. When a user runs an app that is affected by an AppLocker rule, the app is allowed to run and the info about the app is added to the AppLocker event log. The Audit-only enforcement mode helps you determine which apps will be affected by the policy before the policy is enforced. When the AppLocker policy for a rule collection is set to **Audit only**, rules for that rule collection are not enforced| +| **Audit only** | Rules are audited but not enforced. When a user runs an app that is affected by an AppLocker rule, the app is allowed to run and the info about the app is added to the AppLocker event log. The Audit-only enforcement mode helps you determine which apps will be affected by the policy before the policy is enforced. When the AppLocker policy for a rule collection is set to **Audit only**, rules for that rule collection aren't enforced| -When AppLocker policies from various GPOs are merged, the rules from all the GPOs are merged and the enforcement mode setting of the winning GPO is applied. +When AppLocker policies from various GPOs are merged, the rules from all the GPOs are merged, and the enforcement mode setting of the winning GPO is applied. ## Rule collections The AppLocker console is organized into rule collections, which are executable files, scripts, Windows Installer files, packaged apps and packaged app installers, and DLL files. These collections give you an easy way to differentiate the rules for different types of apps. The following table lists the file formats that are included in each rule collection. @@ -70,9 +70,9 @@ The AppLocker console is organized into rule collections, which are executable f When DLL rules are used, AppLocker must check each DLL that an application loads. Therefore, users may experience a reduction in performance if DLL rules are used. -The DLL rule collection is not enabled by default. To learn how to enable the DLL rule collection, see [DLL rule collections](#bkmk-dllrulecollections). +The DLL rule collection isn't enabled by default. To learn how to enable the DLL rule collection, see [DLL rule collections](#bkmk-dllrulecollections). -EXE rules apply to portable executable (PE) files. AppLocker checks whether a file is a valid PE file, rather than just applying rules based on file extension, which attackers can easily change. Regardless of the file extension, the AppLocker EXE rule collection will work on a file as long as it is a valid PE file. +EXE rules apply to portable executable (PE) files. AppLocker checks whether a file is a valid PE file, rather than just applying rules based on file extension, which attackers can easily change. Regardless of the file extension, the AppLocker EXE rule collection will work on a file as long as it's a valid PE file. ## Rule conditions @@ -84,13 +84,13 @@ Rule conditions are criteria that help AppLocker identify the apps to which the ### Publisher -This condition identifies an app based on its digital signature and extended attributes when available. The digital signature contains info about the company that created the app (the publisher). Executable files, dlls, Windows installers, packaged apps and packaged app installers also have extended attributes, which are obtained from the binary resource. In case of executable files, dlls and Windows installers, these attributes contain the name of the product that the file is a part of, the original name of the file as supplied by the publisher, and the version number of the file. In case of packaged apps and packaged app installers, these extended attributes contain the name and the version of the app package. +This condition identifies an app based on its digital signature and extended attributes when available. The digital signature contains info about the company that created the app (the publisher). Executable files, dlls, Windows installers, packaged apps and packaged app installers also have extended attributes, which are obtained from the binary resource. If there's executable files, dlls and Windows installers, these attributes contain the name of the product that the file is a part of, the original name of the file as supplied by the publisher, and the version number of the file. If there are packaged apps and packaged app installers, these extended attributes contain the name and the version of the app package. > **Note:** Rules created in the packaged apps and packaged app installers rule collection can only have publisher conditions since Windows does not support unsigned packaged apps and packaged app installers. > > **Note:** Use a publisher rule condition when possible because they can survive app updates as well as a change in the location of files. -When you select a reference file for a publisher condition, the wizard creates a rule that specifies the publisher, product, file name, and version number. You can make the rule more generic by moving the slider up or by using a wildcard character (\*) in the product, file name, or version number fields. +When you select a reference file for a publisher condition, the wizard creates a rule that specifies the publisher, product, file name, and version number. You can make the rule more generic by moving up the slider or by using a wildcard character (\*) in the product, file name, or version number fields. >**Note:**  To enter custom values for any of the fields of a publisher rule condition in the Create Rules Wizard, you must select the **Use custom values** check box. When this check box is selected, you cannot use the slider. @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ The following table describes how a publisher condition is applied. | **All signed files** | All files that are signed by any publisher.| | **Publisher only**| All files that are signed by the named publisher.| | **Publisher and product name**| All files for the specified product that are signed by the named publisher.| -| **Publisher and product name, and file name**| Any version of the named file or package for the named product that are signed by the publisher.| -| **Publisher, product name, file name, and file version**| **Exactly**
