Merged PR 15069: 4/02 PM Publish

windows/security/information-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ manager: dansimp
 audience: ITPro
 ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
 ms.topic: conceptual
-ms.date: 02/28/2019
+ms.date: 04/02/2019
 ---
 
 # BitLocker Group Policy settings
@@ -1167,7 +1167,8 @@ This policy controls how BitLocker reacts to systems that are equipped with encr
 </tr>
 <tr class="even">
 <td align="left"><p><strong>When not configured</strong></p></td>
-<td align="left"><p>BitLocker uses hardware-based encryption with the encryption algorithm that is set for the drive. If hardware-based encryption is not available, BitLocker software-based encryption is used instead.</p></td>
+<td align="left"><p>BitLocker software-based encryption is used irrespective of hardware-based encryption ability. 
+</p></td>
 </tr>
 </tbody>
 </table>
@@ -1221,7 +1222,7 @@ This policy controls how BitLocker reacts when encrypted drives are used as oper
 </tr>
 <tr class="even">
 <td align="left"><p><strong>When not configured</strong></p></td>
-<td align="left"><p>BitLocker uses hardware-based encryption with the encryption algorithm that is set for the drive. If hardware-based encryption is not available, BitLocker software-based encryption is used instead.</p></td>
+<td align="left"><p>BitLocker software-based encryption is used irrespective of hardware-based encryption ability. </p></td>
 </tr>
 </tbody>
 </table>
@@ -1277,7 +1278,7 @@ This policy controls how BitLocker reacts to encrypted drives when they are used
 </tr>
 <tr class="even">
 <td align="left"><p><strong>When not configured</strong></p></td>
-<td align="left"><p>BitLocker uses hardware-based encryption with the encryption algorithm that is set for the drive. If hardware-based encryption is not available, BitLocker software-based encryption is used instead.</p></td>
+<td align="left"><p>BitLocker software-based encryption is used irrespective of hardware-based encryption ability. </p></td>
 </tr>
 </tbody>
 </table>

windows/security/information-protection/encrypted-hard-drive.md

@@ -7,28 +7,28 @@ ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
 ms.sitesec: library
 ms.pagetype: security
 author: brianlic-msft
-ms.date: 04/19/2017
-ms.topic: article
+ms.date: 04/02/2019
 ---
 
 # Encrypted Hard Drive
 
 **Applies to**
 - Windows 10
+- Windows Server 2019
 - Windows Server 2016
 
 Encrypted Hard Drive uses the rapid encryption that is provided by BitLocker Drive Encryption to enhance data security and management.
 
 By offloading the cryptographic operations to hardware, Encrypted Hard Drives increase BitLocker performance and reduce CPU usage and power consumption. Because Encrypted Hard Drives encrypt data quickly, enterprise devices can expand BitLocker deployment with minimal impact on productivity.
 
-Encrypted Hard Drives are a new class of hard drives that are self-encrypting at a hardware level and allow for full disk hardware encryption. In Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, and later you can install to these devices without additional modification.
+Encrypted Hard Drives are a new class of hard drives that are self-encrypting at a hardware level and allow for full disk hardware encryption. You can install Windows to Encrypted Hard Drives without additional modification beginning with Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012.
 
-Some of the benefits of Encrypted Hard Drives include:
+Encrypted Hard Drives provide:
 
 -   **Better performance**: Encryption hardware, integrated into the drive controller, allows the drive to operate at full data rate with no performance degradation.
 -   **Strong security based in hardware**: Encryption is always "on" and the keys for encryption never leave the hard drive. User authentication is performed by the drive before it will unlock, independently of the operating system
--   **Ease of use**: Encryption is transparent to the user because it is on by default. There is no user interaction needed to enable encryption. Encrypted Hard Drives are easily erased using on-board encryption key; there is no need to re-encrypt data on the drive.
--   **Lower cost of ownership**: There is no need for new infrastructure to manage encryption keys, since BitLocker leverages your Active Directory Domain Services infrastructure to store recovery information. Your device operates more efficiently because processor cycles do not need to be used for the encryption process.
+-   **Ease of use**: Encryption is transparent to the user, and the user doesn't need to enable it. Encrypted Hard Drives are easily erased using on-board encryption key; there is no need to re-encrypt data on the drive.
+-   **Lower cost of ownership**: There is no need for new infrastructure to manage encryption keys, since BitLocker leverages your existing infrastructure to store recovery information. Your device operates more efficiently because processor cycles do not need to be used for the encryption process.
 
