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https://github.com/MicrosoftDocs/windows-itpro-docs.git
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commit
e37361fa8a
@ -81,6 +81,6 @@ This table lists the roles and their permissions.
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>You need to be a Global Administrator, or have the Billing account owner role to access **Permissions**.
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2. Select **Manage**, and then select **Permissions**.
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3. On **Roles**, or **Purchasing roles**, select **Assing roles**.
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3. On **Roles**, or **Purchasing roles**, select **Assign roles**.
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4. Enter a name, choose the role you want to assign, and select **Save**.
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If you don't find the name you want, you might need to add people to your Azure AD directory. For more information, see [Manage user accounts](manage-users-and-groups-microsoft-store-for-business.md).
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If you don't find the name you want, you might need to add people to your Azure AD directory. For more information, see [Manage user accounts](manage-users-and-groups-microsoft-store-for-business.md).
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@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ The Microsoft Store for Business and Education has a group of settings that admi
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| Offline licensing | Configure whether or not to make offline-licensed apps available in the Microsoft Store for Business and Education. For more information, see [Distribute offline apps](distribute-offline-apps.md). | **Settings - Shop** |
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| Allow users to shop | Configure whether or not people in your organization or school can see and use the shop function in Store for Business or Store for Education. For more information, see [Allow users to shop](acquire-apps-microsoft-store-for-business.md#allow-users-to-shop). | **Settings - Shop** |
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| Make everyone a Basic Purchaser | Allow everyone in your organization to automatically become a Basic Purchaser. This allows them to purchase apps and manage them. For more information, see [Make everyone a Basic Purchaser](https://docs.microsoft.com/education/windows/education-scenarios-store-for-business#basic-purchaser-role). </br> **Make everyone a Basic Purchaser** is only available in Microsoft Store for Education. | **Settings - Shop** |
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| App request | Configure whether or not people in your organization can request apps for admins to purchase. For more information, see [Distribute offline apps](acquire-apps-microsoft-store-for-business.md). | **Settings - Distribute** |
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| App request | Configure whether or not people in your organization can request apps for admins to purchase. For more information, see [Distribute offline apps](acquire-apps-microsoft-store-for-business.md). | **Settings - Shop** |
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| Management tools | Management tools that are synced with Azure AD are listed on this page. You can choose one to use for managing app updates and distribution. For more information, see [Configure MDM provider](configure-mdm-provider-microsoft-store-for-business.md). | **Settings - Distribute** |
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| Device Guard signing | Use the Device Guard signing portal to add unsigned apps to a code integrity policy, or to sign code integrity policies. For more information, see [Device Guard signing portal](device-guard-signing-portal.md). | **Settings - Devices** |
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| Permissions | Manage permissions for your employees. For more information, see [Roles and permissions in the Microsoft Store for Business and Education](roles-and-permissions-microsoft-store-for-business.md). | **Permissions - Roles**, **Permissions - Purchasing roles**, and **Permissions - Blocked basic purchasers** |
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@ -50,6 +50,12 @@ ms.date: 03/15/2018
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<td></td>
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</tr>
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</table>
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Footnote:
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- 1 - Added in Windows 10, version 1607.
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- 2 - Added in Windows 10, version 1703.
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- 3 - Added in Windows 10, version 1709.
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- 4 - Added in Windows 10, version 1803.
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<!--/SupportedSKUs-->
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<!--Scope-->
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@ -132,15 +138,7 @@ Here is an example:
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<hr/>
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Take note:
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* You must include the local administrator in the administrators group or the policy will fail
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* You should include the local administrator while modifying the administrators group to prevent accidental loss of access
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* Include the entire UPN after AzureAD
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Footnote:
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- 1 - Added in Windows 10, version 1607.
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- 2 - Added in Windows 10, version 1703.
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- 3 - Added in Windows 10, version 1709.
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- 4 - Added in Windows 10, version 1803.
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<!--/Policies-->
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@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ When the ADMX policies are imported, the registry keys to which each policy is w
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- software\policies\microsoft\vba\security\
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- software\microsoft\onedrive
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> [!Warning]
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> Some operating system components have built in functionality to check devices for domain membership. MDM enforces the configured policy values only if the devices are domain joined, otherwise it does not. However, you can still import ADMX files and set ADMX-backed policies regardless of whether the device is domain joined or non-domain joined.
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## <a href="" id="ingesting-an-app-admx-file"></a>Ingesting an app ADMX file
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The following ADMX file example shows how to ingest a Win32 or Desktop Bridge app ADMX file and set policies from the file. The ADMX file defines eight policies.
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|
Before Width: | Height: | Size: 242 KiB After Width: | Height: | Size: 242 KiB |
Before Width: | Height: | Size: 223 KiB After Width: | Height: | Size: 223 KiB |
@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ This cumulative update model for Windows 10 has helped provide the Windows ecosy
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- [Updates for the .NET Framework](https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/dotnet/2016/10/11/net-framework-monthly-rollups-explained/) are NOT included in the Windows 10 LCU. They are separate packages with different behaviors depending on the version of .NET Framework being updated, and on which OS. As of October 2018, .NET Framework updates for Windows 10 will be separate and have their own cumulative update model.
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- For Windows 10, available update types vary by publishing channel:
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- For customers using Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) and for the Update Catalog, several different updates types for Windows 10 are rolled together for the core OS in a single LCU package, with exception of Servicing Stack Updates.
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- Servicing Stack Updates (SSU) are available for download from the Update Catalog and can be imported through WSUS, but will not be automatically synced. (See this example for Windows 10, version 1709) For more information on Servicing Stack Updates, please see this blog.
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- Servicing Stack Updates (SSU) are available for download from the Update Catalog and can be imported through WSUS. Servicing Stack Updates (SSU) will be synced automatically (See this example for Windows 10, version 1709). Learn more about [Servicing Stack Updates](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/deployment/update/servicing-stack-updates).
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- For customers connecting to Windows Update, the new cloud update architecture uses a database of updates which break out all the different update types, including Servicing Stack Updates (SSU) and Dynamic Updates (DU). The update scanning in the Windows 10 servicing stack on the client automatically takes only the updates that are needed by the device to be completely up to date.
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- Windows 7 and other legacy operating systems have cumulative updates that operate differently than in Windows 10 (see next section).
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@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ In this topic you'll learn how to set-up a Windows Autopilot deployment for a Vi
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## Prerequisites
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These are the thing you'll need on your device to get started:
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* Installation media for the latest version of Windows 10 Professional or Enterprise (ISO file)
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* Installation media for the [latest version of Windows 10 Professional or Enterprise (ISO file)](https://www.microsoft.com/software-download/windows10)
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* Internet access (see [Network connectivity requirements](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/deployment/windows-autopilot/windows-autopilot#network-connectivity-requirements))
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* Hypervisor needs to be unoccupied, or used by Hyper-V, as we will be using Hyper-V to create the Virtual Machine
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@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ manager: dansimp
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audience: ITPro
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ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
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ms.topic: conceptual
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ms.date: 02/28/2019
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ms.date: 04/02/2019
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---
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# BitLocker Group Policy settings
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@ -1167,7 +1167,8 @@ This policy controls how BitLocker reacts to systems that are equipped with encr
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</tr>
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<tr class="even">
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<td align="left"><p><strong>When not configured</strong></p></td>
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<td align="left"><p>BitLocker uses hardware-based encryption with the encryption algorithm that is set for the drive. If hardware-based encryption is not available, BitLocker software-based encryption is used instead.</p></td>
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<td align="left"><p>BitLocker software-based encryption is used irrespective of hardware-based encryption ability.
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</p></td>
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</tr>
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</tbody>
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</table>
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@ -1221,7 +1222,7 @@ This policy controls how BitLocker reacts when encrypted drives are used as oper
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</tr>
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<tr class="even">
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<td align="left"><p><strong>When not configured</strong></p></td>
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<td align="left"><p>BitLocker uses hardware-based encryption with the encryption algorithm that is set for the drive. If hardware-based encryption is not available, BitLocker software-based encryption is used instead.</p></td>
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<td align="left"><p>BitLocker software-based encryption is used irrespective of hardware-based encryption ability. </p></td>
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</tr>
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</tbody>
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</table>
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@ -1277,7 +1278,7 @@ This policy controls how BitLocker reacts to encrypted drives when they are used
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</tr>
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<tr class="even">
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<td align="left"><p><strong>When not configured</strong></p></td>
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<td align="left"><p>BitLocker uses hardware-based encryption with the encryption algorithm that is set for the drive. If hardware-based encryption is not available, BitLocker software-based encryption is used instead.</p></td>
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<td align="left"><p>BitLocker software-based encryption is used irrespective of hardware-based encryption ability. </p></td>
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</tr>
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</tbody>
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</table>
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@ -7,28 +7,28 @@ ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
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ms.sitesec: library
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ms.pagetype: security
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author: brianlic-msft
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||||
ms.date: 04/19/2017
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ms.topic: article
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ms.date: 04/02/2019
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---
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# Encrypted Hard Drive
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**Applies to**
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- Windows 10
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- Windows Server 2019
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- Windows Server 2016
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Encrypted Hard Drive uses the rapid encryption that is provided by BitLocker Drive Encryption to enhance data security and management.
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By offloading the cryptographic operations to hardware, Encrypted Hard Drives increase BitLocker performance and reduce CPU usage and power consumption. Because Encrypted Hard Drives encrypt data quickly, enterprise devices can expand BitLocker deployment with minimal impact on productivity.
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Encrypted Hard Drives are a new class of hard drives that are self-encrypting at a hardware level and allow for full disk hardware encryption. In Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, and later you can install to these devices without additional modification.
