Incorporated review comments

windows/security/information-protection/tpm/change-the-tpm-owner-password.md

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ ms.date: 09/03/2021
 
 **Applies to**
 -   Windows 10
+-   TPM 1.2
 -   Windows 11
 -   Windows Server 2016 and above
 

windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm.md

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ ms.date: 09/03/2021
 
 # How Windows uses the Trusted Platform Module
 
-The Windows operating system improves most existing security features in the operating system and adds groundbreaking new security features such as Device Guard and Windows Hello for Business. It places hardware-based security deeper inside the operating system than previous Windows versions had done, maximizing platform security while increasing usability. To achieve many of these security enhancements, Windows makes extensive use of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). This article offers a brief overview of the TPM, describes how it works, and discusses the benefits that TPM brings to Windows as well as the cumulative security impact of running Windows on a PC that contains a TPM.
+The Windows operating system improves most existing security features in the operating system and adds groundbreaking new security features such as Device Guard and Windows Hello for Business. It places hardware-based security deeper inside the operating system than previous Windows versions had done, maximizing platform security while increasing usability. To achieve many of these security enhancements, Windows makes extensive use of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). This article offers a brief overview of the TPM, describes how it works, and discusses the benefits that TPM brings to Windows and the cumulative security impact of running Windows on a PC that contains a TPM.
 
 
 **See also:**
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ The TPM is a cryptographic module that enhances computer security and privacy. P
 
 Historically, TPMs have been discrete chips soldered to a computer’s motherboard. Such implementations allow the computer’s original equipment manufacturer (OEM) to evaluate and certify the TPM separate from the rest of the system. Although discrete TPM implementations are still common, they can be problematic for integrated devices that are small or have low power consumption. Some newer TPM implementations integrate TPM functionality into the same chipset as other platform components while still providing logical separation similar to discrete TPM chips.
 
-TPMs are passive: they receive commands and return responses. To realize the full benefit of a TPM, the OEM must carefully integrate system hardware and firmware with the TPM to send it commands and react to its responses. TPMs were originally designed to provide security and privacy benefits to a platform’s owner and users, but newer versions can provide security and privacy benefits to the system hardware itself. Before it can be used for advanced scenarios, a TPM must be provisioned. Windows automatically provisions a TPM, but if the user reinstalls the operating system, he or she may need to tell the operating system to explicitly provision the TPM again before it can use all the TPM’s features.
+TPMs are passive: they receive commands and return responses. To realize the full benefit of a TPM, the OEM must carefully integrate system hardware and firmware with the TPM to send it commands and react to its responses. TPMs were originally designed to provide security and privacy benefits to a platform’s owner and users, but newer versions can provide security and privacy benefits to the system hardware itself. Before it can be used for advanced scenarios, a TPM must be provisioned. Windows automatically provisions a TPM, but if the user reinstalls the operating system, user may need to tell the operating system to explicitly provision the TPM again before it can use all the TPM’s features.
 
 The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is the nonprofit organization that publishes and maintains the TPM specification. The TCG exists to develop, define, and promote vendor-neutral, global industry standards that support a hardware-based root of trust for interoperable trusted computing platforms. The TCG also publishes the TPM specification as the international standard ISO/IEC 11889, using the Publicly Available Specification Submission Process that the Joint Technical Committee 1 defines between the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).
 
@@ -58,11 +58,11 @@ Although CNG sounds like a mundane starting point, it illustrates some of the ad
 
 The Platform Crypto Provider, introduced in the Windows 8 operating system, exposes the following special TPM properties, which software-only CNG providers cannot offer or cannot offer as effectively:
 
-•	**Key protection**. The Platform Crypto Provider can create keys in the TPM with restrictions on their use. The operating system can load and use the keys in the TPM without copying the keys to system memory, where they are vulnerable to malware. The Platform Crypto Provider can also configure keys that a TPM protects so that they are not removable. If a TPM creates a key, the key is unique and resides only in that TPM. If the TPM imports a key, the Platform Crypto Provider can use the key in that TPM, but that TPM is not a source for making additional copies of the key or enabling the use of copies elsewhere. In sharp contrast, software solutions that protect keys from copying are subject to reverse-engineering attacks, in which someone figures out how the solution stores keys or makes copies of keys while they are in memory during use.
+•	**Key protection**. The Platform Crypto Provider can create keys in the TPM with restrictions on their use. The operating system can load and use the keys in the TPM without copying the keys to system memory, where they are vulnerable to malware. The Platform Crypto Provider can also configure keys that a TPM protects so that they are not removable. If a TPM creates a key, the key is unique and resides only in that TPM. If the TPM imports a key, the Platform Crypto Provider can use the key in that TPM, but that TPM is not a source for making more copies of the key or enabling the use of copies elsewhere. In sharp contrast, software solutions that protect keys from copying are subject to reverse-engineering attacks, in which someone figures out how the solution stores keys or makes copies of keys while they are in memory during use.
 