    The specified version of the named file or package for the named product that are signed by the publisher.| +| **Publisher and product name, and file name**| Any version of the named file or package for the named product that is signed by the publisher.| +| **Publisher, product name, file name, and file version**| **Exactly**
    The specified version of the named file or package for the named product that is signed by the publisher.| | **Publisher, product name, file name, and file version**| **And above**
    The specified version of the named file or package and any new releases for the product that are signed by the publisher.| | **Publisher, product name, file name, and file version**| **And below**
    The specified version of the named file or package and any earlier versions for the product that are signed by the publisher.| | **Custom**| You can edit the **Publisher**, **Product name**, **File name**, **Version** **Package name**, and **Package version** fields to create a custom rule.| @@ -184,13 +184,13 @@ A rule can be configured to use allow or deny actions: ## Rule exceptions -You can apply AppLocker rules to individual users or to a group of users. If you apply a rule to a group of users, all users in that group are affected by that rule. If you need to allow a subset of a user group to use an app, you can create a special rule for that subset. For example, the rule "Allow everyone to run Windows except Registry Editor" allows everyone in the organization to run the Windows operating system, but it does not allow anyone to run Registry Editor. +You can apply AppLocker rules to individual users or to a group of users. If you apply a rule to a group of users, all users in that group are affected by that rule. If you need to allow a subset of a user group to use an app, you can create a special rule for that subset. For example, the rule "Allow everyone to run Windows except Registry Editor" allows everyone in the organization to run the Windows operating system, but it doesn't allow anyone to run Registry Editor. -The effect of this rule would prevent users such as Help Desk personnel from running a program that is necessary for their support tasks. To resolve this problem, create a second rule that applies to the Help Desk user group: "Allow Help Desk to run Registry Editor." If you create a deny rule that does not allow any users to run Registry Editor, the deny rule will override the second rule that allows the Help Desk user group to run Registry Editor. +The effect of this rule would prevent users such as Help Desk personnel from running a program that is necessary for their support tasks. To resolve this problem, create a second rule that applies to the Help Desk user group: "Allow Help Desk to run Registry Editor." If you create a deny rule that doesn't allow any users to run Registry Editor, the deny rule will override the second rule that allows the Help Desk user group to run Registry Editor. ## DLL rule collection -Because the DLL rule collection is not enabled by default, you must perform the following procedure before you can create and enforce DLL rules. +Because the DLL rule collection isn't enabled by default, you must perform the following procedure before you can create and enforce DLL rules. Membership in the local **Administrators** group, or equivalent, is the minimum required to complete this procedure. @@ -208,21 +208,21 @@ Membership in the local **Administrators** group, or equivalent, is the minimum You can create rules by using two AppLocker wizards: 1. The Create Rules Wizard enables you to create one rule at a time. -2. The Automatically Generate Rules Wizard allows you to create multiple rules at one time. You can either select a folder and let the wizard create rules for the relevant files within that folder or in case of packaged apps let the wizard create rules for all packaged apps installed on the computer. You can also specify the user or group to which to apply the rules. This wizard automatically generates allow rules only. +2. The Automatically Generate Rules Wizard allows you to create multiple rules at one time. You can either select a folder and let the wizard create rules for the relevant files within that folder or if there are packaged apps let the wizard create rules for all packaged apps installed on the computer. You can also specify the user or group to which to apply the rules. This wizard automatically generates allow rules only. -## Additional considerations +## Other considerations -- By default, AppLocker rules do not allow users to open or run any files that are not specifically allowed. Administrators should maintain an up-to-date list of allowed applications. -- There are two types of AppLocker conditions that do not persist following an update of an app: +- By default, AppLocker rules don't allow users to open or run any files that aren't allowed. Administrators should maintain an up-to-date list of allowed applications. +- There are two types of AppLocker conditions that don't persist following an update of an app: - **A file hash condition** File hash rule conditions can be used with any app because a cryptographic hash value of the app is generated at the time the rule is created. However, the hash value is specific to that exact version of the app. If there are several versions of the application in use within the organization, you need to create file hash conditions for each version in use and for any new versions that are released. - - **A publisher condition with a specific product version set** If you create a publisher rule condition that uses the **Exactly** version option, the rule cannot persist if a new version of the app is installed. A new publisher condition must be created, or the version must be edited in the rule to be made less