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Don't use fake random numbers ;-)

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This commit is contained in:
Jeremy Ellington 2005-03-09 17:11:09 +00:00
parent e2cd941c34
commit 413078f80b
1 changed files with 41 additions and 24 deletions
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65
ipmitool/src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt.c
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@ -71,7 +71,8 @@
* 1 on failure (the authcode does not match)
*/
int lanplus_rakp2_hmac_matches(const struct ipmi_session * session,
const uint8_t * bmc_mac)
const uint8_t * bmc_mac,
struct ipmi_intf * intf)
{
char * buffer;
int bufferLength, i;
@ -167,19 +168,17 @@ int lanplus_rakp2_hmac_matches(const struct ipmi_session * session,
printbuf((char*)(session->authcode), IPMI_AUTHCODE_BUFFER_SIZE, ">> rakp2 mac key");
}
/*
* The buffer is complete. Let's hash.
*/
lanplus_HMAC(session->v2_data.auth_alg,
session->authcode,
(session->authcode[IPMI_AUTHCODE_BUFFER_SIZE] == 0?
strlen(session->authcode): IPMI_AUTHCODE_BUFFER_SIZE),
IPMI_AUTHCODE_BUFFER_SIZE,
buffer,
bufferLength,
mac,
&macLength);
free(buffer);
@ -213,9 +212,11 @@ int lanplus_rakp2_hmac_matches(const struct ipmi_session * session,
*
* return 1 on success (the authcode matches)
* 0 on failure (the authcode does not match)
*
*/
int lanplus_rakp4_hmac_matches(const struct ipmi_session * session,
const uint8_t * bmc_mac)
const uint8_t * bmc_mac,
struct ipmi_intf * intf)
{
char * buffer;
int bufferLength, i;
@ -224,9 +225,22 @@ int lanplus_rakp4_hmac_matches(const struct ipmi_session * session,
uint32_t SIDc_lsbf;
if (session->v2_data.auth_alg == IPMI_AUTH_RAKP_NONE)
return 1;
if (ipmi_oem_active(intf, "intelplus")){
/* Intel BMC responds with the integrity Algorithm in RAKP4 */
if (session->v2_data.integrity_alg == IPMI_INTEGRITY_NONE)
return 1;
/* We don't yet support other alogrithms */
assert(session->v2_data.integrity_alg == IPMI_INTEGRITY_HMAC_SHA1_96);
} else {
if (session->v2_data.auth_alg == IPMI_AUTH_RAKP_NONE)
return 1;
/* We don't yet support other alogrithms */
assert(session->v2_data.auth_alg == IPMI_AUTH_RAKP_HMAC_SHA1);
}
bufferLength =
16 + /* Rm */
4 + /* SIDc */
@ -281,9 +295,11 @@ int lanplus_rakp4_hmac_matches(const struct ipmi_session * session,
/*
* The buffer is complete. Let's hash.
*/
lanplus_HMAC(session->v2_data.auth_alg,
lanplus_HMAC((ipmi_oem_active(intf, "intelplus"))
? session->v2_data.integrity_alg
: session->v2_data.auth_alg ,
session->v2_data.sik,
20,
IPMI_SIK_BUFFER_SIZE,
buffer,
bufferLength,
mac,
@ -329,7 +345,8 @@ int lanplus_rakp4_hmac_matches(const struct ipmi_session * session,
*/
int lanplus_generate_rakp3_authcode(char * output_buffer,
const struct ipmi_session * session,
uint32_t * mac_length)
uint32_t * mac_length,
struct ipmi_intf * intf)
{
int ret = 0;
int input_buffer_length, i;
@ -381,7 +398,10 @@ int lanplus_generate_rakp3_authcode(char * output_buffer,
memcpy(input_buffer + 16, &SIDm_lsbf, 4);
/* ROLEm */
input_buffer[20] = session->v2_data.requested_role;
if (ipmi_oem_active(intf, "intelplus"))
input_buffer[20] = session->privlvl;
else
input_buffer[20] = session->v2_data.requested_role;
/* ULENGTHm */
input_buffer[21] = strlen(session->username);
@ -396,11 +416,9 @@ int lanplus_generate_rakp3_authcode(char * output_buffer,
printbuf((char*)(session->authcode), IPMI_AUTHCODE_BUFFER_SIZE, ">> rakp3 mac key");
}
lanplus_HMAC(session->v2_data.auth_alg,
session->authcode,
(session->authcode[IPMI_AUTHCODE_BUFFER_SIZE - 1] == 0?
strlen(session->authcode): IPMI_AUTHCODE_BUFFER_SIZE),
IPMI_AUTHCODE_BUFFER_SIZE,
input_buffer,
input_buffer_length,
output_buffer,
@ -448,7 +466,6 @@ int lanplus_generate_sik(struct ipmi_session * session)
char * input_buffer;
int input_buffer_length, i;
char * input_key;
int input_key_length;
uint32_t mac_length;
@ -519,20 +536,20 @@ int lanplus_generate_sik(struct ipmi_session * session)
assert(0);
input_key = session->v2_data.kg;
input_key_length = strlen(session->v2_data.kg);
}
else
{
/* We will be hashing with Kuid */
input_key = session->authcode;
input_key_length = (session->authcode[IPMI_AUTHCODE_BUFFER_SIZE - 1] == 0?
strlen(session->authcode): IPMI_AUTHCODE_BUFFER_SIZE);
}
if (verbose >= 2)
printbuf(input_buffer, input_buffer_length, "session integrity key input");
lanplus_HMAC(session->v2_data.auth_alg,
input_key,
input_key_length,
IPMI_AUTHCODE_BUFFER_SIZE,
input_buffer,
input_buffer_length,
session->v2_data.sik,
@ -580,7 +597,7 @@ int lanplus_generate_k1(struct ipmi_session * session)
{
lanplus_HMAC(session->v2_data.auth_alg,
session->v2_data.sik,
20, /* SIK length */
IPMI_SIK_BUFFER_SIZE, /* SIK length */
CONST_1,
20,
session->v2_data.k1,
@ -623,7 +640,7 @@ int lanplus_generate_k2(struct ipmi_session * session)
{
lanplus_HMAC(session->v2_data.auth_alg,
session->v2_data.sik,
20, /* SIK length */
IPMI_SIK_BUFFER_SIZE, /* SIK length */
CONST_2,
20,
session->v2_data.k2,
@ -782,7 +799,7 @@ int lanplus_has_valid_auth_code(struct ipmi_rs * rs,
lanplus_HMAC(session->v2_data.integrity_alg,
session->v2_data.k1,
20,
IPMI_AUTHCODE_BUFFER_SIZE,
rs->data + IMPI_LANPLUS_OFFSET_AUTHTYPE,
rs->data_len - IMPI_LANPLUS_OFFSET_AUTHTYPE - IPMI_SHA1_AUTHCODE_SIZE,
generated_authcode,