 •	**Dictionary attack protection**. Keys that a TPM protects can require an authorization value such as a PIN. With dictionary attack protection, the TPM can prevent attacks that attempt a large number of guesses to determine the PIN. After too many guesses, the TPM simply returns an error saying no more guesses are allowed for a period of time. Software solutions might provide similar features, but they cannot provide the same level of protection, especially if the system restarts, the system clock changes, or files on the hard disk that count failed guesses are rolled back. In addition, with dictionary attack protection, authorization values such as PINs can be shorter and easier to remember while still providing the same level of protection as more complex values when using software solutions.
 
-These TPM features give Platform Crypto Provider distinct advantages over software-based solutions. A practical way to see these benefits in action is when using certificates on a Windows device. On platforms that include a TPM, Windows can use the Platform Crypto Provider to provide certificate storage. Certificate templates can specify that a TPM use the Platform Crypto Provider to protect the key associated with a certificate. In mixed environments, where some computers might not have a TPM, the certificate template could simply prefer the Platform Crypto Provider over the standard Windows software provider. If a certificate is configured as not able to be exported, the private key for the certificate is restricted and cannot be exported from the TPM. If the certificate requires a PIN, the PIN gains the TPM’s dictionary attack protection automatically.
+These TPM features give Platform Crypto Provider distinct advantages over software-based solutions. A practical way to see these benefits in action is when using certificates on a Windows device. On platforms that include a TPM, Windows can use the Platform Crypto Provider to provide certificate storage. Certificate templates can specify that a TPM use the Platform Crypto Provider to protect the key associated with a certificate. In mixed environments, where some computers might not have a TPM, the certificate template could prefer the Platform Crypto Provider over the standard Windows software provider. If a certificate is configured as not able to be exported, the private key for the certificate is restricted and cannot be exported from the TPM. If the certificate requires a PIN, the PIN gains the TPM’s dictionary attack protection automatically.
 
 ## Virtual Smart Card
 
@@ -92,13 +92,13 @@ For Windows Hello for Business, Microsoft can fill the role of the identity CA.
 
 ## BitLocker Drive Encryption
 
-BitLocker provides full-volume encryption to protect data at rest. The most common device configuration splits the hard drive into several volumes. The operating system and user data reside on one volume that holds confidential information, and other volumes hold public information such as boot components, system information and recovery tools. (These other volumes are used infrequently enough that they do not need to be visible to users.) Without additional protections in place, if the volume containing the operating system and user data is not encrypted, someone can boot another operating system and easily bypass the intended operating system’s enforcement of file permissions to read any user data.
+BitLocker provides full-volume encryption to protect data at rest. The most common device configuration splits the hard drive into several volumes. The operating system and user data reside on one volume that holds confidential information, and other volumes hold public information such as boot components, system information and recovery tools. (These other volumes are used infrequently enough that they do not need to be visible to users.) Without more protections in place, if the volume containing the operating system and user data is not encrypted, someone can boot another operating system and easily bypass the intended operating system’s enforcement of file permissions to read any user data.
 
 In the most common configuration, BitLocker encrypts the operating system volume so that if the computer or hard disk is lost or stolen when powered off, the data on the volume remains confidential. When the computer is turned on, starts normally, and proceeds to the Windows logon prompt, the only path forward is for the user to log on with his or her credentials, allowing the operating system to enforce its normal file permissions. If something about the boot process changes, however—for example, a different operating system is booted from a USB device—the operating system volume and user data cannot be read and are not accessible. The TPM and system firmware collaborate to record measurements of how the system started, including loaded software and configuration details such as whether boot occurred from the hard drive or a USB device. BitLocker relies on the TPM to allow the use of a key only when startup occurs in an expected way. The system firmware and TPM are carefully designed to work together to provide the following capabilities:
 
 •	**Hardware root of trust for measurement**. A TPM allows software to send it commands that record measurements of software or configuration information. This information can be calculated using a hash algorithm that essentially transforms a lot of data into a small, statistically unique hash value. The system firmware has a component called the Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM) that is implicitly trusted. The CRTM unconditionally hashes the next software component and records the measurement value by sending a command to the TPM. Successive components, whether system firmware or operating system loaders, continue the process by measuring any software components they load before running them. Because each component’s measurement is sent to the TPM before it runs, a component cannot erase its measurement from the TPM. (However, measurements are erased when the system is restarted.) The result is that at each step of the system startup process, the TPM holds measurements of boot software and configuration information. Any changes in boot software or configuration yield different TPM measurements at that step and later steps. Because the system firmware unconditionally starts the measurement chain, it provides a hardware-based root of trust for the TPM measurements. At some point in the startup process, the value of recording all loaded software and configuration information diminishes and the chain of measurements stops. The TPM allows for the creation of keys that can be used only when the platform configuration registers that hold the measurements have specific values.
 