specific. + - **A publisher condition with a specific product version set** If you create a publisher rule condition that uses the **Exactly** version option, the rule can't persist if a new version of the app is installed. A new publisher condition must be created, or the version must be edited in the rule to be made less specific. -- If an app is not digitally signed, you cannot use a publisher rule condition for that app. -- AppLocker rules cannot be used to manage computers running a Windows operating system earlier than Windows Server 2008 R2 or Windows 7. Software Restriction Policies must be used instead. If AppLocker rules are defined in a Group Policy Object (GPO), only those rules are applied. To ensure interoperability between Software Restriction Policies rules and AppLocker rules, define Software Restriction Policies rules and AppLocker rules in different GPOs. +- If an app isn't digitally signed, you can't use a publisher rule condition for that app. +- AppLocker rules can't be used to manage computers running a Windows operating system earlier than Windows Server 2008 R2 or Windows 7. Software Restriction Policies must be used instead. If AppLocker rules are defined in a Group Policy Object (GPO), only those rules are applied. To ensure interoperability between Software Restriction Policies rules and AppLocker rules, define Software Restriction Policies rules and AppLocker rules in different GPOs. - The packaged apps and packaged apps installer rule collection is available on devices running at least Windows Server 2012 and Windows 8. -- When the rules for the executable rule collection are enforced and the packaged apps and packaged app installers rule collection does not contain any rules, no packaged apps and packaged app installers are allowed to run. In order to allow any packaged apps and packaged app installers, you must create rules for the packaged apps and packaged app installers rule collection. -- When an AppLocker rule collection is set to **Audit only**, the rules are not enforced. When a user runs an application that is included in the rule, the app is opened and runs normally, and information about that app is added to the AppLocker event log. +- When the rules for the executable rule collection are enforced and the packaged apps and packaged app installers rule collection doesn't contain any rules, no packaged apps and packaged app installers are allowed to run. In order to allow any packaged apps and packaged app installers, you must create rules for the packaged apps and packaged app installers rule collection. +- When an AppLocker rule collection is set to **Audit only**, the rules aren't enforced. When a user runs an application that is included in the rule, the app is opened and runs normally, and information about that app is added to the AppLocker event log. - A custom configured URL can be included in the message that is displayed when an app is blocked. -- Expect an increase in the number of Help Desk calls initially because of blocked apps until users understand that they cannot run apps that are not allowed. +- Expect an increase in the number of Help Desk calls initially because of blocked apps until users understand that they can't run apps that aren't allowed. diff --git a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/configure-authorized-apps-deployed-with-a-managed-installer.md b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/configure-authorized-apps-deployed-with-a-managed-installer.md index a0242b95b4..3bb07036ab 100644 --- a/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/configure-authorized-apps-deployed-with-a-managed-installer.md +++ b/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/configure-authorized-apps-deployed-with-a-managed-installer.md @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Windows 10 (version 1703) introduced a new option for Windows Defender Applicati ## How does a managed installer work? -Managed installer uses a special rule collection in **AppLocker** to designate binaries that are trusted by your organization as an authorized source for application installation. When one of these trusted binaries runs, Windows monitors the binary's process (and processes it launches) and watches for files being written to disk. As files are written, they are tagged as originating from a managed installer. +Managed installer uses a special rule collection in **AppLocker** to designate binaries that are trusted by your organization as an authorized source for application installation. When one of these trusted binaries runs, Windows monitors the binary's process (and processes it launches) and watches for files being written to disk. As files are written, they're tagged as originating from a managed installer. You can then configure WDAC to trust files that are installed by a managed installer by adding the "Enabled:Managed Installer" option to your WDAC policy. When that option is set, WDAC will check for managed installer origin information when determining whether or not to allow a binary to run. As long as there are no deny rules for the binary, WDAC will allow it to run based purely on its managed installer origin. @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ Users with administrator privileges, or malware running as an administrator user If a managed installer process runs in the context of a user with standard privileges, then it's possible that standard users or malware running as standard user may be able to circumvent the intent of Windows Defender Application Control. -Some application installers may automatically run the application at the end of the installation process. If this happens when the installer is run by a managed installer, then the managed installer's heuristic tracking and authorization will extend to all files that are created during the first run of the application. This could result in unintentional authorization of an executable. To avoid that, ensure