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Encrypted Hard Drives are a new class of hard drives that are self-encrypting at a hardware level and allow for full disk hardware encryption. You can install Windows to Encrypted Hard Drives without additional modification beginning with Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012.
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Some of the benefits of Encrypted Hard Drives include:
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Encrypted Hard Drives provide:
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- **Better performance**: Encryption hardware, integrated into the drive controller, allows the drive to operate at full data rate with no performance degradation.
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- **Strong security based in hardware**: Encryption is always "on" and the keys for encryption never leave the hard drive. User authentication is performed by the drive before it will unlock, independently of the operating system
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- **Ease of use**: Encryption is transparent to the user because it is on by default. There is no user interaction needed to enable encryption. Encrypted Hard Drives are easily erased using on-board encryption key; there is no need to re-encrypt data on the drive.
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- **Lower cost of ownership**: There is no need for new infrastructure to manage encryption keys, since BitLocker leverages your Active Directory Domain Services infrastructure to store recovery information. Your device operates more efficiently because processor cycles do not need to be used for the encryption process.
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- **Ease of use**: Encryption is transparent to the user, and the user doesn't need to enable it. Encrypted Hard Drives are easily erased using on-board encryption key; there is no need to re-encrypt data on the drive.
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- **Lower cost of ownership**: There is no need for new infrastructure to manage encryption keys, since BitLocker leverages your existing infrastructure to store recovery information. Your device operates more efficiently because processor cycles do not need to be used for the encryption process.
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Encrypted Hard Drives are supported natively in the operating system through the following mechanisms:
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@ -38,20 +38,21 @@ Encrypted Hard Drives are supported natively in the operating system through the
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- **API**: API support for applications to manage Encrypted Hard Drives independently of BitLocker Drive Encryption (BDE)
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- **BitLocker support**: Integration with the BitLocker Control Panel provides a seamless BitLocker end user experience.
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>**Warning:** Self-Encrypting Hard Drives and Encrypted Hard Drives for Windows are not the same type of device. Encrypted Hard Drives for Windows require compliance for specific TCG protocols as well as IEEE 1667 compliance; Self-Encrypting Hard Drives do not have these requirements. It is important to confirm the device type is an Encrypted Hard Drive for Windows when planning for deployment.
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||||
>[!WARNING]
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||||
>Self-Encrypting Hard Drives and Encrypted Hard Drives for Windows are not the same type of device. Encrypted Hard Drives for Windows require compliance for specific TCG protocols as well as IEEE 1667 compliance; Self-Encrypting Hard Drives do not have these requirements. It is important to confirm the device type is an Encrypted Hard Drive for Windows when planning for deployment.
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||||
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||||
If you are a storage device vendor who is looking for more info on how to implement Encrypted Hard Drive, see the [Encrypted Hard Drive Device Guide](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/dn653989.aspx).
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||||
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||||
## System Requirements
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||||
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||||
To use Encrypted Hard Drive, the following system requirements apply:
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To use Encrypted Hard Drives, the following system requirements apply:
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||||
For Encrypted Hard Drives used as **data drives**:
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For an Encrypted Hard Drive used as a **data drive**:
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- The drive must be in an uninitialized state.
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- The drive must be in a security inactive state.
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For Encrypted Hard Drives used as **startup drives**:
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For an Encrypted Hard Drive used as a **startup drive**:
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- The drive must be in an uninitialized state.
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- The drive must be in a security inactive state.
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@ -59,7 +60,8 @@ For Encrypted Hard Drives used as **startup drives**:
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- The computer must have the Compatibility Support Module (CSM) disabled in UEFI.
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- The computer must always boot natively from UEFI.
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||||
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||||
>**Warning:** All Encrypted Hard Drives must be attached to non-RAID controllers to function properly.
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||||
>[!WARNING]
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||||
>All Encrypted Hard Drives must be attached to non-RAID controllers to function properly.
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||||
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||||
## Technical overview
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||||
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||||
@ -74,7 +76,15 @@ Configuration of Encrypted Hard Drives as startup drives is done using the same
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||||
- **Deploy from server**: This deployment method involves PXE booting a client with Encrypted Hard Drives present. Configuration of Encrypted Hard Drives happens automatically in this environment when the Enhanced Storage component is added to the PXE boot image. During deployment, the [TCGSecurityActivationDisabled](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/dn923247.aspx) setting in unattend.xml controls the encryption behavior of Encrypted Hard Drives.
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||||
- **Disk Duplication**: This deployment method involves use of a previously configured device and disk duplication tools to apply a Windows image to an Encrypted Hard Drive. Disks must be partitioned using at least Windows 8 or Windows Server 2012 for this configuration to work. Images made using disk duplicators will not work.
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||||
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||||
### Encrypted Hard Drive Architecture
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## Configuring hardware-based encryption with Group Policy
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||||
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||||
There are three related Group Policy settings that help you manage how BitLocker uses hardware-based envryption and which encryption algorithms to use. If these settings are not configured or disabled on systems that are equipped with encrypted drives, BitLocker uses software-based encryption:
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||||
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||||
- [Configure use of hardware-based encryption for fixed data drives](bitlocker/bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md#a-href-idbkmk-hdefxdaconfigure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-fixed-data-drives)
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||||
- [Configure use of hardware-based encryption for removable data drives](bitlocker/bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md#a-href-idbkmk-hderddaconfigure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-removable-data-drives)
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||||
- [Configure use of hardware-based encryption for operating system drives](bitlocker/bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md#a-href-idbkmk-hdeosdaconfigure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-operating-system-drives)
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||||
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||||
## Encrypted Hard Drive Architecture
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||||
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||||
Encrypted Hard Drives utilize two encryption keys on the device to control the locking and unlocking of data on the drive. These are the Data Encryption Key (DEK) and the Authentication Key (AK).
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||||
|
@ -343,6 +343,7 @@
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||||
##### Reporting
|
||||
###### [Create and build Power BI reports using Windows Defender ATP data](windows-defender-atp/powerbi-reports-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
###### [Threat protection reports](windows-defender-atp/threat-protection-reports-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
###### [Machine health and compliance reports](windows-defender-atp/machine-reports-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
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||||
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||||
##### Role-based access control
|
||||
###### [Manage portal access using RBAC](windows-defender-atp/rbac-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
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||||
|
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
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||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
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||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Coin miners
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# How Microsoft identifies malware and potentially unwanted applications
|
||||
|
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Exploits and exploit kits
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -12,11 +12,12 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Fileless threats
|
||||
|
||||
What exactly is a fileless threat? The term "fileless" suggests that a threat that does not come in a file, such as a backdoor that lives only in the memory of a machine. However, there's no generally accepted definition. The terms is used broadly; it's also used to describe malware families that do rely on files in order to operate.
|
||||
What exactly is a fileless threat? The term "fileless" suggests that a threat that does not come in a file, such as a backdoor that lives only in the memory of a machine. However, there's no generally accepted definition. The terms is used broadly; it's also used to describe malware families that do rely on files in order to operate.
|
||||
|
||||
Given that attacks involve [several stages](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/ATT&CK_Matrix) for functionalities like execution, persistence, information theft, lateral movement, communication with command-and-control, etc., some parts of the attack chain may be fileless, while others may involve the filesystem in some form or another.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -25,13 +26,13 @@ To shed light on this loaded term, we grouped fileless threats into different ca
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
*Figure 1. Comprehensive diagram of fileless malware*
|
||||
|
||||
We can classify fileless threats by their entry point, which indicates how fileless malware can arrive on a machine: via an exploit; through compromised hardware; or via regular execution of applications and scripts.
|
||||
We can classify fileless threats by their entry point, which indicates how fileless malware can arrive on a machine: via an exploit; through compromised hardware; or via regular execution of applications and scripts.
|
||||
|
||||
Next, we can list the form of entry point: for example, exploits can be based on files or network data; PCI peripherals are a type of hardware vector; and scripts and executables are sub-categories of the execution vector.
|
||||
|
||||
Finally, we can classify the host of the infection: for example, a Flash application that may contain an exploit; a simple executable; a malicious firmware from a hardware device; or an infected MBR, which could bootstrap the execution of a malware before the operating system even loads.
|
||||
|
||||
This helps us divide and categorize the various kinds of fileless threats. Clearly, the categories are not all the same: some are more dangerous but also more difficult to implement, while others are more commonly used despite (or precisely because of) not being very advanced.
|
||||
This helps us divide and categorize the various kinds of fileless threats. Clearly, the categories are not all the same: some are more dangerous but also more difficult to implement, while others are more commonly used despite (or precisely because of) not being very advanced.
|
||||
|
||||
From this categorization, we can glean three big types of fileless threats based on how much fingerprint they may leave on infected machines.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -39,7 +40,7 @@ From this categorization, we can glean three big types of fileless threats based
|
||||
|
||||
A completely fileless malware can be considered one that never requires writing a file on the disk. How would such malware infect a machine in the first place? An example scenario could be a target machine receiving malicious network packets that exploit the EternalBlue vulnerability, leading to the installation of the DoublePulsar backdoor, which ends up residing only in the kernel memory. In this case, there is no file or any data written on a file.
|
||||
|
||||
Another scenario could involve compromised devices, where malicious code could be hiding in device firmware (such as a BIOS), a USB peripheral (like the BadUSB attack), or even in the firmware of a network card. All these examples do not require a file on the disk in order to run and can theoretically live only in memory, surviving even reboots, disk reformats, and OS reinstalls.
|
||||
Another scenario could involve compromised devices, where malicious code could be hiding in device firmware (such as a BIOS), a USB peripheral (like the BadUSB attack), or even in the firmware of a network card. All these examples do not require a file on the disk in order to run and can theoretically live only in memory, surviving even reboots, disk reformats, and OS reinstalls.
|
||||
|
||||
Infections of this type can be extra difficult to detect and remediate. Antivirus products usually don’t have the capability to access firmware for inspection; even if they did, it would be extremely challenging to detect and remediate threats at this level. Because this type of fileless malware requires high levels of sophistication and often depend on particular hardware or software configuration, it’s not an attack vector that can be exploited easily and reliably. For this reason, while extremely dangerous, threats of this type tend to be very uncommon and not practical for most attacks.