-•	**Key used only when boot measurements are accurate**. BitLocker creates a key in the TPM that can be used only when the boot measurements match an expected value. The expected value is calculated for the step in the startup process when Windows Boot Manager runs from the operating system volume on the system hard drive. Windows Boot Manager, which is stored unencrypted on the boot volume, needs to use the TPM key so that it can decrypt data read into memory from the operating system volume and startup can proceed using the encrypted operating system volume. If a different operating system is booted or the configuration is changed, the measurement values in the TPM will be different, the TPM will not let Windows Boot Manager use the key, and the startup process cannot proceed normally because the data on the operating system cannot be decrypted. If someone tries to boot the system with a different operating system or a different device, the software or configuration measurements in the TPM will be wrong and the TPM will not allow use of the key needed to decrypt the operating system volume. As a failsafe, if measurement values change unexpectedly, the user can always use the BitLocker recovery key to access volume data. Organizations can configure BitLocker to store the recovery key in Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS).
+•	**Key used only when boot measurements are accurate**. BitLocker creates a key in the TPM that can be used only when the boot measurements match an expected value. The expected value is calculated for the step in the startup process when Windows Boot Manager runs from the operating system volume on the system hard drive. Windows Boot Manager, which is stored unencrypted on the boot volume, needs to use the TPM key so that it can decrypt data read into memory from the operating system volume and startup can proceed using the encrypted operating system volume. If a different operating system is booted or the configuration is changed, the measurement values in the TPM will be different, the TPM will not let Windows Boot Manager use the key, and the startup process cannot proceed normally because the data on the operating system cannot be decrypted. If someone tries to boot the system with a different operating system or a different device, the software or configuration measurements in the TPM will be wrong and the TPM will not allow use of the key needed to decrypt the operating system volume. As a failsafe, if measurement values change unexpectedly, the user can always use the BitLocker recovery key to access volume data. Organizations can configure BitLocker to store the recovery key-in Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS).
 
 Device hardware characteristics are important to BitLocker and its ability to protect data. One consideration is whether the device provides attack vectors when the system is at the logon screen. For example, if the Windows device has a port that allows direct memory access so that someone can plug in hardware and read memory, an attacker can read the operating system volume’s decryption key from memory while at the Windows logon screen. To mitigate this risk, organizations can configure BitLocker so that the TPM key requires both the correct software measurements and an authorization value. The system startup process stops at Windows Boot Manager, and the user is prompted to enter the authorization value for the TPM key or insert a USB device with the value. This process stops BitLocker from automatically loading the key into memory where it might be vulnerable, but has a less desirable user experience.
 

windows/security/information-protection/tpm/initialize-and-configure-ownership-of-the-tpm.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 title: Troubleshoot the TPM (Windows)
-description: This topic for the IT professional describes how to view status for, clear, or troubleshoot the Trusted Platform Module (TPM).
+description: This article for the IT professional describes how to view status for, clear, or troubleshoot the Trusted Platform Module (TPM).
 ms.assetid: 1166efaf-7aa3-4420-9279-435d9c6ac6f8
 ms.reviewer: 
 ms.prod: w10
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ ms.date: 09/06/2021
 -   Windows 11
 -   Windows Server 2016 and above
 
-This topic provides information for the IT professional to troubleshoot the Trusted Platform Module (TPM):
+This article provides information for the IT professional to troubleshoot the Trusted Platform Module (TPM):
 
 -   [Troubleshoot TPM initialization](#troubleshoot-tpm-initialization)
 
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Starting with Windows 10 and Windows 11, the operating system automatically init
 
 If you find that Windows is not able to initialize the TPM automatically, review the following information:
 
--   You can try clearing the TPM to the factory default values and allowing Windows to re-initialize it. For important precautions for this process, and instructions for completing it, see [Clear all the keys from the TPM](#clear-all-the-keys-from-the-tpm), later in this topic.
+-   You can try clearing the TPM to the factory default values and allowing Windows to re-initialize it. For important precautions for this process, and instructions for completing it, see [Clear all the keys from the TPM](#clear-all-the-keys-from-the-tpm), later in this article.
 
 -   If the TPM is a TPM 2.0 and is not detected by Windows, verify that your computer hardware contains a Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) that is Trusted Computing Group-compliant. Also, ensure that in the UEFI settings, the TPM has not been disabled or hidden from the operating system.
 
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ If these issues occur, an error message appears, and you cannot complete the ini
 
 ### Troubleshoot systems with multiple TPMs
 
-Some systems may have multiple TPMs and the active TPM may be toggled in UEFI. Windows does not support this behavior. If you switch TPMs, Windows might not properly detect or interact with the new TPM. If you plan to switch TPMs you should toggle to the new TPM, clear it, and reinstall Windows. For more information, see [Clear all the keys from the TPM](#clear-all-the-keys-from-the-tpm), later in this topic.
+Some systems may have multiple TPMs and the active TPM may be toggled in UEFI. Windows does not support this behavior. If you switch TPMs, Windows might not properly detect or interact with the new TPM. If you plan to switch TPMs you should toggle to the new TPM, clear it, and reinstall Windows. For more information, see [Clear all the keys from the TPM](#clear-all-the-keys-from-the-tpm), later in this article.
 
 For example, toggling TPMs will cause BitLocker to enter recovery mode. We strongly recommend that, on systems with two TPMs, one TPM is selected to be used and the selection is not changed.
 
@@ -80,11 +80,11 @@ Clearing the TPM resets it to an unowned state. After you clear the TPM, the Win
 
 Clearing the TPM can result in data loss. To protect against such loss, review the following precautions:
 
--   Clearing the TPM causes you to lose all created keys associated with the TPM, and data protected by those keys, such as a virtual smart card or a login PIN. Make sure that you have a backup and recovery method for any data that is protected or encrypted by the TPM.
+-   Clearing the TPM causes you to lose all created keys associated with the TPM, and data protected by those keys, such as a virtual smart card or a sign in PIN. Make sure that you have a backup and recovery method for any data that is protected or encrypted by the TPM.
 
