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Merge pull request #4597 from mapalko/whfbtroubleshoot
Updating WHFB troubleshooting with information about 3rd party CAs
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@ -45,6 +45,48 @@ After the initial logon attempt, the user's Windows Hello for Business public ke
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To resolve this behavior, upgrade Windows Server 2016 and 2019 domain controllers to with the latest patches. For Windows Server 2016, this behavior is fixed in build 14393.4104 ([KB4593226](https://support.microsoft.com/help/4593226)) and later. For Windows Server 2019, this behavior is fixed in build 17763.1637 ([KB4592440](https://support.microsoft.com/help/4592440)).
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## Azure AD Joined Device Access to On-Premises Resources Using Key Trust and Third-Party Certificate Authority (CA)
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Applies to:
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- Azure AD joined key trust deployments
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- Third-party certificate authority (CA) issuing domain controller certificates
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Windows Hello for Business uses smart card based authentication for many operations. Smart card has special guidelines when using a third-party CA for certificate issuance, some of which apply to the domain controllers. Not all Windows Hello for Business deployment types require these configurations. Accessing on-premises resources from an Azure AD Joined device does require special configuration when using a third-party CA to issue domain controller certificates.
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For more information, read [Guidelines for enabling smart card logon with third-party certification authorities](
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https://support.microsoft.com/topic/a34a400a-51d5-f2a1-c8c0-7a6c9c49cb78).
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### Identifying On-premises Resource Access Issues with Third-Party CAs
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This issue can be identified using network traces or Kerberos logging from the client. In the network trace, the client will fail to place a TGS_REQ request when a user attempts to access a resource. On the client, this can be observed in the Kerberos operation event log under **Application and Services/Microsoft/Windows/Security-Kerberos/Operational**. These logs are default disabled. The failure event for this case will include the following information:
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Log Name: Microsoft-Windows-Kerberos/Operational
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Source: Microsoft-Windows-Security-Kerberos
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Event ID: 107
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GUID: {98e6cfcb-ee0a-41e0-a57b-622d4e1b30b1}
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Task Category: None
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Level: Error
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Keywords:
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User: SYSTEM
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Description:
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The Kerberos client received a KDC certificate that does not have a matched domain name.
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Expected Domain Name: ad.contoso.com
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Error Code: 0xC000006D
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### Resolving On-premises Resource Access Issue with Third-Party CAs
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To resolve this issue, domain controller certificates need to be updated so the certificate subject contains directory path of the server object (distinguished name).
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Example Subject: CN=DC1 OU=Domain Controller, DC=ad, DC=contoso, DC=com
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Alternatively, you can set the subject alternative name (SAN) of the domain controller certificate to contain the server object's fully qualified domain name and the NETBIOS name of the domain.
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Example Subject Alternative Name:
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dns=dc1.ad.contoso.com
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dns=ad.contoso.com
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dns=ad
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## Key Trust Authentication Broken for Windows Server 2019
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Applies to:
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