 Encrypted Hard Drives are supported natively in the operating system through the following mechanisms:
 
@@ -38,20 +38,21 @@ Encrypted Hard Drives are supported natively in the operating system through the
 -   **API**: API support for applications to manage Encrypted Hard Drives independently of BitLocker Drive Encryption (BDE)
 -   **BitLocker support**: Integration with the BitLocker Control Panel provides a seamless BitLocker end user experience.
 
->**Warning:**  Self-Encrypting Hard Drives and Encrypted Hard Drives for Windows are not the same type of device. Encrypted Hard Drives for Windows require compliance for specific TCG protocols as well as IEEE 1667 compliance; Self-Encrypting Hard Drives do not have these requirements. It is important to confirm the device type is an Encrypted Hard Drive for Windows when planning for deployment.
+>[!WARNING]  
+>Self-Encrypting Hard Drives and Encrypted Hard Drives for Windows are not the same type of device. Encrypted Hard Drives for Windows require compliance for specific TCG protocols as well as IEEE 1667 compliance; Self-Encrypting Hard Drives do not have these requirements. It is important to confirm the device type is an Encrypted Hard Drive for Windows when planning for deployment.
  
 If you are a storage device vendor who is looking for more info on how to implement Encrypted Hard Drive, see the [Encrypted Hard Drive Device Guide](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/dn653989.aspx).
 
 ## System Requirements
 
-To use Encrypted Hard Drive, the following system requirements apply:
+To use Encrypted Hard Drives, the following system requirements apply:
 
-For Encrypted Hard Drives used as **data drives**:
+For an Encrypted Hard Drive used as a **data drive**:
 
 -   The drive must be in an uninitialized state.
 -   The drive must be in a security inactive state.
 
-For Encrypted Hard Drives used as **startup drives**:
+For an Encrypted Hard Drive used as a **startup drive**:
 
 -   The drive must be in an uninitialized state.
 -   The drive must be in a security inactive state.
@@ -59,7 +60,8 @@ For Encrypted Hard Drives used as **startup drives**:
 -   The computer must have the Compatibility Support Module (CSM) disabled in UEFI.
 -   The computer must always boot natively from UEFI.
 
->**Warning:**  All Encrypted Hard Drives must be attached to non-RAID controllers to function properly.
+>[!WARNING]  
+>All Encrypted Hard Drives must be attached to non-RAID controllers to function properly.
  
 ## Technical overview
 
@@ -74,7 +76,15 @@ Configuration of Encrypted Hard Drives as startup drives is done using the same
 -   **Deploy from server**: This deployment method involves PXE booting a client with Encrypted Hard Drives present. Configuration of Encrypted Hard Drives happens automatically in this environment when the Enhanced Storage component is added to the PXE boot image. During deployment, the [TCGSecurityActivationDisabled](https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/dn923247.aspx) setting in unattend.xml controls the encryption behavior of Encrypted Hard Drives.
 -   **Disk Duplication**: This deployment method involves use of a previously configured device and disk duplication tools to apply a Windows image to an Encrypted Hard Drive. Disks must be partitioned using at least Windows 8 or Windows Server 2012 for this configuration to work. Images made using disk duplicators will not work.
 
-### Encrypted Hard Drive Architecture
+## Configuring hardware-based encryption with Group Policy
+
+There are three related Group Policy settings that help you manage how BitLocker uses hardware-based envryption and which encryption algorithms to use. If these settings are not configured or disabled on systems that are equipped with encrypted drives, BitLocker uses software-based encryption: 
+
+- [Configure use of hardware-based encryption for fixed data drives](bitlocker/bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md#a-href-idbkmk-hdefxdaconfigure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-fixed-data-drives)  
+- [Configure use of hardware-based encryption for removable data drives](bitlocker/bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md#a-href-idbkmk-hderddaconfigure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-removable-data-drives)
+- [Configure use of hardware-based encryption for operating system drives](bitlocker/bitlocker-group-policy-settings.md#a-href-idbkmk-hdeosdaconfigure-use-of-hardware-based-encryption-for-operating-system-drives)
+
+## Encrypted Hard Drive Architecture
 
