From fb5de43a748dc07c9d6ac00dc7263d494d562996 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: JanKeller1 Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2017 19:31:29 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] Fixed typo, made bold text into headings --- windows/keep-secure/bitlocker-countermeasures.md | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/windows/keep-secure/bitlocker-countermeasures.md b/windows/keep-secure/bitlocker-countermeasures.md index 7e1f6c7414..a928d5da12 100644 --- a/windows/keep-secure/bitlocker-countermeasures.md +++ b/windows/keep-secure/bitlocker-countermeasures.md @@ -23,9 +23,9 @@ The sections that follow provide more detailed information about the different t ### Protection before startup -Before Windows starts, you must rely on security features implemented as part of the device hardware, including TPM andSecure Boot. Fortunately, many modern computers feature TPM. +Before Windows starts, you must rely on security features implemented as part of the device hardware, including TPM and Secure Boot. Fortunately, many modern computers feature TPM. -**Trusted Platform Module** +#### Trusted Platform Module Software alone isn’t sufficient to protect a system. After an attacker has compromised software, the software might be unable to detect the compromise. Therefore, a single successful software compromise results in an untrusted system that might never be detected. Hardware, however, is much more difficult to modify. @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ A TPM is a microchip designed to provide basic security-related functions, prima By binding the BitLocker encryption key with the TPM and properly configuring the device, it’s nearly impossible for an attacker to gain access to the BitLocker-encrypted data without obtaining an authorized user’s credentials. Therefore, computers with a TPM can provide a high level of protection against attacks that attempt to directly retrieve the BitLocker encryption key. For more info about TPM, see [Trusted Platform Module](trusted-platform-module-overview.md). -**UEFI and Secure Boot** +#### UEFI and Secure Boot No operating system can protect a device when the operating system is offline. For that reason, Microsoft worked closely with hardware vendors to require firmware-level protection against boot and rootkits that might compromise an encryption solution’s encryption keys.