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changing wording around Device Guard

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Brian Lich 2016-08-09 14:37:06 -07:00
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windows/keep-secure/windows-10-security-guide.md
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@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ Historically, most malware has been unsigned. Simply by deploying code integrity
The core functionality and protection of Device Guard starts at the hardware level. Devices that have processors equipped with SLAT technologies and virtualization extensions, such as Intel VT x and AMD V, will be able to take advantage of a VBS environment that dramatically enhances Windows security by isolating critical Windows services from the operating system itself. This isolation is necessary, because you must assume that the operating system kernel will be compromised, and you need assurance that some processes will remain secure.
Device Guard leverages VBS to isolate its Hypervisor Code Integrity (HVCI) service, which enables Device Guard to protect all kernel mode processes and drivers from vulnerability exploits and zero days. HVCI uses the processor’s IOMMU functionality to force all software running in kernel mode to safely allocate memory. This means that after memory has been allocated, its state must be changed from writable to read only or execute only. By forcing memory into these states, it helps ensure that attacks are unable to inject malicious code into kernel mode processes and drivers through techniques such as buffer overruns or heap spraying. In the end, the VBS environment protects the Device Guard HVCI service from tampering even if the operating system’s kernel has been fully compromised, and HVCI protects kernel mode processes and drivers so that a compromise of this magnitude can’t happen in the first place.
Device Guard leverages VBS to isolate its Hypervisor Code Integrity (HVCI) service, which enables Device Guard to help protect kernel mode processes and drivers from vulnerability exploits and zero days. HVCI uses the processor’s IOMMU functionality to force all software running in kernel mode to safely allocate memory. This means that after memory has been allocated, its state must be changed from writable to read only or execute only. By forcing memory into these states, it helps ensure that attacks are unable to inject malicious code into kernel mode processes and drivers through techniques such as buffer overruns or heap spraying. In the end, the VBS environment protects the Device Guard HVCI service from tampering even if the operating system’s kernel has been fully compromised, and HVCI protects kernel mode processes and drivers so that a compromise of this magnitude can’t happen in the first place.
Another Windows 10 feature that employs VBS is Credential Guard. Credential Guard protects credentials by running the Windows authentication service known as LSA, and then storing the user’s derived credentials (for example, NTLM hashes; Kerberos tickets) within the same VBS environment that Device Guard uses to protect its HVCI service. By isolating the LSA service and the user’s derived credentials from both user mode and kernel mode, an attacker that has compromised the operating system core will still be unable to tamper with authentication or access derived credential data. Credential Guard prevents pass-the-hash and ticket types of attacks, which are central to the success of nearly every major network breach you’ve read about, which makes Credential Guard one of the most impactful and important features to deploy within your environment. For more information about how Credential Guard complements Device Guard, see the [Device Guard with Credential Guard](#dgwithcg) section.
**Device Guard with AppLocker**