 Encrypted Hard Drives utilize two encryption keys on the device to control the locking and unlocking of data on the drive. These are the Data Encryption Key (DEK) and the Authentication Key (AK).
 

windows/security/threat-protection/TOC.md

@@ -343,6 +343,7 @@
 ##### Reporting
 ###### [Create and build Power BI reports using Windows Defender ATP data](windows-defender-atp/powerbi-reports-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
 ###### [Threat protection reports](windows-defender-atp/threat-protection-reports-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
+###### [Machine health and compliance reports](windows-defender-atp/machine-reports-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
 
 ##### Role-based access control
 ###### [Manage portal access using RBAC](windows-defender-atp/rbac-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)

windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/coinminer-malware.md

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
 audience: ITPro
 ms.collection: M365-security-compliance  
 ms.topic: article
+search.appverid: met150
 ---
 # Coin miners
 

windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/criteria.md

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
 audience: ITPro
 ms.collection: M365-security-compliance  
 ms.topic: article
+search.appverid: met150
 ---
 
 # How Microsoft identifies malware and potentially unwanted applications

windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/exploits-malware.md

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
 audience: ITPro
 ms.collection: M365-security-compliance  
 ms.topic: article
+search.appverid: met150
 ---
 # Exploits and exploit kits
 

windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/fileless-threats.md

@@ -12,11 +12,12 @@ manager: dansimp
 audience: ITPro
 ms.collection: M365-security-compliance  
 ms.topic: article
+search.appverid: met150
 ---
 
 # Fileless threats
 
-What exactly is a fileless threat? The term "fileless" suggests that a threat that does not come in a file, such as a backdoor that lives only in the memory of a machine. However, there's no generally accepted definition. The terms is used broadly; it's also used to describe malware families that do rely on files in order to operate. 
+What exactly is a fileless threat? The term "fileless" suggests that a threat that does not come in a file, such as a backdoor that lives only in the memory of a machine. However, there's no generally accepted definition. The terms is used broadly; it's also used to describe malware families that do rely on files in order to operate.
 
 Given that attacks involve [several stages](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/ATT&CK_Matrix) for functionalities like execution, persistence, information theft, lateral movement, communication with command-and-control, etc., some parts of the attack chain may be fileless, while others may involve the filesystem in some form or another.
 
@@ -25,13 +26,13 @@ To shed light on this loaded term, we grouped fileless threats into different ca
 ![Comprehensive diagram of fileless malware](images/fileless-malware.png)<br>
 *Figure 1. Comprehensive diagram of fileless malware*
 
-We can classify fileless threats by their entry point, which indicates how fileless malware can arrive on a machine: via an exploit; through compromised hardware; or via regular execution of applications and scripts. 
+We can classify fileless threats by their entry point, which indicates how fileless malware can arrive on a machine: via an exploit; through compromised hardware; or via regular execution of applications and scripts.
 
 Next, we can list the form of entry point: for example, exploits can be based on files or network data; PCI peripherals are a type of hardware vector; and scripts and executables are sub-categories of the execution vector.
 
 Finally, we can classify the host of the infection: for example, a Flash application that may contain an exploit; a simple executable; a malicious firmware from a hardware device; or an infected MBR, which could bootstrap the execution of a malware before the operating system even loads.
 
-This helps us divide and categorize the various kinds of fileless threats. Clearly, the categories are not all the same: some are more dangerous but also more difficult to implement, while others are more commonly used despite (or precisely because of) not being very advanced. 
+This helps us divide and categorize the various kinds of fileless threats. Clearly, the categories are not all the same: some are more dangerous but also more difficult to implement, while others are more commonly used despite (or precisely because of) not being very advanced.
 
 From this categorization, we can glean three big types of fileless threats based on how much fingerprint they may leave on infected machines.
 
@@ -39,7 +40,7 @@ From this categorization, we can glean three big types of fileless threats based
 
 A completely fileless malware can be considered one that never requires writing a file on the disk. How would such malware infect a machine in the first place? An example scenario could be a target machine receiving malicious network packets that exploit the EternalBlue vulnerability, leading to the installation of the DoublePulsar backdoor, which ends up residing only in the kernel memory. In this case, there is no file or any data written on a file.
 