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||||
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||||
@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ Having described the broad categories, we can now dig into the details and provi
|
||||
|
||||
**File-based** (Type III: executable, Flash, Java, documents): An initial file may exploit the operating system, the browser, the Java engine, the Flash engine, etc. in order to execute a shellcode and deliver a payload in memory. While the payload is fileless, the initial entry vector is a file.
|
||||
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||||
**Network-based** (Type I): A network communication that takes advantage of a vulnerability in the target machine can achieve code execution in the context of an application or the kernel. An example is WannaCry, which exploits a previously fixed vulnerability in the SMB protocol to deliver a backdoor within the kernel memory.
|
||||
**Network-based** (Type I): A network communication that takes advantage of a vulnerability in the target machine can achieve code execution in the context of an application or the kernel. An example is WannaCry, which exploits a previously fixed vulnerability in the SMB protocol to deliver a backdoor within the kernel memory.
|
||||
|
||||
### Hardware
|
||||
|
||||
@ -76,9 +77,9 @@ Having described the broad categories, we can now dig into the details and provi
|
||||
|
||||
**CPU-based** (Type I): Modern CPUs are extremely complex and may include subsystems running firmware for management purposes. Such firmware may be vulnerable to hijacking and allow the execution of malicious code that would hence operate from within the CPU. In December 2017, two researchers reported a vulnerability that can allow attackers to execute code inside the [Management Engine (ME)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Management_Engine) present in any modern CPU from Intel. Meanwhile, the attacker group PLATINUM has been observed to have the capability to use Intel's [Active Management Technology (AMT)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Active_Management_Technology) to perform [invisible network communications](https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2017/06/07/platinum-continues-to-evolve-find-ways-to-maintain-invisibility/) bypassing the installed operating system. ME and AMT are essentially autonomous micro-computers that live inside the CPU and that operate at a very low level. Because these technologies’ purpose is to provide remote manageability, they have direct access to hardware, are independent of the operating system, and can run even if the computer is turned off. Besides being vulnerable at the firmware level, CPUs could be manufactured with backdoors inserted directly in the hardware circuitry. This attack has been [researched and proved possible](https://www.emsec.rub.de/media/crypto/veroeffentlichungen/2015/03/19/beckerStealthyExtended.pdf) in the past. Just recently it has been reported that certain models of x86 processors contain a secondary embedded RISC-like CPU core that can [effectively provide a backdoor](https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/08/10/via_c3_x86_processor_backdoor/) through which regular applications can gain privileged execution.
|
||||
|
||||
**USB-based** (Type I): USB devices of all kinds can be reprogrammed with a malicious firmware capable of interacting with the operating system in nefarious ways. This is the case of the [BadUSB technique](https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/07/this-thumbdrive-hacks-computers-badusb-exploit-makes-devices-turn-evil/), demonstrated few years ago, which allows a reprogrammed USB stick to act as a keyboard that sends commands to machines via keystrokes, or as a network card that can redirect traffic at will.
|
||||
**USB-based** (Type I): USB devices of all kinds can be reprogrammed with a malicious firmware capable of interacting with the operating system in nefarious ways. This is the case of the [BadUSB technique](https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/07/this-thumbdrive-hacks-computers-badusb-exploit-makes-devices-turn-evil/), demonstrated few years ago, which allows a reprogrammed USB stick to act as a keyboard that sends commands to machines via keystrokes, or as a network card that can redirect traffic at will.
|
||||
|
||||
**BIOS-based** (Type I): A BIOS is a firmware running inside a chipset. It executes when a machine is powered on, initializes the hardware, and then transfers control to the boot sector. It’s a very important component that operates at a very low level and executes before the boot sector. It’s possible to reprogram the BIOS firmware with malicious code, as has happened in the past with the [Mebromi rootkit](https://www.webroot.com/blog/2011/09/13/mebromi-the-first-bios-rootkit-in-the-wild/).
|
||||
**BIOS-based** (Type I): A BIOS is a firmware running inside a chipset. It executes when a machine is powered on, initializes the hardware, and then transfers control to the boot sector. It’s a very important component that operates at a very low level and executes before the boot sector. It’s possible to reprogram the BIOS firmware with malicious code, as has happened in the past with the [Mebromi rootkit](https://www.webroot.com/blog/2011/09/13/mebromi-the-first-bios-rootkit-in-the-wild/).
|
||||
|
||||
**Hypervisor-based** (Type I): Modern CPUs provide hardware hypervisor support, allowing the operating system to create robust virtual machines. A virtual machine runs in a confined, simulated environment, and is in theory unaware of the emulation. A malware taking over a machine may implement a small hypervisor in order to hide itself outside of the realm of the running operating system. Malware of this kind has been theorized in the past, and eventually real hypervisor rootkits [have been observed](http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2017/Jun/29), although very few are known to date.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Macro malware
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Malware names
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Phishing
|
||||
|
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Prevent malware infection
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Ransomware
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Rootkits
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Microsoft Safety Scanner
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Submit files for analysis
|
||||
|
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Supply chain attacks
|
||||
|
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Tech support scams
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Top scoring in industry tests
|
||||
@ -40,9 +41,13 @@ Windows Defender Antivirus is part of the [next generation](https://www.youtub
|
||||
|
||||
The AV-TEST Product Review and Certification Report tests on three categories: protection, performance, and usability. The scores listed below are for the Protection category which has two scores: Real-World Testing and the AV-TEST reference set (known as "Prevalent Malware").
|
||||
|
||||
- November - December 2018 AV-TEST Business User test: [Protection score 6.0/6.0](https://www.av-test.org/en/antivirus/business-windows-client/windows-10/december-2018/microsoft-windows-defender-antivirus-4.18-185074/) | [Analysis](https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RWusR9) <sup>**Latest**</sup>
|
||||
- January - February 2019 AV-TEST Business User test: [Protection score 6.0/6.0](https://www.av-test.org/en/antivirus/business-windows-client/windows-10/december-2018/microsoft-windows-defender-antivirus-4.18-185074/) <sup>**Latest**</sup>
|
||||
|
||||
Windows Defender Antivirus achieved an overall Protection score of 6.0/6.0, detecting 100% of 19,956 malware samples. This is the fourth consecutive cycle that Windows Defender Antivirus achieved a perfect score.
|
||||
Windows Defender Antivirus achieved an overall Protection score of 6.0/6.0, with 19,956 malware samples used. This is the fifth consecutive cycle that Windows Defender Antivirus achieved a perfect score.
|
||||
|
||||
- November - December 2018 AV-TEST Business User test: [Protection score 6.0/6.0](https://www.av-test.org/en/antivirus/business-windows-client/windows-10/december-2018/microsoft-windows-defender-antivirus-4.18-185074/) | [Analysis](https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RWusR9)
|
||||
|
||||
Windows Defender Antivirus achieved an overall Protection score of 6.0/6.0, detecting 100% of 19,956 malware samples.
|
||||
|
||||
- September - October 2018 AV-TEST Business User test: [Protection score 6.0/6.0](https://www.av-test.org/en/antivirus/business-windows-client/windows-10/october-2018/microsoft-windows-defender-antivirus-4.18-184174/) | [Analysis](https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RWqOqD)
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Trojans
|
||||
|
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Understanding malware & other threats
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
# Unwanted software
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Worms
|
||||
|
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 04/19/2017
|
||||
ms.date: 04/01/2019
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Audit: Audit the use of Backup and Restore privilege
|
||||
@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ When the backup and restore function is used, it creates a copy of the file syst
|
||||
### Countermeasure
|
||||
|
||||
Enable the **Audit: Audit the use of Backup and Restore privilege** setting. Alternatively, implement automatic log backup by configuring the **AutoBackupLogFiles** registry key. If you enable this option when the [Audit privilege use](../auditing/basic-audit-privilege-use.md) setting is also enabled, an audit event is generated for every file that is backed up or restored. This information could help you to identify an account that was used to accidentally or maliciously restore data in an unauthorized manner.
|
||||
For more information about configuring this key, see Microsoft Knowledge Base article [100879](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkId=100879).
|
||||
For more information about configuring this key, see [Eventlog Key](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/EventLog/eventlog-key).
|
||||
|
||||
### Potential impact
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -333,6 +333,7 @@
|
||||
#### Reporting
|
||||
##### [Create and build Power BI reports using Windows Defender ATP data](powerbi-reports-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
##### [Threat protection reports](threat-protection-reports-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
##### [Machine health and compliance reports](machine-reports-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
|
||||
#### Role-based access control
|
||||
##### [Manage portal access using RBAC](rbac-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
|
@ -1,238 +1,238 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: Onboard servers to the Windows Defender ATP service
|
||||
description: Onboard servers so that they can send sensor data to the Windows Defender ATP sensor.
|
||||
keywords: onboard server, server, 2012r2, 2016, 2019, server onboarding, machine management, configure Windows ATP servers, onboard Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection servers
|
||||
search.product: eADQiWindows 10XVcnh
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
ms.prod: w10
|
||||
ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
|
||||
ms.sitesec: library
|
||||
ms.pagetype: security
|
||||
author: mjcaparas
|
||||
ms.localizationpriority: medium
|
||||
manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Onboard servers to the Windows Defender ATP service
|
||||
|
||||
**Applies to:**
|
||||
|
||||
- Windows Server 2012 R2
|
||||
- Windows Server 2016
|
||||
- Windows Server, version 1803
|
||||
- Windows Server, 2019
|
||||
- [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Windows Defender ATP)](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?linkid=2069559)
|
||||
|
||||
[!include[Prerelease information](prerelease.md)]
|
||||
|
||||
>Want to experience Windows Defender ATP? [Sign up for a free trial.](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/WindowsForBusiness/windows-atp?ocid=docs-wdatp-configserver-abovefoldlink)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Windows Defender ATP extends support to also include the Windows Server operating system, providing advanced attack detection and investigation capabilities, seamlessly through the Windows Defender Security Center console.