 -   Do not clear the TPM on a device you do not own, such as a work or school PC, without being instructed to do so by your IT administrator.
 
--   If you want to temporarily suspend TPM operations and you have TPM 1.2 with Windows 10, version 1507 or 1511, or Windows 11, you can turn off the TPM. For more information, see [Turn off the TPM](#turn-off-the-tpm), later in this topic.
+-   If you want to temporarily suspend TPM operations and you have TPM 1.2 with Windows 10, version 1507 or 1511, or Windows 11, you can turn off the TPM. For more information, see [Turn off the TPM](#turn-off-the-tpm), later in this article.
 
 -   Always use functionality in the operating system (such as TPM.msc) to the clear the TPM. Do not clear the TPM directly from UEFI.
 
@@ -96,13 +96,13 @@ Membership in the local Administrators group, or equivalent, is the minimum requ
 
 1. Open the Windows Defender Security Center app.
 
-2. Click **Device security**.
+2. Select **Device security**.
 
-3. Click **Security processor details**.
+3. Select **Security processor details**.
 
-4. Click **Security processor troubleshooting**.
+4. Select **Security processor troubleshooting**.
 
-5. Click **Clear TPM**.
+5. Select **Clear TPM**.
 
 6.  You will be prompted to restart the computer. During the restart, you might be prompted by the UEFI to press a button to confirm that you wish to clear the TPM.
 
@@ -120,9 +120,9 @@ If you want to use the TPM after you have turned it off, you can use the followi
 
 1.  Open the TPM MMC (tpm.msc).
 
-2.  In the **Action** pane, click **Turn TPM On** to display the **Turn on the TPM Security Hardware** page. Read the instructions on this page.
+2.  In the **Action** pane, select **Turn TPM On** to display the **Turn on the TPM Security Hardware** page. Read the instructions on this page.
 
-3.  Click **Shutdown** (or **Restart**), and then follow the UEFI screen prompts.
+3.  Select **Shutdown** (or **Restart**), and then follow the UEFI screen prompts.
 
     After the computer restarts, but before you sign in to Windows, you will be prompted to accept the reconfiguration of the TPM. This ensures that the user has physical access to the computer and that malicious software is not attempting to make changes to the TPM.
 
@@ -134,20 +134,20 @@ If you want to stop using the services that are provided by the TPM, you can use
 
 1. Open the TPM MMC (tpm.msc).
 
-2. In the **Action** pane, click **Turn TPM Off** to display the **Turn off the TPM security hardware** page.
+2. In the **Action** pane, select **Turn TPM Off** to display the **Turn off the TPM security hardware** page.
 
 3. In the **Turn off the TPM security hardware** dialog box, select a method to enter your owner password and turning off the TPM:
 
-   -   If you saved your TPM owner password on a removable storage device, insert it, and then click **I have the owner password file**. In the **Select backup file with the TPM owner password** dialog box, click **Browse** to locate the .tpm file that is saved on your removable storage device, click **Open**, and then click **Turn TPM Off**.
+   -   If you saved your TPM owner password on a removable storage device, insert it, and then select **I have the owner password file**. In the **Select backup file with the TPM owner password** dialog box, select **Browse** to locate the .tpm file that is saved on your removable storage device, select **Open**, and then select **Turn TPM Off**.
 
-   -   If you do not have the removable storage device with your saved TPM owner password, click **I want to enter the password**. In the **Type your TPM owner password** dialog box, type your password (including hyphens), and then click **Turn TPM Off**.
+   -   If you do not have the removable storage device with your saved TPM owner password, select **I want to enter the password**. In the **Type your TPM owner password** dialog box, type your password (including hyphens), and then select **Turn TPM Off**.
 
-   -   If you did not save your TPM owner password or no longer know it, click **I do not have the TPM owner password**, and follow the instructions that are provided in the dialog box and subsequent UEFI screens to turn off the TPM without entering the password.
+   -   If you did not save your TPM owner password or no longer know it, select **I do not have the TPM owner password**, and follow the instructions that are provided in the dialog box and subsequent UEFI screens to turn off the TPM without entering the password.
   
 ## Use the TPM cmdlets
 
 You can manage the TPM using Windows PowerShell. For details, see [TPM Cmdlets in Windows PowerShell](/powershell/module/trustedplatformmodule/?view=win10-ps&preserve-view=true).
 
-## Related topics
+## Related articles
 
-- [Trusted Platform Module](trusted-platform-module-top-node.md) (list of topics)
+- [Trusted Platform Module](trusted-platform-module-top-node.md) (list of articles)

windows/security/information-protection/tpm/manage-tpm-lockout.md

@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ The industry standards from the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) specify that TPM m
 
 **TPM 2.0**
 
-TPM 2.0 devices have standardized lockout behavior which is configured by Windows. TPM 2.0 devices have a maximum count threshold and a healing time. Windows configures the maximum count to be 32 and the healing time to be 10 minutes. This means that every continuous ten minutes of powered on operation without an event which increases the counter will cause the counter to decrease by 1.
+TPM 2.0 devices have standardized lockout behavior, which is configured by Windows. TPM 2.0 devices have a maximum count threshold and a healing time. Windows configures the maximum count to be 32 and the healing time to be 10 minutes. This means that every continuous ten minutes of powered on operation without an event, which increases the counter will cause the counter to decrease by 1.
 