-Another scenario could involve compromised devices, where malicious code could be hiding in device firmware (such as a BIOS), a USB peripheral (like the BadUSB attack), or even in the firmware of a network card. All these examples do not require a file on the disk in order to run and can theoretically live only in memory, surviving even reboots, disk reformats, and OS reinstalls. 
+Another scenario could involve compromised devices, where malicious code could be hiding in device firmware (such as a BIOS), a USB peripheral (like the BadUSB attack), or even in the firmware of a network card. All these examples do not require a file on the disk in order to run and can theoretically live only in memory, surviving even reboots, disk reformats, and OS reinstalls.
 
 Infections of this type can be extra difficult to detect and remediate. Antivirus products usually don’t have the capability to access firmware for inspection; even if they did, it would be extremely challenging to detect and remediate threats at this level. Because this type of fileless malware requires high levels of sophistication and often depend on particular hardware or software configuration, it’s not an attack vector that can be exploited easily and reliably. For this reason, while extremely dangerous, threats of this type tend to be very uncommon and not practical for most attacks.
 
@@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ Having described the broad categories, we can now dig into the details and provi
 
 **File-based** (Type III: executable, Flash, Java, documents): An initial file may exploit the operating system, the browser, the Java engine, the Flash engine, etc. in order to execute a shellcode and deliver a payload in memory. While the payload is fileless, the initial entry vector is a file.
 
-**Network-based** (Type I): A network communication that takes advantage of a vulnerability in the target machine can achieve code execution in the context of an application or the kernel. An example is WannaCry, which exploits a previously fixed vulnerability in the SMB protocol to deliver a backdoor within the kernel memory. 
+**Network-based** (Type I): A network communication that takes advantage of a vulnerability in the target machine can achieve code execution in the context of an application or the kernel. An example is WannaCry, which exploits a previously fixed vulnerability in the SMB protocol to deliver a backdoor within the kernel memory.
 
 ### Hardware
 
@@ -76,9 +77,9 @@ Having described the broad categories, we can now dig into the details and provi
 
 **CPU-based** (Type I): Modern CPUs are extremely complex and may include subsystems running firmware for management purposes. Such firmware may be vulnerable to hijacking and allow the execution of malicious code that would hence operate from within the CPU. In December 2017, two researchers reported a vulnerability that can allow attackers to execute code inside the [Management Engine (ME)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Management_Engine) present in any modern CPU from Intel. Meanwhile, the attacker group PLATINUM has been observed to have the capability to use Intel's [Active Management Technology (AMT)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Active_Management_Technology) to perform [invisible network communications](https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2017/06/07/platinum-continues-to-evolve-find-ways-to-maintain-invisibility/) bypassing the installed operating system. ME and AMT are essentially autonomous micro-computers that live inside the CPU and that operate at a very low level. Because these technologies’ purpose is to provide remote manageability, they have direct access to hardware, are independent of the operating system, and can run even if the computer is turned off. Besides being vulnerable at the firmware level, CPUs could be manufactured with backdoors inserted directly in the hardware circuitry. This attack has been [researched and proved possible](https://www.emsec.rub.de/media/crypto/veroeffentlichungen/2015/03/19/beckerStealthyExtended.pdf) in the past. Just recently it has been reported that certain models of x86 processors contain a secondary embedded RISC-like CPU core that can [effectively provide a backdoor](https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/08/10/via_c3_x86_processor_backdoor/) through which regular applications can gain privileged execution.
 
-**USB-based** (Type I): USB devices of all kinds can be reprogrammed with a malicious firmware capable of interacting with the operating system in nefarious ways. This is the case of the [BadUSB technique](https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/07/this-thumbdrive-hacks-computers-badusb-exploit-makes-devices-turn-evil/), demonstrated few years ago, which allows a reprogrammed USB stick to act as a keyboard that sends commands to machines via keystrokes, or as a network card that can redirect traffic at will. 
+**USB-based** (Type I): USB devices of all kinds can be reprogrammed with a malicious firmware capable of interacting with the operating system in nefarious ways. This is the case of the [BadUSB technique](https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/07/this-thumbdrive-hacks-computers-badusb-exploit-makes-devices-turn-evil/), demonstrated few years ago, which allows a reprogrammed USB stick to act as a keyboard that sends commands to machines via keystrokes, or as a network card that can redirect traffic at will.
 