|
||||
|
||||
The service supports the onboarding of the following servers:
|
||||
- Windows Server 2012 R2
|
||||
- Windows Server 2016
|
||||
- Windows Server, version 1803
|
||||
- Windows Server 2019
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
For a practical guidance on what needs to be in place for licensing and infrastructure, see [Protecting Windows Servers with Windows Defender ATP](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/What-s-New/Protecting-Windows-Server-with-Windows-Defender-ATP/m-p/267114#M128).
|
||||
|
||||
## Windows Server 2012 R2 and Windows Server 2016
|
||||
|
||||
There are two options to onboard Windows Server 2012 R2 and Windows Server 2016 to Windows Defender ATP:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Option 1**: Onboard through Azure Security Center
|
||||
- **Option 2**: Onboard through Windows Defender Security Center
|
||||
|
||||
### Option 1: Onboard servers through Azure Security Center
|
||||
1. In the navigation pane, select **Settings** > **Machine management** > **Onboarding**.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Select Windows Server 2012 R2 and 2016 as the operating system.
|
||||
|
||||
3. Click **Onboard Servers in Azure Security Center**.
|
||||
|
||||
4. Follow the onboarding instructions in [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection with Azure Security Center](https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/security-center/security-center-wdatp).
|
||||
|
||||
### Option 2: Onboard servers through Windows Defender Security Center
|
||||
You'll need to take the following steps if you choose to onboard servers through Windows Defender Security Center.
|
||||
|
||||
- For Windows Server 2012 R2: Configure and update System Center Endpoint Protection clients.
|
||||
|
||||
>[!NOTE]
|
||||
>This step is required only if your organization uses System Center Endpoint Protection (SCEP) and you're onboarding Windows Server 2012 R2.
|
||||
|
||||
- Turn on server monitoring from Windows Defender Security Center.
|
||||
- If you're already leveraging System Center Operations Manager (SCOM) or Operations Management Suite (OMS), simply attach the Microsoft Monitoring Agent (MMA) to report to your Windows Defender ATP workspace through Multi Homing support. Otherwise, install and configure MMA to report sensor data to Windows Defender ATP as instructed below.
|
||||
|
||||
>[!TIP]
|
||||
> After onboarding the machine, you can choose to run a detection test to verify that it is properly onboarded to the service. For more information, see [Run a detection test on a newly onboarded Windows Defender ATP endpoint](run-detection-test-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md).
|
||||
|
||||
### Configure and update System Center Endpoint Protection clients
|
||||
>[!IMPORTANT]
|
||||
>This step is required only if your organization uses System Center Endpoint Protection (SCEP) and you're onboarding Windows Server 2012 R2.
|
||||
|
||||
Windows Defender ATP integrates with System Center Endpoint Protection to provide visibility to malware detections and to stop propagation of an attack in your organization by banning potentially malicious files or suspected malware.
|
||||
|
||||
The following steps are required to enable this integration:
|
||||
- Install the [January 2017 anti-malware platform update for Endpoint Protection clients](https://support.microsoft.com/help/3209361/january-2017-anti-malware-platform-update-for-endpoint-protection-clie)
|
||||
- Configure the SCEP client Cloud Protection Service membership to the **Advanced** setting
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### Turn on Server monitoring from the Windows Defender Security Center portal
|
||||
|
||||
1. In the navigation pane, select **Settings** > **Machine management** > **Onboarding**.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Select Windows Server 2012 R2 and 2016 as the operating system.
|
||||
|
||||
3. Click **Turn on server monitoring** and confirm that you'd like to proceed with the environment set up. When the set up completes, the **Workspace ID** and **Workspace key** fields are populated with unique values. You'll need to use these values to configure the MMA agent.
|
||||
|
||||
<span id="server-mma"/>
|
||||
### Install and configure Microsoft Monitoring Agent (MMA) to report sensor data to Windows Defender ATP
|
||||
|
||||
1. Download the agent setup file: [Windows 64-bit agent](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=828603).
|
||||
|
||||
2. Using the Workspace ID and Workspace key provided in the previous procedure, choose any of the following installation methods to install the agent on the server:
|
||||
- [Manually install the agent using setup](https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/log-analytics/log-analytics-windows-agents#install-the-agent-using-setup) <br>
|
||||
On the **Agent Setup Options** page, choose **Connect the agent to Azure Log Analytics (OMS)**.
|
||||
- [Install the agent using the command line](https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/log-analytics/log-analytics-windows-agents#install-the-agent-using-the-command-line) and [configure the agent using a script](https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/log-analytics/log-analytics-windows-agents#add-a-workspace-using-a-script).
|
||||
|
||||
3. You'll need to configure proxy settings for the Microsoft Monitoring Agent. For more information, see [Configure proxy settings](https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/log-analytics/log-analytics-windows-agents#configure-proxy-settings).
|
||||
|
||||
Once completed, you should see onboarded servers in the portal within an hour.
|
||||
|
||||
<span id="server-proxy"/>
|
||||
### Configure server proxy and Internet connectivity settings
|
||||
|
||||
- Each Windows server must be able to connect to the Internet using HTTPS. This connection can be direct, using a proxy, or through the [OMS Gateway](https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/log-analytics/log-analytics-oms-gateway).
|
||||
- If a proxy or firewall is blocking all traffic by default and allowing only specific domains through or HTTPS scanning (SSL inspection) is enabled, make sure that the following URLs are white-listed to permit communication with Windows Defender ATP service:
|
||||
|
||||
Agent Resource | Ports
|
||||
:---|:---
|
||||
| *.oms.opinsights.azure.com | 443 |
|
||||
| *.blob.core.windows.net | 443 |
|
||||
| *.azure-automation.net | 443 |
|
||||
| *.ods.opinsights.azure.com | 443 |
|
||||
| winatp-gw-cus.microsoft.com | 443 |
|
||||
| winatp-gw-eus.microsoft.com | 443 |
|
||||
| winatp-gw-neu.microsoft.com | 443 |
|
||||
| winatp-gw-weu.microsoft.com | 443 |
|
||||
|winatp-gw-uks.microsoft.com | 443 |
|
||||
|winatp-gw-ukw.microsoft.com | 443 |
|
||||
| winatp-gw-aus.microsoft.com | 443|
|
||||
| winatp-gw-aue.microsoft.com |443 |
|
||||
|
||||
## Windows Server, version 1803 and Windows Server 2019
|
||||
To onboard Windows Server, version 1803 or Windows Server 2019, use the same method used when onboarding Windows 10 machines.
|
||||
|
||||
Supported tools include:
|
||||
- Local script
|
||||
- Group Policy
|
||||
- System Center Configuration Manager 2012 / 2012 R2 1511 / 1602
|
||||
- VDI onboarding scripts for non-persistent machines
|
||||
|
||||
For more information, see [Onboard Windows 10 machines](configure-endpoints-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md). Support for Windows Server, version 1803 and Windows 2019 provides deeper insight into activities happening on the server, coverage for kernel and memory attack detection, and enables response actions on Windows Server endpoint as well.
|
||||
|
||||
1. Configure Windows Defender ATP onboarding settings on the server. For more information, see [Onboard Windows 10 machines](configure-endpoints-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md).
|
||||
|
||||
2. If you’re running a third party antimalware solution, you'll need to apply the following Windows Defender AV passive mode settings and verify it was configured correctly:
|
||||
|
||||
a. Set the following registry entry:
|
||||
- Path: `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Advanced Threat Protection`
|
||||
- Name: ForceDefenderPassiveMode
|
||||
- Value: 1
|
||||
|
||||
b. Run the following PowerShell command to verify that the passive mode was configured:
|
||||
|
||||
```Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{ProviderName="Microsoft-Windows-Sense" ;ID=84}```
|
||||
|
||||
c. Confirm that a recent event containing the passive mode event is found:
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
3. Run the following command to check if Windows Defender AV is installed:
|
||||
|
||||
```sc query Windefend```
|
||||
|
||||
If the result is ‘The specified service does not exist as an installed service’, then you'll need to install Windows Defender AV. For more information, see [Windows Defender Antivirus in Windows 10](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-antivirus/windows-defender-antivirus-in-windows-10).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Integration with Azure Security Center
|
||||
Windows Defender ATP integrates with Azure Security Center to provide a comprehensive server protection solution. With this integration Azure Security Center can leverage the power of Windows Defender ATP to provide improved threat detection for Windows Servers.
|
||||
|
||||
>[!NOTE]
|
||||
>You'll need to have the appropriate license to enable this feature.
|
||||
|
||||
The following capabilities are included in this integration:
|
||||
- Automated onboarding - Windows Defender ATP sensor is automatically enabled on Windows Servers that are onboarded to Azure Security Center. For more information on Azure Security Center onboarding, see [Onboarding to Azure Security Center Standard for enhanced security](https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/security-center/security-center-onboarding).
|
||||
|
||||
>[!NOTE]
|
||||
> Automated onboarding is only applicable for Windows Server 2012 R2 and Windows Server 2016.
|
||||
|
||||
- Servers monitored by Azure Security Center will also be available in Windows Defender ATP - Azure Security Center seamlessly connects to the Windows Defender ATP tenant, providing a single view across clients and servers. In addition, Windows Defender ATP alerts will be available in the Azure Security Center console.