 If your TPM has entered lockout mode or is responding slowly to commands, you can reset the lockout value by using the following procedures. Resetting the TPM lockout requires the TPM owner’s authorization. This value is no longer retained by default starting with Windows 10 version 1607 and higher.
 

windows/security/information-protection/tpm/tpm-fundamentals.md

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 ---
-title: TPM fundamentals (Windows)
+title: Trusted Platform Module (TPM) fundamentals (Windows)
 description: Inform yourself about the components of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0) and how they are used to mitigate dictionary attacks.
 ms.assetid: ac90f5f9-9a15-4e87-b00d-4adcf2ec3000
 ms.reviewer: 
@@ -23,17 +23,17 @@ ms.date: 09/06/2021
 -   Windows 11
 -   Windows Server 2016 and above
 
-This topic for the IT professional provides a description of the components of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0) and explains how they are used to mitigate dictionary attacks.
+This article for the IT professional provides a description of the components of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0) and explains how they are used to mitigate dictionary attacks.
 
-A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a microchip designed to provide basic security-related functions, primarily involving encryption keys. The TPM is usually installed on the motherboard of a computer, and it communicates with the remainder of the system by using a hardware bus.
+A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a microchip designed to provide basic security-related functions, primarily involving encryption keys. The TPM is installed on the motherboard of a computer, and it communicates with the rest of the system by using a hardware bus.
 
 Computers that incorporate a TPM can create cryptographic keys and encrypt them so that they can only be decrypted by the TPM. This process, often called wrapping or binding a key, can help protect the key from disclosure. Each TPM has a master wrapping key, called the storage root key, which is stored within the TPM itself. The private portion of a storage root key or endorsement key that is created in a TPM is never exposed to any other component, software, process, or user.
 
 You can specify whether encryption keys that are created by the TPM can be migrated or not. If you specify that they can be migrated, the public and private portions of the key can be exposed to other components, software, processes, or users. If you specify that encryption keys cannot be migrated, the private portion of the key is never exposed outside the TPM.
 
-Computers that incorporate a TPM can also create a key that has not only been wrapped, but is also tied to certain platform measurements. This type of key can be unwrapped only when those platform measurements have the same values that they had when the key was created. This process is referred to as “sealing the key to the TPM.” Decrypting the key is called unsealing. The TPM can also seal and unseal data that is generated outside the TPM. With this sealed key and software, such as BitLocker Drive Encryption, you can lock data until specific hardware or software conditions are met.
+Computers that incorporate a TPM can also create a key that is wrapped and tied to certain platform measurements. This type of key can be unwrapped only when those platform measurements have the same values that they had when the key was created. This process is referred to as “sealing the key to the TPM.” Decrypting the key is called unsealing. The TPM can also seal and unseal data that is generated outside the TPM. With this sealed key and software, such as BitLocker Drive Encryption, you can lock data until specific hardware or software conditions are met.
 
-With a TPM, private portions of key pairs are kept separate from the memory that is controlled by the operating system. Keys can be sealed to the TPM, and certain assurances about the state of a system (assurances that define the trustworthiness of a system) can be made before the keys are unsealed and released for use. Because the TPM uses its own internal firmware and logic circuits to process instructions, it does not rely on the operating system, and it is not exposed to vulnerabilities that might exist in the operating system or application software.
+With a TPM, private portions of key pairs are kept separate from the memory that is controlled by the operating system. Keys can be sealed to the TPM, and certain assurances about the state of a system (assurances that define the trustworthiness of a system) can be made before the keys are unsealed and released for use. The TPM uses its own internal firmware and logic circuits to process instructions. Hence, it doesn't rely on the operating system and it isn't exposed to vulnerabilities that might exist in the operating system or application software.
 
 For info about which versions of Windows support which versions of the TPM, see [Trusted Platform Module technology overview](trusted-platform-module-overview.md). The features that are available in the versions are defined in specifications by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG). For more info, see the Trusted Platform Module page on the Trusted Computing Group website: [Trusted Platform Module](http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/developers/trusted_platform_module).
 
@@ -62,16 +62,15 @@ The following topic describes the TPM Services that can be controlled centrally
 
 ## Measured Boot with support for attestation
 
-The Measured Boot feature provides antimalware software with a trusted (resistant to spoofing and tampering) log of all boot components. Antimalware software can use the log to determine whether components that ran before it are trustworthy versus infected with malware. It can also send the Measured Boot logs to a remote server for evaluation. The remote server can initiate remediation actions by interacting with software on the client or through out-of-band mechanisms, as appropriate.
+The Measured Boot feature provides antimalware software with a trusted (resistant to spoofing and tampering) log of all boot components. Antimalware software can use the log to determine whether components that ran before it are trustworthy versus infected with malware. It can also send the Measured Boot logs to a remote server for evaluation. The remote server can start remediation actions by interacting with software on the client or through out-of-band mechanisms, as appropriate.
 
