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Fixed typo, made bold text into headings

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JanKeller1 2017-01-18 19:31:29 -08:00
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windows/keep-secure/bitlocker-countermeasures.md
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@ -23,9 +23,9 @@ The sections that follow provide more detailed information about the different t
### Protection before startup
Before Windows starts, you must rely on security features implemented as part of the device hardware, including TPM andSecure Boot. Fortunately, many modern computers feature TPM.
Before Windows starts, you must rely on security features implemented as part of the device hardware, including TPM and Secure Boot. Fortunately, many modern computers feature TPM.
**Trusted Platform Module**
#### Trusted Platform Module
Software alone isn’t sufficient to protect a system. After an attacker has compromised software, the software might be unable to detect the compromise. Therefore, a single successful software compromise results in an untrusted system that might never be detected. Hardware, however, is much more difficult to modify.
@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ A TPM is a microchip designed to provide basic security-related functions, prima
By binding the BitLocker encryption key with the TPM and properly configuring the device, it’s nearly impossible for an attacker to gain access to the BitLocker-encrypted data without obtaining an authorized user’s credentials. Therefore, computers with a TPM can provide a high level of protection against attacks that attempt to directly retrieve the BitLocker encryption key.
For more info about TPM, see [Trusted Platform Module](trusted-platform-module-overview.md).
**UEFI and Secure Boot**
#### UEFI and Secure Boot
No operating system can protect a device when the operating system is offline. For that reason, Microsoft worked closely with hardware vendors to require firmware-level protection against boot and rootkits that might compromise an encryption solution’s encryption keys.