|
||||
- Server investigation - Azure Security Center customers can access Windows Defender Security Center to perform detailed investigation to uncover the scope of a potential breach
|
||||
|
||||
>[!IMPORTANT]
|
||||
>- When you use Azure Security Center to monitor servers, a Windows Defender ATP tenant is automatically created. The Windows Defender ATP data is stored in Europe by default.
|
||||
>- If you use Windows Defender ATP before using Azure Security Center, your data will be stored in the location you specified when you created your tenant even if you integrate with Azure Security Center at a later time.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Offboard servers
|
||||
You can offboard Windows Server, version 1803 and Windows 2019 in the same method available for Windows 10 client machines.
|
||||
|
||||
For other server versions, you have two options to offboard servers from the service:
|
||||
- Uninstall the MMA agent
|
||||
- Remove the Windows Defender ATP workspace configuration
|
||||
|
||||
>[!NOTE]
|
||||
>Offboarding causes the server to stop sending sensor data to the portal but data from the server, including reference to any alerts it has had will be retained for up to 6 months.
|
||||
|
||||
### Uninstall servers by uinstalling the MMA agent
|
||||
To offboard the server, you can uninstall the MMA agent from the server or detach it from reporting to your Windows Defender ATP workspace. After offboarding the agent, the server will no longer send sensor data to Windows Defender ATP.
|
||||
For more information, see [To disable an agent](https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/log-analytics/log-analytics-windows-agents#to-disable-an-agent).
|
||||
|
||||
### Remove the Windows Defender ATP workspace configuration
|
||||
To offboard the server, you can use either of the following methods:
|
||||
|
||||
- Remove the Windows Defender ATP workspace configuration from the MMA agent
|
||||
- Run a PowerShell command to remove the configuration
|
||||
|
||||
#### Remove the Windows Defender ATP workspace configuration from the MMA agent
|
||||
|
||||
1. In the **Microsoft Monitoring Agent Properties**, select the **Azure Log Analytics (OMS)** tab.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Select the Windows Defender ATP workspace, and click **Remove**.
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
#### Run a PowerShell command to remove the configuration
|
||||
|
||||
1. Get your Workspace ID:
|
||||
a. In the navigation pane, select **Settings** > **Onboarding**.
|
||||
|
||||
b. Select **Windows Server 2012 R2 and 2016** as the operating system and get your Workspace ID:
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
2. Open an elevated PowerShell and run the following command. Use the Workspace ID you obtained and replacing `WorkspaceID`:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
# Load agent scripting object
|
||||
$AgentCfg = New-Object -ComObject AgentConfigManager.MgmtSvcCfg
|
||||
# Remove OMS Workspace
|
||||
$AgentCfg.RemoveCloudWorkspace($WorkspaceID)
|
||||
# Reload the configuration and apply changes
|
||||
$AgentCfg.ReloadConfiguration()
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Related topics
|
||||
- [Onboard Windows 10 machines](configure-endpoints-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
- [Onboard non-Windows machines](configure-endpoints-non-windows-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
- [Configure proxy and Internet connectivity settings](configure-proxy-internet-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
- [Run a detection test on a newly onboarded Windows Defender ATP machine](run-detection-test-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
- [Troubleshooting Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection onboarding issues](troubleshoot-onboarding-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: Onboard servers to the Windows Defender ATP service
|
||||
description: Onboard servers so that they can send sensor data to the Windows Defender ATP sensor.
|
||||
keywords: onboard server, server, 2012r2, 2016, 2019, server onboarding, machine management, configure Windows ATP servers, onboard Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection servers
|
||||
search.product: eADQiWindows 10XVcnh
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
ms.prod: w10
|
||||
ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
|
||||
ms.sitesec: library
|
||||
ms.pagetype: security
|
||||
author: mjcaparas
|
||||
ms.localizationpriority: medium
|
||||
manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Onboard servers to the Windows Defender ATP service
|
||||
|
||||
**Applies to:**
|
||||
|
||||
- Windows Server 2012 R2
|
||||
- Windows Server 2016
|
||||
- Windows Server, version 1803
|
||||
- Windows Server, 2019
|
||||
- [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Windows Defender ATP)](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?linkid=2069559)
|
||||
|
||||
[!include[Prerelease information](prerelease.md)]
|
||||
|
||||
>Want to experience Windows Defender ATP? [Sign up for a free trial.](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/WindowsForBusiness/windows-atp?ocid=docs-wdatp-configserver-abovefoldlink)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Windows Defender ATP extends support to also include the Windows Server operating system, providing advanced attack detection and investigation capabilities, seamlessly through the Windows Defender Security Center console.
|
||||
|
||||
The service supports the onboarding of the following servers:
|
||||
- Windows Server 2012 R2
|
||||
- Windows Server 2016
|
||||
- Windows Server, version 1803
|
||||
- Windows Server 2019
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
For a practical guidance on what needs to be in place for licensing and infrastructure, see [Protecting Windows Servers with Windows Defender ATP](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/What-s-New/Protecting-Windows-Server-with-Windows-Defender-ATP/m-p/267114#M128).
|
||||
|
||||
## Windows Server 2012 R2 and Windows Server 2016
|
||||
|
||||
There are two options to onboard Windows Server 2012 R2 and Windows Server 2016 to Windows Defender ATP:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Option 1**: Onboard through Azure Security Center
|
||||
- **Option 2**: Onboard through Windows Defender Security Center
|
||||
|
||||
### Option 1: Onboard servers through Azure Security Center
|
||||
1. In the navigation pane, select **Settings** > **Machine management** > **Onboarding**.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Select Windows Server 2012 R2 and 2016 as the operating system.
|
||||
|
||||
3. Click **Onboard Servers in Azure Security Center**.
|
||||
|
||||
4. Follow the onboarding instructions in [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection with Azure Security Center](https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/security-center/security-center-wdatp).
|
||||
|
||||
### Option 2: Onboard servers through Windows Defender Security Center
|
||||
You'll need to tak the following steps if you choose to onboard servers through Windows Defender Security Center.
|
||||
|
||||
- For Windows Server 2012 R2: Configure and update System Center Endpoint Protection clients.
|
||||
|
||||
>[!NOTE]
|
||||
>This step is required only if your organization uses System Center Endpoint Protection (SCEP) and you're onboarding Windows Server 2012 R2.
|
||||
|
||||
- Turn on server monitoring from Windows Defender Security Center.
|
||||
- If you're already leveraging System Center Operations Manager (SCOM) or Azure Monitor (formerly known as Operations Management Suite (OMS)), simply attach the Microsoft Monitoring Agent (MMA) to report to your Windows Defender ATP workspace through Multi Homing support. Otherwise, install and configure MMA to report sensor data to Windows Defender ATP as instructed below. For more information, see [Collect log data with Azure Log Analytics agent](https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/azure-monitor/platform/log-analytics-agent).
|
||||
|
||||
>[!TIP]
|
||||
> After onboarding the machine, you can choose to run a detection test to verify that it is properly onboarded to the service. For more information, see [Run a detection test on a newly onboarded Windows Defender ATP endpoint](run-detection-test-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md).
|
||||
|
||||
### Configure and update System Center Endpoint Protection clients
|
||||
>[!IMPORTANT]
|
||||
>This step is required only if your organization uses System Center Endpoint Protection (SCEP) and you're onboarding Windows Server 2012 R2.
|
||||
|
||||
Windows Defender ATP integrates with System Center Endpoint Protection to provide visibility to malware detections and to stop propagation of an attack in your organization by banning potentially malicious files or suspected malware.
|
||||
|
||||
The following steps are required to enable this integration:
|
||||
- Install the [January 2017 anti-malware platform update for Endpoint Protection clients](https://support.microsoft.com/help/3209361/january-2017-anti-malware-platform-update-for-endpoint-protection-clie)
|
||||
- Configure the SCEP client Cloud Protection Service membership to the **Advanced** setting
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### Turn on Server monitoring from the Windows Defender Security Center portal
|
||||
|
||||
1. In the navigation pane, select **Settings** > **Machine management** > **Onboarding**.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Select Windows Server 2012 R2 and 2016 as the operating system.
|
||||
|
||||
3. Click **Turn on server monitoring** and confirm that you'd like to proceed with the environment set up. When the set up completes, the **Workspace ID** and **Workspace key** fields are populated with unique values. You'll need to use these values to configure the MMA agent.
|
||||
|
||||
<span id="server-mma"/>
|
||||
### Install and configure Microsoft Monitoring Agent (MMA) to report sensor data to Windows Defender ATP
|
||||
|
||||
1. Download the agent setup file: [Windows 64-bit agent](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=828603).
|
||||
|
||||
2. Using the Workspace ID and Workspace key provided in the previous procedure, choose any of the following installation methods to install the agent on the server:
|
||||
- [Manually install the agent using setup](https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/log-analytics/log-analytics-windows-agents#install-the-agent-using-setup) <br>
|
||||
On the **Agent Setup Options** page, choose **Connect the agent to Azure Log Analytics (OMS)**.
|
||||
- [Install the agent using the command line](https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/log-analytics/log-analytics-windows-agents#install-the-agent-using-the-command-line) and [configure the agent using a script](https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/log-analytics/log-analytics-windows-agents#add-a-workspace-using-a-script).
|
||||
|
||||
3. You'll need to configure proxy settings for the Microsoft Monitoring Agent. For more information, see [Configure proxy settings](https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/log-analytics/log-analytics-windows-agents#configure-proxy-settings).
|
||||
|
||||
Once completed, you should see onboarded servers in the portal within an hour.