 ## TPM-based Virtual Smart Card
 
-The Virtual Smart Card emulates the functionality of traditional smart cards, but Virtual Smart Cards use the TPM chip that is available on an organization’s computers, rather than requiring the use of a separate physical smart card and reader. This greatly reduces the management and deployment cost of smart cards in an enterprise. To the end user, the Virtual Smart Card is always available on the computer. If a user needs to use more than one computer, a
-Virtual Smart Card must be issued to the user for each computer. A computer that is shared among multiple users can host multiple Virtual Smart Cards, one for each user.
+The Virtual Smart Card emulates the functionality of traditional smart cards. Virtual Smart Cards use the TPM chip that is available on an organization’s computers, rather than using a separate physical smart card and reader. This greatly reduces the management and deployment cost of smart cards in an enterprise. To the end user, the Virtual Smart Card is always available on the computer. If a user needs to use more than one computer, a Virtual Smart Card must be issued to the user for each computer. A computer that is shared among multiple users can host multiple Virtual Smart Cards, one for each user.
 
 ## TPM-based certificate storage
 
-The TPM can be used to protect certificates and RSA keys. The TPM key storage provider (KSP) provides easy, convenient use of the TPM as a way of strongly protecting private keys. The TPM KSP can be used to generate keys when an organization enrolls for certificates, and the KSP is managed by templates in the UI. The TPM can also be used to protect certificates that are imported from an outside source. TPM-based certificates can be used exactly as standard certificates with the added functionality that the certificate can never leave the TPM from which the keys were generated. The TPM can now be used for crypto-operations through Cryptography API: Next Generation (CNG). For more info, see [Cryptography API: Next Generation](/windows/win32/seccng/cng-portal).
+The TPM protects certificates and RSA keys. The TPM key storage provider (KSP) provides easy and convenient use of the TPM as a way of strongly protecting private keys. The TPM KSP generates keys when an organization enrolls for certificates. The KSP is managed by templates in the UI. The TPM also protects certificates that are imported from an outside source. TPM-based certificates are standard certificates. The certificate can never leave the TPM from which the keys are generated. The TPM can now be used for crypto-operations through Cryptography API: Next Generation (CNG). For more info, see [Cryptography API: Next Generation](/windows/win32/seccng/cng-portal).
 
 ## TPM Cmdlets
 
@@ -79,31 +78,31 @@ You can manage the TPM using Windows PowerShell. For details, see [TPM Cmdlets i
 
 ## Physical presence interface
 
-For TPM 1.2, the TCG specifications for TPMs require physical presence (typically, pressing a key) for turning the TPM on, turning it off, or clearing it. These actions typically cannot be automated with scripts or other automation tools unless the individual OEM supplies them.
+For TPM 1.2, the TCG specifications for TPMs require physical presence (typically, pressing a key) for turning on the TPM, turning it off, or clearing it. These actions typically cannot be automated with scripts or other automation tools unless the individual OEM supplies them.
 
 ## TPM 1.2 states and initialization
 
-For TPM 1.2, there are multiple possible states. Windows automatically initializes the TPM, which brings it to an enabled, activated, and owned state.
+TPM 1.2 has multiple possible states. Windows automatically initializes the TPM, which brings it to an enabled, activated, and owned state.
 
 ## Endorsement keys
 
-For a TPM to be usable by a trusted application, it must contain an endorsement key, which is an RSA key pair. The private half of the key pair is held inside the TPM, and it is never revealed or accessible outside the TPM.
+A trusted application can use TPM only if the TPM contains an endorsement key, which is an RSA key pair. The private half of the key pair is held inside the TPM and it is never revealed or accessible outside the TPM.
 
 ## Key attestation
 
-TPM key attestation allows a certification authority to verify that a private key is actually protected by a TPM and that the TPM is one that the certification authority trusts. Endorsement keys which have been proven valid can be used to bind the user identity to a device. Moreover, the user certificate with a TPM attested key provides higher security assurance backed up by the non-exportability, anti-hammering, and isolation of keys provided by a TPM.
+TPM key attestation allows a certification authority to verify that a private key is protected by a TPM and that the TPM is one that the certification authority trusts. Endorsement keys proven valid are used to bind the user identity to a device. The user certificate with a TPM attested key provides higher security assurance backed up by the non-exportability, anti-hammering, and isolation of keys provided by a TPM.
 
 ## Anti-hammering
 
-When a TPM processes a command, it does so in a protected environment, for example, a dedicated microcontroller on a discrete chip or a special hardware-protected mode on the main CPU. A TPM can be used to create a cryptographic key that is not disclosed outside the TPM, but is able to be used in the TPM after the correct authorization value is provided.
+When a TPM processes a command, it does so in a protected environment, for example, a dedicated microcontroller on a discrete chip or a special hardware-protected mode on the main CPU. A TPM is used to create a cryptographic key that is not disclosed outside the TPM. It is used in the TPM after the correct authorization value is provided.
 
