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- [Audit Process Termination](audit-process-termination.md)
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- [Audit RPC Events](audit-rpc-events.md)
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- [Audit Credential Validation](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-credential-validation)
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> **Note:** For more information, see [Security Monitoring](https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/nathangau/2018/01/25/security-monitoring-a-possible-new-way-to-detect-privilege-escalation/)
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- [Audit Token Right Adjusted](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-token-right-adjusted)
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## DS Access
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---
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title: Audit Token Right Adjusted (Windows 10)
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description: This topic for the IT professional describes the Advanced Security Audit policy setting, Audit Token Right Adjusted, which determines whether the operating system generates audit events when specific changes are made to the priveleges of a token.
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---
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# Audit Token Right Adjusted
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**Applies to**
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- Windows 10
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- Windows Server 2016
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Audit Token Right Adjusted allows you to audit events generated by adjusting the priveleges of a token.
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For more information, see [Security Monitoring: A Possible New Way to Detect Privilege Escalation](https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/nathangau/2018/01/25/security-monitoring-a-possible-new-way-to-detect-privilege-escalation/)
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| Computer Type | General Success | General Failure | Stronger Success | Stronger Failure | Comments |
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|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
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| Domain Controller | IF | No | IF | No | IF – With Success auditing for this subcategory, you can get information related to changes to the proveleges of a token.<br>However, if you are using an application or system service that dynamically adjusts token privileges, we do not recommend Success auditing because of the high volume of event “[4703](event-4703.md)(S): A user right was adjusted” that may be generated. As of Windows 10, event 4703 is generated by applications or services that dynamically adjust token privileges. An example of such an application is System Center Configuration Manager, which makes WMI queries at recurring intervals and quickly generates a large number of 4703 events (with the WMI activity listed as coming from **svchost.exe**).<br>If one of your applications or services is generating a large number of 4703 events, you might find that your event-management software has filtering logic that can automatically discard the recurring events, which would make it easier to work with Success auditing for this category.<br>This subcategory doesn’t have Failure events, so there is no recommendation to enable Failure auditing for this subcategory. |
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| Member Server | IF | No | IF | No | IF – With Success auditing for this subcategory, you can get information related to changes to the proveleges of a token.<br>However, if you are using an application or system service that dynamically adjusts token privileges, we do not recommend Success auditing because of the high volume of event “[4703](event-4703.md)(S): A user right was adjusted” that may be generated. As of Windows 10, event 4703 is generated by applications or services that dynamically adjust token privileges. An example of such an application is System Center Configuration Manager, which makes WMI queries at recurring intervals and quickly generates a large number of 4703 events (with the WMI activity listed as coming from **svchost.exe**).<br>If one of your applications or services is generating a large number of 4703 events, you might find that your event-management software has filtering logic that can automatically discard the recurring events, which would make it easier to work with Success auditing for this category.<br>This subcategory doesn’t have Failure events, so there is no recommendation to enable Failure auditing for this subcategory. |
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| Workstation | IF | No | IF | No | IF – With Success auditing for this subcategory, you can get information related to changes to the proveleges of a token.<br>However, if you are using an application or system service that dynamically adjusts token privileges, we do not recommend Success auditing because of the high volume of event “[4703](event-4703.md)(S): A user right was adjusted” that may be generated. As of Windows 10, event 4703 is generated by applications or services that dynamically adjust token privileges. An example of such an application is System Center Configuration Manager, which makes WMI queries at recurring intervals and quickly generates a large number of 4703 events (with the WMI activity listed as coming from **svchost.exe**).<br>If one of your applications or services is generating a large number of 4703 events, you might find that your event-management software has filtering logic that can automatically discard the recurring events, which would make it easier to work with Success auditing for this category.<br>This subcategory doesn’t have Failure events, so there is no recommendation to enable Failure auditing for this subcategory. |
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**Events List:**
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- [4703](event-4703.md)(S): A user right was adjusted.
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**Event volume**: High.
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