|
||||
|
||||
<span id="server-proxy"/>
|
||||
### Configure server proxy and Internet connectivity settings
|
||||
|
||||
- Each Windows server must be able to connect to the Internet using HTTPS. This connection can be direct, using a proxy, or through the [OMS Gateway](https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/log-analytics/log-analytics-oms-gateway).
|
||||
- If a proxy or firewall is blocking all traffic by default and allowing only specific domains through or HTTPS scanning (SSL inspection) is enabled, make sure that the following URLs are white-listed to permit communication with Windows Defender ATP service:
|
||||
|
||||
Agent Resource | Ports
|
||||
:---|:---
|
||||
| *.oms.opinsights.azure.com | 443 |
|
||||
| *.blob.core.windows.net | 443 |
|
||||
| *.azure-automation.net | 443 |
|
||||
| *.ods.opinsights.azure.com | 443 |
|
||||
| winatp-gw-cus.microsoft.com | 443 |
|
||||
| winatp-gw-eus.microsoft.com | 443 |
|
||||
| winatp-gw-neu.microsoft.com | 443 |
|
||||
| winatp-gw-weu.microsoft.com | 443 |
|
||||
|winatp-gw-uks.microsoft.com | 443 |
|
||||
|winatp-gw-ukw.microsoft.com | 443 |
|
||||
| winatp-gw-aus.microsoft.com | 443|
|
||||
| winatp-gw-aue.microsoft.com |443 |
|
||||
|
||||
## Windows Server, version 1803 and Windows Server 2019
|
||||
To onboard Windows Server, version 1803 or Windows Server 2019, use the same method used when onboarding Windows 10 machines.
|
||||
|
||||
Supported tools include:
|
||||
- Local script
|
||||
- Group Policy
|
||||
- System Center Configuration Manager 2012 / 2012 R2 1511 / 1602
|
||||
- VDI onboarding scripts for non-persistent machines
|
||||
|
||||
For more information, see [Onboard Windows 10 machines](configure-endpoints-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md). Support for Windows Server, version 1803 and Windows 2019 provides deeper insight into activities happening on the server, coverage for kernel and memory attack detection, and enables response actions on Windows Server endpoint as well.
|
||||
|
||||
1. Configure Windows Defender ATP onboarding settings on the server. For more information, see [Onboard Windows 10 machines](configure-endpoints-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md).
|
||||
|
||||
2. If you’re running a third party antimalware solution, you'll need to apply the following Windows Defender AV passive mode settings and verify it was configured correctly:
|
||||
|
||||
a. Set the following registry entry:
|
||||
- Path: `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Advanced Threat Protection`
|
||||
- Name: ForceDefenderPassiveMode
|
||||
- Value: 1
|
||||
|
||||
b. Run the following PowerShell command to verify that the passive mode was configured:
|
||||
|
||||
```Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{ProviderName="Microsoft-Windows-Sense" ;ID=84}```
|
||||
|
||||
c. Confirm that a recent event containing the passive mode event is found:
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
3. Run the following command to check if Windows Defender AV is installed:
|
||||
|
||||
```sc query Windefend```
|
||||
|
||||
If the result is ‘The specified service does not exist as an installed service’, then you'll need to install Windows Defender AV. For more information, see [Windows Defender Antivirus in Windows 10](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-antivirus/windows-defender-antivirus-in-windows-10).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Integration with Azure Security Center
|
||||
Windows Defender ATP integrates with Azure Security Center to provide a comprehensive server protection solution. With this integration Azure Security Center can leverage the power of Windows Defender ATP to provide improved threat detection for Windows Servers.
|
||||
|
||||
>[!NOTE]
|
||||
>You'll need to have the appropriate license to enable this feature.
|
||||
|
||||
The following capabilities are included in this integration:
|
||||
- Automated onboarding - Windows Defender ATP sensor is automatically enabled on Windows Servers that are onboarded to Azure Security Center. For more information on Azure Security Center onboarding, see [Onboarding to Azure Security Center Standard for enhanced security](https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/security-center/security-center-onboarding).
|
||||
|
||||
>[!NOTE]
|
||||
> Automated onboarding is only applicable for Windows Server 2012 R2 and Windows Server 2016.
|
||||
|
||||
- Servers monitored by Azure Security Center will also be available in Windows Defender ATP - Azure Security Center seamlessly connects to the Windows Defender ATP tenant, providing a single view across clients and servers. In addition, Windows Defender ATP alerts will be available in the Azure Security Center console.
|
||||
- Server investigation - Azure Security Center customers can access Windows Defender Security Center to perform detailed investigation to uncover the scope of a potential breach
|
||||
|
||||
>[!IMPORTANT]
|
||||
>- When you use Azure Security Center to monitor servers, a Windows Defender ATP tenant is automatically created. The Windows Defender ATP data is stored in Europe by default.
|
||||
>- If you use Windows Defender ATP before using Azure Security Center, your data will be stored in the location you specified when you created your tenant even if you integrate with Azure Security Center at a later time.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Offboard servers
|
||||
You can offboard Windows Server, version 1803 and Windows 2019 in the same method available for Windows 10 client machines.
|
||||
|
||||
For other server versions, you have two options to offboard servers from the service:
|
||||
- Uninstall the MMA agent
|
||||
- Remove the Windows Defender ATP workspace configuration
|
||||
|
||||
>[!NOTE]
|
||||
>Offboarding causes the server to stop sending sensor data to the portal but data from the server, including reference to any alerts it has had will be retained for up to 6 months.
|
||||
|
||||
### Uninstall servers by uinstalling the MMA agent
|
||||
To offboard the server, you can uninstall the MMA agent from the server or detach it from reporting to your Windows Defender ATP workspace. After offboarding the agent, the server will no longer send sensor data to Windows Defender ATP.
|
||||
For more information, see [To disable an agent](https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/log-analytics/log-analytics-windows-agents#to-disable-an-agent).
|
||||
|
||||
### Remove the Windows Defender ATP workspace configuration
|
||||
To offboard the server, you can use either of the following methods:
|
||||
|
||||
- Remove the Windows Defender ATP workspace configuration from the MMA agent
|
||||
- Run a PowerShell command to remove the configuration
|
||||
|
||||
#### Remove the Windows Defender ATP workspace configuration from the MMA agent
|
||||
|
||||
1. In the **Microsoft Monitoring Agent Properties**, select the **Azure Log Analytics (OMS)** tab.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Select the Windows Defender ATP workspace, and click **Remove**.
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
#### Run a PowerShell command to remove the configuration
|
||||
|
||||
1. Get your Workspace ID:
|
||||
a. In the navigation pane, select **Settings** > **Onboarding**.
|
||||
|
||||
b. Select **Windows Server 2012 R2 and 2016** as the operating system and get your Workspace ID:
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
2. Open an elevated PowerShell and run the following command. Use the Workspace ID you obtained and replacing `WorkspaceID`:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
# Load agent scripting object
|
||||
$AgentCfg = New-Object -ComObject AgentConfigManager.MgmtSvcCfg
|
||||
# Remove OMS Workspace
|
||||
$AgentCfg.RemoveCloudWorkspace($WorkspaceID)
|
||||
# Reload the configuration and apply changes
|
||||
$AgentCfg.ReloadConfiguration()
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Related topics
|
||||
- [Onboard Windows 10 machines](configure-endpoints-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
- [Onboard non-Windows machines](configure-endpoints-non-windows-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
- [Configure proxy and Internet connectivity settings](configure-proxy-internet-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
- [Run a detection test on a newly onboarded Windows Defender ATP machine](run-detection-test-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
- [Troubleshooting Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection onboarding issues](troubleshoot-onboarding-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
||||
|
Binary file not shown.
After Width: | Height: | Size: 97 KiB |
@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: Machine health and compliance report in Windows Defender ATP
|
||||
description: Track machine health state detections, antivirus status, OS platform, and Windows 10 versions using the machine health and compliance report
|
||||
keywords: health state, antivirus, os platform, windows 10 version, version, health, compliance, state
|
||||
search.product: eADQiWindows 10XVcnh
|
||||
search.appverid: met150
|
||||
ms.prod: w10
|
||||
ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
|
||||
ms.sitesec: library
|
||||
ms.pagetype: security
|
||||
ms.author: macapara
|
||||
author: mjcaparas
|
||||
ms.localizationpriority: medium
|
||||
manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: article
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Machine health and compliance report in Windows Defender ATP
|
||||
|
||||
**Applies to:**
|
||||
- [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Windows Defender ATP)](https://wincom.blob.core.windows.net/documents/Windows10_Commercial_Comparison.pdf)
|
||||
|
||||
[!include[Prerelease information](prerelease.md)]
|
||||
|
||||
The machines status report provides high-level information about the devices in your organization. The report includes trending information showing the sensor health state, antivirus status, OS platforms, and Windows 10 versions.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
The dashboard is structured into two sections:
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
Section | Description
|
||||
:---|:---
|
||||
1 | Machine trends
|
||||
2 | Machine summary (current day)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
By default, the machine trends displays machine information from the 30-day period ending in the latest full day. To gain better perspective on trends occurring in your organization, you can fine-tune the reporting period by adjusting the time period shown. To adjust the time period, select a time range from the drop-down options:
|
||||
|
||||
- 30 days
|
||||
- 3 months
|
||||
- 6 months
|
||||
- Custom
|
||||
|
||||
While the machines trends shows trending machine information, the machine summary shows machine information scoped to the current day.
|
||||
|
||||
The machine trends section allows you to drill down to the machines list with the corresponding filter applied to it. For example, clicking on the Inactive bar in the Sensor health state card will bring you the machines list with results showing only machines whose sensor status is inactive.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Machine attributes
|
||||
The report is made up of cards that display the following machine attributes:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Health state**: shows information about the sensor state on devices, providing an aggregated view of devices that are active, experiencing impaired communications, inactive, or where no sensor data is seen.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Antivirus status for active Windows 10 machines**: shows the number of machines and status of Windows Defender Antivirus.