 TPMs have anti-hammering protection that is designed to prevent brute force attacks, or more complex dictionary attacks, that attempt to determine authorization values for using a key. The basic approach is for the TPM to allow only a limited number of authorization failures before it prevents more attempts to use keys and locks. Providing a failure count for individual keys is not technically practical, so TPMs have a global lockout when too many authorization failures occur.
 
-Because many entities can use the TPM, a single authorization success cannot reset the TPM’s anti-hammering protection. This prevents an attacker from creating a key with a known authorization value and then using it to reset the TPM’s protection. Generally, TPMs are designed to forget about authorization failures after a period of time so the TPM does not enter a lockout state unnecessarily. A TPM owner password can be used to reset the TPM’s lockout logic.
+Because many entities can use the TPM, a single authorization success cannot reset the TPM’s anti-hammering protection. This prevents an attacker from creating a key with a known authorization value and then using it to reset the TPM’s protection. TPMs are designed to forget about authorization failures after a period of time so the TPM does not enter a lockout state unnecessarily. A TPM owner password can be used to reset the TPM’s lockout logic.
 
 ### TPM 2.0 anti-hammering
 
-TPM 2.0 has well defined anti-hammering behavior. This is in contrast to TPM 1.2 for which the anti-hammering protection was implemented by the manufacturer, and the logic varied widely throughout the industry.
+TPM 2.0 has well defined anti-hammering behavior. This is in contrast to TPM 1.2 for which the anti-hammering protection was implemented by the manufacturer and the logic varied widely throughout the industry.
 
 For systems with TPM 2.0, the TPM is configured by Windows to lock after 32 authorization failures and to forget one authorization failure every two hours. This means that a user could quickly attempt to use a key with the wrong authorization value 32 times. For each of the 32 attempts, the TPM records if the authorization value was correct or not. This inadvertently causes the TPM to enter a locked state after 32 failed attempts.
 

windows/security/information-protection/tpm/tpm-recommendations.md

@@ -31,11 +31,11 @@ For a basic feature description of TPM, see the [Trusted Platform Module Technol
 
 ## TPM design and implementation
 
-Traditionally, TPMs have been discrete chips soldered to a computer’s motherboard. Such implementations allow the computer’s original equipment manufacturer (OEM) to evaluate and certify the TPM separate from the rest of the system. Although discrete TPM implementations are still common, they can be problematic for integrated devices that are small or have low power consumption. Some newer TPM implementations integrate TPM functionality into the same chipset as other platform components while still providing logical separation similar to discrete TPM chips.
+Traditionally, TPMs are discrete chips soldered to a computer’s motherboard. Such implementations allow the computer’s original equipment manufacturer (OEM) to evaluate and certify the TPM separate from the rest of the system. Discrete TPM implementations are common. However, they can be problematic for integrated devices that are small or have low power consumption. Some newer TPM implementations integrate TPM functionality into the same chipset as other platform components while still providing logical separation similar to discrete TPM chips.
 
 TPMs are passive: they receive commands and return responses. To realize the full benefit of a TPM, the OEM must carefully integrate system hardware and firmware with the TPM to send it commands and react to its responses. TPMs were originally designed to provide security and privacy benefits to a platform’s owner and users, but newer versions can provide security and privacy benefits to the system hardware itself. Before it can be used for advanced scenarios, however, a TPM must be provisioned. Windows automatically provisions a TPM, but if the user is planning to reinstall the operating system, he or she may need to clear the TPM before reinstalling so that Windows can take full advantage of the TPM.
 
-The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is the nonprofit organization that publishes and maintains the TPM specification. The TCG exists to develop, define, and promote vendor-neutral, global industry standards that support a hardware-based root of trust for interoperable trusted computing platforms. The TCG also publishes the TPM specification as the international standard ISO/IEC 11889, using the Publicly Available Specification Submission Process that the Joint Technical Committee 1 defines between the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).
+The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is the nonprofit organization that publishes and maintains the TPM specification. The TCG exists to develop, define, and promote vendor-neutral, global industry standards. These standards support a hardware-based root of trust for interoperable trusted computing platforms. The TCG also publishes the TPM specification as the international standard ISO/IEC 11889, using the Publicly Available Specification Submission Process that the Joint Technical Committee 1 defines between the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).
 
 OEMs implement the TPM as a component in a trusted computing platform, such as a PC, tablet, or phone. Trusted computing platforms use the TPM to support privacy and security scenarios that software alone cannot achieve. For example, software alone cannot reliably report whether malware is present during the system startup process. The close integration between TPM and platform increases the transparency of the startup process and supports evaluating device health by enabling reliable measuring and reporting of the software that starts the device. Implementation of a TPM as part of a trusted computing platform provides a hardware root of trust—that is, it behaves in a trusted way. For example, if a key stored in a TPM has properties that disallow exporting the key, that key truly cannot leave the TPM.
 
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ TPM 2.0 products and systems have important security advantages over TPM 1.2, in
 
 - TPM 2.0 **enables greater crypto agility** by being more flexible with respect to cryptographic algorithms.
 