that the method of application deployment that is used as a managed installer limits running applications as part of installation. +Some application installers may automatically run the application at the end of the installation process. If the application runs automatically, and the installer was run by a managed installer, then the managed installer's heuristic tracking and authorization will extend to all files that are created during the first run of the application. This extension could result in unintentional authorization of an executable. To avoid that, ensure that the method of application deployment that is used as a managed installer limits running applications as part of installation. ## Known limitations with managed installer @@ -64,11 +64,11 @@ To turn on managed installer tracking, you must: ### Create and deploy an AppLocker policy that defines your managed installer rules and enables services enforcement for executables and DLLs -Currently, neither the AppLocker policy creation UI in GPO Editor nor the PowerShell cmdlets allow for directly specifying rules for the Managed Installer rule collection. However, you can use an XML or text editor to convert an EXE rule collection policy into a ManagedInstaller rule collection. +Currently, both the AppLocker policy creation UI in GPO Editor and the PowerShell cmdlets allow for directly specifying rules for the Managed Installer rule collection. However, you can use an XML or text editor to convert an EXE rule collection policy into a ManagedInstaller rule collection. > [!NOTE] > Only EXE file types can be designated as managed installers. -1. Use [New-AppLockerPolicy](/powershell/module/applocker/new-applockerpolicy?view=win10-ps&preserve-view=true) to make an EXE rule for the file you are designating as a managed installer. This example creates a rule for Microsoft's Intune Management Extension using the Publisher rule type, but any AppLocker rule type can be used. You may need to reformat the output for readability. +1. Use [New-AppLockerPolicy](/powershell/module/applocker/new-applockerpolicy?view=win10-ps&preserve-view=true) to make an EXE rule for the file you're designating as a managed installer. This example creates a rule for Microsoft's Intune Management Extension using the Publisher rule type, but any AppLocker rule type can be used. You may need to reformat the output for readability. ```powershell Get-ChildItem ${env:ProgramFiles(x86)}'\Microsoft Intune Management Extension\Microsoft.Management.Services.IntuneWindowsAgent.exe' | Get-AppLockerFileInformation | New-AppLockerPolicy -RuleType Publisher -User Everyone -Xml > AppLocker_MI_PS_ISE.xml @@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ Currently, neither the AppLocker policy creation UI in GPO Editor nor the PowerS ``` -4. Verify your AppLocker policy. The following example shows a complete AppLocker policy that sets Configuration Manager and Microsoft Endpoint Manager Intune as managed installers. Only those AppLocker rule collections that have actual rules defined are included in the final XML. This ensures the policy will merge successfully on devices which may already have an AppLocker policy in place. +4. Verify your AppLocker policy. The following example shows a complete AppLocker policy that sets Configuration Manager and Microsoft Endpoint Manager Intune as managed installers. Only those AppLocker rule collections that have actual rules defined are included in the final XML. This condition-based inclusion ensures the policy will merge successfully on devices that may already have an AppLocker policy in place. ```xml @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ Currently, neither the AppLocker policy creation UI in GPO Editor nor the PowerS ## Enable the managed installer option in WDAC policy In order to enable trust for the binaries laid down by managed installers, the "Enabled: Managed Installer" option must be specified in your WDAC policy. -This can be done by using the [Set-RuleOption cmdlet](/powershell/module/configci/set-ruleoption) with Option 13. +This setting can be defined by using the [Set-RuleOption cmdlet](/powershell/module/configci/set-ruleoption) with Option 13. Below are steps to create a WDAC policy that allows Windows to boot and enables the managed installer option. @@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ Below are steps to create a WDAC policy that allows Windows to boot and enables ## Remove Managed Installer feature -To remove the Managed Installer feature from the device, you will need to remove the Managed Installer AppLocker policy from the device by following the instructions at [Delete an AppLocker rule: Clear AppLocker policies on a single system or remote systems](applocker/delete-an-applocker-rule.md#to-clear-applocker-policies-on-a-single-system-or-remote-systems). +To remove the Managed Installer feature from the device, you'll need to remove the Managed Installer AppLocker policy from the device by following the instructions at [Delete an AppLocker rule: Clear AppLocker policies on a single system or remote systems](applocker/delete-an-applocker-rule.md#to-clear-applocker-policies-on-a-single-system-or-remote-systems). ## Related articles diff --git a/windows/whats-new/docfx.json b/windows/whats-new/docfx.json index 051b32e193..0c42863822 100644 --- a/windows/whats-new/docfx.json +++ b/windows/whats-new/docfx.json @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ "audience": "ITPro", "feedback_system": "GitHub", "feedback_github_repo": "MicrosoftDocs/windows-itpro-docs", - "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/help/4021566/windows-10-send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-feedback-hub-app", + "feedback_product_url": "https://support.microsoft.com/windows/send-feedback-to-microsoft-with-the-feedback-hub-app-f59187f8-8739-22d6-ba93-f66612949332", "_op_documentIdPathDepotMapping": { "./": { "depot_name": "MSDN.win-whats-new",