-**BIOS-based** (Type I): A BIOS is a firmware running inside a chipset. It executes when a machine is powered on, initializes the hardware, and then transfers control to the boot sector. It’s a very important component that operates at a very low level and executes before the boot sector. It’s possible to reprogram the BIOS firmware with malicious code, as has happened in the past with the [Mebromi rootkit](https://www.webroot.com/blog/2011/09/13/mebromi-the-first-bios-rootkit-in-the-wild/). 
+**BIOS-based** (Type I): A BIOS is a firmware running inside a chipset. It executes when a machine is powered on, initializes the hardware, and then transfers control to the boot sector. It’s a very important component that operates at a very low level and executes before the boot sector. It’s possible to reprogram the BIOS firmware with malicious code, as has happened in the past with the [Mebromi rootkit](https://www.webroot.com/blog/2011/09/13/mebromi-the-first-bios-rootkit-in-the-wild/).
 
 **Hypervisor-based** (Type I): Modern CPUs provide hardware hypervisor support, allowing the operating system to create robust virtual machines. A virtual machine runs in a confined, simulated environment, and is in theory unaware of the emulation. A malware taking over a machine may implement a small hypervisor in order to hide itself outside of the realm of the running operating system. Malware of this kind has been theorized in the past, and eventually real hypervisor rootkits [have been observed](http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2017/Jun/29), although very few are known to date.
 

windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/macro-malware.md

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
 audience: ITPro
 ms.collection: M365-security-compliance  
 ms.topic: article
+search.appverid: met150
 ---
 # Macro malware
 

windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/malware-naming.md

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
 audience: ITPro
 ms.collection: M365-security-compliance  
 ms.topic: article
+search.appverid: met150
 ---
 # Malware names
 

windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/phishing.md

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
 audience: ITPro
 ms.collection: M365-security-compliance  
 ms.topic: article
+search.appverid: met150
 ---
 
 # Phishing

windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/prevent-malware-infection.md

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
 audience: ITPro
 ms.collection: M365-security-compliance  
 ms.topic: article
+search.appverid: met150
 ---
 # Prevent malware infection
 

windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/ransomware-malware.md

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
 audience: ITPro
 ms.collection: M365-security-compliance  
 ms.topic: article
+search.appverid: met150
 ---
 # Ransomware
 

windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/rootkits-malware.md

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
 audience: ITPro
 ms.collection: M365-security-compliance  
 ms.topic: article
+search.appverid: met150
 ---
 # Rootkits
 

windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/safety-scanner-download.md

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
 audience: ITPro
 ms.collection: M365-security-compliance  
 ms.topic: article
+search.appverid: met150
 ---
 # Microsoft Safety Scanner
 

windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/submission-guide.md

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
 audience: ITPro
 ms.collection: M365-security-compliance  
 ms.topic: article
+search.appverid: met150
 ---
 
 # Submit files for analysis

windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/supply-chain-malware.md

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
 audience: ITPro
 ms.collection: M365-security-compliance  
 ms.topic: article
+search.appverid: met150
 ---
 
 # Supply chain attacks

windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/support-scams.md

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
 audience: ITPro
 ms.collection: M365-security-compliance  
 ms.topic: article
+search.appverid: met150
 ---
 # Tech support scams
 

windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/top-scoring-industry-antivirus-tests.md

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
 audience: ITPro
 ms.collection: M365-security-compliance  
 ms.topic: article
+search.appverid: met150
 ---
 
 # Top scoring in industry tests
@@ -40,9 +41,13 @@ Windows Defender Antivirus is  part of the  [next generation](https://www.youtub
 
 The AV-TEST Product Review and Certification Report tests on three categories: protection, performance, and usability. The scores listed below are for the Protection category which has two scores: Real-World Testing and the AV-TEST reference set (known as "Prevalent Malware").
 
-- November - December 2018 AV-TEST Business User test: [Protection score 6.0/6.0](https://www.av-test.org/en/antivirus/business-windows-client/windows-10/december-2018/microsoft-windows-defender-antivirus-4.18-185074/) | [Analysis](https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RWusR9) <sup>**Latest**</sup>
+- January - February 2019 AV-TEST Business User test: [Protection score 6.0/6.0](https://www.av-test.org/en/antivirus/business-windows-client/windows-10/december-2018/microsoft-windows-defender-antivirus-4.18-185074/) <sup>**Latest**</sup>
 