-  - TPM 2.0 supports newer algorithms, which can improve drive signing and key generation performance. For the full list of supported algorithms, see the [TCG Algorithm Registry](http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/tcg-algorithm-registry/). Some TPMs do not support all algorithms.
+  - TPM 2.0 supports newer algorithms, which can improve drive signing and key generation performance. For the full list of supported algorithms, see the [TCG Algorithm Registry](http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/tcg-algorithm-registry/). Some TPMs don't support all algorithms.
 
   - For the list of algorithms that Windows supports in the platform cryptographic storage provider, see [CNG Cryptographic Algorithm Providers](/windows/win32/seccertenroll/cng-cryptographic-algorithm-providers).
 
@@ -69,14 +69,14 @@ TPM 2.0 products and systems have important security advantages over TPM 1.2, in
 
   - TPM 2.0 lockout policy is configured by Windows, ensuring a consistent dictionary attack protection guarantee.
 
-- While TPM 1.2 parts are discrete silicon components which are typically soldered on the motherboard, TPM 2.0 is available as a **discrete (dTPM)** silicon component in a single semiconductor package, an **integrated** component incorporated in one or more semiconductor packages - alongside other logic units in the same package(s) - and as a **firmware (fTPM)** based component running in a trusted execution environment (TEE) on a general purpose SoC.
+- While TPM 1.2 parts are discrete silicon components, which are typically soldered on the motherboard, TPM 2.0 is available as a **discrete (dTPM)** silicon component in a single semiconductor package, an **integrated** component incorporated in one or more semiconductor packages - alongside other logic units in the same package(s), and as a **firmware (fTPM)** based component running in a trusted execution environment (TEE) on a general purpose SoC.
 
 > [!NOTE]
 > TPM 2.0 is not supported in Legacy and CSM Modes of the BIOS. Devices with TPM 2.0 must have their BIOS mode configured as Native UEFI only. The Legacy and Compatibility Support Module (CSM) options must be disabled. For added security Enable the Secure Boot feature.
 >
 > Installed Operating System on hardware in legacy mode will stop the OS from booting when the BIOS mode is changed to UEFI. Use the tool [MBR2GPT](/windows/deployment/mbr-to-gpt) before changing the BIOS mode which will prepare the OS and the disk to support UEFI.
 
-## Discrete, Integrated or Firmware TPM?
+## Discrete, Integrated, or Firmware TPM?
 
 There are three implementation options for TPMs:
 
@@ -86,17 +86,17 @@ There are three implementation options for TPMs:
 
 - Firmware TPM solution, running the TPM in firmware in a Trusted Execution mode of a general purpose computation unit
 
-Windows uses any compatible TPM in the same way. Microsoft does not take a position on which way a TPM should be implemented and there is a wide ecosystem of available TPM solutions which should suit all needs.
+Windows uses any compatible TPM in the same way. Microsoft does not take a position on which way a TPM should be implemented and there is a wide ecosystem of available TPM solutions, which should suit all needs.
 
 ## Is there any importance for TPM for consumers?
 
-For end consumers, TPM is behind the scenes but is still very relevant. TPM is used for Windows Hello, Windows Hello for Business and in the future, will be a component of many other key security features in Windows. TPM secures the PIN, helps encrypt passwords, and builds on our overall Windows experience story for security as a critical pillar. Using Windows on a system with a TPM enables a deeper and broader level of security coverage.
+For end consumers, TPM is behind the scenes but is still relevant. TPM is used for Windows Hello, Windows Hello for Business and in the future, will be a component of many other key security features in Windows. TPM secures the PIN, helps encrypt passwords, and builds on our overall Windows experience story for security as a critical pillar. Using Windows on a system with a TPM enables a deeper and broader level of security coverage.
 
 ## TPM 2.0 Compliance for Windows
 
 ### Windows for desktop editions (Home, Pro, Enterprise, and Education)
 
-- Since July 28, 2016, all new device models, lines or series (or if you are updating the hardware configuration of an existing model, line or series with a major update, such as CPU, graphic cards) must implement and enable by default TPM 2.0 (details in section 3.7 of the [Minimum hardware requirements](/windows-hardware/design/minimum/minimum-hardware-requirements-overview) page). The requirement to enable TPM 2.0 only applies to the manufacturing of new devices. For TPM recommendations for specific Windows features, see [TPM and Windows Features](#tpm-and-windows-features).
+- Since July 28, 2016, all new device models, lines, or series (or if you're updating the hardware configuration of an existing model, line, or series with a major update, such as CPU, graphic cards) must implement and enable by default TPM 2.0 (details in section 3.7 of the [Minimum hardware requirements](/windows-hardware/design/minimum/minimum-hardware-requirements-overview) page). The requirement to enable TPM 2.0 only applies to the manufacturing of new devices. For TPM recommendations for specific Windows features, see [TPM and Windows Features](#tpm-and-windows-features).
 
 ### IoT Core
 
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ For end consumers, TPM is behind the scenes but is still very relevant. TPM is u
 
 ### Windows Server 2016
 
-- TPM is optional for Windows Server SKUs unless the SKU meets the additional qualification (AQ) criteria for the Host Guardian Services scenario in which case TPM 2.0 is required.
+- TPM is optional for Windows Server SKUs unless the SKU meets the other qualification (AQ) criteria for the Host Guardian Services scenario in which case TPM 2.0 is required.
 
 ## TPM and Windows Features