|
||||
|
||||
- **OS platforms**: shows the distribution of OS platforms that exists within your organization.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Windows 10 versions**: shows the distribution of Windows 10 machines and their versions in your organization.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Filter data
|
||||
|
||||
Use the provided filters to include or exclude machines with certain attributes.
|
||||
|
||||
You can select multiple filters to apply from the machine attributes.
|
||||
|
||||
>[!NOTE]
|
||||
>These filters apply to **all** the cards in the report.
|
||||
|
||||
For example, to show data about Windows 10 machines with Active sensor health state:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Under **Filters > Sensor health state > Active**.
|
||||
2. Then select **OS platforms > Windows 10**.
|
||||
3. Select **Apply**.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Related topic
|
||||
- [Threat protection report ](threat-protection-reports-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ By default, the alert trends display alert information from the 30-day period en
|
||||
- 6 months
|
||||
- Custom
|
||||
|
||||
While the alerts trends shows trending information alerts, the alert summary shows alert information scoped to the current day.
|
||||
While the alert trends shows trending alert information, the alert summary shows alert information scoped to the current day.
|
||||
|
||||
The alert summary allows you to drill down to a particular alert queue with the corresponding filter applied to it. For example, clicking on the EDR bar in the Detection sources card will bring you the alerts queue with results showing only alerts generated from EDR detections.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -76,4 +76,7 @@ For example, to show data about high-severity alerts only:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Under **Filters > Severity**, select **High**
|
||||
2. Ensure that all other options under **Severity** are deselected.
|
||||
3. Select **Apply**.
|
||||
3. Select **Apply**.
|
||||
|
||||
## Related topic
|
||||
- [Machine health and compliance report](machine-reports-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
|
@ -23,6 +23,13 @@ ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
|
||||
Here are the new features in the latest release of Windows Defender ATP as well as security features in Windows 10 and Windows Server.
|
||||
|
||||
## March 2019
|
||||
### In preview
|
||||
The following capability are included in the February 2019 preview release.
|
||||
|
||||
- [Machine health and compliance report](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-atp/machine-reports-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection) <BR> The machine health and compliance report provides high-level information about the devices in your organization.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## February 2019
|
||||
The following capabilities are generally available (GA).
|
||||
- [Incidents](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-atp/incidents-queue) <BR> Incident is a new entity in Windows Defender ATP that brings together all relevant alerts and related entities to narrate the broader attack story, giving analysts better perspective on the purview of complex threats.
|
||||
|
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ ms.pagetype: security
|
||||
ms.localizationpriority: medium
|
||||
author: andreabichsel
|
||||
ms.author: v-anbic
|
||||
ms.date: 03/26/2018
|
||||
ms.date: 04/02/2019
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Reduce attack surfaces with attack surface reduction rules
|
||||
@ -259,15 +259,6 @@ SCCM name: Not applicable
|
||||
|
||||
GUID: 7674ba52-37eb-4a4f-a9a1-f0f9a1619a2c
|
||||
|
||||
## Review attack surface reduction events in Windows Event Viewer
|
||||
|
||||
You can review the Windows event log to see events that are created when attack surface rules block (or audit) an app:
|
||||
|
||||
Event ID | Description
|
||||
5007 | Event when settings are changed
|
||||
1121 | Event when an attack surface reduction rule fires in audit mode
|
||||
1122 | Event when an attack surface reduction rule fires in block mode
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Related topics
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ ms.pagetype: security
|
||||
ms.localizationpriority: medium
|
||||
author: andreabichsel
|
||||
ms.author: v-anbic
|
||||
ms.date: 09/18/2018
|
||||
ms.date: 04/02/2019
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -37,32 +37,13 @@ You can use Group Policy, PowerShell, and configuration service providers (CSPs)
|
||||
>You can also visit the Windows Defender Testground website at [demo.wd.microsoft.com](https://demo.wd.microsoft.com?ocid=cx-wddocs-testground) to confirm the features are working and see how they work.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|Audit options | How to enable audit mode | How to view events |
|
||||
|- | - | - |
|
||||
|Audit applies to all events | [Enable controlled folder access](enable-controlled-folders-exploit-guard.md) | [Controlled folder access events](evaluate-controlled-folder-access.md#review-controlled-folder-access-events-in-windows-event-viewer) |
|
||||
|Audit applies to individual rules | [Enable attack surface reduction rules](enable-attack-surface-reduction.md) | [Attack surface reduction rule events](evaluate-attack-surface-reduction.md#review-attack-surface-reduction-events-in-windows-event-viewer) |
|
||||
|Audit applies to all events | [Enable network protection](enable-network-protection.md) | [Network protection events](evaluate-network-protection.md#review-network-protection-events-in-windows-event-viewer) |
|
||||
|Audit applies to individual mitigations | [Enable exploit protection](enable-exploit-protection.md) | [Exploit protection events](exploit-protection-exploit-guard.md#review-exploit-protection-events-in-windows-event-viewer) |
|
||||
|
||||
Audit options | How to enable audit mode | How to view events
|
||||
- | - | -
|
||||
Audit applies to all events | [Enable controlled folder access](enable-controlled-folders-exploit-guard.md) | [Controlled folder access events](evaluate-controlled-folder-access.md#review-controlled-folder-access-events-in-windows-event-viewer)
|
||||
Audit applies to individual rules | [Enable attack surface reduction rules](enable-attack-surface-reduction.md) | [Attack surface reduction rule events](attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard.md#review-attack-surface-reduction-events-in-windows-event-viewer)
|
||||
Audit applies to all events | [Enable network protection](enable-network-protection.md) | [Network protection events](evaluate-network-protection.md#review-network-protection-events-in-windows-event-viewer)
|
||||
Audit applies to individual mitigations | [Enable exploit protection](enable-exploit-protection.md) | [Exploit protection events](exploit-protection-exploit-guard.md#review-exploit-protection-events-in-windows-event-viewer)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
You can also use the a custom PowerShell script that enables the features in audit mode automatically:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Download the [Exploit Guard Evaluation Package](https://aka.ms/mp7z2w) and extract the file *Enable-ExploitGuardAuditMode.ps1* to an easily accessible location on the machine.
|
||||
|
||||
1. Type **powershell** in the Start menu.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Right-click **Windows PowerShell**, click **Run as administrator** and click **Yes** or enter admin credentials at the prompt.
|
||||
|
||||
3. Enter the following in the PowerShell window to enable Controlled folder access and Attack surface reduction in audit mode:
|
||||
```PowerShell
|
||||
Set-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Force
|
||||
<location>\Enable-ExploitGuardAuditMode.ps1
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Replace \<location> with the folder path where you placed the file.
|
||||
|
||||
A message should appear to indicate that audit mode was enabled.
|
||||
|
||||
## Related topics
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ You can exclude files and folders from being evaluated by most attack surface re
|
||||
|
||||
You can specify individual files or folders (using folder paths or fully qualified resource names) but you can't specify which rules the exclusions apply to.
|
||||
|
||||
>[!IMPORTANT] The rule **Block executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criterion** with GUID 01443614-cd74-433a-b99e-2ecdc07bfc25, it's owned by microsoft and is not specified by admins. It uses Microsoft CLoud's Protection to update its trusted list regularly.
|
||||
>You can specify individual files or folders (using folder paths or fully qualified resource names) but you can't specify which rules or exclusions apply to.
|
||||
|
||||
ASR rules support environment variables and wildcards. For information about using wildcards, see [Use wildcards in the file name and folder path or extension exclusion lists](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-antivirus/configure-extension-file-exclusions-windows-defender-antivirus#use-wildcards-in-the-file-name-and-folder-path-or-extension-exclusion-lists).
|
||||
|
||||
The following procedures for enabling ASR rules include instructions for how to exclude files and folders.
|
||||
|
@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 03/15/2019
|
||||
ms.date: 04/01/2019
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Enable virtualization-based protection of code integrity
|
||||
@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ If this happens, see [Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting) for remediation steps.
|
||||
>HVCI works with modern 7th gen CPUs or higher and its equivalent on AMD. CPU new feature is required *Mode based execution control (MBE) Virtualization*.
|
||||
|
||||
>[!TIP]
|
||||
> "The Secure Kernel relies on the Mode-Based Execution Control (MBEC) feature, if present in hardware, which enhances the SLAT with a user/kernel executable bit, or the hypervisor’s software emulation of this feature, called Restricted User Mode (RUM).". Mark Russinovich and Alex Ionescu. Windows Internals 7th Edition book
|
||||
> "The Secure Kernel relies on the Mode-Based Execution Control (MBEC) feature, if present in hardware, which enhances the SLAT with a user/kernel executable bit, or the hypervisor’s software emulation of this feature, called Restricted User Mode (RUM)." Mark Russinovich and Alex Ionescu. Windows Internals 7th Edition book
|
||||
|
||||
## HVCI Features
|
||||
|
||||
@ -291,6 +291,6 @@ Set-VMSecurity -VMName <VMName> -VirtualizationBasedSecurityOptOut $true
|
||||
### Requirements for running HVCI in Hyper-V virtual machines
|
||||
- The Hyper-V host must run at least Windows Server 2016 or Windows 10 version 1607.
|
||||
- The Hyper-V virtual machine must be Generation 2, and running at least Windows Server 2016 or Windows 10.
|
||||
- HVCI and [virtualization](https://docs.microsoft.com/virtualization/hyper-v-on-windows/user-guide/nested-virtualization) can be enabled at the same time
|
||||
- HVCI and [nested virtualization](https://docs.microsoft.com/virtualization/hyper-v-on-windows/user-guide/nested-virtualization) can be enabled at the same time
|
||||
- Virtual Fibre Channel adapters are not compatible with HVCI. Before attaching a virtual Fibre Channel Adapter to a virtual machine, you must first opt out of virtualization-based security using `Set-VMSecurity`.