-    Windows Defender Antivirus achieved an overall Protection score of 6.0/6.0, detecting 100% of 19,956 malware samples. This is the fourth consecutive cycle that Windows Defender Antivirus achieved a perfect score.
+    Windows Defender Antivirus achieved an overall Protection score of 6.0/6.0, with 19,956 malware samples used. This is the fifth consecutive cycle that Windows Defender Antivirus achieved a perfect score.
+
+- November - December 2018 AV-TEST Business User test: [Protection score 6.0/6.0](https://www.av-test.org/en/antivirus/business-windows-client/windows-10/december-2018/microsoft-windows-defender-antivirus-4.18-185074/) | [Analysis](https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RWusR9)
+
+    Windows Defender Antivirus achieved an overall Protection score of 6.0/6.0, detecting 100% of 19,956 malware samples.
 
 - September - October 2018 AV-TEST Business User test: [Protection score 6.0/6.0](https://www.av-test.org/en/antivirus/business-windows-client/windows-10/october-2018/microsoft-windows-defender-antivirus-4.18-184174/) | [Analysis](https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RWqOqD)
 

windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/trojans-malware.md

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
 audience: ITPro
 ms.collection: M365-security-compliance  
 ms.topic: article
+search.appverid: met150
 ---
 
 # Trojans

windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/understanding-malware.md

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
 audience: ITPro
 ms.collection: M365-security-compliance  
 ms.topic: conceptual
+search.appverid: met150
 ---
 # Understanding  malware & other threats
 

windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/unwanted-software.md

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
 audience: ITPro
 ms.collection: M365-security-compliance  
 ms.topic: article
+search.appverid: met150
 ---
 # Unwanted software
 

windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/worms-malware.md

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
 audience: ITPro
 ms.collection: M365-security-compliance  
 ms.topic: article
+search.appverid: met150
 ---
 
 # Worms

windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-atp/TOC.md

@@ -333,6 +333,7 @@
 #### Reporting
 ##### [Create and build Power BI reports using Windows Defender ATP data](powerbi-reports-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
 ##### [Threat protection reports](threat-protection-reports-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
+##### [Machine health and compliance reports](machine-reports-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)
 
 #### Role-based access control
 ##### [Manage portal access using RBAC](rbac-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md)

windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-atp/machine-reports-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+---
+title: Machine health and compliance report in Windows Defender ATP
+description: Track machine health state detections, antivirus status, OS platform, and Windows 10 versions using the machine health and compliance report
+keywords: health state, antivirus, os platform, windows 10 version, version, health, compliance, state
+search.product: eADQiWindows 10XVcnh
+search.appverid: met150
+ms.prod: w10
+ms.mktglfcycl: deploy
+ms.sitesec: library
+ms.pagetype: security
+ms.author: macapara
+author: mjcaparas
+ms.localizationpriority: medium
+manager: dansimp
+audience: ITPro
+ms.collection: M365-security-compliance 
+ms.topic: article
+---
+
+# Machine health and compliance report in Windows Defender ATP
+ 
+**Applies to:**
+- [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Windows Defender ATP)](https://wincom.blob.core.windows.net/documents/Windows10_Commercial_Comparison.pdf)
+ 
+[!include[Prerelease information](prerelease.md)]
+ 
+The machines status report provides high-level information about the devices in your organization. The report includes trending information showing the sensor health state, antivirus status, OS platforms, and Windows 10 versions.
+ 
+ 
+The dashboard is structured into two sections:
+ ![Image of the machine report](images/machine-reports.png)
+ 
+Section | Description 
+:---|:---
+1 | Machine trends
+2 | Machine summary (current day)
+ 
+ 
+ 
+By default, the machine trends displays machine information from the 30-day period ending in the latest full day. To gain better perspective on trends occurring in your organization, you can fine-tune the reporting period by adjusting the time period shown. To adjust the time period, select a time range from the drop-down options:
+ 
+- 30 days
+- 3 months
+- 6 months
+- Custom
+ 
+While the machines trends shows trending machine information, the machine summary shows machine information scoped to the current day.
+ 
+The machine trends section allows you to drill down to the machines list with the corresponding filter applied to it. For example, clicking on the Inactive bar in the Sensor health state card will bring you the machines list with results showing only machines whose sensor status is inactive. 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+## Machine attributes
+The report is made up of cards that display the following machine attributes:
+ 
+- **Health state**: shows information about the sensor state on devices, providing an aggregated view of devices that are active, experiencing impaired communications, inactive, or where no sensor data is seen.
+  
+- **Antivirus status for active Windows 10 machines**: shows the number of machines and status of Windows Defender Antivirus.
+    
+- **OS platforms**: shows the distribution of OS platforms that exists within your organization. 
+ 
+- **Windows 10 versions**: shows the distribution of Windows 10 machines and their versions in your organization.
+ 
+ 
+ 
+## Filter data
+ 
+Use the provided filters to include or exclude machines with certain attributes.
+
+You can select multiple filters to apply from the machine attributes. 
+ 
+>[!NOTE]
+>These filters apply to **all** the cards in the report.
+ 
+For example, to show data about Windows 10 machines with Active sensor health state:
+ 
+1. Under **Filters > Sensor health state > Active**.
+2. Then select **OS platforms > Windows 10**.
+3. Select **Apply**.
+
+

windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-atp/threat-protection-reports-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection.md

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ By default, the alert trends display alert information from the 30-day period en
 - 6 months
 - Custom
 
-While the alerts trends shows trending information alerts, the alert summary shows alert information scoped to the current day.
+While the alert trends shows trending alert information, the alert summary shows alert information scoped to the current day.
 
  The alert summary allows you to drill down to a particular alert queue with the corresponding filter applied to it. For example, clicking on the EDR bar in the Detection sources card will bring you the alerts queue with results showing only alerts generated from EDR detections. 
 

windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-atp/whats-new-in-windows-defender-atp.md

@@ -23,6 +23,13 @@ ms.topic: conceptual
 
 Here are the new features in the latest release of Windows Defender ATP as well as security features in Windows 10 and Windows Server.
 
+## March 2019
+### In preview
+The following capability are included in the February 2019 preview release. 
+
+- [Machine health and compliance report](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-atp/machine-reports-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection) <BR> The machine health and compliance report provides high-level information about the devices in your organization. 
+
+
 ## February 2019
 The following capabilities are generally available (GA).
 - [Incidents](https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-atp/incidents-queue) <BR> Incident is a new entity in Windows Defender ATP that brings together all relevant alerts and related entities to narrate the broader attack story, giving analysts better perspective on the purview of complex threats. 

windows/security/threat-protection/windows-firewall/assign-security-group-filters-to-the-gpo.md

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ manager: dansimp
 audience: ITPro
 ms.collection: M365-security-compliance
 ms.topic: conceptual
-ms.date: 04/19/2017
+ms.date: 04/02/2019
 ---
 
 # Assign Security Group Filters to the GPO
@@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ ms.date: 04/19/2017
 
 To make sure that your GPO is applied to the correct computers, use the Group Policy Management MMC snap-in to assign security group filters to the GPO.
 
->**Important:**  This deployment guide uses the method of adding the Domain Computers group to the membership group for the main isolated domain after testing is complete and you are ready to go live in production. To make this method work, you must prevent any computer that is a member of either the boundary or encryption zone from applying the GPO for the main isolated domain. For example, on the GPOs for the main isolated domain, deny Read and Apply Group Policy permissions to the membership groups for the boundary and encryption zones.
+>[!IMPORTANT]
+>This deployment guide uses the method of adding the Domain Computers group to the membership group for the main isolated domain after testing is complete and you are ready to go live in production. To make this method work, you must prevent any computer that is a member of either the boundary or encryption zone from applying the GPO for the main isolated domain. For example, on the GPOs for the main isolated domain, deny Read and Apply Group Policy permissions to the membership groups for the boundary and encryption zones.
 
  
 
@@ -47,7 +48,8 @@ Use the following procedure to add a group to the security filter on the GPO tha
 
 3.  In the details pane, under **Security Filtering**, click **Authenticated Users**, and then click **Remove**.
 
-    >**Note:**  You must remove the default permission granted to all authenticated users and computers to restrict the GPO to only the groups you specify.
+    >[!NOTE]
+    >You must remove the default permission granted to all authenticated users and computers to restrict the GPO to only the groups you specify. If the GPO contains User settings, and the **Authenticated Users** group is removed, and new security filtering is added using a security group that only contains user accounts, the GPO can fail to apply. Details and various workarounds are mentioned in this [Microsoft blog](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/Core-Infrastructure-and-Security/Who-broke-my-user-GPOs/ba-p/258781). 
 
 4.  Click **Add**.