|
||||
- The AllowFullSCSICommandSet option for pass-through disks is not compatible with HVCI. Before configuring a pass-through disk with AllowFullSCSICommandSet, you must first opt out of virtualization-based security using `Set-VMSecurity`.
|
||||
|
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ ms.pagetype: security
|
||||
ms.localizationpriority: medium
|
||||
author: andreabichsel
|
||||
ms.author: v-anbic
|
||||
ms.date: 11/16/2018
|
||||
ms.date: 04/02/2019
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Evaluate attack surface reduction rules
|
||||
@ -45,6 +45,17 @@ This enables all attack surface reduction rules in audit mode.
|
||||
>If you want to fully audit how attack surface reduction rules will work in your organization, you'll need to use a management tool to deploy this setting to machines in your network(s).
|
||||
You can also use Group Policy, Intune, or MDM CSPs to configure and deploy the setting, as described in the main [Attack surface reduction rules topic](attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard.md).
|
||||
|
||||
## Review attack surface reduction events in Windows Event Viewer
|
||||
|
||||
To review apps that would have been blocked, open Event Viewer and filter for Event ID 1121 in the Microsoft-Windows-Windows-Defender/Operational log. The following table lists all network protection events.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Event ID | Description |
|
||||
|----------|-------------|
|
||||
|5007 | Event when settings are changed |
|
||||
| 1121 | Event when an attack surface reduction rule fires in audit mode |
|
||||
| 1122 | Event when an attack surface reduction rule fires in block mode |
|
||||
|
||||
## Customize attack surface reduction rules
|
||||
|
||||
During your evaluation, you may wish to configure each rule individualy or exclude certain files and processes from being evaluated by the feature.
|
||||
|
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ ms.pagetype: security
|
||||
ms.localizationpriority: medium
|
||||
author: andreabichsel
|
||||
ms.author: v-anbic
|
||||
ms.date: 03/26/2019
|
||||
ms.date: 04/02/2019
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Evaluate exploit protection
|
||||
@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Exploit protection | Security-Mitigations (Kernel Mode/User Mode) | 11 | Code in
|
||||
- [Enable exploit protection](enable-exploit-protection.md)
|
||||
- [Configure and audit exploit protection mitigations](customize-exploit-protection.md)
|
||||
- [Import, export, and deploy exploit protection configurations](import-export-exploit-protection-emet-xml.md)
|
||||
- [Troubleshoot exploit protection](troubleshoot-exploit-protection-mitigations.md)
|
||||
- [Enable network protection](enable-network-protection.md)
|
||||
- [Enable controlled folder access](enable-controlled-folders-exploit-guard.md)
|
||||
- [Enable attack surface reduction](enable-attack-surface-reduction.md)
|
||||
|
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ ms.pagetype: security
|
||||
ms.localizationpriority: medium
|
||||
author: andreabichsel
|
||||
ms.author: v-anbic
|
||||
ms.date: 04/01/2019
|
||||
ms.date: 04/02/2019
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Evaluate network protection
|
||||
@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ ms.date: 04/01/2019
|
||||
|
||||
- [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Windows Defender ATP)](https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?linkid=2069559)
|
||||
|
||||
Network protection helps prevent employees from using any application to access dangerous domains that may host phishing scams, exploits, and other malicious content on the Internet.
|
||||
[Network protection](network-protection-exploit-guard.md) helps prevent employees from using any application to access dangerous domains that may host phishing scams, exploits, and other malicious content on the Internet.
|
||||
|
||||
This topic helps you evaluate Network protection by enabling the feature and guiding you to a testing site. The site in this evaluation topic are not malicious, they are specially created websites that pretend to be malicious. The site will replicate the behavior that would happen if a user visted a malicious site or domain.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -55,11 +55,11 @@ The network connection will be allowed and a test message will be displayed.
|
||||
|
||||
To review apps that would have been blocked, open Event Viewer and filter for Event ID 1125 in the Microsoft-Windows-Windows-Defender/Operational log. The following table lists all network protection events.
|
||||
|
||||
Event ID | Provide/Source | Description
|
||||
-|-
|
||||
5007 | Windows Defender (Operational) | Event when settings are changed
|
||||
1125 | Windows Defender (Operational) | Event when a network connection is audited
|
||||
1126 | Windows Defender (Operational) | Event when a network connection is blocked
|
||||
| Event ID | Provide/Source | Description |
|
||||
|-|-|-|
|
||||
|5007 | Windows Defender (Operational) | Event when settings are changed |
|
||||
|1125 | Windows Defender (Operational) | Event when a network connection is audited |
|
||||
|1126 | Windows Defender (Operational) | Event when a network connection is blocked |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Related topics
|
||||
|
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ ms.pagetype: security
|
||||
ms.localizationpriority: medium
|
||||
author: andreabichsel
|
||||
ms.author: v-anbic
|
||||
ms.date: 03/26/2018
|
||||
ms.date: 04/02/2019
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Protect devices from exploits
|
||||
@ -154,5 +154,6 @@ Validate image dependency integrity | [!include[Check mark yes](images/svg/check
|
||||
- [Enable exploit protection](enable-exploit-protection.md)
|
||||
- [Configure and audit exploit protection mitigations](customize-exploit-protection.md)
|
||||
- [Import, export, and deploy exploit protection configurations](import-export-exploit-protection-emet-xml.md)
|
||||
- [Troubleshoot exploit protection](troubleshoot-exploit-protection-mitigations.md)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
|
||||
audience: ITPro
|
||||
ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
|
||||
ms.topic: conceptual
|
||||
ms.date: 04/19/2017
|
||||
ms.date: 04/02/2019
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Assign Security Group Filters to the GPO
|
||||
@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ ms.date: 04/19/2017
|
||||
|
||||
To make sure that your GPO is applied to the correct computers, use the Group Policy Management MMC snap-in to assign security group filters to the GPO.
|
||||
|
||||
>**Important:** This deployment guide uses the method of adding the Domain Computers group to the membership group for the main isolated domain after testing is complete and you are ready to go live in production. To make this method work, you must prevent any computer that is a member of either the boundary or encryption zone from applying the GPO for the main isolated domain. For example, on the GPOs for the main isolated domain, deny Read and Apply Group Policy permissions to the membership groups for the boundary and encryption zones.
|
||||
>[!IMPORTANT]
|
||||
>This deployment guide uses the method of adding the Domain Computers group to the membership group for the main isolated domain after testing is complete and you are ready to go live in production. To make this method work, you must prevent any computer that is a member of either the boundary or encryption zone from applying the GPO for the main isolated domain. For example, on the GPOs for the main isolated domain, deny Read and Apply Group Policy permissions to the membership groups for the boundary and encryption zones.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -47,7 +48,8 @@ Use the following procedure to add a group to the security filter on the GPO tha
|
||||
|
||||
3. In the details pane, under **Security Filtering**, click **Authenticated Users**, and then click **Remove**.
|
||||
|
||||
>**Note:** You must remove the default permission granted to all authenticated users and computers to restrict the GPO to only the groups you specify.
|
||||
>[!NOTE]
|
||||
>You must remove the default permission granted to all authenticated users and computers to restrict the GPO to only the groups you specify. If the GPO contains User settings, and the **Authenticated Users** group is removed, and new security filtering is added using a security group that only contains user accounts, the GPO can fail to apply. Details and various workarounds are mentioned in this [Microsoft blog](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/Core-Infrastructure-and-Security/Who-broke-my-user-GPOs/ba-p/258781).
|
||||
|
||||
4. Click **Add**.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ To learn more about Autopilot self-deploying mode and to see step-by-step instru
|
||||
|
||||
### SetupDiag
|
||||
|
||||
[SetupDiag](/windows/deployment/upgrade/setupdiag.md) version 1.4 is released. SetupDiag is a standalone diagnostic tool that can be used to troubleshoot issues when a Windows 10 upgrade is unsuccessful.
|
||||
[SetupDiag](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/deployment/upgrade/setupdiag) version 1.4 is released. SetupDiag is a standalone diagnostic tool that can be used to troubleshoot issues when a Windows 10 upgrade is unsuccessful.
|
||||
|
||||
## Security
|
||||
|
||||
@ -202,6 +202,9 @@ Do you have shared devices deployed in your work place? **Fast sign-in** enables
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
>[!NOTE]
|
||||
>This is a preview feature and therefore not meant or recommended for production purposes.
|
||||
|
||||
## Web sign-in to Windows 10
|
||||
|
||||
Until now, Windows logon only supported the use of identities federated to ADFS or other providers that support the WS-Fed protocol. We are introducing “web sign-in,” a new way of signing into your Windows PC. Web Sign-in enables Windows logon support for non-ADFS federated providers (e.g.SAML).
|
||||
@ -214,6 +217,9 @@ Until now, Windows logon only supported the use of identities federated to ADFS
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
>[!NOTE]
|
||||
>This is a preview feature and therefore not meant or recommended for production purposes.
|
||||
|
||||
## Your Phone app
|
||||
|
||||
Android phone users, you can finally stop emailing yourself photos. With Your Phone you get instant access to your Android’s most recent photos on your PC. Drag and drop a photo from your phone onto your PC, then you can copy, edit, or ink on the photo. Try it out by opening the **Your Phone** app. You’ll receive a text with a link to download an app from Microsoft to your phone. Android 7.0+ devices with ethernet or Wi-Fi on unmetered networks are compatible with the **Your Phone** app. For PCs tied to the China region, **Your Phone** app services will be enabled in the future.
|
||||
|
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user